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A success for whom? Reassessing the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (1992-1994)

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Master in International Studies

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October, 2024

SOCIOLOGIA
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Department of History

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Abstract

Mozambique's United Nations Operation (ONUMOZ) was a mission of peacekeeping that United Nations Security Council settled in December 1992 following the General Peace's signature (GPA) among the Mozambican government and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO, insurgent group. One of the mission's primary objectives were to ensure the ceasefire, demobilize combatants, assist in the reintegration of former fighters, and facilitate the conduct of free and fair elections. Over its two-year mandate, ONUMOZ successfully oversaw millions of refugees and internally displaced people returned, more than 76,000 troops from both sides were disarmed and demobilized, and democratic elections were held in 1994, which resulted in a peaceful transition of power. Despite challenges such as logistical difficulties, political tensions, and the vast scope of humanitarian needs, ONUMOZ is widely regarded as an effective peacekeeping mandate, significantly helping to the stabilization and rebuilding of Mozambique post-conflict. The whole mission's approach, which combined humanitarian, political, and military initiatives, serves as a notable model for future peacekeeping operations. Building upon a qualitative approach that combines a literature review with document analysis, this thesis sets out to reassess the UN’s peace operation in Mozambique between 1992 and 1994.

Keywords: United Nations, Peacekeeping, ONUMOZ, GPA.

Resumo

A Operação das Nações Unidas em Moçambique (ONUMOZ) representou uma missão de manutenção onde o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas estabeleceu a paz como um objetivo em dezembro de 1992, após subscrição do Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP) no meio das partes envolvidas. Os principais objetivos da missão de paz consistem em assegurar o cessar-fogo, desmobilizar os combatentes, ajudar na reintegração dos antigos combatentes e facilitar a realizar eleições livres e equitativas. Durante o seu mandato de dois anos, a ONUMOZ supervisionou com êxito o desarmamento e a desmobilização dum total de mais de 76.000 militares dos dois lados, o regresso de milhões de refugiados e pessoas deslocadas internamente e a organização de eleições democráticas em 1994, que resultaram numa transição pacífica do poder. Apesar de desafios como as dificuldades logísticas, as tensões políticas e o vasto leque de necessidades humanitárias, a ONUMOZ é amplamente considerada como uma missão de manutenção da paz bem-sucedida, contribuindo significativamente para a estabilização e reconstrução de Moçambique após o conflito. A abordagem abrangente da missão, que combinou esforços militares, políticos e humanitários, é vista como um exemplo de sucesso para futuras operações. Através de uma abordagem qualitativa que combina a revisão da literatura com análise documental, esta dissertação tem como objetivo reavaliar a missão de paz das Nações Unidas em Mozambique durante o período 1992-1994.

Palavras-chave: Nações Unidas, Peacekeeping, ONUMOZ, GPA.

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Glossary of acronyms

ADG- Aid for Democracy Group

AIM- The Agencies de Imprensa de Moçambique

CAC- Cease-fire and Cessation of Hostilities

CCF- the Ceasefire Commission

CCFADM - Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces

CORE- the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel

CSC- Commission for Monitoring and Supervision

CSO- Civil Society Organization

DPKO – Department for Peacekeeping Operation

FADM- The Mozambican Defence Force

FRELIMO – Liberation Front of Mozambique

GPA- General Peace Agreement

NGO – Non-governmental Organization

ONUMOZ - United Nations Operations in Mozambique

RENAMO - National Resistance Movement

RM- Radio Moçambique

SRSG- Special Representative of the Secretary-General

UN – United Nations

UNDP- United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO- The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNMOGIP - United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNOHAC- United Nations Office of Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination

UNSG- United Nations Secretary-General

UNTSO - United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

URSS- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Objectives

This dissertation aims to reassess Mozambique's challenging path to sustainable peace, particularly during the 1980s when it was viewed as an unlikely candidate for stability by international organizations. During that period, the country faced severe poverty, inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of essential elements for long-term peace, such as stable political institutions and civic culture. The focus of the research is on ONUMOZ, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, which ran from 1992–1994, investigating how Mozambique transitioned from civil war to peace.

This study evaluates the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping as a way to overcome conflicts and promote stability, highlighting the evolution of peacekeeping missions since their outset in 1948. It outlines the transition from first-generation to second-generation peacekeeping, which aimed to address more complex crises in the post-Cold War context. Ultimately, the research seeks to determine whether peacekeeping can foster sustainable peace and democratic conditions in post-conflict countries. Although Mozambique's case is presented as a success that could disclose similar initiatives, the research also acknowledges that peacekeeping does not always guarantee enduring democracy.

1.2 Research question

The research question that guides this dissertation is structured as follows:

- *Could the intervention of peacekeeping contribute for the maintenance of a long-lasting peace in post-conflict states?*

In order to address the main research question, a set of sub-research was formulated:

- *What was the role of The UN's involvement in maintaining peace in Mozambique and to what extent was the mission able to achieve its objective?*
- *How significant was the contribution of the international community in supporting Mozambique?*

- *In which ways does UN-led external peacebuilding demonstrate a higher likelihood of success compared to unilateral efforts by a powerful state acting without UN endorsement?*

1.3 Methodology

Regarding the methodology, a qualitative case study research method has been implemented to look into the features that helped maintain Mozambique's peace and stability. Since the qualitative approach could suffer from some weaknesses, text analysis will be implemented. Several research tools were employed to carry out the investigation and collect the data needed for this work. We started by conducting thorough research to increase my understanding of current knowledge. We did this by reading through the body of current literature as well as gathering secondary sources of information about peacebuilding in Mozambique from non-governmental and international organizations for development.

While text analysis provides valuable insights into the peacebuilding process in Mozambique, it is not without its limitations. One primary concern is the potential for subjectivity in interpreting texts, as different researchers may draw varied conclusions from the same material based on their perspectives and biases. This can affect the reliability of the findings. Furthermore, text analysis often focuses on official documents, which may not fully capture the nuances of local experiences, sentiments, and voices of communities directly affected by conflict. As a result, critical viewpoints or grassroots narratives might be overlooked, limiting the scope of the analysis. Additionally, the context in which these documents were produced—including political, social, and historical factors—may influence their content and should be taken into account. Last but not least, while text analysis can highlight patterns and themes, it may not provide a comprehensive comprehension of the dynamics involved, necessitating the integration of other methodologies, such as interviews or ethnographic studies, to support and enrich the analysis. With the goal to focus on comprehensive, extensive data collection through many sources in a given place and for a specific group (Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2002), local and external players in the Mozambique peacebuilding process, Ayokunu Adedokun (2019) will employ a single qualitative case study. When researching the routes to sustainable peacebuilding in Mozambique, a single case study method is very helpful

since it enables us to focus closely on the historical background, which is crucial for a thorough examination. A single case study technique, like the one used here, can be more beneficial than studies that seek "fleeting knowledge" from several settings, as Gerring (2007) notes.

The choice to use a single qualitative case study approach was also motivated by the recognition that, although the unusual Mozambican "post-conflict success" process is not well suited for statistical testing, it nevertheless presents a wealth of opportunities for qualitative analysis and theory development (George & Bennett, 2005). This study's limitation stems from the reality that, despite significant advancements made possible by the UN and the larger international community, obstacles still need to be overcome to create a more peaceful political system in Mozambique. Many social and economic issues still plague Mozambique, including poverty, unemployment, the boom in natural resources, growing political marginalization, reliance on foreign assistance, as well as restricted access to social and economic services and infrastructure. This is meant to show that the process of peacebuilding after a conflict is challenging, unequal, and unpredictable. Because of this, Mozambique's participants and their international counterparts had to think about giving inclusive institutions top priority and encouraging economic growth for Mozambique to remain a shining example of lasting peace after the civil war.

1.3.1 Document Analysis and Sources

The main methodologic resource implemented in this dissertation is document analysis. Owing to the large number of official papers that are available, we have to select which documents may be useful depending on the subjects they cover and the information they include that is most pertinent to the subject we are focusing on. It is an organized process for reviewing or assessing documents to extract meaning, comprehend, and create empirical knowledge that requires the analysis and interpretation of data (Corbin &Strauss, 2008). Document analysis, according to Bowen (2009), entails not only reading (a thorough inspection) and skimming (superficial examination) but also interpretation. The following keywords serve as our starting point: cooperation; United Nations; Peacekeeping; civil war; intervention; elections; and evaluation; By utilizing

these keywords, we are able to: (1) choose the papers that are most pertinent to our areas of interest; and (2) concentrate our attention on the portions of the documents that need analysis rather than concentrating on all the intricacies and facets of United Nations Peacekeeping and Mozambique connection.

In the second chapter, we started by examining documents related to the Peacekeeping process followed by a detailed analysis of the documents, continuing by reading them several times and making notes on the most important points so that we could comprehend the content as well as its context and ramifications. Finally, we go on to the documents' interpretation, for which a set of questions was created. The document of analysis is important to (1) understand the fundamentals of Peacekeeping; (2) the transition from the first to the second generation of peacekeeping; and (3) the main difficulties tackled by Peacekeeping. The focus is on the official document of the United Nations Charter (1945) which helps us to comprehend the transition of Peacekeeping. This chapter will also be supported by 'The Brahimi Report', the reports from the Secretary-General that provide a complete overview of the structure of Peacekeeping. Along with official documents, we also have some academic works like Allard Duursma (2023), a recent work that will help us to understand the main challenges faced by Peacekeeping. Darya Pushkina (2006) analyses some important criteria for evaluating the efficacy of UN peacekeeping operations. The Protocol VI, section I, points 5 and 6, and Protocol VI, section II and Protocol IV, section VI (i), points 2 and 3) will support the fourth chapter, followed by different reports carried out by the UN Secretary-General on the UN operation in Mozambique (1994).

When it comes to the fourth chapter will be supported by the General Peace Agreement (1992), with a particular emphasis on the issues and obstacles that arise during the execution of the cease-fire, demobilization, and elections. We will use some reports such as the ONUMOZ, United Nations, New York, December 3, 1992, Report 5/24892. The fifth chapter will be endorsed by the United Nations Development Programme (1995) to figure out the steps taken to strengthen the development of Mozambique.

Upon selecting the papers to be used, we prepared a set of questions to aid in our analysis: (1) What is the primary goal of the document? (2) What topics are discussed in? (3) What was the environment like when the document was created? (4) How does the document

affect things? (5) How does this document connect to earlier ones? Does it support or refute prior knowledge? Does it add to or change the goals from before? (6) What steps are suggested to be taken?

Apart from official documents, we also use secondary sources, which are scientific publications that supplement the data obtained from the official documents. The rationale for our selection of the articles to utilize varies across the chapters because the topics they cover are quite distinct from each other. To determine what concrete steps have been taken, we focus on the topics of resolution, cooperation, and assistance. Regarding the third chapter the reference from Newitt, Malyn. A History of Mozambique (1995) is indispensable. Isaacman, A., & Issacman, B. (1983) is an academic document that will help us to understand the roots of the Mozambican conflict; it will also be supported by the following article by Bekoe, D. (2008). The fourth chapter will be supported by the article from Alden, C. (1995) who gives a clear review of conflict resolution in Mozambique, along with the academic literature by Chachiua, Martinho, and Malan, Mark (1998) with a glimpse into the Mozambican peace process revisited. The last chapter is going to be supported by secondary sources like Hanlon (2005) and Jallov (2005) who will focus on the major international contributors in supporting Mozambique after the conflict. Manning (2002) is an important contributor to understand the post - conflict demobilization.

1.4 Structure of the argument

This dissertation is structured into five chapters. The initial chapter regards goals and objectives along with the research question and the methodology implemented throughout the dissertation. The following chapter will be focused on the United Nations Peacekeeping. We will start by highlighting the most significant evolutionary steps by analysing its structure and history transformation through The Brahimi Report, published in 2000, which validated all earlier measures meant to increase the system's efficacy. The third chapter is dedicated to Mozambique's history which is marked by repeated external interventions, a weak state, and civic society's evolution. The agreement and the various roles that will be played by the various participants throughout implementation are briefly summarized in this section.

The fourth chapter is dedicated to the Peace Agreement by analysing the clauses of the mandate, the post-war effects and a brief evaluation of the peace talks. In the fifth chapter, we focus our attention on the post-conflict situation in Mozambique and the function that the international contributors performed in assisting. Intervention's limits in post-conflict processes are highlighted in the conclusion. It starts by assessing the peace process's seeming effectiveness in Mozambique as well as the effects it has had on the country's political landscape. After reviewing the features and effects of the peace process sector, it will be evaluated the conceptual model for understanding intervention in peace processes. The peace process industry, to use Mozambique as an example, needs to be more conscious of its intrinsic political character to comprehend, assess, and prepare that inevitably influence political space in a manner that supports and strengthens peace.

Chapter 2. The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation

This chapter is organized into four thematic sections followed by a conclusion. We start by highlighting three key principles of UN peacekeeping—non-use of force, impartiality, and consent, which also considers the significance of these shifts and how their implementation has evolved in peacekeeping missions. It is possible to understand how this enormous organization arranges and frames the mandates of its missions by taking a closer look at its internal workings. International Organizations have become more important than states in a world that is changing (Bratt, 1997) daily and where conflicts transcend national bounds to become ‘international’. By contrast, international issues call for international answers. Today, the United Nations' primary duty is to address this challenge. As stated in the UN Charter, the organization was established to ‘save future generations from the scourge of war.’ (UN, 1945. United Nations Charter: Preamble. CA's San Francisco)

The UN Peacekeeping missions, which have served as the organization's operational arm for the past few decades, will therefore be examined. Thus, the three primary tasks that comprise the UN's missions are peace-making: preventing conflicts and promoting reconciliation (pre-conflict intervention phase); maintaining peace (conflict phase and temporary solutions); and constructing peace (post-conflict phase and long-term solutions) are all aspects of peacekeeping (Duursma, 2023).

In order to create stronger foundations for peace, the main responsibilities of both short-term and long-term conflict prevention are to address and avoid, respectively, structural and direct violence, which are the primary causes of disputes. Conversely, pacification and reconciliation efforts target continuing disputes by employing diplomatic and mediation techniques to attempt and halt them early (Diehl, 1993).

More recently, the word "peacebuilding" has come to refer to UN initiatives that work to restore peace and provide resources to strengthen these foundations. Symbolic instances of peacebuilding include bolstering the rule of law, promoting conflict resolution,

increasing adherence to respecting human rights and providing assistance in a technological manner to strengthen democracy.

In the third paragrapher, we traced back the most significant evolutionary steps of The United Nations Peacekeeping by analysing its structure and history, such as the change from first-generation to second-generation peacekeeping shortly following the conclusion of the Cold War or the Brahimi Report of 2000, which institutionalized all preceding attempts to boost the system's performance.

The last part summarizes the main issues facing UN peacekeeping forces going forward and poses several research topics. Indeed, we believe that this forum post will assist clarify the most important issues facing UN peacekeeping personnel and open the door for more peacekeeping research.

2.1 The Roots of International Peacekeeping

In order to help nations devastated by internal or external conflict and create the circumstances for lasting peace, peacekeeping missions currently rank among the most effective methods available. UN peace operators observe and analyse the dynamics arising from post-conflict conditions from both headquarters and the field, and they support all parties in putting their signed peace agreements into effect (Woodhouse, T., & Duffey, T. 2000).

During this procedure, the UN Security Council is formally granted by the UN Charter the authority and duty to carry out collective actions meant to preserve peace. The international community requests authorization from the Security Council for peace operations for this purpose. Using forces under UN operational command, the UN plans and directs the majority of these missions (Diehl, 1993).

In complementary cases, the Council grants authorization to other Regional or Global organizations, such as the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), NATO, or just the coalition of volunteer countries, to perform a variety of peacekeeping or maintenance tasks when a UN direct involvement is deemed neither appropriate nor excessive. An armed conflict could arise from several factors, including Growing dissatisfaction or disadvantaged people being mistreated and exploited, competition for few resources

escalating public animosity and anxiety, and insufficient political frameworks that cannot guarantee democratic and appropriate power shifting (Hultman, 2023).
These factors all contribute to the escalation of interstate or intrastate violence, whose borders are sometimes hazy. The violence is further exacerbated by the abundance of weapons, regardless of calibre, that are readily available everywhere. This horrible fire, which frequently occurs on a massive scale, causes amazing human pain. Additionally, it threatens global peace and security and ruins the social and economic well-being of whole populations. To promote the idea that passivity could be preferable to intervention, consider how many conflicts in today's world seem remote to people who do not 'stand in the immediate line of fire' (United Nations, 2015).

However, countries everywhere need to constantly weigh the dangers of deciding against the consequences of doing nothing. When the international community fails in its attempts to resolve disputes amicably, smaller disputes may grow into larger ones that have the potential to destabilize neighbouring nations and even entire regions. Few wars can be classified as 'local' throughout the last 30 years, particularly in the present day because of the rapid pace of globalization. These wars are increasingly often the source of a variety of topics, including terrorism, refugee migration, illegal trade in drugs, weapons, and people, as well as environmental harm. Many times, the ripple impact is felt at a great distance from the conflict's epicentre.

The UN system is one of the main assets for addressing these problems because it was developed over 60 years of field experience. The relationships among the 191 Member States are directly related to its legitimacy and universality.

Ever since the initial UN deployment, peacekeeping operations have continued to change. They have increased the efficacy and legitimacy of the UN system by learning from both their successes and failures and adjusting to the shifts that have been thrown at them over time by hostile international contexts.

During the Cold War, the conventional peacekeeping system was initially created as a means of reducing hostilities and assisting in the settlement of disputes between States.

Military men from a variety of nations under UN command, who stood in between the disputing sides, conducted operations with little or no weaponry. It was not intended for peacekeepers to use force to wage war.

Usually, the UN used them after the cease-fire was agreed upon by all parties to the war and had come into effect. When compared to today's duties, the UN forces' obligations were extremely basic: they were to observe events on the ground and provide unbiased reports on the parties' adherence to the cease-fire, troop departure, and respect for the peace agreement (Ruggeri et al., 2020).

The international situation descended into complete disarray during the conclusion of the Cold War. To address demands from all across the world, the Department for Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) was founded in 1992.

New rules of engagement were now required to keep UN peacekeeping operations under control for the safety of both rescued people and UN operators. Better peace operations planning, and deployment were required as a result of this internal transformation. In summary, evolving global circumstances necessitated that the UN strengthen its initiative to safeguard civilians and promote better observance of human rights (United Nations, 2014).

2.1.1. The Three Principles of Peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping missions continue to be distinguished by three fundamental concepts like an effective way of preserving international security and peace. These three principles are interrelated with each other and are the following ones: Consent of the parties; Impartiality; non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate (United Nations, 2018).

2.1.1.1. Consent of the parties

The commitment of UN peacekeeping forces is approved by the principal parties to the conflict. This entails the parties' participation in a political procedure. The UN has the operational and political flexibility to fulfil its mandate because they agree to take part in a peacekeeping deployment. Without this kind of agreement, a peacekeeping mission runs the risk of becoming entangled in the fighting and taking enforcement actions instead of its primary duty of maintaining the peace. There is no guarantee that the main parties will consent to the local stationing of a United Nations peacekeeping force, especially if they are divided internally or do not have effective command and control mechanisms.

2.1.1.2. Impartiality

Maintaining the cooperation and consent of the main actors requires impartiality. Although they should not perform their duties neutrally, UN personnel should contact parties in disputes unbiasedly. A peacekeeping operation should not promote acts by the parties that contradict the agreements made during the peace process or the international norms and values that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds, just as a competent referee is impartial but will punish violations. Failure to do so might jeopardize the legitimacy and credibility of the peacekeeping effort as one or more parties may decide not to support its continued existence.

2.1.1.3. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

The purpose of UN peacekeeping operations is not to impose laws. Nonetheless, they are permitted to use tactical force with the Security Council's consent if they are carrying out their mission and protecting themselves. The Security Council has granted UN peacekeeping missions "robust" mandates in certain tense situations, allowing them to "use all necessary means" to protect civilians in immediate danger, thwart violent attempts to sabotage the political process, and/or support national authorities in upholding law and order.

For effective peacekeeping, the tactical use of force must be authorized by the Security Council and approved by the host country and/or the principal combatants. Without the

Security Council's approval, Article 2(4) of the Charter typically forbids Member States from employing international or strategic peace enforcement. However, the agreement of the main parties is not required for the enforcement of peace. Force should only be used as a last resort in a UN peacekeeping mission. Maintaining approval for the mission and its mandate requires that it be accurately assessed and proportionate to the notion of the least amount of force required to achieve the desired effect.

2.2 How are they funded? Who provides “peacekeepers”?

The UN's annual budget for sustaining and promoting world peace is less than the annual budget of New York City's police enforcement. This ratio serves as the basis for UN peacekeeping missions. The UN peacekeeping budget that has been authorized in 2015–2016 is around $8.27 billion, representing less than 0.5 per cent of the $1,747 billion in worldwide military spending that was predicted in 2013. In terms of evaluated contributions to UN peacekeeping missions from 2013 to 2015, the top 10 suppliers are as follows: first, the United States (28.38%), followed by Japan (10.83%), France (7.22%), and Germany (7.14%); China (6.64%), Italy (4.45%), the Russian Federation (3.15%), the United Kingdom (6.68%), Canada (2.98%), and Spain (2.97%) round out the list.

Along with their assessed share of peacekeeping expenditures, many nations have also freely contributed additional resources in the shape of cash, transportation, supplies, and troops to provide non-reimbursable assistance for UN peacekeeping operations. Member States owing roughly $1.6 billion in peacekeeping obligations, both present and past due, as of June 30, 2015, even though paying assessments for peacekeeping is required.

According to the UN Charter, in order to support UN peacekeeping efforts worldwide, all The Security Council must be supplied by member states with their military troops, police, and logistical support. This will enable the Security Council to better execute the missions. Since 1948, about 130 countries have sent troops, law enforcement officers, and civilian specialists to assist in peace efforts. Since the UN's founding mission, it has employed over a million military personnel, law enforcement personnel, and civilians.

Based on August 2015 figures, the UN had deployed over 90000 troops, plus an additional 1800 and 13500 expert police corps. (Bratt, 1997)

Despite a growing number of donors, the troop supply for UN peacekeeping missions is dominated by developing nations. As of August 2015, the top ten contributors included Ethiopia (8,309), India (7,794), and Bangladesh (9,432), while the U.S. ranked 74th with only 82 peacekeepers (United Nations, 2015).

Troops are voluntary contributions, as the UN lacks its own armed forces. As of July 1, 2019, the UN reimburses contributing nations at $1,428 per soldier per month, with additional reimbursements for police and civilian staff (United Nations, 2000).

2.3 History of Peacekeeping

The Security Council's decision of sending UN military observers to the Middle East signaled the start of UN peacekeeping (Pushkina, 2006). The mission's objective of monitoring the implementation of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors led to the creation of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Since then, the UN has sent more than 70 peacekeeping missions.

UN peacekeeping missions have involved tens of thousands of UN police, during the years, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and other citizens from more than 120 countries. Nearly 120 countries have lost over 3,000 UN soldiers who were operating under the UN's auspices. When UN Peacekeeping was founded, Cold War competition frequently kept the Security Council in a frozen state. When UN Peacekeeping was founded, Cold War competition frequently kept the Security Council in a state of inaction. In order to provide vital assistance for diplomatic attempts to settle disputes amicably, peacekeeping's primary objectives were to maintain ceasefires and stabilize local conditions (Collier et al., 2004).

The primary duties of the unarmed military observers and lightly armed individuals involved in these missions were observing, reporting, and building confidence. UNMOGIP, the United Nations Military Group in Pakistan and India and UN Truce Supervision (UNTSO) were the UN's first two peacekeeping missions. These two missions, which are still active today, were approved with forces in the low hundreds and represented the observation and monitoring kind of operation. UN Peacekeeping's

strategic environment saw a major change following the conclusion of the Cold War. The UN expanded and modified its field activities moving away from "traditional" missions that frequently required military forces to perform observational tasks to more ‘multidimensional’ operations. In order to facilitate the building of lasting peace and guarantee the execution of comprehensive peace accords, these varied missions were founded. Human rights monitoring, security sector reform, and the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants were among the expanding duties that UN troops had to handle (Duane Bratt,1997).

Despite the continued importance of military operations, the responsibilities of economists, lawyers, and humanitarian workers grew. The Security Council approved 20 additional missions between 1989 and 1994 aftermath the Cold War, boosting troop numbers from 11,000 to 75,000 in nations like Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia. However, by the mid-1990s, insufficient mandates and funding challenged the UN's effectiveness, leading the Security Council to limit new operations and engage in a self-reflection process to improve future peacekeeping efforts.

2.3.1. The Brahimi Report (2000)

In response to the United Nations' inability to stop the genocide in Rwanda and to safeguard the citizens of Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The panel's objectives were to assess the shortcomings, vulnerabilities, and inadequacies of the current peace operations system and offer specific, practical suggestions for its enhancement.
The Panel stressed the necessity of a plan as well as assistance while taking preventative measures and promoting peace:

> *“(…) the Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) present to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations*

to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies"[1].

The Panel included enforcement of regulation upholding the rule of law, protecting human rights, and bolstering the demobilization process; it also contained some projects to improve people's lives. The Panel stressed the components and goal of the mission, along with the necessity for UN forces to be self-sufficient. Contingents are allowed to continue the project by making modifications to the engagement requirements. One of the panel's main areas of attention was how realistic the missions' requirements were. Historically, the UN has been unable to respond to crises because it has 'planned best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have exhibited worst-case behaviour'. The UN and its MS responded to the Report with a series of actions meant to strengthen peacekeeping and peacebuilding endeavours. Permission to expand the staff at DPKO, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, headquarters has been given in order to assist field operations.

Since the Brahimi report's recommendations and government financing for them were implemented in 2000, peacekeeping operations' planning, execution, and overall quality have significantly improved. In places where a stable peace and a specific situation seemed far off, long-term initiatives that were first undertaken are now yielding rewards. The current revisions specifically target 'integrated missions', which revolve around the three most important pillars of peacebuilding: humanitarian assistance, human rights, and the rule of law. Following recent complaints of sexual abuse and exploitation, DPKO has implemented significant adjustments regarding accountability, sanctions, and conduct. (Woodhouse, T., & Duffey, T. 2000)

2.4 Challenges for UN Peacekeeping

Political issues are the main obstacles that must be overcome. The government, in particular, has the ability to contest a mission's major political function in the absence of a signed plan. The following examples are the most challenging aspects that Peacekeeping

[1] UN report n. A/55/305-S/2000/809, "Brahimi Report" - Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000), Pag 6, 21 August 2000.

is facing nowadays. Armed conflicts are continuously evolving in nature with the use of terrorist methods to engage armed organizations with shifting profiles, such as attacking peacekeepers associated with criminal organizations.

Since peacekeepers are targets, they risk their lives every day and frequently go where no one else is willing to go. Political solutions are getting harder to find. These days, it might be difficult to settle many long-running conflicts. A number of missions are despatched in the face of shaky political agreements, weakened consent, and protracted peace processes with ambiguous withdrawal plans once UNOCI and UNMIL close. The challenges of peacekeeping remain performance concerns and the ongoing requirement for well-trained, well-equipped troops and women's participation in peacekeeping. (Allard Duursma, Corinne Bar et al., 2023)

Last but not least, a demand for increased commitment from all parties involved in support of the mission, from political to operational concerns. In order to improve peacekeeping, it is possible to identify some key priorities. Initially, it is essential to broaden the range of significant donors to peacekeeping while intensifying the involvement of present contributions. Peacekeeping can only maintain its global nature and efficiently utilize the entire range of capacities available to both partners and Member States in this manner. The skills offered and those needed are becoming less and less compatible in the absence of this complete engagement. Since the UN can only intervene if member states supply police and soldiers, in case the most capable people decide not to engage, it will not be able to realize our full potential. Working with regional actors is the second (Daniel Druckman and Paul Stern, 1997).

2.5 Conclusion

In contrast to early expectations, the realms of peacebuilding and peacekeeping have become increasingly crowded, with multiple parallel missions and regional actors actively participating in crisis management. Building stronger alliances with institutions such as the AU, NATO, CSTO, and EU is crucial. Additionally, it is vital to upgrade the training and equipment of peacekeepers to effectively confront new threats in today’s complex landscape. One of the most daunting challenges is the protection of civilians. Peacekeepers are often deployed over large areas and may lack the resources needed to

reach those who depend on them for safety. During ongoing violence, ensuring comprehensive protection for all is unfeasible without achieving sustainable peace. Missions must conduct thorough risk assessments, prioritize resource allocation, and implement diverse strategies to protect the most vulnerable individuals.

This chapter demonstrates that evaluating success only on the basis of mission fulfilment and focusing on a limited number of potential success variables may ultimately be ineffective for drawing broad conclusions regarding UN peacekeeping. We can challenge a number of widely held beliefs by evaluating success and failure using a wider range of criteria than have historically been used, taking into account several possible factors that might affect success rates, as well as looking at missions from the viewpoints of both international involvement and the circumstances faced by peacekeeping forces.

Chapter 3. Historical background: placing Mozambique's conflict in context

3.1 Introduction

To understand the reasons underpinning the UN peace operation in Mozambique and its success, it is crucial to comprehend the circumstances around it. Most of Southern Africa's history, including that of Mozambique, has been marked by frequent and recurring cycles of conflict, conquest, dominance, and uprising. After 16 years of fighting, a peace deal between RENAMO and the Mozambican government was reached in October 1992. In this chapter, we are going to explore the social, political, and historical factors contributing to war as well as the reasons behind its recurrence. These circumstances have to do with how the state and civil society are formed concerning how political space develops. In this chapter we are going to explore: (1) the early history and the arrival of the Portuguese; (2) the establishment of Portuguese domination; (3) the battle for liberation, (1962–1974); (4) Frelimo's years of independence, 1975–1990s; and (5) RENAMO, 1977–1992, an outbreak to conflict. The academic works from Isaacman & Isaacman (1983) and Gates (2002) will be helpful since they will propose two theories explaining the conflict's ideological roots.

3.2 The Portuguese Colonization

The history of Mozambique is marked by a continuous narrative of foreign invasion and conquest, as reflected in missionary accounts and Portuguese legends. Vasco da Gama's arrival off Mozambique Island in 1498 marked the beginning of significant external influence, though indigenous kingdoms had already risen and fallen due to various groups vying for power (Henriksen, 1978).

The Portuguese initially sought Mozambique for its coastal mineral wealth, using it as a base for trade with Indian merchants. Nevertheless, the interior's potential for gold

led them to adopt a more aggressive expansionist policy, gradually establishing control along the Zambezi River. This ambition faced competition from other European powers,

particularly the Dutch and English, who sought to disrupt Portuguese dominance, attempting to seize Mozambique on several occasions. Despite these challenges, the Portuguese struggled to secure their coastal holdings. Between the 18th and the early 19th centuries, the slave trade became dominant, with approximately 15,000 individuals abducted annually during the 1820s and 1830s.

This trade spurred the development of fortified towns and complex political structures, resulting in significant social upheaval. Following the Berlin Congress of 1884–1885, Portugal intensified efforts to assert control over Mozambique, recognizing the value of its African population as a resource. Cash crops like cotton were prioritized, leading to neglect of food production and subsequent famine. Under Antonio Salazar's dictatorship in the 1930s, colonial policies tightened, restricting foreign investment and encouraging rural Portuguese migration to Mozambique. Despite claims of a multiracial policy, stark distinctions persisted among native and non-native individuals, limiting the rights of the former. In 1962, exiled leaders united to form the Mozambique Front of Liberation (FRELIMO), with Eduardo Mondlane at the helm, calling for independence. With support from the Soviet Union and China, FRELIMO launched a guerilla campaign against Portuguese rule in 1964. Tragically, Mondlane was assassinated in 1969, leaving leadership to Uria Simango and others, amidst ongoing internal divisions. FRELIMO ultimately achieved victory in 1975, with Samora Machel becoming the first president. However, entrenched social and geographic divides, worsened by the fight for independence, created the stage for a civil war fuelled by rising anti-socialist sentiments (Newitt, 1995).

Gates (2002) assesses Mozambique's national raw growth as being 'slightly below the average of other countries at war'. He demonstrates that, even though the large-scale Portuguese migration had a significant and immediate impact on the economy in the beginning, the economic policies put forth by the new government cannot be linked in this way to the start of the upsurge because they only had an impact following the Third Frelimo Party Congress in February 1977, which occurred after RENAMO's establishment.

3.3 The roots of the civil war

Following Portugal's independence in 1977, Mozambique entered a brutal 16-year Civil War that severely impacted its political and economic systems within just two years. Isaacman & Isaacman (1983) propose two theories explaining the conflict's ideological roots. The first suggests external forces intended to bring down the Frelimo-led administration, similar to tactics used in apartheid-era South Africa. The second theory posits that the West sought to promote an alternative development model to prevent independent African nations from aligning with the Soviet Union. Roesch (1992) counters that the war's primary causes were internal, emphasizing the North-South disparity and exclusion from governance. Amidst this turmoil, RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) emerged, formed in Rhodesia with aid from its Central Intelligence Organization.

Led by André Matsangaissa, a former FRELIMO military official, RENAMO opposed the ruling Samora Machel and targeted areas of significant discontent. It engaged in violent actions, including prison breaks for the wrongfully imprisoned, and South Africa became RENAMO's main financial backer as it secured military bases in northern and central Mozambique. Meanwhile, support from the US and European right-wingers helped RENAMO articulate a platform promoting multiparty democracy and capitalist development. The civil war mirrored the Cold War dynamics, with anti-communist RENAMO backed by South Africa and the US, while the communist FRELIMO received support from the USSR and China. Guerrilla warfare and atrocities defined this conflict, leading to immense civilian suffering, including widespread famine and violence. After Matsangaissa's death in 1979, Afonso Dhlakama took over, increasing child soldier recruitment. Despite its larger forces, FRELIMO could not achieve dominance until Joaquim Alberto Chissano succeeded Machel in 1986, dedicating efforts to peace negotiations.

3.4 Final years of the war

1989 was an important year not only globally but also in Mozambique. Thirty years of war were waged by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November, but dangers in Europe ceased in other areas of the world. After a couple of months, the South African president, F.W. de Klerk, liberated Nelson Mandela, sending a strong statement that his country would

no longer put up with the apartheid regime. As Gates (2002) states, the RENAMO leader understood that there was more to the message than just that South Africa would no longer be providing military support.

However, following the election of Joaquim Alberto Chissano as the second president in 1986, FRELIMO began to fortify its ties to international organizations and Western powers. Initial negotiations to secure a loan to boost the economy had started in 1987 thanks to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Three years later, in 1990, a new constitution was ratified that permitted the multi-party system and political opposition. The Catholic Church, which had strong roots in Mozambique, was in charge of the 1980 efforts to reconcile the two sides to a collaborative relationship. The Church was supposed to mediate the disputes between the parties because RENAMO and FRELIMO were unwilling to seek out any kind of reconciliation or point of contact from which to establish a new administration. As was previously observed, in 1990, the apartheid government in South Africa was beginning to show signs of weakness while negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO were aimed to continue. The conflicting parties decided to start talks that would be assisted by the Catholic organization Community of Saint Egidio, which has been active in Mozambique for a long time.

3.5 War's impact

The war severely damaged Mozambique's economic and social infrastructure, affecting industries, educational institutions, trading and health posts, as well as roads, bridges, railroads, and energy facilities. Most of the social and economic progress made in the late 1970s was reversed. By 1989, UNICEF reported that Mozambique's GDP was just half of its pre-war level. In this brutal conflict, the most vulnerable Mozambicans—particularly those in remote rural areas—suffered immensely. Landmines continued to pose a threat even after the war, hindering access to essential water sources and agricultural land, leading to ongoing casualties and disabilities. Nearly half the population was forced out of the workforce. Between 1.5 and 2 million people fled their homes, while an additional 2 million were internally displaced into camps or resettlement programs (Synge, 1997).

Another 2 million were displaced but not included in official counts, with over a million others living in dire conditions, often farming secretly during the day and hiding at night to survive. Thousands were coerced or forced into labour, carrying supplies or providing services for armed forces, and around 100,000 were conscripted into the military (Green and Mavie, 1994). Since health and education were key factors in Frelimo's support, schools and medical facilities became specific targets; many students, teachers, and healthcare workers were abducted or killed, and there were instances of hospital patients being massacred, which deterred people from seeking or providing social services. Approximately 58% of Mozambique's 5,886 elementary schools were either destroyed or forced to close due to the conflict, and about 3,000 rural stores were either shut down or destroyed. Many homes, food stores, and livestock were lost or stolen, along with household goods like clothing. From 1982 to 1992, it is estimated that Mozambique lost between $15 billion and $20 billion in productivity. By 1994, up to two-thirds of the population was believed to be living in absolute poverty, with over 2 million people still dependent on food aid. Mozambique, possibly the poorest nation in the world, was also the most indebted and reliant on external assistance (Gaspar, 1995).

3.6 From War to Peace

Alden (1995) highlights that significant peace negotiations in Mozambique took place during the 1980s and 1990s, known as the Nkomati talks in 1984, the Nairobi process in 1989, and the Rome agreement in 1992. Analysts identify five key factors that contributed to Mozambique's shift from conflict to peace. First, Lloyd (1995) notes that a military stalemate compelled both sides to seek negotiations, as neither could claim victory. The financial resources necessary for warfare dwindled, particularly as the Cold War's influence declined (Walter, 1999). Additionally, a devastating drought strained both parties' abilities to sustain their armies (Alden & Simpson, 1993). Vines (1998) points out that despite some positive developments, rumors of dubious financial incentives for the rebel group Renamo pushed them toward the negotiating table. Bekoe (2008) emphasizes the importance of international partners in promoting peace, with significant support from countries like the US, UK, and Italy. Italy played a pivotal role in both hosting and funding the peace talks (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005). After the 1992 agreement, ONUMOZ, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique facilitated disarmament as well as democratic

elections. Nonetheless, underlying issues remain unresolved, and regional divisions threaten to reignite tensions, posing risks of renewed conflict and ethnic strife.

3.7 Conclusion

We can conclude this chapter by stating that in terms of the number of people killed, injured, displaced, and traumatized, the Mozambican conflict had and still has a significant human, social, and economic impact. Many turned to alternative power structures, such as RENAMO, foreign entities, and traditional leaders, which further weakened state authority. The war intensified pre-existing challenges related to the decentralization and fragmentation of power, a trend evident since the era of ancient monarchies, Portuguese domination, and the FRELIMO Marxist era. The government's attempts to establish a centrally planned economy failed, sparking rebellion and eroding state foundations. Additionally, liberalization policies imposed by international financial institutions hampered the government's ability to address political conflicts, leaving state administrators demoralized under mounting social and international pressures. Although Mozambique's state apparatus was weakened, it did not fully collapse but it made necessary the need to reach a peace agreement that would have guaranteed stability, which will be discussed in the next section.

Chapter 4. The Peace Agreement process

This chapter examines the Mozambican peace process that took place in October 1992 (Rome Peace Accords), known as the General Peace Agreement (GPA), with an emphasis on the issues and difficulties encountered during the process, the cease-fire, demobilization, and election implementation are examined. This chapter will be supported by the official document of the General Peace Agreement (1992) by analysing some of the protocols that led to a stable political condition in Mozambique.

4.1 The General Peace Agreement, October 1992

One of the most challenging peacekeeping tasks of the late 1980s was creating a framework for RENAMO and the Mozambican government's negotiations. From July 8 to 10, 1990, In Rome, the Convent of Sant' Egidio hosted the first-ever direct meeting between Mozambican government delegates and RENAMO attendees. After negotiations, all parties agreed to put aside their differences and concentrate on their shared goal of ending the conflict, which culminated on July 10, when a joint accord was adopted. On May 28, 1991, a peace negotiation agenda was finally reached, outlining six areas that needed consensus: the electoral system, military matters, assurances, political party legislation, a cease-fire, and a donors' conference. The Rome peace accords were signed on October 4, 1992 when the UN launched one of its largest-scale peacekeeping missions to date.

According to the General Peace Agreement, the UN was required to accomplish a wide variety of duties. Verifying cease-fire from the moment the GPA was supposed to take effect was the Organization's first and most important task (Protocol VI, section I, points 5 and 6, and Protocol VI, section II). Therefore, in addition to overseeing the withdrawal of foreign forces from Mozambican territory, which was anticipated to be completed within a month of the cease-fire's commencement, the United Nations was responsible for helping to implement, verify, and oversee the entire demobilization process (Protocol IV, section VI (i), points 2 and 3).

Numerous political, administrative, and logistical setbacks and difficulties seriously hindered the General Peace Agreement's execution. Although the cease-fire had mainly been maintained, several of the deadlines outlined in the Agreement 'proved to be

unrealistic', according to the report from the Secretary-General to the Security Council on April 2, 1993.

The terms of the General Peace Agreement, such as elections as well as the division, concentration, and demobilization of troops, were still pending. The Security Council expressed its concern on April 14th, 1993, when it adopted Resolution 818 (1993), and it asked RENAMO and the Government to conclude the exact timeline for these events.

Numerous challenges were overcome in the next weeks thanks to the United Nations' persistent efforts, and ONUMOZ had established its military infrastructure in each of the three operating zones by the beginning of May 1993. The Secretary-General reported on June 30, 1993, on some encouraging developments that had led to the peace process in Mozambique moving forward. These included international humanitarian initiatives, the establishment of the voluntary Trust Fund to support RENAMO, the Joint Commission's resumption of operations, and a significant increase in the number of internally displaced persons and refugees coming home (Alden. C, 1995).

Along with the effective completion of the troop withdrawals from Zimbabwe and Malawi that were mandated by the Government, the General Peace Agreement, and the UN signed a status-of-forces agreement that enabled ONUMOZ to accomplish its full range of tasks. The Secretary-General said that the country's stability would remain unclear unless the General Peace Agreement's principal provisions were carried out and that a current, practical schedule for the Agreement's implementation should be decided upon immediately. The Secretary-General notified the Security Council on September 10, 1993, that on September 3, the Mozambican government and RENAMO signed two important accords.

These agreements were the result of the initial gathering between RENAMO and the President of Mozambique following the General Peace Agreement's signature in October 1992. All territories that had been under RENAMO authority were to be integrated into the state administration as per conditions of the Government's and RENAMO's original agreement. The Secretary-General thought that the accord would foster national healing and stability in the nation. In addition, the parties agreed to ask the UN to supervise all police activities in the nation, both public and private, keep an eye on citizens' rights and liberties, and offer technical assistance to the Rome Agreement's Police Commission

(COMPOL). This second agreement dealt with the impartiality of the national police. The task of confirming that all police operations in the nation according to the General Peace Agreement, the proposed United Nations police presence would be responsible for. In the peace process, the Secretary-General announced a major breakthrough on October 20.

The Government and RENAMO had reached significant agreements regarding the formation of regional National Police Affairs Commission subcommittees to oversee Mozambican police operations; the composition of the National Elections Commission; the procedure and schedule for completing the Electoral Law; the demobilization and assembly of both Government and RENAMO troops; and the simultaneous disarmament of irregular, militia, and military forces. Through its Resolution 879 (1993), the Security Council determined on October 29, 1993, to prolong the mandate of ONUMOZ for a transitional period ending on November 5, 1993, while the Secretary-General's report, which was required under Resolution 863 (1993), was examined.

The Secretary-General's additional periodic report was sent in on November 1, 1993. On November 5, 1993, ONUMOZ's mandate was renewed for a further six months by the Security Council through Resolution 882 (1993), among other things. However, the mandate was subject to a review by the Council within ninety days, depending on the Secretary-General's further report.

4.2 The Cease-fire

The cessation of hostilities and cease-fire (CAC) in Mozambique, as defined in Protocol VI of the General Peace Agreement (GPA), established a brief, dynamic, and irreversible process intended for implementation across the entire territory. According to Protocol IV, paragraph VI (i) (2), the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) was established to oversee and ensure compliance with cease-fire regulations. Its responsibilities included developing plans for troop movements to minimize incidents, coordinating mine clearance operations, confirming the number of troops and military hardware, and addressing potential cease-fire violations.

The official start of the cease-fire, termed 'E-Day'[2], coincided with the ratification of the GPA by the Republic's Assembly, marking its integration into Mozambican law. On this day, UN officials were deployed to verify compliance. From E-Day onward, both parties were prohibited from any hostile actions, including attacks, military patrols, or reconnaissance operations. The role of the UN was likened to previous missions monitoring cease-fires and demobilization efforts. The GPA took effect on October 15, with the arrival of the Special Representative and twenty-one military observers. However, the deployment faced challenges due to RENAMO's absence from key areas, complicating the verification process. By February 1993, military observers began to arrive, and the CCF actively addressed cease-fire violations, although territorial disputes persisted, requiring ongoing oversight and conflict resolution efforts.

4.3 Demobilisation

The Secretary-General of the United Nations (UNSG) indicated that all parties involved in the peace process recognized the need to postpone Mozambique's elections until the General Peace Agreement's military clauses were fully executed. The UNSG stressed the importance of mobilizing troops effectively and developing plans for the management and destruction of weapons and ammunition. To ensure compliance, teams of United Nations military observers were designated for verification tasks. In November 1992, the Governor identified 20 and 29 assembly points, but access to several of these locations proved difficult, complicating their use for long-term occupancy and verification.

The selection of these sites was based more on their strategic value than their suitability for cantonment. Demobilization emerged as the ONUMOZ mission's most difficult expedition, with uncertainty regarding how many troops would have been demobilized. Both sides were reluctant to part with their best combat units until the final stages of the process. The Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) was essential in supervising landmine clearance, certifying the cease-fire, and establishing protocols for troop assembly. The Technical Unit (TU) assisted by organizing data, providing documents to demobilized soldiers, and distributing essential supplies. By late November 1994, around 78,078 soldiers had been demobilized, but delays in the process persisted due to ongoing tensions

[2] Mozambique — United Nations Operation in Mozambique — ONUMOZ," United Nations, accessed September 2, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumoz.htm.

and reluctance to cooperate, making it impossible to complete armament inspections before ONUMOZ's mandate expired.

4.4 Elections

The Commission for Supervision and Monitoring along with ONUMOZ's authority were put to the test when the General Peace Agreement's election components were implemented. The CNE developed a schedule that encompassed the full electoral process, with dates for registering to vote from June 1 to August 15, the election campaign from September 10 to October 24 as well as the October 27–28 simultaneous presidential and assembly elections. In the following months, the district and provincial election commissions were formed. The elections' conduct, planning, and organization was within the authority of the CNE and its executive secretariat. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) arranged for financial and material support from around the world and offered organizational, training, civic education, legal, social communication, and financial management support during the whole electoral process.

With the deployment of 1.600 civic education agents and 8.000 registrars around the nation, voter registration in Mozambique got underway on time on June 1, 1994. In two separate decisions, the National Assembly extended the registration period to ensure that no demographic—people living in rural regions, returning refugees, and demobilized troops, in particular—was left out of the voting process. During the presidential election, Joaquim Chissano obtained 53.30 percent of the vote, compared to 33.73 percent for Afonso Dhlakama, according to CNE Chairman Brazáo Mazula's declaration of the results on November 19. The elections were attended by 5,402,940 voters, 87.9% of the total population. The Special Representative formally ended the commissions' work on December 7th by presenting those findings to Mr. Joaquim Chissano, the President-elect. On December 8, 1994, the newly elected Assembly of the Republic took office. On December 9, 1994, the mandate of ONUMOZ ended with the election of the new President of Mozambique, and on December 13, 1994, the SRSG departed the country (UN and Mozambique, 1995:66).

4.5 Evaluation

It is crucial to consider the scope, level of intricacy, and challenge of the United Nations mission in Mozambique when evaluating its accomplishments and shortcomings. The challenges resulting from the nation's size, the severely damaged infrastructure, the economic disruption caused by war and drought, and the government's incapacity to manage the additional duties brought about by the complexities of the protocols outlined in the General Peace Agreement. Also, ONUMOZ (UN and Mozambique, 1995:3) was defined by the UNSG as '(a) complex operation involving peacekeeping, the demobilization of armed forces, the provision of humanitarian relief, electoral support, and the return of millions of refugees' (United Nations, 1992).

The emphasis on peacebuilding was among its most important components, which helped to ensure that the armistice would result in lasting peace. According to UNSG (UN and Mozambique, 1995:5), ONUMOZ's primary problems were the lengthy delay in the deployment of the peacekeeping forces, the dispute over territorial and administrative control over specific regions of the country during the conflict, and extra demands from different parties, especially RENAMO, which resulted in major delays in the demobilization of the armed forces and the numerous logistical obstacles that made it more challenging to closely coordinate the various aspects of the operation, which was exacerbated by the start 'of the vitally important program of mine clearance' (United Nations Report, 1992).

Despite its flaws, ONUMOZ was the first UN peacekeeping force to have a significant humanitarian component, as observed by Chachiua and Malan (1998:20). Although the Special Resident Group (SRSG) had the official lead from the beginning of the mission, he did not have the power to compel the several ONUMOZ components to work together. Rather than this, he had to deal with several parent UN organizations advancing their own objectives and communicating with their officials in Mozambique through separate channels that they controlled.

4.6 Cooperation

The transition in Mozambique established several key precedents for international financial support aimed at resolving conflicts. It became common for mediators to accept

side payments. In March 1992, Dhlakama made his first formal request for funding to assist Renamo in transitioning to a political party. Two months later, the UN created a trust fund to support this transition. Another trust fund was established in January 1994 to encourage all registered parties to participate in the elections (Manning, 2002:106). The influx of international funds bolstered Dhlakama's leadership within Renamo and later his political party. This financial support allowed Renamo to maintain the loyalty of select party leaders, compensate military commanders and officials no longer needed, and attract new activists and leaders. Initially, financial assistance was allocated directly to the party leadership, allowing them discretion over its use as part of the peace agreement. However, after the first elections, party financing was set to be partially managed by public representatives rather than the party hierarchy and would depend on the party's success in securing office.

4.6.1 Intervention of Internation donors

The primary objective during the conflict was to preserve life. However, the government struggled to develop a comprehensive plan for the relief and rehabilitation of the 7 million refugees and internally displaced individuals returning home due to its limited capacity. During this period, there were some efforts to foster local industry and developmental initiatives, particularly in areas less affected by the war. Unfortunately, these efforts often faltered once donor organizations withdrew. Organizations like the World Food Program, which primarily focuses on food aid, sought to shift their historically relief-oriented assistance towards more developmental support. Within months, they faced the challenge of a poorly organized administration that was unable to effectively manage, direct, or oversee the activities of external organizations (Graham, M. et al., 1986).

Moreover, low public sector wages forced many workers to take on additional jobs or, for those in high demand, to move to better-paying positions in the private or non-profit sectors. This led to a "brain drain" from the government, exacerbated by the UN's creation of lucrative job opportunities and consulting roles, especially in the early post-war period. Before 1990, civil society groups in Mozambique had never had the opportunity to establish themselves. Throughout the Portuguese era and into the Frelimo period, non-state actors faced persistent suppression from the government or rival elites through strict

political and legal measures. The 1990s marked a significant turning point for civil society in Mozambique, particularly with the adoption of the 1990 Constitution, which introduced various freedoms associated with the rise of liberal democracy. That same year, the Ministry of Cooperation selected 12 well-funded local NGOs to help create a network of NGOs; by 1993, 87 had been registered, and by 1996, that number had surpassed 100 (Gaspar, 1995).

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we addressed the following sub-research question: Was the United Nations in Mozambique's peace process successful, and to what extent was the mission able to achieve its objective? We can affirm that donors, as we analysed in this chapter, created the particular peace conditions that contributed to Mozambique's successful shift from conflict to peace in reaction to particular difficulties that emerged during the peace agreement's implementation, rather than planning them. Donors, either individually or as a whole, intervened to remind both parties of their commitments, give additional resources, and maintain good offices when issues developed during the agreement's execution.

According to Manning and Malbroughd (2010) donors with long-term experience in the nation were able to perceive what sorts of incentives, positive and negative, were most likely to be effective. Conditionality might be adjusted by taking the context into account. Additionally, donors have a great deal of experience cooperating in Mozambique during the civil war humanitarian crisis. Donors became more eager and able to work together as a result of the lack of complicating factors such as valuable natural resources or significant political and economic interests, along with their mutual understanding of the social, political and economic contexts.

Chapter 5. Post-Conflict Mozambique's Reconstruction

In this chapter, we are going to examine how conditional aid and international donors contributed to a durable peace in Mozambique, by claiming that UNOMOZ, assisted by these donors' accommodating reactions, was not the only organization that successfully served as a third-party guarantee of the Mozambican peace deal. The chapter will be supported by several academic sources like Hanlon (2005) and Jallov (2005), Mazula, B. (1996) Turner, M. (1995) and Weinstein, J., & Francisco, L. (2005). Each section offers several lessons learned and specific suggestions for enhancing future foreign support for Mozambique by outlining the advantages and disadvantages of several sectors. The chapter's primary goal is to evaluate whether domestic organizations in post-conflict nations have benefited from foreign support in the fields of media, human rights, and elections. In conclusion, this part endeavors to offer insights gained and specific suggestions for enhancing the efficacy of global support.

5.1 Post-Conflict Assistance

An extensive program of demobilization and reintegration was established, a substantial program of technical and election-related aid was provided, and trust funds were set up to support political parties, and the ONUMOZ operation itself expended almost $1 million daily. (Alden, 2001)

Many bilateral, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral began to concentrate more on structural development projects and programs after the first, successful multiparty elections, rather than providing emergency and rehabilitation aid to Mozambique. These initiatives primarily addressed the capacity-building of public employees and the restoration of infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, trains, bridges, highways, airports, and power and communication lines. Early in 1995, the world community formed the 'Aid for Democracy Group' (ADG), which was the logical continuation of the Elections Working Group, which had been set up in 1993 to monitor the planning and execution of the initial multi-party elections.[3]

[3] The ADG's mission was expanded in 1996, and it became the Donor Policy Group. When the name again changed to Development Partners Group in 1997, it was official that this shift had occurred. The organization shifted its attention from specific projects or politics to more broad development challenges.

The ADG served as a channel for information sharing and a platform for organizing the planning and execution of outside initiatives to strengthen democracy.[4] Monthly meetings were held at the World Bank headquarters. UNDP initially attempted to create an integrated democratic aid program, but funders quickly realized this was not a practical solution after sector analysis and needs evaluations of the regions were combined with a distinctly vertical administrative heritage. UNDP was given the task of developing distinct initiatives that would be co-financed by different sources. Most of the time, negotiations with the government and participating funders were sluggish and challenging when it came to content, implementation strategies, and funding. Although the programs to help the media, police, and parliament were approved in 1996, they didn't start up until 1997. (Mazula, B. 1996)

Donors in Mozambique followed the global trend toward budget support, driven by worries about governance and the desire to improve the effectiveness of aid. Project documentation, progress reports, and assessments serve as the primary sources for this overview of democratic support provided to Mozambique during the previous 10 years.

5.2 Electoral Assistance

In Mozambique's history, a new chapter began with the elections of many political parties in 1994, marking the greatest achievement of the General Peace Agreement (GPA). Despite facing numerous challenges—including a tense political environment, limited economic resources, high illiteracy rates, and inadequate communication infrastructure—the elections were viewed as successful. Municipal elections took place in June 1998, albeit delayed due to lengthy legislative discussions. The government adopted a progressive decentralization strategy, allowing elections in 33 municipalities, which represented about 25% of the electorate. (Hanlon, 2005)

Between 1994 and 2004, the international community contributed around US$150 million to support five multi-party elections, with initial assistance beginning in December 1992. Seventeen donors provided US$59.1 million to assist with the electoral process and voter registration efforts, covering various needs such as training, civic education, and logistical

[4] UNDP, Strengthening Mozambique's Democratic Process.

support. The external assistance aimed to enhance the ability of civil society and political parties organizations, while also reinforced electoral authorities.

While international support played a crucial role in achieving short-term electoral goals, long-term democratization remained elusive. Technical aid improved the electoral administration, as evidenced by the elections in 2003 and 2004. However, the fragmented nature of this support and the government's efforts to limit donor involvement in critical areas highlighted ongoing challenges in the electoral process.

5.2.1 External Assistance's Effect

The objectives of external assistance for elections in Mozambique can be divided into two main categories: capacity-building and equipping electoral authorities and capacity-building for political parties. Electoral administration has been provided with the necessary infrastructure, tools, systems, and procedures to facilitate voter registration and election organization. However, the impact of this assistance remains fragile, as the capacity often relies on individuals rather than on institutional frameworks. Technicians frequently utilize systems and tools in a repetitive manner, lacking innovation (Hanlon, 2005).

A significant concern is that the electoral administration has underperformed in two critical technical areas: the computerization of the voter registry and the tabulation of results, where technical assistance has been systematically rejected. Despite more than $10 million invested by donors in the computerization efforts, the results have been disappointingly low in quality, largely due to the absence of a realistic strategy, technical rigor, and quality control (Tollenaere, 2000).

In other technical areas, such as logistics, training, and civic education, international assistance has made a notable difference. However, this support has primarily focused on task completion, often overlooking essential aspects like the legitimacy and credibility of elections and electoral authorities.

5.2.2 Electoral Assistance's Advantages and Drawbacks

The primary strength of external electoral assistance lies in its substantial volume and the activist spirit driving its organization. Given the importance of elections, donor coordination in this area has been notably effective, with donors consistently making extra efforts to ensure timely funding. Another key advantage of international assistance has been its ability to encourage emerging national organizations to engage more actively in electoral processes, particularly in monitoring roles. However, the weakest aspect of international electoral support is its ad hoc and fragmented nature. Assistance to electoral administration has typically been concentrated in the months leading up to an election, often hampered by delays in the approval of the electoral legal framework and the ensuing deadlines. The 1999 UNDP electoral support program aimed to incorporate a post-electoral component to review and strengthen systems outside the high-pressure period, but this effort was too light, as both the Electoral Administration Technical Secretariat (STAE) and donors showed little interest in sustained engagement (Tollenaere, 2000).

Moreover, international electoral support rarely extended beyond a technical level, particularly after 1994. Authorities ensured that donors did not engage in crucial areas such as vote tabulation, the National Election Commission (CNE), and parliamentary legislation. Both donors and the government found convenience in the perception that elections could not occur without donor assistance, leading to an inflated belief in the importance of that support for democratic consolidation. While electoral support has built technical capacity, it has had limited impact on actual democratization.

5.3 Human Rights Assistance

UNDP has spearheaded two significant initiatives aimed at promoting democratic consolidation in Mozambique after the 1994 elections. The first is a multi-donor police support program, primarily funded by Spain and the Netherlands, which began in 1997. This initiative, rooted in a technical evaluation, aims to restructure and enhance the capabilities of the police force, with support from the Spanish Guardia Civil. Over the past decade, this program has led to better awareness of prison conditions and a heightened focus on human rights abuses, largely thanks to the efforts of civil society

organizations (CSOs), the media, and lawmakers, with the Human Rights League playing a key role (Alden, 2001).

Additionally, the Public Prosecutor's Office has set up an anti-corruption unit, changes made to the Penal Code, and an updated Family Law ensuring gender equality has been enacted. Some improvements to prison facilities have also commenced, along with the removal of legal professionals involved in corrupt practices. However, international human rights assistance has often lacked a coordinated strategy, which may impede the structural enforcement of the rule of law. While there is some collaboration among donors, efforts tend to be fragmented, and there remains a significant gap between available resources and the issues faced. Beneficiary organizations frequently express a desire for funding yet show reluctance to pursue necessary reforms, complicating progress in this sector.

5.3.1 Evaluation of the Effects of Human Rights Support

Over the past ten years, several significant improvements have been noted in different areas. Firstly, there is now heightened awareness and better reporting on the harsh conditions within prisons. Civil society organizations, especially the Human Rights League, along with the media and parliamentarians, have condemned clear violations of basic human rights, leading to some initial enhancements in prison facilities. Secondly, members of the legal system engaged in corrupt practices have faced expulsion or imprisonment, signalling a shift towards accountability. The establishment of an anti-corruption unit within the Public Prosecutor’s Office also reflects this progress, as do recent updates to the legal framework aimed at strengthening oversight.

However, despite some coordination among donors and the existence of multi-donor initiatives, efforts remain fragmented. Donors, while well-intentioned, can inadvertently disrupt relationships within institutions. For example, the Attorney-General’s Office has various needs, but focusing excessively on the anti-corruption unit may divert crucial resources from other areas (Hanlon, 2005).

Moreover, external interventions often struggle due to many institutions, such as the judiciary and police, lacking experience with international partners and being hesitant to

engage. Both donors and beneficiaries face challenges in developing a cohesive strategic vision regarding necessary actions and the role of external assistance.

5.3.2 Human rights assistance's Advantages and Drawbacks

In the current landscape, two key factors for achieving success are effective leadership from beneficiaries and a willingness from donors to engage thoughtfully. The combination of these elements has led to positive outcomes. The human rights and legal sectors will continue to offer significant opportunities for external funding due to pressing needs. Donors could facilitate initiatives like establishing a national human rights commission or collaboratively developing a national human rights policy. There is potential for creating a central database of cases, fostering regional networking, and launching postgraduate courses. Additionally, enhancing training for police and judicial staff, as well as expanding institutional reach, would be beneficial. However, it is crucial for donors to adopt a more streamlined and coordinated strategy when planning their support for the human rights and legal sectors. This strategy should include a clear vision of the role and potential impact of external assistance in these areas, ensuring that efforts are aligned and effectively address the identified needs. By focusing on these strategic elements, donors can maximize their contributions and support sustainable development in the human rights sector.

5.4 Media Assistance

The Republic of Mozambique's Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and the right to knowledge under Article 74. This commitment was reinforced by the 1991 liberal press law, which marked a turning point for media plurality and independence in the country. (Jallov, 2004)

The emergence of commercial radio and television stations, along with independent print media, represented a significant shift from the era of strict censorship experienced during colonial rule, particularly between 1933 and 1974. Following independence, national news agencies like Agência de Imprensa de Moçambique (AIM) and Radio Moçambique

(RM) were established, though the government often used the press to its advantage. While many journalists supported the new administration, the leadership's trust in the media was cautious. The Ministry of Information frequently intervened with censorship when the press did not fulfil its role in educating and mobilizing the public. Significant foreign involvement in supporting Mozambique's media occurred during the democratic transition after the first multi-party elections. The UNDP coordinated a media support program, with UNESCO overseeing its implementation. Launched in 1998, the program aimed to enhance the resources of Mozambique's media, particularly public service and independent outlets, fostering democracy and good governance. Over the past decade, Mozambique's media landscape has improved, thanks to international support, resulting in greater access, diversity, and quality in media services.

5.4.1 Media Assistance's effect

Over the past decade, international media assistance, particularly through the UNESCO-implemented program, has greatly improved the diversity, accessibility, and quality of media in Mozambique. This support has been vital in both establishing new media outlets and reinforcing existing ones. Urban access to print media has grown, Radio Mozambique now provides nearly nationwide coverage, and there have been strides toward more participatory management at the provincial level. Additionally, Mozambique is home to 42 community radios that focus on local information needs, and numerous Mozambican journalists have engaged in various technical and managerial training initiatives (Jallov, 2004).

However, a significant challenge remains regarding the financial sustainability of these initiatives, which rely heavily on international funding. While some community radios may achieve self-sufficiency, others will continue to need support, and some may not be viable in the long run. The cessation of external funding could negatively impact several initiatives. Despite these advancements, there is a lack of a unified vision or strategy among stakeholders concerning the role of external assistance in the media sector, which may undermine the long-term effectiveness of efforts to enhance Mozambique's media landscape.

5.4.2 Media Assistance's Benefits and Drawbacks

Two crucial elements have emerged as essential for successful media support. The first is the need for speed and flexibility to foster independent media initiatives, such as Mediafax and Faísca. This type of support, often small-scale, has had a significant impact. The second key element is adopting an iterative and participatory approach during program formulation and implementation. A critical lesson from the UNESCO project highlights the importance of considering the unique context of each media initiative, as generalizations about their viability and sustainability are not applicable. Therefore, closely monitoring the conditions of each media project is vital for providing tailored support. After a decade of international media assistance, several recommendations for future support can be made: conduct a thorough assessment of the broader legal and institutional media framework, including potential revisions to legislation and the development of a national social communication strategy; further analyse the success factors of community radio and continue to support its growth, possibly through the establishment of a Community Radio Fund; provide ongoing training and coaching for media staff, emphasizing management, accounting, marketing, and fundraising skills; support a review of organizational structures within the media, including the consolidation of national dialogue platforms like FORCOM (Burnell, 2004).

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we can answer the sub-research question: How significant was the involvement of the international community in supporting Mozambique? We can conclude that the procedure was dependably guaranteed by the world community. The government also recognized it as such, frequently protesting the intrusion undermining its sovereignty as a result of the large UN deployment and the interventionist strategies of its commander and his donor community associates. UNOMOZ was not the only credible guarantor following the concerted Ajello's efforts and contributors to the reintegration and demobilization procedures, and donor financial support for and oversight of elections. Rather, a resolute and competent group of donors helped, supplemented, and occasionally got around UNOMOZ. The donor community held the unspoken but widely held belief that the institutional underpinnings of liberal democracy,

such as free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, a strong parliament, and a flourishing, unbiased media, might be progressively established in Mozambique, an engaged and well-organized civil society, as well as decentralized governance, even though the country's lack of experience in post-conflict democracy-building ten years ago. Donors need to pinpoint areas of engagement where they may make a beneficial impact on the democratic character of government based on a realistic appraisal. Supporting the sectors with the greatest needs has historically been the norm, seldom have external aid efforts made a major impact in these areas (like justice). Opportunities should receive equal or more emphasis when prioritizing support since they provide better outcomes. Changes in government policy (such as the growing push to give district governments more authority) or demands from other players in governance (like the media and civil society putting more and more pressure on the government to be accountable) provide these opportunities. Planning, monitoring, and analysis of governance all call for specialized knowledge. Donors must hire specialized personnel for the governance roles, as creating a governance post or unit is insufficient. This appears to be a practice that is spreading and a trend that needs to be encouraged.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, we set out to achieve different goals to further our understanding of the contribution of peacekeeping to a sustainable peace for countries coming from conflicts. We first looked at the root causes of the 17 years of Mozambique's war and emphasized its effects on society and the economy. To answer our research question, it was examined a range of initiatives aimed at capacity-building and post-conflict rebuilding. The study summarizes the most important research results in this last chapter, which serves as the study's conclusion. It provides the findings as best practices and lessons from the experience that may be applied to Mozambique's reconstruction after the conflict.

The last ten years have brought the international community to its knees, raising doubts about whether development initiatives have truly succeeded in leaving a lasting legacy of human well-being, economic prosperity, and inclusivity. It is becoming more and more obvious that the inability to mitigate and avoid violent conflict is more of a factor in the inability to avert conflict than it is in the money provided by donors. The unique requirements of post-conflict societies have caused the development planning cycle to shrink, necessitating more adaptability in programs and resources as well as increased response to catastrophes that were previously limited to humanitarian aid. To thoroughly address the particular challenges of development in post-conflict societies, specialist divisions within bilateral and multilateral donor organizations have emerged in response to the necessity to foster such awareness and develop new instruments.

The type and character of post-conflict interventions in rebuilding, capacity-building, conflict resolution, and stability are influenced by an understanding of history and the underlying reasons for the war. A comprehensive and nuanced knowledge of this kind would enable well-informed actions that may potentially serve as long-term strategies for mitigating conflict and fostering societal reconciliation. Some development practice conventions must frequently be temporarily abandoned due to the destruction of human, social, and physical capital that is frequently observed at the outset of the post-conflict era and the specifics of a peace accord. In this sense, the international community must prioritize easing long-term restrictions that would otherwise prevent the achievement of

more comprehensive post-conflict rebuilding and peace restoration, in addition to the goals of policy reform and enhanced service delivery.

We should focus on answering the research question that served as the basis for our dissertation. The Mozambican Peace Process's success often prompts questions about why it succeeded where others have failed and whether the lessons learned may be applied in other contexts. Even though each of these processes has unique dynamics and Mozambique doesn't provide a general formula some significant conclusions may still be drawn. Therefore, the prerequisites used in this research take into account both sides of 'success': we consider whether the mission was successful in fulfilling its mandate to deal with the political concerns, but the more general requirements enable an evaluation of the contribution of the mission to the United Nations' overarching aims of reducing human suffering and promoting international security.

When assessing the effectiveness of peacekeeping, setting priorities for goals can be challenging. Bratt, William Dixon, Paul Diehl, and others, for example, place a higher priority on aims for peace rather than justice. According to these experts, peacekeeping operations are effective if they reduce the likelihood of armed conflict and encourage conflict resolution.

Bratt (1997) evidences several criteria to address the general success of peacekeeping that can be presented as follows: (1) reducing violent conflict inside the host nation; (2) reducing human rights violation; (3) security in the region can also be ensured by preventing the dispute from spreading outside the boundaries of the object state and (4) enhancing resolution of conflicts. Of all the UN peacekeeping missions we have evaluated the ONUMOZ one, where the main acts of violence stopped. Before the elections, the general state of security was improved, and demobilization was partially carried out. UN forces helped to reduce the violation of human rights, which in turn produced a peaceful atmosphere for the refugees' repatriation and resettlement. Following the mission's departure, there was no recurrence of widespread violence, and Mozambique started the process of rehabilitation and peacebuilding, which produced remarkable outcomes in a few years.

The main focus of the study that is being given here is a qualitative assessment that allows us to make deductions. Civil conflicts are better managed by UN peacekeeping when its members show a constant commitment to resolving the conflict.

UN commitment is gauged by how successfully peacekeeping troops are (a) provided with the resources they need to carry out their missions (which include personnel supply, logistical support, and military assistance), and (b) given those resources in a timely manner. A strong commitment is not demonstrated only by passing resolutions and giving peacekeeping missions.

The claim is that the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping increases when UN members show their dedication to the operation by providing soldiers and funding combined with regional collaboration. According to Alan Henrikson, for instance, peacekeeping is "probably not going to be consistent and continuous" in the absence of regional engagement.

The primary finding is that, under some circumstances, UN peacekeeping may effectively manage civil conflicts. According to the research, some criteria were lacking in the unsuccessful cases and present in almost all of the successful ones. These factors are frequently the consequence of careful preparation and initiative from the UN and member states, suggesting that measures meant to promote these circumstances could improve a mission's chances of success.

However, the results also show that regular UN commitment, separating the conflict from outside assistance, successful negotiation procedures, and the warring parties' dedication to the UN mission in particular and peaceful means of resolution in general—as well as their capacity to formalize this dedication with an agreement—are all associated with success. The second, however challenging, might be accomplished by encouraging openness between the parties, which helps ease security quandaries by reassuring adversaries that an unexpected assault won't occur. A population's ability to obtain knowledge may also shield it from elite manipulation, which frequently uses mistrust and terror to further its agenda.

The experience in Mozambique has demonstrated the necessity of enhancing coordination, harmonization, rebuilding, and capacity building through the adoption of a

programming approach. This study has demonstrated the significant influence that strategic alliances and cooperation between important national and international players had on the provision of relief and reconstruction efforts in Mozambique which had been weakened by conflict. Donors were suitably organized under the direction of UNUMOZ, the United Nations Observation Mission in Mozambique, to attain optimal efficiency. UNUMOZ made it possible for integrated planning, synergistic coordination, project execution, and assessment.

Reconstruction after a conflict is primarily an institutional task. Those mechanisms have to be credible and actively employed for policy management. Therefore, the absence of connections between capacity-building initiatives and the restoration of long-term local institutions, human resource development, and social empowerment is one of the unfavorable lessons to be learned from Mozambique. Rebuilding a country after a conflict is primarily an institutional task. Only building structures is a significant first step correctly. Those mechanisms have to be credible and actively employed for policy management. Therefore, the absence of connections between capacity-building initiatives and the restoration of long-term local institutions, human resource development, and social empowerment is one of the unfavorable lessons to be learned from Mozambique. Involving the community is likely to increase program ownership and, more crucially, increase the likelihood that it will continue after donors have ceased their funding.

In order to come to a conclusion with this dissertation, it is critical to acknowledge its limitations, which include the fact that it merely focuses on official discourse since it was not possible to conduct interviews and fieldwork. In order to better comprehend how precisely these circumstances support mission success and how they may be applied in present and future conflicts, more studies on this issue may be done including fieldwork or interviews.

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