



Escola de Ciências Sociais e Humanas
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology

Justice Seems Not to Be For All:
The Role Played by Justice Perceptions in Discrimination against
Immigrants

Aline Vieira de Lima Nunes

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor in Psychology
Specialty in Social Psychology

Supervisor:
Ph.D, Cicero Roberto Pereira
Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Lisboa, Portugal

Co-supervisor:
Ph.D, Isabel Correia
ISCTE – Lisbon University Institute, Lisboa, Portugal

October, 2013



Escola de Ciências Sociais e Humanas
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology

Justice Seems Not to Be For All:
The Role Played by Justice Perceptions in Discrimination against
Immigrants

Aline Vieira de Lima Nunes

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor in Psychology
Specialty in Social Psychology

Jury:

Ph.D. Maria Manuela Calheiros, Professora Auxiliar no ISCTE-IUL
Ph.D. Gabrielle Poeschl, Professora Associada no FPCE-UP
Ph.D. Joaquim Valentim, Professor Associado no FPCEUC
Ph.D. Jorge Vala, Investigador Coordenador no ICS-UL
Ph.D. Sven Waldzus, Professor Associado com Agregação no ISCTE-IUL
Ph.D. Cicero Roberto Pereira, Investigador no ICS-UL
Ph.D. Isabel Correia, Professora Associada com Agregação no ISCTE-IUL

October, 2013

Abstract

This thesis aimed to examine how justice perceptions are related with the perpetuation of discrimination, exploring the role played by the scope of justice and belief in a just world (BJW) in the legitimation of discrimination against immigrants. Based on the assumptions of the Justified Discrimination Model (JDM), individuals need to search for justification in order to legitimize the discriminatory behaviour, preserving their self-image as a fair individual. The scope of justice is presented as a justice-based argument that facilitates the legitimation process, since the restricted scope of justice helps to the exclusion of the outgroup from positive treatment. This hypothesis is verified correlational and experimentally, indicating the mediation role played by the restricted scope of justice in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination against Brazilian immigrants in Portugal. In order to verify in which conditions this mediation happens, the BJW is applied to the model, testing the prediction that the legitimising role played by the scope of justice is guided by a justice motivation. Results show that the mediation by the restricted scope of justice is moderated by BJW, only when participants expressed a high level of BJW. Experimental studies reinforce the moderation role of BJW where a greater degree of discrimination against immigrants was influenced by a restricted scope of justice priming but only when the BJW was made salient. This evidence introduces an innovation into the literature on the legitimation of social inequalities by demonstrating the relevant role played by justice perceptions in discrimination against immigrants.

Key-words: justice motivation; scope of justice; BJW; legitimation; discrimination.

PsycINFO Code: 3000 – Social Psychology

3020 – Group & Interpersonal Processes

Resumo

A presente tese tem como objetivo analisar como percepções de justiça estão relacionadas com a perpetuação da discriminação, ao explorar o papel do *scope of justice* e da crença no mundo justo (CMJ) na legitimação da discriminação contra imigrantes. Com base nos pressupostos do Modelo da Discriminação Justificada (MDJ), as pessoas precisam de buscar justificações para legitimar seu comportamento discriminatório, preservando sua auto-imagem como um indivíduo justo. O *scope of justice* é apresentado como um argumento de justiça que facilita o processo de legitimação, visto que o *scope of justice* restrito auxilia que exogrupos sejam excluídos de tratamento positivo. Está hipótese é verificada correlacional e experimentalmente, indicando o papel mediador do *scope of justice* restrito na relação entre preconceito e discriminação contra imigrantes brasileiros em Portugal. A fim de verificar em que condições esta mediação acontece, a CMJ é aplicada ao modelo, testando a predição de que o papel legitimador do *scope of justice* é guiado por uma motivação para justiça. Resultados mostram que a mediação pelo *scope of justice* é moderada pela CMJ, apenas quando os participantes expressam CMJ alta. Estudos experimentais reforçam o papel moderador da CMJ, onde um maior grau de discriminação contra imigrantes é influenciado pela primazia do *scope of justice* restrito, apenas quando a CMJ está saliente. Esta evidência introduz uma inovação na literatura sobre legitimação das desigualdades sociais ao demonstrar o papel relevante das percepções de justiça na discriminação contra imigrantes.

Palavras-chave: motivação para justiça; *scope of justice*; CMJ; legitimação; discriminação.

Codificação PsycINFO: 3000 – Psicologia Social

3020 – Processos Grupais & Interpessoais

This thesis was supported by a Ph.D. scholarship (Ref.: SFRH/BD/62066/2009)
and a R&D grant (Ref.: PTDC/PSI-PSO/114159/2009)
from *Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia*

FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO E CIÊNCIA

Acknowledgments **(Agradecimentos)**

Esta tese que me acompanhou por quatro emocionantes anos foi também acompanhada por pessoas e instituições que a tornaram possível. Estes agradecimentos são escritos em Português e Inglês para que tod@s @s que merecem esse sincero ‘obrigado’ possam ter acesso ao seu conteúdo.

Ao Cicero Pereira, por me orientar tanto na tese como na vida académica em si. Obrigada por ser guia dessa minha caminhada. Obrigada por ser meu amigo, antes de ter sido o meu orientador. Sei que provavelmente não mudaria nada na forma como me ajudaste a conduzir o Doutoramento, mas fez toda a diferença em como vivenciei a experiência. Muito obrigada!

À Professora Isabel Correia, agradeço imensamente por ter acreditado no meu potencial quando cheguei a Lisboa e disse que queria fazer o Doutoramento consigo. Obrigada pelo seu cuidado, atenção e carinho que por muitas vezes me fez levantar a cabeça para continuar lutando. A sua força, senso de justiça e resiliência me inspiram a fazer melhor e por isso agradeço por ter aceitado ser minha orientadora. Muito obrigada!

Ao Prof. Sven Waldzus, obrigada pelo seu empenho e dedicação tanto nas leituras dos meus relatórios anuais, como nas apresentações que fiz dos meus estudos. Todas as suas observações e indagações me levaram a contestar-me e a pensar diferente, a ver o mesmo problema por outros ângulos. Aqui ficam os meus sinceros agradecimentos pelo seu trabalho exemplar.

À Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT) por me dar a oportunidade de ser uma bolsista de Doutoramento, estrangeira, em Portugal. Agradeço o apoio financeiro que fez a diferença no dia-a-dia de doutoranda.

Ao ISCTE-IUL, e em especial, ao Departamento de Psicologia Social e das Organizações pelo acesso ao que de melhor se faz na Europa, num lugar tão mágico como Lisboa.

Ao Cis-IUL, agradeço todo o apoio despendido aos seus investigadores e incentivo para que continuemos a levar o nome deste centro de investigação mais longe. Agradeço especialmente aos colaboradores Silvia Rangel, Hugo Marçal e Fátima Costa que tanto me auxiliaram nesses anos que cá passei.

Ao Programa Doutoral em Psicologia e LAPSO, agradeço o empenho em fazer melhor e buscar ouvir os alunos sempre que possível para que nossas reivindicações fossem tratadas. Agradeço também aos professores do Programa Doutoral, internos e externos, por proporcionarem a inovação e renovação de conhecimentos ao longo desses quatro anos. Em especial, gostaria de agradecer à Prof. Maria Benedicta Monteiro, pelas suas palavras de encorajamento, carinho e pura sabedoria em todos os momentos que partilhamos nessa trajetória.

Ao GCIR, grupo de investigação que me fez refletir sobre os mais variados temas e ao mesmo tempo me deu voz para “sair da casca”. Agradeço especialmente aos coordenadores do grupo durante o meu Doutoramento (2009-2013). To Allard Feddes, Elizabeth Collins, Mauro Bianchi and Ricardo Rodrigues, thank you for making my time in GCIR more enlightened and gratifying than I could ever imagined.

Ao grupo de investigação do ICS-UL que provisoriamente é denominado de PSART, formado por Rui Costa-Lopes, Denis Sindic, Alice Ramos, Ana Nunes, João Barreiros, Pedro Silva e Susana Lavado. Agradeço toda a ajuda nas muitas leituras que fizeram dos capítulos e artigos provenientes desta tese. Agradeço também a vossa companhia e amizade nos ótimos momentos fora da academia. Aos meus colegas brasileiros Frederico Costa, Luana Souza e Tiago Lima que estiveram connosco no PSART.

Obrigada por me permitir partilhar o que sei, assim como o que amo nesta terra. Foi um prazer ter vocês por aqui e tenho certeza que nos vamos encontrar muito pelo Brasil.

À Prof. Carla Moleiro, por me abrir horizontes para outras competências da vida académica. Agradeço por me ter convidado a trabalhar no seu projecto para a APPPT, nas questões da transculturalidade que tanto me abriram horizontes para outras questões da Psicologia Social. Obrigada por me presentear com o projecto da Revista Transcultural. Foi um aprendizado que ninguém me pode tirar, assim como um orgulho de a ver crescer e continuar a fazer sua parte para o conhecimento nessa área tão necessária da Psicologia.

Ao Hélder Alves, pela ajuda em diferentes fases da tese, assim como no artigo. Sua ajuda foi crucial em muitas fases e serei sempre grata pela sua entrega e parceria. Agradeço pela amizade, apoio e as muitas ‘boleias’ para a nossa querida Margem Sul que foram sempre tão divertidas.

À Annelyse Pereira, pela amizade, conselhos e acolhida com que sempre me recebeu. Muito obrigada por muitas vezes me ter ajudado quando eu nem sabia que precisava. Serei sempre grata por me ter recebido em casa, sem sequer saber quem eu era, por me fazer sentir “quase da família”. É um orgulho ter sua amizade.

À Helena Santos (LAPSO). Muito obrigada por toda a força e empenho em ajudar nas fases mais enervantes de recolha de dados, assim como à Paula Gil e Carla Franco.

Aos colegas de doutoramento que partilharam todas as angústias, alegrias e finalmente a confiança na relevância do trabalho que fazemos. Em especial à Cristina Godinho, Jaclin Freire, Nuno Costa, Nuno Pinto, Nuno Ramos, Sara Fernandes, Sandra Roberto, Sofia Fernandes e Vítor Hugo.

À D'Jamila Garcia, agradeço pelo companheirismo com que sempre me acompanhou. Obrigada pela partilha do entusiasmo e das ansiedades da vida de Doutoranda. Meu muito obrigada também pelo apoio em um dos estudos da minha tese e por estar sempre disposta a me ouvir.

To Professor Orla Muldoon, Professor John Dixon and Professor Kevin Durrheim, I am grateful to have the pleasure to meet you in the EASP Summer School, Limerick, 2012. You changed some of my perspectives about intergroup boundaries, turning my research somewhat more relevant to myself, at least. Thank you!

To my colleagues/friends from EASP Summer School, I cannot measure your importance in this final year of my PhD. The Summer School itself was the kind of experience that will help us to fulfill our academic dreams, but your friendship will keep that cheerful environment in my mind every time we heard from each other. Hope to have you close to me for life. Thank you my friends, Ajana Low Stanic, Ana Leite, Amy Williams, Bart de Vos, Clara O'Shea, Francesca Prati, Hedy Greydanus, Katerina Tsantila, Jenny Howell, Kenneth Vail, Rocío Martinez, Romy Lee, Shir Etgar, Sabina Toruńczyk-Ruiz, Stefano de Dominicis, Susana Lavado, Thijs Bouman and a special thanks to Tomás Walsh who also helped me as an English native speaker to proof read one of the chapters.

Aos meus queridos amigos da mítica sala 224. Obrigada por me permitir sentir a hospitalidade portuguesa em 1ª mão, por me ensinarem tantas coisas, desde como fazer o relatório anual a escolher um bom restaurante em Lisboa. Obrigada pelas viagens de trabalho e muito lazer que fizemos aos congressos, pelas gargalhadas aos cafés e almoços. Muito obrigada por fazerem parte da minha identidade social e pela partilha dos vossos dias comigo. Com vocês, foi tudo muito mais especial, Ana Loureiro, Carla Esteves, Catarina Gonzalez, Cristina Camilo, João António, Magda Roberto, Miriam Rosa, Raquel Bertoldo, Ricardo Rodrigues, Rita Correia, Rita Morais.

Aos Nunes, minha família portuguesa, agradeço por todo o amor, cuidado e atenção. À minha sogra, Doroteia e meu querido avô Casimiro Nunes, agradeço por terem sempre nos apoiado nos momentos mais difíceis dessa trajetória. Aos Nunes Mendes, em especial, agradeço a acolhida calorosa de sempre e o carinho que emanam nas vossas atitudes. Obrigada tia Manuela, tio Rui, prima Anabela e João Pires. À prima Sandra e aos priminhos Raúl e Matilde, obrigada pelos momentos tão agradáveis. Agradeço a todos vocês por me fazerem sentir muito amada e mais integrada do que nunca.

Aos meus irmãos, Diana e Wayne, quero agradecer por serem exactamente como são e por estarem exactamente onde estão. Obrigada pelas brincadeiras, pela partilha da vida, por me apoiarem sempre, sem questionar. Obrigada por tudo o que fazem e fizeram pelos nossos amados pais enquanto estive longe a buscar esse sonho que hoje é realidade. Aos meus sobrinhos, Laura e Yago, e minha cunhada Nayara, quero agradecer o seu amor incondicional por esta tia que esteve a maior parte das suas vidas distante, mas apenas fisicamente. Um dia também terão suas conquistas e espero estar ao vosso lado para comemorá-las.

Ao meu marido, David. Não há como agradecer todo o amor e suporte que me deste em todas as minhas escolhas, em todos os nossos desafios de vida. Obrigada por me acompanhar e estar disposto a mudar de país, mudar de vida e ficar longe da própria família para me fazer ir atrás dos meus sonhos, que também se tornaram teus, da nossa família juntos. Serei sempre grata pela tua paciência e por me dar a confiança necessária para que fechasse mais esta etapa. *Muito obrigada, meu amor!*

Aos meus queridos pais, Joacé e Fatima. Dedico todo o trabalho e conquista aos dois, que sempre estimularam a minha curiosidade, que sempre me permitiram ir em busca do que eu queria ou achava que precisava. Obrigada por me darem a possibilidade de sonhar e de realizar os sonhos. Vocês são minha maior inspiração para tudo o que eu faço e a minha coragem para fazer acontecer vem do vosso amor. *Muito obrigada, Paiinho e Mainha!*

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Part I – The Role Played by the Scope of Justice in Discrimination against Immigrants	9
Chapter 1. The Legitimation of Discrimination	13
1. Theoretical Antecedents of the Justified Discrimination Model (JDM)	15
1.1. Basis of the Justified Discrimination Model (JDM)	17
2. The Hypotheses of the Justified Discrimination Model	22
3. Empirical Evidence for the Justified Discrimination Model	25
3.1. The Mediation Role of Perception of Threat	25
3.2. The Moderation Role of the Anti-Prejudice Norm	27
4. Further Directions: The Role Played by Justice Perceptions.....	29
5. Summarizing the Legitimation of Discrimination.....	30
Chapter 2. The Scope of Justice	33
1. Origins and Definitions.....	33
2. Functions of the Scope of Justice.....	35
3. The Antecedents of the Scope of Justice: Amplifying vs. Restricting the Scope of Justice	39
4. Consequences of the Restriction of the Scope of Justice.....	42
5. Applications of the Scope of Justice.....	48
6. Summarizing the Scope of Justice	50
Chapter 3. The Mediation Role of the Scope of Justice	53
1. Study 1	55
1.1. Method	55
1.2. Results.....	59
1.3. Discussion	63
2. Study 2	64
2.1. Method	66

2.2. Results	68
2.3. Discussion	74
Summary of Part I	77
Part II – The Role Played by the Belief in a Just World on the Legitimation of Discrimination	79
Chapter 4. The ‘Belief’ in a Just World and the Legitimation of Discrimination....	83
1. The Fundamental Delusion: Origins and Operationalization of BJW	83
2. Functions of BJW	84
3. BJW research: Pre and Post-1990s	85
4. Is BJW a Justice Motive or a Justice Motivation?	87
5. BJW and Derogation of Outgroups	88
6. BJW and the Need to Legitimize Injustice	93
7. BJW and the Legitimation of Discrimination.....	94
8. Summarizing the BJW	95
Chapter 5. The Moderation Role of Belief in a Just World	97
1. Study 3	97
1.1. Method	98
1.2. Results	100
1.3. Discussion	103
2. Study 4	103
2.1. Method	104
2.2. Results	105
2.3. Discussion	106
3. Study 5	107
3.1. Method	107
3.2. Results	109
3.3. Discussion	110
Summary of Part II	113
General Discussion	115
Justified Discrimination	115

Alternative Explanations	118
Scope of Justice is a Superordinate Category	118
BJW and Meritocracy	120
Limitations	121
Norms and Prejudice-discrimination relationship	121
Scope of Justice operationalization issues	122
Dichotomous-continuous dilemma	122
Scope of Justice or Moral Circle?	124
Measuring the Scope of Justice.....	125
Contributions and Further Research	127
Implications	128
References	131
Appendices	148
Appendix A – Developed Measures	149
Appendix A.1 – The Scope of Justice Scale.....	149
Appendix A.2 – The Support for Discriminatory Policies Scale.....	150
Appendix B - Experimental Material of Part II.....	151
Appendix B.1 - Manipulation of BJW: Salient condition	151
Appendix B.2 - Manipulation of BJW: Control condition (Study 4)	152
Appendix B.3 - Manipulation of BJW: Control condition (Study 5)	153
Appendix B.4 - Manipulation of the Restricted Scope of Justice: Salient condition (Study 4)	154
Appendix B.5 - Manipulation of the Restricted Scope of Justice: Salient condition (Study 5)	155
Appendix B.6 - Manipulation of the Restricted Scope of Justice: Control condition (Study 5)	156

Index of Tables

Table 1. Factor analysis of Blatant Prejudice Scale	56
Table 2. Factor analysis of Subtle Prejudice Scale	57
Table 3. Factor analysis of the Scope of Justice Scale	58
Table 4. Factor analysis of the Support for Discriminatory Policies (SDP) Scale	59
Table 5. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the measures used in Study 1 (Cronbach's Alpha in Brackets)	60
Table 6. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role of scope of justice in the relationship between (blatant and subtle) prejudice and discrimination against immigrants (SDP)	60
Table 7. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role of scope of justice in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination against immigrants (SDP)	62
Table 8. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by the scope of justice in the relationship between blatant prejudice and discrimination against immigrants (SDP) in the control condition of the manipulation	69
Table 9. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by the scope of justice in the relationship between blatant prejudice and discrimination against immigrants (SDP) in the cultural prejudice condition of the manipulation.	70

Table 10. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by the scope of justice in the relationship between cultural prejudice manipulation and discrimination against immigrants (SDP)	71
Table 11. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by blatant prejudice in the relationship between cultural prejudice manipulation and the restricted scope of justice	73
Table 12. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by blatant prejudice in the relationship between cultural prejudice manipulation and the support for discriminatory policies (SDP)	74
Table 13. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the measures used in Study 3 (Cronbach's Alpha in Brackets)	100
Table 14. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role of scope of justice and BJW in the relationship between prejudice and support for discriminatory policies	101

Index of Figures

Figure 1. The Justified Discrimination Model (JDM)	24
Figure 2. Justice Applied to The Justified Discrimination Model (JDM)	29
Figure 3. Effect of blatant and subtle prejudice on discrimination against Brazilian immigrants, mediated by a restricted perception of the scope of justice	61
Figure 4. Effect of prejudice on discrimination against Brazilian immigrants, mediated by a restricted perception of the scope of justice	63
Figure 5. Relationship between the blatant (measured) prejudice and discrimination against Brazilian immigrants, mediated by a restricted perception of the scope of justice (control condition of the manipulation).....	68
Figure 6. Relationship between the blatant (measured) prejudice and discrimination against Brazilian immigrants, mediated by a restricted perception of the scope of justice (cultural prejudice condition of the manipulation).....	70
Figure 7. Effect of the manipulation of cultural prejudice on discrimination against Brazilian immigrants, mediated by a restricted perception of the scope of justice.....	72
Figure 8. The relationship between blatant prejudice and SDP, mediated by the restricted scope of justice and moderated by BJW	102
Figure 9. Support for discriminatory policies as a function of the scope of justice and BJW (Study 4)	106
Figure 10. Support for discriminatory policies as a function of the scope of justice and BJW (Study 5)	110

Introduction

Ten years after 9/11 we witnessed the sympathy of (almost) the whole world for the victims of the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York. In 2011, the world watched live coverage of the tribute to the 2,974 individuals who were killed at Ground Zero. During the tribute the name of each victim was commemorated and announced by his or her relatives as a way of recognizing the value of each victim as a unique individual worthy of human appreciation. At the same time, human-rights reports give us easy access to the number of civilian casualties caused by the war on terror waged by the US in Afghanistan. Although this number may sometimes be over-inflated, it would appear that around 40,000 people, including thousands of innocent children, have been killed in Afghanistan since the beginning of the war.

Both the media and those arguing against the war on terror have compared the number of WTC casualties with the number of Afghan civilian casualties. It is quite clear that the tributes and sympathy given to the two groups have not been the same. If human life is considered to be so important, and if it has the same value for everyone, then the sympathy felt for the casualties in Afghanistan should be the same or even greater than the sympathy felt for the WTC victims. Why do people express different amounts of worry and sympathy for different groups (e.g., “my” group and “their” group)? Why do we not feel the harm suffered by others as we feel the harm suffered by ourselves? For social psychologists, those are questions of social justice and intergroup relations (e.g., Vala & Correia, 2008). For the purpose of understanding how justice can be involved in intergroup conflict situations, in this thesis we asked: What is the role played by justice perceptions in the discrimination of social minorities?

First of all, we need to establish which definition of “justice” we are applying in this thesis. For instance, (social) justice can be defined as:

“a state of affairs (either actual or ideal) in which (a) benefits and burdens in society are dispersed in accordance with some allocation principle (or set of principles); (b) procedures, norms, and rules that govern political and other forms of decision-making preserve the basic rights, liberties, and entitlements of individuals and groups; and (c) human beings are treated with dignity and respect not only by authorities but also by other relevant social actors including fellow citizens” (Jost & Kay, 2010, p. 1122).

Justice can also be defined in social psychology as “a judgement people make about events” that motivates human behaviour (Hafer et al., 2012, p. 395). Based on these broad definitions, we can analyze justice as judgements that follow certain standards of how individuals, society and belief systems should work together, where each party receives what it is entitled to (Clayton & Opatow, 2003). In this vein, justice perceptions could be defined as how individuals apply their ideal of justice to every-day life situations, so that “good” citizens enjoy their rights and “bad” citizens receive their punishment.

These judgements and ways of evaluating justice-based events are shared by some social systems including individuals, groups and societies (Mikula & Wenzel, 2000). In fact, judgement processes can have more than one interpretation. Justice (perception) definition and application are subjective and people can use them for different purposes. The influence of justice perceptions on intergroup relations is still an under-explored avenue in social justice research with just a few important milestones along the way to allow us to properly integrate these two areas into the social psychology of justice (see Correia, 2010 for a review on social psychology of justice). As such, justice could, at a higher level of abstraction, serve as a justification providing a balance between what is normative in democratic societies and what can be applied to specific situations in our everyday life. Thus, the perception of justice requires a feeling of justice (e.g., adjustment, restoration) which could make possible the legitimation of injustice by justice-based arguments. This aspect of the perception of justice allows us to consider the motivational process of the legitimation of discrimination where those who need to express prejudice against minority groups will find it necessary to use their (reframed) justice perceptions as a means of treating others in a derogatory fashion.

In the present thesis, we sought to analyse how justice may influence social inequalities in order to contribute to the literature regarding the role played by justice perceptions on the relationship between prejudice and the discrimination of immigrants. We present a justice-based approach to analysing intergroup conflict and specific justice perceptions such as the scope of justice (Opatow, 1990a; 1990b) and the ‘belief’ in a just world (BJW; Lerner, 1980) which have been addressed in intergroup conflict research over the past 40 years. We have used the justified discrimination model (JDM; Pereira, Vala & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009) as a basis for the analysis of the process of the legitimation of discrimination, applying justice as a

specific context where discrimination can be justified. We posit that individuals use justice perceptions such as the scope of justice to legitimate discrimination, and that this legitimizing mechanism is motivated by a desire for justice. Specifically, we propose that the relationship between prejudice and discrimination is mediated by the restriction of the scope of justice (i.e., the individuals' perception that principles of justice are only applied to ingroup members), and that this mediation is moderated by the belief in a just world (BJW; i.e., individuals' concern with principles of justice).

This thesis is made up of two parts, in which each includes chapters of theoretical framework and empirical evidence to test our specific hypotheses. Part I presents the main theoretical framework of the thesis and also a set of studies that support the rationale behind our hypothesis regarding the role played by the scope of justice on the legitimation of discrimination against immigrants. In Chapter 1 we discuss the relevance of the psychological processes through which discrimination can be legitimised. Specifically, we discuss the rationale behind the psychological processes by which discrimination against disadvantaged groups is perpetuated in democratic societies where egalitarian principles, reinforced by anti-discrimination laws, put pressure on individuals to *not* discriminate based on prejudiced beliefs. We briefly revise the literature of the prejudice-discrimination relationship and a recent line of research that proposes a general model of analysing individuals' need to search for justifications in order to legitimise discrimination. The Justified Discrimination Model (JDM; Pereira et al., 2010, Pereira, et al., 2009) is presented as a consistent model that would fit the application of justice perceptions to explain the specific context where discrimination can be legitimated by justice. The JDM and its empirical evidence allow for the possibility of applying the scope of justice as a justificatory factor in the model.

Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature dealing with the construct of the scope of justice in order to clarify its role as a justifying factor in the legitimation of discrimination. The scope of justice is a concept broadly theorized as an important type of justice perception that should be taken into consideration when we analyse the derogatory treatment of others (e.g., Opatow, 1990b; Staub, 1989). However, researchers into the scope of justice have been struggling to find a shared and clear definition of the concept. In addition, its operational dimension has failed to take shape: no validated measure has been found that integrates the various meanings of the scope of justice. It is as such that we delineated the origins and different definitions, choosing

an operational aspect for the scope of justice that we find the most accurate in terms of its analysis in this thesis. We also discussed the degree to which the scope of justice could be amplified or restricted depending on the social context. This specific feature of the scope of justice shows the malleability and the possible functions of the construct in the legitimation of social inequalities. Moreover, since our focus is the role played by the restriction of the scope of justice, the antecedents and consequences of such restriction are described through research exemplifying its use in justice literature. We also provide evidence of how the scope of justice has been applied to general justice research (e.g., procedural and distributive justice). Finally, we sum up the relevance of this justice judgement, by focusing on the role of the restricted scope of justice in an intergroup conflict context as a factor that legitimises the discrimination of immigrants.

Following this theoretical framework, the hypotheses derived from Part I are presented and a set of studies is delineated in Chapter 3. These studies analyze the mediating role played by the restricted scope of justice in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination against Brazilian immigrants in Portugal. Study 1 is a co-relational study aimed at testing whether the prejudice-discrimination relationship really is mediated by the restricted scope of justice. In Study 2, the mediation found in Study 1 is replicated experimentally by the manipulation of cultural prejudice, using a procedure similar to Devine's (1989) research on cultural stereotypes.

Based on the findings of Part I, the second part of this thesis nuances the tested model, adding a possible moderator on the legitimation of discrimination by the restricted scope of justice. Chapter 4 presents the Belief in a Just World (BJW; Lerner, 1980) as a moderator of the mediation showed in the first part of this thesis. As such, the review of the literature emphasizes the influence of BJW in intergroup relations, for example, its role in the discrimination of outgroups (e.g., Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2007; Aguiar, Vala, Correia, & Pereira, 2008) and in legitimizing social inequalities (e.g., Beierlein, Werner, Preiser, & Wermuth, 2011). Subsequently the rationale and hypotheses of Part II are discussed, followed by a new set of studies that analyze the role played by the motivation to believe that the world is just on the legitimation of discrimination against immigrants. Study 3 is a co-relational study in which we proposed and tested the moderated mediation. In addition, Studies 4 and 5 focus on replicating the moderation effect of BJW on the influence of a restricted scope of justice on discrimination. For this purpose, both justice perceptions were manipulated in order to test whether the same effect found in the co-relational study could be replicated in a

more controllable environment. In other words, we analyzed whether, in a context where the motivation to believe in a just world is utmost, the restricted scope of justice would lead to a greater expression of discrimination against immigrants.

The relevance of analysing the discrimination of immigrants and examining the ways and conditions in which it may be justified and legitimized by justice perceptions can help us to understand why discrimination is continuously expressed despite widespread regulations against prejudice. In fact, reports concerning the immigrant situation in Portugal (e.g., European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA, 2009; Lages et al., 2006) show that some of the more fundamental rights are not upheld. For instance, “legal protection against any kind of discrimination” is an important right that we would like to highlight as not being upheld by public State institutions in Portugal. In fact, in a context where every citizen should be protected against discrimination and yet derogatory behaviour persists, we can assume that (a) immigrants are not considered citizens, (b) immigrants receive different treatment from that which nationals enjoy, and (c) discrimination is legitimized since it does not require legal action to protect all citizens from it. Consequently, if the justification used to legitimize discrimination is based on arguments of justice, it may never be recognized as an arbitrary behaviour and it will carry no consequences for the perpetrators. This pervasive process of psychological justification of discrimination using justice perceptions needs to be unveiled in order to punish those who discriminate and, as a result, to allow Portuguese and non-Portuguese citizens to live in a more integrated environment. As such, the main goal of the present thesis is to pinpoint those cases in which perceptions of justice may legitimate discrimination against immigrants in Portugal.

PART I

**The Role Played by the Scope of Justice in Discrimination against
Immigrants**

In this part of the thesis we will analyse the role played by a specific perception of justice in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination. Chapter 1 describes the problem of the legitimation of discrimination and how this problem has been analysed by a number of theories and models regarding the legitimation of social inequalities. We give special attention to the Justified Discrimination Model (JDM), which specifies how and in which conditions the relationship between prejudice and discrimination may be legitimated. Furthermore, we also discuss the limits and range of this model, and aim to contribute to the development of the model by introducing justice perceptions as legitimizing factors of discrimination.

In Chapter 2 we present the scope of justice as a justificatory factor used by individuals to legitimate discrimination. Specifically, we describe the different definitions, functions and applicability of the scope of justice. In addition, the antecedents and consequences of the restriction of the scope of justice show how this concept may fit in with the JDM. In Chapter 3 we test the main hypothesis that the restricted scope of justice may serve as a factor legitimizing discrimination. Two studies analyse the role of the restricted scope of justice as a mediator in the prejudice-discrimination relationship.

Chapter 1 – The Legitimation of Discrimination

To tackle discrimination against individuals from certain groups has been one of the major challenges of contemporary Western society. In fact, theories and research on prejudice and discrimination have argued that, within the last half of a century, individuals have been living in social and cultural environments that promote egalitarian principles of justice while still harbouring negative belief systems regarding minorities and historically disadvantaged groups. For instance, classical research on discrimination against black people shows that individuals could act with a friendly attitude towards this group and even defend them to some extent but would still, in other contexts, reject them (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988). This example suggests a paradoxical scenario: egalitarian and non-prejudiced values are widespread in democratic western societies and yet we continue to observe practices of discrimination. In fact the European Union (EU) has a specific law based on the European Convention on Human Rights. This law sets out a general prohibition of discrimination (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA, 2010), and yet the expression of prejudice and discrimination have not been eradicated in the EU (e.g., European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA, 2009), despite people being aware of the prohibition of discriminatory behaviour. Given this scenario, what is important is to discover just what the psychosocial mechanisms that contribute to the perpetuation of discrimination are in a context where justice and equality are not only defended but also promoted.

A possible explanation could be the fact that individuals have been exposed to a process of socialization by which they have internalized both prejudiced attitudes (e.g., racist beliefs, negative stereotypes) and justice beliefs through which they genuinely project their self-images as egalitarian individuals who should always behave in a just way (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Katz & Hass, 1988; Pereira, 2012). A psychological tension may arise when individuals are faced with situations in which they have to interact with members of minority groups for which they foster prejudices. For instance, Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) provided one of the most relevant theories regarding this problem in the U.S.: the aversive racism theory. This theory suggests that the psychological tension that individuals may experience comes from the typical ambivalence of aversive racism. This ambivalence is characterized by individuals' conflict between (a) negative feelings and beliefs about

black people that motivate them to discriminate, and (b) the internalization of egalitarian values that circumstantially motivate them to suppress these negative feelings and beliefs. The tension that an aversive racist experiences is a result of his/her prejudice triggered by historical racist culture in the U.S. which led to the development of antipathy towards black people, and the simultaneous desire to be egalitarian; that is to say, to regard themselves as non-prejudiced and non-discriminatory people who promote racial equality.

Evidence for this psychological tension can be found in research conducted by Katz and Hass (1988) into value-based ambivalent racism. They argued that contemporary racism is ambivalent simply because individuals can express positive and negative attitudes towards minority groups (specifically black people in the US). Moreover, Katz and Hass showed that this ambivalence reflects value-based motivational conflicts. In fact, they identified a systematic pattern of relations between two contrasting values (Protestant Ethic vs. Humanitarianism-egalitarianism) and two attitudes (Anti vs. Pro) regarding black people in the U.S. In two studies they found a direct association between value and attitude, where generally accepted values of white people such as the Protestant ethic were related to negative attitudes towards black people, while humanity-egalitarian values were associated with positive attitudes towards them. In other words, ambivalence was located at not only an attitudinal level, but reflected a deeper motivational conflict because it was based both on the values that underpin prejudice (e.g., the Protestant Ethic) and on values that stand against prejudice (e.g., humanitarianism-egalitarianism). This motivational conflict takes form because individuals internalise both types of values (see also, Schwartz, 1996). As such, Katz and Hass's (1988) studies suggest that the two contrasting value-based motivations impact on individuals' behaviour towards minority groups.

The psychological tension caused by the value-based motivational conflict was also addressed by Crandall and Eshleman (2003) in their justification-suppression model of the expression and experience of prejudice. These authors suggested that the tension felt by individuals in interracial relations is a result of the conflict between the need to express genuine prejudice, defined as a negative attitude carrying strong motivational forces, and the psychological and social pressure to suppress the expression of genuine prejudice, a pressure that reflects what we know to be the anti-prejudice norm.

Even though earlier research and theories had shown that individuals experience a value-based motivational conflict because of having internalized both egalitarian and prejudiced values (Katz & Hass, 1988), and despite the fact that this conflict is a source for experiencing psychological tension when faced with issues involving minority groups (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004), we do not yet know what socio-psychological strategies individuals use to resolve these motivational conflicts and tensions when they have to interact with minority groups. For instance, are individuals motivated by their prejudiced beliefs, thereby being led to discriminate against these minorities, or, rather, are they motivated by the anti-prejudice norm, and thereby able to avoid behaving in a discriminatory way?

Notwithstanding, recent research on the relationship between prejudice and discrimination has suggested that individuals can be guided by both motivational sources. In other words, they can simultaneously discriminate against minority groups based on their prejudiced attitudes and yet still maintain the feeling that they have acted in a fair and unprejudiced way, not violating the anti-prejudice norm. This occurs because individuals tend to act as if they were making a compromise between the two contrasting motivations. They act in a discriminatory way but, at the same time, they actively try to legitimise their behaviour by using justifications that can be perceived as normative and hence non-prejudiced. This process was first denominated by Pereira et al. (2009; 2010) as ‘the legitimation of discrimination’ in the Justified Discrimination Model (JDM, Pereira, 2012). Below we describe in detail the theoretical background of the JDM and, furthermore, we formulate our contribution to developing this model by suggesting the analysis of the role played by one’s perception of justice as an important legitimising factor in discrimination.

1. Theoretical Antecedents of the Justified Discrimination Model (JDM)

The JDM is primarily based on the idea that the relationship between prejudice and discrimination is an example of the more general attitude-behaviour relationship (Pereira, 2012). As an attitude, prejudice is conceived as a negative evaluation of a target-group, and carries one of the most important features of attitudes, known as the conative component guiding individuals to behave in a way that is coherent with said attitude (e.g., Krüger, 2013; Lima & Correia, 2013; McLeod, 2009). It is assumed that prejudiced attitudes, when internalised by individuals, impel them to behave in a

discriminatory way because said behaviour is consistent with the negative evaluation of the target of the attitude. Accordingly, an internalised unprejudiced attitude should motivate non-discriminatory behaviour because discrimination would be inconsistent with the attitude. This rationale underlies the expected positive relationship between prejudice and discrimination which is borne out by empirical support as evidenced by two meta-analytical studies (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Schultz & Six, 1996). For instance, the meta-analysis carried out by Schultz and Six (1996) showed that prejudice correlates positively with discrimination, despite the low correlation found previously by researchers that questioned the consistency of the attitude-behaviour relationship (e.g., LaPiere, 1934; see Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005 for a review). Dovidio et al. (1996) corroborate this finding further with meta-analytical data, indicating that the relationship between prejudice (in this case racial attitudes) and discrimination is only moderately significant. Besides supporting the importance of analysing the prejudiced basis of discrimination relationship, these results encourage us to question the psychosocial processes informing the relationship between prejudice and discrimination and the socio-normative conditions that motivate these processes.

For instance, Dovidio et al. (1996) questioned whether the measures of prejudice mainly address social desirability rather than assessing the “real” prejudiced attitude. They suggested that the “real” attitude needs to be restructured at a personal level where individuals interpret their prejudiced attitude in a way as to reinforce their positive, non-prejudiced self-image. That is to say, that prejudiced attitude could only be expressed when internally justified in such a way as to legitimate discriminatory behaviour. As such, justification would represent a legitimising process by which prejudiced attitudes would have an impact on discrimination (see also Pereira, 2012). Legitimation is, therefore, an important aspect to be taken into account when analysing the prejudice-discrimination relationship.

Indeed, legitimation is a core concept in the studies on intergroup relations when it comes to understanding discriminatory treatment of outgroups (e.g., Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1984). Legitimation refers to the ways by which attitudes and behaviours can be justified (see Costa-Lopes et al., 2013). Several theories dealing with the contemporary expression of prejudice (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Sears & Henry, 2003) and the legitimisation of social inequalities (Jost & Banaji, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) illustrate the idea of the pursuit of legitimacy as a socio-psychological strategy used by

individuals to resolve the conflict between the two basic behavioural motivations regarding social minorities as represented by the tension between the prejudiced attitudes and the anti-prejudice norm. For instance, individuals are able to formulate justifications prior to engaging in discrimination in order to change the way the discrimination is perceived; that is to say, in such a way that the discriminatory behaviour may be perceived as not being discrimination. The central position of legitimacy and the anti-prejudice norm in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination is the core premise put forward by the JDM. In the following section we will discuss the theoretical background informing this model.

1.1 – Basis of the Justified Discrimination Model (JDM)

What the JDM posits is founded on at least four lines of research into the legitimacy of social inequalities (see Costa-Lopes et al., 2013, for a review): the Aversive Racism Theory (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986); the Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999); the System Justification Theory (STJ; Jost & Banaji, 1994); and the Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice (JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). These theories and model include important constructs applied to the JDM such as legitimacy and normative pressure.

In an egalitarian context discrimination needs to be legitimated. The role played by legitimacy in discrimination has been studied in normative contexts that condemn discrimination in comparison with more permissive contexts. For instance, research based on aversive racism theory (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio & Gaertner, 2005) demonstrates that discrimination is facilitated when the normative context allows for different interpretations (e.g., ambiguity) regarding the “real” intention of a given behaviour, allowing people to call on non-racist explanations to justify it, e.g., bias against black people is most likely to be expressed by whites when it can be explained or justified on a non-racial basis. This process has been analysed more closely in research into discrimination against black people in the context of employment hiring and access to university (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Pereira, Torres & Almeida, 2003).

For instance, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) analysed racial prejudice and the discrimination of black people in accessing employment. Firstly, they explored whether prejudice underwent any change over time by comparing the expression of explicit

prejudice in two student sample groups that were measured 10 years apart (1989 and 1999). They found that participants in 1999 expressed less prejudice than those in 1989, reflecting the general tendency of a reduction in self-declared prejudice over the last half of century. Secondly, they analysed whether the same students still continued to discriminate black people despite denying being prejudiced. To do so, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) used a fictitious scenario about black and white candidates applying for a peer counsellor position. Participants in both student samples had to decide who they would hire (a black or a white candidate) for the position based on three interview excerpts which ranged from clearly strong, to ambiguous and clearly weak applicants (manipulation of candidates' qualifications). Results showed that in the case of clearly weak or strong candidates, participants did not show any racial discrimination in their hiring preferences. However, in the case of ambiguous candidates, participants recommended the hiring of more white applicants than black ones. In other words, white participants evaluated white candidates with ambiguous qualifications more positively than similarly qualified black candidates. According to Dovidio and Gaertner, this occurred because the ambiguity provided participants with a normative context in which a non-prejudiced justification was available to discriminate black applicants.

The effect of ambiguity in the normative context was also illustrated by Hodson et al. (2005) in a study regarding the ways aversive racism could influence legal decisions in a court case involving a bank robbery. In this study, white participants (only individuals who described themselves in the prejudice rating as being prejudiced against black people) read a legal scenario concerning a white or black defendant. The scenario also provided DNA evidence suggesting guilt and additional support such as sentencing recommendations to help participants' decision. Besides the defendant's race, the admissibility of evidence was also manipulated (DNA evidence being considered either inadmissible or admissible). Participants for whom such evidence was deemed inadmissible were told, before exposure to the legal information about the defendant, both verbally and in writing, to ignore information (e.g., DNA evidence) previously declared inadmissible by the judge. In the admissible group on the other hand, participants did not receive instructions to ignore the evidence. Results showed that in the inadmissible group, when participants received instructions from the judge to ignore the incriminating DNA evidence when coming to a jury decision, the black defendant was considered to be guiltier, received longer sentence recommendations, was seen as more likely to re-offend and was rated as less likely to be rehabilitated in

comparison with the white one. In the admissible condition, the defendants' race did not produce significant differences. In fact, in this case participants tended to rate the black defendant as less guilty, with shorter sentence recommendations, and seen as less likely to re-offend than the white defendant.

In short, the research carried out by Hodson et al. (2005) corroborates findings on aversive racism that, when the situation allows for an interpretation that is seen as other than racist (such as in the inadmissible evidence test group), prejudiced individuals use that ostensibly non-racial motive to account for their judgements/decisions regarding black people. That is to say, individuals use any contextual ambivalence to express their unconsciously prejudiced attitude in situations where discrimination is not evident or where it can be restructured in terms of causes other than prejudice, maintaining an unprejudiced image of themselves projected both inwards and to the world. Thus, ambivalence in the normative context is presented as a tool used by prejudiced individuals to justify discriminatory behaviour.

Another study using an employment recruitment scenario was designed to show the direct influence of justification in discrimination. Pereira, Torres and Almeida (2003) manipulated the presence (experimental group) or absence (control group) of justification in recruitment decisions in order to analyse how people use unprejudiced justification to discriminate against black people in Brazil. According to the scenario a female manager from a store in a shopping centre had a position available for a salesperson, and the best two candidates were one black and one white applicant with identical professional backgrounds. Participants were also informed that the candidates were called for interview and the manager identified their skin colour. In the control group, participants read that after the interview, the manager chose the white candidate, not justifying her decision or preference. In the experimental group, participants were informed of the same recruitment decision but, in addition, they were also told that the manager justified her decision just saying "I'm not a prejudiced person, but the Brazilian society (i.e., her potential customers) are highly prejudiced against black people".

After reading the case study, participants indicated (a) their personal preference for the salespersons' skin colour, (b) their position regarding the decision to hire the white candidate (perception of justice and a professional evaluation of the manager) in terms of a prejudicial decision, and (c) their own preferences as managers (i.e., by putting themselves in the manager's shoes) when it came to hiring either the white or

the black candidate. Results showed that there was no difference in personal preference for the salespersons' skin colour in either group, but participants in the experimental group (where there was justification) perceived the decision to hire the white candidate as being more just and more of them stated that they would hire the white candidate if they were in the position of the manager than the participants in the control group. Overall, results showed that participants did not have any preference for either of the two candidates based on their skin colour alone, unless they could justify their preference with an argument that did not threaten their self-image (i.e., the idea that Brazilian society would prefer to have a white rather than a black salesperson).

This evidence corroborates previous research about the role of justification in the process of legitimising the discrimination of black people. However, this evidence did not clarify the starting point at which the legitimation process is called for. One question to be addressed is what are the psychosocial factors associated with the legitimation of discrimination?

Individuals are social and psychologically motivated to legitimate social inequalities. Theory and research on complementary perspectives of the legitimacy of social inequalities have addressed the social-psychological aspects that motivate individuals to legitimise these inequalities (see Costa-Lopes et al., 2013). For instance, the social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) specifies that many forms of intergroup conflict and oppression can be seen as a basic human motivation to construct myths that legitimate hierarchies among social groups. This motivation is defined by the theory of social dominance orientation (SDO) and suggests its expression can be observed in the group desire for, and support of, the maintained domination of majority groups over minority ones. Indeed, in research conducted by Sidanius and Pratto (see Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004), SDO was related to several legitimizing myths (i.e., "attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies that distribute social value within the social system", p. 45) regarding different ways by which discrimination can be expressed (e.g., opposition to affirmative action or opposition to governmental support of minorities). It reinforces previous empirical evidence suggesting that legitimizing myths could be used by individuals to justify discrimination.

The JDM drew on this strategic use of ideological beliefs to legitimize discrimination presented by the social dominance theory, as a way of rationalizing or justifying demeaning behaviour as acceptable in democratic societies. Despite this,

Sidanius and Pratto (1999) did not focus on the legitimation process per se, but simply pointed out that individuals are motivated by SDO in their search for justification aimed at legitimizing the difference between the privileged ingroup and the discriminated outgroup.

A more systematic focus on the legitimation process of social inequalities can be found in the System Justification Theory (SJT; see Jost & van der Toorn, 2012 for a review). According to the SJT, there is a general ideological tendency to justify the status quo, and that leads individuals to perceive the way society is currently organised as being legitimate (Jost & Banaji, 1994), even when it perpetuates their own disadvantaged position in said society (Jost, 2011). That is to say, individuals are moved to rationalize and justify the way things are, so that existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be perceived as fair and legitimate (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). In terms of what we are arguing in our thesis, most relevant conclusion of SJT is the idea that the justification process is central to understanding a range of intergroup behaviours, including discrimination. However, although SJT argues that individuals are motivated to justify social inequality, this theory does not specify the normative function of this motivation.

The role played by social norms in individuals' motivation to justify social inequalities¹ was more clearly described by the Justification-Suppression Model (JSM) of prejudice proposed by Crandall and Eshleman (2003). This model is enlightening regarding the role played by the anti-prejudice norm and the legitimation process in the relationship between genuine prejudice and expressed prejudice. Indeed, the main goal of JSM is to show how people resolve the conflict between the motivation to express genuine prejudice (i.e., a motivational reaction that is not directly measured) and the motivation to suppress this prejudice such as seen with the internalization of the anti-prejudice norm (e.g., beliefs, ideologies, attributions). The JSM highlights the role of justifying factors in explaining how a genuine prejudice can be expressed despite the suppressive forces exerted by normative constraints. Specifically, this model suggests that discrimination depends on a justification that allows individuals to express prejudice without being socially sanctioned and without endangering their self-image as being fair and unprejudiced. In this way, the conflict between the expression of prejudice and the preservation of a self-image can be resolved.

¹ See also Poeschl (2008) about the role played by social norms in unequal family practices.

The resolution of the conflict comes with the process of justification that promotes a correspondence between genuine prejudice and the expression of prejudice. For instance, Crandall, Bahns, Warner and Schaller (2011) analyzed how stereotypes can be a justification for prejudice. These authors based their analysis on the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002) and those aspects of it that guide social judgment: warmth and competence. In three experimental studies, Crandall et al. (2011) were able to identify “genuine”/automatic prejudice by asking participants to match target groups with specific traits in order to assess stereotypes. Results showed that stereotypes (especially warmth traits) could justify and rationalize prejudice as representations of an experience of the target group. In other words, negative warmth traits associated with a target group justified any prejudiced attitude towards it. In accordance with the JSM-based explanation, the tensions normally felt by an individual expressing prejudice towards a target group could be mitigated through widely shared stereotypes in order to maintain one’s self-image and public image as an unprejudiced individual.

Despite its contribution to understanding the social and psychological factors underlying the legitimation of social inequalities, the JSM limits its scope to the analysis of the relationship between genuine prejudice and the expression of said prejudice. In other words, JSM analyses the relationship between two prejudiced attitudes, and not the real effect of a prejudiced attitude on discriminatory behaviour. Moreover, JSM is uniquely based on evidence from an extensive theoretical review of attitudes, beliefs, values and norms. This model lacks any further controllable and empirical evidence to test its assumptions directly.

In short, the theoretical models described thus far posit the possibility strategic justifications to legitimize individuals’ discriminatory behaviour towards minority groups. That is to say, justification is used by individuals to legitimize the expression of prejudice without violating the egalitarian values and norms present in certain social contexts.

2. The Hypotheses of the Justified Discrimination Model

Based on the contributions of each theory and model presented thus far, Pereira and colleagues applied a set of hypotheses to an analytical model called the Justified Discrimination Model (JDM; Pereira et al., 2010; 2009). The JDM suggests that

discrimination needs to be legitimised by a non-prejudiced justification in order to be acceptable by the discriminatory individual and to satisfy the socio-normative constraints imposed by the non-prejudicial norm. The main assumptions underlying the model assume that: a) during the last half century individuals were exposed to a process of socialisation by which they internalised both prejudiced attitudes and unprejudiced beliefs (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986); b) individuals undergo psychological tension when interacting with minority groups because of the conflict between the conative component of prejudiced attitudes impelling them to behave in accordance with said attitudes and the internalised egalitarian values compelling them to behave in a fair and non-discriminatory way (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003); c) individuals actively try to satisfy both driving forces by pursuing or, on occasions, formulating justifications that allow them to discriminate and yet still feel that they are complying with their egalitarian values (Pereira, 2012). In a more specific way, the JDM posits that individuals legitimise discrimination in such a way as to allow the two contrasting motivations to co-exist without any tension forming. These assumptions involve several levels of analysis of psychosocial phenomena by combining individual mechanisms (e.g., the psychological tension), motivational factors (e.g., values conflicts), intergroup relations components (e.g., prejudices and discrimination) and ideological processes (e.g., norms and legitimising myths), as had already been argued by Doise (1976) more than 40 years ago.

It is as such that the JDM suggests that individuals need to legitimise their discriminatory behaviour and that they do so by using seemingly unprejudiced justifications (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Jost & Banaji, 2001) because this helps them to resolve the tension between two contrasting driving forces: one that promotes behaviour guided by prejudiced attitudes and the other promoting behaviour guided by a tendency towards fairness, i.e., being egalitarian (e.g., Pereira et al., 2010; 2009). Accordingly, the JDM goes beyond previous theories and models in its analysis of the legitimacy of social inequalities by predicting that the pursuit of justification is driven by these two motivations. The use of justification to legitimize discrimination helps to resolve possible social and psychological conflicts that could rise from the tension between individuals' desire to act in accordance with internalized egalitarian values (as part of their self-image) and, simultaneously, to follow the conative aspect of prejudiced attitude by expressing behaviour patterns consistent with said attitudes (Pereira & Costa-Lopes, 2012).

Specifically, the JDM highlights the role, in discrimination, of justifying factors as a mechanism by which prejudice leads to discrimination, and specifies the normative conditions of the process (see Figure 1). The model presents two general hypotheses: (1) the effect of prejudice on discrimination is mediated by justifying factors; (2) this mediation is moderated by the prominence of the anti-prejudiced norm. From a psychosocial perspective, justification has the function of re-establishing social and psychological coherence in non-prejudicial contexts where individuals feel the conflict between their drive to behave in accordance with prejudiced attitudes (discriminating against the outgroup), and their egalitarian principles, understood as the need to comply with the norm that says that “expressing prejudice is wrong”. However, in some contexts in which the anti-prejudice norm is either not relevant or is not predominant, discriminatory action based on prejudiced attitudes may occur without the need for justification because doing so is not incoherent with the values and norms present in said social contexts (Pereira, 2012).




Figure 1. The Justified Discrimination Model (JDM)

The JDM contributed to research into the normative influence on prejudice and intergroup relations by considering the specificity of the normative context in which a discriminatory action resulted from a prejudiced perception of the target group. The model hypothesizes that the prejudice-discrimination relationship persists with regard to minority groups even in normative contexts that sanction expressions of prejudice (e.g., egalitarian ones) because individuals use justifying factors to legitimize discriminatory acts.

In general, the JDM establishes that the use of justification is a psychological mechanism by which prejudice leads to discrimination in contexts that are not favourable to prejudice, and where individuals define themselves as being egalitarian. Crucially, the JDM extends the logic of the justification function, applying the psychological mechanism to democratic societies; in other words, to societies with laws based on egalitarian values and justice that explicitly punish discrimination based on prejudice.

3. Empirical Evidence for the Justified Discrimination Model²

The JDM explicitly set outs that justifications are mediating factors in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination in democratic societies. Pereira and colleagues (2009; 2010; 2012) suggested that discrimination is motivated by prejudice, and that this driving force is concealed by justifying the discriminatory act, i.e., the use of justification is a tool that mediates prejudicial attitudes and resultant discrimination. As such, the greater the level of prejudice, the greater the need felt by individuals to search for justification in order to discriminate. The perception of threat is one justification factor that was applied to the JDM.

3.1 – The Mediation Role of Perception of Threat

As far as we are aware, LaPiere (1936) carried out the first empirical research analysing the role played by justification on intergroup conflicts. This author analysed justifications of the antipathy (i.e., an example of prejudiced attitude) felt by the population of a small region called Fresno County (California) towards the presence of Armenian immigrants in the region. LaPiere's analysis of the "explanations" of this antipathy showed that the perception of threat was the main factor put forward by the population to explain that antipathy towards said immigrants. Specifically, LaPiere (1936) identified a reasoning that the non-Armenians used to justify their antipathy towards, and lack of trust for, Armenian merchants in the formers' belief that the latter did not fulfil their obligations with the bank. In fact, records of credit standings showed that this perception did bear any great relation with reality and, thus, the perceived

² A detailed description of the studies where the JDM was applied can be found in Pereira (2012).

threat to the economic system was actually just a legitimating myth used by individuals to justify their antipathy towards Armenians immigrants.

LaPiere's (1936) study was especially important for the JDM since it provided the foundation for the role of perceived threat as a justification factor. Crandall and Eshleman (2003) also posited the perception of threat as a factor to justify discrimination. For instance, Pereira et al. (2010) specifically analyzed the role played by the perception of (real and symbolic) threats on how prejudice leads people to discriminate against immigrants, i.e., to reject immigration and the naturalization of immigrants. These authors used data from the European Social Survey (ESS; Round 1, 2002) and from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP; 2003). In Study 1 (ESS data) they analysed whether the relationship between prejudice and the opposition to immigration is mediated by the perception of threat as a justification for opposing immigration. Study 2 (ISSP data) built on the previous study by analysing the role played by perceived threat in justifying opposition to naturalization.

Pereira et al. (2010) showed that the greater the level of prejudice, the greater the perception of threat and the opposition to immigration and immigrant naturalization. It is as such that individuals are opposed to immigration in as far as they can justify their discrimination on the basis of the idea that immigrants represent a threat to the economy or to security. Individuals are against naturalization in as far as they can justify their discrimination on the basis of the belief that immigrants are a threat to their lifestyle, values and the identity of the host country members. Importantly, the relationship between prejudice and an opposition to immigration was strongly mediated by realistic perceptions of threat, but the same was not the case for symbolic ones (i.e., weakly mediated), while the effect on the opposition to naturalization was only mediated by symbolic threat.

In other words, the JDM empirically showed that prejudice moves people to perceive outgroup members as a (realistic or symbolic) threat to the ingroup, and that, furthermore, the more the outgroup is perceived as a threat, the greater will be the probability of outgroup members being discriminated in a way that is perceived as legitimate (Pereira, 2012; Pereira et al., 2010). Moreover, multi-group analyses using the same variables with data from Portugal and Switzerland showed the same pattern of results. This indicates that the legitimation of discrimination through perceptions of threat activated the same psychological mechanism in both countries. This result reinforces empirical evidence for the first hypothesis of JDM; that is to say, the

perception of threat was the first specific justifying factor that mediated the relationship between a prejudiced attitude towards immigrants and the effective opposition to said immigrants.

3.2 – The Moderation Role of the Anti-prejudice Norm

The JDM posits that this legitimization of discrimination is required when the anti-prejudice norm is present. As already discussed in this chapter, the anti-prejudice norm is based on egalitarian values and specifies social disapproval of discriminatory behaviour when these are prejudice-based. This hypothesis was tested by Pereira et al. (2009) when they demonstrated the moderating role of norms (e.g., the anti-prejudice norm) in the legitimization of discrimination. Specifically, they claimed that the prominence of the anti-prejudice norm (e.g., egalitarianism) made legitimacy all the more necessary, and this can be observed by the mediating role played by threat perception in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination. However, the expression of discrimination based on prejudice in a social context where the social norms facilitate the expression of prejudice (e.g., meritocracy) does not need to be legitimized since prejudiced attitudes may be directly expressed as discriminatory acts of behaviour.

In other words, without the pressure of the anti-prejudice norm, the drive to search for justification need not be activated (Pereira et al., 2009; Pereira, 2012). The JDM specifically analysed the infra-humanization effect (i.e., a specific form of prejudice, e.g., Vala, Pereira & Costa-Lopes, 2009) on discrimination against Turkish people and the acceptance of Turkey as an EU country. Infra-humanization can be defined as a tendency to think in an ethnocentric way where “people are inclined to perceive members of outgroups as somewhat less human, or more animal-like, than themselves” (Leyens, et al., 2007, p. 143). It is the process by which people consider their ingroup as fully human (e.g., attribution of typically human features such as secondary emotions) and outgroups as less humans, by denying them “the human essence” (for more, see Demoulin et al., 2009; Leyens et al., 2000; Rohmann et al., 2009).

Pereira et al. (2009) carried out a study in which they asked participants to read either an article showing different representations of how Turkish people expressed less secondary than primary emotions (infra-humanization condition), or a text about how people learn foreign languages (control condition). In the second phase of the study,

they contrasted the prominence of either egalitarian or meritocratic values in specific social contexts. Participants read a text about the importance of egalitarian or meritocratic values, followed by one on Katz and Hass (1988) scales (egalitarianism or meritocratic individualism), depending on the normative context that the participant was involved in. The third phase was described as a study about the entry of new countries into the EU. This involved a questionnaire which measured the perception of symbolic threat and participants' opposition to the Turkish entry into the EU. Participants in the infra-humanization group expressed greater levels of discrimination (i.e., opposition to Turkey joining the EU) in comparison with participants from the control group. As expected, the effect of infra-humanization on discrimination was mediated by symbolic threat. In addition, this mediation only occurred when the egalitarian context was more marked, and not when the context was predominately meritocratic.

The Pereira et al. (2009) studies constituted the first experimental evidence supporting the JDM assumption that the normative context influences the strategic use of justification, such as the perception of symbolic threat in the relationship between infra-humanization and discriminatory attitudes against a (perceived) minority group. Pereira and Vala (2011) replicated this evidence in recruitment scenario in which a black woman applies for a position working in a store (see Pereira et al., 2003 already described in this chapter for similar experimental procedure). These authors tested the influence of the normative contexts on the legitimation of discrimination towards target-groups that are usually protected by the anti-prejudice norm, such as black people. A result specifically important for supporting the JDM was that discrimination against the black candidate was significantly predicated on prejudice, and the relationship between prejudice and discrimination was justified by the economic perception of threat solely when the egalitarian norm was prominent.

Other researchers (e.g., Vala, Lima & Lopes, 2004) also verified the role of norms on prejudice. For instance, Vala et al. (2004) analysed the role of the meritocratic norm on discrimination in a representative sample of 15 EU member States. This research showed that egalitarian values are the basis for the anti-prejudice norm and that meritocratic values support norms that facilitate the expression of prejudiced attitudes (Pereira, 2012). Furthermore, Son Hing et al. (2011) analysed whether meritocracy (i.e., merit-based outcome allocation) was a principle of justice (prescriptive belief) or a hierarchy-legitimizing ideology (descriptive belief). Results supported the hypothesis of a hierarchy-legitimizing ideology in which people believe that meritocracy exists; that is

to say, that individuals' efforts are always rewarded with positive results. The endorsement of a descriptive belief of merit can facilitate the expression of discrimination, since this belief is related to ideologies that legitimize hierarchies (e.g., racism, SDO, political conservatism).

4. Further Directions: The Role Played by Justice Perceptions

Pereira and colleagues (2009; 2010; 2011) identified a psychological mechanism legitimising discriminatory behaviour in contexts in which the anti-prejudiced norm was present. Results indicated that justification is a mediating factor of the prejudice-discrimination relationship using different target-groups in contexts where the perception of egalitarian principles was predominant. However, despite the importance of the egalitarian context and the predominance of the anti-prejudice norm, we posed the question of whether other perceptions of justice impacted differently on the JDM. In this thesis, we use JDM as a point of departure from which to posit the relevance of perceptions of justice in the process of the legitimation of discrimination. Specifically, we sought to analyze whether a justice perception can play the justification role in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination, and whether a justice motivation may drive this legitimation process (see Figure 2). We then sought to build on what is set out in the JDM by positing the hypothesis that the relationship between prejudice and discrimination is mediated by a justice perception because it legitimates discrimination; and that this mediation is driven by a justice motivation.




Figure 2. Justice Applied to the Justified Discrimination Model (JDM)

The literature on the prejudice-discrimination relationship gave us a number of clues regarding the potential role of a specific justice perception. For instance, LaPiere's (1936) study demonstrated that one of the explanations used to justify antipathy (i.e., the expression of prejudice) towards Armenian immigrants in Fresno County (California) was the "inferior code of social morality" (p. 234) associated with this target group. This perception of Armenians' lack of moral values led to social friction since the group was characterized as displaying a tendency to behave in breach of the law (e.g., being trouble-makers). However, this negative perception was not confirmed by the official records of the Armenians' involvement in crime when compared with the official records of non-Armenians. This type of rationalization depends on the perception of justice boundaries, i.e., the justice perception differentiates individuals that share the same morality as the ingroup (e.g., non-Armenians from Fresno County) from individuals or groups that do not share their moral beliefs (e.g., Armenian immigrants in Fresno County). Following a similar rationale, Crandall and Eshleman (2003) suggested that a disparity in moral systems between ingroup and outgroup members could justify the expression of prejudice. These authors argued that the evidence of some moral inferiority, such as perceived in the Armenians in LaPiere's (1936) study leads to 'moral exclusion' or the exclusion from the scope of justice (e.g., Opatow, 1990a; 1990b); in other words, the decision to restrict someone or certain groups to an area beyond the boundaries where principles of justice and moral considerations are applied.

5. Summarizing the Legitimation of Discrimination

In In this chapter we have discussed the way that the relationship between prejudice and discrimination has been theorized and analysed. The importance of the legitimation process needed to be addressed in order to understand the psychological mechanisms behind this relationship. We presented the justified discrimination model (JDM) as a relevant contribution to illustrating the active role played by justification in the process of legitimising discrimination, along with the theoretical models that showed the need for an explanatory tool such as the JDM to analyse this process.

We illustrated the way that the JDM drew on theories presented in this chapter as a step forward towards the conception of a more objective way of examining the legitimation process. In fact, the aversive racism theory explores the psychological

tension that individuals have to face in order to maintain their self-image when, at the same time, they express their racism or prejudice whenever possible (e.g., ambiguous situations). The social dominance and system-justification theories suggest that individuals tend to justify their social context (e.g., group-hierarchies, the status quo), and this helps them to defend and maintain existing social inequalities. In addition, the justification-suppression model, based on previous evidence, theoretically explores those conditions under which discrimination can be justified. In general, these theories and model illustrate the relevance of justifying one's behaviour both to the self and to others. Individuals search for justification in order to act in accordance with the dictates of society (e.g., to maintain prejudiced attitudes regarding disadvantaged groups) and to preserve a positive image for the self and for society as 'good citizens' (e.g., internalizing egalitarian values and norms). This process of adjusting to social expectations configures the psychological tension that individuals feel in everyday intergroup encounters, and is one that the legitimation process tends to solve.

Finally, we presented research using the JDM, showing its applicability to intergroup conflict literature and how it can be used to identify factors of justification that may be involved in the legitimation of discrimination. In fact, the JDM proposed a set of hypotheses concerning the legitimation process of discrimination based on the idea that a justice principle lies behind the drive to justify discrimination. Despite this claim, the model failed to fully consider or directly analyse the influence of justice. And it is as such that we propose to specifically apply justice to the JDM, exploring the role played by justice (perception and motivation) in the legitimation of discrimination. In fact we initially posed the question of whether a perception of justice (such as the scope of justice) could be strategically used as a way to legitimise discriminatory behaviours.

In the following chapter we aim to discuss the scope of justice as a possible justifying factor in the justified discrimination model (JDM). That is to say, we will be presenting the origins, definition and applications of the scope of justice in order to analyse its legitimising role in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination against immigrants.

Chapter 2 – The Scope of Justice³

Some studies exploring justice perceptions in intergroup relations suggest different answers to the question of why and how individuals use justice to derogate others. The scope of justice, the individual's perception that justice principles apply only to ingroup members (e.g., Coryn & Borshuk, 2006; Olson, Cheung, Conway, Hutchison & Hafer, 2011), may also be related to the derogation of outgroups.

1. Origins and Definitions

We often make decisions about justice-related issues in our daily lives. For example, we have to define (at least in our minds) which groups it is important to care about and which groups do not concern us. Usually, we care about and try to protect what we feel to be our group. When we compare groups, the ingroup and the outgroup are salient for those involved (Tajfel, 1984) and we often apply this differentiation between groups to justice-related issues. Who deserves our attention and who does not count? What defines our scope of justice? The scope of justice helps us to answer these questions because it allows us to understand how people justify their (good or bad) behaviour and how people endorse the behaviour of others.

The idea of the scope of justice has emerged in social psychology in the last thirty years. There are multiple definitions of the scope of justice, some of which are conflicting. For example, Deutsch (2006) defined the scope of justice as a phenomenon referring to “who (and what) is included in one's moral community” (p. 52). This definition leads us to consider the scope of justice as a specific type of categorization. It is a type of categorization about who is perceived to be entitled to fairness. Opatow (1990b) introduced the concept by suggesting that the scope of justice is a psychological perception that is modelled by “the prevailing social order, which defines both our relationships with others and our beliefs about their entitlements” (p. 5-6). In addition, Tyler and Lind (1990) suggested a functional definition of the scope of justice as the boundaries specified by the group in order to delimit those who offer “productive exchange relationships” (p. 84) and those who do not.

³ A shorter version of this chapter was published as a peer-reviewed article: Lima-Nunes, A., Pereira, C. R., & Correia, I. (2013). Justice seems not to be for all: Exploring the scope of justice. *In-Mind Magazine*, 17.

The scope of justice has also been defined as an individual's perception of the justice treatment that ingroup and outgroup members should receive (see Hafer & Olson, 2003). It refers to the individuals' perceptions of what their moral community is, i.e., where they set their psychological boundary for fairness (e.g., Coryn & Borshuk, 2006; Opatow, 1990b; Singer, 1996).

In fact, scope of justice literature was not systematically addressed by social psychologists until distributive justice theorists began to discuss judgements concerning the boundaries of justice in the 1980s. For instance, Walzer (1983) was one of the first theorists to explore the idea of boundaries to the enforcement of justice principles. This author raised important questions about the individuals with whom we share justice principles and introduced the concept of spheres of justice. Different spheres of justice are related to certain principles that govern how goods should be distributed in a way that is perceived as just (see also Miller, 2002). Spheres of justice are delineated by boundaries and can be related to independent cities or countries that are capable of arranging their own patterns of division and exchange in ways that are either just or unjust (Walzer, 1983). The applications of boundaries of justice are delineated by social processes such as social categorizations (e.g., "we share our goods with our group and no one else"). Based on this definition, it is recognizable that the spheres suggested by Walzer could be approximated to the scope of justice in relation to the sharing of goods (i.e., justice principles) within a particular sphere of justice, e.g., with our ingroup.

Inspired by theorists such as Walzer (1983) and Tajfel (1984), who were interested in how justice principles are applied to social relations, Wenzel (2000) analyzed the relationship between identity and distributive justice, revealing that the scope of justice is also important in this domain. Wenzel (2000, p. 159) pointed out that:

"a justice judgment requires specification of who will be considered as the potential recipient of the resources to be allocated. The primary categorization defines the boundaries of the justice problem, that is, who is included as a potential recipient and who is excluded as a nonrecipient, or someone outside the decision".

Indeed, there is empirical evidence that supports the idea that group boundaries and categorization processes are at the origin of justice concerns such as the scope of justice (e.g., Mikula & Wenzel, 2000; Singer, 1996). In fact, the composition of the

scope of justice also indicates this origin. The scope of justice is based on a set of norms, moral rules and concerns about rights and justice that distinguishes our (the ingroup's) behaviour from that of others (the outgroup). These components act as a guide to identifying who is categorized as being within our scope of justice (Hafer & Olson, 2003; Opatow & Weiss, 2000); that is, they allow us to know whether to judge others by the same fairness rules that apply to us and to our fellow group members (Beaton & Tougas, 2001).

As it can be seen, the scope of justice has been defined in multiple ways, which creates some obstacles to operationalization. However, there is a core idea that can be used to analyse the process by which justice judgments are applied to intergroup conflict research. Therefore, in this thesis we decided to operationalize the scope of justice as a specific type of categorization in which individuals' decide whether or not to include a target in their moral community depending on whether or not they perceive the target as being worthy of sharing their justice principles. That is, the scope of justice refers to the degree to which the ingroup extends its concerns for justice to the outgroup, an extension which could involve amplifying or restricting the ingroup's scope of justice. Importantly, the perceived amplification or restriction of the scope of justice depends on its psychological and social functions.

2. Functions of the Scope of Justice

An important psychological function of the scope of justice is to protect individuals' well-being when they are perpetrators or supporters of harmful behaviours against a target. Specifically, the process of defining the scope of justice helps individuals to face up to conflicts and decisions about unjust behaviours without threatening their self-concept as fair people. In any process of emerging exclusion in which individuals are directly or indirectly implicated, they try to "feel ok" about their judgments and decisions concerning the process. Internally, people try to protect their self-concept as a 'just' individual when they have morally excluded someone or some group from their scope of justice. This effort to bring about restoration is a means of protecting individuals' well-being and could be based on a motivation to act as if the world were just and, consequently, as if the morally excluded individual or group received the treatment that he/she/they deserved. In other words, the applicability of fairness (amplifying or restricting the scope of justice) could be an important way of

protecting our perception that “the world is just” (see Lerner, 1980), regardless of whether the outcome is good or bad for others (this relationship between the scope of justice and belief in a just world is examined in Chapter 4).

The psychological function of the scope of justice can protect individuals’ well-being but can also perpetuate moral exclusion. Opatow (1990b) argues that the rationalization used by individuals to restore their internal perception of fairness is not very different from the reasons given at a societal level to defend the state-supported harm that occurs in violations of human rights, e.g., in the anti-terrorism war waged by the United States. In fact, “both covert and overt institutionalization of moral exclusion, such as racism and apartheid, are far more virulent and dangerous than the individual manifestation because institutionalized harm occurs on a much larger scale” (Opatow, 1990b, p. 13). Nevertheless, this widespread moral exclusion is only possible within a society in which people individually engage in moral restructuring, that is, when people find moral justification for various inhumane acts (e.g., Bandura, 1990). In this sense, the functions of the scope of justice do not have only a psychological basis since individuals and society are intrinsic in the composition of the scope of justice.

One psychological and social (psychosocial) function of the scope of justice is to protect community membership. According to Walzer (1983) “the primary good we distribute to one another is membership in some human community” (p. 31). The need to be part of a community is essential and helps to structure society as we know it; that is, this need leads us to share morals, values, and justice principles. Individuals within a community should be able to defend themselves and the group from the “threat” posed by others. Individuals outside this community are not perceived as sharing the same morals, values and justice principles and, consequently, are not entitled to the same rights that people within the community have. In other words, individuals excluded from the community’s scope of justice are perceived to have different morals and values that could represent a threat to the ingroup’s own morals and values. This function could be similar to the role played by symbolic threat (see Pereira et al., 2009), another psychological mechanism used by people to justify a prejudiced or infra-humanized perception of a group and discriminatory behaviour against it. In this sense, when people restrict their scope of justice to their ingroup, this action could be a protective response to a possible threat to their community, such as incompatibility with the ingroup’s values, moral and justice principles (e.g., Opatow, 1995).

The restriction of our own scope of justice has also been described (see Opatow, 1995) as an adaptive defence that simplifies our lives and saves time, energy and resources, protecting the community as a whole. For example, excluded groups were not only physically separated from the rest of the community by confinement. The exclusion was also physically enforced by bans on association. Examples of ways in which communities were protected and those who disobeyed were punished through moral exclusion can be found throughout history. In the Middle Ages, rules were created against sheltering or defending heretics. Members that disobeyed these rules were excluded from community privileges and protection. Similarly, in the Second World War, the Nazis imposed bans on providing shelter or food to Jews and those who disobeyed were punished by death.

Apart from the psychological function of group-membership protection, Opatow (1990b) also argues that the scope of justice provides “moral legitimacy” (p. 8). This type of legitimacy can be understood as a social function of the scope of justice, i.e., individuals need to legitimize their social system to face the injustice present in everyday life. For instance, individuals are able to legitimize the status quo and existing social organization and, on the basis of this justification, individuals perpetrate derogation or harmful behaviour (see Costa-Lopes et al., 2013). The process is psychological but the rationale is social. We justify to ourselves the irrelevance of others or the harm caused to them by invoking the “inevitability” of the situation, turning the meaning of our action into a normative, moral and social-based decision (e.g., “It is what it is. I cannot change the world”). Bandura (1990) argues that undesired behaviour can turn into desired behaviour when individuals cognitively change the moral structure of the action, perceiving it as just. Consequently, if someone who is not considered to be within an individual’s scope of justice is harmed, the individual concerned tends to justify this harm as a fair decision (e.g., Opatow, 1995, 1997).

A common element of these proposed functions of the scope of justice is that moral exclusion appears as a consequence of justice judgments. Exclusion from the moral community could occur when the justice principles that regulate ingroup relations are not applied to relations involving outgroup members. That is, moral exclusion can be seen as a consequence of individuals’ restriction of the scope of justice. In fact, the moral exclusion theory states that allowing harm to come to those outside one’s scope of justice is justified and rationalized (Opatow, 1990a, 1990b, 1995; Staub, 1989). The

restriction of the scope of justice relies on legitimacy and justifies the fact that the excluded person/group 'had to receive' the (usually bad) outcome.

Deutsch (1990) gives a real-life situation as an example of how justice terms are included when we rationalize moral exclusion. He explains that this concept provides a basis for understanding how the perception of Eichmann⁴ as a good family man prior to the Second World War changed when he turned to be the real architect of the Holocaust. We may wonder how it is possible for someone to change his justice perception in a way that allows him to consider others as non-entities (e.g., Eichmann's perception of the Jewish population) and to organize their extermination. In addition, this restructured perception can trigger post-moral exclusion. For instance, the perception of Eichmann's atrocities could somehow have been minimized by his fellow Nazi soldiers, by regular German (but not Jewish) citizens and even by himself when it was rationalized that the otherwise "moral man" was just following orders or doing what he thought was right in the name of his own group. Although this kind of rationalization or justification is dangerous, people engage in it every day to decide what is "right" and "wrong" in order to cope with a different range of injustices. With this example, Deutsch emphasized that the process of social judgment (e.g., "Eichmann committed genocide") and rationalization about whether or not a group should be morally excluded (e.g., "Eichmann did what he needed to do") show the malleability of the scope of justice, which helps people to overcome moral concerns and also provides arguments by which engagement in barbaric actions such as Eichmann's can be justified.

The rationale behind these psychological and sociological functions is that they are a way of (not consciously) satisfying the need to maintain our self-image as fair individuals who apply justice to people that "deserve" it. However, what are the mechanisms that motivate people to perceive that justice is applicable to certain groups or entities but not to others? The scope of justice is often known as a concept that helps us to understand why ordinary citizens engage in spiteful and harmful behaviour that can range from extreme forms of harm-doing, such as genocide, to milder forms of exclusion, such as disregarding or despising others (e.g., Olson, Cheung, Conway & Hafer, 2010; Opatow, 1990a, 1990b, 1995). However, the scope of justice can also help

⁴ Adolf Eichmann (1906-1962) was a Nazi Lieutenant Colonel responsible for the treatment of the Jewish population in Germany and German-occupied countries in the Nazi era. He conceived the plan known as the "Final Solution", according to which Jewish citizens were deported en masse to ghettos and extermination camps such as Auschwitz (Arendt, 1963/2003).

us to understand protective behaviours, such as the application of justice concerns to non-humans entities, motivated by the belief that mankind and animals exist within the same boundaries of justice (e.g., Bilewicz, Imhoff, & Drogosz, 2011). These functions can lead the scope of justice to be amplified or restricted and theorists and researchers usually work with one of them in order to identify and analyze the antecedents and consequences of the scope of justice.

3. The Antecedents of the Scope of Justice: Amplifying vs. Restricting the Scope of Justice

Individuals can either expand or restrict their perception of justice boundaries because certain antecedents exist that can modify their perception of these boundaries. These factors result from perceptions of situations, relationships and the utility of applying fairness to those considered as their moral community. The antecedents identified in literature are (a) perceived utility, (b) perceived threat and (c) perceived dissimilarity (see Hafer & Olson, 2003 for review). A few researchers have demonstrated the influence of these variables on individuals' perception of their scope of justice.

Opatow (1993) analyzed the three proposed antecedents of the scope of justice in a study using the beetle (the Bombardier beetle or *Brachinus*) as the target. Opatow cited three justifications for choosing beetles as her target: (1) using a beetle eliminates social desirability; (2) people know very little about beetles, allowing experimental manipulations to be carried out; (3) using a beetle maximized the degree of inequality in social status. This study aimed to manipulate the extent to which the beetle was seen as being beneficial or harmful (the perceived utility of the target); unthreatening or threatening (the perceived threat posed by the target); and more or less similar to the perceiver (its perceived similarity to the target) in order to analyze how these perceptions influenced the way in which the perceiver thought that the beetle should be treated. Specifically, Opatow analyzed individuals' opinions about the construction of a project (a reservoir for drinking water or an industrial complex) that could exterminate the beetle species (i.e., restricting the scope of justice) or protect the beetle's habitat (i.e., amplifying the scope of justice).

Focusing on the first antecedent of the scope of justice (i.e., perceived utility), if a target has a low perceived utility it is more likely that individuals will restrict their

scope of justice, that is, they will not consider justice principles to be applicable to a plant or animal species that is seen as detrimental to human agricultural efforts in comparison with a plant or animal that is seen as beneficial to these efforts. Opatow (1993) asked participants to read one of two versions of a textbook article about proposed construction projects and their possible impact on a species of beetle. In the harmful condition, participants read about the destruction caused by the beetle species and the possible costs resulting from its existence. In the beneficial condition, participants read that the beetle was beneficial to humans and that this species could benefit the economy (by an amount equal to what it would cost in the low-utility condition). In sum, the text said that the beetle was either harmful (costing humans almost a \$1 billion per year) or beneficial (benefiting humans by almost a \$1 billion per year). The results showed that lower utility meant that individuals were more willing to harm the beetles because the participants thought that the harmful beetles were less deserving of protection and presumably regarded their own willingness to harm the beetles as fair and just.

A second proposed antecedent of exclusion is the perceived threat represented by the target, such as the threat posed by incompatibility or competition in the search for resources. Just as the perception of justice during conflict is different from what it is during times of peace, as the conflict escalates, the concern for fairness between groups shrinks (Opatow, 1990b). In other words, the scope of justice is thought to be restricted in situations of high conflict between ingroups and outgroups. In fact, Opatow (1993) also asked participants whether they would support or oppose a construction project depending on the conflict of interest over a scarce resource (e.g., land for humans and habitat for beetles). In the high-conflict scenario, both humans and beetles had a high level of need for the space, and in the low-conflict scenario, only the beetle had a high level of need for the space, since the project would endanger their habitat. The results indicated that in the low-conflict condition, since there was little conflict of interest, participants amplified their scope of justice to apply justice principles to the beetle, i.e., participants' expressed a willingness to stop the construction project. The high-conflict condition led participants to restrict their scope of justice; that is, when the conflict of interest was high, the beetles were increasingly endangered since moral constraints on behaviour were weak for those outside the scope of justice (Opatow, 1990b).

Finally, the third proposed antecedent is a lack of identification or perceived dissimilarity between target and perceiver. For example, the more dissimilar to humans

an animal is perceived to be, the more likely individuals are to consider that the principles of justice do not apply to that animal. This effect of perceived dissimilarity was presented by Opatow (1993) as an intriguing antecedent of the scope of justice.

In fact, Opatow (1993) found an interaction effect between the degree to which the beetles were similar to humans (social, communicative vs. primitive, non-communicative) and the level of conflict between them (helpful project vs. unnecessary project), indicating that in the low-conflict scenario, participants in the similar condition were more likely to consider that their fairness rules applied to the beetles than in the dissimilar condition. However, in the high-conflict scenario, the effect was reversed; that is, participants in the similar condition were less likely to perceive that their fairness rules applied to the beetle species than they were in the dissimilar condition. Qualitative data from an open-ended question after the manipulation of each condition showed that, in the low-conflict scenario, participants took the beetles' perspective and focused on fairness and rights, while in the high-conflict scenario participants focused on self-interest rather than moral issues.

Olson et al. (2011) found similar results: participants expressed greater willingness to harm similar rather than dissimilar beetles in a high-conflict scenario. These findings questioned the assumption that all variables engendered in a condition of similarity will lead to the amplification of the scope of justice. In fact, this study showed that similarity restricts the scope of justice as conflict escalates. This antecedent is an important assumption of the scope of justice that needs to be clarified. For instance, outside of scope of justice studies a possible explanation of these results is provided by social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Individuals' perceptions of similarity and dissimilarity are important cues in intergroup attitudes because of the need for distinctiveness; that is, our social identity needs to be distinct from others' social identity. Consequently, similarities between an individual and an entity could lead to negative attitudes and derogation based on this type of threat (Costa-Lopes, 2010a; 2010b; Valentim, 2008). In studies carried out by Opatow (1990b; 1993) and Olson et al. (2011), the lack of distinctiveness in relation to the beetle in the similarity condition could restrict individuals' perception of their scope of justice.

Two of the main antecedents of the scope of justice – a situation of conflict and a lack of similarity – are also useful in understanding individuals' perception of the scope of justice in human contexts (for a study that contrasts with Opatow's studies with beetles, see Leets, 2001). In fact, Brockner (1990) analyzed the scope of justice as

an individual's perception of the relevance of moral and justice rules to the target. Brockner studied the effects of redundancies on workers who remained employed (i.e., "survivors" of redundancy programmes) by manipulating both the perceived similarity between a redundancy victim (an unemployed peer) and a survivor (a still-employed peer) and whether the victim was compensated for being unemployed. The results indicated that the redundancy process was considered to be more unfair when the survivors perceived themselves to be more similar to the victims and, therefore, when they considered that their justice principles applied to those redundant co-workers. In other words, similarity is an important factor in the scope of justice, in which harm to individuals perceived as similar is seen as more harmful and unfair than harm suffered by other individuals who are not considered to be within the scope of justice.

In general, the antecedents of individuals' perception of the scope of justice are intrinsically related to their representations of the nature of ingroup and outgroup members. Specifically, the outgroup representations used to outline moral boundaries can be prejudiced ideas, an important aspect that has not yet been addressed in justice literature and which this thesis intends to explore. Therefore, within an intergroup relation framework we suggest that prejudice could be an antecedent for the restriction of the scope of justice. Understanding the role played by prejudice as an antecedent of individuals' perceptions of the scope of justice could help to reduce the occurrence of moral exclusion. Knowing the antecedents of the scope of justice, it can be discussed its most analysed aspect: the consequences that it has for moral exclusion. In this sense, in the following section, we focus on the consequences of the restricted scope of justice. The restriction of the scope of justice can be related to exclusion-specific processes of moral exclusion such as biased evaluation of groups, derogation and dehumanization. In other words, the restricted scope of justice is one of the most relevant socio-psychological bases of moral exclusion.

4. Consequences of the Restriction of the Scope of Justice

When individuals perceive that their justice principles are not applicable to outgroup members, that is, when they restrict their perception of the scope of justice to the ingroup, concerns about fair treatment may not apply to the outgroup or can be perceived as irrelevant (e.g., Opatow, 1990a; 1990b). An example of this phenomenon is the way that we assign justice when we think about what the other or outgroup

“deserves” (e.g., “this person does (not) have the same rights that I have”). When individuals consider that justice principles also apply to outgroups, that is, when they amplify their perception of the scope of justice to outgroup members, concerns about justice and fair treatment govern their conduct towards others.

One of the most important consequences of restricting the scope of justice is moral exclusion, which can occur to varying degrees ranging from genocide to showing a lack of concern (Opotow, 1990b). Individuals or groups not considered to be within the scope of justice are more vulnerable to harm-doing or undeserved treatment. In this sense, the scope of justice could be used by individuals to rationalize both the moral exclusion of a person or group and the negative consequences that this exclusion entails. To explain this rationalization, researchers defined four consequences of the decision to restrict the scope of justice. Opotow (1990b) presents ‘moral exclusion’ as a consequence of the way that individuals manage their scope of justice in different situations, so that moral exclusion can be seen as the exclusion of a target based on justice principles. Examples of the moral exclusion of outgroups include phenomena such as the denial of civil rights, slavery, torture, genocide, and mass killing (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1990; Coryn & Borshuk, 2006; Staub, 1989). Opotow (1990b) also distinguished two types of moral exclusion which differ from each other in the treatment or type of harm-doing that the morally excluded suffers. People can exclude someone or some group because they are perceived as a threat or a plague. In this case, the morally excluded can be a victim of extreme forms of harm-doing that include torture and possibly death. Also, people can be morally excluded because they are perceived as irrelevant, non-existent or a nonentity. The harm-doing stemming from this kind of exclusion can be obliviousness or simply a lack of concern about others’ needs.

Taking the types of moral exclusion theoretically distinguished by Opotow (1990b) as their starting point, Olson et al. (2011) proposed that exclusion primarily means excluding a particular person or group from the positive treatment that the ingroup receives or using different rules of fairness for a particular person or group. For instance, the majority of discrimination phenomena could be seen as examples of this type of moral exclusion. The result is often negative treatment of the morally excluded (whereas those who are morally included are treated positively). The second meaning of exclusion from the scope of justice is to consider the excluded person, entity or group as irrelevant in justice terms, which is a form of moral exclusion similar to that proposed by Opotow (1990b). In both cases, individuals may exclude victims of unfairness as a

way of denying that the situation is unjust, failing to take the victim's perspective (Brockner, 1990). In this way, individuals could perceive the situation to be just and legitimate.

Olson et al. (2011) used empirical data to illustrate the two meanings or types of moral exclusion: (a) the exclusion of the target from positive treatment and (b) the perceived irrelevance of the target in justice terms. In Experiment 1, the authors manipulated the perceived utility of a species of beetle by adapting the experimental procedure used by Opatow (1993) that was described earlier in this chapter. Olson et al. (2011) found that participants expressed greater support for the construction project (i.e., extinguishing the beetle species) when the beetles were said to be harmful than when the beetles were beneficial to humans. This result corroborated Opatow's (1993) findings, providing evidence for the first meaning of moral exclusion, i.e., excluding the beetles from positive treatment, which, according to the rules of justice, the actors believed to be legitimate. This kind of exclusion is seen as fair (or justified on some other basis) by the person who engages in excluding (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1990) because it is based on a judgement that is perceived to be fair.

Olson et al. (2011) also provided empirical evidence for the second type/meaning of exclusion, i.e., others are seen to be irrelevant in terms of justice in that justice principles such as procedural and distributive justice do not apply to them as they are considered to be non-moral entities. Irrelevance in justice terms can lead to negative treatment and harm-doing resulting from moral exclusion (e.g., slavery, genocide). In Experiment 2, Olson et al. (2011) asked participants to read about a proposal asking for scarce government resources to help a particular population to obtain better health care. The population that would receive the aid was manipulated (human vs. animals vs. plants). The authors chose plants as the non-entity or irrelevant group in comparison to animals and humans. Two dependent measures (implicit and explicit) were used to analyse the perceived relevance of fairness attributed to each population. The explicit dependent measure was a self-reported measure in which participants evaluated the relevance of justice considerations (i.e., "what is fair?", "what is just?" and "what is moral?") to one of the three populations. The implicit measure was participants' reaction times for the self-reported measures. The authors expected that the time that participants would take to rate the relevance of fairness to plants would be slower than when humans and animal populations were involved, since justice would not be seen to be as relevant to plants as it is for the other two populations. The

results obtained from the explicit dependent measure showed that participants denied help (i.e. carried out a type of harm-doing) to plants due to the perceived irrelevance of this target. In addition, the results obtained from the implicit measure showed that participants took longer to rate fairness in the plant-population condition than in the condition that combined human and animal populations. These results corroborate the second meaning of moral exclusion, for which justice is not applicable to entities considered to be irrelevant.

When a target is not considered to be within the scope of justice he/she is perceived as “psychologically distant” (Opatow, 1994, p. 59), e.g., such targets have different ways of thinking or living. For instance, Bilewicz, Imhoff and Drogosz’s (2011) research into the ‘humanity of what we eat’ showed that omnivorous people might seek a justification for participating in or complying with a complex process of killing animals. In other words, omnivorous people may subjectively minimize the psychological costs of their own actions by pointing out the differences between humans and animals (e.g., “if animals are primitive and have no human-like feelings anyway, it seems legitimate to kill and eat them”). This consequence also provides evidence that restricting the scope of justice could function as a factor by which to justify harming others.

A further consequence of the scope of justice is that the community does not consider that it has moral duties towards morally excluded individuals. In fact, Opatow and Weiss's (2000) research shows that denial of self-involvement in environmental problems minimizes the relevance of disputes over environmental issues, making it possible for people to exclude themselves from the scope of justice of environmental problems. For example, by regarding themselves as “clean” and insignificant contributors to pollution, people assert their irrelevance and consequently accept no moral obligation in this controversy.

Another consequence of not considering a target to be within the scope of justice is that the target is perceived as irrelevant or undeserving of the ingroup’s justice. Indeed, as already discussed above, Opatow (1993) showed that participants who read about the harmful (and expendable) beetle expressed less willingness to protect it. Moreover, Opatow (1997) argues that, in the affirmative-action debate, the idea that a group does not deserve to have certain benefits makes it difficult for people to accept affirmative-action policies. This issue is related to the argument that target groups do not deserve special treatment because they are not different from others.

One well-documented consequence of the scope of justice is the approval of unfair procedures and outcomes for those who are morally excluded, i.e., procedures and outcomes that would not be acceptable if they were directed at someone included within the scope of justice. To illustrate this consequence, Hegtvedt (2005) gives an example of the seething hatred of Americans against Muslim extremists. Coryn and Borshuk (2006) also provided evidence for this. These authors aimed to analyse whether the restriction of the scope of justice conferred legitimacy on violent actions against people perceived as belonging to outgroups. Coryn and Borshuk (2006) designed a mixed-method (quantitative and qualitative) study, making salient a local conflict involving Muslim Americans. The participants read a narrative about a Muslim American family. The narrative was about harassment based on religion and ethnicity carried out by federal officials who entered the home of an elderly Muslim American couple in the middle of the night. The participants also read that their neighbours had reported them as “suspicious foreigners” and that the family was questioned, causing the elderly man to suffer chest pains that required medical attention after the interrogation. The participants’ task was to answer items on a scope of justice scale and to justify their responses. The theme of the first set of justifications involved narratives in which participants restricted their scope of justice on the basis of “threat and revenge” arguments. The second theme involved narratives in which participants amplified their scope of justice on the basis of arguments that evoked “human rights”, i.e., by the perceived humanity of the target. The theme of the third group of justifications was “ambivalence”. The participants’ narratives were about the irrelevance of the target, i.e., the participants were not worried about problems or harm-doing directed at the target. Also, in some narratives, the participants expressed ambivalence towards decisions concerning whether or not to apply justice to the target. A content analysis showed that the participants restricted, conditionally amplified, or just amplified their scope of justice to legitimize the poor treatment received by the Muslim American family. These results demonstrate the malleability of the ingroup’s scope of justice, which can be restricted or amplified depending on which justice principles are applied to the situation. More importantly, participants tried to justify their decision not to help this family by invoking instances of international conflict situations such as the terrorist attacks on the United States, with the revenge discourse being prevalent. Thus, the Muslim American family “had” to be excluded as a deserving outcome.

One of the most common consequences of exclusion from the scope of justice is discrimination (i.e., a mild form of harm) in spheres such as employment and education (Opotow, 1995). Individuals considered to be within the scope of justice can also be exposed to harm-doing. When it occurs, it is perceived as injustice, which could lead to demands for reparative action. By contrast, when the harm is directed at a target not considered to be within the scope of justice, it may not be perceived as a violation of rights, falling instead into the criteria of irrelevance or resulting in dangerous behaviour towards those who are morally excluded (Opotow, 1990b).

We usually do not perceive the suffering inflicted on the excluded as undeserved. Most of the time, moral exclusion towards outgroups is hard to recognize within ourselves, our ingroup and in our own culture. This recognition is harder because individuals use justifications to hide direct exclusion where “the abject condition of those degraded by exclusion serves to justify their degraded treatment” (Opotow, 1995, p. 350). This use of justification is based on perceptions shared by society to make exclusion seem acceptable as an outcome that is inevitable and deserved. In this way, Opotow (1990a) argues that detecting exclusion is important in stopping its progression. For instance, those not considered to be within the scope of justice may not recognize injustices towards themselves because people internalize social norms that maintain the status quo, denying unjust events and, consequently, using self-blaming arguments to justify their own excluded situation.

Generally, research into the scope of justice mainly focuses on determining the extent (amplified vs. restricted) of the scope of justice, considering only the observer’s perspective. However, a few researchers have taken the victim’s perception of exclusion into consideration (see Hafer & Olson, 2003). For example, Tyler and Lind (1990) analysed how group membership influences aspects of justice pertaining to notions of inclusion and exclusion. The results of their research showed that concerns with justice are less relevant to group members that are marginalized in their own group than to members that have a higher status in their group. Consequently, this non-relevance felt by marginalized members in their group leads to a less intense response to their own unjust treatment. Tyler and Lind’s (1990) study was one of several that analysed applications of the scope of justice, i.e., its relationship to other justice principles such as procedural and distributive justice.

5. Applications of the Scope of Justice

Although the idea of scope of justice can be useful in understanding the reasons why people might accept extreme harm inflicted on others (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1990), its application in empirical research has typically focused on less severe responses, such as willingness to recommend punishment, perceptions of deservingness (e.g., Brockner, 1990; Olson, Cheung, Conway & Hafer, 2010; Singer, 1996), and support for discriminatory policies (e.g., Opatow, 1997).

The application of the scope of justice in general justice studies faces some challenges. First, researchers need to specify the conditions that activate a self-interested orientation and other conditions that specify the outcomes of those orientations. The examination of such conditions may also reveal when procedural justice or distributive justice is more important in defining the scope of justice. Second, as a great deal of justice-related research illustrates, people's perceptions of what is just varies in accordance with a number of factors, including their own moral standards and implicit beliefs about their moral communities. However, researchers normally tend not to examine the fundamental consequence of different perceptions of justice; that is, conflict (Hegtvedt, 2005). For instance, Opatow (1997) addressed conflict (e.g. the affirmative action debate) from the perspective of different justice principles: procedural justice, distributive justice, and the scope of justice. She argues that there are three levels of arguments or abstraction (low-, mid- and high-level), using Susteian's (1995) suggestion that these levels of arguments relate to different principles when people rationalize justice in disputes. For instance, Opatow (1997) indicates that (1) procedural justice arguments involve a low-level of abstraction; (2) distributive justice uses mid-level arguments; and (3) scope of justice decisions are based on a high level of abstraction.

Procedural justice, being the practical application of rules and procedures, is consistent with low-level principles that facilitate agreements between sides in a dispute. When the focus is distributive justice, the arguments are grounded in social resources as well as in political and economic policies that lead to a mid-level principle of justice argument. However, the rationale about which form of justice to apply in a conflict is a decision about who is included or excluded from the scope of justice. The scope of justice is focused on rights, entitlement and discrimination and is consistent with a high level of argument as an abstract principle of justice. In other words,

focusing on the scope of justice to discuss an issue such as affirmative action is harder than it would be in procedural or distributive terms because of the difficulty of debating moral issues. Conflict scenarios provide just one example of how the relationship between procedural justice, distributive justice and the scope of justice can be examined and, specifically, they represent one way of applying the scope of justice to different justice principles.

In fact, there is a prevalence of empirical research into the relationship between procedural (as opposed to distributive) justice and the scope of justice, specifically within an explanation of the concept that focuses on “deservingness” (see Hafer & Olson, 2003). For example, Brockner (1990) observed that, in a workplace context, a perception of low procedural fairness tends to occur when employees know that their peers or people to whom they feel close are made redundant. Participants expressed a low level of concern about procedural fairness when it did not relate to their peers or to individuals with whom they share similarities.

In addition, a set of studies designed by Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas and Weinblatt (1999) corroborates this finding. These authors analysed whether perceptions of deservingness influence the relationship between respect and fair treatment. Deservingness is a concept proposed by Hafer & Olson (2003) that is intended to closely resemble the scope of justice and, to some extent, function as a confound variable. It is significant that Heuer et al. (1999) linked deservingness to procedural justice judgments (such as respectful treatment). In study 1, the context is a workplace where participants had to analyse someone else’s behaviour. Specifically, participants were asked to analyse whether positive vs. negative behaviour, in a situation of high vs. low responsibility for that behaviour, and resulting in respectful vs. disrespectful treatment, was influenced by deservingness. The results indicated that in a high-responsibility condition, negative behaviour led to disrespectful treatment being perceived as fairer than respectful treatment. In other words, the participants perceived that disrespectful treatment is the fairest outcome for someone who intended to perpetrate negative behaviour. Analysing this result from the point of view of scope of justice literature, it can be argued that someone else’s negative behaviour can justify the procedural unfairness suffered by this individual because it was deserved; that is, the other, who is not considered to be within the scope of justice, suffered a negative outcome due to procedural unfairness and this was well deserved because of his/her behaviour.

6. Summarizing the Scope of Justice

Having analysed the concept of the scope of justice and the related research, I can summarize this chapter by saying that the scope of justice allows justice judgments to be made in order to help individuals to answer the question “who”: Who does not count? Who is deserving? Who is irrelevant? Who is important? As noted above, the scope of justice can be situated beyond the “moral”, with good and bad consequences for those outside its boundaries.

The scope of justice literature has not yet provided a clear answer to the question of whether exclusion from the scope of justice is a way of derogating or a form of derogation itself. Hafer and Olson (2003) tried to resolve this difficulty by arguing that inclusion/exclusion is not exclusively related to positive/negative outcomes. These authors stress that when justice is perceived as being irrelevant to the target (because he/she is excluded), the resultant reactions will not necessarily be negative; that is, factors other than justice could induce positive treatment towards the target. In this sense, exclusion from the scope of justice should not be interpreted as derogation itself but can be a justice-based rationalization that (when salient) guides behaviour.

The scope of justice is currently recognized as an important mechanism in uncovering justice processes that lie behind important real-world issues. One of its main functions is to legitimize the derogation of outsiders and the promotion of social inequalities. In this vein, studying individuals’ perception of the scope of justice can be a way of understanding intergroup conflicts and how unjust outcomes towards target groups are rationalized, i.e., by restricting the scope of justice. Empirical studies have shown that the saying “justice is for everyone” is not an appropriate phrase to describe people’s behaviour. It seems that people act much more in accordance with the idea that “justice is for those who are not excluded from our boundaries of fairness”.

Following this idea, in this thesis we propose that the scope of justice can influence discrimination, i.e., the greater the restriction of the scope of justice, the greater the discrimination, because individuals can use the ingroup’s restriction of the scope of justice to legitimise derogation towards the outgroup. So far, the scope of justice has been analyzed and theorized in relation to several influences. One insufficiently studied influence on the scope of justice is the role played by prejudice in amplifying or restricting the scope of justice and the legitimizing effect of this

restriction on discriminatory attitudes and behaviours. This thesis intends to contribute to the understudied role played by the scope of justice in intergroup relations.

Chapter 3 - The Mediation Role of the Scope of Justice

In the present thesis, we aim to clarify the role played by justice perceptions in the psychological process underlying the legitimization of discrimination against immigrants. We focused on the prejudice-discrimination relationship and the assumptions of the Justified Discrimination Model (JDM; Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009) which states that individuals actively search for justifications in order to disguise their prejudice-based discrimination, legitimating it. As we discussed in Chapter 1, the JDM predicts that individuals can simultaneously discriminate against minority groups as a result of their prejudiced attitudes and maintain the feeling that they have acted in a fair and unprejudiced way. The model predicts that a legitimating mechanism acts to solve this apparent contradiction. Legitimation is the psychological mechanism through which individuals solve the tension between the motivation to behave according to their negative attitudes against minority groups and to maintain their fair and unprejudiced self-concept. Thus, individuals feel the need to use an apparently unprejudiced justification in order to legitimise discrimination (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Jost & Banaji, 2001).

Based on the literature on legitimization of social inequalities, we operationalized the legitimising role played by the scope of justice as the mechanism through which prejudice relates to discrimination. We argue that a restricted perception of the scope of justice can legitimise discrimination against immigrants. Our rationale is that by restricting their scope of justice, nationals can discriminate against immigrants without threatening their belief that they are acting in a just way. That is, the scope of justice can influence discrimination against immigrants in the sense that the more nationals restrict their perception of the scope of justice to the ingroup, the lower the threat to the self-concept posed by engaging in discriminatory treatment against outgroup members such as immigrants.

This psychological process is in line with the idea of a general motivation to differentiate the ingroup positively without intentional harmful consequences to the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, the allocation of resources and moral values to the ingroup intrinsically excludes the outgroup from positive outcomes, shrinking the possibility of the outgroup achieving evaluated positively and to be successful. The strategy inherent to the categorization process of favouring our own

group and discriminating the other group from resources is important to the maintenance of the *status quo*. Since the scope of justice can be considered as a type of categorization (as suggested by Wenzel, 2000), it is possible that individuals tend to restrict their scope of justice in order to only allow a minimum number of people to access the same justice that the ingroup is entitled to. In this way, applying justice principles only to the ingroup is a strategy of maximization of shared justice, rights and resources that the ingroup already has in its hands.

Importantly, this tendency to restrict the scope of justice only to the ingroup could be determined by prejudiced attitudes. That is, individuals need to use an unprejudiced-based justification (e.g., incongruence of moral values) to legitimize discrimination. Consequently, restricting access to justice to nationals would lead to a higher support for discriminatory policies against immigrants, preventing them from accessing the same morals, values and justice principles that nationals are entitled to.

In this sense, we reasoned that the restriction of the scope of justice would justify discriminatory acts in order to legitimize the difference between nationals (ingroup) and immigrants (outgroup), using a seemingly non-discriminatory justice-based explanation. This is the case because this process is perceived as fair by the ingroup, as it is just trying to protect its “goods” (e.g., “immigrants do not share the same moral values that we nationals share”; “only nationals are entitled to be protected by the law”). For example, members of a majority group may use their perception of the scope of justice to justify their lack of support for inclusive actions regarding outgroup members, as when affirmative action favouring minority groups is perceived to be unfair and thus illegitimate (Opatow, 1997). Thus, by indicating individuals’ perceptions about the applicability of fairness, the scope of justice allows us to understand how people rationalise unjust outcomes for target groups.

Following this rationale, we propose these hypotheses: the relationship between prejudice and discrimination against immigrants will be mediated by nationals’ restricted perception of the scope of justice, that is, the more the prejudiced attitude towards immigrants, the more the discrimination against immigrants. Following this process, we expect that the greater the prejudice, the greater the restricted perception of the scope of justice, and consequently, the greater the restricted perception of the scope of justice, the more the discriminatory actions against immigrants. In addition, depending on the strength of the mediation, the effect of prejudiced attitudes on discrimination against immigrants would be weaker after introducing the restricted

perception of the scope of justice in the model. These hypotheses were tested sequentially in the studies described below.

Since we conducted the research in Portugal, we chose Brazilian immigrants as our target group throughout the studies. This choice was based on two reasons: (1) The Brazilian community is the largest immigrant community living in Portugal, and (2) these immigrants are the ones that, in 2008, reported the highest levels of discrimination by the host community (44%), only behind broader communities such as Roma people and African immigrants in Europe (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA, 2009).

1. Study 1

In this study we adopted a correlational design in order to explore whether the scope of justice plays a role in discrimination against immigrants. Evidence shows that the expression of prejudice in discrimination occurs in an indirect way (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Pereira et al., 2010), that is, individuals need to justify their prejudice attitude using a non-prejudiced justification to actually discriminate. Based on this evidence, we reasoned that if the scope of justice plays a legitimising role in the derogation of outgroups (e.g., Opatow, 1995; Staub, 1989), a restricted perception of the scope of justice should mediate the relationship between prejudice and discrimination against immigrants. In other words, the restricted scope of justice acts as a legitimation factor that motivates and justifies derogation (e.g., Opatow, 1997), allowing the indirect expression of prejudice in discrimination by restricting the scope of justice. Specifically, the restricted perception of the scope of justice legitimizes the harm that befalls the group not protected by justice (in this case, immigrants).

In this sense, we hypothesized that the greater the nationals' prejudice against immigrants, the more the nationals' perception of the scope of justice would be restricted only to nationals and, the greater this restriction, the greater their support for discriminatory policies against immigrants would be.

1.1 – Method

Participants. One hundred and twelve Portuguese university students ($M_{age} = 19.7$, $SD = 5.57$; 95 female and 17 male) participated voluntarily in this study.

Prejudice measure. We measured prejudice using the Portuguese version of the blatant and subtle prejudice scales (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Vala, Lopes & Lima, 2008). The blatant prejudice scale has 10 items (e.g., “Brazilian immigrants have jobs that Portuguese people should have”; “Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants can never really be comfortable with each other, even if they are close friends”; “Brazilian immigrants come from less able races and this explains why they are not as well off as most Portuguese people”; $\alpha = .83$). Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with each item by using a 7-point scale (1 = strong disagreement to 7 = strong agreement). We submitted the scores to a principal component analysis that extracted one factor with an eigenvalue higher than 1.00 that explained 40.84% of the variance. In Table 1, the factor analysis (and loadings) of the blatant prejudice scale is displayed.

Table 1. Factor analysis of Blatant Prejudice Scale

Blatant Prejudice Scale	Factor 1
I would mind if a Brazilian immigrant person who had a similar economic background as mine joined my close family by marriage	.76
If a child of mine had children with a Brazilian immigrant and my grandchildren were <i>lusu-brasileiro</i> I would be bothered.	.74
Brazilian immigrants belong to a less intelligent race and that explains why they are not in a good situation such as the Portuguese people.	.74
I would mind if a suitable qualified Brazilian immigrant person was appointed as my boss	.70
I would not be willing to have sexual relationships with a Brazilian immigrant	.67
In what honesty may concern, I think that Portuguese and Brazilian immigrants are very different.	.65
Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants can never be really comfortable with each other, even if they are close friends	.61
Brazilian immigrants have jobs that Portuguese people should have	.56
Most Brazilian immigrants living here who receive support from welfare could get along without it if they tried	.46
Most politicians in Portugal care too much about Brazilian immigrants and not enough about the average Portuguese people	.40
Eigenvalue	4.08
Explained variance	40.84%

The subtle prejudice scale has 8 items (e.g., “Brazilian immigrants transmit values and skills to their children that are different from what is need to be successful in Portuguese society”; “In comparison with Portuguese people, Brazilian immigrants are very different in religious beliefs and practice”; “In comparison with Portuguese people, Brazilian immigrants are very different in the language they speak”; $\alpha = .77$). Participants indicated their agreement with each item from both scales using a 7-point scale (1 = strong disagreement to 7 = strong agreement). The scores of the subtle prejudice scale were submitted to a factor analysis (principal component analysis) that extracted one factor which explained 39.11% of the variance (see Table 2).

Table 2. Factor analysis of Subtle Prejudice Scale

Subtle Prejudice Scale	Factor 1
In comparison with Portuguese people, Brazilian immigrants are very different in the values that they teach their children.	.76
In comparison with Portuguese people, Brazilian immigrants are very different in their sexual values and sexual practices.	.76
Brazilians living here teach their children values and skills different from those required to be successful in Portugal.	.76
In comparison with Portuguese people, Brazilian immigrants are very different in their religious beliefs and practices.	.70
Many other groups have come to Portugal and overcome prejudice and worked their way up. Brazilian immigrants should do the same without special favor.	.61
Brazilian living here should not push themselves where they are not wanted.	.46
In comparison with Portuguese people, Brazilian immigrants are very different in the language that they speak.	.42
It is just a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If Brazilian immigrants would only try harder they could be as well off as Portuguese people.	.38
Eigenvalue	3.13
Explained variance	39.11%

Scope-of-justice measure. We developed a 5-item scope-of-justice scale to measure a restricted (as opposed to amplified) perception of the boundaries of applicability of justice principles to the relationship between Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants (“In what concerns justice, Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants belong to different worlds”; “When we talk about justice, Brazilian immigrants and the Portuguese do not share the same principles”; “Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants share the same moral community”, reversed; “Brazilian immigrants share Portuguese social-justice”, reversed; “The principles of justice of Portuguese people are applicable to Brazilian immigrants”, reversed). Participants indicated their agreement with the sentences using a 7-point scale (1 = strong disagreement to 7 = strong agreement). The scores were submitted to a factor analysis (principal component analysis) that revealed only one factor which explained 43.61% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.18; factor loadings from 0.58 to 0.77; see Table 3). Moreover, reliability analysis indicated that this scale has good internal consistency ($\alpha = .68$; see the Portuguese version in Appendix A.1).

Table 3. Factor analysis of the Scope of Justice Scale

Scope of Justice Scale	Factor 1
In what concerns justice, Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants belong to different worlds.	.77
When we talk about justice, Brazilian immigrants and the Portuguese do not share the same principles.	.69
The principles of justice of Portuguese people are applicable to Brazilian immigrants (Reverse).	-.66
Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants share the same moral community. (Reverse)	-.59
Brazilian immigrants share Portuguese social-justice. (Reverse)	-.58
Eigenvalue	2.18
Explained variance	43.61%

Discrimination measure. We operationalized discrimination by means of the participants’ support for discriminatory policies against immigrants (SDP). We developed a 5-item scale to measure SDP using these items: “The national health service should charge Brazilian immigrants more than what Portuguese nationals are

charged”; “Brazilian immigrants should pay more for social security than Portuguese nationals”; “The Portuguese courts should give more severe sentences to Brazilian immigrants than those given to Portuguese nationals”; “Portugal should prohibit Brazilian immigrants from running for political office”; “Portugal should give permission to all Brazilian immigrants to vote in Portuguese elections” (reverse). Participants indicated their agreement using a 7-point scale (1 = strong disagreement to 7 = strong agreement). The scores were submitted to a factor analysis (principal component analysis) that revealed only one factor which explained 53.97% of the variance (see Table 4). Reliability analysis indicated that this scale has good internal consistency ($\alpha = .76$; see Portuguese version in Appendix A.2).

Table 4. Factor analysis of the Support for Discriminatory Policies (SDP) Scale

Support for Discriminatory Policies	Factor 1
The National Health Service should charge Brazilian immigrants more than what Portuguese nationals are charged.	.87
Brazilian immigrants should pay more for social security than Portuguese nationals.	.84
The Portuguese courts should give more severe sentences to Brazilian immigrants than those given to Portuguese nationals.	.80
Portugal should prohibit Brazilian immigrants from running for political office.	.67
Portugal should give permission to all Brazilian immigrants to vote in Portuguese elections. (Reverse)	-.38
Eigenvalue	2.70
Explained variance	53.97%

1.2 – Results

Given the correlational nature of the data, we initially verified the correlation between the developed measures (SDP and the Scope of Justice) and the prejudice scales (see Table 5). As can be seen, SDP is positively correlated with all the other measures. All correlations are in the predicted way to find the mediation.

Table 5. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the measures used in Study 1 (Cronbach's Alpha in Brackets)

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	SDP	Scope of Justice	Blatant Prejud	Subtle Prejud
SDP	2.84	0.92	(.76)			
Scope Justice	3.31	0.78	.51**	(.68)		
Blatant Prejud.	2.28	0.76	.48**	.50**	(.83)	
Subtle Prejud.	3.23	0.79	.46**	.46**	.62**	(.77)

Note. SDP = support for discriminatory policies.
 ** $p < .01$.

We then used a multiple-regression approach to verify whether the relationship between (blatant and subtle) prejudice and the SDP is mediated by the scope of justice. For this purpose, we estimated three regression models. The parameters estimated for the three steps are shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by the scope of justice in the relationship between (blatant and subtle) prejudice and discrimination against immigrants (SDP)

Predictors	Criterion variables					
	Step 1: SDP		Step 2: SJ		Step 3: SDP	
	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β
Intercept	0.99		1.73		0.33	
Blatant Prejudice	0.39	.32**	0.36	.35***	0.25	.21*
Subtle Prejudice	0.20	.21*	0.23	.24*	0.21	.18 [†]
Scope of Justice (SJ)					0.38	.32***
	<i>R</i> = .52		<i>R</i> = .53		<i>R</i> = .59	
Model information	$R^2_{Adjusted}$ = .26		$R^2_{Adjusted}$ = .27		$R^2_{Adjusted}$ = .33	
	$F_{(2,109)}$ = 20.38		$F_{(2,109)}$ = 21.64		$F_{(3,108)}$ = 19.15	
	$p < .001$		$p < .001$		$p < .001$	

Note. *b* = Unstandardized coefficients; β = Standardized coefficients

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p \leq .05$; [†] = .08.

In the first model, we regressed SDP on blatant and subtle prejudice. As predicted, the results showed that both prejudice measures significantly predicted SDP, so that the higher the level of blatant and subtle prejudice, the more the participants supported discriminatory policies against immigrants. In the second model, we regressed the scope of justice on both forms of prejudice. The results indicated that blatant and subtle prejudice have reliable effects on the restricted view of the scope of justice, demonstrating that the greater their prejudice, the more participants restricted their scope of justice.

In the third model, we added the scope of justice to the estimated model for the first step towards discrimination. The results indicated that the effect of the scope of justice on the SDP was significant. The effect of blatant prejudice decreased substantially but remained significant; however, there was no direct effect of subtle prejudice in this model. These results indicated that the relationship between blatant prejudice and discrimination was partially mediated by the restricted scope of justice ($z = 2.44$; $p = .01$). In addition, the scope of justice also mediated the relationship between subtle prejudice and discrimination ($z = 1.92$; $p = .05$).




Figure 3. Effect of blatant and subtle prejudice on discrimination against Brazilian immigrants, mediated by a restricted perception of the scope of justice. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p \leq .05$; † = .08.

Figure 3 shows the mediation analysis. Despite the confirmed partial mediation by blatant prejudice, the two types of prejudice are high correlated ($r = .60$, $p < .001$)

and there is no specificity to strictly differentiate blatant and subtle prejudice in this model. In this sense, we combined blatant and subtle prejudice scales in one variable that we called ‘Prejudice’ ($\alpha = .87$), in order to verify whether the mediation is still present.

Table 7 shows the parameters estimated from the re-analysed mediation. Again, we used a multiple-regression approach to verify whether the relationship between prejudice (subtle and blatant combined) and the SDP is mediated by the scope of justice. Three regression models were estimated to analyse this mediation.

Table 7. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by the scope of justice in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination against immigrants (SDP)

Predictors	Criterion variables					
	Step 1: SDP		Step 2: SJ		Step 3: SDP	
	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β	<i>B</i>	β
Intercept	0.98		1.69		0.33	
Prejudice	0.69	.52***	0.60	.53***	0.46	.35***
Scope of Justice (SJ)					0.38	.32**
	<i>R</i> = .52		<i>R</i> = .53		<i>R</i> = .59	
	$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .27$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .28$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .33$	
	$F_{(1,110)} = 41.27$		$F_{(1,110)} = 43.83$		$F_{(2,109)} = 29.01$	
	$p < .001$		$p < .001$		$p < .001$	

Note. *b* = Unstandardized coefficients; β = Standardized coefficients

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$.

In the first model, we regressed SDP on prejudice. Corroborating the previous mediation, the results showed that prejudice strongly predicted SDP, so that the higher the level of prejudice, the more the participants supported discriminatory policies against immigrants. In the second model, we regressed the restricted scope of justice on prejudice. The results indicated that prejudice again has reliable effects on the restricted scope of justice, demonstrating that the greater the prejudice, the more participants restricted their scope of justice. Finally, in the third model, we added the scope of justice to the estimated model in the first step towards SDP. Results indicated that the

effect of the scope of justice on SDP was significant. The direct effect of prejudice decreased but remained significant (as the blatant prejudice in the previous mediation model).

As can be seen, results using the two types of prejudice combined indicated the same significant effect of the scope of justice on the SDP that was found in the previous estimated model, confirming the partial mediation by the Sobel test ($z = 3.11$; $p = .001$; see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Effect of prejudice on discrimination against Brazilian immigrants, mediated by a restricted perception of the scope of justice.

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$.

1.3 – Discussion

This study provides the first evidence that a specific justice perception could play an important role in the legitimising process underlying prejudice and discrimination. In fact, the results showed that the more participants were prejudiced, the more they restricted their scope of justice and, consequently, the more they showed support for discriminatory policies against immigrants. The initial hypothesis was confirmed, that is, the relationship between prejudice and discrimination against immigrants was mediated by nationals' restricted perception of the scope of justice.

The process of justification based on the restriction of the scope of justice allows individuals to differentiate between ingroup and outgroup (e.g., Tajfel, 1970) when the consequence to the outgroup is not as extreme, such as slavery or torture. Nationals are motivated to differentiate their moral standards and the entitlement of sharing the same

rights of immigrants. When nationals restrict their scope of justice, immigrants can be considered irrelevant for justice that nationals are entitled to. We empirically demonstrated this rationale: a prejudiced attitude of Portuguese students towards Brazilian immigrants predicted a restricted perception of the scope of justice wherein Brazilian immigrants should have restricted access to justice. Accordingly, this restriction of the scope of justice predicted a greater support for discriminatory policies directed at Brazilian immigrants. Our results corroborate other evidence showing the role played by the scope of justice in the derogation of outgroup members (e.g., Coryn & Borshuk, 2006; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), in that prejudiced people restrict their scope of justice in order to legitimize their support for discriminatory policies.

Restricting the scope of justice is a way to justify a discriminatory intention and action without using a prejudice-based reasoning because, with this strategic use of justification, the maintenance of individuals' self-concept as fair and just is not threatened. This non-threatened feeling is only possible because individuals use justice arguments to legitimate their discriminatory behaviour (Mikula & Wenzel, 2000). In fact, justice is a strong basis to all kinds of debates: it is difficult to refute and it has the legitimacy to stipulate entitlements. Justice is the ultimate resource to judge human behaviour within a certain society, being a way to justify our acts even before it is used to legitimate our own behaviour. This strong specificity leads us to suggest that the restriction of the scope of justice can be a psychological mechanism that underlies the relationship between prejudice and discrimination.

Based on this first evidence, we wondered whether individuals would maintain the strategic use of the restricted scope of justice to legitimise discrimination against immigrants when they express (a) individual prejudice, i.e., their own prejudiced attitudes towards immigrants, or (b) cultural prejudice, i.e., prejudice salient in society, and (c) whether this mediation effect can be replicated in a more controllable environment such as in an experimental study.

2. Study 2

This study aims to replicate the previous one and extend its results to cultural prejudice against immigrants. Based on evidence from Study 1, we designed an experimental study to analyse the influence of cultural prejudice on discrimination against immigrants (SDP). As far as we know, there is no well documented procedure

that shows prejudice being successfully manipulated; however, concepts related to prejudice such as infra-humanization (e.g., Pereira et al., 2009) and stereotypes have been successfully manipulated (e.g., Devine, 1989). The internalization of the anti-prejudice norm into the personal belief system is what normally differentiates high and low-prejudiced people in Western democratic societies. We suggest that what is missing at this point in prejudice research is a manipulation that combines cultural prejudice and individual expression of discrimination. For instance, Devine (1989) argues that since prejudice is cultural-based, it is socially composed by and shared between members of a certain group. People within a society are aware of prejudice against target groups, that is, cultural prejudice is salient and sometimes it is internalized. In her study, participants were asked to list the components of the stereotype of Black people but they were also informed that the experimenter was only interested in how people in society think, and not in the participant's personal opinion about the content of stereotypes. Devine (1989) showed that both high and low prejudiced participants were aware of the content of cultural stereotypes of Black people. Since she was able to manipulate the salience of cultural stereotypes, we aimed to manipulate the salience of cultural prejudice using a similar procedure to the one Devine used to manipulate cultural stereotypes. Therefore, instead of trying to manipulate individual prejudice, we intended to manipulate the expression of cultural prejudice. Specifically, we wanted to test whether the activation of cultural prejudice (i.e., salience of how society thinks) would influence discrimination against immigrants in the same way we observed at the individual level.

In fact, previous research such as Camino, da Silva, Machado and Pereira (2001) analyzed subtle racial prejudice in Brazil and found that cultural prejudice is an important indicator of the perpetuation of discrimination. Results indicated that cultural prejudice can be a 'reaction formation' since individuals tend to deny their own prejudice but, at the same time, express strong cultural prejudice (e.g., "Brazilian people are racist but I am not"). The results showed that 82% of participants were aware that there is prejudice against Black people in Brazil and, at the same time, considered themselves as non-prejudiced individuals. This contradiction exists because the anti-prejudice norm is pressuring the individual prejudice not to be expressed, which does not happen with the expression of cultural prejudice, that is, the expression of cultural prejudice is not pressured by the anti-prejudice norm. In a similar way, Devine (1989) explains that when cultural stereotypes are activated, the automatic processing that expresses them is not controlled by the egalitarian ideals that individuals have

integrated in their self-concept. Accordingly, the expression of cultural prejudice is a ‘bad habit’ that people are used to applying since individuals have access to this information due to their integration in society. For Devine (1989), the automaticity of how we use this information is only possible when the conflict is not salient since the question is related to the information that society or group thinks, not the individuals’ position, allowing the expression of discriminatory behavior. Camino et al. (2001) indicate that individuals avoid the responsibility for the expression of racial prejudice at the individual level but they have no problem to express it at the societal level. These authors suggested that this pattern of expression of cultural prejudice is in line with a racist ideology where the latent racial prejudice is always present in society.

Based on these studies, our rationale is that when individuals are instructed to answer some questions as ‘how does society think about immigrants’, they would feel more free to express discrimination, that is, they would feel released from the anti-prejudice norm that pressures individuals to suppress discrimination. Specifically, our goal is to verify (a) the influence of cultural prejudice on discrimination against immigrants (SDP), and (b) whether this influence is mediated by nationals’ restriction of the scope of justice, replicating findings from Study 1.

In this sense, we expected that when individuals are asked to answer the questionnaire about “what the Portuguese society thinks about immigrants”, the expression of SDP will be significantly higher than when no instruction about society is given, as the source of prejudice is not in the individual but in society. Therefore, in the cultural prejudice condition, participants will express more restriction of the scope of justice and, the greater this restriction, the greater the support for discriminatory policies against immigrants. In this sense, the instruction to think about what society thinks will activate prejudice against immigrants. If this activation occurs, there will be a higher support for discriminatory policies and this effect will be mediated by the restricted scope of justice.

2.1 – Method

Participants and Design. One hundred Portuguese university students ($M_{age} = 21.1$, $SD = 2.72$; 47 female, 52 male and 1 not reported) participated voluntarily in this study. Participants were randomly allocated to one cell of cultural prejudice vs. control between-subjects unifactorial design.

Cultural Prejudice manipulation. We adapted Devine's (1989, Study 1) procedure to manipulate cultural prejudice. Participants in the cultural prejudice condition were asked to answer some questions based on the Portuguese society's opinion about Brazilian immigrants living in Portugal. In the same header, participants were instructed that we did not want to know their personal opinion about this group but were only interested in what the Portuguese society thinks about Brazilian immigrants. In the control condition, participants did not read any specific instructions about the target group. Participants in this condition were asked to answer some questions with no further information about the content of the following task.

Scope-of-Justice measure. Participants answered the developed 5-item scale used in Study 1 (e.g., "In what concerns justice, Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants belong to different worlds"; "When we talk about justice, Brazilian immigrants and the Portuguese do not share the same principles"; $\alpha = .72$). Participants showed their agreement with each sentence on a 7-point scale (1 = strong disagreement to 7 = strong agreement).

Discrimination measure. Participants answered the same 5-item scale used in Study 1 to measure the Support of Discriminatory Policies (SDP; e.g., "The national health service should charge Brazilian immigrants more than what Portuguese nationals are charged"; "Brazilian immigrants should pay more for social security than Portuguese people"; $\alpha = .83$). Participants showed their agreement with each sentence on a 7-point scale (1 = strong disagreement to 7 = strong agreement).

Manipulation check. After answering the dependent variables, participants were asked to answer seven items from the blatant prejudice scale (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Vala, Lopes & Lima, 2008; e.g., "Brazilian immigrants have jobs that Portuguese people should have"; "Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants can never really be comfortable with each other, even if they are close friends"; $\alpha = .86$). We chose blatant over subtle prejudice because we intended to check whether the manipulation influenced the blatant expression of prejudice at the cultural level. The analysis of this manipulation check confirmed that the procedure we used to manipulate cultural prejudice was successful. Participants expressed significantly higher blatant prejudice in

the cultural prejudice condition ($M = 3.67$; $SD = 1.13$) than in the control condition ($M = 2.80$; $SD = 1.03$), $t = -4.01$, $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

2.2 – Results

Preliminary analysis: Correlational Evidence

In order to replicate the mediation found in Study 1, we tested the mediation between blatant prejudice (i.e., the measure used as manipulation check), the restricted scope of justice and SDP. The mediation was tested separately for participants in the control and in the cultural prejudice condition using a multiple-regression approach.

We first tested the mediation in the control condition (see Figure 5). In the first step, we regressed SDP on blatant prejudice. As in Study 1, results showed that blatant prejudice strongly predicted SDP, so that the higher the level of blatant prejudice, the more participants supported discriminatory policies against Brazilian immigrants. In the second step, we regressed the restricted scope of justice on blatant prejudice. Again, results showed that the greater the blatant prejudice, the more participants demonstrated a restriction of their scope of justice.




Figure 5. Relationship between the blatant (measured) prejudice and discrimination against Brazilian immigrants, mediated by a restricted perception of the scope of justice (control condition of the manipulation).

** $p < .001$; * $p < .01$.

Finally, the restricted scope of justice was added in the first step. The results indicated that the effect of the restricted scope of justice on SDP was significant, and the effect of blatant prejudice decreased but remained significant (see Table 8). These results replicate Study 1 in that the relationship between blatant prejudice and SDP is partially mediated by the scope of justice. This mediation is confirmed by the Sobel test ($z = 2.40$; $p = .02$).

Table 8. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by the scope of justice in the relationship between blatant prejudice and discrimination against immigrants (SDP) in the control condition of the manipulation.

Predictors	Criterion variables					
	Step 1: SDP		Step 2: SJ		Step 3: SDP	
	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β	<i>B</i>	β
Intercept	0.69		2.13		-0.27	
Blatant Prejudice	0.89	.70**	0.48	.52**	0.67	.53**
Scope of Justice (SJ)					0.45	.33*
Model information	$R = .70$		$R = .52$		$R = .76$	
	$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .48$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .26$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .55$	
	$F_{(1,48)} = 47.09$		$F_{(1,48)} = 17.97$		$F_{(2,47)} = 31.48$	
	$p < .001$		$p < .001$		$p < .001$	

Note. *b* = Unstandardized coefficients; β = Standardized coefficients

** $p < .001$; * $p < .01$.

In the cultural prejudice condition, we follow the same steps of multiple regression approach in that we regressed SDP on blatant prejudice in the first model (see Figure 6). The results showed that blatant prejudice predicted SDP. Then, we regressed the restricted scope of justice on blatant prejudice. Results indicated that blatant prejudice had a strong effect on the restricted scope of justice, showing that the greater the blatant prejudice, the more participants restricted their scope of justice. In the third model, the restricted scope of justice was added to the first model analysis. Again, as in the control condition, the effect of the restricted scope of justice on SDP was significant, and the effect of blatant prejudice decreased, although remaining

significant. The Sobel test confirmed the partial mediation in the cultural prejudice condition ($z = 2.45$; $p = .01$).




Figure 6. Relationship between the blatant (measured) prejudice and discrimination against Brazilian immigrants, mediated by a restricted perception of the scope of justice (cultural prejudice condition of the manipulation).

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p = .05$.

Table 9. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by the scope of justice in the relationship between blatant prejudice and discrimination against immigrants (SDP) in the cultural prejudice condition of the manipulation.

	Criterion variables					
	Step 1: SDP		Step 2: SJ		Step 3: SDP	
Predictors	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β	<i>B</i>	β
Intercept	1.82		2.36		0.62	
Blatant Prejudice	0.56	$.50^{***}$	0.48	$.55^{***}$	0.31	$.28^*$
Scope of Justice (SJ)					0.51	$.40^{**}$
	$R = .50$		$R = .55$		$R = .61$	
Model information	$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .24$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .28$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .34$	
	$F_{(1,48)} = 16.29$		$F_{(1,48)} = 20.49$		$F_{(2,47)} = 13.68$	
	$p < .001$		$p < .001$		$p < .001$	

Note. *b* = Unstandardized coefficients; β = Standardized coefficients

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p = .05$.

Main analysis: Experimental Evidence

As in Study 1, we used a multiple-regression approach to verify whether the effect of the cultural prejudice manipulation influenced the support for discriminatory policies (SDP) and whether this influence is mediated by the restricted perception of the scope of justice. The two experimental conditions were coded as a dummy variable (control condition = 0; cultural prejudice condition = 1).

In the first step of the mediation analysis, results showed that the cultural prejudice manipulation significantly influenced SDP against Brazilian immigrants. This regression showed that the effect of the manipulation was significant ($b = .68$, $SE = .26$, $t = 2.63$, $p < .02$), indicating that the support for discriminatory policies was significantly higher in the cultural prejudice condition ($M = 3.87$; $SD = 1.15$) than in the control condition ($M = 3.19$; $SD = 1.43$).

Table 10. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by the scope of justice in the relationship between cultural prejudice manipulation and discrimination against immigrants (SDP).

	Criterion variables					
	Step 1: SDP		Step 2: SJ		Step 3: SDP	
Predictors	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β
Intercept	3.53		3.81		3.53	
Manipulation	.68	.26*	.67	.33**	.16	.06
Scope of Justice (SJ)					.78	.60**
	$R = .26$		$R = .33$		$R = .62$	
	$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .06$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .10$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .37$	
	$F_{(1,98)} = 6.89$		$F_{(1,98)} = 11.65$		$F_{(2,97)} = 30.39$	
	$p < .02$		$p < .002$		$p < .001$	

Note. *b* = Unstandardized coefficients; β = Standardized coefficients.

** $p < .002$; * $p < .02$.

In the second step, the manipulation also influenced the scope of justice ($b = .67$, $SE = .20$, $t = 3.41$, $p < .002$). This result means that the restriction of the scope of justice was significantly higher in the cultural prejudice condition ($M = 4.14$; $SD = 0.92$) than

in the control condition ($M = 3.47$; $SD = 1.03$). Finally, in the third step, the restricted scope of justice was added to the estimated model in the first step and multiple regressions remained significant. The greater the restriction of the scope of justice, the higher the support for discriminatory policies against immigrants ($b = .79$, $SE = .11$, $t = 7.10$, $p < .001$).

Moreover, an important result for the mediational effect is that the effect of the experimental manipulation on SDP is no longer significant ($b = .16$, $SE = .22$, $t = 0.73$, n.s.) after controlling for the effect of the restricted scope of justice on the third step of the regressed model (see Figure 7). To sum up, results of the three regression models indicated that the manipulation of cultural prejudice influenced participants' support for discriminatory policies against Brazilian immigrants, and that this effect is fully mediated by the restricted perception of the scope of justice ($z = 3.16$, $p < .002$).




Figure 7. Effect of the manipulation of cultural prejudice on discrimination against Brazilian immigrants, mediated by a restricted perception of the scope of justice.

$^{**}p < .002$; $^*p < .02$.

Supplementary Analysis

We carried out supplementary analysis in order to verify whether the mediation we found in this study was motivated by prejudice or simply by the different instructions given to participants. We suggested that the instruction given to participants to answer “as society thinks” is a way to manipulate prejudice since it removes the pressure of the anti-prejudice norm from the individual, that is, it could remove the suppression for expressing prejudice. This rationale implies that the effect of the

instruction is in reality the effect of prejudice. If it holds true, when we control for measured prejudice (e.g., blatant prejudice as the manipulation check), the effect of the manipulation on the restricted scope of justice and on SDP should disappear. This means that the effect of the manipulation on the scope of justice should be fully mediated by measured prejudice. In the same way, the effect of the manipulation on SDP should also be fully mediated by measured prejudice. To test this possibility, we analysed the effect of the manipulation on the restricted scope of justice and on SDP before and after controlling for measured prejudice.

Table 11 shows that the effect of the cultural prejudice manipulation on the restricted scope of justice is fully mediated by blatant prejudice. The mediation is confirmed by the Sobel test ($z = 3.37, p < .001$).

Table 11. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by blatant prejudice in the relationship between cultural prejudice manipulation and the restricted scope of justice.

Predictors	Criterion variables					
	Step 1: SJ		Step 2: Blatant Prej.		Step 3: SJ	
	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β	<i>B</i>	β
Intercept	3.47		2.80		2.12	
Manipulation	0.67	.33**	0.87	.37**	0.25	.12
Blatant Prejudice					0.48	.54**
	<i>R</i> = .33		<i>R</i> = .37		<i>R</i> = .60	
Model information	$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .10$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .13$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .35$	
	$F_{(1,98)} = 11.65$		$F_{(1,98)} = 16.07$		$F_{(2,97)} = 27.31$	
	$p < .002$		$p < .001$		$p < .001$	

Note. *b* = Unstandardized coefficients; β = Standardized coefficients; SJ = Scope of Justice.

** $p < .002$.

In Table 12, we repeated the analysis, changing the dependent variable to SDP. As in the previous mediation, when we added the measured prejudice (i.e., blatant prejudice) in the model, the effect of the manipulation on SDP was not significant. It occurred because the effect of the manipulation was fully mediated by measured prejudice (Sobel test: $z = 3.55; p < .001$). These results indicate that the instruction to

answer “as society thinks” made participants free from the anti-prejudice norm, allowing the discriminatory responses to be higher than when participants answered the discrimination measure without this type of instruction (e.g., individual prejudice). Participants expressed cultural prejudice which explains the effect of the manipulation on the restricted scope of justice and on SDP. As can be seen, when we controlled for measured prejudice, the effect of the manipulation on the restricted scope of justice and on SDP disappeared. That is, the effects of the manipulation on our dependent variables were due to prejudice, which reinforces the evidence that the procedure we used effectively manipulated prejudice.

Table 12. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role played by blatant prejudice in the relationship between cultural prejudice manipulation and the support for discriminatory policies (SDP).

Predictors	Criterion variables					
	Step 1: SDP		Step 2: Blatant Prej.		Step 3: SDP	
	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β	<i>B</i>	β
Intercept	3.19		2.80		1.12	
Manipulation	0.68	.26*	0.87	.37**	0.04	.01
Blatant Prejudice					0.74	.64**
	<i>R</i> = .26		<i>R</i> = .37		<i>R</i> = .65	
	$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .06$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .13$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .41$	
	$F_{(1,98)} = 6.89$		$F_{(1,98)} = 16.07$		$F_{(2,97)} = 35.36$	
	$p < .01$		$p < .001$		$p < .001$	

Note. *b* = Unstandardized coefficients; β = Standardized coefficients; SDP = Support for Discriminatory Policies

** $p < .002$; * $p < .02$.

2.3 – Discussion

In this study, we sought to analyse an important step of our main hypothesis, showing that when participants expressed discrimination based on cultural prejudice, that is, when participants were asked about society’s attitude towards immigrants, they felt “allowed” to express more support for discriminatory policies against immigrants

dissociating themselves from the responsibility of being prejudiced. Study 2 contributes with correlational and experimental evidence to the research on legitimization of discrimination and the role played by justice perceptions in intergroup conflict. We replicated the correlational evidence found in Study 1, showing the mediation effect of the restricted scope of justice on the relationship between prejudice and discrimination against immigrants.

In addition, results from the manipulation of cultural prejudice provided experimental evidence to the legitimising role played by the restricted perception of the scope of justice. In other words, the restricted scope of justice mediated the influence of cultural prejudice on the support for discriminatory policies towards immigrants. Importantly, the effect of the restricted scope of justice was strong enough to nullify the effect of cultural prejudice on discrimination. That is, the justice-based argument successfully reframed the situation in order to justify the discriminatory behaviour. Instead of a prejudice-based attitude leading to the expression of discrimination, individuals' perception is re-structured to a legitimated decision to restrict the access to justice principles only to nationals. The rationale is that individuals use this psychological mechanism to maintain their self-concept as a fair person and to show to others that the decision is made based on justice perceptions, and not on prejudiced conceptions, thus legitimating the discriminatory behaviour. To sum up, Study 2 corroborates previous research that presents the scope of justice as a justice perception that can be used as a legitimising mechanism that justifies intergroup behaviours (Opatow, 1995; Staub, 1989), and goes a step forward by demonstrating experimentally how this process works in the prejudice-discrimination relationship.

Summary of Part I

In Part I, we discussed the psychological mechanisms behind the legitimization of discrimination and analyzed how justice perceptions such as the scope of justice can play a role in this legitimization process. We designed two studies to test our hypotheses about the mediation role of the restricted scope of justice in discrimination against immigrants.

This first set of studies showed that the more individuals restrict their perception of the scope of justice, the greater their motivation to engage in discriminatory treatment against outgroups, in this case, immigrants. These results help to uncover that the scope of justice is a perception that allows us to understand how people rationalise unjust outcomes for target groups. Based on this evidence, we wondered whether this need to restrict the scope of justice in order to make discrimination acceptable is guided by a justice motivation, that is, whether the influence of the restriction of the scope of justice on discriminating behaviour should depend on the extent to which individuals are motivated to believe that the world is just. An example of this concern is the degree to which individuals are motivated to “believe” in a just world (BJW; Lerner, 1980). We will address this topic in the following chapter.

PART II

**The Role Played by the Belief in a Just World on the
Legitimation of Discrimination**

In Part II, we will analyse whether a justice motivation can drive individuals' need to legitimate discrimination. As we showed in the first part of the thesis, the restriction of the scope of justice can be prejudice-based, that is, a prejudiced attitude influenced the restriction of the scope of justice. The restriction of the scope of justice led to the support for discriminatory policies against immigrants, legitimizing discrimination. Based on this evidence, we expected that the influence of the restriction of the scope of justice in discrimination against immigrants would be motivated by the need to believe in a just world (BJW). That is, individuals who are motivated to believe that the world is just will legitimate discrimination against immigrants based on their restricted perception of the scope of justice.

In Chapter 4, we will discuss the BJW and its relevance in intergroup relations research. We will highlight the role of BJW in the legitimation of injustice and possible perpetuation of discrimination. In fact, we added BJW to our hypotheses because this motivation can be an indicator of how justice is perceived in certain contexts. That is, when we are comparing groups, the BJW can be a perception of how justice is allocated to the self and to others. Chapter 5 provides a set of studies where we analyse this assumption using correlational and experimental evidence. Our rationale is that by restricting their scope of justice, prejudiced individuals can discriminate against immigrants without threatening their belief that they are acting in a just way, if they perceive this discrimination as just and legitimated. We thus propose that the need to justify discrimination by the restriction of the scope of justice is especially strong for individuals who are motivated to act fairly (Dalbert, 2001) such as people who feel motivated to believe that the world is just (e.g., Lerner, 1980), which makes necessary to individuals the legitimation of others' attribution of negative outcomes.

Chapter 4 – The ‘Belief’ in a Just World and the Legitimation of Discrimination

In this chapter, we briefly introduce the just-world theory (e.g., Lerner, 1980). Firstly, we define Belief in a Just World (BJW) and how Lerner (1980) developed this concept as “a useful metaphor rather than a psychological construct” (p. 23). Secondly, we present BJW functions and how BJW research is delineated based on different interpretations of the concept. Research on BJW is presented as two different approaches that can be traced as pre and post-1990s. Before the 1990s, BJW was analyzed as a disposition or individual difference, where individuals have a higher or lower degree of this disposition (Dalbert, 2012); and, post-1990s, when BJW began to be analyzed as a motivation to believe that the world is just and act in accordance with this ‘belief’. The two directions provide different perceptions of the outcomes to the self (e.g., better psychological well-being) and to others (e.g., secondary victimization). This ‘double-edged sword’ (e.g., Wu et al., 2011) has led us to analyze whether we consider BJW as a justice motive or as a justice motivation, and how it can be related to the derogation of groups. Finally, we will discuss the role played by BJW in the legitimation of injustice and, consequently, in the legitimation of discrimination against outgroups.

1. The Fundamental Delusion: Origins and Operationalization of BJW

The just-world theory was conceived by Lerner (1980; see Correia, 2003 for a review). This hypothesis was based on his personal experience as a clinical psychologist in a mental health institution and as a professor. By observing the way people act and explaining how and why things are the way they are, Lerner understood that people often “create or select ways of seeing our world in the service of an important need” (Lerner, 1980, p. 5), in this case to perceive the world as a just place.

Lerner’s rationale about how people perceive the world in order to fulfil a need led to the just-world hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, “people want to and have to believe they live in a just world so that they can go about their daily lives with a sense of trust, hope, and confidence in their future” (Lerner, 1980, p. 14). Following this idea, Lerner suggested that people need to find a way to cope with different unpredicted

situations and unjust outcomes in everyday life. This rationale about how things are (present) and how things will be (future) was named as a “fundamental delusion”, also known as the ‘belief’ in a just world. This is a fundamental belief in people’s lives because it helps them to maintain their perception that the world is safe and secure, and, it is a delusion because it is based on the motivation to defend the self against the perceived injustice in our own everyday life (Dalbert, 2009; Furnham, 2003; Lerner, 1980), by re-structuring the situation as if the world is just. Specifically, the need to believe that the world is a just place is useful to face bad outcomes, suffering and deprivation in which these negative consequences have to be buffered by a rationalization that things are the way they should be. More importantly, since this rationalization is based on a perception of how justice is allocated in the world, the belief in a just world has an impact on social judgments and how we evaluate others (see Maes, Tarnai, & Schuster, 2012 for a review). Therefore, the premise of BJW is that individuals need to believe that everyone gets what they deserve and deserve what they get (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978), which leads them to act as if they believe that the world is just.

2. Functions of BJW

In general, people try to maintain the motivation to believe that the world is fair and just using rational and/or irrational strategies. According to Lerner (1980), a rational strategy is the attempt to objectively reduce the injustice of a situation (e.g., helping a victim). When individuals are not able to restore justice, they resort to irrational strategies, for instance, by re-structuring the perception of injustice, to maintain their BJW intact. An example of this strategy is the secondary victimization (e.g., blaming innocent victims for their own situation). These strategies have the function of reducing the psychological discomfort of facing unjust situations, especially when people cannot fight back or restore justice. For instance, a source of threat to individuals’ BJW is being unjust themselves (Dalbert, 2001), because this represents breaking the “personal contract” that assures fair outcomes to those that commit fair deeds. Therefore, BJW motivates individuals to act in a fair way (Otto & Dalbert, 2005), using these strategies in order to preserve their own belief in a just world.

Lerner (1980) suggested that, without the motivation to preserve BJW, people would not engage in socially acceptable behavior or make long-term plans. That is, the

adaptive function of BJW is a fundamental tool for individuals to live in society (e.g., Lerner & Miller, 1978), as a motivation to perceive justice in everyday injustices. This function of BJW is to act as a “psychological buffer against the harsh realities of the world, as well as personal control over one’s own destiny” (Furnham, 2003, p. 796). In this sense, the motivation to believe in a just world has different consequences depending on whom the justice concern is directed at, that is, the consequences to the ingroup can be different from the consequences to the outgroup (Maes et al., 2012).

The adaptive functions of BJW act to restore the cognitive balance expected by those that strongly endorse BJW (e.g., Dalbert, 2009). For instance, individuals who strongly endorse the idea of BJW, when faced with injustice, tend to assimilate the injustice to make the situation less threatening to their BJW. In these cases, when the situation is not resolved, the assimilation function of BJW provides strategies to cope with the injustice, such as blaming the victim (e.g., Lerner & Miller, 1978) and the perception that events in which they are involved are more just (e.g., Correia & Dalbert, 2007). The trust in justice is an important resource for those who strongly endorse BJW, that is, individuals highly motivated to believe that the world is just expect or are confident that others will treat them justly. An example of this confidence can be the trust in governmental institutions, that is, individuals assume that the government will treat them justly. In fact, Correia (2003) showed a positive correlation between BJW and trust in institutions such as the healthcare system, the church and the army.

To sum up, BJW helps individuals to cope with injustices in life, but it can also lead to the rationalization that individuals in unprivileged situations deserve it because everyone gets what they deserve. In the follow section, we describe how BJW research analyzed both situations: its good and bad consequences.

3. BJW research: Pre and Post-1990s

Furnham (2003) traced the trends of BJW research, showing a pattern that could help us to understand the shift in the perspective of research before and after the 1990s. Research on BJW before the 1990s (see Furnham & Proctor, 1989; Hafer & Beguè, 2005; Lerner & Miller, 1978 for a review) was mostly experimental, focused on the negative consequences of BJW (e.g., victim derogation and blame). This perspective showed that BJW leads to the derogation of others in order to eliminate the perception

of injustice from the observer's world, functioning as a fundamental delusion. This is an adaptation process of the perceived injustice in order to maintain BJW. This research suggested that people motivated to believe that the world is just reframe their perception of reality, turning the perceived injustice into a just situation. The consequence of this reframing mechanism is that "the higher the individuals' BJW, the more the derogation and social exclusion of minority and victim groups" (Maes et al., 2012, p. 96). In other words, social exclusion is a consequence of the justification of their unprivileged situation, blaming the individual or group for the previous derogation. This line of research on BJW focused on people's ability to defend their BJW, where the negative consequences for others are already known. However, in the beginning of the 1990s, a new trend of research on BJW changed the perspective to analyze the need to defend BJW.

This second line of research was also based on Lerner's (1980) just-world hypothesis. In this case, the need to believe that the world is just is a motivation to confront the complex (and often unjust) world that we live in. The positive aspect of BJW leads people to use it as a resource to cope with negative outcomes in life, to strive for long-term goals and to feel more secure about the future (Furhnam, 2003; Hafer, 2000; Maes et al., 2012). For instance, studies showed that BJW is associated with better psychological well-being (e.g., Dalbert, 2001), higher self-esteem in school (Correia & Dalbert, 2007) and helps to deal with negative emotions such as anger, anxiety and depression (e.g., Dalbert, 2002; Nasser, Doumit, & Carifio, 2011). The importance of this differentiation (pre and post-1990) does not lie in the chronological order in which this research was done, since it was not a linear evolution of the problem. The importance is in the topic that BJW researchers were focusing on. For instance, the major focus of BJW research has been in intrapersonal motivational aspects and interpersonal contexts, before and after the 1990s. In the same way, some post-1990s research has demonstrated, as Lerner's hypothesis and experiments indicated, that the higher the endorsement of BJW, the more individuals derogate or blame innocent victims (e.g., Hafer, 2000) in order to solve or reduce the psychological discomfort of facing the existence of innocent victims or undeserved outcomes. This distinction in BJW research is mostly relevant to the discussion of the definition of BJW as a disposition or as a motivation.

4. Is BJW a Justice Motive or a Justice Motivation?

Based on earlier research (Lerner & Miller, 1978), BJW literature has distinguished between a personal and a general BJW (e.g., Dalbert, 1999). The personal BJW refers to the belief that the world is just to the self where individuals wonder whether ‘I was treated fairly’ (or not), while the general BJW refers to whether people in general are treated fairly (or not).

The endorsement of the general and/or personal BJW provides different perspectives of the situation. For instance, research shows that individuals’ endorsement of personal BJW is more related to intra-individual mechanisms (e.g., psychological well-being; self-esteem; satisfaction with life; Alves, 2012), and general BJW predicts more strongly inter-individual interaction (e.g., victim-blaming) and intergroup relations (e.g., harsh attitudes against minorities; Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994). As can be seen by these examples, the personal BJW can be perceived as a disposition or personality trait (i.e., individuals have a higher or lower disposition to believe that the world is just) and the general BJW can be perceived as a motivation (e.g., individuals may present a higher or lower motivation to believe that the world is just depending on the situation).

Dalbert (2009) disentangled the research approaches described above by how researchers have been analysing them as a ‘justice motive’ or as a ‘justice motivation’. For instance, justice motive is defined as “an individual disposition to strive for justice as an end itself” (Dalbert, 2009, p. 290), that is, the need to believe in a just world is driven by individuals’ general concern with justice. In other words, justice motive is learned by socialization and it is a disposition to perceive how justice is allocated to the self and to others in various situations. This conceptualization seems to define the justice motive as a personality trait that individuals have in a higher or lower degree. This definition can be related to post-1990s BJW research, focusing on the adaptive functions of BJW as a “healthy coping mechanism with many positive psychological benefits” (Furnham, 2003, p. 796).

In contrast, justice motivation is an orientation to be concerned with justice, triggered by situational aspects in particular circumstances. In this case, the concern with justice is contextual, not strictly a personal disposition. This interpretation is related to the metaphor described by Lerner (1980) that people are motivated to act as if the world is a just place in order to face unjust events in their daily lives. Dalbert (2009) argued that experimental BJW research is an interpretation of the just-world rationale as

a justice motivation, not as individual differences. This interpretation is in accordance with the recent experimental research trend, which is recovering Lerner's (1980) hypothesis as in pre-1990s research.

In this thesis, we consider that BJW is a justice motivation in the sense that individuals are motivated to act as if they believed that the world is a just place, and that that motivation may not be the same in different contexts or situations. This rationale provides the interpretation of BJW as a motivation to search for balance between the justice motivation and the outcomes, which can be triggered in different levels (e.g., high and low BJW). For instance, when individuals' BJW is threatened (e.g., facing an unjust event), people are (more or less) motivated to reduce the psychological discomfort by one of the strategies already described in this chapter. Importantly, this reduction of the psychological discomfort is directed at the self. In other words, the maintenance of BJW would not depend on the actual restoration of justice to others (cf. Jost et al., 2010). The consequence of the maintenance of BJW may be the derogation of others.

5. BJW and Derogation of Outgroups

The difference in justice motivation to the self and to others led to the analysis of how BJW influences intergroup relations. In fact, Lerner (1980) had theorized about the relevance of intergroup relations to the threat to BJW when there is a victim involved, that is, when the victim is an ingroup member, the situation represents a higher threat to BJW than when the victim is an outgroup member. Despite this expected influence of BJW on the derogation of outgroups, only recently has this extension of BJW to intergroup relations been systematically analyzed (e.g., Aguiar et al., 2008; Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2007; Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994).

As an example of this line of research, Correia et al. (2007, Study 2) analyzed how the group identification (ingroup vs. outgroup) and the innocence (vs. non-innocence) status of the victim would threaten participants' BJW. First, participants saw a video where an eight year-old boy was severely and persistently injured. This video manipulated the group to which the child belonged (Portuguese vs. Gypsy family). To manipulate the innocence of the victim, in the innocent condition, after showing the video, the experimenter added no information about the child. In the non-innocent condition, after the video, the experimenter added information that the child and the

parents were informed about the danger of a child's circulation in the place and that the area had a visible 'danger' sign indicating that. Then, participants performed an emotional modified stroop task adapted from Hafer's (2000) paradigm. The task consisted of 10 words for each of the two categories: justice-related words (e.g., fair, right) and neutral words (e.g., glass, telephone). Participants were asked to indicate the colours of the stimuli (in this case, justice-related or neutral words) that appeared on the screen, as fast as they could. The implicit dependent measure was the time that participants took to identify justice-related words *minus* the time to identify neutral words (latency). The higher the identification of justice-related words, the higher the activation of a threat to participants' BJW.

Results indicated that when the victim was an ingroup member (i.e. from a Portuguese family), there was a higher latency for justice-related words than for neutral words, which did not happen when the victim was an outgroup member (i.e. from a Gypsy family). So, in the situation where the victim was an ingroup member, participants' BJW was threatened. The innocence (vs. non-innocence) of the victim had no effect: the ingroup victim was mostly perceived as innocent, even in the non-innocent condition. On the other hand, the outgroup victim is mostly perceived as non-innocent, independently of the experimental condition. These results showed that, in fact, participants' BJW was threatened only when the victim was an ingroup member, showing more concern with justice in this case than when the victim was an outgroup member. In sum, when individuals witness a vivid and moving injustice (e.g., persistent suffering of a child), their behavior is implicitly motivated by the perception of the world as a just place and, more importantly, the motivation is higher when the victim is from the ingroup than from the outgroup.

In order to complement this evidence, Aguiar et al. (2008) analyzed whether a reaction to others' suffering would depend on the group that the 'innocent victim' belongs to. In other words, these authors aimed to test whether the activation of justice concerns is different when people are facing the undeserved suffering of an ingroup or an outgroup member in order to provide empirical support for Lerner's hypothesis. In their most relevant study to this thesis, these authors replicated Correia et al. (2007, Study 2) procedures. In this study, Aguiar et al. (2008) added a condition to the previous study. The non-categorization condition was added to the group identity manipulation, turning it into a three-condition manipulation (ingroup vs. outgroup vs. non-categorization member condition). The dependent measures were (1) the latency

from the emotional modified stroop task, and (2) two questions to analyze secondary victimization, assessing victim blaming (e.g., to what degree is Z (the child) guilty of his situation?) and victim derogation (e.g., what is your overall impression of Z?).

Results from this study confirmed the just-world hypothesis. When the victim was an ingroup member (Portuguese) or a non-categorized victim, participants felt their BJW more threatened than when the victim was from an outgroup (Gypsy) member. Moreover, the outgroup victim was the only situation where participants' BJW was not threatened. This result replicated findings from Correia et al. (2007), confirming Lerner's hypothesis that people show more concern about justice when the victim is an ingroup member, and it shows the mechanism of a minimized reaction to the suffering of outgroup members. In addition, results showed that the outgroup victim (i.e. the Gypsy boy that was less threatening to participants' BJW) was more derogated than the ingroup victim. These authors showed that the processes of blaming and derogating the victim are different for ingroup and outgroup. That is, individuals generally blamed innocent victims for their objectively undeserved situation because it threatened those individuals' perception that the world is a just place. Nevertheless, in some cases, the blaming and derogating processes are only attributed to the outgroup victim. By doing so, the victims' situation can be perceived as just, legitimate, thus not threatening individuals' BJW.

Therefore, this is a paradox: individuals behave unjustly towards others because they are motivated to think about justice issues (Lerner, 2003). This paradox presents the mechanism through which disadvantaged groups are derogated for their fate. In other words, the need to believe that the world is just hides a perverse mechanism towards others. Since people use BJW premise (i.e. 'everyone gets what they deserve and deserves what they get') to understand why we have different outcomes in life, the rationale is that the disadvantaged individuals or groups are receiving what they deserve. Individuals' unprivileged situation in life is justified by the assumption that, since everybody gets what they deserve, derogation would be the compatible outcome for their previous (bad) behavior. However, there are some cases where the observers are aware that the source of the disadvantaged situation is not in the individual (e.g., slavery or misery). In these cases, those suffering are blamed for their own fate in order to restore the feeling that the observers' BJW is not threatened.

An important inference from the Correia et al. (2007) and Aguiar et al. (2008) studies is the possible interpretation of results relating BJW and the scope of justice (i.e.

a justice perception that applies different justice principles for those inside/outside the boundaries of fairness; see chapter 2). This link between the two concepts was also presented by Dalbert and Yamauchi (1994), when testing the hypothesis that BJW would be threatened by injustice only when the outgroup is included in the boundaries of fairness. As far as we know, the research by Dalbert and Yamauchi (1994) was the first empirical analysis that hypothesized about the relationship between BJW and boundaries for application of justice (a similar idea to the scope of justice). These authors analyzed this relationship in the perception of justice of immigrant situations (from Pacific Islanders and Turkey) in two samples (Hawaii and Germany). They operationalized the boundaries of the ingroup as the family's immigration status (Hawaiian sample) and the father's occupation (German sample) from demographic information given to participants. The justice perception of the immigrants' situation was operationalized by participant ratings of the immigrants' possibilities to satisfy basic needs (e.g., go to college; find a job; rent a house) and the perception of immigrants' broad economic situation (e.g., material disadvantage). The similarity between participants and the target-group was measured differently in each sample. In the Hawaiian sample, participants were asked whether they or their families had immigrated to the U.S. or not. If participants or their families had immigrated to the U.S., this would be considered as a similarity between participant and target group. In the German sample, the similarity was measured by participant answers about the professional status of their father. If their fathers worked in the same field as the foreign worker, this would trigger the similarity effect, considering the foreign worker within the boundaries of their own world.

Results showed that the judgment of the situation of the disadvantaged group was considered just when the participants perceived themselves as similar to the target and endorsed BJW. The greater the participants' perception of similarity with the target-group (inclusion in their boundaries by similarity) and the greater the participants' disposition to believe that the world is just, the more they judged the disadvantaged situation of the immigrants as just. These results point to how individuals react when they feel their BJW threatened. The perceived similarity between ingroup and the disadvantaged outgroup triggered the threat to the ingroup's BJW. In this sense, when the target group is perceived as similar by the ingroup, the injustice (e.g., inequality situation) needs to be legitimized to maintain BJW unthreatened.

For instance, Correia et al. (2012) also investigated whether victim derogation or feeling psychologically distant (i.e. one of the scope of justice's consequences) from the ingroup victim are both consequences of individuals' threatened BJW. The rationale was that the higher the individuals' BJW, the higher their motivation to derogate innocent (ingroup) victims in order to maintain their perception that the world is just. The prediction was that the higher the adherence to BJW, the more it would lead to a positive relationship between ingroup identification and derogation or psychological distancing from the (ingroup) victim. Results showed that when the participants strongly 'believed' in a just world and strongly identified with the ingroup (i.e. the group to which the innocent victim belongs), the threat to BJW predicted a higher victim derogation and a higher psychological distance from the victim. In fact, Hafer and Bègue (2005) also pointed out this possible relationship when the scope of justice was considered relevant to explain what threatens individuals' BJW.

Although the importance of the scope of justice in attitudes and intergroup conflict literature was already recognized by Aguiar et al. (2008) in their conclusions, and by Dalbert and Yamauchi (1994) and Correia et al. (2012) in their initial analysis of "the boundaries of one's own social world", the relationship between BJW and scope of justice was not fully empirically analyzed by these authors. Despite this lack of direct evidence, their work on the possible relevance of the scope of justice on BJW research shows not only the legitimizing role that both justice perceptions can play in the derogation of outgroups, it also shows that BJW motivation makes necessary the legitimation of social inequalities to maintain individuals' perception that the world is safe and predictable. We argue here that when individuals are faced with unjust situations or environments, individuals restrict their scope of justice in order to maintain their perception that the world is just.

There are other examples of the application of BJW indicating its legitimizing role. Lerner (1980) theoretically recognized the possible legitimizing role of BJW for the *status quo* (cf. Alves, 2012; Dittmar & Dickinson, 1993). According to Lerner and Miller (1978), "'good' people can deserve a 'bad' fate if their actions are careless or foolish" (p. 1031). The motivation to believe that the world is a just place acts as a genuine concern with unjust situations that occur to innocent or 'good' people. If injustice happens to innocent or good people, the individuals' rationale is that it can also happen to them, even if they do not 'deserve' it. This concern with justice is focused on the just world of the perceiver facing the injustice situation (e.g., "Could this happen to

me?”), which in turn motivates the legitimation of injustice in order to maintain the unthreatened BJW. For instance, Dittmar and Dickinson (1993) point out that BJW can be a sociopolitical ideology that supports the *status quo* and the tendency towards right-wing politics. This relationship between a justice motivation and the maintenance of social situations indicates the legitimizing role that BJW can play. In addition, research focused on the System-Justification Theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994) has also discussed and empirically analyzed BJW's potential to serve as a legitimizing mechanism which justifies the *status quo* (e.g., Alves & Correia, 2010; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).

Another example of the application of BJW is the research of Gaucher, Hafer, Kay and Davidenko (2010). These authors analyzed whether this motivation to believe that the world is just would work as a general tendency to balance not only bad but also good undeserved outcomes in life. That is, Gaucher et al. (2010) suggested that BJW can be a 'compensatory bias' to everyday events. Their results point out that, in order to apply this balanced perception, people need to develop rationalizations to the self (e.g., to keep their BJW unthreatened) and to others (e.g., normative way of thinking), invoking justification processes to compensate the bad events in everyday life. This socio-cognitive research example provided evidence of the relevant role of BJW in justifying and legitimizing negative and positive undeserved consequences (Gaucher et al., 2010). This thesis proposes that not only are inequalities of status perceived as legitimate, but also that negative events happening to members of minority groups will be perceived as a "natural thing". Based on this rationale, we have discussed how researchers have been analysing the relationship of the endorsement of BJW and the legitimation of injustice.

6. BJW and the Need to Legitimize Injustice

The need to legitimize injustice is initially assumed as a 'defense mechanism' that individuals use when facing suffering or unjust outcomes happening to innocent victims or people that deserve fair outcomes. There is recent evidence showing the legitimizing role of BJW.

For instance, Beierlein, Werner, Preiser and Wermuth (2011) analyzed this hypothesis under a more societal approach. These authors expected that the endorsement of BJW would only be relevant to justify social inequalities depending on

individuals' perception about their ability to promote social change (see also Mohiyeddini & Montada, 1998 for BJW and self-efficacy in coping with observed victimization). Specifically, Beierlein et al. (2011) analyzed whether the social impact of BJW (i.e. justice or injustice-promoting behavior) would be attenuated or intensified depending on the level of collective political efficacy (i.e. individuals' perception of mobilizing collectively for social justice). In addition, they also analyzed whether the just or unjust behavior would depend on the influence of BJW in justifying social inequalities. These authors hypothesized that the collective political efficacy would moderate the effects of BJW on (a) justification of social inequality and (b) justice-promoting behavior. They expected that when the collective political efficacy was low, BJW would increase the need to justify inequalities and, consequently, the promotion of justice behavior (e.g., socio-political participation) would decrease. They also expected that when the collective political efficacy is high, BJW is not supposed to have an increasing effect either on justification of inequality or on socio-political participation. Results showed the positive relationship between BJW and the justification of social inequalities, and this effect was moderated by the collective political efficacy, i.e. the endorsement of the metaphor that the world is just leads to the justification of inequality depending on individuals' perception of efficacy to seek social justice. The results confirmed the hypothesis and reinforced what BJW literature has been showing: BJW motivation justifies and legitimizes negative consequences to others, especially when other strategies to promote justice are not perceived as available.

In sum, BJW seems fundamental not only for balanced individual functioning, as Lerner (1980, 2003) and Dalbert (2001) argued, it is also valued socially (e.g., Alves & Correia, 2010), which can be applied to intergroup contexts. However, it contributes to the perception of differences in statuses as deserved (Jost & Hunyady, 2005) and it can have negative consequences to disadvantaged groups. This evidence leads to our rationale that BJW could reinforce and eventually require the legitimation of discrimination.

7. BJW and the Legitimation of Discrimination

The legitimation of discrimination by this justice motivation is a perverse contradiction, that is, the same cognitive bias that is important to maintain individuals' self-esteem and personal well-being could also be the support for justification (and the

consequent) derogation of others that suffer injustice in many spheres of life (e.g., bullying, victim-blaming, secondary victimization).

The issue we raise in this thesis is to know whether the legitimation of discrimination can also be found when individuals are faced with situations involving unequal (but subtle) treatments of minority groups and when their prejudiced attitudes motivate them to discriminate against these groups. We reason that, even for prejudiced individuals, acting in a discriminatory way without a “good” reason for doing this can represent a threat to their BJW. Because individuals are motivated to maintain their BJW, they need to reframe the situation by searching for a justification that allows them to discriminate. Restricting their scope of justice to legitimise their behavior can be such a reframing mechanism.

Therefore, in our studies, BJW is a motivation that leads people to act and perceive the world as just. In order to maintain that belief, individuals that are motivated to believe that the world is just tend to justify undeserved events (e.g., bad or good breaks; Gaucher et al., 2010), because their motivation for justice makes it necessary to legitimize social inequalities. Individuals who are more motivated to act as if the world is just need to actively search for rationalizations to maintain their perception of orderliness. We suggest that this motivation has a role in discrimination against immigrants and that this justice motivation helps to maintain the self-concept as fair individuals.

The need for legitimation of discrimination should be stronger for individuals who are strongly motivated to believe that the world is just in comparison to those that are less motivated, reflecting differences in their need to believe in a just world (see Hafer & Bègue, 2005). Therefore, the influence of restricting the scope of justice on discrimination should especially occur when the motivation to BJW is higher. This implies that BJW should function as a moderator of the influence of the scope of justice on the intention to discriminate.

8. Summarizing BJW

BJW can be identified as a reliable justice perception that motivates both positive and/or negative outcomes. The justice motivation is salient nowadays, especially when alarming situations are rising (e.g., criminality rates, financial crisis). Individuals need this delusion to explain and react adequately to different kinds of

situations such as intergroup conflicts. The role of BJW as a moderator of the legitimation of discrimination is an important way to reactivate the initial purpose of Lerner's (1980) hypothesis. The scope of justice may motivate a greater support for discriminatory policies against immigrants when BJW drives the rationalization to derogate the outgroup, combining two justice perceptions to explain the counterintuitive negative treatment based on justice arguments.

Chapter 5 - The Moderation Role of Belief in a Just World⁵

In this chapter we present three studies analysing how the restricted scope of justice and the BJW play a legitimizing role in the support for discriminatory policies against immigrants in Portugal.

In Study 3, we followed the example set by literature on the legitimation of social inequalities (e.g., Pereira et al., 2009) by operationalizing the legitimising role played by the scope of justice as the mechanism through which prejudice relates to discrimination. Specifically, we aim to replicate the mediation that we found in Studies 1 and 2, where the relationship between prejudice and the support for discriminatory policies is mediated by the restricted scope of justice. In addition, we examine whether this mediation is moderated by a justice motivation, that is, the motivation to act as the world is a just place. Studies 4 and 5 were designed to test experimentally whether the influence of the restricted scope of justice on discrimination is only needed when the BJW is present.

The need for the legitimation of discrimination should be stronger for individuals who more strongly believe that the world is just in comparison to those that believe less strongly, presumably reflecting differences in their need to believe in a just world (see Hafer & Bègue, 2005). Therefore, the legitimation role played by the restriction of the scope of justice on discrimination should especially occur when the BJW is higher. This implies that the BJW should function as a moderator of the influence of the scope of justice in discrimination.

1. Study 3

In this study, we adopted a correlational design in order to explore whether the scope of justice plays a role in discrimination against immigrants and whether it is related to individuals' BJW. Based on evidence that the expression of prejudice in discrimination occurs in an indirect way (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Pereira et al., 2010), we reasoned that if the scope of justice plays a

⁵ This chapter was partially published as:

Lima-Nunes, A., Pereira, C. R., & Correia, I. (2013). Restricting the scope of justice to justify discrimination: The role played by justice perceptions in discrimination against immigrants. *European Journal of Social Psychology*. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.1981

legitimising role in the derogation of outgroups (e.g., Opatow, 1995; Staub, 1989), a restricted perception of this scope should mediate the relationship between prejudice and discrimination. So that the greater the prejudice, the more the participants' perceptions of the scope of justice should be restricted to the ingroup and the greater this restriction, the greater their support for discriminatory policies will be.

Importantly, if the need to restrict the scope for discrimination involves a justice motivation, then mediation should occur for those with high rather than low levels of BJW. That is, mediation by the scope of justice should be moderated by the BJW. This should occur because, in a situation where the outgroup is derogated, people with higher levels of BJW need to protect their belief that they are living in a fair world (e.g., Correia et al., 2007) and that they need to behave in a fair way.

1.1 – Method

Participants. One hundred and eighty-five Portuguese university students ($M_{age} = 23.2$, $SD = 7.36$; 120 female, 63 male and 2 unreported) voluntarily participated in this study.

Prejudice measure. We measured prejudice using the Portuguese version of the blatant-prejudice scale (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Vala, Lopes & Lima, 2008). This scale has 10 items (e.g., “Brazilian immigrants have jobs that Portuguese people should have”; “Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants can never really be comfortable with each other, even if they are close friends”; “Brazilian immigrants come from less able races and this explains why they are not as well off as most Portuguese people”). Participants indicated their agreement with each item using a 7-point scale (1 = strong disagreement to 7 = strong agreement; $\alpha = .84$).

Scope of justice measure. We used the same scale from Studies 1 and 2 in order to measure restricted (as opposed to amplified) perception of the application of justice principles to the relationship between Portuguese people and Brazilian immigrants. Participants indicated their agreement with the sentences using a 7-point scale (1 = strong disagreement to 7 = strong agreement). The scores were submitted to a factor analysis that revealed only one factor which explained 50.33% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.52; factor loadings from 0.46 to 0.69). Moreover, reliability analysis indicated that this scale has good internal consistency ($\alpha = .75$).

The belief-in-a-just-world measure. We used the general BJW scale (Dalbert, Montada & Schmitt, 1987) translated into Portuguese (Alves & Correia, 2008). This scale has six items (e.g., “Generally, the world is just”; “I am confident that justice will always win in the world no matter what”) in which participants indicated their agreement ($\alpha = .66$) using a 7-point scale varying from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 7 (“totally agree”).

Discrimination measure. The same measure we used in Studies 1 and 2 (e.g., “The national health service should charge Brazilian immigrants more than what Portuguese nationals are charged”; “Brazilian immigrants should pay more for social security than Portuguese nationals”). Participants indicated their agreement using a 7-point scale (1 = strong disagreement to 7 = strong agreement). The scores were submitted to a factor analysis that revealed only one factor which explained 51.10% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.56; factor loadings from 0.35 to 0.94). Moreover, reliability analysis indicated that this scale has good internal consistency ($\alpha = .72$).

Distinguishing Measures. We analyzed whether there is some overlap between three measures involving the participants’ evaluation of the target group (i.e. prejudice, scope of justice, and support for discriminatory policies) since these measures contain items that seem to express a negative view of the Brazilian immigrant outgroup. We therefore performed an exploratory factorial analysis (principal axis factoring with oblimin rotation) that included all the items concerning prejudice, scope of justice and SDP. The results demonstrated that the items loaded on three conceptually distinguishable factors, which explained 42.10% of the shared variance: Factor 1 loaded the items of prejudice (eigenvalue = 1.06; factor loadings from 0.30 to 0.84); Factor 2 loaded the items of the discrimination measure (eigenvalue = 6.41; factor loadings from 0.33 to 0.99); and Factor 3 loaded the items of the scope of justice scale (eigenvalue = 0.95; factor loadings from 0.43 to 0.73). These results are important because they show that there is no overlap between the measures that we used to operationalize the concepts.

1.2 – Results

Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics and the zero-order correlation matrix of the measures used in this study. We used a multiple-regression approach (Muller, Judd & Yzerbyt, 2005) to test whether the relationship between prejudice and the SDP is mediated by the scope of justice and moderated by the BJW. For this purpose, we estimated three regression models after centering all predictors. The parameters estimated for the three steps are shown in Table 9.

Table 13. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the measures used in Study 3 (Cronbach’s Alpha in Brackets)

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	SDP	Scope of Justice	Prejudice	BJW
SDP	3.32	1.01	(.72)			
Scope Justice	3.61	1.01	.49**	(.75)		
Prejudice	2.99	0.92	.62**	.58**	(.91)	
BJW	3.33	0.74	.10	-.03	.12	(.66)

Note. SDP = support for discriminatory policies; BJW = Belief in a Just Word

In the first model, we regressed the SDP on prejudice, BJW and the interaction term (prejudice × BJW). As predicted, the results showed that prejudice predicted SDP, so that the higher the level of prejudice, the more the participants supported discriminatory policies against immigrants. There was no reliable effect of the BJW or of the interaction term. In the second model, we regressed the scope of justice on prejudice, BJW and the interaction term. The results indicated that prejudice has a reliable effect on the restricted view of the scope of justice, demonstrating that the greater their prejudice, the more participants restricted their scope of justice.

In the third model, we added the scope of justice and its interaction with BJW to the estimated model for the first step towards discrimination. The results indicated that the effect of the scope of justice on the SDP was significant. The direct effect of prejudice decreased substantially but remained significant. This result indicated that the relationship between prejudice and discrimination was partially mediated by the scope of justice ($z = 3.20$; $p < .01$). Importantly, we found that a reliable interaction effect exists between the scope of justice and BJW in relation to the SDP. This interaction means that the scope of justice predicts the SDP for participants with high BJW scores

($b = 0.39$; $SE = 0.101$; $\beta = 0.38$, $p < .001$) but not for participants with low BJW scores ($b = 0.12$; $SE = 0.085$; $\beta = 0.12$, ns.), indicating that the mediation obtained above could be moderated by the BJW (see Table 9).

Table 14. Parameters estimated according to regression models used in the analysis of the role of scope of justice and BJW in the relationship between prejudice and support for discriminatory policies

Predictors	Criterion variables					
	Step 1: SDP		Step 2: SJ		Step 3: SDP	
	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β
Intercept	3.32		4.44		3.33	
Prejudice (P)	.67	.61**	.65	.61**	.50	.46**
BJW	.06	.04	.12	.09	.09	.07
P × BJW	.07	.05	.03	.02	-.06	-.04
Scope of Justice (SJ)					.26	.25**
BJW × SJ					.18	.18*
Model information	$R = .62$		$R = .61$		$R = .65$	
	$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .37$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .36$		$R^2_{\text{Adjusted}} = .41$	
	$F_{(3,180)} = 37.27$		$F_{(3,180)} = 35.82$		$F_{(5,178)} = 26.78$	
	$p < .001$		$p < .001$		$p < .001$	

Note. *b* = Unstandardised coefficients; β = Standardized coefficients.

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

In order to interpret this moderated mediation, we analysed the effect of prejudice on discrimination against immigrants by taking into account different levels of BJW. Specifically, we estimated the mediating effect of the scope of justice in participants with a low BJW (i.e., those with -1.0 standard deviation below the BJW mean) and with a high BJW (i.e., those with +1.0 standard deviation above the BJW mean). As Figure 6 shows, for participants with higher levels of BJW, the effect of prejudice on SDP was mediated by the restricted perception of the scope of justice. In other words, being highly prejudiced significantly predicted a more restricted view of

the scope of justice, which, in turn, predicted higher SDP ($z = 3.41, p < .001$). For participants with lower levels of BJW, prejudice predicts both the scope of justice and SDP, but the scope of justice did not mediate the effect of prejudice on SDP ($z = 1.48, ns.$).




Figure 8. The relationship between blatant prejudice and SDP, mediated by the restricted scope of justice and moderated by BJW.

** $p < .05$.

Given the correlational nature of the study, we analysed the possibility of an alternative mediational model in which discrimination is the mediating variable in the relationship between prejudice and the scope of justice. In fact, this analysis indicated that there is an effect of the SDP on the restriction of the scope of justice, and that discrimination can mediate the relationship between prejudice and the scope of justice ($z = 2.71, p < .01$). In this sense, both models are supported by our data, which suggests that not only the scope of justice influences discrimination but it also can be influenced by discrimination. However, this model explains a little less variance ($R^2_{\text{adjusted}} = .36$) than the previous one, and also has a slightly lower effect ($\beta = .21, p < .01$) of the SDP on the restriction of the scope of justice than the effect of the restriction of the scope of justice on discrimination (see again Table 9). This pattern of results suggests (although not strongly) that it is more likely that the direction of the psychological process runs from the scope of justice to discrimination rather than in the opposite direction.

1.3 – Discussion

This study provides the first evidence that justice concerns can play an important role in the legitimising process underlying prejudice and discrimination. In fact, the results showed that for those participants who were most concerned with justice (i.e., those with higher levels of BJW), restricting the scope of justice can be the psychological mechanism that underlies the relationship between prejudice and discrimination. This means that restricting the scope of justice involves prejudice, which is useful in understanding the strong role played by the scope of justice in the derogation of outgroup members, as previous studies have shown (e.g., Coryn & Borshuk, 2006).

Importantly, mediation by the scope of justice occurred only for participants with higher levels of BJW, which supports the hypothesis, reached through correlational evidence, that legitimization is necessary when the motivation to believe that the world is just is present. This is the core of our argument and the most innovative aspect of our hypothesis.

In addition, we showed that the legitimization process is possibly more dynamic than we originally hypothesized. We found that the reversed mediation (i.e., discrimination can influence the restriction of the scope of justice) can also occur. However, the justice motivation influencing discrimination apparently is a stronger legitimizing mechanism than the reversed option. The next two studies sought to provide experimental evidence of the causal moderation identified in this study.

2. Study 4

This study aims to test experimentally the hypothesis that a restricted view of the scope of justice influences support for discriminatory policies and that this influence is moderated by the BJW. The participants were invited to engage in a study of justice perceptions that involved three phases. In the first, we manipulated the scope of justice by asking participants to consider a questionnaire allegedly answered by another participant which contained the items on the scope of justice scale. In phase two, we manipulated the BJW by asking participants to read a small text about the importance of living in a just world and to rank the items on the BJW scale (vs. reading and ranking a neutral text and items). In the last phase, the participants were tested in accordance with the support-for-discriminatory-policies scale. We predicted that if the influence of the

scope of justice on support for discriminatory policies is guided by the need to believe in a just world, then participants with a restricted view of the scope of justice should support more discriminatory policies against immigrants after engaging in a task concerning the importance of living in a just world but not after taking part in a neutral task.

2.1 – Method

Participants and Design. Eighty-nine Portuguese university students participated in this experiment ($M_{age} = 20.7$, $SD = 2.4$; 71 female and 18 male). The participants were randomly allocated to one cell of a 2(BJW salient vs. BJW not salient) \times 2(Restricted scope of justice vs. control) between-subjects factorial design.

BJW Manipulation. All participants were instructed to read a small text describing a fictitious participant's response to a previous study and to think for two minutes about the content of the text. In the BJW-salient condition, participants read the following text⁶:

“Currently, the world has undergone many changes: from the weather to the economy, from wars to family conflicts. However, justice is the same for all, which makes it possible to live in a healthy society. For those who break the rules, there are penalties and social shame, and for those who obey the laws, there is serenity and peace. Employment opportunities, education and home ownership are possible for those who seek these things through their effort and dedication. Fortunately, the world is just to those who deserve justice in the world.”

After the reading task, and in order to make the justice concern more salient to participants, we asked them to rank the items on the general BJW scale (Dalbert et al., 1987) according to their importance for them (1 = the most important item; 6 = the least important item).

In the non-salient BJW condition, participants read a text that was unrelated to justice in the world. They read a text about the Portugal's relationship with the United

⁶ The Portuguese version of the manipulations presented in this chapter can be found in Appendix B.

Nations (UN). After the reading, participants ranked six sentences that were unrelated to justice (e.g., “The UN recognizes Portugal’s good work in promoting active citizenship”; “The UN has always had a good relationship with Portugal”), considering the link between each sentence and the content of the text presented for reading.

Restricted Scope of justice Manipulation. In the condition of a restricted view of the scope of justice, participants read the answers of an alleged participant in the five-item scope of justice scale (see Study 1). They were told that these were the answers given by a university student in a previous study and that we were asking them to consider the answers presented (see Alves & Correia, 2008 for a similar procedure). These bogus answers were items on the scale that conveyed support for a restricted view of the scope of justice, i.e. the participants’ perception that the justice rules applied to nationals are not applied in order to regulate their relationships with immigrants. Participants were asked to carefully read the answers of the alleged participant. They were then introduced to a task designed to manipulate their BJW. In the control condition, participants did not read anything about the scope of justice. Instead, they were directly introduced to the BJW manipulation.

Dependent Measure. Participants answered the support-for-discriminatory-policies scale as did the participants in the previous studies (SDP; $\alpha = .76$).

2.2 – Results

A 2(BJW: salient vs. not salient) \times 2(Restricted scope of justice vs. control) between-subjects factorial ANOVA on the SDP indicated a main effect of BJW, which shows that participants in the BJW-salient condition supported discriminatory policies to a greater extent ($M = 3.65$, $SD = 0.93$) than participants in the non-salient condition ($M = 3.02$, $SD = 1.21$), $F(1, 85) = 5.88$, $p = .017$, $\eta^2_p = .06$. For our prediction, the critical effect was a reliable interaction between the BJW and a restricted view of the scope of justice, $F(1, 85) = 5.57$, $p = .021$, $\eta^2_p = .06$.

As can be seen in Figure 7, when BJW was salient, participants supported discriminatory policies against immigrants to a greater extent in the restricted-scope of justice condition ($M = 3.86$, $SD = 0.75$) than in the control condition ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 1.09$), $F(1, 85) = 4.06$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2_p = .05$. When BJW was non-salient, there was no difference in the SDP between the condition in which the scope of justice was restricted

($M = 2.77$, $SD = 0.99$) and the control condition ($M = 3.31$, $SD = 1.41$), $F(1, 85) = 2.11$, ns., $\eta^2_p = .02$.




Figure 9. Support for discriminatory policies as a function of the scope of justice and B JW (Study 4)

Analysing the interaction from another perspective, we found that B JW influenced support for discriminatory policies against immigrants in the condition where the scope of justice was restricted, so that the SDP was higher when the B JW was salient than when it was not salient, $F(1, 85) = 13.01$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2_p = .13$. In the control condition of the scope of justice, the salience of the B JW did not influence SDP, $F(1, 85) < 1$, ns.

2.3 – Discussion

This study replicates and extends the previous study by showing the first experimental evidence for the influence of the scope of justice on support for discriminatory policies. Importantly, this influence occurred only when the B JW was salient. These results are in accordance with our prediction that, in a situation in which people are genuinely concerned with justice, a restricted scope of justice facilitates discrimination against a minority outgroup.

Although the effects are clearly in accordance with our hypotheses, there were some limitations on this study that could weaken our inference concerning the influence of the scope of justice on support for discriminatory policies and could open a window to alternative explanations. For instance, an alternative hypothesis might suggest that greater support for discriminatory policies was due not to the restricted scope of justice

but to the fact that participants had engaged in a bogus questionnaire task. In fact, participants in the control condition did not read an already completed scale equivalent to that read by participants in the restricted scope condition, varying only in the content of the manipulated construct. Another alternative explanation could suggest that manipulating the scope of justice activated a perception of a “tighter superordinate category” rather than a concern for the applicability of justice. In this case, the obtained effect would not have been guided by a justice motivation but by a mere superordinate-category effect. In order to overcome these shortcomings, we conducted another experimental study using a new manipulation for the restricted scope of justice.

3. Study 5

This study intended to replicate the previous one by showing that the influence of a restricted view of the scope of justice on support for discriminatory policies is guided by a justice motivation. Moreover, we used a new manipulation strategy for the scope of justice and introduced a set of manipulation checks intended to address the alternative hypotheses that support for discriminatory policies is more influenced by the task and a superordinate-category effect than by concern for the applicability of justice.

As in the previous study, participants were invited to take part in a study concerning justice perceptions. In phase one, we manipulated the scope of justice by asking participants to organise a set of scrambled phrases which actually were the items on the scope of justice scale used in Study 1 (vs. neutral phrases). In phase two, we manipulated the BJW by using a procedure similar to that used in Study 4. In the last phase, participants indicated their support for discriminatory policies against immigrants and answered manipulation-check measures for scope of justice, BJW and the perception of a superordinate category. We hypothesised that the influence of the scope of justice on support for discriminatory policies is driven by a justice motivation so that participants will show greater support for discriminatory policies when engaged in a restricted scope of justice situation but only in the condition in which BJW is salient. We also reasoned that if this effect is guided by a justice motivation, then manipulating the scope of justice should affect the perception of applicability of justice, but not a perception of superordinate category.

3.1 – Method

Participants and design. Eighty-eight Portuguese university students participated in this study ($M_{age} = 25.6$, $SD = 8.06$; 54 female, 33 male and 1 not reported). As in Study 2, the participants were randomly allocated to one condition of a 2(BJW salient vs. BJW non-salient) \times 2(Restricted scope of justice vs. control) between-subjects factorial design. Therefore, the control conditions for both manipulations had neutral backgrounds without any justice references.

BJW Manipulation. The BJW-salient condition was the same as that used in Study 4. Participants in the non-salient BJW condition read a neutral text about reading habits.

Restricted Scope of justice Manipulation. Participants in the restricted view condition were asked to write a paragraph using five scrambled sentences (actually the items on the restricted scope of justice scale). Participants were told that they could use the given sentences in any order they liked and that they could use connectors so that the paragraph made sense. In addition, they could not introduce any changes to the content of the sentences. In the control condition, participants carried out the same process using five neutral sentences involving phrases unrelated to the scope of justice (e.g., “In society, it is important to organise several events”; “It is preferable to arrange the events in such a way that they do not coincide in time and space”). The participants were then introduced to a task in which we manipulated the BJW.

Dependent Measure. The measure was a support-for-discriminatory-policies scale such as that used in previous studies ($\alpha = .65$).

Manipulation Checks. After answering the support-for-discriminatory-policies scale, participants were asked to state the words that spontaneously came to their mind when thinking about the tasks performed in the previous phases of the study. We used the number of words related to justice as a means of measuring the manipulation check in relation to BJW. The average number of words evoked that related to justice (e.g., “justice”; “merit”; “deserve”) was higher in the BJW-salient condition ($M = 1.86$; $SD = 1.3$) than in the non-salient condition ($M = 1.38$, $SD = 1.3$), $t(1, 86) = 1.75$, $p = .04$ (one tailed).

As a means of checking for the restricted scope of justice manipulation, participants were presented with a list of 10 sentences (the five items from the scale and the five neutral sentences from the control condition) and were asked to choose those that they thought were related to their concern in the tasks performed in the previous phases of the study. We counted the number of sentences that they chose that were related to the scope of justice. The participants chose more sentences from the scope of justice scale in the restricted-scope condition ($M = 3.55$, $SD = .97$) than in the control condition ($M = 0.16$, $SD = .74$), $t(1, 84) = 18.24$, $p < .001$. Thus, both procedures successfully activated the BJW and the scope of justice.

Finally, we asked participants to indicate where they placed themselves on a continuum ranging from Portuguese to Portuguese speakers or “Lusophone” (a superordinate category that includes both Portuguese nationals and Brazilian immigrants) by using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = “Portuguese” to 7 = “Lusophone”). The scope of justice manipulation did not influence the participants’ self-categorization in that there was no difference between the control ($M = 2.25$, $SD = 1.57$) and the restricted condition ($M = 2.70$, $SD = 2.11$), $t(1, 85) = -1.12$; ns. These results indicate that this manipulation did not activate a perception of a superordinate category.

3.2 – Results

A 2(BJW salient vs. BJW non-salient) \times 2(Restricted scope of justice vs. Control) between-subject factorial ANOVA on the SDP revealed a main effect of the scope of justice. Participants in the restricted-scope condition supported discriminatory policies more ($M = 3.58$, $SD = 1.07$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 3.13$, $SD = 0.97$), $F(1, 84) = 4.61$, $p = .035$, $\eta^2_p = .05$.

As predicted, this main effect was qualified by an interaction between the restricted view of the scope of justice and the BJW, $F(1,84) = 3.92$, $p = .05$, $\eta^2_p = .04$ (see Figure 8). In the BJW-salient condition, participants expressed greater support for discriminatory policies in the condition of a restricted scope of justice ($M = 3.73$, $SD = 1.02$) than in the control condition ($M = 2.84$, $SD = .97$), $F(1, 84) = 8.33$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2_p = .09$. In the BJW non-salient condition the scope of justice exerted no influence on the support for discriminatory policies ($M = 3.39$, $SD = 0.91$ vs. $M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.12$), $F(1, 84) < 1$, ns.

As in Study 4, we also analyzed the interaction effect from another perspective and we verified that the salience of BJW did not influence support for discriminatory

policies in the condition where the scope of justice was restricted, $F(1, 84) < 1$, n.s. However, in the control condition of the scope of justice, we found that the BJW has a marginal effect on SDP, $F(1, 84) = 3.29$, $p = .07$, so that participants' SDP was lower in the BJW-salient condition than in the BJW non-salient condition.




Figure 10. Support for discriminatory policies as a function of the scope of justice and BJW (Study 5)

Finally, we conducted supplementary analysis in which we added the measure of superordinate category as a covariate in the analysis. The results indicated a reliable effect of the superordinate category on discrimination, so that the greater the participants' perception that nationals and immigrants share a common identity (i.e. the superordinate category of Lusophone), the lower the SDP ($\beta = -.23$, $p < .05$), $F(1, 82) = 4.70$, $p < .04$, $\eta^2_p = .05$. It is significant that the pattern of results that we obtained do not change in accordance with whether or not the superordinate category is included in the analysis. That is, the influence of the scope of justice and the moderating role played by the BJW occur independently of the effect of the superordinate category. In fact, when the BJW is salient, the restriction of the scope of justice influenced support for discriminatory policies against immigrants, $F(1, 83) = 8.99$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2_p = .10$. When BJW was not salient, the restricted scope of justice did not influence SDP, $F(1, 83) < 1$, ns.

3.3 – Discussion

The results replicated the previous results using a new manipulation of the restricted scope of justice. According to our predictions, the restricted scope of justice influenced support for discriminatory policies only in the BJW-salient condition. This result allows us to reject the alternative hypothesis that participants showed greater support for discriminatory policies because they had engaged in a task of some kind since participants in the current study carried out the same task across the conditions of the scope of justice, which varied only in the concern for the relevance and applicability of fairness (versus non-justice related task). In addition, the analysis from the BJW perspective showed that this belief reduced discrimination in the control condition of the scope of justice. This effect is complementary to our hypothesis because it suggests that individuals that are highly motivated to believe that the world is just tend to avoid supporting discrimination when it is not justified, that is, when they do not have a restricted view of the scope of justice.

Importantly, the results involving the manipulation checks and supplementary analysis demonstrated that participants in both scope of justice conditions did not group together national citizens and immigrants into a broader category, which allows us to reject the alternative hypothesis based on the superordinate-category effect. Moreover, despite the role played by this categorisation in reducing discrimination, it did not affect the influence of the scope of justice and the BJW on the SDP. Thus, this set of results is a strong test for our prediction that the influence of the scope of justice on discrimination is guided by a justice motivation.

Summary of Part II

In Part II we found that the BJW can have an important impact in intergroup processes, especially in the legitimation of discrimination. Thus, we applied the BJW as a justice motivation in the prejudice-discrimination relationship. We found that the BJW played the moderation role in the justification of discrimination against immigrants, and specifically, the BJW also moderated the effect of the restricted scope of justice on discrimination. The justice-based specificity of the legitimation of social inequalities is an innovation in the analysis of the intergroup conflict research.

General Discussion

In the present thesis, we have analyzed the role played by justice perceptions in the legitimation of discrimination against immigrants. The studies from Part I (Studies 1 and 2) show the relevance of a justice perception such as the scope of justice in the psychological process that links prejudice to discrimination. We have showed that a prejudiced attitude needs to be legitimized by justice, and this justification is used as a non-prejudiced argument to support discriminatory policies against immigrants. Studies presented in Part I reveal a mediation effect in that more prejudiced individuals tended to restrict their perception of the scope of justice by saying that the justice principles that regulate national citizenship do not apply to their relations with immigrants. Furthermore, the more restricted the scope of justice was perceived to be, the more individuals supported discriminatory policies against immigrants.

Part II presented a second set of studies (Studies 3, 4 and 5) indicating that the mediation by the restricted scope of justice is needed only for participants with higher levels of BJW. The moderated mediation obtained in Study 3 suggests that restricting the scope of justice could represent a mechanism by which prejudice relates to discrimination for participants who are highly motivated to believe that the world is just. This possibility suggests that prejudiced individuals could restrict their perception of the scope of justice by holding the idea that justice principles that national citizens are entitled to are not applied to their relationship with immigrants, and so it may be legitimate to deny them full political and civil rights. Studies 4 and 5 show experimental evidence that the influence of the scope of justice in discrimination is stronger when the BJW is salient.

Justified Discrimination

The mediation role of the scope of justice can be interpreted within the social psychology framework, according to which prejudice and discrimination tend to persist because individuals have developed indirect ways and legitimated forms of discrimination (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). We have showed that the scope of justice can act as such an indirect way. That is, the restricted scope of justice can be a strategy that maximizes the difference between groups (e.g., Tajfel, 1970), creating a “good reason” to derogate the

outgroup without threatening individuals' self-concept. This interpretation also follows recent theorizing and research on the legitimation of social inequalities, which predicts that the relationship between prejudice and discrimination needs to be legitimized because individuals' self-concepts have internalized egalitarian justice principles which require them to have good reasons to discriminate (e.g., Costa-Lopes et al., 2013; Pereira et al., 2010, 2009).

Study 1 represents a unique contribution to this literature by demonstrating that restricting the scope of justice may function as an example of such a reason. Importantly, it also represents a contribution to the existing literature on the scope of justice by investigating the mediating role that it plays in discrimination, besides using a measure that directly addresses individuals' perceptions of relevance and applicability of fairness, which had not yet been demonstrated in this research field (see Hafer & Olson, 2003). Study 2 shows experimentally the mediation found in Study 1 by manipulating the salience of cultural prejudice. Individuals expressed more support for discriminatory policies when they were hidden by the prejudice salient in society than when they were answering without society's shield. This study is mainly important because it shows the role played by the restriction of the scope of justice in a more controllable setting but also because it represents an addition to prejudice literature in order to gauge the consequences of prejudice when individuals feel more allowed to express prejudice-based discrimination (i.e. lower pressure of the anti-prejudice norm over individuals).

Study 3 replicates the findings from Study 1, adding the relevance of a justice motivation (e.g., BJW) in the process of social exclusion. The consequence of the restriction of the scope of justice on discrimination against immigrants was enhanced when participants showed a higher motivation to believe in a just world. The psychological principle behind this result is that the motivation to believe that the world is just turns the restriction of the scope of justice into a greater derogation of the outgroup (e.g., "if they are outside my scope of justice, they deserve to be discriminated against"). The contribution of the BJW to the model made a stronger argument for the use of their restricted scope of justice as a justification factor, in order to maintain the world as a just place, consequently enhancing the support of discriminatory policies. The rationalization is that, since immigrants do not share the same justice principles as nationals, they deserve to receive a different treatment such as paying more for social

security and health care. The use of both justice perceptions made the rationalization of supporting discrimination more coherent, legitimizing the derogation.

Based on the findings from Study 3, the following studies (Studies 4 and 5) go further by testing experimentally whether the scope of justice influences discrimination and whether this influence is driven by the justice motivation (as operationalized by BJW). In accordance with our predictions, the results show that individuals support discriminatory policy against immigrants depending on whether they are submitted to a condition in which the scope of justice is restricted or not. In addition, the results demonstrate that the BJW moderates this effect: participants in the restricted scope of justice condition showed more support for discriminatory policies against immigrants after they read a text about the importance of living in a just world than when they read a text that did not refer to justice.

In many ways, the most novel finding in this research is that the influence of the scope of justice on discrimination is, paradoxically, guided by a justice motivation, which helps to illuminate some of the processes underlying the effects of justice motivation on intergroup attitudes. We interpreted the results as one indication that justice motivation plays a central role in legitimizing social inequalities (e.g., Costa-Lopes et al., 2013; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Pereira et al., 2010). In fact, BJW seems to make it necessary for individuals to pursue some legitimizing justification for discrimination, for instance, by restricting their scope of justice.

Perhaps this situation has arisen because, in contemporary western societies, individuals genuinely have internalized egalitarian values and are encouraged to act in a fair way, which may generate psychological conflict when they need to behave towards members of minority groups (see Crandall & Elsleman, 2003). This conflict might be stronger when individuals are motivated to believe that the world is a just place. This is especially true in conditions where the scope of justice can play a legitimizing role because it can be used as a good reason to derogate a target to which the ingroup's justice principles are not applied (e.g., Deutsch, 1985; Opatow, 1995; Staub, 1989). This legitimation may have the psychological function of reducing the tension caused by the conflict between individuals' internalization of both egalitarian and prejudice beliefs present in society. That is, the legitimation by the restricted scope of justice provides a rationalization for two opposed needs: individuals' need to perceive

themselves and be perceived by others as just but, at the same time, they act in a discriminatory way in order to fulfill their need to express prejudice-based behavior.

Nevertheless, the research conducted for this thesis can have alternative explanations and limitations that may not assure its findings “as they are” without considering them.

Alternative Explanations

Scope of Justice is a Superordinate Category

The articulation of concepts such as the scope of justice and the superordinate category is crucial to the development of social justice research. The overlap of the two concepts under the categorization umbrella is important to frame the relevance of the scope of justice on intergroup relations. Firstly, the perceived similarity is one of the factors to include group members in the superordinate category. This specific feature is shared with the scope of justice and is the core of the misperception that the two concepts are explaining the same process. However, this misperception also shows their connection, where categorization and group membership are crucial to both perspectives.

On the superordinate category perspective, group membership depends on valence, traits and behavior of group members. Based on this general perception, people decide about the inclusion of subgroup members or their own belongingness to the superordinate category (Rydell, Hamilton, & Devos, 2010). At the most elementary level, the process of social categorization provides cues to individuals and groups of their own identities in relationship with others. In this process, similarities (especially within a group) and dissimilarities (especially across groups) are highlighted, leading people to decide about other groups anchored in those parameters (Hegtvedt, 2005). On the scope of justice side, similarity/dissimilarity is also important to define the application of justice principles to regulate social relations. The scope of justice can be used by individuals as arguments for mishandling a target.

Empirical data already discussed in this thesis showed the fragile role of similarity on the scope of justice definition. An example is Opatow's (1994; 1995) qualitative research on adolescent peer conflict, where she investigated the relationship between similarity and the scope of justice. Analyzes of adolescent narratives found a more straightforward relationship between similarity and inclusion, that is, the greater

the number of similarities that participants discerned between themselves and an adversary, the more likely they were to include that adversary within their scope of justice. However, quantitative results also showed that similarity had no effect on the scope of justice when entered in the principal component analysis as a unitary construct. The similarity/dissimilarity was not associated with the amplification or restriction of the scope of justice.

In fact, any social or physical characteristic can serve as the basis for group comparison purposes (e.g., social differentiation, moral evaluation and exclusion by categorization) and especially for justice-based judgments such as the delineation of the scope of justice. For instance, Opatow (1990b; 1995) argues that the historical sample of excluded categories, such as slaves, Jews, mentally disabled, women, blacks and children, suggests the wide variation in criteria for inclusion/exclusion (e.g., ideology, cognitive capacity, skin color, gender). Specifically, there is less inclination to apply justice or think in justice terms when it is directed at outgroup members (Kazemi & Tornblom, 2008).

Importantly, only similarity/dissimilarity does not have the impact on the scope of justice as the expected⁷ impact on the superordinate category. The decision about the scope of justice also implies a perception of group membership (Tyler & Lind, 1990) and other aspects, such as shared justice principles and moral standards. In other words, despite the social category that the outgroup represents, the moral component is essential to the scope of justice demarcation. The inclusion in the scope of justice is a matter of similarity but is also a matter of moral and justice principles, because the scope of justice also distinguishes based on which way justice principles are universal or contextual. This main difference helps us to understand that to include or exclude any group in/from the scope of justice is different from the idea to share or not a superordinate category with another group.

From a more inclusionary point of view, the scope of justice could be a specific case of superordinate category. For instance, the superordinate category could include ingroup and outgroup under an “embracing” category that has moral standards, values

⁷ Sindic (2011) argues that people could perceive categorization on other bases than similarity. That is, people can feel they are part of a certain group or category without the similarity aspect influencing the decision. For instance, indigenous tribes may not feel similar to other nationals in their country and, at the same time, they share the same nationality and the same moral community.

and features used to intergroup differentiation within a superordinate category (Waldzus & Mummendey, 2004).

This aspect of the superordinate category is also shared by the scope of justice definition. This approach of the scope of justice is consistent with a social-categorization analysis of justice according to which a specific target does or does not deserve fair treatment depending on the social category to which the target is perceived to belong (see Wenzel, 2000). For example, when we think of nationals (ingroup) and immigrants (outgroup) of a certain country. At a first glance, both groups are included in the extended scope of justice (or superordinate category) of human beings. However, depending on the comparison of morals, values, justice principles and their relationship (e.g., more pacific, less pacific, clandestine), nationals could restrict their scope of justice by arguing that immigrants do not share the same morals as nationals, or, that immigrants live with other justice principles and do not deserve to share nationals' rights. In a more extreme scenario, nationals could also exclude immigrants from their extended and inclusive scope of justice "human beings", infra-humanizing the outgroup to the point that killing immigrants is acceptable or justified (see Leyens et al., 2007 for a review on infra-humanization). In this case, group comparison would be important to trigger the decision to exclude outgroup members from the scope of justice, but the entitlement of a just and fair treatment would have a major influence on the restriction of the scope of justice and its consequences.

BJW and Meritocracy

Central in the just-world hypothesis is the meritocratic logic behind the deserving decision; in other words, the basis of people's belief is that society rewards individual ability and motivation. This centrality of meritocracy misleads whether BJW is different from meritocracy or is just another name to describe descriptive meritocracy (e.g., Son Hing, et al., 2011).

We argue that BJW is different from descriptive meritocracy because people do not need to believe that the world is meritocratic, but they need to believe that the world is just from a meritocratic perspective. That is why individuals believe that people deserve what they get. The motivation to believe that the world is just can be the basic psychological motivation that drives people to endorse the meritocratic norm as a strategy to preserve the fundamental delusion. Therefore, meritocracy or the adherence to meritocratic ideology is probably a consequence of a justice motivation such as the

BJW. So, meritocracy is related to BJW but those are different concepts, where BJW is an antecedent of the adherence to meritocracy.

In fact, this difference is demonstrated using the same general model: the JDM. Pereira et al. (2009) showed that when the meritocratic norm is salient or activated discrimination does not need to be justified, since there is an openness to attribute the misfortune of the target group to meritocracy. That is, when the meritocracy was salient, discrimination was already justified. However, in Study 3 of this thesis, when participants reported a higher BJW, the justification provided by the restricted scope of justice predicted a higher discrimination against the target group. In other words, when BJW was salient, without the presence of meritocracy, participants needed to search for a justification such as the restriction of the scope of justice in order to legitimize discrimination. This thesis contributes to disentangle the justice principle (meritocracy) from the justice motivation (BJW) by showing empirically that the motivation to believe that the world is just drives individuals to act in a meritocratic way. Results from these studies demonstrated that BJW plays an important role in the legitimation of discrimination, while the simple activation of meritocracy does not need to be legitimized.

Limitations

Norms and Prejudice-discrimination relationship

Perhaps the main limitation of this research concerns the assumption that individuals feel a psychological tension that is brought about by the internalization of both egalitarian justice principles that pressure individuals to act in a just way, and prejudiced attitudes, and beliefs towards historically disadvantaged groups that motivate individuals to discriminate against other groups in order to favor their own group.

We acknowledge that the normative pressure to suppress any biased behavior leads individuals to search for justifications in order to discriminate against outgroups. Normative constraints can drive both prejudiced and non-prejudiced individuals to legitimize their discriminatory behavior using a seemingly unprejudiced justification (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Jost & Banaji, 2001). Assuming that the anti-prejudice norm constantly impels individuals not to act in a discriminatory way, the legitimation of discrimination helps prejudiced individuals to resolve the tension caused by the contradictory message of the internalization process. So, in egalitarian societies, the

anti-prejudice norm “forces” prejudiced individuals to justify their need to discriminate by using justice concerns as a way to dissimulate the prejudice source of the discrimination. In this way, prejudiced attitudes and beliefs drive individuals not only to be able to satiate the need to discriminate but also to be seen as fair people applying justice to the outgroup that are consensual in an egalitarian society, and not using their own negative attitudes towards the outgroup. Although this assumption has been considered to be strongly plausible by all contemporary theories about prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Crandall & Elsteman, 2003; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Pereira et al., 2009), it has not yet been directly tested in experimental research, which is a limitation to be considered in the inferences made based on our findings.

Another limitation is the non-differentiation between the motivations of low and high-prejudiced individuals to legitimize discrimination. We speculate that the need to legitimize discrimination may be different in individuals with low and high-prejudiced attitudes against minorities. There is a possibility that, in less prejudiced individuals, the need to justify discriminatory behavior could be specifically related to the internalization of egalitarian norms and, in more prejudiced individuals, the need to justify discrimination could derive from normative pressures in a society that prohibits and punishes discrimination against minorities. The set of studies presented here do not satisfactorily address this hypothesis. New studies can differentiate between these two levels of prejudice in order to analyze the specificities of this process.

Scope of Justice Operationalization Issues

Given the wide range of possible analyzes, some definitional and operationalization questions are raised in the scope of justice research (see Hafer & Olson, 2003). Is the scope of justice a dichotomous or continuous variable? Is the scope of justice the same thing as the moral circle? Is there a reliable measure of the scope of justice?

Dichotomous-continuous dilemma. The scope of justice literature does not provide a consensus whether individuals’ perception about the scope of justice is a continuous or a dichotomous variable. Some researchers point out that individuals perceive the justice principles as applied or not applied to regulate the events involving (i.e., a dichotomous view of the scope). Other researchers believe that individuals can perceive the justice principles as more or less applicable to the target (Hafer & Olson,

2003). For instance, Leets (2001) argues that the scope of justice is dichotomous, that is, the exclusion from the scope of justice is an extreme point, whose opposite is inclusion in the scope of justice. The extremes give an unambiguous idea of what we should expect if the decision is about inclusion or exclusion. Hafer and Olson (2003) discussed this issue arguing that the dichotomous idea of the inclusion-exclusion is clearer, and most authors analyze the scope of justice from this dichotomous viewpoint.

As already discussed in Chapter 2, research by Coryn and Borshuk (2006) about the aftermath of September 11 also brought up discussion of the continuous vs. dichotomous concepts. These authors provided important empirical data to analyze the dilemma. The particular family and all their features combined (e.g., U.S. citizens, Muslims, elderly people) caused the ambivalence of participant decisions about the treatment. Some participants judged the treatment received by the Muslim American couple as just and unjust at the same time. That is, participants were ambivalent towards the treatment because the stimulus family were, in fact, ingroup members (e.g., U.S. citizens), but also the stimulus family have outgroup traits (e.g., Muslim heritage). Other participants even saw the situation as irrelevant, that is, some participants did not care about the (good or bad) treatment received by the stimulus family. The ambivalent situation usually tends to lead to a restriction of the scope of justice because the categorization of the stimulus family is not clear. This tendency towards the exclusion point even in an ambivalent scenario is why the dichotomous option is still preferable for researchers than the continuous one.

On the other hand, researchers may lose the mild forms of exclusion (such as the ambivalent position) in everyday justice-related decisions that we make when we are focused on the extremes. The mild forms of the scope of justice decision could represent its malleability, given that people can consider or not to amplify and restrict their scope of justice to some group at the same time, depending on context. The non-constant element that constitutes the concept helps the continuous claim when, in real-world situations, the judgment rarely is as “clean” as we want it to be. In fact, Opatow (1990a, 1990b) defines the scope of justice as a continuous rather than a dichotomous construct, occurring in different forms. She argues that some indications could lead to primarily exclusion positions such as the exclusion-specific judgment (i.e., where there is no trace of inclusion as in dehumanization processes), and an ordinary judgment (i.e., unawareness or neglecting as in condescension).

We suggest that both approaches are important to analyze the scope of justice, but we chose the continuous one because we aimed to analyze the decision based on the scope of justice empirically. Specifically, we opted to not only verify whether individuals consider or not justice principles as applied to a target group, but also to observe the degree of restriction/amplification of the target group depending on the situation. Therefore, we adopted this continuous position throughout the thesis.

Scope of Justice or Moral Circle? Another limitation in the studies presented in this thesis is the lack of articulation between the scope of justice and the idea of the moral circle. Psychological and moral philosophical perspectives define the construct of moral community using different terms. Usually, when the concept is applied in a more philosophical background, the scope of justice is called the “moral circle”. This terminology in philosophy is not recent, dating back to the 19th century (Laham, 2009). The moral circle can be defined as a set of entities considered worthy of moral regard and treatment, in the same way as the inclusion of determined groups, and not others, in the scope of justice. The inclusion in the moral circle is determined by traits and some features that people feel correspond to their moral standards (Lund et al., 2007). In fact, there have been a few papers in psychology (e.g., Reed and Aquino, 2003; Laham, 2009) analyzing the moral circle in the same way as the scope of justice, but using the previous terminology.

For instance, Laham (2009) addresses this lack of the use of moral circle terminology in psychology research by examining an aspect of social judgment, claiming that it may influence the size of the moral circle: the restriction-amplification continuum. From this perspective, amplified or restricted scope of justice is defined as inclusion or exclusion mindset. The inclusion mindset is focused on entities that individuals perceive as appropriate to include in the moral circle, while the exclusion mindset is focused on entities that individuals perceive as inappropriate to include. The inclusion-exclusion discrepancy is similar to the decision to include a certain group within or exclude a certain group from the scope of justice, as addressed in social psychology; and already discussed in this chapter, when we argued about amplifying or restricting the scope of justice.

This evidence of the moral circle in psychology brought the terminology even closer to the actual meaning of the scope of justice. This differentiation should be avoided in the scope of justice literature, despite some singularities in the two

perspectives. From our point of view, instead of disentangling the moral circle from the scope of justice, it is important to stress how the two designations of moral community can be brought under the scope of justice umbrella.

An example of the moral circle application in psychology that could help this approximation is the analysis of pro-environmental behavior. Bratanova, Loughnan and Gatersleben (2012) proposed that the moral circle is an important source for people to engage in activities that are pro-environmental and it could help to increase these activities when people include natural entities in their moral circle. That is, the greater the inclusion of nature in their moral circle (e.g., being morally concerned with these entities), the greater should be the motivation to participate in protective behavior. The pro-sociality effect was already demonstrated by previous studies such as Laham's (2009), and Bratanova, Loughnan and Gatersleben (2012), which analyzed if this effect is replicated in environmental issues. For instance, they studied whether a more expansive moral circle motivates pro-environmentalism in addition to pro-sociality. Results demonstrated that a more extended moral circle regarding pro-environmental behavior can have beneficial consequences (e.g., financial support for environmental activities, policy creation). This recent evidence in moral circle research had already been identified in studies about the scope of justice and environmental issues (e.g., Opatow, 1996; Opatow & Weiss, 2000; Bilewicz, Imhoff, & Drogosz, 2011).

Similar measures and sentences used to analyze the moral circle in Laham (2009) and Bratanova, Loughnan and Gatersleben (2012) such as "moral obligation", "willingness to allocate money", "support for policies" can also be found in research about the scope of justice, such as the scope-of-justice scale (Coryn & Broshuk, 2006; Opatow, 1993, 1995). Surprisingly, as far as we know, there is no crossed information or citations about these studies in the moral circle literature. With this information in mind, we suggest that researchers in both designations working within psychology get in touch with each other to research and explore measures, manipulations and narratives that could beneficiate both perspectives of the moral community.

Measuring the Scope of Justice. An important limitation of this thesis is the lack of a systematic study to validate the scope of justice measure, especially a set of studies comparing this measure with other relevant measures in intergroup conflict research. In fact, several attempts have been made to measure the scope of justice or the perceived relevance of fairness directly (e.g., Beaton & Tougas, 2001; Coryn & Borshuk, 2006;

Leets, 2001; Opatow, 1993; 1995; Singer, 1996). Opatow (1993) initially presented a three-item scope of justice scale. She then added two items to the previous version: the degree of difficulty making the allocation decision; and the willingness to support concrete protective measures. Coryn and Borshuk (2006) replicated this scale using the items as open-ended questions, although it has not undergone rigorous systematic validity testing. For instance, Beaton and Tougas (2001) used nine statements to assess the extent to which principles of fairness were amplified to a specific affirmative action recipient (e.g., women, disabled people). Leets (2001) also used Opatow's (1993) version and added a question about people's willingness to help. In all these cases, the scope of justice scale showed poor reliability psychometric parameters (Cronbach's $\alpha \approx 0.65$).

Another example of the so called "scope of justice scale" are the two scales developed by Singer (1996) to assess individual differences in scope of justice regarding Maori people in New Zealand. This author developed two scope of justice' scales: a perceptual and a contact scale. The perceptual scope of justice scale was adapted from interracial relations' studies and the contact scope of justice scale was based on studies about contact experiences and the actual experience of the New Zealand government departments. Results showed that participants with a higher score on scope of justice regarding Maori people were significantly less opposed to diversity-based selection. This result suggests that participants (i.e. European undergraduate students) who had more favorable attitudes towards Maori people and included Maoris in their justice concerns were less opposed to diversity-based selection. The problem with these measures is the indiscriminate arrangement of items that are probably not measuring the scope of justice. They are actually measuring intergroup contact and attitudes towards the target group.

In fact, Hafer and Olson (2003) made an important point arguing that some operationalization of the scope of justice scale possibly missed the target by not considering the idea that people who exclude others from their scope of justice (e.g., denying the outgroup positive treatment) may act fairly and rationally according to their judgment of the situation. Indeed, the justification role of the scope of justice might be the key to understand the psychological mechanisms behind the scope of justice perception of amplification or restriction. In fact, justice and intergroup relations' research are still waiting for a clear, validated and reliable measure for the scope of justice.

Contributions and Further Research

Despite the limitations, this series of studies makes at least three contributions to the literature on the legitimation of social inequalities. First, it shows a way of articulating the idea of BJW in intergroup relations' processes (see also Correia et al., 2007) in which the salience of BJW can have negative consequences on the integration of immigrants in Europe. Secondly, the operationalization of the scope of justice is important in extending its use in intergroup-relation research in social psychology. The scope of justice scale that we developed has been showing consistent statistical properties and provides a good measure for the application of justice principles to others. Thirdly, it represents a step forward in the process of acquiring knowledge of the relationship between justice perceptions and intergroup conflicts since it takes into account justice perceptions in considering the more general problem of the relationship between prejudice and discrimination.

There are, however, more justice perceptions besides the scope of justice or the salience of BJW that probably influence intergroup conflicts and were not addressed in this thesis. Further research is needed to analyze the role played by other justice perceptions as legitimizing factors in discrimination (e.g., descriptive and prescriptive meritocracy; see Son Hing et al., 2011). Specifically, it would be necessary to analyze directly the difference between BJW and descriptive meritocracy applied to the same model in the same study (e.g., JDM).

On the basis of Wenzel's (2001) suggestion that social identity can also influence justice perceptions in intergroup attitudes, further research should consider the role played by the superordinate category as a potential moderator of the legitimizing effect of the restricted scope of justice in discrimination. As already discussed in this thesis, there is a need to disentangle the scope of justice from the superordinate category in our results. In spite of the effort made in Study 5, where we added a manipulation check to mark this difference between the two concepts, further research needs to analyze this difference using more items in a reliable measure of superordinate category. In addition, the manipulation of both variables (the restriction of the scope of justice and the superordinate category) could help to provide a better understanding of the complexity underlying the effect of the restricted scope of justice beyond the moderation role played by justice motivation.

Moreover, a relevant question to be analyzed in further research is the operationalization of the scope of justice as a specific type of categorization. This feature opens the possibility of the group boundaries' definition being based on another source rather than the categorization process. Specifically, if this holds true, the categorization process would not be the main source of intergroup conflict (e.g., Tajfel, 1982). The categorization process could be based on prejudice beliefs and attitudes. That is, although the categorization leads to a higher intergroup discrimination, the categorization *per se* or its content may be a consequence of prejudice beliefs. This avenue for future research deserves the attention of theorists and researchers in the fields of both intergroup conflict and social justice.

Another possible analysis of the role played by justice perceptions in social exclusion processes is to explore the effect of the restricted scope of justice on the relationship between infra-humanization (e.g., Leyens et al., 2007) and discrimination, since it could be considered as a type of attitudinal differentiation or a prejudiced belief. This possibility is likely, since infra-humanization has already been applied to the JDM (Pereira et al., 2009) evidencing that individuals who infra-humanized the target group needed to justify this need with a non-prejudiced argument in order to legitimize the discrimination. Another interesting analysis would be to explore the role played by the scope of justice in the deviant behavior of ingroup members. That is, could the black sheep effect (e.g., Marques, Yzerbit, & Leyens, 1988) be related to the restriction or amplification of individuals' scope of justice? A possible result could be that a restriction of the scope of justice would lead to a higher negative reaction towards them.

In addition, we suggest that both sets of studies presented in this thesis should be carried out with different target groups (e.g., the homeless, the gypsy community) in order to demonstrate whether the justification process is only for immigrants or could be extended to other target groups.

Implications

Besides the direct contribution to intergroup conflict and justice literature, the aim of this thesis is to help in uncovering the process behind the reticence in executing public policies directed at stopping discrimination against immigrants in Europe.

This thesis had the specific goal of elucidating the fact that discrimination can be legitimized by justice judgments. The non-recognition of discrimination against

immigrants leads to its present perpetuation when discrimination maintains its course with justice-based arguments, rationalizing this unhealthy social behavior. Without the awareness of discrimination, the anti-discrimination law becomes obsolete and it cannot be activated in order to punish perpetrators. If this process is not stopped by awareness and the application of law, the cycle of derogation and impunity will continue.

As Opatow (1990b, p. 14) argues:

“In addition to advancing empirical and theoretical knowledge, research on moral exclusion has the potential to extend social justice. Because social researchers take an analytical rather than a polemical approach to social issues, they can identify and expose social ideologies that support injustice. In doing so, they can actively precipitate social change.”

In this thesis, the analytical approach enlightened the specific role of two justice perceptions in the prejudice and discrimination against immigrants that is latent in Portugal. The social justice aspect of this thesis may help governmental institutions of immigrants' native countries or associations of immigrants to understand the type of discrimination that is maintaining occasional difficulties in their daily lives, leading to a higher claim for their rights and position in Portuguese society. This thesis can also have implications for Portuguese governmental institutions, such as *ACIDI (Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural)* and create population awareness of how seemingly harmless discourses may be obstacles for improving immigration policies.

We can, therefore, underline the social relevance of this thesis, pointing to the importance of social justice research in order to continue this research line, inviting other researchers that want to “act against injustice” to contribute one step at a time to uncover the processes behind social exclusion in its various shapes.

References

- Aguiar, P., Vala, J., Correia, I., & Pereira, C. (2008). Justice in our world and in that of others: Belief in a just world and reactions to victims. *Social Justice Research, 21*, 50-68.
- Allport, G. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Alves, H. (2012). Sobre a descoberta da normatividade injuntiva da expressão da crença no mundo justo: Uma aventura em psicologia social. In C. R. Pereira & R. Costa-Lopes (Eds.), *Normas, atitudes e comportamentos sociais*. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.
- Alves, H., & Correia, I. (2010). Personal and general belief in a just world as judgment norms. *International Journal of Psychology, 3*, 221–231. DOI: 10.1080/00207590903281120
- Arendt, H. (1963/2003). *Eichmann em Jerusalém: Uma reportagem sobre a banalidade do mal*. Coimbra: Tenacitas.
- Bandura, A. (1990). Selective activation and disengagement of moral control. *Journal of Social Issues, 46*, 27-46.
- Bar-Tal, D. (1990). Causes and consequences of delegitimization: Models of conflict and ethnocentrism. *Journal of Social Issues, 46*, 65-81.
- Beaton, A. M., & Tougas, F. (2001). Reactions to affirmative action: group membership and social justice. *Social Justice Research, 14*, 61-78.
- Beierlein, C., Werner, C. S., Preiser, S., & Wermuth, S. (2011). Are just-world beliefs compatible with justifying inequality? Collective political efficacy as a moderator. *Social Justice Research, 24*, 278-296. DOI: 10.1007/s11211-011-0139-2.

- Bilewicz, M., Imhoff, R., & Drogosz, M. (2011). The humanity of what we eat: Conceptions of human uniqueness among vegetarians and omnivores. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 41*, 201-209.
- Bratanova, B., Loughnan, S., & Gatersleben, B. (2012). The moral circle as a common motivational cause of cross-situational pro-environmentalism. *European Journal of Social Psychology*. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.1871.
- Brockner, J. (1990). Scope of justice in the workplace: How survivors react to co-worker layoffs. *Journal of Social Issues, 46*, 95-106.
- Camino, L., Silva, P, Machado, A., Pereira, Cícero (2001). A face oculta do racismo no brasil: Uma análise psicossociológica. *Revista de Psicologia Política, 1*, 13-36.
- Clayton, S., & Opatow, S. (2003). Justice and identity: Changing perspectives on what is fair. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 74*, 298-310.
- Correia, I. (2003). *Concertos e desconcertos na procura de um mundo concertado: Crença no mundo justo, inocência da vítima e vitimização secundária*. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian.
- Correia, I. (2010). Psicologia Social da Justiça: Fundamentos e desenvolvimentos teóricos e empíricos. *Análise Psicológica, 1*, 7-28.
- Correia, I., & Dalbert, C. (2007). Belief in a just world, justice concerns, and well-being at Portuguese schools. *European Journal of Psychology in Education, 22*, 421-437.
- Correia, I., & Vala, J. (2003). When will a victim be secondarily victimized? The effect of the observer's belief in a just world, victim's innocence and persistence of suffering. *Social Justice Research, 16*, 379-400.

- Correia, I., Vala, J., & Aguiar, P. (2007). Victim's innocence, social categorization, and the threat to the belief in a just world. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43*, 31–38. DOI:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.12.010
- Correia, I., Alves, H., Sutton, R., Ramos, M., Gouveira-Pereira, M., & Vala, J. (2012). When do people derogate or psychologically distance themselves from victims? Belief in a just world and ingroup identification. *Personality and Individual Differences, 53*, 747-752.
- Coryn, C. L. S., & Borshuk, C. (2006). The scope of justice for muslim Americans: Moral exclusion in the aftermath of 9/11. *The Qualitative Report, 11*, 568-604.
- Costa-Lopes, R. (2010a). *Similarity and dissimilarity in immigration contexts: different dimensions, different processes*. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller.
- Costa-Lopes, R. (2010b). Semelhança e diferença nas relações entre grupos sociais. *In-Mind, 1*(1), 22-28.
- Costa-Lopes, R., Dovidio, J. F., Pereira, C. R., & Jost, J. T. (2013). Social psychological perspectives on the legitimation of social inequality: Past, present and future. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 43*(4), 229-237. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.1966
- Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justification-suppression model of the expression and experience of prejudice. *Psychological Bulletin, 129*, 414-446. DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.414
- Crandall, C. S., Bahns, A. J., Warner, R., & Schaller, M. (2011). Stereotypes as justifications of prejudice. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37*, 1488-1498. DOI: 10.1177/0146167211411723
- Dalbert, C. (1999). The world is more just for me than generally: About the Personal Belief in a Just World Scale's validity. *Social Justice Research, 12*, 79-98.

- Dalbert, C. (2001). *The justice motive as a personal resource: Dealing with challenges and critical life events*. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
- Dalbert, C. (2002). Belief in a just world as a buffer against anger. *Social Justice Research, 15*, 123–145.
- Dalbert, C. (2009). Belief in a just world. In M. R. Leary & R. H. Hoyle (Eds.), *Handbook of individual differences in social behavior* (pp. 288-297). New York: Guilford Publications.
- Dalbert, C. (2012). On the differentiation of an implicit and a self-attributed justice motive. In E. Kals & J. Maes (Eds.), *Justice and Conflicts: Theoretical and Empirical Contributions* (pp. 77-92). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- Dalbert, C. & Yamauchi, L. A. (1994). Belief in a just world and attitudes towards immigrants and foreign workers: A cultural comparison between Hawaii and Germany. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24*, 1612-1626.
- Dalbert, C., Montada, L., & Schmitt, M. (1987). Glaube an die gerechte welt als motiv: Validierung zweier skalen [The belief in a just world as a motive: Validation of two scales]. *Psychologische Beitrage, 29*, 596–615.
- Demoulin, S., Cortes, B. P., Viki, T. G., Rodriguez, A. P., Rodriguez, R. T., Paladino, M. P., & Leyens, J. Ph. (2009). The role of ingroup identification in infra-humanization. *International Journal of Psychology, 44*, 4-11.
- Deutsch, M. (1985). *Distributive justice: A social psychological perspective*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Deutsch, M. (1990). Psychological roots of moral exclusion. *Journal of Social Issues, 46*(1), 21-26.

- Deutsch, M. (2006). Justice and conflict. In M. Deutsch, P. T. Coleman, & E. C. Marcus (Eds.), *The handbook of conflict resolution* (2nd Edition, pp. 41-64). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Devine, P. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *56*, 5-18.
- Dittmar, H., & Dickinson, J. (1993). The perceived relationship between the belief in a just world and sociopolitical ideology. *Social Justice Research*, *6*, 257–272. DOI: 10.1007/BF01054461
- Doise, W. (1976). *L'articulation psychosociologique et les relations entre groupes*. Bruxelles: Éditions A. de Boeck.
- Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J. Eberhardt, & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), *Confronting racism: The problem and the response* (pp. 3–32). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2000). Aversive racism and selection decisions: 1989 and 1999. *Psychological Science*, *11*, 319–323.
- Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2004). Aversive racism. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 36, pp. 1-52). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Dovidio, J. F., Brigham, J. C., Johnson, B. T., & Gaertner, S. L. (1996). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination: Another look. In C. N. Macrae, C. Stangor, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *Stereotypes and stereotyping* (pp. 276–319). New York: Guilford Press.

- Dovidio, J. F., Glick, P., & Rudman, L. (2005). *On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA (2009). *EU-MIDIS European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey*.
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA (2010). *Handbook on European non-discrimination law*.
- Fiske, S. T. (2000). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination at the seam between the centuries: Evolution, culture, mind, and brain. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 30*, 299-32.
- Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*, 878-902.
- Furnham, A. (2003). Belief in a just world: Research progress over the past decade. *Personality and Individual Differences, 34*, 795–817. DOI: 10.1016/S0191-8869(02)00072-7.
- Furnham, A., & Procter, E. (1989). Belief in a just world: Review and critique of the individual difference literature. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 28*, 365–384.
- Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). The aversive form of racism. In J. F. Dovidio, & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 61–89). San Diego: Academic Press.
- Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2005). Understanding and addressing contemporary racism: From aversive racism to the common ingroup identity model. *Journal of Social Issues, 61*, 615-239.

- Gaucher, D., Hafer, C. L., Kay, A. C., & Davidenko, N. (2010). Compensatory rationalizations and the resolution of everyday undeserved outcomes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *36*, 109-118.
- Hafer, C. L. (2000). Investment in long-term goals and commitment to just means drive the need to believe in a just world. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *26*, 1059-1073.
- Hafer, C. L., & Bègue, L. (2005). Experimental research on just-world theory: Problems, developments, and future challenges. *Psychological Bulletin*, *131*, 128-167. DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.131.1.128
- Hafer, C. L., & Olson, J. M. (2003). An Analysis of Empirical Research on the Scope of Justice. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *7*, 311–323.
- Hafer, C. L., Conway, P., Cheung, I., Malyk, D., & Olson, J. M. (2012). The relation between identification with a target and the perceived importance of justice. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, *34*, 395-409. DOI:10.1080/01973533.2012.711693
- Hegtvedt, K. A. (2005). Doing justice to the group: Examining the roles of the group in justice research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *31*, 25–45.
- Heuer, L., Blumenthal, E., Douglas, A., & Weinblatt, T. (1999). A deservingness approach to respect as a relationally based fairness judgment. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *25*, 1279–1292.
- Hodson, G., Hooper, H., Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2005). Aversive racism in Britain: The use of inadmissible evidence in legal decisions. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *35*, 437-448. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.261

- Jost, J.T. (2011). System justification theory as compliment, complement, and corrective to theories of social identification and social dominance. In D. Dunning (Ed.), *Social motivation* (pp. 223-263). New York: Psychology Press.
- Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false-consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *33*, 1-27.
- Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (Eds.). (2001). *The psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, and intergroup relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2005). Antecedents and consequences of system-justifying ideologies. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *14*, 260-265.
- Jost, J.T., & Kay, A.C. (2010). Social justice: History, theory, and research. In S.T. Fiske, D. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (5th edition, Vol. 2, pp. 1122-1165). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Jost, J.T., & van der Toorn, J. (2012). System justification theory. In P.A.M. van Lange, A.W. Kruglanski, & E.T. Higgins (Eds.), *Handbook of theories of social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 313-343.) London: Sage.
- Jost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., Sheldon, O., & Sullivan, B. N. (2003). Social inequality and the reduction of ideological dissonance on behalf of the system: Evidence of enhanced system justification among the disadvantaged. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *33*, 13-36. DOI:10.1002/ejsp.127
- Jost, J. T., Liviatan, I., van der Toorn, J., Ledgerwood, A., Mandisodza, A., & Nosek, B.A. (2010). System justification: How do we know it's motivated? In R. Bobocel et al. (Eds.), *The psychology of justice and legitimacy: The Ontario symposium* (Vol. 11, pp. 173-203). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

- Jowell, R. & Central Coordinating Team (2003). *European social survey 2002/2003: Technical report*. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys.
- Katz, I., & Hass, R. G. (1988). Racial ambivalence and American value conflict: Correlational and priming studies of dual cognitive structures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *55*, 893-905.
- Kazemi, A., & Törnblom, K. (2008). Social psychology of justice: Origins, central issues, recent developments, and future directions. *Nordic Psychology*, *60*, 209-234.
- Krüger, H. (2013). Ideologias, sistemas de crenças e atitudes. In L. Camino, A. R. R. Torres, M. E. O. Lima, & M. E. Pereira (Orgs.), *Psicologia Social: Temas e Teorias* (2ª edição, pp. 261-308). Brasília: TechnoPolitik.
- Lages, M. F., Policarpo, V. M., Marques, J. C. L., Matos, P. L., & António, J. H. C. (2006). Os imigrantes e a população portuguesa: Imagens recíprocas [Immigrants and the Portuguese population: Reciprocal images]. *Observatório da Imigração* *21*, 237-259.
- Laham, S. M. (2009). Expanding the moral circle: Inclusion and exclusion mindsets and the circle of moral regard. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *45*, 250–253. DOI:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.08.012
- LaPiere, R. T. (1934). Attitudes vs. actions. *Social Forces*, *13*, 230-237.
- LaPiere, R. T. (1936). Type-rationalizations of group antipathy. *Social Forces*, *15*, 232–237.
- Leets, L. (2001). Interrupting the cycle of moral exclusion: A communication contribution to social justice research. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *31*, 1859-1891.

- Lerner, M. J. (1980). *The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion*. New York: Plenum.
- Lerner, M. J. (2003). The justice motive: Where social psychologists found it, how they lost it, and why they may not find it again. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 7, 388-399.
- Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution process: Looking back and ahead. *Psychological Bulletin*, 85, 1030–1051. DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.85.5.1030
- Leyens, J. Ph., Paladino, M. P., Rodriguez, R. T., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., & Rodriguez, A. P., Gaunt, R. (2000). The emotional side of prejudice: The attribution of secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 4, pp. 186-197.
- Leyens, J.-P., Demoulin, S., Vaes, J., Gaunt, R., & Paladino, P. M. (2007). Infra-humanization: The wall of group differences. *Social Issues and Policy Review*, 1, 139–172.
- Lima, M. L., & Correia, I. (2013). Atitudes. In J. Vala & M. B. Monteiro (Eds.), *Psicologia Social* (9ª edição, pp. 201-244). Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian.
- Lund, V., Mejdell, C. M., Röcklinsberg, H., Anthony, R., & Håstein, T. (2007). Expanding the moral circle: farmed fish as objects of moral concern. *Diseases of aquatic organisms*, 75, 109-118.
- Maes, J., Tarnai, C., & Schuster, J. (2012). About is and ought in research on belief in a just world: The janus-faced just-world motivation. In E. Kals & J. Maes (Eds.), *Justice and Conflicts* (pp. 93-105). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

- Marques, J. M., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Leyens, J.-Ph. (1988). The black sheep effect: Judgmental extremity towards ingroup members as a function of ingroup identification. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 18*, 1-16.
- McLeod, S. A. (2009). *Attitude Measurement - Simply Psychology*. Retrieved from <http://www.simplypsychology.org/attitude-measurement.html>
- Meertens, R. W., & Pettigrew, T. (1997). Is subtle prejudice really prejudice? *Public Opinion Quarterly, 61*, 54-71.
- Mikula, G., & Wenzel, M. (2000). Justice and social conflict. *International Journal of Psychology, 35*, 126-135.
- Miller, D. (2002). Two ways to think about justice. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 1*, 5-28.
- Mohiyeddini, C., & Montada, L. (1998). BJW and self-efficacy in coping with observed victimization. In L. Montada, & M. Lerner (Eds.), *Responses to victimizations and belief in the just world (pp. 43–53)*. New York: Plenum.
- Nasser R., Doumit J. and Carifio J. (2011) Well-being and belief in a just world among rest home residents. *Social Behavior and Personality, 39*, 655-670.
- Olson, J. M., Cheung, I., Conway, P., & Hafer, C. L. (2010). Deservingness, the scope of justice and actions toward others. In R. Bobocel & A. Kay (Eds.), *The Psychology of justice and legitimacy (pp. 125-149)*. Ontario: Psychology Press.
- Olson, J. M., Cheung, I., Conway, P., Hutchison, J., & Hafer, C. L. (2011). Distinguishing two meanings of moral exclusion: exclusion from moral principles or principled harm-doing? *Social Justice Research, 24*, 365-390.
- Opatow, S. (1990a). Deterring moral exclusion. *Journal of Social Issues, 46*, 173-182.

- Opatow, S. (1990b). Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. *Journal of Social Issues, 46*, 1-20.
- Opatow, S. (1993). Animals and the scope of justice. *Journal of Social Issues, 49*(1), 71–85.
- Opatow, S. (1994). Predicting protection: Scope of justice and the natural world. *Journal of Social Issues, 50*(3), 49–63.
- Opatow, S. (1995). Drawing the line: Social categorization, moral exclusion, and the scope of justice. In B. B. Bunker & J. Z. Rubin (Eds.), *Conflict, cooperation, and justice* (pp. 347–369). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Opatow, S. (1996). Is justice finite? The case of environmental inclusion. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), *Current societal concerns about justice* (pp. 213–230). New York: Plenum Press.
- Opatow, S. (1997). What's fair?. *American Behavioral Scientist, 41*, 232-245.
- Opatow, S., & Weiss, L. (2000). Denial and the process of moral exclusion in environmental conflict. *Journal of Social Issues, 56*, 475-490.
- Otto, K., & Dalbert, C. (2005). Belief in a just world and its functions for young prisoners. *Journal of Research in Personality, 39*, 559-573.
- Pereira, C. R. (2012). Normas sociais e legitimação da discriminação. Em C. R. Pereira & R. Costa-Lopes (Eds.), *Normas, atitudes e comportamentos sociais* (pp. 171-207). Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.
- Pereira, C. R., & Costa-Lopes, R. (Eds.). (2012). *Normas, atitudes e comportamentos sociais*. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.

- Pereira, C. R. & Vala, J. (2011). A legitimação da discriminação em diferentes contextos normativos. In E. M. Techio, & M. E. O. Lima (Eds.), *Cultura e produção das diferenças: Estereótipos e preconceito no Brasil, Espanha e Portugal* (pp. 363-404). Brasília: Technopolitik.
- Pereira, C. R., Torres, A. R. R., & Almeida, S. T. (2003). Um estudo do preconceito na perspectiva das representações sociais: análise da influência de um discurso justificador da discriminação no preconceito racial. *Psicologia: Reflexão e Crítica*, 2003, 16, 95-107.
- Pereira, C., Vala, J., & Costa-Lopes, R. (2010). From prejudice to discrimination: The legitimizing role of perceived threat in discrimination against immigrants. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 40, 1231-1250.
- Pereira, C., Vala, J., & Leyens, J.-P. (2009). From infra-humanization to discrimination: The mediation of symbolic threat needs egalitarian norms. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45, 336–344.
- Pettigrew, T. F., & Meertens, R. W. (1995). Subtle and blatant prejudice in western Europe. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 25, 203-226.
- Poeschl, G. (2008). Social norms and the feeling of justice about unequal family practices. *Social Justice Research*, 21, 69-85. DOI: 10.1007/s11211-007-0057-5
- Reed, A., II, & Aquino, K. F. (2003). Moral identity and the expanding circle of moral regard towards outgroups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84, 1270–1286.
- Rohmann, A., Niedenthal, P.M., Brauer, M., Castano, E., & Leyens, J-P. (2009). The attribution of primary and secondary emotions to the in-group and to the out-group. The case of equal status countries. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 149, 709-730.

Rydell, R. J., Hamilton, D. L. & Devos, T. (2010). Now they American, now they are not: Valence as a determinant of the inclusion of African Americans in the American identity. *Social Cognition*, 28, 161-179.

Schutz, H., & Six, B. (1996). How strong is the relationship between prejudice and discrimination? A meta-analytic answer. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 20, 441–462.

Schwartz, S. H. (1996). Value priorities and behavior: Applying a theory of integrated value systems. In C. Seligman, J. M. Olson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), *The psychology of values: The Ontario Symposium* (Vol. 8, pp. 1-24). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Sears, D. O., & Henry, P. J. (2003). The origins of symbolic racism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85, 259–275.

Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., van Laar, C., & Levin, S. (2004). Social dominance theory: Its agenda and method. *Political Psychology*, 25, 845–880.

Sindic, D. (2011). Psychological citizenship and national identity. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 21, 202-214. DOI: 10.1002/casp.1093

Singer, M. S. (1996). Effects of scope of justice, informant ethnicity, and information frame on attitudes towards ethnicity-based selection. *International Journal of Psychology*, 31, 191-205.

Son Hing, L. S., Bobocel, D. R., Zanna, M. P., Garcia, D. M., Gee, S. S., & Oraziotti, K. (2011). The merit of meritocracy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101, 433-450. DOI: 10.1037/a0024618

- Staub, E. (1989). *The roots of evil: Origins of genocide and other group violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sustein, C. R. (1995). Commentary: Incompletely theorized arguments. *Harvard Law Review*, *108*, 1733-1745.
- Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific American*, *223*, 96-102.
- Tajfel, H. (1984). Intergroup relations, social myths and social justice in social psychology. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *The social dimension: European developments in social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 695-715). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33-47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1990). Intrinsic versus community-based justice models: When does group membership matter? *Journal of Social Issues*, *46*, 83-94.
- Vala, J., & Correia, I. (2008). Introduction: Social justice, categorization and intergroup relations. *Social Justice Research*, *21*, 1-3. DOI: 10.1007/s11211-007-0062-8
- Vala, J., Lima, M. E., & Lopes, D. (2004). Social values, prejudice and solidarity in the European Union. In W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds.), *European values at the end of the millennium* (pp. 139-163). Leiden: Brill.
- Vala, J., Lopes, D., & Lima, M. (2008). Black immigrants in Portugal: Lusotropicalism and prejudice. *Journal of Social Issues*, *64*, 287-302.

- Vala, J., Pereira, C., Costa-Lopes, R. (2009). Is the attribution of cultural differences to minorities an expression of racial prejudice? *International Journal of Psychology*, 44, 20-28.
- Valentim, J. P. (2008). Identidade pessoal e social: entre a semelhança e a diferença. *Psychologica*, 47, 109-123.
- Waldzus, S. & Mummendey, A. (2004). Inclusion in a superordinate category, ingroup prototypicality, and attitudes towards outgroups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 40, 466-477.
- Walzer, M. (1983). *Spheres of justice: A defense of pluralism and equality*. New York: Basic Books.
- Wenzel, M. (2000). Justice and Identity: The significance of inclusion for perceptions of entitlement and the justice motive. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26, 157-176. DOI: 10.1177/0146167200264004
- Wenzel, M. (2001). A social categorization approach to distributive justice: Social identity as the link between relevance of inputs and need for justice. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 40, 315–335.
- Wu, M. S., Yan, X., Zhou, C., Chen, Y., Li, J., Zhu, Z., Shen, X., & Han, B. (2011). General belief in a just world and resilience: Evidence from a collectivistic culture. *European Journal of Personality*, 25, 431-442. DOI: 10.1002/per.807

Appendices

Appendix A – Developed Measures

Appendix A.1 – The Scope of Justice Scale (in Portuguese)

	Discordo Totalmente	Discordo Muito	Discordo	Nem Concordo Nem Discordo	Concordo	Concordo Muito	Concordo Totalmente
Os portugueses e imigrantes brasileiros são uma única comunidade moral.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Quando se trata de justiça, os imigrantes brasileiros e os portugueses devem ser considerados como povos muito diferentes.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Os imigrantes brasileiros fazem parte da sociedade portuguesa.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Em termos de justiça, os portugueses e os imigrantes brasileiros pertencem a mundos diferentes.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A lógica dos princípios da justiça dos portugueses é igual à lógica dos princípios da justiça dos imigrantes brasileiros.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix A.2 – The Support for Discriminatory Policies Scale (in Portuguese)

	Discordo Totalmente	Discordo Muito	Discordo	Nem Concordo Nem Discordo	Concordo	Concordo Muito	Concordo Totalmente
O SNS – Serviço Nacional de Saúde - deveria cobrar aos imigrantes brasileiros taxas moderadoras mais elevadas do que as que cobra aos cidadãos nacionais	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Portugal deve proibir os imigrantes brasileiros de se candidatarem a cargos políticos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Os tribunais portugueses devem atribuir penas mais severas aos imigrantes brasileiros do que as que atribui aos cidadãos nacionais	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Os imigrantes brasileiros devem pagar valores mais elevados à Segurança Social do que os cidadãos nacionais	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Portugal deve permitir que todos os imigrantes brasileiros votem nas eleições portuguesas	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix B – Experimental Material of Part II

Appendix B.1 – Manipulation of BJW: Salient condition

Num dos estudos realizados recentemente pela nossa equipa, questionamos como as peçoas percebem a justiça nos dias de hoje. Leia a resposta típica dos nossos participantes:

“Actualmente, o mundo tem sofrido muitas mudanças: desde o clima à economia, desde guerras até conflitos familiares.

Entretanto, a justiça é igual para todos, o que torna possível viver numa sociedade saudável. Para aqueles que quebram as regras, há penalizações e vergonha social e, para aqueles que obedecem às leis, há serenidade e paz.

As oportunidades de emprego, educação e casa própria são possíveis para aqueles que as procuram obter através do próprio esforço e dedicação.

Felizmente, o mundo é justo para aqueles que merecem a justiça do mundo.”

Appendix B.2 – Manipulation of BJW: Control condition (Study 4)

Leia, por favor, com o máximo de atenção possível, o seguinte texto:

“As boas relações entre Portugal e a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) são resultado de uma participação activa do país nas actividades da organização, especialmente a partir de 1974.

Essa relação é mais próxima e reconhecida nos dias de hoje, nomeadamente pelo destaque dado pela ONU aos serviços portugueses centrados nos cidadãos.

Indicados como um exemplo da administração do futuro, tais serviços visam a promoção da partilha do acesso à informação.

Tal reconhecimento é de grande importância para a política externa do país frente aos direitos civis.”

Appendix B.3 – Manipulation of BJW: Control condition (Study 5)

Leia atentamente o seguinte texto:

“ A leitura é um processo abrangente de compreensão e interpretação do mundo que envolve uma característica essencial e singular do leitor: a sua capacidade simbólica de interagir com o outro pela manifestação da palavra.

A leitura é uma actividade ampla e livre, embora não seja uma prática neutra, visto que no contacto de um leitor com um texto estão envolvidas questões culturais, políticas, históricas e sociais, presentes nas suas várias formas. Ler é interpretar o mundo em que vivemos.

Assim, ler é um aspecto importante na vida em sociedade.”

Appendix B.4 – Manipulation of the Restricted Scope of Justice: Salient condition (Study 4)

Atenção! A seguir encontram-se afirmações sobre a justiça em Portugal, já com as respostas de outro participante. Leia atentamente as afirmações e confira as respostas:

	Discordo Totalmente	Discordo Muito	Discordo	Nem Concordo Nem Discordo	Concordo	Concordo Muito	Concordo Totalmente
Os imigrantes brasileiros são parte da sociedade portuguesa.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A lógica dos princípios da justiça dos portugueses é a mesma lógica dos princípios da justiça dos imigrantes brasileiros.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Os portugueses e os imigrantes brasileiros são uma única comunidade moral.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Quando se trata de justiça, os imigrantes brasileiros e os portugueses devem ser considerados como um único povo.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Em termos de justiça, os portugueses e os imigrantes brasileiros pertencem a mundos diferentes.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix B.5 – Manipulation of Restricted Scope of Justice: Salient Condition (Study 5)

Atenção! Escreva um parágrafo usando as frases abaixo. Pode usar as frases da forma como achar melhor para formar um texto coerente. Pode acrescentar palavras, mas não pode mudar as palavras que já estão nas frases:

- a. Os portugueses e imigrantes brasileiros não são uma única comunidade moral.
- b. Quando se trata de justiça, os imigrantes brasileiros e os portugueses devem ser considerados como povos muito diferentes.
- c. Os imigrantes brasileiros não fazem parte da sociedade portuguesa.
- d. Em termos de justiça, os portugueses e os imigrantes brasileiros pertencem a mundos diferentes.

Appendix B.6 – Manipulation of Restricted Scope of Justice: Control Condition (Study 5)

Atenção! Escreva um parágrafo usando as frases abaixo. Pode usar as frases da forma como achar melhor para formar um texto coerente. Pode acrescentar palavras, mas não pode mudar as palavras que já estão nas frases:

- e. É preferível organizar os eventos de forma a não coincidirem no tempo e no espaço.
- f. Quando dois ou mais indivíduos opinam sobre a realização de eventos sociais, podem surgir várias possibilidades para a realização desses eventos.
- g. Não é possível realizar dois eventos simultaneamente num mesmo lugar e espaço.
- h.** Na vida em sociedade, é importante organizar diversos eventos.
