Skip navigation
User training | Reference and search service

Library catalog

Content aggregators
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: Relationship between top executive compensation and corporate governance: evidence from large Italian listed companies
Authors: Nannicini, A.
Ferraz, D. P.
Lopes, I. T.
Keywords: Executive compensation
Corporate governance
Remuneration committee
Family firms
Issue Date: 2018
Publisher: Springer/Palgrave Macmillan
Abstract: The modernization of corporate governance aims the alignment of the interests of managers with those of companies, promoting a new discipline of internal controls and risk analysis with an enforcement of shareholder rights of information. This research investigates the impact of corporate governance variables –ownership, board of directors and remuneration committee– on executive compensation. A balanced sample of 52 Italian listed companies has been adopted to test the hypotheses, covering 55.98% and 47.13% of market capitalization in 2011 and 2015 respectively and including 669 board members. Theoretical models evidence a certain stability of compensation schemes for Italian managers over time. Findings suggest that there is a statistically significant positive effect of familiar ownership on the amount of compensation. Along with nature of ownership, the number of directors in the remuneration committee appointed by minorities assume a determinant role. With statistical significance, it affects negatively the compensation level, but, contrarily to best practices, it affects negatively the adoption of forms of incentive compensation.
Peer reviewed: yes
DOI: 10.1057/s41310-018-0050-2
ISSN: 1741-3591
Accession number: WOS:000456413600001
Appears in Collections:BRU-RI - Artigos em revistas científicas internacionais com arbitragem científica

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
IJDG_Accepted Version.pdfPós-print347.01 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

FacebookTwitterDeliciousLinkedInDiggGoogle BookmarksMySpace
Formato BibTex MendeleyEndnote Currículo DeGóis 

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.