Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/12204
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Campo DC | Valor | Idioma |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Carmona, G. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Carvalho, L. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-07T16:59:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2016-12-07T16:59:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0304-4068 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10071/12204 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games with private monitoring. We show that even when players have different and time-varying discount factors, each player’s payoff is equal to his stage-game minmax payoff in every sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that: (a) in every history on the equilibrium path, the pair formed by each player’s conjecture about his opponent’s action must be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, and (b) the distribution of action profiles in every period is a correlated equilibrium of the stage game. In the particular case of public strategies in public monitoring games, players must play a Nash equilibrium after any public history. | eng |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | - |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/5876/147442/PT | - |
dc.rights | embargoedAccess | por |
dc.subject | Repeated games | eng |
dc.subject | Two-person zero-sum games | eng |
dc.title | Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring | eng |
dc.type | article | - |
dc.pagination | 131 - 138 | - |
dc.publicationstatus | Publicado | por |
dc.peerreviewed | yes | - |
dc.journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics | - |
dc.distribution | Internacional | por |
dc.volume | 63 | - |
degois.publication.firstPage | 131 | - |
degois.publication.lastPage | 138 | - |
degois.publication.title | Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring | eng |
dc.date.updated | 2019-04-09T13:59:59Z | - |
dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.005 | - |
dc.subject.fos | Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Naturais::Matemáticas | por |
dc.subject.fos | Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão | por |
dc.subject.fos | Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Sociologia | por |
iscte.identifier.ciencia | https://ciencia.iscte-iul.pt/id/ci-pub-28420 | - |
iscte.alternateIdentifiers.wos | WOS:000373658600016 | - |
iscte.alternateIdentifiers.scopus | 2-s2.0-84959523837 | - |
Aparece nas coleções: | BRU-RI - Artigos em revistas científicas internacionais com arbitragem científica |
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1_s2_0_S0304406816000136_main.pdf Restricted Access | Versão Editora | 409,17 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir Request a copy |
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