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2024-07-25

Deposited version:

Accepted Version

Peer-review status of attached file:

Peer-reviewed

Citation for published item:

Seabra, P. & Mesquita, R. (2023). Wavering or privileged cooperation?: Portugal and Lusophone Africa at the UN General Assembly. In Paulo Afonso B. Duarte, Rui Albuquerque, António Manuel Lopes Tavares (Ed.), *Portugal and the Lusophone world: Law, geopolitics and institutional cooperation*. (pp. 493-509). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Further information on publisher's website:

10.1007/978-981-99-0455-6_24

Publisher's copyright statement:

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Wavering or privileged cooperation? Portugal and Lusophone Africa at the UN General Assembly

Pedro Seabra and Rafael Mesquita

Abstract:

Relations between former colonial powers and former colonies are often characterized by ambivalent political outcomes and mismatched rhetoric. Portugal's interactions with its own former African colonies since 1975 are not an exception and have been routinely depicted by similar oscillating dynamics. They remain, nevertheless, grounded by the expectation of privileged contacts and mutual alignment in several different international fora. This chapter evaluates claims of pre-established international affinity as a proxy product of a shared decolonization legacy and highlights key intricacies of Lusophone political cooperation in the international domain. We explore whether the creation of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) has indeed fostered closer ties between this set of countries in key multilateral platforms by quantitatively analysing sponsorship patterns at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in the last two decades. Our results demystify broader claims of privileged relations, yet still point to considerable room for manoeuvre in institutionally dense formats such as the UN.

Keywords: Portugal; foreign policy; Lusophone Africa; decolonization; CPLP; UNGA

Introduction

The legacy of colonialism in the reformulation of new bilateral relations remains a key topic in contemporary history. The lasting memory of independence wars enmeshed with a shared historical-cultural background has come to supply a set of intersected relations that remains as central as unpredictable in equal measure. The creation of post-colonial intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as instruments to ensure structured ties between former metropolises and former colonies further ensures the issue continues routinely open for debate. The creation of the Commonwealth, with the UK at its core, or the French-led *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie* (OIF) stand out as the two most well-known examples of such lingering collective dynamics (Glasze, 2007; Shaw, 2010). However, analyses are often hamstrung by a recurring lack of empirical data and quantitative studies attesting to the intensity and variation in this kind of relationship. This omission is particularly striking when turning to the Lusophone case. Formed in 1996, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) is often relegated to a secondary role in the broader canvas of IGOs. Yet, its institutional longevity on par with its centrality amidst the foreign policy agendas of countries like Portugal makes the CPLP an intriguing case-study to explore linkages between envisioned designs at the time of creation and its perceived utility in the current world order.

This chapter directly targets expectation of privileged contacts in such kind of formal contexts and its translation into possible mutual alignment in other international fora. We aim to deconstruct how former colonial powers cooperate or interact with their former colonies at the international level by testing these propositions within the framework of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This common multilateral platform stands out as particularly useful by allowing to measure high-level consultations from a longitudinal perspective. Given its expressed purpose to be used for high-level political consultations and concertation worldwide, our main query thus resides on answering to what extent the CPLP has succeeded

or not in promoting greater joint projection between Portugal and African Lusophone countries, namely with Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Two methodological notes are first warranted. On one hand, even though our original point resides in Portuguese relations with its former African colonies, as a more direct testament of contemporary intricacies associated to post-colonial relations, our analysis invariably takes stock of what has also been achieved within the overall CPLP scope, thus including Brazil and Timor-Leste in the mix. On the other hand, we choose to centre our efforts on the 2000-2020 timeframe for the quantitative analysis of work carried out at the UNGA. This decision is grounded on both issues of data availability as well as on matching a period of more increased international visibility for the CPLP.

The chapter is organized as follows. It begins by providing an overall snapshot of post-colonial relations between Portugal and African Lusophone countries in order to showcase the level of priority that it is often attributed to regular high-level political cooperation. We then examine the potential of the CPLP as a multilateral propeller for joint endeavors in the world stage. The third section focuses on specific efforts made within the UN institutional framework, followed by the actual unpacking of expectations surrounding higher concertation at the UNGA. We conclude by summarizing our results and indicating additional areas worthy of further research in this context.

Portugal and Lusophone Africa

Any attempt to holistically address the political-diplomatic relations between Portugal and Africa inevitably faces a considerable pre-existent historical weight. The challenge of exploring these ties proves particularly sizeable when dealing with a relationship as complex as prolific in official announcements, high-level visits, and political-media rhetoric (Seabra, 2019; Carvalho, 2018). Indeed, running counter to some prevailing notions, the “dissolution of Portugal’s African empire was every bit as brutal and nasty as many other imperial endgames, and the managing of the postcolonial relationships was also fraught with incidents and misunderstandings” (Oliveira, 2017, p.13).

For all intents and purposes, the post-April 25th period represented a perfect storm in terms of obstacles to the planning and execution of a new relationship agenda with the African continent. On the one hand, short-lived governments and serious domestic economic difficulties, together with around 600,000 to 800,000 Portuguese citizens who left the former colonies, led to a recurrent degree of paralysis in political terms, as well as hesitation about external options. On the other hand, the East-West geopolitical divisions and the option of many newly independent countries to follow the communist bloc also implied a management of expectations and interests susceptible to cyclical crises (Figueiredo, 1986; Gaspar, 1988). Assessments have therefore hardly differed about the structural problems underlying the planning and execution of Portuguese foreign policy towards Africa since then. Franco (2006), for one, mentions how, in “the name of a 'perfect' bilateral relationship, affections or political friendships are confused with the formality that guarantees relations between States” (p. 29). For his part, MacQueen (2003) characterizes the national efforts carried out in this area as equivalent to a set of “relations, variable objectives and uncertain rapprochements with the former territories, both psychological and political” (p.182).

The inexistence of binding bilateral legal instruments in the immediate period following decolonization that allowed for consultations on issues in the international order, did not help move the needle along either. In fact, the preference was initially placed on agreements of a more diffuse and ambiguous scope, which did not elaborate on how a post-colonial relationship could translate itself into a different international context. On that note, Portugal signed a General Cooperation and Friendship Agreement with Guinea Bissau and São Tomé and

Príncipe, and Mozambique in 1975, followed by Cape Verde in 1977. Angola was next in 1979 with a General Cooperation Agreement. None of these instruments, however, managed to incite much substantial political discussions.

This did not mean that issues of common interest did not occasionally surface. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, the main topic of interest to both parties resided in how Portugal presented itself as an informal representative of the interests of African Lusophone countries within the European Communities, especially when considering the negotiations then underway with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, under the Lomé and Cotonou frameworks (Raimundo, 2014). But following several false-starts in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Monteiro, 1996), enough political consensus was found in 1996 to then create a new multilateral organization, with international legal stand that could bring Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe – and after 2002, East-Timor – to the same table (Seabra 2019).

However, from the start, the CPLP also had to face a considerable number of challenges. On the one hand, it exhibited a lingering centrality by Portugal, which, in turn, came to incite at times a sensitive cohabitation with remaining members (Seabra, 2021). Indeed, the “fact that the organization is sometimes referred to as ‘lusophone’ hints at the existence of an invisible centre/periphery construct, which can seldom be either flattering or beneficial to members other than Portugal” (Santos, 2003, p.75; Reis & Oliveira, 2018). The very aggregating concept of “Lusophony” led to consensus and unity only to a certain point given how its limits were also stretched in the name of new geo-political considerations. The adhesion of Equatorial Guinea in 2014 (Seabra, 2021), in particular, exposed the internal divergences regarding the course intended for the CPLP. On the other hand, a shifting focus from a cultural-based project, to a business-friendly facilitator, to a resource-driven accelerator, and back to more shared-cultural/educational leitmotifs, also fuelled a generalized perception of a structural ambivalence over what its role and purpose ought to be (Hewitt et. al, 2017).

The CPLP and political cooperation between Member States

Mandate-wise, the focus of the CPLP has been unequivocally set on inwards cooperation since the organization’s early inception. The thematic list stand as wide as ambitious, but also on par with other similar multilateral arrangements of the sort: economic and social development, easier transit of citizens, diffusion of the Portuguese language, cultural exchanges, interparliamentary cooperation, business cooperation, scientific and technological cooperation, shared support in humanitarian and emergency crises, civil society exchanges, cooperation in immigration policies, protection and preservation of the environment and sustainable development, eradication of racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia, improvement of children’s living conditions, promotion of corporate social responsibility, and youth exchanges¹.

However, external efforts concerning political coordination also figure prominently amidst this sprawling mandate. In fact, the CPLP’s stated purpose consists of enhancing the “international affirmation of all Portuguese-speaking countries that constitute a geographically discontinuous space but identified by the common language”. Two sub-domains stand out in this regard, namely, (1) promoting “coordination at the multilateral level to ensure the respect for human rights in the respective countries and around the world”; and (2) extending cooperation in “the area of political and diplomatic consultations, particularly within international organizations, in order to give increasing expression to the common interests and

¹ Although not included in the original purview, intra-defence cooperation was subsequently added in 2002.

needs within the international community”². Moreover, the ensuing statutes consecrated “Political and diplomatic consultation between its members in matters of international relation, namely to reinforce its presence in international fora” as one of the organization’s main goals³.

Among its constituent bodies, the Permanent Concertation Committee, made up of one representative from each of the CPLP member states, is in charge with providing a more direct monitoring of all activities carried out within the organization. But the role of the so-called CPLP Groups, made up of a minimum of three Representatives of member states to other foreign Governments or international organizations, is also relevant in this regard as they coordinate positions on common interests, ensure CPLP representation at conferences, seminars and international meetings, carry out joint efforts, exchange information on the political and governmental reality of the country where they are located, support the holding of events organized within the scope of the CPLP and publicize the activities and achievements of the organization itself.

Overall, their activities have been diversified, ranging from accompanying UNESCO programs for the protection of the cultural heritage of Portuguese-speaking countries, to sensitizing FAO agencies in relation to food programs, supporting the implementation of development aid to African member countries and Timor-Leste, or promoting the use of Portuguese in the world and as a working language in international organizations. General evaluations continue to posit that “(...) while often not spectacular in nature, the CPLP does offer meaningful returns for its members. The organisation provides a platform that can be leveraged by members to advance specific agendas if they are willing to devote the necessary resources to coordinating their counterparts and driving their programme forward” (Hewitt et. al, 2017, p.307; Sanches, 2014). However, more nuanced assessments over sectorial progress remain amiss.

The CPLP and the UN

Part of the CPLP’s original mandate consisted in trying to translate prior cultural affinities amongst its members into political dividends in other multilateral settings, while at the same time aiming to stand on an equal playing field with other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in world stages. The most immediate route to both ends inevitably went through the UN. Two reasons underlined such option: on the one hand, it granted a measure of international legitimacy unlike any other international organization; on the other hand, it comprised the sole other venue where all Lusophone member states stood equally invested in its success, utility and longevity.

In that sense, in 1999, just three years after its creation, the CPLP applied for and obtained permanent observer status at the UN General Assembly⁴. The reasoning provided at the time was straightforward: given how the coincidence of purposes with the UN and how “mutually advantageous” it would be to establish working cooperation channels, the CPLP would be officially allowed to participate in the sessions and ensuring work of the General Assembly, on par with 76 other IGOs⁵. Soon afterwards, relations between the CPLP and the UN also began to be framed under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as well as under successive

² CPLP Constitutive Declaration, 17 July 1996.

³ CPLP Statutes, consolidated 2007 version, n. 3, a).

⁴ The UN Charter and the General Assembly Rules of Procedure have no provisions related to granting permanent observer status to third parties. However, it has been agreed the UNGA would restrict observer status to States and intergovernmental organizations whose activities cover matters of interest to the Assembly. Under A/RES/54/195, the UNGA Sixth Committee is bound to consider all applications for observer status before they are considered in plenary session. Permanent Observers may participate in the sessions and workings of the General Assembly and maintain missions at UN Headquarters.


⁵ See A/RES/54/10, 18 November 1999.

UN Security Council resolutions calling for cooperation between the UN and regional/sub regional organizations on maintaining international peace and security. The latter dispositions would become increasingly paramount in light of the CPLP's increasing involvement with successive political-military crises in Guinea-Bissau and ensuring mediation efforts.

The exact same mould of the first resolution would then be reissued, almost to the letter, in 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019⁶. Two explicit requests were also routinely made through such procedures. The first consisted of having the UN Secretary-General regularly submit a report on the implementation of the desired state of relations between the two organizations, which has been carried out with increasing regularity in recent years⁷. The second request entailed initiating further consultations towards the establishment of a formal cooperation agreement between the UNSG and the CPLP, to no avail.

In parallel, the most visible result of this concertation resided in the endorsement of national or individual candidacies for institutions and positions within the UN system. This process began in full in 2002, during the III Summit of Heads of State and Government in Brasília, where 3 candidacies to a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council – from Angola (2002-2003), Brazil (2003-2004) and Portugal (2010-2011) – were collectively endorsed. In the following years, as seen in Figure 1, other additional 58 candidacies were also endorsed⁸. In all these occasions, member states pledged to reinforce such a practice as well as the concertation in world forums on matters of common interest on the international agenda.

Figure 1 – Number of individual and national candidacies endorsed by CPLP member states to the UN system



⁶ See A/RES/59/21, 8 November 2004; A/RES/61/223, 20 December 2006; A/RES/63/143, 11 December 2008; A/RES/65/139, 16 December 2010; A/RES/67/252, 26 March 2013; A/RES/69/311, 6 July 2015; A/RES/71/324, 8 September 2017; A/RES/73/339, 12 September 2019.

⁷ For UNSG reports on relations with the CPLP see: A/61/256, 16 August 2006; A/63/228-S/2008/531, 8 August 2008; A/65/382-S/2010/490, 20 September 2010; A/67/280-S/2012/614, 9 August 2012; A/69/228-S/2014/560, 4 August 2014; A/71/160-S/2016/621, 15 July 2016; A/73/328-S/2018/592, 17 August 2018; A/75/345-S/2020/898, 11 September 2020.

⁸ 2018 proved the only exception, when the Heads of State and Government of the CPLP gathered at Praia opted to not make any explicit commitment in this regard, choosing instead to reaffirm previous commitments to a permanent UNSC seat for Brazil and Africa.


Source: Elaborated by the authors based on the final declarations of Heads of State and Government Summits.

When taken together, these cumulative inroads amount to tokens of political cooperation within CPLP as manifested through the UN. However, if these countries managed to reach such a consensus with regard to candidacies for international positions, it is worthy questioning if such dynamics also translated themselves into the longstanding forum for more recurrent interactions between countries worldwide, namely the UNGA.

Lusophone cooperation at the UNGA

UNGA votes provides a first-cut into the collective behavior of CPLP countries in multilateral arenas. Figure 2 is derived from the Bailey et al. (2017) data and shows the ideal point scores calculated for all 9 members, based on their voting position from 2000 to 2020. The authors recommend interpreting these scores as measures of satisfaction with the US-led international order. As such, there seems to be early evidence of a split between Portugal, tied to the rest of its European partners, and the rest of CPLP.

Figure 2: Roll-call votes ideal point scores



Source: elaborated by the authors, based on data from Bailey et al. (2017).

Knowing, however, that voted resolutions are only a fraction of total UNGA output, these results fail to depict the complete story. As highlighted in additional research on this topic (Seabra and Mesquita, 2022), given that only contentious themes are settled through the ballot box, cooperation between countries can be underestimated by such indices if their partnership is strong on topics that are less controversial. As a remedy, we turn to sponsorship of draft resolutions as a more encompassing metric.

Institutional rites of the UNGA in that regard remain fairly stable and predictable. Every session, an item is put on the agenda, as previously discussed by the General Committee of the UNGA. Most draft resolutions are then initiated and drafted by a member state (the ‘main sponsor’) and usually subscribed by other supporters (‘co-sponsors’). Every draft then turns into a so-called L-document and is normally tabled in one of six different committees, each referring to a different policy area (Mesquita and Seabra 2020). Once a draft is tabled, its trajectory can vary considerably. In an ideal-type scenario, a draft will cruise unmodified through the original committee, before being adopted as a full resolution by the plenary, either through a vote, by consensus, by acclamation, without objection or without any vote (Peterson 2006, 54). However, L-documents frequently receive additional contributions along the way. These can alter either their original sponsors (via Addenda), their content (via Corrigenda and Revisions), or even both (via Revisions). The range of opportunities for member states to engage with the process by sponsoring a draft remains therefore very wide, without any major caveats or preconditions (Mesquita and Seabra 2020).


To map the sponsorship behavior of the CPLP countries, we rely on sponsorship information drawn from the UN General Assembly Sponsorship Dataset.⁹ Following two previously proposed indices, priority and ownership (Seabra and Mesquita, 2022), we seek to better ascertain draft relevance for member states. Priority indicates how early (or late) a country adhered to a draft resolution. Ownership, in turn, is a count of total sponsors, aimed at discriminating between resolutions that embody widespread interests (many sponsors, low ownership) and those conveying peculiar preferences (few sponsors, high ownership). In essence, the indices attempt to separate “the wheat from the tares” (p.3), i.e. differentiate initiatives near to core interests of member states from those that were ritualistic and unimportant, based on their urgency and exclusivity. We use these indices as a complement to raw sponsorship information, so as to obtain a finer assessment of peculiar initiatives arising from the CPLP.

Between 2000 and 2020 (sessions 55 to 74), there were 5,010 draft resolutions tabled at the UNGA¹⁰. From this total, at least 3,709 counted with the sponsorship of one or more CPLP members. In 101 occasions – on average 5 times per session – we observed all 9 CPLP participants sponsoring a proposition together. If we consider that group size changed over the years, with the entrances of East Timor and Equatorial Guinea as of UNGA sessions 57 and 69, respectively, then the total number of occasions when all CPLP members endorsed a draft reaches 120. From these 120 drafts, 15 were initiatives from the African Group, 75 from the G77, 2 from the Non-Aligned Movement, and 20 were not attributed to formal groups. Figure 3 below shows these totals over time.

Figure 3 – Sponsorship of UNGA drafts by CPLP members

⁹ Available at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MPQUE2>

¹⁰ We call “draft” the collection of sequenced L-Documents, starting from an original root proposition until its revisions and addenda.




Source: elaborated by the authors, based on Seabra and Mesquita (2022).

This reveals that joint sponsorship by all CPLP members, more often than not, is a side effect of the activity of larger and more traditional UNGA groupings. This is not to say the group is lost amid these bigger factions. Though less frequent if compared to this type of output driven by large groups, the CPLP has nonetheless a distinctive and intentional production of its own. Its signature product resides in the recurring draft resolution “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries”, previously mentioned. This proposal is tabled every two years at the UNGA plenary. It is not placed under the responsibility of any formal political or geographical group, and different members of CPLP have taken turns in introducing the draft to the Plenary. Similar to other proposals concerning the cooperation between the UN and external organizations, the content of this draft acknowledges summits held by the group, joint statements, and laudatory developments in its countries. Approximately 20 other organizations tabled similar drafts, for instance the African Union, the OIF, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Interestingly, CPLP-UN cooperation drafts stand out as the ones with the most co-sponsors among this sort of initiative. Though in 2004 the proposal only garnered 8 backers, by 2010 this number reached 49, and in 2017 a total of 118, averaging 61 sponsors across the whole period. This performance can be considered surprising if we consider how small the CPLP is with just 9 members. Figure 4 puts this into perspective by comparing several regional organizations that tabled such UN-cooperation drafts. The horizontal axis refers to the number of members each entity had and the vertical axis compares how many supporters it garnered on average on their recurring drafts under this topic. Each organization was observed twice: with average values for 2000-2009 and then 2010-2020. Results show that, though very small, CPLP resolutions had more endorsers than large groups like the African Union or the OIC, and, most impressively, had the highest surge in mean number of co-sponsors from one decade to the next.

Figure 4: Comparison of the mean number of final co-sponsors for drafts on cooperation between the UN and regional groups (2000-2009 and 2010-2020)



Source: elaborated by the authors, based on data from Seabra and Mesquita (2022). Data on number of members in each organization are from Wikipedia.

If we monitor the dimensions of priority and ownership, that is, focusing on drafts sponsored early by CPLP countries and not too diluted among the UNGA crowd, we find next in order of importance drafts attached to the African continent and its different social-political predicaments. CPLP members have essentially supported drafts on health programs¹¹, refugees and displaced persons¹², economic development programs¹³, and memorials about transatlantic slave trade¹⁴, all focused on Africa.

This thematic pull is not surprising if we consider that CPLP countries bring forward relatively little as an original produce of the 9 members and share instead a more loaded agenda with larger political and regional groups. All members tend to nurture denser workloads with neighboring partners. Just as Angola co-sponsored most of its drafts with Nigeria in these 10 years (1,799), Brazil did it with Chile (1,804), and Portugal with Italy (1,677) (see also Mesquita and Seabra 2020). This trend corroborates the accumulated findings from past UNGA scholarship. Studies using roll-call voting ideal points customarily identify a North vs. South cleavage at the Assembly and consistently place Portugal on the Northern faction pitted against Brazil and PALOP countries (Bailey et al. 2017). Novel research using sponsorship, in turn, joins Portugal and Brazil in Western bloc while remaining CPLP members are placed in a broader African, Caribbean and Pacific cluster (Seabra and Mesquita, 2022), confirming a split nonetheless between Lusophone countries.

¹¹ Recurring drafts “Intensification of efforts to end obstetric fistula”(A/C.3/69/L.20/Rev.1, A/C.3/71/L.16/Rev.1, A/C.3/73/L.20/Rev.1), “Prevention and control of non-communicable diseases” (A/64/L.52), “Consolidating gains and accelerating efforts to control and eliminate malaria in developing countries, particularly in Africa, by 2030” (A/70/L.62, A/71/L.89, A/72/L.68, A/73/L.109, A/74/L.91).

¹² See, for example, “Assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in Africa” (A/C.3/65/L.56).

¹³ See, for example, drafts on the “New Partnership for Africa's Development” (A/58/L.17/Rev.1, A/59/L.33/Rev.1, A/60/L.16/Rev.1, A/62/L.10/Rev.1, A/63/L.60/Rev.1, A/64/L.38/Rev.1, A/65/L.69/Rev.1, A/66/L.40/Rev.1, A/67/L.57/Rev.1, A/68/L.41/Rev.1, A/69/L.64/Rev.1, A/70/L.48/Rev.1, A/71/L.70/Rev.1, A/72/L.57/Rev.1, A/72/L.71, A/73/L.96/Rev.1, A/73/L.112).

¹⁴ See, for example, “Permanent memorial to and remembrance of the victims of slavery and the transatlantic slave trade” (A/62/L.32, A/63/L.5, A/64/L.10, A/65/L.36, A/66/L.25, A/67/L.41, A/68/L.7, A/69/L.19, A/70/L.5, A/73/L.119).

Conclusion

The New Strategic Vision of the CPLP for 2016 to 2026, adopted by the XI Heads of State and Government Summit in Brasília, November 2016, aimed to revamp the organization's activities and stake out new a working agenda. In this context, two axes of action in particular were brought up: (1) "Broadening the participation of actors, calling for the cooperation of other relevant partners to achieve the programmatic objectives"; and (2) "Diversification of Partnerships and identification of additional sources of financing, promoting joint work with other actors and seeking to increase the resources available for CPLP cooperation"¹⁵. The organization's global aspirations for the coming years would therefore appear to remain contingent on a set of practical requirements, indicating where the main priority will likely continue to fall.

This chapter focused on exploring the evolution of this type of relations as well as the practical result through which they translate themselves, in multilateral terms. As expected, the manifestation of a Lusophone front in UNGA inner dynamics has proven difficult to emerge over the years. On one hand, Portugal stands out as more closely aligned with its European partners than with the rest of CPLP. On the other hand, whenever joint sponsorship is recorded by all CPLP members, more often than not, it represents a side effect of what was agreed upon within other larger UNGA groupings, where each country is more involved or has a more direct stake. However, the unexpected popularity of drafts on cooperation between the UN and the CPLP also merits further analysis as it indicates that political-diplomatic cooperation in the Lusophone space might actually entice considerable interest across the board of the remaining international community. But for the time being, UNGA inner dynamics demonstrate that the CPLP has not necessarily succeeded in promoting greater joint projection between Portugal and African Lusophone countries, therefore leaving ample room to improve the translating of political consultations in the context of the CPLP into the world at large.

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¹⁵ CPLP Strategic Cooperation Document 2020 – 2026, 16 July 2019, available at: <https://www.cplp.org/id-4176.aspx>

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Indexing terms

Africa
Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries
Intergovernmental organizations
Lusophone world
Multilateralism
Political cooperation
Portugal
Post-colonial relations
Sponsorship
United Nations
United Nations General Assembly