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http://hdl.handle.net/10071/10852
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Title: Perfect equilibria in replies in multiplayer bargaining
Authors: Carvalho, L.
Issue Date: 2013
Publisher: Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Abstract: Multiplayer bargaining is a game in which all possible divisions are equilibrium outcomes. This paper presents the classical subgame perfect equilibria strategies and analyse their weak robustness, namely the use of weakly dominated strategies. The paper then develops a re newed equilibrium concept, based on trembling hand perfection applied only on the replies, in order to overcome such weakness. Concluding that none of the classical equilibrium strategies survives the imposition of the extra robustness and, albeit using more complex strategies, the equilibrium outcomes don't change.
Description: WOS:000328970400001 (Nº de Acesso Web of Science)
Peer reviewed: Sim
URI: https://ciencia.iscte-iul.pt/public/pub/id/12550
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/10852
ISSN: 1110-757X
Publisher version: The definitive version is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/248968
Appears in Collections:CIS-RI - Artigos em revistas científicas internacionais com arbitragem científica

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