Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/10480
Author(s): | Gomes, O. |
Date: | 2012 |
Title: | Discrete dynamics in evolutionary games |
Volume: | 2012 |
Pages: | ART416789 |
ISSN: | 1026-0226 |
Abstract: | This paper furnishes a guide for the study of 2-dimensional evolutionary games in discrete time. Evolutionarily stable strategies are identified and nonlinear outcomes are explored. Besides the baseline payoffs of the established strategic interaction, the following elements are also vital to determine the dynamic outcome of a game: the initial fitness of each agent and the rule of motion that describes how individuals switch between strategies. In addition to the dynamic rule commonly used in evolutionary games, the replicator dynamics, we propose another rule, which acknowledges the role of expectations and sophisticates the replicator mechanism. |
Peerreviewed: | Sim |
Access type: | Open Access |
Appears in Collections: | BRU-RI - Artigos em revistas científicas internacionais com arbitragem científica |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
publisher_version_416789.pdf | 3,71 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.