ISCTE ◈ IUL
Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

School of Social Sciences and Humanities

Citizenship Experiences of the Goan Catholics

Jason Keith Fernandes

A Thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor in Anthropology

Supervisor:
Professor Rosa Maria de Figueiredo Perez, Professora Associada com Agregação,
ISCTE-University Institute of Lisbon

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Abstract

This thesis argues that the nature of the citizenship experience of the Catholics in the Indian state of Goa is the experience of those located between civil society and political society. This argument commences from the postulate that the recognition of Konkani in the Devanagari script as the official language of Goa, determined the boundaries of the state's civil society. Through an ethnographic study of the contestations around the demand that the Roman script also be officially recognised, the thesis demonstrates how by deliberately excluding the Roman script for the language, the largely lower-caste and lower-class Catholic users of the script were denoted as less than authentic members of the legitimate civil society of the state. As a result, rather than enjoy the experience of permanent rights, the hall mark of civil society, their experience of citizenship is in the nature of a location in political society, where those who use the Roman script have to often justify their location in the cultural community of the State, and are awarded temporary concessions the continued existence of which depend on whether the status quo established by the dominant groups within the Goan polity is threatened or not.

The argument I forward adds nuance to the larger discussion on the nature of secularism in Indian republic by introducing a focus on a region outside of British-India, as well as invoking caste, and religion; and looking outside of the binaries that often determine the study of citizenship experiences of minority groups.

Key words: citizenship, secularism, civil society, political society, India, Goa, Portuguese India, Catholicism, caste, religion, emotions, Hindu nationalism, post-colonialism, subalternity.

Resumo

Esta tese tenta demonstrar que a experiência da cidadania católica, no estado indiano de Goa, corresponde a quem se encontra entre a sociedade civil e a sociedade política. Parte-se do postulado de que o reconhecimento do concani no alfabeto devanágari como língua oficial de Goa determina os limites da sociedade civil. Através de um estudo etnográfico das contestações produzidas em torno da reivindicação do reconhecimento do alfabeto romano, a tese evidencia como, pela exclusão deliberada do alfabeto romano da língua concani, grande parte dos católicos de castas e de classes de baixo estatuto são considerados inferiores aos "autênticos" membros da sociedade civil. Como consequência, em lugar do usufruto de direitos permanentes, que simbolizam a sociedade civil, a sua experiência de cidadania decorre do lugar que ocupam na sociedade política. Efetivamente, aqueles que usam o alfabeto romano têm frequentemente de justificar o seu posicionamento na comunidade cultural do Estado, sendo-lhes atribuídas concessões temporárias, cuja continuidade depende de que não seja ameaçado o *status quo*, estabelecido pelos grupos dominantes no sistema governamental goês.

O argumento que proponho contribui para a discussão mais alargada da natureza do secularismo na república indiana, ao focar-se num contexto não pertencente à Índia britânica e, ancorando-se no conceito de casta e de religião, afastar-se das perspectivas binárias que frequentemente caracterizam o estudo das experiências de cidadania de grupos minoritários.

Palavras-chave: cidadania, secularismo, sociedade civil, sociedade política, Índia, Goa, Índia portuguesa, catolicismo, casta, religião, emoções, nacionalismo hindu, pós-colonialismo, subalternidade.

thinking of homes, I should also not forget to thank Alvaro Roquette whose home in Lisbon proved such a comfortable location from which to write and think.

This thesis resulted from a certain turning towards Goa that was effected under the tutelage of Alito Siqueira of the Goa University. My gratitude for this nurturing knows no bounds, and I will remain ever grateful. I am grateful also the support of the members of the *Reading and Writing Goa* group that Alito and I organized jointly. In particular I would like to recollect the camaraderie of Sammit Khandeparkar, and Fernando Velho from those days.

When thinking of times in Goa, I would also like to place on record the privilege it has been to work with Albertina Almeida in the field in Goa, and gain from her insights. Her consistent commitment to the cause of a more just Goa has been inspiring. I would simultaneously like to recall the comradeship of Geraldine Fernandes, Kim Miranda, and Paul Fernandes from the days when we worked together as a part of the *Ganv Ghor Rakhon Manch* ("Platform to Save Home and Village").

Referring more specifically to those I encountered in the course of fieldwork, I cannot forget my many interlocutors in the field, both members of the various groups I sought out, as well as independent activists. The time you shared with me, your trust, very often that peculiar Goan warmth with which you received me have touched me profoundly. I would especially like to thank Tomazinho Cardozo, Fr. Pratap Naik, and José Salvador Fernandes for their support through the entire project.

For aiding the process in gradually turning me into an academic, I would like to thank V.S. Elizabeth, and Sitaramam K. from the National Law School (NLSIU), and Laura Beth Nielsen and Shalini Randeria from the International Institute for the Sociology of Law (IISL). In particular I would like to emphasise how deeply I cherish Sitaram's presence for his quiet support, intellectual, and emotional through the years since law school, offering perhaps the longest collaboration of association ranging from teacher to colleague.

Were it not for the many hours of conversation and spiritual fellowship in thinking through, and discussing the operation of secularism with Shahrukh Alam, Khalid Ansari and Ton Groeneweg of the Patna Collective, this thesis and my own thinking would have been so much poorer. I am in particular indebted to Khalid for opening my eyes to the world of caste politics. My thinking about caste also benefitted immensely from my

Note on transliteration

I follow standard usage in the transliteration of words from Konkani, Marathi, Hindi, Urdu, and Portuguese into English, keeping the use of diacritical marks to the minimum. Given that I am trying in this work to daw attention to the different ways in which Konkani is spelled and understood, the spelling for the same follows usage of my interlocutors, and will not be consistent, unless it is being used in the context of my analysis and narration, in which case the standard English form is used.Where words have entered into standard English usage, such as brahmin, dalit, these words are not italicised, else all other vernacular terms are italicised. When part of a caste name, the word brahmin begins with a capital, as in the case of the Catholic Brahmins, elsewhere when the term is not capitalised.

List of Abbreviations

AGCCSJA	All Goa Citizens' Committee for Social Justice and Action
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CM	Chief Minister
DKA	Dalgado Konknni Akademi
EU	European Union
GCFD	Goan Catholics for Devanagari
GKA	Goa Konkani Akademi
GSB	Gaud Saraswat Brahmin
KBM	Konkani Bhasha Mandal
KPA	Konkani Porjecho Awaz
MGP	Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MoI	Medium of Instruction
MP	Member of Parliament
OLA	Official Language Act
TAG	Tiatr Academy of Goa
TSKK	Thomas Stephens Konknni Kendr
UGP	United Goan Party
VHP	Vishwa Hindu Parishad

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Introduction

Titled *Citizenship Experiences of the Goan Catholics*, this thesis studies the mobilization around a contested demand that has attracted a substantial amount of attention in Goa since around the year 2005. This is the demand that the Roman script for the Konkani language, a language that has been recognised as the official language of the state, be given equal status with that of the Devanagari script. Given that citizenship is often understood as belonging and participation in the cultural community of the nation (Brubaker 1992), and that language sets the limits of the cultural community, this thesis uses the mobilisations around the Konkani language in Goa to enter into the study of citizenship.

The roots of this mobilization stretch back in time to the processes that gave rise to the creation of the state of Goa, from the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, territories that once constituted the *Estado da Índia Portuguesa* (State of Portuguese India). Following a series of mass demonstrations, violent protests and much political mobilizing, the Konkani Language was declared as the Official Language for the Goan segment of the Union Territory through the promulgation of The Goa Daman & Diu Official Language Act, 1987 on 4 February, 1987. This enactment definitively marked the boundaries of a Goan sub-national community and fixed the profile of the ideal citizen-subject of this space. Close on the heels of this recognition, the Union Territory was subsequently dissolved, and Goa converted into a state of the Union of India on 30 May, 1987. These events fulfilled two major demands that had agitated Goan civil society since the time of its integration into the Union of India in 1961. The first of these demands was by segments of the Goan population that Goa maintain its territorial integrity, and not be subsumed into the larger state of Maharashtra. The second of these demands, emerging in the context of the linguistic rationale for the creation of states, was that Konkani be declared the exclusive official language of the territory.

Goa had until 1961 been a territory of Portugal, a claim that was not formally given up until 1974, with the fall of the dictatorial *Estado Novo* in metropolitan Portugal that year. While Konkani had been made the official language of the state, however, the language

was recognized as official only in the Devanagari (Nagari) script, one of the two scripts used for the language within the territory.[1]

Significantly, the Roman script was denied official recognition although it is arguably the script for the language with a longer, and more vibrant history, as compared to the Nagari script that had been attached to the language since the late nineteenth century by orientalist scholars, caste activists, and pro-India nationalists. Two decades later, the demand for the recognition of the Roman script, as well as cultural, and literary activities associated with the script, flared up through the agency of a number of activist groups. These groups included the Dalgado Konkani Akademi, the All Goa Citizens' Committee for Social Justice and Action, and the Romi Lipi Action Front. The crux of their demand was for the official recognition of the Roman script of the Konkani language via inclusion in the definitional clause of the Official Language Act of the Goa state. In response to this demand another group emerged: the Goan Catholics for Devanagari who maintained an opposition to the demand for the official recognition of the Roman script. This group asserted that only Devanagari ought to be enshrined as a valid official script for the Konkani language.

In a context where the state has been understood to have been created on the basis of language, identifying one version of the language, I argue, effectively delimits the field of citizenship as membership in a very specific cultural community. In the case of Goa, the cultural community is delimited by the Konkani language as expressed in the Devanagari script. Those who speak the officially recognised language are the ideal citizens of the state of Goa. This thesis therefore explores the reasons for this demand for recognition, and inclusion in the Official Language Act, as well as those reasons for the opposition to this demand; the strategies that were and are being used to both further, as well as block this demand, and uses this contest to offer an insight into the experiences of citizenship by Goan Catholics in the Indian state of Goa.

This study of the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics, seeks to intervene into a much larger area of study. The question at commencement, and one that continues to animate this work was to inquire into the manner in which non-Hindu citizens of the

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[1] The Roman and Nagari script are just two of the five scripts used for writing the Konkani language. These two scripts dominate in Goa, while outside of Goa, the scripts used are the Kannada, the Perso-Arabic script in coastal North Kanara district of the state of Karnataka, and the Malayalam script in the state of Kerala.

Indian republic experience Indian citizenship. While the Indian republic represents itself as a secular republic, much work, some of which I will make reference to in the course of my discussion, has demonstrated that the republic imagines the ideal citizen-subject as upper-caste, Hindu male (Menon 1998; Pandey 2006: 129- 153). In such a circumstance, what was the citizenship experience of the non-Hindu in India? The question did not stop there, however. I was personally dissatisfied with the manner in which much scholarship has addressed this question. Urged on by the recognition that the Indian citizen is imagined as an upper-caste Hindu male, and especially responding to the bouts of genocidal violence against Muslim communities especially since after, the build-up to, and the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992,[2] much scholarly attention has been directed toward exploring the manner in which the Indian Muslim has become the other in the Indian national imagination (see for example among others, van der Veer 1994; Hansen 1999; Ludden 2005; Mathur 2008; Ghassem-Fachandi 2012). While there is no doubt about the relevance of this useful and critical body of work, and the focus on the Muslim is not surprising given the context within which Hindu and Indian nationalism posited itself primarily against Islam, it occurred to me that if the Indian Muslim was the other to the Hindu national self, then the almost exclusive focus on the Indian Muslim was in fact producing just another narrative about the Hindu self. What was missing was a focus on the experiences of other groups that have been othered by the Hindu national self. Thus, while a number of studies acknowledged the fact that Hindu nationalism sees both Islam and Christianity, and members of these religious communities as foreign, there is very little work that seems to have been done focussing on these Christian groups. Where there has been such an emphasis, it appears to have commenced after the violence directed at Christians, both in Gujarat in 1997, and in Orissa between 2007 and 2008 (see for example, Lobo 2002; Menon 2003; Chatterji 2009). Given that this interest seems motivated by the outbreak of violence against these marginalised groups, it would not be bold to suggest that the focus of this research is unwittingly determined by Hindu

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[2] The Babri Masjid was a mosque in the north Indian city of Ayodhya, built during the reign of the first Mughal emperor Babur, whose name the mosque carried. The city of Ayodhya is also believed to be the birthplace of the Hindu divinity Rama, and the mosque was alleged to have been built over the very place where Ram was born. The site took on significance from the year 1984 when the *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* (VHP), a Hindu right wing organization began a movement around the structure that eventually developed into a demand that a temple be built on the same site as the Mosque. The *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP), a Hindu right wing political party joined issue with the VHP and launched a national campaign to lay the foundation stone for this temple, prior to parliamentary elections in 1989. Political mobilization around the issue grew, until the mosque was demolished by Hindu right wing activists under the leadership of the BJP-VHP combine. This event subsequently unleashed large scale violence across the country, and is a watermark date in the history of the rise of Hindu right wing power in India.

nationalist agendas, and there is therefore, despite a focus on minority groups, not much movement from the upper-caste Hindu-obsessed national narrative.

I would argue that one way to move out of this trap is to expand the narrative to look at the experiences of other kinds of Indians, examining at the manner in which these Indian citizens are also seen as others to the national self, as well as exploring their associations with the other others of the Indian national self. I seek to follow this insight by looking at how Goan Catholics experience Indian citizenship.

There are also other reasons why the Goan Catholics' experience of Indian citizenship would be an interesting way in which to create a different route to discussing citizenship in secular India. As Rochelle Pinto's work *Between Empires* (2007) illustrates the Goan Catholics' experience of Indian history is not entirely within the frames of the British Indian history from which much theorising of the post-colonial Indian experience is written. The Goan Catholics bring an often radically different history in their experience of Indian-ness, as well as a radically different experience of citizenship, and subjecthood. Exploring the experience of Indian citizenship from this perspective allows one to eventually construct a narrative of the post-colonial Indian experience from outside of the British Indian framework that often suffocates the narratives of other groups within the Indian republic, especially at, though not restricted to, the popular level.

Speaking of suffocation, there is also, without doubt, an autobiographical element to this study. Like many Goan Catholics I spent, and perhaps continue to spend, many years attempting to understand the relationship of my community with what is popularly called the national mainstream. How could we become less Goan, less Catholic, and more Indian? The focus of my doctoral research seemed to provide the ideal field to answer these various, but related, questions.

Inspired by the recognition of their "in-between-ness", and their location between empires, I originally intended my doctoral research project to be a multi-sited ethnography of the citizenship practices of Goan Catholics spread over three locations: Goa, Portugal, and London. Even though this research plan was eventually never realised for reasons I detail below, I think it is important to briefly articulate the outline of the project since it provides the context from which the research focus of this thesis emerged. The idea was to follow the citizenship practices of Goan Catholics in these three centres, documenting, and

following the way they experienced citizenship in the context of the discourses of secularism, assimilation, and multiculturalism in each of these three spaces. One of the practices that I wished to follow in particular was that of the display of the Portuguese flag, colours, and emblems, on cars and two-wheelers across the state of Goa. From initial fieldwork, it appeared that this practice showed up particularly among working-class, and lower middle-class Goan Catholics. It appeared as if this practice was a demonstration not only of their claim to Portuguese citizenship, [3] but also a way to distinguish themselves from the rest of the population in the state. Given that a number of those who claim Portuguese citizenship subsequently relocate to the United Kingdom (UK), where large communities of Goans with newly acquired Portuguese passports have sprung up, I assumed that the presence of the Portuguese flags would provide me with an entry point into the field, and also present links to Goan communities both in Lisbon as well as the UK. The aim was to explore the citizenship practices of these groups in the three centres, the Indian, the British, and the Portuguese, and examine the manner in which each sociolegal context affected the practices of citizenship. Through this technique, I hoped to gain a larger canvas on which to gauge the citizenship practices of non-Hindu citizens of the Indian republic.

That this flag displaying practice of citizenship seemed to emerge especially from within the Catholic lower classes in Goa was more than a happy coincidence, however. I was determined that my work should focus on precisely these non-upper caste, lower economic Catholic groups to demonstrate their subaltern character because much of the scholarly work that has been done on Goa ignores these groups. [4] There is, in any case, as Perez and

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[3] When in 1961 the Indian armed forces marched into Goa, as per law, all residents of Portuguese India were Portuguese citizens. Subsequent to the Portuguese state's recognition of Indian claims of sovereignty over the various parts of Portuguese India, the right to Portuguese citizenship by those born in Goa, and their descendants upto the second generation, continues to be recognized by the Portuguese state. A number of Indian citizens of the former Portuguese territories in India have used this option to reclaim their Portuguese citizenship. This option has made particular sense given that holding a Portuguese passport provides the holder, as a member of the European community not only greater mobility across international boundaries, but access to employment within the European Union members states, an option that has been seized on by many.

[4] While I do not intend to suggest there has been no focus on lower caste groups in Goa, what I would like to clarify is that most works, that I list subsequently, tend to focus on lower-caste Hindu groups, as does Rosa Maria Perez (2012, 2005) focuses on the *kalavanti* community, or groups identified as tribal such as Claudia Pereira (2013, 2010) whose work focuses on the *Gaudde*; and Maria Bernadette Gomes (1993) on the *Kunnbi* [sic]. While Pereira's work does focus on the Catholic *Gaudde,* the Catholic lower-caste groups generally tend to be ignored. One work with an explicit focus on caste among Catholics is that by Rowena Robinson (1998), while another work that focusses on what she calls the "International Goan Catholic Community" is that of Stella Mascarenhas-Keyes (2011).

Sardo observed in 1997 (13), very little anthropological work that has been done on Goa,[5] and almost no works on the experiences of Indian citizenship by these groups.

While in the initial phases of fieldwork, it became obvious that as interesting as the interactions might be, it was not going to be an easy task to find persons willing to speak about the Portuguese flags, and symbols that they were displaying on (or in) their vehicles.

Given that the Indian state does not allow for its citizens to hold dual nationality, it appears that most of those who hold Portuguese passports do so surreptitiously. Within a couple of interactions with my interlocutors, I realized that in the context of the scarcity of scholarly work on the subaltern Goan Catholics, I did not have any base material from which to make sense of the life-stories I was collecting. It was at this time that I got thrust into the contest around the official recognition of the Roman script that this thesis focuses on and, for reasons of having a direct historical link with the great post-colonial political mobilizations in Goa, seemed to provide a better handle to understand the citizenship practices and, eventually, experiences of the subaltern Goan Catholic groups. As I will elaborate later in this thesis, this shift from practices to experiences resulted from my encounter with a number of emotional narratives, expressing shame, guilt, and humiliation. It was through this encounter that I realised that citizenship was not merely a matter of practices, or performing bodies, but indeed, as Veronique Benei (2009: 72) has articulated, felt and feeling bodies, and therefore experiences as well. This shift from practices to experiences was perhaps inevitable given that I confronted the presence of caste structuring the experience of citizenship in the course of my fieldwork. Indeed, a focus on caste, a focus not often invoked when discussing the Goan Catholics, will be one of the lenses through which I will discuss the citizenship experience in this thesis, and challenge the tendency to represent the many Goan Catholic groups as one monolithic community who presumably share a set of similar interests.

Getting into the field

I believe it important to indicate that this doctoral thesis represents not merely an objective study of the citizenship experiences of Goan Catholics in Goa, but is also born from a very personal involvement with the local field. I was raised in Goa, engage in the public sphere

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[5] The following citations reference a good amount of the anthropological work that has in fact been done on Goa: Bastos 2009, 2008, 2007, 2005, 2001; Henn 2012, 2011, 2009, 2000; Henn and Siqueira 2011; Newman 2001; Perez 2012, 2009, 2006, 1997; Sardo 2011, 1997.

as an op-ed columnist whose writing appears in a couple of local newspapers,[6] and in the initial periods of the fieldwork, was also actively involved in the popular political mobilizations of the time.

Starting from around 2009, Goa was seized by what came to be called the *Goa Bachao Andolan* ("Save Goa Movement"). For a number of aesthetic, and demographic reasons that I will briefly elaborate below, the *Goa Bachao Andolan* protested against the large-scale conversion of agricultural and plantation land into settlement land that would have made available large tracts of Goa for real estate development. To a number of groups, Goa is a land of green fields and vast open spaces that are increasingly being displaced by real-estate developments which being purchased by former British Indians who would like to have a holiday home in Goa, and built by labour that migrates from various parts of India, have effected a demographic change in the state. Further, as per the popular narratives I encountered in the course of fieldwork, the erection of these edifices promotes the entry of non-Goan labour by the real estate developers, both Goan and non-Goan, who then stay on to find other employment.

Given that the post-colonial Goan political identity has been based on the maintenance of its identitarian difference, the seeming flood of "outsiders" has threatened a variety of groups. All of these sensibilities were captured by the Save Goa Movement that continues in some form or the other, even today. Simultaneously, between the years 2008 and 2009 as a resident of the village of Taleigão I was also involved with the *Taleigão Bachao Abhiyan* ("Save Taleigão Movement") an organization that sought greater participation of villagers in the local governance body, the *panchayat*, and its general body, the *gram sabha*.[7] Through this organization, I came to be involved in the *Ganv Ghor Rakhon Manch* ("Platform to Save Home and Village") a group that sought to consolidate village-level organisations to protest against the land-use changes that were being effected in the Regional Plan 2021 of the state, as well as to demand greater participation of villagers in the *gram sabhas* of their village *panchayats*. Indeed, it was being involved in these larger

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[6] These columns most of which were written for the Goan newspaper *Gomantak Times* commenced in the year 2007, and continue till date, are archived at www.dervishnotes.blogspot.com

[7] *Panchayats* are the lowest tier of governance in India, being the level below that of the state government. This system commences with each village, or a group of small villages being constituted into a *gram panchayat* area, and subsequently rises up to the district or *zilla* level. The office-bearers of the *panchayat* are the *sarpanch*,who is the head of all the *panch*, all of these being persons elected as representatives from each ward of the *panchayat* area. The general body of all voters within the *panchayat* area constitutes the *gram sabha* of the village.

political mobilizations that allowed me to place, through this thesis, the contests around the Roman script in the larger socio-political context.

One of the events that I would frequent as a part of my general engagement with the local intellectual and political environment was the "History Hour" held by the Xavier Centre for Historical Research (Xavier Centre). Despite its name, the event was very often a platform for local and visiting scholars (amateur or otherwise) to present their views for debate before an engaged audience. Indeed, after the research that produced this thesis, the existence of this engaged audience was, and continues to be for me, a unique feature of the Goan polity[8].

There is a sphere of debate, one that is admittedly largely male and middle-class, that takes place not merely on newspapers, but in public debate forums such as the Xavier Centre's "History Hour", where people come, listen, and deliberate. This allows us to think of Goa as having a civil society in the manner that many political theorists, not least of them being Habermas (1991), conceive it. As latter chapters will go on to demonstrate, this civil society is not without its limitations. However, the fact is that there is a sphere of debate, which allows a variety of people to present their ideas for discussion and that are actively taken up.

The "History Hour" of 6 October, 2005 was a presentation by Ramnath Naik titled "Social damage done by Goa's language controversy and conspiracy behind it [sic]" (Naik 2006). Ramnath Naik, who is a *Bahujan samaj* [9] activist in Goa, argued that the Konkani language movement was a conspiracy by the *Saraswat* caste to achieve dominance over the other groups. As chapter four in this thesis will elaborate on, the mobilization of the

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[8] Unless unavoidable, through the length of this thesis I have attempted to use the word "polity" instead of "society". As will become obvious later in the text, I do so to avoid evoking the kinds of images of a homogenous and hermeneutic entity that the term society tends to evoke. My preference for the term polity over society is best captured in Ronald Inden's reasons for utlising the term that stress the complexity and plurality of the social processes that he seeks to capture:

"I also use the term 'polity' rather than 'state' or 'nation state' because I want to cover a wider range of composite or complex agents than the term state which, as many use it, takes as given rather than as problematic the existence of a polity as an agent in whcih the transcendent is already manifest. I prefer to see the state of modernist European discursive and political practices as one of many polities that has existed. I include among polities, in this broader sense, not only nation states but 'civil society,' which is often distinguished from the state as government, and societies or associations, often territorially dispersed, that claim to speak for people sharing certain things, those often referred to by the euphemistic term 'community' in South Asian studies - castes or classes and sects or religions. On a grander scale, I also use the term to designate historic world orders, what I have elsewhere called 'imperial formations' (2006: 246)."

[9] *Bahujan Samaj* literally translates to the society (*samaj*) of the many (*bahujan*) and is a reference to the fact that the subaltern Hindu castes were a larger force than the dominant upper-caste elites. The upper-caste that these *bahujans* were arrayed against were essentially the Hindu *Saraswat* brahmin caste.

bahujan samaj in Goa has been a critical feature of the development of Goa's post-colonial polity. The discussion hour subsequent to the presentation was marked by passionate arguments and, what was particularly interesting to me, caste-based slurs hurled at Naik by one of the brahmin members of the audience.[10]

The subsequent session of the "History Hour", held on 20 October, 2005 was to feature Uday Bhembre. A stalwart of the Konkani language agitation in the late 1980s that ensured the Konkani language's official status, Bhembre's presentation was entitled "Roadmap for Faster Development and Standardisation of Konkani" (Bhembre 2005). This presentation was Bhembre's argument for the need to create one single community, united around the Konkani language, and marked by the slogan "One language, One people, One script". The script he proposed was of course the Devanagari script. Perhaps suspecting, in light of the discussion at the earlier session, that the situation could go out of hand, the Director of the Xavier Centre was looking for a person to chair the session, and he eventually asked me to occupy that position, which I did. This fact was, I believe, critical to opening up the field to me in more than one way. To begin with, seated on the dais next to Bhembre, I got a bird's eye view of the various participants in the discussion. It allowed me to get a sense of the individuals, and the various groups that were involved in the contest. It was while seated there, and already attuned to a possible caste angle to the conflict, that I first got the sense that caste among the Catholics played a significant role in the contest around the demand for the recognition of the Roman script for the Konkani language.

This encounter also opened up the field for me in the sense that a number of the actors now recognized me, making it easier to begin interacting with them. Contributing op-ed columns in the local newspaper, as well as taking a position on the script controversy in favour of the Roman script, also aided me in the sense that I was already a known figure to some of these activists (Fernandes 2006).

While this may have aided my research in the case of those activists who were in favour of the Roman script's recognition, there were some members of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari who were initially reticent to share their opinions with me. I should also

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[10] Reacting in rage to Ramnath Naik's polemic, and in the context of one of his statements about the Vedas, an elderly *Saraswat* acclaimed as a freedom fighter (against the Portuguese regime) stood up and screamed "*Arrey mankda, thum aamka ved xikoithai?*" (You monkey, are you presuming to teach us the Vedas?). This naming of a lower-caste person, by an upper-caste person, as a monkey, impressed on my mind powerfully, and has in many ways contributed to the attention to caste politics in this thesis.

confess that I began this research as a partisan of the Roman script's cause, but being able, in the process of this research to appreciate the reasons why these Goan Catholics for Devanagari have taken the positions that they have, moved from the animosity that marked my attitude to the Nagari group to an empathy with their condition.

The fieldwork that informed this thesis was largely conducted in the years from 2007 to 2009. In this interval, I was registered as a student of the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society in Bangalore, but was based entirely in Goa. As suggested above, I did not dedicate myself solely to fieldwork during this time span, but was also actively involved in the larger socio-political debates in Goa during the period. In 2009, on obtaining the grant from *Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia* (FCT) that enabled me to complete this thesis, I shifted to ISCTE - University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL) and, so, Lisbon. From here, I returned to Goa every winter where I continued to conduct ethnographic research and attend events that were organised by the activists I was interacting with.

As indicated earlier, this thesis is not merely an attempt to understand the citizenship experiences of Goan Catholics. It has also been motivated by the desire to articulate a perspective that is sympathetic to the subaltern groups among the Catholics. This required a re-reading of the representational forms used in the context of the Goa and Catholicism in Goa, and an exploration of the historical context within which these forms emerged, were sustained and continue to be used. My field visits, therefore, have also been used for research at the library of the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society, Bangalore, and to read newspapers and magazines in Panjim's State Central Library, particularly those pertaining to the periods that this thesis focuses on.

Introducing the field

A large part of this thesis has been crafted from transcripts of conversations and meetings that I conducted with individuals involved in the movement for and against the recognition of the Roman script. My entry into the field initially began with meetings with those who I had been able to identify as key players in the debate around the demand for the recognition of the Roman script. These meetings, initially recorded with a camera, and subsequently with an audio recorder, were invariably at least two hours long, and conducted in a single session. Subsequent to these meetings, I was able to engage more intensely with the field, following these activists in their meetings with politicians, as well as in gatherings the activists organised. A couple of these activists would take it on

themselves to call me up, inviting me to these gatherings, or keep me informed via email or phone, about the calendar of events they were organising as part of their mobilization.

While some of the individual meetings between me and the activists were conducted in English, invariably almost all gatherings and most meetings were conducted in Konkani, or in a mix of Konkani and English. In the latter cases, I would phrase my interventions in English, and receive the responses in Konkani, later transcribing these responses directly into English. When interacting individually with my interlocutors, I did not limit the conversation merely to the issue of script. Rather, I sought to gain a larger sense of their life-story, community, family origins and their experience of significant moments in the life of the territory, be it the integration into India in 1961, or the Konkani language movement in the 1980s.

The initial conversations I had with my interlocutors were dictated by my view from that evening at the same Xavier Centre "History Hour", while seated next to Uday Bhembre, and from reading the lively debates that were being conducted in Goan cyberspace. There was, and there continues to be, an engaged, and not always polite, discussions on the script issue on the electronic listserv called Goanet (http://www.mail-archive.com/goanet@lists.goanet.org/), which is probably the most subscribed to e-group connecting Goans across the world. I encountered two of my first interlocutors, Fr. Nascimento Mascarenhas, and Fernando do Rego at both the "History Hour", and the discussions on Goanet. Both these men were passionate supporters of the exclusive recognition of the Nagari script, but, as I later realized, were not members of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari, the single group that was leading the opposition to the demand for inclusion of the Roman script in the definition of the official recognized Konkani language.

Over time, using the snowball technique, I was able to speak with most of the significant members of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari, most of whom were Catholic priests and, as I later realized, also largely from brahmin backgrounds.[11] Unlike their pro-Roman script opponents in the field, this group did not attempt to organize the public around their cause. Their manner of operation appeared to be more attuned to backroom meetings with the

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[11] When I suggest that they are drawn from brahmin backgrounds, I refer of course to the fact that they belong to the Catholic Brahmin caste, and not that they are recent converts to Catholicism from Hindu brahmin castes.

activists demanding recognition of the Roman script, and the publication of a magazine called *Dalgadocho Sondex* ("Dalgado's Message"). More crucially, using their power as priests, and as persons in the upper levels of the clerical hierarchy, they were able to limit the role that parish priests inclined toward the demand for the Roman script could play. The location of these priests in the clerical heriarchy also enabled them to influence the official position of the Archbishop in council.[12]

As a result of the manner in which they operated, the public events that the Goan Catholics for Devanagari organized were relatively few and far between. Nevertheless, I was able to attend these public events when they did organise them. As such, participant observation at these events, and the many events organized by the Roman script activist groups, forms another base of the data from which this thesis has been scripted. These gatherings also allowed for conversations on the sides, with peripheral members of these groups, or critics of those in the leadership of the groups (especially in the case of the Roman script activist groups, where the leadership of the Dalgado Konknni Akademi was far from uncontested), as well as getting a sense of the alliances that were behind both these groups of activists. From this point of view, it became obvious that even though the events organized by the Goan Catholics for Devanagari were few and far between, when they were organized, these gatherings were arranged with the aid of what is possible the most significant non-governmental Konkani language institution in Goa, the Konkani Bhasha Mandal.

Established in 1962, the Konkani Bhasha Mandal is the single largest civil society group that seeks to promote what they call Konkani culture and literature. Drawing on members from across the state, the Konkani Bhasha Mandal conducts events throughout the year, including youth meets that are organised on a substantial scale. Most members of the Goa Konkani Akademi, the state-recognised Konkani language establishment, have passed through the portals of, or are members of the Konkani Bhasha Mandal. Given the Konkani Bhasha Mandal's dominance in the field, a number of the persons at these gatherings were also members of the state's organ for the Konkani language, the Goa Konkani Akademi.

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[12] I use the term Archbishop in council because, once again through my participation in the "Save Goa" mobilization, I was informed in the course of a meeting between representatives of the *Ganv Ghor Rakhon Manch*, and clerical representatives of the Archdiocese, that the Archbishop does not act, at least in principle, on his own, but on the advice of members of various councils that have been established subsequent to the reforms initiated by the Vatican Council II. These reforms will not be elaborated on in this text, but will hopefully form the focus of an investigation to be carried out at a post-doctoral level.

These connexions caused me to attend some of the public meetings of both the Goa Konkani Akademi as well as that of the Konkani Bhasha Mandal that gave me a sharper sense of the manner in which the environment of the official, and pro-Nagari, Konkani establishment was organized. The structure of their rituals, that is to say the format in which these meetings were conducted, the social groups that attended these events, and the content, and context, of their assertions were features I focused on. Consequently, I also observed the ritual structures of the gatherings of the other groups, i.e. the Goan Catholics for Devanagari, and the Dalgado Konknni Akademi. Indeed, I realised that the Dalgado Konknni Akademi in fact structured many of their own events in imitation of those of the Konkani establishment (i.e. those organisations like the KBM and the GKA). As should be obvious, the proceedings were largely conducted in Konkani.

Where the opposition to the demand for extension of official status to the Roman script emanated from one group, there were a number of groups, what are usually called civil society institutions, involved in the demand for the recognition of the Roman script. The first of these, and clearly the premier group leading the demand is the Dalgado Konknni Akademi and was for a long time led by Tomazinho Cardozo, and continues even now to be mentored by him. The other group, whose interventions are largely relegated to issuing press statements in favour of the Roman script demand, is the Romi Lipi Action Front. This latter group is the result of the interventions of Fr. Pratap Naik, S.J., as well as Wilmix Mazarello. Fr. Naik is a central figure in the story of this mobilization. Not only was he present at the inception of the early demand for recognition of the Roman script, but he has been, since the movement gathered momentum in the last few years, central to goading the central activists to pursue the issue with greater zest. Perhaps indicative of his central location in this movement were the strong reactions that his name arouses among the members of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari. Through the Thomas Stephens Konknni Kendr (Thomas Stephen Konkani Centre), of which he was director until recently, Fr. Naik has also been able to actively support the consolidation of the community associated with the Roman script, especially through the awards offered by the Kendr (i.e. Centre) for persons involved in the production of cultural and literary works in the Roman script.

Another of the organizations whose involvement was especially marked in the early stages of the demand for recognition of the script was the All Goa Citizens' Committee for Social

Justice and Action (AGCCSJA). This group followed what can typically be understood as civil society techniques for the recognition of the demand, involving letter petitions to the President of India, to various politicians and office-bearers of political parties at the centre, and the state level. It was through the person of M.K. Jos, who maintains a detailed copy of the correspondence and the initiatives of the group in the various interventions it has made in the public interest that I was able to gain a detailed sense of the strategies used by the Roman script activists.

The Dalgado Konknni Akademi has been by far, the more dynamic organization involved in the demand for the recognition of the Roman script. In the course of time, and in testament to the persistence and the effectiveness of their strategy the Dalgado Konknni Akademi was able to birth the formation of a new group: the Tiatr Academy of Goa.

Tiatr, as a later chapter will discuss, is a hugely popular theatre form in Goa that provides a platform (quite literally) for trenchant critique of the customs of "society",[13] political commentary, and to articulate popular opinions and desires. It was because of the popularity of *tiatr* that in the course of the Konkani language movement in the late 1980s, *tiatrists* (i.e. those who perform *tiatr*) were roped into mobilizing the population toward demanding that Konkani alone be the official language of Goa. Similarly, in support of the demand for the Roman script's recognition, the activists, who were largely litterateurs under the banner of the Dalgado Konknni Akademi, have attempted to rope in *tiatrists*.

This roping in should not be seen merely as a strategic activity taken up by the litterateur activists of the Roman script. On the contrary, the inclusion of the *tiatr* is central to understanding the claims of the Roman script activists. The demand for the recognition of the Roman script is not merely an assertion for the recognition of the script alone, but is a symbol for a variety of neglects, and humiliations, that are alleged against the Goan state. The argument of the Roman script activists is that along with the exclusive recognition

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[13] In using the term society cautiously I follow a number of scholars who question the appropriateness of the term, especially when 'society' is constructed as an autonomous independently existing entity (Ingold 1996: 55- 98). I have, however, especially following Hindess' (2000) proposition where he argues against the tendency in the social sciences to present societies as if they were "substantial and enduring collectivities, exhibiting their own cultural patterns, possessing definite social and political structures" (*ibid*: 1492). Particularly relevant for an anthropological discussion of citizenship, he points out that it is this suggestion that allows for notions of citizenship to be incarnated within the idea of the nation-state as a cultural community. I agree with his argument that society itself should also be seen as an artifact of government, rather than simply be assumed to exist.

granted to the Devanagari script, all the dialects,[14] and cultural and literary forms associated with the Roman script fell from grace and hence were deprived, of any opportunity of state awards, or recognition. They argue that the official recognition of Konkani in the Devanagari script was not merely recognition of the script, but of the *Antruzi* dialect that has been associated with it. Thus any Konkani literary or cultural form that was not marked by the combined presence of both *Antruzi* and Devanagari failed to merit any attention. As a result, just like the *tiatr*, other literary and cultural forms, like the many novels and other products from authors in the Roman script, were deemed by those opposed to the official recognition of the Roman script, to be lacking in "standard". Indeed, Wilson (Wilmix)[15] Mazarello, who is associated with the Romi Lipi Action Front is an acclaimed *tiatrist* himself, and my conversations with him in the course of fieldwork demonstrated how the demand for the recognition of the Roman script was not merely a demand for the recognition of script alone, but a debate about the process through which the Konkani language would be standardized, and the routes through which the sub-national culture of Goa, or as I phrase it later in this text, Goan modernity, would be crafted.

The creation of the *Tiatr* Academy of Goa as a state sponsored organization is, therein, a major achievement of the Roman script activists, and represents at the very least a partial achievement of the demands that were set out by the Dalgado Konknni Akademi.

It was the events of these two groups, the Dalgado Konknni Akademi and the *Tiatr* Academy of Goa that allowed me the space for participant observation among Roman script activists. These events were comprised of a variety of forms, and were held in various locations across Goa. Thus, I was able to attend and observe a number of gatherings, the locations of which ranged from urban settings to the rural. This diversity also took in events that sought to commemorate critical moments in the history of the Konkani language, to felicitate, or condole a member of the fraternity, or meetings organized to plan larger gatherings with the intent to reach out to a larger group of sympathizers.

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[14] There are a number of dialects in the Konkani language that vary as per region, caste and religion. The dialects that are central to this thesis' discussion are the *Antruzi* dialect, associated with the *Saraswat* Brahmins, the *Bardezi* dialect associated with the region of Bardez and used in the *tiatr* as the regular dialect, and *Saxtti* associated with the region of Salcette and used within the *tiatr* tradition to signal a comic interlude.

[15] Wilmix is Mazarello's stage name, borrowed from the name of the trio that Wilson used to lead in his early days as a *tiatrist*.

In sum, then, the field that this thesis focusses on is that created by the various groups that have grown around the demand for the inclusion of the Roman script in the definition of the Konkani language in the Official Language Act of the state of Goa. Not all of these groups are in favour of the Roman script's recognition, and not all of these groups are comfortable with each other, and it is this interaction, in a field heavy with colonial as well as post-colonial antecedents through which I have studied the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics.

Despite the fact that this thesis may seem to focus on the leaders of larger movements, and not on the rank and file of these movements, this could not be further from the truth.[16] In following these various groups, I was able to engage not only with their leaders, but also meet with the rank and file, especially on the side of the Roman script activists. These encounters took place at the mandatory tea breaks at events organized by the Dalgado Konknni Akademi, where I was able to be introduced to and meet with these activists, or listen in on conversations that they were having. Very often, I also managed to travel to and/or from these meetings with persons who were not leaders of these groups, and once more gauge the sensibilities and opinions that swirled around the demand for the recognition of the Roman script, and the demand of respect for its literary and cultural forms.

It was obvious to me that these encounters with the "rank and file" were in fact germane to the concerns of this thesis since my difference from the groups I was studying continuously confronted me at every turn in the course of my fieldwork. I may have grown up in Goa, but the Goa I was interacting with was substantially different from the Goa I was raised in, and knew as a natal environment. Raised and educated largely in an English speaking environment, the field I was investigating was a largely Konkani speaking one.[17] This difference was significant since it marks a difference of class, and entering this world was to enter a different Goa, substantially different (though not radically) in terms of not only language, but ways of relating to persons, and ways of

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[16] I have introduced this argument into the introduction largely as a response to comments received on reading a chapter of the first draft of this thesis, especially those at the SASNET Doctoral Students Workshop held in Falsterbo, Sweden between 2-3 Sept 2012.

[17] While my interactions were largely conducted in English, there were some activists who were more comfortable speaking in Konkani. As a result, these conversations were marked by a bilingualism where I spoke in English, they responded in Konkani, or my alternating between Konkani and English. While I am not fluent in Konkani, I understand the language, and in the course of my research, even managed to translate into English, the text of Fr. Pratap Naik's address at the first convention organized by the Roman script activists.

behaving. To enter into this terrain was, while familiar, simultaneously unfamiliar. I was conscious, therefore, that if I was not to extend my own preconceptions and prejudices into the field, I would have to extend my study to more than just interactions with key players in the field, but also interacting simultaneously with other players.

There was also the question of my relationship to other players in the field. As a Goan Catholic, from an upper-caste and upper-class background[18], I felt a certain pressure to engage with the priests, whose political positions I was studying, in a deferential manner. The fact that I was initially hostile to the position of those priests who were ranked against the demand for recognition of the Roman script, complicated my relationship with them. For these reasons, I had to be rather conscious of the way I interacted with them, finding ways in which I could challenge the assertions they presented me, while at the same time not necessarily annoying them with what they may have seem as my radical position. My caste location definitely played a role in my engagement with some other activists who had allied themselves in favour of the official recognition of the Roman script. One activist for the Roman script, for example, early on in the course of my fieldwork identified me as a brahmin who was nevertheless taking a position against the brahmins. I similarly wonder, how, despite the warmth with which I was invariably received, how much I actually understood of the subterranean politics of the field. I make this observation in recognition of the fact that caste sensibilities clearly play a significant part in the unfolding of the politics, and despite this fact, is largely never articulated in public.

Structure of the thesis

This thesis commences with an engagement with the theoretical framework I constructed to make sense of the citizenship experiences I had been witness to in the field. I begin with one of the two problems that confronted the research: how was I to study the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholic? What would constitute an appropriate anthropological method to explore this field? The answer presented itself in the suggestion that citizenship is appropriately studied anthropologically neither as a bundle of rights, nor merely as membership in the cultural community of the nation. On the contrary, citizenship is ideally studied as constituted by practices of individuals and groups as they seek "room to

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[18] I will elaborate on the relationship between these two social locations in the Goan context later in the thesis. For now, I would like to point out that mere location in an upper-caste does not translate to greater economic power. Location as an upper-caste person definitely brings some amount of social, and cultural, capital along with it, but this does not necessarily guarantee location among dominant economic classes.

manoeuvre" within the social field. I go on to argue in the first chapter, that the study of practices while an appropriate entry point into the study of citizenship should not be exhausted in the study of the quotidian. Rather, there is a need to probe beyond the daily actions that constitute the habitus of the subject, and investigate the acts that create room for the creation of a new habitus (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The focus of this thesis, then, is not merely practices, but what, following Isin (2008) I have called acts of citizenship. As I will elaborate, I have used Isin's reflections to suggest that these acts differ from practices, in that while practices are repetitions intended to fix the status quo, actions seek to rupture the status-quo and create space for different practices and actions.

As indicated at the start of this introduction, I initially sought to study the citizenship practices of the Goan Catholics over multiple sites across the world, including Goa, London and Lisbon. This interest continues to animate this thesis, especially with regard to the influence of international spaces on the citizenship experience. I therefore seek to demonstrate that citizenship is not merely the result of an internal relationship between state and citizen, but is in fact part of a larger disciplinary regime that seeks to manage populations internationally. In making this argument, I follow other scholars in taking citizenship out of the state-individual relationship and present citizenship as a relational concept, born out of the attempts by both groups and individuals to claim political space that is constituted not merely in the *citizenplace*, but between various structural places in society. To do this, I take the support of the idea of interlegality, a theory crafted to explain the condition of legal pluralism[19] that can be said to structure our existence. What I bring to the anthropological study of citizenship, then, is a legal pluralist perspective. I believe that this perspective must naturally follow the moment we break out of the positivist theories that normally mark citizenship theory, at least within political science.

As should be obvious, this first chapter seeks to set up a way of thinking about citizenship as constituted between the tension of fixing and mobility. Thus, while on the one hand

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[19] Legal pluralism refers to the condition where there is more than one legal system in operation within a jurisdiction. This condition was traditionally understood to operate in colonized spaces, assuming that "western" law introduced by the colonizers would operate parallel to "traditional" legal systems. However, thanks especially to the adoption of the concept by sociologists and anthropologists of the law, this condition has been demonstrated to also operate in the "western" world as well. The study of legal pluralism is especially used to challenge the idea of the state law being the only law within a jurisdiction and points to the fact that the norms of extra-legal social institutions, such as the family, or professions, do in fact share features similar to those of laws enforced by the state. For further discussions, see Tamanaha 2008 and Merry 1988.

citizenship practices fix individuals and groups in definite identities, the acts of citizenships that seek "room to manoeuvre" challenge this immobility. This tension between mobility and fixing is captured best in the reference I make to discussions on subalternity that locate it as a predicament that one seeks to escape from (Morris 2010: 8).

Even as I make this argument for the Goan Catholic, I suggest not only that the Goan Catholics are subaltern, but that they are caught in a web, chain, or scale of subalternities. Indeed, I should also draw attention to the fact that even as I engage with the tension between a binary of movement and fixity, this thesis is consciously an engagement with scales and webs of relations, rather than with the binaries that structure so much of social theory. I argue in chapter one, therefore, against a binary elite-subaltern equation, but suggest that as with citizenship, subalternity too is a relational position.

The final observation of this first chapter is to suggest that studies of citizenship ought to focus not merely on individuals, the normally privileged subject of citizenship theory when framed by political scientists, but groups as well, and population groups, in particular. This concept of the population group is more wholly explored in the second chapter that lays out the field of secular citizenship in India. In this chapter, I use the concept proposed by Partha Chatterjee of a political society, a location in the polity which, Chatterjee argues, is the experience of large segments of subjects who while *de jure* citizens, do not *de facto* enjoy the privileged relationship with law that one assumes to be the case for those individuals located in civil society. Instead, he suggests, these subjects are treated as members of population groups. These groups are catered to, and enjoy at best, temporary concessions from the state, rather than permanent rights. Unfortunately, however, Chatterjee seems to privilege the relations around property alone, as the route through which groups get cast into political society. Building on similar critiques of this restriction of the concept, in this chapter I suggest that the concept must necessarily be expanded to include all sorts of communities that find themselves on the wrong side of the nationally approved agenda. Toward this end I demonstrate the manner in which Indian nationalism negotiated with the western modernity it encountered, crafting for national society its own secular modernity. This secular national modernity is ideally embodied in the figure and experiences of the upper caste Hindu male. Accordingly, the secularism of the Indian nation-state does not tolerate the articulation of particularisms, such as caste and religion that fall outside of the experience of this ideal citizen-figure.

Chapter two goes on to discuss how linguistic nationalism is one of the few particularisms that Indian secularism has traditionally tolerated. This linguistic nationalism is largely a local manifestation of Hindu nationalism, where local dominant castes incarnate their own dialect, now seen as a mother-tongue of all persons within the space where they hold sway, as the deified mother-goddess. Through this process, local dominant castes find space for themselves within the power-structures of the Indian nation-state, while communities that fail to embody this figure of the ideal citizen-subject find themselves in political society.

Having laid out the theoretical frame through which I was able to make sense of my field experiences, Chapter three titled "Konkani and its political history", seeks to locate the context for the citizenship practices of the various groups that have arisen around the demand for the extension of official status to the Roman script. To do this, I have explored the historical context within which Konkani was first crafted as the exclusive language of Goa, and mother-tongue of Goans. I describe the manner in which this process twined with the demands of the native upper-caste Catholic elites in the territory of Goa for autonomy from Portugal, as well as with their construction of themselves as an elite with brahmanical heritage, a manoeuvre that I suggest, was a citizenship act of those times, changing as it did the habitus of the Goan Catholic elites. This act created a route for these elites to imagine themselves within the epistemologies not merely of British Indian orientalism, but European romanticism as well.

In the rest of the thesis I argue that the post-colonial implications of these acts was to enable upper-caste, and upwardly mobile, Goan Catholics to identify with the agenda for Konkani crafted by brahmanical upper-caste groups. In legitimising a brahmanical heritage, this citizenship act delegitimised the socio-cultural markers of Catholic groups as valid constituents of national culture.

The second citizenship act that I discuss in this third chapter is that of Varde Valaulikar, who is hailed by Konkani language activists as the progenitor of the Konkani language movement. What I try to highlight in this chapter, is that he was also working within the shadow of earlier activists engaged in constructing the *Saraswat* caste as a new corporate entity for a variety of related *jatis* (i.e. caste-groups) that were seeking better socio-economic prospects in the city of Bombay and the larger Bombay Presidency in the late

eighteenth and early nineteenth century.[20] This segment of Chapter three presents the manner in which the basis of post-colonial Goan modernity was laid, the manner in which these movements anticipated the eventual contours of civil society and Goa, and the manner in which the basis for political exclusion of the lower-caste, and lower-class Goan Catholic, among other subalterns, was laid.

The fourth chapter of this thesis discusses the manner in which the ideal citizen-subject for Goan modernity, the *Konkani munis* ("Konkani person"), was fixed. This process evolved over the course of three major mobilisations of the population, largely relying on the energies of the Goan Catholic masses. These mobilisations included the Opinion Poll in 1967 that inquired of Goans whether they sought to maintain administrative autonomy or be merged into Maharashtra, the Konkani language movement that demanded that Konkani alone be awarded official language status, and finally the Medium of instruction mobilisation that determined that only schools imparting primary education in vernacular languages, i.e. Marathi and Konkani, would receive state grants.

This chapter invokes a number of the concepts that have been discussed earlier. For example, it seeks to demonstrate the manner in which the lines dividing the nationalist space of Goan modernity, i.e. Konkani, and political society, were fixed not merely in discourse, but through law. It demonstrates, also, the argument of the scale of subalternities presenting the way in which a pecking order is created among the many subalterns in the Goan space. I argue that thanks to the ways in which secular Indian and Goan modernity is imagined, the Hindu *bahujan* managed to gain recognition for Marathi, while the lower-class and lower-caste Goans were effectively cast to the bottom of the symbolic pile in post-colonial Goa.

The fifth chapter takes up more directly the politics of civil society and political society and demonstrates how the demand for the extension of official status to the Roman script through actions normally associated with the assertion of claims in civil society failed to achieve success. On the contrary, the demand for recognition of the script had to pass through the mobilisations of political society, where a "population group" was organized

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[20] The Bombay Presidency was a province of British India that encompassed vast portions of the western sea-board of the South Asian peninsula. It therefore encompassed portions of what are today the Indian states of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Karnataka. It should be borne in mind that British India did not encompass the Princely States. These latter territories, under indirect British rule, together with the provinces of the British India, combined to create the British Raj.

to demand their rights. These rights, though, were not directly granted, and typical to the features of political society, what has so far been handed out are a number of concessions to the activists for the cause of the Roman script.

The final chapter of this thesis explores another dimension of practices, the formation of habitus and the citizenship acts that were laid out in the first chapter. This chapter seeks to make sense of the narratives of shame and humiliation that were encountered in the course of fieldwork, and suggests that the sense of shame is a critical element to citizenship.[21] This is possible, this chapter argues, as a result of norms being cultivated within individuals who are taught and urged to embody the figure of the ideal citizen. In tandem, this chapter also argues that given the central role that caste plays in moulding the figure of the ideal citizen-subject, what we see in operation in Goa is a case of untouchability, i.e. caste-based shaming on those who are unable to, or fail to embody the figure of the *Konkani munis*, a figure that is modelled on the *Saraswat* Brahmin. The final argument of this chapter focusses on the citizenship act that emerges as a result of the response of the activists for the Roman script to this shaming. The most significant response to this shaming has been the indignation of the activists to the suggestion, from members of the Nagari establishment, that the literary and cultural productions of the Konkani written in the Roman script lack standard. I posit this response as a claim for humiliation. In this chapter, I argue that while shame results from the failure to meet norms that have been internalised, humiliation is a claim that responds to the experience of shaming. Following the suggestion of Palshikar (2009) however, I argue that this initial claim is completed not only when the shamed individual affirms that the situation that gave rise to the shame is unacceptable, and presents an alternative form within which social relationships may be structured. The citizenship act, in this case, is not merely the demand for the extension of value to the Roman script and the various cultural productions in it, but also the refusal of some of these activists to frame the terms of the debate within the framework of caste.

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[21] I am aware that within the field of anthropology, subsequent to the work of the Oxford anthropologists namely Peristiany (1965), Campbell (1964) and Pitt-Rivers (1963), the concept of shame is coupled with that of honour and tied particularly to the Mediterranean region. As I will elaborate in the final chapter, however, my own use of the term sees shame as linked with (though not coupled in binary form) respect, not honour. Furthermore, rather than see this shame and humiliation as values linked to a more-or-less static code, which is the way Mediterranean honour was conceived by these structural anthropologists, as I elaborate in the chapter, I focus on how emotions, not values, of shame emerge from dynamic processes and include possibilities to challenge the norms that create these experiences of shame.

While concluding this introduction to the thesis, I would like to draw attention back to the fact that in the course of exploring the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics, I have had two aims foremost in my mind. The first was to contribute, through long-term ethnographic research, to filling the gap in the existing anthropological study of citizenship. I sought to do this particularly with a consciousness that while there is little anthropologically informed discussion of citizenship, all too often it is also the concerns of the global north and center on the themes of immigration and integration in a given national space that structure even anthropological studies of citizenship (Roitman 2007).

The second aim has been, of course, to specifically focus on the Goan Catholics, but especially on the lower-caste and lower-class Goan Catholics, about whom too little work has been done. It is because so little work has been done on these Catholics, that all too often, as my thesis will demonstrate, the Goan Catholic groups have been misunderstood and seem to lack a coherent voice. As such, informed by my fieldwork, this thesis has attempted to locate the citizenship experience of these groups within the larger historical context that should provide the depth necessary to understanding these subalternised groups.

Chapter 1
Studying Citizenship

As I indicated earlier in the introduction to this thesis, my doctoral research was guided not only by an interest in the area of citizenship experience that I was studying but also by the fact that I am a Goan Catholic. One of the major challenges that I found, especially as an academic was the paucity of academic works in general, but anthropological works in particular, that could make sense of the experience of the Goan Catholics. What local works do exist, fail to explore the milieu of the Goan Catholic within a larger theoretical frame, creating in the process a specificity to Goa that is not particularly useful, academically or otherwise. It was in this context that I felt the need to articulate my study within the context of a larger theoretical background that would not only step away from these tendencies in the field, but also respond to the challenges that emerged in the course of my fieldwork.

These local problems were compounded by a larger problem where the anthropological study of citizenship is largely guided by the concerns of the developed North and its reception of immigrants. My first task in this chapter, is to articulate an anthropological method that steps away from not only these theoretical concerns that were largely unhelpful to me, but also focusses on the specificities of studying the citizenship experience of a minority group within a complex secular democratic state. This concern frames the first section of this chapter and led to my adopting a focus on governmentality, demonstrating the way subjects are sought to be disciplined or fixed, and the manner in which they respond and seek mobility. To unpack the complex dynamics that animate citizenship, in the second section I seek to move the study of citizenship away from the state-society binary within which it is largely trapped, to look at multiple alternative locations that mould the behaviour of individuals and groups. This shift allows me to demonstrate how the politics of caste, patriarchal discourses and international politics impact on the way the citizenship is experienced by Goan Catholics. The third section looks at citizenship not as a status, but as practice, allowing me to present citizenship as dynamically forged. Given that it is my argument that the Goan Catholics are a subaltern group, section four of this chapter explores the interaction between citizenship and subalternity, opening up the argument that will be developed later in the thesis of both

citizenship and subalternity being not fixed identitarian locations, but relational positions. In this context, and in light of the politics of Goan citizenship practices that are marked by the tussles between various subaltern groups, I suggest that we understand the operation of subalternity through the image of a web or chain of subalternity. The final section focuses of the proposal of seeing citizenship not merely as practices that stabilize the status-quo, but also as acts, or radical ruptures that create space for the establishment of new citizenship experiences. This section continues from my earlier focus on governmentality and responds to the need to demonstrate the manner in which while citizenship is an ideology of fixing, as demonstrated by the fixing of a Sanskritic ideal in Goan civil society, it is not meekly accepted by the citizen-subject, but, as the actions of the activists for the recognition of the Roman script epitomise, is also actively responded to.

An anthropological study of citizenship

The paucity of anthropological studies on Goa, is a situation that marks the anthropological study of citizenship. A number of reasons have been forwarded for this gap in anthropological focus. Some have suggested that the legalistic hold over the subject of citizenship is responsible, while others have held the originary distinctions between anthropology and sociology responsible for this gap. This latter logic proposes that given that sociology was focused on statal societies, citizenship was seen to naturally form a part of its area of study. Given that anthropology focused on non-statal societies, the focus was traditionally trained on tribal and ethnic identities rather than citizenship (Werbner 1998; Craith 2004). Indeed, Craith credits the continuing legacy of anthropology's relationship with colonialism which ensured that it developed as the study of those who could not be (or should not be allowed to become) nations (Craith 2004: 258).

However, it is not as if the field of anthropology has been entirely lacking in studies of citizenship. On the contrary, it has drawn attention to major lacunae in the way citizenship does tend to be studied, highlighting the manner in which citizenship theory tends to focus on what ought to be, rather than an ethnographic description of what it is. Anthropological studies of citizenship point that the focus is too often on grand, Eurocentric narratives, with little attention to historical and contemporary practices of citizenship. Furthermore, what complicates this study is that where there is attention to contemporary practices of citizenship, too often the focus tends to be dominated by the concerns of North American or of Europe (Roitman 2007, Saeidi 2010). Thus Janet Roitman argues:

> Contemporary citizenship is conceptualized and debated according to the language of rights as arising from the … history of the idea of citizenship and its emergence in Western political philosophy. In that sense, most of this scholarship assumes the definition of "citizenship" to be a formal, constitutional status that evokes certain rights and obligations. Circumscribed by theoretical, juridical or academic presuppositions about the nature of citizenship, such studies pay little attention to historical and contemporary practices of citizenship, or active participation in relationships of affiliation and definitions of the general welfare. This inattention to heterogeneous practices in the use of this term, which is invoked more and more as a claim to certain rights (human rights, social rights, civic rights) by social movements throughout the world, gives rise to very general or even speculative analyses of these practices in the world today. (2007: 187)

This stress on a move away from the legalistic focus on citizenship, and towards a focus on constitutive practices is similarly argued by others, who recommend that

> for us as anthropologists, the issue is not what model of citizenship we should endorse but rather what ethnography can do to analyse how these key categories – citizenship and culture – are being constituted anew (and in this process transformed) in the practices of their everyday lives by particular people(s) in particular times and places. (Ouroussoff and Toren 2005: 209)

It was, however, Jonathan Inda's introduction to *Analytics of the Modern* (2005), which despite speaking to an anthropological study of modernity, I found most useful to framing an anthropological study of citizenship. Inda points out that an ethnographic project ought not to treat the subject in abstract terms (as is all too often the case for the study of citizenship) to render "some grand, general account" (2005: 1) but to analyze its concrete manifestations. The object, Inda argues, ought to be to examine the materialization of, in this case, citizenship, and the manner in which it constitutes the social and biological life of the human (*ibid*: 1).

> "Ethnographic" here has a rather particular connotation. The concern … is not with describing a place and its people - that is, with analyzing an ethnos. Nor is it with searching for meaning - that is, with investigating culture. This is what one usually thinks of when the word "ethnography" is evoked. Rather, the concern …is with materiality. It is with examining the concrete manifestations of modern government - the way it is materialized in very specific practices. (*ibid*: 11)

Inda goes on to indicate that the ethnographic is also implied when one is interested, not in describing the various places,

> but with these places as milieus or environments in which and through which government occurs. Indeed...milieu - proper environment, setting, local particularities - matters very much when it comes to governing… Finally, to be anthropological in nature means that at the heart of the examination of modern government is the anthropos or human being. Indeed, a central concern … is with

> how practices of government put the social and biological life of the human in question. It is with the problematization of human beings as citizens, objects of knowledge, living entities, targets of regulation, and so forth. (*idem*: 11-12)

What Inda is doing in the quotation above, is to make ethnography alive to the operation of governance, which, following Foucault, he describes as all those more or less calculated and systematic ways of thinking and acting that aim to shape, regulate, or manage the comportment of others. Within the frameworks of such an understanding, " 'government' designates not just the activities of the state and its institutions but more broadly any rational effort to influence or guide the conduct of human beings through acting upon their hopes, desires, circumstances, or environment" (Inda 2005: 1). Conversely, the ethnographic study of citizenship would also include the responses of these human beings to the efforts at influencing behaviour, thus expanding the ambit of citizenship that has been traditionally restricted to the public sphere. What is crucial, however, to the direction that Inda provides, is a particular approach to analyzing modern political power, where one recognizes the state as only one element, even though admittedly a rather important one, in a multiple network of actors, organizations, and entities involved in exercising authority over the conduct of individuals and populations.

In his exposition, Inda unveils aspects to governmentality that are critical to a study of citizenship practices. First, in speaking of governmentality as the shaping of conduct it ensures that political power is not reduced merely to the activities of the state, and that the usual state-society opposition that marks much political and social theory is abandoned to look for the multiple locations of power that are instrumental in moulding the individual. Secondly, the focus on governmentality also draws attention away from the abstract focus on the individual to point out also the focus on population. The emphasis that Inda is making, it has to be stressed, is not on one or the other, but recognizing that the concerns of governmentality are to at once "totalize" and "individualize", to view the two in tandem. Finally, this focus on a diffused government, and a focus on population groups, does not ignore the fact that the individual him/herself plays a role in moulding her/himself in this diffused form of governance. As Inda goes on to state:

> To focus on the subjects of government is thus, on one level, to direct attention to how governmental practices and programs seek to cultivate particular types of individual and collective identity as well as forms of agency and subjectivity. It is to emphasize how government is intimately involved in making modern subjects ... [O]n another level, to focus on the subjects of government is to deal with how particular agents cultivate "their own" selves and identities. The idea here is that

> while governmental practices might seek to create specific kinds of subjects, it does not mean that they necessarily or completely succeed in doing so. Individuals can and do negotiate the processes to which they are subjected. For governmentality scholars, then, it is important to look not just at the forms of collective and individual identity promoted by practices of government, but also at how particular agents negotiate these forms - at how they embrace, adapt or refuse them. (Inda 2005: 10)

These elements, on which I will elaborate further, have guided this thesis in the study of the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics. I seek to move the study of citizenship away from the state-society binary within which it is largely trapped, to look at multiple alternative locations that mould the behaviour of individuals and groups. I would argue that it is only when the state-society binary is fractured, that the pluralism contained within, the otherwise homogenously imagined, society will be revealed, demonstrating the existence of tense relationships among groups that are the very stuff that constitute citizenship. Further, I will be able to demonstrate the way in which the politics of caste, patriarchal values and international discourse impact on the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics. Secondly, I have shifted the focus away from the usual association of citizenship with individuals to also look at the manner in which governance, and the response to it, involves groups, in particular, population groups. Third, while I recognize the shift on emphasis, I also ensure that I do not lose sight of individuals and, now that citizenship has been understood more broadly, the various citizenship practices that they engage in.

Citizenship beyond the state

Despite the state-centric focus of much work around citizenship, there have been a number of works within the body of literature that constitutes citizenship studies that take seriously the idea of looking at citizenship "beyond the State" (Gordon and Stack 2007). Engin Isin (2007) observes that as a result of the operation of what he calls "scalar logic" most of these studies have been stuck within a vertical scale of imagining the beyond. The "beyond" they think of, and discuss, is the beyond of "above" the state, that is, the space of the international and the global, a concern that, not surprisingly, stems from the developed North's preoccupations with immigration and the flows of population.[22] Isin, on the other hand, suggests including a look "below" the state for this beyond proffering the city as an example of a space below the state within which citizenship can be studied. Rather than

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[22] Significant names in the work on population and cultural flows are those of Sassen (1998), Appadurai (2003) and Castells (1996).

refer to the physical location of the city, or *urbs*, however, he clarifies that his idea of the city, is to view it as an agglomeration of *urbs* and *civitas*, as a body politic that "assembles all other spaces within its orbit and creates spaces of influence, presence and domination" (Isin 2007: 223).[23]

If Isin points to the city as the space where citizenship is constituted, through the practices of contestation, and negotiation, then Barry Hindess (2000) draws to attention another manner in which citizenship is constituted at an international level. This constitution, he proposes, is one that operates as an international management of populations. The objective of citizenship, he convincingly argues, is to fix individuals as members not just of definite countries but of definite national societies. He argues that "societies are presented as substantial and enduring collectivities, exhibiting their own cultural patterns, possessing definite social and political structures, and, in some cases, developing a sense of national identity" (*ibid*: 1492). In pointing to this feature of citizenship, Hindess highlights that not only is there an international space in which citizenship is constituted, and that the discursive, i.e. citizenship practices at this level involve the assertion of the idea of national polities as being constituted by homogenous national societies. In addition to the other insights that this observation brought to my work, it also forced me to rethink and examine the manner in which a national society is constituted and subject that very idea to critique.

The highlighting of this internationalist dimension of citizenship is particularly important because in displacing the nation-state as the centre of the focus of citizenship studies, and especially in guiding this thesis, it enables seeing the different ways in which post-colonial citizenship could have been constructed, and draws attention to the history of imperial colonies and their differing models of citizenship. The non-Anglophone colonial empires of the French and the Portuguese, for example, provided space for some of the colonized to acquire citizen status. While Indian subjects of the British crown did advance claims to be granted the status of imperial citizens (Banerjee 2010), these claims were denied. Efforts by these subjects to travel within the Empire, as freely as the capital that sustained the

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[23] I would like to stress that I am not interested in the city as an urban space, and that this thesis is not a work in urban anthropology. I make reference to Isin's interesting formulation on the city only to draw attention to the interesting ways in which citizenship can be rethought, in this case, by pointing to the space "below" the state. In addition to this reference, there are other interesting ways in which the city can be used to plot the development of citizenship among marginal groups. I have in mind particularly the interesting references made to the city and the claiming of rights by outcaste Tamil Christians in the work of Aparna Balachandran (2012).

Empire, were restricted by the same Empire, with an especial intent to maintain certain locations such as Canada and Australia as white-only spaces (Singha 2005). These colonial era politics eventually impacted on the way in which anti-imperial nationalism emerged, and forged the image of the nation, as a space that was exclusively native.

This realization draws attention to the fact that there is a line that unites the logic of the racist politics of colonization, the manner of decolonization and the creation of nation-states as successors to the colonial empires, where these nation-states being imagined as spaces where each racial or ethnic group (and its concomitant elite) had a definite space. To reveal this history of empire, and decolonization, would allow a deeper appreciate of Hindess' argument of citizenship as conspiracy, and stress the role that citizenship plays in the fixing of populations (see also Hindess 2004; 2005).

The intention of both Isin and Hindess, and other scholars who similarly suggest a focus on different spaces from which to study the manner in which citizenship is constituted, rights created and demanded, or claimed, is to decentre the study of citizenship from the current obsession with the state, and by extension, the juridico-political perspective that limits the dominant understanding of citizenship. Hindess's argument is that citizenship is too often restricted to what he calls the internalist understanding of citizenship (2000: 1486). This understanding of citizenship is "a view that focuses on relationships between an individual and the state in whose territory he or she happens to reside" (Hindess 2000: 1486). His argument is that this focus on the state obscures the operation of an international discourse and practice that constitutes citizenship as an identity that fixes the individual within a definite territory. For his part, Isin articulates an argument using the concept of a "scalar thought" that twines admirably with Boaventura de Sousa Santos' legal pluralist formulation of the legal condition as one of interlegality (1995: 410), a concept that I will discuss subsequently.

Isin argues that scalar thought is a representational form that "conceals the difference between actual (physical and material) and virtual (symbolic, imaginary and ideal) states in which bodies politic exist" (2007: 211). Scalar thought, Isin argues, is a product of modernity, and is marked by characteristics of subordination, fictional existence and the emphasis of hierarchies. Thus, one has the subordination of all bodies to the state, and a construction of hierarchies that privilege the state. The state Isin argues is really a fictional body that has no real life in the social world, but which is able to impress itself upon

popular imagination thanks to the dominance of scalar thought. In articulating this argument, he is also clearly indicating that law, as we understand it today, is a part of this scalar imagination. In the extract below, Isin indicates succinctly how this imagination forces a return to the single language it is comfortable with, i.e. law, restricting the understanding not just of the world, but of citizenship as well.

> [I]f citizenship is as much about belonging, identity and social status as juridico-legal status, it then cannot be contained within its juridico-legal bodies. Citizenship decodes and recodes these bodies and traverses their rigid and inflexible constitution. How citizenship overflows and how these overflows constitute citizenship through struggles of social groups are questions of investigation that scalar thought with its principles of hierarchy, exclusivity and ahistoricity will not and cannot ask. Instead, scalar thought constantly urges the return to juridico-political constitution of the citizen and the state or some other container, considering anything in "between" and "beyond" (assuming that there are two bodies) as subordinate, fictional and hierarchical. (219)

Phrasing the contrast in this manner, Isin highlights that citizenship is therefore not something constructed and contained within the realm of the juridico-political alone, but something that is constructed and articulated constantly through the actions of the persons signified as citizens, or those who demand the extension of the rights of citizenship to themselves. The demand that the recognition of the law be extended to Konkani in the Roman script is perhaps a sharp example of the manner in which a citizenship right is created not only through jurido-political interventions, but through various forms of mobilization that included theatre, the privileging of relations between social groups, and relations among genders. This view of citizenship effects a shift from a recognition of citizenship as status, to one of citizenship as practice (Bosniak 2000). It also allows citizenship to be seen as a relational practice, where citizenship is constituted through amending relationships with various groups, and where the relationship with each group is not necessarily similarly placed. I will develop this idea more substantially subsequently in this chapter when I discuss the idea of chains of subalternity.

The interaction of the complex of state and extra-state bodies that Isin points to gains sharper nuance as a result of Santos' presentation of a map of the interpenetration of what he calls the "structural places" that define the condition of "interlegality" (Santos 1995: 410). Indeed, Santos specifically mentions that the point of this map he provides is to replace the dualisms that dominate political and legal theory, namely opposition between state versus civil society, the distinction between the public and private sphere, the

conception of politics as a specialized sector or dimension of social life, identified with the state, the reduction of law to state law and the concomitant separation of law from politics (*ibid*).

To overcome this tendency towards binaries, Santos describes the space of the social, as one constituted by six structural places, the *householdplace*, the *marketplace*, the *communityplace*, the *citizenplace*, and the *worldplace*. The structural places are banal sites of the operation of power where this power is uniquely structured through the constellation of power, legality and epistemology of that site.[24] As per Santos, not only is each site marked by its own unique form of power, legality and common-sense, but it is the constellations between these forms that provide the logics for the unique operation of that structural place. Furthermore, while each place is structurally autonomous, each of these forms of the structural places engage in combinations or constellations with their correspondent forms in other structural places.

I am not interested in taking up Santos' entire argument as much as I am interested in the direction he provides of identifying various structural forms, each with their unique disciplinary logics that simultaneously operate on each other. Rather than refer to the terms that Santos provides, I would like to illustrate his argument by referring to some of the sites that will be discussed in this thesis. For example, patriarchy, the form of power associated with the *householdplace*, twines with the logic of untouchability that is peculiar to the institution of caste. This provides the non-state legality that makes it possible for marital alliances between persons of dissimilar caste backgrounds to be opposed. Similarly, multiple structural locations also interact independently and together with the law of the state. Take for example the manner in which a patriarchal logic that deifies the female body to control it combines with the brahmanical logic of caste to create the mother-goddess. This image gains power as a result of international politics unleashed by romantic nationalism, which constructs maternal relations between social groups and languages.

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[24] Santos provides a list of six structural places that include the *householdplace*, a cluster of social relations of production and reproduction of domesticity and kinship; the *workplace* which is constructed around the social relations of production and exchange; the *marketplace* produced from the social relations of distribution and consumption; the *communityplace* that results from the relations engendered through production and reproduction of physical and symbolic territories and communal identities and identifications; the *citizenplace* constituted by the social relations that constitute the "public sphere" and reciprocal relationship between citizens and the state; and the *worldplace* that is the product of the social relations that flow from the global division of labour (Santos 1995: 420-21).

This idea of the "mother-tongue" that is the centre of nationalist mobilization is in turn codified in law as the official language of a state to define citizenship status, demonstrating the manner in which the powers, legalities and epistemologies of various structural places combine with each other to structure the daily lives of subjects.[25] Constellation, or combination, or interpenetration, is critical to the map of the world that Santos lays out. What Santos' map does, therefore, is to provide not only a particularity to the power that Foucault argues is now dispersed through society, but to provide a model that can deal with a fair amount of dynamism, leading away from the binaries that currently dominate both popular and academic thinking. As I will discuss later in this chapter, this observation is of particular relevance to my study of citizenship.

Before moving on one final remark about the structural places is necessary. While Santos presents a map of diverse locations that work to structure the legal condition, he does not fall into the trap that some communitarian critics of the state fall into. On the contrary just like Inda who acknowledges that the "rather important" location of the state in the exercise of modern power (Inda 2005: 1), Santos suggests that the structural constituent of the state, i.e. the *citizenplace*, is marked by certain peculiarities that give it this important role. This peculiarity is that of all the forms of power, legality that are linked to the various structural places, it is only the forms of power, legality that thinks of themselves as the only law and only power. This self-imagination is matched by the state's desire to assume total hegemony over all of society, and claim or promise, more than it can deliver. This rhetoric explains its prescriptions for all other structural places, as well as its constellations with other legalities and power forms. As I will demonstrate later in this thesis, this rhetorical promise is useful, since the state becomes the first political institution to promise equality, even though in the economic arena this is not necessarily carried out. But this promise is critical to the struggles of groups, providing a useful resource, as well as the basis on which the state maintains its centrality in the imagination of the people. It is for these reasons, that Santos points out that "all the other forms of law tend to take [the state's] presence for granted, and to organize and maximize their own regulatory intervention and

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[25] For other discussions on the manner in which the logic of the home is used by the state to structure discourses of citizenship, refer to Walters' (2004) discussion of domo-politics and Tyler's (2010) use of domo-politics to demonstrate the manner in which British citizenship discourse is structured to cast the nation-state as a home, and subsequently justify exceptional measures, including the violent abjection of persons of colour deemed to not belong to this "home".

efficacy around the limits, gaps and weaknesses of state law" (1995: 436).[26] State law and its imagination, are in fact central to the structuring of the legal condition, and the experience of citizenship.

The concepts discussed in this segment pervade the entire body of this thesis. I seek to demonstrate how the spaces above, and below the state, such as family and caste structure the experience, and practice, of citizenship of Goan Catholics. Further, these discussions are critical for me to eventually demonstrate how an international common-sense of the relationship between the formerly colonized and their culture is critical to the formation of the citizenship experience in Goa.

Citizenship as practice

This decentering of the state from the gaze of citizenship studies that Isin and Santos advocate allows analysis to begin from the activities of the social actor. It enables recognition that "the rights of citizenship are produced through, and are a result of, practices by those involved in specific struggles to define, alter, and expand the meaning of belonging within a political community" (Pell 2008: 148). The practices of individuals and groups, then, are once again foregrounded as the ideal focus for an anthropological study of citizenship.

Just as the focus on alternate locations for the articulation of citizenship is not new, the focus on practices is similarly not unknown. Cynthia Miller-Idris (2006) observes that there has recently been a focus on practices in the study of nationhood that diverts from the earlier focus on nation as constructed and mediated through official narratives, state policies, formal curriculum or legal policies. Similarly, there has also been a focus on the everyday experience of the state (Das and Poole 2004) and on the discursive practices of corruption (Gupta 1995).

But once more these works seem to be limited to the single relationship between the individual, or the community that the individual is located in, on the one hand, and the state on the other. Nevertheless, having once recognized the manner in which the study of practices need not be limited to merely a relationship between the individual and various

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[26] Despite the fact that Santos is a sociologist of the law, his works, especially in suggesting interlegality, have been adopted by anthropologists of the law. Furthermore, given that I have located my anthropological study of citizenship within the framework of explicating the materiality or milieu that Inda (2005) has insisted must be the focus of ethnography, I find Santos' elaboration of the various social spaces in which legality manifests itself quite useful.

organs of state, the focus on practices that constitute citizenship is particularly rewarding. As Benei's work that focusses on the moulding of citizens in schools and through the harnessing of patriarchal moralities demonstrates, the attention to practices opens up space to see how the state seeks to fix national identity (which is what citizenship tends to be collapsed into) through quotidian practices in schools, public functions; and the manner in which these practices are negotiated by individuals and communities in these and other spaces of daily and ritual life (Benei 2009).

Casting this discussion in strikingly Foucauldian terms, by invoking his notion of self care, Cynthia Weber (2008) elaborates that

> Unlike traditional forms of governance that concentrate power and authority in the figure of the sovereign, governmentality functions by disbursing power and authority throughout various fields of practice (schools, hospitals, factories, barracks) to citizens within the territorial state. Through these techniques of power, modern liberal citizens are no longer called upon to serve one all-powerful sovereign; they are instead called upon to care for the body politic as a way of caring for themselves. Herein lies the design principle for safe citizenship in disciplinary society – Caring for One's Country (by caring for one's self). (*ibid*: 134)

The focus on practices that constitute citizenship is a welcome addition precisely because it allows the space of the political within the study of citizenship to be enlarged. The juridico-political understanding of citizenship, especially compounded by T.H. Marshall's (Marshall and Bottomore 1992) formulation of citizenship that has dominated the social sciences, has resulted in citizenship being collapsed into claims being made on the state. Where there has been a focus on practices, it has been limited to the practice of consultations of citizens, and the cyclical practices of voting in elections (Isin and Nielsen 2008: 1). That such an understanding of citizenship is so far from the early civic republican ideal of citizens engaged in deliberative democracy, and in their actively taking decisions, is testament to how much the idea of citizenship has been emptied of political significance, even as it has been collapsed to mean pretty much the same as nationality.

Studying citizenship through an emphasis on practices also enables an enlarging of the space of the political in another manner. One of the significant critiques of the juridico-political frame of understanding citizenship has been the manner in which theorization begins from the formal liberal assumption that all citizens are equal. While formally recognized as equal, there is a plethora of work that points out that in fact all citizens are not equal; that in fact, some citizens are more equal than others (Balibar 1991). Indeed,

this thesis seeks to demonstrate how, as a result of the operation of various discourses, both above and below the state, it is Hindus, but in particular upper-caste, Hindu, *Saraswat* Brahmins in Goa, who achieve a position of dominance and are located within civil society, while others, in particular lower caste Goan Catholics are marginalised into subaltern positions. Such tendencies have been especially critiqued in the recent debates over the nature of operation of western (and other) secularisms. Scholars, not least among them Talal Asad (2006; Asad 2003), have highlighted the manner in which secularism privileges the articulation of certain kinds of cultural being, while silencing others as inappropriate. This has been a critique of Indian secularism as well, which I will discuss in the subsequent chapter.

Hindess makes a similar argument when he suggests that we might be better off seeing citizenship as not necessarily progressive, but as a conspiracy (2000). In making this claim, Hindess draws from a strain of thought that critiques the cosmopolitan urges of the Enlightenment.[27] In a similar argument, Hindess points out that the thinkers of the Enlightenment while recommending universality of the norms that have indeed, via colonization and the current international order, been universalized, recognized that not all humans were able, or indeed capable of achieving these norms. Their ability to participate in this civilizational and ethical order was thus either non-existent, or subject to pedagogic demonstration by these European countries (Hindess 2004: 31).

Indeed, as observed in the discussion of Partha Chatterjee's notion of political society in the subsequent chapter, the idea of pedagogy is central to the idea of citizenship and membership in civil society (2007: 7). Citizenship then, as Hindess points out, is a disciplinary process that operates as a conspiracy against, rather than toward participation. Pointing to the history of the term in Greek society, he reminds us that citizenship was based on the decisions of a privileged few over a larger whole who were effectively disempowered (Hindess 2004: 306). The growth of modern democracies has only exacerbated this process, where the idea of direct participation has been lost to indirect participation effected largely through quinquennial elections, and the idea of the republic consumed by the idea of the nation.[28]

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[27] For a collection of essays on this topic see *Public Culture* 12.3, 2000.

[28] In phrasing this idea, I was inspired by the reference that Isin and Turner (2007: 12) make to Hannah Arendt's formulation of the conquest of the state by the nation. Isin and Turner extract her formulation to suggest "the transformation of the state from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation". They

While these are valid criticisms of the liberal democratic imagination of democracy and the civil sphere, or civil society, as emphasized earlier, it needs to be borne in mind that merely because population groups are being disciplined in such a manner, this should not assume their dumb acquiescence to such disciplining. Where citizenship is seen as a conspiracy to discipline persons into members of national groups best located in their national territory, and only rarely straying outside of it, citizenship can also be seen as the practices taken up by the members of these population groups against such disciplining. A valid example of such an assertion would be the acts of citizenship by the activists for the recognition of Konkani in the Roman script. By affirming their right to have this particular script recognised, they are challenging the fixing of Indian culture into brahmanical forms alone. They contest the idea that the Roman script is foreign because of its origin outside of the sub-continent. This questioning of the idea of acceptable Indian-ness disputes not just the common-sense determined by Indian nationalism, but by that of international discourse whose imagination of India is determined to a larger extent by orientalist imaginations.

I would like to refer back to the quote from Pell (2008) that inaugurates this section to suggest that the rights of citizenship are produced through, and as a result of practices in the struggles to define, alter and expand the scope of belonging within a political community. It is within this understanding of studying citizenship through practices, Gordon and Stack suggest rather interestingly, that "citizenship has been considered, at certain times and in certain places, as a kind of *room for manoeuvre*" (2007: 125, emphasis in the original). This understanding of citizenship as a *room for manoeuvre* works very well with a conceptualisation of citizenship as relational, as constantly evolving, and as constructed between various social spaces. Indeed, this idea of a *room for manoeuvre* is a critical idea that this thesis will pick up on to elaborate on the practice of citizenship, especially when arguing for an expansion of the notion of politics and the space for the exercise of citizenship, outside of the formal space of civil society or the *citizenplace*.

Neveu (2005: 200) has similarly argued that citizenship should be seen, not so much as a kind of identity, as much as "a specific political role, a way to expose dissent and find temporary agreements so as to 'make society'". I would especially like to develop this idea

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go on to say that "[i]t was this conquest that defined citizens of the state as nationals whether defined racially, ethnically, culturally or even religiously. As a result of this move, the idea of citizenship was collapsed into meaning nationality, conceptually inflating what should ideally be seen as two different ideas" (*ibid*).

of citizenship being seen as a way to find temporary agreements in the subsequent chapter, where I discuss Chatterjee's suggestion of the existence not merely of a civil society, but a political society as well. In the subsequent chapter, through the focus on political society, I will further develop the proposition, made earlier in the chapter, that the study of citizenship simultaneously focus on both, the individual, as well as groups, in particular, population groups.

Citizenship and subalternity

The ideas of seeing citizenship, as does Neveu above, as much more than identity, and that of seeing citizenship as creating room for manoeuvre, opens up space for a discussion of subalternity that this thesis engages with. Engaging with the idea of subalternity is important for a variety of reasons. The first, is because it is imbricated in the concept of political society that I feel explains the location of the Goan Catholics, and especially the location of the marginalized groups i.e. members of the lower classes and lower castes, among the Goan Catholics. The concept is particularly critical for this thesis because even those Catholics who were relatively elite seemed to be in positions where they were unable to be heard; a condition that Spivak (2010) [29] has classically described as representative of the subaltern condition.

I would like to begin this discussion on subalternity and citizenship by drawing on an observation by Rosalind Morris who points out that:

> Subalternity is less an identity than what we might call a predicament … [I]t is the structured place from which the capacity to access power is radically obstructed. To the extent that anyone escapes the muting of subalternity, she escapes being a subaltern. (Morris 2010: 8)

I find this caution useful since it challenges the tendency to locate the subaltern in a definite material location, i.e. conflating subalternity with an identity. More significantly, this caution dovetails neatly with one of the concerns of this thesis which is to demonstrate the location of citizenship in the tension between fixing and mobility. Just as I seek to suggest that citizenship is not merely a status or a location, Morris suggests that subalternity is not a fixed location, but a predicament, and one that subalterns attempt to

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[29] I am making reference here to Spivak's famous question of whether the subaltern can speak, an issue that she has returned to on many occasions, reworking the formulation on each occasion. Spivak argues that subalternity is a subjectivity, or a location where owing to the manner in which dominant discourse is structured, the subaltern may speak, but s/he will not be heard, or understood in any coherent manner by the groups dominant in society.

escape. It is these attempts to escape, these attempts to create room for manoeuvre, that constitute the acts of citizenship that I will discuss in the subsequent section in this chapter. I stress mobility and movement not only because of the concern of this thesis with identifying mobility as a citizenship act in the face of the fixing that constitutes the citizenship discourse of the state, but also because of the manner in which this tension finds happy coincidence with Spivak's formulation of subalternity as the location "where social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a recognizable basis of action" (Spivak 2005: 476).

This formulation allows relationality to be conceived of as the basis of subalternity, where one could be subaltern in a particular set of relations, frustrated in the formation of a recognizable basis of action, but in others find space for movement. Such a position as I propose would not only enable skirting the dangers of a simple collapsing of the subaltern into identity politics, but also permit developing a somewhat more nuanced idea of the operation of power and hegemony. Rather than dilute the potency of the concept of subalternity, such a conceptualisation would in fact enable appreciation of the nuances in the (im)possibilities of movement, as well as a more profound appreciation of the position of those who are in fact quite unable to escape their subaltern condition or create room for manoeuvre.[30]

It is with this understanding of subalternity, and buttressed by my experiences in the field, that I recommend seeing subalternity not as a relationship between a discrete elite and definite subaltern group, but as a scale or web. As I will elaborate later in this thesis, discussing subalternity in terms of scales or webs is not irrelevant to the critique of political society. On the contrary, such a conceptualisation complicates the easy, albeit necessary, distinction between a political and civil society. Thus, the concept of the scales or webs of subalternity suggests that if there are multiple groups locked in a subaltern

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[30] Inden, following Collingwood, similarly argues that a focus on scales of forms, and overlapping classes, would enable us toward moving away from the tendency towards thinking in terms of structures, and essences, that no less today, than when Collingwood and later Inden proposed the idea, continues to hold sway in more subtle forms (Inden 1992: 21). Inden points out that the scale of forms is marked by what Collingwood called an eristical movement, "a situation in which the two interacting parties start from a position of disagreement and attempt to gain triumph over one another. Through this double process of interaction, agents, or even parts of agents, attempt to retain or alter their positions in a system or systems. But it is very important to keep in mind here that as agents or their constituents raise or lower their positions, converge or diverge, or even extrude a rival, they also alter their content" (cited in Inden 1992: 25). This idea, as I will attempt to demonstrate later, is not entirely irrelevant to the discussion of the manner in which the Goan Catholics seek to engage in the field of Indian citizenship.

position vis-à-vis each other, and if location in political society is the result of a subaltern location, once could be simultaneously located within both political and civil society.

Acts of citizenship

The discussion thus far has been to suggest that a focus on the quotidian practices through which citizenship is constituted would form an eminent place to begin an anthropological study of citizenship. This focus on practices is deepened through the proposal of the study of citizenship via a focus on "acts of citizenship" (Isin and Nielsen 2008). Seeing practices as merely neutral repetitive actions that do not challenge the system, being deeds enacted by passive subjects contributing to habitus formation and perpetuation, they propose a focus on the act (*ibid*: 2). The act is posited as a creative rupture of the habitus. In so doing, these moments "shift established practices, status and order" and in disrupting the habitus "create new possibilities, (to) claim rights and impose obligations" (Isin and Neilsen 2008: 10). Isin thus distinguishes between the "active citizen" and the "activist citizen" (Isin 2008: 38). The active citizen, he argues, is one who is merely engaged in the practices of citizenship, the dull repetition of rituals that constitute the habitus. The activist citizen on the other hand, is the one who is engaged in creative rupture, who in the process of actualizing the act, opens up space for a new habitus to be born. In his words:

> Active citizens act out already written scripts. While activist citizens engage in writing scripts and creating the scene, active citizens follow scripts and participate in scenes that are already created. While activist citizens are creative, active citizens are not. (Isin 2008: 38)

What should be stressed when discussing this distinction is that the "act", as per this critique, cannot be collapsed into an action. On the contrary, the act is the ontological situation that creates the actor, who actualizes the act through an action (Isin 2008: 15 – 43). The act is the circumstance that calls forth, that impels the creative rupture of the habitus. This creative rupture is another feature of the act of citizenship as developed in this critique, since it is definitely not "impulsive and violent reactions to a scene" (Isin 2008: 27), but one that allows the subject to continue in that location, and craft the possibilities for a new subject, different from the one crafted by the earlier habitus.

It would be appropriate, at this point, to extract Isin's argument as to the inadequacy of a mere focus on practices, and why it is exactly that there is a need to grant more attention in the study of citizenship to a focus on the act. Isin argues that,

> [m]ost critical studies on citizenship focus on how status becomes contested by investigating practices through which claims are articulated and subjectivities are formed …. The effect of this shift to practices has been the production of studies concerning routines, rituals, customs, norms and the habits of the everyday through which subjects become citizens. We can suggest that the impact of this body of work has been to include habitus ... within studies of citizenship ... This body of research has demonstrated effectively that virtues are cultivated, that citizenship is not inherited but learned, and that cultivating citizenship requires establishing supportive and relatively enduring practices and institutions.... (Isin 2008: 17)

This emphasis on the "learning" of citizenship, within the framework of supportive and enduring practices and institutions, is critical to this study of the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics. As I will demonstrate in the last chapter of this thesis, it is vital that studies of citizenship focus not only on the practices of individuals, but recognize that these subjects are feeling subjects. Citizenship, I argue, drawing from this insight, is the product of feelings of shame that are actively inculcated within individuals through a variety of institutions, and their accompanying legalities, power forms and epistemologies, working together, from the school, to the family.

Elaborating the case for a focus on acts, as opposed to standard explorations of citizenship, Isin adds:

> The insistence on acts as the object of investigation rather than the status or habitus of subjects already breaks new ground. Citizenship studies often proceeds with a focus on the three ontic aspects of citizenship: extent (rules and norms of exclusion and inclusion), content (rights and responsibilities) and depth (thickness or thinness of belonging). We can suggest that these aspects of citizenship arrive at the scene too late and provide too little for interpreting acts of citizenship. They arrive too late because the actors of extent, content, and depth are already produced; for acts produce actors that do not exist before acts. They provide too little because the scene has already been created. If acts produce actors (or actors are produced through acts) then initially we can define citizenship as those acts that produce citizens and their others. (Isin 2008:37)

This observation is of no small significance to an anthropological study of citizenship, given that it stresses that the milieu being studied, should not be limited to merely an interpretation of actions, but enable an understanding of the circumstances through which the emergence of the actors and their actions have been made possible in the first place. To this extent, despite the apparent discord with Inda's recommendations discussed earlier, this critique of practices offers an opportunity to deepen the understanding of the requirements for an anthropological study of citizenship along lines already set out by Inda.

This focus on the act twines well with the concept of interlegality that has been discussed previously. It could be argued that it is the constellations brought on by the multiple possible combinations achievable between the power, legality and common-sense of each of these structured places that create the ontological possibility for an act to emerge. Indeed, I would argue that this critique, that urges a focus on the act, would also do well to integrate into itself the insights from legal pluralism. In the course of his discussion, Isin suggests that

> "[a]cts of citizenship are not necessarily founded in law or responsibility. In fact, for acts of citizenship to be acts at all they must call the law into question and, sometimes, break it … Those activist citizens that acts produce are not a priori beings recognized in law, but by enacting themselves through acts they affect the law that recognizes them" (2008: 39).

Thus, "[t]he third principle of theorizing acts is to recognize that acts of citizenship do not need to be founded in law or enacted in the name of the law" (Isin 2008: 37). This critique would be very much impoverished if it was not able to articulate the source from where these activist citizens were able to garner the legitimacy for their cause. Resting on the concept of interlegality, I would argue that they enjoy the capability to effect these ruptures, and that too in fact of the contravention of the law, because they are able to draw on the legalities that have stemmed from other structural places, or as a result of the combinations of multiple legalities. I would like to briefly illustrate this argument by anticipating a discussion I will attend to in greater detail later in this thesis. My argument is that because the *Antruzi*-accented, Konkani-speaking upper-caste Hindu is understood as the ideal citizen-subject of Goan civil society, caste, and the accompanying practices of untouchabilty structure the citizenship experience in Goa. The space to challenge these twined legalities, I suggest, may emerge not only from the constitutional values of equality guaranteed by state legality, but also by discourses of equality that emerge from Catholicism.

Despite the multiple perspectives from which this focus on acts speaks to the study of citizenship there is one point I would like to differ with Isin on. I would argue that the distinction that he makes between the "act" and "practice" based on the "agency" of the subject is deeply problematic. It needs to be underlined that Isin can articulate this distinction because he makes a prior argument where practices are cast as merely passive

repetitions of an act. To do so is to underestimate the agential capacities of the active citizen who is capable of either consciously, or unconsciously, effecting changes to the act in the course of the repetition. I would like to recollect here the understanding that Butler brings to performativity. She argues that

> "'[s]ince all social formations are reproduced through a reenactment of norms, this makes these formations vulnerable because each restatement/reenactment can fail. Thus the condition of possibility of social formation is also 'the possibility of its undoing'" (Butler cited in Mahmood 2005: 19 -20).

Butler observes that every act has the potential to fail in its reproduction, and this makes every action potentially destabilizing and, therefore, every individual capable of agency. Mahmood's (2005) work that discusses the collectives of women in Egypt that engage in Quranic study and adopt veiling and other practices that mark a woman as devout, uses Butler's insight to demonstrate the way in which, even though these women seem to be participating in apparently patriarchal practices that will restrict their agency, in the very process that they do so, they are also simultaneously opening spaces to challenge the patriarchal order. As a result, it would do well to remember that the distinction between the activist and the active citizen is a notional distinction, even while recognizing that this notional separation is in fact useful and critical to the larger argument that Isin makes. Thus, while recognising the act of citizenship as a fundamental moment in the manner in which subjects seek "room to manoeuvre", it is also important to pay attention to the practices through which these acts are actualized.

Indeed, it appears that Isin leaves open space for such an understanding since he himself argues:

> Acts cannot happen without motives, purposes, or reasons, but those cannot be the only grounds of interpreting acts of citizenship. While acts of citizenship involve decisions, those decisions cannot be reduced to calculability, intentionality and responsibility. But because they are irreducible to those qualities they can be enacted without subjects being able to articulate reasons for becoming activist citizens. (Isin 2008: 38)

In making this argument, Isin seeks to strike a balance between the binaries of structure and agency. Simultaneously, this position also opens up the possibility for citizenship acts to not necessarily be directed toward either justice or emancipatory potential. On the contrary, acts of citizenship could just as well turn out to be exclusive acts, directed against migrants or other groups marked as "other". What is critical to the act of citizenship is that

it is a political act, that opens up the possibility for a different subjectivity, whether this be one that inaugurates claims for the citizen against the state, or directs the some groups of citizens against other groups within the polity who are deemed to not have a right to claim from the state. In the subsequent chapter I will revisit the critical need to challenge the hegemony of binaries that hold sway within academic thought, in particular as displayed in Chatterjee's articulation of the concept of political society.

Summation

This chapter lays out the manner in which this thesis attempts an anthropological study of citizenship. Picking up a thread from Foucauldian discussions of governmentality, the focus has been on the milieu within which citizenship is seen not as a status, but as being constituted through practices. Citizenship is understood as being constituted through governance which seeks to mould or fix behavior. In looking at governance in this Foucaldian manner, this thesis is also open to looking at citizenship as being constituted not merely in relationship to the state, but as a result of relationships across the sphere of the social. In looking beyond the State, this study draws attention to the existence of disciplinary locations not merely above the state, as if often the case, but also below the state. Thus not only do I point to the sphere of international practices, but to the practices within such sites as that of caste and the family.

In using frames of governmentality to study citizenship, this thesis also moves away from the privileging of the individual that is a common feature of the study of citizenship in political science. Rather, as has been suggested in this chapter, but will be developed in the subsequent one, I also look at the role of population groups in constituting the experience of citizenship.

Taking the critique of scalar thought that Isin presents, what I have attempted to suggest in this chapter is the idea of citizenship as constituted through, and within, webs of relations. As a consequence, citizenship is not merely a relationship between individual and state, a unidimensinal hierarchical one, but a relationship between multiple social spaces, each of which has an impact on the other. This sense is perhaps most elegantly expressed in the idea of viewing citizenship as acts that create "room for manoeuvre", a trope that this thesis will refer to repeatedly.

Finally, I have drawn attention to citizenship being constituted not merely through practices, but also through acts of citizenship, the latter being actions that rupture the habitus constituted through practices to create the room for manoeuvre. In doing so, I suggest the possibility of citizenship having not merely a fixative nature, but also a liberative one, which is to say that it allows for mobility. This shall also be a feature of the discussions in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

Chapter 2
Citizenship in India

Some months after I commenced investigating the contestations around the demand for the official recognition of the Roman script in Konkani, I realised that I didn't have a frame that would adequately capture the experiences in the field. The activists were making demands, phrasing them both as requests to leaders from political parties, as well as more formal appeals to constitutional rights, but neither of these forms was working. This was not the operation of civil society as one tends to understand it. It was at this point that it became obvious to me that Partha Chatterjee's formulation of the concept of political society (2007) did capture the experiences I was witness to rather neatly. The first segment of this chapter discusses the concept of political society as articulated by Partha Chatterjee (2007), who presents it as an ideal way to describe the political experience of those who while *de jure* citizens and members of civil society, do not in fact enjoy the rights and privileges associated with the same. The problem with utilising this concept was that Chatterjee's formulation of the concept did not admit cultural minorities as within the ambit of political society given that he frames the concept in rather economistic terms. The second segment of this chapter builds on a critique of political society to demonstrate how marginalised cultural groups, such as the Goan Catholics I study, also share in the experience of exclusion from civil society. To do this, I work within the ambit of Chatterjee's earlier works, to demonstrate how Indian national modernity has been arbitrarily defined to privilege upper-caste Hindu groups, and cast others as non-modern. Given that Chatterjee formulates civil society as the space of elite groups that imagine themselves as modern, I demonstrate how this imagination of national modernity ejects groups deemed to be non-modern into political society. Since my study of the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholic is one defined by the contours of the mobilization around the Konkani language, the last section of this chapter continues engaging with the manner in which Indian modernity has been structured, by exploring the dynamics of linguistic belonging, the one particularism that Indian modernity does not have a problem with. Drawing from arguments laid out in the previous chapter, I discuss how, in the shadow of both orientalism and racist imaginations that underlay the romanticist movement, languages were recast as mother-tongues. In the Indian context these mother-tongues were then deified as mother goddesses making them compatible with Hindu nationalism. Those languages, or aspects of languages, such as the Roman script, that were not compatible

within this frame, get expelled from the imagination of Indian modernity, and the groups associated with it are relegated beyond the boundaries of civil society.

Setting up the argument in this manner places my fieldwork within a broader theoretical framework that allows me to both give coherence to the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics that, otherwise, thanks to the inbetween-ness that marks their history, tends to be misunderstood.

Political society

An ideal manner to delve into a discussion of Chatterjee's suggestion of a political society, a socio-political location that is separate and distinct from the usually referred to civil society is to identify the subject that is the denizen of either space.[31] This focus is ideal given that this chapter will have to grapple with the heritage of universalist theories of classic liberal theory, while attempting to lay a framework through which the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholic within the confines of Goa's location in the secular nation-state of India can be understood.

The denizen of civil society is the citizen, an abstract individual, one who is eminently modern, shorn of all "pre-modern",[32] communitarian filiations and sentiments, and the bearer of rights. This individual participates as an equal in the commonwealth, either as an individual, or a member of an association of like-minded individuals, with a view toward the articulation of laws, pre-eminently those of contract and property, that will govern the polity. The member of political society on the other hand is emphatically not an individual, but a faceless member of a population group. While *de jure* recognized as a citizen, this member of the population group, does not *de facto* occupy a location similar to the citizen who is a member of civil society. These population groups are not assumed to be fully modern, and exist for this reason in a pedagogic relationship, with the state, and civil society. This relationship is not merely a pedagogic one, but following a pattern that Foucault calls bio-politics (1980: 139), is also a relationship of welfare, where the technocratic state identifies the needs of these population groups and administers to them

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[31] I use the term "denizen" as a way to distinguish between a citizen, who is a full-fledged member of civil-society, and those members of the polity that while *de jure* citizens are merely members of political society.
[32] I place the term pre-modern within quotes because I would like to draw attention to the problematic nature in which the distinction between modern and non-modern, or pre-modern is in fact arbitrarily drawn. The arbitrariness of these boundaries is precisely one of the issues that this chapter will go on to deal with.

their requirements. It is in the course of this relationship that the nature of the legality of political society is born.

As per Chatterjee's formulation, while the *de-facto* citizen, that is, the member of civil society, has a relationship that is based on the sanctity of the contract and property, what marks the life of members of political society is that their existence inheres in various degrees of contravention of the laws of both contract and property. It is for this reason, where their very existence is deemed illegal,[33] that the demands of members of political society are unable to merit the status of rights. The extension of the state towards the demands of these population groups is always in the nature of concessions, temporary entitlements that are won through their battle or engagement with their state. It is the nature of their engagement with the state that marks another distinction between the denizens of civil society and political society. While the denizen of civil society can be said to enjoy a Weberian formal-rational relationship with the law, where the identification of a link between one's personal situation and the law ensures an application of relevant regulation to the situation, this is not the nature of relationship between the population groups, law and the state.

Chatterjee argues that the success of the claims of population groups depends entirely on "the ability of particular population groups to mobilize support to influence the implementation of governmental policy in their favour" (2007: 60). Thus, stressing that it is not a formal-rational identification of a need that demands legal redress, but an active tugging of the chains of social authority, Chatterjee points out that

> [g]roups in political society have to pick their way through this uncertain terrain by making a large array of connections outside the group – with other groups in similar situations, with more privileged and influential groups, with government functionaries, perhaps with political parties and leaders. They often make instrumental use of the fact that they can vote in elections... (Chatterjee 2007: 40-41)

It is the wide difference between the nature of the denizens of these two spaces, and the nature of their experiences, that leads Chatterjee to refer to civil society as a "closed association of modern elite groups, sequestered from the wider popular life of the communities, walled up within enclaves of civic freedom and rational law" (2007: 4).

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[33] I would like to draw attention at this point to the particularly evocative phrase, suggested by the Alternative Law Form, of the 'illegal citizen' (http://www.altlawforum.org/node/277).

The notion of political society could be twined along with Barry Hindess' (2000) propositions that also discuss the ideas of governmentality and population groups. If Hindess draws attention to the international operation of the discursive project of governmentality, Chatterjee's discussion brings focus more specifically on the implications of this project within national and local limits. Chatterjee points out that the notions of liberal political theory, such as that of civil society, the purported relationship between citizens and state, and *de jure* citizens and the law, do not reflect the quotidian experience of "most of the world" (2007: 75). He draws two historical trajectories to explain the contemporary predicament where citizens are related to by the state not as individuals, but as members of discreet and multiple population groups. In the first case, one has the histories of the states in the developed west and, on the other hand, one has the histories of locations subjected to colonisation. Chatterjee's objective thus, is to tear away the universalizing tendency and make theory more attentive to context (*ibid*).

Chatterjee challenges the dominant understanding on citizenship that follows from T.H. Marshall's articulation, by suggesting that the celebrated proposition of an expansion of citizenship growing from the recognition of civic rights, towards political and social rights, was in fact, a "category confusion" (Chatterjee 2007: 36). What was actually occurring, but failed to be appropriately identified or diagnosed, was the unprecedented proliferation of governmentality, one that laid the foundation for the conversion of governance from the realm of citizenship to that of the management of populations. Thus, arguing against Marshall, Chatterjee proposes that governance, which was formerly concerned with notions of liberty and community, was now "less a matter of politics and more of administrative policy, a business for experts rather than for political representatives" (Chatterjee 2007: 35). This opinion explains the reason for the bewildering proliferation of adjectives stressing identities and claims to secure the same that have crowded the academic debates on citizenship. There has been a growth in adjectival citizenship because it is through the crafting of discreet identities, through the creation of population groups whose special needs require to be catered to, that these various groups, formally recognized as citizens, are able to receive benefits from the state machinery.

For the parts of the world, outside of Western Europe, but with a history of European colonial rule, Chatterjee suggests that technologies of governmentality in these locations emerged prior to the advent of the nation-state. As an example of this assertion, he provides the intensely classificatory colonial state in British India that documented,

classified, and categorized both land and people (Cohn 2000, in particular chapter 10 p. 224). Populations in these states were *ab initio* subjects and not citizens. While ideas of republican citizenship did accompany the struggles for national liberation, Chatterjee argues that the resultant post-colonial states were overtaken by the developmental state which promised to end poverty and backwardness by adopting appropriate policies of economic growth and social reform. These states were marked by the *de jure* recognition of all denizens as citizens, but a *de facto* failure to recognize these individuals as citizens. As a result, these individuals almost instantaneously slipped at the moment of decolonisation into the category of population groups being demarcated by the developmental state into so many population types based on the remedies that the technocratic state would conjure up for them (Chatterjee 2007: 37).

While Chatterjee does well to interrupt the tendency towards a linear narrative in the development of popular republican democracy around the world through the introduction of the concept of political society, it should be pointed out, as I will discuss in greater detail below, that it was not merely the rise of the developmental state that caused the slippage of the incipient citizen into that of population group. On the contrary, there were other significant local politics, such as around language, and power dynamics around dominant caste groups, that harnessed the image of the developmental state and gave local substance to the otherwise abstract idea of a developmental state leading the population toward a nationally appropriate modernity.

Before moving on to this discussion, however, there is a need to recognize the other merits that the introduction of the concept of political society brings to political theory. Some of these merits are that it breaks up the state-civil society dynamic that as James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta suggest (2005: 106) operates in a good amount of literature, as well as points to the problematic imagination of civil society that dominates not merely theorization, but also governmental practice in "most of the world" (Chatterjee 2007: 75). There is a long history of seeing the state as possessing such "higher" functions as reason, control, and regulation, as against the irrationality, passions, and uncontrollable appetites of the lower regions of society (Ferguson and Gupta 2005: 106-107). This venerable sociological distinction gained firmer ground within the studies of the new states of the former colonial world. Here, the state was seen as a western or colonial imposition that somehow failed to capture the spirit of the people, present in society (*ibid*: 107). Within both traditions "civil society" emerged as the kind of a middle ground that would mediate

between the state and society. Furthermore, this idea of civil society obtained an added fillip in the late 1980s when with the fall of the Communist bloc, and subsequently through the 90s, democracy and neo-liberalism were hailed in major parts of the world as the model that would lead to full global integration with the core countries of the international system. This particular model of democracy rode on the faith reposed in the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements that would lead the development of democracy in these states (Roniger 2006: 490). Indeed, even though the idea of civil society is fractured (Cohen and Arato 1994, Khilanani 2001), there is a substantial opinion that sees the assumedly enlightened and progressive social movements and NGOs as comprising this civil society that will engage in social change, and allow for the nesting of democracy in these hitherto anti-democratic or undemocratic societies.

What the introduction of the idea of political society does is to point to the violence inherent in the idea of a civil society that will lead political change in a polity. It also points to the way in which the civil society envisaged in these vanguardist imaginations of an NGO led flowering of democracy is somewhat different from the otherwise limited bourgeois imagination of civil society as the public sphere described by Habermas (1991). It should be remembered that in this formulation also, the public sphere is the product of bourgeois culture (Habermas 1991, Turner 2008). Where scholars such as Hindess point to the missionary urge within this culture (2004), Chatterjee speaks to the character of civil society which once incorporated into the imagination of the native bourgeois takes on a life of its own, and operates as a tool to extend their power over the rest of the population. Civil society in these polities, he convincingly argues taking up a thread from his earlier works (Chatterjee 1993), is a "closed association of modern elite groups, sequestered from the wider popular life of the communities, walled up within enclaves of civic freedom and rational law" (Chatterjee 2007: 4). As I will go on to elaborate, this modernity is essentially an arbitrarily defined modernity that privileges the habitus of the elite groups. The attempt of state and civil society is to draw the groups that lie outside of this arbitrarily defined modernity, via a pedagogic project of requiring them to discard the markers of their antiquated selves, resignifying them and equipping them with the accoutrement deemed compatible with this modernity. Until they are able to effectively do so, and this begs the question if they ever can, they lie outside the realm of civil society, comprising the realm of what Chatterjee calls political society.

The other significant move that the idea of political society effects is to prevent us from succumbing to the expansion of the realm of civil society to include all social space outside of the state proper. This move is conceptually awkward, because it would merely be one more step toward reifying the problematic idea of a single and discreet entity called "society" (Ingold 1996, Hindess 2000), erasing in the process all forms of plurality within the social and accompanying forms of contestation. As I will go on to discuss, this idea of a single social entity is precisely the basis on which cultural models of secular citizenship are built.

Subsequent sections of this chapter will go on to point out that there are parts of Chatterjee's articulation of the concept of political society that are problematic. Not least of which is his understanding of citizenship, which he seems to equate with the exercise of voting in elections (Chatterjee 2007: 40-41).[34] Such an understanding would take us back to the critique, discussed in the earlier chapter, that Isin mounts, where the focus on citizenship is the practice, rather than the act of citizenship. However, before proceeding to this critique of Chatterjee's articulation in the subsequent section, I would like to draw attention to the fact that his theorization of contemporary political experience, which I will later go on to affirm as being constitutive of citizenship, echoes a number of the critical points of Hindess' argument. These points, this thesis submits, are necessary to be able to make sense of the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics that it studies. Chatterjee's formulation points to the repetition of the pedagogic impulse that animated the Enlightenment project, and continues to form a systematic arm of the contemporary international order, indeed of the logic of contemporary statehood. Furthermore, it repeats the motif of individuals being treated, not as citizens interpellated through the address of law, but as population groups addressed on the basis of their relationship of need with a paternalist state, that would rather shrug them off, but nonetheless needs to address their needs and wants if this state is to gain legitimacy.

Recasting political society

The relationship of the state-civil society complex, with political society, perhaps gains sharper nuance in the discussion of the condition of interlegality that Santos brings to bear via his critique of modernity, and his exposition of the constellations of power, law and

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[34] "They [population groups in political society] often make instrumental use of the fact that they can vote in elections, so that it is true to say that the field of citizenship, at certain points, overlaps with governmentality" (Chatterjee 2007: 40-41).

epistemology that mark the modern capitalist world (1995).[35] The value in the concept of political society as articulated by Chatterjee lies in the fact that it allows us an interesting manner in which to pierce through the veil that has been dropped over the experience of citizenship by canonic political theory, in particular the ideals of liberal civic nationalism. I would like to draw attention to the fact that Chatterjee's conceptualisation of political society is one that rests on the tension between a number of binaries. For example, there is the tension between citizenship, which is the language of civic nationalism, and that of governmentality, which conceives of its target audience as population groups. There is the tension between the notion of the nation as a perfect community, and that of the nation having to be educated into perfection. There is the tension between popular legitimacy and elite control, the tension between the theoretical and the real (or the experiential), between legality, and what he calls para-legality, between rights and entitlements; and of course the tension (or distinction) between civil society, and political society. While these tensions are useful, it seems to me that in the route through which he has developed the idea, Chatterjee (2008) seems to abandon the possibilities of these binaries being ideal types, constructing them as if they were complete and impermeable social realities, where if one is a member of political society, for example, there is no way in which one can utilise the language or the opportunities of civil society (Shindo 2009: 224).

While his work on political society is admittedly part of a conceptual framework that is still evolving (Chatterjee 1997; 2007; 2008), I would like to stress that it seems that the value of the idea of political society rests on the fact that it highlights the tension between the theoretical and the lived reality. Its value rests not on the creation of binary oppositions, but on creating a location and a descriptive category from which entry could be had into the experiences of those who are trapped between spaces.

What I am trying to suggest by referring to the experience of those who are trapped between spaces is that the citizenship acts of those stuck in political society should not be judged merely from the position of the capacity of these acts to carry the actors into civil society. Rather, there is a need to be attentive to the rhetorical achievements of these acts as well. S. V. Srinivas captures this crisis perfectly when he uses Etienne Balibar's insight that indicates that "the predication of a universal, rights-bearing citizen was a *hyperbolic*

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[35] Santos is not the only scholar who offers a critique of modernity and its epistemology. From within the larger Ibero-American world emerge the works of Enrique Dussel (2000; 1993), Walter Mignolo (2011), while from the subcontinent the works of persons like Ashis Nandy (1989) are now classics.

proposition, where '*the wording of the statement always exceeds the act of its enunciation…*the import of the statement already goes beyond it (without our knowing where), as was immediately seen in the effort of inciting the liberation that it produced'" (Balibar cited in Srinivas 2009: 131, emphasis in the original). As Srinivas then glosses, "the hyperbolic proposition thus laid the ground for political struggles of liberation" (*ibid*). As a result, even if she may not enter, the fact of her mobilisation of its language, and her recognition by the state, ensures that the citizen-subject is never wholly in either location (Lehmann and Siebzehner 2008). Thus, once inside this space of the in-between, i.e. the space of people who are citizens, and yet not, the challenge is to look for more pegs on which to hang the experiences of these subjects and make sense of their interaction within a terrain that the state seeks to encompass. In any case, it would be dangerous, or at any rate incorrect, to uncritically reproduce the assumptions of uniqueness that civil society arrogates to itself and conceive of political society as civil society's mirror opposite. It would be more appropriate to argue, as legal pluralists would, and as Frazer in particular does, for the existence of multiple publics that exist outside of the formally recognised civil society public that liberal democracy recognises (Fraser 1990). Besides, I would like to highlight that like the social contracts that form the basis of the liberal formulation of the world, the idea of civil society and its public sphere, is quite precisely exactly that, an idea. This idea is based on a very peculiarly located understanding of the political, and in fact, notions of the ideal citizen and their presence in the public space have changed substantially from time to time, and from location to location (Schudson 2006). Thus rather than become the trope through whose binaries alone the experiences of citizenship may be explored, the value of the idea of a civil society/political society distinction lies in the possibilities that it allows to explore the realities of lived citizenship experiences, in the multiple publics that exist.

Subsequent to highlighting the inbetween-ness of the members of political society, there is one more aspect of the nature of the struggle that needs to be taken note of. In his work on fan clubs and political mobilization, Srinivas makes an observation pertinent to this discussion. Speaking in the context of post-Emergency Andhra Pradesh, where there were large scale mobilizations of "non-citizens",[36] the author argues that "[i]t would be

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[36] Adding detail to the manner in which these non-citizens mobilized, and adding one more illustration of the manner in which political society mobilizes outside of the abstract category of the "citizen", Srinivas points out that in the course of those mobilizations, "virtually every caste and tribal group acquired its own

politically correct but not entirely accurate to conceive of this political ferment as the struggle for citizenship. For such a conception betrays a rather literal reading of the 'hyperbolic proposition' and the assumption that a movement from subjecthood to citizenship is only a matter of time and some organization" (Srinivas 2009: 140).

This observation is critical to my larger discussion on citizenship and the attempt to draw the discussion away from a focus on the state, to include, as will be demonstrated below, the manner in which citizenship should be viewed as an effort to create "room to manoeuvre" in other social spaces as well. Furthermore, in making this observation Srinivas also alludes to the possibility that the concept of political society seeks to explain; where despite all their mobilization and organization, some individuals will never be able to make the transition to civil society and concomitant full citizenship. They will always remain members of political society. A classic example to offer would be that of the Muslim communities in India, who despite all efforts at integrating, for reasons of India being ultimately imagined as an originally Hindu space (Pandey 2006: 129 – 153), seem doomed to remain cast out of the realm of civil society. To put it in Gyanendra Pandey's words, they will always remain Indian Muslims, their Indian-ness being qualified, while the Hindus in India, will quite simply be Hindu, not Indian Hindu (*ibid*). Similarly, after conclusion of my fieldwork, and my continued observation of the debates around the demand for recognition of the Roman script, I remain pessimistic of the possibility where the Goan Catholics, and those who use Konkani in the Roman script will ever be seen as full members of the Goan civil society.

Aiding this resistance toward the temptation to draw neat lines between political mobilization and state-centric citizenship is Srinivas's readings of the films of the Telugu "megastar" Chiranjivi (Srinivas 2009). Through these discussions, Srinivas argues for, and is able to demonstrate, the process through which film becomes the medium through which the multiple crises that are faced by the subaltern, or the non-citizen,[37] are resolved through the displacement of the political into the realm of cinema. Particularly interesting

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organization and charter of demands and mobilized their members in a series of mammoth meetings (often termed garjana or roar)" (Srinivas 2009: 140).

[37] I should hurry to suggest that it is not necessarily that the subaltern is contiguous with the figure of the non-citizen (or member of political society). In the subsequent chapter I will argue against an identitarian location for the subaltern. Instead I would suggest that a constituent of political society is a subaltern to the extent that the room for maneuver that marks citizenship is largely restricted or absent, putting them in the category of subalternity which is, as in Spivak's articulation, discussed in the subsequent chapter, that location "where social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a recognizable basis of action" (2005: 476).

is his discussion of the film *Gharana Mogudu* (*ibid*: 149 - 150)*,* where he demonstrates how a caste-class battle is resolved through transfer into the realm of the domestic, or from the public into the private. In doing so, though he does not articulate it as such, he demonstrates how multiple and intertwined legalities, commonsense and power forms of the *citizenplace*, the community place, the family place are addressed through the political action of cinema. I am making reference to his discussion because I believe that it underlines my own argument that citizenship should be recognised as manoeuvres effected not just in civil society or the *citizenplace*, but in the various structural places. To return to the earlier discussion of interlegality, the displacement can in fact work, because of the manner in which these varied structural places are, at the level of the quotidian, imbricated in each other. Indeed, a closer look at the other films that Srinivas discusses indicates how the formal space of politics, that of the *citizenplace*, is not sufficient to address the lack of *de facto* citizenship. To resolve this situation caused by an "excess of particularity" (Dhareshwar and Srivatsan (1996), one has to deal the multiple factors that cause this excess. These factors are the inequalities that lie among other spaces at the heart of the domestic and the community. Thus, at the centre of the citizenship debate, is not merely the challenge of the subject of political society entering civil society, but addressing the contestations between the norms of the *citizenplace* and those of the other places as well.

Such a formulation would enable finding greater acceptance for the understanding of citizenship that this thesis is seeking to argue for, where citizenship is recognized as strategies of broad social negotiations, that is to say, as the room for manoeuvre, rather than merely resistance to the *status quo* within a strictly defined *citizenplace*.

The most substantial critique of Chatterjee's formulation of political society must surely be directed at the manner in which he has crafted the subject of political society. In critiques of his later developments of the concept Chatterjee (2008) has been charged with adopting a rather economistic focus, at the risk of ignoring "a much more wide-ranging description of the multiple axes of power and domination, such as those based on caste, ethnicity, or region" (John and Deshpande 2008: 85; see also Shah 2008, Baviskar and Sundar 2008).

This economistic focus present in Chatterjee's later development of the concept of political society, is not a new feature, but is present, even if in somewhat disguised form, in his earlier articulation of the same idea (2007). In this earlier discussion of the concept, while laying the foundations for the articulations of the idea of political society he acknowledges

that "[t]he ideals of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship enshrined within the modern states are …mediated by and realised through the two dimensions of property and community" (Chatterjee 2007: 74). He elaborates that property is "the conceptual name of the regulation by law of relations between individuals in civil society" (*ibid*: 75) while the only valid community form that the modern state recognises is that of the nation. Having done so, he then seems to privilege property as the space within which one finds one's way into the realm of political society when he concludes that

> it is over property then that we see, on the terrain of political society, a dynamic *within* the modern state of the transformation of precapitalist structures and of premodern cultures. It is there that we can observe a struggle over the real, rather than the merely formal, distribution of rights among citizens. (*ibid*: 75)

It is at this point in his argument, that I find my most substantial critique of Chatterjee's formulation of political society, for lost within this elaboration are the possibilities of persons on the wrong side of the nationally approved communities finding themselves in the location of political society. This includes as I have indicated above, not merely Muslim communities, but also tribal[38] groups, who are displaced not only because of a refusal to recognise their rights in property, but also because their lifestyles are believed to be "backward" and must make way for the developed lifestyles embodied by the urbanised upper caste groups. Further, as I will go on to demonstrate through the length of this thesis, even though not necessarily economically marginalised, there are a number of communities, such as the Goan Catholics, with the lower caste Goan Catholics in particular, who for reasons of failing to meet civil society's notions of modernity, are cast into the realms of political society.

One reason for this economistic focus could perhaps be explained by Chatterjee's reliance on the idea of governmentality to articulate the notion of political society. This reliance has been called into question by the works of Aditya Nigam (2006) and Nivedita Menon (2010), two scholars, who point in the direction through which the understanding of political society and its denizens could be expanded.[39]

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[38] I recognize that the casual use of the word tribal is considered highly problematic and derogatory in contemporary social science and anthropology. However, I persist in my use of the term because this is the term that continues to be dominant in public discourse in India, a way in which social groups identified by the Indian constitution, and consequently the manner in which the term is also often used by activists while demanding rights.

[39] Another possible set of explanations for Chatterjee's bewildering focus on governmentality with the result of seemingly excluding caste, religion and region from the scope of axes that mark one's belonging to political society is provided by Aamir R. Mufti's critique of Chatterjee's work. Mufti charges that

In his book that deals with the nature of challenges to the secular-nationalism in India, Nigam argues that he is not "persuaded by Chatterjee's insistence on governmentality as the defining reference point for political society" (2006: 323). While setting aside Chatterjee's focus on governmentality, Nigam suggests concentrating on other aspects that Chatterjee identifies as marking the sphere of political society. These aspects that Nigam highlights as useful include, the fact of the persistence of an identification with a community other than that of the national community, that is to say a refusal by marginal groups to shed particularist identities in favour of the unmarked abstract citizen, even as these communities and their mobilizations are marked by the use of "modern emancipatory rhetoric of autonomy and equal rights", and the significance of modern political associations such as the political party to political society (Nigam 2006: 323). These aspects that Nigam identifies, allows me to locate the Roman script activists, who refuse to abandon the Roman script in favour of the Devanagari script, and are therefore penalised for it, as groups that fall into the realm of political society.

The other scholar to set aside what can be seen as Chatterjee's inordinate focus on governmentality in the articulation of the concept of political society is Nivedita Menon (2010). In her use of the concept of civil-political society, Menon unhitches the later development of the formulation of political society, where Chatterjee stresses its link to the welfare function of society. Menon would rather have us focus on two features of political society that she identifies, the first of which is that "many of the mobilizations in political society that make demands on the state are founded on a violation of the law", while the second feature of these demands of political society is "that such demands are made on behalf of a collectivity, not as individual citizens" (Menon 2010: 126). She argues that the second two, that focus on the welfare function of the government, may have been true for the development of Indian democracy until the 1980s but in the current moment "fail to capture the changing nature of political society since the liberalization era of the 1990s when the state withdrew more and more from its 'development' obligations" (Menon 2010: 126).

Chatterjee's formulations "continues to replicate the autobiographical assumptions of the postcolonial nation-state: it assumes an essential continuity of 'Indian' polity from pre- to post-Partition times" (Mufti 1998: 118). I would like to suggest that what Mufti refers to is similar to my problematisation of the academic discussions on the operation of Hindu nationalism in India in the introduction to this thesis, where despite the undoubtedly secular nature of much Indian social-science, especially that produced by those associated with the subaltern school; we are never really very far from the imagination of the Indian self as essentially upper-caste and North Indian (this North India being that of the Gangetic plains).

Menon's useful observation here is that while the population groups that compose political society do make demands, these are not necessarily anymore claims for "welfare." Alternatively, what she says is that "'political society' in Chatterjee's sense is better understood today as a *problem* for civil society's conceptualization of democracy and development, rather than the *target* of that development" (Menon 2010: 127, italicised emphasis in the original). What I believe Menon means is that rather than adopt a dated view of political society as a target of state and civil society action for pedagogical and welfare action that would lift these population groups into civil society, political society is today seen as a problem to be overcome. This is to say that political society is seen, by members of civil society, individuals and groups who embody the desired modernity of the Indian national project, as the hurdle blocking Indian civil society's thrust towards its "India Shining"[40] superpower image. Thus, political society could therefore be relocated, not only as "the realm of struggles that functions with an alternative common sense - alternative, that is, to the common sense of civil society" (Menon 2010: 127) but also as that realm that is pitched in a struggle for survival in the face of the belligerence of civil society.

I concur with Nigam and Menon that Chatterjee's emphasis on governmentality, and the resultant economistic focus, is perhaps overly placed. Like Nigam and Menon, I believe that there is a value to the concept of political society and that it can speak to situations outside of the restricting economistic frames that Chatterjee has placed on the concept. To free the concept from these frames, like Menon, I would like to revisit the ideas of the negotiation of modernity that Chatterjee himself has presented in earlier works, and a conceptualization that has been extremely popular in the understanding of the negotiation of nationalist modernity among scholars of British Indian colonialism and post-colonialism (Chatterjee 1993). I will use this argument to demonstrate how Indian nationalist modernity has been articulated in the context of colonial period orientalist framing of India as a spiritual land of Hindus, and how this excludes non-Hindu traditions, such as Catholicism, from being considered authentically or legitimately Indian. In so excluding

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[40] "India Shining" is a slogan that emerged as a part of the election campaign of the BJP, (the Hindu nationalist political party) in the 2004 parliamentary elections. The slogan sought to speak to the Indian middle classes aspiration to become a global leader and international superpower. While the term emerged with the BJP, this term, and other similar forms, continues to be used in the popular media pointing to the widespread belief among India's middle classes and elite groups, of the need and ability of India to be a global player.

Catholicism, Indian nationalist modernity marginalizes Catholic groups, thrusting them into political society.

Indian modernity and its politics

Revisiting the argument of the negotiation of nationalist modernity is critical to my attempt to expand the concept of political society, given that Chatterjee articulates civil society as "a closed association of modern elite groups, sequestered from the wider popular life of the communities" (Chatterjee 2007:4). Chatterjee himself suggests an alternate way of exploring the idea of political society by looking at the positioning of groups that are deemed to live within modernity, and communities that are held to be outside of modernity. Given that these groups are deemed to be outside the pale of modernity, it is incumbent to inquire into the understanding of modernity that has been accepted by these elite groups.

The argument about a modular modernity with origins in western Europe that is subsequently adopted by and integrated into the colonies, an argument present for example in Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1989), is one that has been actively resisted, especially by social scientists from the formerly colonized world. This is understandable given that to accept this argument is to not only accept a narrative that fails to explain local peculiarities, but also denies the formerly colonized a fair degree of agency in their entry into "contemporary history". This challenge is resolved by suggesting that the modernity that was emerging in Europe was not taken wholly by colonized societies, but carefully negotiated, creating local nuances that must not be ignored when investigating the creation and rise of modernity in these spaces.

In his earlier articulation about the process through which the nationalist groups that formed the elites of the Indian anti-imperial and national struggle, and subsequently post-colonial state of India negotiated modernity, Chatterjee suggests that these elites arrived at an understanding that for India, true modernity "would lie in combining the superior material qualities of Western cultures with the spiritual greatness of the East'" (Chatterjee 1986: 51).

This starting point for my re-understanding of political society must necessarily draw attention to the context of the terms of this negotiation. As has been pointed out by Said, the discourse of the European colonizers was framed by the production of a difference

between themselves and the colonized peoples, a project that has come to be called orientalism (Said 1978). In the case of India, this form of orientalism, operating alongside the binary logic of the Enlightenment, saw the production of the colonizing British, or west, as rational, the colonized, or the East, as irrational; the British as secular, and the natives as religious; the British as urban and industrialized, and the colonized as rural and primitive; and so on. Alongside these dichotomies was also the liberal distinction that was already in place in Western Europe between the public sphere of male participation in the state and community, and the private sphere of the home and domesticity. Last, but not least, it has to be emphasized that these binaries also produced the national, in the sense of uniting an "Indian", no matter how often this unity would be challenged, against a "foreign". It nevertheless has to be highlighted, that the binary division between colonizer and colonial did not always necessarily operate against the colonized. For example, from a disenchantment with the anomie produced by industrialization was generated a positive evaluation of the unindustrialized East as the repository of lost wisdom that could be recaptured from a learning from the East (Inden 1992: 197). What has to be recognized is that these binaries were accepted by the colonized elite as *de facto* accurate observations of the natures of the two groups, and the development of their negotiation commenced from these points. What must also be recognized is that this formulation also takes for granted the existence of a single, stable, discreet entity of a "society" (Inden 1992); in this case "Indian society", underlining the Hindess' argument discussed in the preceding chapter, that "perhaps the most disappointing feature of the academic literature on nations and nationalism is that many of those who insist on the invented and artefactual character of nations continue to treat societies as if they were altogether more substantial entities" (2000: 1491).

Responding from their location of relative powerlessness vis-à-vis the colonizing British, the native elite recognized the need to enter into modernity if they were to confront the colonizer and share, if not displace entirely, power with the colonizer. Chatterjee has argued that this entry into modernity was negotiated by the Indian elite in a manner that that sought to adopt the superior material qualities of the west, while securing their spiritual greatness. This argument highlights the fears of the nationalist elite that if they were to reform completely, that is both in the material public sphere as well as in the private spiritual sphere, then the very distinction between the west and the East would vanish - the self-identity of national culture would itself be threatened (Chatterjee 1989:

623). Alongside this need to protect the spiritual element from colonial interference and contamination, was also the need, born out of aggressive colonial critique, to perceive of the native condition as one in a state of decline, to promote native culture as well (Ramaswamy 1997: 26).

I would like to highlight that the native elites' engagement with modernity was not only born from a location in shame, but was comprised of two distinct, but nevertheless intertwined projects. The first was an engagement with the material culture, and the second with the spiritual. Both these projects partook of a pedagogic impulse, as it was through the dissemination of these learnings that the nation would be able to overthrow the colonial yoke, and take its place alongside the colonizing nations as an equal in modernity. The engagement with material culture involved thus not only industrialization, a trajectory that would lead in later times to the developmental projects of the Nehruvian state, grandly termed as the temples of modern India, but also the adoption of the political models that were seen as modern, namely of a national-state, as well as its secular-liberal form. On the spiritual front, once again born from an adoption of epistemological frames produced in Western Europe, as Sumathi Ramaswamy (1997) argues, the reform project was intimately tied to the issue of language. Language was one of the primary foci of the romanticist movement in Europe. In her work Ramaswamy seeks to demonstrate the impact that this movement had on the linguistic mobilisation in India. She does this by pointing to the profound impact that the imagination of such romancist scholars, such as Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, had in crafting a global imagination as regards the language. She says that to the romanticists, "the state of the language mirrors the state of its speakers; language is the essence of their culture, the bearer of their traditions, and the vehicle of their thoughts from time immemorial. It holds the key to their social solidarity and to their political health and fortunes" (Ramaswamy 1997: 244). Language then, became key, not only to the achievement of standards of civilization, but of anti-colonial nationalist mobilization.

Menon ably demonstrates how these multiple pedagogical projects twined together when she discusses Indian secular-nationalism. Of Indian secularism, Menon says that the term "has stood in for the entire modernizing project of the Indian elites" (Menon 2010: 131), a project that included

(a) bourgeois democracy, which here was about the interrelations among communities, individual citizens, and the state at different levels; (b) the capitalist transformation of the economy through the creation of the mobile unmarked citizen; and (c) social justice, to the extent that equality in a formal legal sense (for example through the abolitition of untouchability and caste discrimination) was necessary for the first two. (Menon 2010: 130 -131)

The secularist project of the Indian nation-state then, she argues, must be seen in conjunction with the violence of the other modernist projects of this collection of elite groups. From this outline it is evident how the concern for ensuring capitalist norms of property in society, the focus of Chatterjee's formulation of political society, is not unrelated to the simultaneous projects of secular-nationalism and developmental projects. Thus, it becomes clear that the understanding of political society ought to include not only those groups that operate outside of the legally accepted notions of property, but also those that fall outside the scope of the project of secular-nationalism. This is to say, those groups who refuse to be, or are unable to incarnate themselves as the ideal subjects of the project of Indian secular-nationalism. A case in point would of course be those persons who continue to use the Roman script for Konkani, or the *tiatrists* who craft theatre outside of the Sanskritic traditions adopted by the *Antruzi* and Devanagari using Konkani language establishment.

Menon is not the only scholar to point to the manner in which Indian secularism is twined with other projects of the nationalist elites. On the contrary, with the development of right-wing Hindu nationalism in India, especially after the 1992 demolition of Babri Masjid, and the Gujarat genocide in 2002, much scholarly insight has gone into analyzing the nature of Indian secularism (van der Veer 1994; Hansen 1999). These works have inquired how it was that the once-standard Nehruvian norm of "unity in diversity" has in recent years given way to the bitter marginalization not just of the Indian Muslim, but all religions that had a foreign origin (this includes Christianity, though unfortunately this is not a denomination that has received much attention) and all issues that were considered detrimental to Hindu upper-caste interests. Reflecting in this context, Shabnum Tejani argues that to

> treat secularism as a predetermined category elucidates nothing about its meaning in the context of India. Rather than being distinct from the categories of community and caste, nationalism and communalism, liberalism and democracy, Indian secularism emerged at the nexus of all of these. It was therefore a relational category arising out of a series of specific historical negotiations. (2010: 41)

In making this observation about the relational aspect of secularism, Tejani allows me to tie in secularism within one of the other themes that I have sought to stress in the earlier chapter, that of citizenship being a relational category. In making this observation about relationality, Tejani draws attention to the fact of seeing terms like citizenship and secularism, not as universal terms applied in an ahistorical manner, but born within definite contexts. This emphasis on context, and the materiality of the manner in which terms like citizenship and secularism are experienced underscores the argument Inda makes of focussing not on an *ethnos*, or how it is, but on the milieu, that is, how it comes to be (Inda 2005 :11). In addition, Tejani's caution also draws attention to the fact that Indian secular-nationalism was also the result of negotiations between what Chatterjee calls the nationalist class that dominated the Indian National Congress both prior to independence and well into the post-colonial period, and the regional elites. Indeed, it is the role of the regional elites, and their definition of a nationally compliant Goan modernity that will be dealt with in chapters three and four.

Pointing to the nature of this negotiation, Needham and Sunder Rajan, explain that

> Official (that is Congress-controlled) nationalism found it strategically necessary, in other words, to wear "two faces" and to speak in two different, even opposing idioms – a "modernist" idiom, secular and democratic in its emphasis, which purportedly transcended the politics of the religious (and caste) communities; and an idiom invoking precisely those sectarian politics (organized, for instance, around deeply emotive and divisive issues like the cow-protection movement or the Hindi-Urdu controversy) that nationalism had sought to neutralize and transcend. (Needham and Sunder Rajan 2010: 14)

It was this double-face that Needham and Sunder Rajan credit as being responsible for the manner in which the subject position of the secular citizen of India was crafted. This negotiation created then the context for Indian secular-nationalism, that Srivastava eloquently calls "Hindu contextualism" (Srivastava 1998: 81-118). Hindu contextualism, he argues, is the hierarchized arrangement of Indian secular-nationalism that gave to, primarily North Indian and upper-caste notions of Hinduness, a pre-eminence by recognizing these forms as eminently Indian. Subservient to these were representational space for other religions. What should be recognised however is that this representation space for the "other" religions is that which is occupied by upper-caste non-Hindus. Thus, in the case of North India, it is the Urdu-speaking, Muslim *ashraf*,[41] and as I will go on to

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[41] *Ashraf* the plural for *Shareef*, or noble, refers to the four upper caste denominations among North Indian Muslims, these being the Sayeed, Sheikh, Pathan and Mughal. "Below" the *ashraf* lie the caste groups

elaborate, in the subsequent chapters in this thesis, in Goa, that of the upper-caste Goan Catholics.

There was a curious arrangement however between the modernism of the nationalist elites and caste that is important to grasp as I proceed in developing an understanding of Indian secular-nationalism. In his essay that elucidates the place of caste in the secular space, Dhareshwar twines secularism with the desire of the nationalist class (to use Chatterjee's formulation) to be modern (1993). To be modern then is to be upper caste, as well as to banish, or repress, the presence of, or rather the reference of caste from the space of the public into the private. Where caste is mentioned, it is in the case of the "lower" so that it is only they who raise the issue of caste. This process, Dhareshwar argues following Balibar, is an essential part of the

> progressivist narrative of liberal humanism ... [that] outlines a trajectory of self-fashioning where the self gradually sheds its ethnic, caste, linguistic and gender markers and attains the abstract identity of the citizen or becomes an individual. (Dhareshwar 1993: 116)

As a result, when caste is mentioned in the public space, it is seen as that element that "contaminates and corrupts" the secular space, through the articulation of a primitivism best shed, and indeed shed by those in civil society. However, Dhareshwar points out, caste is not in fact banished entirely, but is banished only to the private realm, a space, he indicates, where the vernacular has also been banished (though only with a sense of loss, defeat, betrayal, and guilt).[42] Dhareshwar's argument is that in the public-private divide that was constituted, it was the public sphere that was signified as secular, containing elements such as the use of English and references to class, rather than caste, that were deemed secular. Other particularisms, like the vernacular and caste were relegated to the realm of the private, and the raising of other particularisms in the public sphere held as a violation of the secular nature of the public sphere.

I would like to briefly provide a couple of examples, from the field this thesis studies, of the discussion so far. The first example pertains to the way in which certain upper-caste particularisms are universalised in India. Thus *jatis* in Goa represent themselves in terms that make sense within a larger Sanskritic imagination of India. In keeping with this

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collectively known as the *ajlaf*, who would correspond to Other Backward Caste groups, and the *arzal* who would correspond to Dalit groups.

[42] Dhareshwar's observation on the negative emotions associated with the banishing of the vernacular are extremely interesting and I believe find explanation in the context of the final chapter in this thesis where I discuss the manner in which negative emotions of shame and guilt emerge and are sustained.

tendency members of the Catholic *bammon jati* refer to themselves as brahmins. A particularly illustrative example was one reported to me of a Catholic *bammon* lady, the wife of an internationally renowned Goan professional. This lady, it was reported, would "always seek the first opportunity she can find to inform you that they are brahmins". Similarly, some *Chardos* present themselves as *Rajputs*, or *Kshatriyas*. For their part, a number of low-status temple service groups adopted the prestigious title of *Maratha* in the course of consolidating themselves into the *Gomantak Maratha Samaj*. That this particular process took place prior to integration into India, but in the shadow of the nationalist movement in British India, is testament to the power of the British Indian nationalist model even prior to Indian independence and the integration of Goa into the Indian Union.

Despite these representations within pan-Indian terms, however, there is a simultaneous refusal, when in public spaces, to speak of other castes in terms of their caste identity. Rather, most persons would refer to the other castes as "they". If people were to bring up the issue of caste, as did some of the Roman script activists, then the "secular" members of the Konkani language establishment would gently chide them, as did the President of the Goa Konkani Akademi when addressing a gathering to commemorate the first anniversary issue of the bi-monthly Roman script Konkani language magazine *Goykar* on 21 August, 2009. Speaking as a guest of honour, he recognised that there may be valid grouses that the Roman script activists may have "but let us be secular" he pleaded, pointing to the manner in which particularisms of caste and religion among others are not appreciated within India's secular sphere.

What a number of scholars, including Srivastava, are careful to point out is that this formulation of Indian secular-nationalism did not emerge as a result of conspiracy by these nationalist elites to subsume the other groups. On the contrary, these arrangements arose not only as a result of the political negotiations between the various nationalist groups, but also as a result of the orientalist discourses that framed the exertions of these groups.[43] In her work on Tamil linguistic activism Ramaswamy nuances the terrain of the "Indian" to give us an insight into the manner in which this formation of the Indian national subject emerged. She points out that while making space for exceptions to the rule, the major part

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[43] I would like to point out, that I have a rather specific understanding of the individual that runs throughout this thesis. In this conception, the individual is understood not as the rational and conscious individual, but one who while a conscious actor, is simultaneously acted on by a larger social system, even as this individual influences this same system. My reference would once again be to the debate chaired by Tim Ingold (1996) and in particular the idea that "there is no society and there are no individuals – only the social relations in and through which we become what we are" proposed by Christina Toren (76) in the same debate.

of British colonial assumptions on India rested on the fact that India was primarily Hindu (1997:25). This Hinduism was not seen as an homogenous entity, but composed of at least two dominant strands (*ibid*). On the one hand was the strain of the Aryan, distinguished by philosophical treatises composed in Sanskrit, and best exemplified in brahmin and North Indian communities, while on the other were the "primitive" faiths and practices of the non-Aryan, Dravidian, and tribal groups, that consisted of "shamanistic rituals, animal sacrifices, and animistic ceremonies involving petty village deities and bloodthirsty mother-goddesses" (Ramaswamy 1997: 26). This orientalist scholarship also imagined a relationship between these two strains, where the elevated Sanskritic thread was able to lift the baser folk-cultures of the non-Aryans from their ignorance, while in turn the authentic Hinduism of the Aryans was simultaneously perverted through association with the non-Aryan, a trend that some would hold continued as a result of "Muslim invasions" in the medieval period. If the Sanskritic thread was deemed as more sophisticated, civilised and eventually reified as authentic Hinduism, it was because it was able to meet the positivist biases of western scholars looking for parallels with their own imagined antiquity in Greek philosophy.[44]

There were two outcomes as a result of these theoretical formulations that were, and continue to be, grounded as common-sense. In the first case, it allowed for the imagination of brahmanical scriptures and Sanskritic culture associated with Hinduism as not merely religion, but as Indian philosophy and culture. By universalizing the particularism of a few select groups within the subcontinent, this provided a context for the Hindu contextualism that defines Indian secular-nationalism. The parallel between the manner in which western-European Christian values were universalized through the Enlightenment to produce western secularism, and the process in the Indian sub-continent should not be lost at this point. The result of this move was that while Indian secular-nationalism has space for diversity, this diversity operated on the basis of being concessions to the non-Indian. I would like to stress this aspect of concessions to that deemed non-Indian for it is my argument that this is precisely the manner in which non-Hindu, and in particular, lower-caste non-Hindu groups are kept out of civil society.

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[44] It should be noted that Chris Fuller has criticized the Sanskritic / non Sanskritic Hinduism binary frequently used by social scientists on the ground that this distinction lacks a systematic ethnographical approach (Fuller 2004).

The second impact of these Orientalist formulations was the birth of what Ramaswamy calls neo-Hinduism (Ramaswamy 1997: 26, 43-51). Born from not merely missionary critique, but orientalist scholarship as well, the "universalist" neo-Hinduism sought to purify Hinduism from the dross that had assumedly accumulated over the centuries, and return the religion to its imagined earlier state of purity. This modernist, and clearly developmentalist, agenda including a caste-free society, "universalist" version which condemned caste hierarchies and irrational rituals, and recommended an action oriented practice of spiritual truths. If neo-Hinduism existed in this tension with the other Hinduisms, deemed barbaric and in need of paternalist guidance into the modernized Hindusim, then it shared a similar tension with those religious traditions deemed non-Indian, namely Islam and Christianity. In practice, as has been indicated earlier, much of Indian nationalism, was powered by the drive for this internal self-reform. If some reforms in Hinduism were held in abeyance until after Independence, the drive for reform nevertheless found other outlets, namely the Independence movement (Chatterjee 1989, 1993).

Despite the location of Hindu-ness (rather than Hinduism per se) at the heart of Indian-ness, both Nigam and Srivastava highlight important differences between Indian secular-nationalism, and Hindu nationalism. Indian secular-nationalism, Nigam argues insisted on the idea of the nation in terms of the Nehruvian formulation of "unity-in-diversity" while also privileging the idea of the secular unmarked, abstract citizen. Hindu nationalism, on the other hand, while also seeing citizenship as abstract and unmarked, nevertheless insisted on a prior and explicit acceptance of Hinduness as the essence of nationhood (Nigam 2006: 68). Another crucial area of difference between the two was where secular-nationalism, in keeping with its position of unity-in-diversity proffered a syncretic reading of tradition and culture, whereas Hindu nationalism offered a darker, reading of Indian history (Nigam 2006: 69). This reading by Hindu nationalism once more relied heavily on the orientalist constructions of subcontinental history and culture that saw an ancient period of Hindu civilization, supplanted by Islamic invaders; and saw persons as belonging to definite religious groups, existing in a state of constant tension, a tension that was presided over by the secular and rational, *Pax Britannica*.

Despite the insistence on the unmarked subject, they note that when this central location of Hindu-ness was contested, by other particularisms, be it that of tribal or peasant defence of their lands from state expropriation, or the assertion of difference by religious or Dalit

groups, even the ordinarily secular voices would challenge these assertions as being communal, or non-secular. This is where Srivastava's formulation of Indian secular-nationalism as Hindu contextualism is particularly appropriate, for it underlines the hierarchical nature of secular cultures, captured in Balibar's suggestion that "differences are not always suppressed; often they are relativised and subordinated to the national culture" (Balibar cited in Nigam 2006: 43). This contextualism is useful as it allows both Nigam and Srivastava to make sense of a number of perplexing anomalies in subcontinental history. How it was possible, for example, that the Doon School, an institution that was determined to be seen as, and indeed was, eminently secular and committed to the production of the secular, unmarked citizen, from its very beginning, could host at its inauguration persons known for their communal slant to politics? The personages referred to here are Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya, the founder of the Benaras Hindu University and activist of the Hindu Sabha; Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, the founder of the Hindu right wing organisation the *Jan Sangh*; and Chaudhuri Sir Muhammad Zafarulla Khan, who in 1931 had been President of the Muslim League (Srivastava 1998: 104). Or how does one make sense of the flip-flopping positions where Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, a Hindu nationalist, was capable of taking "secular" positions, while at the same time the relatively secular Vidyarthi was capable at times of "a wholesale defence of Hindu dharma" (Nigam 2006: 68). These positions are possible, both Nigam and Srivastava argue, precisely because Hindu nationalism and Indian secular-nationalism have a particular version of Hindu-ness situated at their core. When this centrality is challenged, and particularisms deemed other to national culture claim equality, and in the course of the citizenship acts of members of Indian political-society, this centrality is often challenged, the responses are often very much alike, and not easily distinguishable from each other.

Political society and linguistic citizenship

However not all particularisms within the post-colonial Indian state have the tendency to offend secular-nationalist culture and be cast off as uncivilized rumblings of a political-society. Where assertions of caste and religious difference tend to upset Indian secular-nationalism, assertions of the primacy of linguistic communities have traditionally shared an easier, though by no means simple or uncontested, relationship with Indian secular-nationalism. While Nigam suggests that this was because linguistic diversity was not seen as incompatible with the demands of modern life (Nigam 2006: 15-16), Lisa Mitchell

suggests that this was as a result of the fact that language movements in India have not typically been separatist or nationalist movements (2010: 21). On the contrary, much like the case of the Konkani language mobilization, both colonial and post-colonial that will be elaborated on in subsequent chapter, rather than seeking to establish new independent nations, these movements have preferred to find space within the existing Indian nation (Mitchell 2010: 23). While these statements may be broadly true, they ignore the significant tensions that existed between the Dravidianist mobilization around the Tamil language and the Indian nation-state, as well as the hesitation with which the Indian nation-state eventually reconciled itself to a linguistic division of the national territory (Ramaswamy 1997: 160). Examining the reasons for this tension would allow us to behold the manner in which Indian secular-nationalist has been framed, and the manner in which its civil society was, and continues to the constituted.

Ramaswamy's work on the mobilizations around the Tamil language demonstrate the existence of a variety of positions vis-à-vis the language, the two that are pertinent to this discussion being those of the Dravidianists, and those of the Indianists (Ramaswamy 1997). Largely the product of non-brahmin devotees of Tamil, and those opposed to Brahmanism, Aryanism and Sanskrit, the Dravidianists consciously attempted to cast Tamil as either a maternal-figure, or as a secular goddess. This attempt contrasts sharply with the image of a divine goddess in the Hindu mould that was adopted not just the Tamil Indianists, but also by Telugu language activists and those from Karnataka, not to mention the manner in which language was formulated as *Mai* or Mother in Goa (Newman 2001: 54- 80, Mitchell 2010; Nair 2011; Fruzzetti and Perez 2002; Perez 2012).

The personification of language as a woman and a maternal figure has much to do with the manner, as discussed above, in which modernity was negotiated by the Indian anti-imperial and nationalist elites, as well as the manner in which the "Indian" was cast by orientalist thought as feminine, and taken up as such by the native elites. Thus as the private space was seen as the realm of tradition, it was simultaneously feminized to be presided over by the woman, who in turn came to be required to be seen as the embodiment and keeper of tradition (Mani 1998; Fruzzetti and Perez 2002, Perez 2012, chap.5). Given the overwhelming influence of the Romanticists, who cast languages as "mother-tongues" internationally, and language being seen as the prime essence of a people, it was little wonder that language came to be configured as female. If however, the casting of language as female was accomplished through the imaginations of the

romanticist movement in Europe, the deification of the mother-tongue in the manner of a brahmanical goddess, was facilitated by the nationalist energies released by this combination of occurrences within upper-caste groups across the continent, not least of them being the energy of neo-Hinduism. What should not be forgotten is that these goddesses, were but one of many goddesses that were produced at this point in time, the other more famous one being that of *Bharath Mata* (Mother India) where the subcontinent was depicted as a brahmanical goddess resting against a lion. The casting of the mother-tongue, or any other entity such as the nation, as a Hindu goddess was crucial to determining the extent of the inclusivity of these movements. While creating space for upper-caste Hindu groups, these images simultaneously problematized the association of non-Hindu, and non-upper-caste groups. For example, Nigam points to the manner in which the neo-Hindu brahmanical wrappings associated with revolutionary nationalism in Bengal, namely the *Vande Mataram* hymn and the devotion to the national mother-goddess, posed a significant challenge for the Muslim Muzaffar Ahmed's participation. However, Nigam goes on to point out, the same Ahmed, found Islam no hurdle to later joining the atheistic communists (Nigam 2006: 271 – 272), indicating the manner in which a number of non-upper-caste, and non-Hindu youth turned to communism because they failed to identify with the Hindu inspiration of contemporary nationalism, as well as had problems with their nationalism being tied with the notion of a "prior 'Indian essence'" (*ibid*: 273- 275). Similarly, Janaki Nair highlights the manner in which the very articulation of the history of Kannada in brahmanical terms, one in which Karnataka is similarly imagined as a unified homeland based on a reference to ancient and medieval kingdoms, and how the sultanates were an interruption of that time, would eventually result in the norming of the citizen of the Karnataka state, to the exclusion of the Muslim, the Tamil, and other non-dominant caste groups in the region (2011: 57–59). On the other hand, the stress that Tamil language activism placed on rationalism, and consistent attempts to not deify the Tamil goddess along brahmanical lines, opened up a space for Muslim groups in the Madras Presidency to identify with Tamil, even as they rejected a pan-Indian Muslim identity predicated on Urdu-Hindustani (Ramaswamy 1997: 175).[45] Indeed, it is possibly because of these challenges that it was Konkani that became the locus around which a Goan political identity was framed, both in the colonial period, as well as in the post-colonial. In a polity divided by caste, and religion, language proved to be an

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[45] This pan-Indian Muslim identity, it should once again be underlined, is premised on the natal culture of the North Indian *ashraf* Muslim.

effective symbol around which to rally a sub-national identity. Furthermore, given that the majority of the population toward whom this symbol was directed were Catholics, perhaps within India it is in Goa alone, that the language remains a mother, but does not necessarily become a goddess. A Hindu formulation of goddess would significantly exclude these groups from accepting such a formulation while the more secular form of mother would have been acceptable.

It was therefore the imagination and depiction of language as a mother-goddess in Sanskritic terms, a formulation itself born from the peculiar understanding of modernity by the Indian nationalist elites, which allowed for language to be one of the particularisms tolerated by Indian secular-nationalism. This Sanskritist leaning toward the reform of languages was a feature not only of its iconographic representation, but also of the form of the language itself, resulting famously in the sundering of Hindustani into discreet entities of Sanskritised Hindi represented as being the language of and for Hindus, and Perso-Arabised Urdu as the language for and of the Muslims (King 1994; Rai 2001). This separation through script also led eventually to the effective post-colonial rejection of Hindustani (now configured as Urdu) and the suggestion of a *de facto*, if not *de jure*, acceptance of the "Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan" slogan that intertwined with both Hindi and North Indian Hindu nationalism (Pai 2002). What should also be highlighted is that this Sanskritisation[46] went hand-in-hand with the dominance of the brahmanised upper-castes over the nationalist project of the rearticulation of various related dialects, like *Braj-bhasha*, *Bhojpuri*, *Maghai*, into the consolidated form of Hindi, that was then presented as the ideal national language.

However, there were other more pragmatic reasons as well that allowed for secular-nationalism to make its peace with linguistic nationalisms, and this once more returns us to the negotiated nature of anti-imperial national politics. Linguistic nationalism came to occupy the central position it did not only as a result of the belief in language being the manifestation of the private and spiritual essence of the community, but also because the interests of regional elites played a significant part in this mobilization. Indeed, Mitchell points out that the Indian National Congress, that had been established in 1885, had to amend its organizational structure to accept the principle of linguistic division as a

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[46] The concept of lower castes sanskritising themselves and higher castes westernizing themselves was first introduced into anthropological discourse through adoption from the work of sociologist M. N. Srinivas (see Srinivas 1956).

fundamental organizational feature under pressure from linguistic nationalist groups, a trend that first commenced with the establishment of the Andhra Mahasabha in 1910 and subsequent demands from Tamil language groups (2010: 38).

While the Indian National Congress made its peace with linguistic particularisms as a way in which to unify diverse groups against an external enemy, that is to say the British imperialists, this did not translate into the nationalist elites' acceptance of particularisms within secular modernity.[47] On the contrary, another round of post-independence negotiations was required between the nationalist elites at the centre, and those at regional centres, when in the 1950s violent and assertive demands for the organization of linguistic states within the Indian nation eventually gave way to the States Reorganisation Act of 1956. Starting first with Andhra Pradesh, it made language a substantial basis for the organization of an administrative territory, and gave these territories the nature of a linguistic homeland. However, the acceptance of the linguistic principle came with great reluctance given that it challenged not only the dominance of the national elites at the centre, but introduced a particularism into the national imagination that went against the abstractions demanded of secular citizenship, and introduced potential challenges to the imagination of the unity of the nation. The solution was produced not merely through a concession to *realpolitik*, but also through the discursive possibilities produced by such slogans as the Nehruvian motto of "unity in diversity" and the actions of groups that Ramaswamy calls in the Tamilian context, the Indianists (1997: 46-47).

Cultural belonging was articulated, as is made obvious by Ramaswamy's elaboration of the Indianist articulation of Tamil devotion, of love for not just the Tamil goddess, but Mother India as well, twining both these affective allegiances within the language of Hindu nationalist-devotion. Not only was citizenship as cultural belonging expressed in terms of belonging to the Indian community, a community that was ostensibly unmarked by religion or caste but, equally importantly, was expressed in terms of belonging to a linguistic community that one was required to be passionately devoted to. Indian citizenship then, especially in states like Goa, marked by a high degree of linguistic mobilization, is understood as belonging to the linguistic group that has been the substantial vehicle not only of linguistic nationalism, but associated social reform projects.

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[47] It is this this ability of the nationalist elites in the centre to accept some particularisms, and not others that Needham and Sunder Rajan refer to as that of the "two faces" of "official (that is Congress-controlled) nationalism" (2010: 14).

There is one more aspect that must be highlighted, though, that explicates the manner in which this negotiation between the abstract modernist impulses of the nationalist class and the regional elites found resolution. In her discussion of the mobilization of Telugu linguistic nationalism, Mitchell indicates the ironic presence of a caption in the English language in Roman script on a statue of the Telugu goddess (2000: 93). Mitchell argues that the absence of the Telugu script is not surprising as the actual use of Telugu is no longer necessary to representations of the Telugu language, people, and territory, instead, "[w]hat matters is the *idea* of Telugu" (*ibid,* emphasis added). She points out that while it was necessary to use the language as a medium of communication when Telugu linguistic mobilization began, subsequent developments have ensured that its need today is primarily as a marker of cultural identity or sub-national citizenship.

Before concluding this discussion and the chapter, there is another aspect to political society that needs to be addressed. This involves the manner in which belonging to the national community was linked in terms of passionate belonging to an "Indian" language group. This aspect allows us to expand the frame of Chatterjee's economistic narrowing, even while referencing his selection of property as a way of determining the boundaries of civil society and political society. Referring to works such as that of Benedict Anderson (1983), Ramaswamy underscores the manner in which modernity configures a number of peculiar relationships. One, where people are bound to their language, in the sense that the language is seen as their personal property; and the second, where the people are bound to each other, via their common ownership of the language which forms their patrimony. Now imagined, not merely as a tool of communication but as property, language partakes of the rules by which other property is understood, as an object whose value and worth ought to be enhanced, not allowed to decline, into which energy must be expended to develop it and, furthermore, prevent others from encroaching upon it (Ramaswamy 1997: 11, 244). Thus for example, Konkani language activists are often known as *Konkani mogi*, or lovers of Konkani. These lovers, invariably male, are expected to express their love for the language by "working" for the benefit of Konkani. Thus, the language may be cast as a female who has to be adored, but just as women are cast as property of men, similarly the feminized language, is seen as property that must be protected, and whose worth increased through active labour.

As discussed earlier, the way Chatterjee understands the situation, of the two dimensions of property and community, it is via one's relationship to property that one finds one's way

into either civil society or political society, for the project of civil society, twined as it is with the capitalist project, is to effect a transformation of "precapitalist structures and of premodern cultures" (Chatterjee 2007). As I have attempted to demonstrate thus far, modernity is not necessarily a discreet object but actively negotiated by dominant groups in society. Those that fall outside of the boundaries of what is determined to not be modern, fall into the realms of political society which is where "we can observe a struggle over the real, rather than the merely formal, distribution of rights among citizens" (Chatterejee 1997: 75). Chatterjee thus predicates civil society on those that live within the realm of contract and private property. Simultaneously, what Ramaswamy suggests is that language is constructed not only as private property of the individual, but as an asset that needs to be secured from loss or attack. Reading both together, one can postulate a situation where once language is constituted as property, and the national is the privileged carrier of modernity, the national language operates as the terrain on which one's presence in civil or political society is determined. Those groups that identify with, or can be said to possess, the dialect recognized as modern fall into the closed enclave of civil society, while those that are believed to not possess this dialect, or refuse to recognize its centrality, proving to be unamenable to education into the modern tongue, fall into the realms of political society. This location outside civil society is further compounded by virtue of being seen as the uncivilised, and as a result, those who would challenge the security of the property of the group. I would like to recall in this context, Menon's articulation discussed earlier, where political society is seen as a hurdle to be overcome. It is this situation, I would like to argue, that applies in the case of those who use, and champion the cause of the Roman script in Goa. In this state, civil society is composed by persons who embody the privileged marker of Konkani in the Nagari script and the *Antruzi* accent. As the latter chapter will make more explicitly, it would be ideal, though not necessary, that these persons be Hindu. Failing to meet the former requirements of script and dialect, as do those who use and champion the Roman script and associated dialects, places subjects in a thorny relationship vis-à-vis the privileged cultural community of the state. Not only are these groups seen as needing the ministry of the Konkani language establishment in terms of improving their standard, but the refusal to toe the establishment line ensures that they are both seen as threats to the unity of the community, a hurdle for civil society to be overcome, but also deprived of any state recognition of their efforts.

Summation

The purpose of this discussion that has been to expand the scope of political society, elaborate on the nature of Indian secularism and the histories of linguistic nationalism in India to prepare a context within which the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics I study can be understood. To do so, I reverted to the nexus Chatterjee proposes between civil society and modernity. Subsequently, I attempted to demonstrate how modernity is not a universally existing condition, but one that has been peculiarly negotiated, in the subcontinental case, through the efforts of the anti-imperial nationalists, and subsequently the post-colonial Indian national elites. Through this negotiation, only a definite range of socio-political arrangements were deemed appropriately modern. The first of these was secular-nationalism. As in other parts of the modern world, but primarily Western Europe, this form of political mobilization stressed the creation of the unmarked abstract citizen who would be the privileged subject that the nation-state addressed. Like other secular-nationalisms, Indian secular-nationalism while claiming to address the abstract citizen, conceived of the citizen in particularist terms, even while it universalized these particularisms, thus invisibilizing them. Born as a result of shamed nationalist response to imperial racism, missionary critique, and orientalist scholarship, the abstract Indian citizen is in fact imagined as upper-caste and Hindu. Nowhere does this privileging of the upper-caste and Hindu become as obvious as the manner in which the demands of the Indian nation-state's Muslim, *adivasi*[48] and Dalit groups for social and representational justice, or indeed the demands for the recognition of the Roman script for Konkani, are immediately labelled as non-, or anti-, secular.

Added to this, in regions of the nation-state that were marked by vigorous linguistic mobilization, the figure of the abstract citizen that would have been imagined as marked by certain particularisms, was also marked by belonging to a definite dialectical group; the dialect selected to best embody the authentic self of the sub-national group. These then are the constituents of civil society, encompassing not just a location on the right side of the regulation of property, but the possession of a self that inheres on the right side, or the civilized side, of modernity. The law of the state, i.e. in the terms of Santos that I have made constant reference to, the law of the *citizenplace* embodies not just the consensus as regards property, but the consensus as regards what constitutes the civilizational norm of

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[48] Translated literally, the term means early inhabitants, and is the preferred term of reference by the ethnic and tribal groups in India that claim indigenous, or aboriginal status.

modernity for civil society.   To refer to Menon, political society should be understood "as the realm of struggles that functions with an alternative common sense – alternative, that is, to the common sense of civil society" (2010: 127). Political society, therefore, could also be alternatively be understood as the realm of the subaltern, the space of those that are cast out of representational legitimacy, an argument I will develop, specifically in the Goan case, in the subsequent chapter.

In conclusion, based on this discussion, I suggest that citizenship can be understood as the attempt of population groups to enter the realms of civil society. The citizenship acts of those persons in political society would be the ruptures they make to assert their entries into civil society. These acts have historically been the attempts of colonized persons to enter imperial civil society as citizens, and today is constituted (not only) by the attempts of those members of political society to enter civil society. While Chatterjee's formulation provides us with a basic scheme with which to understand this useful distinction, this initial formulation can clearly be expanded to include not merely the economistic focus that Chatterjee provides, but also the civilizational dynamics that constitute civil society. Furthermore, reference must be had to the fact that the attempts by members of political society to enter civil society, their citizenship acts are attempted not as individuals, but as members of population groups. These groups are either those identified as such by state and civil society, as group that need to be catered to, or as political associations that are formed to achieve definite goals. Critical to the understanding of the constituents of civil society are their relationship to law, where they are the holders of certain rights. This relationship with the law is markedly absent from the experience of the members of political society, who while they attempt to gain coverage of the certainty of inalienable rights, enjoy merely concessions conceded to them by the state. These concessions are extended to them as a result of their ability to challenge the *status quo*. The moment this threat disappears, they may slide back into political society, bereft of the benefit of these temporary entitlements. This does not diminish the importance of the fact that in addition to the networks of patronage and clientalism that they may need to take recourse to, these population group and political associations also take recourse to, as Nigam stresses, to the "modern emancipatory rhetoric of autonomy and equal rights" (2006: 323). It is towards these features of citizenship in political society that the subsequent chapters of this thesis will direct itself.

Chapter 3
Konkani and its political history: an anthropological approach

Prologue

Fr. Constantino[49] is a member of the Pilar Fathers and a partisan of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari. I met him for the first time on a rainy afternoon in the year 2007 in Pilar, the centre of this missionary order, and subsequently at one of the few events that the Goan Catholics for Devanagari (in association with the pro-Devanagari, Konkani language foundation Asmitai Pratisthan) had organized. This particular event was the release of the booklet titled *Dalgado on Konkani: A translation of Mgr. S.R. Dalgado's introductions to his dictionaries* (Borkar 2008), being an extract of Monsignor Rudolf Dalgado's published comments on Konkani. Msgr. Dalgado is a critical figure not merely because he is a symbol for the Roman script activists, and because the Devanagari script activists seek to lay claim to him as well; but also because he is one of the figures central to the history of the development of the Konkani language.

As had been the case for other events organized by the Goan Catholics for Devanagari, the event was well-attended by persons from the larger world of those who supported the exclusive recognition of Devanagari as the official script for the Konkani language. Prior to the commencement of the event, I was located by Fr. Constantino, who indicated that he wished to introduce me to Fr. Evangelho.[50] Fr. Evangelho and I indicated, however, that we already knew each other. At this point, Fr. Constantino directed my attention towards Kiran Budkuley. An academic employed in the English department of the Goa University, Kiran Budkuley has written a number of essays, quoted copiously in this chapter, on Varde Valaulikar, a figure who will feature prominently in this essay. Taking me with him, he introduced me to Budkuley and indicated to her that he really liked her recent newspaper article (Budkuley 2008). Turning to me he said, "You must always be rooted. Rooted in our religion, in our culture".

This incident remained in my mind for quite a while. What did Fr. Constantino mean about roots? Why were they important? What was the linkage between Kiran Budkuley and these roots? As I sought to make sense of my fieldwork, I realized what these roots meant. The

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[49] Name changed to protect identity.
[50] Name changed to protect identity

roots were the work of Varde Valaulikar, whom Fr. Constantino and the rest of the Devanagari world recognize as Shenoi Goembab. This work stressed the Sanskritic and brahmanical roots of the Konkani language. Further, these roots had been highlighted by the work of Kiran Budkuley, who in this process, and also for reason of her Hindu-ness and Brahmin-ness, embodied the Sanskritic roots of Konkani.

In addition to the theoretical arguments addressed, the present chapter is also directly linked to this particular incident with Fr. Constantino. It was to make sense of his fascination with roots, to make sense of all that he and other members of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari spoke to me, that this chapter was written. The writing of this chapter, and the making sense of the processes that made the members of this pro-Devanagari activist group so committed to the Devanagari cause, was also important for me as a researcher. It converted me, slowly, but surely, from someone who had no patience with the activities of this group, convinced as I was of the justice of the demands of the Roman script activists, into someone who was able to empathize with these Devanagari-script activists. These activists were, I realized, the inheritors of a longer process that had its roots in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. While not helplessly flowing in the stream of history, these activists were logically acting out responses that framed the construction of Goan civil society and the experience of citizenship in this state of, and for, the Konkani language.

Introduction

This chapter is part of a narrative spread over two parts tracing the establishment of civil society in Goa. The first deals with the crafting of civil society out of the literary concerns of the dominant castes within and outside of Portuguese India. The second part of the narrative, in the subsequent chapter, deals with the post-colonial developments that converted this linguistic imagination and colonial era civil-society, into a legally recognized and formalized civil society marking the boundaries of the Goan *citizenplace*.

In light of the discussion in the previous chapter that presented the manner in which location within or outside of civil society is determined by the peculiar definition of modernity by the dominant groups within the national movement and subsequently the nation-state, this chapter will narrate a politicised history of the Konkani language to demonstrate the manner in which similarly, the modernity for the Goan (sub) national community was formulated. The argument of this chapter commences from a recognition

that with the fixing of Konkani as the official language of the state, and especially through the rhetoric around Konkani that is accepted by all parties, Konkani is the marker of Goan modernity, and hence the cultural basis of citizenship. More specifically, the performance of a particular variant of Konkani, spoken and scripted, allows one to embody the ideal member of the Goan socio-political community, that is to say, the Goan citizen. This chapter shows how the activists battling for recognition of the Roman script are firmly trapped in the linguistic narrative of Goa, which is itself born from a caste battle. Nevertheless, this casteist location is not recognized as such because by raising the features of this caste location to a universal status, it is made to appear to transcend communal, that is to say, religious, boundaries. The linguistic narrative of Goa rejects the linguistic multiplicity of the state, to create a hegemonic single language. What this chapter will also suggest, a suggestion that will be developed in the subsequent chapter, is that as a result of being party to this founding myth, which is based on exclusion of the multiple heritages that comprise the Goan cultural world, it is little wonder that the Roman script activists are forced to be party to their own exclusion from the civil society space that they seek to enter.

This chapter will demonstrate the peculiar manner in which the dominant castes among the Catholics and Hindus were able to arrive at consensus regarding this particular variety of Konkani, through different historical routes. This chapter will close with the conclusion of Portuguese sovereignty over Goa. The subsequent chapter will continue this narrative to demonstrate how, subsequent to the integration into the Indian Union, from a dominant-caste consensus largely outside of political power, this position came to be converted as the basis for admission into civil society. What is important about the twining of the separate projects of these two sets of elites in colonial India, both Portuguese, and British India, is that these were part of their attempts to shrug off their subaltern positions in the colonial world, and present, for that reason, a variety of citizenship acts. As has been discussed earlier in this work, the citizenship act is understood as a political act, one that opens up the possibility for a different subjectivity. If such be the case, then a political history of Konkani, will demonstrate the multiple moments in which the language has been the ground on which the subject position of groups of individuals have been attempted to be changed.

Before concluding these introductory comments to the chapter there is a need to also indicate the need for such a political narrative of the Konkani language. Simply put, this

need emerges because none currently exists. Despite the caution that was displayed so long ago by Pierre Bourdieu (1991), the academic discussion (in English) of the Konkani language is remarkably unconcerned with exploring the social conditions implicit in the production of "the language". On the contrary, it seems to be so tied in with the (sub) nationalist project of attempting to craft the linguistic community and its accompanying civil society, that significant, and oftentimes transparent, questions regarding the language are often brushed aside in an attempt to craft the language as an *a priori* fact. Ramaswamy points out though, that this lack of concern with historicity is a marked feature of the study of South Asian languages where,

> [B]ecause our historical conceptions come to us in and through language, historians have tended to treat it, the linguistic turn notwithstanding, as a transparent medium of communication of information rather than as an ideological formation that itself has a politics which has to be historicized. (Ramaswamy 1997: 2)

I realised in this process, that when crafting a narrative of the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholic while speaking of these experiences from the perspective of the battles around the definition of the language, it becomes important to attempt a narrative that focusses on the "ideologies of language", those networks of representations and significations about the Konkani language which emerge within particular literary, social, political, and religious formations (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). I did this by being attentive to the names of the idols that were quoted to me in the course of my conversations in the field, and following not merely the histories of these individuals, but also trying to locate the lifestories of the people who spoke about these idols. In light of these occlusions that render the operation of the milieu opaque, this chapter, is an attempt to flesh out the literary, social, political, and religious formations not just around the Konkani language, but also around the processes that ensured that Konkani would become the marker of Goan identity.

Creating Konkani as a Goan language

A political history of Konkani, that is to say, a history that recognizes the time when Konkani was first identified as a marker of Goan identity, must begin in the nineteenth century. Rochelle Pinto's work on the Goan elites in this period begins by observing: "If there was a single dominant perspective through which Goa's Catholic elite viewed their nineteenth century, it was as a condition to be mourned" (Pinto 2007:1). She argues that this framework set the stage as the "resilient filters through which the century and its

aftermath would be received". The lament, Pinto suggests, was for what this elite saw as Goa's, and their own, defining condition and predicament; of a dual location that placed them firmly in the periphery the "dual location within the economic twilight of the Portuguese empire and the political fringe of British India" (*ibid.*, 2007: 1).

If there was a lament, however, then it was because the Goan Catholic elite had scripted themselves into such a position, given that they were in fact presented with the choices to flit between two epistemic frames, and up to three historiographical options. These included the "nationalist histories of the Portuguese empire and nation, English supremacist histories to which Portuguese historians had begun to succumb, and the range of elite Indian theorization of colonialism and nationalism" (Pinto 2007: 24). These elite Indian theorisations were in no small way also beholden to the colonial British crafting of the Indian historical timeline that suggested a decline of a subcontinental Hindu greatness subsequent to Muslim invasion that could now be addressed through the reform of Indian (understood largely as Hindu) society under British rule. Pinto highlights that this three-fold division of Indian history was unable to accommodate the peculiar history of the Goan Catholic elite under Portuguese rule. This history was one where Portuguese colonial practice was embedded in Romanist notions of empire and Christian notions of equality (Pagden 1995).[51] This political context allowed for the Goan Catholic elite to be incorporated as citizens into both imperial governance structures as well as Portuguese society in a manner that was inconceivable to the Indian elite who were merely subjects under British governance.[52]

Despite this lack of fit with their peculiar circumstances, this British, and elite British Indian historiography of the decline of ancient greatness held a unique promise to the

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[51] Juan Pimentel argues that from its founding moments as a colonial power in the early sixteenth century, Portugal possessed an imagination of the colonies as "simply further additions to its peninsular kingdoms, with no distinction made in either a legal or theoretical sense" (Pimentel, 2000:22). This imagination can be seen for example in the Charter issued by Rainha Dona Maria II in 1843 over the status of the city of Panjim. The Charter, indicated that the new capital of the *Estado da Índia* would "have all the privileges and rights similar to those of other cities and possessions of the kingdom; and shall be permitted to compete with them in all ways; its citizens shall have the same prominence that is enjoyed by those of others". Also legendary are the changes that the Marquês de Pombal recommended in 1757 where all persons within the Empire were to be treated equally, regardless of religious persuasion. Indeed, in his book *Imagined Communities* (1989) Benedict Anderson quotes Charles Boxer to emphasize that the Marquês justified his various liberal reforms not by the "doctrines of the philosophes" but by "citing ancient Roman conceptions of imperial citizenship" (60).

[52] Options for incorporation into the empire were also available to Hindu elites, though to a lesser degree. It was with the declaration of the Portuguese Republic in 1910, when citizenship was made available to all subjects of the empire regardless of religion, that Hindu elites were able to also participate in imperial governance, as well as be incorporated, like their Catholic counterparts from Goa, into metropolitan society.

Catholic elite in Goa. This narrative of ancient greatness and medieval decline allowed for Catholic dominant-caste groups one more argument in their battle for local autonomy and complete control over the local administration. The position of these local dominant caste groups was not the subaltern subservience that they chose to represent, on the contrary, "the register in which state and elite communicated suggest rivalry rather than subordination" (Pinto 2007: 151).[53] In this battle they were pitched not just against the representatives of the metropolitan government who came from continental Portugal, but also the *mestiços* or *Luso-descendentes* based in Goa as well.[54]

Pinto argues that prior to their adoption of their antique brahmanical heritage, the nationalist claims of the Goan elite was based not on notions of cultural authenticity, nor the antiquity of their culture. On the contrary, it was based on the censuring of the Portuguese for the economic decline of Goa was located in arguments of mismanagement and ineptness. "The Catholic Goan elite, however ... saw in the claim to an antique culture, an attractive legacy that they could adopt" (Pinto 2007: 57), especially because it offered them one more argument from which to argue for self-rule (Rangel-Rebeiro 2010).[55]

This strategic adoption does not seem to have accounted for the power of the epistemic frames marked by the belief in national and racial essences that rode to power with the colonial empire of the British. The adoption of the British Indian historiographical model resulted in the shift in the discourse within Goa such that it set the frame for a civilizational model for Goan identity. Within this framework, the Sanskritic was seen the mother-culture of the Goan and the Portuguese intervention and the introduction of Catholicism as a cutting off of roots. This "cutting off of roots", required the constant reaffirmation of the destruction wrought by the Portuguese, the invention of a history of persecution of their cultural identity, and a possible exaggeration of the impacts of the actions of the Inquisition. Take for example, the work of José Pereira that suggests the possibility of a uniform Konkani in the golden age of pre-Portuguese Goa. This "standard"

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[53] This is an argument made by other scholars as well. Take for example the argument formulated by Bastos (2001).

[54] Early colonial Goan society was constituted by three dominant social groups. The *Reinols* (people from the metropole), *mestiços* (persons born from mixed marriages) and *gente de terra* (native subjects). The native elites were composed of the *Bammon* and *Chardo* castes, the former claiming Brahmin status, the latter *Kshatriya* status. With some changes, these contests continued into later Goan colonial history that was marked by the jostling for power between these three groups. An elaborate sense of the Luso-descendente families in Goa can be gained by reference to the three volume mapping of these families by Forjaz and de Noronha 2003.

[55] See in this context the forthcoming works of Sandra Lobo (2011).

Konkani he suggests, broke up into the various dialects that today mark the geography of the Konkani language, wholly as a result of the Portuguese persecution of the territory and its people (Pereira 1992: 11). Furthermore, in keeping with this trope of medieval decline and persecution, one has the suggestion of the persecution of the Konkani language by the Portuguese from about the late 1700s.[56] Indeed, using the trope from Indian nationalist historiography, of divide and rule, the assertion is that the Portuguese deliberately attempted to destroy Konkani and encourage Konkani so as to drive a wedge among the people, separating in the process the Christian from the Hindu. Given the manner in which syncretic practices among the Goans are celebrated, this assertion of a wedge is definitely problematic, but necessary to the rhetoric of Indian nationalism within Goa. This moment is subsequently cast as the moment when the purportedly harmonious pre-colonial state of nature, to which contemporary Konkani sub-nationalism seeks to return the Goan people, was first disrupted. SarDessai's words capture this sentiment perfectly when he suggests that the Portuguese conquest of the city of Goa in 1510 marked "the destruction of the Konkani-speaking Hindu state of Gomantak or Goa…." (2000: 10). While this period may have been marked by conflicts between various clerical orders with regard to the language to be used in communicating with the faithful, it requires a monumental leap of imagination to affirm the *de facto* persecution of Konkani that is suggested. This is especially so, because until this moment, the very same histories indicate a Konkani language that was extended primarily through the work of Christian missionaries. Furthermore, none of the studies that present this persecution are able to adduce proof beyond the positivist reading of edicts on the matter. Enough historical and sociological work on law has been done to indicate that a mere statement of the law does not prove its enforcement. These formulations have subsequently been seized on by the many literary histories and representations of the Konkani language that have subsequently been produced (SarDessai 2000; Sardesai 2006; Botelho 2002, Desai 2002).[57]

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[56] Much is made of the Decree of 27 June, 1784 that insists that the vernacular idiom be set aside in favour of Portuguese, the locals being schooled in the language, so that Portuguese becomes dominant in the territory, and also advocates punishment for those that speak in the vernacular (cited in SarDessai 2000:13). In contrast to this policy is contrasted the "enlightened attitude" of the Government in British India that supported local languages (Moraes 1964-65: 31).

[57] In addition, this formula is integral to all historians of the Konkani language where the existence of village schools, *patshalas* and *gurukuls* and their alleged subsequent destruction is repeated *ad nauseum* by almost every scholar reflecting on Goa's cultural identity or language (Botelho 2002, Desai 2002). The examples they rely on, however, seem extremely thin; they quote the existence of village schools by basing this on an image of what "Indian" life would be like, while never acknowledging that even if these existed, they were rooted in a caste structure that made it unavailable for more than the offspring for a few families. Unlinked to

This employment of an option by the Catholic elite for such an epistemic framework that effectively delegitimized their hybrid condition may seem somewhat suicidal. Indeed, as my fieldwork indicated to me, it has ensured the delegitimising of features typical to Goan Catholic life, such as the Roman script for Konkani. It has also placed Catholic elites, as elites secondary to the Hindu brahmins who dominate Goa's social and cultural world. Nevertheless, this discomfort was mitigated by the fact that the native Catholic elites were able to fall back on a discourse of caste that had continued since the early sixteenth century to have currency in one form or another.[58] The recognition of these caste locations by the Portuguese establishment ensured that despite the apparent epistemic shift effected by the inauguration of Portuguese sovereignty over the territory of Goa, these groups continued to be interpellated as elites within the colonial system. As will become increasingly obvious in subsequent portions of this thesis, this historiographical option and the epistemic frameworks it adopted while working for the upper caste denizens of Catholic Goa, did not leave much options for those Catholic groups that could not claim a dominant-caste history. On the contrary, as I will discuss later in this thesis, this discourse interpellated them as the audience for the concerned cultural and linguistic ministrations of the dominant caste elites, a trend that is not at end even today.

The constitution of this Goan modernity got a significant boost through the works of Cunha Rivara, a metropolitan-Portuguese civil servant who arrived in Goa in 1855 as Secretary General of Portuguese India. As a Portuguese civil servant operating in the shadow of British hegemony both on the European continent and colonial India, he is reputed to have wasted little time in "finding out what the British scholars had done for Indian studies in neighbouring India and was greatly impressed by Dr. John Wilson's efforts in the cause of vernacular languages" (SarDessai 2000, 77).[59] A result of these comparative efforts was his works on the Konkani language.[60] Operating under the burden

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a larger system of economic surplus generation (or extraction), there is no study that demonstrates that these schools were able to transcend the scale of elementary schooling to the university scale that these fondly and oft proffered examples suggest.

[58] I am making reference here to the famed caste genealogies produced by two Goan clerics, António João de Frias and Leonardo Pais. While Frias was the first to write *Aureola dos Indios e Nobiliarchia Bracmana* in a bid to establish the superiority of the Bammon, Pais responded with his tract *Promptuario das diffinicoens Indicas* to suggest the noble origins of the *Chardo* caste (see references to these texts in Moraes 1964-65 :10, and Curto 1997: 69).

[59] See also De Souza's observations on Cunha Rivara in De Souza (1996).

[60] In his text on the Konkani language José Gerson da Cunha (Da Cunha 1881) mentions the editorial efforts of Cunha Rivara, drawing attention to his publication of "the Grammar and Dictionary of the Konkani language, written by an Italian Missionary named Francis Xavier de Santa Anna ... published with emendations and additions ... we must be thankful to the late Mr. Rivara without whose exertions in giving it

of mimicking the British delineations of native communities with their own cultural and linguistic traditions, Cunha Rivara identified Konkani as the language of the Goan people. The most commonly cited reference of his works is the extract below, which gives a sense of the manner in which the trope of decline from ancient glory, necessitating a contemporary period of reform, had inserted itself into his work.

> The time has come to restore the mother-tongue to its rightful place. To you, then Goan Youth, is reserved this great work, essential element of intellectual and social regeneration of our countrymen! The methodical culture of your mother-tongue will bring you closer to the Marathi language; it will facilitate the knowledge of Asiatic and European languages, ancient and modern and thereby useful knowledge will be opened to your intelligence, and the treasures of the world, till now hidden from you, due to the absence of this instrument of exploration will be opened to you ... Let fools laugh and shout from their ignorance that the language has no grammar ... If however, you feel that these ignorant people deserve a reply, tell them that this book and others that will follow prove whether the language has a grammar or not ... And lastly its very corruption should be an incentive to you to improve it, to purge it rather than to despise it ... Indeed the enterprise is not easy, but it is useful, it is honorable, it is glorious. (Cited in SarDessai 2000, 79)

The phrasing of this extract, especially the reference to Konkani's lack of grammar, should also indicate to the reader the nature of an audience that Cunha Rivara's energetic efforts had encountered. While the Catholic elite were by and large impervious to his appeals, given that at this point in time a revival of the Konkani language and of their culture was largely rhetorical flourish toward different political ends, his works seemed to have touched on a raw nerve of the dominant-caste Hindu activists of the period. Indeed the charge that Konkani had no grammar to speak of was one that would continue to reverberate into the 1980s in the course of the Konkani language movement. The reason for this agitation seems to have been that Rivara's defence of Konkani, and his urging of its adoption as the language of the Goans, was cast onto a peculiarly sensitive stage. After much struggle by the Hindu elite of the *Estado da Índia*, and with the support of the Catholic elite, with the introduction of Marathi types in the national press in 1853, Marathi had been effectively made a language of the Portuguese state in India (Pinto 2007: 101). Subsequently Marathi had been introduced into schooling as the language of instruction in the New Conquests. The introduction of Marathi language schools was an important gain

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publicity, the work might have always remained a mere manuscript, obscure and incomplete" (*ibid.* 40), and the "*Grammatica da Lingua Concani no dialecto do Norte* or 'Grammar of the Konkani Language in the dialect of the North'" (*ibid.*, 40) a work written by a Portuguese missionary in the seventeenth century, and published for the first time by Cunha Rivara in Goa in 1858.

for the members of the Hindu dominant castes in the New Conquests, given that it opened up larger opportunities for work in the bordering British Indian territory of the Bombay Presidency as opposed to the more limited options in Portuguese India (Pinto 2007; Kamal 1986). To now have Konkani pressed as the language of Goa would have challenged these new found opportunities, and any possibility of such a move was firmly blocked by such powerful personages in the *Estado* as Suriaji Rao, official translator to the *Estado* who did much to block the project of the introduction of Konkani into the Goan school system of the time.

There would have been other reasons for this opposition as well, not least of which would have been the social groups with which Konkani was identified. Where the Catholic elite used Portuguese as its public and oftentimes intimate language, and the Hindu upper-caste elite used Marathi as a public language that also tied it to such prestigious traditions as that of the *Maratha* confederacy, Konkani was identified as the language of the *criados* (servants), in this case being the Catholic underclass of the territory.[61] As I will demonstrate later in this chapter, and I stress on numerous occasions through the thesis, the evolution of the language project necessitated the redefinition of Konkani to locate it in the bosom of the dominant Hindu castes, excising it completely from any stain of association with that of the Catholic labouring classes. A somewhat amusing reflection of this distaste for the dialect of the Catholic labouring classes was illustrated in a conversation prior to the release of the book mentioned in the prologue to this chapter. In the course of the tea-time refreshments customarily served prior to the event, a public-spirited Hindu brahmin man, and clearly, from his presence at the event, a Konkani partisan as well, shared with me his delight over the progress Konkani had made in the many years since Liberation. He spoke to me of the contests that had been organised to popularise the language. These contests were so successful, he remarked, that in one case the prizes had all been taken by Catholic girls. And yet, he continued, their accent was so perfect, that if you had not known their names, you could not tell that they were Catholics! The irony of the situation, where perfection clearly lay in attempting to hide one's natal dialect of course did not strike the gentleman, who continued to beam through the rest of the conversation.

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[61] Given that Goa and things Goan are often looked at as exceptional cases, I would like to point out that this casting of one of the many languages spoken by a community as an inferior tongue is not peculiar to Goa. While discussing the position of gender in nationalist movements, Anne McClintock (1991: 106) points out the medley of High Dutch and other dialects were initially scorned as the *kombuistaal* (kitchen language) of house servants, slaves, and women until the moment when it was resurrected as a mother-tongue of the Africaans people by the Africaner nationalist movement.

In urging Konkani onto the Goan public within the framework of cultural and historical authenticity, Cunha Rivara seems to have unwittingly set in motion a process that would eventually come to divide the Goan public.[62] Invoking a trope that has also marked the linguistic histories of British India, not least of which being the famous division of Hindustani speaking peoples into Urdu for Muslims and Hindi for Hindus (Brass 1974; King 1994; Rai 2001), separate publics were carved out for Konkani speakers, presumed to be Catholic, and Marathi speakers presumed to be Hindu (Pinto 2007).

This process of the construction of a linguistic public would have been aided in no small process by the fact that Konkani was the language that the Church had been associated with in the course of its evangelisation of the peoples in the Old Conquests. Regardless of the claims of such scholars as Pereira who assert the presence of a written and highly sophisticated Konkani prior to Portuguese arrival, the extant grammars of the Konkani language are those that were produced by European missionaries subsequent to the arrival of European presence in the subcontinent (Pereira 1992; SarDessai 2000; Gomes 2010).[63] Given the quantum of scholarship that has suggested the manner in which cultures and traditions were reconstituted through colonial intervention, it is surprising that there has as yet not been any scholarly work that estimates the impact the missionary grammars had on consolidating a *new language* from the multitude of local tongues that already existed on the western coast when Portuguese sovereignty was first established in 1510. Even works that focus on the seminal contribution via the grammars and other works produced by the missionaries, invariably assume a *contribution* to an existing tradition, rather than a radical innovation (Gomes 2010). This fact should indicate the manner in which the scholarly works associated with Konkani have been largely twined with the sub-nationalist projects of consolidating a Goan "civil society" under the banner of the Konkani language. I am referring in this instance, especially to Olivinho Gomes' work, the book *Konkani Literature in the Roman Script* (2010), which was a project commissioned by the Dalgado Konkani Akademi. All the same, this may not be surprising given that like many of the

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[62] Given the context of this work, where the word public has definite connotations of a reading public, as well as a "civil society" that is equal and engaged in public debate, I would like to stress that I use the word "public" in this context qualifiedly. I use it as short hand reference to the manner in which the groups in the territory would be interpellated by rhetoric.

[63] I should draw attention to the fact that in his text on the Konkani language, Gerson da Cunha took umbrage to the suggestion that "mere copyists and not authors of these books" (da Cunha 1881: 36). He reasoned "this is an unfounded supposition, especially when one considers the not small number of books these Goanese Brahmans, after their conversion to Christianity, and their being sent out of the country as missionaries to distant places" (*ibid.*). Regardless of the ethnic origin of the authors, the fact remains that the initial grammars for the language were crafted by Catholic missionaries, whether European or native.

Roman script activists, Gomes himself started out as a Devanagari partisan, and like many Konkani language activists and artistes, was committed to the autochthonous project of a Goan for Goans imagined as an ethnic group that was Konkani speaking. This should go to underline my observation that I will elaborate on later, of the Roman script activists, being engaged not in a negation of the nationalist framework, but of negotiation for space within it.

The intervention of the early modern Christian missionaries did mark the linguistic geography of Konkani. Their production of grammars and their use of print technology, and the choice of dialect that they then moulded to produce catechisms for the neophytes produced another one of the forms of Konkani, *padri bhas*, literally meaning the priest's language, or clerical Konkani. In later times, and especially the post-colonial, the expurgation of words with roots in Romance tongues from the Konkani language would become part of a determined campaign, not only in the secular sphere, but as will be elaborated in subsequent chapters, within the Church as well. The one single impact that the missionary intervention did definitely have was to introduce the Roman script to aid articulating the language. In making this intervention, and in using Konkani as the language of evangelisation in the territory, the Catholic Church ensured a certain fixing for Konkani, both in form, as well as in terms of script. As has already been pointed out, this fact did not go unnoticed by the Hindu elite, and seems to have marked Konkani and its associated Roman script as the language of the ritually impure (and hence untouchable) Catholic. In addition, within the frameworks of the late modern and post enlightenment epistemologies, that required a unique authentic script for the native language, and that came to be adopted in Goa, it also came to be marked in later times, as the mark of interruption of the "natural" flow of the Konkani language and the mark of inauthenticity.

This concern of inauthenticity was marked by another scholar of the Konkani language who followed in the wake of Cunha Rivara, and who as a result worked, whether consciously or not, toward the standardisation of the language. Working in the late 1800s, Monsignor Sebastião Rudolfo Dalgado was born into a *gãocar* family of "first-class"[64]

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[64] My use of the term "first-class" follows the suggestion by Rowena Robinson (1998: 79- 80), and realizing its worth subsequent to my own fieldwork. In her work on a largely Catholic village in South Goa, Robinson points to the existence of two status groups within the single caste that dominated the village. The first class member of the caste group occupied positions of authority in the Portuguese regime, spoke Portuguese and were highly "westernised". The second class members, on the other hand, were peasant farmers, did not speak Portuguese, and were economically not unlike the tenant-farmers in the village.

Catholic Brahmins of the village of Assagão. In addition to these privileges of birth, or perhaps, as discussed in the previous chapter, as a result of the same, Dalgado also managed to secure high positions within the hierarchy of the *Padroado*, working across South Asia, gaining proficiency in various languages. In the course of these efforts Dalgado also engaged in the two works that have gained him prominence in the world of Konkani literature; a dictionary of Konkani into Portuguese, followed by a dictionary of Portuguese into Konkani. Dalgado's project seems to be best represented and summarised in his own words where he indicates that:

> Trying to be above all prejudices, and to treat the language with due impartiality, I took as the starting point the language as it is spoken in the province of Bardez today. According to the general opinion it (the language) is preserved best there (Bardez), (a conserva melhor), noting, in due place, the terms exclusively used or mainly used in other parts. As I was definitely inclined to write a decidedly etymological dictionary, and to Sanskritise, as much as possible, the language in which, I thought, there were purity and perfection, I took for norm to consider pure the word which approached closely to the typical origin, and to characterize its phonetic variations as corruptions and short forms. (As translated in SarDessai 2000: 86)

It is interesting to note that in the opinion of this Portuguese-speaking, upper-caste, upper-class Goan Catholic, it was *Bardezi* (the form of Konkani spoken in *taluka* or *Concelho* of Bardez) that was the finer form of the language. This contrasts sharply with the *Antruzi* (the form spoken in the district of *Antruz*, corresponding to the contemporary *taluka* of Ponda, and particularly associated with the brahmins of that territory) which came to hold pride of place in the writings of Varde Valaulikar, a later and significant activist for the Konkani language, whose position today holds sway. Nevertheless, despite this position, no doubt influenced by the idea of rupture, Dalgado felt the need to sanskritise the same tongue so that it could approximate the mother-language from which Konkani was believed to derive.

The link between Sanskrit and Konkani is crucial to understanding not just the current conflict around script that this project studies, but also the manner in which the entire

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This complexity of class, status and caste is important to my discussion of subalternity and the citizenship experience in Goa, because I believe that it is pivotal to inflecting the acts of citizenship in Goan society. For example, it was largely first-class members of Catholic upper-caste backgrounds who supported sole recognition for Devanagari as the official script for Konkani and actively opposed the Roman script. Similarly, it highlights the fact that merely because a person is from an upper-caste background, it does not presume location in a higher economic strata, or class location. Thus, through the length of this thesis I keep highlighting lower-caste and lower-class as two locations of the subalterns among Catholic groups in Goa.

socio-political panorama around Goans and Konkani has been shaped. Sardesai (2006: 3) suggests that it was Gerson da Cunha who first advocated the link between Konkani and Sanskrit by asserting for it a brahmanical heritage. Gerson da Cunha, a gentleman-scholar[65] who lived in Bombay, is celebrated as one of the finest orientalists of the period, and is credited with having first given scholarly sanction to the idea of this migration from the North and intimately twining Goa's origin to brahmanical intervention. Da Cunha unearthed, collated, compared and presented in published form, thereby making it acceptable scientifically, an origin myth for Goa from the *Sahayadri Khand* of the *Skanda Purana*. This publication, and its subsequent use by Hindu brahmin activists in the course of their caste mobilisation efforts, ensured that the text was fixed as the definitive origin-myth for Goa. This myth suggested Goa had been created by the mythical brahmin figure Parashurama, and subsequently gifted to a number of brahmin families who had migrated to Goa from Kashmir, after a lengthy sojourn in Bengal (or the ancient Gaud region). In keeping with this creation myth, Da Cunha also suggested that Konkani was one of the Gaudian languages of the north-western group, imported into the Konkani by this colony of brahmans from the north (Da Cunha 1881).

I would like to digress from the narrative at this point to reflect on the nature of the citizenship act that Gerson da Cunha's scholarship represented. His work was not merely some objective scholarship on an area of scholarly interest. On the contrary, as with other gentlemen-scholars of the time da Cunha was deeply invested in the project of Konkani at various levels. [66] As his text *The Konkani language and Literature* (Da Cunha 1881) demonstrates, the Konkani language operated as a stage from which he was able to locate himself and his social peers within the context of both, Portuguese India, British India and the larger European world. Being a first-class brahmin from the village of Arpora,[67] da Cunha crafted the text on Konkani not only to present Konkani as a brahmanical and Aryan language, but to locate his people as aristocratic descendants of those Aryan

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[65] I use the term "gentleman-scholar" to draw attention to the the socio-economic location from which da Cunha wrote. He was not a full-time scholar, but a doctor who enjoyed a lucrative practice, who had scholarly interests that merged into his socio-politcal goals.Indeed da Cunha used his scholarship to achieve social recognition, not merely in British-India, but as Vicente (2012) has pointed out, in Europe as well.

[66] For a discussion of the manner in which this recognition came about through the creation of an international network of gentlemen- scholars beholden to each other, see Vicente 2012, especially pages 71 - 72.

[67] A biography of Gerson da Cunha is quick to mention that though born in Arpora, da Cunha's family traced its origin to the prestigious village of Cortalim in Salcete. This village, being identified by da Cunha in his works, as one of the places hallowed in legend as the original villages established by the migrating *Saraswat* Brahmins when they first arrived in the Konkan (Moraes 1964 – 65: 1).

brahmans. He stressed that their Portuguese names did not imply racial mixture, but merely conversion to the civilising influence of Christianity. Da Cunha was not merely speaking of Goan Catholics. On the contrary, he carefully distinguished the Goan Catholic aristocrat, from the labouring Catholic, indicating that it was they alone "who betake themselves to domestic service" (*ibid.*: 37). Having worked this distinction, he proceeded to distinguish the Goan Catholic from the Bombay Catholic, indicating that the latter, were descended mostly from "tribes" (*ibid.*: 37). While claiming this Hindu past, however, he carefully distinguished himself from the Hindus by pointing out that his caste consciousness is limited only to the issue of marriage, for in other respects, Goan Catholic society operates largely likely the European with regard to social interaction. He was consequently, he sought to demonstrate, effectively European, a fact that he sought to underline by making reference to the endeavours of his brahmin ancestors, no doubt under the aegis of *Padroado*, in spreading the Christian faith among the "heathen" of South India and elsewhere (*ibid.*: 39). It was necessary for the Goan Catholic elite to stake a claim to being both Catholic and brahmin. Their unique, and indeed precarious, identity was not able to function with just one of these two. Being Catholic established, and rationalised, their European and Christian selves among the European elites in the city of Bombay, while being brahmin established their nobility, and hence justified their presence within these elite European circuits (Vicente 2012). This situation was typical of the Goan native elites, stuck between two colonial worlds, and is a discomfort that is clearly present among their intellectual descendants, the most legitimate of whom are the Catholic partisans arraigned against the official recognition to the Roman script for Konkani.

What Gerson da Cunha was doing, I would like to suggest, was to use Konkani as the basis for a citizenship act, establishing both himself and his peers as legitimate members of the cosmopolitan city of Bombay. This act that Da Cunha was forging was the rearticulation, though in a different context, of the acts that his peers in Goa were doing versus the Portuguese there. It should be borne in mind that Da Cunha's citizenship act, was not only in a different context; that of British India, but also at another scale of the international order, British India was after all a different domain under a different European sovereign power. I particularly underline this difference to draw attention to the multiple levels at which the contours of Goan citizenship were being articulated. Furthermore, this citizenship act was not insubstantially tied to the citizenship act that Cunha Rivara had been engaged in, both for himself and his peripheral colonizing state. This citizenship act

was to perform a role in Portuguese India, similar to what the British were doing in their territory. In so performing, and following the acts of the Imperial British, Rivara would have reclaimed some dignity for a Portugal that was already largely dismissed to irrelevance on the international (by which I mean, the inter-European) stage.[68] Individual acts of citizenship therefore, took place within a larger international context, and required to be performed at multiple levels for it to eventually gain coherence and legibility. Further, the citizenship acts of the *Saraswat* activists that I discuss later in this chapter, were able to gain strength, because of the previous work effected by persons like Gerson da Cunha, not least of which was the fact that his work on the Konkani language (1881) was integrated into the Bombay Gazeteer, being the symbol of politically validated knowledge in the colonial era.

To return to the larger narrative, if a Sanskritic bias formed the background to Dalgado's project on Konkani, he nevertheless had to continue to struggle against the facts that stared up at him in the course of his work. While publishing his dictionary, Dalgado pioneered in the use of the Devnagari typescript for Konkani, given his belief that Devanagari was the appropriate script for Konkani. The manner in which he argued for this position, merits some attention for reason of highlighting the linkages Dalgado sought to privilege, and those he sought to shrug off. He was faced with a situation where there was reference to Konkani being written in various documents in the Halle-Kannada script. Dealing with this situation, he argued that Halle-Kannada must have been used because the locals (the Konkani speakers) were working with merchants familiar with the script, and also because the rulers used the Kannada script. On the other hand, because it was not possible for a Dravidian script to be native to Konkani an Indo-Aryan language, it must be that Devanagari was the script for Konkani (Borkar 2008: 10). Indeed, these very reasons were repeated in the course of the release of *Dalgado on Konkani* (2008). Having made reference to this book and its release, it should also be stressed that this attention given to Dalgado from the Devanagari partisans seemed to stem more from the need to compromise the symbol of Dalgado that the Roman script activists had chosen, than from a tradition of

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[68] By virtue of its early start in the course of the European expansion, Portugal was one of the first European powers to establish territorial claims outside of the European continent. This transcontinental empire was subsequently challenged by the Northern European powers and by the nineteenth century was a spent force, being also in a dependent relationship with Great Britain. This semi-peripheral condition was compounded when following the Berlin Conference in 1884, Portugal was served an Ultimatum, where it was indicated that it would lose control of the African territories it laid claim to, if unable to effectively exploit the same. The eventual loss of these territories confirmed Portugal's irrelevance in the international order (Santos 2002).

holding Dalgado in esteem. The manner in which Dalgado was being used as a symbolic marker was made very clear when the secretary to the Dalgado Konkani Akademi indicated to me the reason for their choice of Dalgado as a symbol in a rather colourful manner; "If they can put Shenoi Goembab on their head and dance, then we can also put Dalgado on our head and dance!" Perhaps it is not a coincidence that Dalgado was, like Valaulikar, also brahmin, effectively putting two brahmin figures at odds with one another, rather than risking a non-brahmin figure who might not get the same amount of attention as the figure of Dalgado attracted. Of course, by virtue of adopting the figure of Dalgado, the Roman script activists also laid themselves open to the risk of having Dalgado's articulations, and his dilemmas being used against them, in the very manner that the Goan Catholics for Devanagari and the Asmitai Pratisthan were doing.

Dalgado's articulation only goes to underline Pinto's observation that "[t]he overall discomfort with the Roman alphabet expressed by the Goan elite drew in part from the legitimacy of linguistic discourses that could only see the phenomenon of an Indian language in a non-Indic script as a distressing anomaly" (Pinto 2007: 225). As should be obvious, it was not just the use of a European script for an "Indian" language that bothered this elite. They were also concerned to demonstrate the manner in which Konkani was also an Aryan language and hence possessing, despite a plethora of evidence to the contrary, an Aryan or brahmanical script. The story of Konkani came to be intimately linked to the fashioning of the self-image of the largely upper-caste Goan elite, as they sought to fashion a space for themselves in the late modern colonial order, encompassing, the local and the international space.

What should be stressed, is that this creation of an authentic ancient self, did not necessarily limit the options of these men or their class in terms of their contemporary comportment. Operating within the framework of the division of cultures into the public and the private realms, they could still operate in the public sphere as highly westernized persons. Indeed, it was exactly this comportment that was necessary for them to succeed in life.[69]

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[69] Take for example the case of Tristão Bragança Cunha, hailed as the Father of Goan Nationalism. A bitter critic of what he believed was the tendency of the Goan Catholic elite to "ape" the Portuguese, this did not prevent him, according to local lore, from sitting down to dinner dressed in a three piece suit and using cutlery to eat.

In his formulation of the project of the Indian nationalist class, Chatterjee demonstrates how they created a private sphere of the home that was held to be the repository of the traditional, or the authentic, while they participated in a public sphere that was run according to western lines. This split seems a necessary part in the nature of the construction of a situated modernity. In the case of the Goan Catholic elite, who had entered modernity earlier through their induction into the hierarchies of the Portuguese empire, their route was somewhat different, where they created an authentic ancient self that allowed them to operate in a similar manner to the native elites of British India.[70] The creation of this authentic self and past was necessary if they were to craft a space from which they could continue to operate in the larger world constructed according to the epistemic frames of late modernity.

This space that was created presented them with numerous opportunities. Not only did it continue to provide them a location from which to critique the Portuguese for incompetent colonialism, and demand autonomy; it also allowed them a position from which to be taken seriously within the British Raj. Finally, as an established elite, and inheritors of an ancient tradition, it allowed them to represent themselves as leaders of the entire "Goan community". It needs to be underlined that while the creation of this ancient past, and the Konkani renewal project served to secure them vis-à-vis other elite, it also allowed them to fix the marginal groups within Goa into place. Pinto points to the concerns of Mariano Saldanha, author of *O Ensino de Concani em Goa* who believed that the Goan peasants were better suited to an education in Konkani rather than English. He observed that when Goan peasants were given an education in Portuguese, they showed a disconcerting tendency to aspire to a less laborious life. An education in Konkani according to him would keep them in their place, and equip them with a vibrant organic culture (Saldanha, quoted in Pinto 2007: 62). He grumbled that whereas "vernacular instruction did not impede the Hindu and Muslim from returning to offices befitting their social position" the Christian believed he had gained entry to a socially superior scale and would not return to rural labour, and "not being able to complete his studies or get a job, prefers to remain idle, or offer his labour outside Goa" (Saldanha, quoted in Pinto 2007: 64).

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[70] The colonial encounter with Europe (understood as Britain) is seen as the start of the modern period in South Asia, a position that I find some what problematic. If this encounter with Europe marks the start of modernity, then surely it is the encounter of South Asia with the Portuguese, and through them the encounter with European sovereignty and legal frameworks, not to mention religion and cultural forms, must inaugurate early modernity in the sub-continent.

Pinto correctly assesses this concern with the challenge that was being presented to the Goan elite by the underclass that had migrated to Bombay. Once out of confines of the highly stratified environs of the Goan village these migrants began challenging the "natural" leadership that the Goan upper-classes had assumed in Bombay as well. They resisted the representation that the likes of Mariano Saldanha wrought of the Goan labouring class as illiterate, uncultured and immoral. These elite representations of the labouring migrant Goan Catholics included a disparaging treatment of the literary forms that were evolved in Bombay, including the *romance* and the *tiatr*.

The story of the *tiatr* is embedded in this politics of contestation as well as reform, and as a major form of Konkani cultural production, is salient to the history of the creation of a Goan modernity. With their migration to the city, the labouring Goan Catholic brought along the performance tradition of the *khell*, an impromptu form that encouraged and created a space for social critique. The *khell* seems to have been one of those markers of the Goan Catholic that was dismissively received by both Goan Catholic elite, as well as other communities in Bombay (Fernandes 2010: 45). It was to remedy this "lack of standard", a phrase that continues to be repeatedly used against the productions of the labouring Goan Catholic,[71] that the *tiatr* was formulated. The *tiatr* was created as a mix between the sentiments that inspired the *khell* and the Italian opera and Parsee theatre forms present in Bombay, in an active attempt to reform the tradition (Fernandes 2010: 159). In the course of listening to the discussions that the Roman script activists had, when they were with the *tiatrists*, I made note of an observation they made of a fomer *tiatrist*, C. Alvares. The *tiatrists* recalled the memory of C. Alvares, who sought to project the image of the *tiatrist* as a gentleman. These *tiatrists* recollected that he would insist that a *tiatrist* always be well dressed, C. Alvares himself dressing in a proper suit (Fernandes 2010: pp. 142 -3).[72] Nevertheless, this impulse to "improve the standard" of these performances did

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[71] For example, in a brochure published by the Kala Academy to mark the Silver Jubilee of the *Tiatr* competition, in 2000, I read a reference by the then chairperson of Kala Academy, the former Chief Minister Pratapsingh Rane, speaking of the need to improve the standard of the *tiatr* form; "...I sincerely wish it should become a powerful weapon for social awakening. The entertainment aspect has to be there, but we must remember that today's viewer is getting more and more intelligent. He does not like anything that is below standard" (Rane 2000: 3).

[72] Given that this thesis seeks to highlight the caste biases, and even forms of untouchability that impinge on the citizenship experience of the working class and lower caste Catholic, I would like to suggest, that C. Alvares' concerns with his sartorial presence were similar to that of the representation of the Dalit icon, Dr. Ambedkar, who is always being depicted in a suit. It has been pointed out that if Ambedkar had worn a dhoti, the typical response would have been to suggest that as a Dalit, this is what he would possibly have worn. The suit gains significance from the fact that "(b)y the canons of tradition and history this man was not supposed to wear a suit, blue or otherwise. That he did was a consequence of his extraordinary personal

not blunt the capacity to deliver biting social critique, and the *tiatr* grew to become a forum where social norms are upheld, as well as social critique delivered (Kale 1986).

This social critique seems to have been within the form of opposition, as well as response, to the sniffing Goan elite both in Bombay and Goa. In his review of the *tiatr* tradition, Rafael Fernandes points to the fact that the *tiatr* rarely ever criticised the Portuguese. While Fernandes points that this may have been a result of the Portuguese censorship, he suggests that the major reason may have been because the issues of social injustice that these plays focused on, were the "defects… inherited more from the local culture rather than imposed by the colonisers" (Fernandes 2010: 162). Indeed one of the tropes of critique in the *tiatr* has been the landlord, many *tiatrs* focusing on the romantic involvement between the landlord's daughter and the young man from a "humble background".[73]

The labouring Goan Catholics were right to sense that the attitude of the upper classes and the representations produced about them would place them in a subaltern position. Since Goan modernity was being defined in terms of a return to the authentic values represented by a brahmanical past, if you were not brahmin(ized), there is no space to return to, only a location where one was forced to replicate and hope for individual success. Following the emphasis by these early scholars on the "natural" link between the Devanagari script and the Konkani language, the use of the Roman script provided later scholars and activists, such as those involved with the Goan Catholics for Devanagari, one more plank on which to denigrate the literary and cultural productions of the laboring Goan Catholic, eventually confirming their subaltern location. These criticisms labelled the Roman script not only wholly inappropriate to the Konkani language because it was a "foreign" script unsuited to an Indian language, but also that the works contained in the Roman script were marked by a lack of standard.[74]

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achievements: a law degree from Lincoln's Inn, a Ph.D. from America and another one from England, the drafting of the Constitution of India" (Guha 2002). The vesting of Dr. Ambedkar in a suit should therefore be read as the memoralisation of the fact that one could escape the marginality that is impressed on the marginal and subaltern groups in India. I would like to suggest, that C. Alvares' concerns with his sartorial presence were similar to that of the representation of Dr. Ambedkar.

[73] "Humble background" is a euphemism not only for persons from the lower socio-economic strata, but also for those from a lower caste. Similarly, a "good background" invariably refers to people not merely from the higher socio-economic orders, but upper caste backgrounds.

[74] The argument that the literary productions in the Roman script do not have "standard" is the alternate basis on which awards are not presented to these works, but to works in Devanagari alone, effectively maintaining the hegemony of the Devanagari script.

As becomes obvious from the preceding discussion, the modern or nineteenth century story of Konkani, is one of fixing. It is a century when in an attempt to formulate their place in the British Indian modernity that was being structured in the subcontinent under British epistemological frameworks, the Portuguese-speaking Goan upper caste and upper class elite chose the frameworks of British India to write and understand their history. In doing so they chose to recover a glorious ancient past that was deemed to hinge on the Konkani language. Following this mode would allow them to approximate the manner in which local elites in British India were similarly engaging in social reform and the formation of linguistic sub-nationalisms. To follow this lead of the native British Indian elites would simultaneously also confirm their own elite status both in Goa and in British India. In doing so, they fixed themselves within a distinctly upper-caste frame that would delegitimize the processes under Portuguese colonialism that produced them as an upper-caste group, as well as those Catholics who did not share their elite status.

The way forward rested on a re-appropriation of an ancient heritage that was, however, restricted to upper caste groups alone. This idea later found resonance in the formulation of T. B. Cunha who labelled it the "denationalisation" of the Goan Catholic (Cunha 1961). Indeed, there is a distinct and remarkable similarity in tone between the formulations of Mariano Saldanha and T. B. Cunha. In response to an understandable lack of interest of the rest of the Goan Catholic groups, and their attempt to challenge the socio-political dominance of the Catholic elite, this elite produced the idea of the illiterate and uncultured labouring Goan.[75] These two ideas, of denationalisation and illiteracy worked to produce the larger frame that would in post-colonial times work to fix the citizenship experience of the Goan Catholic, and simultaneously limit the room for their "manoeuvres".

Having made this observation, and to draw attention to this issue of scales that this thesis seeks to focus on, I should also point out that the selection of Konkani as a Goan language was in fact a citizenship act for the Catholic elite, the language marking them off as a population group in their contest for local autonomy. This production of a language for a

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[75] Cristiana Bastos highlights that while the Portuguese-speaking Goan elite were able to also enter into the upper echelons of Portuguese society, they ensured that "otherness was not attributed to the local population and culture as a whole; only the lower classes and castes were seen as "other", decadent and unhealthy" (Bastos 2005: 29). This elite, was consequently not only able to enter the realms of the colonizer, and present, and see themselves as Portuguese, but also effectively restricted the definition of Goan-ness to encompass their lifestyles alone (Ifeka 1987). This is the process through which the distinctions, not only between castes, but between classes within castes, were perpetuated. The dismissal of *tiatr* and *cantaram* are contemporary continuations of these earlier strategies of distinction.

Goan people was no less of an act of citizenship for the metropolitan administrator Cunha Rivara who in imitation of British colonial models was casting his country as another modernising European colonial power.

Fixing Konkani as a brahmin tongue

If the first movement of narrating this segment of the political history of Konkani focussed on the role of the Catholic elite in fixing their place in modernity, the second movement must deal with the efforts of the Hindu elite, in particular the efforts of Wamanrao Varde Valaulikar. What is important to stress is that if the concerns of the Goan Catholic elite stemmed primarily from their relationship with the metropolitan Portuguese, and resulted from their imbrication in the processes of early modernity, the concerns of the Hindu-largely brahmin-elite were markedly different.[76] The Goan Catholic had been incorporated into the hierarchies of the Portuguese empire, and were integrated into metropolitan society (Perez 2012) even if in less exalted positions. The Hindu elite on the other hand, while crucial to the Portuguese *Estado da Índia* did not gain formal citizenship status, and the ability to hold public office until 1910.[77] As a result, their entry into colonial modernity did not share the same complexities as those of the Catholic elite, but were no less concerned with crafting a space for themselves within the modern world. One form that this concern took was the creation of a single caste, to be known as the *Gaud Saraswat* Brahmins, from the multiple related *jatis* that existed, and making the Konkani language a distinct feature of this group.

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[76] I would like to caution against too dramatic a reading of this statement. To suggest that their concerns were markedly different is not to suggest that the Hindu elites were abject subalterns. On the contrary, these elites, especially the brahmin groups were crucial to the continuing presence of the Portuguese state in India. brahmin families, such as the Mhamai Kamats, established themselves as traders, including the slave trade (see Mhamai 2004); Brahmins, like Suriaji Rao were indispensible to the functioning of the Portuguese state, some, such as the ancestors of Varde Valualikar, operated as ambassadors for the Portuguese state. Hindu elites, such as the Deshprabhus of Pernem who earned the title of Visconde, Krishna Govindraya Shenoy Dempo of the Dempo family who enjoyed the title of Baron, were titled by the Portuguese state. Close to the end of the Portuguese State in India, Vaikuntrao Dempo was also scheduled to be a representative in the Portuguese Parliament. Their concerns may have been different, but this is not to suggest that they did not have close connections with the Portuguese state, metropolitan elites, and native Catholic elite. I would also like to echo at the same time, the caution that Frank Conlon (1974) provides in his text, where he suggests against conflating the status and power of the elite families within these brahmin groups with the entire caste group, some of whose members were quite poor.

[77] Coutinho (1987: 131) quote from Antonio de Noronha's text on the Hindus and the Republic provides some context: "Till 1920 there was not a single Hindu primary teacher in Government schools with the exception of Marathi-Portuguese schools; today there are not only primary teachers among Hindus in Government schools, but also secondary teachers. And with the establishment of administrative autonomy, immediately after the establishment of the Republic we have already had Hindus in the highest political body of the territory – Government Council, Concelho da Governo, and now we have in the legislative council; Conselho Legislativo."

Born into a Hindu brahmin family, Varde Valaulikar has been constructed by the Konkani literary fraternity as *Shenoi Goembab*, the Father of the Konkani Language movement. This "civil society" recognition has subsequently been privileged by the Goan state that sought to mark and celebrate the centenary of his birth as *Konkani Asmitai Divas* ("Konkani Pride Day").[78] Despite the manner in which the official Konkani establishment has until recently ignored the signal efforts of a person like Msgr. Dalgado, Valaulikar may well deserve the credit the Goan state grants him. The scheme that Valaulikar identified has been crucial to the forging of the Konkani language project.[79] This project has identified Devanagari as the ideal script for the language, *Antruzi* as the finest form of the language, one that deserves to be the basis for the standard literary form, and also the state sponsored form. In the process it has also continued the twining of the brahmin (or brahmanical) self with the image of the ideal post-colonial Indo-Goan that first commenced in 19th century Goa by the native Catholic elite. To address these matters at this moment would be to rush ahead of the story, and Valaulikar cannot be looked at without reference to the political history of the language that was first forged by the Catholic, and Portuguese speaking, native elite of the *Estado da Índia*.

In his reminisces, Valaulikar is reported to have credited the Baron of Cumbarjua with inspiring him onto the task reviving Konkani as a language that would unite all Goans. Having written a Marathi-Portuguese primer *O Mestre Português,* he submitted it for approval to the Baron Tomás Mourão, who was at the time Inspector of Schools in Goa. The Baron was one of those enthusiasts who attempted to introduce Konkani into the school system of Goa, but found that they were stiffly resisted through the efforts of such

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[78] The similarity in tone to the phrase Gujarati Asmitai popularised by the Gujarati Chief Minister Narendra Modi, held responsible for the riotous assaults on Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 should be underlined (Yagnik and Sheth 2005).

[79] I should draw attention to the fact that I use the term "project" in the sense that Ramaswamy (1997: 22-23) has used the idea. Relying on the work of Nicholas Thomas, she uses his words to identify a project as a term that draws attention "not towards a totality such as a culture, nor to a period that can be defined independently of people's perceptions and strategies, but rather to a socially transformative endeavor that is localized, politicized, and partial, yet also engendered by longer historical developments and ways of narrating them" (Thomas cited in Ramaswamy 1997: 22- 23). I was particularly taken by this articulation primarily because it fit so neatly into my own understanding of the process that I was studying, and the manner in which I have conducted my study. For example, as my later discussion of embodiment and performance will demonstrate, I am uncomfortable with the idea of absolutely self-conscious and instrumental actors. Such a conceptualization of the individual that may fit into Enlightenment frames, fails to capture the impact that social systems have on the actions of the individual. What the term project seems to bring to theoretical conceptualizations, is a formulation where it is not just discourse that operates independently, but provides space for the agency of the individuals, who are not in themselves absolutely self-conscious instrumental actors, but also moved by forces larger than themselves and beyond their comprehension.

members of the Hindu elite as Suriaji Rao. As indicated earlier, Marathi had only recently been introduced into the school system and represented a significant win for the Hindu upper castes, who without opportunities for employment in public office within Portuguese India, rightly saw it as a means to gain employment in British India. Apparently still nursing these wounds of defeat, Mourão corrected Valaulikar that the *língua vernacular* (local language) of the Goans was not Marathi, as stated in *O Mestre Português*, but Konkani (Valavalikar 2003: 25).

The Konkani establishment's narrative dramatizes this correction as the moment when Valaulikar is said to have recognised his error and subsequently worked to develop Konkani. The project of Varde Valaulikar must consequently be seen as a continuation of, or at the very least inspired by, the intellectual concerns of the Goan Catholic elite.[80] Given his social location as Hindu, and his physical location in the British Indian city of Bombay for the large part of his life, his works were simultaneously also influenced by the trajectories of Indian nationalism. Indeed, it appears as if the secular compact that saw Hindu and Catholic elites stand for Konkani was the result of the efforts of Varde Valaulikar.

The smooth ease with which Valaulikar is represented in the hagiographies, as having recognised his mistake regarding the local tongue of Goans, erases the internal conflicts that seem to have wracked Goan Hindu, and particularly Goan Hindu brahmin society in those tumultuous years at the cusp of the twentieth century. This conflict is by and large erased not only due to the hagiographic mode employed by Valaulikar's biographers, but also because of the manner in which the operations of caste are erased by those consciously writing in the "secular" sphere. A visbilising of caste, I seek to demonstrate, makes much more obvious, not only the context within which Valaulikar operated, but also the "manoeuvres", or citizenship acts he effected that channelled his caste community into the space of civil society.

Varde Valaulikar is today recognised as a member of the *Gaud Saraswat Brahmin* (GSB) caste. This fact is often not elaborated, but once more this is because of the nature of secular writing that seeks to efface the operation of caste, and all reference to its operation

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[80] Sandra Lobo, via correspondence drew my attention to a possible gap in the narrative I have assembled in this chapter. She pointed out that the Barão was a Luso-descendente, whose project was frustrated precisely because of the lack of support from the native elite. A more comprehensive narrative of the political history of Konkani would require us to inquire in the conditions under which the native elite were more receptive to Konkani as a marker of Goan identity.

especially within the secular sphere of "civil society". While this caste is today dominant within Goa, by and large recognised as brahmin, and seen as a single block, this was not always the case. On the contrary the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a period when this caste was first consolidated through a unification process of "several related *jatis*" (Conlon 1974: 352).[81]

The unification process of "the *Saraswat*s" seems to have been motivated by a number of factors. The first was the need to consolidate a group as a number of migrants to Bombay from these *jatis* fought for securing employment options within the British Raj's Bombay Presidency. The idea was to forge a unity between groups that had some kind of linkages, to create support for the recent migrants to the city with the older established families already resident in the city of Bombay. "It was hoped that this would confer benefits to those already in the competitive urban arena and enable disadvantaged GSB families to gain access to education and employment" (Conlon 1974: 352). The need for unity itself stemmed from "the spill over of the debate in the nineteenth century that questioned the brahmin status of Gaud Saraswat brahmins" but in fact was premised on debates that reached further back into the early modern period (Desai 2002: 112; see also O'Hanlon and Minkowski 2008). In the nineteenth century, this challenge to these multiple caste groups came from the Marathi speaking *Chitpawan* brahmins who were a dominant group in the Bombay Presidency. This challenge to their brahmin status had not merely social, but economic implications as well, given that it marred their access to public office. Both these factors combined to provide an added impetus to coalesce and establish their combined brahmin identity (Conlon 1974).

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[81] It would be necessary to make some methodological clarifications that impact fundamentally on the discussion. While Conlon uses the word *jatis*, he explains the term with the use of the word sub-castes. This is an unfortunate use because the term sub-caste seems to suggest that all these *jatis* were merely the result of a break-away from an original mother-caste group - in this case, the "*Saraswats*". Indeed Conlon in his otherwise illuminating essay seems to fall into this cyclical error. While this is not the place to ruminate on the history and theory of the caste system, it would be worthwhile to contemplate the possibility that merely because various castes eventually banded together under a common name, and have a mythology to support it, it does not automatically suggest that they did the last, to the biases that weigh in the field of Indo-Portuguese studies, it should come as no surprise that the caste "histories" or mythologies of the "*Saraswats*" have been used rather uncritically to construct contemporary historical narratives. Take for example the manner in which Conlon suggests the "Various historical forces, most notably the Portuguese conquest of Goa, produced significant further migrations by many of the ancestors of the GSB" (Conlon 1974: 353). This bit of "history" is taken from Valualikar's polemic *Goemkaranchi Goembayli Vosnok*, produced in the context of inter-caste rivalries and cited in Pearson (1972). As such, it is as possible that the ancient histories and existence of the *Saraswats* acknowledged today may in fact be the result of invented traditions coined in the course of the nineteenth century (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

It was this peculiar situation that these migrants faced that forced them to identify the constituent features of their caste that would simultaneously assert for them a brahmin identity. The GSB was consequently marked out by features of clan (*gotra*), family deity (*kuladeva*), village, family and allegiance to a lineage of spiritual descent (*guru parampara*) of preceptors (*swamis*) (Bayly 2001: 75). Given the resistance the "*Saraswat*"[82] faced from the Marathi-speaking brahmins that dominated Bombay, it is perhaps little wonder that in a set of double moves, that combined 19th century western European epistemologies with the needs peculiar to a caste battle, these caste unifiers, identified their "mother-tongue" Konkani as another marker of the *Saraswat* caste. An example of such a combination would be the "scientific" efforts by Gunjikar and Sharma who in 1884 proposed the existence of a language called *Gomantaki* as the language of *Saraswat*s. This language was considered a form of ancient *Saraswat*i, and comparisons made to ancient Balabhasha, also suggesting that the most pure form of this *Balabhasha* was the speech of Goan *Saraswat*s (Desai 2002: 112; Wagle 1970 (a), (b)).[83]

Other scientific efforts that aided in this process was the introduction into the academic sphere of José Gerson da Cunha's *Sahayadhri Khanda*, a text that provided a brahmanical genealogy to this group and allowed the caste activists to claim that the various *jatis* were in fact sub-castes that had broken away for reasons of historical accident; from a single caste, once located solely in Goa. More significantly, as already pointed out earlier in this chapter, was that Gerson da Cunha's text *The Konkani Language and Literature*, which twines Aryan and brahmin roots to Konkani, and ties Konkani to the *Saraswat* caste was published in the Bombay Gazetteer. For reasons of being the official space for colonially approved ethnographic knowledge, publication of this text in the Gazetteer allowed persons such as Varde Valaulikar space for their own citizenship acts with regard to the Konkani language and creating the space for their caste group within the public sphere.[84]

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[82] I use quotation marks here to draw attention to the fact that the term *Saraswat* at this moment in time was still not used to indicate a member of the *Saraswat* caste as is commonly understood today.

[83] *Saraswati* and *Balabhasha* being language forms.

[84] Gerson da Cunha's work was in fact challenged, and it was precisely da Cunha's international status as a scientist that Varde Valualikar would use in the intra-caste battle for recognizing Konkani, not Marathi as the language of the *Saraswats*. See for example the extract from the English translation of Varde Valaulikar's *The Triumph of Konkani*:

"After taunting Pundalikbab, the next target of Raghunathbab's verbal cannonade is the illustrious son of Goa, Dr. Jose Gerson da Cunha of hallowed memory. Raghunathbab calls him by such expletives as "defiled Christian", "bigot" and "goanese"; and his excellent essay "The Konkani Language and Literature" is rubbished as a pamphlet; and his was an essay which was commissioned by the British Government and was acclaimed by scholars. From this we can gauge the enormity of Raghunathbab's sagacity. I doubt whether, in

This identification of Konkani as a group marker was unfortunately not without its own problems, and not only because of its linkages with the labouring Catholic groups. Marathi was the preferred language of the elite, mobile and urbanised families from these *jatis* who were already established in Bombay, and saw themselves as "*Saraswat*". Konkani on the other hand was not only seen as the language of the newly arrived lower status migrants from the villages of the Bombay Presidency and Goa, but also the name for the *jatis* they came from, especially in the Kanara districts of the Bombay Presidency.[85] Having arrived in the city, these migrants entered into conflict with these "first-class" brahmins, demanding the right to participate in the management of the temples of the families established in Bombay (Conlon 1974: 355).

With this information, it becomes obvious that the history of Konkani and the *Saraswat* caste is also a history of conflict between *jatis*, and the differing imaginations of themselves within the caste group. Indeed, until even after the efforts of Varde Valaulikar, Marathi would continue to be seen as the language of elites within these *jatis*, causing considerable conflict within the caste at the time of the language agitation in Goa. Take for example the fact that Laxmikant Bhembre, the father of the Devanagari stalwart, Uday Bhembre was a staunch supporter of Marathi as an official language for the state of Goa.[86]

It is in this larger context of the need felt for unification, and the opposition to this project that the work of Varde Valaulikar should be seen. A quick review of his biography will

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his entire lifetime, Raghunathabab will ever be able to just read and digest the research done and books written by Dr. Gersonbab on coins and ancient history. How can one reconcile Raghunathbab's ridicule with the acclaim earned by Dr. Gersonbab in Asia, Europe and America? Dr. Gersonbab is certainly not a religious fanatic; he is a large-hearted, virtuous scholarly Brahmin who, having been born in Goa, endeavoured to spread worldwide the glory of his motherland. And when Raghunathbab realises this, I am sure, he will be filled with great remorse" (Valavalikar 2003: 32).

[85] For those familiar with the social geography of the Kanara coast, such as Fr. Pratap, it is common knowledge that to be a Konkani in the Kanara coast is to refer to today's *Gaud Saraswat* Brahmins. In Goa, however, the term *Konknne*, is used to refer to all brahmanised Hindu groups, not just the brahmins. Flowing from the manner in which Konkani has been identified as the marker of Goan-ness, and the secular imperatives to overcome communal differences, a number of Goan Catholics, Fr. Pratap being one among them, choose to call themselves Konkani. On questioning him about the wisdom of this move, given that there is a slippage between *Konknne* and Konkani, Fr. Pratap indicated that indeed, there was no problem. These were too separate words, *Konknne* being a caste caste name, whereas Konkani is not. According to him, we can safely call ourselves Konkani and not be mixed with the *Konknne*. Interestingly, Desai points out that members of the *Saraswat* community settled in the USA use the term "Konkani" to refer to their particular caste group, that is, the *Gaud Saraswat* Brahmins of the South Kanara, rather than as a regional or a linguistic community. The Goan GSBs who live in the USA on the other hand, refer to themselves as Goan rather than Konkani, indicating a continuing distinction maintained by the related caste groups (Desai 2002: 86).

[86] An anecdote related to the difference of opinion within the same household may prove interesting. When Uday Bhembre was asked how he, a son of Laxmikant Bhembre could argue that Konkani was his mother tongue, when his father Laxmikant Bhembre argued for Marathi as his own mother tongue, Uday Bhembre is reported to have responded, "But don't you know that my mother, and my father's mother are not the same?"

bear out this fact. Conlon indicates that the *Samyukta Gauda Sarasvata Brahmana* [GSB] *Parisad* ("United Gauda Saraswat Brahmin Conference") was founded in 1910, and its energies eventually petered out by the year 1917. It revived itself for a conference in the year 1935, but was largely dormant in the rest of the period. However, prior to 1910, and even subsequently, the environment, both in Bombay city, the larger Bombay Presidency and the territory of Goa was charged with the excitement of this attempt at creating a single caste, as well as the challenges that were being presented to these efforts, both by those within the groups that the caste was trying to gather into itself, as well as those castes that were opposed to these related *jatis*.

Exploring the significance of the pen-name, Shenoi Goembab, that the young Varde Valaulikar chose provides an insight into the context within which his work emerged.

In her commentary on his life, Budkuley points out that one of the reasons for Valaulikar using Shenoi in his pen-name was to "herald to the world proudly the glory contained in the word "shenoi" which was often misconstrued or misinterpreted by *petty individuals for short sighted motives*" (Budkuley 2003: 17, italicised emphasis mine; see also Wagle 1970). What is being referenced to here is Valualikars's investment in the battle to gain respect for his caste in the face of the dismissal by other brahmin castes in the city of Bombay.[87] Similarly the second part of his name was connected with a slight he received on his migration to Bombay from Goa. *Goembab* seems to have been the manner in which the established "*Saraswat*" families in Bombay referred to the lower-class brahmin migrants to the city from Goa (Naik 2007: 8-9). Once again establishing coeval status with the "*Saraswats*" in Bombay appears to have been central to his life's project.[88]

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[87] A less hagiographic description of the text in which Valaulikar exhumes the honour of the term Shenoi points out that "the essay titled 'Shennai', which forms the main part of his collection of essays in Marathi, deals with the different brahmin sub-castes in Maharashtra and Konkan, in order to prove the superiority of the GSBs among all" (Desai 2002: ft. nt. 21: 94). In the course of proving his caste's superiority, Valaulikar is reported to have played on the *Dravida-Gaud* distinction. The *Saraswats* he argued were Gaud, and hence Aryan, whereas the *Chitpawan* and *Karhadas*, and *Dravida*, that is, Dravidian, brahmins and hence not quite up to scratch against the Aryan *Saraswats*. Consequently, it becomes obvious that Varde Valaulikar's adoption of the term Shenoi as a *nom de plume*, and his fight for its respect was not disconnected from the affirmation of caste superiority.

[88] Under this pen name, one of the many works he penned was the poem *Goenkaaracho Mumbaikaar* in 1910. In a tract *Shenoi Goembab: The Man who Resurrected Konkani* that was available online Budkuley wrote "It lampoons the presence, the hypocrisy and the ultimate misery of a man who pawns his self-respect and identity for petty pelf and false sense of borrowed grandeur, only to be disillusioned and chastened at the end" (Budkuley 2010). The poem is clearly mocking the Marathi speaking "*Saraswats*" of Bombay who refused to accept a Konkani identity. What is noteworthy is that in this process Varde Valaulikar, his biographers and commentators managed to normalise the idea of a single GSB caste not marked by internal hierarchies or distinctions. Secondly, in keeping with the racist and nationalist frameworks of the nineteenth

There is another episode that demonstrates the manner in which Valaulikar's work was part of a larger caste-battle aimed at securing a space for his caste-group in late colonial modernity. This episode was that of the school teacher in Bombay who "slighted *a particular community* in class, making irresponsible and disparaging comments about *the people concerned*" (Budkuley 2003: 24-25, italicised emphasis mine). What is relevant to the recounting of this incident is that subsequent to these comments, the young Valaulikar penned an essay, managed to get it published, and posted a copy of the publication to the teacher. By erasing all references to the castes involved, or the context of this comments and Valaulikar's response, his biographers have been able to use this episode to demonstrate his strength of character and dedication to the cause of truth. While these character traits may have been present, what is critical to this discussion is that it also indicates that the young Valaulikar was sufficiently aware of, and invested in the caste battles that animated the literate segments of the denizens of Bombay.

That Valaulikar's work was motivated by the caste battles that were being fought simultaneously both "within" the "*Saraswat*" caste and against other brahmin castes is obvious by a close reading of the texts he produced. A review of the work of his biographers and commentators does not provide any clue as to the audience he was largely addressing. Indeed, if one relies on these works then one is led to believe that the audience he was addressing was a secular "civil society". This audience was indeed "secular" in that because of the manner in which it drew on popular preoccupations with Aryan heritage and brahmanical roots and a space for the Goan in diverse public spaces, both in Portuguese, and British India, it eventually grew to incorporate Catholics from the "upper castes" and hence transcended a merely religious community. It meets the requirements of "civil society" in that this rhetoric was addressed to a larger audience in the public sphere. But this does not reveal the dominant constituents of this "civil society".

If one read's Valaulikar's works closely, scanning his logics for clues to the groups they would appeal to, one realises that the "civil society" that he was addressing was essentially

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century epistemologies, they constructed Goa as the original homeland of this Konkani caste. Finally, it asserted in no uncertain terms that it was Konkani alone that was the language of the *Saraswat* caste (and by extension of all Goans), and the use of Marathi being the result of misplaced sensibilities. Desai points out that Valaulikar simultaneously constructed Marathi as the language of the *Chitpawans* and *Karhadas*, the two major brahmin sects in Maharashtra, against whom the "*Saraswat*s" were pitted against (Desai 2002: 93-94). These early assertions of monolingualism and linguistic identity would nevertheless require more time before this suggestion could be matter-of-factly asserted, as is today the case.

a Hindu, and especially a brahmin audience, in particular the members of the *Saraswat* caste whose unification cause he was essentially furthering (Varde Valaulikar 2008; Varde Valaulikar 1985). The point that this discussion continues to attempt to make, is that it is this largely occluded caste context of Valaulikar's work that sets the stage for the conflicts that would mark the political history of the Konkani language, and the delineation of post-colonial Goa's civil society.

A good part of Valaulikar's writings that are translated into English were delivered in the context of a specific associational setting. He was involved with the establishment of, and subsequently the running of the Goa Hindu Association, a cultural association for the Goan "Hindus" of Bombay akin to those available to the Goan Catholics (Budkuley 2003). The most substantial of his works, *Goenkaranchi Goianbhaili Vosnook* ("The Travels of Goans outside of Goa") was originally a lecture delivered to a "public" audience hosted by the Goa Hindu Association and the *Saraswat Brahman Samaj*. The aim of this lecture series was to boost *Saraswat* pride and to create a history for this group fighting for place in the public spaces of the Bombay Presidency.

> Currently in Goa there is an on-going debate of whether one should take up a job or not, you should not jump into this debate and get washed away. You can call a job by whatever name, you can insult the job and say that it is not worth doing but even then it does not change the job or its content. If we Hindu Goans kick aside government jobs, then our Christian brothers will hold them in high esteem; even if they kick these jobs aside, we will have the Parsis from Mumbai or the Iyer-Iyengars from Madras come and take up these jobs and enjoy success. We will then not have the opportunity to get these jobs. (Varde Valaulikar 2008: 29)

Like other reformists, Varde Valualikar extols the brahmin community when they shed traditional prejudices and taboos to participate in the opportunities being opened by colonial modernity (Varde Valaulikar 2008: 30). More specifically, it encourages the younger generation of the *Saraswat* to follow their noble learned ancestors and challenge the idea that the *Saraswat* was backward in education (Varde Valaulikar 2008: 16; 13- 15; 23- 33). The setting of modernity that Valaulikar established then involved the rejection of traditional interdictions of a provincial community, an encouragement of entering into "modern" professions, especially those within Government service, and a stressing of the Aryan heritage.

From the discussion above it appears that one of the primary motivations of Varde Valaulikar's work was the promotion of the cause of Saraswat unification. In the course of

this effort, he identified, following on the labours of other caste activists, Konkani as a significant factor. As was the case with other upper-caste activists in colonial British India, this caste mobilisation was not uninformed by nationalist ambitions, and already in the 1920s Varde Valaulikar seems to have also envisaged a time when Goa would be a part of free India. Still, he refused to directly address this nationalist cause and was more focussed on the issue of language as a caste issue. His argument in response to the question as to why he did not engage in the nationalist struggle was appropriately enough that "*even in linguistic issues there is a lot of politics*" (Budkuley 2003: 84, italicised emphasis mine).

Already in the early 1900s the imagination of a free India comprising various linguistic homelands was an ideal in circulation. As was already pointed out in the second chapter of this thesis, the Indian National Congress, that had been established in 1885, had to amend its organizational structure to accept principle of linguistic division as a fundamental organizational feature under pressure from linguistic nationalist groups, a trend that first commenced with the establishment of the Andhra Mahasabha in 1910 (Mitchell 2010: 38). The recognition of the linguistic principle resulted in the formation of Pradesh Committees based on language groups, resulting in the setting up, not only of the Andhra Pradesh committee, and those for the Tamil language, but also the Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee in 1924 (Nair 2011 :54).

In this situation, where it seemed clear that the future of an independent India would involve the creation of civil societies marked by the dominance of one language within the space of that particular civil society, it is no surprise that Varde Valaulikar, in the context of the caste battles in colonial Bombay, chose to stress Goa as the space of Konkani and consequently of the *Saraswat* caste who were the exemplars of this language:

> My words would, of course, be those of a Brahmin, an intelligent and cultured person, but they must also be those of a labourer i.e. they should be intelligible to a rustic and ignorant person. Even children should not find them difficult to comprehend. (Naik 2007: 19)

Given the nature of the debate that was concerned with marking out the difference of the Konkani speaker, it was not long before the idea of a separate homeland should also have emerged. Though Varde Valaulikar may not have been the first person to articulate it, given his centrality in the imagination of Konkani language activists, he is regarded as having first come up with this idea. Subsequently, Pereira points out, the idea of a Konkan state, as a *Sagari Pranta* or "Maritime Province", was articulated by a prominent lawyer

from Karwar, Madhav Manjunath Shanbhag. This concept was later elaborated by "Kakasaheb Kalelkar …, but was first presented in cogent intellectual terms by George Mark Moraes …, whose arguments were reinforced by the fervent rhetoric of Bhaskar Anand Saletore …" (Pereira 1992: 20-21).[89] Among these many activists, it is Madhav Shanbhag who is important to my narrative of the political history of Konkani for another significant reason.

Shanbhag was another of the activists who had been involved in the caste unification process. Impressed by Varde Valaulikar's efforts Shanbhag supported him, and together, worked to establish the Konkani Parishad (Konkani Conference). Founded in 1939, it held its first convention in the same year in Karwar, Karnataka. What should also be remembered is that this Konkani Parishad was held in the context not only of the recognition of the linguistic principle for organisation of the Indian National Congress, but also of the establishment of the Kannada Sahitya Parishad in 1915. This Parishad was committed to the idea of *karnataka ekikarana* (consolidation of Karnataka as the space of Kannada speakers). Conducting its first conference in Bangalore in 1915, the Parishad followed a pattern, latter taken up by the Konkani Parishad, of conducting its annual meetings at different locations in the Kannada speaking areas (Nair 2011: 61). Similarly the *Saraswat* Parishad also moved the location of its conferences, being one way to attract the interest of those who could not afford to travel to a single fixed location. What should be also stressed is that these strategies, as well as the forms that the conferences would take, were also drawn from the patterns of the early Indian National Congress, and other national public interest associations that formed civil society, both in the colonial period, and later the post-colonial period.

In her discussion of the developments of the demand for a Karnataka state, Nair points to the fact that caste was recognised to play a not insignificant role. The demand from the 1940s to create a Karnataka state around the state of Mysore was recognised to be a move that would privilege the Lingayat caste over the Vokkaligas who had dominated the Mysore state (Nair 2011: 53). There were also other caste considerations at play, as Desai

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[89] Both Madhav Shanbhag and Bhaskar Anand Saletore, are as evidenced by their surnames, from the North Kanara region of the former Bombay Presidency. In his work, Desai suggests that in the case of the Mangalore GSBs like the Pais, the need to "counter the hostility of the regional brahmin groups such as the *Shivallis* and also to consolidate the forces scattered in different states" made them work toward "promotion of Konkani as a symbol of their identity, and Devanagari script as the distinct Aryan heritage to which they had claim" (Desai 2007: 245). It is in this context of inter-caste rivalries, that the support for the *Sagari Pranta* as a bastion of Konkani (read *Saraswat*) interests should be seen.

points to in his discussion of the politics of script in Goa (Desai 2002). He highlights that the Konkani-speaking brahmin caste groups had to deal with "the hostility of the regional Brahmin groups such as Shivallis", who are a Kannada-speaking brahmin caste, and used Konkani as a way to consolidate their forces that were scattered in different states (Desai 2002: 245). Given that this consolidation twined with the earlier project of establishing their brahmin-status that seems to have always been contested, this project of consolidation made them work toward "promotion of Konkani as a symbol of their identity, and Devanagari script as the distinct Aryan heritage to which they had claim" (Desai 2002: 245). As should be obvious from this discussion, the Konkani Parishad did not emerge from a *tabula rasa*, but a field that was fraught with challenges.

At its first meeting in Karwar in 1939, this convention a five-fold programme was focussed on, which included "Striving to create a uniform standardized language, and; Adopting the original and natural Devanagari script for Konkani" (Budkuley 2003: 69).[90] In his work on the politics of script in the Konkani language, Narayan Desai points out that this decision roughly coincides with the period of insistence on Hindi and Devanagari as a part of Indian nationalist struggle (Desai 2002: 88). It is not merely the insistence on Hindi and Devanagari that framed the nationalist opposition to Imperial British rule, but the insistent linking of Devanagari to Hindi as well (Rai 2001). Indian modernity was being cast at the national level in Sanskritic terms, and this trend was being followed by sub-national movements as well. The Devanagari Konkani activists of today, refer to this resolution of the first convention when suggesting that the decision as to the script for Konkani was fixed by consensus. The consensus is easier to argue, for reasons of the presence of Catholic activists in this convention and other efforts by this group. After the preceding discussions, the unspoken caste interests and locations of these Catholic representatives should be obvious, allowing the consensus produced to be recognised as one of a definite caste group in its attempts to secure a space in the modern order.[91]

It was much more than mere caste affinities that produced this conversation between the two elite groups. The ability to see the Hindu *Saraswat* as a fraternal other was made

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[90] The entire five point programme included "1. The unity of the Konkani people; 2. Reviving the zest and the lost love for Konkani; 3. Striving to create a uniform standardized language; 4. Adopting the original and natural Devnagri script for Konkani; and, 5. Developing and disseminating the Konkani literature and culture" (Budkuley 2003: 69).

[91] While the unanimity of the consensus in Karwar is often harped upon, the fact that a similar resolution to the effect was opposed in the second Parishad at Udipi in 1940 is almost never mentioned (Desai 2002: 286 - 87).

possible as a result of the choices, discussed earlier in this chapter, made by the Catholic elite in the early 19th century to adopt the epistemological frames dominant in British India. These frames now came to dictate their view of the world, enabling them to see the *Saraswat* as fraternal, and themselves as the orphaned prodigal of this family owing to casting themselves as being torn from the harmonious pre-colonial state of nature by virtue of their conversion to Christianity. The colonial era sentiment only grew stronger in post-colonial times deepening the desire of this elite to correct historical accidents and return to the "mainstream". In later times, and especially after the integration of Goa into the Indian Union, this would facilitate the successors of this Catholic elite to be satisfied to play second fiddle to the agendas articulated by the *Saraswat* and brahmanised Hindu interests.

This playing of second fiddle was obvious to me for example in the course of my fieldwork among the members of the Goan Catholics for Konkani. Their caste location allowed them to see themselves as members of a larger brahmanical community, but because they were Catholic, they were lacking not merely in legitimacy, but also in the spirit that could allow them to lead. As a result, following the lead of the Hindu (and brahmin) groups was the only possible option for them. This loss of the ability to legitimise one's presence and automatically see oneself as leader can be traced directly to the manner in which the colonial Catholic elites took up the orientalist cultural argument against Portuguese colonialism and metropolitan dominance. A strategy that cast other economic critiques into secondary status, it also elevated the Hindu brahmin self to the position of the authentic voice of the people, a position that the Catholic Brahmin elites may have been able to lay claim to, but ultimately lay outside of themselves.

The manner in which the Catholic Brahmin was encouraged to think of themselves as fraternal of the Hindu brahmin was made obvious to me in the course of three incidents in the course of my fieldwork that I will now recount. In the first case, I met a former colleague from Higher Secondary School who perhaps in jest, asked me if I didn't know of any Catholic Brahmin girls whom he could marry. On asking him whether he, a Hindu would marry a Catholic, this friend responded, "*Arrey* Jason, Catholic or Hindu, we are all brahmins no?" Having entered into the terrain of our common brahmin-ness, another remark he made that struck me, was his say "We, were born to rule this state". To refer to a theoretical thread that runs along this thesis, I would like to point to the way in which familial relations, in this case through the commonality of caste, are indispensible toward constructing space for associational forms in the *citizenplace*.

The second occurrence I would like to recount, once again refers to the manner in which a common brahmin identity is constructed. The background to this incident is my presence in a village-activist group that had sprung up in about 2008, like many other village-activist groups agitating against the land-use changes that were proposed, land-uses that would convert large swathes of agricultural land into residential land, open for real-estate development. These groups were also demanding greater power to the village *panchayats*[92] through the collective body of the *gram sabha*[93] on land-use decisions. In this context I was dining with an associate of this group after a particularly exhilarating meeting. Perhaps because alcohol had lowered our defences, or because of the camaraderie that had been produced in the course of that meeting, this associate leaned across to me and suggested that "We who wear the thread, have to stick together". The reference was of course to the sacred thread that Hindu brahmins wear across their chest. What this associate was suggesting, was that despite the fact that I did not wear a thread, and was Catholic, I was still brahmin; and "our" interests were still similar, in the face of the aggressions by other caste groups.

The third and final event I would like to recall is one that took place via a telephone conversation with another activist, one who was playing a significant role in these same agitations, whether against the Regional Plan, or the fight against the creation of Special Economic Zones. Calling me in the context of one of the op-ed columns I had written that took a rather anti-brahmanical position, he eventually asked me, "Tell me Jason, are you *Saraswat*?" What is important to note, is that he did not ask me if I was brahmin, rather he suggested that in addition to possibly being brahmin, I was also, like him, *Saraswat*. Since this activist is one of those younger *Saraswat*s who rest their activist credentials on being leftist and secular, he explained his question to me, saying that if I was *Saraswat*, then just had been the case with him earlier, the excesses that we embark on in our youth are excused, since the excesses are seen as produced by "one of us" who is impassioned now, but will come around later on.

All three incidents demonstrate the manner in which a brahmanical compact is constructed across religion, to involve and include the Catholic in a brahmanical power formation that seeks to hegemonize the *citizenplace*.

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[92] Village *Panchayats* are organs of local governance.
[9393] The *gram sabha* is the general body of all voters within a village *panchayat* area.

With these background in place, I would now like to return to the example of Fr. Constantino presented in the prologue to this chapter. In this incident, Fr. Constantino seemed to take pleasure in the recognition awarded to him by Budkuley. This pleasure, it seemed to me, was similar to that displayed by the other priests when they were praised, and recognised, for the role they were playing in the Konkani language movement. The fact that it came from the font of authenticity that the Hindu, and especially the Hindu brahmin represented, seemed to be the cause of this pride.

A number of these sentiments are also plainly visible in the Presidential address to the third Konkani convention, by Armando Menezes, a prominent Catholic man of letters. Menezes begins by apologising to the gathering for addressing them in English. He pleaded that his cultural location that privileged Portuguese, had resulted that the language that ought to have been his mother-tongue, was not so in fact and neither did he have a comfortable command over it. Having made the argument typical to men of his generation, that despite being acknowledged as being comfortable in various European languages by others, he argued that;

> … whoever may have been deceived or content, I was myself never content or deceived. I had from the earliest years felt in me a peculiar uneasiness, which I very slowly began to distinguish as a creative urge clamouring for self-expression; and for all I did, wantonly or ignorantly, to dissipate it in critical energy, that creative urge would not be silence or appeased …. It is in the throes of that terrible birth that I turned wistfully towards the mother-tongue and realised that I was her orphan. The guesture was naïve and desperate, unpreoccupied with social uplift, uncomplicated by political aims. It was simply the instinctive guesture of the child turning towards its mother … (Menezes 1976: 84)

One can hear in this statement of deprecation the echoes of the ideology famously articulated by Herder. To remedy this situation he went on to argue, continuing in the footsteps of Herder, that there was a need to create a system that would allow people to develop the language, subsequently confessing that,

> I am afraid I was one of the most responsible for compromising on the Roman script for Konkani, in the hope of weaning my Christian countrymen back to their mother-tongue. But I was convinced even then that the chief stumbling-block to the unification and systematization of Konkani was the script; and that the Devanagari was, logically, the only script for Konkani; so I was glad to hear Mr. Shanbag, a Kanarite and therefore presumably more interested in the Kannada script, agree with Mr. Valaulicar on this vital question. (Menezes 1976: 86)

What is fundamental to understanding the priorities of the group of upper class Goan Catholics, is Menezes' indication that the "political hopes implicit in this unification of Konkani do not interest me. My interest is, as it ever has been, linguistic, literary, cultural" (*ibid.*: 88-89). For the Catholic elite like Armand Menezes, it appears that "politics" was not the issue; culture, or finding space for themselves in a rapidly changing world was. One sees in this statement, the same distaste for "politics" that is later demonstrated by the leaders of the Konkani language movement, and is a feature of the operation of civil society. Beyond this distaste for the political, that would have come easily for a group of men who were well inserted into the elite rungs of colonial and nationalist India, it becomes obvious that in the international atmosphere that stressed authenticity, and the national that stressed "Indian-ness", there was an urgency in gaining the accoutrements of authentic Indian-ness that they believed they had lost.

The establishment of the Konkani Parishad, that Menezes was addressing, ensured a number of gains for the Konkani activists. It engendered the establishment of a number of Konkani language institutions, not least of which being the Konkani Bhasha Mandal. Other organisations were similarly established, with the Konkani Sahitya Samithi, founded in 1944, in Bombay; and the Konkani Cultural Association in 1965. Another Konkani Bhasha Mandal was founded in Mangalore in early 1974. With the integration of Goa into the Indian Union, in 1961, a Konkani Bhasha Mandal was founded first at Margão (SarDessai 2000: 11). Subsequent to Goa's integration into the Indian Union, these institutions, and especially the Konkani Bhasha Mandal in Goa, would play active roles in introducing the Konkani language into the governmental school system. The other significant factor was its ability, through using the logic of caste interests to attract members from the Catholic dominant castes and present the Konkani language movement and agenda as being secular.

These processes while fixing a space for the elites from Portuguese-Goa within the larger world framed by the epistemologies governing the hegemonic colonial order, had its impact on the marginalised, and in this process subalternised groups in Goa. The impact of the collective activities of both Catholic and Hindu elites was to affirm that Konkani, and more particularly a Sanskritised Konkani in the Devanagari script, was the unique linguistic marker of the Goan, and that Goa was the home territory of all those who spoke Konkani, or were part of the Konkani identity. This process would have been unproblematic had there in fact existed a single Konkani language, spoken uniformly

across the territory of Goa, or outside of it in spaces along the west coast of India. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

In the Goan context, in a situation that largely continues, and in fact can be said to give rise to the problem that this project studies, each caste group or community has a version of the language peculiar to itself. These languages also vary according to the region in which it is spoken. As a result accents to the language mark the geographical home of the speaker, indicating whether they are from, for example, Mangalore, or Karwar, outside of Goa; or Bardez, Salcette or Pernem, within Goa. Similarly, based on words used, one can identify the speaker's social location, whether they are Catholic or Hindu, brahmin, *Gauddo* or any other caste. Indeed, as in other parts of South Asia, an insight particularly relevant to this study, language is not merely a medium of communication; it is also a medium of signification and social codification and more importantly a marker of social location. Consequently, based on one's self-perception, one could either try to retain one's tongue; to demarcate one's difference and social superiority over others, as indeed was the attempt of the *Saraswat*s; attempt to lose the markers of one's social location, as is the case of those Goan Catholics who today speak in English to their children, and attend Mass in English, rather than in Konkani; or attempt to copy or mimic another tongue, as is the case of those Goan Catholics, who form part of the group Goan Catholics for Devanagari.

This project of fixing ensured that by the time of the integration of Goa into the territory of the Indian Union, the idea that the language spoken by the Hindu brahmin was representative of an ideal was widely accepted. This acceptance, though, also included an acknowledgement that the forms of other groups were less than ideal. Where the adoption of Catholicism came to be seen as a distancing from "roots", the language of the Catholic, with its inflections of Portuguese words and syntax, was seen as lacking in multiple respects, as the subsequent extract demonstrates,

> It is not that earlier there was no literature produced in Konkani. Poems, tales, songs, dramas, news and discussions were being published in periodicals printed in the Roman and Kannada scripts for satisfying the needs of a particular class of people. Many booklets of various sizes dealing with the aspects of Christian religion were being printed in Roman and Kannada scripts. But nobody bothered to take a stand against this genre on the basis of principles, history or research. That language was somehow existing within the confines of a limited community without any communication and intermingling with other Indian communities. It did not possess even a semblance of a distinct identity. Its sole *raison d'etre* was the need of a particular group of people for communicating the happenings within

its confines. This necessity was silently doing its work. And nobody bothered to take notice and oppose it. That language did fulfill [sic] a need but in a disjointed way, devoid of any regular structure; it had forgotten its ancient kinship with other Indian languages. It would try to imitate such European languages as Portuguese and English without rhyme or reasons, unnecessarily borrowing their terminology and even their syntax. But now, upon being aware of its separate identity, when it tried to move out of the nooks and kitchens of the humble sheds of illiterates and semiliterate people and, having found its ancient roots and moorings, began to savour the elixir therefrom, when it started to walk the ramp in its natural and rightful Devanagari attire like a beautiful model, her detractors, being engulfed by envy and plain scurrility, recoiled to oppose her. (Naik 2007: 42-43)

The point of this unusually long extract is to demonstrate the manner in which the language forms of the labouring Catholics (since it was these groups who primarily produced literature and theatre in Konkani) was dismissed. To be sure, both these versions of Konkani were attempts at inserting their groups into modernity. If the endeavour of the labouring Catholic was to couch their participation in the terms of the language, and in participation in the cultures that they encountered, the efforts of the elite Catholics was to stress purity and a return to a past. It is obvious that if the position of the labouring Catholic failed, it was because it did not meet the larger requirements of dominant epistemologies that privileged racial and simultaneously cultural purity. This, the labouring Catholic could not provide, either in terms of a cultural purity, or in terms of sanguinary pedigree, setting the stage for their subalternisation. This subalternisation, and their subsequent push into political society, would mature in the creation of a democratic polity in Goa, and the legal determination of the contours of Goan (and Konkani) civil society, a trajectory that will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Summation

This chapter began with a reference to the importance of roots; as such, the consequent discussion laid out the search for, and the creation of roots of two elite groups in Goa, the native Catholic elite, and the dominant Hindu brahmin caste in the territory. What should be obvious is that the trope of the historical accident is common to both these searches, and the accident both refer to is the entry of the Portuguese. While in the case of the Catholic elite this entry marked their removal from the authentic national community, for the Hindu brahmins, this was interpreted as the major reason for their "diasporic" spread across the subcontinent. In both cases this search for roots and the focus on the historical accident led to an assertion of the territory of Goa as the space for their autonomy, whether from the

metropolitan Portuguese or from other Hindu brahmin dominant castes, with Konkani being created as the definitive linguistic marker of this space of autonomy.

In the context of this discussion, I would like to suggest that this search for roots, and the assertions that accompanied this search, were citizenship acts for the individuals and groups associated with them. These were acts that sought to increase the space for the manoeuvres that these individuals and groups sought within colonial society. What is interesting about these citizenship acts is that they were able to be realised as a result of a series of twinings. The first of these were the twinings between the agendas of the elite native Catholics and the Hindu brahmins. One, without the other, would not have been able to so successfully lay the ground for the civil society space that they founded. Secondly, this space was also made possible thanks to twining between the epistemological frameworks of Portuguese India, and British India. This twining within the confines of the orientalist and orientalised international and proto-national intellectual frame that, saw peoples as being constituted by their languages, and in the subcontinental context privileged brahmanical authenticity was what allowed for this language, and the Sanskritised and brahmanical dialect in the Devanagari script to be accepted as the linguistic marker for the Goan polity and nascent *citizenplace*.

If this fixing was a citizenship act for these Goan elites, it considerably restricted the space of civil society for non-elite categories of the Goan population, in particular, the labouring Goan Catholic. This was because the brahmin self was seen as the ideal figure that had to be incarnated in the autonomous space that was being created. The implications of this move will become more obvious in the subsequent chapter that deals with the manner in which this colonial period civil society was recognised by law in post-colonial Goa.

Chapter 4
The Konkani *Munis*

Gham' kaddunk Pavlu ani khaunk mat Panddu – Fr. Pratap Naik S.J.[94]

Prologue

John Mendes[95] is an activist for the recognition of Konkani in the Roman script. Formerly a member of the committee of the Dalgado Konkani Akademi, he was also the editor of a Konkani (in the Roman script) magazine called *Ugdas*. This magazine was one of the many initiatives that the Roman script activists had initiated to not only get the community to cohere, but also to promote space for persons, and especially younger persons to write in the Roman script.

On 17 January, 2008, I received a phone-call from John, sometime in the morning, inviting me to attend a Konkani poetry recitation session that he, as editor of *Ugdas*, was organizing at about half past three that afternoon, in Chinchinim in Salcette.

The session followed the usual pattern of such gatherings, where after a few preliminary words, the assembled poets were invited to declaim their poems in front of the assembled audience. John would introduce each poet prior, or subsequent to, their declamations. After about three poets had presented their poems, John came up and indicated to us in the audience that he was going to call on a young man who felt pride to be called a *Konkani munis* ("Konkani person"). He recounted how his friend Crystal, who was a lecturer at a local college and was also playing the role of the Master of Ceremonies, was going to stage a play in the college where she taught. It was while she was planning for this play, that this boy, a student in the institution came up to her and told her that he felt that come what may, he somehow had to be in on the play. The boy reasoned that he had to necessarily be included in the play because "*Hanv Konkani munis*" ("I am a Konkani person"). He is originally from Mangalore, John said, and pointed out that when we hear about Mangaloreans there is a certain joy that we feel, because they are originally from

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[94] Extract from Fr. Pratap Naik's key note address to the First Romi Sahityik ani Sonvskrutik Sommelon 20 -21 December, 2008. The phrase translates as "It is only Paul who sweats (or labours) and Pandu who benefits".

[95] All names of persons, the magazine and the village that feature in this prologue have been changed to protect identity.

Goa, a fact that the Mangaloreans also feel and take pride in this fact. He subsequently introduced this boy to the audience as Abbas.

Introduction

This chapter seeks to continue a narrative that was commenced in the earlier chapter, of a description of the process through which a civil society for Goa was built around the recognition of Konkani as the linguistic marker of the extent of the Goan polity. This chapter will narrate the post-colonial developments of subsequent to the initial framing of this project in the colonial period. This development took place through a process that can be mapped in four stages; first where Goa was ensured separate administrative status on the basis of its language being Konkani, and not Marathi, establishing language as the *raison d'être* for the territory, and its cultural community. Second, through civil society mobilisations that got the Konkani legibilized as a language officially recognised by the Indian state. Third, through the Konkani language movement where the Devanagari script was officially recognised as the legitimate script for the language; and fourth, the Medium of Instruction controversy where vernacularism was held to be a necessary attribute of the Goan citizen, expunging English and the "western" from the list of acceptable cultural attributes.[96] Each of these movements, I argue, constitute citizenship acts, demonstrating how the citizenship act is about the assertions of rights, of claiming political space, but not necessarily, as will be demonstrated, attuned toward justice for all, or indeed, equality in the political sphere.

This chapter is also about the citizen figure that got fixed. The space of civil society is, as has been discussed in chapter two of this work, created as the space for the operation of the unmarked abstract citizen figure. Who was this citizen, and what were the markings that were to be cast off, and what markings were invisibilised, or assumed necessary for this citizen figure? As Abbas's statement in the prologue above should make clear, the critical

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[96] This four part division of post-colonial time has been borrowed from the doctoral dissertation of Narayan Desai (2002: 119). I had earlier preferred a tri-partite presentation, excluding Desai's second phase that he called the movement for Education and Literary Status – 1967 – 1975. I did this since it was in the first, third and fourth moments alone when the Catholic masses were mobilized. In the period between the years 1967 – 75 what can be observed is the maneuvering at the Central level by those who went on to form the Konkani language establishment in Goa. However in light of my discussion of citizenship within the frames of civil and political society, I believe it makes sense to include all four of these moments to draw attention to the context in which the Goan Catholics experience citizenship.

marking of the denizen of Goan civil society was to be the Konkani speaker, or, the *Konkani munis*. But who was to embody this *Konkani munis*?

In this chapter I argue that the individual who embodies the *Konkani Munis* best is the Goan Hindu in general, but the Hindu *Saraswat* brahmin in particular. This fixing has resulted not only from colonial era articulations, but also from post-colonial Goan and Indian politics that I discuss in this chapter. A discussion of this post-colonial history provides the context within which the labouring, and marginalized caste Catholics in particular have been subalternized, and effectively cast out of the realm of civil society, into that of political society. Drawing from my earlier discussion of Inda (2005: 11) I do so to demonstrate the exclusion of these Goan Catholics have been materialised in very concrete ways.

Expunging the Muslim

Prior to launching into the narrative that forms the meat of this chapter, there is one observation that I need to make. I should make it clear that it was only through the representation of Abbas's words by John Mendes that I heard of the term *Konkani Munis*. Nowhere else in the duration of my fieldwork, did I come across this term, not even when attending functions of the Konkani Bhasha Mandal. It is my assumption therefore that Abbas may have made up the term while arguing for a place in the play that was to be performed. While he may have made up the term, what is clear is that he did so from within a particular cultural context that privileges the Konkani language and the Konkani speaker as the privileged autochthon. The fact that Abbas is Muslim, and is not, as is popularly understood, of Goan "ethnicity" is central to the context within which the creation of this term should be read.

Thanks to the brahmanical framing of the history of Goa, a circumstance beholden to the adoption of orientalist tropes by the Goan elite, the territory is seen as the land of its Hindus and Catholics with Hindu pasts. Muslims are largely excised from this construction of the Goan polity, irrespective of whether they have lived in Goa for generations, or whether they have migrated from the neighbouring state of Karnataka, as have apparently, the family of Abbas.[97]

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[97] I do not say completely excised, but largely, because there is some space, albeit marginalized, where the Muslim is represented as a part of the Goan polity.

An excellent example of this marginalized position awarded to the Muslim in Goa is available in a mural in the gallery of the Ravindra Bhawan in Margão. The Ravindra Bhawan, a complex of auditoria designated for cultural performances in the city of Margão was the location of a number of the ceremonies that I attended while engaged in fieldwork. On the wall of one of its galleries, is the depiction of the Goan polity. Reading it from left to right, one sees the depiction of the Hindu community followed by the Catholics, and finally the Muslims. What is interesting about this mural, is not only the fact that these three groups are placed in this particular order, but that the space awarded to them is graded apparently based on their percentile composition of Goa's population. Consequently, the Hindus have about sixty percent of the space of the mural, the Catholics around thirty percent, and the Muslims are squeezed away in the end with about ten percent of the space.[98] The percentile increase of the Muslim population in Goa is seen as a threat to the traditional composition of Goan society by both Catholic and Hindu groups.

Of greater interest to the discussion in this thesis, however, is the fact that I found Sandesh Prabhudesai, one of the younger Hindu members of the pro-Devanagari group, making an impassioned speech at a discussion I was chairing, about the threat that the increase of Muslims posed to Goan "society".[99] While the argument he was making seemed innocent, it was in fact an exercise in clever rhetoric. Thus, he suggested that even though the composition of Muslims in Goa's population has grown by 8 times, as compared to the Hindu growth rate that is a mere 2.5 time; "in reality, this 'eight times' is hardly from 11,000 to 92,000". Consequently, he submitted that "the growth in overall Muslim population is merely from 2% to 7%." Through this rhetoric he was able to suggest that Goa was being overwhelmed not by Muslim in-migration into Goa, but by Hindu in-migration.[100] Despite having seemingly exculpated the Muslims, Prabhudesai also marked the migrant Muslim as the bearer of the communal "virus" when he suggested that

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[98] An image of this mural can be viewed at http://www.artandculture.goa.gov.in/ the website of the Art and Culture Department of the Government of Goa, where it forms the banner at the top of the website.

[99] Please note that I use the term society here, as opposed to my preferred term of polity. Society, being the phrase Prabhudesai used. Like other figures associated with the Konkani language movement, Prabhudesai too is lauded as being a secularist. This probably stems from the fact that in his youth, Prabhudesai was a student activist, married outside of his *Saraswat* caste, and has been actively engaged in movements acclaimed as being secular. The problematic nature of his secularism is perhaps demonstrated in my discussion of his presentation.

[100] In posing these figures, I would argue that what he was doing was while preparing the ground for raising the spectre of a Muslim invasion of Goa, he was also simultaneously stoking the Goan Catholic fear of being reduced to a unimportant minority within Goa as a result of "Indian" in-migration. As I will discuss later in

"[i]t is a fact that the outsider Muslim (73,742) has outnumbered the original Goan Muslim (18, 468) due to which the culture of outside Muslims has started becoming dominant among the Muslims. It is an issue that needs to be addressed by the original Goan Muslims immediately, rather than spreading communal virus against them" (Prabhudesai 2008: 23-24).

It is within this context of being cast as the outsider, and the potentially dangerous outsider, that I would like to suggest the possible crafting of this phrase by Abbas. Perceiving the extent to which the Konkani language is seen as the mark of the Goan citizen, this phrase was an attempt by Abbas to create belonging within the Goan polity for himself. In this process, he demonstrates the power of the imagination of Konkani as the single feature that creates the Goan *citizenplace*.

Fixing Goa's secular culture I: The Opinion Poll

The Konkani language movement took on a renewed vigour and became a significant marker for the development of citizenship within the territory subsequent to the integration of Goa into the Indian Union late in 1961. It was in this post-colonial period, that the dominant-caste consensus discussed in the previous chapter, a consensus that existed largely outside of political power, came to be converted as the basis for admission into civil society.[101] The period subsequent to the integration of Goa into the Indian Union posed a unique question for the territory. Would it be merged into the larger state of Maharashtra, or would it, based on earlier assurances from Nehru remain a distinct unit? [102] There were various forces pushing for merger both within the state and without. From outside the state were the forces of Maharashtrian pride that, motivated by the principle of linguistic division of states, sought the integration of the territory as part of other attempts

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this thesis, stoking this fear is fundamental to the Konkani establishments securing of the support of upper-caste and elite Goan Catholics.

[101] What I am suggesting here is that a civil – political society distinction is formed after a particular sensitivity is enshrined as the marker of state culture; or in the Indian case, of its modernity. This is not to suggest that these Konkani language activists did not form a nascent civil society of sorts prior to the post-colonial period. That they did is evidenced by the fact that their rhetoric is clearly marked by a sense of superiority to the other Konkani speakers and sought to establish a pedagogical relationship with them. Furthermore, it needs to be recognized that they were able to situate themselves in this rhetorical position, because of the orientalist epistemologies that located brahamnical nativism as the high watermark of native society. What is crucial to understanding the process in which this distinction plays out, is that they were still not properly enshrined in this position through legal recognition; a recognition that emerged only gradually, to be sealed in the year 1987.

[102] Most recollections of the situation prior, and subsequent to the Indian action that annexed the former Portuguese territory to Goa are filled with references to Nehru's assurances that the distinct identity of Goa would be maintained and preserved.

to consolidate the Marathi speaking territories in the region (Esteves 1986: 69). These spaces included territories that it claimed from the neighbouring state of Karnataka.

Within Goa the demand for merger eventually came to be led by the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) or Pro-Maharastra Goan Party. This party was led by Bhausaheb Dayanand Bandodkar a snippet of whose personal history gives us an insight into the forces demanding merger. Bandodkar was born into a community of *devadasis* (or *kalavantis*) and associated temple artistes that had recently, in the late nineteenth century reinvented itself as the *Gomantak Maratha Samaj*. Making his fortunes as a business person with interests in the fledgling mining industry of the 1950s, Bandodkar, earlier a member of the Congress Party, was roped into the MGP when in the run-up to the first elections in the territory it had become obvious that the Congress was going to be a party dominated by the Hindu brahmin (or GSB) interest (Esteves 1986: 71; Kamal 1986; Joshi 1964: 1094).[103] The other party that had emerged in the newly post-colonial territory was the United Goans Party (UGP) led by Jack de Sequeira that by and large was dominated by Catholic Brahmins and Catholic landlords, and represented the interests of the Catholic elites and Hindu brahmin elites (Esteves 1986: 74).

The political developments subsequent to integration into the Indian Union provided an opportunity for political mobilisation of the various groups to contest *Saraswat* and other elite domination of the social and political spaces in the territory (Esteves 1986: 11). Thus the MGP in its electoral campaign relied on the energies of the Hindu *bahujan* groups and the support of non-brahmin and non-elite Catholics, and committed to an anti-landlord and pro-merger platform. It was the continued support of the *bahujan samaj* that would ensure the success of the MGP for the next decade and a half. This in turn created the circumstances that united both Hindu brahmins and members of the Catholic elite. As already discussed in the preceding chapter, this unity was already in earlier situations engendered through the logics of caste interest and the peculiarities of orientalist historiographies that marked Goa's 19th century.

For the *bahujan* groups a scenario dominated by the brahmin dominated Congress and the Konkani-touting brahmin meant the possibility of a continued suppression as had been the case especially in the New Conquests where the GSB operated as particularly hated

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[103] Perhaps most significantly, of the 18 Hindu candidates set up by the Congress, only six were non-brahmins.

landlord. A way to dilute this hegemony was to harness the energies of the brahmin-despising *Maratha* movement that had since the 19th century grabbed the Maharashtrian imagination.[104] The appropriation of the term *Gomantak Maratha* as the symbol through which the *kalavanti* community reinvented itself should give us some proof of the inspiration this anti-brahmin *Maratha* pride movement provided.[105] The response of the *bahujan* groups therefore, was to assert that it was not the *Saraswat* tongue Konkani that was their mother-tongue, but Marathi. As such, based on the logic of the linguistic basis of states, it was the argument of these *bahujan samaj* ideologues that Goa should be merged into Maharashtra and not remain a separate unit (Rodrigues et al 2004: 5535).

What complicated this scenario was the rhetoric employed by the pro-merger forces. The *Maratha* pride movement of Maharashtra was marked by a unique feature; it may have despised the brahmin, but it upheld the logics of brahmanism (Omvedt 2008). As a result, this anti-brahmin movement was unable to formulate a rigorous critique of the Hindu nationalism embedded in Indian nationalism. Consequently, this nationalism had developed an antipathy to the monolithically constructed non-Hindu, be it Muslim, or in the case of Goa, the Catholic. Indeed, Esteves reports that Y.B. Chavan, who despite being a Congressman, campaigned actively for Goa's integration in Maharashtra "referred to Goan Christians as 'Black Portuguese'" (1986: 83). He called the demand of the UGP for a separate state, a dangerous trend which "breeds fifth columnist tendencies", and questioned whether such a demand was consistent with nationalism (*ibid.*). As should be obvious from these words, Catholicism was associated with colonialism, and the pro-merger movement very often articulated anti-Catholic slogans alongside the assertions of Marathi. While sharing anecdotes from his life with me, one of the priests who is a member of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari recounted to me how after the Indian action, there were groups of people who were transported in trucks and were raising slogans which suggested that it was now their *Raj*, that is, Hindu Raj, which would now prevail in Goa (see also Anonymous 1967: 129).[106]

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[104]For discussions on this movement and centred on the princely state of Kolhapur, see: Copland 1973; Mudaliar 1978; Zelliot 1970.

[105] Despite the role that this social group has played in being responsible for a variety of far reaching social changes in the Goan, and broader western Indian, context, there is a dearth of academic work focusing on this *jati*. Fortunately, one can look forward to some works by Parag Porobo, and Anjali Arondekar. There are also some interesting initial writings on the dynamics within this group by Rosa Maria Perez (2012).

[106] It was not just the groups involved in the battle for merger that engaged in this rhetoric. A perusal of reports from the period, academic or otherwise, will indicate how Catholicism was implicitly assumed to mould a person's loyalty towards the "colonial master", while Hinduism seemingly naturally created an

This association of Christianity with colonialism, and the Catholic with an inherent anti-national position sets the frame for the subaltern position of the Goan Catholics in general.[107] It limits their options and compels them, when fearful of being seen as anti-national; to act in a manner that is consistent with the frames of Hindu nationalism.

As a result of this anti-Catholic sentiment, while the non-elite Catholics may have voted the MGP to power in the first election, the same support was not as forthcoming in the mobilisations for the Opinion Poll. Furthermore, this anti-Catholic rhetoric that animated the demand for merger ensured that Marathi was permanently seen by the bulk of the Catholics in Goa as inimical to their interests. This fear drove the Catholic masses into the arms of the elite groups espousing the cause of Konkani. The UGP "asked the electorate to vote for the party so that their language, Konkani, may be encouraged and developed, its cultural heritage retained and Goa's unique identity and personality preserved instead of allowing it to be lost in the vast ocean of" Maharashtra (Esteves 1986: 75). On the other hand, the fact that the Old Conquest consistently returned members of the UGP to the Assembly, and vehemently supported Konkani, was read, and represented, by *bahujan* partisans of the MGP as proof of the pro-Brahmin and pro-*ancien régime* sympathies of the Catholics.

History subsequently points out that the meaning of "Konkani" as understood by each of these groups were in fact radically different. The pro-Marathi MGP partisans saw and represented Konkani as the language of the *Saraswat*s. The Catholic elite to a large part saw Konkani as the "native" tag that they could attach to themselves and perpetuate their control in the Old Conquests. Indeed, their understanding of Konkani was the brahmanical version that had been promoted by the *Saraswat* activists for Konkani. The Catholic marginalized groups on the other hand understood Konkani to be the language in which the *romance* were written, the language used in the *tiatr* and *cantaram*,[108] and the language used in for preaching in the Church. That there existed these wide differences indicates the

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empathy with India. Take for example the following extract: "The Hindus have always felt that their Christian Portuguese rulers were alien and that historically, culturally, and traditionally they belonged to India. The linguistic affinity with Maharashtra and the social and family relations with the people in that state also helped to keep alive this sense of being Indian. But the situation was quite different for the Goan Christians. Religion, of course, was principally responsible for this…" (Joshi 1964: 1095).

[107] For a first-person narration of this sense of siege and suspicion by the political establishment refer to Couto's plenary session address at the conference *Goa: 1961 And Beyond* (2011).

[108]*Cantaram* (plural for the singular *Cantar*) are the songs sung (largely in the *Bardezi* dialect) between scenes in a *tiatr*, usually bearing no relation to the story line of the *tiatr*, and invariably embodying some form of social commentary.

absence of a wider public that was in agreement as to the terms of the debate being conducted. Furthermore, that the Catholic labouring classes were persuaded to collaborate with groups whose understanding of Konkani was so widely divergent from their own understanding of the language and their interests marks the entry point of my argument of these Catholic masses as subaltern in the postcolonial order in Goa. In this situation, their political desire either found no voice, or was not comprehensible.

The primary route through which their participation was ensured was through fear. This fear was, and as my field research demonstrates continues to be, employed to hold Catholics within the Konkani camp and not challenge the "consensus" that has been built up regarding the contours of officially recognised Konkani. This was revealed to me in the course of my conversations with members of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari. Seeking to persuade me about the pointlessness and danger in the demand for the Roman script, this priest elaborated for me that his Hindu (brahmin) allies in the Konkani establishment indicated that the raising of the demand for recognising the Roman script would ensure that Marathi would once again be resurrected as an official language for Goa. "Look Father", their argument reportedly went, "for us there is no problem, we are comfortable with Marathi, but it will be your Catholics who will lose in the end". Presenting this fear of Marathi being hegemonic in Goa to the detriment of the Catholics, continues to remain, it appears, an effective way to secure the support of the Catholic elites for the Devanagari script, and prevent the raising of democratic dissent within this "imagined community" (Anderson 1989).

This fear is made all the more real because of the recollections of the incidents that occurred immediately after the integration of Goa into the Union, such as the incident recounted earlier in this chapter, where gangs of people roaming in trucks raised slogans suggesting a Hindu Raj in Goa. What should not be forgotten was that in this entire contest, both Marathi and the Konkani of the labouring Catholic groups, were tokens of subaltern groups contesting the markers of the hegemonic. That Marathi, the symbol around which the Hindu *bahujan* mobilized, found a voice, while the Catholic did not, is indicative of the value of the scheme of chains of subalternity that I argue should be adopted instead of a simple binary opposition between elites and subalterns. By virtue of being tainted by the foreign, the Konkani of the Catholic labouring groups was effectively pushed into a subaltern position of being unable to find representation.

The Central Government in Delhi saw an Opinion Poll as the only way to resolve the problem that had emerged in the territory of Goa. This Poll, held on 16 January, 1967, presented the people of Goa with two options, vote for Merger, or vote for separate administrative status. With the battle lines were largely drawn with the Catholics and segments of the GSB caste on the anti-merger side, supporting an identity based on Konkani, and the Hindu *bahujan* on the other supporting an identity based on Marathi, the result was a rather slim victory of 54% for the anti-merger forces, as against the 43% for merger on 16 January, 1967.

Fixing Goa's secular culture II: The backstage fixing of Konkani as a language

The Opinion Poll resolved the question of Goa's administrative status and provided a lull to linguistic politics for the next 20 years when the matter resurfaced in the form of the demand for the recognition of Konkani as the Sole Official Language of the state. In the meantime, the pro-Konkani forces had continued silently working to ensure that a framework for the construction of Goan identity within Konkani frames had been set in place. This was ensured by, among other things, introducing Konkani into the schooling system, an achievement managed through the networking of two pro-Konkani forces. The first was that of the *Konkani Bhasha Mandal* (KBM), based in Margão, and largely dominated by the GSB of that town, but also supported by nationalist minded dominant-caste Catholics. In particular was the support of the Correia-Afonso family, through the person of Pedro Correia-Afonso, who was the first President of the KBM, and the maternal uncle of one of the prime actors in the insertion of the teaching of the Konkani language into the school curriculum.

Before moving to this unfolding of history, there is a need to appreciate more fully the depth of the habitus of the Pedro-Correia household in matters of the thinking about Konkani, or vernacular culture, and the culture of the Goan Catholic elite. This thinking is captured perfectly in the words of Propercia Correia-Afonso, sister to Pedro Correia-Afonso. In the context of her colleague, the Hindu Professor Ramachandra Naique, she wrote;

> *Genuino Indio no pensar e no sentir, mas sem chauvinism; professor que é um verdadeiro apostolo, Ramachondra Naique tem muito que ensinar ao indo*

> *portuguez imerso nessa civilisação hibrida que nada produz. Vande Matram, camarada e mestre.* (in Couto 2004: 245) [109]

It was this thinking, among the nationalistically inclined Goan Catholic elite of the inability of their natal culture that engendered the goodwill for the propagation of the Konkani language. This elite were convinced that their natal culture had been too compromised by Catholicism and Portuguese, to create a genuine nationalism. Through the goodwill generated by these Catholics, the KBM was able to introduce teaching of the Konkani language in four local schools; the Loyola High School run by the Jesuits, the Holy Spirit school attached to the parish of the Holy Spirit Church, and two other convent schools in the city of Margão. The KBM helped train the teachers as well as produced books that would accompany the students as they graduated from the lower to higher grades (Botelho 2002: 222). This Konkani was the kind of Konkani that Varde Valaulikar has in the early part of the century promoted, the language of the brahmin (or the *Antruzi* dialect) and scripted in Devanagari.

That this Konkani, which clashed with the forms utilised both by the Catholic Church and the Catholics of the territory, should have been introduced almost without difficulty into Diocesan schools should not come as a surprise. First, as discussed in the earlier chapter and the discussion above, the Catholic elite had already been convinced in the past century of the error that their hybrid lifestyles constituted. As members of the pro-Devanagari forces demonstrate today, and their intellectual ancestors, such as Propercia Correia-Afonso, demonstrated earlier, their support for this Konkani was, and continues, to be seen as atonement for their lifestyles that failed to embody the nationalist ideal. When speaking to me of their opposition to the demand for the recognition of the Roman script, members of the group Catholics for Devanagari remonstrated that whether they knew to write in Devanagari or not was irrelevant, what was important was that it was the correct script and we should not be allowed to continue in our error.

A second reason that these members adduced for this support was to aid the younger Catholic generation to assimilate into "the mainstream". While "the mainstream" in the Goan case would be defined by the eventual identification of Konkani in the Devanagari

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[109] Couto (2004: 245) translates this as "A true Indian in heart and mind yet with no vestige of chauvinism; a teacher who is yet a true apostle, Ramachandra Naique possesses much that he can teach the Indo-Portuguese, who is immersed in a hybrid civilization which creates nothing. Vande Mataram, comrade and master."

script as the official language in 1987, given the contours of Indian nationalism, this mainstream was already fairly commonsensical.[110]

What has to also be recognised is that the Church was dominated by the upper-caste elite, and their thinking formed the habits of the post-colonial Church in Goa. It was also a thinking that was marked by a sense of siege, and having to find a way forward, both for the institutional church as well as the body of the community under the new dispensation. This sense of siege was generated in no small measure by the fact that the Catholic Church had officially been seen as part of the state mechanism in Portuguese-Goa, and was viewed with some amount of suspicion by the political establishment.[111] Furthermore, the rhetoric used in the run-up to the elections and during the campaigning for the Opinion Poll had convinced the Catholic Church of a need to appear more accommodating.

Another reason that facilitated this adoption of Konkani by the Catholic Church resulted from changes within the Church being wrought internationally as a result of the Vatican Council II. As is famously known, one of the many changes the Council ensured was a move away from the privileging of Latin in the life of the Church, to the adoption of the vernacular. In the case of Goa, this meant not only a move away from Latin, but Portuguese as well, and the enshrining of Konkani in the liturgical life of the local Church. I should emphasise that this movement of the Catholic Church was not removed from concerns with modernity. Most pertinent to my discussion, and an aspect that will be elaborated in a subsequent chapter, was the recognition of different "peoples" with their own peculiar customs, traditions, which had to be respected.[112] This gave rise to the relatively new concept of "inculturation" in the Church, where the "gospel values" were required to be "incarnated" in the local cultures. The problem, however, was that it assumed and privileged a position of authenticity, leaving little or no space for groups such

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[110] This common-sense is illustrated by the recommendations of the B. N. Jha committee set up by the Government of India soon after integration, to review the educational system, and to make it conform to the one generally followed in India. The recommendations of importance to my discussion are: first, that the medium of instruction at the primary level should be the mother tongue, and secondly, that Konkani, if chosen, had to be in Devanagri script (Botelho 2002: 222).

[111] The support of the Church in Goa for the *Estado Novo*'s claims to sovereignty over Goa and other parts of the *Estado da Índia Portuguesa* can be gauged from the pilgrimages to the tomb of St. Francis Xavier that it organized in the 1950s. One of the priests, who is an activist for the Roman script, recounted to me that as a native, and obviously nationalist, Christian, he found these displays deeply embarrassing.

[112] The process through which racist ideas associated themselves with ideas of anti-colonial nationalism has already been suggested in the second chapter of this thesis. While a discussion of the complex routes in which these ideas impacted the Catholic Church would require a separate work, do have reference to the work edited by Stanley (2003) especially the chapters by Lehmann (2003: 34- 53), Kalu (2003: 250- 277), Hastings (2003: 15- 33).

as Goan Catholics in any class location, whose cultures were seen as lacking in authenticity.

Significant in both these moves, those of introducing Konkani into schools, as well as shifting the language of ritual within the Goan Church, were the efforts of Fr. Vasco do Rego S.J. A Jesuit priest who gained his priestly formation in independent India, rather than Goa or Portugal, Fr. do Rego was also responsible for leading the Goan church in the translation of texts into Konkani.[113]

This change perhaps marked the start of a new attempt by the Goan Catholic elites to "purify" their language from the Portuguese accretions that had become established in common speak over the course of generations. In its stead, Catholic clerical terminology was now replete with Sanskrit words that displaced those that had been adopted from Portuguese.

In my conversations with him, Fr. do Rego insisted that he did not go hunting for Sanskrit words to replace the existing words with Portuguese or Latin origins. Rather, he suggested, he was seeking to replace words that did not communicate their meaning to the people, with words that would communicate their internal and theological meaning owing to the peoples' familiarity with the word. It seemed to me that Fr. do Rego was reflecting the romanticist conviction that "native" words would speak to the "soul" of the people. Thus for example, Fr. do Rego suggested we take the word sacrifice. From the Portuguese *sacrifício* is obtained the Konkani *sacrifis*. "What is the meaning of *sacrifis*", he asked me? If on the other hand, he suggested, we use the word *bolidaan*, (a Kokani form of the Sanskritic *balidaan*) then he could explain it by breaking it into *bali*, because *boli* was a common Konkani word, and *daan*, a word that was also common. He could thus explain what is *balidan*. Similarly, he could explain what is *yagna*[114] and so forth and in this process, develop his theology for the benefit of the people.

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[113] Fr. do Rego was son of a prominent member of Panjim's Catholic elite. A landlord with property interests in Bardez and Ilhas, his father married into the prominent nationalist Correia-Afonso family of Margão. It appears that it was this Correia-Afonso heritage that facilitated Fr. Rego's interaction with the members of the KBM and encouraged him to facilitate St. Loyola's school in Margão to start imparting education in the Konkani language. Incidentally, as a result of this familial atmosphere, Fr. do Rego's sibling, who I was also able to interact with separately, is also a keen participant in the rhetorical battles around the script issue, except, more in keeping with the habitus of the Goan Catholic elite, roots for the exclusive valorization of the Nagari script.

[114] *Yagna* is the ritual of Vedic Hinduism where a sacred fire is made the receptacle of offerings to the Gods.

What struck me in the course of this conversation was that for the individual in a Goan parish, the term *sacrifis* probably had more resonance than the brahmanical terms that priests like Fr. do Rego believed would speak to them. However, this issue is not up for debate in this segment, and I extracted this aspect of our conversation only to demonstrate the kind of energies that were being poured into the recrafting of the Konkani language by members of the Catholic Church in the wake of the Vatican Council II; energies that twined with the efforts to craft Konkani as the linguistic marker of the newly post-colonial territory of Goa.[115]

The efforts of the Konkani lobby were not limited to introduction of Konkani into schools alone. In the run-up to the Opinion Poll, the pro-merger movement had echoed the assertions that Varde Valaulikar had devoted his life to combating. The Marathi lobby had insisted that Konkani was no independent language, but a mere dialect of Marathi. It had no literature, it had no grammar and was not marked by uniformity. Indeed, as Narayan Athavale the editor of the pro-Marathi, pro-merger *Gomantak* newspaper was quoted as arguing, many years later in the heat of Konkani language movement,

> Konkani has little literature of its own. In all, there are 300 books published in Konkani, whereas Marathi has a rich literary history. It (Konkani) is spoken by everyone, but the written language is Marathi. That is why I have been telling these people, go develop your language for about 20 years and then agitate (in Noronha 1999).

As a consequence of such assertions, the Konkani lobby believed that it would continue to be on the back foot until Konkani was recognised as a language therefore. The solution identified for this challenge was the recognition of Konkani's independent status as a language by the Sahitya Akademi of India. To achieve this recognition the members of the Konkani lobby consciously engaged in a spree of writing in, and translating into Konkani (Kelekar 2008: 20). This writing was led once more by members of the *Saraswat* caste, most prominent of whom was Ravindra Kelekar, and included not only writing in Konkani, but also translating from other languages into Konkani.

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[115] Before I convey the sense that this shift towards the Sanskritic was a unanimous project of the Goan Catholic elites, or upper-castes, I should point out that this project was, and continues to be, a highly contested one. Reflections of this contestation are more than evident in issues of *Renovação*, the magazine of the Archdiocese of Goa, through letters that are written to the editors, who at least in the person of Fr. Martinho Noronha, appear to be in favour of this shift. See for example, the letter titled "Krist Prosad" written by Fr. V. Azavedo in the *Renovação* dated 15 March, 1990. Or the letter titled "Translations" by Fr. Anastasio Gomes O.C.D dated 1 May, 1991.

The fact that Kelekar was not engaged solely in linguistic politics demonstrates the extent to which the politics around the Konkani language was firmly twined with the attempts of caste hegemony that had been initiated as far back as the time of Varde Valaulikar. For example, Kelekar was Convenor of the Council of Action, whose stated purpose was to oppose the operation of the MGP government. Some of the programs of the Bandodkar government that they objected to are rather revealing of contours of Goan "civil society" subsequent to integration. The Council of Action charged the Bandodkar government with the preaching of caste and communal hatred that led to a breakdown of "healthy and harmonious relations that existed between Hindus and Christians for generations"; attempts to establish a "Hindu Raj" in the Territory through frequent outbursts against Catholics branding them as anti-Indians and traitors; and the bringing in of a large number of deputationists[116] from the neighbouring states, particularly from Maharashtra, for routine jobs within the state (Esteves 1986: 98).

The "healthy and harmonious relationship between Hindus and Christians for generations" is one of the clichés on which the myth of the "secular" harmony of Goa is constructed. As indicated earlier in this chapter, this harmony is built on the fact of absence of not only Muslims; casting Goa as a two community state; but also of any "subalterns", of any cleavages within these groups, cast as monolithic entities, where caste and class is hidden and erased. What the cliché refers to therefore, is the secular compact that had been built between the Catholic and Hindu Goan elite, whether in Goa, or in Bombay. Furthermore, through the erasure of the language of caste, this secular compact had presented these elite caste groups as leaders of their respective religious groups. For the *bahujan samaj* to fracture this myth through the discussion of caste challenged the narrative of leadership that had been claimed by this dominant caste combine. What was also clearly disturbing to these elite groups was the possibility that the entry of the deputationists from Maharashtra would challenge the hegemony for Konkani that was sought to be established. Given that these deputationists would be entered into the electoral roles, the challenge they represented to the narrow margin of the Saraswat and Catholic combine can be imagined. Indeed much of the populist rhetoric in Goa is speared by this dominant caste fear of being submerged.

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[116] "Deputationists" was the name given to Indian government officials that were sent into the newly conquered territory of Goa on "deputation" to fill in governmental positions that were either created afresh under the administration of the Indian state, or fell vacant when officials left Goa to other parts of the Portuguese empire.

Very much in keeping with the nationalist and Gandhian ethic of teaching to the uninitiated, Ravindra Kelekar had been the editor of the *Gomant Bharati*, a magazine published from Bombay in 1950s, reportedly with the objective of politically "educating" the Goan Catholics settled in Bombay and also to curb the adulteration of their language (Desai 2002: 164). This objective also motivated another Konkani language magazine published from Bombay and edited by Bakibab Borkar another language activist who gained significance in the post-colonial mobilization for the language in Goa. The manner in which the Goan Catholic was interpellated as audience through these initiatives, is significant as it marks the dual roles that the "Catholic" played in the Konkani language movement and the defining of the Goan *citizenplace*. While on the one hand the upper caste, and upper class, Catholic elite were in a classical understanding of civil society, cast as those with whom the *Saraswat*s were in dialogue, on the other hand, the other Catholic caste and class groups were seen as being spoken to, heralding their future role as the population groups of political society[117]. What is significant is that because the *Saraswat* activists made no distinction between the types of Catholics, because the Catholic leadership themselves strove to underplay this marker, affirming in this process the argument that their Konkani was lacking, and because the Catholic underclass themselves did not articulate a caste rhetoric, it laid the ground for the subalternisation of all that "the Catholic" stood for.

These prejudices however did not prevent the group led by Kelekar, a group that both wrote and encouraged the writing of the language in Devanagari, from drawing from the huge corpus of literature that had been produced by Goan migrants in the city of Bombay. The use of these books in the Roman script, are pivotal to the arguments levelled by those now arguing in favour of simultaneous recognition of Konkani in the Roman script. Bonaventure D'Pietro was one of the more prolific producers of *romance* in Bombay. He now lives in Goa, where he supports the demand for the recognition of the Roman script. A quiet, unassuming man, he is not vocal, or visibly angry about the means in which the production of works in the Roman script was effectively shut down. He nevertheless poses the question, as do other activists like him; as to how it came to pass that when the *romance* literature in the Roman script was indispensable to the language being recognised

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[117] Through the length of this thesis, I seek to continuously draw attention to the fact that mere location in a traditionally upper caste did not translate to location in an upper economic location, or upper class. A number of upper caste Catholics shared socio-economic circumstances similar to lower caste and working class Goan Catholics who had migrated to Bombay.

by the Sahitya Akademi, it is now possible for the same literature to be branded as lacking in standard? This task of collecting, and displaying together the various works in Konkani had the required effect and prompted the following observation:

> Today, Konkani possesses considerable literature of all varieties. Ravindra Kelekar's collection of 400 Konkani publications of high literary standard is enough evidence to prove. Further, Stephen's Konkani Grammar is the first grammar of any Indian language, which was published as early as 1640' [sic] …. There are about twenty-seven grammars and thirty dictionaries in Konkani. J.A. Fernandes, B.B. Borkar, Prof. Ram Chandra Naik, Ravindra Kelekar, Felicio Cardozo, E. George, Fr. Agnelo Maffei S.J., Manohar Sardessai, R.V. Pandit, etc., by their writings, 'have proved that Konkani is an independent and mature language which can adequately express all nuances of thought and feeling in prose, poetry, plays and in music. (cited in Botelho 2002: 223)

These efforts of the Konkani language activists ultimately paid off with the Sahitya Akademi recognising Konkani as an independent language on 26 February, 1975. This manoeuvre, however, was not easy. Indeed the attempt in 1975 marked the second attempt at gaining the Akademi General Council's approval, a previous attempt having been made in the year 1974. If the recognition of Konkani in the Akademi was managed in 1975, it has been pointed out, it was managed despite the continued opposition from the Marathi language representatives in the Akademi and owing to the support of Sunitikumar Chatterjee who was at the time the President of the Akademi and pleaded the case for Konkani in the absence of a Konkani language representative in the institution (Desai 2002: 126).[118]

With this battle having been won, the stage was set for the next step toward the fixing of Konkani within the format identified by the *Saraswat* activists for Konkani. The Advisory Board for Konkani at the Sahitya Akademi New Delhi for the period 1978- 1982 determined that for the purpose of the Akademi's deliberations, Konkani would be understood to be the Konkani written in the Devanagari script. Significantly, the Advisory Board during the term consisted largely of members of the *Saraswat* caste, who were particularly invested in the Konkani language movement.[119] Twining Devanagari with

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[118] Desai points out that this support was managed as a result of lobbying among members of the Akademi's General Council by the prime actors in this phase, Ravindra Kelekar, Uday Bhembre and the then Congress MP from Goa Pursshottam Kakodar. In addition, these activists ensured that Chatterji was aware of the mobilization among the Konkani language activists, having invited him to address the tenth Konkani Parishad in 1974 (2002: 126).

[119] The Advisory Board was structured to consist of ten members from across the four states (Goa, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra) where Konkani was a spoken language. The composition of the Board that took this decision had six representatives from Goa. Of these, one, Fr. Antonio Pereira, was a Catholic

Konkani, as has been repeatedly demonstrated had the impact of not only associating the caste group with an Aryan and Sanskritic heritage, but enabling this caste group, especially in the states of Karnataka and Kerala, to secure their properties the benefits of minority institutions under the Constitutional provisions in this regard.[120] What I would like to stress here, referring back to a discussion in the first chapter, is the multiple scales at which these maneuverers or citizenship acts have an implication. Though the debate on Konkani is being fought largely through the prism of Goa; the project twines caste powers, epistemologies and legalities at the level of the international, national, regional and not least of all, at the level of caste.

At the national level, this legibilisation of Konkani as an independent language was finally completed in the year 1992 when Konkani was included in the Eighth schedule of the Indian Constitution and recognised as a national language. Reflecting on this achievement, at the *Konkani Rastramanyathay Dis* 2008 (Konkani National Recognition Day) organised by the Goa Konkani Akademi (GKA) on 20 August, 2008, the President of the GKA, Pundalik Naik argued that this recognition made them full citizens of the Republic.[121] This link between fulfilment of citizenship and the legibility of Konkani was in fact drawn to the attention of the audience in this particular case, when he adduced as proof the fact of the Konkani language is now printed on the Indian Rupee note. The language is present in the Devanagari form.

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and a priest, and the others were senior GSB writers and language leaders. The members representing Bombay (Maharashtra) and Kerala were Dattaram Sukhtankar and N. Purushothama Mallaya, both GSB. The two members from Karnataka were from Mangalore viz. V.J.P. Saldanha and Fr. Willie R. D Silva. The convenor of the Board was B.B. Borkar, another Saraswat who was a recognized poet and writer in both Marathi and Konkani (Desai 2002: 286 -87).

[120] For example, the Manipal group of institutions and the deemed university of MAHE (Manipal Academy of Health and Education) despite being a family run affair, and effectively restricting their understanding of Konkani to mean *Saraswat*, enjoy the benefit of being Linguistic Minority Institutions under the provisions for Linguistic Minorities as per Articles 29 and 30 of the Indian Constitution (Desai 2002:106 – 107). In Kerala too, the GSBs have used the local denominator for their caste "Konkani" to "get their temples, schools and other institutions out of the governmental administrative restrictions and controls by getting them declared as the minority institutions and attracting security and privileges under the Articles 29 and 30 of the Indian Constitution" (Desai 2002: 237). Thus both in Kerala and Karnataka, Konkani has been used to demarcate the brahmin groups that speak the language. This in turn has allowed them a privileged marker in their contests against the Namboodiri and Tamil brahmins in Kerala and against the *Shivalli* Brahmins in coastal Karnataka. The scriptal standardisation of Konkani, therefore, gave a caste group that had come to be identified with the language cultural capital in terms of providing an Aryan identity, but also significant material gains through benefits under the law.

[121] Interestingly, given that this celebration included Konkani language activists, both of whom were *Saraswats*, from outside of Goa, as honoured guests, there was a slippage as regards who this "us" that Pundalik Naik was referring to. Did it refer to the Goans, or did it refer to the larger community of Konkani language speakers?

At the local level in Goa, a period of relative calm ensued when after the Opinion Poll was conducted in 1967 it was determined that Goa would remain a separate administrative unit. But as the discussion above indicates, the language activists were busy at the national level ensuring that their position could not be challenged there. Whether it was a conscious policy or not, it was only after a period of twenty years, in the 1980s, subsequent to these national gains that the issue of Konkani as the officially recognised state language of Goa occupied centre stage.

Fixing Goa's secular culture III: Konkani as official state language

The period, of the demand for recognition of Konkani as Official Language, starting in 1985 and concluding with passage of the Official Language Bill by the Legislative Assembly on 4 February, 1987, was a particularly tumultuous time in Goa. It saw the deaths of a couple of activists, large-scale mobilisations of crowds and the breakdown of law and order in various parts of the state in the interim.[122] The demand for the recognition of Konkani as state language was not unconnected to earlier moments in post-colonial Goan history. In the context where the Indian states had been divided on a linguistic basis, to have an official language, and transform itself from being a union territory to a state would ensure the effective fixing of Goa's borders as an administrative unit.[123]

While these demands were being circulated in the public sphere for some time in the eighties, the storm as it were, broke on 19 July, 1985. An Official Language Bill introduced by Luizinho Faleiro, representing a minority party in the legislature had been defeated by an overwhelming majority of the legislators. A report in the newspaper *Herald* titled "Konkani fans decry move" on 24 July, 1985, indicates that the dramatic rejection of this Bill on the floor of the House challenged the project for a Konkani homeland sufficiently for a public mobilisation to ensure Konkani's recognition as the sole official language of the state.

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[122]Staff reporter. 1986. "13 Persons Injured: Violence Rocks Vasco." *Navhind Times*, August 7.; Staff reporter. 1986. "40 Hurt in City Violence." *Navhind Times*, January 22.; Staff reporter. 1985. "Language Controversy Hots up: 10 Hurt as Violence Rocks Margao." *Navhind Times*, November 18.; Staff reporter. 1986. "KPA Leaders on Hunger Strike." *Navhind Times*, January 18.

[123] There were other considerations at play in this move as well. While a Union Territory had an elected legislative assembly, the Governor of the state, appointed by the Central Government had a good amount of power in the running of the state. Gaining statehood, would also allow the local elite a much firmer control over the local field. Indeed, arguments that statehood was not an economically attractive option, given that the territory enjoyed grants from the Centre as a result of its Union Territory status were brusquely brushed aside in the fervour generated by the language lobby. Recognition of Konkani as a state language was also seen as necessary to the addition of Konkani into the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution.

Before I proceed to the details of the mobilisation for Konkani, it would be necessary to make a few comments on the political parties and their response to the suggestion of Konkani as official language in the state. The position of the MGP was that while Konkani ought to be recognised as the official language of the state, they were opposed to it being the sole official language of the state. Instead, they continuously asserted their commitment to a dual language policy for the state where both Konkani and Marathi would have equal status.[124] On the other hand the Congress (I) party had rode into power in the last elections had promised making Konkani the official language of the state. However it appears that there were differences within the party, with the then Chief Minister Pratapsingh Rane, and other senior party members like Sulochana Katkar opposing the shift to Konkani. [125] In the highly polarised world of Goan politics of those days, and especially through the vitriolic coverage of the mobilisations by the clearly partisan *Herald* newspaper, both these individuals were cast as being pro-Marathi and hence anti-Goan. [126]

Contrary to the simplistic logic peddled by the *Herald*, it appears that in the case of both these individuals, there were other factors at play. Katkar for her part was displaying the concern that had animated *bahujan samaj* opposition to Konkani as far back as the Opinion Poll. This concern was interpellated by the easy collapsing of Goa into Konkani. The nature of the *bahujan samaj* opposition is captured nicely in the report titled "Massive Turnout for Marathi dindi" in the Herald on 3 October, 1985. That the demonstration was imbued with overt Hindu symbolism, is also evident by the fact that the demonstration was called a *dindi*.[127]

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[124] Staff reporter. 1985. "Khalap Flays Language Resolution." *Navhind Times*, September 12; Staff reporter. 1987. "MGP Firm on Dual Language." *Navhind Times*, February 3.; "MGP, BJP oppose move." 1985. *Herald*, September 12.

[125] The Congress (I) until recently a party dominated by the Hindu brahmin, had with the fracture of the MGP and the UGP drawn elements from these various groups. Both Pratapsingh Rane and Sulochana Katkar were members of the MGP prior to their entry into the Congress Party, representing a challenge to the hegemony of the exclusive caste interests of the GSB in the Congress Party.

[126] The *Herald* newspaper, already a widely read newspaper, played a singular role in constituting a public for the demand of Konkani as a state language, and simultaneously for Devanagari as the ideal script that would unite Konkani. This public was constituted not only by the highly emotional address to the people to support Konkani, but also by deliberately indicating to readers that there was no space for creating a division among the Konkani supporters as regards script. For reminisces about the role played by the newspaper and in particular, the role of the editor, Rajan Narayan, in constituting this public see Nair 2008; Faleiro 2008; and Noronha 2008.

[127] A *dindi* is normally a religious procession associated with the Bhakti cult of the Hindu diety Panduranga, located in Maharashtra. These processions, normally involve flags, cymbals, trumpets, the singing of devotional songs, and a figure of the deity. In calling the demonstration a *dindi* and imbuing it with religious

Rane's responses on the other hand seem to have been more complex, possibly tied, as the Herald article titled "Devil's politician" (*Herald*, 7 Jan, 1987) seems to suggest, both to the identification with *Maratha* culture and Marathi in his constituency of Sattari, as well as his own identification through the history of his clan with the *Maratha* culture. This tendency was not surprising given the assertions from the Konkani lobby demanding Konkani exclusivity in Goa, on the grounds that "there are no Marathi speaking people in Goa, except those who have migrated to Goa from Marathi speaking areas" (Rebello 1987: 1). In other words, what was being played out in the Konkani language movement was once more the opposition by the Hindu *bahujan* groups to the hegemony that the *Saraswat* caste, in association with Catholic groups, was seeking to establish within the Goan *citizenplace*.

From the discussion above, it becomes obvious that Konkani was merely a counter in the battles between different groups vying for power within the party and the *citizenplace*. For this reason, the mobilisation for the cause of Konkani's recognition demonstrates admirably the hypothesis that Chatterjee forwards regarding the existence of a split in the public sphere between a political society and a civil society. This split is between elite groups that had managed to define their social locations as that of modernity, and those of the subalterns, primarily the non-elite caste Catholics, who lacking a voice that would allow themselves to be heard, were merely population groups, mobilised on the basis of promises in the future. Desai captures this situation best when he says;

> The support and contribution of the Catholics to the Official Language agitation was mainly in the mobilization men and money, show of numerical strength. Their concern was essentially emotional rather than practical, because they looked at Konkani as their identity, but moved towards English increasingly in all the aspects of personal, socio-cultural and economic life. Their assessment of party positions and share in political institutions was more in terms of religion, which was reflected in their electoral behaviour in the first two decades after Liberation. (Desai 2002: 139)[128]

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symbolism, the organisers were not only alluding to the non-, or anti-brahmin nature of the demonstration, but also speaking largely to a Hindu audience.

[128] I would like to point out that Desai's work on the politics of script in Goa is one of the few works that examines the interplay between caste and language and does not take, as do so many other works, the Konkani language as a given. Unfortunately, his work is not free from a caste location, where the attack on the attempted *Saraswat* hegemony over the language is mounted from the position of the non-*Saraswat* Brahmins in Goa. Furthermore, as should be evident from a close reading of this extract, Desai is not particularly sympathetic to the Catholic figure. Indeed, his work suffers from the typical problems with reading the monolithically constructed Goan Catholic, where this figure is seen as contaminated by the Portuguese.

After a series of public meetings, the leadership of the agitation was vested firmly in the *Konkani Porjecho Awaz* or Voice of the Konkani People (KPA). The KPA displayed a peculiar arrangement, distinguishing between the "inspiration" provided by "literary giants" and the "organising" by "loyal workers", as regards those who would lead the agitation.

> The inspiration to the Konkani movement was provided by the literary giants like Pundalik Naik, Ravindra Kelekar, Dr. Manohar Rai Sardessai and Damodar Mauzo. But the credit for organizing the mammoth rallies in Margao and Panjim goes to Luizinho Faleiro and Uday Bhembre and Mauvin Godinho and Dr. Wilfred D'Souza and Ferdino Rebello and their loyal workers, including Churchill Alemao, Tomazinho Cardozo and Domnic Fernandes and Cyril Pacheco and Manoj Joshi and Dr. Rebello, Chandrakant Keni… (Editorial, *Herald*, 17 Nov, 1985)

The *Herald* reports that at the very first public meeting that had been organised in Margão, the base of the KBM, Pundalik Naik, who would later become the President of the KPA, argued "that members of Sahitya Academy should be in the forefront during the morcha[129] to make public realise that what they demand is not for their personal honour but for the benefit of the whole Union Territory" (*Herald* 1985: 4).

The figure of Pundalik Naik is an interesting one for the study of the manner in which the secular modernity of Goa was established. It demonstrates how non-dominant caste groups can be drawn into a secular compact with dominant caste groups, though caste and familial links. Pundalik Naik is a member of the *bahujan samaj* married to a *Saraswat* woman, who is also a writer in the Konkani language (Sequeira 1987). The significance of this was described by a *Saraswat* man in an exchange on a Goan forum on the internet, suggesting that this incorporates him as a "son-in-law" into the *Saraswat* community, forging familial links between caste groups, that in any case had already enjoyed intimate relations in the past (Borges 2005; see also Perez 2012: 57, 82). It was in light of such an understanding, that the Roman script activists I interacted with argued that Pundalik Naik's leadership of the KPA not only fulfilled the appearance of a literary led effort for Konkani, but also the image of a multi-community, and hence secular demand for the recognition of Konkani as the basis of Goan citizenship, led by a Goan youth from the *bahujan samaj*, even while ensuring that "the strategy was placed entirely under the leadership and guidance of the

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[129] A *morcha* is a protest demonstration.

*Saraswat*s under the Konkani stalwarts, although the agitation was project as that of the Goan masses" (Desai 2002: 133-134).

The caution that Pundalik Naik raised at this first meeting, set the tone for the rest of the language agitation where legitimate leadership of the movement was always vested in the hands of those recognised as litterateurs. What this move would do was to use the masses of political society for the demonstrations that would eventually be held, but firmly place these litterateurs as the legitimate faces of the movement. Indeed, the phrasing of the report is suggestive, where a distinction was made between a "public" normally given to presume self-interest in its actions, and these litterateurs, representative of civil society, who were marked out by their participation in organs of civil society. This public, needed to realize, or be taught that these leaders from civil society, like contemporary Gandhian renouncers did not think of their own personal interests but of society at large, and were above such petty desires (*Herald*, 1985: 4). In addition, this leadership, and the prominence given to these litterateurs, had implications for the form of the language that would be fixed as Official language. Early on in the course of the language movement, it was pointed out in an editorial in the *Herald* titled "A script for Konkani", that the leadership of the movement seemed unreasonable in its demand that literary Konkani also be the official Konkani (Editorial 1985: 2). This literary Konkani, as highlighted earlier, was the Konkani of a specific caste group, whose dialect, with some Sanskritisation, was seen as the perfect form of the language.

In retrospect it appears as if these litterateurs were in fact unable to mobilise mass support at all. The Catholic crowds were mobilised through the efforts of young Catholic men with political inclinations, such as Tomazinho Cardozo, one of the major protagonists of the Roman script movement; through the support of the *tiatrist* who mobilized their audiences to back the agitation; and that of the Catholic Church. This support was reportedly made manifest through the crucial role that parish priests played in mobilizing parishioners to attend the mass-rallies that demanded the recognition of the Konkani language as the only official state language. As Bonaventure D'Pietro pointed out to me, this mobilizing role that these persons played should not cloud the initiative that was taken by average people in the villages. D'Pietro pointed out that it was the people in the villages who organised themselves to arrange buses to go to the rallies held by the KPA, very often putting in their own money for the hire of these buses. Subsequent to the conclusion of the agitation when

Konkani was recognised as the Official Language, Ferdino Rebello, a firm supporter of the Konkani and Devanagari cause reflected that:

> The Konkani movement specially in Talukas of Pernem, Bicholim and Satari had literary support behind it. However, there was no political leadership in these Talukas supporting the Konkani cause. The result was that when the MRPS started organizing themselves in these talukas, the Konkani literary leadership did not have the necessary back-ground to oppose the strategy adopted by the MRPS which mainly was invoking religious sympathy for their cause (Rebello 1987: 1).[130]

Clearly, the Official language agitation was continuing along battle lines that had been drawn up at the time of the Opinion Poll, with a battle between *Saraswat* Brahmins on the one hand and the *bahujan* Hindus on the other. The Catholic community as a whole, unable or unwilling to openly articulate caste divisions was drawn via its upper caste leadership into this caste battle. Through the duration of this battle, "literary", seems to have been secular speak for the inherent attributes of an elite caste group, the natural foundations for Goan civil society, while "political" referred to the quotidian issues and peoples that fell outside the scope of civil society. In light of this discussion, the Konkani identity could be seen as the secular compact between the dominant castes among the Catholics and the Hindus.

Following the agitation, the intervention of the Central Government and the apparent resolution of divisions within electoral parties, the Official Language Act (OLA) was enacted in February 1987. The result of this Act was to recognise Konkani, in the Devanagari script, as the Official language of the state, while also recognising that Marathi could be used "for all or any official purpose." This moment is of course central to this work, for it marks the moment when the nature of Goan citizenship, and the cartography of Goan modernity, were legislatively defined and, for reason of gaining state backing, fixed more substantially than it had been in the past.

This resolution of the two year-long language controversy seems to have pleased no one at that moment. Nevertheless, this decision, that reflected pragmatic political compromises, effectively laid the ground for an understanding of the legitimate contours of the Goan *citizenplace* in terms of a description of the Goan "self", that is to say the ideal figure of the citizen, and the authentic cultural community of citizens. While the Devanagari script

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[130] MRPS was the acronym for the *Marathi Rajbhasha Prasthapan Samiti*, the organization parallel to the KPA that demanded for Marathi the status of Official language of the state of Goa.

was presented as the basis for the Goan cultural community and statehood; in recognising the Marathi language, the OLA invested this language with a legitimacy within the state. In excluding the Roman script, despite the demands for it, what was achieved was not only the hegemony of one Konkani over other, but also the assertion of a peculiar vernacularity over that which was identified as "foreign".

That both Konkani in the Devanagari script, and Marathi could wrest legitimate recognition for themselves, and that Konkani in the Roman script could not, is also a testament to the argument for recognising a scale of subalternities that I argue for in this thesis. Through Indian nationalism's privileging of a narrowly defined indigenity, influences deemed "foreign"; be it the Perso-Arabic script for Hindustani, or the Roman script for Konkani, fail to gain legitimate space within the national imagination, where they are refused the possibility of defining Indian nationalist modernity. As a consequence of this privileging, while Marathi, the marker for the subaltern Hindu caste groups was able to gain access to the state, Konkani in the Roman script failed, underlining the subaltern position that the Goan Catholic masses were increasingly being thrust into.

While the opposition to Devanagari's exclusive recognition for Konkani has emerged since the 2000s, the demand for Roman as an official script for the language was placed on the agenda even when the demands for Konkani as official language were being made in the 80s. This is revealed through a review of the newspaper reports and more critically letters to the editor from the period between 1985, when the issue of the need to recognise Konkani as Official Language was first raised in the legislature and kick-started the language agitation, until the passing of the OLA in 1987. The nature of the responses to this demand, as well as the demands for recognition themselves provide a critical view into the nature of the citizenship experience of the Goan Catholics. It demonstrates how the field of citizenship was dominated by the operation of caste, and caste agendas. Furthermore, it highlights the environment within which the demands for cultural recognition of the Goan Catholics were voiced, an environment in which their cultural experience was seen as an obstacle to achieving a local identity compatible with that of the Indian nation. To this extent it demonstrates the subaltern character of the Catholic, where the articulation of their demand for recognition of the script was seen as so contrary to the social lines of mobility, that it did not permit the formation of a recognizable basis of action (Spivak 2000).

The letters to the editor could be divided into two broad categories, those written by Catholics and those by the *Saraswat* and allied caste groups.[131]

Reading the letters written by Catholics to the editor, it becomes clear that there was no one position that was taken by all of them. These letters were not just referring to script, but as seem obvious in the letters written by C. M. Vaz on 26 September, 1985, and A.C. D'Lima on 18 October, 1985 in the *Herald*, were displaying an insecurity that the Catholics (and presumably from the tone of the letters, these voices emerged from among the middle to upper class Catholics) were beginning to experience.

Take for example the letter "AIR, Please Note…" by Patrick Dias dated 29 November, 1985 in the *Herald*, that points to the Sanskritised tone of the Konkani used in broadcasts from All India Radio's (AIR) Goa base, and the apparent exclusion of "Konkani songs that stormed the market of late." In doing so, he was clearly referring to the songs known as *Cantaram* associated with the *tiatr* tradition, and the absence of distinctly Catholic accents among the radio presenters.[132] This letter makes the point of accents, ties it to "a religious community" but also displays a deep upper class Catholic prejudice and sensibility, in that it privileges the Portuguese influence on lifestyles that have "raised our standard of living to decent ways of life which we ought to cherish", while diminishing the worth and value of the Devanagari script. Patrick Dias' letter also raises the issue about the change of name from Panjim to Panaji, making the extremely subjective argument that Panjim is more sonorous than its post-colonial formulation. This observation is perhaps indicative of the larger concerns that these letter writers were experiencing. Indeed, in a letter written in the *Herald* on 6 February, 1985, D. J. Falcao suggests that the real issue underlying the entire mobilization was in fact the concern regarding the "vanishing Goan identity".

Despite the belief in the superiority of Portuguese and western culture that these letter writers demonstrate, or perhaps because of this, these letters also display a certain kind of cosmopolitanism.[133] This cosmopolitanism is evidenced from their suggestion that the stress on linguistic homelands that the Indian nation-state was building was creating more tension than good. In the face of this insight, these letter writers refuse to get tied down to

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[131]This caste membership being identified by the surnames used.

[132] Some years prior to commencing fieldwork I had worked part-time at the AIR studio as a radio presenter and in the process became familiar with man of the persons working in the studios as well as witness to the subtle politics in the space. While engaged in fieldwork I met one of the employees of the studio prior to the start of a workshop for young writers, who during our discussion, indicated the preferences that were manifested in the studio, where accents associated with Catholics were generally not encouraged.

[133]For an engaging discussion on cosmopolitanism see the special issue of *Public Culture* Fall 2000, 12 (3).

an identity that stresses one script, or one language. Rather than build the nation on multiple languages, they suggest building the nation on the commonality of English, given, that in the words of D. J. Falcao in his letter to the *Herald* on 21 November, 1985,

> [I]t was English that brought together the educated eminent sons and daughters of India and projected India's image to the world. Again, it was English that gave birth to a sense of one country and one people.

Referring to the opposition to Hindi in other parts of the country, in the letter quoted earlier, Falcao suggests that "For Hindi to be accepted as a national language throughout the country, it should be adopted in the Roman script which is facile (sic) to manage and easily adaptable and therefore it should present no difficulty to its acceptance by one and all". This cosmopolitanism was not without an accompanying sneer however, as evidenced in the letter written by Paul Fernandes to the *Herald*, on 2 September, 1985, where he suggested that,

> [t]he first step to safeguard Konkani as an independent regional language of Goa is to adopt Roman script. It can also adopt Devnagri script but foreign communications can be preferably addressed in Roman script because people cannot read Devnagri script beyond the shores of India. Address your letters abroad in Devnagri and see the result.

To be sure this cosmopolitan option is marked by a civilizational superiority, but it stands as a marked contrast to the equally oppressive regime of brahmancial monoculturalism that was being effectively imposed on the Indian polity.

These rather condescending approaches to the Devanagari script are the only representatives of those arguing for the Roman script. The letter from A. Nunes from the village of Fatorda, published by *Herald* on 13 August, 1985, points out that to opt for Devanagari alone would result in "a post-mortem of the Catholic people in Goa". Rather than argue for English or against Devanagari, this letter makes the accommodatory gesture of suggesting "The inclusion of *Concani* [emphasis mine to demonstrate the alternate spelling and accompanying imagination of the language] [134] will be beneficial to all Goans whether the Bill contains the provision that the script will be in Roman as well as Devanagari (*ibid*)". This letter seems to unwittingly stretch the limits of pluralism by using

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[134] I have boyhood memories of reading a Letter to the Editor in the Navhind Times that marked a sharp distinction between Konkani and Concanim, and the groups that spoke either language. That letter made a strong impression on my mind, and led me to distance myself from the Concani of the Catholic masses, around me. Unfortunately despite my best efforts, I have been unable to locate that letter.

the older spelling for the language, rather than the nationalist inspired spelling "Konkani". A similar suggestion by Vasco Alvares in his letter to the *Herald* on 2 August, 1985 cautions the Konkani language movement against haste precisely because there is no standard for Konkani among the people, being spoken in different accents and different scripts. Rather, he says, there is a need for a team of philologists to shape Konkani into a form acceptable to all, and then alone made the official language. These letters are, however, lone voices of caution, in a sea of letters to the editor that largely castigate the Chief Minister, blame the MGP, and raise the fear of absorption into Maharashtra.

Responding to these kinds of letters was another stream that stressed the reasons for Devanagari. An interesting letter to commence this discussion, and indeed one of the first letters from the year 1985 that deals with the script issue, is from a Shivanand Singhbal. At the outset of this letter, published on 8 January in the *Herald*, it appears as if Singhbal, speaking from a typical secularist position, that does not brook the assertion of particularities in the face of nationalism, is opposed to the idea of the inclusion of Konkani in the Eighth schedule of the Constitution as well as the creation of Goa into a separate state. He sees these issues as sowing the seeds of regionalism, and stresses that "In the wake of the demand of statehood it is necessary to think of Goa although liberated fourteen years after Indian independence, as a part of Indian territory". That he is not against Konkani per se, but against the dominant, that is the Catholic, form of Konkani becomes evident when he points out that there was no uniformity in the usage of the language and that there was a need to encourage "the introduction of primary education in the mother tongue, better development of Konkani in Devnagri script like Hindi, upgrading of Konkani Academy and more propagation of and popularisation of Konkani literature and Konkani drama (*tiatr*) among all sections of people".

Similar in tone to Singhbal's letter is that of N.R. Nayak[135] on the pages of *Herald*'s edition of 16 November, 1985. His letter is a response to an earlier letter that was written by a Minguel C. Fernandes from Ribandar on the 6 November, 1985.[136] Apparently Fernandes ended his letter by "blaming the 'bamons'" for the scriptal and language

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[135] I would like to highlight the fact that one can deduce Nayak's belonging to the *Saraswat* caste from his surname. Where even non-brahmins use the surname Naik, some brahmins choose to distinguish themselves by changing the spelling to distinguish themselves from the similar sounding non-brahmin family names. Alternatively, the spelling Nayak, could also indicate that this man was a *Saraswat* from outside of Goa, probably the west of the adjoining state of Karnataka where *Saraswats* have a significant presence.

[136] The paper from 6 November, 1985 is missing from the Central Library collection of newspapers. I have reconstructed the arguments by referring to Nayak's response.

controversy. According to Nayak, and keeping with the nature of secular politics in India, this mode of naming the caste group is not "secular" and thus it attains a communal and casteist colour. Nayak chides Fernandes for this action and indicates that "no true lover of Konkani will dare to talk about script or other things bringing in communal factors. Only Marathivadis do that. Sometimes, Marathivadis in disguise go on arguing on such issues like script, etc.".

In making this argument, Nayak invokes a long tradition of secular Indian nationalism that, as discussed earlier in this thesis, regards the articulation of difference as detrimental to the secular project. As has been discussed earlier, this position only allows for the continued hegemony of dominant groups over the national culture in the conspiracy of silence that is effected by this ban on articulating difference. Nayak went on to defend the literary organizations involved in the language agitation by suggesting that "Moreover, the authors in Konkani and their institutions are not in favour of creating any controversy regarding the script. They know that unless they accept one script, Konkani will not develop and stand on her own among the other languages of India. Only those people argue on the question of Konkani's script, those who have not written a single line in Konkani. I believe Fernandes may be one of them." Once again, therefore, just as the case is today made by the pro-Devanagari activists to those who demand the recognition of the Roman script, the need for unity to facilitate development of the language was cited as a reason to present a *fait accompli* for not recognising the Roman script. Furthermore, in his final words, there is a suggestion of the Catholic Fernandes being unfamiliar with Konkani, a suggestion that gains strength from the representations of Catholics as preferring English or Portuguese, whereas the Hindu (read brahmin) was nursed at the breast of the Konkani mother. Thus as Kisan Kamat similarly suggests in a letter to *Herald*: "The question of script is resolved amongst the Konkani writers. Those who talk of Roman do so emotionally. They do not know to write Roman or Devnagri properly" (1985).

The final letter of these series, by N. R. Nayak, is perhaps the most comprehensive of these letters indicating and presents the gamut of arguments in favour of Devanagari, and consequently against Roman. He argued first, that the multiplicity of scripts that one witnesses in Goa and Konkani is a result of the "historic accident". This assertion brings back the myth of the Portuguese induced displacement of Konkani from its homeland, and categorically states that Goa is the homeland of the *Konkanis* (i.e the Konkani speaking

populations of the west coast of India). The suggestion is that the Konkani project was an attempt to correct this historical accident and suture the community back together. This is not merely a suggestion however since Naik indicates that adopting Devanagari would enable participation in the national mainstream. The Roman script, it is therefore suggested, in an echo of the opinion of Armando Menezes quoted in the preceding chapter, would not enable this participation. Nayak links the Konkani project with the nationalist project by suggesting that the Sahitya Parishad decision was a part of the nationalist imagination of the time, and that Konkani is seen as part of the nationalist regeneration for Goa, which until recently was subjugated by the Portuguese. Recalling the intervention of native Orientalists like Gerson da Cunha, Naik asserts that Konkani is linked to Sanskrit and that the decision for Devanagari is made by the writers of Konkani. And as if marking the distinction between the writers who are rational, and are represented as working solely in the public interest, Naik suggests that the demand for Roman is a sentimental and emotional argument.

It was within this form of public opinion that the decision on the script was taken by the political parties involved in hammering out the consensus to enable the passing of the Bill. Given that unity was being stressed, both of the national community, within which the Catholics had to fit in, as well as of the Konkani community, against the alleged depradations of the Marathiwaadis, Devanagari was recognized as the script in which the language would be officially recognized. This preference was nevertheless recognized, even by those who stood for the Devanagari option, as a sacrifice that had been made by the "Catholic community" to enable "those who were diverted from the mainstream 'for historical reasons' to be brought back to the fold" (Rebello 1987).

There is an entire economy around this term of sacrifice that deserves elaboration. To begin with, this sacrifice was made largely by the Catholic elites, perhaps rightfully insecure about their location in post-colonial Goa. This sense is perhaps captured perfectly in a little anecdote related to me while interacting with a voluble supporter of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari. He pointed out that after a dinner party at his house, Fr. Correia-Afonso (at that time the Secretary to the Bishop) indicated to him (in Portuguese) that the decision of the Archbishop Raul Gonsalves, in the Medium of Instrution controversy was perhaps the best thing that the Archbishop could have done. This statement, palpably of relief, I would like to interpret as the expression of the sacrifice, or accommodation that

the Church and the Catholic elite had made to the new Indian dispensation.[137] This "sacrifice" was also mirrored by the *Saraswat* partners of the Catholic elites in this project. The same priest who had explained to me why the Catholics had to stick with the Devanagari activists also recollected another argument presented to him by the upper-caste Devanagari activists. He told me that Sandesh Prabhudesai had demonstrated that while the Catholics may have sacrificed their tradition of using the Roman script, they too had given up their long Marathi tradition, for the sake of unity and Goan identity.

What needs to be highlighted here is that this voice of sacrifice was not articulated by the letter writers in the *Herald*, nor by the crowds who are reported to have not identified with the "Marathi Konkani" (the name that they gave the *Antruzi* dialect and its Devanagari script) when it was used at the time of the Konkani Language movement. Reminiscing about those incidents, Tomazinho Cardozo recounted to me how the crowds would argue "*Them Marathi Concani amkam naka hanh!*".[138] Indeed, on more than one occasion my attention was directed toward the fact that the day after the enactment of the Official Language Act, Churchill Alemao led a furious group to the offices of the Herald's office protesting against the headline that indicated that Konkani had been made an official language. If the Roman script was not recognized, Alemao had argued, how could it be said that Konkani was recognized as the official script? (Editorial *Herald* 1987: 2; see also Noronha 2008: 76). Further, Tomazinho Cardozo points out that when this issue was brought up, the Konkani "leadership" would suggest that this issue could be discussed later, and that no opportunity should be given to create a division among the Konkani movement. Indeed, Desai points out that whenever, in the mass rallies, the issue of script emerged, the answer that would be thrown back was that "voice (*awaz*) has no script" (Desai 2002: 296). It is in light of these failed assurances that Tomazinho Cardozo and other prominent activists demanding recognition of the Roman script, speak in terms of a conspiracy to undermine and destroy Konkani in the Roman script (Cardozo 2008).

In recognition of the "sacrifice" and the inconvenience that would be involved for those required to transition to the Devanagari script, assurances were made that the Roman script

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[137] This relief was not merely a sentiment of Fr. Correia-Afonso alone, but shared by other senior members of the hierarchy. Take, for example, various statements by Fr. Martinho Noronha, who as editor of the Archdiocese's magazine, *Renovação* had occasion to make numerous statements in favour of the Devanagari script, both as a way to join the mainstream, as well as express his opinion on the inadequacy of the Roman script for Konkani (Noronha 1991: 173; Noronha 1987: 53).

[138] "We don't want that Marathi-Konkani okay!"

would continue to be patronised with provision being made for Roman for a transition period (Herald Reporters, 1985: 1). Indeed, at the celebration of the twenty fourth *Raj Bhas Dis* (Official Language Day) on 4 February, 2009 organized by the Goa Konkani Akademi where Luizinho Faleiro speaking as Chief Guest, recollected how he had proposed for a transition period of twenty five years for the Roman script, a transition period that finally did not materialize. This transition period was, one imagines, the period within which it was assumed that having gained capacity in the Devanagari script the Roman Catholic population would be capable of integrating into the national mainstream. The proposed period varied between twenty five years and ten years. As it turned out, this notion of a transition period was ultimately dropped and only Devanagari found mention in the OLA.

What none of these positions recognised, was that by agreeing to this need for the Catholics' need to return, the Goan Catholic was positioned as the necessary recipient of tutoring, of having to necessarily mend their ways, and thus cast as a classic population group that must be catered to by those who now occupy the legislatively privileged and acknowledged space of Goan modernity. The fact that the assurance of a transition period was made and then eventually dropped, that the militant masses of the Konkani language agitation were allowed to believe that the Konkani that was being fought for was that in Roman script, and let down at the eleventh hour, also evokes Chatterjee's suggestion that the denizens of political society, are only recipients of concessions that can be rolled back when the status-quo changes. They are never the recipients of rights (Chatterjee 2007).

Fixing Goa's secular culture IV: the medium of instruction

The next crucial point in this narrative is the period marked by the "Medium of Instruction" controversy. The medium of instruction controversy marks a significant point at which, subsequent to the gains at the conclusion of the language agitation, the hegemony of the vernacular (both Konkani and Marathi) over those elements deemed foreign was firmly established. This translated into large sections of Goan Catholics forced into being educated in officially sanctioned Konkani, which is to say Konkani in the Devanagari script and the *Antruzi* dialect, with English language education now available only subsequent to primary schooling, or via private run schools offering instruction with English as the language of instruction.

As the name suggests, the medium of instruction (MoI) controversy raged around the issue of the medium, or language, in which instruction would be provided to students in state-funded primary schools. The turn of events that brought this situation to pass is rather strange since the seeds of this educational policy did not start with any popular demand for education in the regional or vernacular languages, but started as a result of a demand by a teacher employed in a Diocesan school[139] for payment on par with the scales recommended for state-funded schools. This scenario is significant in pointing once more to the subaltern nature of segments of the Goan Catholic population, where popular movements mobilised by this group, or at attempt to speak, seem to largely be diverted to meet the interests of hegemonic groups, who speak on behalf of the marginalized classes among the Goan Catholics. This was, as is obvious in the earlier discussions, the case in the fight for separate status within the Indian Union, and the fight for recognition of Konkani as the language of the state, which nevertheless did not ensure the recognition of the Roman script and associated dialects favoured by the bulk of those mobilised.

As it turned out, the teacher won the case with the High Court ruling that allowing the private primary schools to pay lower salaries to their staff (merely because they were minority institutions) would be ultra-vires of Article 14 of the Constitution (Writ Petition No 302 of 1988, judgement dated November 7/8, 1989 cited in Noronha 1999).

Three months later, The Tenth All India Konkani Writer's Conference, passed a resolution urging that the government of Goa should take steps "to impart pre-primary and primary education in Konkani only ... (and) that no grants nor assistance should be given to those private schools which harm the minds of the tender children by thrusting on them ... pre-primary and primary education in alien languages, especially English (['Resolutions Passed', Konkani Basha Mandal, no date.], in Noronha 1999)." The argument of the Writer's conference, and Konkani language activists ever since, has relied much on the recommendations of the UNESCO where "ideally, the medium of instruction for a child living in its own language environment should be the mother tongue". The argument was made that teaching children in a language other than their mother tongue, or in this specific

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[139] Subsequent to the integration of Goa into the Indian Union, primary educational facilities had burgeoned in the territory, with schools being run by the Church, especially with English as the medium of instruction providing the bulk of this education. These Church-run schools included those schools that were run by the Archdiocese in the various parishes in the state, as well as schools run by Catholic religious orders that submitted to the regulatory authority of the Archbishop. Teachers in these schools were paid salaries ranging between Rs. 165 and Rs. 400 a month, while their counterparts in the government schools drew a salary of Rs. 1200. The demand before the Court was therefore equal pay for equal work (Noronha 1999).

case, the non-vernacular tongue of English, would harm children by thrusting on them primary education in alien languages.[140] Subsequently, backers of both Marathi and Konkani joined forces to demand government grants for private primary schools, provided they did not use English as the medium of instruction. The MGP-dominated Progressive Democratic Front government acceded to this demand articulating in 1990 a rule that ensured that the state would provide grants to all primary schools where instruction was imparted in the regional language, but denied, at the same time, any state aid to English-medium primary schools (Noronha 1999).[141]

Caught between this policy by the Government and the High Court decision that compelled them to pay teachers at government schools, the Diocesan schools found themselves in the proverbial location between a rock and a hard place. As Noronha points out, the position of the Diocesan Board of Education zig-zagged through the length of the incident.

Initially the Archdiocese stalled for time, indicating its willingness to implement the policy, but pointed out that since the teachers in their schools were not equipped to teach the language and other infrastructural preparations were required, the implementation of the policy be deferred for a year. This willingness to compromise infuriated the parents determined that their children be educated in the English language. This was not surprising given that from the times of Portuguese sovereignty over the territory, education in English had been the preference for those Goan Catholics who could afford the option.[142] English was associated not only with the opportunities – both social and economic – for liberation

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[140] Underlining the argument of citizenship being impacted not only by intra-state discourses, but international discourses, as well, I would like to point out that it appears that the UNESCO recommendation itself was the product of Bangaldesh's struggle for independence, where Urdu was being forced on a population more accustomed to speaking Bengali.

[141] Multiple explanations have been forwarded for why the Government enforced this educational policy. Some have suggested that faced with a challenge from the BJP party that had newly entered the Goan electoral field and was challenging the MGP's Hindu base, the MGP was keen to take steps that would indicate to its electorate that it was acting in support of local culture and traditions (Rubinoff 1998:121). Others, assuming Konkani to be the "natural" tongue and culture of Goa, and falling back on tropes articulated during the campaigning prior to the Opinion Poll, suggest that the MGP, led by Shashikala Kakodkar were interested in a "Marathification" of Goa (Botelho 2002: 225). Still others, have suggested that the Catholic politicians at the time, Luis Proto Barbosa, who was then Chief Minister, and Churchill Alemao wanted to cut the Church down to size, and assert their power over the church.

[142] Supplementing the meagre supply of Government schools in the territory, was a slew of private schools that were set up to enable students to receive primary education in the English language. Indeed, such was the popularity of these English language schools that to deal with the situation, the Portuguese government in India was forced to insist on completion of the primary level of education (up to the *Segundo Grau*) in Portuguese before students were allowed to migrate to schools affiliated to British Indian boards of education set up within the territory of Goa.

from the colonially enabled *ancien régime*, but was (and continues to be) also seen as a way out of the fixing that the traditionally spoken dialects imposed on the person. As in other parts of the subcontinent, one's spoken language marked one's belonging in a definite spatial and group location. Thus one could determine from one's speech the geographical, religious and caste location of the speaker. A shift to English offered one way to move outside of this framework since command over English is a status marker. Another evidence of this switch to English is the preference to attend Mass in English, rather than Konkani. Indeed, through the duration of my fieldwork, I heard many complaints, from both sides of the scriptal divide, lamenting the fact that instead of attending Mass in Konkani in their village, people would travel to towns for Mass in English.

Gathered under the banner of the Action Committee for Medium of Instruction (ACMI), the agitation that they mounted lasted over two months. In a gesture that emphasizes their subaltern position in political society, it ultimately produced no definite result. The agitations around the controversy were finally settled when the Archbishop issued a Circular, indicating that after deliberations with a number of the relevant bodies of the Church, the Church had decided that Konkani would be accepted as the medium of instruction at the primary and pre-primary level, starting from June 1991 in Church-run schools (Gonsalves 1991: 86).

The agitation may have subsequently died down, but this has not signalled a resolution of the problem. Over the past two decades, the flight of students from Diocesan schools to private schools in the English medium has been high. This has been despite the fact that parents are forced to make a concerted effort to pay the not insubstantial fees for the education in the English language. In addition, those Catholics who have no option but to send their children to the Konkani medium schools find that their wards are being taught in a language they cannot identify with. Parents frequently complain that they do not understand the language that is being taught in the school.

While privy to this situation by virtue of being a Goan, I gained a rather direct experience of it in the period of fieldwork. At the home of a friend who was a prominent local activist, I encountered her sons going from the house, after lunch, for tuitions. Inquiring into what tuitions they were going for, she indicated that they were going for Konkani tuitions. She explained that her son just did not understand what was taught in school, and furthermore

had great difficulty in understanding the script. Hence, the need for the tuitions. This activist and her sons were not the only Goan Catholics I had encountered who claimed this difficulty with the Devanagari script and understanding the Konkani taught in the schools. I suspect that this inability to comprehend reflects not an absolute inability to fathom the script, but more a disinclination to invest in a language, which is Konkani, that they already believe they know, but is taught in a form athat they do not recognize to be their own. Furthermore, as one *tiatrist* recounted in a public meeting, when faced with the difference between the Konkani spoken at home and the Konkani taught in schools, wards often correct their parents saying: "Daddy, Mummy, your Konkani is wrong!" To a number of Catholics, this only compounds the situation where they perceive that their Konkani is being mocked by the elites that have determined the nature of standard-form Konkani.

It is perhaps these continuing concerns that caused a renewed demand for grants to schools with the medium of education in English in the summer of 2011. The crowds that these demonstrations have drawn have had parallels with the demonstrations in support of Konkani, which were truly monumental in scale. More interestingly, these demonstrations, while led largely by Catholics, have also drawn Hindus from the Goan hinterland. This latter aspect is not an issue that concerns the argument of this chapter. What I would like to draw attention to is that the response to this recent assertion has once more drawn a combined opposition from the "pro-Konkani" and "pro-Marathi" groups.

The impact of this intervention was to firmly establish the hegemony of official Konkani in Goa. Through the creation of an entire syllabus in official Konkani, the *Saraswat* dialect *Antruzi* that embodied the official Konkani was given one more structural prop to establish itself as "proper Konkani". Indeed, in the subsequent controversy where recognition of the Roman script was demanded, those opposed to the Roman script would point out that younger Catholics now preferred to read Konkani in Devanagari rather than in Roman, in the course of Church services. This argument, it turns out, was in fact the response of a prominent upper-caste Catholic author, who pointed out that in her local parish, there was a girl who was more comfortable in the Devanagari script than in the Roman. As such, this girl preferred to write out the text of her readings in the Devanagari, rather than read them directly in the Roman script from the texts in the Church. Predictably, this single example was then magnified to demonstrate the preference of the younger Goan Catholic

generation. This decision also indicated the direction in which "civil society" preferred the Goan community identity, or the Goan cultural community to develop. It pointed to the unacceptability of the evolving culture of the Catholic masses that included an increasing anglicization and westernization. What is significant, is that not only was this effected at the level of state dictat, but was effectively underlined by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church that accepted this dictat. The impact of these decisions was to effectively push large sections of the Goan Catholic, especially those who could not claim a history of cultural purity thanks to dominant-caste locations, into a precarious relationship with the Goan cultural community, or civil society. While to a larger extent community life continued with its drive towards the acquisition of English and "western" lifestyles, this drive was castigated by both state and Church. Further, it established that the Goan Catholics were incorrectly Goan, and though Konkani speaking, would have to aspire to speak it "properly". The medium of instruction controversy completed a process through which while being legally recognized as citizens in the state of Goa, where its modernity was defined in terms of *Saraswat* Konkani, non-elite Goan Catholics were pushed into the location of political society. I would like to re-emphasize, that this *Saraswat* Konkani was able to gain hegemony primarily because it was couched within the larger Hindu-Sanskritic frames of Indian national modernity.

In the wake of the medium of instruction controversy, the extent to which language was such a fluctuating marker has been remarked on in a number of papers (Botelho 2002; Noronha 1999). There is a suggestion, best captured in the words of Botelho below, that there was a confusion in the minds of the Goans, and especially the Goan Catholics, as to the route they wanted to take. He observes that

> While in 1987 people fought to enthrone *Konkani Mai* onto the throne of 'official language', three years later the same people wanted to retain English as a medium of instruction at the primary level and, as the survey indicates, even today desire to educate their children through English medium schools at the primary level. (Botelho 2002: 226)

I would argue that using the lens of subalternity presents a perfect tool to understand this fluctuation; that is, the preference for language fluctuated because language was not the issue in the first place. A large segment of the Goan Catholic masses that powered the mass agitations associated with the Konakni language movement had recently liberated themselves both from poverty as well as the landlord and *gãocar* dominated social

structure through migration to the Gulf. For this group, interested in economic security and social mobility, it was English that provided the key, providing at the same time a social marker that gave them parity with the traditional upper strata. Desai points out that their concern for Konkani was motivated more through their concern to obtain a location through which they could intervene in the politics of the state and protect their identity within the territory (Desai 2002: 85 – 86). Thus, what was the issue was not in fact the language per se; on the contrary at issue were the demands for citizenship rights, rights that were feared to be threatened subsequent to the integration of the territory of Goa to the Indian Union. It is precisely because of the subaltern nature of the groups articulating this demand, that their demands were inaudible. The metaphors they used to articulate the demands were constructed on an epistemological plane that was built for other concerns. Thus the Goa whose distinct status they argued for, was in fact an argument for equal rights, but was effectively used to construct a homebase for the Konkani language. The Konkani that they spoke in favour of would come to mean not the dialects they spoke, but the Konkani of the *Saraswat* caste group, and the history of the Konkani caste. When they argued for English at the time of the Medium of Instruction controversy, they were not arguing against the Konkani they spoke, but for the socio-economic and political rights to not be fixed by state practice into one field, but to retain the personal and communal dynamism that had been discovered that allowed them to speak, sing and write in their dialects, while working in English, both within Goa, the former British India, and internationally. That these demands were not articulated in this fashion, but in other forms, and further, not heard, is I believe; powerful evidence of their profoundly subaltern location. It is in this context that I return to Fr. Pratap Naik's statement quoted at the start of this chapter, where in the story of Konkani's enthronement as an official language of the state, it has been Paulo (the labouring Goan Catholics) who struggled, while Pandu (the upper-caste Hindu and associate groups) that have come to enjoy the fruits of this recognition.

Summation

This chapter sought to add flesh to a number of theoretical concerns that this thesis addresses. To begin with, is the argument of citizenship as a form a fixing of populations. Citizenship, as the belonging to a cultural community was fixed through the process of a variety of citizenship acts that delimited the territorial boundaries for Goa, and the nascent Konkani language community, by establishing the status of Konkani not as a dialect of

Marathi, but as an independent language, and in the wake of this triumph, elevating Konkani as the state language for the territory of Goa. These acts of fixing were also accompanied by the privileging of a narrowly defined and understood vernacularity over those local elements that which was defined as foreign. Marked off as foreign in this act of fixing were the Catholic religion and its adherents, the Roman script, and the many cultural products of those who were Catholic and scripted their Konkani in the Roman script. Relying heavily on romanticist notions of the connection between the soul of the nation and its language, as well as the social location of its producers, these cultural forms such as the *tiatr*, *cantaram*, and the *romance* were seen as impotent and lacking in quality, unable to wholly express the soul of the Konkani people.

There are two arguments I would like to underline that stem from the above observation. The first is that these citizenship acts affirm the argument made earlier that citizenship is not necessarily about equality and justice, but more properly the claiming of rights, privileges and even concessions, they are the acts that give the actors the space to manoeuvre. The second, and larger, argument I would like to make is that the observations above underline the way in which the lower-caste and lower class Goan Catholics in particular are located in a subaltern position, and the manner in which the play of the web of subalternities can be discerned. The subalternity of these groups may not immediately be visible if one looks at Goan Catholics as a single monolithic community. Nor does this subalternity manifest by looking solely at the relative material prosperity of a group that has gained immensely from migration overseas for employment. This subalternity is evidenced in the fact that the Konkani language is used as a tool to articulate concerns of these population groups that cannot otherwise find legitimate expression. This subalternity is underlined by the fact that despite using the language as a tool, these population groups fail to have their concerns addressed. The web of subalternities is evidenced when it is observed while their Christianity is as a burdensome marker, some Catholics, especially the upper-caste, are able to secure positions within the realm of civil society. This web is also demonstrated when it becomes clear that thanks to this devalorising of the Catholic, the otherwise subaltern lower-caste Hindu groups, were able to gain space for themselves in the crafting of the official *citizenplace* through the privileging of vernacularity, and especially the Devanagari script, the Marathi language, and *Antruzi* dialect over the Roman script. These various factors call attention to these Catholic groups as population groups that exist outside of the civil society of the state of Goa. This civil society is those

segments of the community that can claim to perfectly embody either Konkani (in its *Antruzi* and Devanagari form), or some form of vernacularity (namely Marathi and Hinduism). These markers, especially after the enactment of the Official Language Act are the markers of Goan nationalist modernity that allow access into Goa's civil society. Those who cannot possess these markers, are, at least from the point of view of the cultural community, cast into the dark of its political society.

Chap 5
Between Civil and Political Society: The Citizenship Experiences of the Goan Catholics

Prologue

Earlier chapters of this thesis demonstrated how the Goan Catholics, and especially the marginal caste and lower class Goan Catholics find themselves in a subaltern position, and the manner in which the citizenship ideal for the Goan *citizenplace* had been fixed over the course of the nineteenth century and following integration of the territory into the Indian Union. This chapter will move from these larger terrains, both of time and space, and locate itself in the present and the local context of Goa to examine how the activist strategies of those demanding, and opposing, official recognition of the Roman script for the Konkani language demonstrate their location between the forms of civil and political society.

As already elaborated in the introduction to this thesis, the field of this thesis is concerned with the demand for recognition of the Roman script for the Konkani language in the Official Language Act (OLA) of Goa. Promulgated in 1987, this Act recognises Konkani in the Devanagari (Nagari) script as the official language of Goa, while also giving Marathi space for administrative use in the territory. With both these vernacular languages being given official space, it is only Konkani written in the Roman script, and the language forms associated with it that have failed to gain official recognition. In the face of this exclusion, and as a result of the marginalization of the Konkani language forms, and literary forms associated with the Roman script, the demand has been taken up by a variety of groups, most notably the Dalgado Konknni Akademi (DKA), for an inclusion of the Roman script within the OLA. In response, this demand has been opposed by other groups, most notably the Goan Catholics for Devanagari (GCFD) that assert not only exclusive recognition for Devanagari alone, but argue that recognising the Roman script would have devastating cultural effects, splintering the sub-national Goan community. It is within this context, that this chapter will contemplate the politics in favour of, and in opposition to the Roman script within the context of Chatterjee's concept of political society.

As was discussed in the second chapter, Chatterjee introduces the idea of political society as a way to problematize the mode in which polities that fulfil the procedural norms of

democracy are understood. Chatterjee argues that the realm of civil society, that is often used to encompass the entire citizenry in a polity, is in fact a profoundly limited location. It is limited to a closed association of modern elite groups that sequestered from the wider popular life of the communities represent the high ground of modernity, walled up within enclaves of civic freedom and rational law. While the members of civil society are addressed as individuals by the state, persons outside of this civil society location are treated as members of population groups. These groups are seen as groups whose needs, and demands, have to be catered to. These groups, Chatterjee argues, do not enjoy rights, but merely concessions, granted when their demands cannot be denied, and withdrawn when the political imperative to address these claims no longer exists. Chatterjee also points out that when faced with a challenge from political society, the strategic response of the state is invariably to break up the benefit-seekers into smaller groups. These groups are subsequently defined by specific demographic or social characteristics, so that there can be a flexible policy that does not regard the entire rural population as a single homogeneous mass but rather breaks it up into smaller target populations. While phrased in welfarist tones, the intention, Chatterjee charges, is to fragment the benefit-seekers, dividing in this process the potential opposition to the state (Chatterjee, 2007, 2008).

In this formulation, groups in political society do not have recourse to a formal-rational relationship with the law that is theoretically the mark of the relationship between citizens and the state in civil society. On the contrary, to gain redress to their demands, groups in political society need to exert influence, make deals, plead for recognition, display strength of numbers indicating to politicians that the groups comprise a sizable block, promising their support for future electoral success. Prior to articulating these claims, however, they have to first constitute themselves as an identifiable population group, "invest their collective identity with a moral content" (Chatterjee 2007: 57) and invent themselves into some form of a community, invoking tropes of kinship and other communitarian ideals (Chatterjee 2007:57, 75) so as to inscribe themselves in the governmental record as a distinct population group. It is only once they are constituted as a group in the eyes of the state, that they can move to make claims on their state, and demand attention to their particular population group.

This chapter will not only discuss the strategies of the groups for and against the official recognition of the Roman script according to this framework, but will also problematize

the neat binary divide that Chatterjee proposes between civil society and political society. As in earlier discussions in this thesis, I will seek to demonstrate in this chapter, that as useful as binary divisions may be when conceptualising an intellectual framework, reference to the field will demonstrate just how the binaries merge into one another, creating a scale of forms. To demonstrate the way in which these two spaces are in fact transcended, imbuing one with the character of the other, this chapter will have recourse to Santos' (1995) frame of interlegality, illustrating the legalities and knowledge forms of multiple social locations, notably that of caste, and the family, that twine to produce this complex terrain of citizenship. This will ideally underline the larger argument of this thesis, that citizenship acts must be seen as the attempts to create space to manoeuvre in a variety of intertwined social locations, not merely within the realm of the political and in reference merely to the state.

The "politics" of Konkani's civil society

Contrary to the claims of the GCFD, who suggest that the demands for the recognition of the Roman script, emerged recently, following the instigation of the BJP legislator, and for a while Chief Minister, Manohar Parrikar, the narratives of the Roman script activists reveal a much longer history for the demand. They assert that the demand for the recognition of the Roman script in the Official Language Act (OLA) began no sooner than the OLA was passed, through the actions of a rather improbable actor.[143]

Fr. Pratap Naik S.J. is a Jesuit priest who was at the time a researcher in the Thomas Stephens Konknni Kendr (TSKK), a Jesuit research institute set up to promote the cause of Konkani. In the course of my interviews with him, Fr. Naik told me that subsequent to the passing of the Bill, and of the opinion that "now that the Bill had been passed, there was a need to bring the Community into the mainstream" he organized a meeting of Konkani writers who used the Roman script. The meeting held on 14 March, 1987 was chaired by Fr. Naik, and it was there, Fr. Naik revealed, that he first became acquainted with the fact that the recognition of Konkani in the Roman script alone had not been a unanimous decision.

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[143] I say improbable, because not only was Fr. Naik eager that the Catholics join the "mainstream", but also because, despite his demands for the recognition of the difference of the Roman script and its associated dialects, much of his activism, through the aegis of the TSKK of which he was, until recently, director, is to create a Konkani culture that would sit comfortably within the ambit of a brahmanically understood "Indian" or "local" culture. This obsession with crafting Konkani into local forms is not disconnected with the deep discomfort that many Konkani speakers, both Catholic and non-Catholic, feel with regard to the cultural forms assumedly introduced into local culture by the Portuguese and Catholic missionaries.

In many recollections of that meeting, including that of Fr. Naik's, it is the figure of Fr. Freddy Da Costa that is credited with challenging the assumption of the Chair (Fr. Naik) that it had been now unanimously agreed that Devanagari had been accepted by all of those writing in Konkani. In the narrative of the Roman script activists, it was this meeting in 1987 that set the ball rolling for the establishment of the Dalgado Konknni Akademi (DKA) that was eventually set up in the year 1988. Fr. Da Costa was elected the President for the first committee of the organization. For a variety of reasons, this group, that was set up to promote the interests of the Roman script does not seem to have achieved much, and after a change of presidents of the association, entered a stage of dormancy between the years 1990 and 2004 (Naik S.J. , 2005).

What is critical to this part of the narrative, are the circumstances that led to the revival of the Akademi. Fr. Pratap recounts that subsequent to the establishment of the DKA, there was an apparent change of tone in the language that Fr. Da Costa used. At public functions Fr. Da Costa would reportedly assert "we" had accepted Devanagari as the official script for Konkani. Upon inquiring as to the reason for this change, Fr. Da Costa seems to have suggested to Fr. Pratap that he felt that there was no point to their agitating for the Roman script anymore. The leaders of the demand for the Roman script, including Fr. Da Costa had apparently been visited by those activists from the Konkani Bhasha Mandal (KBM) who had played a significant role in the Konkani language agitation, and had, at the time of the agitation, acknowledged the need to renounce the demand for the recognition of the Roman script in the interests of unity. In the process, they had also suggested to him, so the narrative goes, that it was impossible for a language to be recognized by the Sahitya Akademi in the Roman script. I should mention that this suggestion was also forcefully made to me by those opposed to the Roman script, both from the GCFD and those who were not a part of the GCFD. These activists sought to convince me, no doubt as they sought to convince Fr. Da Costa and other persons, that because the Roman script was not an "Indian" script there was no way it could be recognized as a valid and legitimate script by the Sahitya Akademi, a national body. In the face of such odds, Fr. Da Costa informed Fr. Naik, it appeared as if there was no point in further agitating. He justified his continued works in publishing magazines and newspaper in the Roman script as being tailored to the audience that did not understand Devanagari. They needed to be provided "food" and it was for that purpose that he continued with his publication efforts. It should be recollected that prior to the enactment of the OLA, there were suggestions that the Roman script be

given a period of grace of about ten years, to enable those used to it, to eventually switch over to Devanagari. Fr. Da Costa's efforts, it appears, seem to have been now geared toward fulfilling this kind of a programme.

To set this issue straight Fr. Naik wrote to the Sahitya Kala Akademi seeking clarification on this issue, and finally in 2004, received a letter that indicated that it was not script that determined the status of the language, but a set of various other criteria. It was this receipt of this letter, and the realization, subsequent to Fr. Naik's propagation of its contents, that the Roman camp had been misguided all these years, that got the agitation for the Roman script, through the aegis of the DKA, kick-started once more.

This episode is useful because it demonstrates a number of the features that mark the experiences of citizenship in the Goan *citizenplace*. To begin with, the law is encountered not directly through a reference to the written text, or scholarly discussions of the same, but through representations of it in the social field. These representations gain power first because of the social standing of the person who makes this representation. This social standing emerges possibly from educational qualification; the leaders of the Devanagari lobby are armed with persons such as Uday Bhembre, who work as lawyers, but also because of the upper-caste locations of these individuals, and their simultaneous location in Church hierarchy. For example, speaking with Fr. Evangelho, one of the priests opposed to the recognition of the Roman script, and a Canon lawyer, I was told that not only could the Sahitya Akademi not recognize the Roman script, but it was constitutionally impossible for one language to be recognized in two scripts. Drawing on my location as a researcher, and not the "good Catholic boy" image I often felt obliged to fall into when interacting with these priests, I challenged Fr. Evangelho's assertion. In response he drew out the Constitution, but was unable to find the particular provision. In the face of this, the authority with which he was speaking was displaced on to others who were lawyers. It was they, he told me, who had pointed it out to him, even though he could not find the provision now. I would clearly have to take his word for it.

An equally significant fact working in the field is the self-perception of many Catholics, of the illegitimacy of their culture, and its incompatibility with the culture of the national "mainstream". It appears that this single factor was the most significant in ensuring a number of activists for the Roman script accepting the argument that there was no way in which Roman could be recognized legally. Take for example Fr. Da Costa's own

resignation discussed above. More significantly, this lack of an active and direct relationship with "the law" seems indicative of a location in political society. They are not familiar with the law, because it is not through the law that their issues have been addressed. Their issues have been addressed primarily by the dominant caste groups, and especially those of the Hindu dominant castes, who assured them that, despite not being embodied in the law (i.e. the OLA), their interests would be taken care of. A reference to the history outlined in the earlier chapter buttresses this argument rather substantially.

Following its period of dormancy, the DKA was revived in 2004, with Fr. Da Costa once more being elected President of the *ad hoc* managing committee. Unfortunately for the DKA, Fr. Da Costa died in a road accident a couple of days after tis revival of the Akademi. Despite the fact that his death seemed poised to disrupt the momentum that had been renewed, the organization persevered and after some transitional hiccups, was led by Tomazinho Cardozo. Cardozo was a veteran from the Konkani language agitation, a former politician, and is a significant actor in the mobilisations this thesis studies. With Cardozo as President, the DKA has substantially moved forward in the process of asserting its demand for recognition for the Roman script in Konkani.

I would like to interrupt the reflection on these strategies and actions of the DKA to focus on the efforts of another group of activists that also attempted to secure the official recognition of Konkani in the Roman script. The strategies of this group, the All Goa Citizens' Committee for Social Justice and Action (AGCCSJA), in particular through the efforts of its prime actor M.K. Jos, epitomize the strategies of those who see themselves as members of a civil society, or those who see these strategies as viable options as citizenship practices.

The *All Goa Citizens' Committee for Social Justice and Action* is a civil society action group that seems to epitomize the idea of a civil society group.[144] This is to say that it seems to lack a popular base, but is active in the public sphere through the writing of

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[144]Indeed, the fact that this group's name is available only in English should also say something about their conscious location in the realm of civil society. In this context, I would also like to make reference to the name of the organization of the Catholic activists for the Devanagari script (GCFD), which is also in English. These similarities allow to recall my observation in the second chapter of this thesis, where making reference to Mitchell's observation (2009: 93) of the Telugu goddess being captioned in English was a testament to how after being established as a symbol around which the community is organized, the language is required only as an idea, not as an actual tool of communication. I would not like to overemphasize this point, since the *Konkani Bhasha Mandal*, a group that eminently embodies civil society is a group whose name is in the vernacular.

letters to the editors of various newspapers, making use of the Right to Information Act to procure information about the modes and manners in which governmental power is exercised, and lending its voice to popular protest movements. Some of these movements were the popular agitations against the alignment of the Konkan Railway[145], the Nylon 6.6 project[146], and the Meta Strips project[147]. From the sense that I received in the course of my interactions with M.K. Jos, the group has had a floating membership, but has always been marked by the central presence of M. K. Jos. This fact is significant since it seems to demonstrate how, despite the fact that the association finds continued life through the efforts and presence of a single individual, an associational form is seen as critical to being able to participate in civil society discussions in a legitimate manner. The associational form, with its history of civil society interventions, are important to demonstrate that the group is not a motley impromptu association, but one that is composed of "respectable members of society", acting in concert and in the public, not private, interest. As if to emphasize the importance of a *citizenplace* that is based on written assertions presented for debate in the public sphere, Jos maintains a systematic record of all correspondence that he has undertaken, or received, as well as filed copies of newspaper reports pertinent to his actions.

A review of some of the letters that Jos has written shows some similarity to the rhetoric employed by the activists of the KPA described in the earlier chapter, as well as sharing the same discomfort of members of Indian civil society to the politics of the masses. Take for example his letter to Ramakant Khalap, a leader of the Maharastrawadi Gomantak

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[145] The Konkan Railway project sought to realize a century old suggestion of linking the Konkan segment of the Indian west coast, through a railway line from Bombay to Kerala. The agitation against it in the early 1990s was a movement that consumed the Old Conquest areas in Goa. At the root of the issue was an opposition not to the project itself, but its alignment citing environmental issues, as well as the fact that it would pass through the densest population pockets in the state. For a detailed discussion see Raghuram (1995).

[146] In 1985, the international chemical company DuPont proposed to set up a synthetic nylon 6,6 factory at Goa in collaboration with one the Indian Thapar group to capture the booming market in automobile tyres. This project was opposed by local environmental activists and Panchayat leaders when they were made aware that the primary chemicals used in the production of nylon 6,6 process had been classified as hazardous substances in the US. After a
prolonged struggle, involving some writ petitions, violence against the project's properties and death of an activist in police firing, the opposition was successful in preventing the project from being sited in Goa. Like the Konkan railway agitation, the anti-Nylon 6,6 agitation too was supported by the Catholic Church. For a further discussion see Cohen and Sarangi (1995).

[147] A project proposed by the Jindal group, once again this project was opposed on the basis of the local populations fears of environmental pollution, and while drawing on the larger network of environmental activists in the state, was supported by the local parish.

Party, dated 25 February, 1986, in the course of the Konkani language agitation. He explained in this letter that

> I am writing all this to you….because, I consider you as one of the very few level-headed politicians of Goa, and a respectable professional! You have your political status, and your professional integrity to safeguard; naturally the stakes are high!

This extract illustrates both his imagination of what the *citizenplace* ought to be, as well his critique of the actually existing space of politics. The *citizenplace* was ideally populated by professionals, who could be level headed, as well as have a professional integrity that they would be unwilling to compromise. On the other hand, the fact that Khalap was seen as "one of the very few", was an indication that the field of politics had in fact been taken over by those who were not professionals and did not in fact have anything to loose through the political deals that they would and could cut. This was not merely a phrase articulated to flatter Khalap, since in the course of the mobilizing for the recognition of the Roman script, he continued to stress in letters to prospective collaborators, such as one dated 1 Sept, 2005, addressed to "Parish Priests, Heads of Institutions and Eminent Persons", that it was important to demonstrate that their exercise be seen as one emanating from "knowledgeable people, and not a frivolous effort". These assertions are also indicative that Jos and his associates consciously saw themselves as members of politics-free civil society. Professionals, who were educated, respectable members of society; in other words consciously modern rational denizens of society, they were not like those who did, or needed to politick to gain the attention of the state. This act of politicking was engaged with by those barely modern politicians and their mass supporters.

Jos is not a Goan, and came to Goa in the period soon after the territory's integration into the Indian Union. Since an early period he has been involved in a number of protest movements and civic initiatives and has been especially associated with a number of priests.[148] Indeed, his association with the movement for the recognition of the Roman script in Konkani came about as a result of his friendship with Fr. Vasco do Rego S.J. Fr. Rego had had occasion in an earlier instance, to benefit from the drafting skills, and quasi-

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[148] Given the central role of the Church and its organizational structure within Catholic, and secular society in Goa, this association with the Church could perhaps be a way for an "outsider", as Jos is often characterized, to integrate with Goan society and gain social significance. This aspect is not, however, one that I have spent time on analyzing.

legal advice of Jos and had drawn him into the Roman script mobilization and introduced him to Fr. Pratap Naik.

Jos' strategy to win recognition for the Roman script took the relatively simple form of a petition for recognition addressed to the President of India. The logic of this petition was fuelled by Jos' reading of Art. 347 of the Constitution of India,[149] which on plain reading indicates that should a substantial proportion of the population desire, and demand of the President that the use of any language spoken by them to be recognized by the state, then the President would direct that such a language be recognized by the government. To demonstrate that the demand emerged from a substantial proportion of the population, the AGCCSJA initiated a signature campaign across Catholic institutions in Goa, these institutions including Churches, chapels and Church-run schools in support of their petition.

There is an almost touching naiveté to this campaign, in that it assumes as fact, the theoretical assertions of the processes through which the law (in this case Constitutional provisions) and democracy work. There is an assumption of the existence of a Weberian model of formal-rational relationship between the law and the citizen. When faced with a peculiar situation, the citizen has to only assert the existence of a condition that attracts a definite clause of the legal code. The citizen would have to demonstrate how that particular norm would benefit them and resolve their discomfort, and it would subsequently be applied to one's condition by the state, in this process resolving the problem and asserting the citizenship rights of the individual. In this view of the state-civil society relationship, there is no space, nor indeed, need, for politics. Indeed in a letter to the Pratap Singh Rane, who was the Chief Minister at the time of writing the letter in August 2005, Jos, referring to the existence of the Constitutional provision in Article 347 asserted:

> **It is as simple as that**! It is your responsibility, as Leader of the Goa Assembly and Chief Minister of Goa, to appeal to the President to initiate the necessary process, and to grant recognition to Konknni in Roman Script. (my emphasis in bold)

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[149] The relevant Article reads "347. On a demand being made in that behalf the President may, if he is satisfied that a substantial proportion of the population of a state desire the use of any language spoken by them to be recognised by that state, direct that such language shall also be officially recognized throughout that state or any part thereof for such purpose as he may specify".

From the records available with Jos, it is obvious that after an initial response from the Presidential Office, indicating receipt of the letter, and a subsequent meeting with the President when he visited Goa, there was no other response from the Presidential Office. Further, rather than gaining recognition for the Roman script, this petition pushed the group into the ambit of political society. In this case, it was to engage with Margaret Alva, the representative from the Congress Party Central Committee in Delhi.[150] Marking the distinction between the strategies employed by the other Roman script activists and Jos, as well as the space of law in such demands, is a particular recollection of Jos of that meeting.

Jos narrated to me that Fr. Naik had observed that his position was different from the rest of the Roman script activists, and so urged him to the front to speak in the course of the meeting with Alva. This difference was that the other Roman script activists were apparently urging Alva to persuade the local Congress (I) leaders to amend the OLA, asking her to use her influence as authority in-charge and the person whose writ presumably ran over the local Congress. This route, they were convinced would ensure that the local Congress (I) leaders would make the necessary changes. Jos on the other hand, indicated that rather than have to engage with the local level politics and the opposition that was being presented by the Devanagari lobby, one had to merely refer to the Constitution and utilize the provision that had been placed there precisely to ensure the interests of minority groups, such as that of the Roman script activists. His suggestion was that the Union Ministry could validly make a change at the Central level, so that automatically the state Government would have to make the change. His proposal was to obviate entirely the need for any "politics". Alva's response, as reported by Jos was, "Oh! You are speaking of the Constitution!" The impression that I received from this recounting was that Alva thought that the reference to the Constitution was rather irrelevant to the political compromise she was seeking to effect in the dispute over the scripts.

There are some similarities and dissimilarities in the methods through which Jos, and the other activists were seeking to achieve their goal. First, from my experience, and discussions with the majority of the Roman script activists, their claim is being made as a population group that is deprived of recognition, awards. Their argument was no doubt that the situation where the Roman script was denied recognition was unfair, and unjust; but they were not necessarily relying on a notion of rights. Jos on the other hand was referring

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[150] As has been pointed out, it is not just the Congress party that gives precedence to the central unit to take the lead in deciding an issue, but is in fact the case with most national parties (de Souza 2009: 134).

to the highest possible law in the land, the Constitution, and asserting the right to be recognized. In any case, both groups were eventually relying on the good offices of a party insider to get the changes effected, and were effectively both relegated to operation in political society.

Before returning to how, despite their preference for civil society forms of action, the AGCCSJA utilized the forms of mobilization prevalent in political society, I would like to dwell on other features of the AGCCSJA that mark their politics within civil society.

I have already drawn attention to the stress that Jos, and the AGCCSJA, placed on the value of educated persons to the *citizenplace*. This emphasis was further elaborated in other forms in the various letters that were sent by it in the course of its mobilization. Following on the model of the successful mobilizations that were a part of the Konkani language agitation, the AGCCSJA sent letters to the various Catholic parishes, Catholic educational and other institutions in Goa to garner signatures supporting its petition to the President. The issue was framed as a way to secure the interests of the Catholic community in Goa, and hence they assumed that they would be flooded with signatures from the persons in these institutions through the powerful intervention of institution heads as well as parish priests. It turned out, for reasons that I shall come to presently, that this hope did not eventually materialize, with the whole effort gaining not more that disappointing 56,310 (fifty six thousand, three hundred and ten) signatures, as opposed to the one lakh signatures that he had hoped they would get.

It is in the multiple letters that were written to the parish priests in the hope of cajoling, shaming or threatening them into cooperation that I gained another insight into the how these activists were influenced by the model of civil society. In a letter to Parish priests dated 31 January, 2006, while indicating that "We are compelled to confess to you that the results so far have not come up to our expectations, and remain uninspiring!" (emphasis in original) Jos also queried in the same letter:

> Do you want future generations to despise us for showing such condemnable indifference at this point of time when we have a very knowledgeable and CARING President in Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam? (capitalised emphasis in original)

This reference to President Abdul Kalam needs to be taken up, given that it is critical to the see how those who preferred classic "civil society" mechanisms also imagined it as the space of modernity. In his interview with me, Jos mentioned that they could not have got a

better person than Abdul Kalam to take up their case, and this fact was repeated in a report of the meeting that members of the AGCCSJA had with the President in the course of his visit to Goa (D'Souza 2005). In a phrase that harked back to the virtues of those who crafted the public sphere of Indian nationalist politics, Kalam was praised as a man of "simple living and high thinking", and like the politicians that Jos seems to value, was a "professional". This validates Chatterjee's suggestion of civil society as a space that is ideally populated by those who are educated and professional, i.e. "modern" (Chatterjee 2007: 4). Furthermore, Abdul Kalam was seen by the sections of India's middle class, as someone who was apolitical, and for this reason an ideal choice, indicating the preference of a civil society that was technocratic, and unmarked by challenges to the status quo from the masses. He would represent the ideal apolitical individual that they desired (Editorial EPW 2007). Reflecting this sentiment, in another letter dated 26 March, 2006 to Lucas Fernandes of Colva, trying to get him to collect more signatures for the campaign Jos wrote that:

> [w]e are singularly fortunate that our President of India, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, is not a politician, but a TOP CLASS SCIENTIST, and a great simple man, approachable, and willing to listen to the problems of the people, and shows readiness to help. (emphasis in original)

Furthermore, echoing the "Indian Shining" slogan that was being popularised in the media at the time, Abdul Kalam was someone who personally stressed an image of a "developed" and hence "modern" India. Indeed, in the course of his interaction with the member of the AGCCSJA,

> The President made no secrets of his intentions and desire to see Goa develop into a model state in the country with due focus given to the development of agriculture, including horticulture and floriculture, information technology and tele-medicine, tourism, value addition to food, fruits and fish, and finally to upgrade the Goan iron ore into processed steel. (D'Souza 2007)

Another aspect of the modernity desired by the classes that inhabit Indian civil society is that of "development", marked by latest technological competence, military power, and diplomatic pre-eminence. Given his hawkish position on this front, it was not surprising that Abdul Kalam was in fact seen as "the best person" to deliver the remedy that Jos had believed would be the best option.

Despite their preference for the strategies of civil society, and indeed despite their own imagination of being a part of civil society, their marginal position in the *citizenplace*

forced the AGCCSJA to also adopt strategies that, as per Chatterjee's articulation, are more proper to political society (2007: 40- 41). To begin with, the claim that they were making was actively structured as the claim of a religious group, hence that of a population group. The petition of this group to the President, and to the various political leaders it petitioned in the course of its campaign, all stressed that the Roman Script in Konkani was used by the Goan Catholics, and that this was the script connected with their religious practices. This emphasis stands in rather stark contrast to how the Dalgado Konkani Academy (DKA) structured its claim, where the fact that it was a demand of the Goan Catholics was rather studiously avoided. Indeed, the DKA has appeared to go out of its way to rope in supporters and office bearers who were Hindu, to stress that its demand was a "secular" demand, and not the demand of a religious minority. The claim of the DKA was often in terms of claiming equality for all forms of Konkani. Religious belonging and identity itself was not referred to.

Another feature of the AGCCSJA campaign, that while rooted in the form of civil society strategies of letter writing and petitioning slid into the realm of strategies of political society, was the manner in which even while asserting the fairly simple legal remedy contained in the constitutional provision, also shook the chains of authority. One could see this shaking of the chains of authority as the desperate measures of a group unable to realize its goal, but this should only go to emphasize their marginal position in the *citizenplace* and the difficult in achieving their goal through processes peculiar to civil society. Illustrating this desperation is the scenario where the AGCCSJA wrote letters to Sonia Gandhi, widely seen in India as the de-facto head of the dynastically inclined Congress Party, imploring:

> We appeal to you, Madam, to kindly telephone Mr. Rane upon reading this letter, and ORDER him to announce Congress Party's decision to move the Resolution in the forthcoming Assembly session and to grant Official Recognition to Roman Script Konknni. (Letter to Sonia Gandhi dated 4 July, 2006)

It should also be mentioned that this particular request seems to have emerged from their meeting with the (at the time) Chief Minister Rane, who indicated, so the letter reveals, that should "High Command, meaning, you, madam, asks him to do it, he will do it". Even as this act can be understood as one of desperation by a group unable to obtain its objectives through forms peculiar to civil society, I would like to caution that it could also possibly be an act typical of civil society. As will become obvious from the discussion

below, this private recourse to superiors to override the decisions of those lower down in the hierarchy, could also be typical to the way in which these "modern elite groups" in fact operate, by pulling rank and other powers and privileges emerging from social status to obtain a goal that theoretically is obtained through reference to the law and bureaucratic processes.

In these same letters, in a missal dated 17 February, 2006, once more the demand for the recognition of the Roman script was phrased as a demand of the Goan Catholics stressing that the Goan Catholics, and especially those in the South Goa constituency, had always been strong supporters of the Congress Party and that by ignoring their demands, the Congress Party risked pushing these loyal supporters into the waiting arms of their political rival, the BJP. This letter seems to advance a peculiar formulation of this South Goan Catholic electorate, suggesting that they are not independent citizens responding to issues, but rather a population group that can be swayed through the handing out of benefits. But this construction should not be seen as one entirely dismissing the intellectual capacities of the South Goan Catholic electorate. Rather I would like to suggest that it points to the difficulty in sustaining the theoretical idea of a civil society and its associated rational processes in a *citizenplace* that is pervaded by the presence of political parties vying for election to executive power, and by the logics of governmentality. What I am trying to do is precisely to problematize the existence of a discretely existing civil society. Rather, I am suggesting the fact that civil society is itself "infected", if I could use a problematic metaphor, by the processes that have been identified as peculiar to political society. Thus, even though they imagine themselves as members of civil society, these denizens of civil society, it appears, must necessarily invoke forms of political society.

While the signature campaign and petition to the President of the Republic may have not been very successful, it nevertheless produced a significant outcome; the emergence of a group that styled itself "Goan Catholics for Devanagari" (GCFD). This religious appellation was explained by members of this group as responding to the identification that the AGCCSJA had made in the first place. The members of the GCFD pointed out that the AGCCSJA had in their representation to the President and in the letters inviting signatures made the issue out to be a Catholic issue. The aim of the GCFD was to prove that not all Catholics were in favour of the Roman script, and its official recognition, and that there was a substantial group that approved the continued use of Devanagari alone for official

Konkani. Offering a succinct statement on the politics of secularism in India, they indicated their fear that this Roman script opposition to the status quo represented with official recognition to Devanagari alone would tar the entire community of Catholics as being anti-national and against assimilation with the mainstream. Hence the need to indicate a specifically Catholic opposition to the recognition of the Roman script.

Indeed, the initial meeting of those concerned by the actions of the AGCCSJA was hosted in the chambers of Fr. Moreno De Souza in Old Goa. Fr. Moreno was perhaps an unlikely candidate to host such a meeting, since he had been the editor for forty two years of the monthly Konkani language Catholic devotional magazine in the Roman script, *Dor Mhoineachi Rotti* (da Costa 2010). In doing so, as should be apparent from the discussion in the earlier chapter, this group was following a strategy that had marked the participation of the Catholic elite in the Konkani language agitation in the late 1980s.

Interestingly, except for the odd layperson, most members of the GCFD are members of the Catholic clergy, and upper caste, being largely brahmins, or in the odd case, *Chardo*. Some of them are high-ranking members of the clerical hierarchy in the Goan Archdiocese, and in their narratives to me indicated that they were able to use their clout in the Archbishop's offices to send instructions to churches across Goa to not participate in the signature campaign that had been initiated by the AGCCSJA. Indeed, the members of the GCFD indicated to me that when they heard of the signature campaign that had been initiated, they informed the Archbishop's office, and via the help of his Secretary, rang up each parish church in Goa, informing them that the petition did not have the permission or approval of the Archbishop, in this process prohibiting any action. This single intervention should perhaps explain the less than enthusiastic response that AGCCSJA received, despite numerous letters to parishes pleading for their support.

The social location of the members of this group indicates once more the contours of civil society in Goa, as well as the institutions through which the experiences of citizenship are mediated. Civil society, as the space of elite groups with a privileged access to modernity, is largely defended by persons from the dominant castes.[151] Substantiating this argument is the fact that while this defence is largely articulated by the brahmin priests, this position is also shared by a couple of *Chardos*. In their cases, it appears that their support was either

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[151] Srinivas (1959) suggests that the dominant caste is the one that is demographically and politically the most powerful in a certain place. While a village is normally marked by the presence of just one caste, an entire region, or state like Goa, can be marked by a couple of dominant castes that jostle for power.

for reasons of their commitment, in keeping with the problematic traditions of Indian secularism, to the secular framework of the Goan state, or to ensure their own, personal, social mobility. These cases are demonstrated by two examples that I will elaborate below, of Charles Fonseca in the first case, and Epifanio Dias in the second. [152]

The first case is that of Charles Fonseca, an indefatigable activist against the recognition of the Roman script. Prior to speaking with him, I was at a loss to understand from where he summoned the spirit to be a part of this largely brahmin group. Early on in the course of my research I realized that while most of the supporters of the Devanagari exclusivity were Catholic Brahmins; and those demanding Roman from marginalized castes, the entire debate was also overlaid by the historic Brahmin-*Chardo* battles.[153] This contest it appears still continues and coloured the positions one took. It was on a reflection of my conversations with Fonseca that it became apparent that what brought him to a support of official recognition for Devanagari alone was his commitment to the ideal of the secular state and the relationship of the citizen to that state. Fonseca's formulation of secularism was in fact an argument against pluralism. There could not be a multiplicity of languages in which the state would have to interact with the people. This problem could be resolved only by having one language and one script selected, and these two would establish the basis of the secular state. Consequently, as other members of the GCFD phrased it, in imitation of the "road map" laid out by Uday Bhembre, what they supported as a secular agenda was "one Goa, one language, one people, one culture" (Bhembre 2005). Reading a letter in the possession of one of my interlocutors, I became aware that Uday Bhembre, in his position as Chairman of the Vichar Vibhag, the think-tank of the Goa Congress Party, submitted a recommendation via a letter dated 26 June, 2006, to the Party that it was only a "section of the Catholic community, which is a minority in the state" that was demanding a recognition of script. In light of the recommendations of the larger letter, it becomes obvious that the suggestion is that this minority group not set itself up to be isolated but tailor itself to the ways of the majority.

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[152] Charles Fonseca and Epifanio Dias are pseudonyms attributed to individuals to protect their identity.

[153] As explained earlier in the thesis, the dominant groups in colonial Goa consisted of three groups, the metropolitan Portuguese, the *Luso-descendentes* and the native elites. This latter group was composed of the Catholic Brahmins and *Chardos*. While the three former groups struggled for power within Goa, there were also struggles for power between the *Chardo* and Catholic Brahmin elites. Reference to these struggles can be seen in the sixteenth tracts referenced earlier, written by two Catholic priests, António João de Frias and Leonardo Pais. One brahmin, the other *Chardo*, each of them wrote a tract stressing the superiority of their own caste over the other. These battles continued into the nineteenth century, especially in the context of municipal and other elections. For an example of the kind of polemic that was crafted in the context of this Brahmin-*Chardo* contest, see Coutinho 1987.

It was now for the citizens as individuals to conform to this model in the interests of maintaining the secular fabric. This understanding of secularism, despite the way in which it seems to slide into the basis for an authoritarian state, is not substantially at odds with the understanding of secularism in India. As discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, the cultural markers of the dominant castes have been adopted as constituents of Indian secularism and the maintenance of the secular fabric of the polity rests on the meek acceptance of the same by groups outside of civil society. Any articulation of difference, based either on caste or religion, is seen as a challenge to this order.

Not surprisingly, this secular format is not viewed as oppression by members of the civil society that articulates this format. On the contrary, as evidenced by Fonseca's interest in the Roman script, or of the almost half-century long contributions of Fr. Moreno De Souza, or the fact that most of the members of the GCFD are priests who use the Roman script on a daily basis in their use the Konkani language liturgical texts of the church, it is possible for them to participate in cultural forms outside of the secular cannon, while at the same time maintaining, thanks to their belonging to civil society, a pedagogical relationship with these cultural forms. Take, for example, the case of Charles Fonseca who is not entirely opposed to the Roman script, unlike some of his colleagues like Fr. Evangelho, who see absolutely no merit in the cultural productions that emerge through the agency of this script. Fonseca evinces an interest in the Roman script and its cultural productions, and makes an effort to demonstrate that he is not opposed to the script entirely. Nevertheless, he does constantly stress the point, one that is made by his colleagues, that there is a need to standardize the use of the script, as well as to raise the standard of cultural productions in it. This is necessary, they claim, so that the dialects associated with the Roman script may eventually reach the standard of Devanagari Konkani and its *Antruzi* dialect form.

In this manner, the role of the members of civil society is akin to that of the patriarch of the family, leading the members of the family to the natural order, as well as securing what the patriarch believes to be their best interest. Indeed, if there was one consistent tonal quality to the arguments heard from the clerical members of the GCFD, it was that of shepherding the flock in their care to security.

To my understanding, this undertaking emerged not only from the habitus of this group that is influenced both by their dominant caste position, but also from the position they

held as clerics of the Church. By virtue of being members of dominant castes, the members of the GCFD see themselves as natural leaders of the Goan Catholic community, while simultaneously by virtue of being clerics, are specially invested as leaders of the community. As should have been obvious from the discussion in earlier chapters, it is the Church that mediates the political experience of large sections of the Goan Catholics, or at least large segments of its political experience.

The limits of the powers of moral suasion of the clerical hierarchy have, nevertheless, seemingly diminished since the period of Portuguese sovereignty in Goa, when their location within the social structure was central. Both the diminishing of this power, as the variety of ways in which this power could be exercised was demonstrated in an anecdote recounted to me by Epifanio Dias, a member of the GCFD, and the protagonist of the second of the examples I present to demonstrate the reasons for individual *Chardo* support for the GCFD position.

What became obvious to me in the course of my conversations with Epifanio, that I detail below, is that Epifanio was a member of the KBM because, regardless of the fact that he was *Chardo* and the organization brahmin dominated, his location in the KBM gave him, an ambitious man, the space for personal mobility. As will become evident, not only is he a member of KBM, in his opinion the most important Konkani language organization in the state, but as a result of the executive position he holds within the organization, also he is at the centre of all the action, and personally associated with the cultural power brokers in the state. Further, because he is called upon to intervene with the Roman script activists, he is also in a position where he can be part of a group that speaks down to the Roman script activists as if they were errant school children. For example, at an encounter between the members of the GCFD and members of the DKA, one of members of the GCFD, a priest, is reported to have asked Tomazinho Cardozo to look in the mirror and be honest with himself. His conscience would indicate to him that he was "forcing himself to disagree" with the status quo. He was told that:

> [y]our conscience, your inner soul tells you, all these are wrong, and you are agreed to me, already agreed long back, and you are agreed to me, because you are educated, I did not expect from you, he said to him. And once he said to him, I bet you, you will curse yourself when you look in the mirror, you will curse yourself, what steps you are taking. (Extract from one of my interviews with Epifanio Dias)

Given the lack of ability to persuade the flock, the response was that of the patriarch in the face of the rebellious offspring

> Now we gave up, we are no more humble with them, you go ahead, you do what you want, you put your demands, you come on the streets, no problem, create! Because we know, we have already informed the society of Goa, or the young generation, what is good, what is bad. People who wants to join them have a free hand, join [sic]. That's that. (Extract from one of my conversations with Epifanio Dias)

Epifanio is not a priest, and in the extracts above is clearly recounting episodes that involved priests who composed the GCFD, while also placing himself alongside these priests.

I would like to point out that there is a reason I am drawing on family metaphors here. I do this not only because this is the mode in which the admonitions and advice were dispensed in the field, but also because it demonstrates the multiple social locations that need to interact to produce this citizenship experience. In this case, familial tropes of disciplinary practice are brought into the conversation to fortify political arguments. This should demonstrate that citizenship is not merely activity in a discreet *citizenplace*. On the contrary, given how this advice discussed above could just as well have been dispensed by a father (a position that a priest effectively holds) to an errant son in the *householdplace*, it demonstrates how citizenship is composed of activities in a variety of social locations.

As much as the GCFD managed to utilize the existing discourse of secularism in India against the GKA and the activists for inclusion of the Roman script within the OLA, they too seem to have run afoul of this secularist code. The reference to "Goan Catholics" seems to have upset a number of those persons who were otherwise sympathetic to the cause of the GFCD. If the charge against the activists of the DKA were that they were raising the issue of difference and upsetting the unmarked nature of the secular citizen, then the same argument was raised against the GCFD. Bowing to these sentiments, the GCFD has in recent times reconstituted itself, naming itself anew as the Dalgado Devanagari Konkani Manch, so that it would overcome this secular objection to the articulation of difference.

For a long time, the exact mechanisms through which the GCFD was thrown together largely eluded my research. Whenever I posed the question of origin, I was never given a response as to who exactly had taken the initiative to start the group. On the contrary, this

issue was largely elided. What I was told was that the GCFD had grown from a meeting of persons concerned by the demands of the Roman script activists. This meeting was held in the Jesuit residence adjoining the Basilica of Bom Jesus in Old Goa, where Fr. Moreno was in residence.

These mechanisms became clearer when speaking with Epifanio Dias a lay member of the GCFD. Epifanio Dias is an active member of the Konkani Bhasha Mandal (KBM), being the Vice President for the second time in a row at the time when I conducted the fieldwork. In the course of my conversation with him, he revealed that it was he, on behalf of the KBM that had taken the initiative to organize the meeting that saw the creation of the GCFD. It was in the course of this exchange with Epifanio that I also realized that Fr. Evangelho, another central member of the GCFD, was also an active member of the KBM. This linkage is important because it sheds light on the contours of the *citizenplace* in Goa, at least to the extent that the Konkani language is critical to this space. The KBM, as was already discussed in the last chapter, was a critical factor in the fixing of Konkani as the identity marker of the Goan *citizenplace*. To the extent that it has defined the contours of Goan modernity, and is composed largely by an upper caste group, it meets the features that Chatterjee sets out as markers of a civil society group. My interactions with a number of persons, and especially with Epifanio Dias, reveals a certain democratic deficit in the internal workings of this group.

While the KBM was set up by Pedro Correia-Afonso, a member of the Catholic elites of Margão, the group is now largely acknowledged to be dominated by the Hindu *Saraswat* Brahmins of the same city. This does not mean that the KBM suffers from a lack of members from other caste groups. On the contrary, right from the time when Pundalik Naik, a member of the *bahujan samaj*, was presented as the face of the *Konkani Porjecho Awaz* (the body that coordinated the Konkani language agitation), there has been an attempt by the KBM to attract members of non-*Saraswat* castes. It was pointed out to me that the past two presidents, Purnanand Chari and Prashant Naik have been two recent Presidents of the KBM that have not been brahmin. In his description of the process through which the Committee of the KBM was selected, Epifanio Dias led me to believe that members are chosen to represent a particular *taluka* of Goa. Through this mirroring of the Goan body politic, the KBM attempts to be a body representative of Goa, its veritable civil society organization, perhaps captured ideally in the words of Purnanda Chari "[b]y

unifying all the communities and the youths, we will do our best to take the palanquin of Konkani to greater heights" (Pereira 2006).[154] Indeed, The KBM prides itself on having been the single organization responsible for many of Goa's significant political movements, ranging from the Opinion Poll, to the Konkani language agitation, to the more recent "Save Goa" agitation.

Despite these displays of democracy, it appears that the internal workings of the KBM are subject to a good amount of what can only be called manipulation. Speaking with Epifanio, it appeared as if while elections to the committee of the KBM were subject to the rules of democratic election, the procedures of which were scrupulously followed, there was a good amount of backstage management. For example, Epifanio was at pains to demonstrate that an advocate or some credible person was called in to operate as the election officer to ensure free and fair elections. Further elaborating on the KBM's commitment to secular representation, he pointed to how Hindus were urged to not contest the elections if there were Catholics who were also contesting a space. Simultaneously, and almost without irony, Epifanio pointed to the moment when the group ensured that Vincy Quadros, a Konkani litterateur who had sympathies for the Roman script cause, and who desired to be President of the KBM, would not be the President.

Similarly when the demand for the Roman script was emerging, they sought to make Tomazinho Cardozo the Vice President of the organization in an effort to placate him. In the words of Epifanio Dias "these are the games that we were playing because for the interest of Goa". These suggestions underlined the popular belief that it was a clique of the Margão *Saraswat*s (and their associate individuals), who were controlling the KBM and therefore the Konkani language agenda, and Goan politics. This popular belief found strident articulation in the assertion by the activists for the Roman script that I both, interviewed, and interacted with, that the literary awards for Konkani literature from the Sahitya Akademi are in fact devoid of recognition of merit but handed out to members of this elite group in turn. This popular belief is also borne out by the odd comments by

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[154] Without seeking to draw too much of a link between forms of kingship and the way in which the subject-citizenship is constituted in post-colonial India, I would like to draw attention, thanks to Purnanda Chari's reference to the palanquin, and to Konkani as the deity or the goddess within that palanquin, to Inden's essay on the way in which the trope of imperial progress has been utilized in postcolonial India's concern with developmentalist progress. See Inden, Ronald. 2006. "Embodying God: From Imperial Progresses to National Progress in India." In *Text and Practice: Essays on South Asian History*, 241 –311, SOAS Studies on South Asia, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

affiliates of this circle that they control Goa; that they planned out movements that brought down governments; and decided who would be Chief Minister or otherwise.

In light of these insights, one can suggest that while civil society groups claim a privileged relationship with the law, and with the state, being addressed as individuals by the state, their inner workings are not necessarily in conformance with the theoretical requirements of democracy. On the contrary, as with the KBM, one sees an internal playing of politics marked by the intertwining of different forms of legalities emerging from multiple social spaces. This twining is not just the twining of the power forms of caste with that of the nationalism, but also that of the *householdplace*. Thus not only do the activists of the GCFD speak from positions of patriarchs, who are not necessarily listened to, but younger members of these groups like Epifanio actively speak of their being younger, and having to learn from those who are older, who have seen more than him, and who have wisdom to share.

As I will elaborate in the subsequent chapter's discussion on embodiment practices, these should not be seen merely as comments designed to persuade me into believing that Epifanio is an obedient follower of a disciplined KBM. On the contrary, it is also reflective of the extent to which political bodies, such as the KBM, are structured as much by norms of the *citizenplace*, as they are by the patriarchal norms of the *householdplace*. Furthermore, as someone who has been a part of the KBM for a while, it is reasonable to assume that being the obedient son now, and following the patriarchal norms of the *householdplace* would ensure that when it is time for him to rule as patriarch, he will be similarly obeyed by the younger offspring of the KBM.

I would also like to take this opportunity to make the argument that this observation urges a rethinking of Chatterjee's formulation of the civil society- political society divide. Focused on political society, Chatterjee does not give much attention to the workings of civil society. But as example others in this chapter demonstrate, civil society too is marked by forms that one would associate with political society. Once more this goes to underline the argument made earlier, of a need to move away from rigid binaries to an appreciation of scales, which allow for theorization to encompass the dynamism that is present in the field.

The significant power that the KBM possesses, or is seen to possess, is a good reason for members from marginalized groups, or those with ambitions for power and social recognition, as seems to be the case with Epifanio, to join the organization. The social locations that they come from are converted, in the process of their participation, into the social groups that the KBM claims to represent while co-opting them into the dominant caste agenda that is embodied in the Konkani language movement. The Catholic dominant castes, as has been discussed in previous chapters, seem to see a common agenda with the Hindu dominant castes that allows them to work with the KBM.

I would like to point out though, that it appears that this association is also achieved through forms of emotional manipulation. I deduced this possibility after a couple of the members of the KBM indicated the conversations they had with Sandesh Prabhudesai, one of the younger members of the Hindu dominant caste groups that seek to privilege Devanagari. In this conversation, the trope of the sacrifice was brought up, with Prabhudesai indicating that as the Catholics had made the sacrifice to give up the Roman script, so the Hindus had similarly given up their age old tradition of Marathi. Prabhudesai further cautioned that if the Roman script activists got their way, then the Marathi language activists would renew their demands for Marathi to become another official language in Goa. This would not impact on the Hindus, Prabhudesai pointed out, as much as it would impact on the Catholics, since the Hindus would still be able to cope with Marathi, an opportunity that the Catholics would definitely not have. Fear, then, was used to manipulate the participation of those Catholics who were either against the official recognition of the Roman script, or were members of the GCFD. While the presence of the Catholic laity in themselves are important to the KBM's representations as a civil society representative, the fact that it has the presence of high ranking members of the Catholic clergy allow it also to both influence the course of the Catholic Church, as well as claim the space of the secular, for its being representative of not just Hindus, but definitively of the Catholics as well.

In the face of the rather effective opposition from the GCFD, its support from the Konkani language establishment and the failure of the political establishment, both in Goa and New Delhi to respond to the AGCCSJA's petition, it appeared as if the civil society routes to constitutional mechanisms of redressing the problem were now closed. This left the field open to the strategies of the Dalgado Konkani Academy (DKA). These strategies eminently fit the descriptions of political society actions that Chatterjee has outlined, and

indeed seem to have ensured some progress on the demands for the recognition of the Roman script and the various demands of this segment.

The agitation of political society

The DKA laid out a list of ten demands from the state government. The primary claim of the DKA was, that the words "and Roman script" be inserted into the definitional clause of the Official Language Act (OLA) that currently recognizes as official, only that Konkani which is written in the Devanagari. In addition, parity for DKA was demanded with that of the Marathi Academy that receives annual grants from the state. The DKA also indicated the expected to see the establishment of systems that would ensure that persons with a background in Roman script Konkani would get placed in the official Konkani language institutions promoted by the state, to give parity to both Roman and Devanagari. Awards and other state support, including the publication of books, should be extended to include Roman-script Konkani. Furthermore, they required that Kala Academy, which was set up to promote the culture of Goa, actively organize competitions to boost the cultural productions of the Roman-script Konkani world. With an understanding of the value of cultural capital, demands were placed for the naming of state-owned public performance spaces after prominent *tiatrists* and the renting of these spaces at concessional rates for *tiatrs*. As such, the DKA indicated that they expected that the auditorium in the newly constructed Ravindra Bhawan in Margão be named in memory of João Agostinho Fernandes, the person credited as being *Pai Tiatrist*, or the Father of Tiatr.

In addition to these claims, the DKA also set about very consciously collecting together the "Roman Konkani lovers"[155] that they averred had been dispersed after 20 years of disregard. This process of collection was in fact the constitution of a collective identity, and was achieved through a series of meetings in various parts of Goa. The narrative of the DKA consistently mentions that since the time of the promulgation of the OLA, the persons who used the Roman script had been dispersed, and had for this reason suffered,

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[155] "Roman Konkani lovers" perhaps deserves some explanation. This expression while used in the English form by the Roman script activists, is in fact a translation from the Konkani *Romi Konknni mogi*, or the lovers of Roman Konkan. *Mogi* is derived from the Konkani word *mog* for love. This formulation itself derives from the usage of the term *Konkani mogi* (Konkani lovers) that was used to describe the many activists for the recognition of Konkani as the official language of the state in the 1980s. Whether the relationship of this *mogi* is the relationship of the young man to a damsel, as in the case of Telugu (Mitchell 2010) or Tamil (Ramaswamy 1997), or of the devoted son toward the mother *Konkani Mai* (see Newman 2001: 54 – 80; and Fruzzetti and Perez 2002) I am unable to say. However, what can be definitely said is that the relationship is constructed between a male Konkani speaker, and a female Konkani language.

and it was therefore the DKA's effort to reconstitute this group. These meetings were not simply political meetings, but organized around the distribution of awards, the conduct of workshops – especially for younger writers, the celebration of significant events – like the celebration of the release of the first Konkani film as Konkani Cinema Day, the commemoration of the memory of significant *tiatrists* who the activists averred had been forgotten by the community and the state, the felicitation of those alive, condolence meets for those who passed away, the release of books, magazines, and the organization of mega-events, like the *Konknni (*Romi *Lipi) Sahitya & Sonvskruti Sommelon* (Romi Konkani Literary and Cultural Conference).[156]

Rather than locate their activities solely in the big towns of Panjim or Margão, the DKA organized its events across a wide swathe of Goan villages in its attempt to rally the support of individuals to the cause of the Roman script. What was interesting about this process was the manner in which recognition of individuals went hand in hand with the honouring of their families. Thus widows, and grandchildren, or sisters-in-law would be heralded on public platforms in the course of this process. Family and the political community were in this process, once more twined firmly together. Finally, the DKA also relied on the support of the *tiatrists*, who are known to be able to gather large crowds, in the course of gaining the attention of the state government. Representatives of the state, the Chief Minister, Ministers of the state government, legislators of the state Assembly, representatives in the Parliament, were invited to attend these shows, intended to be a display of the strength of numbers. I would like to emphasize that the electoral representatives were not invited merely to demonstrate the strength of numbers. They were also invited to smaller occasions, such as when the portrait of *Pai Tiatrist* was unveiled at the entrance to the auditorium of the Ravindra Bhawan in Margão.[157] It was at this interaction that I realised that these occasions were opportunities to stress a link between the politician and the group, interpellating themselves in the process as those who depended on him for help.

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[156] Subsequent to the first Conference, or Sommelan as the organizers have preferred to name it, the DKA was able to successfully conduct the second conference in February 2010, and at the time of the writing of this thesis, the third Sommelan in Feb 2011. Similar to the conduct of their other meetings, the Sommelan too was held across different spaces in Goa. The first was held in Margão, the second in Curchorem, and the third in Panjim.

[157] On this occasion, the Member of Parliament (MP), Shantaram Naik had been invited to an event where there were not more than forty people comprising the audience. Subsequent to the unveiling, the conventions of such occasions required that there be speeches by all those deemed important. This ensured that the MP was forced to listen to the requests of the group, giving them an opportunity not merely to list their pleas, but to interpellate the MP as someone who could help and extend his umbrella of patronage to them.

This creation of a bond of dependency takes place simultaneous with the fact that they invited him to preside over the function which is seen as a giving of respect to the politician. The relationship was not the assumed one where those who elect demand from the politician, based on their knowledge where the politician needs the voters, or where the voters assert their rights. This situation was markedly different since it was one where their loyalty, their dependence was stressed, rather in the style in which familial links were established between a landlord and his tenants and dependents. Similarly in other meetings, such as a conversation between Mauvin Gondinho[158] and three of the Roman script activists whom I accompanied, while they asked for Godinho's help for their case, their plea was not one of rights, but of equity and fairness. The argument was cast in a familial trope, Konkani *Mai* (Fruzzetti and Perez 2002; Perez 2012, chap.5) had two children (a reference to the scripts), while one was in the house, the other child had been cast out. Was this fair, they asked. More significantly, for my discussion of political society, in addition to being based on a familial trope the argument here is based not on the idea of rights, but an appeal to moral sensibilities, and sympathy, if not pity.

Chatterjee speaks of the techniques in which political society invests itself with kinship relations to create a binding bond for the group (Chatterjee 2007: 57, 75). This process did not seem so obvious in the course of the mobilizing of the Roman script activists, and yet it is plain that the *householdplace* was critically present in the organization of the population group for the demand of the script's recognition. This was evident not only in the style in which the demand for attention was phrased, but in the following manner as well.

What stood out significantly in the course of my fieldwork was the absence of women in positions of power within the movement.[159] While there were always women in the audience at critical meetings, women who were themselves *tiatrists*, or litterateurs, these women invariably played the role of hostesses at the meetings. The wives of the President and Vice President of the DKA would automatically assume this role when present, but in

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[158] As will be obvious from a quotation provided in the previous chapter, Mauvin Godinho is a politician who has been associated with the Congress Party since the inception of his political career, having earlier been associated with the Youth Congress. Already a leader at the time of the Konkani Language Agitation in the 1980s, Godinho was one of the voices that asserted the need for Konkani to be made official language of the state. In the course of this interview too, Godinho asserted that it was he who spoke with the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, to persuade him to ease the way for Konkani to be recognized as the state language, and grant Goa statehood within the Indian Union.

[159] This is perhaps not surprising. A similar observation had been made in the case of the Konkani language movement in the 80s by Siqueira (1987).

their absence there were other women who would assume this role of hostess. My attempt to elicit the opinions of the wife of one of the prominent activists, who is also present at many meetings, and functions as compere at many of the DKA and TAG events, was futile. She pleaded that she would have to think, that she had nothing extra to say. From these insights it appears that the space for women within this movement seems to be that of the role played by women within the household, constructing the movement for the recognition for the Roman script as the movement by an extended family.

In her formulations on the *tiatr*, Robinson pointed out that the *tiatr* tended to emphasize traditional family values, where "A good woman makes the home", and where "Politics and the domestic sphere parallel each other" (Robinson 1993). As such, it could be said, that the normative order of the family, is what is seen as worthy of emulation by the *citizenplace* that is corrupted by "politics". Given that the demand for the recognition of the Roman script is led by persons with strong linkages to the *tiatr*, it is not surprising that the movement is constructed in such a fashion. The felicitation of the women[160] associated with deceased *tiatrists* and litterateurs, and their emphasis as caregivers and supporters, seems to operate to not only recognize their work, but at the same time to stress the ideal role of women within the family. This is not to say that women are not encouraged to transcend the domestic space. On the contrary, the movement has emphasized and celebrated the pioneering role of Goan Catholic women on the stage and film, at a time with other Indian women did not act. Despite this apparently progressive position, it appears that the movement simultaneously stresses the care-giving role of women within the family and the political mobilization, where the main player on the political stage of the citizenplace will be the man.

In the context of the strategy of the meetings in various parts of Goa, subsequent to attending multiple public meetings of the movement, it struck me that the purpose of these meetings was not merely to consolidate a group, so that that Roman script activists had a substantially sized population group with which to back their demands. It appeared that in addition to this critical task, the purpose of the meetings was to also discipline, or educate, this particular segment of the Goan Catholics, into the rituals and processes of public life, this is to say, in the rituals and processes of civil society. This insight is demonstrated particularly well in the case of the condolence meets that the DKA activists would

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[160] I use the word "women" because it is not just spouses or female family members who are felicitated instead of the male *tiatrist* but in one case, the deceased *tiatrist's* female care giver.

organize. The attendance at these gatherings would invariably be rather thin, frustrating the activists. I would like to point out that the poor participation was not because people did not care about the deceased, since the attendance at the funerals of these individuals would invariably be substantial. What the activists were attempting to do was to create a secular public sphere for this segment of the Goan Catholics outside of the all-pervading sphere of the Catholic Church.

This is not merely a response to the hierarchy's refusal to engage more actively with the demand for recognition. On the contrary, the organisation of these condolence meetings appears to be motivated by an independent desire born from the recognition that most Goan Catholics seem disengaged from any interaction with the state and the *citizenplace*. An example of this disengagement can be illustrated by the disinterest that most *tiatrists* seem to be showing for the demand for recognition of the script. At a meeting organized by the DKA in the build up to the Convention at the Grace Church Hall in Margão, the grumble of those who have committed wholly to the movement, is that the *tiatrists* refuse to cease their shows on such days as the Literary and Cultural Conference, or to actively support in another way. They do so, the activists argue, because these *tiatrists* are more interested in the money they will make from their shows.

On similar lines, the sociologist Alito Siqueira in a conversation pointed out that Goan Catholics has largely kept out of government employment, nor have they organized to gain monetary or benefits, such as reservation, from the state, largely because the monetary gains that they procure from private employment, either in the Gulf, or via working in the merchant navy, cruise ships, getting allotments to the highly lucrative shacks on the beach, or more recently through migration to the European Union, far outweigh the benefits that the state could provide. Another respondent suggested that the result with the lack of Catholic engagement with the state was that one had the government offices filled with Hindus. They gained information about Governmental schemes and passed the information on to their relatives and other intimates, while this information totally elided the Catholics, who in any case seemed to show no interest in these options. The political options for the Catholics were therefore reduced to either the relationship established with local politician; through the mass mobilisations effected from time to time; or, through the assertions made on behalf of the community through the offices of the Church. The mobilization that has been taken on by the DKA seems to also be filling, out of necessity, the gap in engagement

that marks the experiences of the Goan Catholics. Indeed, in one of my final conversations with Tomazinho Cardozo, he once again stressed the need for the Goan Catholics to realise that "small or big … government benefits, should be taken". In light of his larger attempts, I would argue that this urging is not only to suggest that state resources identified for public consumption should be utilized, but in a larger sense as a way to be engaged with, and be invested in, the state.

As indicated above, while it appears that the constitutional strategy employed in the first instance did not work, the processes of the DKA, that have had the effect of creating a steady political rhythm to the demand for recognition of the Roman script has had an impact. The DKA was able to garner a regular grant from the Government that ensures that it has a regular source of income to conduct its various activities. Most significantly, this has allowed the DKA to be able to conduct its Annual Conference, allowing it to consolidate itself as a population group recognized by the state. It has also been able to institute awards in the field, thereby ensuring that the awards, and social recognition, denied by the official Konkani establishment, are met through the offices of the DKA. Furthermore, responding to the charge that the cultural productions like *tiatr* had thus far been sidelined by state cultural agencies, the Chief Minister Digamabar Kamat announced the institution of the Tiatr Academy of Goa (TAG). This academy has received an office space paid for by Government funds, and is the recipient of annual state grants. The TAG has now become one more front for the association of pro-Roman groups to push its agenda. The TAG has been responsible for beginning the commemoration of the first Konkani film produced, the commemoration of the birth of *Pai Tiatrist*, the release of the first Konkani long playing (LP) disc and a variety of other memorials. Furthermore, these achievements have also ensured that artistes from the field of *tiatr* are now recognized by the Department of Culture, and those who are entitled to a pension from the state now receive such an option. Additionally, the TAG has also moved initiatives that would provide health insurance for *tiatr* artistes.

All of these efforts clearly involve a legibilization of not just the cultural productions of the Goan Catholics, but of those involved in these productions, and extending the welfare benefits of the state to these groups. Also, pointing to the exclusion of writers in the Roman script from state awards has also seemed to have made an impact. In 2009, Jess Fernandes, a Konkani poet who has also published his poems both in the Roman as well as

Devanagari script, was granted an award by the Sahitya Akademi. Yet it has been observed that *Kirvontt*, the book of poems for which Fernandes was awarded, while originally written in Roman script, was subsequently transliterated into the Devanagari script. It was this transliteration, the dissonant voices argue, that enabled Fernandes to be granted the award.

Another point that should be considered is the complaint that was made to me by some members of the DKA. They observed that despite the fact that the DKA was able to secure a grant from the state, Tomazinho Cardozo had to literally "dance" to realize the release of the money. Tomazinho, they said, had been a Member of the Legislative Assembly, and Speaker of the Assembly. If Tomazinho had been made to dance in this manner, can you imagine what would have been our position otherwise? The harassment, which is what Tomazinho's dance is supposed to represent, could perhaps be the usual bureaucratic hurdles that every beneficiary of the state is expected to endure prior to being recognized (becoming legible) by the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. Despite this possibility, this process was also interpreted by these members of the DKA as the result of the obstruction the Devanagari script lobby was able to bring to bear on the process. This process demonstrated to the DKA members not only the clout of the Devanagari lobby, but also the backroom manipulations that this lobby engaged in, and was a feature of the politics of the clique that was opposed to the recognition of the Roman script.

While the actions of the DKA have managed to get its segment recognized as a population group and gain welfare from the state, the critical question remains the additional recognition of the Roman script in the OLA. On this front the DKA has still been unsuccessful. Activists from the DKA point out that whenever they approach the politicians, they are assured of support from these politicions in "whatever" form they can provide, while simultaneously indicating that they are not willing "to touch" the OLA. In light of these responses, it appears that regardless of the continuing nature of grants to the DKA, TAG, that are now reportedly assured, and the fact that *tiatr* artistes are now recognized by the state, the rights element to their demands still remain unmet. To this extent, the movement fits the description provided by Chatterjee where members of political society are presented with concessions, but not extended belonging in civil society through the recognition of their demands as legitimate rights (Chatterjee 2007: 60). To refer back to the case of Jess Fernandes winning a Sahitya Akademi award, the critics of

this process, such as Fr. Pratap Naik, argue that to make this award has not in fact changed anything.

The position of those opposed to the recognition of the Roman script, including those in the GCFD, has been that books written in the Roman script could easily be transliterated into Devanagari and then submitted to qualify for the prize. If there was any merit to the book, since some of the activists in the GCFD insist that most works in the Roman script do not in fact meet a reasonable literary standard, the work would gain an award. These critics pointed out that under such circumstances, granting Jess Fernandes the award was to engage in an eye wash. The award was given for a book in the Devanagari script, not because it was written in Roman. Furthermore, these critics argued, Jess Fernandes was "their" man, cooperating with those in the Devanagari lobby for the benefits it would bring. Extending their argument of an eye wash, these critics argued that the award was merely being given to a Catholic name, and did not constitute a recognition of the field of cultural productions associated with the Roman script. In support of this argument, they also pointed to the award of the Gomant Sharada Puraskar in 2008, to Lambert Mascarenhas. They asserted that Lambert Mascarenhas was of a similar mindset as those who favoured Devanagari. As such, awarding Lambert Mascarenhas was once again not a recognition of Konkani in the Roman script, but merely awarding a Catholic who was pro-Devanagari. Hence, "they" were only pretending a change of policy with regard to support to the Roman script.

It would be difficult to argue that the official Konkani lobby was simulating a change in policy given that the recognition of Catholics, and especially those who participated in the nationalist brahmanical frame that privileged Devanagari, has been a policy, particularly of groups such as the KBM. However, if there was a change in policy, it would go toward indicating the extent to which the argument of the Roman script activists has been understood, or misunderstood, to be an argument by Catholics, and for Catholics. On the contrary, the Roman script activists have in fact taken pains for some time now to forge a movement that would transcend religious identity and include persons from other religious groups.

Thus there is the inclusion of Premanand Lotlikar who was elected to be President subsequent to the passing of the office from the hands of Tomazinho Cardozo. Also, the DKA has actively associated with a group of litterateurs from the city of Vasco da Gama,

that have included not just Hindus like Pandarinath Lotlikar, Prabhakar Tendulkar, but the Muslim, Konkani language poet, Yusuf Sheikh. What is nevertheless interesting, is that all these persons are distinctly not of the *Saraswat* caste, once more emphasizing the centrality of caste, not just to the demand for recognition of the Roman script, but to the definition of civil society in Goa, and the attempt of other groups to make this space more inclusive. At one point, this group of activists, even contemplated making overtures to those groups allied to Marathi. Thus there were suggestions that both Marathi and Konkani in the Roman script be recognized in the Act.

As a part of these attempts to combine anti-*Saraswat* forces, on the occasion of the First Roman Konkani Literary and Cultural Convention, the Marathi newspaper *Pudhari*, a newspaper aligned with *bahujan* interests, published a special supplement in Konkani in the Roman script. Copies of this newspaper were kept for the audience at the venue of the Convention. This effort does not seem to have gone too far though, since the antipathy to Marathi has become so deep rooted that this strategy could easily work to the disadvantage of the Roman script activists. I would like to highlight that it was not just a visceral antipathy to Marathi that prevented this union from taking place. To make this suggestion, or remain only at this suggestion, would present an image of the subaltern with no consciousness, except for visceral and emotional responses. It appears that the failure of the pro-Marathi groups and the Roman script activists to unite may have been as a result of careful foresight. It was pointed out to me by one of these activists, that should Marathi be included as an official language of the state, there would be serious implications for those Goans (largely Catholics) who did not speak Marathi. As of today, thanks to the peculiar nature in which Marathi has been accommodated within the OLA, for recruitment into state employment, the knowledge of Marathi is preferable, while that of Konkani is essential. Should Marathi also become a state language; recruitment to state employment would require the mandatory knowledge of both Marathi and Konkani, in a stroke requiring the Catholic applicants to know Marathi, or lose-out to Hindu applicants. The endeavours of the Roman script activists have been to enable Goan Catholics to secure a legitimate space in the Goan polity, by privileging their version of the state language. An alliance with Marathi might gain them recognition of the Roman script, but at the same time, push them back into second place in a contest for space within state administration.

The connexions that the Roman script activists are making in the course of their activism have a further significance because they lead to another insight when looking at the role of subaltern and activist groups in political society. As recounted earlier in this thesis, I had first encountered the debate around the scripts for Konkani at a series of discussions hosted in the Xavier Centre in 2005. Flush with the experience of the debates I both witnessed and one of which I had chaired, and following on initial discussions with the activists involved, I was convinced that this group of Roman script activists was rearticulating the basis of Goan citizenship.

I had assumed that these activists had realized that they did not have a space within the Goan *citizenplace* that was biased towards a citizen self that was brahmanically marked. Convinced that these subalterns would resist, I was rather surprised when the DKA and other Roman script activists continued following a number of rituals that mark the Indian public space as severely brahmancial. For example, while not a *de rigeur* rule, the word *Xri* (Shri) was commonly used at a number of the meets organized by the Roman script activists under the banner of the DKA, as titles for men. Another common ritual at these moments was the lighting of the lamp to mark the commencement of a ceremony (Srivastava 1998), or the offering of flowers before the image of the person whose memory was being honoured. Another aspect that caused me some surprise was the position of the activists around the spelling of Konkani. Rather than adopt "Konkani", the English standard form that has evolved, the version they seem to prefer is "Konknni". This is obvious in the spelling of both the Thomas Stephen Konknni Kendr, as well as the Dalgado Konknni Akademi. This spelling is not only closer in form to the *Antruzi* form of pronunciation, but also at odds with the earlier spelling of "Concani" that was standard for the Roman script users.

As my fieldwork progressed, and as I contrasted the ceremonies of the Roman script activists with those of the KBM or the GKA, I came to realize that the gatherings organized by the Roman script activists drew vastly from the model used by the KBM and other similar groups. The model of organizing their literary conference, for example, was crafted by imitating the method in which the KBM organized and structured its conferences. Indeed, one of the activists of the DKA shared with me the fact that there was a desire to rope one of the Konkani litterateurs into the DKA primarily to draw on his organizational skills, having been involved with the KBM. Or take for example the model

of honouring persons that was used by the TSKK, which involved the profoundly brahmanical action of draping of a shawl over the recipient of the award. At the time of the presentation of some of the awards that the TSKK presents, the ceremony also includes an umbrella being unfurled over the head of the person being honoured. This person being seated on a throne like structure while this honour is being conferred on them.[161]

Taking cognizance of these instances, I realized that what I was seeing was not resistance, in terms of rejection of the entire edifice of Konkani citizenship, but a negotiation, by these members of Goa's political society, to be able to enter the space of Konkani, and Goan, civil society. Perhaps what would describe this action best is the concept of Action-in-clinamen that Santos introduces when discussing the cosmopolitanism of the subaltern (Santos 2007). Action-in-clinamen, he argues, is unlike the revolutionary action, which emphasises the need for a dramatic break with the status quo. On the contrary, this action is marked by a slight swerve or deviation so that the cumulative effects of this deviation allow for new, "complex and creative" possibilities for the future. The *clinamen* does not refuse the past; on the contrary, it assumes and redeems the past by the way it swerves from it. Similarly, the actions of the Roman script activists are not demands to do away with the entire edifice composed of epistemologies and practices that constitute Goan citizenship; rather, all they seek to do is make a slight deviation that will allow their particular form of the written and spoken language to also be officially recognised. What they are doing is not consciously creating a new public culture, but negotiating a space within the frames of the existing national culture. They were not stressing difference but making an argument for inclusion. Thus it was not a failure, or inability to think the concepts through, that made them adopt the forms that they did, but in fact a natural outcome of their desire to be incorporated more wholly into the Goan body politic.

Yet in making these "compromises" that seemingly detract from an absolute acceptance of their difference, these activists are also ensuring that they are retaining space for the various elements that constitute their difference. The space of the subaltern after all, is the space of the marginalized, and their attempt is the attempt to be inserted into the mainframe of social action. Consequently, they use not the principles that may be the

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[161] I recognize that this form could be interested to be not brahmanical, but a reference to Indic forms of kingship. Yet given that these forms of kingship do not form part of the Goan Catholics' bundle of cultural practices, I can only read this insertion as an attempt by the TSKK to re-introduce "Indian" forms into the Goan Catholics famously "de-nationalised" cultural lifestyles.

mainstay of civil society, but the temporary strategies that will allow them the little progress that is available to them within the constraints of their condition.

In his discussion of political society, Chatterjee points out that all too often, in the face of the mobilizing of sections of political society into a population group, the state attempts to fragment the population group through various strategies of co-option, concessions and the like. There seems to have been a similar response by the state in the face of the mobilizing of a group that would actively demand the inclusion of the Roman script into the OLA. As has been discussed earlier, the bulk of those demanding the inclusion of the Roman script in the Official Language Act were litterateurs in the Roman script as well as the *tiatrists*. As a result, many of the demands put forth by the DKA were in fact demands that centered on a recognition for the *tiatr* industry.

Sometime just before the organization of the First Convention of Konkani in the Roman script, a gathering that was aimed precisely at constituting a public and a population group, the Government announced its willingness to form the Tiatr Academy of Goa. Among those appointed to this body was Tomazinho Cardozo, the President of the DKA. This announcement seemed to have challenged the fragile alliance that had been built among those demanding recognition for the Roman script. There were two rather distinct but related arguments that buzzed about in the course of the tea and lunch breaks at the Convention.

The first set of arguments suggested that now that the possibility of the Tiatr Academy had been recognized, persons like Tomazinho and the other leaders of the movement so far would lose interest in the demand. After having accepted this post from the Government, they had been effectively compromised. How could they accept this benefit from the Government and continue to push the demand for recognition of the script forward was the question posed by these critics. The second set of arguments emerged from the organizational style adopted in planning and executing the conference These critics averred that no other persons besides the leaders of the DKA, had been involved in the preparation of the conference. These leaders had taken all the responsibility on themselves. The critique of the detractors was that while this would ensure the future of the organisers' career, in terms of getting placed in governmental bodies such as TAG, the result was the disappointing response to the Sommelan. Indeed, they pointed out, the fact that Tomazinho had been made the President of the TAG was evidence of the way in which the movement

was being used to push the interests of these leaders, rather than the cause of the movement.

It seemed to be a rather uncharitable critique of the lead activists, and in their defence it should be acknowledged that while it did seem that subsequent to the announcement of the TAG, there was a waning in the force of the demand for the recognition Roman script, the demand itself has continued to be articulated. There have been at least two changes subsequent to the consolidation of the TAG. The first was that the TAG began to now mark the calendar year with a number of events, as described above. These meetss were plainly being organized with the help of the funds that the TAG now had at its disposal. What this marked was a further consolidation of the population group by addressing diverse segments of the population that should have an interest in the promotion of the Roman script. This was being done especially through the recognition of the families of those associated with the person whose work was being recognized. Simultaneously, there was the assertion that the cultural productions of those using the Roman script were as much a part of Goan modernity as those hailed by the official Konkani establishment. The second interesting development was that TAG's organisation of these events seemed to have opened up a space for the Roman script activists to enter the space of civil society. Events that are now organized by either TAG or DKA, now have dignitaries representing two institutions, rather than just one (that of DKA), creating what one could call an institutional density. While on the one hand they have the President of the DKA in the presence of Premanand Lotlikar, on the other they have the President of the TAG, in the presence of Tomazinho Cardozo.

The ritual acknowledgement of the presence of these multiple dignitaries at their events, where either verbal mention is made by the compere, or the speakers at the occasion, or by their being formally escorted onto the dais, is one step toward the legibilization of this population group, as well as, the giving of respect to the groups that they recognize. The fact that there is more than one institution, it seems served as a way of producing the demand for the recognition of the Roman script, not as the demand of one marginal group alone, but the demand of a variety of professional and semi-professional groups. The subsequent chapter will discuss the issue of humiliation and the extent to which this demand for the Roman script's inclusion is also self-respect movement. As such, this aspect of these meetings should not be underplayed. Thus, even though it appears the

demand for the inclusion of the Roman script in the OLA has been soft-pedalled it seems that the larger agenda of constituting the population group, and organizing it more substantially, disciplining it as it were, continues apace.

This task of disciplining the population group has already been referred to above, but it needs to be stressed that this task of disciplining is more substantial than the mere introduction of a homogenous group to the nuances of political activity. As has been stressed in an earlier portion of this work, the attempt of this work has been to point out that despite the constant references to singular subject of the "Goan Catholic", this group is one that is deeply marked and riven by divisions, class and caste being just two of them. To begin this discussion though, it would be important to once more reaffirm that the demand for the inclusion of the Roman script is not merely a case of Goan Catholics against the might of the dominant Hindu groups in the territory.

As should already be obvious, the battle lines in this case are cast between the dominant caste Catholic Brahmins in favour of Devanagari, and the marginalized Catholic castes in favour of the Roman script. Hindus are present in this equation on both sides of this line, with caste lines being rather clear on both sides of the divide. The brahmin and brahmanised castes on the one side, that of Devanagari; and the anti-brahmin groups, and the Roman script, on the other. As should be obvious from this description, the groups on the Roman script side of this debate are not united by caste, but are in fact an agglomeration of multiple castes groups.

In the course of the research it became obvious that there were at least two factions present within the groups demanding recognition of the Roman script. One of these groups was composed of *Chardos*. As has been elaborated earlier, the *Chardo* caste has "traditionally" been pitted in a contest against the brahmins. This contest it appeared was being played out in the case of the script demand as well. While the brahmins were supporting Devanagari, the *Chardos* were supporting Roman. Indeed, discussions with some of these *Chardo* supporters of Roman cast the debate as one against "those *bammon*". On the other hand, there were other leaders of the Roman script demand who were not *Chardo*, but belonged to other caste groups, traditionally cast lower on the hierarchical scale. The sense that I got was that the differences were not necessarily based on a disrespect of other groups, but one that was born from a solidarity with those from one's own caste group. All the same, the

presence of these solidarities did not ensure the success of the associations that were forged.

Take for example the intermediate history of the DKA after the death of Fr. Freddy and before Tomazinho Cardozo took over as the President. A panel for the leadership positions had been constituted consisting of three men, all of who were *Chardos*. Given that theirs was the only group to stand for elections, they were elected uncontested to the posts. Despite this uncontested victory, this constellation did not work out for a number of reasons, and the DKA floundered in the doldrums until the committee was persuaded to resign and call for fresh elections. On this happening, the leadership was assumed by Tomazinho Cardozo, and the representatives this time round were all non-*Chardo*. While my interviews with these various players did not result in disrespectful comments hurled at each other, what was clear from my observations in the course of the meetings that were held by the DKA, an observation of the rolling of eyes, or the exchange of glances, was that there was a sense among these *Chardo* members of the group, that despite the work being carried forward by the team led by Tomazinho Cardozo, they could indeed have done it better. Indeed, subsequent to the collapse of the *Chardo*-dominated committee, some of these individuals went on to form the Romi Lipi Action Front (RLAF), whose interventions by and larger seemed restricted to issuing press statements in favour of the cause of the Roman script. This opened up another front for the demand for the Roman script, and can be seen as a valuable addition to the movement. All the same, what should also not be forgotten are the tensions and fractures that seem to coincide with caste groups demonstrating that even among those marginalized-caste groups that were demanding recognition of the Roman script, there were significant divides. It is the presence of these divides that must be plastered over to create a population group that will effectively gain recognition for the Roman script. And yet, as has been discussed earlier, it is also clear that this disciplining seems to be, at least unconsciously, part of a larger concern of the disengagement by the Goan Catholics with the state and intra-state politics.

Summation

I have trained focus in this chapter, not merely on the operations of political society. On the contrary, I have also focused on the operations within what one imagines, is civil society, and on those who self-consciously imagine themselves as members of a civil society as well. This is something that Chattejee does not do, since it appears that he takes

civil society as a given, and sees it simply as the space of elite groups who imagine themselves as being modern. My question has been to ask: what is the nature of their politics? What is the nature of their location in this space? This broadened focus reveals the existence not of a binary divide between a discrete civil society operating alongside political society, but the operation of a scale of forms. The reference to the field makes the operation of these scales that much clearer, posing a substantial challenge to the tendency to cast citizenship experience within one or the other category. Thus those groups, such as the AGCCSJA, who imagine themselves within civil society, and in many cases actually would form part of civil society initiatives, are actually forced, as a result of their espousing the cause of subaltern Catholic groups, to engage in forms of activism more suited to political society. Groups like the KBM, that are firmly hegemonic, reveal a tendency toward the undemocratic that does not quite fit the imagination of a civil society that is rational and has reverence for a rule of law.

To argue for a scale of forms is not to suggest that the formulation of political society is without use. As an ideal type, it allows determining the quantum to which the citizenship experiences of groups and individuals approximate the civil society ideal. It should be clear that the Roman script activists are clearly members of political society, given that they are unable to assert their demand as a right, but must rather engage in a variety of strategies, none of which seem to have as yet given to them their most important demand, recognition in the law of the Roman script's official status. It is largely this failure, and the fact that even their demand is seen as illegitimate in some spheres, that their being recognized as worthy of state support, definitively marks their experiences as being that of political society. Their argument is for recognition of their difference as a legitimate constituent of the citizen community, the cultural community of the Goan state. Consequently, the very granting of this state support, while not changing the OLA, underlines their difference as out-of the ordinary, marking in this process their presence in political society, rather than in the community imagined as the embodiment of Goan modernity.

Despite this confirmation of their location, what is also clear is that they seem to be steadily on their way out of political society, given that they are organizing themselves into a plethora of related associations, engaging with the state, rather than remaining out of its scope, and outside of active conversation with the state.

I have also pointed to the extent to which the power forms within the Church, family and caste play to impact upon the citizenship experiences, reinforcing my argument against the dominant analysis, that citizenship is not merely an experience within a discreet field of politics in the *citizenplace*, but spread out across the social field.

Chapter 6
Humiliation in Political Society

Prologue

> My first humiliation, great humiliation, in Belgium, on Christmas, my first Christmas there. 1952. You see in the evening, we were people from seventeen nations in our college. Different seventeen countries. The leader proposed that people from each group sing Christmas carols. And we were two. My companion was a first class singer and, what shall I say, he was acquainted with all our Konkani *mandos* etc. He used to sing very well, first class voice also, but when it came to our turn to sing the carols, we had to remain dumb. Why? Because Goa with its 450 years of Catholicism did not have even one Christmas carol! Not one! And the people were pushing us. Come on man, go man! Go! They thought that we were shy! Shy to speak in public? Why! We were among the most brilliant students there! Africans from Congo, who were one generation of Catholics had their own Christmas carols, and we didn't have! Our humiliation, my humiliation on that day! What could I boast of? But that day I was entirely convinced that I had to start this. (Extract from my conversations with Fr. Vasco do Rego S.J.)

Presented above is an extract from the transcript of my conversation with Fr. Vasco do Rego S.J. As was indicated in an earlier chapter of this thesis, Fr. Vasco Rego is a Jesuit priest whose trajectory in the history of the postcolonial church in Goa, as well as that of the Konkani language mobilizations has been extremely interesting and important. Fr. Rego was one of those who played a significant role subsequent to the changes mandated by the Vatican Council II in facilitating the shift of the Catholic Church in Goa to the vernacular tongue (from the earlier pre-conciliar use of Latin). In the course of this process, he was also among those who effected a Sanskritisation of the Konkani used by the Church. Simultaneously, through his work in the parish of Margão in the years around 1964, he was also instrumental in aiding the Konkani Bhasha Mandal to introduce its Konkani language text-books into four Diocesan schools and commence a process where the Devanagari script and the *Antruzi* dialect gained a foothold in the school curriculum and thus in the formation of the ideal Goan citizen.

The extract of the transcription quoted above highlights a self-identified critical moment in the life story of Fr. do Rego when he felt it was of paramount importance that he commit himself to a project where Konkani would take on a more important place in the life of the Goan Catholics. There were a number of factors, not least of which was his family history, as well as the socio-political formation of the Goan Catholic elite from whose ranks Fr. do Rego hailed, that contributed to this particular moment making such a lasting impression

on the then young priest. In addition to all of these, there was the factor, of the institutional culture in the University of Leuven, that gave this incident greater gravity, and provided the context for making this such a humiliating experience for Fr. do Rego. This institutional culture was that created by the work and presence of Fr. Pierre Charles S.J., a professor of theology at Louvain from 1914 to 1954, the period during which Fr. do Rego spent time in Leuven.

Fr. Charles founded the Louvain school of missiology which maintained that the aim of missionary activity should be the planting or formation of a church (with its own hierarchy, indigenous clergy, and sacraments) in non-Christian countries (Anderson 1999: 127). By all accounts, Fr. Charles possessed a missionary zeal with regard to his vision of missiology, penning a great number of articles, but also exhorting his students to see his point of view. Fr. Charles seems to have had a rather aggressive style of communicating his point of view, a manner, as Fr. do Rego recalled;

> One of them was what we would call an insult. We were two of us, Goans... "You Goans are monkeys!" he would say! In class huh. "You Goans are monkeys!" We didn't mind it, because we knew from whom it came ... and everybody looked at us not also with mirth, but how are you going to react. He says, "you imitate from the west all that is bad in us, and you forget that you have such richness among yourselves in Goa." He knew Goa also. "Take the question of your names," he says. "Take the question of your dress. The woman's dress marks everywhere the culture of the people. And what have you all done Catholic people in Goa? You have adopted only the western dress. What a beauty is your sari!" he says. So you see, that way.
> Now about the names. "What are your names?" he says. "What are your names! All taken from the west and you think they are names of saints!" …. A cultured man also, he says like this, … "you think you become a Catholic, by using the names of saints? What were the saints before they were canonized?" Finally he would say. You tell me, which of you knows the meaning of the name Cyprian. I suppose you call your children Cyprian also. Do you know the meaning of the name?" … None of us knew. We were about 200 people there in his class none of us knew. "I will tell you," he says. "Cyprian is the name of a devotee of the Goddess of Love," that is to say of immorality, Venus in Cypress. There is a big temple there dedicated to Venus. He would become all red. "So I can call my son, the devotee of Venus, and I can't call him Ram? Why not! You monkeys!"

Introduction

In the course of my fieldwork I encountered a substantial challenge realising that I was confronting not just the citizenship practices that I had set out to study but emotions as well. Indeed, it seemed as if the more profound insights would emerge from attending to these emotional narratives that I was encountering. It seemed obvious to me that if I had to

be honest to the ethnographic nature of the study I would have to find a way to integrate these narratives into the scope of this thesis. The solution to this challenge seemed to lie in recent discussions in the anthropology of citizenship and emotions; in particular, works by Saba Mahmood (2005) and Veronique Benei (2009), both of which rely on the concept of embodiment to make their arguments. Given that much of the basis of the discussion in this thesis refers to the ideal citizen-subject being embodied by a definite social group, it seemed to me appropriate that in a discussion of the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics, I return to a discussion on embodiment.[162] It was from their use of the concept of embodiment that I was able to make the arguments that this chapter will elaborate, and more importantly, enabled me, along with the insight provided by Fr. do Rego, to move this thesis from being a study of citizenship practices, to that of be a study of the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics.

Drawing from strands within the vast production in the anthropological study of emotions, this chapter will argue that emotions do not arise within persons spontaneously. On the contrary, bodies are taught to feel. Further, this chapter will demonstrate the plurality of locations from which discourses emerge to discipline these bodies. In keeping with the discussions initiated in the first chapter of this thesis, this chapter will demonstrate how these discourses are not limited to locations within and "below" the nation-state, but as should be obvious from the prologue to this chapter, emerge also from outside and "above" the nation-state as well.

Drawing quite clearly from Santos' (1995) suggestion of the twining of discourses from various locations, I will argue that the hegemonic combination of these discourses legitimises the body of the ideal citizen. This is the body that is marked by secular modernity, the body that is actively created by a variety of social institutions and social spaces, to populate the space of civil society. This body, its sentiments and emotions, are marked as embodying the rational, and hence is the denizen of civil society. The bodies that fail to, or refuse to, embody this ideal, that is to say, the bodies of those who are subalternised, are marked out as irrational, moved by passions and hence relegated to political society where they must await the appropriate moment for their induction into civil society.

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[162] There has been a great amount of scholarly and anthropological reflection on the theories of embodiment and the associated concept of agency for more than a decade. In addition to the more recent works by Benei and Mahmood that I quote above, and use extensively, other texts I have referred to include: Burkitt 1999, Csordas 1990; Frank 2006; Jaye 2004; Inden 2006: 241-311; Mahmood 2001, Rosaldo 1989.

The argument of this chapter commences from the suggestion, particularly contained in the work of Mahmood (2005) and Benei (2009) that persons are taught to embody certain responses, and that this process involves the internalisation of certain norms (see also the discussion in Perez 2009). Based on an understanding that shame and guilt are self-evaluative emotions that arise when one fails to meet self-acknowledged standards of what the citizen-subject should be, this chapter will argue that these two emotions are a central part of the citizenship experience. Further, I will argue, that humiliation, if understood as a claim against this shaming, and accompanied by a program for change, is constitutive of the citizenship act. In looking at these narratives of shame and humiliation, I return to one of the other concerns of this thesis, which is to draw the study of citizenship away from a focus on the state proper. Examining these narratives of shame highlights the multiple locations, outside of the space of the liberal state, where the citizenship experience is played out.

Even though this chapter would like to underscore the multiple locations that twine together to produce the discourses that discipline the citizen's body, I would like to especially emphasize the role in which the structural place of caste plays a particularly important role in forming this body. I seek to stress the role of this social formation not only because caste is synonymous with shame and shaming, and intrinsic to the processes through which an upper-caste Hindu body has been identified as that of the ideal citizen-subject, or in the Goan case, the *Konkani munis*; but also because of the way in which caste and its operation is invisibilised among Catholics in Goa, and also because of the manner its operation is occluded when speaking about Catholics in Goa.

The final part of this chapter seeks to return to the concept of the citizenship act. I therefore argue that claiming humiliation and responding to the sense of shame, without confirming the epistemic order that makes the humiliation possible, is what makes possible a citizenship act.

Emotions and the formation of the ethical self

The anthropological study of emotions differentiates itself from the method in which other social sciences, such as psychology and philosophy have studied emotions (Solomon 2008). In these two disciplines, the emotions have a mentalist and an individual bias. Emotions are seen within an individual frame, rising spontaneously from within the individual, and are evidence of an interior condition of the subject. Unless exercising great

will, emotions are believed to be uncontrollable by the individual. This understanding has its basis both in Descartes' initial separation of the mind from the body, and Kant's subsequent underlining of this description and his (this is to say, Kant's) ascription of a negative role to emotion, privileging it below reason, that was, in his philosophy marked by the presence of the will and the absence of emotion (*ibid*: 8). As a result of these assumptions, emotions were seen as universal and not the product of definite social contexts. To be sure, in this understanding, emotions stood outside of social contexts.

Within anthropology, however, emotions are held to be dependent on the social and cultural context.[163] These studies stressed the cultural production of emotions and the fact that there is a definite audience that can make sense of these emotions, asserting also, that emotions are not universal, nor are they a reflection of some interior space untouched by society. One particularly interesting argument in this strand is Appadurai's suggestion in the collection of works edited by Lutz and Abu-Lughod (1990). In this essay, Appadurai postulates the existence of a "community of sentiment." Appadurai articulates the idea of the "community of sentiment" in the context of the larger discussion that he is engaging in, that emotion is not necessarily the reflection of an inner state. Thus, in a context where he discusses "Praise and Emotion in Hindu India", he argues that:

> praise is not a matter of direct communication between the "inner" states of relevant persons, but involves the public negotiation of certain gestures and responses. When such negotiation is successful, it creates a "community of sentiment" involving the emotional participation of the praiser, the one who is praised, and the audience of the act of praise. (Appadurai 1990: 93- 94)

On this aspect of praise, he submits that it "is governed by regularities of discourse and embodied strategies of interaction that do not assume anything critical about the 'inner' states of the actors" (*ibid*: 105). Appadurai formulates that:

> in the creation of 'communities of sentiment', standardized verbal and gestural forms are used, and there is no assumption of any correspondence between the words and gestures and the internal emotional world of the "actor." What matters are the emotional effects of the praise, which, when it is properly "performed," creates a generalised mood of adoration or admiration or wonder that unites the one who praises, the object of this praise, and the audience if there is one. (*ibid*: 109)

The works of Benei (2009) and Mahmood (2005) should be seen within this tradition of the study of emotions. Mahmood shifts away from the Cartesian understanding of

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[163] For an overview of these changes see the discussion at Svašek 2005: 1- 25; Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990: 1-23.

emotions that link them to an authentic interior condition. Instead, she turns to the Aristotelian conceptualisation of emotions as emerging from the ethical formation of the self. She points out that Aristotle's conception of the habitus fundamentally contravenes the popular perception of the emotion as arising spontaneously. Emotions, she points out, are the result of a physical process of inculcation, which is precisely what the development of habitus is, physical training over a period of time so that the response is ingrained within the person. She demonstrates this by providing examples of the women who veil themselves to inculcate modesty, or weep during prayer to imitate the pious behaviour of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Mahmood's argument is that that merely because they intentionally mimic these actions, and are motivated by fear, does not mean that they do not feel the emotion (2005: 128 -152).

Benei's work that studies the daily nationalist rituals in a school in Maharashtra proposes that through the public worship of the nation, the students in the primary schools were also creating their physical and emotional selves, and at the same time "enacting and embodying 'India' into their existence" (Benei 2009: 24). In an insight critical to the study of citizenship, she argues that in being "phenomenologically taught to 'feel' the nation within their own bodies" (Benei 2009: 24) school children in Maharashtra were embodying the nation by incorporating it within their own bodies. To support this argument she explains that:

> [c]entral here is the notion of embodiment or incorporation; which presupposes that **one cannot distinguish the contents of the process from the process itself, as the two are mutually produced**. Incorporation refers to the formation of a habitus that not only has to do with corporeal practices but also conjures up socially and culturally produced emotional, sensory, and cognitive resources enabling interiorization of the self. Thus, the manufacturing of interiority and embodiment cannot be dissociated from that of a collective regional and national self. (*ibid*: 26, emphasis in bold mine)

The works of both Benei and Mahmood offer a number of arguments for the anthropological study of emotions. The first of these arguments, one that both works make, is to dispel the suggestion that emotions emerge spontaneously from an interior space, and secondly that this manufacturing of interiority is an individual process alone. On the contrary, they demonstrate that persons are taught to internalise certain values, embody certain dispositions, and these dispositions engender definite emotional responses. In addition to articulating the link between emotions and the self, these arguments also

persuade a revisiting of the dominant understanding of the body and the self. In pointing to the way in which bodily dispositions constitute our sentiments and that bodies are also feeling bodies, it becomes possible to expand the notion of the body to include these dispositions and emotions, all three of which together constitute the self. Such an understanding would be particularly useful when discussing the practice, and experience, of untouchability that I will discuss in the Goan context subsequently.[164]

The second argument that these works would present for the anthropological study of emotions would be Mahmood's observation that "the emotion of fear not only propels one to act, but is also considered to be integral to action. Thus, fear is an element internal to the very structure of the pious act, and as such is a condition for (to use J.L. Austin's terms) the 'felicitous' performance of the act" (Mahmood 2005: 145). If, in her example, fear is integral to the structure of the pious act, I would, in the course of this chapter, like to refigure this arrangement of emotion and act to suggest that it is shame that is integral to citizenship practice.[165]

I would like to illustrate this possibility by referring back to Benei's aforementioned example where children are taught to feel the nation within their beings. This process is the

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[164] As will become obvious in the course of my discussion, the form of untouchability that I discuss in the context of the Goan Catholics is far removed from the standard use of the term. The standard use is restricted to the more heinous forms of discrimination practiced within the caste system against groups that today identify as Dalit. These forms include social and ritual segregation and discrimination. Further, within the anthropology of South Asia, the term, and social practices it captures, are understood to also have a ritual component. To therefore use this term in the relatively less-visceral context of the Goan Catholics, and include the experiences of upper-caste Goan Catholics within it may seem excessive. I could even be charged with detracting from the extreme violence that accompanies practices of untouchability against Dalit groups within the subcontinent.
I would respond to these possibilities by suggesting that it is not my attempt to diminish the brute force of untouchability that continues to be practiced in India. On the contrary, I would suggest that placing the examples that I profer provides a sense of scale of the more violent actions that are perpetrated. Further, given the idea of the body that I am invoking via my use of embodiment theory, and the fact that the Catholic is constructed as lower caste, I believe I am justified in suggesting caste-based discrimination that participates in the nature of untouchability. Further, to use this term in the context of Catholics, moves one step toward displacing the Hindu as the focus of India studies, and the caste system, and think of caste as a South Asian system, not necessarily tied to Hinduism. This is, however, a larger debate within South Asian studies, that goes back to discussions involving Dumont (1980) and this is a discussion I believe needs to be taken up elsewhere. Indeed, I would like to reevaluate my use of the term within the larger context of Dalit studies in a separate work subsequent to the completion of the doctoral project.

[165] I use the word citizenship practice instead of citizenship act, as a result of my having adopted the rather specific meaning to citizenship act as suggested by Isin and Nielsen (2008), where the act opens space for the transformation of the repeated practices that consolidate the performance of citizenship. In this specific usage, then, repeated performance is understood as practice, and the potentially disruptive performance as the act.

formation of habitus[166] and, as I will demonstrate later, the internalisation of certain moral codes within the person's body.

My engagement with the idea of shame and its place in the citizenship experience commenced subsequent to engaging with the anecdotes from Fr. do Rego's life that he shared with me, and I have subsequently included in the prologue. Up until that moment, I kept encountering a number of narratives that contained an aspect that I could not quite place a finger on. It was when Fr. Do Rego framed it in the terms that he used, that of humiliation, that I realised that the emotion that I had been constantly been confronting and could not find a name for was that of shame. Thus while a number of my interlocutors did not use the words "shame" or "humiliation", I have read this term into their narratives, and subsequently been able to make greater sense of their narrative and the nature of their citizenship experience.

Having decided to discuss the central role that the emotion of shame plays in framing the citizenship experience, I should also indicate that I am aware that the terms of shame have had a particular resonance in anthropological literature, associated as it is with Mediterranean cultures (Peristiany 1965; Campbell 1964; Pitt-Rivers 1963). There are substantial differences, however, between the way I use the term and the way it has been understood within this tradition. To begin with, shame in this context is associated strongly with gender and sexual codes, providing gendered honour as the binary opposite to shame. This distinction stands in contrast to the sensibility of respect that I privilege in this discussion. Secondly, this structuralist use of shame has been sharply criticised by a number of scholars for reasons of proposing honour and shame as constituents of a static code (Coombe 1990: 224, Dubisch 1995: 197) rather than as sensibilities that emerge as a result of dynamic social process. Indeed, unlike these scholars, I am not arguing that shame constitutes a central value of Goan society,[167] but rather, that it is engendered as a response when one fails to meet the standards that are inculcated within persons. In doing

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[166] The term habitus has gained signifance since Bourdieu's (1977) use of the term, and indeed, it is with Bourdieu that Mahmood is also in conversation with when she discussed the manner in which practice forms the disposition of the individual. Mahmood, however, disagrees with Boudieu in so far as she argues that Bourdieu makes a distinction between practical mimesis, the process by which habitus is acquired, and imitation. Mahmood's disagreement is with the "the lack of attention to the pedagogical process by which a habitus is learned (2005: 139). Bordieu, she suggests, attributes an intentionality to imitation, while ignoring the intentionality that accompanies the learning of habitus producing dispositions.

[167] As already indicated earlier, I have reservations against the uncritical use of the term society, given that it suggests a problematic idea of a polity as a hermeneutically sealed group.

so, I also seek to demonstrate how, through the claim of humiliation, these standards are challenged and possibly changed.

The anthropological study of the emotions of shame and guilt suggests that these emotions are self-conscious evaluative emotions, produced when persons fail to meet the norms that have been internalised through years of disciplining. It is when the external authority is replaced by the internal authority, that of the self, that persons begin to feel shame and guilt. In particular, shame is felt when an evaluation in light of these internalised norms holds the entire self responsible, while guilt is produced when it is a particular act that is held responsible for failure to meet the norms, thus producing the space to possibly redress the error.[168] As the rest of this chapter will go on to elaborate, it is the emotions of shame and guilt, of not meeting the moral codes that have been interiorised, that create within persons the incentive to produce or, at the very least, attempt to produce themselves as ideal citizens. Shame and guilt, therefore, are a central part of the citizenship experience, constantly urging subjects to embody more completely the ideal image of the citizen-subject.

Shame and guilt are but two of the emotions that this chapter deals with, the third, being that of humiliation, an emotion that Fr. do Rego explicitly named in his conversation with me. While shame and guilt are responses felt when failing to meet self-acknowledged standards, I believe that in his discussion of humiliation Palshikar (2009: 79 – 92) offers a useful way to think about humiliation, especially in the context of Fr. do Rego's experience that I have shared in the prologue to this chapter. Palshikar suggests that when persons indicate that they have humiliated, or that they claim have been placed in an unacceptable situation, it is only half a claim, or no claim at all. In his own words, "'[H]umiliation' is a claim which is made complete only by incorporating in it the proposed response to the alleged humiliation" (Palshikar 2009: 87). It is only once the choice of action is made, he argues, that "'humiliation' becomes more than a language used to make sense of a disagreeable situation" (*ibid*). Palshikar's argument is therefore that humiliation as a claim is completed when the protest against an unacceptable situation is accompanied by an argument for a new social arrangement that will make impossible the situation that is being protested.

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[168] For a more elaborate discussion of the understanding of shame and guilt, see Lewis 2010; see also the discussion available in Palshikar 2009: 79 - 92.

A sharper sense of this distinction can be gained by referring back to the example in the prologue. Fr. Do Rego claims not only a sense of shame, but also humiliation. While I am not suggesting that the distinction I seek to make in this chapter is one that animated Fr. Do Rego, I would like to suggest that if the distinction I draw is taken up, one can see that because Fr. Do Rego was determined to end the kind of social relations that characterised the Goan Catholic with regard to their "maternal" culture,[169] the emotion he experienced was not merely shame but humiliation. These sorts of claims of humiliation, I will argue more elaborately later in this chapter, is what constitutes a citizenship act.

In this context of the ethical formation of the self to produce the ideal citizen, Benei demonstrates how otherwise abstract ideas, such as the nation, or language, are actively embodied through the harnessing of body-metaphors that then link to specific moral frameworks. She makes this point through the discussion of a number of scenarios, but I will limit myself to one particular example, that of the experience of the Dalit man, Baba, that she recounts (Benei 2009: 90–92).

Baba, who was born into the *Bhangi* caste, was an individual who could recall a personal history of having to engage in the manual scavenging that formed part of the caste group's obligations to the upper castes, and in the course of his schooling faced the shaming associated with the untouchable status of his caste group. Nevertheless, he managed to gain a basic education, finishing his last two years of schooling with English as the medium of instruction. Subsequently, he ensured that in the following two generations, regardless of their gender, those of his children and grandchildren, who could handle studying in English, were sent to English-language institutions, while the less academically able ones received an education in Marathi-language schools. As a result of these choices, some of his children educated in the English language were able to pursue higher education and later secure mid-ranking jobs in a company and local administration, respectively. Despite the fact that education in English played a significant role in removing him and his family from the shaming associated with untouchability and improving their material conditions, Benei reports that:

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[169] As discussed earlier in this thesis, the elite Goan Catholics at least in the nineteenth century saw Konkani as a *lingua dos creados*. This relationship can be explained as one common to a situation where social groups were not necessarily identified with one language, but spoke multiple languages based on the context they were in. With the influence of Romanticism, and orientalism in reforming the way in which the world was understood, and once Konkani was elevated as the mother tongue of all Goans, this relationship was deemed as problematic and shameful.

over the years…Baba…would increasingly confide that "he had made a mistake" (*majhe cukle*), "now felt bad" (*atta wait wattle*) because "one should definitely learn in one's mother tongue" (*matru bhashemadhyec shijlec pahije*). (Benei 2009: 91, all translations and italicization in the original)

How was one to understand this sense of guilt in one for whom English effectively meant an escape from the tyranny that fixity in one's caste location represented?

In her discussions that seek to make sense of this and similar situations, Benei demonstrates how "notions of morality are ... negotiated through linguistically (and corporeally) mediated understandings of daily life and events, (providing) bearings for one's place in the world, both as an individual and as part of a collective (*ibid*: 89)." In this discussion, she refers to the manner in which language was constructed as mother tongue, and through this process was endowed with the body-metaphors of the mother, and thus embodied and linked to a larger emotional landscape. It was this embodiment of the language, as a mother, that engendered the strong emotions of attachment to the language, and the associated guilt in the form demonstrated by Baba.

Using the example Benei provides, a similar process of ethical disciplining of those who speak the Konkani language can be observed. As has been demonstrated by Newman (2001, 54 – 80) and subsequently highlighted by Perez (2012, chap 5: 41- 58), Konkani was actively constructed as a mother - *Konkani Mai* - since the period of the integration of Goa into the Indian Union. This active construction of a mother-figure underlines the moral economy that accompanies the process of endowment of body-metaphors onto otherwise abstract ideas. Thus, when in Goa, Konkani the language is constructed as mother, it automatically draws on the moral lessons that a one has learned from not just the *householdplace* but also in school, and via religious education; that one has to protect one's mother, and/or worship her. The failure to live up to these ideals with regard to the mother-tongue then induce emotions of shame, or guilt, similar to what one would have experienced if it were one's own mother that was subject to such dismissal. This figure of *Konkani Mai* was first articulated in order to rally the mother's sons to her defence when this metaphor was raised to a fever pitch in the course of the language agitation in the 1980s. As discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, the mother figure is not alien to language, and has been a part of the stock in trade of the romanticist movement, influencing not only European linguistic nationalisms, but Indian linguistic movements as well, not least of which was the nineteenth century creation of Konkani as the "mother"

tongue of the Goan people. It was because of such a history of articulating language that it was possible, as illustrated in the prologue above, for persons like Fr. do Rego to feel ashamed for not knowing his mother tongue sufficiently to be able to sing Christmas carols.

 However, as the prologue indicates, it was more than shame that Fr. do Rego felt. He also felt guilt, as is evidenced by his statement that I have excerpted in the prologue above: "But that day I was entirely convinced that I had to start this." Fr. Do Rego felt ashamed that the community he was a part of, the group that contributed to his sense of self, had failed to cultivate the knowledge and developments of its language. In failing to do so, his community had failed to materialise the standards that the romanticist and nationalist believed to be critical for a community to be taken seriously. This sentiment pertained to his communal self. Personally, however, being trained as a leader of his people, and with capabilities that he was clearly more than aware of, he also felt a sense of guilt. He was someone who could change matters. Thus it was that he decided to change matters definitively.

This process of embodying Konkani through the body metaphor was further developed in the course of the discussion of the various scripts in which Konkani is written as the different dresses that *Konkani Mai* wears. In one instance, when I accompanied activists who constituted the Romi Lipi Action Front (RLAF) in a meeting with the legislator Mauvin Godinho, the body-metaphor of the language as mother was used to a different effect. In this meeting, these activists used the body-metaphor to claim the privileges to an equal share in the maternal property. In this conversation with the legislator, the activists pointed out that when the Roman script was not recognized, it was akin to one son (in this case, Devanagari) being allowed to stay in the house, while the other son (the Roman script) was forced to live outside the house, thus clearly violating the equal claims that sons have on the mother, as well as the mother's obligation to love her children equally. "This is not fair no?" the activist asked Godinho, who either for the sake of propriety, or in agreement with the way the metaphor had been employed, agreed solemnly and sympathetically.

In invoking the mother metaphor, the two groups that are engaged in this dispute over the recognition of the Roman script are also scripted into the role of brothers that comes with its own set of implications. For one there is a moral imperative that they live in fraternal

peace, and it should not be forgotten that the call to fraternal relations lies at the root of the liberal rights discourse. At the same time, this crafting of the relationship into a fraternal one also ensures that the claim is at the same time not an appeal to legal rights alone, and therefore remains ambiguously in a space of appeal suggesting a claim more appropriate to political society. At the same time, as a result of this forging of familial bonds, it also opens up a relationship of what Dipesh Chakrabarthy calls "facing", that is the opening up of a space not merely for resistance, but of negotiation and a space to acknowledge the emotional hurt that has been inflicted (Chakrabarthy 2006: 105). Whether these spaces are utilized or not is another matter, but what needs to be acknowledged is that these spaces have in the process of the usage of the moral framework of the family-place, been opened up. Facing also opens up the space to see, or to force to see, that the other is not different, but similar, and in the context of the untouchability that marks the *citizenplace*, that the other is also human. What should also be recognized is that in the process of this facing, and in evoking the maternal, what these activists are also affirming is the presence of what Appadurai calls the "community of sentiment" (1990). It is these acts of facing, I will argue later on in this chapter, that open up the possibility for the construction of an act of citizenship by some of the Roman script activists.

The plural locations of ethical formation

Having drawn attention to the relation between the emotions that persons feel and the process of ethical formation, drawing on my reference to Santos' formulations on the condition of interlegality that I discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, I would now like to turn my attention toward a recognition of the intertwined nature of the moral frameworks that contribute to this ethical formation. A commonsensical understanding of citizenship as cultural belonging would readily acknowledge the twining of the *citizenplace* with the familyplace. To reiterate a central concern of my study of citizenship, which is to assert the breadth of locations that determine the contours of the citizenship experience, I would like to make the specific point that the habitus is formed by discourses that emerge not only from within and "below" the nation-state, but, as should be obvious from the prologue to this chapter, emerge also from outside and "above" the nation-state as well.

To do so I would like to return to the examples presented in the prologue to this chapter. That these incidents took place in Belgium should underline the argument I forward in this

thesis that citizenship discourses are determined not only within the space of the nation-state, but also by circumstances and practices outside of it. These incidents recounted by Fr. do Rego represent the effects of a discourse born from the dominant racist discourses spread across the globe as a result of European dominance that saw social groups as members of biologically discreet congregations called races. Each of these races were marked by radical and insurmountable differences, and it was right that they devote their energies to the unfolding of their natural proclivities of their race. Liminal groups such as the Goan Catholics, therefore, were a particular aberration that had to be schooled into recognising the error of their ways, and pointed in the internationally approved set of ethics that governed the construction of the self. Referring back to the prologue of this chapter, I would offer the particularly sharp manner in which Fr. Pierre Charles schooled the Goans in his class into recognising the error of their ways as an ideal illustration of this process.

There are other dimensions, to this incident that should be heeded since the feeling of shame seems to have emerged not only because the Goans were in aberration of the norms for the ethical formation of national selves. These other elements involve the relationship of different racial and national groups to each other, and their location in the larger international order. As I have demonstrated in the prologue to this chapter, Fr. do Rego also indicated that "Africans from Congo, who were one generation of Catholics had their own Christmas carols, and we didn't have!" Looking at the details of the Christmastime incident recounted by Fr. do Rego, also draws attention to the implicit hierarchy in the international order that seems to have added to the shame of the Goan priests.[170] Added to

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[170] I should add that this is not the only example that I found of a Goan priest who while being overseas was made aware of his Indian-ness by others in the Church hierarchy. The other example that I possess is that of Fr. Hubert Olimpio Mascarenhas, who was like Fr. Vasco do Rego, a Konkani language activist. Speaking at the felicitation of Prabhakar Tendulkar, a Konkani language that Dalgado Konknni Akademi, Goa and Omor Prokaxon (an institution associated with Tomazinho Cardozo) organized in 2009, Suresh Amonkar recounted the following anecdote about Fr. Mascarenhas: "He had gone to Rome and obtained a D.D. Doctor of Divinity, and his principal told him that he was to give his lecture in his mother-tongue. Now he thought, and said, I will speak in Portuguese. But [he was told] Portuguese was not his mother-tongue. I will speak in English he said but English is not his mother-tongue. Then there was a Mangalorean with him, who had also got a D.D. taking his help, he wrote out a speech and delivered it. But at that moment he felt, that somewhere or the other, he had a lack (a failing – *unneponn*) in himself, and he learned Konkani, spoke well in Konkani…" Another version of the Fr. Mascarenhas story is provided by Fausto D'Costa, who in a compilation of the biographies of those who "contributed to the progress of Konkani" writes, "While studying in Rome, once he was asked to prepare a citation to be presented to the Pope. He prepared it in Konkani written in Roman script. When the same was given to the Secretary to the Pope, the latter returned it and told him to write it in Indian characters. He spent the whole night transcribing the same in Devanagari. In this manner, he came to realise the importance of Indian languages and Devanagari script" (From The Cradle of Konkani History_5, last accessed 1 May, 2013, http://lists.goanet.org/pipermail/goanet-

the shame of not being true to their culture, was added the shame that the Congolese had bested the Goans. Due to the lack of data, I am unable to suggest what exactly were the reasons for the shame in comparison. It could have emerged because the African peoples (and especially given that they were from Congo, the "heart" of the dark continent), generally considered backward, were in this case able to display cultural developments that the Goan upper-caste heirs of a millennial culture[171] were unable to display. It could also have developed external to the racial origins I have suggested above and emerged purely for the reason that Fr. do Rego indicates, which is that neo-Christians, recent converts to Christianity and merely a generation old, had accomplished what the century old Catholics, associated with the powerful figure of St. Francis Xavier, Apostle of the Indies had failed to do.

There is another element, to the shame that Fr. do Rego experienced, and this was as a result of belonging, or being a part of the Portuguese imperial family. The discourse of the Iberian colonizers that sought to assimilate the colonized into Iberian Catholic culture was now deemed, in the face of the political and material dominance of the European North, as backward and outdated. Given the developmentalist language that structured the post-colonial nation-state projects, and especially that of India, those who did not conform to this idea of ideal citizen-selves were seen as in need of reform and thus cast, as will be obvious from the episode recounted, not just by national practice, but by international discourse as well, into the realms of political society. From this location they would have to be educated into ideal citizen-selves and members of the international order.

I would like to further illustrate this shame that Fr. do Rego would have felt, by referencing the shame displayed by a Portuguese author subsequent to his interview with the same Fr. Pierre Charles. In an essay written in 2009, Luis Ángel Sánchez-Gómez describes the situation that unfolded when Pierre Charles, "the Jesuit writer and celebrated Belgian missionary scholar" and "professor at the Catholic University of Leuven" came to Lisbon in April 1932 to participate in the 22nd session of the International Colonial Institute (679). Sánchez-Gómez reports that while in Portugal, Fr. Charles granted an

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goanet.org/2011-May/209287.html). Do note how in both cases, it is a superior who indicates what is the mother-tongue, or appropriately Indian.

[171] As I have discussed in an earlier chapter of this thesis, the native Catholic elites in Goa constructed themselves as heirs of an ancient Sanskritic and Aryan civilization not only to represent themselves in forms that had currency in British India, but also as a strategy to demand greater autonomy from the Portuguese metropole.

interview to a Lisbon daily, which interview was in turn extracted and commented upon by an author in OMC, a religious magazine in Lisbon. In his commentary, the author in the OMC essay argued that:

> [i]t was … the enormous distance that separated the development of the Portuguese and Belgian missionary studies (and the renewal of the missionary practice) which led the author in the OMC to comment – with surprising conviction – that his country 'was still sleeping' and that it 'lagged behind the universal movement to update missionary activity' (*ibid*).

The terms "sleeping" and "lag(ging) behind" used in the OMC's commentary on the interview are demonstrative of the shame that the Portuguese across the empire in the twentieth century seem to have felt in comparison with the British Empire that was the model of efficiency and wakefulness, and indeed the hegemonic ideal that all peoples were expected to aspire to.[172] Indeed, the shame of Fr. do Rego, was similarly expressed rather revealingly by Fr. do Rego's brother who took strident positions in the email battles that raged on Goan internet fora around the issue of the demand of the Roman script's recognition. Speaking to me at his home in Panjim's Fontainhas neighbourhood in September 2007, he asked, "What does Portugal have? One Rossio only." It would have been better, he suggested, had Britain colonized "us".

The shame of being compared unfavourably to the Congolese, therefore, was compounded by the Goans being typical members of the Portuguese Empire, laggards in all fields. The sense of shame then was born from a recognition of a certain order of the world, in which it was the British vision of the world that dominated, and certainly not the Portuguese. This sense of shame, also draws to attention the dissociative strategies that are a response to continuous shaming. At least in the opinion of Fr. do Rego's brother, it was clear that it would be better to form the ethical selves of the Goan Catholics in the form suggested by the dominant British rather than the laggardly Portuguese. It is in this context, then, that one can see the haste and the verve with which the Roman script, a reminder of the Portuguese influence on Konkani was sought to be shrugged off by the Konkani language activists in favour of the exclusive use of the Devanagari script.

Through these incidents that focus on the negative self-conscious emotions of shame and guilt, it can be seen that the discourses that contribute to the ethical formation of the citizen-subject emerge not merely from within the nation-state in its twining with the

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[172] This argument is derived from that developed by Santos (2002).

communityplace, but also from "above" the nation-state, from the internationalplace, underlining the suggestion that citizenship is part of a larger strategy in the global management of populations. In this disciplining, certain bodies are privileged and along with this, specific kinds of sentiments and dispositions. It is these dispositions, sentiments, and bodies that find themselves naturally placed within the realm of civil society, not merely at the national, but at the international level, as well.

Emotions, civil and political society

If the inculcation of certain emotions is privileged for the citizenship experience, it stands to reason that there are a host of sentiments and emotions that are therefore disprivileged. This relationship has been largely captured by dominant political theory through the casting civil society, or the *citizenplace*, as the emotion-less, or passion-less realm of rationality. From the discussions above, however, it can be postulated that it is, in fact, those emotions privileged by the dominant segments of the polity that are deemed to be rational. Deemed rational because they embody the ideal citizen-subject, the rest, those segments of the polity that are unable to embody this ideal, or refuse to embody the ideal, are dismissed as irrational bodies. Those bodies that are deemed too emotional could then be said to fall into a political society where they must be educated until the moment when they are ready to enter the rational space of civil society.

To illustrate this argument, I would like to return to the archive discussed in chapter four in the context of the mobilisation in the 1980s to secure Konkani as the exclusive language for the territory of Goa. I would especially like to draw attention to the letters written by Kisan Kamat (1985) and Narayan R. Naik (1985). In his letter to the editor of the *Herald* newspaper dated 24 October, 1985, Kamat argues that "[t]he question of script is resolved amongst the Konkani writers. Those who talk of Roman do so emotionally. They do not know to write Roman or Devnagri properly (1985: 2)." Thus it is that the emotional members of the polity are identified as lacking in knowledge and capacity in the language. For his part, Naik's letter in the Herald dated 25 October, 1985 frames the issues from a developmentalist point of view. He returns to that old romanticist trope of the historic accident engendered by Portuguese interference in the presumably natural unfolding of a peoples' history. He accordingly argues that "Konkani was forced to use more than one script, at different places [sic] due to some historic accidents.... (1985:2)" If these historic

accidents can be understood to be a community losing its governing spirit, then he posits the nationalist mobilisation as the recovery of reason. Thus, the

> Parishad, under the stewardship of a great personality like Shenoi Goembab, the champion and torch bearer of modern Konkani literature, took an historic decision some 45 years ago that rightful script of Konkani is Nagari [sic], since this language belongs to the family of Sanskrit oriented languages of India. (Naik 1985:2)

It must not be forgotten that this emphasis on "modern", a distinction that I have attempted to demonstrate in the previous chapters, is an arbitrarily defined one. The mark of this modernity, Naik clearly demonstrates, is its ordering principle: Sanskrit. It is by undoing the historical accident, and renewing the invented inspirational link with Sanskrit, that order is reasserted for this language group, and the space for its modernity created. And thus, as per Naik, it was only once the Devanagari script was adopted for Konkani that the language was able to make "tremendous progress (*ibid*)". It is in this context then, that Naik is able to echo, like Kamat, that making demands for the recognition of the Roman script would only result in a challenge to this project of progress, which "can be achieved only through Devanagari script, without making it a sentimental issue, as some persons would like to do." Once again, then, we are faced with this a situation where those sentiments that stand athwart the modernity that has been defined by the dominant groups of the region being deemed irrational, sentimental and emotional.

What is noteworthy is that as long as Konkani was not defined as the official language of the territory, the Konkani language activists were at pains to demonstrate that they were not making emotional demands but rational ones. Thus, once again in 1985, in the course of the demand for statehood for Goa, Chandrakant Keni, a strident activist for the Konkani cause argued that "The Goans' demand for statehood is therefore, not just a sentimental demand but a demand to restore the rights of a free Indian citizen which have been denied for the quarter century since Liberation" (Keni 1985: 3334). Once again, I must underline the proximity that was made between the rationality of the demand and its rights-based content.

Speaking at the commemoration of the Konkani Recognition Day that I attended in the year 2008 in the course of my fieldwork, Pundalik Naik, then President of the Goa Konkani Akademi (GKA), made an observation that is pertinent to my discussion on emotions, the ethical formation of the self and the experience of citizenship, within

political society and civil society. In the course of his address to the audience gathered for this commemoration, Pundalik Naik said that it was the inclusion of Konkani in the eighth schedule of the Indian Constitution that made "us" (that is to say, the Goans) full citizens of the Republic. His suggestion was that until this critical moment, when the recognition of Konkani as an independent language by the Indian state was not secured, he and by extension other persons who identified with the Konkani language, felt as if they were second class citizens. Given that the term second class citizen is often used to suggest persons who do not have the same claim on the state as first class citizens, it can be suggested that these Konkani language activists recognised themselves as not being included in civil society, but in a space outside of it, one that in this thesis has been identified as that of political society. Continuing on the subject, Naik said that he had wanted to see his language printed on Indian currency. On the day he saw Konkani on the Indian rupee note, he said, he was pleased. It should be clear from this discussion that these Konkani language activists saw themselves being embodied in the Konkani language. The recognition, or not, of the Konkani language within the boundaries of constitutionally recognised Indian languages, impacted on their sense of self. The inclusion of the language, therefore, meant not only an inclusion in the space of civil society, but a recognition of the value of those features that embodies their selves, and was, thus, a matter of pride. By contrast it could be argued that location in political society, where one is not recognised as being worthy of official recognition, where the markers of one's self are not recognised as worthy enough, is cause for shame. This experience becomes one of humiliation when, as a result of the operation of democratic discourses, one believes that one's self ought to be recognised and not the object of shame.

Having achieved their goal, it was possible for the Konkani movement to once more embrace sentimentality as evidenced in the words of Manohar SarDessai speaking on Ravindra Kelekar:

> While Shenoi Goembab was chiefly concerned with the independence of Konkani, Ravindra Kelekar has another string to his bow that of Goa's freedom. In fact, this strain is foremost in his writings before the liberation. It is obvious that this concern for Goa's freedom goes along with Goa's integration with India not merely political but cultural and emotional as well. Hence he makes it a point to introduce to Konkani readers Indian thoughts and culture and especially Gandhian thought in all its aspects. (SarDessai 2000: 209 -210)

Throughout the entire period before Konkani could be recognised officially by the various central and state governmental agencies, and even as the demands were being made at the time of the fieldwork for this thesis, the demands of the Roman script activists were being dismissed as emotional demands, and childish ones, thus clearly casting illegitimate demands and sentiments as irrational and hence out of the possible scope of civil society, leaving only the space of political society for these groups.

I would like to argue that it is not merely because the arguments of the activists for the Roman script fall counter to the romanticist and Hindu nationalist notions of what the ideal community should be like, that the demand of the Roman script activists are cast outside of the space of rational civil society. On the contrary, their arguments are also cast out of civil society because of the nature of the very bodies from which these demands emerge. In other words, I am arguing that the Roman script fails to find space within the space of Goan civil society not only because the pure body of the *Saraswat* has been upheld as the epitome of the ideal citizen, but in the process the very bodies of the people who embody these unrecognised aspects of the Konkani language are treated as untouchable. I am thus making reference to the ways in which caste structures the experiences of citizenship within the Goan polity.

Caste, shame and the experience of citizenship

In chapter three of this thesis, I made reference to an encounter in the course of my fieldwork, where during the tea-time refreshments customarily served prior to the event, a public-spirited Hindu brahmin and, clearly, from his presence at the occasion, a Devanagari partisan as well, shared with me his delight over the progress Konkani had made in the many years since Liberation. He spoke to me of the contests that had been organised to popularise the language, which were so successful, he remarked, that in one case the prizes had all been taken by Catholic girls. And yet, their accent was so perfect that if you had not known their names, you could not tell that they were Catholics!

This episode demonstrates the processes through which the Catholic body is not only marked out for education by the members of the Konkani establishment, but is marked as lacking in the capacity to be identified as the ideal *Konkani munis*. The attempt of the Konkani language activists, supported by the state through the recognition of their preferred forms for the language, is to make these Catholics shed their natal forms of the language, be it script or dialect, and adopt the brahmanical model. In keeping with the

argument in the earlier part of this chapter, this is to suggest that the embodied Catholic figure, that is the complex of religion, language, accent and life-style, the dispositions of the Catholic body, is not worthy; it fails to meet the standard set for Goan modernity and must be replaced by that of the unmarked ideal citizen, which in Goa, as previous chapters have sought to demonstrate, is acknowledged to be that of the *Saraswat*.

I would like to further argue that this aversion for the Catholic body has longer roots than merely those immediate to the integration of Goa into the Indian republic and the enthronement of Konkani as the official language of Goa. Toward this end, I would like to refer to an extract from the writings of Varde Valaulikar:

> After taunting Pundalikbab, the next target of Raghunathbab's verbal cannonade is the illustrious son of Goa, Dr. Jose Gerson da Cunha of hallowed memory. Raghunathbab calls him by such expletives as "defiled Christian", "bigot" and "goanese"; and his excellent essay "The Konkani Language and Literature" is rubbished as a pamphlet; and his was an essay which was commissioned by the British Government and was acclaimed by scholars. (Valavalikar 2003: 32)

In this extract from his polemic *The Triumph of Konkani*, Valaulikar is clearly responding to his adversary Raghunath Ganesh-shenoy Talwadkar who was averse to Valualikar's project of defining Konkani as a brahmin tongue. On the contrary, Talwadkar preferred to be identified with the more hegemonic Marathi. In addition to this identification, I would like to focus on one of the implications of one of the terms Talwadkar is said to have used, namely: "defiled Christian". The sense of the Christian being polluted, and hence "untouchable", is clearly evident. In an earlier part of that polemic are other references that evidence the manner in which Konkani was considered the language of the lower castes that converted to Christianity. Earlier in the text, Valaulikar takes pains to counter Talwadkar's suggestion that Konkani is the Catholic "tongue derived from the language of 'the very low classes viz fisherfolk and farmers'" (*ibid*: 16). What Valaulikar did, therefore, was to argue that the Portuguese were interested in converting brahmins rather than lower castes, giving numerous examples to buttress his argument that it was from the brahmins that the Portuguese priests learned the Konkani language, and not from the "the Sudras, Gavdas, Kunbis and other castes" (*ibid*: 19). In doing so, Valaulikar was also following the more powerful example of Gerson da Cunha who, as elaborated in an earlier chapter, sought to identify Konkani with the brahmin groups in Goa (Da Cunha 1881).

Dissociative behaviours are a response to the feeling of shame (Lewis 2008). What should be borne in mind, though, is that while Valaulikar was saving the Konkani language, he was doing so not by esteeming its performance by these lower-caste folk, but by scripting those groups out of Konkani. It can therefore be assumed that Valaulikar was no less embarrassed, or ashamed, by the Konkani connection with the Catholics, than was Talwadkar. Konkani was perceived as tainted by its Catholic association, a stain that clearly continues to inhere, constituting the continuing agenda of the Konkani language activists to wipe the language clean of this association. Based on the discussion I have presented thus far in the chapter, I would argue that in light of the understanding of the way in which the body and self is constructed, where the body includes not merely the corporeal element but also the dispositions that constitute it, what becomes apparent is that this dissociation of the performance of the Konkani language by lower-caste Catholics in fact operates as a practice of untouchability. This untouchability is not merely restricted to the physical body of the Goan Catholic but, rather, extends to a dissociation from the larger ethical self of the Goan Catholic, that is to say, their dispositions, their manner of speaking, writing of the language, and their cultural productions in the language. Furthermore, as can be seen, and has been stressed in earlier parts of this thesis, there should be no doubt that this dissociation, or what I have called "untouchability", is an integral part of the project of the Konkani language establishment. As a result of the central place that Konkani holds in the definition of Goan civil society, I would argue that this untouchability, and its concomitant shaming, is an integral part of the citizenship experience of being Goan.

What is noteworthy is that this model has been internalised by large sections of the Goan Catholics. This should be obvious not only from the fact that the Catholic girls referred to earlier in this chapter were able to win the contest, but also from the narrative of Fr. do Rego that features in the prologue of this chapter. The idea that the ethical formation of the Goan Catholics had followed a historically and morally erroneous path, was clearly being impressed upon the Goan Catholics at various levels. I would like to provide some more examples before I move on to subsequent stages of the argument.

Another priest whom I spoke with in the course of my fieldwork recounted to me another narrative of shame. A peripheral member of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari, this priest worked in a seminary. He told me that whenever he celebrated the Mass outside of the

seminary, he would invariably go early so as to make sure that the persons who would be reading the Bible passages in the course of the Mass pronounced the Konkani "correctly." It was in this context that he recalled an incident from his life that hinged on his long and close friendship with a Hindu. Despite their proximity, Fr. Froilano revealed that he would never speak to this friend in Konkani, the "mother tongue" that they shared in common. This state of affairs continued until one day this friend asked him why it was that even spoken to in Konkani, Fr. Froilano would always respond in English. Fr. Froilano then explained to this friend the reason for his silence in terms of his shame to speak his own Konkani in front of a Hindu friend. "They," said Fr. Froilano, spoke such perfect and "pure" Konkani, and "ours" was not as good, marred as it was by borrowings from English and Portuguese. These ideas of a Hindu *them* that was "pure" and a Christian *us* whose Konkani was impure flows from the larger idea that I have discussed earlier of the conversion to Catholicism being seen causing a rupture with native culture. It was for the resultant shame of being unable to embody the linguistic ideal that he would have otherwise embodied that he refused to speak the language to Hindus.

This was not the only incident of silence born out of shame on the part of Catholics, in the face of being addressed in Konkani by a Goan Hindu. A couple of years prior to beginning my fieldwork, I was training, along with other persons, to be hosts on the Goa station of the All India Radio (AIR). Largely Catholic and English speaking, we were in a session chaired by a resource person who spoke *Antruzi* Konkani fluently and elegantly. There was an awkwardness to the entire session, since through the length of his session, none of the questions he posed to the audience were able to evoke a response. This sullen silence from an audience, especially when the audience is composed of students, or persons in a pedagogical relationship with the speaker, is not surprising. However, the silence in the room was just too painful and my curiosity got the better of me. After the session, therefore, I went up to one of the women in the group and asked her what her reason was for staying silent. Was it the case that she was, like myself, unable to speak Konkani? She responded rather vociferously to my question. On the contrary, she replied, she was a member of the church choir, thus indicating that she was able to sing in Konkani, and also a lector for Konkani language masses. "But their Konkani is different no?" she explained, indicating that once more, at least in her case, that silence was a response from a Catholic in the face of *Antruzi* Konkani.

What I am trying to suggest is that shame, via the incorporation of moral codes that induce that emotion in the individual that fails to live up to these norms, is a critical part of the citizenship experience.[173] I make this argument not merely for the citizenship experience in Goa, but for citizenship in general. Subjects are encouraged to embody the figure of the ideal citizen-subject because the failure to do so results not only in being cast into the space of political society, a space where one has a hesitant relationship with rights, but also because of the humiliation that one encounters, both for being in this space, as well as for not being able to embody the ideal citizen-figure.

To return to the particular case of the citizenship experience of the Goan Catholic, I am not trying to suggest that silence, or a refusal to learn *Antruzi* Konkani, is the standard response of all Goan Catholics. On the contrary, the example, of the Catholic girls who won the recitation competition, with which this section commences, would demonstrate that there are a number of Catholics who are learning *Antruzi* Konkani via school, and are able to excel in it. What I am trying to draw attention to, nonetheless, is the sense of shame that is cultivated among this segment of the Goan population vis-à-vis the language that they learn at home. This sense of shame was ideally demonstrated via the intervention in the course of an event organised by the Dalgado Konkani Akademi (DKA). A prominent *tiatrist*, when expressing the need for the Roman script to be recognised, presented an argument that, as per my observations, is made by a number of Goan Catholics. He indicated that the Konkani taught in schools was extremely difficult for Catholic parents to teach their children. Not only was this language completely different from what they spoke at home, but after learning this Konkani in school, their children would come home and correct their parents saying "Mummy, Daddy, your Konkani is wrong!" This *tiatrist*, a man liable to get extremely excited in the course of making his arguments, was quite worked up when he asked of the audience if this was not a scandalous situation, that not only was their language dismissed in favour of *Antruzi*, but their own children were taught to think that the language that their parents spoke was wrong? It also seemed that a good amount of the scandal stemmed from the fact that thanks to this education, the family order was also being upset with children chastising parents for their faulty language.

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[173] Another example of shame induced silence, or what has been called "selective mutism" and subsequently a speech defect, is presented by Anand (2009) who argues that this resulted from an internalisation of the perception of 'incompetence' that was consistently projected on to the Dalit individual whose experiences are presented in the essay.

This experience was similarly demonstrated in another incident. Speaking with me in the course of my fieldwork, Rudolph Mendes, a local journalist, drew my attention back to an episode in the course of the events that led me into the study of this conflict between the scripts. He recalled the "History Hour" where I had presided as Chair of the session featuring Uday Bhembre. He indicated that he had stood up and pointed out that many parents feel helpless in the face of the Konkani that is taught to their children at school. The parents, he had argued, do not know many of the words and are unable to aid their children in their homework, or explain aspects the child may have not grasped in school. In his response to this journalist, Uday Bhembre had suggested that this was only a problem with persons who came from "non-Konkani speaking backgrounds." From my long association with this journalist, I know him to be a pacific person, but it was obvious to me that Bhembre's response had clearly agitated him. This agitation was not surprising given that, as my journalist friend pointed out, this was the way in which Catholics were routinely dismissed as not knowing Konkani. "Merely because we speak English at home, it does not mean that we are not Konkani speaking", he had argued to me. What is obvious here once again is the manner in which the Catholic body is not held to be capable of embodying the language.

If the shaming of the Goan Catholics' Konkani is a part of the experience of Goan citizenship, or part of the process in the formation of the *Konkani munis*, what happens to those Catholics who do manage to learn state-approved Konkani? An example of this was presented to me by one of the activists Babu[174] who has been associated with the DKA for a while. In addition to being an activist for the cause of the Roman script, Babu is also a litterateur, writing poems and short stories, and involved with a Konkani language newspaper. It was with this background that he applied for a teaching position in the Konkani language department of the Goa University. The interview board was headed by Suresh Kamat,[175] and Babu was pleased with this circumstance. Given that Kamat had been his teacher and was personally aware of Babu's capacities and capabilities, Kamat's presence would probably work to Babu's advantage. In Babu's narration, however, it turned out that when he went in for the interview, Kamat merely said "*Babu, thum amka kitem sang*" (Babu, why don't you tell us something?). After having indicated this much to me, Babu asked me if I realised what that little question Kamat had posed meant. When I

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[174] Name changed to protect identity.
[175] Name changed to protect identity but incorporates markers that reveal the individual's caste identity.

pleaded ignorance, Babu repeated the question Kamat had put to him "*Babu, thum amka kitem sang.*" His nostrils flaring in a clear demonstration of his anger at the situation he had been put in, Babu explained to me that what he had been asked about in his interview were not his achievements, but to "say something" so that the interview board could check if Babu had the "correct" pronunciation and accent.

This experience obviously upset and hurt Babu immensely, but also brought into sharp highlight the glass ceiling that prevented him from moving upward in his chosen career. This was a ceiling that prevented those who did not come from the "right" backgrounds into jobs in the language department.

Babu is not only a member of a Shudra caste among the Catholics, but is also of the first generation of university educated from that background. Employment in the university would have meant a significant achievement not merely for him, but for his family as well. Significantly, this incident also demonstrates that Babu had, until that moment, bought into the arguments of Konkani as the language of all Goans, the vehicle that would create a civil society with equal opportunities and value for all. The experience at the interview confronted him with the possibility that the rhetoric did not in reality meet fact. It was clear to me that Babu was extremely angry as a result of this episode, and disappointed as well. Looking at the effects of this incident, it can be seen that this too was an outcome of the practice of shaming that forms a part of the experience of citizenship. Additionally, in now making a claim that this normative order was unacceptable, Babu was converting a sense of shame, into a claim of humiliation. In his discussion on humiliation, Palshikar suggests that "[h]umiliation is a critical point in a power relationship, the cusp region as it were, something that brings sharpness to the exercise of power and helps reproduce those relations of power, but it can also lead to their ultimate dissolution. It is a potentially disruptive element of power" (Palshikar 2009: 87). Thus, if the shaming of the Catholic performance of Konkani, and the underlining of the incapacity of the Catholic body to embody the *Konkani munis* is a regular feature of the citizenship experience in Goa, and helps reproduce the relations of power that keep the Hindu brahmin in particular and the Hindu in general as the hegemonic representative of Goan-ness, then this moment of humiliation also allowed for an individual, such as Babu, to confront it and join a movement challenging this hegemony.

In keeping with the challenging of the monolithic construction of a single "Goan Catholic" that has formed one of the emphases of this thesis, I would not like to suggest that all Catholic bodies are shamed equally. On the contrary, given that the shaming is premised on the valorisation of the Hindu brahmin body it is, therefore, the body of the lower-caste Catholic body that is devalued in greater measure. Given that I am trying to also make an argument for this devaluing as the practice of untouchabilty, I would like to reinvoke the metaphor of scales (of subalternity) that I have used earlier in this thesis, by calling our attention to Ambedkar's argument that untouchability embodied the principle of "graded inequality" (cited in V. Geetha 2009: 96). This devaluation is demonstrated quite amply in the concerns and responses of some of the members of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari, most of whom, as I have pointed out earlier in this thesis, are members of upper-caste groups, and are largely brahmins. What is demonstrated in these examples is the extent to which caste so hegemonically structures the experience of citizenship in Goa.

In trying to illustrate this case, I would like to focus in particular on a question posed to me by Fr. Evangelho, one of the stalwarts of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari. On one occasion, Fr. Evangelho asked me with some amount of irritation, "What culture do they have?". The "they" in question were the Roman script activists, and was a direct reference to the low estimation of the cultural capital, such as *cantaram*, *romance*, and *tiatr* of these activists who are also largely subaltern caste Catholics. This perspective is not one that Fr. Evangelho holds in isolation, but is shared by the dominant Konkani establishment. When challenged as to why the *romance,* and other literary works in the Roman script did not get any awards, the standard response from the Konkani language establishment has been that "they are lacking in standard". Similarly, despite its vibrancy and popularity, and its possibly unparalleled socio-political critique within the territory, the *tiatr* form is constantly shrugged off as "below standard" (Rane 2000:3). Indeed, the slur of having no standard is one of the significant issues that the Roman script activists have taken objection to and animates their struggle. To return to Fr. Evangelho, it seems plain that his irritation in regard to the claims of the Roman script activists for a recognition of their script of choice and an esteeming of their cultural and literary forms stems from the dissociative impulse born from his own shame of his cultural group not embodying the markers of the ideal citizen-self. The response to the emotion of shame, it has been pointed out, is an attempt to get rid of this emotional state, and may lead to a variety of dissociative behaviours especially when the shaming is repeatedly encountered.

Another example of this form of disassociation was with regard to the *Mando* Festivals annually organised by a group called Goa Cultural and Social Centre. This group had been organising what is possibly the most important *mando* festival in Goa, intermittently since 1965 until date. However, it turned out that in recent years there had been a consistent drop in the number of participants. Trying to understand why participation was falling, I spoke with one of the central organisers of the festival. From our conversation, it turned out that what was actually transpiring was that some of the groups, formed in part by the founders of the festival felt that the standards of the competition were falling in recent years. These groups formed by some of the founders argued against the inclusion of groups that changed the tempo of the *mando*, that did not use the traditional percussion instrument called *ghumot*, or the violin, and those who wanted to use the electric guitar instead. To counter these innovations, these older traditionalist groups, or individuals, insisted that all groups participating in the festival be allowed to participate only after first presenting their performance before a selection committee. Initially, the organisers of the festival acquiesced to this demand, but realising that the number of groups participating plummeted in the subsequent year, they gave up on the requirement of a selection round. In response to this move, these "traditionalists" boycotted the event.

While it may appear that this debate was a contest about traditions and innovations, attendance at the *Mando* Festival in the year 2008 as a part of my fieldwork revealed a dramatically interesting dimension to this contest. This insight came to me via a conversation with an upper-caste, and upper-class Goan academic present at the festival and sitting behind me in the auditorium. She pointed out to me in the course of the performances that the people who were singing (and dancing) the *mando* now were not from the class of people who originally did so, as a result, these new performers of the *mando* didn't know how exactly to present it. In this sense, she suggested that what was being displayed was largely mimicry of the original. This suggestion of mimicry was also proposed when one of the comperes for the festival made reference to the fact that earlier it was people who spoke Portuguese that wrote the *mandos*. Viewing the performances of the *mando* it became obvious that there may be a seed of truth there, given that it was the upper-class and upper-caste groups that seemed to have their costumes right, and seemed much more at ease while performing than other groups. This contrast is perhaps sharply captured by a recent article in a local newspaper:

> December is the month of weddings. My noticeboard in the kitchen was pegged with invitations arranged date wise so as not to miss any. In the first fortnight of December I had one such wedding. As I was beginning to dine, next to the stage, slowly savouring the food, I heard the DJ announcing that they would now play a Mando and requested all the family members, as well as the bride and groom, to gather at the dance floor. I was quite excited about it because I had a Mando written for my wedding and that was the first dance I danced with my husband. It is a very old tradition that has been followed for years in Goa; but to my surprise, at this wedding, I had a bunch of people jumping all around, clapping hands to the sound of a kind of Konkani rock song with lyrics of a Mando!

> "This is what I call –murdering the Mando" – I told my husband. In my opinion all weddings don't have to follow such traditions, but if they want to include this dance, do it the right way. I also wonder how many of the guests really knew what was happening. (Sousa 2012)

Clearly evident in this extract is the sniffing disdain for those who don't know what the *mando* really is, affirming that there is such a thing as *a mando*, and that there are those who know to dance it properly and the rest who don't, and these latter should not really attempt to dance it if it is not a part of their tradition.

With this in mind, it becomes obvious that the boycott of the festival by the "traditionalists" was in fact less about style, and perhaps more to do with refusing to participate in a competition with social inferiors, and thus a larger problem with the democratisation of Goan (and Catholic) society that had taken place since the integration of Goa into the Indian Union.[176] What was taking place in the course of this boycott was another dissociative practice, one that was motivated by the shame of having to share a space with people that were considered beneath these traditionalists, but also draws attention to the differing forms of "untouchability" that are practiced against lower-class and lower caste Catholics.[177]

To return to the case of Fr. Evangelho, his dissociative response of shrugging off the burden of the cultural productions and the very beings of the lower-caste and lower-caste Catholics was coupled with the attempt to embody the ideal *Konkani munis*, the Hindu

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[176] Sardo (1997) similarly highlights the manner in which elite upper-caste families argued that only those born into the tradition were able to properly perform the *mando*, and resented the intrusion of other groups into this dance and music form. Indeed, she points out that the inclusion of non-elite performers into the arena of the *mando* was accepted largely because of the political need immediate on the integration of Goa into the Indian Union and the concomitant threat of integration into Maharashtra, to affirm a local Konkani culture. In doing so, one is tempted to once again inquire if one is not witness to concessions being handed out to members of political society when there is a challenge to the status quo, and once the status quo changes, the same concessions are sought to be withdrawn.

[177] I would like to draw attention here to Perez' (2012) disagreement with the self-representation of Goan Catholics that caste matters only when it comes to the question of marriage.

Saraswat Brahmin. For Fr. Evangelho, the future was clear. The Catholics needed to embrace Devanagari if they were to become a part of the "mainstream" and not be discarded as "mixed breeds". Given the biological metaphor that Fr. Evangelho used, it becomes more obvious that there is a definite loathing of the bodies of the impure, and the mixed. What Fr. Evangelho failed to recognise is that both his desire to become a part of the mainstream, and indeed his acceptance within the mainstream represented by the Konkani Bhasha Mandal and the activists for Devanagari exclusivity was made possible by over a century, if not more, of the construction of the Catholic Brahmins as kin (even if separated by historical accident) of the Hindu *Saraswat*. This option is, if not impossible, rather difficult for those that do not share a similar brahmanical heritage.

These dissociative responses from the members of the upper-caste groups are not the only examples of this reaction in the face of shaming that I encountered. While sitting in the meetings that the DKA organised among the *tiatrists*, I came across an interesting pattern. I had been warned by my activist friends that it was difficult for the *tiatrists* to work together as they could not cooperate with each other, and often had ego clashes. In the various meetings I attended, I realised that not only was this true, but that there was a pattern to these clashes. Each of them had to have the last word, and there were a number among them who could not countenance being challenged by others. This situation was somewhat cynically captured in the course of a conversation at the first Romi Lipi Sommelan in Margão. Hanging out at the edge of the conference with a varied bunch of people, a discussion emerged regarding the value of conducting workshops to aid those writing reviews of *tiatrs*. Good reviews, it was pointed out, would allow for *tiatrs* to get better, and get more visibility. The response of one of the more prominent actors was to smirk and say ""*Henh*! They will come? They know everything!"

The overwhelming tendency when viewing this behaviour of the *tiatrists* has been largely to put this down to individual tendencies of the *tiatrists*. When viewing these behaviour, in the larger context within which I was working, I realised that this too was the example of a dissociative behaviour in the face of the shame experienced by these individuals. In the case of the *tiatrists*, one encounters a situation where their self-evaluation is marred by an identity that is negatively perceived by the dominant groups in society, or by society at large. Furthermore, this negative perception is, as in the case of caste, or the citizenship experience, institutionally perpetuated. This ensures that the experience of shaming is a

continuous assault on the individual. In such a case, one's very body and self-image is a cause for shame, and the dissociative behaviour involved could include an attempt to not identify with the particular group, creating the absence of solidarity. Ambedkar captured this situation perfectly in his description of the implications of the system of graded inequality:

> All have a grievance against the highest and would like to bring about their downfall. But they will not combine. The higher is anxious to get rid of the highest but does not wish to combine with the high, the low and the lower lest they should reach his level and be his equal. The high wants to over-throw the higher that is above him but does not want to join hands with the low and the lower, lest they should rise to his status and to become equal of him in rank. The low is anxious to pull down the highest, the higher and the high, but he would not make a common cause with the lower for fear of the lower gaining a higher status and becoming his equal. (In Jaffrelot 2005: 36)

What I was witness to I realised, was this kind of a dissociative behaviour, a behaviour that made the possibility of the *tiatrists* working together extremely difficult. Indeed, as a journalist remarked in the course of the *Romi Lipi Sommelan* ("Roman Script Conference"), "We have too many leaders and not enough followers." In the course of attending the many meetings with *tiatrists* that I did, it also became obvious that some of these *tiatrists* would not become followers, because they considered themselves of a "class" higher than those who were leading, or were capable of leading. Furthermore, I should make it obvious that the disparaging of the *tiatrists* was being done by some of the litterateurs among the Roman script activists. This is to say, that among the Roman script activists, themselves, there had been an internalisation of the dominant idea that the producers of *tiatr,* the archetypal embodiment of the Goan Catholics' cultural production, were uneducated and unreasonable people. This situation impeded the gains that the Roman script demand could possibly have made if the *tiatrists*s threw in their lot as a collective into the demand. If as discussed in chapter one, being unable to make oneself heard or understood is one feature of the subaltern, then the inability to work together and craft a common discourse surely is another feature of subalternity, a condition that these lower-class and lower-caste Goan Catholics find themselves in.

Caste, it becomes obvious, is a central institution through which the citizenship experience of the Goan Catholics is encountered. The hegemony of not only the *Saraswat* but other brahmanised caste groups ensures that caste is the central social institution through which

the ideal of the citizen-subject is upheld, and the shame that is a central part of the caste experience twines with the shame that is a part of the citizenship experience.

Caste, humiliation, and the citizenship act

If I have thus far made a case for the Goan Catholics being shamed, I would like to emphasise that some of the activists for recognition of the Roman script also attempt to insult their opponents in the Devanagari camp. I have to caution that not all of these activists indulge in this form of shaming and this practice seemed limited to those from upper-caste locations. In this process I realised that it was not only the presence of insults, that demonstrated the way in which persons manifest their agency to challenge a hegemonic ideal, but also the absence of insults. In doing so, I argue that it is possible to see the difference between citizenship practices and the citizenship act.

To refer back to an initial argument, Isin and Nielsen propose a distinction between practices and acts, by suggesting that citizenship practices are repetitive actions, actions that are often passive and one-sided. Acts of citizenship on the other hand are those actions that "disrupt habitus, create new possibilities, possibilities, claim rights and impose obligations in emotionally charged tones; pose their clams in enduring and creative expressions; and, most of all, are the actual moments that shift established practices, status and order" (Isin and Nielsen 2008 :10).

Having underlined how the citizenship act is identified with the possibility for the change in habitus, I would like to draw attention once again to Palshikar's assertion that humiliation as a claim is made possible not only when the person experiencing the shame asserts that this shaming is no longer acceptable. On the contrary, he argues, the claim is at this stage incomplete and completed only when it is accompanied by a claim that the normative order that generates this sense of shame must go and be replaced by a new vision of social relations. I would especially like, in this segment of the chapter, to posit the responses of some of the Roman script activists to their humiliation, in the failure to respond in kind, to a citizenship act that has the potential to disrupt the habitus and shift established practices, status and order.

While I was analysing my material subsequent to realising the narratives of humiliation and shame that I had been alerted to, I realised that it was not as if the Goan Catholic activists for the recognition of the Roman script were merely taking all insults lying down.

On the contrary, some of these activists were also responding with insult. Take for example the narratives of two of these activists who focussed on the person of Prabhakar Shirodkar,[178] one of the principal actors of the Konkani language movement in the 1980s and, at the time of my fieldwork, the office bearer of the Goa Konkani Akademi. One of these activists repeatedly referred to Shirodkar as a bastard, pointing to the fact that he belonged to the *kalavanti* community. As if this were not sufficient, he went on to use this casteist logic to explain why Shirodkar was an ally of the Devanagari movement. This caste, he argued, was accustomed to being "used" (sexually) by the *Saraswat*s and Shirodkar was only continuing this tradition. I believe that what should also be borne in mind is that these statements were made to me not in the course of a casual conversation, but while the two of us were sitting in front of an audio-visual recorder. This activist was very much aware of the camera and microphone, and on a number of occasions in the course of the interview, solemnly faced the camera while making his arguments. These statements were meant to be, I believe, made as public statements intended to insult.

Another activist, who similarly identified Shirodkar as a target, did not refer to his caste location but, instead, to the man's rumoured habits of womanizing. "He is a *bailando* (womanizer)" said this man, disgust writ all over his face. Once again, there was a reference to Shirodkar's caste location and the implication that a social group that once regularly provided women as sexual partners for the *Saraswat* community could not possibly now live up to the norms of decent society.

Also underlying these insults are an acceptance of a patriarchal order, [179] as is demonstrated by the use of similar insults hurled against Margaret Alva,[180] at different times in the course of my fieldwork. In this case, two men from either side of the debate called her a "prostitute". All these examples also go to demonstrate the patriarchal order that underlies the institution of caste. While this fact once more makes evident the multiple social locations from which the citizenship experience is crafted, I would like to refer back

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[178] Name changed to protect identity.

[179] In his text *The Annihilation of Caste*, Dr. B. R, Ambedkar observed that "[w]here society is already well-knit by other ties, marriage is an ordinary incident of life. But where society is cut asunder, marriage as a binding force becomes a matter of urgent necessity. The real remedy for breaking Caste is inter-marriage. Nothing else will serve as the solvent of Caste." (In Rao 2009: 232). In doing so he highlighted the critical role that the control of female sexuality played in the maintenance of caste. As such, calling a woman a prostitute, is not merely a gendered slur that gains value within a patriarchal society; it is also demonstrative of the power of caste within a society, especially in one where definite caste groups were required to proffer sexual services to their upper caste patrons.

[180] Alva is a member of the Congress (I) party, and was sent to Goa by the Central Committee of the party to resolve the script issue.

to the "community of sentiment" that speaks of a commonality between persons in the experience of emotions (Appadurai 2008). In this case, I would like to suggest that these actions of insult were not changing the rules that created the community (the Goan polity), but were consolidating the rules by which this community was bound.

But there is more to this case than mere commonality in sentiment or a communal understanding of issues. Who insults and how is, as I shall demonstrate, more nuanced. It appears that those who are doing the insulting, at least the two individuals I have referred to in the examples above, are able to do this because they are, in terms of caste status, in a position of equivalence, or above the person being insulted. This is to say that both these individuals are from brahmanised upper-caste groups, one of them being a *Chardo*. They are using the strength of their location in the caste hierarchy to hit back at a member of the group they see as shaming them, both because this particular individual belongs to a group that formerly offered services to the Hindu brahmins, and also because it is upper-caste markers that are, to put it in Bourdieu-ian terms, the currency of the field. As I will subsequently highlight, my suggestion is that this route of using insult as a tool in the game is not shared by all players in the field.

 In discussing humiliation, both Nandy(2009) and Palshikar (2009) also make an argument that the humiliator and the humiliated are part of a dyadic relationship. Palshikar's argument is that "in complaining against a state of affairs, one may be unwittingly accepting the premises of that order" (Palshikar 2009: 84). Palshikar further elaborates that:

> [i]n humiliating the humiliator, one is either playing God, or, less audaciously, desperately seeking to erase the ontological status of the acts perpetrated by the humiliator. But, this may unwittingly result in the confirmation of the underlying order of evaluations which made these mutual humiliations possible in the first place. (*ibid*: 89)

Alerted by this insight I was able to subsequently recognise that while these dominant-caste activists for the recognition of the Roman script were free with their abuse, members of the non-dominant castes were not playing this game of matching insult with counter-insult. Neither were they calling out in public the caste locations of the humiliators, nor the caste-bias involved in *Antruzi* and hence in official Konkani. I was initially confused when I saw that even though it was plainly obvious that most of the members of the Goan Catholics for Devanagari were Catholic Brahmins, and the *Antruzi* dialect was that of the

*Saraswat*s, and were clearly calling the shots, no one was pointing out to this fact. It was when I actively, and repeatedly, pointed this fact out to various activists, that they eventually and reluctantly acknowledged it. At this point, it became obvious to me that it was not that this fact had gone unnoticed earlier, but that it had in fact been noticed, and while discussed in private, had as a matter of conscious choice, never been used in public discourse. On the contrary, when the activists for the Roman script did make reference to these castes, the speaker would invariably make use of the euphemism "small community", thus erasing the existence of the operation of caste in the *citizenplace*.

A number of reasons could explain this absence, the first of which is to point out that the Roman script activists, especially under the leadership of the DKA, have attempted to maintain a "secular" tone to their demands. Thus, they try, to the best of their ability, and as far as possible, not to make the issue one of Catholics being persecuted by Hindus, that is to say, a case of persecution of a religious minority, but one of the Devanagari script against the Roman. In making this general demand, they are sticking to the secular protocol in India's civil society that frowns on the overt mobilization of religious or caste identities when mounting a political demand. The more important reason could perhaps be that by phrasing the debate in terms of caste, in making the issue one of "upper" castes discriminating against "lower" castes, the effect would be to reify the hierarchical distinction between these groups. This is to say that if they were to phrase the dispute as an upper vs. lower caste debate, these activists would effectively acknowledge the superior position of the brahmins and the lower position of the rest. Furthermore, it is possible that despite the fact that the preference for Devanagari is seen as a predilection largely by brahmins, the non-brahmins do not in fact see themselves as "lower", or as members of "castes" in the first place.

I do not argue that this has been a conscious decision by these activists, and may perhaps be an unconscious one. Regardless of its origins it may be that this absence of a reference to the caste location of the preference for Devanagari may have the effect of circumventing the casteist shaming that informs the citizenship experience in Goa. If Palshikar argues that the recognition of, and the mere complaining about humiliation forces the humiliated into unwittingly accepting the premises of that order, Baxi and Chandhoke in the collection of essays edited by Guru (2009) make a similar argument with regard to the system of

reservations in India.[181] Chandhoke argues that "reservations in effect have proved a soft option for political elites, who are reluctant to carry out deep-rooted changes in society" (Chandhoke 2009: 152). As a result, while agendas of affirmative action are concerned with social justice, and should ideally include land reform, income generation policies, Chandhoke points out that the redressal of inequality and securing the well-being of the disprivileged has been collapsed into reservations in institutions of higher education and in government jobs with the result that, "[r]eservations, which should have formed one component of social justice, have come to substitute for social justice" (*ibid*). Both Baxi and Chandhoke stress that reservations are a perverse method of rendering static the identity of those who claim positive discrimination from the state. These benefits are then seen, both by members of civil society, state and claimants themselves, as emanating from the state and not as a part of what is due to members of a given society because they are equal shareholders in the resources of a given society. This, Chandhoke argues, compromises the tenets of egalitarianism, since it reinforces a lack of self-esteem and self-respect, where the beneficiaries of state action come to see positive discrimination as "state generosity and largesse". Baxi similarly stresses that those who benefit from reservations, and those who wish to claim it in the future, are constituted as, "the plebiscite *bazaars* of entrenched *vote banks*" (Baxi 2009: 65, italicised in the original), bereft of any serious prospect of promoting structural transformation.

With an emphasis on caste and the caste-based shaming that informs the citizenship experience in Goa, it is possible to see two different kinds of citizenship practices emerge from among the Roman script activists. When the first set engages in hurling slurs at the Devanagari group, as well as loudly proclaiming their humiliation, what they are doing is largely perpetuating caste as the basis of the citizenship experience in Goa. The second group on the other hand, opens up an alternate route to the citizenship experience in the same context, and their actions could more appropriately be called an act of citizenship. These actions are motivated by the humiliation that these lower-caste Catholic activists experience. Yet rather than refer to the bases on which they are being humiliated, that is, by the privileging of a caste normed body as the ideal *Konkani munis*, they make their claims on the basis of rights that ought to be available to citizens. They claim the right to be treated equally. In eschewing the route to claim humiliation by the official Konkani

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[181] The system of reservations, as is well known, is a means of affirmative action and is obtained through the reservation of seats in educational institutions and in governmental employment for members of groups (castes and tribes) who are identified as needing economic and social support.

establishment and the state, and in refusing to locate the issue as one of upper-caste domination, but rather as one of the cornering of the state by one group and challenging this on the basis of inequality, these Roman script activists are making a definitive break with the practices that govern social relaations. In effecting this break they are creating the possibility of exiting a polity where citizenship is based on repeated humiliation, and creating the possibility for the establishment of a polity of equal citizens.

I would like to contrast these citizenship acts with the citizenship practices that have marked the other examples described in this chapter. In particular, I would like to look at the example of Fr. Do Rego, that inaugurates this chapter, as well as the examples of the narratives of the members of the Konkani language establishment. While that of Fr. Do Rego could be seen as a citizenship act to the extent that he did attempt to make a change in the habitus of the Goan Catholics, like the members of the Konkani language establishment, he did not challenge the epistemology on which civil society was and is based. Both he and these members of the establishment merely followed the logic that was hegemonic. They sought to insert themselves into the logic that shamed. They ensured in this process that while they were not shamed, other groups continued to be shamed. They did not rebel against the combined logics of race and class that have twined to create the *Konkani munis*. To this extent, no matter that their actions ensured that they were no longer shamed, but became members of a civil society, one would hesitate to cast their actions as citizenship acts.

If such is the case, then what can be seen in the assertion by lower-caste Roman script activists is the attempt to shift the locus of caste in Goan civil society. Through their actions, they demand that the discourse be shifted to recognizing members of the polity as equal members of society, and not as inferior members of lower castes. I would also like to draw attention to the fact that a number of these activists are associated with the *tiatr* tradition, that was, as I have pointed out earlier in this thesis, right from its inception concerned with dignity and respect of the people it was both a production of, and directed towards.

Having made this observation in regard to the possible existence of an act of citizenship by this latter group of activists, I would rush to underline that I am not in any way trying to suggest the existence of a rigid rule, or more appropriately of a binary divide among the Roman script activists. What I am suggesting is a tendency, which is perhaps born of an

intuition, rather than a consciously articulated policy, and hence is not necessarily followed as a rule. As such, despite the manner in which the citizenship act has been phrased theoretically, as an act that will shift practices, I believe that even if this act has the potential for shifting practice, it needs to be identified for this potential.

Summation

Based on an anthropological tradition that understands emotions are learned responses within a definite cultural context, this chapter suggested that shame is a central part of the citizenship experience. Having internalised norms that are hegemonic in society, subjects feel ashamed or guilty at not being able to embody the figure of the ideal citizen-subject. In the case of Goa, this figure is the *Konkani munis* modelled on the linguistic markers of the upper-caste Hindu brahmin. Given that a caste-normed body is upheld as the ideal, the failure to embody this figure by those outside of this caste and religious complex causes shame among those who are Catholic and, more specifically, lower-caste. Caste, and the accompanying practice and experience of "untouchability", this chapter has sought to argue, is a central institution in the experience of citizenship in Goa. But it is not only caste that plays a role in defining the experiences of the Goan Catholics. On the contrary, this experience is formed as a result of the combination of a variety of logics that play out at various levels, the international as well as that of the family.

The upper caste-normed body of the citizen-subject gains strength because it is able to twine with the international discourse that sees denizens of national communities as ideally embodying their own cultural values. This allows for local and national elites to limit the options available to members of the polity, and privilege the caste-normed body as that worthy of emulation. The logic of the family comes into play as both internationally and locally, as in Goa, civil society is cast as the community of those who speak a certain language - the mother tongue. Once cast as a mother, members of the polity are required to treat the language as one would one's own mother, thus engendering feelings of shame or guilt were one to fail this mother.

In the process of the discussion of this chapter, I sought to make a distinction between shame and guilt, as well as humiliation. Shame and guilt are emotions that were evoked as a result of the internalisation of the norms that are, both, inculcated in the person and by the person. Persons feel ashamed when it is their entire self that is incapable of meeting the established norms. Take for example the experience of shame by Goan Catholics who are

ashamed to speak Konkani in the presence of a Goan Hindu fluent in the *Antruzi* dialect of Konkani. Guilt results when the individual believes that there is a particular action that they could have done to embody the norm, an action that they failed to do. This guilt is demonstrated in the narrative of Fr. Do Rego, who as a leader felt that he (or his people) could have done something to match to the international expectations of what form of Catholicism non-European Catholics must embody. Humiliation, on the other hand, emerges when individuals are able to summon alternate discourses and assert that the shame, or guilt, that they experience is unacceptable, and challenge the existence of these norms. This claim of humiliation, I further went on to argue, is complete only when this claim of humiliation is matched with a proposal to change the manner in which social relations are arranged. This completed claim is what creates the citizenship act.

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to use the demand for the inclusion of the Roman script in Konkani in the official definition of the language in the Official Language Act of Goa as the point of entry to understand the nature of the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics. Consequently, I have argued that the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics are best described as those that are located in what, following Chatterjee (2007), I have called political society. As a perusal of this thesis will demonstrate, however, I have more than a discussion of the concept of political society. On the contrary, this thesis appeals to a number of concepts that I seek to relate to each other in order to explain the nature of the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics.

When attempting to capture the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics, especially the lower-class and lower-caste among this group, I realised that the project was doubly challenged by the fact that while there has not been substantial ethnographic work focussed on these subaltern groups among the Goan Catholics, the field of the anthropological study of citizenship is itself somewhat limited. This was further complicated by the fact that the terrain of the study of citizenship is dominated by political scientists. The broad tendency is to see citizenship as a legal status, and therefore make the study of citizenship a positivist study of what ought to be, rather than what is. Furthermore, this is a field of studies that is overly constituted by the concerns of the global North; a field of studies that assumes that citizenship is necessarily about justice and equality; and finally a field of studies that privileges the individual rather than the group. While this terrain proved challenging on the one hand, this gap proved to be something of a blessing since it allowed me to bring to the work my own formation in socio-legal studies to expand the frame of the manner in which citizenship can be studied anthropologically.

As a result of this situation, while investigating the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics, this thesis also proposed a number of ways in which citizenship could be re-understood from within the anthropological approach. In response to this state of the field, this thesis drawing on the recent works of a number of scholars suggested, among other things, that citizenship be studied as part of a disciplinary regime of fixing. Citizenship, while often understood as a legal status and a consequent claim on rights, is also

understood as membership in a single cultural community. Through this restriction of the concept, citizenship regimes seek to fix the identity of persons into the frames of the ideal citizen-subject of that polity. In so doing, the regime limits not merely the identity of persons, but also their mobility, not merely within the polity, but also across international boundaries. As I have pointed out, this form of citizenship is constituted through quotidian practices. Where citizenship is about embodying the ideal citizen-subject, citizenship is about forming the bodily dispositions, i.e. the habitus, of the individual in the group.

To this markedly Foucauldian position, I also suggested that citizenship should be studied as being constituted by acts of citizenship, i.e. the attempts by both individuals and groups to challenge this fixing, and be recognised as acts that seek to create "room for manoeuvre" for these actors. The study of citizenship therefore, should comprise both these elements, that of fixing, as well as the attempt to gain mobility. These acts of citizenship, I argued, should be seen not necessarily as seeking the extension of rights for all persons nominally recognised as citizens. Rather, they are more narrowly focussed on creating the space for members of the groups that rupture the status quo. Thus, expansion of the space of citizenship for one group, could very well translate into limiting the rights and space for manoeuvre of other groups within the polity. Citizenship then, is also a relational condition, involving not merely the citizen and state, but a more complex relationality, involving relationships of the individual with the group, individual with other invididuls, groups with other groups, and the relationship between structural places, scales and epistemologies.

Within the framework of this suggestion, I have demonstrated the process through which the legally, and therefore State-endorsed, cultural community of Goans was eventually fixed, through the enactment of the Official Language Act of Goa, around the *Antruzi* accented, and *Devanagari* scripted version of the Konkani language. This fixing is further enabled through the delineating of the markers of ideal citizen-subject of this community around the figure of the *Konkani munis* ideally embodied in the Hindu *Saraswat* Brahmin. The underscoring of the centrality of this version of the language, and its accompanying figure of the *Konkani munis* form the citizenship practices within the Goan polity. The citizenship acts within this polity are embodied through the challenge of the Roman script activists who seek to create legitimate space for themselves and their cultural productions. These activists argue that these productions, such as the *tiatr*, *cantar,* and the *romance*

have been unfairly relegated to the sidelines of the polity. This marginalization has been effected, not only by arguing that these productions have been rendered illegitimate through the non-recognition of the Roman script; but also dismissed by claiming that these productions have no "standard". In challenging the status quo that accepts *Antruzi* and *Nagari* as the defining markers of the Konkani cultural community, these actions constitute acts of citizenship.

This thesis has also argued that these acts of citizenship are not the only acts of citizenship in the history of the constitution of the Konkani language as a marker of Goan civil society. There have been other acts of citizenship that demonstrate that these acts are often concerned with a smaller, more definite group, rather than the entire polity the actors belong to. Thus for example, Konkani came to be accepted as the mother-tongue of all Goans thanks to the nineteenth century and early twentieth century acts of citizenship of two groups. In the first case, the act of the native Catholic elites of the Portuguese territory of Goa, who embraced an orientalist history that hailed them as inheritors of an ancient brahmanical civilisation. This claim was used to challenge metropolitan Portuguese control of the territory, even though it undermined their contemporary cultural existence. The second of these citizenship acts were those of the brahmin reformers, most notable among them the figure of Varde Valaulikar. These men sought to constitute a single *Saraswat* caste group from among a variety of related *jatis*, sought to carve Goa as the power-base of this brahmin group, and proposed Konkani as the brahmanical tongue of this caste. Understanding these citizenship acts of the past are necessary to understanding the manner in which the field of civil society in Goa is constituted, and the manner in which the space for new acts of citizenship are enabled. As I have demonstrated, neither of these acts of citizenship was primarily concerned with rights of other groups. On the contrary, these actions served to distinguish both these groups from other groups, whether elites, or subalterns.

In addition to making this argument, I also suggested that this regime of citizenship as fixing, and the challenge to this fixing, is effected not merely in the space constituted between citizens, whether imagined as groups or individuals, and the state, but across a scale of locations. These locations stretch from "above" the nation-state to include the sphere of international, to "below", and alongside the nation-state as well, including the structural places of the household and caste. This argument owes a debt of gratitude to the

field of legal pluralism. This field, of the sociology and anthropology of law, challenges the hegemony of the positivism that suggests that it is only the norms of the state that are law. Instead, it suggests that the norms of other social locations are equally critical to fixing the individual. These norms do not exist independently, but operate in varying degrees of co-operation, or inter-penetration with the norms of other social locations, including with that of the state. The state is undeniably a central location in the fixing of our legal condition. The creation of space, or room for manoeuvre, therefore, is also effected across a range of locations, and not merely within the structural space of the *citizenplace*, or what we often call civil society. In making this argument, I once again point to the nature of citizenship, as a relational condition.

Making this affirmation is necessary to challenge the positivist and legalist tradition of understanding citizenship. As such, I sought to demonstrate the manner in which the contemporary citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics were formed not merely within the delimited space and time of post-colonial Goa. Indeed, these experiences were formed in places as far afield and diverse as Belgium and Bombay; and as a result of the operation of the discourses of orientalism that have significantly impacted the manner in which colonialism was responded to, in which post-colonial nations were set up, and the national cultures for these nations established.

Critical to being able to appreciate this argument is the need for us to develop a more nuanced idea of colonizers and the colonized than the one that is currently dominant today. Rather than clubbing them together under the single label of "white" colonizers, I suggest recognising the differences in power between the British-colonizers and the Portuguese, the differences in their styles of operation, the relations between the two, and the implications that this had, and continues to have, in constituting the experiences of the colonised, and the formally decolonized. The subalternity of the Goan Catholics is crafted, I argued, by the fact that the early modern history that moulded them, was rendered redundant in the face of the late modern epistemologies that have drawn from hegemonic colonial practices of the British in particular. As a result, typical of the condition of subalterns, I suggested that the Goan Catholics lack the ability to be heard when they seek to represent themselves. Rather, their experiences were, and continue to be represented triply through the lens of the Portuguese, those of the British hegemon, and subsequently those of the British Indian, who inherit the gaze of their former British colonizers. Locked

within this maze of representational politics, a maze that twines and privileges the brahmanical and the orientalist, it is especially the lower-caste and the lower-class Goan Catholics who seem unable to articulate their claims in a manner in which they will be understood.

In the light of this complexity of colonial and post-colonial relations, I suggest that we ought to consider moving away from the binary dichotomies of elite and subaltern, to recognise that subalternity is, like citizenship, a relative condition. Most of us are subaltern in certain relations, and yet elites in others. We exist therefore, in chains, or webs of subalternity. Thus I pointed to the complex relationships that structure the field of citizenship in Goa. The Hindu brahmins who are today dominant were not so in the colonial past. The Catholic upper-castes who today align with the Hindu brahmins, are dominant only to the extent that they are junior partners in their relationship with the Nagari supporting *Saraswat* dominated Konkani language establishment. The lower-class and lower-caste Catholics may have achieved economic mobility thanks to their "westernized" ways that allow them to move across international boundaries in search of work, but they definitely lack space for political mobility.

In making this suggestion of chains or webs of subalternity, I have been quite significantly influenced by Ambedkar's suggestion of the experience of caste being that of graded inequality. Indeed, in continuing the challenge to a restricted understanding of citizenship, and emphasising that citizenship is crafted in a variety of social spaces that interface with that of the state, I gave attention to the operation of the caste system in impacting on the experience of citizenship. Constructed, and sustained through the operation of orientalist discourses, the Indian state privileges a brahmanised subject as the ideal citizen of the republic. It is the practices, and culture of this figure that defines the extent of nationalist modernity in the Indian polity. My argument is not that this is a uniform figure applicable throughout the extent of the Indian nation-state. On the contrary, the brahmanical merely sets the larger context that is subsequently filled in by the image of the local dominant and brahmanised groups. It is because of this larger national common-sense that it was possible for the local brahmanical figure of the *Saraswat* to get grounded in Goa as the *Konkani munis*.

I follow Chatterjee to suggest, that civil society is the closed association of those elite groups whose habitus is defined as nationalist modernity (Chatterjee 2007: 4). Those

groups that fail to embody the attributes of this brahmanised citizen-subject are relegated to the space of political society, which Chatterjee suggests is marked by a negative relationship with law and the rights regime. He suggests that these members of these population groups while *de jure* citizens, do not in fact enjoy the rights of citizens. In fact, they are but beneficiaries of concessions by the groups that occupy civil society. These concessions are characterised by the fact that they are not permanent gains like rights, but capable of being rolled back when the situation that necessitated granting these concessions has been resolved. In the course of fieldwork, as I struggled to understand how I could explain the citizenship experience of the Goan Catholics I was studying, I found the idea of political society that Chatterjee has developed extremely useful. Goan nationalist modernity is the habitus of its brahmanised, but especially its brahmanised Hindu groups. This habitus, as I have pointed out earlier, is guaranteed a permanent centrality through its recognition in law. The other groups, especially the lower-class and lower-caste Catholic, for their inability to embody these brahmanical selves, fall outside of the scope of this modernity, and have to endeavour to enter this space. Whether they are invited or not, depends entirely on the good humour of the dominant groups, or the quantum of the threat to the status quo. The moment this threat to the status quo disappears, or the situation stabilizes, these groups are cast out into political society once more. Thus, in the 1960s and in the 1980s, when the dominant castes in Goa were being threatened and required mass support to ensure that their continued hegemony, the Cathlic lower-caste groups were welcomed into the space of civil society, a welcome that turned into rejection at the very moment of the recognition of Konkani as the official language of the state of Goa.

What also needs to be stressed is that when invited into civil society, members of political society are invariably invited inside as individuals, rather than as communities. Indeed, as was demonstrated, it was the ability of these individuals to break out of their natal habitus, and thus undermining its value, that enabled them to be invited into civil society.

Once again, however, I argue against taking the binary too literally, but make a plea to recognise these locations as ideal types, from which to understand the experience of citizenship. I made this argument primarily based on the circumstances of the activists whose actions I was studying, given that even those who were located within the sphere of civil society, demonstrated many a time experiences that could well place them in political

society. Thus, while some of the Roman script activists were used to operating through strategies of civil society, they realised that in this particular case, their position was really that located in political society. Similarly, those who today defend the Devanagari script, and are located in civil society, were not only formerly located in political society, but also continue to conduct business within their associations in a manner quite contrary to the processes of law. The experience of these individuals within civil society organisations can at times be akin to those in political society. This situation only goes to underline my argument that we live within a chain of subalternities, a condition that is pluri-relational, which is why it is possible for our experiences to flit between that of civil society and political society.

Indeed, it is because I have proposed a scale of experiences, and challenged the binaries that dominate the field, that I have been able to achieve the nuance I think that I bring to discussions on citizenship in Goa. Thus while I have argued that the experience of the Goan Catholics is the experience of political society, I have also sought to complicate this assertion by rupturing the dominant tendency to present the Goan Catholics as constituting a single monolithic community. Responding to this tendency, I have endeavoured to demonstrate how, even though they may share similar inconveniences when citizenship is determined by brahamnical norms, this community is fractured by caste and class.

It was perhaps an attentiveness to the role that caste plays in moulding the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics that made me aware of the narratives of the experience of shame and the claims of humiliation that were experienced. While I was particularly attentive to the arguments of shame and humiliation by the Roman script activists, as a result of proposing that subalternity be understood as constituted within webs of relationships, I was also able to demonstrate the manner in which the operation of multiple discourses ensured that even those who now constitute civil society in Goa experienced shame. Indeed, it was their experience of shame, and their claim of humiliation, that ensured that they ruptured the earlier habitus and affirmed the centrality of a particular version of Konkani to providing the definition of nationalist modernity, and the limits of civil society in Goa.

The argument that this thesis makes is to take seriously the implications of embodiment. If citizenship is about attempting to embody the figure of the ideal citizen-subject, then citizenship is not constituted merely by disembodied practices and acts; but effected

through the deployment of a feeling body. In making my argument about the shame associated with citizenship in Goa, I focus attention on the argument that it is the *Saraswat* brahmin that embodies the *Konkani munis*. The abstract figure of the citizen is thus concretely embodied in a discrete set of dispositions and practices. Thus it is not merely the ability to speak like, or look like the *Saraswat* that is necessary, but eventually, and this is what separates civil society from political society in the sense of an ideal type, but being a *Saraswat*. Given the manner that the citizenship experience is so intertwined with caste location then, I have suggested that the experience of the Goan Catholic in political society is also the experience of untouchability. The refusal to allow the habitus of the lower-caste and lower-caste Catholic to impress upon the figure of the *Konkani munis*, I have argued, is in fact a refusal to touch their body. I have unfortunately not been able to expand on this argument, but this argument definitely deserves fuller discussion in a separate work sometime later.

Before I conclude, I would like to draw attention to the fact that this thesis has very consciously attempted to be a contribution to the slowly growing field of comparative colonialism/ post-colonialism with the Indo-Portuguese as its primary term of reference. In struggling to articulate itself, this field has not surprisingly often fallen into articulating the Portuguese mode of colonialism as a binary other to the British. This tendency is perhaps visible in Santos' (2002) articulations in what has been for me personally, a seminal essay in understanding the realm of the Indo-Portuguese. As useful as this form of stylizing may be theoretically, we should beware of such tendencies for rather than push us away from the tropes of the Portuguese colonial world, such as Lusotropicalism, they may just as surely draw us back.

Cautioning us against this tendency are Bastos's reflection in the field where she suggests that the problem lies less in Goa's, or for that matter Portuguese colonial exceptionalism, and more in the "implicit reference to a model of a colonialism largely inspired by a depiction of a homogeneous Raj with a clear opposition between colonizers and colonized" (Bastos 2009). Her recommendation is a movement away from static representations of the colonial space, and the adoption of greater nuance in recognising that we are dealing with heterogeneous spaces. If we do this she argues, then, the point will no longer be about "the contrast between one form of administration and another or about

the difference between the British way of implementing medicine and hygiene as a means of control and the Portuguese way of not doing so efficiently." Rather,

> [t]he fact is that nineteenth-century Goa, despite being administered by the Portuguese, was one region of India, like the several other regions across the subcontinent. Once we understand better the variety of what went on at ground level, we may see more clearly the actual unfolding plots in Goa as part of that diversity. After we refocus on local agency and local plots, colonial governance can be interpreted as a fraction of a broader context of multiple coexisting projects and actions that interacted with one another in different modes, and often through misunderstandings. (Bastos 2009: 161)

Similarly, in her own work that engages with the larger field of scholarship on India even as she works on Goa and Gujarat, Perez has cautioned against the seductive appeal of the binary (Perez 2009; 2012).

The seductive appeal that Perez points to is not merely that of the Indo-Portuguese however, but that embedded in the field of British Indian studies.[182] It is for these reasons that I have looked for a way to integrate the plural within this study, rather than restrict myself to the binaries that populate so much of social science and post-colonial theory. Another way in which I have attempted to challenge this tendency toward creating a new dichotomy is to use tropes that mark the post-colonial study of British India, but inflect this study with the experience from Portuguese India, in this case, that of Goa and the citizenship experiences of the Goan Catholics. In doing so, I believe I have been able to open up useful space in the study both of Goa, and comparative post-colonialism. I have for example, been able to craft a third position from where we look at Indian citizenship, restricting the dialogue not merely between the beleaguered minority and the Hindu majority, but able to integrate multiple points of view. Thus, the figure of the Muslim appears in this thesis, as do insights from scholars engaged with Dalit experiences and struggles. Also, rather than create an isolated universe of the Indo-Portuguese, this thesis has stressed the interpenetrations between the Portuguese and the British, the Indo-Portuguese and the British Indian. I believe that eventually it will be the study of these interpenetrations that will allow us to capture the dynamism and the complexity of these fields that we seek to study.

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[182] A similar argument is made by Rodrigues (2009) who suggests the caste and class locations of the scholars who have been at the forefront of generated post-colonial theory has been critical to producing the binaries between a single Europe, against a single India, and the undifferentiated Colonizers versus the colonized.

Glossary

Adivasi	Translated literally, the term means early inhabitants, and is the preferred term of reference by the animist groups in India that claim indigenous or aboriginal status.
Ajlaf	An Arabic word that denotes the second tier within the three-fold caste divisions among South Asian Muslims. This category contains those Muslim *jatis* that do not claim an ancestry outside South Asia, and are assumed to be drawn from local lower castes (*jatis*).
Antruzi	One of the many dialects of the Konkani language, this dialect gains its name from the former *Antruz Mahal* territory that today corresponds to areas within the jurisdiction of Ponda *taluka* in Goa. The dialect is associated with the *Saraswat* Brahmin caste.
Arzal	An Arabic world that denotes the lowest tier in the three-fold *varna* divisions among South Asian Muslims; the *jatis* within this group are treated as untouchable.
Ashraf	The plural of the Arabic word *Shareef* that means "noble", it denotes the first of the three-tier *varna* divisions among the South Asian Muslims. *Jatis* within this caste group claim descent from groups not native to South Asia, namely Arabs, Turks, Afghans and Central Asians.
Asmitai (Asmita)	Pride, a word that is particularly significant for its adoption in propaganda by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Hindu right wing political party, both in Gujarat as well as in Goa.
Bahujan Samaj	Translating literally into the "society of the many", the term is used to signify the lower caste that are not dalit. This

would mean the castes traditionally seen as Shudra, and who would today be categorised under the constitutional schemes as backward castes.

Bammon (bamon)   The Konkani form of brahmin.

Bardezi   One of the many dialects of the Konkani language, this dialect gains its name from the region of Bardez. The dialect is marked by variations based on the speakers, caste, religion, and, gender.

Bharath Mata   Mother India.

Bhasha   Language.

Bhatcar   Konkani term for landlord; literally, the owner of a *bhat* (orchard).

British Raj   Was the extent of the British crown's possessions in the subcontinent of South Asia. This territory included the Princely States that were administered indirectly by the British through native princes, and the various provinces of British India, these latter territories being directly under British administration.

Cantaram   The plural of *Cant*, or song in Konkani, especially as spoken among Goan Catholics. The term specifically refers to the songs sung between the various acts in a *tiatr*.

Chardo   A Catholic dominant caste in Goa that has had a history of confrontation with the Catholic Brahmin caste.

Comunidade   Portuguese term for the village governments that were set up after the conquest of Goa in 1510 by the Portuguese crown. These governments were based on a translation of existing institutions known as *gãocarias*.

Confraria	Confraternity; caste-specific associations within a parish that held certain rights to either the celebration of feasts, or roles within the ritual life of the parish church.
Dalit	Broken; the term has been adopted by politically mobilized untouchable groups.
Devadasi	Emerging from the Sanskrit words for deity (*deva*) and servant (*dasi*), *devadasis* were girls and women who were dedicated to a deity, and in this capacity offered a variety of services to the temple. The operation of colonial era politics has resulted in a problematic commonsense understanding of the women in this community being sexually available to brahmin, or dominant caste men, either as keeps, or as prostitutes.
Devanagari	A script that has come to be associated with languages such as Hindi, Marathi.
Dindi	Normally a religious procession associated with the cult of the Hindu diety Panduranga, located in Maharashtra. These processions, normally involve flags, cymbals, trumpets, the singing of devotional songs, and a figure of the deity.
Dominant Caste	A concept in the sociological and anthropological study of South Asia to describe a *jati* that either preponderates over other *jati* in the village, and/or holds the most economic and political power over the other groups.
Estado da Índia Portuguesa	"State of Portuguese India", that included the territories of Goa, Daman, and Diu.
Estado Novo	"New State", an institutional form of the Portuguese state which commencing in 1933 replaced the First Republic, and was dominated by the figure of António de Oliveira Salazar.
Fabrica	The institution that owns the moveable and immovable property of the church or chapel that it is associated with.

Gãocar	A member of the *comunidade* or *gãocaria*. Such a person had to be male, and claimed descent from the original founder of the village, and as such was a member of the dominant caste in the village.
Gaudo	A member of the *Gaudde* caste, that are today recognized as members of a tribal group.
Gomantak	a vernacular term for Goa.
Gram Sabha	The general body of all voters within a village (*gram*) *panchayat* area.
Jati	While normally translated as caste, I prefer to use caste as a translation for the term *varna*. *Varna* would refer to a term like Brahmin, or *Ashraf*, that can contain a variety of groups that claim this Brahmin or *Ashraf* status, each of these groups, are *jati*, which literally means "birth".
Kalavanti	Literally translated the term can be understood as a person cultivated in *kala* (art), the term was used to denote those persons and their offspring, who rendered services of music and dance in the temples in Goa. As with *devadasis* women from this group also took on male (often brahmin) patrons.
Kendr	Sanskritic term for institutional centre.
Konkani munis	Konkani Person. *Munis* would translate to human, or person.
Kshatriya	Traditionally seen as the *varna* below the brahmins, this *varna* claims the status of warriors and princes.
Luso-descendente	One of the social groups in colonial Goa, they operated as a caste, and claimed descent from the mixed marriages between Portuguese men and native women, subsequent to Afonso de Albuquerque's policy that encouraged these marriages.

Lusotropicalism	A term first coined by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freire to describe the features of Portuguese colonialism, that was reportedly unmarked by racial biases.
Mandal	Sanskritic term to denote group, or agglomeration.
Mando	A Goan music and dance form that took distinctive shape in the homes of the landlords of the Salcette region of Goa, and is today seen as a distinctive feature of Goan and Catholic society.
Maratha	In the context used in this thesis, the term refers to a caste primarily located in the state of Maharashtra, that claims *kshatriya* status, and was marked by a robust anti-brahmin movement.
Morcha	A protest demonstration involving a procession.
Mundcar	Tenant, especially to a *Bhatcar*.
Munis	Konkani word for human or person.
Novas Conquistas	The collective term for the latter acquisitions of the *Estado da Índia* around the island of Goa after the initial conquests in the 16th century. This territory consisted on the current *talukas* of Pernem, Bicholim, Satari, Ponda (or Antruz), Sanguem, Quepem, and Canacona.
Opinion Poll	The expression refers to the option presented to persons resident within the territory of Goa in 1967, as to whether they would like to maintain a separate administrative status, or be merged with the adjoining sate of Maharashtra. The Poll was a significant moment in the history of the territory of Goa.
Panchayat	The name for the lowest tier of governance in India, being the level below that of the State government. This system commences with each village, or a group of small villages

being constituted into a *gram panchayat* area, and subsequently rises up to the district or *zilla* level. The office-bearers of the *panchayat* are the *sarpanch*, who is the head of all the *panch* (literally "five"), all of these being persons elected as representatives from each ward of the *panchayat* area.

Rajput	A *jati* across much of North India that claims *Kshatriya* status.
Romance	Term for novels written in Roman script Konkani.
Romi	Roman in Konkani.
Samaj	While translated into society, the term is very often used to denote a *jati;* for example, *Gaud Saraswat Samaj*, *Gomantak Maratha Samaj*.
Sanskritisation	A term popularized by the sociologist M. N. Srinivas to denote a process where lower castes seek upward mobility by adopting practices and rituals of brahmanised upper, or dominant castes.
Saraswat	The name for the dominant *jati* in Goa, that claims brahmin status, and whose more formal name is *Gaud Saraswat* Brahmin.
Sudir	Konkani form of the word *Shudra*, the fourth *varna* in the four-fold division of the *varna* social system in South Asia.
Taluka	A sub-division of a district.
Tiatr	A Konkani theatre form.
Vande Mataram	Sanskrit formulation for "Hail Mother", a nationalist slogan in India which has profound Hindu nationalist symbolism.
Varna	While normally translated as caste, to effect a distinction between *varna* and *jati*, I use *varna* in the sense of the broad

groups that various *jati* could cluster under. Thus Brahmin, *Kshatriya*, *Vaishya*, Shudra, Ashraf, Ajlaf, Arzal are all *varna* that contain various *jati* that claim the status associated with each *varna*.

Velhas Conquistas	The initial acquisitions of the *Estado da Índia* around the island of Goa in the 16th century. This territory consisted of the current *talukas* of Ilhas de Goa (or Tiswadi), Bardez, Mormugao and Salcette.
Xri	The Roman script spelling of the term *shri*; which is an abbreviation of the Sanskritic term *shriman* meaning respected man. This term is adopted by the Indian state to signify what "Mr." normally would.

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