Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/12204
Autoria: | Carmona, G. Carvalho, L. |
Data: | 2016 |
Título próprio: | Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring |
Volume: | 63 |
Paginação: | 131 - 138 |
ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
DOI (Digital Object Identifier): | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.005 |
Palavras-chave: | Repeated games Two-person zero-sum games |
Resumo: | We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games with private monitoring. We show that even when players have different and time-varying discount factors, each player’s payoff is equal to his stage-game minmax payoff in every sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that: (a) in every history on the equilibrium path, the pair formed by each player’s conjecture about his opponent’s action must be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, and (b) the distribution of action profiles in every period is a correlated equilibrium of the stage game. In the particular case of public strategies in public monitoring games, players must play a Nash equilibrium after any public history. |
Arbitragem científica: | yes |
Acesso: | Acesso Embargado |
Aparece nas coleções: | BRU-RI - Artigos em revistas científicas internacionais com arbitragem científica |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
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1_s2_0_S0304406816000136_main.pdf Restricted Access | Versão Editora | 409,17 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir Request a copy |
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