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Title: Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
Authors: Carmona, G.
Carvalho, L.
Keywords: Repeated games
Two-person zero-sum games
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: Elsevier
Abstract: We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games with private monitoring. We show that even when players have different and time-varying discount factors, each player’s payoff is equal to his stage-game minmax payoff in every sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that: (a) in every history on the equilibrium path, the pair formed by each player’s conjecture about his opponent’s action must be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, and (b) the distribution of action profiles in every period is a correlated equilibrium of the stage game. In the particular case of public strategies in public monitoring games, players must play a Nash equilibrium after any public history.
Peer reviewed: yes
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.005
ISSN: 0304-4068
Accession number: WOS:000373658600016
Appears in Collections:BRU-RI - Artigos em revistas científicas internacionais com arbitragem científica

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