Applications of game theory to natural resources management: the case of High Seas fisheries

Abstract

Property rights are in the center of fisheries management difficulties. The problem becomes more complex when fisheries are transboundary by nature. Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction gave the coastal states property rights and the potential of a sustainable management of fisheries resources. But, the High Seas remain with a statute where the principle of the “freedom of the seas” is in force. The imprecise definition of use rights in the areas of High Seas adjacent to the EEZs and the consequent difficulties in the management of the straddling stocks, made the origins of a lot of “fish wars”, in the 90s. The U. N. Agreement (1995) on Transboundary Stocks and Highly Migratory Species pretended to be a formula of cooperation among interested states. The purpose of this paper is to survey the important contribution of Game Theory to study this problem of fisheries management and to highlight the possible routes for further research.