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http://hdl.handle.net/10071/7223
acessibilidade
Title: Campaign finance regulations and policy convergence: The role of interest groups and valence
Authors: Köppl-Turyna, M.
Keywords: Interest groups
Political campaigns
Issue Date: Mar-2014
Publisher: Elsevier
Abstract: Regulation of campaign finance of political parties and candidates is intended to decrease the political influence of special interest groups and enhance the public interest in electoral outcomes. I investigate empirically the consequences of campaign financing regulations and find that public funding leads parties' platforms to diverge whereas ceilings on individual contributions lead to platform convergence to the median voter outcome. I relate these consequences to differences in valence or intrinsic popularity of parties. I also show that platform divergence is associated with a ban on corporate donations and with requirements of public disclosure of parties' income statements.
Peer reviewed: Sim
URI: https://ciencia.iscte-iul.pt/public/pub/id/8705
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/7223
ISSN: 0176-2680
Publisher version: The definitive version is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.11.001
Appears in Collections:BRU-RI - Artigo em revista científica internacional com arbitragem científica

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