The homo neuroeconomicus: a window for the future

Abstract

This paper analyzes the validity (and also the framework) of the rationality postulate on the moments of decision-making by economic agents, as it is promoted by the economic and financial fields on investigation, especially on microeconomic and portfolio theories and models. The main features surrounding this postulate are addressed to the aims of this study and are criticized considering the developments achieved on the neuroscience investigation on human being decision-making process. There are considerable developments got in several areas, mainly for example in the area of the effects of dopamine on the preference ordering (and the subsequent relation with the reversal of preferences hypothesis), in the area of the proprieties of oxytocin on the decision and choice under social situations and context, and in the areas of the somatic marker hypothesis and of the value of emotions. The magnitude of the importance of memory processes (operative and long-term memory) in connection with somatic states in decision-making problems is also highlighted. These features are sensitized on what can constitute the basis for the construction and definition of an alternative profile of the economic agent, which analysis will be tested later in the investigation, dealing with problems of decision-making and choice in game theory environment (especially in dynamic or iterated games).