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Author(s): Moury, C.
Date: 2011
Title: Italian coalitions and electoral promises: assessing the democratic performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II governments
Volume: 16
Number: 1
Pages: 35-50
ISSN: 1353-2944
Keywords: Coalition governance
Electoral pledges
Italian political parties
Abstract: Italian party coalitions (from both the centre-left and the centre-right) have enacted an average of 57% of the pledges included in their common manifestos. In relative terms, Italian political parties keep their electoral promises much less than parties governing in single-party government, but slightly outperform those that form post-electoral coalitions. Although this finding contradicts the widespread pessimism about Italy's performance, it also illustrates that there is no significant advantage to bipolarism and the existence of a common programme as opposed to situations where coalitions are formed after the elections. This might explain Italians' dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their country.
Peerreviewed: Sim
Access type: Embargoed Access
Appears in Collections:CIES-RI - Artigos em revistas científicas internacionais com arbitragem científica

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