Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/9919
Author(s): | Moury, C. |
Date: | 2011 |
Title: | Italian coalitions and electoral promises: assessing the democratic performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II governments |
Volume: | 16 |
Number: | 1 |
Pages: | 35-50 |
ISSN: | 1353-2944 |
Keywords: | Coalition governance Electoral pledges Institutions Italian political parties |
Abstract: | Italian party coalitions (from both the centre-left and the centre-right) have enacted an average of 57% of the pledges included in their common manifestos. In relative terms, Italian political parties keep their electoral promises much less than parties governing in single-party government, but slightly outperform those that form post-electoral coalitions. Although this finding contradicts the widespread pessimism about Italy's performance, it also illustrates that there is no significant advantage to bipolarism and the existence of a common programme as opposed to situations where coalitions are formed after the elections. This might explain Italians' dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. |
Peerreviewed: | Sim |
Access type: | Embargoed Access |
Appears in Collections: | CIES-RI - Artigos em revistas científicas internacionais com arbitragem científica |
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publisher_version_Modern_Italy.pdf Restricted Access | 354,98 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open Request a copy |
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