State and Societal Challenges in the Horn of Africa
Conflict and processes of state formation, reconfiguration and disintegration

Alexandra Magnólia Dias (Ed.)

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## CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION:** UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND PROCESSES OF STATE FORMATION, RECONFIGURATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA  
ALEXANDRA MAGNÓLIA DIAS  
3

**FROM BELEAGUERED FORTRESSES TO BELLIGERENT CITIES**  
MANUEL JOÃO RAMOS  
14

**THE SECURITY ISSUES BEHIND THE ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA (2006-2009)**  
ELSA GONZÁLEZ AIMÉ  
32

**SECURITY STAKES AND CHALLENGES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**  
PATRICK FERRAS  
48

**AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA) SUBSIDIARITY AND THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)**  
RICARDO REAL P. DE SOUSA  
59

**SOMALIA AS A MARKET FOR PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES: DEFINITIONS, AGENTS AND SERVICES**  
PEDRO BARGE CUNHA  
78

**INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA (2006-2013): YET ANOTHER EXTERNAL STATE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT?**  
ALEXANDRA MAGNÓLIA DIAS  
90

**THE LEGACY OF POWER SHARING IN KENYA: LITERATURE CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH AGENDA’S INVISIBILITIES**  
ALEXANDRE DE SOUSA CARVALHO  
108

**STILL CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: NUBA POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND FAILURE OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT IN SUDAN**  
ALEKSI YLÖNEN  
126

**RESOURCE-BASED CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN AND GAMBELLA (ETHIOPIA): WHEN WATER, LAND AND OIL MIX WITH POLITICS**  
ANA ELISA CASCAO  
143

**AUTHORS’ BIO & ABSTRACTS**  
166
INTRODUCTION:
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND PROCESSES OF STATE FORMATION, RECONFIGURATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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Since the end of the colonial period, the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan) has been affected by a large number of inter-state and civil wars (Woodward, 1996). Uganda is part of the region’s security dynamics and a member of its organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.

In contrast with West and Southern Africa, the ill-defined nature of the borders in the Horn of Africa has led to two high-intensity inter-state wars, namely the 1977-1978 war between Somalia and Ethiopia and the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and inter-state disputes between Djibouti and Eritrea, Eritrea and Yemen and more recently between Sudan and South Sudan (Jacquin-Berdal, 2002; Kornprobst, 2002).

Wars and famines have triggered major displacement within countries and across borders, making the Horn one of the main regions generating refugees and internally displaced persons. By the end of 2007 the region hosted 815,200 refugees and in 2012 the total was 1,266,375 (Lomo, 2006; UNHCR, 2012). Specific border areas such as the Sudan-Ethiopia, Sudan-Uganda and Somalia-Ethiopia borders have been in an ‘intermittent state of crisis’ with movements of refugees back and forth for the last 40 years (Clapham, 1996).

Environmental factors have affected groups in different areas and countries, leading to food crises associated with recurrent droughts, floods and crop pests (Thrupp and Megateli, 1999) but also with the politicization of these crises and the related relief, and with conflicts and displacement (Markakis, 1998).

Furthermore, the movements of pastoral groups within and across borders in their search for water and grazing land are paramount to understanding the regional political arena (Catley, et al., 2013). The Horn of Africa states rank among the top 10 worldwide in terms of size of pastoralist population. Sudan comes first, Somalia third, Ethiopia fifth and Kenya sixth (Lomo, 2006).
The region’s security dynamics

In the post-World War II and Cold War periods, external interventions further exacerbated the region’s pattern of power and of politics, where the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ and alliances kept shifting in the regional political arena (Keller, 1997). In the post-Cold War period the combined policies and interventions within the domestic, regional and global political arenas to avoid the recurrence of war in the Horn of Africa have led to divergent outcomes (Woodward, 1996). This tends to demonstrate that the nation-state model promoted during the post-colonial and Cold War periods, with its ideology of national political and cultural unity and economic homogeneity, has not brought the expected results of stability and peace in the region.

The past and current pitfalls in terms of the distribution of power and economic benefits have created tensions (Markakis, 1998). These are mainly linked to governments’ failure to acknowledge and accommodate demands for reform and change (Clapham, 2007; Compagnon, 1998; Young, 1997). Central powers’ failure to address existing complex and fragile livelihoods in the design and implementation of political, development and social engineering projects is left unaccountable. These factors, coupled with the state’s inability to extend its institutions and agents to the periphery, have resulted in the proliferation of insurgent movements driven by a diversity of aims, including secession (Clapham, 2007). The recurrence of conflict and the state’s lack of monopoly of the means of coercion have resulted in the proliferation of weaponry in this region (Kiflemariam Gebrewold and Byrne, 2006). Indeed, these tensions have often led to local conflicts of various intensities and multiple dimensions.

These tensions have also led to inter-state wars often justified in terms of respect for sovereignty or security of the nation-state. Moreover, conflicts of internal origin in the Horn of Africa have spill-over effects beyond the national administrative borders resulting in the regionalization of conflicts (Cliffe, 1999).

These historical, ideological, political, economic, territorial and environmental factors have created tensions between states resulting in enmity, rivalry and mutual suspicion. This rivalry is played out in the regional political arena resulting in cross-border support for specific insurgent movements involved in local conflicts against the rival state (Abbink, 2003).

These interferences in each other’s internal affairs contribute to the formation and escalation of conflicts within one state and between states and ultimately lead to destabilization in neighbouring states (Cliffe, 1999; Keller, 1997).

Due to the aforementioned features of the regional political arena, the dynamics of violence need to be examined at regional level.

Finally, these factors have a common denominator: their association with the particular trajectories of state formation in the region. Indeed these trajectories show that tensions exist between the logic of building states and that of ensuring that war will not recur (Call and Wyeth, 2008). This brings us to
the definition of the book’s central issue and its key contribution to the debates on the process of state formation and the analysis of the factors that exacerbate trends towards reconfiguration, consolidation or, in contrast, disintegration of the region’s states. Finally, the book engages with the debates around external state reconstruction projects in Africa and specifically in the Horn of Africa.

**War and state formation: the law of limited return**

“If protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war-making and state-making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy - qualify as our largest examples of organized crime. Without branding all generals and statesmen as murderers or thieves, I want to encourage the value of that analogy […]. A portrait of war-makers and state-makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives […].

To the extent that the threats against which a government protects its citizens are imaginary, or are the consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. Since governments themselves simulate, stimulate and even fabricate threats of external war, and since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest threats to their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same way as racketeers. There is, of course, a difference: racketeers, by conventional definition, operate without the sanctity of governments.” (Tilly, 1985: 169-171)

The key research question of this book is how to relate the process of state formation to war and armed conflict in the Horn of Africa.

Several studies relate this process in the Horn of Africa to the recurrence of conflict (Clapham, 2003; Jacquin-Berdal, 2002). These studies concede that war-making leads to state-making in some cases (Eritrea and the three-decade war for independence) (Iyob, 1993; Pool, 2001). However, with the recurrence of conflicts the law of limited return of war-making in relation to state consolidation prevails (Jacquin-Berdal, 2002; Reid, 2005). Indeed the wars in the Horn of Africa seem to have led to more cases of state disintegration (and ultimate collapse) than state consolidation (Clapham, 2003).

The book seeks to understand how the processes of state formation, disintegration and reconfiguration explain the recurrence of conflict in the region. In doing so it explores the tensions between state and peace consolidation in order to identify the key factors, actors and moments of crisis that magnify this tension and lead to the escalation of conflicts.

The states’ trajectories in the region show that outcomes seem to diverge in the relationship between state and war. Indeed, in some instances, war has led to: a) state formation/creation (two cases in point are Eritrea during the war for independence and Southern Sudan until it became South Sudan); b) to state disintegration (Somalia after the fall of Siyad Barre); c) state weakening, a case in point being the relapse into conflict by Eritrea and Ethiopia during the 1998-2000 border war which compromised the state- and nation-building projects of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front/ People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (EPLF/PFDJ) in Eritrea, and finally the relapse into conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.
in contested areas along the international border; and d) to state reconfiguration, a case in point being the civil war against the Derg that allowed the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front/Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (TPLF/EPRDF) to implement an ethnic-based federal model in Ethiopia in clear rupture with past political statebuilding projects.

State and society relations are paramount to understanding the divergent outcomes in the relationship between state-making and war-making in the region. Indeed, bearing these elements in mind an analysis of the relationship between conflict and the state-formation process seems to confirm the law of limited return. Up to a certain extent, war-making can lead to state-making and/or creation and reconfiguration, but relapse into conflict may lead to the opposite outcome, thereby contributing to weakening and ultimately disintegration of the state.

The Horn of Africa’s changing map and boundaries

In the post-Cold War era, the reconfiguration of Ethiopia and Sudan and the creation of two new states – Eritrea (24 May 1993) and South Sudan (9 July 2011) – reconfigured the Horn of Africa’s state borders and created the need for newly landlocked states (Ethiopia and South Sudan) to consider alternative routes to the sea. Eritrea had been an Italian colony (1890-1941), hence its claim to a separate trajectory as a sovereign state. The legitimacy of its claim to self-determination was based on its past as a colony. In the aftermath of World War II and of the defeat of the Italian forces in the region, Eritrea was under a transitory British Military Administration (1941-1952) up to the controversial international decision to grant Eritrea autonomy within a federation with Ethiopia (1952-1962). The federation was abrogated in 1962 and Eritrea was incorporated as the 14th Province of the Ethiopian Empire. This decision resulted in a three-decade war for independence in Eritrea and it was only reversed in 1991 in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Derg by the combined EPLF and the TPLF forces. Eritrea finally became independent on 24 May 1993, after a referendum.

The creation of a new state (Eritrea) in a volatile, conflict-prone region posed specific challenges to contiguous neighbouring states. The key lesson to be learned from Eritrea’s creation and subsequent foreign policy towards the region is the need to pay particular attention to border delimitation and demarcation at the time a state is created and recognized. This aspect acquires particular significance in mitigating and eliminating potential tensions arising out of border disputes. As the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea confirmed, once established, borders can only be changed at great cost and this border remains a barrier between peoples (Dias, 2008: 222; Clapham, 2010: 187). The boundary disputes between Sudan and South Sudan further confirm that borders are not mere lines on maps, they are an inescapable fact of borderlanders’ daily lives and attempts at changing those borders have been rare (Clapham, 1996; 2010:195; Jacquin-Berdal, 2002: 219).
Table 1: Horn of Africa’s contiguous neighbours and their shared borders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Contiguous neighbouring countries and length of shared boundaries between dyads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Djibouti (113 km)/Eritrea (113 km)/Ethiopia (337 km)/Somalia (58 km)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Djibouti (113 km)/Ethiopia (912 km)/Sudan (605 km)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Djibouti (337 km)/Eritrea (912 km)/Kenya (830 km)/Somalia (1,626 km)/South Sudan (606 km)/Sudan (1,000 km)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Ethiopia (830 km)/Somalia (682 km)/South Sudan (232 km)/Uganda (933 km)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Djibouti (58 km)/Ethiopia (1,626 km)/Kenya (682 km)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Ethiopia (1000 km)/Kenya (232 km)/Sudan (2000 km)/Uganda (435 km)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Eritrea (605 km)/Ethiopia (606 km)/South Sudan (2000 km)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Kenya (933 km)/South Sudan (435 km)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As above the table shows, after the end of the Cold War and despite significant changes in the region’s map, Ethiopia is still the country that shares the most international borders with other Horn of Africa countries (6), followed by Kenya and South Sudan (4). Although the region lacks a clear hegemon, what happens in the majority of the Horn of Africa’s countries is very important to Ethiopia. In addition, due to the interconnectedness of conflict and the region’s security dynamics, each country’s domestic politics are intertwined with the regional political arena.

Contemporary debates: key questions and events

Underlying the book are five assumptions. First, politics and conflict in the Horn of Africa need to be understood simultaneously in the domestic, regional and global political arenas. Second in order to understand present-day conflicts we need to look into the archaeology of conflicts in their relation to the particular states’ trajectories. Third, the existing literature on weak and failed states overlooks how these states undergo processes of reconfiguration (Doornbos, 2006) and how regional actors mobilize local and global agendas in order to pursue their own aims in the domestic and regional arenas. Fourth, the study of local actors highlights their agency as they compete with other actors for control of critical local resources. Fifth the recurrence of conflict in the domestic and regional political arenas hampers accommodation of different groups’ demands and perpetuates the reproduction of the practice of resorting to armed force to negotiate political space and obtain control of the state (Kaiser and Okumu, 2004).

Since World War II, the Horn of Africa has been characterized by a shifting pattern of alliance formation forged against the backdrop of external involvement in the region, which has tended to
exacerbate the region’s conflicts. However, external involvement has not reduced the agency of the states in the region.

What distances the Horn of Africa from other regions in Africa is the region’s geo-strategic location. The Horn of Africa is a bridge between Africa and the Middle East and its nearness to a strategic “chokepoint”, Strait Bab el Mandab, has made the region more prone to external involvement than others in Africa.

US policy towards Africa has tended to be more reactive than proactive (Schraeder, 1993: 190). The events have overridden planning and have shaped policy approaches towards the region rather than the other way round. If this holds true for most of African countries, in the Horn it becomes more salient when bearing in mind key events that have had as their outcome the reinforcement of a shifting pattern of alliances.

Six key events have influenced the greatest changes. During the Cold War, the first one was the 1977-78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia. At this critical juncture the US fell short of losing an anchor state in the region. When Mengistu failed to obtain military support from Washington, following the logic of superpower rivalry, Ethiopia turned its back on the US and successfully sought an alternative external patron in Moscow. In reaction to this major shift the US provided support for Siyad Barre’s Somalia. During this period the US sustained its involvement through support for the Khartoum, Nairobi and Mogadishu axis and for non-state actors that shared the common aim of overthrowing the Derg regime in Ethiopia. In this period, US strategy was to encircle a state, Ethiopia, by forging alliance with contiguous neighbouring countries (Sudan, Kenya) and supporting non-state actors opposing the Derg (EPLF, TPLF/ EPRDF and, in the end, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The aim was to contain the expansion of communism in the region.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the second event was brought together under the promising banner of providing support for a new breed of African leaders, the so-called African Renaissance leaders, former guerrillas turned state builders. During this period the US sustained its involvement by supporting the Asmara, Addis Abeba and Kampala axis, personified in the promising leaders Isaias Afewerki (Eritrea), the late Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia) and Yoweri Museveni (Uganda). At this critical juncture, US strategy was to encircle a state, Sudan, by forging alliances with neighbouring countries that shared the common goal of containing the expansion of militant nationalism in the region, as embodied in the National Islamic Front’s (NIF) rise to power in Sudan in 1989. As a result, relations between the US and Sudan deteriorated, culminating in the placement of Sudan in the US list of states harbouring terrorists in 1993 and the shutdown of the US embassy in Khartoum in 1996 (Iyob and Keller, 2006: 107).

1998 was a turning-point year. First the unexpected escalation of a border incident into a full-scale war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998 made the post-Cold War Addis-Asmara-Kampala axis falter. Secondly, and perhaps more significant in terms of US foreign policy towards the region, the
bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam placed the Horn of Africa, and Somalia in particular, on Washington’s radar. The perpetrators of the attack were said to be part of Al Qaeda’s Eastern Africa cell and Somalia was used as a transit point.

2001 marked a critical rupture from past trends of US involvement in the region. After 9/11, these states have been widely considered in international relations owing to their strategic location and natural-resources, their role in the Global War on Terror and the potential for Islamic radicalisation in the region. At the time, the US Administration even considered approving military action in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2004: 68). Quite significantly, since 2003 the US has set up its sole military base in Africa in Djibouti: the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa (CJTF/HOA).

2006 was another critical year marked by the rise and fall of the militant Islamist movement in Somalia, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), due to Ethiopia’s forceful intervention in Somalia and the creation of the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which provided critical support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The US air campaigns in Somalia tied it up to Ethiopia’s approach. In October 2008, Al-shabaab’s attacks in Hargeisa (Somaliland) and Bossaso (Puntland) confirmed the presence of mujahideen in Somalia, including a US citizen from Minnesota who was of Somali origin. The end of the World Cup in July 2010 was marked by al-shabaab’s first attacks outside Somalia in Uganda’s capital, Kampala.

Finally, 2011 witnessed the creation and recognition of the youngest state in Africa, South Sudan, and the worst drought in the region in August 2011, which resulted in a massive inflow of refugees from Somalia to neighbouring countries.

Reflecting in part US cycles of engagement and disengagement in the Horn of Africa and China’s growing interest and engagement in the region, particularly in Sudan and South Sudan, analysis from an international relations standpoint has often taken a reductionist approach to the region, considering these states mere secondary actors on a chessboard where the rivalry between superpowers and/or rising powers (Clapham, 2009) is the decisive factor in understanding the region’s security dynamics.

In stark contrast to these approaches, the contributors in this book explore the international and domestic politics of the Horn of Africa “from within”. In particular, interplays between domestic politics and external relations, intra-regional affairs and the impact of international events on the region are their key focus. The aim of the book is therefore to enhance knowledge on the Horn of Africa from a regional perspective, grounded on secondary and primary empirical evidence.

Given these challenges, the questions we asked our contributors at the outset included:

1. What is the relationship between the region’s states’ trajectories and the recurrence of conflict?
2. Which are the historical, economic, political, territorial and environmental factors that have led to the recurrence of conflict in the Horn of Africa?
3. What role have international interventions played in the dynamics of conflict in the Horn of Africa?

4. How does the recurrence of conflict in the domestic and regional political arenas relate to pre and/or post-electoral violence?

The book's contributors used both qualitative and quantitative methods that included in-depth case-studies of a range of perceptions and representations of both local and international actors on the recurrence of conflicts, collection of documents and archival research, participant observation, a questionnaire complemented by observation and semi-structured interviews.

**Overview of the book**

Ethiopia stands out in this book as the region's potential hegemon, its guarantor of stability and order and a strong, consolidated state. However, the authors converge in bringing to our attention key changes on the domestic front and in relations between state and society within Ethiopia that place it in an uncertain predicament. Indeed, the chapters by Manuel João Ramos, Elsa González Aimé and Ana Elisa Cascão focus on Ethiopia, bearing in mind the intertwining between domestic and regional politics. In chapter 1 Ramos reflects on the domestic and regional cleavage between Muslims and Christians. He argues that this cleavage is key to understanding Ethiopia's containment policies towards the expansion of political Islam in the region and the federal and local authorities' internal containment policies towards Muslim Ethiopian citizens. Still focusing on the relationship between state and political Islam, in Chapter 2 Elsa González Aimé analyses Ethiopia's forceful intervention in Somalia from a critical security studies perspective. She argues that this intervention was the product of a securitisation move with domestic, regional and broader international aims. It was intended to secure the Ethiopian state and to reshape the image and political project of the Ethiopian People's Democratic and Revolutionary Front both domestically and internationally, after the generalised criticism in 2005 of the incumbent party’s conduct after the elections. With regard to the connection between Ethiopia and US policies in Somalia, the author draws our attention to the need to introduce an element of caution in our analysis. She argues that the link was not clear and was indeed avoided. Chapter 2’s key contribution is to offer an analysis on Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in relation to its own socio-political domestic context.

Patrick Ferras and Ricardo Real P. Sousa centre their analysis of the region in light of the potential and limitations of the new African Peace and Security Architecture. Pedro Barge Cunha focuses on the role of non-state actors in the region and more specifically on the role of private military and security companies in Somalia. Alexandra M. Dias’ chapter focuses on the state reconstruction project in Somalia since Ethiopia’s intervention in 2006 and more specifically in the post-transition period. Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho moves our attention further south and reflects critically upon the formula that recommends power-sharing agreements as the best means to overcome electoral violence and avoid the
relapse into conflict in light of Kenya’s elections in December 2007 and March 2013. Finally, Aleksi Ylönen and Ana Elisa Cascão focus their studies on previously peripheral areas that have become key borderlands since the creation of South Sudan. Ylönen does so in relation to South Sudan’s predecessor (Sudan) and Cascão advances our understanding of South Sudan and Ethiopia’s political approaches to access to and distribution and allocation of critical natural resources in peripheral areas in South Sudan and Ethiopia’s Gambella region. She challenges our conventional understanding of the central role of oil as a cause of conflict. She puts forward the argument that both land and water have been overlooked in conflict analysis in the two case studies, highlighting that these factors should stand as additional natural resources to be considered in a complex puzzle of conflicts.

Taken together, these essays shed light on the relationship between conflict and the trajectories of the region’s states and contribute to our understanding of state formation processes in non-western regions and of the pitfalls of external state’s reconstruction projects. In fact, the case studies show that in contrast to the European experience the outcome of war should be analysed on a case-by-case basis. In some instances war further weakens the state rather than consolidating it, as in European state’s formation experience. The focus on the trajectories of the state and the relationship between state and society on a case-by-case basis offers a unique vantage point in understanding the international implications of each country’s domestic trajectories in the state formation process.

Students of the Horn of Africa’s politics, whatever their theoretical starting point, must therefore accommodate the fast-evolving nature of state-society relations in states at the crossroads of regional and global dynamics. The Horn’s strategic location brought it back into the limelight of the international political agenda with the issues of terrorism and piracy at the forefront. However the most fascinating and challenging dynamics are still taking place in the domestic and regional fields.

**Bibliography**


The mainstream and until recently unchallenged view of the history of Christian-Muslim relations in the Horn of Africa has depended on a simplistic narrative stating that the Christian Kingdom that ruled the Ethiopian Highlands claiming its legitimacy as heir to the ancient Aksumite civilization has long stood as a “beleaguered Christian fortress in the midst of a sea of Islam”, eternally surrounded by prowling Muslim enemies, as King Haile Selassie once put it in a speech before the United States Congress (Markakis, 2003: 2).  

Ethiopian contacts with Western European nations since the late medieval period have been recurrently interpreted on the basis of this grounding divisive ideological discourse in which Christian rulers were regularly depicted (and actually frequently depicted themselves) as needing allies in European powers in a millenary religious war, defensively perched in the natural bastion of the mountainous Ethiopian Highlands. This long narrative thread is strongly defining in the political historiography of Ethiopia and its regional relations and one that has tended to legitimate aggressive action by Ethiopian Orthodox Christians against the bordering Muslim sultanates and, after the late nineteenth century Southern expansion under King Menelik II, against Ethiopia’s Muslim populations. It is also enmeshed in the more recent “containment policies” that the Ethiopian government has been following regionally (Desplat and Østebø, 2012, 16; see also Erlich, 2012, and Hansen, 2012, in the same volume).

So popularized is this historiographic view that, in international relations speak, the geo-strategic configurations of the Horn of Africa and Middle East generally revolve around this divide to produce functional interpretations of Ethiopian diplomatic and military involvement in regional affairs and even beyond. From the Thewodros crusading offers to Imperial Britain to the Korean war and, more recently, symbolic participation in the US-led coalitions in the first and second Iraqi wars, Ethiopia’s alignment with Western powers is inspired by and interpreted in the Christian alliance paradigm or, we could say, the enduring mirror effect of the Prester John myth (James, 1990: 34-36). But these long-accepted assumptions about the view of the “beleaguered Christian fortress” have been progressively challenged by recent historiography (Hussein, 1992; 2000; Carmichael, 1996; Braukämper, 2002; Markakis, 2003) and by a string of sociological, anthropological and political studies on Christian–Muslim relations in Ethiopia (Abbink, 1998; Fiquet, 2007; Desplat and Østebø, 2012; among others).

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1 Actually quoting J. S. Trimmingham’s remark (1969: 21); see also Owens (2008:1).
In 2008, following the lead of the late Ahmed Hussein (1992: 15), Travis Owens, a graduate from the Monterey Naval Post-Graduate School, produced a little known and little quoted thesis (Owens, 2008). It convincingly reinterpreted historical relations between the Medieval Christian Kingdom and the Ifat and Wollo sultanates as one of continued Christian aggression and expansion against what he calls the “beleaguered Muslim fortresses” to the southeast of the Ethiopian space. He thus reviewed the groundings for the 16th century Adalite Jihad led by the famous (or notorious, in Christian views) Imam Mohammed ibn Ibrahim (nicknamed Ahmed Gragn, or the left-handed, by Amharic speakers). The undeniable virtue of Owens’ (and for that matter Hussein’s) stance is that it definitely muddies the waters of ideological legitimacy on which the international image of Ethiopia has tended to be based for centuries. Not only are Muslims endogenous to Ethiopia, despite the ingrained Christian describer “Muslims in Ethiopia” rather than “Ethiopian Muslims” (mostly Hussein’s contribution; see also: Østebø, 2008b), but the Christian-controlled rulers have also historically acted predatorily and aggressively against Muslim city-states (Owens' own argument). It would be unfortunate not to consider these findings as a positive contribution in a major historiographic revision in the context of Horn Studies.

A further crack in the traditional view of Ethiopia’s monolithic image has been the uneasy acknowledgement that demographic portraits of the Ethiopian population’s religious allegiances show that the growth of Islam followers has been continuous, matched by a constant decline of Christian Monophysite Orthodoxy. Quoting the 2007 Ethiopian Population Census Commission, the latest PEW Report on Mapping the Global Muslim Population (PEW, 2009) acknowledges that followers of Islam have grown in the last decade to 33,9 per cent of the total population, in fact almost equalling the Orthodox Christians (40 per cent). Less conservative statistics point to a Muslim 45-50 per cent majority, against an Orthodox 35-40 per cent (Nationmaster.com, 2013). Notwithstanding the many complaints regarding possible (even probable) religious and ethnic statistical underrepresentation coming from various sides, the fact of the matter is that the overall ideological image of a Christian Ethiopia is not presently matched by demography – and formally at least in constitutional terms since the fall of the last monarch, King Haile Selassie, in 1974. One should not of course be tempted to read Ethiopian religious statistics from a strictly dualistic perspective. In practice, the decline of Orthodoxy is inversely paralleled with the growth of the so-called the P’ent’ayoch, the followers of the Pentecostal Protestant Churches in the south and even the northern part of the country. similarly, Ethiopian Muslims, traditionally followers of Sufism, are growingly embracing a variety of Sunni reformist trends (on the relationship between these and ethnicity, see Østebø, 2008a: 435 seq.), a phenomenon directly related to the changes brought about by the DERG’s

2 Medieval urban history in Ethiopia is intimately connected with Muslim trade. Later, Muslim settlers are a founding community of the first post-Aksumite Christian capital: Gonder. Local Muslim oral traditions even indicate that their present there predates Fasiladas’ “founding” of the city in the mid-seventeenth-century. And when Ali I, the Muslim Oromo ruler of the Yejju dynasty, from Begemder, took control of the kingdom after Ras Sehul Mikael’s death, in 1779, he was interested in controlling the kingdom’s political centre, not in re-establishing an independent Muslim sultanate.

3 See Jimma Times (2008), EOTC (2009).
fall, and the official acceptance of religious freedom by the EPRDF since 1991. However, after the 1995/6 Muslim demonstrations and the more recent government adoption of “war against terrorism” rhetoric (Derej Feyissa, 2012: 27), we can say that this containment policy that inspires its regional foreign affairs has progressively split inwards. But in societal terms, the recent flowering of Muslim reformism cannot and should not be extricated from the massive urbanization process that is hitting Ethiopia. In the last ten years most cities have seen their population more than double and Addis Ababa has grown at an annual rate of 4 per cent, now being one of the ten largest cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, expected to reach 8 million before 2020 according to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP, 2013).

Although we could be left wondering to what extent the ethno-federalist drive that has been reshaping the political and administrative outlook of the nation has reinforced ancient internal ethno-religious cracks, and even speculate about any future possible secessionist and radicalizing effects (ICG, 2012; Østebø, 2012: 254), these destabilising factors are overshadowed by those revealing a major reconfiguration of Ethiopian urban life, and the growing tensions that mark the public – and noisy – coming out of urban Islam. On the one hand, an understanding of this coming out requires addressing both the power shifts within the Muslim community and the various modes of Christian reactions to it, and on the other, a look into the sinuous internal containment policies of federal and local authorities.

**A Wahhabi spring?**

Against the framework of a long-consolidated nation-state – an obvious exception in the Horn region – reconfigured by a recently engineered and largely experimental, ethno-federalist and quasi-authoritarian regime (Aaron Tesfaye, 2002; ICG, 2009; Clapham, 2002: 25 seq.; McGeachie, 2010: 33) -, Ethiopians are being faced with sweeping changes, both in terms of their millenary agrarian economy and the physical and mental reconstruction of their urban settlements. The Muslim reformist trend draws its strength from the obviousness of the limitations of a religious and ritual system anchored in pre-modern rural and urban traditions. But, as it makes its way in the public sphere, it raises fears that the community may fall prey to a polarizing fundamentalist discourse that opens the door to unstoppable internal tensions and becomes a harbinger of centripetal conflict that will unbalance the fragile status quo of regional balance in the Horn of Africa. This fear seems to be running deep among Ethiopian and international political commentators, advisors and scientists. This line of reasoning, which flows from a deeply ingrained comparative and functional perspective concerning political Islam after 9/11, may help understand the antagonising position and repressive actions of the government towards Muslim reformists, but not the spread of reformism itself and more generally the growth of religion allegiances in cities nationwide. Thus, as it is so much in line with the official position, the danger is that it will have a legitimizing effect instead of an explanatory power.
This article examines a series of recent conflicts in Ethiopian urban politics relating to the federal government's handling of Islamic claims and demands for public freedom of worship, in order to gauge the adequacy of such fears. The interview-based fieldwork was mainly carried out in three Ethiopian urban areas: the capital, Addis Ababa, Bahir Dar and Gondar, Northern Ethiopia, from March to May 2012 and in March 2013. Additionally, research was also carried out in Lebanon in May and June 2012. Formal and informal interviews were conducted with a wide range of stakeholders from different walks of life and varying religious and political perspectives, from government party cardholders to opposition-prone militants and non-politicized citizens, of multiple religious and sectarian adherences and representing all age groups, from young adults to Shimageloch (“elders”). Local, regional and federal government officials and public servants were interviewed, as were journalists, university students and academics, Christian and Muslim scholars, representatives from long-established urban families and first-generation migrants from rural areas. The following is an abridged compilation of data collected over the past two years but partly underpinned by pre-existent connections and network access from previous fieldwork missions over the past decade.

As mentioned above, an important issue underlying the ideological dynamics of national identity in Ethiopia today is the handling of a major demographic shift in religious representation and of the political reframing of the status quo in the Muslim community in order to accommodate answers to the troubling question: “Are Muslims becoming a majority in Ethiopia?”. 2030 is waved in forecasting studies as a possible date for this momentous statistical event, Ethiopia being one of the countries with the fastest growing population (PEW, 2011). Concurrently, most respondents, both Muslim and Christian, agree that there is a generalized perception in Ethiopia that the growth of the Muslim population has been sustained and continuous, and that it is directly associated with various signs of Muslim public assertiveness, e.g. the current mosque vs. church building competition in all major cities, the wearing of marking visual attire (the taqiyah and the hijab), claims to use of public festive venues, mounting quarter segregation and multiple neighbourhood frictions in mixed kebeles, etc.

“They have more wives, they breed more than we do”; “We’ll soon become a minority in our own country and the government is doing nothing about it”. These are recurring statements among Amhara Christians when referring to Muslims. Although less studied than the Muslim dynamics in the South of the country and the Wollo region, the importance of the Islamic rise in the northern cities (Gondar and Bahir Dar in the Amhara region and also in Tigray: Mekele, Adigrat and Adwa in particular) should not be ignored. In Gondar, for instance, grievances towards Muslims’ intent to occupy Christian festive venues (such as Meskel Square near the Medical College on the route to Azazo) highlight a progressive alienation

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4 An almost inevitable bias must be admitted since gender balance was difficult to achieve in many instances, particularly due to etiquette limitations in more traditional family groups. Additionally, regular surveys were carried out in internet news aggregators, the blogosphere and the expanding digital social media from inside the country and in the diaspora, where freedom of expression is less limited and where political and religious views tend to be more emphatically vented.
between the two communities. In the Arada area, typically a mixed quarter to the east of the city Castles complex (the ghebi), long-established Christian families talk of moving out as hitherto peaceful relations become estranged by mutual suspicion and signs of enmity. Breaking with an old tradition, today Muslim neighbours seldom participate in the traditional coffee ceremony in front of Christian families’ homes at the end of Lideta Maryam ("birth of Saint Mary"). Although being clearly identified as a major Christian centre (a former capital of the Abyssinian kingdom and an historically important theological centre), Gondar’s Muslims have been there since the city’s foundation in the mid-seventeenth century (or even before; see footnote 2). The mosques built during the Italian period have consolidated Muslim theological studies there since the thirties and it was from here that the main Salafi reform movement spread to Addis Ababa in the late 1990s (Østebø, 2008a: 422).

Most respondents agree that Muslims seem to be one of the communities more clearly profiting from the present neo-liberal setting in which Ethiopia seems progressively immersed.

- They give abundant examples of thriving Muslim business companies. Muslim banking is seen as playing an important role in promoting prominent Muslim families’ business ventures, such as infrastructural (mainly building), agricultural or commercial (import-export, commodities, end consumer, etc).

- The overshadowing figure of the investor Mohammed Hussein Al Amoudi, tagged as one of Africa’s richest men,⁵ and whose deep and enigmatic ties with the ruling federal party EPRDF seem unshaken by the recent waves of Islamic protest, serves as inspiration and is talked about as an important beacon. He is regarded as helping to channel financing and entrepreneurship within the Muslim upper classes, but also attracts suspicion and endless gossip, especially among Christians, because of his Saudi ties and unverified hidden agendas in the militant spread of Islam in Ethiopia. His philanthropic ventures are an important source of rumours among Christians who are not supporters of the EPRDF.

It is difficult to gauge the reality and sustainability of the double-digit economic growth that Ethiopia is experiencing today and that official propaganda acclaims as a major achievement of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s governing action, though this is not the place to discuss it. But we cannot help connecting this economic drive with the radical reshaping of the agrarian economy that took off in 2009 (Lefort, 2010), the speed of rural-city migration processes (with Addis Ababa being one of the fastest growing cities in the world today, UNEP, 2013), visible in the current urban sprawl that is dotting Ethiopia, and tentative industrialization. Above all there is the feverish infrastructural development taking place everywhere in the country – the building and rebuilding roads and urban motorways and the housing spree -, a national push whose epitome is the Renaissance Dam, a megalomaniac government programme to

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⁵ Al Amoudi’s wealth has been recorded in the Forbes billionaire list since 2002, ranking him as the richest person in Ethiopia and the second richest Saudi Arabian citizen. As of March 2013, Forbes ranked Al Amoudi as the second richest African person in the world (Forbes, 2013).
tame the upper-Nile waters and supposedly bring an unprecedented bonanza to the region's energy sector.\textsuperscript{6} The flip-side of the coin is less shiny, though, and tends to be hushed up in the official discourse: massive displacement of whole urban neighbourhoods to give way to high-rises, malls, hotels, gated communities, etc; mass emigration to the Gulf states and beyond, profound changes in peoples' daily routines and family solidarities, with accompanying loss of traditional cultural anchors under the pressure to copy American leisure dreams, Gulf-style housing paradigms, and Asian entrepreneurship practices, early steps in automotive democratization that sucks peoples' meagre finances dry and exerts a terrible public health toll on urbanites and, not least, escapist forms of return to religion.\textsuperscript{7}

It is in this very dynamic scenario that communal and religious identities are being shaken, reconfigured and reaffirmed. Particularly in the Muslim community, attendance at Friday prayers in the expanding network of mosques and participation in religious discussion groups (at Mosques, Islamic schools and charitable institutions and in the ever expanding regular afternoon t'chat sessions) has reached an all-time high in living memory. Muslim prayers in public places such as in university campuses have actually become an important ground for anti-governmental protest in the guise of claims to freedom of worship at Addis Ababa University (AAU) and elsewhere.

Older respondents establish a curious parallel between this intellectual militancy of Muslim university youth and the utopian enthusiasm with which students embraced Marxist-Leninist ideological and terminological discussions on the AAU campus in the early 1970s. This youthful Muslim awakening is read against the background of a long intellectual lull caused by the tragic interregnum of the Red Terror period and its aftermath, which was the period of transfer of power to the EPRDF's ethnic federalism programme (or as many oppositionists say the divide & rule strategy of the TPLF's predatory national project), and as an identitarian reaction to the present government's neo-liberal economic policies. This is added to the spread of materialist aspirations associated with the so-called “American Dream”, which is funnelled through televized Ethiopian soap operas, Fox TV series and success stories from the returning US diasporas (a trend that was stressed in the much-propagandized New Ethiopian Millennium commemorations in 2007-2008). But there is another aspect to this tidal turn, one that is not so readily acknowledged. Although the discursive nature of young Muslims' claims to a return to the letter of the Koran and Islamic ethical purity and their emphatic aspirations to embrace the wider, borderless Muslim community seem rather shallow and not particularly imaginative, they seem to be engaging in a hidden dialogue with the older Muslim generations. The supposed “return to the letter of the Koran” actually hides a mainly urban and literate modernizing cry with revolutionary undertones against traditional Ethiopian Islam, one deeply immersed in orality, the worship of Muslim saints and the wider substrate of “factual

\textsuperscript{6} Since Ethiopian rivers amount to 70 per cent of the total Nile caudal, also forecasted is a major power shift in Ethio-Sudanese and Ethio-Egyptian relations, as regional hydropolitics tend to abide to the rule that upstream countries hold the upper hand when they manage control of water flows.

\textsuperscript{7} Pilgrimages to holy sites have taken off with renewed fervour and stories of miraculous cures by holy water (both Christian and Muslim) are widely popularized, as are mentions of apparitions of Saint Mary.
beliefs" that has for centuries pieced together a pan-Ethiopian and trans-religious mental worldview based on a common sacrificial semantic, the ever popular holy water cult and ancient inner family and communal rituals. As elsewhere in the Muslim world, an inter-generational standoff is being posited via apparently paradoxical social modernization claims based on a purifying return to the roots of Islam.

Furthermore, a growing part of Muslim youth that is attracted to the cities in growing numbers is now attending universities and polytechnics (which have grown more than tenfold in the last five years), where they are being compelled to participate in a major debate today: are Ethiopian Islamic traditions truly Islamic? As seen through the condescending eyes of Arab theologians and Islamic scholars, the Sufist strains of Ethiopian Islam are little less than heathen and paganist (kafir: "infidel"). In the interviews conducted in Beirut, with Sunnis, Shi’ite of Al-Ahbash representatives and university researchers and scholars, all proved to have only second-hand, stereotyped knowledge of Ethiopian Muslims. The oral-based familiarity with the hadiths, non-compliance with Islamic law (Shari’ah), sacrificial practices, Awliya-based worship, and suspected shallowness of theological knowledge and debate, were quoted as proof of the little credit Ethiopian Muslims receive outside. This derogatory view is curiously evocative of a long history of Western Christian argumentation against the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and Orthodox rabbinical dismissals of the Jewishness of Ethiopian Falasha immigrants brought into Israel in the mid-1980s (Bard, 2002: 183-4).

Mustafa Kabha and Haggai Ertlich (2006) have pointed out that from the mid-1950s, Salafi-prone polemists have surfaced in Southeast Ethiopia (mainly in Harar) and have been able to make an imprint, if not for any other reason, at least because they fostered a theological discussion and caused a Sufi reaction that acknowledged the need for argumentation, thereby diversifying and opening up Ethiopian Islam. Further occurrences of Salafist activity are recorded in the rural areas of Bale region in the early 1970s. Terje Østebø (2011), discussing a conflict that broke out about revenues from local Sufi shrines, mentions that a Salafist shaykh, Abubakr Muhammed, went as far as to declare the Awliya dead, while calling for a return to “true” Islam and denouncing Sufist practices and views as deviationist (Østebø, 2011: 628-9). Hussein Ahmed (2000), Jan Abbink (2007; 2008) and Eloi Fiquet (2007), among others, have preferred to focus on Wollo rural Muslim communities – a region where historically tolerance and transitivity between Christians and Muslims seems to have been the rule. Here again the issues of oral vs. written authority, along with popular conservatives vs. elite reformers, claim an important foothold (Abbink, 2007: 73-4).

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8 It is undeniable that Christian-Muslim cooperation and tolerance rhetoric hide a harsh, asymmetrical political and sociological reality that has contributed to the Muslims’ feelings of historically being treated as second-class citizens (Clapham, 1975: 77-78; Østebø, 2008a: 434) and that meat sacrifice is a major distinctive feature between Christians and Muslims (Fiquet, 2007), but it is at this symbolic level that the endogenousness of Ethiopian Islam is clearer.

9 Plural of wali: “Sufi saint”.

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But even if well documented and increasingly studied, the friction between reformists (Salafi, Tabligh, and now more specifically Wahhabi (see Østebø, 2008a; Desplat and Østebø, 2012) vs. Sufi traditionalists raging in urban areas today (not least in the capital Addis Ababa) have been insufficiently considered in connection with the above-mentioned demographic, economic and social reconfigurations under way in Ethiopian cities. This is not so much (or at least not only) a theological issue but an effective political move to claim physical space (over control of mosques, schools and monetary flows) and ideological allegiance inside the growing Muslim community.

Although this may be contested, our younger Wahhabi respondents do not see their involvement in the religious affairs of the community as impacting on their normal social life, work or study, or even at home. Many, especially at university, keep their Christian friends from high school and neighbourhood times. They acknowledge that there are radicalized fringes in their midst, who generally do not receive much attention from the religious authorities or much credit from their peers. They feel aggrieved and insulted that the government plays with Christian fears¹⁰ and traditionalists’ defensiveness, when placing them with international political Islamists and suggesting phantom ties with Al-Qaeda type terrorists. But, although they tend to be careful when talking about their differences from their parents’ views of Islam, and even if they follow their families’ sacrificial practices at home, it is easy to sense disdain for or at least distancing from Sufism. As frequently happens with younger Pentecostal’s rapport with the Bible, they have acquired a taste for reading the Koran, are intensive followers of doctrinal discussions on the internet and use the information thus acquired to make their point in their theological arguments. Still, it would be too simplistic to look at the type of Sufi discourse practised in Harari or Addis Ababa as “traditional”, since the degree of their connectedness and world-wisdom must not be undervalued. We attended quite a few t’chat sessions where Sufism was debated and welcomed as a fall-back from the negative impacts of modern city life. When we hear such comments made by bankers, doctors or scholars returning from migratory stints in the US, we can be confident that they are more probably about “reinventing” a tradition, than following it (in Hobsbawm’s sense). Publicly adhering to home-grown Ethiopian Sufism has little to do with traditional practices. As much as Wahhabism, it has become for many an identitarian marker of distinction (generational, “ethnic” or class-based).

Gondar and Bahir Dar mostly being populated by self-defined Amhara. “Ethnicist” rifts are less apparent than religious ones here (even if Muslims tend either to be seen as coming from Harar in the 16th century, Wollo at the end of the 19th century or Eritrea and Tigray during the Italian period). In the melting pot of Addis Ababa, they are mingled together in processes of individual and collective identitarian legitimation. A Merkato Gurage tends to be Tabligh, a Harari Sufi, or an Oromo Salafi (when not Pentecostal). A youngster will prefer Wahhabism to Sufism. Being Muslim, or a true Muslim, is easily banded together with not being Tigrynian or Amhara, even if this classificatory practice collides with claims

¹⁰ Notably among Tigrinyans, by spreading the idea that they may be massacred if EPRDF looses power.
of an ancient historical presence of Muslims in these regions. In terms of party politics, religious and ethnic distinctiveness also becomes easily muddled. As much as the *Woyane* (“rebels”), which has become a derogative term to refer to any member of the TPLF and is frequently extendable to signify a Tigrynyian, the *Amhara* opposers also qualify as *Habesha*, (“Abyssinian”) people coming from the Northern Highlands, and hence Christian (on the relationship between religion and ethnicity, see: Østebø, 2008b).

2005 to 2009 saw a truly revolutionary process in Ethiopian politics. From the “stolen elections” of May 2005 that amounted to a traumatic recognition by the EPRDF of their limited popular support (particularly in urban areas) to the 2010 plebiscite, the ruling party successfully managed to muzzle the opposition, recreate allegiances and induce an astounding swelling in party card holders that in fact established a highly effective (some say corruptive) patronage system based on financial and economic benefits for an emerging middle-class in rural and urban areas that accompanied the neo-liberal opening up and booming growth of the Ethiopian economy. Whole tracts of the population, who in 2005 felt confident that Ethiopia would become a free and democratic state, became tremendously disillusioned with politics and suspicious of the TPLF-controlled EPRDF ruling party. A continuous flow of rumours and flowering urban myths closely link prominent members of the ruling elite (not least Meles Zenawi’s widow, *Waizero* Azeb Mesfin Haile, EFFORT Group’s CEO) with both the land- and urban-grab spearheaded by a number of mushrooming business conglomerates. The *Woyane* tend to be vilified whenever respondents feel sure they are not at risk of being denounced to or spied upon by agents of the fearful Ministry of Internal Affairs. As a result of a situation where the ruling party has obliterated all democratic opposition (and where under the guise of the US-sanctioned “war against terror” the Ethiopian army has successfully cornered independentist guerrilla movements in the South of the country), Muslim urban youth has found religious militancy a soothing alternative to the inaccessible political game as grounds for claiming a social voice. Adherence to Wahhabism is more a means to an end than a goal itself as it means, according to interviewed student respondents, the possibility to enter politics when other means become unavailable.

Therefore, the spread of Wahhabism among urban Muslim youth should make us question whether this adherence is not more cultural than specifically religious, in the sense that it has the contours of a generation gap issue – brought about by a politically muzzled youth. It is also closely tied to the urban migration process, additionally fed by short-term migratory flows to the Gulf countries, and by Saudi Arabian-sourced promotion of Islamic teaching in the flowering new Islamic universities and schools in Ethiopia.

As early as May 2003, political scientist Medahne Tadesse warned about the spread of religious radicalization in Ethiopia. In a conference on federalism, conflict and peace building hosted by the Ministry of Federal Affairs and the German development agency, GTZ, he adamantly argued that “the religious equilibrium [in Ethiopia was] collapsing very quickly” and that the religious status quo in the country was being “dramatically eroded, incubating violent confrontation”. His claim was that both the federal
government and the Orthodox Church were failing the country in offering at least mitigating solutions to the
social and economic ills of the poorest quarters of society, thus giving way to other religions. He was
specifically addressing the enormously successful proselytizing efforts of the Pent’ay Churches in
Southern Ethiopia, but in the back of his mind at least he was also concerned with the then growth of
Sunni fundamentalism in Somalia, where the Islamic Courts were in control of the collapsed state
structures (his main field of studies; see: Medahne Tadesse, 2002). Whatever the case, his conclusions
had a generalizing tone that would also apply to Wahhabism when saying that “the hour of the miracle
worker – religion - [had] finally come”, and that “the contemporary religious militancy should be seen as a
wholly new phenomenon and a threat to the peace, stability and independence of the country (IRIN,
2003).

A series of tense events that made headlines for most of last year seemed to be, on the surface
at least, a confirmation of his prophetical alert. This was also the general tone of interviewed officials and
party members when interpreting the multiple rebellions that fired up the Muslim community in Addis
Ababa and elsewhere against the federal government’s decision to meddle (repressively and violently at
times) with the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC; Mengelis), the right to demonstrate (for
religious purposes), the Islamic banking system (the closing of the of ZamZam Bank s.c., a Shariah-
compliant, interest-free banking service, in June 2012), and mainly who was to define what Ethiopia’s
“official” Muslim doctrine should be. But, given that the “Muslim problem” was so clearly stirred up by the
government itself, we can say that Medahne Tadesse’s prophecy was clearly self-fulfilling in the sense
that he, like others, have helped frame the government’s path. Why, then, create a “Muslim problem”? The
government attack on the Muslims was directed at the heart of their financial system, at their religious
administrative structures and their doctrinal freedom. Even if too simplified, comments heard in informal
conversations may harbour more than a grain of truth. They referred to last year’s government clampdown
as a diversion and a reflex of a discreet struggle for control between Azeb Mesfin’s EFFORT and Al
Amoudi’s MEDROC. Whatever the reason, one thing seems clear and this is that there is no public
evidence that there was “a threat to the peace, stability and independence of the country” in 2011 but still
the government framed its action precisely in that way.

In June 2011, one year before the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia’s federal
government took a puzzling step that lit the fuse of identitarian religious tensions: that of inviting a small
group of 15 Lebanese theologians to educate Ethiopian Muslims in the doctrine promoted by the Beirut-
based Jam–Iyyat al-Mashari al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya (the “Association of Islamic Charitable Projects”),
better known by its nickname: the Al-Ahbash.11 A seminar chaired by Dr. Samir Qadi, vice-president of the
Lebanese organization, and attended by Shiferaw Tekle Mariam, the powerful Minister of Internal Affairs,
took place in Harar, followed by a lecture by Dr. Qadi at the Ghion Hotel in Addis Ababa on the subject of

11 The Al-Ahbash had already had a discreet presence in the country since the late 1990s, but was no more than a
fringe grouping, according to respondents from Addis Ababa.
“religious extremism”. After that a series of indoctrinating sessions were arranged at universities and military installations throughout the country. According to Terje Østebø (2012: 244-245), at least 18,000 people (imams, ulama and students) were “mentored” (in English) in the teachings of Al-Ahbash and the inherent corrupting dangers of Wahhabism – indicating that anyone not accepting the new EIASC leadership would be “considered similar to an extremist and a terrorist” (Østebø, 2012: 246). This move sparked a controversy of unexpected proportions, followed by a stream of violently repressed rebellious demonstrations and months of government harassment and arrests of Muslims.

Before going into the interpretations the respondents offered of the series of events that pitted the Muslim community against the government for most of 2012, it is useful to briefly mention the origin and nature of the Al-Ahbash movement in Lebanon and elsewhere in the world.

The Al-Ahbash boomerang

The origins of the Al Ahbash / Wahhabiyya disputes in Lebanon and elsewhere in the world are rooted in the controversies that opposed two Harari scholars in the late 1940s. One was Shaykh Yusuf Abd al-Rahman al-Harari, a Harari educated in Mecca and Medina and an influence behind the pro-independentist Harari group that visited Mecca in the 1930s, who advocated a Wahhabist doctrinal reform of Ethiopian Islam. The other was Shaykh Abdalla ibn Muhammad ibn Yusuf al-Hariri. The controversies between the two Harari scholars finally led to the latter’s exile in Jerusalem and then Beirut in the 1960s (Hamzeh and Dekmejian, 1996: 219 seq.; Kabha and Erlich, 2006: 523-4). The beginnings of Al Ahbash (i.e. “the Ethiopians”) in Lebanon are partly enveloped in mystery. It is known that Al Hariri and a group of followers took over the Association of Islamic Philanthropic Projects” (Jam-iyyat al-Mashari al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya) in 1983 and that the organization is known in Lebanon to have proselytized among the Sunni fighters, incorporating most members of the disbanded Abd al-Hafiz Qasim militia, while not involving itself in the civil war (Hamzeh and Dekmejian, 1996: 220).

Al-Hariri’s ideas initially revolved around the virtues of moderation, political passiveness and the playing of sport, during the last period of the Lebanese civil war and after the group concentrated on violently antagonizing the Wahhabists, countering Ibn Taymiyya’s and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s precepts of intervening politically to achieve religious goals (Hamzeh and Dekmejian, 1996: 224). Today’s Lebanese Sunnis and Shi’ites tend to view Al-Ahbash doctrine as insubstantial, populist and rather unsophisticated. A mishmash of Sunni, Sufi and Shi’a ideas are purportedly at the base of their doctrine (Hamzeh and Dekmejian, 1996: 222 seq.). Successive brawls with Wahhabists in Southern Beirut during and after the civil war eventually rocketed the group into the political arena and in the 1989 elections one Al-Ahbash candidate (Adnan al-Tarabulsi) was elected to the National Parliament. As Ezbohlah emerged victorious on the national scene, Al-Ahbash leaned progressively towards this Shi’ite militia, to the point that it is now viewed as their stooge, drawing its financial support from its ties to the Syrian government (Hamzeh and
Dekmejian, 1996: 225; Kabha and Erlich, 2006: 523). The basic self-contradiction underlying Al-Ahbash’s standing, which contributed to its progressive loss of popularity in Lebanon (while thriving in the Muslim Middle East Diaspora in Western Europe and North America), lies in the fact that the group’s opposition to Wahhabists’s view that political intervention has legitimate religious grounds paradoxically led it to do exactly that by entering the complex sectarian game of party cum-ethnic politics to further uphold their position. By the time Al Hariri was invited by Meles Zenawi to travel to Ethiopia in 2008 (which he did not, as he died that year), Al-Ahbash had already lost a great part of its support basis in the Beirut suburbs and elsewhere in Lebanon.

The intriguing decision by the Ethiopian federal government to bring in the group of Lebanese members of Al-Ahbash to teach its exogenous and “post-modern” brand of Sufism with a view to declaring it the official Ethiopian Islamic doctrine, thus breaking a constitutional rule specifying the separation between state and religion, was followed by a more obvious but nonetheless equally illegal one. It was to intervene in the composition of the EIASC in November, 2012. Had these actions been successful, respondents say, they would have led to a split in the Muslim community and a more clear identification of radical adepts of Wahhabi views. As it was, the decision was met with general dissatisfaction and a continuous string of rebellious demonstrations in various cities that united the whole Muslim community against the government’s decision. The Muslim Diaspora was likewise incensed, and definitely more vocal, since it was free from the recently installed surveillance and eavesdropping Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) software technology that the government acquired from the Chinese.\(^{12}\)

The rallying cry was that religious matters should not be politicized, and that the government was intruding in forbidden areas by forbidding Friday gatherings, killing Muslim demonstrators (particularly the incidents at Grand Anwar Mosque in 21 July 2012), mingling with the Mengelis – EIASC, imposing government-appointed Al-Ahbash representatives (in the contested elections to the Council in November 6th, 2012, etc. Progressively, Sufis joined in the protest and even if Christians inside the country kept relatively aloof from the clash, Diaspora oppositionists and journalists referred to the clampdown as further proof of the government's illegitimacy. An “Arbitration Committee” composed of 17 respected Muslim religious leaders was nominated to try to dialogue with the government in order to remove the Al-Ahbash representatives from the EIASC and regain control of the board of the Awaliyya School.

\(^{12}\) DPI technology used by the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) purportedly allows eavesdropping and data mining and also enables it to censor and intercept fixed and mobile communications. It blocks nationwide access to news websites and jams Diaspora-based Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) and other external broadcasters such as the Voice of America and Germany's Deutsche Welle Amharic service. It spies on emails in real time and allows INSA to “look inside all traffic from a specific IP address, pick out the HTTP traffic, then drill even further down to capture only traffic headed to and from Gmail, and can even reassemble e-mails as they are typed out by the user”. Surveillance is conducted through Ethio Telecom, the government monopoly that controls all Ethiopian telephone and Internet communications (see Negash, 2012; TOR, 2012).
Towards the end of the year, even the exiled Tehawedo Church in the US joined in the protest to oppose the Ethiopian government’s decision to favour Al Ahbash. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the International Crisis Group and other respected international organizations and also the US by-partisan Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) condemned the arrests of leaders of the “peaceful protests” under the controversial 2009 Anti-Terrorist Proclamation (ATP). Finally, the government partially backed down as the EPRDF scrambled to hold control of the country in the wake of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s death, announced on August 21st, 2012. In interviews carried out in March and April 2013, the Muslim respondents were adamant. “The government plan to divide the Muslim community backfired and had exactly the opposed effect”. “It is an embarrassing defeat for the EPRDF”. The “divide and rule” tactics that the ruling party had been using so successfully in ethnic politics, especially directed at Amhara and Oromo, the largest groups, failed miserably in the confrontation against the Muslim community and ended up being a major blow against the ethnicization discourse itself: “Oromo, Harari, Gurage, Amhara – even Tigray – we are all Muslims”, declared an AAU student interviewee who had been involved in the demonstrations of 2012. Still, the court appearances of accused Muslim members of the “Arbitration Committee” such as Abubakar Ahmed and spokesman Ahmedin Jebel, and journalists Yusuf Getachew and Solomon Kebede, from the banned Islamic magazine Yemuslimoch Guday in early April 2013 enraged most Muslims. They stood accused of committing “terrorist acts” and planning and conspiring to commit terrorist acts under Articles 3 and 4 of the ATP. There were also accusations of mistreatment of the detainees in the notorious Maikelawi prison.

A government hard-landing or just a respite?

A few months later Meles Zenawi’s death, a curious document was “leaked” on the website of the Awramba Times, an Addis Ababa newspaper, and quickly spread to digital outlets and social media pages. The scanned Word file that contained the supposed minutes of an urgent meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) projects an interesting light on the whole issue. It is well worth summarizing it here:

The Muslim protest was the main agenda of the meeting, focused on the Muslims’ requests to remove the current Megelis’ (EIASC’s) members appointed by the government, to reorganize the administrative board of the Awaliyya School, and to terminate the Al-Ahbash indoctrination. Discussed also was an assessment report of all official interventions dealing with the above requests, particularly a series of interviews carried out with the members of Megelis, discussions with the Lebanese Al-Ahbash invited by the government, analysis of studies written by Western intelligence experts on the Horn of Africa, discussions with “several members of Ethiopian society”, and papers authored by the “Israeli Hagai [Hagai Erlich, no doubt] on Ethiopian Muslims”.

The measures proposed in the report were: to try keeping the key persons involved the protest separated from other Muslims and to weaken the opposition movement from inside, by relating the Wahhabi movement with terrorism-related activities, to create suspicion in the general Muslim community on the motives of the movement, and to pressure the Muslim leaders to find a solution for the current conflict. The document also assesses measures taken by the police and
the character of the “Committee” elected by the Muslims. Also discussed was the fact that “key persons in the Ehadig” (the Amharic name of the EPRDF) opposed the way the government had been dealing with the Muslims’ protest. The document states that the NSC members agreed that the Muslims’ request in the year 2004 (Ethiopian Calendar; 2012) was not treated properly, and that they agreed on the following:

The government hadn’t fully understood the Muslims’ issues and as a result the measures taken were not adequate; its interpretation of the nature of their protests was incorrect and complicated the situation further; a better remedy had to be found to prevent the protests becoming a political problem; the governmental fears of the protests were misplaced; the measures taken by the current Megelis and by the Ministry of Federal Affairs to deal with the original Muslim request had brought about strong opposition from the community.

They also agreed that the current Megelis’ members hadn’t been elected and had overstayed in their position: hence, the Muslims’ request to remove them and organise an election was appropriate; that the conflict contributed to the unpopularity of the EPRDF among Muslims; that the protests were legal, their aim was of religious, not political, nature, that the movement was free from foreign intervention and had no hidden political interests, as well as no relation with any kind of outside terrorist groups; that the Muslim community had been expressing their objections peacefully and that even the Friday prayers on Ginbot the 3rd (May 11th, 2012) hadn’t disturbed the International Economic Forum that was held in the same day in Addis Ababa.

In conclusion, the document states that: the Al-Ahbash training programme should be immediately stopped; decisions regarding the board of the Awaliyya school should be devolved to the Muslim community; the election of the Megelis should be transparent and according with the Muslims’ wishes; the ZamZam Bank should be allowed to operate, as soon as possible; the governmental media coverage of the protests should be corrected and revised; discussions with the Muslim leaders should continue and remedies should be found urgently; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should participate in clearing the confusion created by the protest; people arrested as a result of the conflict should be urgently released; internal conflicts between members of the EPRDF should be discussed and cleared; and the Ministry of Federal Affairs should act to appease the rebellion.

(Awramba Times, 2013).

By any means, this is an astounding document. Suspicions that it was forged are widespread among Muslims. People point particularly to the fact that it serves the purpose of isolating Shiferaw Teklemariam, the Minister of Federal Affairs within the TPLF\(^\text{13}\) (thus being the work of Azeb Mesfin’s lobby) and of extricating the memory of Meles Zenawi from the mess he himself created the previous year. The online comments on the Awramba Times piece give a good portrait of how readers received it, flatly doubting the document’s veracity.\(^\text{14}\) The very fact that the page is not down and remains accessible makes the leak seem purposely “planted”.

\(^{13}\) In page 2 of the document he is quoted as saying he “tried to create problems among Muslims, aiming at dividing them”.

\(^{14}\) In a post dated March 15, 2013, a user calling himself Tazabi says: “The document is all fake. To convince us that it was leaked from the PM’s office, they printed the footer which says C://My Document/PM office/Moslem/004. This was intended to convince us this document was released from Prime Minister’s office. However, the motive of this document is different. They believed that people would be cheated the moment they saw the footer. We know there is no computer called “PM office” and such information would never be kept there in any way as it might be prone to
It is in fact probable that it was produced after Meles Zenawi’s death and allowed to spread and be assessed inside the country (given the NSA’s ability to block any specific internet IP, the fact that it was not is most telling). It came out at roughly the same time as the new Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn declared in a parliament address on 16 October 2012: “The government is not and would not interfere in the affairs of any religion in the country”. In any case, as there is no official position regarding its contents, or any denial of its authenticity, we can only speculate about its origin and intentions. Muslim respondents declared it to be counter-information, in view of the contradicting occurrences of continued police harassment of the community and the judicial charges against the “Arbitration Committee” members, the continued ban on ZamZam Bank operations and of suspension of the EiASC. They concede that the government trump card of the Al-Ahbash had been exhausted and that repression around mosques has subsided. On the other hand, Muslims leaders have been discreetly pressing for a stand-down of demonstrations in a wait-and-see strategy. The document seems to be a belated ashamed recognition that Muslim matters had been mishandled by the government and that not changing course could lead to mounting, rebellious politicization of the Muslim community. As much as the respondents may complain about the situation, they admit that a new stage had been reached in terms of internal unity of the Muslim community.

Against catastrophist expectations, the country did not fall into chaos after the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the almost simultaneous death of Abuna Paulos (the Ethiopian Orthodox patriarch). Even if it was defeated in its stand against the Muslim community, the EPDRF still has a steady hold over the general political situation. As lobbies inside the governing elite carefully reposition themselves, a national hero cult around the late Prime Minister is being tentatively tried in official propaganda, the secret services maintain business as usual and conflicts and tensions concerning the Muslim community have largely subsided. During our latest visit to the country (March and April 2013), except for the humiliating court appearance of respected Muslim leaders, there are practically no records of clashes around mosques or news of inflamed declarations, press controversies or conspicuous detentions. The urban Muslim population continues to grow and thrive. There is a feeling of a cautious respite and as the waters of the Blue Nile begin to be diverted in Bani-Shangul there is hope that the Great Renaissance Dam may help Ethiopian Muslims cease to live in a fortress beleaguered by the Woyane.

Bibliography


security attack. Hence, the document is hilarious. Think of the people who can potentially release the document. They know they will be hanged in daylight if they do this. I believe that the document was released to distract us from the controversies of the tplf meeting and its division recently” (Awramba Times, 2013).


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Introduction

The relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have known turbulent episodes in recent history. The deployment of Ethiopian troops in Somalia in 2006 can be understood as a new phase in their relations, but one with historical roots. It implied a change from the relative peace between the two countries since the end of the Cold War and the start of a conflict dissimilar to previous wars between the two states. It is widely acknowledged that Ethiopian troops have regularly crossed the frontier during peacetime to police the border area, especially to fight armed movements and to secure the Ethiopian state. But this was not something overtly admitted by the Ethiopian government in 2006, until Meles Zenawi openly deployed his troops in Somalia with the tacit support of the international community. Since then, their presence has been virtually constant, though two phases can be discerned: from December 2006 to January 2009, and from November 2011 until the present.¹

This chapter will focus on the securitization process in Ethiopia that permitted the deployment of Ethiopian troops in Somalia between 2006 and 2009, in an attempt to go beyond the traditional understanding of security, with its focus on the military sector and its problem-solving approach. The chapter is not so much about the war as on the securitizing speech acts² on the threat posed by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), the securitization of this issue, the political context in which it happened and some of its consequences for Ethiopia. In this regard, this work is partly inspired by Didier Bigo’s question related to the task of critical security studies: “Who is doing an (in)securitization move, under what conditions, towards whom, and with what consequences?” (Bigo, 2008: 125). This research draws on critical security studies and international political sociology and following Paul Williams attempts to bring them closer to the English School by analysing the implications of this intervention for the international society. (Williams, 2005) It argues that the Ethiopian intervention has to be understood as the product of a

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¹ The Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn stated on 23rd April 2013 that Ethiopian troops would leave Somalia, but other prior announcements of this kind have not come true; cf. News 24 (2013). In January 2007 the Ethiopian government affirmed that the Ethiopian troops in Somalia would withdraw, an announcement that was welcomed by the United Nations Security Council, but the troops stayed two more years (S/RES/1744 of 21st January 2007).

² Understood as “the act of saying security in relation to an issue”; according to Ole Wæver, if successful, the act itself allows a state-representative to claim “a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block” the security issue (Columbia Peoples and Vaughan Williams, 2010: 76-77).
securitization move, and in consequence that it needs to be approached beyond its bilateral manifestation, taking account of a broader context, as much in time as in space.

The argument is divided into three parts. Firstly, I briefly outline the Ethiopian intervention in 2006-2009, and propose new insights to broaden and deepen our understanding of it following the work done by Critical Security Studies. My suggestion is that the analysis of the discourse around the intervention, as reflected in The Ethiopian Herald (TEH) — the main official English language newspaper in Ethiopia —, imply that the securitization move of the Ethiopian government regarding the events in Somalia in 2006 and after, helped not only to secure the Ethiopian state but also to reshape the image of the Ethiopian regime and its political project. Secondly, to understand this move it is necessary to enlarge the picture in order to situate this process in a wider context. Questioning the meaning of this intervention as a bilateral issue, I connect it to the local and international context: the aftermath of the Ethiopian elections, and the securitization of Africa, in order to understand the connections of different political agendas. Finally, I briefly consider the consequences of this intervention for Ethiopia and the international society, concluding that the securitization process helped to (re)create the government’s local and international authority and legitimacy or at least to reshape the idea of it.

Securitizing Somalia: the 2006-2009 Ethiopian intervention in the country

In October 2004, in the framework of the Eldoret Peace Process, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) was established and Abdillahi Yusuf (a former colonel of the Siyad Barre regime that became the leader of one of the rebel groups that fought against Barre’s regime, and one of Somalia’s warlords and leader of Puntland) was appointed President of Somalia. This government was known as an ally of Ethiopia (one of its main weaknesses in the eyes of the Somali population), and dependent on foreign support, not only from the US or EU, but Ethiopia as well, as their openly admitted good relationship showed.

When in 2006 the UIC gained force and presence in the country, especially after June when they succeeded to control Mogadishu, the Ethiopian government transmitted its concern about the unfolding of events. The takeover of the country by the UIC was perceived as a threat to the integrity of the Ethiopian state, among other reasons because of the UIC “Greater Somalia” discourse and their claims on Ethiopian Somali region, a region already troubled by the Ogaden National Liberation Front’s (ONLF) demands for independence (Hagmann, 2007); the hosting of the Oromo Liberation front (OLF) by fundamentalist movements in Somalia in order to add another destabilizing factor for Ethiopia; a fear of attacks in other parts of Ethiopia, in reminiscence of the 1996 and 1997 bombings in public buildings such as the Ghion Hotel in Addis Abeba, claimed by Al-Ithad, then led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys who was one of the

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leaders of the UIC in 2006; and the Eritrean connection with the UIC and other armed movements, documented in the November 2006 Report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2006).

At least since 1997, Ethiopia had been making —although denying it— incursions into Somalia. The consolidation of the UIC in Somalia and the jihad they declared against Ethiopia in July 2006 catalysed the attention of the government, who started a securitization move concerning the conflict in Somalia, and particularly the role of the UIC in it. In this regard, it is possible to identify a shift in The Ethiopian Herald’s coverage of the issue. Until that month, international information in this newspaper focused primarily on bilateral relations with the countries of the Horn (Eritrea and the role of the UNMEE regarding the border dispute, diplomatic relations with the TFG and Djibouti), other countries such as China, the US and UK and international organizations (EU, IGAD).

At the same time, the support of Ethiopia through international aid also had a prominent place in the newspaper. Overall, those themes presented Ethiopia as a country committed to peace in the Horn of Africa (HoA) and the continent at large through its peacekeeping forces, and with sustained international support visible in its wide diplomatic relations. Simultaneously, other political news presented the Ethiopian regime as committed to democracy, development, growth and the fight against poverty. The questioning of this commitment by foreign actors (or local ones, such as armed movements like the OLF) was presented in the newspaper as an attack on Ethiopia, giving support to the opposition and the Diaspora against the EPRDF, putting at risk the achievement of these purported objectives. But nevertheless, news tended more to underline the maintenance of international aid to Ethiopia, implying that the government succeeded to obtain this support because of a genuine democratization and development project, and defending that a transition was really happening in the country as shown in the 2005 elections.

Then, after mid-June and particularly July, the information in the newspaper experienced a clear shift. Coverage of the conflict in Somalia started to be much more prominent because of the consolidation of the UIC, challenging the TFG, Ethiopia and the Horn. Two news items, on July 29th —“Lasting peace, stability in Somalia crucial for overall security of the Horn”— and August 12th —“Ethiopia committed to ensuring dependable peace, security in Somalia: MoFA”—, illustrate the securitization move happening around the conflict in Somalia. Securing the TFG was underlined not only as fundamental to protect peace, stability and the rule of law in Somalia, Ethiopia, and East Africa, but as the only option. Besides, it aligned the African Union, the IGAD, the “international community” and Ethiopia behind a common objective, defeating terrorism, combating Al-Ithihad and Al-Qaeda and their Eritrean connections in

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Somalia. Ethiopia was then participating with other international actors in the global war on terror, and portrayed as defending core international values such as order and stability.

But this securitization move through speech acts in this newspaper is especially noticeable since December, when the utterances about security multiplied, depicting the UIC as an existential threat to the Ethiopian sovereignty, expecting the people to gather around the government to stand against this aggression for the survival of the state. Nevertheless, these articles are interesting not only because of how they securitize this issue, but also for what they imply about the way the securitization move happens. Beyond the defence of peace, stability and the rule of law in Somalia, the newspaper’s articles affirmed the Ethiopian government's commitment to other principles such as democracy, tolerance and cooperation and portrayed this political project as threatened by the conflict in Somalia.

In this regard, it is possible to consider that this securitization process fits Rita Abrahamsen’s description of securitization moves as gradual and incremental, placed on a continuum in which “the normalcy end of the security spectrum approaches the continent largely in terms of development/humanitarianism, whereas the other extreme places it in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’.” (Abrahamsen, 2005: 59) Playing with this continuum, the Ethiopian government maintains a double discourse, as its commitment to the above-mentioned principles can be questioned by its political practice. While Somalia represents the worst case scenario along this security continuum —being the epitome of the collapsed state concept, Ethiopia successfully presents itself as the hegemon of the region, on which its stability, order and security depend. In addition, as it is the second most populated state in Africa and because of its proximity to the Red Sea and the Bab el Mandeb Detroit —despite not having a direct access to the sea, any regional disorder is perceived by other states as a potential source of concern for international order. Any move aimed at maintaining the status quo easily gathers support.

The intervention officially started on 24th December 2006, and was legitimized by the Ethiopian government as an act of self-defence under international law, following the invitation from the TFG for troops to enter Somalia and combat the UIC. It aligned Ethiopia with other countries in the global war on terror. The main argument for deploying Ethiopian troops was then the protection of the integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia’s territory. The Ethiopian Herald transmitted not only the security concerns expressed by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, but also by other countries like the US and Canada. A point is worth noting here regarding the Ethiopian-US connection in this intervention.

Although it is frequently said that this intervention was undertaken with the direct sponsorship of the United States, the type of support provided by the US is far from being clear and even recognized by

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both parts. This question of the US involvement is not easy to elucidate, as it is neither easy to know how many soldiers were effectively deployed during the different phases of the intervention, nor how many casualties there were. In fact, the decision process around the issue has been characterized by its secrecy, Parliament being consulted in November/December 2006 just to approve the measure. Although some opposition deputies tried to question the intervention, they had no capacity to impede the resolution, as any questioning of it implied an accusation of betrayal.

The Ethiopian government has claimed it received no foreign support, but at the same time fuelled the ambiguity. *The Ethiopian Herald* showed strong support by the international society towards the decision to intervene in Somalia, while exposing the renewal and increase of foreign aid flows. Nevertheless, although the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia is frequently associated with US sponsorship or direction, no evidence has been made public. This does not mean that the US had no knowledge of the Ethiopian decision to intervene but it seems worth not overstating the American factor in the intervention. As Menkhaus puts it: “Though the Ethiopian offensive was not, as has sometimes been falsely portrayed, an instance of the US subcontracting the war of terror to a regional ally (Ethiopia pursued its own interests and would have acted with or without US approval), the US did provide diplomatic, intelligence, and possibly other support to the Ethiopian government in this operation” (Menkhaus, 2009: 3).

It seems prudent then not to overstate or understate the involvement of the United States. This link isn’t clear, for at least two reasons: first, because in military terms, the Ethiopian state is strong enough to bear the costs of the deployment by itself (especially in terms of troops and ammunition) and second, because the United States was not interested in getting closely involved in another war. Although the interests of Ethiopia and the United States seemed to converge, it appears that the Americans were aware of the difficult consequences that engaging directly or overtly supporting Ethiopia might have. Consequently, any direct link has been avoided, which does not mean the absence of any connection.

As Awol Kassim Allo has analyzed, the legality of the intervention might be questioned by the doubtful legitimacy of the TFG government itself as the representative of the Somalia state (Allo, 2009). At the same time, confronting the Ethiopian arguments with international law, “although Ethiopia could be seen to be under an imminent threat of attack triggering the right of recourse to a proportionate response,

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8 As I have been told during the fieldwork, at the beginning 20,000 soldiers were sent to Somalia (14 per cent of the regular troops), and that at the end there were around 8,000. There is no given number of casualties.
9 TEH (2006-12-01), “Parliament endorses resolution to reverse Somali Islamists aggression” and “Meles describes stand of some opposition leaders to stay aloof amidst attacks coming from Somalia as historic hitch”, both in p. 1.
10 TEH (2007), “We have never expected any country to back us; neither we asked anyone to do so – P.M. Meles”, January 3rd, p. 3.
11 This is what can be seen from the document “Somalia: Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa” (US Government, 2006).
it certainly went beyond what is necessary to remove the threat and used a disproportionate force” (Allo, 2010: 167). In this regard, Ethiopia fulfilled the first “felicity condition” necessary, according to Ole Wæver, for a securitization process to be successful. That is, it followed “the conventional ‘plot’ of securitization” presenting an existential threat as legitimizing “the use of extraordinary measures to combat that threat”, the extraordinary measure being the deployment of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, despite doubts about the legitimacy of this intervention (Columba Peoples and Vaughan Williams, 2010: 79).

Furthermore, this conflict also carried historical connotations — the third felicity condition according to Wæver (Columba Peoples and Vaughan Williams, 2010: 79) — likely to contribute to the success of the securitization move. Not only have relations between Somalia and Ethiopia known periods of open conflict, but this move was also related to the recent securitization of Africa as part of the “war on terrorism”. In this regard, this new war is one between Ethiopia and a non-state actor and does not reproduce former confrontations, such as the 1964 and 1977-1978 wars.

Even if the operation was officially depicted as an immediate success, the troops remained in Somalia for two years. The principal reason given for prolonging the intervention was the impossibility of ensuring real control of the territory by the TFG and filling the vacuum created by the departure of Ethiopian troops, although apparently Ethiopia was entrapped, not having an exit plan. The two main factors that help to explain the withdrawal of the troops in January 2009 are, on the one hand, the peace process between TFG and UIC that started in 2008, conditioned later on by the end of the Ethiopian presence in Somalia's territory, and on the other hand the creation and slow deployment of the AMISOM “peacekeeping” force.

The securitization of the Somali conflict following the events of 2006, with the Union of Islamic Courts gathering momentum, presents characteristics going beyond the military sector, as the covering of the issue in The Ethiopian Herald transmits. According to official discourse, the UIC represented a challenge to the Ethiopian state not only in a material or physical way (that is, the survival and continuity of Ethiopian boundaries and the population inside Ethiopia), but in an ideological way too, affecting the political project of the Ethiopian government. Putting the principle of Ethiopian sovereignty at the centre of the agenda, the speech acts about this conflict, along with other decisions of day-to-day politics, helped to reinforce the idea of an inside/outside dichotomy as Robert B. J. Walker has described it: spatially

13 Other researchers have pointed out too that the connections with international terrorist networks were not self-evident, and that as a consequence the importance of the threat might have been overstated; cf. Marchal (2007: 1105).
15 “[…] the Ethiopian army then found itself (like Western militaries in Iraq and Afghanistan) in the classic tar-baby dilemma, where every attempt to attack the problem led to its being still more firmly stuck to it.” (Clapham, 2009: 190).
differentiating the inside of a political community—Ethiopia—associated with peace and security and with the possibility of betterment, from its outside associated to sempiternal sources of conflict and insecurity. (Walker, 1993) Nevertheless, at this time the Ethiopian regime was not facing only the challenge coming from fundamentalist movements in Somalia, but also political difficulties, particularly following the 2005 elections. At that moment, its capacity to promote liberty, peace, security and betterment in the country was being questioned locally and internationally. In this regard, the second of Wæver’s felicity conditions—that the securitizing actor is in a position of authority and has enough social and capital authority—for the success of a securitization move was less evident. The Ethiopian government used the voice of ‘security experts’ and scholars to give legitimacy to the intervention, as before the intervention it was still the target of criticism regarding its authoritarianism after the 2005 elections.

The (in)security issue incarnated by the UIC has to be understood beyond the moment of exception that led to Ethiopian intervention. Through the way the UIC was portrayed as a threat to Ethiopia, the Ethiopian government was able to reconstruct and reinforce its identity, restate its political project and recover its authority. In this regard, the consequences of the successful securitization of the “external” conflict in Somalia extended to “internal” conflicts as well. But this is something that has to be made apparent, or otherwise security remains focused on the threat, without paying attention to what is being secured.

Looking beyond the moment of exception

Situating speech acts in their broader political context is fundamental if we are to grasp the consequences of this securitization process. As pointed out before, the securitization of Somalia by the Ethiopian government served to state a commitment to principles such as democracy, peace and order and to international law too, at a moment when the government’s compliance with that commitment was questioned. Nevertheless, portraying itself as the opposite of Somalia, Ethiopia tended to reassert it and come closer to the international society. Beyond this self-portrait, the implications and consequences of this securitization move cannot be assessed without understanding what is being securitized.


The Ethiopian elections in 2005 and the “local” context

Most of the works that have tackled the question of the Ethiopian intervention have done so working on the conflict in Somalia. Although some articles have dealt with the Ethiopian intervention by focusing on the Ethiopian government position, pointing to the need “to look back at the context in which the military intervention occurred in order to understand better the Ethiopian strategy” (Fanta, 2007),\(^\text{18}\) it is still necessary to deepen and broaden the approach beyond the military, and particularly to understand how it relates to the Ethiopian socio-political context. Furthermore, given the multiple actors involved and the complexity of the scenario, it is necessary to enlarge the understanding from the spatial point of view and broaden the temporal framework to highlight how different political agendas intertwined. As Kjetil Tronvoll has done in his work on the Ethiopian democratization process, highlighting different times and phases instead of focusing exclusively on the electoral process (Tronvoll, 2009), the intervention should be understood not limiting comprehension only to its development from December 2006 to January 2009.

The Ethiopian incursion into Somalia territory started one year and a half after the controversial national and regional elections of May 2005.\(^\text{19}\) This electoral process produced a “crisis of governance” that can be related to the “expression of much deeper problems that derive from the inherent contradictions of state creation and maintenance in a perennially violent corner of Africa” (Clapham, 2009: 181). These elections put in question the legitimacy of the government and its state model for some local and international actors. At the same time, the intervention in Somalia was geared to protect this political project threatened by the UIC, but was also questioned by other actors in the Ethiopian political realm.

While the openness of the pre-election period and election day has been recognized — at least in the urban areas — and is visible in the backlash the government experienced from voters, the post-electoral developments showed a high level of authoritarianism.\(^\text{20}\) The demonstrations that took place in Addis Ababa in June and November 2005, ending in the death of demonstrators shot by police, numerous arrests and the imprisonment of the main opposition politicians (especially of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy – CUD), journalists and social activists, exposed the violence of the Meles Zenawi’s regime and its fear of losing power (Lyons, 2005; Amnesty International, 2006: 4).

The Ethiopian government’s reaction initially constituted a drawback to its legitimacy in the eyes of the main donors in the international society. Nevertheless, if at first they threatened Ethiopia with cutting the aid on which the Ethiopian budget was heavily dependent, as the opposition was asking, this threat did not materialize (Muchie, 2006; Woldemariam, 2005). On the contrary, and as reported in The Ethiopian

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\(^{18}\) See also Bamfo (2010).

\(^{19}\) In the Somali region the elections took place in August due to logistical and infrastructural problems.

\(^{20}\) The European Observation Mission stated that “the high level of participation by the Ethiopian people and the opening of public debate prior to election day marked a significant development towards democracy in Ethiopia”, although as René Lefort has pointed out, this may have been the case mainly in the urban zones but not in the rural areas. Cf. EU Election Observation Mission in Ethiopia (2005: 5) and Lefort, René (2007). For an assessment of Ethiopian authoritarianism shown in the 2005 elections, cf. Abbink (2006).
Herald, embassies finally renewed their support, foreign governments kept funding the main development projects and, as in the case of Spain, even consolidated their relationship by raising their cooperation substantially. The European Union Electoral Observation Mission seems to have said what the European governments did not wanted to say, thereby avoiding being tied by their statements. This made it possible to maintain a key ally in the global war on terror. (Borchgrevink, 2008: 210-215)

Since 2005 the EPRDF has worked to recover its control over the country, and has done so, as stated above, with a double discourse, committing itself to democratic changes while actually restricting political liberties. The executive has shown strong control of the judiciary system, for example with the imprisonments mentioned, despite the release of most of them in 2007. And as was visible in the 2010 elections, the five years between elections were fatal for the opposition, who failed to maintain their coalition. In addition, during this interval, very restrictive laws were passed, tightening the Ethiopian social and political space: an amendment to the electoral law in 2007, the press law in 2008 and the charities act and antiterrorist law of 2009. These laws restricted the democratic space and civil liberties, increasing fear and suspicion in the Ethiopian population, and allowing more control over the international cooperation. The result has been a more severe state and government.

Nevertheless, the electoral process of 2005 can probably be better understood in the light of the preceding one in 2000 and of the impact on it of the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war: “The 2005 election thus follows in the same path as the previous ones, as they ‘revealed major constraints in Ethiopia’s political system, underlining that after the regimes of Emperor Haile Sellassie (1930–74) and the military leader Mengistu (1974–91), centralist authoritarianism is not gone but perhaps is being reinvented in a new form’.” (Tronvoll, 2009: 464) As the 2000 elections had been a clear demonstration of the non-democratic nature of the EPRDF regime (Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen, 2002), so the 2005 ones were too, and those in 2010 even more. At the same time, maybe it is not too adventurous to say that, as the Ethio-Eritrean war of 2000 was used to awake state nationalism, the intervention in Somalia was also instrumentalized.21

The intervention had the effect of reasserting the Ethiopian government on a state level, and particularly in the Somali Regional State. Politics in this region had been a problem for the EPRDF since the end of the Derg, as the ONLF never joined the coalition, defending the absolute secession of the Ogaden. In 2007, the intervention in Somalia melted with the fight between the government and the ONLF, especially when it targeted an oilfield exploited by a Chinese company in April. Additionally, the intervention served to combat the Oromo opposition through the OLF, with bases in Somalia and Kenya, and backed as the ONLF by Eritrea and the UIC. These links between Eritrea, ONLF, OLF and the Somalia conflicts have been acknowledged by the UN Monitoring Group as well.

Through an ambiguous federalism, with a constitution that recognises on the paper the right to secede but a government that controls *de facto* all the regions with a network of affiliated regional-ethnic parties, the EPRDF has managed to control the elections through different political parties, as in the Somali region. Especially since 1998 the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP) affiliated to EPRDF has been governing the region, and accused by its critics of being an incarnation of the Addis Ababa colonialism in the Ogaden. This interpretation of the inclusion of the Ogaden in Ethiopia has its detractors, but it shows that the construction of the Ethiopian state (as any other) is still going on, and is related to the colonial period, when the expansion of the Ethiopian state and the definition of its present borders took place.22

The Ethiopian intervention should be addressed bearing in mind this ongoing state-building process, especially as it had different and simultaneous battle fronts, that in addition have existed all the lifetime of the EPRDF regime, especially against Eritrea and armed opposition movements contesting the predominance of Addis Ababa in their regions (ONLF, OLF). All were labelled as “terrorists”, but this strategy blurs the different political aims each one of them support and their different trajectories, as well as the political aims and means of the Meles Zenawi’s regime in these regions. At the same time, regarding the front against extremists groups in Somalia, and taking into account the two previous Ethio-Somali wars, in 1964 under Haile Selassie and in 1977-1978 during the Derg regime, although the intervention can be understood as the third Ethio-Somalia war, having the border question in common with the two previous wars, this time it was more than a bilateral confrontation. For these reasons, and following Christopher Clapham’s understanding of the maintenance of the Meles Zenawi regime (Clapham, 2009), it is important to understand how the local overlaps with the regional and international political realms.

Melting the local, regional and international levels

Buzan and Wæver considered the Horn of Africa one decade ago as a proto regional security complex (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 241-243). Nevertheless, the multiplicity of actors involved in the Somalia conflict and the diversity of issues at stake in the Ethiopian intervention make us think that the HoA nowadays is actually a regional security complex. The two main reasons given by Buzan and Waever do not seem sufficient nowadays to question the current intertwinement of security dynamics in the region, even more if we consider the recent independence of South Sudan, a new landlocked country. First, it seems problematic to assume that “the lack of much significant linkage between the Ethiopia–Somalia dynamics on the one side, and the Ethiopia–Sudan ones on the other” imply merely “a chain of localisms without any clearly defined regional pattern of security interdependence” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 242). Indeed, although the Sudan-South Sudan-Somalia connection may not be apparent, Ethiopia is a strong

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22 For different accounts on what was happening in Somali Region at the moment, cf. Samatar (2004), Hagmann, Khalif (2006), Hagmann (2005).
enough link between those countries to consider their political dynamics as connected. This is particularly noteworthy regarding the regional implication of the natural resource management and the regional dimension of the Ethiopian regime economic projects, especially the construction of pipelines, railroads and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. In addition, their environmental impact and effects on other regional states have been a source of tension as well. As a result, the deployment of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, along the Ethio-Eritrean border, and in international missions in Sudan also has to do with the need to maintain regional stability for the development of these projects. (Bach, 2012: 150-152) Additionally, the fact that regional boundaries may not seem clear does not mean there are no regional security connections, as the recent involvement of Kenya in Somalia shows as well. This would point more to the colonial legacy in African politics and ongoing state-building dynamics, with states like Kenya participating in various regional security complexes.

As a result, the regional level of the intervention goes beyond its bilateral appearance. The Union of Islamic Courts was apparently defeated very quickly, but the reason why Ethiopia stayed longer probably is not simply because it had no exit plan (which is something that seems to be accepted by different analysts) or that it was invited to stay longer by the TFG. In Terrence Lyons words: “To Ethiopia, the potential that these threats would increase over time –rather than the ideology of the Islamic Courts, their irredentist claims, or their ties to Al-Qaeda– compelled a response. Ethiopia acted pre-emptively by providing the military might to drive the UIC out of Mogadishu, to end the safe havens offered Ethiopia’s enemies, and to bring the TFG to power in the Somali capital.” (Lyons, 2009: 174) For the government it was the occasion to realize its own ‘local’ political agenda and to reassert itself beyond the region.

Internationally, this intervention gave Ethiopia something of vital importance: the opportunity to present itself as the core country in the Horn of Africa rather than a new source of trouble, taking advantage of the political contrast with its two neighbours, Eritrea and Somalia, despite the 2005 elections. This is not to downgrade Ethiopian government concern regarding the consolidation of the UIC. Indeed, Ethiopia tried between June and October 2006 to bring the TFG and UIC to the same table, and negotiate with the UIC, and resorted to the military option when it became clear that they were not reaching any common view. But the way Al-Itihad and Al-Shabaab were depicted as a threat, also helped to reinforce the Meles Zenawi regime at a critical moment.

As a result, at a broader international level, it served to reassert the country as the key to the Horn’s order and stability and by extension as a protector of the international order. The justification of the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia in terms of international law can be interpreted in this sense. As pointed out above, two arguments were used by Ethiopia to legitimate the presence of its troops in

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23 This was the government’s explanation: TEH (2009), “Ethiopia had to defend clear and present danger-triangular enemies”, January 31, p. 9.
Somalia: self-defence, and the request by the TFG. The government succeeded in using the communicative and legitimizing functions of international law (Onuma, 2003), sending a message to the international society of its compliance with international standards and framework, and appeasing any possible opposition.

This move was highly successful, as neither the African Union nor the UN Security Council condemned Ethiopian intervention in Somalia. This discretionary policy is related in turn to the securitization of Africa. The securitization of Somalia by the Ethiopian regime situated Ethiopia on an equal footing with other states in the global war on terror and helped to legitimize its role in the international society. As Rita Abrahamsen has explained in relation to British foreign policy under Tony Blair, particularly since September 11th, the underdevelopment of Africa was turned into a security issue. The security and development agendas were intertwined, associating underdevelopment with conflict, and Somalia was depicted as the epitome of this connection (Abrahamsen, 2005). Although it could be considered that it had not generated emergency actions, as Abrahamsen pointed out, the Horn was a forerunner of this process. And this appeared to be even more urgent following the participation of Eritreans, Somalians and Ethiopians in the failed London bombings on 21st July 2005.

The intervention in Somalia was indeed an emergency action, possible partly because once again Ethiopia succeeded in managing the terrorist concerns of the international political agenda to its benefit. Nevertheless, beyond any legitimate concern in 2006 regarding the evolution of the conflict in Somalia, this securitization move served also to improve domination of the Ethiopian society by the Meles Zenawi government. The securitization of Somalia helped to legitimize Ethiopian engagement in the country, and was complemented by justification from international law. But just as New Labour's securitization of Africa “can be seen as a powerful political strategy that shapes and maintains the unity of [the] political community” (Abrahamsen, 2005: 68), for Ethiopia this securitization move served in a similar vein, at the level of both Ethiopian society and the international society. Foreign aid kept flowing towards Ethiopia, and Meles Zenawi managed not only to maintain but even to strengthen its international presence, as his participation in main international forums such as G8 Summits or The Commission for Africa demonstrates.

Interpreting the securitization and its consequences

Ethiopia's securitizing speech acts about the conflict in Somalia were fundamental to legitimize the adoption of an exceptional political measure like its intervention. Nevertheless, situating this conflict in a wider context, both temporarily and spatially, allows us to connect the securitization move with other political agendas at local, regional and international levels. Statements like the ones in The Ethiopian

25 In 2006 Ethiopia received 1.9 billion dollars per year that represented 25 per cent of the GNP; cf. Lefort (2006).
Herald contributed to the construction of a contradictory "regime of truth" that simultaneously reproduces and questions the commitment to ethical and legal principles such as democracy and human rights. This double discourse has clear implications for Ethiopian society, and at the same time it is not unique to the Ethiopian government as it is also a feature of the international society.

Discourses need to be understood as producing socio-political relations, while the accompanying practices contribute to the creation of identities (Foucault, 2007; Fournier, 2012: 24). In this vein, in Ethiopia this securitization discourse and the subsequent intervention had an effect on power relations and shaped the socio-political landscape. They helped to portray the state and government as committed to democracy, humanitarianism, peace, order and collective security. Through statements on the conflict, the political opposition was questioned and depicted as a source of disorder, while the identity of Ethiopia was built as a unified nation rallied under and defended by the TPLF/EPRDF since the fall of the Derg.26

These utterances are nevertheless problematic, particularly their contribution to silence. It is evident that since 2005 there has been no progress regarding the democratic space in Ethiopia. On the contrary, different laws were passed that contributed to close the political scene even more and especially to resist external questioning of this closure, in order to ensure a greater capacity for manoeuvre for the government. Indeed, the Ethiopian regime has consolidated its position in the international arena despite the fact that the elections in 2010 and 2013 fell short of being democratic. In practice then, the TPLF/EPRDF performs an identity that questions the veracity of its commitment to democracy and by extension any international agenda related to it. While it adapts its discourse to the international political zeitgeist and utilise its vocabulary to gain international legitimacy and support, at the same time it resists some of those principles, undermining their meaning and questioning their legitimacy as international principles.

Beyond that, just as “It may be instructive to understand the ‘new terrorism’ as part of the ‘unfinished revolt against the West’” (Devetak, 2005: 242-243), the Ethiopian securitization of Somalia can be interpreted likewise pointing to an unfinished construction of the international society. Behind the appearance created through speech acts, the intervention has challenged international principles and rules such as freedom, democracy and human rights, and questioned through it the global distribution of power. Neither more nor less tacit support for this intervention coming from other members of the international society has contributed to the consolidation of those principles. The resurgence of terrorism as much as the responses given to it have contributed to challenge their implementation (Hurrell, 2007: 162-164)

26 TEH (2007), “Opposition needs to redress its mistakes on Somalia issue”, January 5th, p. 3; TEH (2007), “EPRDF has addressed the challenge on the road to peace, democracy and development effectively – Tefera Walwa, Minister of Capacity Building”, May 29th, p. 3.
This political landscape reflects that the Ethiopian state is, as any other, a work in progress, just as the international society is. What is problematic is that the consequences of those political issues, articulated through the issues of security and order within the society of states, as much in Ethiopia as in other states, are detrimental to the life of individuals and societies in these states, and how states may produce human wrongs. In this regard, critical security studies can be extended beyond Europe. The securitization of Africa can be seen as problematic as it has not contributed to tackling structural and long term troubles (Abrahamsen, 2006). Similarly, the securitization of Somalia has reinforced illiberal practices in Ethiopia. This is not to deny the problem that fundamentalisms pose but to reassert the problem of the manner in which it is addressed, as it fuels local and international inequalities. This kind of order might not be positive for any common social existence.

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SECURITY STAKES AND CHALLENGES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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Introduction

The aim of this article is to make a contribution to the analysis of African solutions to the continental crises emerging from the Horn of Africa. It bases its findings on my experiences in a career as a French officer and numerous researches studies in the field since 2007.

In Addis Ababa, the seat of the African organization, the festivities of the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the Organization of African Unity (1963) and its successor, the African Union (AU), will be chaired by the AU president, Ethiopian Prime minister Haylă Maryam Dessalegn. Just like the European Union (27 states), the AU (54 states) is an example of advanced complex and regional integration.

Africa is a continent where peace and security problems persist and show no sign of decreasing. The recent creation of two UN missions for Mali and Somalia and the situation in the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo are examples of disruption of peace and international security.

Since 2002, Africa has established protocols and mechanisms and created its own organization to try to solve its peace and security problems. This African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) should be operational in 2015 after a few years of increase in power strongly supported by American and European partners. At the same time as this difficult challenge, despite few reforms in security sectors, African armies remain at a low operational level and do not have the will to get involved in the African continent.

Having presented the strategic interest of the Horn of Africa, we will assess peace and security in the most conflict-torn region in Africa. The peace and security structure foreseen by the APSA a few years ago has evolved and is a goal in view of the plurality of the committed actors. This region is a laboratory of types of intervention and thus of resolution of conflicts. Three states, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, are very committed in diverse military operations. The example of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces concretely shows an appropriation of the reform of the security sector adapted to the country and its geopolitical environment. Having analyzed the security stakes, we shall suggest some paths for the future of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa.
The strategic interest of the Horn of Africa

Only a few miles from the Arabian Peninsula and thus near seaways vital to the world economy, the Horn of Africa is a strategic area. The French and American military presences underline this. It nevertheless remains a geographical space mentioned (in the media) for plagues such as maritime piracy, forced migration, humanitarian crises and war.

The Horn of Africa continues to illustrate a paradox: even when numerous regional actors are committed to peacekeeping or support operations, this region remains the most conflict-torn of the continent. It includes a large part of the problems of different forms of war - interstate, intra-state, by proxy. All states of the Horn of Africa are in conflict or major crisis.

South Sudan acquired its independence after a civil war lasting more than 20 years (Geoffroy, 2012: 8-11; Raimbaud, 2012: 335-375). The first months of this new status ended in an armed conflict with its neighbour to the north. In spite of calls for restraint and dialogue, it is not very likely that these two states will cease their disputes.

Uganda is marked by an old, little known conflict which widely overflows its borders. The fight against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) very quickly entered the current South Sudan and a few years ago the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic.

Eritrea opposed Yemen for the sovereignty of the Hanish islands in the Red Sea (Reid, 2009: 131-149). Both states accepted French mediation and an international decision on the distribution of islands.¹

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea lasted two years (1998-2000) and between 50,000 and 100,000 people died. Further to the peace agreement signed on December 12th 2000 in Algiers, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and a border demarcation committee were set up. The committee had to stop its demarcation work on the ground at the end of 2007 and the UNMEE withdrew in July 2008. It was a new situation in which a United Nations mission accepted by both belligerent parties had to give up. The two states are now in a situation of “neither peace, nor war”, mobilizing a great deal of their army.

The border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea led to limited confrontations in June 2008. So far, Qatari mediation has made no fundamental advances on the ground.

Somalia has faced a civil war and several foreign interventions since 1991 (Fontrier, 2012: 5-25). The most recent were that with Ethiopia from December 2006 to January 2009 and Ethiopia and Kenya since the end of 2011. The embryonic Somalian army trained in Uganda and supported by the AMISOM fights Shabaab, which makes regular attacks thereby weakening the state reconstruction process.

¹ The conflict started in 1995.
As we have just seen, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia are in crises where armies are present in peacekeeping or support missions and also national interventions.

**UN peacekeeping operations**

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations manages and supports 16 operations, two of which are in Africa. The last one, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission was created on April 25th, 2013. The operations account for 94,035 uniformed personnel, 79,693 of whom are military observers and soldiers and 12,540 police officers. There are also 16,971 civilian personnel and 2,089 United Nations volunteers. A total of around 113,000 people are allocated to peacekeeping operations. The budget is $7.33 billion dollars for the year from July 1st, 2012 to June 30th, 2013.

Only half of the peacekeeping operations are in Africa but they monopolize 75 per cent of United Nations personnel. Their weight is thus extremely important and Africa is the main place of their deployment.

Three major operations are taking place in the Horn of Africa and underline the importance of the security stakes in this region. They are related to the consequences of the conflict between North and South Sudan and the independence of South Sudan.

*The United Nations Mission for Abyei*

Security Council Resolution 1990 of June 27th, 2011 reacted to the urgent situation in the Abyei area of Sudan by creating the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The Security Council was deeply worried about the violence, escalation of tensions and people's movements. The force's mission is to check the tense border zone between North and South and it is authorized to use force to protect civilians and humanitarian workers in the Abyei area. It was set up after the Sudan Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) reached an agreement in Addis Ababa to demilitarize Abyei and allow Ethiopian forces to control the area. At the end of the UN Security Council mission, the UNISFA will control and check redeployment of all the Sudanese armed forces and MPLS forces or the entity that will succeed it outside the Abyei area. This area will be demilitarized and only the UNISFA and the Abyei police will have to be present. In case of need and in cooperation with the Abyei police, UNISFA troops will also ensure the security of the oil infrastructure there. On March 31st, 2013, it comprised 3,977 uniformed personnel, 3,827 of whom were soldiers, 140 military observers and 10 police

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2 The mission in Afghanistan is a political mission.

3 The other missions are deployed in Liberia, South Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Western Sahara, Abyei and the Ivory Coast.
officers, plus 146 international civilian staff members, local civilians and volunteers. Ethiopia has been involved in the agreements between Sudan and South Sudan and supplies almost the entire contingent of troops in the mission.

The United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council Resolution 1769 of July 31st, 2007 authorized UNAMID to take all necessary measures in the sectors where its contingents would be deployed and as far as its capacities allowed. UNAMID will protect its staff, places, installations and equipment and ensure the security and free circulation of its personnel and humanitarian agents. It will facilitate the fast and effective implementation of the Peace Agreement for Darfur, prevent any disturbance and armed attacks and protect civilians without prejudice to the responsibility of the Sudanese Government. It will contribute to restoring the necessary security conditions for humanitarian assistance throughout Darfur and to the protection of people threatened by physical violence. For its mandate, the UNAMID has 20,071 uniformed personnel (14,902 soldiers, 311 military observers and 4,858 policemen) and 4,434 international civilian staff members, local civilians and volunteers.  

With a staff of about 25,000 people, UNAMID is the most important mission in the Horn of Africa.

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

Having determined that the situation facing South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and the security in the region and acting according to the Chapter of the UN Charter, Security Council Resolution 1996 of July 8, 2011 set up the UNMISS. Its mandate aims at strengthening peace and the new state and promoting long-term economic development. It will support the government in the exercise of its responsibilities regarding prevention, mitigation and regulation of conflicts; help it to insure security, set up the rule of law and strengthen the police and justice sectors. On March 31st 2013, it comprised 7,259 uniformed personnel (6,560 soldiers, 143 military observers and 556 police officer) and 2,598 international civilian staff members, local civilians and volunteers.

These three missions help to ensure security in both Sudans and are fundamental elements in support for the construction of the state of the South Sudan.

Other institutions or partners support United Nations in the peace and security missions.

The missions of the African Union (AU) and external partners

Two missions are in progress in the Horn of Africa: the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army.

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4 March 31, 2013.
AMISOM was created by decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council on January 19th, 2007 and confirmed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744. Its mandate is to provide support for the federal transition institutions in their efforts to stabilize the situation in the country and the continuation of dialogue and reconciliation, facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid and create the right conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia. It evolved in face of the threat from Al Shabaab and opposition groups in Somalia.

Five contributors sent troops within the framework of the AMISOM. Uganda (6,223 soldiers) and Burundi (5,432) were the first, elements of this African force. They were joined by Djibouti (960) and Kenya (4,652) and 850 soldiers from Sierra Leone are expected soon.

AMISOM is an African force of more than 15,000 people allocated to the stabilization of the Somalian state in terms of security and the reconstruction of its institutions.

The first activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) took place in Uganda in 1987. They crossed national borders for several years and thus raised a grave regional security problem. Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Sudan and the Central African Republic were affected by LRA troop movements, which we recently estimated at 400 people. To put an end to this conflict, which was responsible for 100,000 deaths, 20,000 kidnappings of children and about a million displaced persons in the north of the country, the African Union set up a regional cooperation initiative against the LRA in November 22nd 2011 (decision of the Peace and Security Council). Its mission is to fight the LRA and strengthen the operational capacities of countries affected by its activities. Four countries decided to allocate contingents of troops. At the end of February 2013, 3,360 people were dedicated to this initiative.

While the will of the African Union to fight against the LRA is justified, it collides with the military limits and geopolitical situation of the states concerned. Only Uganda, concerned primarily and supported by American military advisors, showed an effort to combat the threat.

The European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) is a military mission aimed at strengthening the Somalian national government and institutions by giving military training to the Somalian national armed forces. It was launched to support United Nations Security Council Resolution 1872 (2009). It is part of the EU’s global approach to challenges in the Horn of Africa. This action’s main goal is to train the new Somalian army. The mission is located at two sites in Uganda. The general staff is in Kampala and the training is given in Bihanga. It has trained 3,000 troops.

The dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea began in March, 2008 following Eritrea’s deployment of troops and military equipment to Ras Doumeira and the island of Doumeira, both administered by Djibouti in an area where the border remains a de facto line because of divergent former colonial agreements.

5 Uganda (3,000) – CAR (360) – South Sudan (500) – DRC (500).
6 12 Djiboutian soldiers were killed between the 10 and the 13 June, 2008. 60 were wounded.
The agreement between Eritrea and Djibouti under the mediation of Qatar on June 6th, 2010 specifies that both countries agree to solve their border dispute by a negotiated agreement and entrust Qatar with setting up a mechanism to facilitate the demarcation of the border, control the border and solve the question of prisoners of war and missing persons. Hundreds of Qatari soldiers are in the mission.

The Horn of Africa is a region where United Nations peacekeeping troops are deployed to support African Union missions and the European and Qatari initiatives. They are connected to building, disintegration or reconfiguration of the state. They help to put an end to violence. They take place in an African context of a will to manage the conflicts in the continent.7

**The new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)**

On succeeding the Organization of African Unity, the African Union developed its perception of peace and security in the continent. The decision to create a Peace and Security Council (PSC - Protocol of July 9th, 2002) and its official launch in 2004 was a major act for the new African institution. It consists of fifteen representative members of five African regions and there is no right of veto.

Its objectives are the promotion of the peace, security and stability in Africa, the prevention and anticipation of conflicts and the promotion of peace building and reconstruction after conflicts. The PSC leans mainly on regional economic communities, regional mechanisms and the African Standby Force to achieve its objectives.8 The ASF should have an intervention brigade per region by 2015. It derives from the African concern to react with African means for regulation of crises in Africa. It must be able to be deployed on short notice and consists of permanent general staffs and readiness units in their country of origin.

In the Horn of Africa, for the East Brigade, it was necessary to create a special organization to include the states9 that wished to join it, the Eastern African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM), which replaced the temporary coordination structure of the IGAD.10 EASFCOM includes IGAD states and also the Indian Ocean Commission and the East African Community.

To satisfy both regional powers of the EASFCOM, certain components are situated in Ethiopia (headquarters of the brigade and the logistics base) and others in Kenya (Planning Element, International Peace Support Training Centre). This distribution presents handicaps (in terms of cohesion) due to location in two different geographical areas.
The Amani Africa exercise cycle was launched in 2008 to estimate the African Standby Forces. The last stage will take place in Botswana at the end of 2014 and should end in certification of the ASF. This cycle took place within the EU / AU partnership.

The implementation of the APSA and thus the increase in power of the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism evolves according to the balance of power between African countries in political and military potential (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi). The lack of regional cohesion hinders the development of EASFCOM. Furthermore, this strength seems very dependent on the international support.

If the African Peace and Security Architecture increases in power, it will be effective and operational only if the military actors (the national armies) are capable of making the necessary contributions for the deployment of the African Standby Forces.

The conflict in Mali and the rebellion in the Central African Republic caused analysts to question the value of the African armies. From the headline of the French Jeune Afrique journal (“Why are they so hopeless?” of December, 2012) to that in Africa Report (“African armies are better than you think” of April, 2013), this question remains and has not found a satisfactory global answer. What about all the cooperation programmes with the European and American armies? Where are the programmes launched under the concept of reform of the security sector? Every army is a particular case and requires an appropriate study. It is also connected to the state and its construction.

To illustrate our comment, it seems worthwhile to study the increasing importance of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) since 1991 (Ferras, 2011). It could supply a reference framework.

**African military actors, the example of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF)**

In 1991, the Tegray and Eritrea liberation movement defeated the Ethiopian army, one of the most powerful in Africa. After the fall of the Marxist military dictatorship of Mängestu Haylä Maryam, Ethiopia built a transitional government for four years. It drafted the new constitution (1994). The government's priority was military reorganization on its constitutional side and its weight in relation to the government (budgetary costs, staff). According to the Constitution (Articles 51 and 86), Ethiopian defence policy is based on four principles:

1. Defend the sovereignty of national territory;
2. Protect national interests (ensuring national independence);
3. Intervene in case of deterioration of the situation in one of the federated states when it can no longer be controlled;
4. Seek and support peaceful solutions to international disputes (litigation, conflicts).
These principles provide a clear framework for national defence in Ethiopia. The bulk of power in this area is in the hands of the Prime Minister who is the commander in chief of the armed forces. The Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces assist him. General Gäbrä Tsadqan Gäbrä Tänsaë, chief of staff until 2001, who fought against the dictatorship of Mängestu Haylä Maryam for sixteen years, played a key role in developing the concept of the Ethiopian armed forces. He defined the characteristics of a national army and they have been incorporated in the Constitution and army doctrine. The national army remains under the orders of political power and is a safeguard of the constitution and the Nation.

The first action taken by the transitional government was to demobilize most of the national army (Fontrier, 2012: 10-25). Indeed, its excess strength did not meet priorities, which were the reconstruction of the state, development and the fight against poverty. The first demobilization (and disarmament) returned to civilian life approximately 403,000 soldiers including 38,000 war invalids. Some managers whose specificities were essential to the reorganization and did not have direct relationships with the Därg regime have been maintained in the new national army. The role of the national army during the transition period was played by the armed forces of the main opposition movement, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front which led the fall of Mängestu Haylä Maryam.

The Constitution provides that the composition of the armed forces must reflect a fair representation of the “peoples, nations and nationalities” that make up Ethiopia. The army faced a second demobilization. In 1991, the people under arms came mainly from the Tegray People Liberation Front and 30,000 of them were returned to civilian life in 1995 to satisfy the principle of stability of the nations, nationalities and people that make up Ethiopia. Meanwhile, a recruitment campaign began especially in regions under-represented in the national army. While maintaining the defence capacity in the country, the army underwent two major demobilizations in three years. In 1998, the army had not completed its transfer and during the reorganization it was difficult to consider dealing with a major commitment. The armed forces had 50,000 to 60,000 troops (Army and Air Force, the abandoned Navy).

The conflict lasted two years and resulted in 50,000 to 100,000 deaths. The Ethiopians and the new Ethiopian army were surprised. The authorities had to mobilize, train and deploy their troops quickly. In 1999, the Ethiopians took over Badme after heavy fighting and recovered all the territories they had controlled before the conflict in May 2000.

At the end of the conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s national defence forces underwent their third demobilization in less than ten years. The armed forces in 2008 stabilized at between 140,000 and 150,000 men. Today they are around 135,000. The defence budget declined and was around 1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product in 2012.

In December 2006, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia called for Ethiopia’s help against the establishment of an Islamic state. Ethiopian troops entered Somalia in December 2006.
and quickly routed the Islamic Courts Union forces. The Ethiopian presence lasted two years and ended in early 2009 because of the withdrawal announced by the Government of Ethiopia. A second deployment of troops occurred at the end of 2011 to help the Somali army, AMISOM and the Kenyan army to fight against Al Shabaab. The end of this intervention had been announced by the Prime minister in April 2013.

In addition to these three major conflicts, Ethiopian National Defence Forces intervened in the national sphere and also for the benefit of the international community. The ENDF was the fourth contributor to UN peacekeeping operations with 6,514 troops deployed. This involvement with the international community also came with participation in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Ethiopia was also involved in the concept of the African Standby Force (ASF).

Ethiopia, which had underestimated its geopolitical environment during the first years of the post-Mängestu period, readjusted its defence instrument by taking account of its conflict with Eritrea, which marked a regional break. The intervention of Ethiopian troops in Somalia definitively let Ethiopia in to its regional area.

The plans for the reorganization of the ENDF before the fall of Mängestu did not envisage the Ethiopian army as we know it today. The first years of the period devoted internal geopolitics to the organization of armed forces. The conflict with Eritrea showed that an army was also connected to its geopolitical environment. The ENDF is thus the product of Ethiopia's internal and external geopolitics.

The example of the Ethiopian army and its reorganization underline the need to adapt the reforms of the military instrument by taking account of national specificities and also the geopolitical environment of the state in question. In view of the level of conflict in Africa, armies must not be neglected in a perspective of national or international commitment.

**Some lines of reflection on security and challenges in the Horn of Africa**

It seems clear that the regionalization in Africa is far from finished and that rivalries between regional organizations, states and the African Union are still great (Gnanguenon, 2010). The Horn of Africa does not escape this lack of coherence between geographical regions and from regional economic communities. The rivalries in the domains of peace and security led to the creation of a coordination mechanism (EASFCOM). But the IGAD and the EAC continue to take their own action in these particular fields. The African Union does not seem to have enough recognized authority “to rationalize” the structures and avoid unsatisfactory “doubles”. The commitment of numerous actors to internal conflicts in the region but also marginally out of the region does not help to clarify the situation.

The financial aspect remains essential and the AU and EASFCOM are dependent on international contributions. The Chinese donations for the construction of the African Union headquarters

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11 China offered the new headquarters and paid more than 250 million dollars.
in Addis Ababa and AMISOM are recent examples. Without international intervention, the African Peace and Security Architecture is blocked. The Mali donors’ conference in Addis Ababa in February 2013 showed this. Less than a fifth of the 480 million dollars required was brought by Africa. The budget of the African Union is 278 million dollars in 2013 (Africa Report, May 2013). Another example is the London Conference for Somalia (May 7th, 2013) which was able to find 300 million dollars in international aid. The APSA is a necessary project for Africa and its future. But this project is very ambitious and too dependent on external donations.

The common African defence and security policy drafted in 2004 should be taken back and set out in a white paper on defence and security in Africa to lay foundations accepted by all and taking into account experiences of the first decade of the APSA. It would make a balanced assessment of the African armies, equipment and efforts needed to reach a common goal.

In the Horn of Africa, the EASFCOM remains a major challenge both in the organization and capacities of military intervention. EASFCOM is therefore delaying its commitment, in particular in Somalia. As Colonel Metayer pointed out during a colloquium (2011, in Paris) on Somalia, “It would bring a more convenient framework to balance the levers of action between pressure, diplomatic dialogue and development aid” and could “assert its point of view and its voice to contribute completely to the resolution of an African crisis”.

The troops of the main military actors in the Horn of Africa were committed in Somalia. Ethiopia and Kenya showed an interest in having forces and committing them in a national context for the conservation of their interests. They underlined that they could precede a peace support operation, be launched in parallel or become part of it. The various commitments in Somalia open opportunities to develop scenarios for the African Standby Force. To be achieved, it is necessary to have a reactive, operational military tool. The Horn of Africa has an expertise on the subject that it would be good to include in future reflections.

The intervention in Mali and Somalia shows that the main military operations will be carried out by some leading nations in Africa that have a military capacity and recognized leadership. Their action would have an attractive effect on the small African military nations.

Large-scale military actions require assets in strategic transport, intelligence and targeting and planning capacities. Only the continental level of the African Union would be able to plan, manage and acquire these assets, which cannot be acquired by a single African state.

**Conclusion**

The challenges and the security stakes in the Horn of Africa are gigantic. By welcoming a third of the United Nations peacekeeping troops, it has reached a level of unbearable conflict for both the
continent and its countries. The first decade of the African Peace and Security Architecture laid the foundations of an organization and try to lean on regions to find solutions. 2015 will validate the concept of the African Standby Force.

But the commitment difficulties for political and military reasons do not have to block attempts to anticipate or solve crises. If standby brigades can be useful, they will not provide all the solutions, in particular during complex crises. The states whose national interests will be affected by a conflict will always reserve the possibility of making a unilateral commitment or forming ad hoc coalitions. The Horn of Africa is a laboratory that opens paths of reflection or studies of the future of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Bibliography


AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA) SUBSIDIARITY AND THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)

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Introduction

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is to become the main reference for security in the region, including cases where a peace enforcement mission needs to be deployed.

Subsidiarity has been proposed as the main principle for governing inter-institutional relationships within APSA, between the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations (SRO), and between the AU (as the central body of APSA) and the United Nations (UN). The subsidiarity principle entails three elements: a decision-making mechanism, the division of labour and burden sharing. But there is a lack of consensus on how these are to be implemented (African Union, 2012).

This paper looks at the possible challenges in the implementation of the subsidiarity principle and its elements. Using hegemonic stability theory it analyses two unsuccessful security initiatives at the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD): the 2005 to 2011 process of enlargement of the security mandate and the proposed 2005/6 IGAD mission to Somalia.

The selection of IGAD is justified as it is the regional economic community (REC) best positioned to take on full security functions alongside ECOWAS and SADC. The choice of processes is due to a focus on enforcement missions as the most significant security function and the aim of capturing unsuccessful cases as best illustrations of shortfalls.

Hegemony and subsidiarity

Hegemony

Hegemony theory has been developed by Marxists, international relations theorists and international political economists alike. According to hegemonic stability theory, the stability of the international relations system and the relevance of their institutions is possible if a hegemonic state is able to enforce institutional norms and rules (such as with subsidiarity) (Kindleberger, 1973). This process is not only achieved by coercion but also by compromises between different actors in a process of consent (Gramsci, 1971).
A hegemon is a (politically, militarily, economically) powerful state that provides (directly or by enforcement mechanisms) public goods that are in its interest and within its capacity to supply (Kehoane, 1984). The regime reflects the dominant actor's interest in maintaining its power relationships whereas the development of institutions may be in the hegemon's interest as an extension of its control mechanisms.

While there is a debate as to whether Nigeria in Western Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa are hegemonic players and on their implications for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003; Møller, 2005), it is less clear what potential there is for an hegemon in the Horn of Africa and its implications for IGAD.

The hypothesis suggested in this paper is that the absence of a hegemon prevents implementation of the principle and elements of subsidiarity through IGAD. The main mechanism is that without a hegemon, states in the region are not interested enough in IGAD's institutional building under subsidiarity rules.

The data are based on secondary sources and semi-structured interviews with officials at the AU, IGAD, diplomatic bodies, civil society and academic organisations conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Nairobi, Kenya, in April and May 2011 and December 2012.

Subsidiarity principle and APSA

With origins in 19th-century Catholic doctrine the subsidiarity principle of governance is best illustrated in the European Union. In 1957 Article 3b of the Treaty of Rome established,¹ "in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community [the central authority] shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community." Applying it to the multilateral African institutional security set up, this means allocation of power from the UN (at global level), to the AU (regional organisation) and from both the UN and AU to SROs like ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, EAC, ECCAS and CEN-SAD.²

One ontologically significant factor contributing to this process of allocating governance functions to regional levels was the end of the Cold War and with it the demise of a single superimposing world system, which allowed for sub-systems to develop and become more recognised. On the one hand a "new

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¹ Later adopted in the treaty of the European Union under article 5.
² ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States, ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States, SADC - Southern African Development Community, East African Community – EAC, the Intergovernmental Agency for Development – IGAD, Community of Sahel-Saharan States CEN-SAD. Theoretically states would constitute the lowest layer in this allocation of power, though the analysis is limited to multilateralism and therefore states per se are not considered as a layer here.
regionalism” emerged as a reflection of increased social, economic, cultural and political interactions and interdependence between regional states in a post-Cold War setting. On the other hand, security realities themselves were regarded as interconnected among states in specific regions, as suggested in regional security complex theory (Buzan and Wæver, 2003).

Nevertheless, the allocation of power to regions or SROs from a more centralised organisation (such as the UN) has been controversial, particularly regarding responsibility for military intervention.

The main benefits of lower allocation of power in military interventions are: lower costs; the organisation’s proximity to the area of intervention; synergies of actors in terms of language, culture, sensitivity, local knowledge and politics; interoperability and, in particular, self-interest in solving the conflict due to fear of spill-over effects in the region. These benefits are identified in contrast to UN agency and therefore their opposite can be considered the disadvantages of UN operations. Nevertheless, these benefits are controversial some specific non-UN problems are lack of impartiality, bias, logistics difficulties, vulnerability to domestic politics and lack of financial, technical and coercive resources (Diehl, 1993). It has been also found that non-UN interventions lack the “moral authority” (Dorn, 1998) or unique legitimacy (Bellamy and Williams, 2005) that the UN confers or require accountability to the UN itself (Weiss et al, 2007). Specifically regional and sub-regional organisations are mostly criticised for their tendency towards partiality and conflict of interests, both when they do and do not intervene (Price and Zacher, 2004). In contrast, the main UN advantages are its impartiality in operations, its broad multinational nature and resourcefulness to pursue its mandate (Bhagat, 1998).

Despite the controversy surrounding it, the involvement of regional and sub-regional organisations in security has been under way for a couple of decades. SRO (mainly ECOWAS and IGAD) involvement in military interventions started in the 1990s. At regional level the creation of the AU in 2000 marked a watershed moment for the regionalisation of security. Based on it, the APSA developed with five main components in the subsequent decade: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the decision-making mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; the Panel of the Wise, which assists the PSC particularly in conflict prevention; the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which gathers information to anticipate and prevent conflict; the African Standby Forces (ASF); and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (African Union, 2012).

The latter two components are of special relevance to military interventions. The regional mechanisms are constituted by the African Standby Forces (ASF), which are standby multidisciplinary civilian and military contingents ready for rapid deployment. There is one RM for each of the five sub-African regions (East, West, North, South and Central), where three of the RECs are also RMs because they manage the ASF – ECOWAS, SADC and ECCAS. The East and North are managed by specific
RM: the East Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) (comprising the IGAD and EAC countries) and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC). The subsidiarity principle is especially relevant in managing this relationship between the AU and RECs/RMs and them and the UN.

Subsidiarity elements

As per the African Union assessment there are three main elements in the application of subsidiarity: decision-making mechanisms, burden sharing and division of labour (African Union, 2012).3

The decision-making mechanisms are mainly connected to formal procedures that conflict-management decisions have to go through to safeguard institutional legitimacy. According to the UN Charter, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has primacy in the authorisation of enforcement-type military intervention and explicitly states, “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the UNSC...” (Article 53.1). On the other hand, regional initiatives for pacific settlement of local disputes are encouraged prior to being referred to the UNSC. (article 52.3) At AU level the Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) is the forum that decides on ASF deployment, preferably by consensus but otherwise by majority vote. At the RECs/RMs level each structure has its own decision-making mechanisms, which are supposed to report to the AU PSC. Following on from the UN Charter, these other decision mechanisms must request authorisation from the UNSC for any enforcement mission before deployment.

Nevertheless, despite the general agreement on this requirement several institutional interventions have started since 1989 without prior UNSC authorisation. This was the case of Burundi in 1993 and 2003 by the OAU (Organization of African Unity) and AU respectively; Central Africa Republic in 2002 by CEN-SAD (later taken over by ECCAS); Comoros in 1997 by OAU; Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999 by OAU; Guinea Bissau in 1998 by ECOWAS; Ivory Coast in 2003 by ECOWAS; Lesotho in 1998 by SADC; Liberia in 1990 by ECOWAS; Rwanda in 1991 by OAU; Sierra Leone in 1991 and 1997 by ECOWAS; and Sudan in 2004 by AU. Even if not all interventions involved peace enforcement it is generally accepted that they all should have been authorised by the UNSC prior to deployment.4

In this context in 2004 the UN recognised that within its primary responsibility for peace and security there might be urgent situations where authorisation could be sought after operations had begun. (United Nations, 2004) In spite of this policy statement, the UN charter remains unchanged and in tension with practice. With the development of APSA it is now more urgent to clarify the appropriate consultative decision-making framework, not only between the UN and AU, but also between the AU and REC/RMs (Sousa, unpublished).

3 The description focus on the component of military interventions as it is considered the most significant security function, nevertheless the subsidiarity principle is to be applied to other security areas.
4 About two-thirds of non-authorized interventions since 1989 were subsequently recognised in a UNSC decision or presidential statement.
Burden sharing refers mainly to the financial costs of peace and security initiatives and who funds them. The AU has three main sources of funding: assessed contributions by member states, voluntary contributions to the solidarity fund by member states and funds from external partners. The five main economies in the continent (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa) each contribute 15 per cent of the assessed contributions and the remaining 25 per cent is paid by other member states. For 2013 the total AU budget sourced from member states is USD 123 million, while USD 155 million is from external partners. Despite the development of the AU Peace Fund (APF) as an APSA component to mobilise donor support, the AU is finding it hard to meet the heavy financial requirements that peace operations entail.

Significantly, in 2008 the Prodi report determined that AU missions could be supported from UN assessed funding if the missions were approved by UNSC (and UN General Assembly) and the AU mission would transition to the UN within six months (United Nations, 2008). Also since 2008 and as part of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), the EU has been a main contributor to the AU Peace Fund with the 10th European Development Fund (EDF). In its directives, the EU Council considered, “the African sub-regional organisations are the pillars of the overall security architecture of the” AU wherein “regional components are key elements of the Continental Early Warning System and of the African Standby Force” (2.2 p.5) (Council EU 14551/08). Furthermore, for 2011-2013 the action plan highlights, “of critical importance is the subsidiarity principle between the AU's responsibilities vis-à-vis those of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)” (p.4), identifying the RECs as the building blocks of the AU (Council EU 11730/11). About two-thirds of the funds are for AU peace support operations with the bulk of the remaining funds going to APSA and Africa-EU dialogue. The beneficiaries of the funding facility are the AU and African SROs, which can request the support independently, although SRO requests need to have the political approval of the AU (Council EU 14551/08 5.3 and 5.6).

Both of these developments allowed the APSA to become a more operational structure, although dependent on external support which necessarily impacts on which interventions occur and their mandate and form.

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5 About USD 160 million is for programme work and USD 118 million for operational work. The Peace and Security Council is budgeted at USD 701,000 and the African Union Commission has a budget of USD 216 million for 2013.
6 For instances the AMISOM costs in 2009 with a deployment of 5221 troops was around USD 200 million (SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database).
7 A total of €600 m has been budgeted and equally divided between the 2008-2010 and 2011-2013 programmes.
8 In the 9th and 10th European Development Fund (EDF) APF breakdown, the peace support operations supported are: AMIS (Darfur/Sudan); FOMUC/MICOPAX (Central African Republic); AMISEC/MAES (Comoros) and AMISOM (Somalia). In terms of capacity building the focus in on the APSA, specifically on the: AU Commission; ASF workshops AU/REC/APSA; support to AU Commission personnel in the Peace Support Department (PSD); APSA support and Training Centre. The remaining support went to the Early Response Mechanism and other initiatives (Council EU 14551/08 and Council EU 11730/11).
9 Specifically for 2011 the AU’s requested APF funding amounted to €40 million, as follows: (EU ASF budget plan 2011): AUC 19 per cent; COMESA 10 per cent; EAC 9 per cent; ECCAS 13 per cent; SADC 11 per cent; IGAD 7 per cent; ECOWAS 13 per cent; CENSAD 1 per cent; EASFCOM 12 per cent; NARC 5 per cent; and contingencies of 2 per cent.
Division of labour refers to which functions each party executes and it is necessarily connected to the organisations’ capacity to perform them. As stipulated by the Charter, the UNSC can entrust in other organisations the execution of missions, which reinforces the perspective of division of labour within the charter. The division of labour in the APSA is associated with six conflict and mission scenarios (1.6) each linked to organisations responsible for taking over operations (2.10). Table 1 summarises division of labour.

**Table 1: Agency, type of mission and response time**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Agency*</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deployment requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/regional military advice</td>
<td>Political mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/regional co-deployed with UN Mission</td>
<td>Observer mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stand-alone AU/regional</td>
<td>Observer mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping force</td>
<td>Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace building)</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping Force</td>
<td>Complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions including those involving low level spoilers</td>
<td>90 days with military component able to deploy in 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention</td>
<td>e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly</td>
<td>14 days with robust military force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: African Union (2003). In African Union terminology regional refers to SRO in this paper.

For the lighter scenarios in 1 and 2 the AU has the capacity to deploy. The UN would normally deploy in scenarios 3 and 4, while heavier peace enforcement scenario 6 requires a capable nation that is prepared to take leadership of the mission. The AU ASF are focusing on building capacities for scenario 5, which is a feature of many of the current conflicts. (African Union, 2003, Part I: 3)

A distinction is made between the peace support operations conducted in scenarios 1 to 5 in different conflict types and conflict intensity and (peace enforcement) interventions specific to the scenario 6 conflict type involving war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Furthermore the AU concept of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) is conceptually distinct from UN concept of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). The objectives of AU PSOs is to help stabilise fragile environments, which may
involve supporting the government being challenged, without a clear distinction between a conflict period and a situation where peace must be kept, as shown by a peace agreement (African Union, 2012). The UN PKOs are based on three principles: the parties' consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

We will now make a brief reference to other, non-intervention processes where there are both trickle-down and bottom-up processes in the development and implementation of security policies. Theoretically the UN develops world guidelines, which are then translated into more grounded regional policies at the AU based on inputs from member states, which are then passed on to RECs/RMs for further policy development and implementation at sub-regional or state level. But this process's hierarchy differs depending on the sector. In the security sector the AU can only harmonise and cannot impose policies on the RECs/RMs, unlike the economic programme where AU policies can be required to be implemented by sub-regions (and states). Inversely in some cases the processes are bottom-up as the AU is as much a producer of APSA as a result of its SROs' (and states') competencies. In this regard APSA development is driven and inspired by the areas of RECs/RMs' competence. Specifically, the early-warning mechanism is based on IGAD experience, economic integration in COMESA, the ASF on ECOWAS and possibly some of the mediation processes on SADC.

A main determinant of the possibilities of division of labour is organisations' capacity to take over the responsibility. Therefore there is a focus on capacity building, for instance with the start in 2006 of the UN ten-year capacity-building programme for the AU in a broad spectrum of peace and security functions including conflict prevention and mediation, elections, rule of law and peacekeeping.

At this stage decision making is de jure with the UNSC but de facto may not be based there. Burden sharing is mainly taken on by donors and the division of labour is for building regional and SRO capacities for more robust types of missions.

The Horn of Africa, IGAD and EASF

The Horn of Africa is a peninsula in East Africa comprising Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia, and some authors would also include Sudan and South Sudan. These countries, together with Uganda and Kenya, form the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). The region is characterised by a history of conflict, poverty and drought and the lack of a clear hegemonic player.

In the recent past, intra-state conflict erupted in several countries in most cases with other states from the region involved (see Table 2 below). Three of these were large: the secessionist war in Sudan that led to the creation of South Sudan in 2011, the Ethiopian civil war that ended the Mengistu regime in 1991 and led to the secession of Eritrea in 1993, and the civil war in Somalia since 1991. Additionally, and exceptionally in this region, there are cases of interstate conflict, the most significant ones being between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-8 and Ethiopia and Eritrea, which started in 1998 (see Table 3 below).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Type of Intra-state conflicts</th>
<th>Main contentious issue or area</th>
<th>IGAD member states involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Since the 1990s</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Ethnic tension between Afar and Issa</td>
<td>Control of state power</td>
<td>Somalia and Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1991</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Religious and ethnic tension</td>
<td>Control of state power</td>
<td>Ethiopia and Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s-1991</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>Control of state power and secession</td>
<td>Sudan and Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>Small-scale armed resistance by OLF and ONLF</td>
<td>Control of state power and secession</td>
<td>Eritrea and Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1960s</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Ethnic tension preceding and following elections</td>
<td>Control of state power</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1991</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Civil war among clans, factions, militia groups</td>
<td>Control of state power, key towns, ports</td>
<td>Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-2005</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Civil war between SPLA and the government</td>
<td>Secession (South Sudan)</td>
<td>Ethiopia and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>Darfur crisis</td>
<td>Autonomy and distribution of resources</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1990s-2006</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of Inter-state conflict</th>
<th>States involved</th>
<th>Major contentious issues or areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Brief armed conflict</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Somalia</td>
<td>Control of Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabited territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Tensions</td>
<td>Kenya-Somalia</td>
<td>Control of Kenya’s Northern Frontier District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>Full-scale war</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Somalia</td>
<td>Control of Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabited territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>Tensions</td>
<td>Sudan-Eritrea</td>
<td>Islamism threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>Tensions</td>
<td>Sudan-Ethiopia</td>
<td>Sudanese link to the Mubarak assassination attempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2000</td>
<td>Full-scale war</td>
<td>Eritrea-Ethiopia</td>
<td>Territorial dispute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Somalia</td>
<td>Ethiopia intervened militarily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>Brief armed confrontation</td>
<td>Eritrea-Djibouti</td>
<td>Territorial dispute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Tensions</td>
<td>Kenya-Uganda</td>
<td>Territorial dispute over Migingo islands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to these countries’ interdependence in terms of security, the Horn of Africa is considered a security region that has increased its interdependence over time. In the 1970s the Horn of Africa was considered a pre-complex region, where the countries had significant bilateral security relations. By 2002 the interdependence had increased to the point of it being possible to delineate and differentiate a region and it was therefore considered a proto-complex (like Western Africa). In both cases the region fell short of being a Regional Security Complex (RSC) characterised by high security interdependence and cross-linkages of actors/countries in a region where the security of each one interacts with the security of the others to create clear internal regional dynamics. An example of an RSC by 2002 was Southern Africa (Buzan and Wæver, 2003)\textsuperscript{10}.

There is currently only one outstanding major inter-state conflict, the one opposing Ethiopia and Eritrea, while the Darfur crisis in Sudan and Somalia are a source of major concern where internal conflicts are concerned.

Overall, these historical levels of conflict can in themselves be an indication of the absence of an hegemonic player, one that is able to enforce consent without resorting to conflict. According to hegemonic stability theory a hegemon’s capacity relies on three attributes: a large, growing economy, dominance in a leading technological or economic sector and political power backed by projective military power (Keohane, 1984).

Data on the economic and military capacity of the countries of the region identify three candidates for the role of hegemon: Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya (see Table 4). Sudan is the biggest and wealthiest country, but its potential role in the region is undermined by two internal conflicts, a secession and being associated more with Arab North Africa. Ethiopia is the most populated country and identified as having one of the strongest armies in the region (even if it falls short of other countries’ military expenditure) but it is the weakest of the three economically and also facing internal state challenges. Kenya, on the other hand, has a strong economy and is the third biggest in population but although it has high military expenditure, it is not considered a strong military state (compared to Sudan or Ethiopia).

Table 4: IGAD and EAC countries compared

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti (a)</td>
<td>23,180</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>*1.8</td>
<td>*60</td>
<td>*6.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (a)</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>82,950</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{10} Other post Cold War examples of RSCs are Europe, post-Soviet Union, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, South America and North America.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>GDP PPP</th>
<th>Military Expenditure</th>
<th>Military Expenditure as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea (a)</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>5,254</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya (a,b)</td>
<td>569,140</td>
<td>40,513</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (a)</td>
<td>627,340</td>
<td>9,331</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (a)</td>
<td>1,861,484</td>
<td>33,604</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>*2093</td>
<td>*3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan (a)</td>
<td>644,329</td>
<td>9,948</td>
<td>*15</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda (a,b)</td>
<td>199,810</td>
<td>33,425</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania (b)</td>
<td>885,800</td>
<td>44,841</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi (b)</td>
<td>25,680</td>
<td>8,383</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>*76</td>
<td>*4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda (b)</td>
<td>24,670</td>
<td>10,624</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a - IAGD, b – EAC; Land, population and GDP PPP are from World Bank World Development Indicators for 2010, except land area for Sudan and South Sudan is from the CIA world factbook (accessed 10 April 2013), Djibouti GDP PPP for 2009, South Sudan GDP is current US$. Military expenditure is from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI- www.sipri.org) for 2010 in USD million at constant 2011 prices and exchange rates, except for Djibouti, Sudan and Burundi where expenditure is for 2005; Military expenditure as share of GDP with the same caveats as military expenditure. The EAC countries Burundi, Tanzania and Rwanda are represented as they share the same RM.

Therefore none of the countries with the most capacity has emerged as a clear hegemonic player, which can also partly explain the lack of institutional reinforcement of the common regional organisation – IGAD.

IGAD was formed in 1996 and its current membership includes Djibouti, Eritrea (membership suspended since 2007), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan Uganda and South Sudan (became a member in 2012). Taking over the mandate on drought and desertification of its predecessor, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), IGAD extended it to food security, environmental protection, security and economic cooperation and integration (in line with the aims of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and African Economic Community (AEC)).

The security mandate does not include peace enforcement, instead Article 7 (g) defines the aim as being "to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue." Of relevance is the fact that the main body of heads-of-state and government functions by consensus (article 9 (4)) and agrees to deal with member issues at sub-regional level before referring them to other regional or international organisations (article 18 (A) (c)) (IGAD, 1996).

Although the idea of the organisation is to be based on funds for activities, the mandate has been enlarged significantly without the corresponding changes to its structures. Since 1996 IGAD has begun four security initiatives, all donor funded. In 1998 the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was founded to target pastoral cross-border and trans-border conflicts in three clusters: Dikihil between Djibouti and Ethiopia; Somali between Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and Karamoja between
Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia. The success of the initiative would lead to it becoming a reference for the APSA Conflict Early Warning System. In 2006 the IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) began, with five main components: judicial capacity, interdepartmental cooperation, border control, training, and strategic cooperation. The project was initially contracted to the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), which provided operational know how under the umbrella of political legitimacy conferred by IGAD and then it became a fully fledged IGAD project on counter terrorism in 2010, focusing specifically on the Somalia area. In addition to these initiatives, IGAD was involved in two important conflict management processes. One was the Sudan peace process, which started in 1994 and ended the conflict with a referendum and South Sudan's independence in 2011. Another was the peace talks and mediation on Somalia begun in 1998 (even though other initiatives had been undertaken since 1991) which produced several outcomes. It is still ongoing and the proposed IGAD intervention in 2005/6 was part of the process (presented below). The benefits of this mediation have been less evident than the one for Sudan (Healy, 2009).

Despite the ad hoc nature of initiatives and the lean organisational structure of IGAD, the initiatives have all consolidated into permanent programmes. This has occurred at the same time as donor funding is available, indicating that there is cautious selection of initiatives and a pragmatic partnership with donors (Tavares, 2010). In 2010 the IGAD secretariat had a total of 44 staff and a budget of USD3.8 m, The other initiatives were budgeted separately: CEWARN USD200,000, ICPAT USD742,000, the office of facilitator for Somalia about USD 2 million and the office of the Special Envoy for Peace and Reconciliation in Sudan about USD 700,000 (Munya, 2010).11

Adding to the conflict history and lack of hegemon the establishment of the East Stand by Force (EASF) (originally named Eastern Africa Standby Brigade – EASBRIG) reflects the divided leadership in the region. The region is one of the most affected by overlapping constituencies of countries to regional organisations. Members of the EASF belong to COMESA, EAC, IGAD and SADC, making the identification of a REC candidate to assume the responsibility over EASF a difficult task.12 Consequently in February 2004 at a meeting in Jinja, Uganda, it was decided for IGAD to assume an interim role in setting up the EASF with a pending decision over the final structure. The discussion over these structures would be dominated by political concerns raised by non-IGAD member and the desire of some members to host organs of the EASF (Mulugeta, 2008). The result by 2013 is that in Nairobi, Kenya is located the PLANELM (planning element) and the EASBRICOM (Easter African Standby Brigade Coordinating Mechanism), which constitutes the command structure of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the highest organ, which replaced the IGAD interim-role. In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia is located

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11 For comparison purposes ECOWAS has between 200 and 300 staff and an operational budget of 10 million USD and the AU has about 700 staff and a budget of about 200 million USD.
12 The countries are: Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Comoros, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius and Burundi.
the Standby Brigade Headquarters and the logistical base. An ASF is composed of about 5000 standby personnel with more than two thirds being troops and the remaining civilian and police, supported by the command, planning and logistical structures. The current planning is to have the ASF operational by 2015.

Not only the decision to locate the logistic base in Ethiopia is sub-optimal for transport purposes compared to the benefits of locating it along the coastline (Cilliers and Malan, 2005) but also it is organisationally less efficient to have separated structures. The decision is mainly explained by the aspiration of both Ethiopia and Kenya for regional leadership (Vines and Middleton, 2008).

The decision to have an independent EASF cannot be attributed to a failure of IGAD but instead to structural conditions while the four security initiatives presented before have been widely analysed. This paper focus instead on two less studied unsuccessful cases associated with IGAD: the proposal to strategically reformulate peace and security functions and the failed attempt at military intervention in Somalia. In these two cases the organisation was not able to achieve its goal and they may therefore constitute a good reference for the challenges that SROs face in acquiring security skills and autonomy within the subsidiarity concept.

The two IGAD cases

Enlargement of security mandate

Building on the achievements of the projects referred to above in the overall context of promoting SROs in Africa and using the more developed SADC and ECOWAS structures as a benchmark, IGAD embarked on an initiative to upgrade its security skills.

In October 2003 the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in Kampala, Uganda, decided to develop an IGAD Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) Strategy. At this stage IGAD was a candidate to become the REC with ASF responsibilities for the region within the AU architecture, much like ECOWAS or SADC. But in Uganda in 2004, as explained above, the countries of the region decide to have EASF separate from IGAD.

Despite this policy change at the 24th session of IGAD's Council of Ministers in 2005 it was decided to support the IGAD Secretariat in the development of a CPMR strategy (Mwagiru, 2008). Subsequently in 2005, the IGAD formally began the formulation of a peace and security strategy with the support of donor funding. Besides several other aims, the terms of reference for the project covered a broad range of security areas with a requirement for national and regional consultation with enlarged stakeholders. The project was expected to be completed within a maximum of 18 months (the table below summarises the 2005 objectives and later developments).

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13 A 2000 assessment study by the Leeds University precedes this decision.
The process would last longer than expected and only by 2010 was a draft circulated, at that time creating some expectations for a significant upgrade of the security sector in IGAD. Nevertheless the proposal was not approved and went into a review process that culminated in it being converted into a plan for restructuring the ICPAT into the IGAD Security Sector Programme, which was approved in 2011 (Interview with Berouk Mesfin, Institute for Security Studies – ISS –, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December 2011).

This process illustrates the IGAD incapacity to expand its security mandate as a result of its structural limitations. Despite the success of CEWARN, the range of types of conflict or areas of intervention were not significantly broadened. No initiatives for structural conflict management such as preventive diplomacy or mediation were established, neither was a capacity for peace support operations (although this is being developed by the RM). Although many of these functions have been taken over by the RM which is focusing on ASF readiness several other areas could be developed elsewhere as is the case with the mandate approved in 2011. Despite the fact that IGAD is considered the most developed security-wise REC after ECOWAS and SADC, a series of challenges prevent it from developing further.

Table 5: IGAD security strategy content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preventing and combating terrorism</td>
<td>Develop and promote comprehensive institutional framework of IGAD for terrorism, maritime security, trans-boundary, organised crime, SSR</td>
<td>Maritime security including piracy, illegal dumping of waste and toxic materials, illegal Fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding the role of CEWARN</td>
<td>Review and expand the mandate and legal framework of CEWERU (CEWARN)</td>
<td>Organised crime including corruption, drug and human trafficking, prostitution, money laundering and counterfeited products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting up conflict resolution mechanisms</td>
<td>Develop and implement IGAD protocol on establishment of a mechanism for CPMR</td>
<td>Counter terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to peace support operations in a liaison role with the AU regarding EASFCOM</td>
<td>Develop and implement IGAD peace support operations – peacekeeping, peace enforcement, post conflict reconstruction and development</td>
<td>Cyber crime and intellectual property and copyright crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing the capacity of IGAD's Secretariat Peace and Security Division</td>
<td>Develop linkages with the IGAD security sector programme</td>
<td>Reform and capacity building of security sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring peace agreements, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
<td>Develop and implement an IGAD protocol on non-aggression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting the peace and security component of an agenda for reactivating IGAD's Inter-Parliamentary Union</td>
<td>Establish and implement an IGAD mediation support unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Put in place and start up an institutional and normative framework for preventive diplomacy for CPMR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish and implement a roster of indicators and a panel of the wise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen role of IGAD/CSO NGO Forum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: "Launch of the IGAD Security Sector Programme (restructuring ICPAT). Source: IGAD (2005a, 2011) and Munyu (2010)."
Besides the above-mentioned financial and resource constraints, some of IGAD's shortcomings are: hostility between member states, the unpredictability of alliances, the ad hoc nature of initiatives, overlapping constituencies of its members, in particular Kenya's role in the EAC and amalgamation of projects (Fisseha, 2008). Others focus more on rivalry among member states, regional instability and lack of a regional power (Mulugeta, 2009).

The main security function envisioned in APSA is the capacity to launch a mission. The next section analyses the IGAD 2005/6 failed attempt to launch a peace mission through IGAD.

**IGASOM's failure to deploy in Somalia in 2005/6**

In January 2005, after years of negotiations, IGAD announced an IGAD summit decision to deploy a peace support mission to Somalia to support the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was being challenged by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) which some courts were associated with hard-line jihad Islamists (ICG, 2006). On one hand the IGAD agreement had no provisions for such type of initiatives. On the other hand the decision followed an appeal to the AU by Abdulahi Yusuf, TFG leader, for a military force to help establish government authority, even if many Somali parliamentarians were opposed to it (Healy, 2009).

The IGAD decision was endorsed by the fourth ordinary session of the AU and authorised by the 24th meeting of the AU PSC in February 2005 on the condition that the mission's first phase would not include front line states' troops. In March the deployment plan and cost provisions of the IGAD Forces for Somalia (IGASOM) was approved at the IGAD summit with a deployment planned for April 2005 (Mulugeta, 2009). IGASOM's mandate was to provide security support to the TFG, guarantee sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with re-establishing peace and security, including police and army training (Mays, 2009). But the mission was never deployed.

On March 2006 the 11th IGAD summit reiterated the decision to deploy IGASOM. The proper decision-making process had been followed. The IGAD approves an intervention, seeks to amend the IGAD agreement to include provisions for such initiative, had endorsement from the AU, which was supposed to seek UN approval. (IGAD, 2005b) At this stage the mission could have started if the policy of the 2004 UN report A more secure world: our shared responsibility that allows for a non-UN intervention to start while awaiting UNSC authorisation would have been followed, even if in that way not observing UN SC primacy (Sousa, unpublished).

The mission was not deployed and found no international support, with the main critics being the planned involvement of Ethiopia and non-acceptance by the UIC of the mission. Instead, when the UIC took power in Mogadishu in June 2006, the conflict situation changed and in July 2006 the Ethiopian army

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15 This refers in particular to the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya which had fought wars against Somalia in 1964 and 1960s respectively.
unilaterally entered Somalia, taking over the capital by December (BBC, 2012). This was a non-authorised military intervention and Ethiopia justified its legitimacy on the grounds of its right to individual and collective self-defence against a terrorist threat and as a reply to an invitation from a legitimate government (Warbrick and Yihdego, 2006; Allo, 2009).

In the aftermath of the intervention, in December 2006 the UNSC authorised the deployment of the IGAD mission as a “training and support mission” with a partial lifting of the arms embargo in place for Somalia (UNSC/1725). But IGASOM was never deployed. Besides a division within IGAD, with some members having strong reservations, the mission continued to find no financial support externally. With intensification of the insurgency in Somalia due to the presence of Ethiopian troops, IGAD requested an African Peacekeeping Mission for Somalia. In January 2007 the AU PSC decided to set up the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), approved by the UN in February 2007 (UNSC/1744) and deployed with United States logistical assistance to Mogadishu in March 2007 (African Union, 2007; Healy, 2009). The first contingent of troops is not from front line states, coming from Burundi and Uganda. This deployment alongside other developments created the conditions for Ethiopian troops to leave, with the last troops reported to have left Somalia in January 2009.

In response to IGAD’s support for Ethiopian intervention, Eritrea suspends its membership in April 2007. Later, in December 2009, a UNSC resolution (UNSC/1907) approved arms and travel sanctions against Eritrea for supporting insurgents trying to topple the TFG in Somalia and the sanctions were expanded in 2011 (UNSC/2023).

Justified by security and economic interests, in October 2011 Kenya intervenes militarily and unilaterally with about 2,400 troops in the Southern Somalia at a time that AMISOM force totalled around 8,000 troops. In February 2012 the UNSC approved the enlargement of AMISOM to a contingent of 17,731 uniformed personnel (integrating the Kenyan troops) and by 2013 the AMISOM troops were all from the region (including front-line states), specifically Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda. The bulk of the costs of AMISOM are being borne by the EU.

The results of the Ethiopian intervention have been associated with increased violence, insecurity and radicalisation of the conflict (Menkhaus, 2007) particularly between 2006 and 2009. The reasons for IGASOM’s failure to deploy were due to the multi-actor, fragmented approach to its planning, lack of funding, the failure to lift the 1992 arms embargo preventing the deployment in March 2006, lack of consent from the belligerents, lack of an acceptable, achievable mandate for the mission and lack of political will of the contingent providers (Mays, 2009).

**Conclusion**

Regarding the three elements of subsidiarity, we can identify the following results. In terms of decision-making mechanisms, the enlargement of the security mandate was hampered by a lack of
political will. The IGAD decision to intervene was first made without overall international support (even though it had AU support) and secondly may have been perceived by powerful states as instrumentalisation of IGAD, in this case an illustration of Ethiopia's soft power. This confirms Healy's (2009) conclusion that member states may seek to use IGAD's authority to legitimise their own policies. Even without UNSC authorisation, the military intervention was made by a single state instead of multilaterally. The conclusion is that, even if seeking to follow the prescribed decision-making mechanisms, regional powerful states may resort to unauthorised action if required. States are still central to security dynamics, even if they fall short of hegemonic status.

On the issue of division of labour, constraints on the enlargement of IGAD’s security mandate were not inter-institutional competition (between IGAD and AU or UN) but rather lack of state’s political will. Therefore it seems feasible that if this political will can be harvested, the enlargement of the mandate within APSA division of labour would be forthcoming. Regarding the specific area of military interventions, the case illustrates the need to have a leading nation for a peace enforcement mission, as identified by the policy guidelines in scenario 6, although this scenario may not be solely applicable to situations of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Burden sharing is significantly on the side of the donor community. In this case IGAD has not been able to develop programmes with internally mobilised resources. Nevertheless, donor-funded projects are able to meet internal and external requirements that enable them to become permanent programmes. Specifically regarding military intervention, it was the political sensitivity of Ethiopia’s troops in Somalia that led to the AMISOM initiative and not necessarily exhaustion of Ethiopian strength.

De jure decision-making subsidiarity may be bypassed by de facto local decisions that do not prevent the financial burden from being borne by the international community alongside regional actors' troops on the ground. Therefore, subsidiarity is held back not only by limited resources but also by lack of decision-making autonomy on intervention, in the sense that a SRO decision may not find support throughout the decision-making chain (AU and UN) regardless of its need for resources.

Capacity constraints on the organisation do not enable a subsidiarity process. Nevertheless, when there is political will, capacity is built quickly and successfully, therefore making politics rather than capacity the decisive factor.

Affecting both resources and political will is the lack of a clear hegemon pushing the region and IGAD, as compared to ECOWAS or SADC, confirming the findings of Møller (2005). The alternative possibility of the role of a hegemon being replaced by institutional cooperation between states is hampered by current and historical conflicts between member states.

Finally, the intricacies of different stakeholders’ definition of the same processes (military intervention) result in ambiguity and are prone to inconsistencies. This is the case if intervention requires
UNSC authorisation for legitimacy because it is a UN-type enforcement mission or if an intervention is to be considered legitimate because it has been invited by a government and/or is an AU type of peace support operation to curtail a rebellion.

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SOMALIA AS A MARKET FOR PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES: DEFINITIONS, AGENTS AND SERVICES

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Introduction

The current academic debate around the private military and security companies (PMSCs) is intense and without consensus, starting with definitions. There is still no consensual answer to the question of what a PMSC is. In order to establish a comprehensive conceptual framework, this study examined the different definitions and identified divergences and convergences. This allowed us to formulate proposed definitions in order to contribute to the academic debate. It proved to be a fundamental tool in the characterization and comprehension of the object of study and its action in Somalia.

This study seeks to understand the impact of PMSCs in territorial states, which in the case study of Somalia is collapsed. According to Rotberg, the collapsed state has a power vacuum, political goods are obtained by private or ad hoc means and it is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen (Rotberg, 2004: 9). Rotberg also considers it a “rare and extreme” variation of the failed state, which cannot control its peripheral regions, especially those occupied by out-groups. They lose authority over large sections of territory and the expression of official power is often limited to a capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones (Rotberg, 2004: 6). This justifies the choice of this case study, which is complemented by the piracy phenomenon off the coast of Somalia and the consequent proliferation of PMSCs in the Horn of Africa region.

It is worth noting when the proliferation of PMSCs started. After the end of the Cold War, armed forces all over the world reduced their personnel – military downsizing – freeing manpower and equipment and creating a security gap and a power vacuum. In addition, the decline of outside intervention by “the major powers”, United Nations and regional organisations contributed to the development of the PMSC market (Singer, 2003: 58-60), generating niches that the companies exploited. An expression by the former senior American diplomat, Dennis Jett, translates the dynamics of the business: “the criticism for losing people in an African civil war is going to be a lot harsher than for not committing troops to that situation” (Chicago Tribune, 2000).

In order to clarify the concepts is important to define the states involved in contracting PMSCs services. In accordance with the Montreux Document, “Contracting States” are states that directly contract for the services of PMSCs, including, as appropriate, where such a PMSC subcontracts with another
PMSC. “Territorial States” are states on whose territory PMSCs operate and “Home States” are states of nationality of a PMSC, where a PMSC is registered or incorporated (General Assembly Security Council, 2008: 6). The Montreux Document was drafted on Switzerland’s initiative and made proposals to regulate the sector, emphasising the need to comply with international humanitarian law and human rights, as well as the domestic law of the contracting, territorial and home states.

The general goal of this analysis is to contribute to the study of the privatisation of security in the Horn of Africa and its impact on political, military and security structures, using Somalia as a case study. In specific terms, the study looks to determine the PMSCs’ areas of intervention in Somalia and understand their dynamics by analysing the types of services provided and the public and private beneficiaries of these services. It is also the result of field research in Addis Ababa in February 2013.

This chapter is divided in two main sections. To illustrate the local reality, it starts with empirical data considering both local and global agents – in The Horn of Africa as a Market. By making this distinction it is easier to contextualise the contracted services and understand their depth and scope in the field. The sections Private Military and Security Companies involvement at the Global Level and Private Military and Security Companies involvement at Local Level interpret the empirical evidence at global and local levels.

Private Military and Security Companies’ impact on the African State

In the African context, the most important factor underlying states’ international weakness and their vulnerability to internal fragmentation and external penetration is economic failure (Clapham, 2000: 163). In Sub-Saharan Africa, Peter Lock considers that most states appear to be moving along similar paths in varying degrees, at the brink of state failure. Clientelist political systems expand resulting in a steady flow of additional resources that the élite has to appropriate in order to stay in power, because clientelism carries steadily increasing costs. Under these conditions, the political power in control of the state is confronted by international pressures to accept the need for the structural adjustment of economies burdened by unaffordable debts. Under pressure to adjust, “the incumbent élite often abandoned their social obligations and concentrated on safeguarding their economic fiefdoms, while duly paying lip service to the imposed financial regime” (Lock, 1999: 19).

In Somalia, the state’s inability to rebuild the nation was structural, because local élites saw no benefits in institutional reconstruction and had local parallel structures based on clans that provided some kind of authority (Goméz-Benita, 2011: 29). Thus “clans became effectively self-governing entities throughout the Somali region as they carved out spheres of influence” (Lewis, 2008: 76). This study seeks to understand the influence and impact of PMSCs in Somalia under these conditions of state weakness.

The academic debate is divided in two interpretative lines. For some, PMSCs can be helpful in restoring public security and order in failing states because they make it possible to break vicious cycles of
violence, “either by compensating for political unwillingness to intervene militarily in a context of humanitarian emergency, or by serving as ‘force multipliers’ to local forces” (Branovic, 2011: 11). In addition, the protection provided to political elites by PMSCs has played a crucial role in denying warlords and strongmen access to strategic resource-laden enclaves. Without resources, they are unable to make profits from the sale of strategic resources that are crucial to continuing to fight. As an alternative, “such profit can go to rebuilding war torn economies, while also paying for the introduction of reform” (Kinsey, 2006: 123).

On the other hand, rulers in weak states face real internal security threats from rival warlords and strongmen. They meet these threats with whatever means they have at their disposal including using income from natural resources to hire PMSCs in order to remain in power (Reno, 1998: 3). The weaker the state and the more chaotic the situation and control over PMSCs is less effective. As a consequence the state may make concessions that would undermine national sovereignty (Sandoz, 1999: 205). As a consequence, the state cumulatively loses its role as a guarantor of security, and individual security becomes a function of disposable income (Lock, 1999: 26). This study aims to contribute to this academic debate by discussing the consequences of PMSC activity in Somalia.

Defining the object of study

Due to a lack of consensus, the study of private military and security companies is a challenge. Scholars have been debating the subject for years, proposing definitions and discussing conceptual frameworks. In order to illustrate the current debate it is important to bring the different perspectives to the table. Some authors use the term private military companies (PMCs). According to Chesterman and Lenhardt, the term denotes “firms providing services outside their home states with the potential for use of lethal force, as well as training of and advice to militaries that substantially affects their war-fighting capacities.” They prefer the term ‘military’ because “semantically, it better captures the nature of these services as it points to the qualitative difference between firms operating in conflict zones in a military environment and ‘security firms’ that primarily guard premises in a stable environment” (Chesterman and Lenhardt, 2007: 3).¹ This definition takes account of the distinction between ‘military’ and ‘security’ companies, a concern that is shared by other authors. Some define private security companies (PSCs) as “corporate entities providing defensive services to protect individuals and property, frequently used by multinational companies in the extractive sector, humanitarian agencies and individuals in situations of conflict or instability”, in contrast with PMCs – “corporate entities providing offensive services designed to have a military impact in a given situation that are generally contracted by governments” (Makki, Meek, Musah, et al, 2001: 4).²

¹ Other authors that use the term PMC: Ortiz (2010) and Bures (2005).
² Other authors that use the term PSC: Spearin (2008), and Kinsey, Hansey and Franklin (2009).
Although the authors make a distinction between “military” and “security” and separate the different types of clients, there is no clear dividing line between PMCs and PSCs. Most companies fit in both fields, because of their ability to provide a great variety of services, a situation that is stimulated by the growing mist between traditional military and other security tasks in current conflicts. For that reason, several authors prefer to use wider definitions for both PSCs and PMCs, and normally one includes the other. From this perspective, PSCs may represent a whole variety of for-profit security firms “because it aptly describes the range of services these companies provide” (Avant, 2005: 2), denoting all the companies within the industry (Holmqvist, 2005: 6). For other authors, PMCs may also include private security companies in its category, as a subset (House of Commons, 2002: 5; Isenberg, 2009: x). Although a broader definition better conveys the situation in the field, the acronyms PSCs or PMCs are not informative enough to illustrate the market’s reality.

In contrast, there are highly specialised conceptual options, which make a very restrictive framework. As Kinsey points out, proxy military companies are defined by their working relationship with their home state government, aligning themselves with the government’s external policy, while private combat companies only undertake combat operations, leaving support and logistics to other companies (Kinsey, 2006: 13-15).

This study uses a broader definition, private military and security companies (PMSCs) because it better illustrates the full spectrum of activities undertaken by these companies and denotes the multiple types of clients – ranging from governments, NGOs and multinational companies. This study therefore considers PMSCs to be private business entities that provide military and security services, or just one of them, sign contracts with public and private agents and implement internal and/or external security policy goals. This definition allows us to construct a broader conceptual framework, extending the spectrum of analysis and allowing a wider perception of the privatisation of security in Somalia.

A multiplicity of services

To illustrate their multiplicity of services, PMSCs provide logistics, intelligence, military support, equipment delivery, transport, crime prevention, military advice, military and technical training, close protection, mine clearance, management and so on. This great variety of services constitutes a research challenge due to the difficulty in categorising the situation in the field.

Nevertheless, there are some options on the table. Singer’s stratification is based on three levels – military provider firms, military consultant firms and military support firms – called the Tip of the Spear typology. In the forefront of the battle space, military provider firms are characterised by their focus on tactical environment and engage in actual fighting, “either as line units or specialists and/or direct

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3 Other authors that use the term PMSCs: Carmola (2010) and Tonkin (2011). The acronym is also used in the Montreux Document.
command and control of field units”. The firms included in the second type provide training and advisory services to the operation and restructure a client’s armed forces, offering analysis at strategic, operational and organisational levels. Finally, military support firms provide supplementary military services, which include nonlethal aid and assistance, including logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply and transportation (Singer, 2003: 92 – 97).

On the other hand, Shearer expanded the categorisation of their services to five categories: I – direct support to military operations; II – military advice and training; III – logistics; IV – security services and political analysis; V – crime prevention (Shearer, 1998: 25). This study therefore uses the broader term PMSCs to describe all companies operating in the field, and then uses the Shearer’s taxonomy to build an analytical framework in order to understand the companies’ activities at local and global levels.

The Horn of Africa as a market

Piracy and state weakness stimulate the phenomenon by creating favourable conditions for the proliferation of private security responses. As a result, PMSCs have a market and a considerable variety of clients – ranging from governments, NGOs and multinational companies. In Somalia privatisation was evident and public and private actors hired security services from companies in order to fulfil a multiplicity of proposals. This phenomenon was not restricted to Somalia, and other countries throughout the Horn of Africa region witnessed the presence of these private actors. Although Somalia is the case study, it is pertinent to illustrate the privatisation process in other states of the region.

Starting with Djibouti, the PMSCs were a direct result of the international presence in the country, specifically US forces at the Camp Lemonnier military facilities. Companies like PAE Government Services provided harbour security, logistics, air operations support and base support vehicles and equipment (Defense Industry Daily, 2011). After the arrival of the U.S. forces in 2003, the presence of contractors was safeguarded in the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Djibouti on Access to and Use of Facilities, by stating that “U.S. personnel and U.S. contractors and vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for U.S. forces may use and have unimpeded access to these facilities and areas” (Agreement, 2003). From the start, the US military effort in the country included the employment of private contractors, outsourcing non-core functions and creating public and private commitments.

Kenya witnessed the proliferation of PMSCs, registered as business enterprises under the Companies Act of Kenya and therefore not categorised as security firms. Local companies provided individual private security guards, cash-in-transit security services to banks and delivery of registered mail to the general public. Additionally, national and international companies provided site protection to embassies, business, non-governmental organisations and humanitarian agencies, as well as risk analysis, staff training and professional advice in crisis management (Mkutu and Sabala, 2007: 395-396).
The situation in Somalia is different, as PMSCs have a heavier footprint in the country and have signed contracts with a wide variety of clients, ranging from global to local actors. Starting on the global level, DynCorp International, later replaced by PAE and AECOM, was hired by the US State Department to equip, deploy and train the African Union peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi contingents of AMISOM, and provided logistics and equipment maintenance to that force (DynCorp International, s.a.). These services correspond to sector II and III in the Shearer categorisation. Selected Armor, also an American company, was involved in planning military operations in support of the former Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and got permission to use three bases in Somalia and the air access to reach them, apparently with CIA consent (The Guardian and The Observer, 2006). This service fits in the sector I in Shearer’s categorisation. Salama Fikira had a contract with the Canadian company Africa Oil Corporation to protect its activities and interests in Puntland. In Shearer’s categorisation, Salama Fikira fits into sector IV. With US support, Bancroft provided technical expertise to AMISOM and the TFG military, as well as the TFG President’s personal guard (UN Security Council, 2011: 258-259). Bancroft’s support fits in sector II of Shearer’s scale.

Where anti-piracy is concerned, several companies were funded or refocused on maritime security in order to offer armed protection to ships and crews traversing the High Risk Area, which comprises the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman and parts of the Indian Ocean (UN Security Council, 2012: 278). This privately contracted armed security personnel seems to be effective in repelling piracy attacks and so far no ship with armed guards has been taken by pirates. Thus, by contracting maritime security protection, multinational companies look to minimise risks and to maximise profits. They try to protect their human resources and cargo and avoid payments of ransoms and insurance complications. Anti-piracy efforts fit into two of Shearer’s sectors, IV and V.

The above examples demonstrate that global actors with regional interests use PMSCs as operational mechanisms generating public and private commitments, in order to achieve political, military and economic goals.

In a different perspective, some local entities also signed contracts with PMSCs. Triton International was hired by Somaliland authorities to provide assistance to the local coastguard (UN Security Council, 2011: 258). Hart Group was hired by Puntland authorities in 2000 to build the capacity of the local “coast guard”, to undertake anti-piracy operations and curtail illegal fishing. The company provided law enforcement, training, military support and security services (Kinsey, Hansen and Franklin, 2009: 153).

The best-known case is Saracen, rebranded as Sterling Corporate Services, which had a contract with Puntland authorities to develop, train and equip the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), a heavily armed ‘coast guard’ designed to fight piracy. The initiative’s main donor was the United Arab Emirates, which were concerned about the impact of piracy activity on commercial shipping from and to the Middle
East. This effort involved setting up a training camp in Bosaaso, which became the best-equipped military facility in Somalia after the AMISOM bases in Mogadishu, creating a well-equipped and trained force over 1000 strong that reports directly to the President of Puntland (UN Security Council, 2012: 22). It was used against non-pirate Galgala rebels as infantry (Hansen, 2012: 263). Between 2010 and 2012, Saracen developed a considerable military facility, provided training to a public force and was to develop a training program for TFG forces. However, due to the protests from AMISOM and pressure from the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia, the death of a South African trainer shot by a Somali trainee and lack of funding, Saracen was forced to depart, leaving behind a well equipped and trained but unpaid security force (New York Times, 2012). As seen above, local entities also sign contracts with PMSCs to strengthen their capacities, creating commercial networks able to operate without public scrutiny and be used by the political elites as coercion mechanisms. The services provided to local entities in all the examples fit in sector II of Shearer’s categorisation.

Private Military and Security Companies’ involvement at the global level

International actors, such as states and international organisations, often employ PMSCs to achieve foreign policy goals, seeking to reduce the political and financial cost. The United States of America is a considerable actor in Somalia, because it has outsourced AMISOM’s training programs to American PMSCs and has provided assistance and training to the Somalia TFG. After Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, followed by the televised episode of Black Hawk Down and Presidential Decision Directive 25, enhancing a zero-casualties policy, the US approach towards Africa has tended to be centred on the development of African countries’ capacities. Use of PMSCs needs to be understood in the context of US reluctance to get boots on the ground in African conflicts (Aning, Jaye and Atuobi, 2008: 615). In order to minimise risks, outsourcing can be regarded as the solution. By using an indirect mechanism, the US supported the African Union peacekeeping effort, AMISOM, and strengthened the operational capacities of the TFG, while avoiding the political cost of justifying direct commitments and making and contributing to the overseas stabilisation process (Reno, 1999: 38).

Governments are attracted by the privatisation process because it allows low-cost engagement. A state needs to recruit and train personnel in order to undertake intervention. It then needs to feed and pay them and provide transport and logistics to the theatre of operations. In addition, the state is responsible for the soldiers and has to send condolences to the family if anything goes wrong. Finally, the state is responsible for the soldiers’ retirement. The state needs to make a considerable political and economic investment. On the other hand, PMSCs provide a cheaper solution that is limited in time, because there is a contract. The common feature with the first option is payment. PMSCs give the contracting state fast access to human resources, just-in-time performance and an attractive cost-benefit ratio, emphasising efficiency and effectiveness (Branovic, 2011: 6). In addition, “paying for specialists only when needed
saves considerable sums in salary, housing, and pensions while the leasing of private equipment, especially airplanes and helicopters, saves storage, insurance, and maintenance costs” (Howe, 1998: 4).

Contracting states have a direct impact on territorial states by using PMSCs as an indirect tool. This delegation of force and responsibility brings the issue of legitimacy to the table. According to Hall and Biersteker, “having legitimacy implies that there is some form of normative, uncoerced consent or recognition of authority on the part of the regulated or governed” (Hall and Biersteker, 2004: 4-5). Although it is difficult to prove that the PMSC activity fulfils these requirements, in fact they act in accordance with the contracting states interests and guidelines. In certain circumstances the state delegates authority by outsourcing functions where engagement in offensive operations and use of lethal force is a possibility, changing the balance of power in the territorial state and leaving a considerable footprint. This delegation of responsibilities by employing PMSCs as an indirect foreign policy mechanism helps to legitimise the companies’ activities because they have a legal, recognised contract and provide services that directly achieve the contracting state's foreign policy goals. The US support to AMISOM and TFG through DynCorp International, PAE and AECOM is the empirical evidence that corroborates the argument.

**Private Military and Security Companies’ involvement at local level**

PMSCs also leave a considerable footprint at local level by establishing relations with the incumbent power and directly influencing the balance of power by developing operational capacities. This relationship is highly influenced by local dynamics and the development of the PMSC business also takes account of the clan phenomenon.

The Somali identity is characterised by patrilineal lineage, which determines each individual’s place in society. At the apex of this structure is the clan-family (Pham, 2012: 70). After the fall of Siad Barre in 1991 and the state’s collapse in the aftermath, “Somalia had fallen apart into the traditional clan and lineage divisions which, in the absence of other forms of law and order, alone offered some degree of security” (Lewis, 2002: 263). This model of societal and political organisation is the core of the local dynamics – ”although clan-family membership has political implications, in the traditional structure of society the clan-families never act as united corporate groups for they are too large and unwieldy and their members too widely scattered” (Lewis, 1994: 20). Here is where the PMSCs exert a considerable local footprint by enhancing the capacities of a specific group. This changes the balance of power and the relationship between clans and increases the cleavages between them. This is boosted by what Robert Rotberg called the collapsed state, where “political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means”, “security is equated with the rule of the strong”, and “the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order and other vital political goods to the inhabitants embraced by language or ethnic affinities or borders” (Rotberg, 2004: 10).
In Puntland, both Hart Security and Saracen International were careful to maintain clan balance between their employees and trainees and gather consensus among the different clans. But it is Hart Security departure’s from Puntland that best illustrates the importance of clan dynamics in the PMSC business. According to Kinsey, Hansen and Franklin, during the conflict between Jama Ali Jama and President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who originally hired and paid for Hart services through fishing licenses, the Hart-trained coastguard split along tribal lines. Yusuf Ahmed won with the support of the Tarr family. This clan owned fishing boats that could readily lend themselves to conversion to coastguard vessels, and was looking to assume Hart’s position through Somcan, the clan’s company (Kinsey, Hansen and Franklin, 2009: 154). President Yusuf Ahmed changed service supplier and chose to replace Hart Security. The company lost the contract because of the Tarr family’s influence over the president, and was forced to abandon Puntland, leaving behind its investments in the field.

Saracen International mainly financed by the United Arab Emirates, also left a considerable footprint in Puntland, because it provided services that helped develop specific mechanisms to strengthen the operational capacities of the incumbent political power. They installed a military facility in Bosaaso that was the most advanced in Puntland and the second in Somalia, after the AMISOM installations in Mogadishu. In Bosaaso, Saracen created and developed the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which provided the political power with anti-piracy capabilities and reinforced its armed capacity. This shows that the engagement of an external private entity resulted in the provision of certain skills that directly influenced local power. The employment of the PMPF against non-pirate Galgala rebels demonstrates that the Saracen-developed ‘coastguard’ force was used beyond its initial functions – to curtail piracy.

Conclusion

The empirical data demonstrate that the relationship between private and public agents in the security sector is effective, encompasses multiple services and pursues a considerable variety of goals. Due to its lack of formal authority, extensive coastline and desire to develop businesses, Somalia can provide a lucrative market for PMSCs. These companies’ activity has a direct impact at political, military and security levels, both globally and locally. These changes correspond to the emergence of what Abrahamsen and Williams (2011: 3) called global security assemblages: new security structures and practices that are simultaneous public and private, local and global, where the local power is reconfigured.

We analysed PMSCs activity in Somalia at two levels, global and local. In the first dimension, the PMSCs contributed to the development of the Somali TFG’s capacities through the involvement of foreign companies – DynCorp International, AECOM, PAE and Bancroft. The contracting state, the USA, had a direct impact on the territorial state, and the companies involved worked as indirect tools to achieve foreign policy goals. This was a way of providing assistance to the internationally recognised government.

of Somalia. These services are in sector II of Shearer’s categorisation. In a different area of intervention, Selected Armor provided direct military support, sector I in Shearer scale. In this case, the involvement of an external company in combat did not reinforce state capacities. Instead, it contributed to the delegitimisation of the incumbent power, by directly supporting the TFG against insurgents.

At local level, the contracting state and territorial state are the same, which means that a local entity directly contracts a foreign agent in order to reinforce its capacities. The services analysed dovetail in sector II of Shearer’s categorisation. The companies involved reinforced the capacities of specific Somali clans, not the internationally recognised government of Somalia. Saracen International’s involvement showed that an external private agent was able to change the local balance of power by developing the Puntland Maritime Police Force, thereby reinforcing the capacities of the incumbent local power.

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INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA (2006-2013): YET ANOTHER EXTERNAL STATE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT?

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Introduction

Since 1991 Somalia has been the site of internationally sponsored political engineering. The current government has signalled the end of the 8-year transition period since August 2012. However, in order to survive, it stills depends on external protection from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and its leadership at the time of writing still faces the challenge of bringing the al-shabaab led insurgency to an end.

The central concern of this chapter is understanding to what extent the post-transition government will be able to rebuild state institutions in order to bring peace and prosperity to significant parts of the country. This chapter argues that the institutional architecture of the post-transition state resembles a state by and of international design. To date, key institutions in the judiciary and security have yet to be implemented. Moreover, the self-governing units in Somalia still need to agreed on the recognition of Federal Member States and the critical issue of the decision-making process around the creation of new Federal Member States.

The overall aim of this article is to contribute to an understanding of key difficulties faced by external state creation projects in Africa.

The central research question is to what extent the post-transition government represents another external state creation project in Somalia. To what extent the difficulties encountered are related to the general external state creation project in Africa, to post-conflict societies’ dynamics or to the particular trajectory of Somalia. This chapter seeks to understand the extent to which the past state creation projects are related to the recurrence of conflict in Somalia and to what extent the current attempt addresses the past obstacles to state reconstruction in Somalia.

The period of analysis is 2006 to 2013. The starting year is 2006 and not 2004 or 1977 or 1884. 2004 was when the Transition Federal Government (TFG) was created in the Mbaghati peace process (2002-2004). The TFG was the outcome of the 14th external attempt to rebuild the state in Somalia. Kenya led the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, which resulted in the creation of the TFG. 1977 was the year when Siyad Barre’s Somalia started a war with Haile Mariam Mengistu’s Ethiopia over
Region V or the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, where a majority of citizens of Somali origin lived. 1884 marked the partition of the Somali-speaking areas in the region among the colonial powers or the colonial period where some of the problems that led to state disintegration could be found (Kapteijns, 2001).

The selection of 2006 as the beginning of the period for analysis is justified by the fact that the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), its ascendance and control of the capital triggered the move of the TFG from Kenya to Somalia (Baidoa). In addition, the ICU’s ruling period showed that order, or a semblance of it, could be restored under the auspices of a domestic generated and led initiative (Samatar, 2006; Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Bradbury, 2009). In addition, Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia in the aftermath of the invitation of the TFG, at the time headed by President Abdullahi Yussuf, marked a significant rupture in Somalia’s domestic dynamics and especially in the relations between state and society. Indeed, while it remained in Somalian territory (2006 to 2009), the Ethiopia National Defence Force (ENDF) contributed to an unprecedented level of resistance and triggered a radicalization of Somalia’s society that had been absent before that period (Menkhaus, 2007). This in turn contributed to a heightened capacity of the remnants of the ICU and the main insurgency movement, al-shabaab, to mobilize support among Somali youth and other marginalized groups seeking payment of a salary on a regular basis (Marchal, 2009).

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part examines the state’s trajectory and focuses on understanding its disintegration in the aftermath of the fall of Siyad Barre’s regime and successive failed attempts at rebuilding the state. Indeed, Somalia epitomizes the inherent difficulties of external state creation in Africa (Clapham, 2011:73). The second part looks at relations between state and society in order to understand the main lines of cleavage in the conflict’s dynamics. The third part examines the post-transition institutional architecture (since August 2012). Finally, it seeks to place the issue of external actors’ engagement and intervention in Somalia, specifically Somalia’s neighbouring states, within the broader context of restoring order and stability within the state reconstruction project. Ultimately, this chapter reflects on how to restore the basic human imperative of trust in a shattered society and the inherent difficulties that multiple actors face in the context of post-conflict societies when trying to rebuild the state. Ultimately, the political dispensation that is most suitable to address the key challenges of restoring order, peace and stability via the reconstruction of the state lies with Somalia’s domestic constituencies.

State’s trajectory & state disintegration

In the 1960s, Botswana and Somalia were praised as the two most homogenous nation-states in Africa. However, whereas Botswana was able to overcome the divisive potential of pre-colonial and colonial identities, Somalia gradually bent to its centrifugal pull (Samatar, 1997: 704). In Somalia’s case, as this section will argue, ethnic homogeneity was superseded by segmentary lineages, ultimately leading
to political fragmentation and civil war. This interpretation, however, needs to be qualified. As a single factor, ethnic and/or clan identities were neither the cause of national consolidation in Botswana’s case nor of political fragmentation and civil war in Somalia’s case (Samatar, 1997: 697). This point will be further developed in the next section which deals with the main lines of cleavage in Somalia’s society. In addition, beyond Somalia’s homogeneity, an analysis of other lines of cleavage, such as social-economic and regional lines, show that minority groups from the southern riverine and inter-river areas, Afmaay speakers, have been marginalised and under-represented within the state’s institutions, particularly in the national assemblies and legislatures of the 1960s and 1970s (Cassanelli, 2003: 17). Since the 1980s, conflict over the control of critical resources such as land, water and local power have intensified to the loss of the local residents of these areas in South Somalia. Indeed, the disintegration of the Somali state was more ruinous for southern riverine groups as their territory was and continues to be the scene of intense battles (Menkhaus, 2003:150).

The founding leaders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) endorsed the consensual agreement on the principle of respecting the inherited colonial borders as the basis of statehood. Somalia’s conception of statehood was at odds with this arrangement. At the founding session of the OAU in Addis Ababa, the Somali leadership expressed its opposition to the *uti possidetis* principle. Somalia’s conception of nationhood was not embedded in the borders inherited at the time of independence but rather on the idea of a Greater Somalia. This idea challenged the artificial division of Somali-speaking communities across the boundaries that the colonial powers and Ethiopia’s Emperor Menelik recognized in the nineteenth century. The Somali leadership aimed to create a Somali state which would bring together the Somali-speaking communities dispersed in Djibouti, the new Somali Federation (which united British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland), Ethiopia’s Ogaden and the Kenyan Northern District. The five-pointed star on the Somali flag corresponded to these territories. Indeed, the unification of the three remaining points in the flag became “[…] the main target of Somali foreign policy from 1960” (Woodward, 1996: 196).

In 1967 Prime Minister Egal, a Northerner, agreed to suspend any irredentist claim to Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. Such was the fervour of nationalism that the political class and the press accused President Egal of “selling out the Greater Somalia ideal” (Jacquin-Berdal, 2002: 165-66).

Until the war with Ethiopia broke out in 1977 (lasting until 1978), Siyad Barre toned down any irredentist claims in order to guarantee international support from the Soviet Union and avoid isolation in the region. Barre’s “scientific socialism” was based on the eradication of the forces of “clannism” by nationalism (Jacquin-Berdal, 2002: 168-69). During this period Barre successfully mobilised “sentiments of national solidarity […] which effectively embraced all the nation’s major clans” (Lewis, 2002: 260-61). Indeed, one of the core tenets of Barre’s political programme for Somalia was its official rejection of “clannism”. However, the regime’s continuous interference in Ethiopia’s domestic affairs, especially in the
Ogaden, was related at a deeper level to Siyad Barre’s reliance on clan and sub-clan solidarity to sustain his hold over the power structures of the state. The construction of his inner power circle encompassed members from a triangle of a related clan (Darood). According to Lewis, the three Darood sub-clans were the Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante (Lewis, 1989: 574). The Ogaden sub-clan was that of the President’s mother’s brother.

The 1977-78 war had generated “a tremendous patriotic euphoria and Siyad Barre was the national hero for the duration of the war” (Samatar, 1997: 703; Lewis, 1989: 575). However, Somalia’s military defeat contributed to the regime’s decline. Shortly after the withdrawal of the troops from the Ogaden, dissident army units launched a coup against Barre’s government. The April 1978 coup had been both ill-timed and ill-planned. It was led by military officers of the Darood/ Majeerteen sub-clan (Mayall, 1978: 344). The military loyal to Barre reacted with the killing of civilians, mass abuses and the destruction of areas inhabited by the Majeerteen sub-clan (Elmi, 2010:18). In Ethiopia, this group of Majeerteen officers was involved in the creation of an insurgency movement, the Somalia Salvation and Democratic Front (SSDF) (Lewis, 1989: 575). Indeed, the government’s defeat contributed to the creation of the SSDF and the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1978 and 1981, respectively. These two northern-Somalia opposition movements organised their guerrilla operations from bases in Ethiopia (Lewis and Mayall, 1996: 104). While the SSDF relied on Darood/ Majeerteen solidarity, the SNM relied mainly on Isaaq solidarity. In the second case as well Barre’s regime responded with reprisals on civilians, specifically killings in Hargeisa and Bur’o (Elmi, 2010: 18). The movements’ mobilization of support around clan affiliation was the outcome of Barre’s divisive strategies and elite manipulation. According to Lewis, by the end of the 1980s the collapse of national solidarity had been accompanied of an unparalleled growth of inter-clan rivalry. Barre relied almost exclusively on the support of his immediate sub-clan, the Marehan (a segment of the Darood).

In a dangerous strategy Barre manipulated clan connections and antagonisms, distributing arms and financial incentives to co-opt supporters. In this context of increasing rivalry and suspicion the configuration of inter-clan alliances kept changing (Compagnon, 1998: 73).

After the ousting of the regime in 1991, the state succumbed to the centrifugal forces of segmentation within society and disintegrated. The various political factions manipulated clan and sub-clan rivalries to advance their claims to the spoils of the state. With the state’s disintegration, economic rivalry between factions of the same clan/sub-clan also led to inter-clan alliances sometimes in “violation” of the segmentary kinship principle (Lewis, 2002: 260-61). Clan-based contradictions were a constituent element of the equation (Lewis, 2002: 52).

Furthermore, the disintegration of the state created notable changes and the former Somali Republic split up into at least three “self-governing units” (Lewis, 2002: 333). Without a government at the helm, Somaliland unilaterally declared independence (1991) and Puntland established itself as an
autonomous region (1998). The disintegration of the state further aggravated the pre-existing permeability of Somalia’s borders, rendering it vulnerable to incursions from neighbouring states. For contiguous neighbouring countries, namely Ethiopia and Kenya, the breakdown of the state, in part, froze challenges to their territorial integrity. The remnants of Somalia, i.e. the capital, central and southern Somalia, were ravaged by armed conflict between shifting factions.

Between 1991 and 2012 international actors supported 15 attempts at forming a government and several conferences outside Somalia, five of which were major meetings, yielded temporary outcomes, though they all failed in the end. The interference from external actors (mainly neighbouring countries), the unwillingness of domestic actors to reconstruct the state and the reduced legitimacy and domestic support for internationally sponsored initiatives all worked against the ultimate goal of restoring order and stability and rebuilding the state. The initiatives included the Djibouti Conference in 1991, the Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation in Ethiopia in 1993, the Cairo Conference in 1997, the Somalia National Peace Conference in Djibouti, known as the Arta peace process in 2000, which led to the creation of the Transitional National Government and the election of President Salad and the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya, known as the Mbagathi peace process between 2002-2004, which led to the creation of the Transitional Federal Government and the election of President Yussuf (Elmi, 2010: 22; Bradbury, 2009: 7). The Mbagathi peace process’s political arrangements had to be revised in 2008 with the Djibouti political process and as a result the ICU’s moderate Islamist Sheik Sharif Ahmed was elected as the last President of the transition’s political dispensation. Finally, after the end of the transition period in August 2012, the Federal Parliament elected a new incumbent, President Mahmoud in September 2012.

Lines of cleavage and conflict’s dynamics

Any analysis that is anchored on a single-factor explanation fails to capture the complexity of state and society relations. This has been even more acute in Somalia’s case.

Authors seem to diverge as to the importance of the Somali segmentary lineage system to an understanding of politics. Indeed, the divergent analyses of the role of clans in politics have had implications in terms of proposed state reconstruction projects in Somalia.

Those that follow Lewis’s analysis of Somalia’s politics emphasize the key role of clans and sub-clans and their divisiveness and centrifugal pull over the centre as the key obstacle to rebuilding a national state (Lewis, 2002: viii).

Despite rivalry between Darood and Hawiye, there is also intra-clan rivalry. The rivalry between Hawiye- Abgal and Hawiye- Habr- Gidir/ Ayr and even between Hawiye/ Habr- Gidir Sa’ad and Ayr in Mogadishu in 2006, or the rivalry between Darood Marehan and Darood Dulbahante in Kismayo over control of the city in 2013, have shown that at times conflict over control of critical resources supersedes
alleged clan and sub-clan solidarity. Furthermore, conflict over control of critical resources has also proven to be disruptive of alliances built on the basis of religious solidarity, such as the rivalry and splintering of al-shabaab and Hizbul Islam in Kismayo over control of the port in 2009.

Any analysis that takes the major clan families as the key referent will inevitably be undermined by the bewildering shifting of allegiances according to the level of segmental solidarity mobilized. In addition, inter-clan alliances also occur, sometimes in contradiction of the kinship principle. Traditionally, inter-clan alliances were forged via social contract and/or marriage. Since 1991 in particular, alliances have tended to shift according to political circumstances, economic interests and/or the faction leaders’ predatory agendas. The boundaries between kin groups move constantly and politics is defined as much by contract (heer) as by kinship (reer) (Compagnon, 1998: 73).

Beyond clan and sub-clan affiliations, regional, socio-economic cleavages and gender are paramount to understanding fault lines in state and society’s relations in Somalia and to understanding the changing conflict dynamics (Little, 2003; Cassanelli, 2003; Menkhaus, 2004; Hagmann, 2005: 532).

The most intense period of fighting immediately after Siyad Barre’s fall, during the 1991-92 escalation of violence, highlights the importance of regional and socio-economic cleavages to understanding the conflict’s dynamics. The residents of the Jubba Valley and Bay region were ill-positioned in terms of access to weaponry to maintain territorial control of their land and other production resources. Indeed, as argued in the first section, the minority groups in the southern river and inter-riverine areas were amongst the most affected by the civil war. In the aftermath of the 1977-78 war between Somalia and Ethiopia, refugees from Ethiopia’s Ogaden region settled in the riverine and inter-river areas (Cassanelli, 2003: 18). This important factor helps understand why Ethiopia so vehemently opposed the Kenya-led Jubaland initiative of creating a new Federal Member State with the capital in the disputed port city of Kismayo. This point will be developed further in the next section (Flood, 2011; IRIN, 2013).

The conflict for territorial supremacy in 1991-92 in the riverine and inter-river areas destroyed critical resources, such as herds, grain stores and irrigation pumps. The warlords that have prevented the state from regaining the legitimate monopoly over the means of coercion are not simply clan leaders. The warlords are rivals using weapons, alliances and propaganda to gain access to productive land, port facilities and urban real estate (Cassanelli, 2003: 15).

Gender cleavages pervaded Somalia’s state and society relations long before the disintegration of the state and brought together traditional and religious leaders. Those who respected both Customary and Islamic law in Somalia fiercely opposed Barre’s attempt to implement the 1975 Family Code, which

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1 Jubaland comprises the following regions: Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo. These regions are contiguous to Kenya and Ethiopia. Jubaland would cover a combined area of 87,000 km² and have a total population of around 1.3 million. Numerous clans live in these regions, such as the Ogaden-Darood, Marehan-Darood, Sheekhaal, Coormale, Blimaal, Gaaljecel, Rahanweyn, Dir, Gawaaweyn, Murile, Bejuni Boni and various Bantu groups.
would impact on inheritance issues. The law aimed at entitling women to inherit half of what their brothers inherited. The law was not implemented in the end (Helander, 1999: 48). Women have gradually become more involved in civil society and politics. In the internationally sponsored peace conferences and parliaments that have resulted from these internally-led initiatives, women were awarded a quota of the total seats. The first conference to establish a 25 per cent quota for women representatives in the future parliament was the Arta peace process. This measure was retained in the Mbagathi peace process but the quota was reduced to 12 per cent (Bradbury, 2009: 24). However, looking at members of the past and the current Federal Parliament the number of female members of parliament remains below the 12 per cent threshold.

Religious solidarity with the ascendency of the ICU and its control of the capital between June and December 2006 seemed to be the only viable alternative with regard to a political state building project. Indeed, solidarity around Islam during the ICU’s “ruling” period in the capital mobilized consensus among various sections of Somalia’s society, both within Somalia and in the diaspora (Samatar, 2006). Since the fall of Siyad Barre, the ICU’s short-lived rule was lauded by some as the most successful experiment at bringing order and stability to the capital and as having managed to control and re-establish order over large swathes of territory in south-central Somalia (Woodward, 2013: 88). The ICU rule was perceived as legitimate because it sought to answer local security concerns and it was committed to keeping public order and safety (Bradbury, 2009: 31). However, the ascendancy of more militant elements and factions within the ICU raised suspicions in the regional and global political arenas, especially in Addis Abeba and Washington. It should be noted that most Somalis, who profess Sunni Islam, viewed the salafi interpretation of Islam as an ideological import (ICG, 2005: 16) and were therefore not inclined to support the more militant, extremist leanings within ICU’s disparate leadership.

As a result of different interpretations of the role of clans in politics, Somalis have been divided between those that favour a centralized unionist approach and those that favour a decentralized approach within a federal model (Menkhaus, 2008). The unitary approach is fiercely resisted because of fears of re-establishment of Siyad Barre’s style of governance based on clan dominance (Woodward, 2013: 87). Somalis believe that the unitary approach favours majority clans’ dominance. Indeed, as argued in the previous section, Barre maintained his grip on power through reliance on the MOD formula. Others oppose the intertwining of clans and politics, as they argue the clans are a form of social organization and clan politics reflect narrow political interests which are in tension with those of a democratic state. The system of proportional representation based on the 4,5 formula adopted originally at the 1996 Sodere Conference, afterwards at the 2000 Arta peace process and the 2002-2004 Mbagathi peace process, reproduces an imbalance between majority and minority clans and contradicts the democratic principle of equal representation of all citizens (Bradbury, 2009: 17). This formula, as will be developed further in the next section, awards an equal number of places to each of the four major Somali clan-families (Rahanweyn, Dir, Hawiye and Darood) with the remaining 0,5 allotted to minority groups and women. The
disagreements over which federal model will be implemented in the post-transition period will be the subject of the next section.

Post-transition institutional architecture

The underlying dilemma remains unanswered. What kind of federal model will emerge in post-transition Somalia? More specifically what form of federalism will prevail? Puntland favours a decentralized form of federalism while the Federal Government of Somalia seems to favour a centralized approach to the creation of new Federal Member States. In a federal system of states what level of local autonomy will be recognized for each of the Federal Member States? Finally, what role will clan, sub-clans and minority groups play at local and regional level? Will minority groups be represented in local and regional councils?

Since 2009 Sharia has been recognised as the main law of the country. However, the Provisional Constitution is not clear on the key elements of Shari’a Implementation, on the relationship between the sharia’s courts and other court judges and on the major legal domains that fall under sharia or Somalia’s post-transition judicial system. Not all parties seem to have accepted the post-transition institutional architecture, namely the judicial system. Indeed, al-shabaab in April 2013 attacked the main court house in Mogadishu as a sign of rejection of the post-transition institutional architecture (BBC, 2014).

The controversy surrounding the federal model to be implemented starts with the key question of who can decide on the creation of new Federal Member States. According to the Provisional Federal Constitution, federal states can be established as long as they are based on “a voluntary decision, two or more regions may merge to form a Federal Member State” (e.g. Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo could unite to bring the Jubaland initiative into fruition). However, according to the Constitution, the lower house of the Federal Parliament and a National Commission (that was not yet set up at the time of writing) will need to decide on this matter. The current constitutional row over the creation of new Federal Member States and the Constitution’s lack of clarity further complicate the decision over who controls and leads this process. As Prime Minister Shirdon has argued the central government and parliament lead the creation of Federal Member States. In contrast, the regions themselves like Puntland and the leadership involved in setting up the Jubaland Federal state have argued that the regions should lead the creation of Federal Member States.

As Figure 1 shows the executive, legislative and judiciary powers are intended to be distributed between the federal, Federal Member States and local level.
The tension between the central Federal Government, the Federal Member States and the local level is a key fault line that threatens to compromise the post-transition institutional architecture and the restoration and exercise of the executive, legislative and judicial powers. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister in Prime Minister’s Shirdon cabinet is originally from Somaliland. This should not be interpreted as a mere coincidence. Somaliland’s quest for international recognition is not likely to wane even with a functioning government in Mogadiscio. Puntland and Galmudug qualify and seem inclined to join the Federation. The Jubaland initiative, which aims at creating a new Federal Member State, is not a recent political project, though its re-emergence at a critical juncture has highlighted and re-opened the debate on the form of the Federation, the ambiguities and diverging conceptions over the decision-making process when it comes to the creation of Federal Member States and the degree of initiative and autonomy to be awarded to the region. Indeed, this is a major fault line in the state reconstruction project.
External actors' role

This section addresses the region's states' engagement in Somalia. The role of the UN and its agencies, the EU and EU member states, Turkey and the US will only be discussed as complementary. The key theoretical premise remains that the domestic and regional security dynamics are prominent in relation to other global dynamics. Indeed, although extra-regional actors and global dynamics do play an important role, this and the preceding sections show that both Somali (including diaspora formations) and regional actors are far more determinant for understanding Somalia’s state trajectory and conflict dynamics (Marchal, 2012: 2; Cliffe, 1999; Woodward, 2013: 46). Correspondingly, Somalia’s conflict remains pivotal to the Horn of Africa’s security.

The UN, more specifically the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) via the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representatives for Somalia, has played a critical role both in the process that led to the election of the last President of the Transitional Federal Government (President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed) in preparation of the post-transition period and in the institutional architecture and Provisional Constitution of Somalia. According to UNSC Resolution 2093 of 6 March 2013 and UNSC Resolution 2102 of 2 May 2013 (UNSC, 2013a; 2013b), the UNPOS is to be replaced by a successor mission by 3 June 2013 entitled United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).

After the disintegration of the state and in face of the escalation of violence in 1991-92, the first UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia was empowered by UNSC Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992 (UNSC, 1992). The operation was named Operation Restore Hope. At the time the Resolution was greeted as a very significant opening as it was the first attempt to establish a humanitarian operation under Chapter VII. The US contribution was critical to setting up the operation. The US administration created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to act in coordination with the United Nations Mission for Somalia (UNOSOM). Despite considerable problems UNOSOM II took over formally from UNITAF/UNISOM on May 4, 1993. As the security situation deteriorated, UN and US forces reacted increasingly aggressively (Lewis and Mayall, 1996: 107-124). This would culminate with the clash between Somali militia and US peacekeeping forces on 3-4 October 1993, which resulted in the loss of 18 American soldiers and the withdrawal of US forces in 1994. Engulfed with insurmountable difficulties the UNPKO withdrew from Somalia in March 1995. Quite significantly, on 24 February 2012, the UN flag was raised for the first time since the UN’s withdrawal in 1995.

The regional organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had been divided at the TFG’s request for an interposition force. Earlier plans to create an IGAD Peacekeeping operation for Somalia, IGASOM, failed due to a lack of consensus among its member states on the composition of the force. Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti opposed contributions from contiguous neighbouring countries to Somalia at the time.

At the outset, civilians in Mogadishu were hostile to the presence of both Ethiopian troops and AMISOM peacekeepers. In addition, the disproportionate use of force by the warring parties placed civilians in the middle of hostilities inflicting major casualties on non-combatants (Human Rights Watch, 2007). This state of affairs at the time created resentment both of Ethiopia and of the TFG, as it revived the worst memories of the intense fighting between faction leaders in the early 1990s. The US air campaigns helped create resentment over US interference in Somalia’s domestic affairs and connected US and Ethiopia’s interventions in Somalia.

After the ENDF’s withdrawal in January 2009, opposition to AMISOM started to wane.

After the IGAD’s public recognition of Ethiopia’s sacrifice for regional peace in Somalia, Eritrea decided to temporarily suspend its membership (Sudan Tribune, 2007). Eritrea demanded to re-activate its membership four years later (Sudan Tribune, 2011).

IGAD countries divergences vis-à-vis the Somali crisis had other implications. In addition to the Ethiopia-backed TFG offensive, Kenya closed its border with Somalia in order to prevent ICU members from escaping and mingling unnoticed with the Somali-speaking communities. Kenya handed one of the prime ‘terrorists’ in to the US, allegedly for his involvement in the Mombassa 2002 hotel bombing and his links with the al-Qaeda East Africa Network (Roberts, 2007). Finally, Kenya intervened forcefully in Somalia in October 2011 and has joined AMISOM (ICG, 2012) while Ethiopia has continued to opt for unilateral intervention close to its borders.

International engagement in Somalia’s crisis has shown that the influence of IGAD tends to be by-passed by bilateral interstate relations and by the self-interested motivations of regional countries (Vines, 2012: 7). In addition, a shifting pattern of alliances has characterized the region, contributing to the reproduction and reinforcement of the motto “My enemy’s enemy is my friend”. Indeed, the constantly changing alignments compose the pattern of power within the Horn of Africa region (Bull and Holbraad, 1995: 157). In Somalia’s case this pattern was reproduced in Ethiopia and Eritrea’s diverging support strategies to the conflict protagonists back in 2006 (while Ethiopia supported President Yussuf’s TFG, Eritrea supported the ICU leadership).
The limited scope and density of regional governance at the formal level of inter-state relations within the Horn of Africa region gives space for non-state actors to play a major role in determining the dynamics of regional security. Al-shabaab’s continued ability to launch attacks outside Somalia’s territory since the 2010 attacks in Kampala during the closing match of the World Cup is a potent reminder of the interconnectedness of the region’s security dynamics.

Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya host the widest proportion of refugees of Somali origin and count ethnic groups who identify with Somali clans among their national citizens. As discussed in the first section, at the time of African independences, the idea of Greater Somalia aimed to incorporate Somali-speaking areas in the Horn of Africa in a united Somali state. As a result, both Kenya and Ethiopia follow Somalia’s domestic politics closely and have long vied in influencing the various attempts at rebuilding the state. Since 2006 both Ethiopia and Kenya have been engaged, interfered and intervened forcefully in Somalia’s domestic politics. Some authors argue that their role has been critical in preventing the emergence of any viable government in Somalia (Marchal, 2012: 2).

During the period under analysis (2006-2013) Somalia’s neighbouring states had to directly handle the ramifications of Somalia’s conflict and famine crisis in 2011 in terms of refugee flow. Indeed, this pattern confirms the overall trend in other regions. The main refugee flows are intra-regional and 86 per cent of refugees tend to remain within their region of origin and in contiguous neighbouring states (Hammerstad, 2010: 245; Bali, 2005: 178).

Despite increased international engagement in Somalia, both from regional and extra-regional actors, the number of refugees originating from Somalia in neighbouring states has steadily increased and in the aftermath of the 2011 famine the number has passed the 1 million threshold.

Figure 2 shows that between 2006 and 2013 Somali refugees in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen have grown exponentially.

Figure 2: Somali Refugees in the Region (2006-2013)

While in 2006 these states had 8,642; 16,576; 173,702 and 91,587 Somali refugees respectively, in the first four months of 2013 they had 18,725; 238,957; 507,797 and 229,447. The two contiguous neighbouring states, Ethiopia and Kenya, host the largest group of Somali refugees with 238,957 and 507,797.

In addition, both Ethiopia's and Kenya's pattern of interference in Somalia's internal affairs and the military incursions into Somalia's territory between 2006 and 2013 made the settlement of Somali refugees near the border even more problematic. This is nothing new, but the continuous placement of Somali refugee camps in borderland areas near their country of origin means that Somalis are not adequately protected from the conflict they fled from in the first place. Refugee camps close to the border of the refugees' country of origin further increase insecurity (Lomo, 2006: 44-45). Al-shabaab has intensified its penetration and has launched attacks on Dadaab refugee camps located in Kenya 100 kilometres from Somalia (McSweeney, 2012).

Between 2006 and 2013, neighbouring countries' interventions in Somalia have led to the perpetration of human rights' violations against Somali citizens, refugees and those of Somali origins. More specifically, Ethiopia, Kenya and other parties to the conflict (the previous TFG security forces and AMISOM) have been accused of committing abuses against civilians in Somalia (Human Rights Watch, 2007; 2008; 2012; 2013). Ethiopia, between 2006 and 2009 and thereafter through its incursions into Somali territory near the border, and Kenya since 2011, firstly with Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) and then as a troop contributing country to AMISOM, have both perpetrated human rights abuses against Somalis inside Somalia.

Since the end of the transition in August 2012, international engagement and interest in Somalia's new institutional architecture and leadership have been on an ascendant curve. However refugees' flows and stays in neighbouring countries reveal that conditions within Somalia remain uncertain. Security in Mogadishu has improved\(^2\) since 2013, but general conditions for Somalis are far from the minimum allowed to survive on a daily basis without fear of threats to their lives or physical integrity.\(^3\)

While al-shabaab is weaker it remains a spoiler of peace in Somalia and a major challenge both to the Federal Government of Somalia and other international actors involved in the state's reconstruction. Al-shabaab still opposes any internationally supported initiative of rebuilding the state in Somalia and the presence of foreign forces in Somalia. Its aim to implement an Islamic state lost legitimacy when sharia was recognized as the prevailing law on election of the President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed back in 2009. Article 2 (2) and (3) the Provisional Constitution sets out that Islam and Sharia are recognized as the only

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\(^2\) On 25 April 2013, the Union Jack was raised for the first time in Mogadishu since the UK's embassy closure in 1991. British Foreign Secretary William Hague was in Mogadishu for the formal opening of the Embassy.

\(^3\) On 14 April 2013, al-shabaab successfully disrupted a court session in the capital with a bomb attack and several people were injured and 29 reportedly killed. This was the most successful al-shabaab attack since the insurgents had been expelled from the capital in August 2011.
religion that can be propagated in Somalia and sharia is the primordial law against which all law should be made compliant (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2012).

Conclusion

An analysis of the State’s trajectory and of the lines of cleavage in Somalia’s society confirms that the clan and sub-clan cleavages are not the central factor of the crisis of state formation in Somalia. Indeed, clan identities have become increasingly politicized and expressed through forceful means. The politicization of identities was part-and-parcel of the process of state formation, which became more prominent during Siyad Barre’s regime. The competition and conflict over the control of critical resources has predominantly been expressed as a question of rivalry between clans (Brons, 2001: 89-90). In contrast, the analysis shows that the competition over critical resources more often than not has surpassed both clan and religious solidarity.

The post-transition institutional architecture is an ongoing process at the time of writing already fraught with internal contradictions and lack of previous clarification. A case in point is the gap in the Provisional Constitution and the tension with regard the process of creating and recognizing Federal Member States. Somaliland unilaterally declared independence. However, in the post-transition the Federal Government of Somalia has not shown any signs of its openness to recognizing Somaliland’s claim to self-determination. The tension between the capital and the regional centres of power remains a key fault line in the process of rebuilding the state. Finally, the Jubaland initiative and its uncertain outcome at the time of writing highlight the importance of bearing in mind, not only the relations between the capital and Somalia’s regions, but also the positioning of neighbouring states and the degree of influence they are able to exert on Somalia’s political actors.

Somalia’s neighbouring states have recurrently interfered in Somalia’s internal affairs. During the period under analysis this interference has escalated up to the level of intervention and more systematic engagement with the various domestic parties to the conflict. Somalia’s crisis remains pivotal for the region’s security and the security of the contiguous neighbouring states. However, neighbouring states’ interference and intervention in Somalia’s internal affairs are driven by self-interested motivations that at critical moments have militated against the ultimate aim of restoring order and rebuilding the state in Somalia through a domestically led process. The rise and fall of the ICU, even if a 6-month rule period was insufficient to determine its long-term political project for rebuilding the state, was a domestic generated project, but its fall was precipitated by a combination of regional and global dynamics. In this regard, both Ethiopia’s and the US’s foreign policies vis-à-vis Somalia coincided in the determination to prevent a militant Islamist movement (even if domestically generated and with extended support from domestic constituencies) from overthrowing an externally created government, the Transitional Federal Government at the time led by President Yussuf.
Although Somalia’s crisis of state formation requires a regionalist approach to the restoration of order both within Somalia and in the region, the process of rebuilding the state will necessarily reflect local priorities and local mechanisms of conflict resolution, reconciliation and reparation. This is the only lesson learned from several international conferences that have failed in their ultimate aim of contributing to the reconstruction of the state.

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THE LEGACY OF POWER SHARING IN KENYA: LITERATURE CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH AGENDA’S INVISIBILITIES

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Introduction

Kenyan political elites signed a power-sharing agreement in February 2008 in the wake of the violent hostilities that swept the country following the irregularities of the hotly contested December 2007 general elections which left behind over 1,000 dead and more than 600,000 IDPs in just over two months. Since the agreement was struck, a Government of National Unity composed of the two main contenders was put in place to halt the violence and set in motion a reform agenda to address the structural causes of violence. During its five-year run, the power sharing agreement was able to put forward a new Constitution (approved by popular referendum in August 2010) and held the next electoral process (in March 2013) by and large peacefully. Even though born in the realm of political science striving for political engineering in divided and multi-ethnic societies via democratic proportional inclusiveness, power sharing arrangements have been recurrent in the African continent since the end of the Cold War, particularly as a conflict resolution mechanism included in peace agreements. However, in both the democratic theory and the conflict resolution strands of research, literature on power sharing is almost exclusively derived from an elite-based and/or institutionally-driven analysis, neglecting bottom-up approaches and dynamics and failing to deliver a more comprehensive analysis on the impact of power sharing. Additionally, the lack of dialogue between sub-dimensions of the studies on power sharing has provided for yet little knowledge of its medium- and long-term consequences. Highlighting the findings of fieldwork done in Kenya during the March 2013 elections, this chapter intends to shed light on the dynamics of power-sharing agreement in Kenya. It argues that the aforementioned lack of dialogue between research and analytical agendas has been responsible for ‘blind spots’ in the literature that have been neglecting potentially influential actors and dynamics that could further the understanding of the limitations and potential consequences of power sharing arrangements. This chapter maps inconsistencies between the literature on power sharing theory and the practice of Kenyan power-sharing experience, using a diagnosis of the shortcomings of power-sharing literature to demonstrate the need for

1 According to LeVan (2011) between 1990 and 2008, 22 African countries had a total number of 64 power sharing arrangements concerning violent conflict scenarios or violent political crises. According to Mehler (2009b) between 1999 and 2009 17 African countries had power sharing arrangements, including four in the Horn of Africa: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan.
new research agendas that can complement the accumulated yet contradictory dominant research agendas.

**Powersharing: an introduction to the debates**

“[..] consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.” (Lijphart, 1969: 216)

Power sharing literature emerged in the late 1960s as a normative attempt to provide stable democracies to divided societies through accommodation and inclusion of political elites as well as incentives for moderation and cooperation. Mostly through the academic work of Arend Lijphart (e.g. 1969; 1977; 2008), consociational or power sharing theory suggests four characteristics – a grand coalition, group autonomy, proportionality and minority veto – which can take different forms and adapt to the different scenarios accordingly. Due to its malleable applicability, these four features of consociational theory can take different forms and are not to be equally recommended to societies trying to implement power sharing models of democracy, nor is it imperative that the four features have to be present. As O’Flynn and Russell noted,

“In principle power sharing enables conflicting groups to remedy longstanding patterns of antagonism and discrimination, and to build a more just and stable society for all. Institutionally, there is an indeterminate number of ways in which democratic power sharing can be realised.” (O’Flynn and Russell, 2005:1)

The power sharing advocates’ main argument is based on the assumption that in heterogeneous societies (particularly in fragmented and polarised ones) simple majority rule or, as Lijphart (2008:12) notes, “bare-majority models of democracy” – e.g. winner-takes-all; First-Past-The-Post [FPTP] – can produce a scenario of “tyranny of the majority”, i.e., where some segments of society face the risk of permanent exclusion from the political game. The dangers of such exclusion in ethnically divided societies are reinforced by the necessity for mutual security (Dahl, 1973) among political elites and their communities, particularly during electoral periods. Accordingly, as elections are the primary forum of inter-group competition, there is a need to guarantee a level of protection of essential rights so that a group’s electoral defeat does not represent a threat to its own survival, thus discouraging divided societies with majoritarian models of democracy to perceive electoral competition as a winner-takes-all (and loser-gives-all) zero-sum competition for control of the state and its resources, and where the stakes of political access can to certain groups represent their political, economic, cultural and even physical survival.3

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2 “In my writings after 1969, I started using the term ‘power sharing’ democracy more and more often as a synonym for consociational democracy.” Lijphart (2008:6).

3 “Absent Dahl’s pre-requisite of mutual security, elections are perceived by groups in conflict as a zero-sum game; it is a winner-take-all contest. Often, an election is perceived as an opportune moment for politicians to manipulate ethnicity in order to retain power, as in Kenya and Ghana in recent years. In many divided societies, electoral competition is a contest for the ownership of the state. Minorities, particularly, equate democracy not with freedom or
Drawing from a consensus on the disadvantages of bare-majoritarian models of democracy and the political conditions in which violence in divided societies occurs, power-sharing studies have been engineering alternative models for political systems and institutions that can, through the promotion of the broadest possible majorities in the decision-making process, manage the destructive potential of inter-communal divisions through the formulation of an inclusive peaceful and democratic institutional framework. In the consociational model for example, there can be a combination of inclusive government such as a grand coalition (elite accommodation), group autonomy (for example, federalism), proportional representation (including allocation of resources and civil service appointments), and mutual veto. Consociationalists argue that, through the broadening of participating actors in decision-making process, the consociationalist proposal can provide a peaceful and stable democracy by promoting the broadest majority (or even consensus) possible, thus enabling more accurate representation and in particular better representation and protection of minority interests. It is in this last regard that power sharing theory can be an alternative model of deepening democracy in divided societies, as it seeks the inclusion of segments of society that face the risk of permanent alienation from the decision-making process.

Power sharing agreements have been recurrent in the African continent (see for e.g., Mehler, 2009b; LeVan, 2011). However, classic consociational theory has been mainly concerned with other contexts rather than violent conflict settlements from which power sharing has been more frequently adopted, nor has Lijphart’s work – with the exception of the South African case – focused on the specificities of African framework concerning power-sharing dynamics and models. Concomitantly, power-sharing literature has been emerging since the turn of the century through the lenses and goals of conflict resolution and in particular the sustainability of power sharing as a conflict resolution mechanism. This renewed interest has also brought new analyses that, in turn, have put forward contradicting results that question the validity of the arguments of classical power sharing literature and its proponents. In effect, several authors (e.g. Jarstad and Sisk, 2008); Mehler, 2009a; 2009b; Noel, 2005; Spears, 2000; O’Flynn and Russell, 2005; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005) have argued that, contrary to classical power sharing participation but with the structured dominance of adversarial majority groups. Permanent minorities such as Tamils in Sri Lanka, Catholics in Northern Ireland, and whites in South Africa have feared the consequences of electoral competition, especially when the expected consequence of majority victory is discrimination against them. For minority groups, losing an election is a matter of not simply losing office but of losing the means for protecting the survival of the group.” (Sisk, 1996: 31).

The debates on power sharing have produced a vast literature and different approaches, the consociational being accompanied since the eighties by an ‘integrative’ or ‘structuralist’ approach (Horowitz, 1985) and by a ‘power dividing’ approach by Roeder and Rothchild (2005). Nonetheless, such inclusion does not mean that power sharing can only succeed or even be exclusive to democratic regimes or institutionally democratic frameworks. Milton Esman demonstrates the case of the accommodation of non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire which had been given degrees of autonomy, self-determination and self-management. In the same way, some autocratic post-colonial African regimes informally balanced the cabinet to include different groups in such a manner that (access to) power and its resources would be proportionally allocated and distributed. Rothchild names these executives “hegemonic exchange regimes” where a portion of state power and resources are proportionally shared between certain groups in order to manage a degree of accommodation and balance, and simultaneously controlling democratic freedoms. See Esman (1986) and Rothchild (1986; 1995).
literature, power sharing may, in fact: i) fuel extremist, radical and anti-democratic behaviour; ii) inhibit the transition of conflict-management to conflict-resolution; iii) smother internal diversity and its acknowledgment for the sake of community identities and collective concerns; iv) show difficulties in recognising and dealing with cross-cutting identities; v) leave insufficient space for individual autonomy; vi) damage the relationship of transparency and accountability; vii) foster the conditions for government deadlocks; viii) increase the economic inefficiency of government; ix) reverse democratisation efforts in Africa in the last twenty years centred on state-building and political liberalisation, thus prioritising peace before process; and x) lack democratic legitimacy and ownership of the process. In short, in spite of the power sharing debate being far from a consensus in academic circles, its embrace by policy-makers has shown “a huge gap between the generalising theory and the political practice” (Finkeldey, 2011: 12).

Moreover, despite distinct focus and conclusions, both strands of research share a common methodological focus: they derive their analysis and conclusions almost exclusively from elite-based or institutionally-driven (e.g. Noel, 2005; Norris, 2008) perspectives, and contradicting results are perhaps the inevitable reflection of the lack of dialogue between the two strands. Jarstad points out:

“[...] in the conflict-management discourse, power-sharing is seen as a mechanism to manage the uncertainty in a peace process – if need be, as a substitute for elections – while research based on democratic theory treats power-sharing as a mechanism to foster moderation and to improve the quality of democracy. This means that researchers of both schools advocate power sharing for war-shattered societies, albeit for different reasons. However, the lack of integration between the two discourses means that there is limited knowledge of the long-term consequences of power sharing in societies emerging from war.” (Jarstad, 2008:111)

Some authors have hinted at this lack of integration and dialogue between different schools of thought and sub-dimensions of political studies: Spears (2005) highlights the resistance of political elites in engaging in power-sharing negotiations and implementing power-sharing arrangements in post-conflict scenarios, alluding to the fact that conditions of anarchy that accompany civil war and state collapse may, more often than not, require solutions that are prior to power sharing, including solutions that may even exclude power sharing. Debates regarding issues such as contemporary violent conflicts in Africa, peace-building and state-building interventions, failed states and security predicaments have been largely neglected in power sharing literature.6

Other authors have emphasised the need to analyse power sharing beyond the conflict mitigation dimension (LeVan, 2011) and call for power sharing to be regarded as a process (Mehler, 2009b) rather than an event, citing the example of Burundi as a case study of the impact of twenty-years of trial-error experiments in power-sharing arrangements as a tool for political liberalisation, democratisation and conflict resolution (see Vandeginste, 2009).

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Despite having what some authors consider “an unimpressive record”, power sharing is still a centrepiece of many African peace initiatives (Spears, 2005). Such was the case of the example illustrated in this chapter: Kenya had a severe, violent post-electoral crisis, where in two months a country previously considered a beacon of stability in the Horn of Africa region suddenly found itself in the brink of civil war and the idea of turning into a failed state was looming. A power-sharing agreement was struck roughly two months after the elections in which the main candidates formed a grand coalition know as the Government of National Unity to halt the violence, and outlined a reform agenda to deal with the structural roots of violence and move the country towards reconciliation. Regardless of the position of power-sharing advocates and opponents, one fundamental question has yet remained unanswered, as Blessing-Miles Tendi pointed out:

“It's easy for you and me and many others to sit there, deliberate and criticise power sharing but there's a big elephant in the room: had there been no power sharing in Zimbabwe and Kenya, flawed as it is, what other option did we have?” (Tendi apud The Guardian, 2010)

Power sharing in Kenya

Independent since 1963, Kenya is a multi-ethnic state with over 40 ethnic groups and a history of tribalist politics under a 23 year-old de facto one-party system (and a de jure one-party system just before the failed coup d’état of 1982 up until 1992) that has taken its toll over the almost 50 years since gaining independence. The one-party system was an historical legacy that many African countries shared after liberation from European colonial shackles, and in Kenya KANU – the party in power from independence up until 2002 – was the political party that helped shaped the transition from an early stage of multi-party democracy in the country to the one-party system. The first glimpses of the one-party state can be found right after independence: following a dispute between KANU and opposing party KADU over the constitutional federal or quasi-federal elements included in the constitution, Kenya moved towards a more unitary, centralised system of governance. Following its defeat, KADU was dissolved and its elements joined KANU. In 1966 Oginga Odinga, one of the “founding fathers” of Kenya’s independence, formed the KPU but within 3 years it had been banned and Odinga arrested, turning Kenya into a de facto one-party state by 1969. According to Widner (1992: 1-2), “KANU existed only as a loosely knit grouping of politicians” in the early years of its existence and “tolerated some internal criticism and debate over its platform, albeit to a diminishing degree”. It was only during the rule of Jomo Kenyatta’s successor Danial Arap Moi that the relationship between party, government and state began to change significantly, with KANU acquiring a “far stronger role in the pursuit of political order, and its boundaries began to merge with

7 “We do not believe Kenya is a failed state. However, it is chastening to think that the situation over the first months of 2008 closely resembled the fluid and potentially uncontrollable situation typical of collapsing states.” (Branch and Cheeseman, 2008:16).
8 Kenya African National Union.
9 Kenya African Democratic Union.
10 Kenya People’s Union.
those of the Office of the President”. Political parties born out of the implementation of multi-party democracy in 1992 continued showing the same trend of weak organisations, generally held together around their leader, with the sole purpose of providing an electoral vehicle towards political dominance and, with the exception of a few very recent cases, mobilising their constituencies along ethnic lines and manipulation of ethnic identities.

Therefore, it may be quite ambiguous to uphold Kenya as a beacon of stability in the Horn of Africa. Although this epithet may have provided for relative distinction (and status) of Kenya among its neighbours, it has simultaneously turned a blind eye on Kenya’s troublesome socio-political fabric. Historical trends such as the adversarial nature of the Kenyan bare-majoritarian political system entrenched into a zero-sum political game towards the control of state and its resources have been accompanied by political elite fragmentation and manipulation of collective ethnic identities for mobilisation particularly during elections, fostering narratives of exclusion and prejudice that pitted various ethnic groups against each other (Mbugua, 2008). Such long-standing grievances have created a polarised society with recurrent episodes of violence that have emerged episodically throughout Kenya’s post-colonial period, but more frequently after the implementation of a multi-party democracy in 1992 (Atuobi, 2008). However, the 2007 post-electoral violence came as a surprise to many. Kenya had relatively small episodes of violence in the 1992 and 1997 elections, and violence was almost unheard of in the transition from Arap Moi’s 24-year rule in 2002. Contrary to 2007, electoral outcomes were accepted without significant contestation, even if claims of electoral fraud did surface. In 1992 and 1997 the opposition to Moi-led KANU was highly divided and none of the candidates individually had a fighting chance, a condition that was not present in 2002 where a major coalition was formed between numerous ethnic political parties to dispute the elections against Moi’s appointed successor Uhuru Kenyatta (Ng’weno, 2007). In 2007 the conditions had changed: a too-close-to-call contested election with numerous evidence of electoral fraud threw the country into the greatest violence the country had seen since the Mau-Mau uprising, and exposed Kenya’s structural difficulties.

The roots of conflict

The outbreak of the post-election violence in 2007-2008 was the most violent crisis that had hit Kenya since the Mau-Mau uprising. From the date of the general election on 27 December 2007 and signing of the power sharing agreement to 28 February 2008, Kenya was on the brink of civil war. In only two months, over a thousand people were killed and about 350,000 were forced to move around in search of refuge (Karabo, 2008). Subsequent reports point to almost 1,500 deaths and nearly 700,000 people internally displaced due to post-election violence (CIPEV, 2008; Lynch, 2012).

Although a consensus exists on the triggering and proximate causes of the violence that struck the country regarding the too-close-to-call contested presidential election and evidence of electoral rigging
and fraud, it would be negligent to dismiss the structural causes in Kenyan politics that make it a political violence-prone country. Among the structural elements that have generated and fuelled conflict in Kenya, three dimensions must be highlighted: 1) Natural resources, in particular tensions over land issues and management of natural resources leading to politicisation of territorial administration and pastoralist conflicts; 2) Political dimensions such as the exacerbated centrality of an all-powerful presidential system leading to centrifugal disputes over state control, a culture of corruption and impunity extensible to political institutions and the perception of the state as a predatory actor; from the historical legacy of political elites' manipulation of collective (ethnic) identities and episodic outbreaks of political violence (particularly in electoral periods); 3) Sociological and economic dimensions of long-standing economic and political grievances based on polarised narratives of third-parties' greed or jealousy; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons since the 1990s as a response to the environment of regional political instability; from poverty and deep economic inequalities and marginalization to unemployment and criminality. The 2007-2008 post-electoral violence in Kenya can only be understood by combining its immediate causes and the explosive cocktail of complex historical political processes.

The 2007 elections

The 2007 presidential elections were hotly contested by two main candidates. On one side, the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu from Central Province, as a leader of PNU and on the other side, Raila Odinga, a Luo from Nyanza Province, representing ODM. In 2002, Kibaki had won a landslide victory against Daniel Arap Moi’s chosen successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, effectively ending 24 years of Moi’s rule. His victory was a product of a combined effort of a coalition of multi-ethnic political parties and leaders – NARC – that, contrary to the 1992 and 1997 elections, managed to overcome its divisions and run on one electoral ticket. Kibaki had come to power with the promise of ending tribalism, granting a constitutional reform process in support of devolution of power, economic progress and ending the culture of corruption and impunity in the country. Shortly after the transition, Kibaki backtracked on a pre-electoral commitment to create a Prime Minister’s position destined for his second in command in NARC, Raila Odinga. To many of Odinga supporters, this was seen as a betrayal and re-enactment of the early years of Kenya’s independence, when the first President Jomo Kenyatta (father of Uhuru Kenyatta) did the same with Raila Odinga’s father, Oginga Odinga. Additionally, in 2005 Kibaki once again went back on his electoral promises on decentralisation and devolution of power and put forward a Constitutional Reform draft favouring a unitary state with the powers of the Presidency untouched. This process was highly contentious, pitting different ethnic groups against each other and also marked the creation of the Orange Democratic Movement as an opponent to this constitutional proposal, winning it in referendum and

11 See, for example: Mbugua (2008), CIPEV (2008), KCSC (2010).
12 Party of National Unity.
13 Orange Democratic Movement.
14 National Alliance Rainbow Coalition.
marking the definitive breakup between Kibaki and previous NARC supporters from various ethnic groups. After the referendum defeat, Kibaki got rid of supporters of the Orange Democratic Movement in the Cabinet and appointed several trusted names, largely from the President’s own ethnic background, to replace them. This decision favoured the perception of ethnic bias that Kibaki had promised to end, and later on as numerous corruption scandals became public Kibaki’s image was one of failing to deliver the promises he had waved at Kenyans. And even though Kenya from 2002 onwards did make significant progress in terms of infrastructure, economic growth, education and political freedoms under Kibaki’s leadership, by 2007 ethnic communities were already highly polarised and current and historical political narratives of grievances and resentments were pervasive.\textsuperscript{15}

The 2007 electoral campaigns were marred by divisive ethnic rhetoric, ethnic prejudices and stereotypes, oftentimes dehumanising and demonising the “other” group, political mobilisation through ethnic manipulation of collective identities, and filled with historical narratives of long-standing grievances. As the election date neared, both candidates alleged the only possible scenario not involving their own victory would be a clear sign of massive electoral fraud (Wrong, 2009). A combination of divisive and exclusionary hate speech mixed with both main candidates refusing to accept a scenario of defeat, a history of social, political and economic resentments and massive evidence of electoral fraud and vote rigging in a too-close-to-call contested election made for the perfect storm for the inter-communal violence that was about to ensue.

The outbreak of violence of such proportions was a drastic reminder that, even though Kenya might have seemed an “oasis” of stability in the region, its history of exclusion and divisiveness had been boiling under Moi’s rule and had not been overcome with the establishment of a majoritarian democracy, but instead consolidation of democracy still remained fragile:

“All actors accept the value of democratic institutions and rules in principle. The KANU party’s acceptance of defeat in 2002 indicated significant progress in terms of the internalization of democratic norms. Yet the behavior of all major political players in the aftermath of the 2007 elections indicates that commitment to democracy is linked to the question of whether or not all major ethnic groups are involved in the victorious party. That condition existed in 2002 but not in 2007.”

(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009:10)

\textbf{A Government of National Unity?}

After a failed mediation attempt by the then African Union Chairman and Ghanaian President John Kufuor in the first days of January 2008, a second mediation attempt led by Kofi Annan began to take shape (\textit{Associated Press}, 2008). An agreement was struck on February 2008, between the government/PNU and ODM, contemplating a power-sharing coalition between Kibaki, maintaining his role as President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, a position that was included in the Bomas draft of the

\textsuperscript{15} See for example: Horowitz (2009), and Ng’weno (2007)
constitution, which Kibaki had rejected for his own version. The agreement (KNDR, 2008) had four main objectives, know as Agendas One, Two, Three and Four: 1) immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties; 2) immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation, healing and restoration; 3) resolving the political crisis from the disputed presidential electoral results as well as the ensuing violence in the country; and 4) tackling the long-term issues and solutions, such as: constitutional, legal and institutional reform; poverty, inequity, unemployment, regional imbalances, land reform; transparency, accountability and impunity; national cohesion and unity.

However, the Cabinet that came out of the power-sharing agreement soon displayed the various findings that recent power-sharing literature had warned about: by including former enemies (or, in the case of Kenya, bitter rivals at least) in joint government, the institutionalisation of conflict led to numerous government gridlocks and infighting became commonplace. The scenario of a highly expensive dysfunctional (or even non-functioning) executive with nearly one hundred ministers and deputies gave the impression that the so-called Government of National Unity was a gross exaggeration:

“[...] Kenya does not have a functioning executive at all, just an unholy alliance of fierce rivals. A schedule of constitutional, electoral, judicial, security, land and economic reforms was laid out in the original agreement between the two parties. A domestic tribunal to judge those responsible for the post-election mayhem was supposed to be set up and a truth commission established. Yet more than a year later the ODM and PNU have failed to agree on any of these issues.” (Economist, 2009)

With the severe undermining of vertical relationships of transparency and accountability and with power-sharing having little popular democratic ownership, Kenya seemed to have rolled back in its history to the one party-state era. Additionally, power sharing was evidently becoming more and more similar to a ‘marriage of convenience’, as reflected by the numerous quarrels within the cabinet that, though generally short-lived and often accompanied by divisive and inflamed rhetoric, protracted government paralysis due to its successive accumulation in sequencing events. These quarrels and bickering effectively introduced uncertainty as to how long this arrangement would last.

However, the dynamics of unity government in Kenya did seemingly change in 2010, moving away from the divisive and inoperative stage towards a more conciliatory engagement. This transition is first noted in the celebrations of the second anniversary of the National Accord signed in 2008 (Woods, 2010). Cheeseman and Tendi’s (2010) concept of the ‘politics of collusion’ offers a presumable explanation for the more cooperative dynamics of power sharing in Kenya. A context of a flawed election and severe post-electoral violence between opposing sides that were both perpetrators and victims fostered a narrative of conflict of shared responsibility, combined with a history of inter-elite accommodation during the one-party state era (from 1969 to 1992). However, the transition from centrifugal to centripetal forces in the Kenyan grand coalition is still largely unexplained in the power-sharing literature. Hanson offered some clues, having noted that:
“[..] Just days before Kenyans went to the polls to vote on a new constitution, not only were pollsters predicting a victory for the "Yes" campaign, former political foes President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga held a rally together in Kisumu in support of the constitution. Kisumu is a stronghold of Luos, Raila Odinga's ethnic group. Kibaki would have been persona non grata in Kisumu in 2008. Of course, Kibaki and Odinga had their own personal motivations for working together on the "Yes" campaign. Kibaki wants to ensure his political legacy, and Odinga is maneuvering in advance of the 2012 presidential elections." (Hanson, 2010)

From 2010 onwards Kenya's power-sharing government seemed to confirm the arguments of power-sharing supporters, as the Kenyan constitution review process was underway, and several reform agendas soon ensued. In August 2010 a major accomplishment for the country was reached when a new constitution was approved by popular referendum approved by 68.5 per cent of the voters with a total voter turnout of 72 per cent, effectively ending twenty years of failed attempts at constitutional reform. The constitutional debate was a highly contentious one even before Kenya gained its independence in 1963 (Ng’weno, 2007) and it had been the watershed moment that instigated the split of NARC’s broad-majority coalition in 2005 setting the tone (as well as the campaign agenda) for the upcoming elections. The debate has been centred between those who favour decentralisation and devolution of power with reduced powers of the Office of the President in order to accommodate and include most significant groups and those who favour Kenya as a unitary state (with cross-cutting divisiveness on an hypothetical position of Prime Minister but no consensus on the nuances of its role and power). Even in late 2012, uncertainty in the full implementation of the Constitution reflected the degree of how contentious it still is today. Threats of secession were made by some MP’s after a proposal in Parliament not to implement an upper house (the Senate) following the 2013 elections as established under the 2010 Constitution (Nyassy and Jenje, 2012).

Kenya’s Constitution also includes several recommendations put forward by classical power-sharing theory and, to some extent, it has institutionalised power sharing through decentralisation and devolution (Nyamjom, 2011) of power to the local level, established a Bill of Rights, reduced the powers of the Presidency (Sihanya, 2011) and returned to the bicameral system – which had been established in the first Kenyan Constitution but was never implemented – (Kirui and Murkomen, 2011), and significantly increased the level of checks and balances throughout the various organs of government. Most importantly, it renewed the confidence of Kenyan citizens in the government institutions and the perception of institutions' independence and national representativeness instead of instruments of inter-communal agendas (Kivuva, 2011).

However, towards the preparation for the upcoming elections some structural conflict drivers remained unresolved, chiefly: land reform, resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs), poverty, inequality, youth unemployment, manipulation of ethnic identities as a primary tool for political

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mobilisation, corruption and impunity. The ICC\textsuperscript{17} involvement\textsuperscript{18} regarding the 2007 post-electoral violence, while enjoying a wide popular support in the first years of the grand coalition, turned into an object of electoral dispute. Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, both indicted for crimes against humanity, teamed up to run on the presidential ticket under the Jubilee/TNA.\textsuperscript{19} Kenyatta and Ruto had been on opposing sides in 2007 and 2008, and their alliance was allegedly a form of demonstrating reconciliation among two major ethnic groups (the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin) while at the same time accusing the incumbent Prime Minister and again presidential candidate Raila Odinga (now under CORD – Coalition for Reform and Democracy) of conspiring against those two groups with international actors.

The victory of the Jubilee Alliance on the March 2013 elections also showed a significant improvement. With a tightly contested vote (with Jubilee avoiding a run-off by less than 1 per cent) and yet again evidence of voting irregularities (Gettleman, 2013), the losing party and Kenyans turned to the courts instead of guns. However, it may not represent a trend nor the overcoming of the drivers of conflict but instead a belief in the credibility (though fragile) of the institutions created or reformed under the new Constitution. However, many challenges still remain unresolved. The use of negative ethnicity is still a centrepiece of electoral tactics (reflected by the fact that two out of eight tickets for the Presidency gathered over 90 per cent of the vote), land reform and security sector reform have been practically untouched since 2008, unemployment – particularly among youth – and inequality are still highly pervasive and Kenya has now a President (and a Vice-President) that politicised the ICC for electoral gains while publicly alleging they will respect the verdict coming from the Hague.

Conclusion: The invisibilities of the power-sharing discourse - drawing new agendas for research

In the vast power-sharing literature, research and analytical agendas have been driven and heavily reliant on an institutional and elite-led perspective, either more recently focused on the mitigation of conflict or, in the classical theory approach, on the normative political engineering dimension of a permanent democratic institutional framework based on inclusive accommodation of political elites. Somewhat incomprehensibly, both these two dominant strands and discourses of the power-sharing

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\textsuperscript{17} International Criminal Court.
\textsuperscript{18} “In the aftermath of the crisis, a Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) [...] was established to investigate the facts and circumstances of the election violence. Among its major recommendations was creation of a Kenyan special tribunal to try the accused organisers. Mindful of the history of political impunity, it recommended that if the government failed to establish the tribunal, the Panel of Eminent African Personalities that under Kofi Annan’s chairmanship mediated the political crisis should hand over a sealed envelope containing the names of those who allegedly bore the greatest responsibility for the violence to the ICC for investigation and prosecution. President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga signed an agreement for implementation of CIPEV’s recommendations on 16 December 2008, and parliament adopted its report on 27 January 2009. A bill to establish a special tribunal was introduced twice in parliament but on both occasions failed to pass. Not even last-minute lobbying by the president and prime minister convinced parliamentarians. Annan consequently transmitted the sealed envelope and the evidence gathered by Waki to the ICC chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, on 9 July 2009. Four months later, on 5 November 2009, the prosecutor announced he intended to request authorisation to proceed with an investigation to determine who bore greatest responsibility for crimes committed during the post-election violence.” (ICG, 2012: 1)
\textsuperscript{19} The National Alliance.
\end{flushright}
debate are still encapsulated within each other. Furthermore, it has shown a lack of connection and dialogue with other analogous debates – such as contemporary armed conflicts, frequently correlated with issues of governance and state formation and evolution and respective structural imbalances, the debate on the processes of construction of identities and societal dynamics, political psychology, game theory and so forth. Such gaps have precluded power-sharing studies from a holistic and in depth perspective of the reality power sharing shapes but also the long-term consequences of its enforcement — particularly in Africa where it has been a very significant trend in the post-Cold War era.

Additionally, it is rather surprising that with the recent renewed interest in power-sharing studies in academia, the influence of the nature and typology of political parties in African nations on power-sharing agreements, dynamics, and outcomes are generally overlooked. Even when political parties are arguably considered one of the main actors if not indeed the centrepiece within any given political system, power-sharing studies tend to shift their focus from a small group of elites to national institutions, without much regard for bottom-up processes, the influence of the diversified nature of political parties in shaping power-sharing dynamics (can such different political parties, for example, in Kenya and Zimbabwe be explanatory factors for influencing different outcomes?) or tensions between state institutions, elites, political parties and segments of society. This might partially shed some light on the reason why power-sharing theory offers little help in explaining the conundrum of dominant power-sharing discourses reaching contradictory conclusions: by not giving adequate focus on power sharing itself as a multi-dimensional process (Mehler, 2009b) that can go through different phases (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005). Classic power sharing has focused chiefly on designing a more permanent, though not irrevocably static, institutional framework for inclusive political accommodation for different segments of a divided society. Recent literature on conflict mitigation has mostly focused on power sharing as a temporary mechanism in peace settlements serving a security imperative (even if with potential hazards for the democratisation process in the long run). So far, little attention has been paid to power sharing as a dynamic process that can travel back and forth, include different actors and shape the processes that power-sharing literature has focused on, as previously mentioned.

The transition from centrifugal to centripetal forces in the Kenyan grand coalition is still largely unexplained in the literature, and hence many questions still remain unanswered: How did the Government of National Unity go from gridlock and bickering to setting institutional reform? Was it just a matter of letting time heal? Did the legacy of intra-elite cooperation of the “politics of collusion” Cheeseman and Tendi (2010) enunciated gradually take over the more radicalised stances? Did the balance of the power-sharing regime change? Did external pressure from the ICC — or indeed, other international actors and if so, who? — foster a resolve for Kenyan elites to engage in reform? Or was it

20 With the notable exception of the research papers on power dynamics in Zimbabwe by Matyszak (2009) and the comparative analysis of Kenya and Zimbabwe by Cheeseman and Tendi (2010).
21 On types of political parties, please see Gunther and Diamond (2003).
pressure from the bottom-up civil society organisations? Or a combination of all of the above? Or is there more to it? Power-sharing literature, in all its contradicting conclusions, does not give many hints as to the mutation the Kenyan grand coalition seemed to have been through, from highly polarised government gridlock early on to its more proactive reformist engagement in the latter days.

The Kenyan case concerning transitional steps between power sharing as a temporary mechanism for conflict mitigation in an initial stage towards power sharing as a method of a more permanent democratic conduct and framework — as included in the new Constitution of Kenya — seems to favour Roeder and Rothchild’s alternative formula for power dividing as a tool for sustainable peace and democracy. The power-dividing prescription argues that a consociational approach is useful to accommodate elites to hold on to a peace agreement in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict and thus should be considered mostly as a mere short-term mechanism towards consolidation of the peace agreement. Subsequently, a second step advocates for a power-dividing approach by fostering civil liberties, multiple crosscutting majorities and checks and balances:

“divided-powers democracies allocate state power between government and civil society with strong, enforceable civil liberties that take many responsibilities out of the hands of the government. They distribute those responsibilities left to government among separate, independent organs that represent alternative, crosscutting majorities. For the most important issues that divide ethnic groups, but must be decided by a government common to all ethnic groups, power-dividing institutions balance one decision-making center against another so as to check each majority.” (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005:15)

Taking into account the developments of the Kenyan experience, starting from the 2008 peace settlement, to the institutions created for the numerous reforms, towards the approval of the new Constitution in 2010 onwards, the transitional process of power sharing in Kenya seems to fit Roeder and Rothchild’s power-dividing predicament. Moreover, it highlights and reinforces the need to comprehend and include different actors and dynamics that classical power-sharing (consociational) theory by and large omits.

The construction of discourse involves the exercise of power. It is an act of selection and legitimisation, as well as omission and marginalisation. While power-sharing critics underline the lack of democratic ownership in some power-sharing arrangements and the undermining of vertical relationships of accountability and transparency as well as placing the short-term peace imperative over the medium to long-term process of democracy promotion through state-building and its institutions, academic literature and media reports on the Kenyan study case have systematically disregarded the fact that many institutions created within the power-sharing agenda encompassed numerous civil society organisations in their own decision-making agendas. The discourse on the power-sharing agreement in Kenya has been almost exclusively analysed through intra-elite accommodation. However, much of Kenya’s progress has

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22 A fact that became evident with several interviews I pursued in my fieldwork in Kenya during the 2013 elections.
been due to success in implementing these institutional structures, which largely benefitted from the inclusion of civil society organisations and enjoyed relative independence from political tampering by the grand coalition executive. Narratively, power sharing is presented as being accomplished due to pressure from the international community and a mediation effort from an African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities led by Koffi Annan. What is referred to seldom or not at all is that Kenyan civil society organisations had been engaging with international donors from an early stage of the conflict to lobby for an international mediation effort for peaceful resolution of the violence that was afflicting the country, and were subsequently engaged in the mediation talks and in fact continued to be so for the duration of the power-sharing period and its newly-created institutions and platforms. Institutions such as Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, which encompassed civil society organisations to push for what would later became known as Agenda Four of the Power Sharing Agreement concerning the structural causes of the Kenyan conflict, the Kenya National Cohesion and Integration initiative of the Uwiano Platform for Peace, an early warning and response mechanism during the run up to the 2010 national referendum, established as a partnership between government security organisations and several civil society organisations and the United Nations, as well as the Kenya Constitutional Review Commission or the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution for the constitutional reform process that was immensely participatory over the most central and divisive political issue in Kenya in the last ten years:

“The media are behaving as if Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga won and William Ruto and John Njue lost. The media’s obsession with politicians, as so clearly manifested in their coverage of the referendum campaign, has obscured the hard work of civil society. The ideas and the struggle for reform were initiated and sustained by civil society while politicians were making their deals to stop reform. In the recent review process, the media ignored civil society’s admirable efforts to educate the people on constitutional issues. It is unlikely that the new constitution will be implemented meaningfully without the continued engagement of civil society.” (Ghai and Ghai, 2010)

Additionally, other initiatives originated solely within Kenyan grassroots movements to promote and reinforce accountability and transparency and had such an impact that they were used in several other countries for election monitoring and disaster management (Carvalho, 2013). Social media platforms such as Ushahidi and Uchaguzi were created, helping to collect and disseminate virtually live eyewitness testimonies of violence, hate speech, corruption and several other illegal activities during the post-electoral violence (Ushahidi) and the period of the Constitution Referendum (Uchaguzi)23.

Although Kenya’s vibrant civil society has become highly regarded and a somewhat consensual description of Kenyan politics in international and African political studies, it would be of great value to explore if the praxis and dynamics of cooperation and collaboration between civil society organisations and various national and state level: 1) existed in Kenya prior the power-sharing arrangement; 2) if those

23 See also Kalan (2013) and Chan (s.a.).
dynamics changed between 2008-2013 and 3) what implications and consequences they may have for the future.

Whilst civil society's real influence and power may be the subject of dispute, it seems evident its engagement not only provided legitimacy to a grand coalition executive that no Kenyan citizen voted for, but also enhanced the accountability and the transparency in Kenya's democracy and may have provided the missing tool for the country to move forward by actively engaging in the reform processes, from grassroots-sponsored peace-building to the implementation of power-sharing institutions under the power-sharing agenda as well as the new democratic institutional framework under the 2010 Constitution. Power-sharing literature, both in the promotion of democracy and in the peace and conflict studies research agendas, has by and large disregarded or overlooked these dynamics. By so doing, not only has it produced an analytical loophole, but it has also made several non-elite actors invisible by reproducing a parcelled, hegemonic and elite-centred discourse and reality.

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STILL CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: NUBA POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND FAILURE OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT IN SUDAN

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Introduction

The contested nature of the state is at the heart of armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa. This applies to the complex landscape of ongoing large-scale violence in and between the two Sudans, the explanation of which requires understanding of the historical trajectory of the highly exclusive state in Sudan and the extraordinary permanence in power of sections of a narrowly based governing elite.

This chapter traces the latest trajectory of the Sudanese state in order to explain the conflict dynamics between the two Sudans. Given the complexity of the conflict, it concentrates on the political resistance of the Nuba peoples, which best represents the struggle of the marginalized peoples on the peripheries of the Sudanese state. Highlighting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) period (2005-2010), the chapter contends that despite generating hopes for increased self-determination the CPA failed to address the political and security concerns and grievances of the Nuba. Instead, the implementation of the CPA and the resulting secession of South Sudan (2011) fell short of remedying the perpetual marginalization of the Nuba and other peripheral peoples in the Sudanese political system, and led to the re-deterioration of the security situation. A renewed armed struggle ensued in the South Sudan-Sudan borderlands and continues to undermine relations between the two states.

The chapter addresses the little-explored political opposition among the Nuba political leadership, which is directly linked to the exclusivity of the Sudanese state. By pointing out the importance of considering the process of state formation in understanding the armed conflicts since Sudan’s independence, the chapter focuses on the historical development of the Nuba opposition, and also highlights implementation of the CPA, which failed to resolve exclusive governance and marginalization as major root causes of the armed conflict.

The state, contested national identity and marginalization

There are distinct degrees of marginalization, which in the Sudanese case is socially and culturally derived and manifested at different levels of political and economic exclusion. Those originating from the state peripheries that maintain their culture have historically been fully politically and
economically excluded, while those adopting the peculiar “Sudanese” form of Arab-Muslim culture are partially incorporated but without full access to the narrow and highly exclusive elite largely defined by family, kinship, and narrow ethnic ties (Jok, 2007).

The current Sudanese state is a product of a historical process that began in the 19th century. The conquest of Sudan by the Egyptian viceroy of the Ottoman Empire, Muhamed Ali, initiated the process of forming a centralized colonial administration in most of the territory comprising contemporary Sudan as one entity, for the first time in the history of the region. Foreign Turkish-speaking elite, composed of a number of nationalities, arrived to direct the administration and allowed the slave trade in the state’s southern periphery to prosper until the late 19th century. This consolidated a peculiar type of racial “social hierarchy” (Deng, 1995) as the source of social composition of the state as an imposed structure over the highly culturally and ethnically heterogeneous landscape.

The following period of revolutionary Mahdist rule (1885-1898) further consolidated the inherited form of exclusive governance, which was subsequently adopted to an extent by the British who became the de facto administrators of Sudan in the aftermath of the Anglo-Egyptian conquest. Although the slave trade diminished drastically during British colonialism, the social hierarchy remained, in which “Black” Nuba and southern peoples occupied the lowest position under the Arabized Muslim peoples of northern Sudan perceived as semi-civilized by the colonial authorities. While the late colonial period saw the ascension of the exclusive Western educated elite from northern Sudan into increasingly prominent roles in the state administration, it only allowed Western-educated “Blacks” limited opportunities at the very lowest levels of state institutions.

The Sudan decolonization process began in the late 1940s and expectedly led to a state dominated exclusively by individuals from the northern elite (Niblock, 1987). This governing elite defined the state as “Arab” and “Muslim” according to its self-constructed political identity despite the culturally and ethnically heterogeneous nature of the Sudanese polity. The projection of this perception enabled this elite to define political and economic power narrowly and anchor both to its dominant role, which it maintained by reconstructing myths of the supremacy of Arab culture and Islam through literature, language and use of other cultural strategies. This not only justified its exclusive power, but excluded other groups through the imposition ethno-culturally and regionally dividing governance methods emerging from colonialism that continued to emphasize ethnicity, race, religion, language and regional affiliation.

The narrow elite’s project aimed at maintaining exclusive political and economic power has continued to fragment the Sudan by maintaining identity politics based on ethnicity. This dynamic that has dictated the prevailing “big man” politics based on hierarchical and horizontal networks of social legitimacy
and provision of resources forms the heart of exclusivist and divisive political behaviour along ‘tribalism’ and hampers the rise of parties as the focus of political competition.\(^1\)

In response to these realities of the Sudanese state and political system, a number of marginalized peoples from the geographical and social peripheries have engaged in resistance. Ethnic and/or regionalist opposition movements have been the norm, some engaging in armed struggles. These groups have often sought to construct narratives that celebrate their local identities and traditions in their opposition to the prevailing state order and to contest the exclusive power of the governing elite. While most of these movements have demanded a federal solution or greater regional autonomy, with a real and effective devolution of the highly centralized government power, some have emphasized their right to self-determination and secession.

**Armed conflicts and the Nuba struggle**

Sudan has been at war with itself for most of its independence. Two highly devastating long-term armed conflicts have taken place in southern Sudan (1955-1972 and 1983-2005), which have been linked with instability and large-scale violence in the southern Blue Nile, southern Kordofan, Darfur, and eastern Sudan. Although armed conflicts have taken place in the peripheries of the Sudanese territory, the state itself having been affected mainly by occasional coups by the competing sections of the Arab-Muslim elite, these conflicts are intimately related to the nature of the “marginalizing state”.\(^2\) A narrow, exclusive conception of this identity justified marginalization of the “other”, the most drastically different form of which was the *janubi*, the southerner, and the peoples of the Nuba Mountains, who, following the racial conceptions arising from pre-colonial and colonial legacies of slavery and subjugation, have been perceived physically different and culturally inferior in northern Sudan and have continued to be associated with servile connotations.

After Sudan’s independence, this prevailing attitude in northern Sudan resulted in growing political confrontation between part of the Nuba intelligentsia and the Arab-Muslim governing elite. The Nuba politicians increasingly demanded improved social status and material life, which starkly contrasted the ruling elite’s attempt to maintain its exclusive political and economic power and the social status quo, by limiting development in the marginalized areas and peoples in the state’s periphery unless they fully subscribed to cultural assimilation through Arabization and Islamization. Although many Nuba are Muslims due to the gradual process of acculturation, this situation has encouraged others to adopt Islam superficially as part of an effort to ascend in the “social hierarchy”, while at the same time retaining their older cultural customs and beliefs (Insoll, 2003: 124).

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\(^1\) For an overview of “big man” politics in Africa, see various chapters in Utas (2012). It could be argued that transformation to party politics as a major mobilizing force is even more unlikely today due to the decline of political ideologies since the Cold War. See e.g. Kaldor (1999) and Chandler (2006).

\(^2\) It can be argued that a particular kind of ‘marginalizing state’ exists in Sudan, which to a large extent is a continuation of the specific historical social, economic, and political processes. See e.g. i.e. Ylönen (2009a).
1964 witnessed the collapse of the military regime of Ibrahim Abboud, which had taken power in a 1958 coup and engaged in violent imposition of Arabization and Islamization in the context of the war in southern Sudan. The military government was succeeded by a period of multiparty politics, but prior to this some members of the Nuba intelligentsia had founded the General Union of the Nuba Mountains (GUN), headed by Philip Abbas Ghaboush, which was subsequently registered and won eight parliamentary seats in the 1965 elections (African Rights, 1995: 54). The stated purpose of this political organization was to improve the general wellbeing of the Nuba, although personal aspirations of some in the Nuba leadership also played a significant role. However, despite the high expectations and collaboration with southern and eastern Sudanese political formations, the GUN achieved little at national level towards raising living standards in the Nuba Mountains (Johnson, 2003: 34).

This was in part because, following the 1965 elections, the GUN had split into two factions. While Abbas’ group emphasized the common Nuba identity and African solidarity, working closely with some southern leaders, Mahmud Hasib’s faction formed an alliance with groups associated with the governing elite (Saavedra, 1998: 223-52), and catered particularly to Nuba migrants to north-central Sudan who felt closer to the Arab culture and Islam. Sections of the governing elite often manipulated these divisions in which some Nuba politicians’ personal aspirations regarding jobs, personal influence and enrichment played a major role. These divisions in the Nuba political leadership prevailed.

The multi-party interlude following Abboud was short-lived as a group of army officers took power in 1969 and established another military regime headed by Jaafar Nimeiri. The Nuba political leadership suffered a major setback around this time since Abbas was forced to flee the country and was sentenced to death in absentia following an aborted coup scheduled before power was seized by Nimeiri (Aguda, 1973: 177-200).

Heightened economic growth in the early Nimeiri period facilitated assimilation of migrant Nuba into the Arab culture and Islam. New opportunities, particularly in north-central Sudan, encouraged labour migration. The Nuba generally provided low-level labour as workers, assistants and members of the security services, including the military, which indoctrinated many to fight against armed opposition on the periphery. After the regime’s increasingly Islamic orientation from the mid-1970s onwards, it provided grants to Nuba to study Islam and return to their communities to proselytize. Yet, penetration of Islam, and Christianity, continued to be hindered by the prevalence of traditional beliefs and customs (Baumann, 1987).

In the course of the late 1970s the national economic situation deteriorated. At the same time, the covert Nuba political movement gained momentum in part because of frustration about lack of opportunities among the Nuba political class. The cultural estrangement and employment difficulties

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3 During the 1970s, Hasib used his ties with the Baggara and jallaba to become Governor of Kordofan after which he was at odds with the regime over his demands for regional autonomy.
resulting from the deemed low status of the Nuba fed such feelings among the intelligentsia, particularly in the conditions of general economic decay. The growing disenchantment was also largely related to the confiscation of land in the Nuba Mountains to extend mechanized farming ventures owned by the ruling elites.

In 1972, the Nuba League (al-Abna Jibal al-Nuba) was formed by secondary school students in Kadugli to counter Islamist influences in the Nuba Mountains. Five years later those members of the Nuba League who had entered Khartoum University in 1976 and 1977 formed Komolo, a group led by Yousif Kuwa Mekki. Prominent Nuba leaders, including Abdelaziz al-Hilu, Daniel Kodi, Ismael Khamis Jelab, Telefon Kuku and Neroun Philip, joined the movement.

In 1981, Kuwa was elected to the recently established regional government of Kordofan and became the Deputy Speaker. However, he was outnumbered by representatives from semi-nomadic Baggara Arab groups from both North and South Kordofan, who sided with the ruling elites and used their political influence to distribute material benefits, land and government relief during the shortages in the early 1980s (African Rights, 1995: 56). Meanwhile Nuba concerns about education and development remained largely ignored.

At this juncture, another Nuba party, the Sudan National Party (SNP), appeared. It was led by Philip Abbas who sought to form a regional movement at national level. The SNP became a rallying point for those Nuba who believed that they had been marginalized, while collaboration was sought with southern as well as western and eastern opposition organizations. It later joined a coalition, the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), in the national parliament, with Abbas becoming the Chairman, and maintained contacts with the remaining armed southern factions (African Rights, 1995: 57-8). The USAP campaigned against the regime’s Islamic laws decreed in 1983, which even most Nuba Muslims rejected, and for the redistribution of wealth and political power.

Members of the Nuba political leadership had maintained close ties with southern insurgents in the 1960s. These contacts, and the supply of weapons (SV, 2004), laid a basis for a continued relationship. For instance, during the Nimeiri regime, individuals such as Abbas and Kodi maintained contacts with southern underground groups and encouraged Nuba to join southern rebel training camps based in Ethiopia. Kodi was also in contact with the secret officers’ group that later became the SPLM/A and was aware of the plan of simultaneous mutinies that triggered the war in southern Sudan in 1983. In this context he met Lam Akol, the SPLM contact in Khartoum, Edward Lino, a recruiter for the movement who belonged to the same secret cluster as Akol, and another recruiting officer, Peter Nyot (SV, 2004). Kamil Kuwa’s role in the establishment of the local SPLM/A office in Libya, which channelled military aid

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4 It has been argued that: “...Nuba graduates were frustrated further as they found themselves not considered for high prestigious jobs. This in turn led to frustrated Nuba intellectuals participating in the civil war that broke out in 1983” (Koinonia Nuba, s.a.).
from Libya’s leader Muammar al-Gaddafi to the movement, is another indicator of the close links of some in the Nuba leadership to the SPLM/A.

After being persuaded by the highest SPLM/A leadership during his visit to Ethiopia in 1984, Yousif Kuwa decided to officially join the SPLM/A. Announcing his decision on the SPLA radio, he invited the Nuba to join the liberation war (SV, 2004). However, although not all Nuba and not even some Komolo members approved Kuwa’s decision, it resulted in all Nuba being stereotyped as rebel collaborators and becoming the targets of regime persecution and military and militia operations, which, in turn, pushed more Nuba to join the SPLM/A (Kaballo, 1993: 114). Subsequently, Kuwa was assigned to direct the SPLA office in Yemen and was appointed an alternate member of the SPLA High Command. While this boosted Kuwa’s prominence among the Nuba, the SPLM/A leadership used these developments strategically as evidence for the national extent of the SPLM/A struggle to seek support in other areas of the Sudanese periphery by citing the conditions of exclusive power of the Arab-Muslim elite and perpetual marginalization of the majority.

For this objective, it also designed a political agenda around the concept of “New Sudan” that was successful in attracting support in other parts of Sudan’s marginalized periphery. The “New Sudan” approach essentially aimed at democratization of the Sudanese state and wider distribution of political and economic power, to ensure a degree of local autonomy and self-determination within a unitary state. Similar views to those pronounced by Kuwa about seeking to correct the Nuba second-class citizen status, right to justice and equality and demand for decentralization and self-determination were voiced in other parts of Sudan’s marginalized periphery (Rahhal, 2001). This perception converted the traditionally viewed “southern problem” into a “problem of all Sudan” (Khalid, 1987).

Part of the Nuba leadership’s participation in the SPLM/A led to a serious conflict in the Nuba Mountains in 1985-2002. In the early 1990s the Nuba faced extreme violence as the Islamist National Congress Party (NCP) regime waged a widely documented campaign for wholesale eradication of the Nuba and their culture. Although the war owed largely to a section of the Nuba leadership shifting to an armed struggle, and involved local inter-group animosities between the Baggara and the Nuba, it was perceived increasingly as “Arab” versus “African” in the context of the wider conflict between the NCP and the SPLM/A. Both parties established positions in southern Kordofan in the course of the conflict and became increasingly internalized in the local context as polarizing forces, obliging the local groups to side with either one or seek safety by displacement away from the Nuba Mountains.

By the end of 1990s the war in the Nuba Mountains had led to an almost total defeat of the SPLM/A-Nuba. However, the rebels continued the struggle until a ceasefire agreement was signed in Bürgenstock, Switzerland in January 2002. Largely a product of international pressure on the NCP regime,

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5. Salih (1995, 1999) and others have characterized this as attempted genocide or ethnocide in the course of which a holy war, jihad, was waged against the SPLM/A Nuba in the 1990s. See e.g. African Rights (1995).
headed by the recently appointed US Special Envoy, John Danforth, it led to initial improvement of conditions in the Nuba Mountains and enabled many of the estimated 289,000 Nuba displaced by the conflict (IRIN, 2009a) to begin their journey home.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: an inadequate solution for the Nuba

In 2005, the CPA, which marked the formal end of the most devastating conflicts in the peripheries of the Sudanese so far, was initially regarded as an answer to political and economic grievances of at least some of the marginalized peoples. However, although it did end the most devastating large scale hostilities and stipulated that general and presidential elections would take place in 2009, it was a piecemeal approach to peace that ignored the centre-periphery nature of the war and granted only southern Sudanese and the people of Abyei the possibility to exercise their right to self-determination through referendums to be celebrated in 2011. The international actors, headed by the United States, which were instrumental behind the deal, were aware of its limits but preferred to concentrate on an exclusive agreement while paying lip service to the agreement’s capacity in to effecting democratic change (Young, 2012). In fact, instead of implementing power-sharing, the NCP, which had been forced to agree to the treaty, used it to divide the armed opposition from the peripheries along regional lines as it negotiated two separate peace agreements in Darfur and eastern Sudan in 2006.

In the context of the CPA negotiations, the Nuba opposition had remained divided on the objectives of their political struggle. This was despite the position expressed by Kuwa and endorsed widely among the Nuba social organizations, according to which the Nuba should be allowed to decide between remaining part of northern Sudan, becoming part of a possibly independent South Sudan, or becoming independent (Sumbeiywo, 2002; NRRDO, 2002; Nuba Vision, 2002). There were those headed by Yousif Kuwa, a political leader and a respected war hero, advocating adherence to SPLM/A policy for a new unified Sudan, those led by Suleiman Musa Rahhal, a diaspora politician, demanding an independent Nuba state, and those aligned with the NCP regime drawing constituents mainly from the Nuba migrants in the north-central Sudan. A number of differing opinions were addressed at two conferences, in 2002 in Kampala and Kauda respectively, but the leadership concluded that while the Nuba’s aspiration for self-determination should be pursued, this should occur within the framework of a united Sudan.

The Nuba issue had been problematic in the peace negotiations from their outset in 1994. It had created divisions within the SPLM/A leadership regarding the position of the Nuba Mountains as part of southern Sudan or not. By including it, as Kuwa insisted, some in the SPLM/A leadership feared that the movement would risk its objective of gaining a self-determination referendum and possible independence for southern Sudan since the Nuba Mountains are generally considered part of northern Sudan, while the NCP feared a secessionist domino effect in the Sudanese periphery (Kodi, 2009; op ‘t Ende, 2009). Although Kuwa chose not to stand in the way of southern Sudan’s demands by insisting that the Nuba
Mountains should be included, his successor since 2001, Abdelaziz al-Hilu, was less accepting and was pressured to comply by the SPLM/A supreme commander John Garang and international actors headed by the United States (Kodi, 2009; ICG, 2013: 6-7).

As a result, the Nuba Mountains gained a weak and relatively vague Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States in the final CPA signed in January 2005. Instead of the Nuba achieving a direct right to decide upon their political future, the Nuba Mountains and South Kordofan were joined with West Kordofan, including predominantly Baggara areas of which the population largely sided with the NCP, and diminished the proportion of the Nuba population within the state. This generated further resentment.

In addition, the claims for self-determination were only addressed by ‘popular consultations’ with a vague right to express views regarding South Kordofan’s desired future position within the Sudanese political system. These consultations were to be channelled through the state parliament to be elected in the 2009 general elections and aimed at determining whether South Kordofan as a whole endorsed the whole CPA, or rejected parts thereof that should be renegotiated (Ylönen, 2009b: 10), and to bring out other issues that the agreement had disregarded.

The other main features of the protocol dictated the state’s political arrangements to be implemented in the course of the so-called Interim Period over six years, ending in southern Sudan’s referendum of self-determination referendum. The agreement in South Kordofan included reform of structures of the state government, legislature, and the judiciary; political power sharing on 55 per cent NCP and 45 per cent SPLM/A basis at the state level; and financing of South Kordofan from the national budget including 2 per cent of the oil produced within the state and shared allocation (with the Blue Nile) of 75 per cent of the total fund destined intended to for war affected areas (CPA, 2005). South Kordofan was also divided between government-held and SPLM/A administered areas, a division first monitored by the Joint Military Commission that was subsequently replaced by 10,000 blue helmets of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) backed by Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), composed of 6,000 SPLM/A and government troops (CPA, 2005).

Essentially a two-way power-sharing agreement that excluded other political forces from political and economic power at the national level, the CPA changed the political reality in Sudan only to the extent that it recognized the SPLM/A as a legitimate political force. This, however, did not alter the NCP’s dominant role except in the southern Sudan and in the SPLM/A areas of the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile, where the movement remained as the main political force. The NCP strategies of the NCP to maintain its power over the ‘marginalizing state’ prevented a full commitment to the pledged “making unity attractive” (Ylönen, 2011), and contributed to dynamics conducive to the disintegration of the Sudanese state after the celebration of the 2011 self-determination referendum in southern Sudan.
CPA implementation and deteriorating security

After the signing of the CPA the Nuba demonstrated their dissatisfaction. Many Nuba claimed that the CPA failed to address issues of identity, territory, and political destiny, by reducing the political objective for self-determination into an vague, inferior and vague political arrangement, the “popular consultation”, with other aspects of the agreement also having a number of grey areas (op ’t Ende, 2006; Pronk, 2007). Following Garang’s death in a helicopter accident, the SPLM/A’s new supreme leadership pushed subsequent reorientation of the movement to concentrate its political efforts almost exclusively to secure its supremacy in southern Sudan. In this context the southern Sudan’s backing of the Nuba political cause became less apparent.

At the same time the divisions within the Nuba leadership especially between the NCP and the SPLM/A supporters continued to be problematic. In 2005 the All Nuba Second Conference in Kauda was convened to search seek further cohesion among the Nuba opposition. The main issues addressed included the evaluation of the CPA, which was viewed as positive but inadequate to address Nuba grievances, the unity of the Nuba, land and territory, heritage and cultural identity, and development. The CPA was criticized for failing to endorse self-determination for the Nuba and restoring the official name of the region to Nuba Mountains, lacking provisions to recompense local communities affected by mechanized farming and oil industry, and ignoring human rights violations and the attempted genocide the Nuba had been subjected to during the war (All Nuba Second Conference, 2005).

The CPA had a polarizing effect in local politics in South Kordofan. While there was minimum cooperation among the main protagonists, their local representatives developed personal interests in maintaining power (IRIN, 2009b). For instance, in 2008 the competition for local influence between the SPLM/A and the NCP was personified at the highest levels of state government with the sacking of the SPLM/A state finance minister, Ahmed Saaed, by the NCP-appointed governor. This was followed by the contentious appointment of Ahmed Haroun⁶ as the new governor and al-Hilu, who had initially refused the governorship due to his disenchantment with the CPA, as his deputy. The NCP’s motivation to appoint Haroun was related to expectations about tensions and the resumption of armed violence during the post-elections and post-referendum period, since he had earlier mobilized and conducted militia warfare against the SPLM/A in Kordofan and had experience from Darfur.

During the CPA Interim Period, political stability in South Kordofan was also affected by the lack of integration between the government and SPLM/A-held areas. Two local government structures with

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⁶ The appointment of Haroun, an NCP official from North Kordofan, followed an NCP reshuffle prompted by pressure from Arab states after Haroun’s and President al-Bashir’s indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes in Darfur, where the former had served as the acting state Minister for Humanitarian Affairs.
separate education, health, judicial and administrative policies ran in parallel (ICG, 2008: 8),\(^7\) which prevented the adoption of laws and hindered reintegration of returnees. Lack of goodwill and mistrust continued to obstruct work in the area and commerce was discouraged by a system of double taxation of traders crossing from one area to the other. In the SPLM/A territories the lack of improvement in transportation and communication left some areas largely isolated, raising levels of discontent. This encouraged some hard-line elements, especially among youth, as many were upset with the SPLM/A leadership in Kadugli that had allegedly continued to direct resources to finance the administration or corrupt practices (ICG, 2008: 4 and 8; Pantuliano, 2008) mostly in NCP-held areas in detriment of local development in the SPLM/A-aligned areas.

The division of power between two parties also had a direct impact on economic development. The 55-45 representation ratio in the state government in favour of the NCP complicated the situation because it allowed neither party a significant majority to implement policies. A lot of controversy existed over development financing, mostly controlled by the NCP as the main party in the government of national unity, as “only 30 to 40 per cent of the 115 contracts … [were] implemented three years after the CPA was signed” (IRIN, 2009a). Accordingly, frustrations over CPA implementation ran deep.

In addition, the return of the massive number of displaced Nuba became a destabilizing factor. The return of hundreds of thousands was complicated by the need to ensure livelihoods and land issues which became a destabilizing security issue since land claims and rights remained unclear in the post-war situation in which land initially vacated by the displaced have often been settled by others. The resettlement of this large number of people put a strain on resources such as water and land, especially as there was little development in other aspects of life of the local people after the signing of the CPA. For instance, progress in the SPLM/A areas was largely dependent on the efforts of NGOs, which ran services and small-scale development projects.

The CPA failed to define land rights and whether land was formally or customarily owned. Because the dispossession of Nuba lands was at the heart of the tension in the late 1970s and early 1980s that led to the war in the region, emotions over land use ran high. Tensions were increased by the return of the Baggara to their transhumance pasture routes, further expansion of mechanized farming and the return of displaced people who attempted to protect themselves by curbing the economic activity of the Misiria and Hawazma or by forming alliances with sections of Shanabla that competed with the two Baggara groups over land (SAS, 2009: 3, 5). This denied sections of Baggara access to their traditional pastures.

In this political context, tensions in the Nuba Mountains heightened towards the end of the CPA Interim Period. Violent incidents persisted and mobilization and arming among local groups continued.

\(^7\) For example, school curricula differ substantially between areas and health care is free in the SPLM/A zone, unlike in the government-administered region.
General elections held in other parts of Sudan in April 2010 were postponed in South Kordofan due to disagreements on the national census results which the Nuba leadership claimed missed many of its constituents particularly in the SPLM/A areas of the Nuba Mountains. It suspected widespread fraud in the November 2009 voter registration (Reuters, 2010; ST, 2010). The Nuba opposition leaders feared that the elections would not reflect the will of the state’s majority Nuba population since the census failed to recognize this. For instance, South Kordofan’s significant Baggara population would be unlikely to support any process for Nuba self-determination because it might undermine their interests, particularly access to land (op ‘t Ende, 2009) they expected to use for pasture and agriculture.

The CPA Interim Period left the Nuba marginalized, without significant economic development and politically insecure and discontented. Not only did the partisan manoeuvring by the NCP and the SPLM/A sever Nuba-Baggara relations, but it also created fragmentation within these larger ethnic agglomerations. The abolition of Western Kordofan exposed fissures among the Baggara, and the Misiria leadership was affected by the July 2009 Permanent Court of Arbitration award that reaffirmed the Ngok Dinka authority over traditional Baggara grazing lands and routes in the southern part of South Kordofan and Abyei. While the decision was favourable for the NCP because it recognized the national government’s authority over Heglig oilfields in detriment of the interests of the SPLM/A controlled Government of Southern Sudan, it, together with the NCP’s failure to provide for the Baggara, exacerbated grievances that alienated sectors of the latter and allowed the SPLM/A to gain Baggara recruits among the Misiria and Hawazma (ICG, 2013: 8-10). Meanwhile, some Nuba commanders, unconvinced of future southern support after the SPLA withdrew large part of its force from South Kordofan in 2007 and 2008, reportedly stored arms and trained recruits for a possible return to war in 2011 when southern Sudan and Abyei were set to vote for self-determination (Mohammed, 2008; SAS, 2009: 5). Overall, the manoeuvring of the two national protagonists in local-level politics encouraged radical elements, feeding the polarizing "Arab" versus "African" antagonism emanating from the war.

Re-escalation of the armed conflict

As the end of the CPA Interim Period and the possible independence of southern Sudan drew nearer, the NCP’s and the SPLM/A’s attention focused increasingly on their shared borderland areas. This attention concentrated on South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, where opposition aligned with SPLM/A against the NCP remained strong, and less so on Abyei, which from June 2011 hosted the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) composed of almost 4,000 men that separated the warring parties in the area.

In South Kordofan, the dynamics described above led to a deterioration in the security situation particularly near the SPLM/A-Nuba strongholds. From 2008 onwards, the NCP was accused of provoking instability and conflict to prevent the presidential and parliamentary elections conditioned by a successful
north-south border demarcation, and stalling a resolution of the dispute over national census results (Flint, 2008; ST, 2009). It stepped up recruitment as part of a strategy to ensure its position in the region after any undesirable outcome in the general elections. The NCP armed and trained the police force and the Popular Defense Force militias (Flint, 2008; Mohammed, 2008), the latter of which drew from sections of the Misiria, Hawazma, and the Nuba (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013: 25-26), continued to form an important part of its security strategy as an extension of the formal army. Strengthening the fighting capacity of government-aligned elements in South Kordofan became increasingly important after the January 2011 CPA-stipulated referendum of self-determination in southern Sudan returned an almost 99 per cent vote for independence (BBC, 2011).

In May 2011, the legislative and gubernatorial elections in South Kordofan were held after having been continuously postponed. The stakes in the gubernatorial race were high. While losing the governorship would have made the incumbent NCP governor Haroun available to answer the charges made by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity allegedly committed under his supervision in Darfur, his SPLM/A deputy al-Hilu needed to prevail in order to strengthen the SPLM/A-Nuba’s effort to secure the ‘popular consultation’ and the right to renegotiate the inadequacies of the CPA in South Kordofan (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013: 15). The vote polarized between the two, and led to Haroun’s victory with a 1.5 per cent margin according to official results, while the NCP gained 31 and the SPLM/A 21 seats in the state’s legislative assembly (Verjee, 2011: 2 and 4). However, the election result was immediately disputed and became a bone of contention. It was accompanied by developments in the security sector which led to the escalation of armed violence.

The CPA stipulated that southern military elements in South Kordofan would withdraw to South Sudan by the end of its implementation. Although this troop withdrawal had taken place to a large extent during the Interim Period, except in the case of fighters incorporated into the JIUs composed of an equal number of government and the SPLA fighters, the period of preparation for South Kordofan elections had witnessed a return of many southern soldiers and movement of the SPLM/A artillery towards the border with Sudan (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013: 15-16). In this situation, the government sent Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to occupy the southern part of Abyei (from where it subsequently withdrew ahead of UNISFA) and presented an agreement signed with Daniel Kodi, a senior member of SPLM/A-Nuba and former Deputy Governor of South Kordofan, which stated that all SPLA elements including those of SPLA-JIUs would withdraw to southern Sudan by 9 April (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013: 16). The SPLM/A-Nuba leadership disputed the validity of the deal as part of the NCP’s security plan, which also included a heavy military concentration in South Kordofan ahead of the independence of South Sudan in July 2011.

The situation escalated further after the SAF viewed that its demand that all SPLA-related fighting units should leave South Kordofan by June had not been met. Consequently, Sudanese units began disarming SPLA soldiers, skirmished against SPLA-JIUs and attacked al-Hilu’s residence in Kadugli a day
after he had fled to the mountain region to lead armed opposition to the government (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013: 16; ICG, 2013: 17). Systematic arrests and killings of SPLM/A sympathizers followed and despite its presence in Kadugli the UNMIS failed to protect civilians (ICG, 2013: 18). This outburst of armed violence, which was answered by the SPLM/A-Nuba that organized its resistance from bases in the mountains as during the first war, led to a resumption of armed conflict.

The ongoing war in South Kordofan since June 2011 has had grave humanitarian consequences. The violence and aerial bombing have disrupted economic activities and subsistence farming, which has resulted in the lack of access to food for a large part of the population. According to a Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency report, over 1 million people in South Kordofan have been affected by the war, with the number of internally displaced persons in the SPLM/A-Nuba areas alone amounting to over 436,000 and over 70,000 seeking refuge in South Sudan and other countries (SRRA, 2012: 11-12). Human Rights Watch has further denounced the Sudanese government for indiscriminate bombing of civilians, arbitrary arrests and detentions, sexual violence and deliberate denial of access to essentials of life by destroying food and water supplies, looting livestock and blocking humanitarian aid (HRW, 2012).

Since the resumption of war, the SPLM/A-Nuba has established itself as the main armed threat to the NCP in Sudan. Although Khartoum has sought to prevent it from strengthening, the SPLM/A in South Kordofan has continued to gain support from South Sudan and forge increasingly credible alliances with armed groups mainly based in Darfur. In November 2011 the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) was formed. It seeks to end NCP rule by installing an inclusive transitional national unity government through armed and non-armed opposition. The SRF includes the SPLM/A-Nuba, other elements of the SPLM/A operating in Sudan as SPLM-North, along with the Justice and Equality Movement, factions of the Sudan Liberation Army, and individuals from the Umma and Democratic Unionist parties (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013: 30; ICG, 2013: 21-22). The military force of this opposition has been stronger than the Nuba fighting force during the earlier war, and its capture of war material and supplies from the government and cooperation with Darfurian groups, has led to a degree independence from external material support and capacity to confront the SAF also in the low lying areas of South Kordofan, particularly when operating with the SPLA (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013: 29-39, 49-50).

Concluding remarks

The resumption of war in South Kordofan has presented a challenge to the Sudanese state. Although some in the ruling elite regarded South Sudan’s independence as necessary for the successful implementation of the NCP’s Islamic project in the perceivably more culturally similar northern Sudan, the current armed conflict in South Kordofan points to the perpetual structural flaw of the Sudanese state that imposes socially and culturally exclusionary political and economic order on a highly heterogeneous and ethnically diverse population.
The renewed war has left the NCP ruling elite few alternatives but to fight to maintain its political power and the state has described the SPLM-North as an illegal political formation that needs to be confronted by military means. Particularly the NCP hardliners have been uncompromising in their refusal to agree to negotiate with the armed opposition, although some attempts by third parties to bring the NCP and SPLM-North together took place in 2012. On the other hand, the SRF’s success in bringing about regime change through military means is so far unlikely despite the strength of the armed opposition and the success in overcoming some of its divisions.

The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan, formed initially to facilitate negotiations on South Sudan’s independence, has been active in its attempts to find a solution to the current crisis. Reflecting the vision of the late supreme leader of the SPLM/A John Garang for a democratic “New Sudan” (Gibia, 2008), it has recommended to the African Union Peace and Security Council that the resolution of conflicts in South Kordofan, the Blue Nile, and Darfur inevitably requires an inclusive process of national democratic transformation (AUHIP, 2013). However, in the current context of ongoing war, replacing the government with a democratic one, and, more importantly, any change in the exclusivist governance logic of the “marginalizing state”, remains as little more than a distant hope for many Sudanese.

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Resource-based conflict in South Sudan and Gambella (Ethiopia): When water, land and oil mix with politics

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Introduction

This article aims at analysing the issue of resources-based conflicts in the Horn of Africa region, looking at two different case-studies – the newly independent country of South Sudan and the Gambella region, the westernmost region of Ethiopia. The main aim is to understand how natural resources may have been or are at the core of the conflicts that have been affecting the two regions over the last decades. It is well documented that oil (a valuable natural resource) has been a main factor of competition and contention in the long-lasting conflict between North and South Sudan. But if we look at the internal conflicts within South Sudan, other natural resources appear as key elements of a complex puzzle of conflicts, whereas access to land and water for livelihoods (agriculture and pastoralism in particular) figure prominently as main sources of conflict. Just across the South Sudan–Ethiopian border, in the Gambella region, similar patterns of conflict can be observed. The aim of the article is not to make a comparison between the two cases, but instead to assess how the management and allocation of water and land resources has been the basis for both conflict and cooperation between different societal groups.

The analysis takes as point of departure that land and water are key resources in the livelihoods of the populations living in South Sudan and Gambella. The two regions have in common the fact of being poor and marginalised in the political context of their respective countries (Sudan, as before the separation, and Ethiopia), whereas the “periphery versus centre” political complexity is evident. When looking at it from a resource perspective, we are talking about two regions where natural resources such as land, water, forests, fisheries and mineral resources (oil, gold, etc.) are abundant. Despite this “abundance”, livelihoods and subsistence are still deeply marked by strong vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are intimately related to political factors – widespread and long-lasting civil conflict, external political interference, border porosity, dependence on international aid, forced migrations, asymmetric power relations and fragility of institutions, among others – that have been hindering socio-economic development in the two regions for the past decades. This article is an attempt to understand the nexus between the (mis)management of natural resources and the overarching political trajectories.

Finally, this article looks at the latest developments in South Sudan and Gambella and attempts to understand the ongoing “new race for resources”, and its possible impacts. In the case of South Sudan,
we see how a potential oil economy has blinded the development agenda in the newly independent country since separation of the two Sudans and, in Gambella, how foreign direct investment (FDI) in large-scale commercial agriculture in the region (since 2009/2010) seems to be affecting local political dynamics and livelihoods.

**Resource-based conflicts in the Horn of Africa**

The Horn of Africa region has experienced plenty of conflicts during the last century – be it inter-state or intra-state conflicts, or even proxy wars. Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda have experienced long-lasting civil wars involving heavily armed central governments to opposition groups with diverse agendas – cultural, economic, ideological, religious and/or political – and usually also militarily well equipped (Clapham, 1998). Inter-state conflicts have been less common in the region, although the 1998 Ethiopian-Eritrean war was among the most deadly. But proxy wars have been a common feature of conflicts in the region and “support the enemy of your enemy” has been a main military strategy (Woodward, 1996). Ethiopia and Uganda supporting Sudanese rebels, Sudan supporting Ethiopian and Eritrean opposition groups, Eritrea supporting Somali insurgent, and the story goes on.

Although all these conflicts have their own specificities, they often have a characteristic in common – control over natural resources is a bone of contention (Markakis, 1998). Natural resources can include valuable mineral resources such as oil, gas, gold, uranium, etc; but they can also include natural resources such as water, fertile land for agriculture, pasture land, forests, wetlands, that are essential factors in the livelihoods of the region's populations of the. The Horn of Africa region is inhabited by millions of small subsistence farmers, agro-pastoralist and pastoralist communities. The region is home to the three main African livestock producers – Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia (Knips, 2004). Land and water are key factors of production in the economic activities of these societal groups. Conflict and cooperation between users and uses is as old as history (Fukui and Markakis, 1994). Manipulation of “normal” competition for livelihoods has often been used with political intentions – in order to attain, maintain or expand political power. Examples are plentiful in the region – but resource-based disputes are sometimes more visible as root causes of the conflict than others.

What this article will try to show, by looking at the two examples in Gambella and South Sudan – is that natural resources are often fuelling conflicts in the Horn of Africa region. The main cause of the conflicts may be ethnicity, religion, inequality, underdevelopment, colonial past, etc – but natural resources play a role in fuelling conflicts. Struggles to control the resources can serve to monopolise rents, finance military spending, empower and disempower certain groups or marginalise certain regions. As the cases of Gambella and South Sudan will show, oil, land and water have been key elements in the conflicts of these regions – not only during times of full-scale war but also in times of low-intensity disputes.
South Sudan conflict – the role of oil and other natural resources

The murky waters of the conflict

The newly independent country of the Republic of South Sudan was born from a series of bloody wars – the root causes of the conflict have been studied by many authors, but it has also been the subject of several intentional misinterpretations (Deng, 1995; Johnson, 2003). Portrayed as a religious conflict by some and as an identity conflict by others, the conflicts have been also intimately linked to control over natural resources (Collins, 2005). This article looks at the particular resource-based perspective of these conflicts.

South Sudan, as part of the whole of Sudan, had been colonised first by the Ottoman Empire (1820-1898) and later by the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899-1955). South Sudan would become the southernmost region of independent Sudan in 1956. The north-south Sudan divide started immediately during negotiations for the independence of Sudan at the very beginning of the 1950s, but only escalated to a civil conflict (usually called the First Sudanese Civil War) in 1955, months before the independence of Sudan was declared. The war lasted until 1972, when a peace agreement was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; among the root causes of this conflict were the different understandings between North and South on how to divide political power, and the autonomy that the South strongly claimed to manage its own affairs, especially the use and development of its natural resources (Johnson, 1998). Seventeen years of war helped to seriously jeopardize any plans for development in the South. But when peace came back, there were high expectations.

Between 1972 and 1983, South Sudan experienced a window of peace and generalised political stability after autonomy was granted to the region by the 1972 Peace Agreement. The region became known as Southern Sudan Autonomous Region. During the post-war period of grace, the South Sudan region was able to focus on its socio-economic development – it experienced rapid agricultural development and became a net exporter of food commodities for both agricultural and livestock products. By then South Sudan was getting significant external support from the international community to foster economic development at regional level, especially by focusing on developing institutions and infrastructures to make use of the country's plentiful natural resources (fertile land for agriculture and livestock, water, wetlands, forests, etc) (Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, 2002). However, at the very same time, the government in Khartoum was making plans to use the same resources (in particular water) for other types of political adventures. As per the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement signed between Egypt and Sudan (in which the South Sudan region did not have a say), the countries embarked on plans for “water conservation” (Agreement, 1959). These plans included the construction of a 360km mega open-air canal to divert the Nile waters vertically crossing the Sudd region, which was entirely located within the South Sudanese territory. This top-down development approach was in complete contradiction to the terms of the peace agreement, and was not very welcome in the autonomous region.
The goal of the Jonglei Canal project was to drain the Sudd wetlands, in order to make more water (around 4 bcm) available for irrigation projects in north Sudan and Egypt. Despite all the expected severely negative impacts (studied by the Jonglei Investigation Team) the government of Khartoum decided to go ahead with it (Collins, 1996). Major impacts were expected on the livelihoods of local communities in the South, in particular the pastoralist groups such as the Nuer, Dinka and Shilluk. Negative impacts included: curtailed water for grazing land, massive resettlement of pastoralist and agriculturalist populations and drainage of the fragile wetlands ecosystem (Howell, Lock and Cobbs, 2009). Moreover, once the canal was dug it would represent an artificial disruptive “border” between the east and west banks of the Nile that would endanger the movement of people, livestock and wildlife in South Sudan. Construction began in 1978 – consultations with the political power in South Sudan were limited and their concerns completely ignored, and the seeds for a new conflict between north and south
were planted. It was probably no coincidence that the communities most affected by the Jonglei Project became the leaders of the guerrilla that would lead the second wave of civil conflict between north and south.

In 1984, when 240 km out of a total of 360 km of the canal had been excavated, the infrastructure was bombed by the SPLA and the damage was huge. Its construction was never resumed. The symbolic message of such an attack was an obvious one: South Sudan was not going to tolerate new colonial adventures in the south and the Nile waters crossing South Sudan were not going to serve the vested agricultural interests of Sudan and Egypt (Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, 2002). This event was symbolic in the re-start of new conflicts between North and South Sudan – the Second Sudanese Civil War had already been ongoing since the end of 1983. This war would last for more than twenty years (until the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2005) – and its consequences for South Sudan's livelihoods and socio-economic development were devastating.

Oil resources in the South – fuelling the conflict

Water was however not the main natural resource at the core of the North-Sudan second civil war, but another globally, regionally and nationally more strategic resource – oil. It was during the peace window (1972-1983) that the first reports about the existence of oil resources in South Sudan territory came to the public domain. Chevron, the big American oil company, began explorations for oil in South Sudan in 1975 but it was only in 1980 and 1982 that major reserves were found out in the Unity region (Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, 2002). This would change the dynamics of conflict in the region for ever – oil became the fuel in a raging conflict that mixed political power, religion, identity, culture, ethnicity, control over water and land, etc (Prendergast, et al., 2002). The prospects of turning oil into a major input in the political economy of Sudan further blinded the political decision-makers. The struggle to exploit and control this valuable resource was just starting – and no longer involved just the internal actors, but brought to the scene a lot of external actors, such as western countries and private oil companies. In the last two decades of the 20th century, the conflict between north and south Sudan became an explosive mix between a battle for political control and a battle for oil resources.
Oil entered the North-Sudanese second civil war in many ways. Oil money helped to finance the conflict by offering extraordinary financial resources to the Sudanese government (as a federal system, the oil was under the responsibility of the central government and not the regional government) to buy extensive military equipment to fight the insurgents. Oil fields became major stages of war – with the rebels using them as targets of military attacks, because these attacks had serious disruptive outcomes for the oil production, revenues, the companies and the government in Khartoum (Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, 2002). Foreign governments and companies also became part of the complex conflict equation – by taking sides and by directly and/or indirectly contributing to the continuation of the war. The lack of regulations (economic, social and environmental) framing oil production and exportation in Sudan was translated into a “no man’s land” complex in which oil companies were operating, and apparently giving
support. Peace did not seem to be factored into the business plans of these companies or the
governments backing them.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, oil became the *par excellence* resource for fuelling the struggle – it became the central piece of the conflict (Field, 2000). In particular since 1999, when Chinese and Malaysian companies started operating full-scale, oil became the major source of revenues of Sudan. A booming oil economy was on the rise, in particular to the benefit of the elites in north Sudan although more than 2/3 of the oil fields were located in South Sudan. Elites in Khartoum were so inebriated with the oil revenues, that commercial agricultural production (once the main source of state revenues) was completely sidelined in the political agenda. However, with the escalation of the war, exploitation of the oil also became a riskier enterprise because the oil fields became major battlefields, especially in the western Upper Nile region. Not surprisingly, oil also became the centre piece of attempts at reconciliation and fragile negotiations for peace. Contrary to the peace negotiations in the 1960s/1970s, distribution of power was no longer the main issue. It was the distribution of wealth (from oil) that was the main bone of contention. Oil revenues jumped the queue of political priorities – negotiations for peace were negotiations on how to share the oil, with or without secession on the horizon.

In brief, oil has that double capacity of fostering development and conflict at the same time. The Sudan experience shows that oil has helped to improve the economy of Sudan – in particular north Sudan, but not so much South Sudan. Who is to blame for the lack of economic takeover in South Sudan is another question discussed further in this article. But oil had also been the reason for the prolongation and deepening of the conflict – because benefits were not shared equally between different social and economic groups (between north and south or within the two regions). But mainly because it might have provided a source of funds to sustain repressive state institutions, fuel official corruption and/or sustain armed governments and opposition groups (Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, 2002).

*Peace negotiations and agreement: only oil?*

Negotiations for a peace agreement between north and south started in 2002, which led to the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Agreement, 2005). Several issues were covered by the major pre-agreements and initiatives, such as decentralisation of economic and political powers, increased autonomy and possibility for a secessionist scenario, equitable distribution of wealth, development plans for the southern region, etc (Grawert, 2010). Embedded in all these topics was the issue of the management and allocation of natural resources, also a very important component in the backstage calculations of both sides – namely the recognition that good governance and management of the resources (be they mineral, water or land) were indispensable to distribution of wealth and power and a sustainable peace.
However, when analysing the different protocols signed from 2002 to 2005, it is interesting to note that oil resources and revenues became the major priority of the two parties to the conflict. The three main protocols signed in Naivasha in 2004 – Agreement on Wealth Sharing, The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area and The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States – were mainly about oil and the strategic regions where the main oil fields were located (Grawert, 2010). The final comprehensive agreement was signed on 9 January 2005, when all the protocols became operational. Decisions about oil production and revenue sharing during the interim period were clearly defined on the basis of a 50-50 per cent sharing formula. The deal was somehow a trade-off: most of the oil fields were located in South Sudan, but the pipelines, refineries and other facilities were located in north Sudan – therefore the wealth should be shared equally between the two parties. This arrangement lasted from 2005 to 2011, when South Sudan became an independent state.

Interestingly enough, other natural resources such as land and water were somehow kept out of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Why that decision was taken is an interesting point of debate. If we take into account that historically speaking resource-based conflict (for control of water and land) had always been the source of the conflict between different groups, this absence is surprising but indicates that South Sudan itself had problems on how to deal with these issues. Long-lasting conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists (and among different groups of pastoralists) had been a central feature of conflicts within the South, and in the independence and post-independence period this became more obvious.

*Independence and post-independence: role of natural resources*

According to the 2001 report of the UN Commission on Human Rights, “the government [of Sudan] rejected all accusations that oil revenues would be used to fuel the war and claimed that they were instead invested for the development of the south. So far the government has not provided sufficient evidence supporting this claim” (UN, 2001). Evidence shows that during the negotiations and the interim CPA period, the government of Khartoum not only did not promote socio-economic development in the South but also increased its military spending. The promise from the North to promote development in the South during the interim period (2005-2009), in order to provide serious incentives for South Sudan to vote for unity in the referendum of 2011, failed on several accounts (LeRiche and Arnold, 2012). The magnanimous 99 per cent of votes in favour of the secession (instead of unity) in the referendum of January 2011 was an outcome of this failure, although mixed with other political motivations of the South Sudan leaders. However, what is interesting to observe is that the new South Sudan government in power since the independence seems to be deploying a copycat strategy.
Since independence, the government of South Sudan itself is being accused of not equitably sharing the benefits of the lavish oil revenues or promoting socio-economic development for the different sectors of the population. It is easy to use North Sudan’s interference in the internal affairs of South Sudan as a scapegoat excuse for this lack of development, but it is an argument that is losing credibility as the years pass. Dinka and Nuer leaders, at the top of the power institutions of the new country, are being accused of monopolising the country’s resources of the country for their own benefit (ICG, 2011a). Inter-ethnic warfare has been increasing rapidly since independence, opposing the mainly-agriculturalist populations of the Equatoria regions (south of South Sudan), where the capital Juba is located, to the pastoralist groups (the majority in governmental positions). The accusations are deep-rooted in the history of the country, with the agriculturalists coming back to accusations of marginalisation and exploitation; but inter-ethnic warfare is also rampant between the three major pastoralist groups – Dinka, Nuer and Murle – which became a mix between conflicts for control of livestock, pasture routes and now politically powerful positions in the government (ICG 2009; ICG, 2011b).

Resource-based conflicts in South Sudan are back on the agenda – if they ever left – but with new nuances due to some current and potential developments, such as:

a) **Interruption of oil exploitation and revenues**: after the independence of South Sudan, the 50-50 per cent deal between Sudan and North for the sharing of the oil revenues was over, as it was an agreement only for the interim period (Agreement, 2005). Since then the two parties had been unable to reach a new formula for sharing and oil exploration was eventually shut down (January
2012-April 2013) and the economic impacts were severe for both sides, in particular for South Sudan, which is near a bankruptcy. This had been translated into economic downturn, interruption in the development of infrastructures, increase dependency on foreign aid and ultimately an increasing mistrust between different groups of society (Lieng, 2013); b) **Unclear economic policy**: it is still to be seen what the economic future of South Sudan will be as an independent country. An oil economy but without the institutional capacity to manage the resources and benefits? An agriculture-based economy, that gives priority to improved subsistence agriculture and food security and/or market-led commercial agriculture? An economy based on high-value livestock products for export, like north Sudan is doing? c) **Land “grabbing”**: the South Sudan government is being accused of making misuse of land resources in the country – on the one hand, appropriating land to which farmers claim property rights (mainly in the Juba area), and on the other hand, selling off fertile agricultural land and forests to foreign investors, where the land lease contracts are far from being transparent (Deng, 2011). Unclear land tenure and unsettled conflict resolution mechanisms altogether make the situation potentially very explosive in terms of social conflicts. d) **Generalised pastoralist conflicts**: successive accounts of bloody cattle raids, communal clashes and violence, revenge attacks and selective killings in regions such as the Jonglei and Upper Nile areas (north of South Sudan) and in the Akobo area bordering Gambella in Ethiopia, make headlines almost every month (IRIN, 2009; IRIN, 2011; IRIN, 2012). The frequency and intensity of these conflicts has been increasing rapidly since independence, and there is no clear resolution in sight. e) **The return of the Jonglei Project idea**: although many see the infamous Jonglei Canal has something from the past, the fact is that resumption of the project is not off the agenda. The CPA says nothing about water resource development, but since independence South Sudan has also been negotiating with north Sudan (and Egypt) on how to use the Nile resources – intricate negotiations might lead South Sudan leaders to consider the construction of the canal, as a trade-off for support for other developments such as hydropower that would provide the much-needed energy sources. Many consider that going back to the project would be like calling back the war, as many would feel that once again central governments were disregarding the rights of local people in the Sudd area.

This section has tried to show that resource-based conflicts in South Sudan are not only about oil resources, but also the management, allocation and control over land and water resources. Oil revenues and possible development coming out of good use of these revenues are not necessarily going to make the conflicts disappear, instead they might once again fuel the conflicts, as was the case in the second civil war between North and South Sudan. Dismissing this lesson learned from past experience would be an unwise, expensive mistake for the government and people of South Sudan.
Gambella – unlocked potential?

A coveted region

The political history of the Gambella region is *sui generis*. Located in a strategic geographical corridor, where the border between Ethiopia and South Sudan now lies, the region has been the stage of several colonial political power games. The Gambella region (in particular the lowland areas) had been under nominal British control during the 17th and 18th centuries, and as such was part of the British empire and later the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium; at the end of the 19th century, the region was occupied by Ethiopia, which was by then conquering territory southwards of its stronghold in the Ethiopian highlands (Bahru, 1976). Officially, Gambella only became part of Ethiopia in 1902, after long and complex negotiations between Emperor Menelik II and the British, which were translated into a swap of territories between the two empires – Gambella was exchanged for Kassala, located in the northern border of the two empires (Markakis, 2011). After the adoption of the bilateral agreement, Gambella became then the westernmost border of Ethiopia – until 2011 bordering Sudan and after separation bordering the new country of South Sudan.

Figure 4: Map of the Gambella region

![Map of the Gambella region](source: Anyuakmedia (2006)).
The strategic location of Gambella is very much explained by its hydrology – the region is crisscrossed by several rivers (Baro, Akobo and Gilo being the major ones) that are tributaries of the White Nile, and as such part of the geopolitically very important Nile River Basin. The confluence of the rivers is located at the most western point of the border, then becoming the Sobat River and later White Nile River. The river had perfect navigation conditions and had therefore always been considered perfect to become a main corridor for trade (imports and exports) between the neighbouring countries. At the beginning of the 20th century, traders and mercenaries from different parts of the world and the Ethiopian government itself had great plans to transform the Baro-Sobat-White Nile into a major trading corridor and trade station in the Horn of Africa region (Bahru, 1987). By then, Gambella had jumped the queue from a marginal region to the centre of the political ambitious of the government of Ethiopia in Addis Ababa. Grandiose plans were frustrated by the political events that followed – abuses by the imperialist powers, disregard for the rights of local populations (in particularly the Anuak), allegations of slave trade, social instability, political destabilisation and conflicts (Dereje, 2011). As a result, Gambella returned to its position as a marginal and marginalized region in the Ethiopian political context until very recently, as discussed at the end of this section.

Figure 5: Map of the rivers in the Gambella region

![Map of the rivers in the Gambella region](image)

Source: author.

People and livelihoods of Gambella

Gambella is of the eleven regional states of the federal republic of Ethiopia – the smallest in terms of territorial size and population. According to the latest census the current population of the region is 300,000 people (Census, 2007), although these statistics are contested by many in Ethiopia. Its population is very diverse. The major ethnic groups are the Nuer (46 per cent), Anuak (21 per cent), Highlanders (9 per cent), Kafficho (5 per cent), Oromo (5 per cent) and Mezhenger (4 per cent) (Census, 2007). The Anuak are the original inhabitants of the region and until recently the majority of the population.
Nuer have also been living for a long time between the Gambella region and South Sudan, shifting between different areas due to the transhumance nature of their livelihoods. Highland settlers were moved to the region mainly from the mid-1980s, as analysed in the next section.

Livelihoods in Gambella include subsistence agriculture (Anuak and highlanders mainly), pastoralism and agro-pastoralism (Nuer), fisheries (Anuak) and beekeeping (Mezhenger). The livelihoods of three main groups – Anuak, Nuer and Highlanders – living in the lowlands areas of the region are very much linked to the use of water and land resources (Aleme, 1978; Kurimoto, 1994). Conflict and cooperation have historically characterised the socioeconomic and political dynamics between the three groups. The Anuak have always lived along the Baro and Gilo rivers, practising recessive agriculture – meaning agriculture on the river banks in the period after the floods- as rainfall levels in the region are high from May to August and agriculture usually takes places in the remaining months (Mengistu, 1999).

The Nuer have been moving back and forth in the Gambella and South Sudan regions, where they move with their livestock in a regular basis between the inland (during the rainy season) and the river banks (during the dry season). Access to river by Nuer and their cattle was often based on cooperative processes with the Anuak neighbours, and in times of competition between uses and users conflicts had been usually addressed through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (Dereje, 2011). The role of the central state of Ethiopia in these processes of conflict and cooperation had been limited (or unsuccessful), at least until the 1980s. The arrival of the new settlers coming from the Ethiopian highlands to the region during the Derg period and the establishment of a new political system in Ethiopia based on ethnic federalism since the 1990s changed the political landscape of the Gambella region (Pankhurst, 1997; Dereje, 2004). The livelihoods of the new settlers had been mainly based on agriculture, as well trade in the last decade.

As mentioned in the introduction, land and water resources are abundant in the Gambella region but this has not prevented resource-based conflict in the region. One of the main factors is the concentration of long-standing and newcomers in the same geographical areas, namely the Baro and Gilo river banks, that has contributed to increasing social tensions between the different groups due to competition for the same natural resources (Mengistu, 2005). Nevertheless, the intensity of the resource-based conflicts has exponentially increased due to political motivations related to the management and allocation of the natural resources, and more recently a race for political power resources. The role of the Ethiopian central state, first during the Mengistu’s regime and later during the Meles Zenawi period, had been extremely influential on how customary resource-based conflicts have escalated to widespread mistrust and social conflicts. The next section looks at the critical developments in the region since the 1980s and their impact in the nexus between resources management and political “transformation”.

155
1980s: a population explosion in the region

The mid-1980s are a tipping point in the history of the Gambella region, with two extreme events that changed the socio-economic and political dynamics to an unprecedented extent. The population of Gambella was estimated to be 50,000 people in 1984, and in the following couple of years the population in the region increased sevenfold in a very short period of time (Mengistu, 2005). The first event was the arrival of 150,000 settlers, mainly Ethiopia highlanders, as a result of a resettlement programme including a forced migration policy by the Derg regime in 1984 (Mengistu, 2005). The second event was the arrival of 300,000 South Sudanese refugees and military contingencies soon after the resumption of the Sudanese civil war on the other side of the border. The Gambella region was not only the location of three of the main refugee camps for Southern Sudanese (Itang, Punydo and Bonga), but also where the SPLA headquarters was located. The SPLA received military, logistical and financial support from the Ethiopian Derg regime until its fall in 1991 (Johnson, 1998).

Figure 6. Map of population pressure over the riverine areas of the Gambella region

The impacts of these migrations were multi-fold, and it is not the goal of this article to provide an extensive account of them and the enormous changes that they brought, but to look in particular at their
impact on the sharing and allocation of natural resources. But in brief, five major consequential changes can be identified:

a) **Population density**: most of the newcomers (from Ethiopia and South Sudan) moved to overlapping or adjoining areas where local populations where already living, helping to increase social tensions.

b) **Competition for resources**: access to land and water became more competitive, and severe challenges occurred in terms of land tenure and rights to use the water resources.

c) **Disruption of customary conflict resolution mechanisms**: the efficiency of the traditional mechanisms to resolve conflicts among different sectors of the population were disrupted or dismantled, and not necessarily replaced by an efficient new way of dealing with the new types of conflicts.

d) **New layers of power relations**: the arrival of the newcomers contributed to the complexity of power relations in the region and increased asymmetries – the already existing ones (empowering some of the local communities at the expense of others) and new layers (newcomers had political resources and networks that the local populations could not benefit from).

e) **Increasing dependency on aid**: with the arrival Southern Sudanese refugees, also a lot of international aid agencies arrived providing all kind of humanitarian assistance. This also included food aid, which contributed greatly to the disruption of agricultural production in the region.

In the last half of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, these challenges became more acute and contributed to a generalised situation of conflict and political instability in the Gambella region. Two different facets of the conflict can be identified. On the one hand, the region suffered from the spillover effects of the civil war in Sudan – military activities also took place on the Ethiopian side of the border (Johnson, 1998; Dereje and Hoehne, 2010). On the other hand, it contributed to the proliferation of a central-periphery type of conflict between the regional powers in Gambella and the central powers in Addis Ababa. This was translated into marginalisation of the region in terms of economic development – few or no investments or infrastructures were made in the region during this period. The exception was the beginning of construction of the Alwero Dam (see next section) in the Gilo River, which would have a very symbolic importance in the years to come. The dam was not completed before the end of the Derg regime however.

**Post-Cold War Gambella**

The end of the Cold War, by domino effect, had multiple impacts on the political kaleidoscope of the Gambella region. By the beginning of the 1990s, a new regime took power in Addis Ababa, replacing the socialist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam by the western-supported government of Meles Zenawi. In
the aftermath, we can identify two political outcomes with major consequences for the Gambella region. First, the SPLA lost its precious support from Ethiopia, and the Southern Sudanese army had to pull back its troops and headquarters to the other side of the border, but left behind thousands of refugees and traces of political instability (Dereje and Hoehne, 2010). Second, in 1994 the new Ethiopian government adopted ‘ethnic federalism’ as a new political system, and Gambella (before called Illulabor) became one of the eleven regional states. The political transformations at national and regional levels of power were to affect the region, including distribution of positions in the new regional government. The race for political power was just starting and natural-resource based conflicts took on a new dimension (Merara, 2003).

Although Gambella never became a conflict-free region in the 1990s, conflict would come back in force to the region later, in 2005. The root causes of the conflict could be traced back to the history of Gambella – marginalisation of the region by the central government of Ethiopia, mistrust between local communities (in particular the Anuak) and the Ethiopian central government, accusations of attempted genocide by the Anuak community, tensions between old and new (highland) settlers, etc (Sommer, 2005; HWR, 2005; Chan, 2007). Among the many complaints of the Anuak there was an allegation that customary land tenure rights were not being respected and that their land was being sold off without the consent of the local communities. This claim became stronger in later years because of major land deals between the Ethiopian government and foreign investors interested in large-scale commercial agriculture in the region, as discussed later in this section.

Water: a strategic resource

As mentioned previously, the hydrology of the Gambella region is one of the reasons that have made the region attractive to several outside actors. At the beginning of the 20th century the river was attractive as a trade corridor that could be used to import and export goods between Ethiopia and neighbouring countries, in particular Sudan. At the beginning of the 21st century, the Gambella’s rivers became attractive no longer as a highway but because of the water resources themselves.

Ethiopia, usually called the “water tower of Africa” has several rivers running throughout the country, the Nile system being the most important in hydrological and geopolitical terms. The Blue Nile/Abbay, the Tekezezze/Atbara and the Baro-Akobo/Sobat rivers are the three tributaries of the Nile Basin in Ethiopia. Of these three rivers, the Baro-Akobo/Sobat river is the second most important (after the Blue Nile/Abbay) in terms of flow contribution – 23bcm of water annually, which means around 14 per cent of the total Nile flows. Despite its vast water resources, little or no development took place in the basin. There are external and internal reasons, such as the complex hydropolitics between Ethiopia and its downstream neighbours Sudan and Egypt, but also the lack of priority given to this basin due to the attraction of potential developments in the Blue Nile. However, it is possible to say that the main reasons
for the lack of development were the persistent political instability in the region. It was only during the Derg regime that this basin's water resources gained strategic importance.

The Alwero Dam in the Gilo River was studied and planned in the Mengistu period, and construction started in 1984. The main purpose of the Alwero dam was to store water for large-scale irrigation. The dam was completed in 1992. Its completion had both positive and negative effects in terms of local livelihoods. On the one hand, it made water available for agriculture in the Abobo area, both for Anuak and highlander populations. It also helped to generate a new economic activity – fishing in the dam reservoir (Mengistu, 2005). On the other hand, it reduced the flow downstream and affected the water available for pasture for livestock. Consequently, the pastoralist populations have been moving more close to the riverine areas and tensions between agriculturists and pastoralists have substantially increased.

Nevertheless, the water in the Alwero Dam reservoir was never used for its intended purpose, i.e. the development of large-scale irrigated agriculture. The irrigation were never built in the first phase of construction (still during the Derg period) and no priority or investment went to it under the new government that came to power in the 1990s. The potential remained there however – and almost thirty years later it looks like the water stored in the dam is going to be used for the purpose for which it was built – as analysed next.

In brief, the waters of the Baro-Akobo-Gilo are a strategic resource for the local livelihoods of the groups living in the region, for the Ethiopian central government and private investors, and even beyond the border for South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt. Are the demands of these different users compatible? This is the big question that needs to be answered. And the socio-economic and political future of the Gambella region lies in the answer to this question.

Land and water “grabbing” in the Gambella region

Gambella and its water and land resources are back on the agenda of the Ethiopian government and once again a grandiose plan is dominating the decision-making process. This time we are talking not about navigation but about large-scale agriculture, but where trade is still the key word. The story goes that in 2008 the world woke up to a global food crisis, with an unprecedented spike in the prices of several food staples like rice and cereals. This propelled governments and private companies, mainly from water-scarce countries (such as the Gulf countries), to lease land for agriculture production in many African countries (Pearce, 2012). Ethiopia, and in particular the Gambella region, became particularly attractive to these new ventures. This was because there was plenty of land and water resources available and the Ethiopian government had been offering attractive incentives for direct foreign investment (Cotula, et. al., 2009; Weissleder, 2009). Because of its fertile land, high levels of rainfall and the riverine areas Gambella became a main region for these land deals – and at the same time Mengistu’s past slogan that land in Gambella was virgin (i.e. not being currently used) came back to the limelight. The slogan is as much
contested nowadays as it was in the 1980s – land and water are being used by local communities and are therefore not virgin. Despite that, several land deals between the Ethiopian government and investors had been signed in the past five years, and for the first time in history Gambella was making headlines in the international media as the example of what is called “land and water grabbing”.

**Figure 7: The Saudi Star rice project**

As of 2013, two large agricultural projects are starting in the Gambella region. A large-scale rice farm (potential: 140,000 ha of land) in the Abobo area, that will soon start using the water stored in the Alwero Dam reservoir once the irrigation canals are . This project is run by Saudi Star Agriculture Development, a private joint venture between Saudi and Ethiopian investors. The other is a large-scale sugar-cane and corn farm (potential: 400,000 ha of land) run by Karuturi, an India-based private agro-business company operating globally. The farms are currently undertaking rain-fed agriculture, but have shown an interest in moving towards irrigated agriculture using the water in the Alwero Dam and/or the Baro River. The lease contracts include deals on the extension (in hectares) of land that the private companies can use for their agricultural activities, though they are somehow omissive about the water resources – but it is a given that they will need water to expand agricultural production. How much water the projects are going to use in the future is still unclear.
Despite all the international media attention given to this new business in Gambella, it is too early to draw conclusions about the impacts these projects may have, both in terms of water (and land) resources and in general political terms. But two major questions can be raised. Will these projects contribute positively to the socio-economic development of Ethiopia and the Gambella region in particular? Or will these projects impact negatively on the already-complex dynamics in the region, by increasing resource-based competition and conflict of interests between the different users? The picture may not be black and white. Extensive fieldwork and interviews with relevant actors in the region indicate that the answer to both questions is yes. The answer to the first question is “yes”, as it can help improve the socio-economic development in the region at least in the short-term by developing new infrastructures (roads, airport, hotels, etc), creating jobs, increasing food production, transfer of technology, increasing small-scale trade, bringing more (national) investors to the region, reducing its geographical marginality and increasing availability of hard currency in the Ethiopian national treasury that could potentially be used for the socio-economic development of the region. But this kind of analysis takes into account only the short-term benefits, which might not be sustainable in the medium- and long-term future, and when only some experimental plots have been developed within the large-scale schemes. It is also pertinent to keep in mind that for the moment the local populations are still giving the benefit of the doubt to investors (and by default to the Ethiopian government) and are not (yet) being significantly affected by the projects. But this could change at any moment.

The answer to the second question is also “yes” – the mega-projects have the potential to impact negatively on the region and its populations in several different ways. In general terms, if the investors and the government fail to deliver and fairly distribute the benefits/outcomes of the projects, the likelihood of local populations turning against them is high. Dangerous political games of empowering and/or disempowering of some of the local groups at the expense of others, as has happened in the past, can also be extremely risky. But it is the specific concerns related to land and water resource management and allocation that are more relevant for the purpose of this article. Three major risks can be identified. First of all, major abstractions of water resources for the large-scale projects (which will occur as soon as the projects take over in a big way) can reduce the amount of water available for agricultural and pastoralist activities, and this will increase the likelihood of conflict between local groups and companies, and between the different local groups. Second, expansion of agricultural production beyond the current experimental plots may overlap with land areas that are currently being used by the local communities, and the lack of clarity on land tenure, resettlement policies, compensation and conflict resolution mechanisms might be translated into a major uproar with unpredictable negative consequences. Last but not the least, the mega-projects may have medium and long-term negative impacts in the environment – deforestation, reduced water quality and increased climate variability – and all of them may have consequential negative impacts on the livelihoods of the local people as well as in the Gambella National
Park, which is located very close to the projects and considered an important asset to the region due to its untapped tourism potential.

In brief, land and water are at the core of the development of the Gambella region but they may also be at the core of potential exacerbated conflicts. The balance may be difficult to reach, but it is not impossible if social, economic, environmental and political dimensions are factored into the decision-making processes. Political wisdom is an essential requirement – and this only possible if the needs and concerns of the local populations are taken into account.

Conclusion

The two case studies analysed above put in evidence that resource-based conflicts are intimately linked with political volatility and economic fragility. Gambella and South Sudan are vivid examples on how natural resources conflicts have a social and economic basis. Colonial and post-colonial history has set the stage for complex dynamics that go beyond one single factor explaining why a war/conflict starts and is maintained. Central governments, opposition groups and local communities have operated and interacted in a context where political, legal and institutional frameworks were far from being clear and not informed by notions of common goods and equitable development. In the most recent years, despite the consolidation of state and regional institutions, clarity is not yet taken for granted. Governance structures on how to manage and allocate natural resources are still to be improved – if fair exploration and distribution of resources and wealth is to be achieved. Legal and institutional frameworks to deal with issues such as land tenure, water rights and conflict resolution need to be developed further, such as political and economic governance at all levels – inter-state, state, regional and local.

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162


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FROM BELEAGUERED FORTRESSES TO BELLIGERENT CITIES

MANUEL JOÃO RAMOS

Abstract | Given the progressively central role of religious affiliation as a marker of political identity in Ethiopian urban communities, this paper reflects on the impact of current imprints of conflict in inter- and intra-religious relations and the degree of government interference in national religious structures. As religion becomes part of the political debate, it is worth reading the present situation against the framework of traditional mediation, negotiation and tolerance practices, which have historically shaped intra- and inter-communal relations. As politically relevant as the Christian / Muslim cleavages may be, the tendency of analysts and external decision-makers to overvalue it, disregarding the pragmatism shown by millennial coexistence between these groups and the evidence of major reconfigurations presently taking place in urban Ethiopia, runs the risk of hindering a comprehensive reading of the complexity of the dynamics of domestic and foreign Ethiopian policy in the Horn of Africa.

Keywords | Ethiopia, Islam, Christianity, Politics, Conflict.

Bio | Manuel João Ramos is a professor of anthropology at ISCTE - University Institute of Lisbon, sub-director of its Centre of African Studies and head of the Central Library of African Studies. His recent publications range from studies on Ethiopian history to heritage and risk studies, including a scholarly edition of Pedro Paez’s History of Ethiopia (2011), Ethiopian Stories (forthcoming) and a number of books on road risk. His research interests are risk and conflict studies, heritage studies and urban anthropology. His regional area of research is the Horn of Africa.

THE SECURITY ISSUES BEHIND THE ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA (2006-2009)

ELSA GONZÁLEZ AÍME

Abstract | In 2006 Ethiopian troops were deployed in Somalia. This intervention was possible after a securitization process in Ethiopia regarding the conflict in Somalia and the role of the UIC. Beyond the threat to the Ethiopian state posed by this armed movement, the securitization move contributed to the reconstruction and reaffirmation of the Ethiopian political regime, both locally and internationally, at a moment when its legitimacy was damaged and questioned, especially after the 2005 elections. Approaching this intervention from critical security studies and particularly analyzing the discourse that accompanied this securitization move, it is possible to highlight how the securitization of Somalia helped to tighten the Government’s authority and consolidate its state model with the backing of the international society.

Key Words | Ethiopia, Somalia, security, intervention, 2006

Bio | Elsa González Aimé has a BA in History from the Autonomous University of Madrid, where she is a PhD candidate in the doctoral programme in International Relations and African Studies. She is a member of the Group of African Studies and the Group in IR Studies of that university. She has done internships at the Centre d’Étude de l’Afrique Noire in Bordeaux (10 months), the Centre d’Étude des Mondes Africains in Paris (3 months) and the Centre Français d’Études Éthiopiennes in Addis Abeba (3 months), as well as other visits related to her research in Addis Abeba and Paris. She is Currently the editor of the online IR journal on: www.relacionesinternacionales.info.
SECURITY STAKES AND CHALLENGES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
PATRICK FERRAS

Abstract | The Horn of Africa continues to illustrate a paradox. Even when numerous regional actors are committed to peacekeeping or support operations, the region remains the most conflictive in the continent. It alone includes a large part of problems related to forms of war - interstate, intra-state, by proxy. The implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and thus the increase in power of the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) are of interest to the member states of the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority for Development), the East African Community (EAC), the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania. The situation evolves according to the balance of power between African countries in terms of political and military potential (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi). The Horn of Africa is a laboratory that opens doors to reflection or studies on the military commitments capable of settling the conflicts in Africa.

Keywords | APSA, African Standby Force, EASFCOM, Ethiopia, peacekeeping operations

Bio | Patrick Ferras spent his entire military career as an intelligence officer in the French Air Force (lieutenant-colonel) in Air Force Units and at Air Force and Joint Headquarters. He took part in numerous foreign operations: Chad, Central African Republic, former Yugoslavia and Saudi Arabia and was posted to the Republic of Djibouti three times (from 1992 to 1994, in 1997, and from 2004 to 2006). He ended his military career at the French Headquarters in Djibouti. He was in charge of the Intelligence and International Relations Office. He was awarded a PhD in Geopolitics (University of Paris 8 (French Institute of Geopolitics) in May 2011 (Title: The Ethiopian National Defence Forces, a tool of a regional power in the service of Ethiopian Federal Power). He is the director of the Observatory of the Horn of Africa (www.csba-ferras.eu) and a lecturer (University of Paris 13, Mäqälé (Ethiopia), Political Science Institute in Bordeaux, Strategic International Relations Institute in Paris, Think Tanks and the Chamber of Trade and Industry.

AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA) SUBSIDIARITY AND THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)
RICARDO REAL P. DE SOUSA

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Abstract | The new African Peace and Security Architecture is based on the principle of subsidiarity governing the relationship between the United Nations, African Union and regional mechanisms. Nevertheless it is still unclear how subsidiarity will be implemented in the decision-making mechanism, division of labour and burden sharing. This paper analyses the challenges of subsidiarity in two IGAD processes: the renewal of the security mandate started at IGAD in 2005 and Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006. It finds that regional rivalries and historical legacies prevent the development of IGAD's security mandate and an intervention policy while international interests determine the projection of the Somalia case. It concludes that sub-regional inter-state institutional coordination and capacity-building are essential requirements for the implementation of subsidiarity.

Key words | IGAD, Subsidiarity, APSA, Horn of Africa, International Intervention

Bio | Ricardo Real P. Sousa is a PhD candidate in Development Studies at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam (EUR) in the Netherlands. He is also part of the Research School in Peace and Conflict (PRIO / NTNU / UIO) in Norway and associated with the African Studies Centre (CEA) at ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute in Portugal as a researcher on conflict (ISCTE-IUL). With a background in management for corporate change, he had assignments in the private sector, public sector, civil society and multilateral institutions as a development practitioner. More
recently, he has been involved in research projects on the dynamics of the political economy of conflict in Angola and the Horn of Africa. His PhD research focuses on the effect of external intervention on conflict intensity based on an analysis of Africa's conflicts since the end of the Cold War.

SOMALIA AS A MARKET FOR PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES: DEFINITIONS, AGENTS AND SERVICES
PEDRO BARGE CUNHA

Abstract | The current academic debate around private military and security companies (PMSCs) is intense and without consensus, starting with definitions. There is still no agreement on the question of what a PMSC is. In order to establish a comprehensive conceptual framework, this study examined the different definitions and identified divergences and convergences. This allowed us to propose definitions in order to contribute to the academic debate. It worked as a fundamental tool in the characterisation and comprehension of the object of the study. The general goal of this research is to make a contribution to the study of the privatization of security in Africa. In specific terms, the study looks to understand the PMSCs’ dynamics and areas of intervention in the Horn of Africa region by analysing the types of clients and services provided.

Keywords | Somalia, Private Military and Security Companies, Privatisation of Security

Bio | Pedro Barge Cunha is a PhD candidate in Political Science, International Relations, and has been a member of the Monitoring Conflicts in the Horn of Africa research programme since 2012.

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA (2006-2013): YET ANOTHER EXTERNAL STATE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT?
ALEXANDRA MAGNÓLIA DIAS

Abstract | Since the rise and fall of the militant Islamist movement in Somalia, an array of actors have intervened in Somalia with disparate aims and implications in terms of the post-transition period (August 2012 up to the present). Both regional states (Ethiopia and Kenya) and organizations (IGAD and AU) have contributed to the international re-engagement with Somalia, the most notable being the Africa Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM since 2007). Al-shabaab, among other insurgent movements, continues to forcefully resist external-led interventions aimed at rebuilding the Somali state. Outside the region, the European Union has been particularly involved in providing support to state-building efforts with a focus on the security sector, especially the maritime dimension of security (through EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and EUCAP Nestor since July 2012) and the creation of security forces (through EUTM Somalia). This paper contributes to the debate on the interplay between insurgency, externally led state-building efforts and the particular domestic dynamics and how these contribute to or undermine the state reconstruction process.

Keywords | external state reconstruction, state disintegration, insurgency, Somalia, international intervention, state-building.

Bio | Alexandra M. Dias is an Auxiliary Researcher at the Centre for African Studies and Invited Auxiliary Professor at the ISCTE-IUL Department of History. She completed her master's degree in African Studies at ISCTE and she obtained her PhD at the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her PhD entitled “An inter-state war in the post-Cold War era: 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia” received an honourable mention in the second Selecting Committee of the Portuguese Political Science Association’s (APCP) Prize for Best PhD Thesis.
THE LEGACY OF POWER SHARING IN KENYA: LITERATURE CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH AGENDA’S INVISIBILITIES
ALEXANDRE DE SOUSA CARVALHO

Abstract | Power sharing arrangements have been recurrent in the African continent since the end of the Cold War, particularly as a conflict resolution mechanism included in peace agreements. However, in both the democratic theory and conflict resolution strands of research, literature on power sharing is almost exclusively derived from an elite-based and/or institutionally-driven analysis, neglecting bottom-up approaches and dynamics and failing to deliver a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of power sharing. Highlighting the findings of fieldwork done in Kenya during the March 2013 elections, this chapter sheds light on the dynamics of power-sharing agreements in Kenya. It argues that the lack of dialogue between research and analytical agendas has been responsible for blind spots in the literature, which has been neglecting potentially influential actors and dynamics that could further the understanding of the limitations and potential consequences of power sharing arrangements.

Keywords | power sharing; politics of transition; civil society organisations; Kenya.

Bio | Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho has a degree in International Relations from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Coimbra and holds a master's degree in African Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Bradford. He has been a researcher for the Centre for International Co-operation and Security of the University of Bradford and the Observatory on Trafficking of Human Beings of the Portuguese Ministry of Internal Affairs. He is currently doing a PhD in Political Science on the Kenyan and Zimbabwean power-sharing arrangements as a mechanism for sustainable and democratic peace at ISCTE-IUL. He is also a researcher in the Conflict Monitoring in the Horn of Africa project for the Centre for African Studies - ISCTE.

STILL CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: NUBA POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND FAILURE OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT IN SUDAN
ALEKSI YLÖNEN

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Abstract | This article concentrates on the Nuba’s political resistance in Sudan that contests the state order based on forced cultural assimilation and marginalization. It traces the trajectory of the Nuba’s political struggle, highlighting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Period. The article contends that, despite generating hopes for increased self-determination, the CPA failed to address the political and security concerns and grievances of the Nuba. Instead, implementation of the CPA (2005-2010) and the resulting secession of South Sudan (2011), failed to remedy the perpetual marginalization of the Nuba in the Sudanese political system, and led to the re-deterioration of the security situation in the Nuba Mountains. Renewed violence and armed struggle ensued and are now undermining relations between Sudan and South Sudan.

Keywords | Marginalization, Conflict, Nuba, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Southern Kordofan, Sudan

Bio | Aleksi Ylönen is a Visiting Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany, and a member of the African Studies Group at the Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain. Dr. Ylönen’s work concentrates on African conflicts and security issues. His geographical areas of expertise are the Sudans and the Horn of Africa. He has lectured at a number of universities and his work has been published in books, journals, magazines and newspapers in various languages.
RESOURCES-BASED CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN AND GAMBELLA (ETHIOPIA): WHEN WATER, LAND AND OIL MIX WITH POLITICS

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Abstract | This article looks at the issue of resources-based conflicts in the Horn of Africa region, examining two different case-studies – the newly independent country of South Sudan and the Gambella region, the westernmost in Ethiopia. It analyses how natural resources may have been or are at the core of the conflicts that have been affecting the two regions in recent decades. It is well documented that oil (a valuable natural resource) has been a main factor of competition and contention in the long-lasting conflict between North and South Sudan. But if we look at the internal conflicts within South Sudan, other natural resources appear as key elements of a complex puzzle of conflicts, where access to land and water for livelihoods figure prominently as main bones of contention. Similar patterns of conflict can be observed just across the South Sudan-Ethiopian border, in the Gambella region. The article assesses how the management and allocation of water and land resources has been the basis for both conflict and cooperation between different societal groups.

Keywords | natural resources, land, water, oil, conflict, cooperation, agriculture, pastoralism

Bio | Project Manager at the Stockholm International Water Institute - Department of Transboundary Water Resources.
This book brings to fruition the research done during the CEA-ISCTE project “Monitoring Conflicts in the Horn of Africa”, reference PTDC/AFR/100460/2008. The Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) provided funding for this project.

The chapters are based on first-hand data collected through fieldwork in the region’s countries between 4 January 2010 and 3 June 2013. The project’s team members and consultants debated their final research findings in a one-day Conference at ISCTE-IUL on 29 April 2013.

The following authors contributed to the project’s final publication: Alexandra M. Dias, Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho, Aleksi Ylönen, Ana Elisa Cascão, Elsa González Aimé, Manuel João Ramos, Patrick Ferras, Pedro Barge Cunha and Ricardo Real P. Sousa.

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