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    <dc:date>2026-04-29T01:02:12Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10071/37027">
    <title>Inside Chega's membership</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10071/37027</link>
    <description>Título próprio: Inside Chega's membership
Autoria: Carvalho, J.; Santana Pereira, J.; Marchi, R.
Editor: Carvalho, João
Resumo: This chapter examines the characteristics of Chega’s party members in the early 2020s through the analysis of a large N survey to help overcome the lack of overall knowledge on far-right activists. The internal composition of the PRRP shapes their internal development, as well as their electoral success at the polls. Drawing on past literature, this chapter will trace the distribution of Chega’s membership according to three main groups: the extremists, the opportunists, and the moderates. Secondly, this investigation seeks to explore the causal factors that influence the internal composition of Chega’s membership. The conclusions will suggest that Chega’s membership is mainly formed by moderates, followed by opportunists, whilst overt ideological extremism is confined to the fringes of the party’s membership. Male and younger party members are more likely to display an extremist profile than female and older members. Chega’s internal composition reflects its roots in deeply conservative circles and the lack of imposition of a cordon sanitaire by the mainstream parties, particularly the PSD</description>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10071/36982">
    <title>The Lebanese-Israeli maritime agreement: A conflict resolution model or a geopolitical stopgap?</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10071/36982</link>
    <description>Título próprio: The Lebanese-Israeli maritime agreement: A conflict resolution model or a geopolitical stopgap?
Autoria: Ismail, A.
Resumo: The 2022 US-mediated maritime delimitation agreement between Lebanon and Israel marked a significant technical achievement, resolving an 860 km² overlap in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and enabling future offshore gas exploration. This article examines the domestic political and economic factors in Lebanon and Israel that facilitated the settlement.  It assesses the roles of external actors, particularly the United States, the EU, and the UNIFIL, in shaping and supporting the agreement. Drawing on conflict resolution theory, including models of ripeness, interest-based negotiation, conflict management and transformation, the analysis reconstructs the negotiation process and examines the implementation obstacles. It argues that, although the agreement represents a successful technical compromise, persistent domestic gridlock in Lebanon, limited enforcement mechanisms, and investor hesitation have delayed drilling and reinforced Israel’s asymmetric benefits. The absence of multilateral frameworks or maritime security protocols further limits the agreement’s potential as a model for broader cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The article concludes that durable peace and stability will require accelerated Lebanese energy development, institutionalized EEZ coordination and formal maritime security arrangements.</description>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <title>The Euro Area sovereign debt crisis: 2010 to 2012 and beyond</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10071/36971</link>
    <description>Título próprio: The Euro Area sovereign debt crisis: 2010 to 2012 and beyond
Autoria: Leão, P. R.; Bhimjee, D. C. P.; Leão, E. R.
Resumo: This article carries out a detailed study of the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis since its inception in late 2009 until its most acute phase in the first semester of 2012. First the origin in Greece, Portugal, and Ireland is pinpointed, followed by a description of the contagion to Spain and Italy. The specific focus of the article is on the underlying macroeconomic imbalances and structural economic weaknesses that made these countries vulnerable. The paper highlights both the common and the country-specific features of the development of the crisis. Also, it examines the responses to the crisis implemented both by individual governments and at the European level by the European Central Bank and the European Commission/European Council. The Euro Area sovereign debt crisis constitutes a historic event of great relevance to fiscal policy and the associated public debt sustainability. The public finances of Greece and Portugal became vulnerable when their export dependent economies were hit by the global economic downturn of 2008–2009. In Ireland and Spain, the source of the public finance troubles were the construction and housing crashes which occurred in these two countries. Finally, in Italy the troubles originated in the initially high public debt burden, a pre-existing problem which worsened and became unsustainable in the context of the global economic downturn and already installed sovereign debt crisis.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10071/36962">
    <title>Angola</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10071/36962</link>
    <description>Título próprio: Angola
Autoria: Seabra, P.; Martins, V.
Editor: Kleynhans, Evert; Wyss, Marco
Resumo: After more than three decades of internal strife and extensive involvement from key international actors, Angola’s oversized military apparatus found itself without a core mission following the end of hostilities in 2002. Since then, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) have been used interchangeably as means of national reconciliation, internal repression, and external power projection. However, these roles have been adopted with varying degrees of priority and effectiveness. This chapter explores the ensuing adaptation of the FAA as dictated by a lingering wartime legacy, the aftermath of multiple disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes, and the atomization of authority for the protection of the state. The combined effect of these three elements helps to explain the set of capabilities made available, the functional overlapping of internal structures of the state, and the fleeting interest in meeting broader African security demands.</description>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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