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## Basic income-inspired policies in Europe.

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Factors that lead to the emergence of a policy innovation in the social policy context: lessons from two case studies in Europe.

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PhD thesis in Public Policies, specialization in Comparative Politics

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Department of political science and public policy

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in public policy.  
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### **Abstract**

When looking at the sociological context of European cities, they present some problems that the States have difficulty tackling, for example, housing emergency, cost of living, or precariousness of jobs. In this scenario, cities emerge as potential institutional actors in developing public policy. In this context, some municipalities innovated by implementing a policy innovation (PI) in the social policy context. This policy entails some features of the basic income (UBI), like unconditional and unlimited. A more developed minimum income scheme. In this process (of innovating), the ability of the policy entrepreneurs involved, to explore and experiment, is a highly referred issue by the literature, along with other factors which can explain the emergence of policy innovations: a) the role of epistemic communities; b) the progressive alliance of the left; c) the participation of cities in transitional municipal networks; d) the evolution of the political agenda of the EU. By tracing the process of the PI (with qualitative methods from semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and documental analysis) in a two-case selection in Europe – Barcelona and Dutch municipalities (two different municipal contexts with a similar PI), we were able to find what factors lead to policy innovation in the social policy context: a) Historical and strong participation in the European networks of municipalism; b) Radical change in the government structure, presenting a great match between municipalism and European union in local policymaking. Moreover, by applying a two-theoretical approach (MSF and ACF) to a multilevel reinforcing dynamics context of three levels (local, national and EU-level), the study also shows the agency role of public officials in opening policy windows on other levels of governance and also the role of science and expertise in advocacy coalition activities, playing a role as strategic policymakers.

**Keywords:** new municipalism, basic income-inspired policies, European Union, Multilevel reinforcing dynamics, advocacy coalition actors



## Resumo

Quando olhamos para o contexto sociológico das cidades europeias, estas apresentam determinados problemas que os Estados têm dificuldade em resolver, por exemplo, a emergência habitacional, o custo de vida ou a precariedade do emprego. Neste cenário, as cidades emergem como potenciais actores institucionais no desenvolvimento de políticas públicas. Foi neste contexto que alguns municípios inovaram ao implementar uma política inovadora (PI) no âmbito das políticas sociais. Esta política integra algumas características da ideia de rendimento básico (RBI), como o facto de ser incondicional e ilimitada. Um esquema de rendimento mínimo mais desenvolvido. Neste processo (de inovação), a capacidade dos empreendedores políticos envolvidos, para explorar e experimentar, é uma questão altamente referida pela literatura, juntamente com outros factores que podem explicar a emergência de inovações políticas: a) o papel das comunidades epistémicas; b) as alianças progressistas de esquerda; c) a participação das cidades em redes municipais transnacionais; d) a evolução da agenda política da UE. Ao fazer o *process-tracing* da política (com recurso a métodos qualitativos de entrevistas semi-estruturadas, grupos focais e análise documental) numa seleção de dois casos na Europa - Barcelona e municípios holandeses (dois contextos municipais diferentes com uma IP semelhante), conseguimos descobrir quais os factores que levam à inovação política no contexto da política social: a) Participação histórica e forte nas redes europeias de municipalismo; b) Mudança radical na estrutura governamental, apresentando um forte *match* entre o municipalismo e a União Europeia na elaboração de políticas locais. Além disso, ao aplicar uma abordagem de duas teorias (MSF e ACF) a um contexto de dinâmica de reforço multinível de três níveis (local, nacional e europeu), o estudo mostra, também, o papel de agência dos vereadores na abertura de janelas políticas noutros níveis de governação e, também, o papel da ciência nas actividades das coligações de advocacia, desempenhando um papel de decisores políticos estratégicos.

**Palavras-chave:** novo municipalismo, políticas inspiradas no rendimento básico, União Europeia, dinâmicas de reforço a vários níveis, coligações de advocacia





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## Acronyms

PI – Policy innovation

UBI – Universal basic income

UMI – Unconditional minimum income

BIIP – Basic income-inspired policies

PvdA – *Partij van de Arbeid* (social-democrats/labour party)

GL – *Groenlinks* (Green Left)

D66 – *Democrats 66* (social liberals)

SP – *Socialistische Partij* (socialista party)

VVD – *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (Liberal party)

CU – *ChristenUnie* (Christian union)

CDA – *Christen-Democratisch Appèl* (christian democrats)

Bcomú – *Barcelona en Comú* (Leftist alliance)

PSC – *Partits dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (Socialists)

ERC – *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (Republican left)

RGC – *Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía*

RMI – *Renta municipal d'inclusió*

ACF – Advocacy coalition framework

MSF – Multiple streams framework



## Part I

### Chapter One

#### Introduction

2017 was a relevant year for basic income-inspired policies (BIIP). In that year, the debate on basic income was vivid. Some parties have set this issue onto their agendas, international organizations, such as ILO and OCDE, were discussing the idea (OCDE, 2017, Ortiz et al., 2018). It was in this scenario, of the basic income as an idea that is “out there”, that many cities and regions implemented a policy innovation of basic income-inspired policies (BIIP). Although is not a basic income (UBI<sup>1</sup>) *per se*, it represented an innovation in the social assistance policies (e.g., in the minimum income schemes of the respective countries).

As an innovation, it caught the attention of the media and civil society, but as an experimental policy, it did not receive the attention it deserved from academia, as a possible case study. There are questions regarding this policy innovation that, to our knowledge, are relevant to public policy studies and were not analysed yet. Questions such as a) What factors explain this particular policy innovation to emerge at the local level? b) Why do some municipalities manage to implement such PI and others do not? c) What kind of dynamics between the actors in the process can we witness? d) What kind of dynamics between the different levels of governance emerge in this process? e) How do these dynamics explain the emergence of the policy innovation?

This is not a thesis on the moral justifications of basic income nor a study on the basic income experiments in least-developed countries (as there are some examples). This thesis discusses the policy innovation in the context of a social policy, the basic income-inspired policy (BIIP) experimentation, in the European context by analysing a policy innovation in two case studies – Barcelona and Dutch municipalities. We propose to look at the multilevel dynamics produced in different layers of governance (subnational/local level, national level, EU-level and international level) and the dynamics between the different actors in the policy-making process (e.g., policy entrepreneurs, alderman, mayors).

Barcelona and the Dutch municipalities provide especially interesting cases. Barcelona has a “long tradition of progressive social policies and citizen participation” (Blanco, 2014, Blanco, et al, 2020: 34) and the Dutch municipalities have a long tradition and discussion about policies

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<sup>1</sup> The idea of Universal basic income (UBI) is conceptualized as “an unconditional cash benefit to all on an individual basis, without means-test or work requirement” (Groot and Veen, 2000: 1 and Van Parijs e Vanderborght, 2017).

of inclusion and solidarity (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014), having one of the eldest and highest minimum income schemes in Europe (Wang e Vliet (2016: 337) and Crepaldi et al. (2017: 73), together with Denmark, and the debate around the basic income idea goes back to the eighty's decade (Vanderborght, 2004). They are both cities where a policy like this is not so strange to emerge and they implemented an innovative policy that represents a change in their well-developed and established welfare state. Even less strange is for the Dutch municipalities to innovate in this matter, if we take into consideration that they had a reform of the social assistance law which enabled them to innovate (Art 83<sup>o</sup>/PA act law, 2015). Having, what seems, a correct institutional framework for the emergence of this PI, it is natural to think they would be able to innovate in this domain. Nevertheless, Barcelona has gone further in the innovation process ("degree of innovativeness"), implementing a more well-developed social assistance policy. This is puzzling because it makes us curious to understand what led to the emergence of this PI at the local level. What kind of features do municipalities have that enable to innovate in this domain and implement such a policy?

There are particular problems that affect cities, like housing, the high cost of living (particularly in big cities), and the increase in job precariousness. In this context, cities appear with autonomy to design policy innovations in the social policy context. There are features of the basic income that can be relevant to help people in their relation to these issues. The illimitation and unconditionality are two features that are both related to the concept of 'decommodification of labour'. The first embodies the idea that the income does not suffer changes, it is the same despite whether the person receives an income from a job or not. They can accumulate. Considering the thesis of Luís Capucha, when he mentions the 'transitory families' (mainly, constituted by recently unemployed young people), we see that transitory regimes (into a sustainable trajectory) are very difficult for the beneficiaries of the minimum income schemes. Mainly because it is a situation that is very dependent on acquiring new skills and qualifications, having family support (e.g., money) or even changes in the labour market. It is not surprising that "work-welfare cycling" is very common in this kind of situation (McGregor and McTier, 2018: 22-23). The illimitation in social benefits gives the possibility for the beneficiary to retain the amount from the benefit alongside the income from a possible job. Therefore, this feature could be of great influence in sustainable transitions and the 'transitory regimes. The second embodies the idea of non-activation, meaning, the beneficiary does not have to look for work or enter training programs. The conditionality is a concept very present in the social assistance programs (e.g., minimum income schemes) in their workfare philosophy towards the citizen which states that in order to receive a benefit from the state, you have to do something in return. The workfare approach underpins this philosophy on a more intense compulsion for activation. In other words, there is no such thing as free money. Among those conditions is the frequency of job searches, training programs that the



beneficiaries have to comply with, to receive the benefit. Authors who are in favour of the Active-State say that limitation is a way to encourage the beneficiary-citizen to look for work. They centre their arguments on two basic notions – high rates of employability and individual responsibility (Pestieau, 2006: 47) of reacting to the dependency culture and encouraging work (Geldorf, 1999). Some authors, like Atkinson who argue in favour of a ‘participation income’, say that conditionality is a kind of incentive that prevents situations of exclusion among unemployed workers through the performance of socially useful tasks, promoting social insertion, that is, an “active participation” (this is why they defend a participation income rather than a basic income). On the other hand, those who defend unconditionality tend to base their argument on the non-domination theory and state paternalism. Having the state control the citizens and saying what the beneficiaries should do with the money they receive from the state is not a matter of helping the citizens but disciplining them. Take, for example, the argument presented by McNally (2011) about the labour market, it serves to discipline workers. Since most of the workers do not have sufficient means to live without depending on labour, they have to conform to the dictatorship of those who own the means of production or subject themselves to a life of unemployment and poverty. Despite the Marxist language in this argument, this thesis relates to Van Parijs's (1995) argument that truly free citizens are those who are not subjugated to the domination of capitalism.

The PI in the two-case selection is innovative as they present innovative features such as unconditionality and illimitation (inspired by the basic income) in their social assistance policies. Policy innovation can be understood as a "program or policy which is new to [the state] adopting it" (Walker 1969: 881). More recently, Jordan and Huitema defined policy innovation as “the process and/or product of seeking to develop new and/or widely adopted, and /or impactful policies, when existing ones are perceived to be under-performing (Jordan and Huitema, 2014b). In this sense, innovation is understood as something new to the status quo, when the existing policies are perceived as under-performing. This process (of innovating) is dependent on the ability of the actors involved, to explore and experiment. Therefore, the work of policy entrepreneurs, in this matter, is very relevant (Kingdon, 1995, Guldbbrandsson and Fossum, 2009, Westley et al., 2013, Jordan and Huitema, 2014, Audrestsch et al, 2021). They can be defined as “the coupling activities of like-minded individuals with *different skills, knowledge and positions* that take place simultaneously or at different stages in the policy process” (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg, and Huß, 2016: 250). A theoretical model that emerges regarding the work of these actors in influencing policy change is the Multiple streams framework (MSF). Many authors have used it in different situations – privatizations in Britain and France (Zahariadis and Allen, 1995), and child health promotion policies (Guldbbrandsson and Fossum, 2009). Another relevant type of actors in influencing policy change are the epistemic communities. These particular actors are not only relevant in designing the policy,

like it happened with the policy innovations in the sixties and seventies in USA and Canada, but also in calling attention to policymakers for a particular problem (Nelkin, 1979, Haas, 1992). Due to the experimental and innovative character of these initiatives, epistemic communities play an important role as they are often linked to policy design and evaluation (Mukherjee and Howlett, 2015, Ettelt et al., 2015). In that sense, the role of epistemic communities can be determinant to lend agency to the problem stream (Mukherjee and Howlett, 2015) by creating knowledge about a policy and informing policymakers.

There was also evidence of "progressive alliances" between moderate left and radical left parties and neighbourhood associations, trade unions and other civil society organisations (Fernandes et. al, 2017: 36) regarding the implementation of innovative policies at the local level. In these cases, after processes of social revolution. In France, in the central government, it was the left-wing coalitions that appropriated the ideas of autonomy and self-management of May '68. In Portugal, in the local government, it was also coalitions similar to the French, from the ideological point of view, with MDP/CDE from Marxist-Leninists to social democrats and progressive Catholics. Some authors argue that ideas such as this are more popular among leftist parties (Lee, 2018, Parolin and Siöland, 2020 and Vlandas, 2020) so it is not difficult to imagine this policy coming from that spectrum of political ideology. Particularly if we think that 'municipalism' argues in favour of universalizing the basic needs of social reproduction (e.g., housing, food, water, energy), allowing them to explore social innovations like the basic income (Blanco et al., 2018). Municipalism, as an ideology, is about the "democratic autonomy of municipalities" (Thompson, 2021: 317), it entails a "fundamental reorganization of our territories, exploring what forms of social power, institutions and processes" (Russel, 2020) can explain some initiatives at the local level. It is much linked to the ideology of the left of libertarian socialism and libertarian municipalism (Bookchin, 1991, Sepczynska, 2016 and Biehl, 2019) which supports decentralized confederations of municipalities, as opposed to statism and belief in direct democracy. This theory has been having particular relevance in the explanation of urban policies (Angel, 2020), mainly, due to municipalistic candidacies of new political organizations (Angel, 2020, Blanco, et al, 2020) and the win of elections, an important power resource in the "left power resources theory" (Korpi, 1983). Although this evidence appears in municipalities, which put emphasis on the word 'municipalism', the relevance of the concept is related to the ideology of left-wing movements with agendas for change and progressive alliances of left parties in power. The debate around municipalism developed in the wake of the crisis of 2008 and the austerity measures that followed. Against these measures, emerged new social movements (Indignados and M15) and political parties of the left spectrum (PODEMOS). Parties with municipalistic agendas often promote the concept of "right to the city" with the idea of winning back the institutions lost to the neoliberalistic paradigm (Russel, 2020). In the following of the events of the 2008 crisis

and the austerity measures, there was a need for governments to control the budget which led to a reduction in the social expenditure which, as a consequence, resulted in a gap between the necessity of the population and the services provided. In line with the philosophy of the neoliberalism ideology of government action, the goal was to cut and downsize, as “fiscal purging is therefore a recurrent condition under neoliberal governance” (cited by Peck, 2012: 630). As a result, emerged several social innovations (Blanco et al, 2018 and Rajasekhar, 2020) to address the gap left by the welfare states. Municipalities with left-wing municipalistic agendas often want to implement “novel solutions to social needs and problems” (Phills, et al, 2008: 37-38).

We cannot neglect external factors like the participation of cities in transatlantic municipal networks (TMN). “International municipalism” provides “means through which members (municipalities) can contact each other to bid jointly for (usually EU) project funding” (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009: 321) or the evolution of the political agenda of the EU for innovation and urban sustainable development (Parés et al, 2017, article 8 ERDF). International agencies, like the European Union and the European Commission, have been dedicating special attention to this issue by funding innovative projects in the social domain (Rajasekhar, 2020). If we look at European policy instruments following the European pillar of social rights, we can see that there is not much going on in terms of social protection at the European level, at least as it is happening with other dimensions such as equal opportunities and access to the labour market or fair working conditions for participation in labour market, where there is a lot of hard law involved in promoting these dimensions. However, in the social domain, there are a few initiatives by the EU, in terms of developing new social programs that local governments can use.

Given the relevance of the different levels of governance in local policymaking, we propose to look at the context of multilevel reinforcing dynamics (MRD). Multilevel reinforcing dynamics (MRD) aim to explain more accurately the interdependencies between levels of governance: subnational, national, European and international levels. Actors at different levels seize opportunities to open policy windows on one level (Reitig, 2020). MRD can occur in the following circumstances: 1) interdependencies between levels of governance; 2) regular communication and exchange of information between actors at all levels of governance, meaning, that policy entrepreneurs must be aware of opportunities to utilize the problem and policy streams of other governance levels; 3) recognition that problems linked to one or more levels of governance require policy solutions from a different level; 4) sufficient ambiguity exists to allow policy entrepreneurs to seize opportunities to pool flows between levels and utilise open policy windows, regardless of the level at which they currently occur.

These multilevel reinforcing dynamics can be viewed within public policy theories that regard the role of political actors in explaining policy change. The Multiple streams (Kingdon, 1984,

1995), focus on the way policy entrepreneurs negotiate and couple streams on another level. These activities are in favour of seizing an opportunity to open policy windows. In Kingdon's theory, the multiple political flows converge to produce political change. Once you realise that a solution has to be found, you start to design possible alternatives. This is where the ideology of the party comes into play, as does the social and political context. The Advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) helps understand possible formation of coalitions in a specific policy subsystem and it can show us how advocacy actors can mobilize resources and deal with constraints that can influence their political strategies on different levels. In this field, a recent contribution was made by Reitig (2021) which acknowledged the importance of MSF in the context of Multilevel reinforcing dynamics. However, it remains to be seen the importance of other theories, such as the Advocacy coalitions framework (ACF) in the context of multi-level dynamics. We believe that it could break ground in the literature and give a valid contribution to the debate of local policymaking.

In this study, we will process-trace the policy innovation in the two cases with qualitative methods and analyse the data with a data analysis software for qualitative data (MAXQDA).

The thesis is organized as it follows. The second chapter will focus on the literature review, discussing the relevant theories in this field of study. The third chapter proposes the theoretical framework based on our literature review. Chapter four will present, in more detail, our research methods. The fifth and sixth chapters will analyse the two case studies. In the final chapter, the seventh, we compare the two cases based on the propositions of our work.

## Chapter two

### 2. Literature Review

#### 2.1. Understanding the policy: making the case for a basic income-inspired policy.

The idea of basic income is not new. This idea emerged in the intellectual world of Thomas Moore (1516), Thomas Paine (1796) and Juan Vives (1517). From the notion that "no citizen should be starved" (Moore, 1995 [1516]: 44), we witness today, in the literature, an argument more linked to poverty reduction and a response to labour precariousness (Standing, 2011, Bidadanure, 2013, Birnbaum, 2017). From the theoretical perspective to the practical world, there were several policy experiments, and innovations of basic income-inspired policies (BIIP), throughout the years and around the world. In the sixty's decade, there was an implementation of a negative income<sup>2</sup> in rural areas of Iowa and North Carolina, Gary and Seattle-Denver (Moynihan, 1981, Widerquist, 2018 and Merrill et al, 2019) and New Jersey, between 1968 and 1978. At the time, it was the political leadership of the newly elected president with a Democratic majority in the US Congress, which allowed this negative income tax programme to emerge. The Democratic Party of Lyndon Johnson implemented a set of social policies such as the "Fight Against Poverty" programme (1964) and the "Urban and Housing Development Plan" (1968). He created the Office of Social Opportunities, which commissioned sociologist Daniel Moynihan to carry out a survey on the living conditions of black people in America (The Negro Family, 1965). It concluded that the lack of employment and income hit single-parent families the hardest (Kelly and Singer, 1971, Bawden and Harrar, 1977). One of the problems evidenced in the study of Moynihan was that:

*"Black men could not earn enough to provide for their families (household), so they left the household so that women and children could access social support"* (Moynihan, 1973: 36)

After the negative income, the UBI had almost an interregnum of new experiments or structural policies (e.g., Alaska) between 1980 and the end of the 20th century (two experimental policies are counted, Alaska and USA (Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Casino


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<sup>2</sup> Negative Income tax is an extension of an existing progressive income tax system in the states - those earning more pay higher rates on their income. Negative taxation continues this trend in the opposite direction - those below some kind of poverty line pay increasingly negative tax rates on their income. It is up to the state to compensate the incomes of some with tax exemptions and social subsidies to others (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017: 32). Rebecca Maynard in her study on rural Iowa, explains that the negative tax is the complement of the guaranteed annual income (GAI) and the income tax rate (t). If total household earnings and other income are below the critical level determined by G and t, the household receives an income subsidy (Maynard, 1977: 371).

Revenue Fund). Between 1975 to 1978, there was another BIIP but this time in another country, Canada, in the Manitoba province, in the cities of Dauphin and Winnipeg. A policy that was set onto the agenda by the New Democracy Party (NDP) gave rise to innovative social programmes in the fight against poverty (Simpson et al, 2017). Until the new century, there were two experimental BIIP, in Alaska and the USA (Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Casino Revenue Fund). But, in 2017, there was a “boom” in these kind of policies around the world. Utrecht, Groningen, Nijmegen, Tilburg and Wageningen (in the Netherlands), Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain), Hamilton, Brantford, ThunderBay and Lindsay (Ontario, Canada), Marica (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) and Finland implemented a basic income-inspired policy, each with a different configuration of the policy and in the scale of implementation.

Basic income in Europe

Graphic 2. 1 - Policy adoption of UBI schemes from 1968 to 2017



Source: adapted from Rogers (1983), based on Stanford, Basic income lab website (2020)

The fact that there is an economic sufficiency test between total household earnings and what is defined as the poverty line (means-tested system) can give rise to perverse situations of the system itself and the way it is designed. This is because "people with no income who live with a partner or parents with an adequate income are not entitled to the benefit" (Blommesteijn and Mallee, 2009: 5). This situation is one of the arguments used by UBI advocates around the 'individuality' of the idea. The concept previously argued by other authors refers to basic income as "an unconditional cash benefit to all on an individual basis, without means-test or work requirement" (Groot and Veen, 2000: 1 and Van Parijs e Vanderborght, 2017). The fact that UBI is "individually allocated" is intended not to encourage people to live together and not to subjugate one spouse to the income of the other, because as Van Parijs and Vanderborght argue "cohabitation should be encouraged, not penalised" (2017: 16). A structural element of the idea of UBI that can be seen in the welfare literature as a 'decommodification of family', meaning, an autonomization of the family household in which welfare policies are calculated. This structural element is also present in the feminist thesis of Ingrid Robeyns when the author states that a basic income would make "woman without earnings might experience an improvement of their intra-household bargaining position" (Robeyns, 2001: 102). The same logic applies to the elements of unconditionality and illimitation – 'de-commodification of the labour market'. The idea of basic income argues in favour of the same amount for everybody, despite economic differences. The idea, as Van Parijs puts it, argues that for us to be free in a capitalist society we must all start from an egalitarian point, which would be to have an equal income for all (Van Parijs, 1995). Since people are dependent on having an income to live on, this puts pressure on the workers' (supply) side to accept a job. Whoever has more human capital will, initially, have more possibility to negotiate their reservation wage<sup>3</sup>, but will always be dependent on their income from work if they have no other income than the one from their work. That is, for some, the main characteristic of the basic income. Without a link to the labour market (no work requirements) the 'decommodification of work' will give people autonomy to say 'No' to 'bad jobs'<sup>4</sup> they don't want and "choose the life that each one wants to have" (Van Parijs, 1995: 43). In an argument based on the republican theory of non-domination, McNally (2011) argues that the labour market serves to discipline workers and since workers do not have sufficient means to live without depending on labour, they have to conform to the dictatorship of those who own the means of production or subject themselves to a life of unemployment and poverty. A thesis that relates to Van Parijs's (1995) argument that truly free citizens are those who are not

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<sup>3</sup> Reservation wage can be understood as the minimum wage for which we are willing to accept a job (Barbanchon et al, 2017). Thus, with a UBI, the reservation wage could increase (depending on the value of the UBI).

<sup>4</sup> 'Bad Job' is a concept developed by Kalleberg which associated with low-paying jobs, unsecured bonds and few or no social perks (e.g., American health insurance).



subjugated to the domination of capitalism. In this sense, basic income's idea argues in favour of a fixed amount – 'flat-rate' – paid monthly and in cash, without a time limit – unlimited – with the amount remaining unchanged over time and individual.

There are two features, which even for the theorists of the basic income are not consensual, that it should not end after the working age (it is supposed to be for life), and the amount should be sufficient for a dignified life. As to the first point, some argue that it should be paid at birth and others argue that it should be paid when the person reaches majority (Bidanure, 2013: 558) as to the second, authors like Van Parijs argued that the amount should be enough to "choose the life that each one wants to have" (Van Parijs, 1995: 43). The "real freedom" is how Van Parijs puts it (1995: 33). But in a more recent book, he and Vanderborght theorized this amount on a more practical way and said that the basic income should be paid at the level of 25% of the GDP of the country where it was implemented (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017: 11). Another argument is in favour of a sustainable environment (Pinto, 2018). The author argues, in his PhD thesis, that a basic income would reduce the impact that a consumption society has. On the assumption that people would reduce their working hours, they would go to a more autonomous sphere of work, non-paid work like volunteer work or care work, which does not have such an ecological impact (Pinto, 2018: 12).

But the relevant feature in this policy is the *unconditionality*. Minimum income schemes are known to have a great deal of conditionality – demands on the part of the State (work as a counterpart for the provision of assistance to the citizen). The conditionality became a characteristic of the minimum income schemes in Europe, particularly, with the workfare approach that governments have implemented. Workfare appears in the US and UK with Ronald Reagan's (1981-1989) And Margaret Thatcher's (1979-1990) governments. The introduction of the concept of "workfare" in economics is an example of a new philosophy towards the citizen which is based on an intense compulsion for activation. Is it fair for a person to receive from the State without compensation? The negative response to this question marks the way minimum income schemes are designed, with a workfare component. In other words, there is no such thing as "free money". Among those conditions is the frequency of job searches, training programs that the beneficiaries have to comply with, in order to receive the benefit. Conditionality before activation refers to a discussion around the state paternalism of treating the beneficiary-citizen with distrust (in their willingness to work) and the limitation of the benefits is a way to encourage the beneficiary-citizen to look for work (e.g., applying a logic of reducing the generosity of the benefit if there are new incomes in the household). These logics shape the argument of the advocates of the Active-State who centre their arguments on two basic notions – high rates of employability and individual responsibility (Pestieau, 2006: 47).

The defence of activation is based on an efficient way of reacting to the dependency culture and encouraging work (Geldorf, 1999). Following some of the teachings of Bourdieu (2010 [1979]), social habits are explained by the coincidence between the social structure and the social practices, so it is necessary to create a kind of incentive to prevent situations of exclusion among unemployed workers through the performance of socially useful tasks that, ultimately instance, they promote social insertion, that is, an “active participation” (Roche, 1992, Atkinson, 1996). However, two dimensions of the activation process must be taken into account. First, in the face of reduced generosity benefits, they can be seen as a disincentive because it is less rational and advantageous for the beneficiary to get paid work (Gilbert, 1992). Second, activation appears as an intrusive factor, often manifesting itself as an interference in the citizen-beneficiary's personal life by social workers who place the person under stigmatizing scrutiny (Hespanha e Matos, 2000). In the view of Charles Murray, an advocate of the UBI in a ‘right-wing’ perspective, unconditionality can also be advocated by the right as it “offers smaller government in terms of the state’s power to control people’s lives” (Murray, 2008: 1) as the state can no longer have civil servants to do a verifying job of the beneficiaries, but also, the means-test procedure “is associated with higher levels of (public) spending” (Calnitsky, 2016: 33).

Minimum income schemes often leave out people who are not only ineligible, because they have household incomes slightly above the allocation limit, but also, "because they are unaware of how it works, because they are reluctant to accept what may be perceived as charity and because they are obliged to a number of steps" (Pestieau, 2006: 41-42). It is the "stigma of subsistence testing" (Titmuss, 1968: 45). Social assistance system is “marked by deep social stigmatization” (Calnitsky, 2016: 65). No wonder that the same Richard Titmuss argued that the welfare state (which he has supported vigorously) needed social innovation (Hulgård and Ferreira, 2019). It is understood that UBI, by not having a means-tested nor activation obligation, could eliminate the stigmatisation around social assistance policies and, also, the “boundaries between the deserving and the undeserving poor” Calnitsky, 2016: 65). This is where they stand, those who defend the basic income. In theory, in social assistance, ‘everyone can apply’ because is a non-contributory scheme. Contributory policies, as opposed to non-contributory minimum income schemes, are financed through contributions from employers and workers (Hecló, 1974). For instance, if a person leaves a job and decides he wants to change, he will be left out of unemployment allowance because he had the initiative (not the employer), but he can request social assistance because there are no contributory requirements for how the person became unemployed (contrary to the unemployment allowance). However, it has certain conditions associated. Some authors argue that is, precisely, in this activation process that the stigmatization is more intense, not so much on the targeting (to the poor) (Calnitsky, 2016). In the targeting, a person has to show their

possessions (for the means-test) and to go through a process of requiring the benefit, which usually takes a while, maybe months, during which the person will be left without an income. This does not happen with the basic income because when a person decided to change jobs, he is already receiving the benefit. In addition to this, in most of countries, social assistance benefits are designed, with very low amounts (Figari, Matsaganis and Sutherland, 2013), because the true nature of them is to combat extreme poverty, not poverty. The characteristics of unconditionality and non-limitation allow, on the one hand, a "libertarian resource" (Birnbaum, 2017) by giving choice to the citizen-beneficiary to choose suitable work for an unlimited time and, on the other hand, it allows the citizen-beneficiary not to fall into a poverty trap (Bosco and Chassard, 1999, Heikkilä, 1999), as the amount of the benefit is not automatically reduced or terminated when the citizen-beneficiary has new income, but also does not act as a disincentive. The idea of the incentive versus disincentive in social policy philosophy is that, when faced with the benefits of reduced generosity, it is less rational and advantageous for the beneficiary to obtain paid work (Gilbert, 1992 and Hvinden, 1999). If so, we may be faced with a trade-off between not having a more immediate participation in the labour market, but promoting a better job match between the individual and the job he or she chooses (Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999: 269). The requirements are necessary to prove economic insufficiency and they are not very restrictive, but the amount given is very low which is why only the extremely poor require this kind of amount. Moreover, if the person has the benefit and they start to work for the minimum wage, in many countries, they lose the right to keep the benefit. This is a great deal of importance since in the social assistance schemes people tend to enter a "poverty trap". Transitory regimes within the social assistance beneficiaries can "depend on the ability to acquire new skills and qualifications, possible changes in the labour market and social protection system, family support..." (Capucha, 2004: 266). If there was the possibility for the beneficiaries to accumulate the social assistance with, e.g., a minimum wage job, it could make a difference in the transitory regime of these citizens. Without that possibility, they, sometimes, feel helpless. When entering a job, in many schemes, they lose the benefit and, if they end up losing the job, they return to the same situation they were before. Some authors call this "work-welfare cycling" (McGregor and McTier, 2018: 22-23). The unlimited characteristic of the basic income provides the beneficiary with the possibility of accumulating the two "incomes" which will give the person more autonomy towards the labour market to make his own choices with relative freedom, "the power to say no" to "bad jobs" or the concept of 'Real freedom' of Van Parijs (1995).

In an article from 2004, Barbara Bergman makes an interesting case about what the basic income would mean for a person living in two distinct welfare states.

*“Unless a well-developed welfare state were established first, those people who currently lack these kinds of merit goods, the many of today in the United States, would remain without them despite their Basic Income grants. While under such schemes, lower income citizens who took jobs would be more affluent than they are now, many would (as they do now) fail to buy health insurance, suffer with poor-quality public schools, send their children to low-quality care, fail to get the mental health treatment they need, live in slummy dwelling units, and so on”.* (Bergmann, 2004: 112)

Barbara Bergman once said that, even in the Western world of welfare states, there are significant differences in what freedom (provided by the basic income) could mean. The comparison between Sweden, a well-developed welfare state, with the United States, which does not even have a national health service, is a very well-taken comparison. People in the USA, without health insurance, could easily take the basic income to provide themselves for the lack of that basic service, whereas, in Sweden, people would not have to worry about that and, therefore, would have “more freedom”. Tim Vlandas explored the levels of acceptance of the idea of UBI, in different countries, and found that the most accepting of this idea were those countries with less developed welfare states and more labour-market-activated benefits (Vlandas, 2019).

As we stated in the beginning, this is not a thesis on the moral justifications of basic income nor a study on the basic income experiments in least-developed countries where the welfare state is not as developed as in the Western world. Rather a thesis that discusses a policy innovation in the context of a social policy – the “basic income-inspired policy” (BIIP).

The goal of this research is two-fold. First, to understand what factors make it possible for this policy to emerge, at the local level. Under which conditions does the policy emerge and which are relevant? Secondly, what makes some municipalities innovate more than others? How do some cities take better advantage of conditions for innovation than others?

The next section will discuss the literature review around the conditions for the emergence of policy innovation: external – international diffusion and internal determinants – states, regions, and municipalities conditions (e.g., decentralization of powers).

## Basic income in Europe

*Basic income-inspired policies compared: Barcelona municipality went further in the “degree of innovativeness”.*

Although they are inspired by the idea of basic income idea, these policy innovations do not capture the essence of the idea as they all have conditions linked to them. To start, their selection process is not unconditional but linked to the economic situation of the person/household (meaning, they all have a means-tested procedure). Finland was the only country that implemented this policy experiment on a national level but was limited to some cities in the country. In Canada, the Ontario Basic Income Pilot (OBIP) was approved in the region of Ontario but also, limited to some cities – Hamilton, Brantford, ThunderBay and Lindsay. In the other cases, the initiative and implementation were at the local level.

In Finland (*Perustulotutkimus*), people have to be unemployed in order to benefit from it. In Marica only people below a certain level of monthly earnings can benefit from the policy, which is three times the minimum wage in Brazil (>3135R\$). In Ontario, Barcelona (*Renda Municipal d'inclusio*) and Dutch municipalities (*Weten Wat Werkt*) the limit is indexed to the minimum wage level. But there are two features that separate the cases of Marica (*Renda Básica de Cidadania*) and Finland from the others which are the “fixed amount” and the “individual basis”. These features put Marica and Finland on a more ‘basic income structure’ basis as the Ontario, Barcelona and Dutch municipalities are more of a ‘minimum income structural Basis’ (Table 28).

In all cases, there is a condition based on residency which entails that all beneficiaries have to be living in the municipality, region or country for no less than two years and also a condition based on age. Only people of working age (from 18 to 65, although this scale varies) can benefit from the policy. The experimental innovative policy, which we call basic income-inspired policies, in Barcelona and Dutch municipalities, have distinctive characteristics. The table above will provide the characteristics of the policy in the two case studies and shows how the policy is closer to the UBI idea, in each case. We will see that the policies are unconditional, in the sense that they do not oblige the beneficiary to activate in the labour market, but they differ in one feature. Barcelona has made their policy unlimited (during the time of benefit), meaning the beneficiary is not subject to a new means-tested procedure if he has a new source of income (e.g., by finding a job), which brings it closer to the idea of Universal basic income, when compared to the Dutch municipalities. Utrecht, Nijmegen and Wageningen maintained the means-tested procedure whenever there is a change in the beneficiary’s income, but the beneficiary can accumulate up to 199€ of the benefit if there is a change in his situation (e.g., finding a job).

Table 2. 1 - Variation in the intensity of innovative policies compared to the minimum income schemes of the respective country/region.

Variation in the intensity of innovative policies in Barcelona, Utrecht/Nijmegen/Wageningen											
Municipalities	Local and regional policies	Unconditionality	Fixed income	In cash	Unlimited	Monthly payment	Automatic renewal	Difference in generosity		Individual	Degree of innovativeness
								% Increase in relation to minimum policies	Minimum Wage		
Barcelona	<i>Renta garantizada de ciudadanía (2017-?)</i>	—	—	X	—	X	—	584,00€ per month	858€ (2017)	—	
	<i>Renda municipal d'inclusió (B-mincome, 2017)</i>	<b>X</b>	—	X	<b>X</b>	X (662,60€)	X	<b>13%</b> (584€*1,135=662,84€ per month)	77% of the MW in Spain	—	+++
Utrecht Nijmegen Wageningen	<i>Bijstand (1963-?)</i>	—	—	X	—	X	—	1,026€ per month	1551,60€ (2017)	—	
	<i>Weten Wat</i>	<b>X</b>	—	X	<b>The beneficiary</b>	X (1,026€)	—	<b>0,0%</b>	66% of the MW in	—	++

Basic income in Europe

	<i>Werkt</i> (2017)				<b>y can accumulat e up to 199€</b>					Netherlan ds		
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In this comparison, Barcelona has implemented a policy more pronounced in its variation than the Dutch municipalities, meaning, with a higher degree of innovativeness. In the amount (the generosity), Barcelona increased the level of the amount when compared to the minimum income scheme in Catalonia (*Rendimento mínimo de inserció*). The generosity of the amount rose to 56.3% and in the Dutch municipalities stayed the same as the existing minimum income scheme in the Netherlands (*Bijstand*). This represented a rise, in the benefit, of 62.5% when compared to the poverty threshold in Spain (Eurostat, 2022). A single household, without work, can benefit from 662,55€, which is 77% of the minimum wage in Spain (in 2017), which proves to be more balanced than the previous amount of the *Rendimento mínimo de inserció* (1990-2017).

Besides the generosity which we have seen has improved, there were two surprising characteristics in this policy. The illimitation and unconditionality. In the first characteristic, it is possible to accumulate the benefit received with income from work in an unlimited way, meaning, if a beneficiary finds work, he/she can accumulate the salary with the social benefit, unlimited. This does not happen in the minimum income schemes where the family household is obligated to inform the social services of any kind of alteration in their income and, therefore, subject to a new means-tested procedure. In the unconditionality, the beneficiary is no longer obligated to carry out active job search diligences, or vocational training, among others. This is a characteristic that the policy in Barcelona has. The amount remains unchanged for the time of the policy (unlimited), even if the beneficiary finds another source of income but in both cases, there are no work requirements. This kind of innovation allows people to have more time to look for the work they want and, when they do, they can accumulate two incomes, which can be a way to a more sustainable trajectory. This characteristic is also present in the case of Utrecht, Nijmegen or Wageningen. In these cases, the variation of intensity consists, mainly, of unconditionality but, also, of the possibility of accumulating work with benefits. Nevertheless, this is not possible in an unlimited way, like Barcelona, but rather limited to an amount of 199€. The value of the benefit remained the same when compared to the social assistance scheme (*Bijstand*) they have, which is one of the highest in Europe (Wang e Vliet (2016: 337) e Crepaldi et al. (2017: 73).

These characteristics bring this policy closer to minimum income schemes than to the idea of UBI. Although there are elements that make this policy innovative enough for some people to call it a UBI experiment, the fact is it is not universal. Universalist benefits have a much wider coverage as they do not imply admissibility control, which is inherent to means-tested benefits, hence they are group-oriented policies of the social protection system (Pierson, 1994; Capucha, 2004 and Pestieau, 2006: 41-42). The fact that it has a narrow coverage of the



universe of putative beneficiaries may explain why some social protection experts advocate universalist policies (such as the NHS where the eligibility criterion is citizenship status) over means-tested policies (whose eligibility is based on economic resources conditions). We consider unconditionality as the absence of obligation of activation and universality as the lack of means-tested procedure. The illimitation is the lack of means-tested procedures during the time of the benefit. The means-tested procedure is checking the level of income of the household. In both schemes, those who are below 60% of the median income of the country have access to the benefit. From this perspective, UBI is a redistributive policy<sup>5</sup> like minimum income, incorporating the current minimum income schemes, recalibrating the social protection system (Ferrara et al, 2000, Ferrara, 2005 and Hemerijck, 2013). The idea of recalibration of the welfare state presupposes a rebalancing of social protection functions according to social risks ('functional recalibration') and equitable distribution of protection along the social structure ('distributional recalibration') (Hemerijck, 2013: 105-110).

The last decades have been marked by a scenario of precariousness with transitory passages through unemployment. A reality that plagues, above all, the youngest, the new generations (Oliveira, 2016; Carmo and Matias, 2019). This reality does not end in the labour market and in the worker-employer relationship; it is also a reality that goes beyond this relationship, affecting other dimensions of life like social relationships and lifestyles (Alves et al, 2011). According to Alves et. al (2011), the imminent risk of being without work, without one of the sources of income, or an unforeseen socioeconomic event is something that is always present in the type of reflexivity produced by these individuals and that wears on their daily lives. The 2008 crisis revealed the weaknesses of the State in protecting these citizens in a consistent and sustainable way. A problem that is related to the way the social protection system is designed, in a duality (Silva, 2014). In the dichotomization of insiders-outsiders, the author David Rueda, argues that this dichotomization is due to the historical roots of the social-democrat parties. Traditional social democratic parties, historically linked to trade unions, tend to defend the interests of insiders by promoting their security in the labour market rather than trying to promote the protection of those who are unprotected (outsiders), even leading to the institutionalisation of labour market dualization (Thelen and Palier, 2010). It was thus the author's understanding that outsiders became more marginalised because the policies of social democratic parties were not open to this phenomenon. The emergence of parties of the "new left" gave a voice to outsiders and this led to a reconfiguration of national parliaments, as seen in Spain with the appearance of PODEMOS in the national parliament and the government of Madrid and *Barcelona en Comú* in the government of Barcelona.

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<sup>5</sup> Redistributive politics is characterised by actions that "aim to manipulate the allocation of wealth, property, personal or civil rights or other resources across social classes or racial groups" (Birkland, 2011: 213).


The UBI appears, in this framework, as a solution to many problems that modernity has brought, namely, the risks caused by flexibility and a possible future where long contributory careers will be possible only for a minority (Diamond and Sage, 2017), which puts the UBI in a plan of recalibration alternative to the theses proposed by Ferrara, Rhodes and Hemerijck (2000).

*Basic income: The diffusion of an idea*

International organizations like BIEN (Basic Income Earth Network) have been arguing in favour of the idea of basic income since 1986. BIEN was not only important in disseminating the idea at a transnational level but also contributed to a more rigorous definition of the concept of UBI – "an income granted unconditionally to all on an individual basis, without a means test or work requirements" (Groot and Veen, 2000: 1 and Van Parijs e Vanderborght, 2017). This organization was founded by scientists and experts in the fields of economics (Phillipe Defeyt), sociology (Paul-Marie Bolanger) and philosophy (Phillipe Van Parijs). But these organizations have dependencies in continents and in countries. UBIE, the Unconditional Basic Income Europe, connects 25 countries from Europe and, also, dependencies in most of the countries in the world advocating in favour of this idea. The Netherlands created its domestic network in 1991 – *Vereniging Basisinkomen* and Spain, in 2006, created *Red Renta Basica*. These advocacy networks organise conferences at the international level (in order to promote basic income), at the European level and the domestic level. They hold meetings and participate in the organisation of projects on UBI. BIEN, the mother organisation, 2014 organised conferences every four years. In 2014, they became biannual and in 2016 annual. This reveals the strong preponderance that UBI has been having around the world since 2014.


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Figure 2. 1 - Evolution of basic income advocacy networks'



Another indicator of this preponderance is the interest that emerged, in the google internet search engine, for the term "unconditional basic income<sup>6</sup>", as of November 2016. The internet has been an important mechanism in spreading the 'word' for UBI, among the population. Not only by the search for its meaning on the google search engine but also by the number of events promoted on social media to discuss the topic of UBI. The mass media are factors that contributed to the dissemination of the subject among the population. This factor can be observed by the number of newspapers that gave relevance to the theme in the articles they published, something that Loek Groot (2004) had already analysed, in his doctoral thesis in economics, in the Netherlands.

Figure 2. 2 - Unemployed and basic income articles



6

[https://trends.google.pt/trends/explore?cat=16&date=all\\_2008&gprop=news&q=universal%20basic%20income](https://trends.google.pt/trends/explore?cat=16&date=all_2008&gprop=news&q=universal%20basic%20income)

**Source:** Groot e Van der Veen (2000)

In 2004, Groot argued that if the economy would ever be in a situation of full employment, with all kinds of jobs available, then there would never be a demand for the implementation of a basic income because everyone who wanted to work could leave their job and find another 'in a second'. On the other hand, if there is a large scale of unemployment then it should raise a high demand for a basic income as all citizens would feel it is a necessity when there aren't any jobs available. The theory states that the popularity of basic income would go up whenever the economy bursts but when the economy is booming the support for the basic income would disappear very quickly. In this graphic above, Groot and Van der Veen (2000) stated that the number of articles and the number of unemployed in 1985 and 1995, the two "peaks" of unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s, coincided with the time when there were references to the UBI in newspaper articles.

The impact of mass media on the diffusion of ideas and social movements has been widely studied. In Andrews and Biggs' study of the spread of sit-in protests in the USA, the authors argue that "mobilisation at the local level depends on social networks, but the diffusion of protests between cities may depend on information transmitted by the media" (Andrews and Biggs, 2006: 772). The media, as an explanatory variable of the phenomenon under analysis, is present in other studies such as Myers (2000), which proves its relevance, although some authors refer to the surpassing of this factor by the media such as the internet and smartphones, in their diffusing capacity of protest waves (Chabot, 2010: 102). These media allow information to be shared on a global level, immediately and aggregate a wide range of people. Castells who argue for the thesis of the "network society" and the "knowledge society" (2009) refers to the importance that the internet and its use by citizens can constitute an important counterpower against the power of elites who are powerless in the face of the rapidity of dissemination of waves of protest and social movements (Castells, 2007: 258-259). Castells developed the concept of 'network society' to describe a society where social relations in the 'knowledge society' are based on 'networks' (Castells, 2009). A concept that will be developed in relation to the notion of "transnational actors". For the author, network communication is the new "dominant mode of organisation" of modern societies. The space that mass media and social networks have occupied in the diffusion of the idea of UBI, together with the social protest movements that emerged at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, have constituted a fertile ground for the production of power in the communicative space (Castells, 2007: 258-259). Diffusion, which occurs when a social group or an organisation develops an innovation from two dimensions: idea or behaviour (Givan et al, 2010: 4), has in the media an important channel for the dissemination of the idea in a given social space. Sidney Tarrow and Della Porta have argued that "diffusion is essentially relational", a social

process that "transmits repertoires and frameworks through interpersonal contacts, organisational relationships or networking" (Tarrow and Della Porta, 2005: 2) e.g., diffusion, to be considered, requires that the different advocacy networks – international, European, and domestic – have a link, are connected (Givan et al., 2010).

### 2.2. External conditions for diffusion: advocacy networks and transnational networks of municipalism (TMN)

The emergence of innovations is normally associated with external factors and internal factors.

The literature states that innovation and its diffusion are dependent on two dimensions, the external determinants, and the internal determinants (Walker, 1969, Berry and Berry, 2007). Berry and Berry, in their willingness to understand what causes a government to adopt a state lottery, found that neighbour states' proximity has a great influence, particularly, when the internal characteristics of the state are, particularly, favourable to innovation (Berry and Berry, 2007). Among those internal characteristics are the proximity of elections and fiscal health, which acknowledge the motivation for innovation of the actors. This study was particularly relevant to understand how the diffusion and the internal determinants should not be analysed in isolation. Everett Rogers, a sociologist, talked about the diffusion of innovations. The concept emphasized the strength of the "wave" of diffusion in its ability to diffuse through channels (direct or indirect) through the members of a social system (Rogers, 1983: 5), second, the internal determinants that countries have to adopt the changes proposed by the diffusion "wave" (Berry and Berry, 2007: 231), meaning, the political, economic and social factors that can lead states to innovate (Walker, 1969). For example, democracy, as a political regime, is designed as a political framework more likely to accept the diffusion of human rights, ideas of social justice and citizenship than non-democratic regimes (Givan et al., 2010). Countries that have the internal condition of being democracies are more likely to have social movements and networks that promote ideas of human rights and social justice. Therefore, it is natural that ideas such as these appear in countries like England, but they are not so natural to appear in Iran, for example.

When reform policies were disseminated in Latin America based on privatized pensions, they were only fully implemented when countries like Chile (from which the diffusion process in Latin America originated) returned to being a democratic country (Weyland, 2007: 19). Therefore, it is not enough for an innovation to have a great strength of diffusion by advocacy networks, but the internal determinants of the country have to be open to the diffusion. By this

logic, there are particular features of the countries, or in this case municipalities, that would allow that policy innovation to emerge.

The notion of *transnational networks* can be defined as a relation between “any collection of actors ( $n \geq 2$ ) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another” (Risse, 2001: 428). If we look to cities, it is common, nowadays, for them to join networks of municipalism to help them put onto the agenda some issues that are relevant for the cities (Bulkeley, 2004, Kern and Bulkeley, 2009) as the European Union and the European Commission have been dedicating special attention to this issue by funding innovative projects in the social domain (Rajasekhar, 2020). Keck and Sicking (1998: 2) argue that “activists in (transnational advocacy) networks try, not only, to influence the policy outcomes, but to transform the terms and nature of the debate”. These networks “seek to facilitate this process either by providing means through which members can contact each other to bid jointly for (usually EU) project funding, or by submitting bids themselves together with their constituent municipalities (Bulkeley, 2004: 23 and Kern and Bulkeley, 2009: 321). It has been argued and evidenced that these networks are “part of a wider process of Europeanization” (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009: 310). The Europeanisation process can be defined in two ways. On the one hand, the impacts that the development of European institutions and their policies have on the governance of states and, on the other hand, the convergence between different member states in the pursuit of EU guidelines (Moreno and Palier, 2005). Another definition of the concept is the one provided by Risse et al., who defined ‘Europeanization’ as the “emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among actors and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules “(2001: 3).

In the social domain, there have been various political instruments which have helped states to develop new social policies. The case of the European recommendation of 1992, 92/441/CEE. This recommendation marked the beginning of the Europeanization process of social policies, characterized by "soft law" instruments, meaning, the use of political-legal instruments which act as guidelines for the Member States, but without the obligation of transposing standards. When some of the member-states implemented the minimum income in their welfare states, like Spain or Portugal, this derived from a recommendation from the European Union, in 1992. The 92/441/CEE stated that member states should “recognize the basic right of a person to sufficient resources and social assistance to live in a manner compatible with human dignity as part of a comprehensive and consistent drive to combat social exclusion”. In 1996, Portugal, used this recommendation to improve the internal situation of the political actors who favoured the development of a minimum Income and contributed to broadening the coalition that supported the development of a safety net (at the time, both PS

and PCP had electoral proposals about this), creating a consensus around this issue (Silva, 2011). There was a linkage between the recommendation of EU and the political agenda of left parties. When the socialists won the national elections, they pursued their agenda in this theme and, under the leadership of Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues (minister of social security, at the time), they implemented a pilot of guaranteed minimum income which was continued, in 1997, as a structural policy. In Spain, there was a great mobilization of social organizations around the policy (Natili, 2018) such as Caritas (Moreno and Arriba, 1999) but also, a great relevance of left parties in setting the policy onto their agenda. If we take these two examples of Spain and Portugal, we see that there are relevant factors that account for policy change, at the national level. Soft-law instruments are not necessarily less effective than hard-law instruments (Silva, 2011: 8), there is a need for domestic conditions to adopt the policy. In the case of the minimum income recommendation in 1992, in Portugal, it was the “string European legacy on domestic policy” and the “domestic agenda” of political parties of the left (at the time, both communists and socialists had set the idea onto the agenda) that favoured policy change, particularly, when the socialists won the elections of 1995 (Silva, 2011).

Europe can provide the structural incentives for actors to exploit (Börzel and Risse, 2003 and Silva, 2011) however if the internal conditions are not effective, change will not happen. The argument is on the administrative divisions of States, by regions, and their redistribution of competencies between the macro and meso levels of governance, end up working more favourably for one or the other level of governance in the formulation of public policies (Börzel, 2002). These are two empirical shreds of evidence of how institutions have great importance in framing countries' public policies – “without institutions, actors are not able to realize their preferences or make choices on how to achieve them” (Börzel, 2003: 23). Tanja Börzel formulated the hypothesis of institutional adaptations by the regions of Spain (autonomous communities) and Germany (Länder) regarding the unbalanced distribution on which the redistribution of “say and pay” competencies in relation to European policies was based. This redistribution was based on the idea that the European institutions allowed the states to have exclusive access to the regions' competencies, leaving the regions with the burden of implementing the measures. Through a process-tracing of the negotiation process between regions and the central state, the author demonstrated an institutional adaptation of regions in public policies, derived from “pressure for adaptation and adaptability” between European and domestic norms and rules” (Börzel, 2002). In both countries, regions were forced to cooperate more closely with the central government, but the institutional impact in the two countries was different. In Germany, the existing cooperative federal system was strengthened, but in Spain, the traditional competitive relationship between the different levels of government (state, regional and municipal) could not continue. Europeanisation led to a significant change in the pattern of Spanish politics, transforming rivalry into cooperation (Börzel, 2002). This thesis is

an important analysis of the impact of Europeanization on domestic politics and on the relationship between the central state and regions/federations in particular. This has led to the efficient adoption and improvement of public policies in these countries, albeit in different ways. In Germany, the existing cooperative federal system was strengthened, but in Spain, the traditional competitive relationship between the different levels of government (state, regional and municipal) could not continue with a direct adoption of European policies under the principle of subsidiarity.

#### *Eurocities as an example of Networking for municipalities*

The European and transatlantic municipal networks (TMN), the “international municipalism”, provide an opportunity structure for municipalities to set their problems in international platforms. We know from transnational networks’ studies that the participation of cities in TMN provides “means through which members can contact each other in order to bid jointly for (usually EU) project funding” (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009: 321). Barcelona is a “paradigmatic example of the increasing influence of network governance in European cities” (Blanco, 2014: 7) as they are one of the “founding fathers” of EUROCITIES. In 1989, Jordi Borja, deputy mayor of Barcelona in the government of Pascal Maragall (1983-1995), organized a conference in the city on the role of cities in building a more united Europe ready for the common single market of 1986. One of the conclusions of this conference was the need to put cities and their social, economic and political problems at the heart of the European Union's debate. This initiative resulted in the strengthening of lobbying with the European Commission and a meeting between a delegation of politicians from the founding cities (Barcelona, Birmingham, Milan, Rotterdam and Frankfurt) and the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, and the Commissioner for Regional Policy, Bruce Millan, on October 24, 1989. A series of conferences in Europe followed in the following years, helping to consolidate the network of collaboration between European cities, to influence the political decision-making processes of the European institutions and to act as a partner in the European institutional debate in favour of cities. On March 6, 1992, Eurocities' Brussels office was created. The organization born in 1986, in Rotterdam, had only been an informal platform for debate between mayors and city councillors from the different European cities, academics and industry representatives, until it gained formal meaning. It also became clear that this platform aimed to establish relations not just between European capitals, but cities that were "European metropolises" (Eurocities, 2011).

EUROCITIES and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) are, perhaps, “two of the most successful attempts of consolidating the presence of cities in the politics of the European Union” (Blanco et al., 2018). That is one of the reasons why it has been argued that these



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networks are “part of a wider process of Europeanization” (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009: 310). The authors who studied these networks of European governance have defined this concept as the capacity in which cities can influence other cities in the adoption of certain policies, building themselves as actors in global governance (Hakelberg, 2014). Cities, acting unilaterally or in a network, inspire other cities to act on behalf of a certain policy. The explanation lies in the fact that “more and more often, cities are sharing similar problems and the creation of institutions which facilitate the policy learning becomes an important strategy” (Kern, 2001 in Kern e Bulkeley, 2009: 316) in the development of new policies. In Kern and Bulkeley’s study (2009), by identifying three climate change networks in Europe, since 1990 – Berlin, Amsterdam, Stockholm, and Rome – they were able to conclude that these networks “developed forms of governance...which influenced the debate in the climate protection” (Kern e Bulkeley, 2009: 319). In this form of Europeanization, EUROCITIES suggests similar developments in other policy areas” (Kern e Bulkeley, 2009: 328) which can also, be viewed as a policy learning process for policymakers on the local level. They can support policy innovations on local level, with which policymakers can learn from. They can also form a collective voice, at the European level, for policymakers to promote ideas. But they can also establish networks with other actors (policymakers on other cities) to promote certain solutions on the European level. Whether these cities reach their goals or fail to do so will depend on how they are affected by Europeanization, meaning the impact of “soft-law” instruments. This can happen through a top-down process in which the European regulation will affect cities but also, through a horizontal process in which cities join “benchmarking exercises and vie for awards for their local activities. Alongside the evolution of Eurocities as a promoter of debates, there was an important legislative advance at European level, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the regional Innovation Strategies and Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty.

### *European Policy instruments.*

In the new century of 20<sup>th</sup>, the process of Europeanisation was marked by EU communications, resolutions, and recommendations to the Member States. The Open method for coordination (OMC), another 'soft law' instrument, defined in 2000 at the Nice European Council and reinforced in the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, has been important for cooperation between member states in the area of social inclusion and social protection. It has led member states to define indicators to guide their policies such as minimum incomes, "pension schemes, health and long-term care Its relevance led the European Commission to issue a communication in 2008 aimed at reinforcing the role of the "social OMC" in the states. This reinforcement involved the states progressively adopting successful methods within the

framework of the Lisbon Strategy (2000). The European Commission's communications have followed up the 1992 recommendation in terms of bringing about convergence and urging member states to have more adequate social minimum schemes. Adequacy is not only restricted to the number of benefits but also to the way they are designed and implemented. In this sense, the committee drew up communication COM (2008) 639 final, which reported on the need for more adequate social support in most member states, more personalized pathways to employment for those who are excluded from it and higher quality employment. These communications were followed up with European Parliament Resolution 2012(C 70 E/02). Resolution 2012( C 70 E/02 published in the official journal of the European Union is an 18-page compendium that draws member states' attention to the need for concrete measures to combat poverty: a) that they should set minimum income schemes at a minimum of 60% of the median income of the respective country; b) that the living wage should always be above the poverty threshold and that workers who remain below this threshold should receive unconditional support (highlighting the positive experiences with the negative tax in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s); c) that states define the fight against poverty based on the relative poverty indicator (60% of the national median income); d) reducing minimum income conditionalities; e) that the different experiences with universal and unconditional minimum incomes, accompanied by additional insertion and social protection measures are effective measures to fight poverty and exclusion.

The EU's competencies are very limited in social protection and inclusion. If we look at the framework of EU interventions by area of intervention: equal opportunity and access to work; fair working conditions and participation in the labour market; social protection and inclusion, we see that the BIG area of intervention has been the second one. In this area, the EU is making an effort with hard law (e.g., regulations on fair working conditions and participation in the labour market pillar), the others are marked by soft law leaving it to the states to intervene. In this area, we have wages, work-life balance, job security, social dialogue, and safety at work. There is not much happening in terms of social protection at the European level because the EU does not have that competence, it is the MS that has competencies in social protection, redistribution, and welfare state.

*Table 2.1 - European Policy instruments following the European Pillar of social rights.*

<b>Area</b>	<b>Principles</b>	<b>Before</b>	<b>Instruments following European Pillar of social rights</b>
	Education	Soft law	Soft law

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Equal opportunities and access to the labour market	Gender inequality	Soft and hard law	Soft and hard law
	Equal opportunities	Soft law	Soft and hard law
	Active support to employment	Soft law	Soft law
Fair working conditions Participation in labour market (Labour markets)	Secure and adaptable employment	Hard law	Hard law (revision)
	Wages (directive on minimum wages)	Hard law	Hard law (proposal)
	Information about employment conditions and protection in case of dismissals	Social partner inclusion in hard law (directives)	Hard law (revision)
	Social dialogue and involvement of workers	Hard law	Social partner inclusion in hard law (directives)
	Work life balance	Hard law	Hard law (revision)
	Health, safe and well-adapted work environment and data protection	Hard law	Hard law (revision)
<b>Social protection and inclusion</b> <b>Re-distribution /</b> social contingencies (Welfare States)	Children and support to children	Soft law	Soft law
	Social protection	—	Soft law (council recommendation)
	Unemployment benefits	—	—
	Minimum income schemes	—	—
	Old age income and pensions	Soft law	—
	Health care	Soft law	Soft law
	Inclusion of people with disabilities	—	Soft law
	Long-term care	Soft law	—

	Housing and assistance for the homeless	Soft law	Soft law
	Access to essential services	—	—

**Source:** La Porte, Caroline, FISS conference (2022)

However, there are EU fundings that are being used by states to develop new social programs for children, education and employment programs such as the NextgenerationEU and the delegated regulation 522/2014. On 11 March 2014, the commission drew up delegated regulation 522/2014 allowing local urban authorities with at least 50,000 inhabitants to create proposals (article 2/a). The entity entrusted by the European Union; Innovative Urban Action is empowered to select innovative proposals based on a panel of experts who would assess the proposal according to criteria of a) new solutions; b) quality of the proposal; c) relevant partners; d) ability to achieve the proposed results; e) transferability of the proposed solutions (art 3/ a) b) c) d) e). Each innovative proposal can last up to 4 years (Art 3/6). This delegated regulation was based on article 8 of ERDF, by an initiative of the European Commission, which conceded support for actions in the area of urban sustainable development that are relevant for the EU (art 8, 1303/2013 EU). This gave the local authorities the possibility to develop social innovations supported by EU funds. This can be seen as a continuity of the effort that the European Commission made to boost innovation, as at the 2000 European Council, which took place in Lisbon, innovation was designated as a strategic action line (Parés et al, 2017: 34). Innovation through European funding is not new. Article 10 (1989) of the European regional development fund (ERDF) promoted innovative actions in European regions in the 1990's decade. Castilla y Leon, Wales (1994-1996) and the Basque Country (1997-1999), were some of the regions that had pilot projects in the 1990s. The ERDF financed 50% of the projects, the remaining 50% was financed by the implementing region itself or by the central government. The areas of intervention focused on infrastructure, education and training, among others.

*Table 2.2 - European policy agenda for innovation in the area of urban sustainable development*

Years	Features	Description
1989	ERDF article 10 of European commission	possibility for <i>regions</i> of European member states to elaborate their projects of innovation and tackle some problems they faced
2014	ERDF article 8	support for actions in the area of <i>urban</i> sustainable development that are relevant for the EU (art 8, 1303/2013 EU)

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	Commission		
<b>2014</b>	delegated regulation 522/2014 of the European parliament	allowing local <i>urban</i> authorities with, at least, 50,000 inhabitants to create proposals (article 2/a)	
<b>2014</b>	Urban Actions of the European union	Innovative of the	empowered to select innovative proposals based on a panel of experts who would assess the proposal according to criteria of a) new solutions; b) quality of the proposal; c) relevant partners; d) ability to achieve the proposed results; e) transferability of the proposed solutions (art 3/ a) b) c) d) e). Each innovative proposal can last up to 4 years (art 3/6)

2.3. Structural elements for policy innovation

A truly novel policy innovation is very rare as policy change often requires marginal or “incremental” alterations of the status quo. Incrementalism is a theory that has its roots in the historical process of policies and institutions and argues that changes are not sudden, but rather part of a gradual process as a consequence of political pluralism and bounded rationality (Lindblom, 1980). Processes are very stable, but sometimes changes occur, even if for a certain period. Policy innovation has the condor of challenging the existing institutional context (Hulgård and Ferreira, 2019), which makes it hard to appear as policy change. However, some incentives can allow change to occur, in a particular moment. For example, the emergence of a new law in the political framework. In 1980, the Housing Act in England provided a fortunate generation of council-house tenants the “Right to Buy” their rented house (Pierson, 1994: 79) but, also, completely changed the social structure in which the state had a major participation in providing housing for the less privileged. Years later, the new generations struggle to get a house in the private market since the state lost major powers to provide new public housing. There are moments in which the institutional actors reproduce the existing framework and there are moments in which is possible for change to occur beyond the existing framework. A “cleavage” (or crisis) as Collier and Collier put it (1991). The emergence of new players in the political landscape could also be one of those moments (e.g., new political organizations with agendas for change). In the study of Steinecker (2001), the author investigated the case of the abolition of municipal self-government in Miami (to the detriment of belonging to Miami-Dade County). This issue was already on the public agenda, but it was not adopted due to the governance conditions that were imposed, namely, an interpretation by the Miami-Dade County attorney general that entailed a 240-day wait between the referendum petition and the voting day (Steinacker, 2001: 111). During this period, circumstances changed completely. The city had a new municipal administrator (Ed Márquez), one of the commissioners was implicated in a corruption scandal, changing the focus of attention of the municipal

government, and the fiscal crisis of the municipality came, again, to the public debate as one of the central issues. The very politicians who supported the dissolution (the African American group) eventually gave up on the initiative. Thus, Miami's municipal government was maintained rather than a metropolitan government.

#### *Structuration theory and rational Choice institutionalism*

The interaction between individual agency and structural responses is not new (Giddens, 1984, Emirbayer and Mische, 1998 and Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012). As Archer puts it, structure and agency “cannot be examined separately (Archer, 1988: 77). Most of the studies in this area identify the agency role as crucial for these sorts of transformations (Westley et al., 2013). The sociology of structuration emphasizes *agency* and *structure* as two elements determinant for social transformation. Structure is the rules and resources which can be of two types, signification, and legitimation (structured proprieties of social systems). On the other hand, agency refers to the motivation, will, initiative and creativity that drive actors to break away from the structural contexts of action (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 962-963). A particular feature of the agency is the interactional element. As Emirbayer and Mische put it, the agency “entails the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas and ambiguities of presently evolving situations” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 971). Bourdieu's notion of habitus is a clear connection between agency and structure where the structure prevails over the agency element (through a reproduction of action) but does not dominate. An agency can change habitus and break away from its own social space. In the constitution of society (1984), action is described as the capacity of an actor to act. Agency has the power and the capacity to act, “agency refers to doing” (Giddens, 1984: 10). Resources are a means to an end for the power of the agency to be carried out. There is a routine in the structuration action, however, there are moments in which the routine can have a breakdown, and a situation of conflict like an economic crisis can be one of those moments (Giddens, 1984). We can see this linkage between agency and structure in the rational choice institutionalism theory (RCI) as it argues that actors' choices are directly linked to the institutional settings. Depending on whether the country offers opportunity structures or veto points, change is more likely to occur (Silva, 2011). Actors operate their preferable choices in a particular institutional context ('strategic calculations'). It is therefore necessary to know the institutional context in which they operate to have a notion about their choices. Institutions influence these interactions (between actors' choices and their context) in the sense they affect the sequence of choices available and supply information and limit the margins of uncertainty linked to the action of other actors. In Finland, policy entrepreneurs could introduce new policy ideas because there were

institutional arrangements that could “secure a remit to develop new policy ideas and beyond” (Henderson, 2019: 676). The results showed the relevance of institutional arrangements which provided “procedures that governed their policy development activities, established the receptiveness of the context to their ideas and determined their eventual ability to succeed in getting those ideas onto the agenda.

In the sociological theory, institutionalism plays a high role in explaining the shape of a policy (Emmergut, 1992 and Person, 1994) as the shape of a certain policy outcome can be explained by certain aspects of constitutional structures within welfare states. We can see this in the doctoral thesis of Immergut (1992) about the national health system in three different systems, Sweden, France and Switzerland. According to the author, the shape of a certain policy outcome can be explained by certain aspects of constitutional structures within welfare states (Emmergut, 1992). She argued that certain aspects of constitutional structures within welfare states can constrain the expansion of social policies. Whether it is a federation, a presidential system, a bicameral system, or a referendum system, has effects on the outcome of public policies. It is the political institutions and their constitutional structures that explain the shape of social policies. Political systems that rely on veto points limit the possibilities for collective action to succeed in more generous welfare state reforms. This institutionalist perspective on public policymaking helped to explain why Switzerland, Sweden and France ended up with such different outcomes in their national health service. On one hand, Switzerland rejected national health insurance and the role of government in health care was limited to providing subsidies to private insurance and, on the other hand, Sweden implemented true national health insurance. The greater the centralization of political power, which the author treats as dimensions of political arenas, and, also, the isolation of the executive branch, the more likely is that there will be social policy reforms that change the status quo (Emmergut, 1992). The answer lies in the fact that there are certain aspects of the constitutional structures of countries, namely, countries that rely on veto points can limit the possibilities for collective action, and political actors in the party system shape the outcomes (Beramendi, 2012). If a political system does not rely so much on veto points, then the change is likely to happen but if it does, then the limitations for the policy change are higher.

### 3. Theoretical framework

#### 3.1. Going local to the multilevel reinforced dynamics within the multiple streams

Birkland (2011) argued that there was a hierarchy of levels of political agenda, that social and political actors follow. From the universal agenda, represented by all the ideas that can be raised for discussion in society or the political system, these ideas can reach the systemic agenda by their relevance. Being successful at that level, they reach the institutional agenda,


the level that can decide the passage to the final level, the decision-making agenda (Birkland, 2011: 170-173). By thinking of levels and different stages of the policymaking process, as Birkland did, we have a theoretical framework used to analyze the interdependencies between different layers of governance (subnational, national, regional level/EU-level and international levels). The Multilevel reinforced dynamics framework (MRD) has the aim to explain more accurately the empirical interdependencies between policymaking on the subnational level, national level, European and international level (Rietig, 2020). Multilevel dynamics can be reinforced by international negotiations and agreements, by influencing lower levels of governance (Swinbank and Daugbjerg, 2006). They can identify a policy problem raised by policy entrepreneurs on lower levels of governance (Trittin, 2004). This means that EU-level and international level can influence policy, politics, and problem streams across low levels of governance, as it was evidenced by Rietig (2020). As stated in her article, MRD can occur in the following circumstances: 1) interdependencies between levels of governance; 2) regular communication and exchange of information between actors at all levels of governance, meaning, that policy entrepreneurs must be aware of opportunities to utilize the problem and policy streams of other governance levels; 3) recognition that problems linked to one or more levels of governance require policy solutions from a different level; 4) sufficient ambiguity exists to allow policy entrepreneurs to seize opportunities to pool flows between levels and utilise open policy windows, regardless of the level at which they currently occur. The causal mechanisms for the occurrence of MRD are a) formal or informal networks; b) established governance procedures of recurrent negotiations or reform processes at the international level with the requirement of implementation at other levels and c) strategic exploitation of opportunities by political entrepreneurs through, for example, buying space or forming coalitions (Reitig, 2020: 59). However, MRD alone lacks precision in explaining policy change and policy implementation across multiple governance levels. By linking this framework with the multiple streams of John Kingdon, the author could explain the interdependencies between international climate governance and European climate of renewable energy (Reitig, 2020).

In 1984, in an interpretation of the 'Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice' theory (Cohen et al., 1972), Kingdon created a model analysis – 'multiple flows' – to analyse the US political system. In order to understand how problems, become policy problems and why policymakers pay attention to a particular problem over others, Kingdon identified a set of flows that explained the process in which policies emerge, and how they are formulated. Policymakers assign policy formulation responsibility to civil servants who draw on expert groups, and interest groups to produce policy solutions. In this US context, Kingdon's theory looked at the process of the social construction of policy through multiple flows that, converging with each other, concurred to open the window of opportunity. There are five streams: the problem stream, solutions/alternatives, policy context, policy entrepreneurs and windows of



opportunity. The three most important flows to explain the process are the existence and perception of problems, usually perceived by political communities (they can be experts, members of parliament, municipal councillors, etc.) who promote the diffusion of ideas in certain forums. Having the notion that a solution must be found, the decision-makers look for possible alternatives. In the flow of alternatives, there may be certain measures of party ideology. This thesis is also corroborated by authors such as Hibbs (1977) and Jungblut (2014) who argue that the ideological influence of the parties that were in power and their ideological positions regarding certain issues are determinant in explaining the outcome. Knowing possible solutions/alternatives, policy entrepreneurs, which can be some of the actors in the political communities, work on promoting specific solutions to the problem (Araújo and Rodrigues, 2017). Here, policy entrepreneurs have to act quickly, before the opportunity passes and the window closes. Kingdon defined these actors as "individuals or groups of individuals who propose alternative solutions to certain problems at key moments" (Kingdon, 1995).

Table 3. 1 – Multiple streams framework by John Kingdon (1984)



Despite the high relevance of this theoretical framework in explaining policy change, which has been used in several studies (Zaharidis and Allen, 1995, Gulbrandsson and Fossum, 2009), the fact is that it has “made little progress on formally integrating global policy change at the international level” (Rietig, 2020: 56). Also, MSF is usually applied on the national level (Zaharidis and Allen, 1995). Nevertheless, there are studies at the local level (Exworthy and

Powell, 2004, Gulbrandsson and Fossum, 2009, Alimi, 2015) and, normally, with a single policy case. The contribution of MSF into the context of MRD made a greater theoretical contribution to the academic debate on policy change and policy implementation across multilevel dynamics. Recent literature on factors of the emergence of policies have been emphasizing the role of political leadership (developed by policy entrepreneurs) and advocacy groups. In Bogota, the advocacy groups' influence came around when the political support failed as the political leadership was very influential in "triggering the policy" (Rosas-Satizabal and Rodriguez-Valencia, 2018: 147). Having a policy entrepreneur is essential to foster the policy, to "fight" for policy innovation. They are seen as agents of change (Mintröm, 2000). Policy entrepreneurs such as Mayors and city council members "advocate policy innovations and transform political arenas" (Mintröm, 2000: 5). These actors have been found to be influential in various domains, namely, economic policy, transportation, education, health, water management and climate action (Goyal, 2020: 35), but it is unclear their influence in the social domain. The main role of the policy entrepreneur is to influence the problem definition and mobilize public opinion (Roberts and King, 1991) and they can come from different backgrounds such as politics, business, consulting, think tanks, public administration, academia or civil society (Goyal, 2020: 42 and 43). They can be defined as "the coupling activities of like-minded individuals with different *skills, knowledge* and *positions* that take place simultaneously or at different stages in the policy process" (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg, and Huß, 2016: 250). The phase of agenda-setting will depend on governance conditions, namely elections, that may lead to a party elected with a particular ideology or events such as crises. In essence, problem flows, governance conditions and policy entrepreneurs all contribute to the opening of a window of opportunity. In this context, policy entrepreneurs have to have the ability to act.

In a recent PhD thesis, about the Indian electricity transition, Nihit Goyal reviewed the multiple streams of Kingdon by identifying a specific stream, *the technology innovator*. A stream related to "research, patenting, licensing, commercialization, financing" (Goyal, 2020: 19). The emergence of policy experimental innovations is often linked to science, research and knowledge, things that can be identified in the scientific community. Due to their experimental configuration, these kinds of policies are usually designed and evaluated by social scientists as part of government-sponsored programs. The goal is to create knowledge about a policy to better inform policymakers. They, in turn, tend to look to this knowledge as a form to create an actual policy, not just knowledge. This was the case of the rural income maintenance experiment (Bawden and Harrar, 1977) and the New Jersey income maintenance experiment, with the participation of the Mathematica policy research centre and the case in Canada, Manitoba (Keher, 1977). Their role is most of the times focused on "introducing policy alternatives, the selection of policies and the building of national and international coalitions in

support of the policies” (Haas, 1992: 16). Their motivation is purely scientific as they want to show “what works” but, sometimes, they appear as policy entrepreneurs due to their particular interest in an idea. In this capacity, Dorothy Nelkin (1979: 107) referred to them as “the policy role of the knowledge elite”. In this sense they can be acknowledged as “agents of change” as they are “norm entrepreneurs” mobilized at the domestic level (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 67). In the climate change field, these actors sometimes play the role of strategic policymakers (Gabehart et al., 2022). In the case study of three pilot programs in health and social care domain, in England, Ettelt, Mays and Allen (2015) showed that the intention was to demonstrate the effectiveness of the policy experiments rather than just investigate “what works”. This happens because policymakers “tend to commit themselves to a policy direction before, rather than after they begin an experiment and invest their political capital accordingly” (Ettelt et al., 2015: 294). This is where policy experimentalism can be seen as a form of incrementalism as policymakers think of policy experiments as a way to achieve a successful adoption of a structural policy. In this sense, “policy experimentation means innovating through implementation first, and drafting universal laws and regulations later” (Heilmann, 2008). However, the influence of these social experiments on domestic policy is slim as it was shown in the past, in England, with the Income Maintenance Experiments and the Welfare-to-Work experiments (Greenberg and Robins, 1986), meaning their capacity to become structured policies is slim. Still, their influence on building social knowledge of public policy is relevant.

### *The role of epistemic communities*

Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Ronan van Rossem evidenced how two major movements of intellectuals and social policy experts in Germany and England, in the 19th century, had influenced the social knowledge of the State and helped increment new ideas onto the social policy reforms of the welfare state. The founding of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) is one example of the influence of the London Fabian Society and how a set of intellectuals impacted the realm of ideas. Their influence on social knowledge was also done through the Labour Party as the “Fabian political goals became incorporated within the Labour Party” (Rueschemeyer and Van Rossem, 1996: 118).

A glimpse of the policy role of the epistemic communities. These communities attract the attention of policymakers because they are a “distinct voice whose language is rooted in ideas rather than interests” (Dunlop, 2016: 276). The theory of epistemic communities places a lot of emphasis on the *power of knowledge* as an institution and how it is produced by communities of experts – epistemic communities ‘flourish’ under conditions of uncertainty (Haas, 1992: 15).

*“First, following a shock or crisis, epistemic communities can elucidate the cause-and-effect relationships and provide advice about the likely results of various courses of action. In some cases, they can help decision-makers gain a sense of who the winners and losers would be as the result of a particular action or event, as was the case in considerations about banning chlorofluorocarbon use or facing a possible environmental disaster. Decision makers seldom apply the types of decision-making heuristics that scientists apply under conditions of uncertainty” (Haas, 1992: 15)*

In the conceptualization of Peter Haas, these actors are seen as a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992: 3). In this role, they are *best positioned to lend agency to the problem stream* (Mukherjee and Howlett, 2015) and create awareness about the problem. But the role of these “intellectual elites”, as Nelkin calls them, became more relevant with the recognition of governments when they called upon their services. For example, in the experimental negative income tax policies in the USA in the 1960s, there was a great influence of expert agencies that produced studies that influenced the decisions of state and municipal governments. Prominent among these knowledge-producing agencies was Mathematica Policy Research, funded by the local government of Princeton, New Jersey.

As the work of the epistemic communities is produced in the context of networks with experts from other countries, developing international projects and disseminating knowledge in international conferences, a new form of production of power – in the influence of political decision-makers – may lead to proposals such as this, inserted in the logic of redistributive policies and recalibration of welfare states, being a factor to be taken into consideration by political decision-makers. Especially when we are dealing with newly formed political parties that seek to assert themselves in the political arena and win over voters by producing their electoral programmes, with new proposals to break with the political establishment of the moment. The role of these experts in the dissemination of an idea is aptly illustrated in David Molowitz's article (1996: 345) referring to Donald Rowat's 1985 study on the dissemination of an idea around the world. The process of professionalization of these non-governmental agencies had its greatest development in the 1970s and 1980s, which coincided with the period of growth of universities in democratic countries such as the USA, England and France. For ten years – 1973 and 1983 – the number of scientists and engineers with doctorates grew by 51% and the number of masters by 44% (Haas, 1992: 9). Their role is also relevant when discussing policy innovation projects. The use of the expertise and know-how of the epistemic communities can be very relevant to bid for funding as we have seen when they enter networks

to bid jointly for (usually EU) project funding, or by submitting bids themselves together with their constituent municipalities (Bulkeley, 2004: 23 and Kern and Bulkeley, 2009: 321).

Since the role of epistemic communities is determinant, as argued by Haas, in times of uncertainty, seeking and promoting solutions to a given problem, it reveals that these communities can carry with them "cognitive heuristics" (Weyland, 2007). Cognitive heuristics are conceptual frameworks that actors involved in policy design carry with them when designing and conceiving policy. Weyland refers to this term to explain the design of the Latin American reform model (Weyland, 2007: 55). The diffusion patterns that Weyland refers to raise important questions about the alignment of actors, tactics and conceptual frameworks, socio-economic and political contexts in which diffusion occurs. Policymakers often consider 'outside' models to prepare their own decisions (Weyland, 2007) and countries are "attracted to certain foreign experiences for arbitrary reasons, including, geographic and temporal proximity, but also for modern innovations appropriate to a particular problem" (Weyland, 2007: 6). Some countries are more receptive to external influence than others (Given et al., 2010). In Chile, when the pension model was adopted, inspiration came from the emergence of a few privatization projects and particularly from a proposal made by the Liberal Institute, a neoliberal think tank funded by large business groups (IL 1991: 15-19, 38-43 in Weyland, 2007: 126). But these paradigms were not copied in their entirety, being called "cognitive shortcuts" because of the limitation they presented vis-à-vis the original model. Some authors might see this approach as a "bounded rationality" (Weyland, 2007), caused by an insufficient evaluation of the "model" of the idea due to the immediate pressure to respond to an existing problem...". Instead of evaluating the model in its completeness, they cling to features that catch their attention more and balance the cost-benefits of implementing the policy" (Weyland, 2007: 6). Kurt Weyland (2007: 17-18) distinguishes between the spread of specific policy 'models' and more abstract 'principles' or guidelines that are compatible with a broad set of policy choices to explain how some policies are adopted by countries. The phenomenon of Latin American reform policies in the 1990s, analyzed by Kurt Weyland (2007), showed Chile as a pioneer in the adoption of a privatized pension model and that, in turn, eventually influenced other Latin American countries to adopt this reform model in a logic of bounded rationality. Countries like Bolivia and El Salvador imported much of Chile's private model (Weyland, 2007: 220) which had already been copied from the USA. Even countries like Costa Rica, which had enough expertise to design their own model, and this was seen in the modifications they made to the model, still imitated it. Even when the Bismarckian social insurance model was imitated by various states, including those outside Europe (Latin America and countries of the former Soviet bloc), it was not imitated strictly "to the letter" by countries defying diffusion due to geographic proximity (Berry and Berry, 2007: 228-229). Countries which adopted the model made adaptations (Weyland, 2005), because although these 'cognitive heuristics' are a causal

mechanism for the diffusion of policy, they do not in themselves explain the emergence of the outcome (Weyland, 2007: 221).

*The entrepreneurial activities: skills, knowledge and social position*

Policy innovation can be understood as a "program or policy which is new to [the state] adopting it" (Walker 1969: 881). More recently, Jordan and Huitema defined policy innovation as "the process and/or product of seeking to develop new and/or widely adopted, and /or impactful policies, when existing ones are perceived to be under-performing (Jordan and Huitema, 2014b). In this sense, innovation is understood as something new to the status quo. The process is dependent on the ability of the actors involved, to explore and experiment. This process can face many challenges. Many times, it is them, the policymakers, who avoid innovation at the highest level. It is not that they do not want to innovate but they avoid innovation, and higher degrees of innovativeness, because they want to prevent the risk of blame. In these dimensions of risk, Michael Howlett points to the scope or extension of the innovation and the visibility of failure in the media and opposition parties. Many times, this blame-avoidance dynamics may downplay its extent and duration (Howlett, 2014). They try to diminish the visibility that these innovations have by "reducing their extension and duration (e.g., 'policy experimentation' or 'pilot projects'), which emphasizes its unpredictability and inevitability taking periodic action but not so much to address the problem in concrete terms, but to attack its messengers or at best engage in small scale short-term experimentation when visibility and intentionality concerns are higher" (Howlett, 2014: 7).

However, for policy entrepreneurs to be active and appear as key actors in this policy process they are dependent on factors that contribute to the emergence of innovations. Some point to the institutional framework<sup>7</sup>, notably (e.g., resources, norms, political framework, societal climate) as essential for entrepreneurial activities (Gedajlovic et al, 2013 and Henderson, 2019). In this line, it emerges the concept of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988) which relates entrepreneurship with institutional governing. Entrepreneurs in institutional positions "seek to change the institutions governing a particular domain in the interests of realizing particular goals of their own" (Westley et al., 2013: 27). The entrepreneurial action (e.g., collaboration and networks, investment activities, etc.) makes it highly relevant to the discussion of policy innovation (Krev et al, 2014, Bund et al, 2015) as the work of policy entrepreneurs is receiving more attention (Kingdon, 1995 and Huitema and Meijerink, 2009). Authors have identified several skills that institutional entrepreneurs need to

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<sup>7</sup> It can be defined as a set of values, norms and laws that regulate human and organizational actions on the societal level (North, 1990: 3)

cause transformation in institutional governing (Westley et al., 2013). Authors like DiMaggio (1988) emphasize the capacity to bargain, of mobilizing or leveraging resources for their projects (in Westley et al., 2013). Entrepreneurship requires a lot of autonomy and capacity of the actors (Kingdon, 1995), so it is natural that the activities developed by the entrepreneurs are very rooted in individual characteristics. Studies argue that “individuals with strong characteristics must have the courage to become active and initiate an innovation” like a high level of endurance (Audrestsch et al, 2021: 241). In the study of Guldbbrandsson and Fossum (2009), policy entrepreneurs were distinguished by some resources as the “claim to a hearing, political connections or negotiation skills and, most importantly, sheer persistence” (Guldbbrandsson and Fossum, 2009: 439). The policy entrepreneur acts on promoting specific policies or solutions to ‘solve’ a policy problem (Roberts and King, 1991). In fact, a policy entrepreneur can foster a specific solution to a problem by framing it in the dominant policy paradigm (Béland, 2005). That is where the politics stream comes (Kingdon, 1995) with the political entrepreneur ‘politicizing’ the issue (Hysing, 2009). Political support is another driver of policy innovation. It is a scenario beyond the institutional framework and a complement to the societal climate framework<sup>8</sup> (Krlev et al, 2014, Nicholls and Murdock, 2012). This political support is not detached from strong political leadership, a policy entrepreneur who fights for innovation, a *broker*<sup>9</sup> that has “access to information and therefore can perceive order” (Dorado, 2005: 397) or a technology innovator who promotes “a technological solution to a societal ‘need’ or a policy problem” (Goyal, 2020: 46, Goyal et al, 2022). The process broker usually plays a role in “connecting stakeholders, networking and building trust” (Christopoulos and Ingold, 2015, Giest, 2018 and Brouwer and Huitma, 2018 and Goyal, 2020: 46). In other words, innovation is dependent on the ability of all actors to explore, to experiment and discover (Jordan and Huitema, 2014a) and the skills and the profile of entrepreneurs is important to the process. These skills can be perceived as the capacity (individual capacity of the actors). In the framework of Aurenhammer (2015: 4), the author perceives the capacity as characteristic of the individual and those characteristics connect with the structure, which in this case, we will argue in favour of the multilevel dynamics between the different levels of governance – Regional level/EU-level, national level, sub-national/local level.

### *Advocacy coalitions and policy learning*

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<sup>8</sup> Societal climate relates to the idea that policy innovation is targeting the satisfaction of pressuring, underserved needs (Nicholls and Murdock, 2012: 2).

<sup>9</sup> Brokers are actors that connect networks of individuals who are otherwise weakly or not at all connected (Burt, 1992).

Advocacy coalitions can be relevant to understand how actors fostered the policy. They are an integral part of the framework (ACF) developed by Paul Sabatier. A theoretical framework used to analyze and understand the dynamics of policy change. The theory argues that “policy change is best seen as fluctuations in the dominant belief system within a given policy subsystem over time” (Sabatier, 1987: 650).

There are three premises quite relevant in this framework. The *Advocacy coalitions* are a group of individuals from different areas that gather to promote a certain policy or goals. They integrate a specific policy subsystem which “consists of actors of a variety of public and private organizations and a variety of positions, who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue” (Sabatier, 1998: 99). Members of an advocacy coalition often *share beliefs* and goals related to a specific issue. These shared beliefs often serve as the ‘glue’ that holds the coalition together (Sabatier, 1988: 141). They come from different backgrounds, which means they can be composed of a diverse array of individuals and organizations, including interest groups, government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), experts, activists, and more (Sabatier, 1998). This diversity can provide the coalition with different perspectives and resources and influence their political activities. They often engage in various political activities to influence policy decisions. These activities may include lobbying, public awareness campaigns, research, litigation, and other advocacy efforts. Policies often reflect and translate the convictions of the advocacy coalition. ACF assumes that political actors are rational and have limited cognitive capacities to process information. *Policy subsystems* involve actors from several levels of government, from international organization and other countries (Sabatier, 1998: 99). For the purpose of the ACF, “the concept of subsystem needs to focus on the group of people and/or organizations interacting regularly *over periods of a decade* or more to influence policy formulation” (Sabatier, 1988: 111).



Table 3. 2 – Advocacy coalition framework, by Paul Sabatier




Figure 1 Revised diagram of the ACF

Being this a policy in the social domain, it would be expected to have a higher degree of policy learning on the social policy and innovation matters than on other issues (Sabatier, 1988: 135).

ACF tries to understand and explain mainly three puzzles: advocacy coalitions, policy learning and policy change. Nevertheless, there some corollaries here. It is not clear their role on these two cases, it is expected that advocacy coalition can occur in the policy process or how can it explain policy change and policy emergence. In this sense, we will be aware of the elements in this framework in our analysis as it can be relevant for the policy analysis of the process. ACF can act as relevant framework into the context of multilevel reinforced dynamics.

*Linking multilevel dynamics to ideas: New Municipalism and progressive alliances of the left*

A concept that emerges when analysing policies on the local level, is the New Municipalism. This is a theory linked to the theory of "left power resources". we have to go back to the origins of the Keynesian welfare state, when some of the principles of this form of Welfare were achieved by the ability of strong working-class movements to forge political alliances with farmers' organisations. Indeed, the sustenance of social democracy has depended heavily on "its ability to form new coalitions, this time with the white-collar working class" (Esping-Anderson, 1990: 18). Progressive alliances of the left had a major influence on local

government's politics. Progressive alliances are characterised by coalitions, traditionally, between a social democratic left and liberals (Wheatcroft, 2010). Nevertheless, there was also evidence of "progressive alliances" between moderate left and radical left parties and neighbourhood associations, trade unions and other civil society organisations (Fernandes et al, 2017: 36), in the implementation of innovative policies at the local level. In France, in the central government, it was the left-wing coalitions that appropriated the ideas of autonomy and self-management of May '68. In Portugal, in the local government, it was also coalitions similar to the French, from the ideological point of view, with MDP/CDE from Marxist-Leninists to social democrats and progressive Catholics. But in Spain, it was the moderate and technocratic elites of the old regime who were in the transition to democracy. It was the Catalan and Basque regional elites who were the interlocutors of a regime change process (Magalhães, 2017: 249 and 250). But evidence is not just limited to "progressive alliances of the left" as some authors have evidenced that, countries with great autonomy of the municipalities and "shared legacies" (Magalhães, 2017) are also linked to the emergence of social innovations. Fishman argued, in his comparison between Portugal and Spain about the political process, that cities with "revolutionary contexts" are more susceptible to the pressure of civil society, therefore, party identities could be formed in a more egalitarian sense and give rise to progressive coalitions and leave lasting legacies. Della Porta and Portos (2019) argued that the social movements, from which the new parties have emerged (Van Cott, 2005) carry with them memories and legacies of previous 'waves' of protests.

The focus of our analysis lies in the actors and not so much on institutions. One of the most prominent theories in public policies is the 'power resources' theory. The "left power resources" theory (Stephans, 1979, Korpi, 1983 and Esping-Anderson, 1990) which could easily be called the "left's expansion of the welfare state" (Watson, 2015) is, perhaps, one of the most prominent macro-level theories in the public policy literature. This thesis places its emphasis on the capital-labour axis – the alliance of the traditional, social-democratic left and on the control of certain "power resources", such as elections and trade union bargaining, the reason for the generosity, universality, and redistribution of welfare states. The more political resources are controlled by the left (e.g., winning elections, ability to coordinate union bargaining, etc.) the more likely a country is to have generous and universal social protection policies (Korpi, 1983). Left-of-centre parties are highly linked with social policy expansion. They were responsible for the main reforms in social expenditure in Latin American countries (Huber and Stephans, 2012). Although this theory applies to the Nordic countries in Europe, it is not the case in southern Europe where the left is divided between far-left and moderate-left. As Sarah Watson highlighted, the fact that Portugal and Spain opted for different trajectories in the outcome of unemployment benefits (Portugal - less generous and Spain - more generous) derived from the way in which the countries had to manage the trade-off between employment

and salary. This negotiation involved political parties with their own strategies in the face of a singular context of transition to democracy and in an attempt to gain power in the face of a "divided left" (between moderates and radicals). In Portugal, with the strong competition of the Communist party across the spectrum of the political left, the Socialist party, which was in power, chose to weaken the PCP and its trade union ally, the CGTP, supporting the emergence of more moderate trade unions, as came to happen with the emergence of the UGT. Thus, by not supporting more generous and comprehensive social protection it would take away competitive power from the PCP and trade union allies, but the ones who would pay the bill would be the workers most exposed to the vicissitudes of the market. In Spain, power was on the side of the centre-right, the UCD. With a radical left that was less competitive than in Portugal, and therefore less threatening, the strategy was to expand social protection in order to compete electorally with the PSOE (the major centre-left contender) while favouring the incorporation of the CCOO (controlled by the Spanish Communist Party). But building progressive social policy capable of attacking the roots of poverty and promoting redistributive welfare remains a major challenge to policymakers (Hall, 2006). Social assistance policies are policies of 'last-resort', meaning, whenever all the other social protection schemes end, the citizens resort to these schemes. They are "marked by deep social stigmatization" (Calnitsky, 2016: 65). They are targeted at poor people and to this social group there is a lot to be said. The poor are unlikely to organize themselves into a political group (Hays, 2001). They lack the material resources to engage in political actions, unlike, for instance, the workers in collective agreements who are fighting for an increase in wages. The poor are also a very heterogeneous group with different biographies, diverse interests and a wide range of identities and belief systems (e.g., single mothers, unemployed people with or without social protection, long-term and short-term unemployed, workers in precarious employment, etc.) (Bonoli, 2006 and Esping-Anderson, 1999). This group changes over time as these situations are linked to particular phases of life (Bonoli, 2013 and Clegg, 2013). Therefore, those who are in a situation of economic disadvantage do not have the resources to be relevant in the process of social change (Natili, 2018: 118). So, they have to rely on collective actors (political organizations, governments) to fight for them. This is an interesting point as, according to Schwander and Vlandas (2020), the most assertive defence of the UBI came from the 'labour' left, that is, from a left-wing closely linked to trade unionism and employment protection and not so much to those on the 'libertarian left' as argued by Wright (2002) and Levin-Waldman (2018). Schwander and Vlandas put forward the hypothesis that for a UBI to be implemented it would probably require cross-cutting coalitions, which would mean that a version of the UBI (closer to the demands of the Labour left) would be implemented, e.g., with fewer conditions and a more generous version of the minimum income schemes, but not universal (for everyone).

Municipalism is a recent concept and, as Thompson put it, it can be described as the “democratic autonomy of municipalities” (Thompson, 2021: 317). Although the idea of having a predominance of local governance over higher-level units of governance is not new, in the last decades, this concept has been gaining relevance because of the austerity measures (Peck, 2012) and the “politics of retrenchment” (Pierson, 1994). Nevertheless, the concept is much related to the idea of the city being a “political arena”. The city offers possibilities for certain alliances and minority parties to emerge to give rise to innovative politics – “new municipalism rests on the premise that the scale of a city offers a unique positioning to create more just and democratic forms of society” (Angel, 2020). For Russel, the city offers a privileged scale for building radical politics because of the politics of ‘proximity’ that is said to be latent within the city (Russel, 2019: 1002). The city is an asset because of the “forces it aggregates” (Angel, 2020: 4). Cities create possibilities for the formation of new solidarities and more collective subjectivities (Subirats 2016).

The literature on this theme gives examples of Manchester (England) and Barcelona (Spain) of municipalistic projects. New municipalism emerged as a way to contest this so-called neoliberal politics of retrenchment (Thompson, 2021). After the crisis of 2008, there was a push of the national government to reduce the autonomy of the municipalities and limit their capacity for spending and reacting to social needs. This led to a “rebel” position of the municipalities, known as “new municipalism”. This concept cannot be understood without defining other concepts, such as “social innovation” (Phills et al, 2008 and Rajasekhar, 2020) and “libertarian municipalism” (Bookchin, 1991 and Sepczynska, 2016) and, also, “left power resources” (Korpi, 1983). A fundamental aspect of “municipalism” is the politics of the left. Libertarian municipalism is one of the modern varieties of libertarian socialism and it advocates in favour of decentralization, opposition to statism and belief in direct democracy (Bookchin, 1991 and Sepczynska, 2016: 357) and that the power should be in the hands of citizens’ assemblies. The left has always worked with programs for change (Bookchin, 1991). Left-wing movements with agendas for change are very keen on identifying problems like poverty and inequality, which in their view, needed local responses. When the austerity measures were implemented by the governments, there was an increase in social innovations because they wanted to reduce the gap between the necessity of the population and the services provided (Rajasekhar, 2020). Social innovations can be described as “the process of inventing, securing support for, and implementing novel solutions to social needs and problems” (Phills, et al, 2008: 37-38). SI can be part of policy innovation when it is explicitly integrated into the policy-making process. Policy innovation can involve incorporating social innovation principles (such as the one in the basic income-inspired policies) and practices into the development of policies and regulations.

If we trace back the terminology history, we also find that the relation with left-wing movements is not new as the term “was associated with social reform and socialism” (Rajasekhar, 2020: 21) and we can find this concept referred to in the writings of Marx or Engels. Municipalism goes beyond the ideas and concepts of the left ideology. The “rebel” side of these projects is not just about new ideas, is about reorganizing the power relations between different tiers of government. It is about going beyond the state governance (Thompson, 2021). For them, the city is the one that offers the best position to overcome these problems and make societies fairer and more democratic (Russel, 2020: 1002). The city is an asset because of the "forces it aggregates" (Angel, 2020: 4) due to its proximity to its citizens. Cities create possibilities for the formation of new solidarities and more collective subjectivities (Blanco et al, 2018). Municipal projects defend a basic structure for the reconstruction of social rights allowing them to explore social innovations like the basic income (Blanco et al., 2018). They argue in favour of universalizing the basic needs of social reproduction (e.g., housing, food, water, energy), the “social rights”. They want to establish an urban economy of common well-being ‘*municipalisme del bé comú*’ (Blanco and Gomà, 2016, Zelinka, 2018). Barcelona is a paradigmatic example of this. Thompson (2021) identified three types of models: platform municipalism, autonomist municipalism and managed municipalism. Barcelona is a city identified by the author to be in the platform municipalism due to its “attempt to democratise urban platforms and utilize platforms in wider projects of urban-economic democratisation” (Thompson, 2021: 327). The use of the technology became a feature of municipalities but there is also another feature which is particularly relevant in terms of innovation, that is the municipalism theory itself. Another particular feature of municipalism is the great proximity to academic research (Blanco et al. 2018: 23-24) which emphasizes the importance of epistemic communities in the design and evaluation of these kinds of policies. Therefore, municipalism can, in that sense, be understood as a way for local governance in which the actors in government promote its autonomy in the face of higher-level units of governance (e.g., region, States). This form of governance is linked to the ideology of left-wing parties, in governance, which defend a democracy in which the citizens are active members of the decision-making process.

Table 3.3 - Operationalization of ‘New Municipalism’

Concept	Authors’ definitions
<b>Laval and Dardot (2015)</b>	“Supreme good of the city, universality, property...” Linkage between active democracy, cooperative value generation and community ownership of public services

<b>Blanco et al. (2018)</b>	basic structure for the reconstruction of the social rights allowing them to explore social innovations like the basic income, universalizing the basic needs of social reproduction (e.g., housing, food, water, energy)	urban economy of great common well-being proximity with academic research
<b>Russel (2020)</b>	city is the one that offers the best position to overcome these problems and make societies fairer and more democratic	
<b>Thompson (2021)</b>	contest neoliberal retrenchment	this so-called politics of governance going beyond the state
<b>Angel (2020)</b>	proximity with their citizens	
<b>Phills, et al, (2008)</b>	"Novel solutions to social needs and problems"	
<b>Bookchin (1991)</b>	politics of the left - Left-wing movements with programs for change (e.g., left municipalist movements)	libertarian municipalism (Municipalizing the economy) – a different form of organize the economy which is neither nationalized nor collectivized)

Municipalism theory suggests a relevance of the *ideology of the left* (with left-wing political organizations with agendas for change), defending a basic structure for the reconstruction of the “social rights” and in favour of universalizing the basic needs of social reproduction, allowing them to explore social innovations. Political entrepreneurs foster entrepreneurial municipalistic activities which lead to innovation. Although agency refers to the motivation and willingness of the actors, agency cannot be examined separately from structural contexts of action (Archer, 1988). In this line, the institutionalist theory emphasizes the intrinsic capacity of decentralized contexts in giving room for manoeuvre for local government to produce new policies. One might think that municipalities in decentralized contexts could be more

incentivized to innovate, than in non-decentralized contexts, as it is argued by Obinger et al., 2005 and Rogers, 2021. Therefore, the institutional rules of centralization and decentralization can play a key role and can limit the scope of political jurisdiction in which local agenda-setting takes place (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005).


Why do some municipalities go further in the innovation process? Why do some municipalities manage to implement these projects of policy innovation through European Union mechanisms and others do not? Do the dynamics between the different levels come out reinforced due to the role of the actors at the local level? I provide a combination of factors, a two-fold dimension of conditions. Municipalism as the ideational promoter of entrepreneurial activities of actors at city council and the mechanisms provided by the EU, can reinforce the dynamics between EU-level and local-level governance. It is our argument that there are moments in which is possible to go beyond the existing framework and allow change to occur. A newly elected government with a progressive political agenda of its own and a public official fostering the policy in that context can be one of those moments. We aim to contribute to this literature by making a valid contribution to the multilevel reinforcing dynamics framework. We argue that municipalism (a feature of local level) can be a trigger for public officials to reinforce the multilevel dynamics, particularly between EU-level and local level, by building advocate coalitions in the politics stream.

In order to pursue this research, we will process-trace the policy innovation of basic income-inspired policy, in the two case studies, through documental analysis of institutional and non-institutional documents and semi-structured interviews analyzed in MAXQDA software. This study also aims to provide insights about the policymaking, making recommendations to local Stakeholders (e.g., City council). The next chapter will present a comparison between the two policies of each case, with similarities and differences of the policy.

*The analytical framework of Multilevel reinforcing dynamics model (MRD) within the analytical lens of multiple streams framework (MSF) and advocacy coalition (AFC)*

On the model above, we assume that local level problems can drive policy actors (e.g., skilled policy entrepreneurs) to foster policy solutions at higher-level governance, in “bottom-up” approach. We know how the different streams interconnect with each other, in the different stages of process of policymaking, and “when the MRD is applied to the MSF, policy entrepreneurs can negotiate on two governance levels and actively couple streams on one level” (Rietig, 2020: 58) and by that it can reinforce the multilevel dynamics.

Figure 3. 3 - Analytical framework – Multilevel dynamics/MSF approach to policy innovation at the local level



In this model, the problem stream can be identified by precarity and poverty issues in urban regions. The politics stream can be identified by the election of a new political party with a municipalism ideology. Policy stream can be identified by the technical and political feasibility. The policy entrepreneurs can be identified by the actors in the city council, public officials active in fostering solutions to the problem stream. They “produce the necessary conditions for a policy window to open” (Alimi, 2015: 876). Having the policy entrepreneurs trying to “open” a window on another level, they will be active on both reinforcing levels of governance. They often “use their reputation by standing in both formal and informal networks” (Rietig, 2020: 59). So, it is natural to assume that possible coalitions can occur, with other types of actors, inside and/or outside of the city council.

We propose a model of MSF within the Multilevel dynamics from a “bottom-up” approach (from the low to a higher level), by using a policy innovation of basic income-inspired policy in two different municipalities/cases.



### Chapter four

#### 4.1. Methodology and data analysis

##### *4.1.1. Case selection*

In our research, we used cities as case studies. The main reason and an obvious one lies in the fact that these cases are cases of success of the policy, meaning, places in which the policy was adopted, which were almost all in cities. Second, they offer the same scale of geographical dimension (cities), which leaves out the case of Finland. Third, they are both in Europe and closer to the reality of the European countries and the welfare state's framework (of minimum income schemes), which leaves out Marica (Brazil), Ontario (Canada), Kenya and Stockton, Santa Monica, and Santa Clara (USA). Fourth of all, we are able to say that Barcelona offers the most innovative scheme when compared to their minimum income scheme and to other basic income-inspired policies in Europe.

##### *4.1.2. Data collection*

Given the nature of the study – case studies – and the research question – What factors can explain the emergence of this policy? – the research was developed using qualitative data and small-N methods. According to Silverman, the quantitative methodology is not the best method for finding the causes and consequences of a given phenomenon, but rather, the qualitative methodology. It is by adapting the method to what we want to explain that the research is characterized. Theda Skocpol argued that the important thing, in a comparative study, is not to focus so much on the type of methods we use (alluding to the preference of the research method over the research question) but rather, to choose the appropriate method for the pursuit of the research objectives. For Skocpol, it is the method that adapts to the starting question and to our object of study and not the other way around. Good research is research marked by relevant questions.

This research was inspired by the causal process-tracing method (Blatter and Haverland, 2012 and Bennett and Checkel, 2015). The support for doing the process tracing is based on semi-structured interviews with relevant actors in the process (e.g., experts, politicians, aldermen, etc.). This comprehended fieldwork missions in which we applied an interview survey to our interviewers. Being a qualitative study with interviews, it is characterized by a reflexive process. This means that along the interview process, we can embody various new elements to our interview process that come along as we do the interviews: how we start an

interview, what should be the first question, and certain aspects of our interaction with the interviewer. Nevertheless, before we started the series of interviews with our actors, we applied an interview draft, an exploratory interview guide, that we did in the first and second year of the PhD program to “secondary” actors. “Secondary” in the sense that they were not the main actors of the process of policymaking but they did have some relevant information about the process due to their relation to the actors or because they were in the research teams that evaluated the policy.

This research was also completed with documental analysis from institutional documents (digital and paper) such as laws, regulations, parliamentary minutes, parliamentary/city council group motions, institutional letters, council orders, etc. and press documents. The following table presents the datasets of the data collection – the time period analyzed and the time period in which the data was collected, sources of information and observation units.

*Table 4. 3 - Data collection datasets*


<b>Datasets</b>	<b>Case 1</b> (Utrecht)	<b>Case 2</b> (Nijmegen)	<b>Case 3</b> (Wageningen)	<b>Case 4</b> (Barcelona)
Time period covered	2010-2022	2010-2022	2010-2022	2008-2017
Data collection period	2020-2022	2020-2022	2020-2022	2020-2022
Primary sources	Interviews to: Local politicians (alderman, city council deputies) Experts Civil servants	Interviews to: Local politicians (alderman, city council deputies) Experts Civil servants	Interviews to: Local politicians (alderman, city council deputies) Experts Civil servants	Interviews to: Local politicians (alderman, city council deputies) Experts Civil servants Focus group to the international office of the city council
Secondary sources	Technical reports	Technical reports	Technical reports	Technical reports

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	Academic articles	Academic articles	Academic articles	Academic articles
Documents analysed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• City council motions</li> <li>• Statutory laws</li> <li>• EU legal documents: communications, regulations, resolutions</li> <li>• Press articles/newspapers.</li> <li>• Political election and government programmes</li> </ul>			

The data collection was divided into two sources: primary and secondary. The primary source is based on interviews of relevant actors in the policymaking and the secondary data was collected from documental analysis. Each interview took about one hour of duration. This was after the interview draft, which, in that case, took less than two hours of duration but as we went along the various interviews, we were able to cut the duration of each interview. Regarding the interview of experts, we choose these particular actors because it was a more efficient way of obtaining relevant and more precise information about our object of study (Bogner, Littig and Menz, 2009: 2). We choose experts who played a relevant role in the design and evaluation of the policy.

Graphic 4. 1 - Relevant actors interviewed



n= 15 (primary source)

n= 4 (secondary source)

Table 4. 4 - Main role of the primary actors of the policy-making

Most relevant actors	Barcelona	Nijmegen	Utrecht	Wageningen
Politicians/alderman	21,1%	20,0%	16,7%	50,0%
Knowledge-based experts / epistemic communities	31,6%	20,0%	20,8%	25,0%
Expressing the most favourable piece of legislation	0	20,0%	0	0
Designing, evaluating and coordination of the teams	5,3%	20,0%	12,5%	25,0%
Expressing the European laws	10,5%	0	0	0
Implement new solutions of income policies	5,3%	20,0%	4,2%	0
Civil servants	10,5%	0	4,2%	0
Political entrepreneurs	5,3%	0	16,7%	0
Municipal coordinators	0	0	8,3%	0
Advocates of basic income	5,3%	0	16,7%	0

The interviews were mostly face-to-face, however, due to restrictions raised by the countries at the time of the impact of the pandemic COVID-19, some of the interviews were conducted online (e.g., cases of respondents from Nijmegen and Wageningen municipalities). Graphic 2 shows the number of interviews done during the process of research and their roles in the policy-making process. Since some actors had more than one role, they are listed two times in the graphic (e.g., the process broker is also an advocate of the basic income)

The major difficulty in this process was to translate the institutional documents, which were in the language of the respective country (Dutch and Catalan) to Portuguese but thanks to the new technology of translation, this process was greatly expedited, and we did not have many problems. The interviews were done in English and Spanish (castellano) which I easily dominate. In Barcelona, I was able to do a period of visiting research at the Institute of Governance and Public Policy. However, this mission was affected by the pandemic covid-19, for two times, constraining the fieldwork. Due to the new technology which enables us to do interviews by Zoom or Microsoft Teams, we were able to overcome this problem. In Netherlands the visiting research was not possible, but we were able to go there and also conduct interviews by distance. The empirical analysis based on interviews with relevant actors in the process carried out on-site – Utrecht and Barcelona – gave a much closer perspective of the case studies. While the analysis was carried out in Lisbon, the research base, at ISCTE-IUL, allowed a scientific distance to the object of analysis that was very important.

The data from newspapers were collected through the selection of relevant local and national newspapers. We used keywords to look for relevant sources such as “*Wet werk en*

*bijstand*”, “*B-mincome*” and “*renda municipal d’inclusió*”. We managed to locate some newspapers like “*La Vanguardia*”, “*el Periódico*” (in Barcelona) and “*Algemeen Dagblad*”, “*Het Parool*”, “*De Volkskrant*” (in Netherlands).

*Process-tracing methodology.*

Process-tracing analysis is, usually, accompanied by data collection analysis techniques specific to the qualitative method such as "stories, archival documents, interview transcripts and other sources to see if the causal process, a theory presupposes or implies in a case, is indeed evident in the sequence and values of intervening variables in that case" (Bennett and Chekel, 2015: 6). These various techniques allow an account of the "unique or multiple pathways by which they happen" (Collier, 2011: 824). This approach makes it possible to explain outcomes in a particular case", where the main objective is to answer the question "what mechanisms explain the emergence of the outcome?". It is characterized by not having an independent variable (variable or variables that cause the dependent variable, the outcome, to change), but rather a set of intervening variables that may cause the dependent variable to change. It is a study in which we select cases on the basis of the Dependent Variable, the policy outcome (the policy in study). In this case, the choice of this method lies in the fact that we start this investigation without an identified independent variable, but several that must be verified. Given this starting point, the process-tracing method emerges as the most reliable method in the analysis we want to make.

*Table 4.2 - Process-Tracing "case-centred" explanation mode revision model*

<b>Causal Process Tracing: Variants, Descriptions, and When to Use Them</b>		
<b>Variants</b>	<b>Descriptions /Key-questions</b>	<b>When to use them</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Case-centric; Detailed narrative;</b></li> <li>• <b>Historically specific</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Detailed narrative that explains how a particular policy outcome or set of events came about.</li> <li>• What mechanistic explanation accounts for the outcome?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For explaining outcomes in a particular case.</li> <li>To develop a data set for making tests for causal inference</li> </ul>

**Source:** Adapted from Kay/Baker (2015) who already adapted from Beach and Pedersen (2013), George and Chekel (2005), and Hall (2006)

*Data analysis*

The data collected from documents and interviews were analyzed in MAXQDA (data analysis software) through theoretically oriented coding ("free-coding") and coding "with new code" after carefully reading the content of the interviews. In the analysis, we created two variables: the professional profile of the interviewee (quality in which the person was interviewed: politician, councilor, expert, civil servant, etc.) and the municipality to which they belong (Barcelona, Wageningen, Nijmegen or Utrecht). As this is a comparative study between two cases, there was no interest in creating variables for the political party to which the interviewee belonged because this was not the criteria for the selection of the interviewees, but rather the municipality to which they belonged and their role *vis-à-vis* politics. The political party was analyzed as a dimension of analysis and subdivided into categories related to the ideological spectrum. The aim is to position politics in the ideological-party spectrum, after analyzing the content of the interviews.

The dimensions created were nine, subdivided into categories and subcategories. The formulation of these dimensions was based on the theoretical framework described above (theoretically oriented) but, also, based on the content of the interviewees' discourse (exploratory), what Bardin (2009 [1977]) called the heuristic function of the content. In the coding of the categories, we were interested in checking the number of times a phrase, word, or expression associated with the category under analysis was mentioned.

In order to understand if there was a relation between the variables codified in MAXQDA between the different actors (factors for the outcome), we did a similarity analysis (table 11). We were able to verify that there was a similarity in the discourses which provide us with the confidence to know that the content of all the interviews is relevant and that the relationship between all the factors is good. Of all the actors interviewed for the Barcelona case, there is not one with a significance below 0,83 (up to 1).

In this study, we had few observations (n=15) so in order to do the Multiple similarity analysis of all documents we had to cross the observations from both cases, Barcelona and Dutch municipalities. Otherwise, we were not able to do the analysis as the N for one case was too small to do the analysis on MAXQDA.

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Part II

Case Studies

Since the economic crisis of 2008, which had severe repercussions in European economies and on people's way of life, from 2011 onwards, indicators such as unemployment and long-term unemployment have grown, causing many people to resort to social benefits such as unemployment benefits and minimum income schemes, a greater problem in Spain than in the Netherlands. Between the years of 2012 and 2014, the number of unemployed people rose between 24% and 26% in Spain and between 6,7% and 7% in the Netherlands, whereas long-term unemployment, during the same years, levelled up to 12% in Spain and in the Netherlands by 3% (Eurostat, 2022). This social context led to an increase in requests for social assistance (subsidies of social exclusion benefits) which had repercussions on the accounts of the States in Europe, especially in times of the Troika<sup>10</sup>. In 2011, the number of people receiving social benefits (unemployment and social assistance), in Spain, was 37.380 whereas in the Netherlands was 5.833 (Eurostat, 2022). In that year, the protest movements, *indignados*, culminated in the emergence of a new party – *Podemos* (Romanos, 2017). The demands were to criticize the cuts imposed by the Troika in a period when people needed them the most. The budget of 2010, executed by the socialist government of José Luís Zapatero, knew the “largest pack of social cuts in the history of the democratic period” (Noguera, 2019: 289). Alongside this wave of protest and the rising of unemployment and social benefit recipients, a discussion was growing which, although not new, had a strong impact in the post-2011 period, the unconditional basic income debate. The universal basic income idea has filled the agendas of many political parties in Europe like *Podemos*<sup>11</sup> and *La France Insoumise* of Jean-Luc Mélenchon. In Spain, the emergence of *Podemos* resulted in the first time that an idea such as basic income was put on an electoral programme (the European elections of 2014).

The Troika's economic adjustment programme for Spain included: fiscal discipline, structural reforms to improve competitiveness and reforms to stabilise the financial system. The protests were too rough, and they resulted in the biggest defeat of the socialist party in national elections and the shift to a right-wing government, the *Partido Popular* with an absolute majority. However, what followed was even a more “severe set of social policy spending” (Noguera, 2019: 290). This adjustment programme was implemented at the state level, but each region could “say” how it was going to do it. This is part of Spain's regional decentralisation. With the adjustment programme came impositions by the Troika that led

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<sup>10</sup> The European troika is a term used, especially in the media, to refer to the decision group formed by the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

<sup>11</sup> The proposal was approved by 80% of the members of *Podemos* (Noguera, 2019: 292).



regions such as Catalonia to restrict access to benefits (RMI reform 2011<sup>12</sup>). The increase in claims of social benefits together with cuts in regional benefits (decrease of the Catalanian RSI, in 2011) led to a strong civic and political mobilisation around a change of paradigm. The indignados movement in Madrid and the emergence of the *Podemos* and the *Guaynem* movement, with the appearance of *Barcelona en Comú* in Barcelona, were the major examples of civic mobilization around a change of paradigm. One feature of this new paradigm, we can rightly say as it was on the agenda of some parties, was the idea of universal basic income. Its unconditional character as opposed to the strong demands for activation under the threat of severe penalties that could lead to the loss of the benefit and its basic character as opposed to the insufficiency that the provision of the minimum income schemes had made this idea a banner of the electoral programmes of parties like *Podemos* and the *Barcelona en Comú* (2015). It was the first time that a policy with this typology emerged in the context of social public policies at the municipal level. The debate on basic income was vivid, not only by the agenda-setting of the parties but also in the debate that had been evolving around the world with international organizations such as ILO and OCDE discussing the idea (OCDE, 2017, ILO, 2018).

In the Netherlands, the context was different. They are known to be a country that has discussed the basic income idea for a long time. It is not new for political parties, at least, not so much the traditional ones (Social liberals, Greens, SP). However, the 2010 decade witnessed an emergence of this idea onto the agenda of some political parties, as the Greens and social liberals.

In this scenario of basic income as an idea that is “out there”, Barcelona and other cities implemented experimental innovation policies of basic income-inspired policies (BIIP). The following chapters aim at understanding the factors that led them to implement this innovative social policy.

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<sup>12</sup> Decree of 384/2011 of 30<sup>th</sup> of August, from the application of the law 10/1997, of 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, of the *Rendimiento mínimo de inserció* (1990-2017).



### Chapter five

#### Barcelona

## 5. What is the story behind the basic income-inspired policies in Barcelona?

### 5.1. Features of social policies in Catalonia and Barcelona

This section describes the evolution of social policies in the Spanish region of Catalunya and next the specific initiatives of the city of Barcelona.

In 1990, the region of Catalonia implemented a minimum income scheme *Rendimento mínimo de inserció* (1990-2017). This lasted until 2017 when the autonomous region of Catalonia reformed the existing minimum income scheme<sup>13</sup>. This scheme, like the ones implemented before in Europe, targeted the poor (through a means-tested procedure), meaning, people below a certain level of income, without access to other forms of welfare assistance, could access that benefit. It constitutes a policy of social minimums that came under the competence in the social domain, which the constitution of Spain (*Constitución española* 1978) assigned to the regions (applied by the regional budget) and based on the EU guidelines for social matters – the "European social model" – which culminated in the 92/441/EEC recommendation. At the time, Spain was in a process of decentralization (1982-?) and joined the European Union in 1986, which promoted competition between regions and states for the powers in applying European politics. In 1990, the autonomous region was led by Jordi Pujol, from *CiU*, with an absolute majority, earned in the elections of 1988.

The benefit was assigned through a means-tested procedure (like all the social assistance programs) which considers the economic situation of the person. The most generous minimum income schemes are in Navarre and Basque Country (the latter, the first of the *comunidades autónomas* to implement a minimum income scheme, in 1988). Catalonia indexes the amount of the benefit to the evolution of the economy (Rodríguez-Cabrero, et al, 2015) which in 2015 was about 65% of the minimum wage in Spain (648,60€ in the same year). There are other conditions associated with the requirement of the benefit as age criteria and residency. Only people living in Catalonia for, at least, two years can benefit and only people of working age can benefit, which, in this case, is people between 23 and 65. And the duration of the benefit is one year, having the beneficiary renew the benefit if they are still under economic emergency.

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<sup>13</sup> The *Rendimento mínimo de inserció* (1990) was changed in 2017, with the approval in the Catalan parliament of the *Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía* (2017), following the delivery of a Popular Legislative Initiative in parliament in 2014.

Table 5. 1 - Minimum income scheme in Catalonia (year of 2015)

	Age	Residency	Level of the benefit		Duration
Catalonia	23-65	2 years in Catalonia	423,70€ (in 2015 for a single person)	672,51€ (for a couple with 2 children)	1 year (subject to renewal and another means-tested procedure)

**Source:** Rodríguez-Cabrero, et al (2015) based on MSSS (2015) and regional MIS documents

Due to some political and economic reasons, considerable changes were made to this income scheme, in 2017. The 384/2011 law of 30th August marked a reform in the *rendimento social d'insercion* (RSI) policy. Back then, Spain, led by Jose Luis Zapatero, was being intervened by the Troika and there was a demand for reducing the budget to 10% minimum. One of the reforms done by the *Generalitat*, led by the right-wing government of Artur Mas (CiU), was the restriction of access to social benefits. The right-wing government of CiU and UDC, passed a reform with the votes against the left-wing parties, the decree 384/2011 of 30th of August, of deployment of Law 10/1997, of 3 July 1997, on *Renta minima de inserción*. This new decree established the principle and requisite of "additional social difficulty" which harsher the possibility of people with economic difficulties accessing the benefit. The restrictions implemented by the new law (of 2011) put 1/3 of the beneficiaries of the minimum income out of the scheme. They reduced the amount of the benefit and increased the sanctions for fraud control (Rodríguez-Cabrero, et al, 2015), strengthening the orientation towards activation, meaning, a more workfare approach. In the wake of these events, Catalonia started to gather signatures to present an *iniciativa legislativa popular* (ILP<sup>14</sup>) to implement the *Renta Garantida de Ciudadania* (approved in 2017) in the Catalonia parliament in order to change the existing law (*rendimento minimo inserció*, since 1990)<sup>15</sup>. The main requests were the increase the amount of the social assistance policy and to eliminate some conditionalities linked to the activation program (parliamentary debates between 2014 and 2017). This law was only approved in 2017<sup>16</sup>, the same year the city of Barcelona implemented an experimental

<sup>14</sup> This is an initiative is based on article 6 of Catalonia's new statute of autonomy "The citizens of Catalonia have the right to promote the calling of popular consultations by the *Generalitat* and its amendments, in terms of their respective competences, in the manner and with the conditions that the law establishes".

<sup>15</sup> The *Rendimento mínimo de inserció* (1990) was changed in 2017, with the approval in the Catalan parliament of the *Renta Garantizada de Ciudadania* (2017), following the delivery of a Popular Legislative Initiative in parliament in 2014.

<sup>16</sup> In 20th of July, unanimously approved by seven parties presented in parliament (*Junts pel Sí, Ciutadans, Socialista, Catalunya sí que es Pot, Partit Popular de Catalunya, Candidatura d'Unitat Popular - Crida Constituent*), the Ley 14/2017, after 4 years in discussion.

innovation policy in the social domain (*Renda municipal d'inclusió*). The amount of the RSI benefit and its segregating conditions were the main arguments of those who promoted the reform. The context of crisis and austerity made people take to the streets to protest. In 2011, a group of unemployed people started to collect signatures to promote an *iniciativa legislativa popular*. Diosdano Toledano and Sixte Garganté, two of the main actors in the ILP, started to organize a *comision promotora* in order to present a proposal in the parliament of Catalonia. Several actors from civil society were in favour of this initiative. The CC.OO, one of the major unions, was in favour and all the political actors of the left were in favour. The right-wing government was the only one against this policy.

Tracing back the parliamentary debates between 2014 and 2017, when the RGC was being negotiated in Catalonia, after the ILP was delivered by the *comision promotora*, the main arguments were pointing to the lack of sufficiency of the benefit (RSI, at the time) and the difficulty in accessing the benefit.

Table 5. 2 - Statements of politicians and deputies of PSOE and ERC

	ROLE	STATEMENT
<p><b>DIOSDADO TOLEDANO GONZÁLEZ</b></p>	<p>Representant de la Comissió Promotora de la Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía</p>	<p>"In fairness, the 426€ of the minimum insertion income are clearly insufficient... the minimum income systems are not in line with the provisions of the European Social Charter, or with regard to the level of benefits, far below the poverty ceiling set by Eurostat" (26/03/2014)</p>
<p><b>ORIO AMORÓS</b></p>	<p>Deputy of ERC in the parliament of Catalonia</p>	<p>"We must be aware that we are far from this situation, that we closed 2013 with 820,000 people unemployed, 100,000 families without income and that the duration of the crisis affects many people - their employability has worsened, remarkably. The benefit coverage rates every month - a month later - loses 1 or 2 percentage points. And this affects their self-esteem, they have associated problems, they have difficulty paying for their housing, facing unexpected expenses, paying basic expenses, etc." (26/03/2014)</p>

<p><b>EVA GRANADOS</b></p>	<p>Deputy of PSOE in the parliament of Catalonia</p> <p>“We all know the situation of the labour market. In the end, inequalities are increasing in Catalonia. At the beginning of the crisis, it must be said that inequalities in Catalonia were below the European Union average, but it is clear that job losses, the reduction of wages and also the reduction of social protection have decreased. It has led to an increase in inequality in Catalonia.” (28/05/2019)</p>
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These two main arguments – generosity and easier access to the benefit – were the motives behind the will of the political actors to change the law in the social assistance policy. These two motives are linked, since it is the insufficiency of income that determines access to the social benefit, the lower the amount threshold, the fewer the number of eligible beneficiaries.

In 20<sup>th</sup> of July, the parliament of Catalonia was approved, unanimously by the seven parties presented in the Catalanian parliament<sup>17</sup>, the law 14/2017, after four years of discussion. Even with a right-wing government, nobody wanted to veto a people's initiative (interview José Noguera, 15<sup>th</sup> January 2020). However, just after it had been approved and people started to require the benefit, it was noticed that a lot of people in economic difficulty would be left out of the benefit, which proved to be the case. Although the RCG abolished the criteria of “additional social difficulty” and the amount was higher than the previous scheme (RSI), the fact that the candidate had to show his income for the past six months and the fact that the amount is not sufficient to meet other expenses such as housing (Navarro-Vargas, Porcel and Cruz, 2019), made the expectations around this policy to decrease. The most decentralised benefits are those of the worst quality, those with the least sufficiency and intensity of protection and those which, above all, are not guaranteed (Navarro-Varas and Porcel, 2017: 28) and the way the legal rules were designed promoted little room to create entitlement benefits of quality. However, the calculation of the threshold has been made in accordance with the provisions of Law 13/2006, which are also included in the RGC regulations: "The assessment of the situation of need in accordance with the law 13/2006 establishes that the amount of the IRSC is increased by 30% for each member of the family unit or of the cohabitation unit who has no assets or income" (art. 15 Law 13/2006)<sup>18</sup>. However, the amount of the IRSC is fixed periodically in the *Generalitat's* budget law but has not been updated since 2010 until 2017.

<sup>17</sup> The seven parties in catalonian parliament: *Junts pel Sí, Ciutadans, Socialista, Catalunya sí que es Pot, Partit Popular de Catalunya, Candidatura d'Unitat Popular - Crida Constituent.*

<sup>18</sup> *Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía* assumed a gradual increase in the amount by 30% since its creation in 2017. Thus, in 2020, it would reach 100% of the IRSC.



Table 5. 3 - Renta garantizada de ciudadanía (Household typology, 2017)

<b>RENTE GARANTIZADA DE CIUDADANIA</b>									
	<i>Household typology</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Income</i>	<i>Residency</i>	<i>First member<sup>19</sup> (2017)</i>	<i>Second Member</i>	<i>Descendents</i>	<i>Reduction Rate</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>WORKING</b>	Single household	23-65	—	2 years in Catalonia	584€	282€	75€		941€
	Single-parent household	14 years	—	“”	584€		75€		659€
	2 adults	23-65	—	“”	584€	282€			866€
<b>UNEMPLOYED</b>	Single household	23-65	450€	“”					
	Single-parent household	14 years	900€	“”					
	2 adults	23-65	450€	“”					

Source: [https://dretssocials.gencat.cat/ca/ambits\\_tematicos/pobresa\\_i\\_inclusio\\_social/rentagarantizada/](https://dretssocials.gencat.cat/ca/ambits_tematicos/pobresa_i_inclusio_social/rentagarantizada/)

<sup>19</sup> The value presented corresponds to 85% of the IRSC. The policy was designed in a progressive way until reaching 100% of the IRSC, which is 664€ (identical to the B-mincome value).




## Basic income in Europe

The table above shows the characterization of the RGC policy scheme by household typology. The amounts had improved when compared to the previous scheme of minimum income, the RSI. However, there were still issues left to improve like the working criteria where you have to be out of work for the last six months to apply for the benefit. There was a great expectation around the RGC during this period, but “there was never a sufficient political will to develop this policy to its own potential” (interview Gomà, 14<sup>th</sup> December 2021).

During this period – 2011-2014, without a social response from the welfare of the regional government, the beneficiaries started to resort to a policy that was designed by the central state for people without any social benefit, the *Renda Activa d’Inserció* (RAI). The design of this policy is very similar to a minimum income scheme, but it does not replace it. It can be used by citizens of the Spanish State in a subsidiary or preferential way, as long as there is no overlapping of benefits between regional and national schemes.

Figure 5. 1 - *Renda Activa d’Inserció*: evolution of the beneficiaries of the state benefit, between 45 and 64 years of age



**Source:** adapted from Navarro-Varas, Porcel ad Cruz (2019: 11)

This graphic shows the increase in the number of beneficiaries of the RAI policy from 2012 until 2014, when it started to decrease. This goes hand-in-hand with the reform of the RSI of Catalonia. When the effects of the reform of the RSI started to emerge, there was an increase in the demand for the RAI. Between 2014 and 2015, when the ILP and the RGC were being negotiated, the numbers declined.

When the *Renta garantizada de ciudadanía* emerged in May 2017, it was seen as a response to the people who had been left out of the social assistance, by the criteria of “additional social difficulty” and the insufficiency of the amount. The new law presented a policy

with a bigger amount than the previous RSI, 585€ for a single person (with a graduate increase until 2017 of 664€), which was one of the main objections. In order to access the benefit, you would have to be over 23 years of age or over 18 if you have minors or disabled dependants, have been orphaned by both parents, have been a victim of sexist violence at home, have the condition of a person at social risk, accredited with a compulsory technical report. You would have to be resident in Catalonia for at least two years, except if you are a woman who has a residence permit for family reunification and loses it due to divorce or separation, if you are a returning Catalan emigrant. You would have to have no patrimony of their own, other than the first house; have exhausted sources of income for at least 6 months (including unemployment benefits) unless you are a single parent with dependent children or a large family, family where the person working is over 55 years of age and has been unemployed for a long time, who can reconcile the RGC with a part-time contract. As to the obligations it entails, you are subject to an annual renewal and to an employment-insertion plan, which, if you do not comply with, lose 150€ of the benefit (limitation). The RGC policy still had many gaps to fill.

During the time that the RGC was being discussed in the parliament (2014-2017), at the municipal level, in 2015, the city executive, at the end of the government of CiU (right-wing party) implemented a social emergency benefit for families with children aged 0 to 16. This policy was characterized by its unconditionality, meaning, every household with children, below a certain income (differentiated by typology of household) could access this policy without having to look for work or do training programs. This was a social emergency benefit for families with children aged 0 to 16 (*Ajuts d'urgència social per a famílies amb infants de 0 a 16 anys*). This policy comes aligned with the institutional context of the law on social benefits that followed the approval of Catalonia's new statute of autonomy (as we will see in the next subchapter) which clarified the ways in which Catalan municipalities could act on economic benefits. The urgent, basic and specific nature of this structural policy allowed some elements to be taken to the *Renda Municipal d'inclusió*, in 2017. Given its unconditionally, this was the first municipal government policy granted on the basis of the provisions of the law on social services and economic benefits (law 13/2007) with characteristics of unconditionality.

Table 5. 4 - *Ajuts d'urgència social per a famílies amb infants de 0 a 16 anys*

<b>Household typology (with children)</b>	<b>Age (less than 16 years)</b>	<b>Income (annual ceiling by household)</b>	<b>Benefit</b>	<b>Complement (for a single-parent household)</b>	<b>Residency</b>
<b>2 elements (single-parent household)</b>		11.950,60€ = 996€ monthly	100€	100€	Barcelona

## Basic income in Europe

<b>3 elements</b>	14.939,49€	175€	—	Barcelona
	=	1245€		
		monthly		
<b>4 elements</b>	17.927,39€	225€	—	Barcelona
	=			
<b>5 elements</b>	20.915,29€	275€	—	Barcelona
	=			
<b>6 elements</b>	23.903,29€	325€	—	Barcelona
	=			
<b>7 elements</b>	26.891,09€	375€	—	Barcelona
	=			
<b>8 elements</b>	29.878,99€	425€	—	Barcelona
	=			
<b>9 elements</b>	32.866,89€	475€	—	Barcelona
	=			
<b>10 elements</b>	35.854,79€	525€	—	Barcelona
	=			
<b>11 elements</b>	38.842,68€	575€	—	Barcelona
	=			

The requisites to access this benefit are the obligation to have residency in Barcelona, not having kids more than 16 years, and testifying the household income.

### 5.2. The emergence of a new policy: *Renda municipal d'inclusió*

*Bcomù*, wanted to implement a policy that responded truly to the problems of the citizens of Barcelona and not just Catalonia. The city executive knew that, and once they entered the government, in 2015, they had to start thinking of ways to design an innovative social policy that would meet the criteria defined by the *Generalitat*. When they implemented the *Renda municipal d'inclusió*, they maintained the unconditionality of the *Ajuts d'urgència social per a famílies amb infants de 0 a 16 anys* but, also, added the *unlimitation*, meaning, the possibility of the beneficiary to accumulate income from work with the benefit in an unlimited way. Moreover, when compared to the RGC (of Catalonia), the *Renda municipal d'inclusió* had a higher amount of benefit – 662€ - which is the same as the RGC, when it reached the year of 2020. Another important feature of this SI is that it separates what are the basic necessities and the housing costs. It is a relevant point as it specifies a particular problem of the city, the

housing costs. The two policies, *Renda municipal d'inclusió* and *Renta Garantizada de Ciudadania* could not complement, the RGC would have primacy over the *Renda municipal d'inclusió* and this would be implemented if the beneficiary was not receiving the RGC (interview Torrens, 5<sup>th</sup> March 2020).

## Basic income in Europe

Table 5. 5 - Renda municipal d'inclusió (B-Mincome, 2017)

	Household Typology	Age	Income	Residence	BASIC NECESSITIES		HOUSING COSTS		Child	REDUCTION RATE	TOTAL
					Food; clothes; First member	Second member	Rent/mortgage; gas; water First member	Second member			
<b>WORKING</b>	Single Household	25-65	---	2 years in Barcelona	402,60 €	---	260€	---	---	Unlimited	662,60€
	Single-parent household	14 years	---	""	402,60 €	148€	260€	---	40€	Unlimited	850,60€
	2 adults	25-65	---	""	402,60 €	148€	260€	110€	---	Unlimited	920,60€
<b>UNEMPLOYED</b>	Single Household	25-65	450€	""	402,60 €	---	260€	---	---	Unlimited	1112,60 €
	Single-parent household	14 anos	900€	""	---	---	---	---	---	Unlimited	900€
	2 adults	25-65	450€	""	402,60 €	148€	260€	110€	---	---	1370,60 €

**Source:** documental analysis

**Note:** The policy approaches a generosity of 100% of the IRSC and, although it does not change the value of the generosity of the benefit, it differentiates between basic needs and the cost of living.

If we look at the scheme, Barcelona increased the level of the amount when compared to the minimum income scheme in Catalonia (*Rendimento mínimo de inserció*<sup>20</sup>) but for a single household. Although, with the *Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía* (RGC) the level of the amount was incremental, meaning, it increased for a single household (at the same amount as the RMI in Barcelona). Nevertheless, the amount of the RGC is higher for other types of households. In Barcelona, the generosity of the amount rose to 56.3%. This represented a rise, in the benefit, of 62.5% when compared to the poverty threshold in Spain (Eurostat, 2022). A single household, without work, can benefit from 662,55€, which is 77% of the minimum wage in Spain (in 2017), which proves to be more balanced than the previous amount of the *Rendimento mínimo de inserció* (1990-2017). Although, with the gradual increase in the amount of the *Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía* (RGC), the amount of the RGC is higher for other types of households (e.g., two adults). Besides generosity, there were two surprising characteristics of this policy. The illimitation and unconditionality. In the first characteristic, it is possible to accumulate the benefit received with income from work in an unlimited way, meaning, if a beneficiary finds work, he/she can accumulate the salary with the social benefit, unlimited. This does not happen with the minimum income schemes where the family household is obliged to inform the social services of any kind of alteration in their income and, therefore, subject to a new means-tested procedure. In the unconditionality, the beneficiary is no longer obliged to carry out active job search diligences, or vocational training, among others<sup>21</sup>. The conditionality became a characteristic of the minimum income schemes in Europe, particularly, with the workfare approach that governments have implemented. This kind of innovation allows people to have more time to look for the work they want and, when they do, they can accumulate two incomes, which can be a way to a more sustainable trajectory.

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<sup>20</sup> The *Rendimento mínimo de inserció* (1990) was changed in 2017, with the approval in the Catalan parliament of the *Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía* (2017), following the delivery of a Popular Legislative Initiative in parliament in 2014.

<sup>21</sup> Although is not subject to a new means-tested, this policy has an expected duration of two years, meaning, it is unlimited during this time. Otherwise, it could give rise to inconsistencies. For example, if a person is unemployed and has a benefit of 600€ and finds a job for 950€. If he/she has the 950€ from work plus the 600€ benefit compared to someone who receives the same salary but never received the benefit (because he/she was employed when they require the policy), there is an inconsistency problem.

## Basic income in Europe

Table 5. 6 - Welfare policies in the region of Catalonia and the city of Barcelona

Years	Regional level		Municipal level	
	1990-2017	2017-?	2015-?	2017-2021
<b>Policies</b>	<i>Rendimento mínimo de inserció</i> (with a reform in 2011 - decree 384/2011)	<i>Renta Garantida de Ciudadania</i> (with a reform in 2020 – Ley 1/2020)	<i>Ajuts d'urgència social per a famílies amb infants de 0 a 16 anys</i>	<i>Renda municipal d'inclusió</i>
<b>Characterization / target group</b>	Conditional Means-tested	Conditional Means-tested	Unconditional Households with children No means-tested	Unconditional Unlimited Means-tested


Table 5. 7 - Evolution of minimum income schemes and experimental innovative policies in Barcelona and Dutch municipalities towards Universal Basic Income

Level of governance	Catalonia	Catalonia	Catalonia	Barcelona	Barcelona
<b>Social assistance policies towards UBI</b>	<i>Rendimento mínimo d'inserció</i> (1990- [2011]-2017)	<i>Rendimento social d'inserció</i> (2011-2017)	<i>Renta garantizada de ciudadanía</i> (2017-?)	<i>Ajuts d'urgència social per a famílies amb infants de 0 a 16 anys</i> (2015)	<i>Renda municipal d'inclusió</i> (2017)
<b>Characteristic / target group</b>	Means-tested. conditional	Means-tested (harsher) Workfare approach (more conditional)	Means-tested. Less conditional	Unconditional Targeted to Households with children	Unconditional Unlimited Means-tested

These characteristics bring this policy closer to the minimum income schemes than to the idea of UBI. Although there are elements that make this innovation a basic income-inspired policy, like unconditionality and illimitation, it is not universal as it is means-tested, meaning, linked to the economic level of the household. It is for those who have incomes below 60% of the median income of the country. Even so, by the level of its generosity, it will reach more people than the existing minimum income schemes (at least, in Barcelona) and this can be a transformative policy, particularly for the outsiders and the precariat.

Figure 5. 2 - Geography of the Renda municipal d'inclusio (B-Mincome project) beneficiaries

**Figure 2. Location of the 10 Eix Besòs neighbourhoods chosen for the B-MINCOME project.**



Source: Barcelona City Council. Social Rights. Research and Knowledge Department.

**Source:** Laín, Riutort and Julia (2019: 4)

These results show a policy continuity, a legacy in the policy, if you will, since the unconditional policy for children in 2015 of the right-wing government (*CiU*) and the reform of the minimum income scheme, in 2017, in the autonomous region of Catalonia, there was a progressive move towards unconditional minimum income, with the *Renda municipal d'inclusió* in Barcelona. when we refer to the policy innovation of basic income-inspired policy we are referring to unconditionality in the forms of control of the beneficiaries and not without means-tested procedure, meaning, not having conditions of access to the benefit. social assistance policies in Barcelona have, progressively, moved towards unconditionality, since 2017. This path has received support from particular political parties, but also it benefited from institutional settings that provide the municipality with tools to design and implement autonomous social policies. This path has received support from particular political parties, but also it benefited from institutional settings that provide the municipality with tools to design and implement autonomous social policies. The next section is dedicated to the analysis of the institutional settings in which Barcelona is integrated.

The next sections describe the process which made it possible for this policy to emerge. Inspired by a process-tracing method, I will follow a multiple-stream approach as it will facilitate the roles of the actors in the different stages of the process.



### 5.3. Institutional framework.

*2006-2007: the new Statut d'Autonomia de Catalunya and the incentive for the municipalities in Catalonia*

Spain, a country with a long centralist tradition, is today one of the most decentralised states in Europe (Guillén and León, 2011 and Gallego and Subirrats, 2011: 97), having started this process in the late 1970s with the 1978 Constitution of the Spanish Republic. The Spanish autonomous regions allow regions such as Catalonia to create their own social policies (Navarro-Varas and Porcel, 2017). Of the 17 autonomous regions, three have their own approved statutes of autonomy – Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. The remaining regions have gradually gained more competencies in different governance matters (Gallego and Subirrats, 2011). Decentralisation allowed greater proximity to citizens as well as innovation in policy design, production and management of services which facilitated learning and service improvement (Rodríguez-Cabrero, 2011: 19) but, also, led to the emergence of new public policy choices by autonomous communities which resulted in different welfare regimes (Gallego, Gomà and Subirrats, 2005). The expansion of the welfare state in Spain happens mainly in the 1980s, during the period of transition to democracy and in the same decade that Spain joined the EU and resulted from the negotiation and correlation of forces between a right-wing (UCD) that defended the unitary state and a left-wing (PSOE) that defended a federal state. The result ended up being a middle-ground solution, the Autonomous State (Gallego, Gomà and Subirrats, 2005). This process gave rise to negotiations between central and regional governments that helped to define some competencies that had been assigned to the autonomous regions (CCAA) in 1978. Article 148 of the Spanish constitution attributes a set of competencies that are of exclusive preserve of the CAACs: "The Autonomous Communities may assume competencies in the following matters...social assistance". This constitution was promulgated in 1978, after the fall of the Franco dictatorship and the transition to democracy. A year later, the *Statut d'Autonomia de Catalunya* of 1979 was passed in the Catalan parliament. This statute had the character of an organic law and was an institutional norm which, in accordance with the fundamental law of the Spanish constitution, defined the rights and duties of Catalan citizens. Faced with the need to transpose some of the European guidelines in various matters, a process that was the responsibility of the States, the CAACs took on some of the competencies that had been granted to them by the constitution, some of which were part of the European guidelines. How did these two competencies cohabit? The balance of conflict between the central and regional levels of governance ended up tilting more towards the CAACs (Börzel, 2002).

Social assistance is an area in which the power is of the “exclusive competence” of Spanish mesogovernments, the *Comunidades autónomas*. In this sense, in 1990, Catalonia implements its minimum income scheme (*Rendimento mínimo de inserció*). A policy of social minimums that came under the competence in the social field, which the constitution assigned to it and based on the EU guidelines, in social matters – the "European social model" - which culminated in the 92/442/EEC recommendation. The combination of the principle of decentralization in Spain and the principle of territorial subsidiarity in the EU (which means that decisions should be taken transnationally only if local, regional or national levels cannot perform better) favoured the participation of infra-level tiers of governance in implementing social assistance programs and policy innovation (Moreno and Arriba, 1999).

On the 18<sup>th</sup> of July 2006, the parliament of Catalonia approved the new *Statut d'Autonomia de Catalunya* of 2006, which emphasised the concepts of Catalan nationhood, language, and historical rights. As the statute's preamble states: "The Parliament of Catalonia, capturing the sentiment and will of the citizens of Catalonia, has defined Catalonia as a nation by a large majority. The Spanish Constitution, in the second article, recognises the national reality of Catalonia as a nationality." This preamble led 99 MPs from the Popular Party (PP) parliamentary group to request that the document be declared unconstitutional. At the time, the *Generalitat* government was led by Pasqual Maragall (2003-2006) with a left coalition with ERC<sup>22</sup> and Greens (ECV). The Constitutional Court ruled in 2010 that "a preamble has no legal significance and is an exposition of reasons or considerations". In addition to the issues of the values of the Catalan nation, the new statute deepened some of the powers of the *Generalitat*, in the judiciary and in the financing system. In the social domain, Article 24 of the statute states that: "families in poverty have the right to access a guaranteed citizenship income that ensures the minimums of a dignified life, according to the legally established conditions". On the competencies of the region's municipalities, article 84 states that: "c) The organisation and provision of basic services to the community". The regional government of Catalonia has the exclusivity of the economic benefits of law not attributing this competence to the municipalities. However, law 13/2006 of 27<sup>th</sup> July has clarified the regulatory criteria that municipalities have to solve the economic benefits of social emergencies. The government of the region of Catalonia determines some parameters within which the social emergency policies, that the municipalities want to create, have to fit. These have to be of a specific, basic and urgent nature – "The economic benefits of social urgency are intended to address situations of specific, urgent and basic need" (art. 30 of law 13/2006<sup>23</sup>). By need, article 12 states that: "any

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<sup>22</sup> *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*. The acronyms ERC stand for 3 principles: Left agenda, Republic and Catalan independence.

<sup>23</sup> Law 13/2006, of 27<sup>th</sup> July, economic social benefits and the law 12/2007 of 11<sup>th</sup> October, of social services.

contingency that appears in the course of a person's life and which prevents him/her from coping with the essential expenses for adequate maintenance or for the maintenance of the persons composing the family unit". The economic benefits of social emergency constitute the instrument to attend to these punctual, urgent, and basic subsistence needs" (law 13/2006 art.5). Among the benefit supports that were possible we have the scholarships, supplements for families with children between 0 and 16 years old, subsidy for rent payment, among others (Navarro-Varas and Porcel, 2017: 27). The municipalities then define, based on the principle of local autonomy, the characteristics that these social supports have, within these parameters. For example, setting requirements for access to benefits such as the household income threshold or the length of residence are some examples of the characteristics that these supports have (Navarro-Varas and Porcel, 2017: 27). Social support is not expected to be above 200€ or to last longer than three to four months (Navarro-Varas and Porcel, 2017: 27). This the case of *Ajuts d'urgència social per a famílies amb infants de 0 a 16 anys*. According to the *Constitución española de 1978* and the *Estatut d'Autonomia de Catalunya de 2006*, social assistance policies are an exclusive competence of the *Generalitat* (Catalonian regional government). Following article 30 of law 13/2006<sup>24</sup>, they can only implement social benefits of an urgent, basic, and specific nature (e.g., student grants, supplements for families with children aged between 0 and 16, subsidy for rent payments, etc.). These social benefits are not expected to be above 200€ or to last more than three or four months (Navarro-Varas and Porcel, 2017: 27).

Regarding the income threshold that will result in the amounts awarded, the limit is defined through the Sufficiency Income Indicator (Catalonia's sufficiency income indicator), i.e., 7.967€ per year (equivalent to 664€ per month). The same threshold is used to calculate the amounts of the Catalan minimum insertion income. Following the same line of thought, in 2007, the parliament of Catalonia enacted the law 12/2007 which clarified the competencies of the Catalonia region in the social services. The *Renda municipal d'inclusió* (B-mincome project) does not fit all the parameters stipulated in the 13/2006 law, as it is above 200€ and lasts for more than three or four months. Even in the case of the *Ajuts d'urgència social per a famílies amb infants de 0 a 16 anys* there were some interpretations that this wasn't a policy of social emergence. A stricter interpretation, based on the legal provisions, would tend to interpret the policy as unconstitutional (interview Torrens, 5 March 2020). The institutional configuration, *per si*, does not explain the emergence of the outcome. Although the legal-institutional framework did not allow for a policy like this to be implemented, the legal definitions helped to clarify the competencies of municipalities and preceded a set of policies that manifested themselves as antechambers of new innovative policies that were yet to come. The

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<sup>24</sup> Law 13/2006 of 27<sup>th</sup> of July of economic social benefits.

municipalities had already some competencies in social services (law 12/2007). Inside this scope municipalities could create policies of social emergency of specific, basic, and urgent nature, nevertheless, the municipality could not create a social policy of a large range, as this is an autonomous regional government of Catalonia's competence. Although the decentralization to the local level was very restrictive, they had little room for manoeuvre in this area. Nevertheless, Barcelona managed to implement an innovative policy that exceeds the parameters given by the regional government of Catalonia and which overcame the innovative scope of the SI in basic income-inspired policies in Europe.

The *Renda municipal d'inclusió* (B-mincome project) does not fit all the parameters stipulated in the 13/2006 law, as it is above 200€ and lasts for more than three or four months. We can say that the evolution of decentralization of competencies, with the new autonomous statute, opened a window for municipalities to start thinking of ways to innovate in the social domain. Having the knowledge that there was not much to do with the national/regional law in the social domain, the city council started to think of new ways to achieve the outcome (in this limitation and restrictive internal institutional framework).

*"...knowing that the town council has no legal powers in terms of creating new entitlement benefits, we had to move forward...between our desire to combat inequalities and the European Union's interest in promoting this type of initiative."* (Press conference Laia Ortiz, 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2016)

It was the own party of *Bcomú* who has acknowledge the fact that the city does not have the proper tools to develop a policy like a basic income in the municipality, as this is an autonomous government's competence. What factors led to the emergence of this policy in an unfavourable institutional context? Following the theoretical model, we will analyse if the greater the presence of more left-wing parties in the city executive, the more likely is for these policies to emerge. We argue that the role of the actors, with certain features, in relevant positions explains the emergence of the outcome on the local level.

[Process-tracing the Policy innovation of \*Renda Municipal d'inclusió\* \(a basic income-inspired policy\)](#)

#### 5.4. 2007-2016: Barcelona as a leftist city

We can say that Barcelona is a leftist city. Since the transition to democracy and free elections, the socialist party (PSC) has been in power most of the time, representing the traditional party in Barcelona. From Narcis Serra (1979-1982) to Pasqual Maragall (1982-1997), Joan Clos (1997-2006) to Jordi Hereu (2006-2011), there have been 32 years of the

socialist party. At the beginning of democracy in Spain, the socialists were in power in Barcelona (1979-2011) and Spain's central government (1982-1996) with the government of Felipe Gonzalez's (PSOE – the equivalent party at the central government). But this was not 32 years of isolated socialist government as there were some coalitions. First of all, in the first government of Narcis Serra, with an absolute majority, with the communists of PSUC, the conservative party of the *CiU* and the radical left of ERC. This coalition lasted until 1983, when new elections were held. Pasqual Maragall was already mayor by party vote when Narcis Serra was appointed defence minister in the Spanish central government at the invitation of Felipe Gonzalez. In 1983, there was a new coalition, this time without the participation of the Republican left (ERC). In 1987, the PSC revalidated its status as the party in power and formed a coalition with the Catalan Green Initiative (CI), a coalition that would last for two terms (until 1995). During the 1980s decade and with the entrance in the new decade of 1990, the city of Barcelona was known as the “Barcelona model”, mainly, because of “the urban policies implemented in the post-dictatorship period” (Perès et al., 2017: 38). This model was characterized by continued collaboration between the public, private and community sectors (Blanco, 2009 and Casellas, 2006). In 1995, a new and broader coalition, again with the PSC as the leading party, took shape. The Socialists formed a coalition with the Catalan Republican Left (ERC) and with a new political alliance, the *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds - Esquerra Unida i alternativa* (ICV-EUiA). This electoral alliance is the junction of the Catalan Green Left with the new party of the United Left (EUiA), founded in 1998. In 1996, Pasqual Maragall, president of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) since 1992, resigned from office. He was succeeded by Joan Clos until the 1999 elections, maintaining the coalition. In 1999, Joan Clos won with an absolute majority and formed a government with the Catalan Green Initiative (ICV) and the Catalan Republican Left (ERC). In 2003, the new elections put Joan Clos in the municipal executive with an absolute majority forming a coalition with Republican Left, and Initiative Greens. In 2006, when Joan Clos was appointed Minister of Industry by the central government, he was replaced by Jordi Hereu, who kept the same coalition. In 2007, the elections, again, gave victory to the PSC party and Jordi Hereu took place and a coalition between PSC and ICV-EUiA was formed. Only in 2011, the government of the socialist party was succeeded by a right-wing government, the conservatives of *CiU*. This year can be seen as a change in municipal executive as the socialists never came back to power as the leading party. Instead, in the 2015 elections, the left came back to power, but this time with a newly created party, *Barcelona en Comú*, which formed a government with the socialists being the second leading force.

Table 5. 8 - City council and government composition 2003-2015

Periods of governance	Ruling party in Barcelona	Ruling party in Generalitat	Ruling party in central government
1979-1982	PSC in coalition with ERC, PSUC, CiU	<i>Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya</i> (CDC)	<i>Unió de Centristes Democràtics</i> (UDC – Centre) (1981-1982)
1982-1997	PSC in coalition with PSUC (1983-1987) PSC in coalition with <i>Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds</i> (1987-1995)	CDC	<i>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</i> (PSOE – centre-left) (1982-1996) <i>Partido Popular</i> (PP) (Conservative) (1996-2004)
1997-2006	PSC in coalition with IC-EV i ERC (1995-2003) PSC in coalition with ERC and ICV-EUiA (2003-2007)	CDC in coalition with PSC + ERC (2003-2006)	PP (1996-2004) PSOE (2004-2011)
2006-2011	PSC in coalition with <b>ECV-EUiA</b> (2007-2011)	CDC with PSC	PSOE (2004-2011)
2011-2015	CiU	CDC	PP (2011-2018)
2015-2016	<b>Bcomú</b>	<i>Partit Democràtic</i>	PP (2011-2018)
2016-2019	<b>Bcomú</b> in coalition with <b>PSC</b> (05/2016-11/2016)	<i>Europeu Català</i> (PDeCAT – Catalan nationalist and liberal) <i>Junts per Catalunya</i> (Catalan nationalist conservative)	PSOE (2018-?)

Source: <https://www.historiaelectoral.com/mbarcelona.html> adapted from Blanco et al, (2020)

*The leftist coalitions between moderate left and left parties.*

Although the socialists were always in power since the beginning of free elections in Spain, even with a majority, they always did coalitions with other parties from the left spectrum. Since 1979, socialists had four majority governments in ten elections. They were the leading party on eight occasions. In every government, they did alliances with left parties of the Republican left (ERC), the green left (IC and EV) and the far-left of the communists (PSUC). As far as the right-wing parties, they did one alliance, in the first elections (1979), with CiU. The green-left and Republican left were parties that have always been involved in the city executive. From 2003 to 2015, ICV-EUA, ERC and *Bcomú* were present in every government except during the right-wing government of Xavier Trias (CiU). If we look throughout the history of Barcelona, since the transition to democracy, only with the exception of the right-wing government (2011-2015), there had always been political alliances between socialists and other leftists' forces and the legacy of innovative policies that Barcelona has were always due to parties further to the left of the socialist party (interview Gomà, 14<sup>th</sup> December of 2021). This position of the left parties in the government structure – executive commission or city council – had an impact on the policy-making policies in the city. Both from the leftist spectrum of policy ideology, they brought environmental, feminist, and anticapitalistic concerns to the agenda of the city government. These parties were involved in the formation of *Barcelona en Comú*, in 2015.

*Table 5. 9 - Framework of the ideology of the parties in Catalonia/Barcelona*

Left-wing			Right-wing	
Comunist s (CUP)	Republica n left (ERC)	Catala n Socialists (PSC)	Socia l liberals (C's)	
Gree n left (ICV- EUiA)	<b>Bcomú</b> ( <i>Podemos</i> , EQUO, Greens, alternative left, <i>Procès</i> and X movements)		Conservative s (CiU)	Liberal s (AP)

The ICV is a party founded on the basis of the ecological and environmentalist concerns of the 1980s. The ICV had been an alliance led by the *Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya* and

was the equivalent of *Izquierda Unida* in Catalonia. The ICV later became a political party and PSUC was dissolved. In the 2004 European Parliament elections ICV ran on the *Izquierda Unida* list. A Member of the European Parliament, Raül Romeva, was elected from ICV which joined the Green Group. ICV was part of the previous coalition (with the Socialist Party of Catalonia and the Republican Left of Catalonia) in the *Generalitat* of Catalonia. The coalition governed Catalonia from 2004 to 2010. The EUiA was born out of the 1997 electoral crisis of the Initiative for Catalonia-Els Verds coalition in 1998.


Table 5. 10 - City Council composition 2015-2019

Parties	City council composition
<b>Bcomú</b> ( <i>PODEMOS</i> , Catalan green initiative, united and alternative left, <i>procès constituent</i> and X movement and Equo)	11
CiU ( <i>Convergència i Unió</i> )	10
C's ( <i>Ciudadanos</i> )	5
ERC-MESBcnCO- AVANCEM-CatSí-AM ( <i>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya-Moviment d'Esquerres-Barcelona Ciutat Oberta-Avancem-Catalunya Sí-Acord Municipal</i> )	5
<b>PSC</b> ( <i>Partits dels Socialistes de Catalunya-Candidatura de Progrés</i> )	4
PP ( <i>Partido Popular</i> )	3
CUP ( <i>Candidatura d'Unitat Popular Capgirem Barcelona-Poble Actiu</i> )	3
<b>Total</b>	41 seats



# Basic income in Europe

Graphic 5. 1 - Progressiveness of the municipality of Barcelona



After the law 13/2006, ICV-EUiA was in coalition with the socialists. The consensual agendas between the two left-wing parties (ICV-EUiA) led them to establish a party alliance that lasted until 2011. The alderman for social affairs, Ricard Gomà, was from the EUiA party. At the time, who later became alderman was in ICV party and was part of the team of social affairs of the city council. In 2015, she became the alderman for social affairs in the *Bcomú* government and a key actor in the implementation of the *Renda municipal d'inclusió* (2017). In 2004, the Plenary of Barcelona City Council approved a Municipal Action Programme for 2004-2007, where the city committed to the elaboration of a Municipal Plan for Social Inclusion. The PSC and ICV-EUiA coalition designed a plan for social inclusion for the period of 2005-2010. In this plan, it was already underlined the relevance of the European Union and EUROCITIES in developing new and innovative actions at the local level. Barcelona was seen as a municipality of Europe. European Union established the relevance of the local and regional territorial dimension for the social agenda of Europe in the Nice Conference of 2000. The project "Cities Combat Against Social Exclusion" (CASES) funded by the European Commission through EUROCITIES enabled a set of "good practices" and recommendations for the improvement of social inclusion at the local level. The objective of this municipal plan for social inclusion was to establish a broader political and social commitment in the field of social inclusion by signing a broad Citizens' Agreement for an Inclusive Barcelona. This municipal plan was also of key importance because of the conclusion it drew. It enabled to understand that the city should focus more on the dimensions of social exclusion instead of poverty (interview Gomà, 14th December 2021). But, above all, this plan showed the first draws of the municipalism that characterizes the parties of the left, that being, innovative solutions for problems, affordable housing, "a city that intensifies the mechanisms and spaces of civic relations and democracy" (city council, 2004: 11). However, in 2011, Xavier Trias' party, CiU, won the Barcelona city council for the first time, changing the ideological paradigm that had marked the municipal executive until then. They counted on important support from the regional government as they were also in power in the *Generalitat*. However, in Barcelona municipal, they were a minority government, leaving the PSC with 11 seats on the city council, eight from the PP and five from the left-wing ICV-EUiA alliance. With a right-wing party in government, Barcelona implemented a social policy like the *Ajuts d'urgència social per a famílies amb infants de 0 a 16 anys*. It is like what Fishman (2019) has argued in his book "Democratic Practice" in certain revolutionary contexts (like the one Barcelona has), the plasticity of institutions was more given to the pressure of civil society and in this way, political and party identities could be formed in a more egalitarian sense and give rise to progressive coalitions and leave lasting legacies (Fishman, 2017). Although a social policy of emergency (aligned with the *Generalitat's* rules) the context of leftist politics in which the city council is immersed has effects on the city politics. During the 36 years of democracy, the left was,

## Basic income in Europe

without any doubt, the majority ideology in Barcelona's local government and they governed the city with coalitions to the left of the socialists (moderate left). But, in 2015, in the wake of the events of 2011-2014 with the economic crisis, Barcelona city council knew a new political organization that covered many of the left parties that were in coalition with the socialists in the previous years.

*2015-2016: Candidatura del cambio (municipalism ideology) – defining the problem stream.*

One of the main features of municipalist projects is going beyond state governance (Thompson, 2021). They seek to define the institutional contours of a new society”, involving a clear definition of the social realm while fighting for a more ecological society which is dependent on education and organization. The notions of municipalism are not just “an evocation of all traditional anti-statist notions of politics”, rather a municipalization of the economy, meaning “the custody of citizens in free assemblies” (Bookichin, 1991: 7). We find evidence of these features (of the municipalism) in the political organization project of *Barcelona en Comú* (Commons). This party was born from a civil society movement, *Guanyem* (let's win!), it was formalised in 2014 to run for the June elections of 2015 and aggregated Podemos, the Catalan green initiative, the united and alternative left (former coalition in the Barcelona city executive), the *proces constituent* and the X movement (Catalan pro-nationalism movement), and Equo (branch of Spain's green party in Catalonia) (*el periódico de Catalunya*, 28 of October of 2015). This aggregation of forces allows us to characterise this party as a progressive and nationalist radical green left party. It was with this party in local government that the municipality became more progressive, from the influence of left-wing movements, which up until here, were in second place in Barcelona politics. This movement was led by Ada Colau, an activist for housing evictions by those affected by mortgages (PAH – *Plataforma de Afectats per la Hipoteca*). This movement was created in February of 2009 and the main concern was to “change the laws and recover the right to housing” (Forti and Spina, 2019: 13). Ada Colau, as so many people who were starting to begin the adult life, knew the problem of finding a house in Barcelona. With the 2008 crisis and the new *Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil* from the Rajoy's government (2011-2018), which predicted that in case of insolvency, the person who contracted the mortgage would lose their house but still would have to pay the mortgage. This gave visibility to Ada Colau to form a movement that had the housing emergency as the main issue, a movement that was the antechamber of the party *Barcelona en Comú* (2015). In June 2014, in Barcelona, already after the RGC was delivered in the Catalan parliament (in 2011), Joan Subirats - academic and activist, Ada Colau - leading anti-displacement activist from *Plataforma d'Afectats per la Hipoteca* (PAH) and Jaume Asens - Lawyer - presented a manifesto that contained four reforming principles for the city of

Barcelona. The *Guyanam Manifesto* was based on the idea that it was necessary to win back Barcelona for its citizens (*Guyanam Manifesto*). The digital platform "*Guanyem Barcelona*" was made public on 26<sup>th</sup> June 2014 and had a great diffusion. In less than one month they collected 30,000 signatures, in December they decided to move towards the constitution of a party and the consequent submission to the municipal elections the following year (interview Joan Subirrats, 29th September 2021). The electoral programme was built around ideas like "taking back institutions", "winning back the city", and creating a "citizens municipal platform" ([barcelonaencomu.cat](http://barcelonaencomu.cat), March 2016).

*"Municipalism is self-government to achieve the best conditions that allow sustaining a common life worthy of such a name. Municipalism is deciding collectively to meet our wishes and needs, reversing a context of widespread retrogression of democratic rights and guarantees. Municipalism is simply doing democracy at the closest territorial level"*  
(Ganemos, 5/10/2014)

On 14<sup>th</sup> June 2015, *Bcomú* won in six districts (Ciutat Vella, Sants-Montjuïc, Horta Guinardó, Nou Barris, Sant Andreu and Sant Martí) in a contested election with *Convergència i Unió* winning in four districts (Eixample, Les Corts, Sarrià Sant Gervasi and Gràcia). The new government took office in July 2015, in the minority. When *Bcomú* took the local government, the mayor wanted to follow the example of Pascall Maragall (former Mayor of Barcelona between 1979-1995) when he was president of the *Generalitat*. *Pla de barris* was a policy that identified the main poor neighbourhoods in Barcelona, for an intervention of the government in essential areas like education, infrastructure, and sanitation. *Bcomú* wanted to replicate this idea by identifying these poor neighbourhoods and trying to reduce the inequalities between them by giving a municipal income to the people who were receiving and were eligible to receive this benefit (interview Torrens, 5<sup>th</sup> of March 2020).

In the electoral programme of *Bcomú*, in 2015, in the section of "fighting social inequalities and strengthening social rights", there was the idea of "establishing financial support for inclusion towards the people in poverty". The idea of creating a municipal income for people above the line of poverty was an electoral banner of the "*candidatura del cambio*" (agenda for change). As a metropolitan and cosmopolitan city, *Barcelona en comú* works to create networks of collaboration among municipalist movements around the world. This is a party that strongly believes that European politics has a direct impact at the local level, therefore the party proposed a municipalist agenda around the idea that Europe should defend life and the common good. *Barcelona en comú* had a very own vision of European politics of what it should be. A solidaristic Europe, for the community, that would stop evictions, make access to housing a right, and improve working conditions, against speculation. A "fearless Europe" that would

go beyond the nation-state logic, facing the politics of the State (government program of May 2016).

In May 2016, without a ruling majority, they formed a coalition with the historic municipal governing party, the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC), the “*Acord de govern d’esquerreres*” (government program of May 2016).

*"The crisis experienced in recent years, and still evident today, has revealed the need to rethink the order of priorities in political action. On the one hand, the economic and social crisis to which a speculative model has subjected us has harmed the vast majority of the population, generating an increase in inequalities everywhere. On the other hand, the distance between institutions and citizens has demonstrated the need to rebuild and rethink the ways of doing politics, to listen to the voice of all and to open up institutions to ensure their transparency and management at the service of citizens. To this end, public leadership is necessary to think in the interest of the majority capable of achieving new objectives for this new phase"* (left-wing government agreement for Barcelona, 2016)

This alliance gave the newly formed government stability to govern the city executive. The newly formed party of *Bcomú*, aggregating different “lefts”, became influential in the idea of a municipalism agenda. The party draw a document called “Municipalize Europe!” where they defended the idea of a “fearless Europe” in which municipalities would have the autonomy and responsibility to take an active role in policymaking. This is a party formed out of a digital platform called “*Guanyem Barcelona*”. Promoting local democracy was one of the main issues on the party agenda. “Politics of proximity”, protect local autonomy” and local self-government” were phrases enunciated in the document of the party and it formed the ideology of the party that promoted these ideas in European forums.

Table 5. 11 - *Municipalize Europe!*

<b>Main demands</b>	<b>Description</b>
Housing	Stop evictions; right to housing; against speculation, abusive loans and contracts
Social rights	Democratic access to water and energy
Working conditions	Improve labour conditions and working life
Networks of municipalities	Weave networks of collaboration with municipalities from across the continent towards shared goals, “a Europe of proximity”

Tax heavens	Create a list of tax heavens to account companies that operate in the municipality to contribute to the community
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**Source:** barcelonaencomu.cat, March 2016

In several areas, *Bcomú* had a true agenda for change, that deviate from what the previous governments had presented. Housing and social rights became two of the main demands. As the autonomous region of Catalonia restricted the powers of municipalities to create entitlement benefits that could respond to social problems, on 24<sup>th</sup> February 2017, with the delay in the approval of the *Renta garantizada de ciudadanía* (in the Catalanian parliament since 2014), *Bcomú* urged the *Generalitat* to take action on the social domain as they made an institutional declaration on economic benefits in which they urged the regional government to give freedom to the city executive to implement a municipal minimum income. This would enable the local government to take action in implementing a municipal income scheme in Barcelona, as promised in the programme by the party. However, as expected by the city executive, this declaration had no effect on the position of the *Generalitat* in this matter. *Generalitat* did not give powers to the municipalities to pursue local policies, instead, they restricted them. The reason was that, as they said: “a policy like this be implemented in the city and not in other regions” (interview Ortiz, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2021). Making an analysis of the most relevant ideological reasons behind the basic income-inspired policy, the only reason in the Barcelona case was “it is going to increase the territorial inequalities”.

Table 5. 12 - Perceptions of the political actors in the *Renda municipal d'inclusió*

Ideological thought	Barcelona
They believe that people know how to make the best judgement	0
it is going to increase the territorial inequalities	14,3%
They think that people will no longer want to work	0
They don't want to jeopardise the monitors' work	0
Don't want it to be unlimited	0

**Source:** MAXQDA, based on content analysis of interviews to relevant actors. Own creation.


#### 5.5. 2015-2016: Policy core belief.

The interpretation of the municipality is that there is a denial of the territorial diversity in the government of Catalonia which does not recognizes that there are specific problems in the city of Barcelona that need a specific answer, like the lack of housing at an affordable price or a high number of non-standard jobs and the way to do this is by giving more competences to the municipality to create new public policy in this area.

“Housing is a problem. I believe that living in Barcelona...an inhabitant of Barcelona has many more problems to have his basic needs guaranteed than an inhabitant from outside Barcelona, for two reasons. First, the RGC does not take into account the cost of living in Barcelona, and we have tried to approximate this idea with B-mincome.... then Barcelona is a city where many part-time or temporary jobs are generated, and this cuts the RGC benefit.”  
 (Interview Torrens, 5<sup>th</sup> of March 2020).

The housing emergency is a major problem in Barcelona, and it was a banner of the *Guanyem* movement and the *Bcomú* electoral programme. Ada Colau was the person behind this electoral banner as she was, for many years, the face of the *PAH – Plataforma de Afectats per la Hipoteca*. When the *Renda municipal d’inclusió* emerged in the agenda of the party was always associated with the idea of creating an income policy for the city that would respond to two main social problems, fragmentation of support / inadequacy of existing policies (e.g., minimum income) and excessive control and monitoring of the assistance policy.

Figure 5. 3 – Identification of problems by the advocacy coalitions<sup>25</sup>



The fragmentation of support / inadequacy of existing policies came as the main issue in the Barcelona case. This problem grew with the reform of 2011, and it was the main objection of the advocates of the *Renta Garantizada de Ciutadania*. This idea of creating a municipal income came from political actors, especially, under the political leadership of the public official, the alderman for social affairs, Lara Ortiz. Knowledge-based experts came into this policy-making process after the political leadership, hired by the alderman to integrate the policy-making process. Nevertheless, they had particular relevance in this process for various reasons. The descriptive analysis of the interviews’ content showed that of all the actors, politicians/ councillors and knowledge-based experts are the most relevant in the process for

<sup>25</sup> This graphic was based on content analysis of the interviews.

respondents, with political entrepreneurs coming third<sup>26</sup>. Although the vast majority of knowledge-based experts have as their main function "Designing, evaluating the policy and coordinating the team", which is the most expected function of the epistemic communities (Haas, 1992, Dunlop, 2016), the function of "Expressing European directives in a favourable way" and "Thinking about income policies to adopt" stand out in these cases. Apparently, new functions in the framework of the analysis of the role of epistemic communities in policymaking. Something that, apart from being new, connects very well with the theory of municipalism in wanting to create, for the city, innovative policies and to redefine the European project with a municipalist agenda (government program of June 2015). In the role of the political entrepreneurs, the role of "Promoting Basic Income" stands out, and in this role, two of the political entrepreneurs are also politicians/councillors. The next chapter will provide a detailed analysis of the strategies in which the PI emerged and the strategies of the skilled actors in the office.

#### 5.6. Developing an advocacy coalition in favour of a basic income

When *Bcomú* took power as the municipal executive, they started to work on a municipal income policy. This was the desire of Laia Ortiz, the vice of President Ada Colau and alderman for social affairs. In the first municipal assembly, 26<sup>th</sup> of June 2015, Laia Ortiz made it clear that *Bcomú* was going to start thinking about how to design a municipal income policy. Laia Ortiz had worked as the municipal executive with Ricard Gomà, when she was in the ICV party, in coalition with EUiA. Ricard Gomà is a professor of political science at UaB (*Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*) and, during the years 2007-2011, he had been the alderman for social affairs and a city councillor for welfare in the previous years, 2003-2007. They both worked in the development of social policies for the city executive during the mandate of 2007-2011 and they were both advocates of a municipal income policy. The work done alongside Ricard Gomà, between 2007-2011, opened the door for the continuity of innovative social policies.

*Hiring a social policy specialist and advocate of UBI – using the expertise to foster RMI.*

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<sup>26</sup> This analysis is done by counting the number of codifications, meaning, the number of times the interviewees refer to a main factor (e.g., "Expressing European directives in a favourable way", "Promoting Basic Income") so political entrepreneurs could also be mistaken by the politicians/councillors as some of them had positions in the local government.



## Basic income in Europe

After the first municipal assembly, the new elected public official, the alderman for social affairs hired a social policy specialist (minutes of the 26<sup>th</sup> of June 2015 assembly). As director of social innovation, Lluís Torrens had two major tasks:

- a) to express the European directive which is more favourable than the Spanish legislation and;
- b) b) to design and implement new social income policy solutions (interview Ortiz, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2021).

From the left spectrum of politics and in *Bcomú* there is not a clear position in favour of the basic income but there are relevant actors in favour of a municipal unconditional income like Gomà, Ortiz and Torrens (interview Gomà, 14<sup>th</sup> December of 2021). In fact, Lluís Torrens had been hired as a director of social innovation in the area of social rights. Seen as an “innovator” (focus group with IRDBCC<sup>27</sup>, 27<sup>th</sup> of October 2021) “he completely changed the way the municipality saw the social policy” (focus group with IRDBCC, 27<sup>th</sup> of October of 2021) because he was in that position.

*"Lluís Torrens is a key factor in all this. It's not just the political intensity that is important, but also Lluís Torrens' way of understanding things and grasping things. Lluís Torrens is an innovator and has a special vision of how to use technology. The fact that Torrens is in that social position has completely changed the way of looking at social policy in Barcelona"* (Focus Group with IRDBCC, 27<sup>th</sup> October 2021)

The idea of using expertise and know-how to interpret the rules of the game, that skill is very important in order for organization to bid for funding. Lluís Torrens had the know-how of the law, the technology, and the contacts of the evaluators of UIA. He was able to “move throughout Europe, to connect people” (interview Rebollo, 8<sup>th</sup> March 2022). This knowledge allowed the city executive to design a project to submit to UIA to bid in order to get funding from the European Union. In this sense, we can acknowledge this particular actor in assuming the role of a technology innovator in this process, meaning, a person who promotes “a technological solution to a societal ‘need’ or a policy problem” (Goyal, 2020: 46, Goyal et al, 2022). The integration of experts in the structure of local government resulted in the know-how of the legal European instruments. Lluís Torrens, having the specific task of “Expressing European directives in a favourable way”, adopted the following delegated act. Having the knowledge of European law and social policy he used his technical skills to express the European directive which is more favourable than the Spanish legislation. But he also used his “connections” in Innovative urban action, like Fernando Barreros, which had, previously, been

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<sup>27</sup> International relations department of Barcelona’s city council.

an evaluator of IUA (interview Ortiz, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2021). But he was also, an advocate for Universal basic income in *Red Renta Basica* (the UBI association) as a secretary of the Spanish network for basic income.

*Participation in European networks of municipalism – lobbying for the policy at the EU-level.*

Barcelona has a history with the European network of municipalism. In 1989, Jordi Borja, Deputy Mayor of Barcelona under Pasqual Maragall leadership (1983-1995), organised a conference in Barcelona about the role of cities in building a more united Europe, prepared for the single common market of 1986. This was the beginning of the EUROCITIES, a transnational municipal network which had been created by six European cities, Barcelona, Birmingham, Milan, Rotterdam, and Frankfurt. Large-scale cities were the main focus and Barcelona was one of the founding fathers. But this was not the only network in which Barcelona was enrolled. In 2004, it was created the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) which Ricard Gomà was president of the social inclusion commission. This is a platform that brings together local and regional government representatives from across the world to debate, share and advance collective initiatives on social inclusion, participatory democracy, and human rights. The headquarters are still set in Barcelona. There is a historical presence of Barcelona in international municipal networks (interview Gomà, 14<sup>th</sup> December 2021) and this presence was conquered by the city executive. Barcelona is a “paradigmatic example of the increasing influence of network governance in European cities” (Blanco, 2014: 7) as they are one of the “founding fathers” of EUROCITIES. EUROCITIES and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) are, perhaps, “two of the most successful attempts of consolidating the presence of cities in the politics of the European Union” (Blanco et al., 2018). Barcelona being one of the “founding fathers” of EUROCITIES and having the quarters of UCLG set in the city helped Barcelona become a municipality of Europe. Since the beginning of the foundation of Eurocities (in 1986), this was more than a way for the presidents of cities in Europe to meet. Eurocities began to make recommendations to the EU and Member States, taking a favourable position on the mobilisation of structural funds for urban issues (Eurocities, 2011 and 2019). When *Bcomú* enter the city government, they started to be active in the Eurocities platform, especially in taking social matters to the agenda.

*“I think this has always been on the agenda, but lately it has been top priority. There has always been political action on this topic, but with this government it has become one of three priorities of the city council of Barcelona....there is a difference between pre-Colau and the Colau government”* (focus group with IRDBCC, 27<sup>th</sup> October of 2021)

When *Bcomú* came to the city executive they started to be very active in EUROCITIES. *Bcomú* used its positioning, already acquired in the European networks of municipalism, EUROCITIES, due to their historical relation with this network, and the integration of experts with a sense of innovation in the governance structure. According to the civil servants working in the international relations office of the city executive, although previous governments had been present on the executive committee, it was very difficult to find a political representative who would go to Brussels to be part of the meetings....and this changed with the new government (*Bcomú*)...they started to be very active, politically, in EUROCITIES (focus group with IRDBCC, 27<sup>th</sup> October of 2021). The alderman for social affairs, Laia Ortiz, was elected president of the social affairs committee of EUROCITIES on 18<sup>th</sup> October of 2016, after one year as vice-president of the same committee and over a year in office as alderman in the city executive and vice-president of Ada Colau. As president of the social affairs committee, she put two themes on the table of discussion: housing emergency and income policies (interview Ortiz, 29<sup>th</sup> September of 2021). Barcelona became one active member in these issues alongside Ghent and Leipzig (EUROCITIES Social Affairs Forum, 2017).

The new social position as president of EUROCITIES was essential to put in the agenda the two main issues that the city executive of Barcelona and, particularly, Laia Ortiz was fighting for. Calling attention to relevant themes which cities were going through, especially at a time when Eurocities were having more relevance in urban politics. Laia Ortiz was a true policy entrepreneur in the sense that linked the city executive with social policy experts and fought for these matters on international platforms. Laia Ortiz is a politician who came from the young ecologists and the left green of Catalonia. A political trajectory is much related to the environment, feminism and socialism themes. Themes which many times are linked to the arguments in defence of the basic income idea. Feminism and the empowerment it could give to women (Robeyns, 2001) and an ecological basic income in defence of a greener and sustainable world (Pinto, 2018).

*“Laia Ortiz is a person who due to the knowledge she has, the sensitivity she has and the support and ideological line she follows, supports this. I am sure that today this would not have been possible. We are with the same party and the portfolio of social rights is with Bcomú, but the leadership is different, and this presupposes a change of priorities and sensitivities, and some are betting more for some things, others for others.”* (Interview Julia, 6th March 2020)

The difference between pre-Colau and the Colau government in the activism of Laia Ortiz in the EUROCITIES is intrinsically linked to the electoral programme of *Bcomú* which had a vision of Europe as an organization that should defend life and the common good of citizens. The

party wanted to take advantage of Europe and its resources in order to promote the principles in which they funded their candidacy. Being so active in Eurocities, it led Barcelona to establish proximity with cities such as London, Paris, Milan and Berlin, “and precisely these four cities, because of a more ideological coincidence, are the ones to which Barcelona still has more relations” (Focus group with IRDBCC, 27<sup>th</sup> October of 2021). But it was not just the leadership of Laia Ortiz and her enrolment in EUROCITIES that had a major impact on this new government, under the leadership of Ada Colau, the mayor, there were several meetings between city mayors, for the development of partnerships between cities. In May 2016, Ada Colau met with Bill de Blasio to discuss priorities in urban policies (Parés et al, 2017: 43) and in July 2018, she met with Anne Hidalgo, mayor of Paris to discuss strategies for tackling the challenges posed by housing and gentrification, climate change and innovation in large cities (Ayuntamiento de Barcelona website<sup>28</sup>, 2022).

*Alderman became President of the social affairs committee of EUROCITIES.*

On the 18<sup>th</sup> of October of 2016, the alderman for social affairs was elected president of the social affairs committee of EUROCITIES, after one year as vice-president of the same committee and over a year in office as alderman in the city executive and vice-president of Ada Colau. As president of the social affairs committee, she put two themes on the table of discussion: housing emergency and income policies (interview Ortiz, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2021).

*"...both at the level of the European Parliament and in the Committee of the Regions and Eurocities we requested a specific meeting with the Commissioner, and I had the opportunity to meet with her on two issues"* (interview Ortiz, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2021)

Barcelona became one active member in these issues alongside Ghent and Leipzig (EUROCITIES Social Affairs Forum, 2017). Barcelona, through its councillor for social affairs, was able to use its influence in the European networks of municipalism, EUROCITIES and in the European social forum, putting "on the table" issues such as housing and income policies that helped influence the debate at the level of the European Union.

*"Thanks to the European Commission, Urban Innovative Action focuses a lot on urban poverty issues, and this is relevant because the UIA, until then, had not had projects to fight poverty"* (interview Ortiz, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2021)

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
<sup>28</sup> [https://www.barcelona.cat/barcelonaciencia/es/noticia/paris-and-barcelona-a-common-front-for-the-right-to-housing-and-the-city\\_688672](https://www.barcelona.cat/barcelonaciencia/es/noticia/paris-and-barcelona-a-common-front-for-the-right-to-housing-and-the-city_688672).

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Table 5. 13 - Entrepreneurial activities and roles of the actors

Stream	Type of entrepreneur	Actor	Time	Role
<b>Politics</b>	Far-left-wing Political alliance	Bcomú	June 2015	Municipalism approach to local politics – “ <i>candidatura del cambio</i> ” (agendas for change)
<b>Policy</b>	Political	Alderman for social affairs and president of social affairs committee of EUROCITIES – Laia Ortiz And vice-president of social affairs committee	18/10/2016-18/10/2018 And 21/10/2015-18/10/2016	Fostering the policy, couple the streams
	Technology	Director of innovation	September 2015	Exploit policy windows; acquiring bid for funding

Graphic 5. 2 - Multiple similarity analysis of all documents “local conditions for innovation – Euromunicipalism”



**Source:** MAXQDA, based on content analysis of interviews to relevant actors. Own creation.

### 5.7. Agenda coupling on the EU-level and decision coupling on lower-level governance.

The coincidence between municipalism and the policy agenda of the EU through the “entrusted entity” of the Innovative Urban Action, which promotes “new, unproven and hence risky ideas” (DR 522/2014) means that the policy could have a greater variety of intensity since their goal is to fund and support innovations in the area of urban sustainable development that are relevant for the EU (art 8, 1303/2013 EU). The *Renda municipal d’inclusió* was supported by the European Union through the Innovative urban action which is a program from the European Union to support innovative actions of local governments (delegated regulation 522/2014). Based on Article 8 of ERDF, the European Commission adopted a delegated act that detailed the rules by which the innovative actions should be supported European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). This legal instrument of the EU, the delegated regulation of 522/2014, allowed local urban authorities with at least 50,000 inhabitants to set up proposals (article 2/a). These proposals had to fill some goals: a) they had to be new solutions; b) quality of the proposal; c) relevant partners; d) ability to achieve the proposed results; e) transferability of the proposed solutions (art 3/ a) b) c) d) e). Each innovative proposal can last up to 4 years (Art 3/6). This regulation bases its implementation on regulations 966/2012, 1268/2012 and 1301/2013. The entrusted entity for the evaluation of projects is urban innovative action (UIA). Urban Innovative Actions (UIA) is an Initiative of the European Union that provides urban areas throughout Europe with resources to test new and unproven solutions to address urban challenges (UIA website<sup>29</sup>, 2022). The *Renda municipal d’inclusió* was supported by the European Union through the Innovative urban action which is a program from the European Union to support innovative actions of local governments (delegated regulation 522/2014). Based on Article 8 of ERDF, the European Commission adopted a delegated act that detailed the rules by which the innovative actions should be supported European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). This legal instrument of the EU, the delegated regulation of 522/2014, allowed local urban authorities with at least 50,000 inhabitants to set up proposals (article 2/a). These proposals had to fill some goals: a) they had to be new solutions; b) quality of the proposal; c) relevant partners; d) ability to achieve the proposed results; e) transferability of the proposed solutions (art 3/ a) b) c) d) e). Each innovative proposal can last up to four years (Art 3/6). This regulation bases its implementation on regulations 966/2012, 1268/2012 and 1301/2013. The entrusted entity for the evaluation of projects is urban innovative action (UIA). Urban Innovative Actions (UIA) is an Initiative of the European Union that provides urban areas throughout Europe with resources to test new and unproven solutions to address urban

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<sup>29</sup> <https://www.uia-initiative.eu/en/about-us/what-urban-innovative-actions>.

challenges (UIA website<sup>30</sup>, 2022). This was seen as a continuity of the effort the European Commission was doing in pushing for innovation as in the European Council of 2000 which took place in Lisbon, innovation was designated as a strategic line of action (Parés et al, 2017: 34). But not only the EC was pushing in this direction as the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America were making efforts in this direction. The latter with the creation of the Office of social innovation (Parés et al, 2017: 35).

Table 5. 14 - Budget of the Renda municipal d'inclusió

	City executive		European Union
<b>Amount invested</b>	10.000.000		5.000.000
<b>What did it fund?</b>	<i>Renda</i>	<i>municipal</i>	Evaluation of the policy
	<i>d'inclusió</i>	(B-mincome	(questionnaires,
	project)		researchers, ethnographic
			work, social assistants)

This was viewed as a policy to help people, with the European stamp of approval (interview Torrens, 5<sup>th</sup> March 2020). The socialists did not oppose this innovative policy. This was the first time they were in a secondary position in the government structure, as they were always the leading party in government. In November 2016, they were not in power in the regional government or in the central government. They had a fragile position, and their strategy was to win power again. Maybe, if they were in power in the different levels of government, it would have been a discussion, but this did not happen when in government, they did not oppose. In October of 2017, with the referendum for the independence of Catalonia, *Bcomú*, which is for the independence of Catalonia, expelled the socialists from the city executive because they were aligned with the socialists of the central government – PSOE – which opposed any separatist referendum as it violates the provisions of the Spanish constitution that does not allow any vote on the independence of any Spanish region while judging any vote without its consent illegal. At the time, Catalonia was governed by the nationalist party of *Junts per Catalunya* and after the referendum, Charles Puigement was exiled in Belgium as he declared, unilaterally, the independence of Catalonia. In 2019 there were new elections for the municipality and *Bcomú* lost many seats in the city council, but an agreement with the socialists was done and Ada Colau stayed as mayor. With the arrival of the new government, came a new government structure and Laia Ortiz left the city executive. Her leadership was crucial for the emergence of the outcome as when she left the office the policy did not have continuity (interview Rebollo, 8<sup>th</sup> March 2022, Interview Julia, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2020). This acknowledges the

<sup>30</sup> <https://www.uia-initiative.eu/en/about-us/what-urban-innovative-actions>.



relevant role of the policy entrepreneur in fostering the policy, in “getting things done” by using their ability to explore and experiment (Jordan and Huitema, 2014a) and their high level of endurance (Audrestsch et al, 2021: 241).

Table 5. 15 - Structuring elements for social innovation and the emergence of *Renda municipal d'inclusió*

<b>Structuring elements</b>	<b>Actors and institutions</b>	<b>Main strengths of the elements</b>
<b>Evolution in the decentralization of competences</b>	<i>New Statut d'Autonomia de Catalunya</i> of 2006 Law 13/2006 of 27 July Law 12/2007	Clarified the competences of the municipalities in social welfare.  New parties in power (in coalition or in the leading government) started to think in social innovation policies
<b>Policy legacy</b>	<i>Ajuts d'urgència social per a famílies amb infants de 0 a 16 anys</i>	the configuration of the unconditionality
<b>Gaining the Political resources</b>	Barcelona en comú in power at the city executive (Podemos, ICV-EUiA, Guanyem, Procés Constituint, Equo) and the public official with the portfolio of social affairs	Non-traditional parties of the left spectrum in power (winning elections)
<b>Relevant position of the alderman in European networks of municipalism</b>	vice-president for the social affairs committee (21/10/2015-18/10/2016) president for the social affairs committee (18/10/2016-18/10/2018)	Representing Barcelona in the section of social inclusion (lobbying, calling attention for urban problems: housing emergency; income policies)
<b>Legal European policy instrument</b>	Regulation of 522/2014 – pushing for innovative actions	Allowed local urban authorities with at least 50,000 inhabitants to set up proposals (article 2/a)
<b>Existence of an “innovator” in the city council</b>	Director more highly committed to social innovation	Know-how of European legislation, technology, Network of contacts

But this innovation thinking towards regions and cities had been in place since Article 10 of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), in 1989. The evolution in decentralization opened new ways of thinking about local policies for local actors. After 2007, the city government of Barcelona started to push for innovative policies but, this was not just an initiative of the municipalities as the European Union was pushing for innovative actions in European Union. The delegated regulation of 522/2014 manifested the will of the European Union for innovation. Barcelona city council, with the newly elected government, was following the same direction with the setup of social innovators like Torrens. The city executive presented the proposal to the UIA in March 2016. In May 2016, *Bcomú* and PSC signed the “*proposta d’acord de govern d’esquerres per Barcelona*”, a proposal that stated the need for the city to fight inequalities. UIA delivered the final answer on the first of November 2016. Once UIA delivered the final answer, the city executive was prompted to present the project to the governing commission. The project and the policy altogether would be around 15/18 million euros, ten million by the municipality and five million by the EU/UIA (according to art 2/5 of the 522/2014). The policy itself would be funded by the municipality and the EU would fund the evaluation of the policy (researchers). Since it did not exceed 10 million, the city executive did not have to go to the city council to approve the budget, legally, they only have to go to the government commission which was represented by the parties in government, *Bcomú* and PSC.

The table above provides us with information regarding the structuring elements that led to the emergence of the innovative policy of *Renda municipal d’inclusió*, an unconditional minimum income. The four elements that make this case can be identified as the existence of political resources...the positioning of the city and the alderman in the European networks of municipalism...the existence of a legal European policy instrument such as the delegated regulation 522/2014 and the existence of an “innovator” in the city council.

These elements were fundamental to understanding the emergence of this policy innovation in Barcelona. Elements that were there in 2017 but lacked in 2010.

Table 5. 16 - non-existence of structuring elements in 2007-2011

<b>Structuring elements</b>	<b>Actors and institutions</b>	<b>Main strengths/weaknesses of the elements</b>
<b>Evolution in the decentralization of competences</b>	<i>New Statut d’Autonomia de Catalunya</i> of 2006 Law 13/2006 of 27 July Law 12/2007	Clarified the competences of municipalities in social welfare

<b>Policy legacy</b>		
<b>Gaining the Political resources</b>	ICV-EUiA in a political alliance with the PSC (not in the leading power)	Non-traditional parties of the left spectrum not in power in the city executive (not the main party in power) Control of the social affairs portfolio
<b>Relevant position of the alderman in European networks of municipalism</b>	President of the social inclusion commission of United cities and local governments (UCLG 2007-2011)	Relevant social position in European networks of municipalism (Not in Eurocities)
<b>Legal European policy instrument</b>		
<b>Existence of an “innovator” in the city council</b>		


Between 2007 and 2011, there was a small existence of the political resources but the party coalition ICV-EUiA was not in power but was part of a coalition with PSC, which was the leading party. However, they had control over the social affairs portfolio. The existence of a public official was also there and with a relevant position in a European network of municipalism, United cities and local governments but it was not in Eurocities which has a higher relevance in urban development policies. But the main elements that were lacking were the existence of a legal European policy instrument and the existence of an “innovator” in the city council. The existence of the structuring elements between 2015 and 2017 not only was fundamental to the emergence of innovative policies but also relevant to acknowledge cities as institutional actors capable of producing public policy.

5.8. Setting ACF into the Multilevel reinforcing dynamics context.

ACF is a framework that “brings attention to how individuals form coalitions and engage in various political strategies to learn and influence policy” (Gabehart et al, 2022: 1). ACF acknowledges the concepts of policy subsystem, belief system and advocacy coalitions. We were able to identify those concepts in this framework, making a significant change in our starting model of analysis (based on the MSF). ACF assume that political subsystems are the

main unit of analysis for understanding political processes. These subsystems are characterised by a geographical area, an issue and political actors. Subsystem actors include the participants who try to influence policy. The ACF assumes that political actors are rational and have limited cognitive capacities to process information.

Figure 5. 1 – Model of analysis of the Barcelona case – Euro municipalism



In this particular case, an advocacy coalition emerged composed by a politician/alderman (of left-wing), a social policy expert/UBI advocate who shared the same policy belief. This policy belief is the ‘glue’ of a coalition (Sabatier, 1998) as the actors share certain ideas, coordinate with each other in a functional way to suggest specific issues to the government and influence the decision-making process.

In the framework above we can identify the problem stream as the “Fragmentation of the support/insufficiency of income policies to tackle urban poverty and housing emergency” (as stated by the interviewed actors in the process). Having an external event such as a change in the government system, which led to the power a far-left progressive coalition party – *Barcelona en comú*, enabled actors in the political subsystem of the city council – department of innovation and social affairs – with the necessary (political) resources to foster their ideas (policy core beliefs). This was done through what we identified as an advocacy coalition between a political actor of the party elected and an expert/researcher in social policy and an advocate in favour of UBI. Together but with different roles, they acknowledge that the problem of Barcelona needed a solution and acted on another level of governance, the EU-level, in

## Basic income in Europe

order to open a policy window. Skilled actors operated on the EU-level, with different roles, and making it possible to couple the streams on another level of governance that made possible to apply at the local level. The hiring of an expert as the leading director of the innovation department who had the role of using the technical expertise and connecting people in Europe. The alderman, who became vice-president and later president of the social affairs committee of a network of municipalism for European cities called Eurocities, called attention for the main problems in the municipality. The first developed a project for funding in IUA and engaged with evaluators from the European initiative. The second, by getting relevant social positions in the structure of the network, called attention for the main problems in the municipality.

A note on the advocacy coalitions, according to the ACF, subsystems can aggregate the actors into one or more coalitions, and they happen on different levels. However, it is not the case here as the advocacy coalition happened on the local level. The fact that local actors operated on the EU-level in lobbying for the policy, resulted in a reinforcement of the dynamics across the local level and EU-level. Entrepreneurial activities on the higher-level facilitated the decision coupling and enabled the agenda coupling across the two levels. EU had, since 2014, various initiatives which enabled local governments to take actions in policy innovation in the social domain (ERDF article 8, 522/2024, IUA). European networks of municipalism were already a fact in the municipal context of Barcelona but having an alderman active in that network enabled to couple streams on another level of governance. Not only we were able to apply Multiple streams theory into the Multilevel dynamics' interdependencies, but we were also able to apply elements of the advocacy coalition, therefore, expanding the multilevel reinforcing dynamics framework.

### 5.9. 2020: an idea that still goes on

#### *Ingreso minimo vital, España y Renta Básica Universal, Catalunya*

On 13<sup>th</sup> January 2020, Spain, after an impasse in governance, formed a coalition with the far-left party of PODEMOS, one of the parties enrolled in the political project of *Barcelona en Comú*. A coalition like the one in Barcelona but with the socialists as the leading party.

In June 2020, in the wake of the COVID pandemic, the government approved the *ingreso minimo vital*. This was a policy developed to tackle the most vulnerable, a minimum income scheme across the country. In Spain, due to the decentralization of powers to the *comunidades autonomas*, they are implemented by region. After the Covid pandemic and the growth of poverty ratings, the new government had a necessity to respond to the poverty issue because of the discrepancies between regions. Therefore, in all of Spain, they started to have the *Ingreso minimo vital* which is 40% of the median equivalised net income in Spain. However,

the beneficiaries have the right to choose the most beneficial for them between the minimum income scheme of their region or the one from the State. Although there are some regions in which the benefit from the State is more beneficial, there are others in which the social assistance benefit from the region will be more beneficial. Beneficiaries are entitled to choose which one is more suitable for them.

On 14<sup>th</sup> February 2021, the *Generalitat* had new elections for the *comunitat autònoma de Catalunya*. In those elections, the socialists of PSOE, ERC<sup>31</sup> (republican left) and nationalists of JxCat formed the new government for the region. In June of that same year, the autonomous government approved the following decree – 245/2021. This decree proposes a *basic income office to plan strategically a pilot for a basic income in Catalonia* (article 3 of the decree 245/2021, 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2021). With more leftist parties in power, with agendas for change – PODEMOS (central government) and ERC (autonomous region) – ideas for innovation in the social domain such as the basic income, took another step. We can see the policy innovation in Barcelona as an example for other political systems to innovate in the same direction, as it influenced the national mood.

#### 5.10. Conclusions: Multilevel reinforcing dynamics: Municipalism and European agenda for innovation in the area of urban sustainable development

Municipalistic projects are characterized by their autonomy. Barcelona is a progressive municipality. In all the years of democracy, there were several left-wing political alliances, with the socialists in the leading power, but in 2015, the Left-wing progressive and radical party *Barcelona en Comú* won the electoral resources. This external event – change in the governing system (a new political formation in the city council) – was crucial to strengthen the municipalism idea. The findings of the municipalistic ideology that evidenced in this research verifies what the literature said about municipalism, as a particular political project emphasizing the ‘right to the city’, the ‘re-appropriation of institutions’ and the ‘municipalization of Europe’. As we literature showed, municipalism can be described as the “democratic autonomy of municipalities” (Thompson, 2021: 317) and linked with the left ideology. The “rebel” side of these projects is not just about new ideas, is about reorganizing the power relations between different tiers of government. It is about going beyond the state governance (Thompson, 2021).

This study emphasizes the strength of the connection between municipalism and the European Union. Moreover, it emphasizes the connection between universities and the academic world and the municipalities as the advocacy coalition was composed by a politician/alderman (of left-wing), a social policy expert/UBI advocate.

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<sup>31</sup> The acronym stands for three principles: Left agenda, Republic and Catalan Independence.

*Renda municipal d'inclusio* (basic income inspired policy) is a good example of the connection between 'new municipalism' and the European Union in policy innovation in the area of urban sustainable development. The newly formed political organization, with roots in civil society, gave origin to alliances of the radical left that won the necessary political resources to pursue the willingness and capacity to innovate. The empirical evidence of this case confirms our thesis which states that there are moments in which the institutional actors reproduce the existing framework and there are moments in which is possible for change to occur beyond the existing framework. The emergence of a new political organization, disruptive with a rebellion side (against the austerity measures of the higher-level government units), like the case of *Barcelona en comú* is one of those moments. The research has provided support for the municipalist argument, in which the municipalist ideological framework, evidenced by strong left-wing ideological attitudes such as the 're-appropriation of institutions', the 'right to the city' and the 'municipalisation of Europe', is the basis for supporting entrepreneurial activities that define the innovation process. The new elected public official saw the possibility of having the city of Barcelona as an institutional actor, meaning, having the capacity to develop an income policy, instead of being subject to the policies of higher-level governance (*Generalitat*). This policy core belief led to a "bottom-up" action via EU-level. It combined with European agenda for innovation in the area of urban sustainable development in which promotes "new, unproven and hence risky ideas" (DR 522/2014) means that the policy could have a greater variety of intensity since their goal is to fund and support innovations in the area of urban sustainable development that are relevant for the EU (art 8, 1303/2013 EU).

### *Highlighting the role of science in advocacy coalitions and the role of public officials*

Two actors were relevant the policymaking process by using the European networks of municipalism (which beyond the local level scope) and for acquiring EU funding and starting a local experiment of basic income-inspired policy. The new elected public official of the city council, the alderman for social affairs, identified the problem and made the necessary provisions to find a solution - hired a social policy specialist to a) to express the European directive which is more favourable than the Spanish legislation and b) to design and implement new social income policy solutions. In this case it applies the ACF as it is usually motivated in converting the beliefs of the advocacy coalitions into policy (Carboni, 2012).

The new social position as president of EUROCITIES was essential to put in the agenda the two main issues that the city executive of Barcelona had: housing emergency and income policies. The social position of the actors – vice and president of European networks of municipalism (Alderman of social affairs) – which were relevant to advocate the social problems and promote solutions on the EU-level and – the director of innovation in the

innovation office – which was able to use legal instruments to promote policy innovation. Policy entrepreneurs, as the literature states, are “highly sensitive to the context in which they work” (Westley et al., 2013: 27) and they have certain skills that are relevant to the pursuit of change. The capacity to bargain, of mobilizing or leveraging resources for their projects (in Westley et al., 2013) or a high level of endurance (Audrestsch et al, 2021: 241) are seen as key skills of the institutional entrepreneurs for innovation to emerge. According to Guldbrandsson and Fossum (2009), policy entrepreneurs are distinguished by the “claim to a hearing, political connections or negotiation skills and, most importantly, sheer persistence” (Guldbrandsson and Fossum, 2009: 439). “Entrepreneurship and innovation are intrinsically related as both involve the process of discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities (entrepreneurship) and novelties innovation” (Crossan and Apaydin, 2010: 1177). Our research acknowledges the same key skills of the policy entrepreneurs and of researchers as strategic policymakers (Gabehart et al., 2022). Our interviews emphasized the knowledge, sensitivity and support and ideological line of the alderman and the political intensity and the special vision of how to use technology and to look at the social policy of the director of innovation. These skills manifested the willingness, and they were of key importance to occupy relevant positions in political spaces such as EUROCITIES and to take advantage of European policy agenda for innovation. On the EU-level, the public official opened the policy window – by setting the problem onto the agenda of EUROCITIES, and the technology innovator opened the policy window by executing the technical part of designing a project for the policy (using the European law and an entity entrusted by the European Union to select innovative proposals). These are the best-positioned actors to take action as they are in governance structures of political relevance. These structures allowed them to have access to important resources such as European platforms of political influence and the directorship of strategic and planning offices.



### Chapter six

#### Dutch municipalities

#### 6. What is the story behind the basic income-inspired policies in the Dutch municipalities?

##### 6.1. Policy legacy

This section describes the evolution of the idea of basic income in the main parties of the Netherlands which set the idea onto the agenda and ends with the characterization of the *Weten Wat Werkt* (the most similar policy to the basic income idea in the Netherlands) in three Dutch municipalities: Nijmegen, Wageningen and Utrecht.

Since 1975, first with the Radical Party (PPR) and then in the 1980s with Democrats 66 and the Labour Party/social democrats (PvdA) entering the debate, the Netherlands had UBI on the political agenda (Vanderborght, 2004). The eighties decade, in the Netherlands, was a decade of high levels of unemployment (Kloosterman, 1994). By the mid-1980s, the Netherlands had almost one million recipients of the minimum income scheme (Cremers, 2018). The country was one of the first to implement a minimum income scheme, in 1965 (*Algemene Bijstandswet*) which replaced the Poor Management Regulations Act of 1854. The Netherlands has one of the highest minimum income schemes in Europe, alongside Denmark (Wang e Vliet (2016: 337) e Crepaldi et al. (2017: 73). When the economic system could not employ all, the basic income theme became a debate (Van Oijk<sup>32</sup>, 1985: 4). Like Loek Groot (2001) said in his doctoral thesis, whenever there were waves of unemployment growth, the UBI debate tended to emerge, and this was particularly true in those days. UBI emerged on the party agenda and in the political debate as a possible solution in the face of the problem of high levels of unemployment in the country.

The social democrats (PvdA) and D66 gave rise to heated debates in the 1980s on the UBI issue (almost two decades after the implementation of the minimum income scheme). The PvdA party even set up a working group on basic income. A kind of think tank, led by Paul de Beer (PvdA), and started in June 1985 (Vanderborght, 2004: 20). The D66, led by Maarten Engwirda, included the UBI proposal in the 1986 electoral programme, but with some nuances, namely the duty to seek work (Otjes and Lucardie, 2014) which removed the unconditional character of the measure, making it a Participatory Income in the image of that advocated by Tony Atkinson (1996). The internal discussion also included the question of the flat-rate system which "would give a lot to those who already have and little to those who do not" (Otjes and Lucardie, 2014).

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<sup>32</sup> Bram Van Oijk is the actual leader of *Groenlinks*. At the time, he was a member of the Radical Party (PPR), one of the parties that founded the *Groenlinks*.

For the PvdA it was an interesting case since their background emerged from a Marxist ideological matrix and with strong links to the workers' and trade union movements. The labour party (PvdA) takes after the traditional social democratic party which was founded in 1894 and represented the interests of the working class (NIMD and IPP, 2008)<sup>33</sup>. It is interesting because the idea of the “working left” being supportive of the basic income idea is not consensual, as we have seen in the literature. The Marxist ideology that characterized the origins of the party came to the Netherlands from Germany. Over time, and particularly in Wim Kok's first government, in 1994 and alliance with the liberals of the VVD and under the influence of the Labour English Party of the 1990s (New labour party), the party followed a “third way” route integrating elements of neoliberalism into a social democratic program. That was when the party first set the idea of their political programme (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014). The government programme for 1994-1998 under Willem “Wim” Kok's leadership introduced the idea of basic income into the agenda. Without committing to the idea as a possible policy for the Netherlands, the party underlined the feature of simplifying the social security bureaucracy system as the beneficiaries do not have to make active job search diligences. This reduces the monitoring tasks of social workers and the freedom to choose the work they want instead of being concerned about not having money to make ends meet. However, on the other hand, this policy would increase the spending budget. All things measured, the party chose to follow a strategy of “blame avoidance” which would leave the door open for future decisions about this but stating that the 'basic income can be tried on a limited scale and subject to certain conditions' (PvdA election program, 1994: 88). It was also during this period of 1994 until 2002, when the Wim Kok government left, that the green left became the main opposition party to the left of PvdA.

The 1990s decade was marked by the appearance of another party supporting the measure, the green left (*Groenlinks*) and by the appearance of the UBI's domestic network in 1991. *Groenlinks*, which was formed by a former politician of the Radical Party (PPR) went on to join the debate with D66 which was a social liberal party that had supported the idea since the 1980s. D66 is the second member of the liberal family (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014). In fact, in the European Parliament, they are part of the same political family – the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). However, it has not left its social matrix. Proof of this is a study on the issues that marked the Dutch parliament in 2012. On social and economic inequalities, the D66, although further to the right, appeared on the centre-left, followed by PvdA on the moderate left and *Groenlinks* and *SP* on the more radical left (Andeweg and Irwin,

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<sup>33</sup> The Dutch social democratic Labour Party (PvdA) was founded in Amsterdam on 9<sup>th</sup> February 1946 through the merger of the socialist social democratic workers' Party (SDAP) with the social liberal VDB (Free-thinking Democratic League), the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) and several prominent members of Christian socialist groups, the party established itself as the party of the socialist (social-democratic).

2014: 76 and NIMD and IPP, 2008: 16). It was the first party to emerge in the political spectrum with environmental concerns. In 1989, *Groenlinks* came along and filled that space. Emerging from the dissidents of four political forces – the communist party (CPN), the socialists' pacifists (PSP), the radical Catholics (PPR), and the progressive evangelists (EVP – which was funded by progressists of the CDA party), they are characterized by its environmental and multicultural issues.

These two parties, GL and D66, along with the Labour party, made UBI the debate in the year of 1995 (Vanderborght, 2004). In 1994, the PvdA, the D66 and the VVD "agreed on the principle of UBI, but not on the amount" (Vanderborght, 2004: 21). Incidentally, from 1985 to 1994, UBI was on the political agenda of several parties (Groot and Veen, 2000), even discussed at the national level at a parliamentary level during Wim Kok's 1994-1998 government composed of a PvdA majority coalition with VVD and D66. At the time, the PvdA minister of social affairs, whose main aim was to reduce unemployment in the Netherlands, opposed the proposal although in the election program for the 1994-1998 government, the party, with appropriate caveats, stated that "basic income can be tried on a limited scale and subject to certain conditions" (PvdA election program, 1994: 88). Even in the party most in favour of UBI there is no consensus among its members, also, due to the internal divergences of the different factions that make up the party, such as the *Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij* (PSP) and the *Communistische Partij van Nederland* (CNP). Something identified by authors such as Erik Olin Wright (2002) or Levin Oldman (2018), who refer to the opposition of parties with a strong trade unionist slant and a Marxist vision of labour relations (holders of the means of production and holders of the productive force, in Marxist language) as the justification for opposition to the unconditionality of the UBI, but the same is no longer true concerning social assistance of a conditional nature in activation. After the 1998 government, the UBI debate waned, to the extent that in 2002 one of the most vocal parties and UBI advocates, the *Groenlinks*, removed the idea from its electoral programme. The idea came to the party agenda in the electoral program for the elections of 2014.

Table 6. 1 – Ideas of the main parties towards Basic income and minimum income schemes

<p><i>Groenlinks'</i> Social assistance complements to the Electoral program, 2014</p>	<p>"<i>Groenlinks</i> wants to give municipalities the space and financial means to stimulate participation in their own way. They can experiment with new forms of social security, such as a basic income, in which freedom of choice, appreciation and development are key: "fewer rules, more room to win"</p>
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<i>Groenlinks'</i> Social assistance complements to the electoral program, 2014	"Assistance is not a favour that makes you dependent and subordinate to a patron... the current policy is paternalistic and distrustful... We believe that every human being is a full citizen, and that freedom should be developed. We believe in individual responsibility, emancipation, and commitment"
Interview Hoeijmakers, 26th June 2021	D66 did the same but with a less pronounced emphasis on the basic income idea as D66 were kind of hesitant to talk about the word "basic income"
Electoral program D66	"D66 wants to investigate whether it is possible to reuse this article (Art <sup>o</sup> 83/PA act)
Electoral program D66	"D66 shares the opinion that minimum schemes should certainly be used for the target group"

In 2017, following the legal possibility provided by art<sup>o</sup> 83 of the PA Act (2015), six municipalities tried to change the policy paradigm of the PA Act law and implemented an experimental innovative policy that deviated from this approach, the *Weten Wat Werkt* (2017). This was seen as a Basic income-inspired policy (BIIP) as it presented a feature of unconditionality which is linked to the idea of UBI. Its unconditional character as opposed to strong compulsion requirements for activation under penalty of severe sanctions that could lead to the loss of the benefit made this idea a banner of the electoral programmes of parties such as *Groenlinks* and D66. But, while it allowed municipalities to deviate from the workfare approach, it also enabled them to do this autonomously as the central government would have a "say" in this initiative from the local governments.

## Basic income in Europe

Table 6. 1 - Social assistance basic income-inspired policy (Weten Wat Werkt, 2017)

	Household Typology	Age	Income	Residence	Basic necessities				Reduction Rate	Total
					First member	Second member	Child	Child policy		
<b>Working</b>	Single Household	25-65			1026€				1026€	
	Single-parent household	25-65; 14Y			1026€		314€		1340€	
	2 adults	25-65			1465€				1465€	
<b>Unemployed</b>	Single Household	25-65	600€		1026€			300€	1326€	
	Single-parent household	25-65; 14Y	1552€				150€		1702€	
	2 adults	25-65	600€		1465€			450€	1615€	

**Source:** documental analysis

Looking at the scheme of the policy in Table 18, the generosity of the amount stayed the same as the existing minimum income scheme in the Netherlands (*Bijstand*), not having any modification. The great modification of this innovative policy comes with the unconditionality towards activation, meaning the beneficiary is no longer obliged to carry out active job search diligences, or vocational training, among others. There is also the possibility for the beneficiary to earn extra money on top of the benefit, accumulating benefits with income. However, contrary to Barcelona, this is not unlimited as the beneficiary can only amount up to 199€ of extra money.

Through this analysis, we are able to see that the debate around UBI is not new in the Netherlands. Since the 1970's there were parties discussing this and even putting the idea on their agenda, even mainstream parties like the social democrats (PvdA, D66) afterwards, in the 1990's decade, with *Groenlinks* but we still lack to explain how this experimental innovation emerged at the local level. The political programs, at the national level in 2014 and 2015 (which coincided with the reform of 2014 and implemented in 2015 of the PA act law), stated the position of parties like D66 and GL about the idea of having fewer conditions in the social assistance policy. In previous decades, although there was the idea "in the air" mainly due to parties like D66 and PvdA through the creation of working groups on this theme and even the putting the idea on the political program, there were never motions in favour of this idea. The next chapter will describe the institutional framework in which this policy was implemented.

## 6.2. Institutional framework

1992-2015: separating the expenditure side and the revenue side.

On 12<sup>th</sup> March of 1992, through the Municipalities Act (*nieuwa Gemeentewet*, 1992), the Dutch states-general initiated a state duty to promote local autonomy as the most efficient way to respond to problems. Article 117 of the law recommended the promotion of municipal autonomy by the acting minister of the interior – "Our minister (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations) promotes decentralisation for the benefit of municipalities" and "Proposals for measures where certain issues are considered part of the national or provincial policy are only made if the issue in question cannot be represented efficiently and effectively by municipal authorities.". This new law was seen as a relevant source towards administrative renewal around the large municipalities. Dieuwke IJtje Willems Nauta (CDA) was, at the time, the secretary of state responsible for the new law under the third Lubbers government. Former alderman in Sneek, he was the representative of the progressive sector of the Christian Democrats (CDA). A coalition between labour/social democrats (PvdA) and Christian democrats (CDA) governed the Kingdom of the Netherlands between the years 1989-1994.

This was the third Lubbers government after two mandates in a row, since 1982 but with a different political alliance, the VVD.

The Netherlands is known for not having large party electoral majorities. The party that had the highest percentage elected was the Christen-Democrats (CDA) in 1989 with 35.3% (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014). This forces parties to colligate between them to form a government. All levels of government, usually, involve coalitions of two or more political parties (Breeman et al, 2015). In the entire history of the Netherlands as an independent state, there has never been a single-party government, only coalitions between two up to six parties (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014). The government is formed through a *formateur* – a politician appointed by the King (usually from the most-voted party) to conduct a negotiation between the different parties to form a coalition<sup>34</sup>. Like many other countries, powers are divided into three tiers of government, nationally, regionally, and locally. On the national level, the parliament (Staten-Generaal) consists of two bodies, the first and second chambers. The second chamber is the one with the most powers, as they are entitled to make laws (in collaboration with the government), they have the duty to 'keep an eye on the government on behalf of the Dutch people' (NIMD and IPP, 2008: 32). The first chamber is known as 'the senate' and it can only accept or reject bills that have been passed by the second chamber, but only entirely, they cannot amend them. On the local level, the mayor is appointed by the government, in effect by the Ministry of the Interior<sup>35</sup>. The alderman is elected by the people and is responsible for the content of the program, as they are the ones elected, and they have to address the democratic arena of the city council and have to defend the policy proposals. Contrary to the councillors, who are amateurs, meaning, they usually do their work in municipal politics alongside their normal jobs, the alderman is a full-time job (NIMD and IPP, 2008: 62-65). Lijphart calls the Netherlands a "semi-federal" system with a "symmetrically bicameral" parliament. The fact that central power, despite the transformations achieved since 1992, still places the appointment of Mayors and provincial governors on the central government (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014: 216). The executive is chosen by the voters of the municipality, but the mayors are appointed by the central government. A measure that contrasts with the evolution of municipal autonomy. Remnants of an over-centralised system, as Lijphart calls it, a "semi-federal" system that has already had attempts to change the system. There was a

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<sup>34</sup> In the Netherlands, the monarch is officially part of the government, as opposed to Sweden. In that sense, "the monarch asks the vice-chairman of the council of the state for advice on the political situation and, on that basis, the monarch can appoint a *formateur* to take charge of the negotiations, often the leader of the largest party or, instead, the monarch can appoint a *informateur* to investigate how the government can be formed (usually a politician who enjoys the respect of many of the parties). If the *informateur* can come up with a majority coalition, a *formateur* finishes the job (NIMD and IPP, 2008).

<sup>35</sup> The municipal council often presents a list of two candidates to the minister of the interior and the minister usually appoints the first person on the list.

proposal of the Democrats 66 in wanting to have direct elections of the mayors and the direct election of the Prime Minister or *formateur*, instead of the King's appointment. However, these attempts had no consequences.

In October of 2003, the Work and Social Assistance Act was implemented under the supervision of the Secretary of state, Mark Rutte, which had the social security and unemployment portfolio. It was the first government of Jan Peter Balkenende (Kabinet Balkenende I) with a majority of the CDA (Christian Democratic Party), allied with the VVD (liberals) and the LPF (Party of Pim Fortuyn). This was a right-wing liberal coalition with a populist slant, which thus vindicated in the law on work and assistance, a more controlling and activation of the citizen-beneficiary, foreseeing some competencies for the municipalities. This law-initiated municipalisation with the decentralisation of some competencies of the State, which remained the creation of social assistance laws and income policies, for the municipalities. The law states: "The Municipal Council establishes rules on the target group for the salary cost allowance and the amount of the salary....the municipal executive may contract third parties to implement this law, subject to the determination of the rights and obligations of the interested party and the necessary assessment of their circumstances....the competence in implementing the policy was assigned to the municipalities" (*Wet werk en bijstand*, 2003). Municipalities received two budgets, one to pay benefits and one to spend on labour market activation measures. If the municipality spends less than what has been allocated, it keeps the remainder, but if more needs to be spent, it is up to the municipality" (Blommesteijn and Mallee, 2009: 6). The revenue side is basically fixed. There is not a policy-making process in this line as the amount of money is fixed. However, If the municipalities disburse less than the amount given to them, then they can use this money for other purposes. So, the expenditure side and the revenue side are separated. The expenditure side is determined by the caseload – how many people apply to the local city office for the welfare benefit. The municipality gives 1026€ per month (for the minimum income scheme in the Netherlands), for a single-person household.

*"The funds for the Participation Act are part of the general distribution of the Community fund. Formally speaking, municipalities are free to use these resources in all sorts of ways. This is not a decentralisation benefit in this way or a specific benefit. I must formally say that municipalities have the freedom to use these resources in all sorts of areas, but I know that the directors I have spoken to will use the resources that may remain with the "no-risk policy"*  
(intervention of Klijnsma in the national parliament, 10th November 2016)

All the policy-makers have the incentive to look for efficient ways to organize welfare services (interview Groot, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2022). This decentralisation of competencies allowed



municipalities to control and execute policies (with more autonomy) and implement new solutions, if there was money left. The policy regulation of the Work and Social Assistance Act, like almost all of the minimum income schemes in Europe, implied some rules for the attribution of the policy, such as being registered in the employment centre, being available to accept a job or accepting some professional training, although there are some exemptions. For example, citizen-beneficiaries who have children up to five years of age may be exempt from seeking work. However, this exemption is based on prior assessments by the social monitoring services and is temporary in nature (Blommesteijn and Mallee, 2009). It also provided special conditions for young people up to the age of 27. Here the municipalities are obliged to give them a wide range of opportunities to ensure that they are skilled enough to secure a place in the labour market and can offer one-off cash supplements that provide a sufficient safety net until they find a place in the labour market (Blommesteijn and Mallee, 2009). The social assistance model in the Netherlands is generous, but also demanding in terms of activating the citizen-beneficiary and this period, was, particularly, marked by a paradigm shift from a passive to an active welfare state (Hemerijck, 2013) which culminated in the Participation Act law.

In February 2015, it was implemented the *Participatiewet* (Participation Act, 2015) in the Netherlands. In coalition with the social democrats (*'Paars kabinet'*), the majority government of the liberals (Kabinet-Rutte II), with Mark Rutte as prime minister, the Participation Act was implemented. This was a reform of the *Wet werk en bijstand* of 2003 (Work and Social Assistance Act, 2003). This new law gave municipalities, in the Dutch provinces, the ability to make policy decisions on child and youth support, long-term care, and income policies. Municipalities, in the Netherlands, now have more administrative and financial autonomy over these policies. The Work and Social Assistance Act (9/10/2003) already allowed municipalities to be responsible for "welfare to work" social assistance programs, however, this decentralization process has expanded this responsibility (Vermeulen, 2015). This process allowed municipalities to have more efficient management of the costs of providing social support (Boersma et al, 2013 and Vermeulen, 2015). But, as it gave more autonomy and responsibility over to the municipalities, it had a clearer orientation towards activation, a workfare approach of the social assistance policy, and that responsibility passed to the municipalities. They would have to demand "compensation" (*tegenprestatie*) from social assistance beneficiaries who did not apply for work. Although this new law put a great emphasis on workfare, it also allowed municipalities to deviate from this approach through an innovation article (art. 83<sup>o</sup>) which allowed municipalities to implement an experimental innovation policy. The PA act introduced an important element of workfare, the so-called "service in return" (*tegenprestatie*) (Van der Veen, 2019: 2). The name of the Participation Act was intended to create the idea that there was a counterpart to a state benefit, namely, the

participation in society (for the money they receive of the State). In addition to new conditions for citizen participation in society, more restrictive conditions for access to social benefits were also created (Van der Veen, 2019). Something that became known as the transition to the 'participating society' (Jong and Vonk, 2019: 166). With this paradigm shift in social policies, the issue of workfare emerged in the Netherlands, through the centre-left and left parties, mainly because of the economic crisis of 2011. Changes in the governing structure comprise the rational reorganization of governments in response to social and economic pressures (Bannink and Ossewaarde, 2012) and this was contemplated in the participation act. As it was necessary to control the budget, the liberals (in coalition with the social democrats) made adjustments in the law so that people would have to be very active in their job search and would leave the benefit for employment.

Just after establishing the central government coalition in 2012, the social democrats agreed on a "social agreement" with the liberals. This social agreement was essential for both parties. For VVD to not let the government fall and for the PvdA to get their social agenda onto the government. However, the economic constraints of the time led the VVD to find support to cut four million euros in the government's budget in the parliament from the right-wing parties, particularly the Christian democrats (Het Parool, 12<sup>th</sup> April of 2013). In order to control the costs, the state would have to be more aggressive with the beneficiaries of social assistance. The new law did not have so much to do with the decentralization of powers, because that was already there with the Work and Social Assistance Act (2003), but it had more to do with the idea that the "right to a welfare benefit must be balanced with more stringent duties" (interview Groot, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2022). The law had to be stricter in order to control better the budget spent on social benefits. This works because "it makes people unhappy in the social security system, so they leave" (interview Sanders, 5<sup>th</sup> July 2021). But, while it emphasized the conditionalities with strictness and rigidity, it also allowed municipalities to deviate from these conditions as long as they ask the central government for permission, which left the Central state with a "say" in the implementation of experimental innovation policies (Heeger-Hertter, 2019: 92). Article 83 allowed the following: "an experiment may, on an experimental basis, derogate from the provisions or pursuant to articles 6 to 10, in order to examine the possibilities of implementing this law more effectively with regard to employment and financing; an experiment referred to in the first paragraph shall last for a maximum of three years. If, before the end of a trial, a bill has been submitted to the States General to convert it into a structural statutory regulation, the trial may be extended until the bill comes into force; the Minister may designate municipalities at his or her request to participate in an experiment. Rules are made by or in accordance with an Order of Council in respect of the application of this authority". These three rules of article 83 allowed an opening for experimental policies within a policy innovation that could go up to

three years in duration. It could be structural if, before the policy expires, a request to convert the regulation into a structural policy was submitted to the central government.

The institutional incentive of the PA Act gave the opportunity for actors to mobilize around social change. In a previous study about these basic income-inspired policies in Dutch municipalities, Neuwinger (2021) identified three types of constraints for why these policies ended up being not a basic income as the promoters wanted but rather something remotely resembles. The legal issue gave the possibility for the policy to emerge (Van der Veen, 2019: 2), but the political constraint aligned with the economic constraint restrained the success of the policy. There are institutional actors which reproduce the existing framework and there are moments in which is possible for change to occur beyond the existing framework. Our argument is that the emergence of new political players and the alliances that are built can be one of those moments and a particular feature for these policy innovations to emerging at the local level. Following the analytical framework in Table 1, we will analyse the legal-institutional framework that allowed these experimental policies to be implemented, the ideational legacy in the parties' agenda: *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA), *Socialistische Partij* (SP), Democrats 66 (D66) and *Groenlinks* (GL), the evolution of progressive political alliances in local governments throughout the years 2002 to 2018, the relevance of the epistemic communities and public officials in the policymaking and how the institutions as veto players help us explain the adoption of the innovation and its shape. The new institutional configuration in the Netherlands allowed municipalities to deviate from the orientation of the central state, allowing them to implement experimental innovation policies. They had a favourable institutional framework, however, despite this fact, the Dutch municipalities did not innovate as much as other cities (e.g., Barcelona) and did not take advantage of the available resources. Why? What factors explain the emergence of this policy innovation? We will analyze the parties in the Netherlands and their linkage to the idea of UBI through the analysis of motions and political programs since the first years the idea came around.

### 6.3. Ideology

2002-2018: left and centre parties in the Netherlands.

Parties are often described as “progressive” or “conservative”. Following the NIMD and IPP (2008) argument there are two ways of categorizing a party as “progressive” or “conservative”. First, we can say that a “progressive party is reform-minded while a conservative party wants to keep things as they are” (NIMD and IPP, 2008: 16). A good example of this is the political position of the D66 party in electoral reform. Another way is the position of parties in moral matters, such as homosexuality, abortion, or euthanasia and the willingness to use the State’s

intervention to restrict those freedoms. In this view, parties who are progressive believe that the state “should not interfere with the way people wish to live their lives and should not patronise them” (NIMD and IPP, 2008: 16-17). This argument is particularly relevant if we think about the arguments of the basic income defenders related to conditionality. This is seen as a state’s paternalism of treating the beneficiary-citizen with distrust (in their willingness to work). So, if a party is keener in defending maximum personal freedom, then, it would be characterized as progressive. By this line of thought, parties like D66, VVD, GL, SP or PvdA are ‘progressive’. In the analysis of the Institute for Public and Politics (IPP) and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the political parties appear in the following positions, from the left to the centre, Socialists (SP), Greens (GL), ChristenUnie (CU), Labour / Social-democrats (PvdA), social-liberals (D66). The D66 comes from a liberal family, and, in Europe, they are represented in the same European family as the VVD, the European liberal democrat and reform party (ELDR). But, the D66 has been assumed as a much more reform-based party, compared to the VVD and their social component puts them in the centre of the Netherlands politics.

Table 6. 2 - Framework of the ideology of the parties

Left		Centre	Right
Socialists (SP)	Christian Union (CU)	Social liberals (D66)	Liberals (VVD)
Green Left (GL)	Social Democrats (PvdA)	Christian democrats (CDA)	

Source: NIMD and IPP, 2008: 16

However, there is a catch as the parties, traditionally in government, tend to be change-averse as they are not represented on the radical side of politics like the social democrats, liberals, or Christian democrats. These three main parties in the Netherlands are commonly characterized as centre-left and centre-right parties, respectively. In this analysis of the municipal elections from 2002 until 2018 we can categorize the most progressive parties as the ones represented on the left (*Groenlinks*) but not the mainstream parties (PvdA, SP)<sup>36</sup>, meaning parties that are traditional in government coalitions (at the national level) since the II WW (1945). Due to their positions throughout the years, we can identify them as *Groenlinks*,

<sup>36</sup> The mainstream parties are parties that are usually in governance. The major parties in the Netherlands are PvdA, VVD, CDA and SP.

SP<sup>37</sup> and even D66. These parties, particularly the D66 (1966), although older than the GL (1990), have been growing their political position in the local elections. The enlargement of the left spectrum, in the political system, is something that has been happening over the years in the Dutch political landscape. If there used to be a strong mobilisation of the left in a single party – the PvdA, today the left spectrum splits into the PvdA, *Groenlinks* (which has been growing on a local level mainly), the SP and also D66 (Velden, 2010).

Following the typology of Kruyt (1959), the table above shows how the different institutions enter the four pillars of the Dutch system, mainly socialists, liberals, Catholics, and protestants, between 2014 and 2018.

Table 6. 3 - Distribution of actors and institutions linked to the policy by the “Dutch pillars” between 2014-2018

“DUTCH PILLARS”	PARTY			
	UNIVERSITIES	IN CENTRAL GOV	PARTY IN LOCAL GOV	NEWSPAPERS
<b>SOCIALIST</b>	Amsterdam University	PvdA	<i>Groenlinks</i> (Utrecht, Nijmegen)	<i>Het Parool</i>
<b>LIBERAL</b>	Utrecht and Groningen Universities	VVD	<i>Democrats 66</i> (Utrecht, Wageningen)	
<b>CATHOLIC</b>	Radboud University e Tilburg University			
<b>PROTESTANT</b>	Amsterdam University		<i>Groenlinks</i> (EVP)	

**Source:** own creation, adapted from Kruyt (1957 and 1959), Andeweg and Irwin, 2014: 36 and Lijphart (1968)

In Kuyt’s typology, Amsterdam University, *PvdA* and *Groenlinks* and *Het Parool* are linked to the socialist pillar. Utrecht and Groningen universities, *VVD* and *D66* are linked to the liberal pillar. The protestant pillar can be linked to the Amsterdam University and the *Groenlinks*, as they were formed by a faction of the evangelists of the *CDA*.

<sup>37</sup> SP, although newly than PvdA, has also Marxist-Leninist roots and, because it has always maintained true to its roots due to it did not follow the influences of other ‘third-way’ movements of the labour/social-democratic parties, it has denounced the way in which PvdA reach compromises with other parties on social and economic topics.

*Progressiveness of municipalities*

If we look at the evolution of elected parties in the city councils, we can identify an evolution of progressive parties in local governance.

Table 6. 4 - Parties most voted by municipality, 2002-2018

Municipalities	Parties most voted			
	2002-2006	2006-2010	2010-2014	2014-2018
<b>Utrecht</b>	—	PvdA; <b>GL</b> ; VVD; <b>SP</b> ; CDA; <b>D66</b>	<b>GL</b> (10); PvdA (9); <b>D66</b> (9); VVD (7); CDA (4); SP (3)	<b>D66</b> (13); <b>GL</b> (9); VVD (5); PvdA (5); <b>SP</b> (4), CDA (3)
<b>Wageningen</b>	<b>GL</b> ; PvdA; CDA; VVD; <b>D66</b>	PvdA; <b>GL</b> ; <b>SP</b> ; VVD; CDA; <b>D66</b>	<b>D66</b> (6); <b>GL</b> (5); PvdA (4); VVD (3); CDA (3); Stadspartij (2)	<b>D66</b> (5); <b>GL</b> (5); Stadspartij (5); PvdA (3); CDA (2); VVD (2)
<b>Nijmegen</b>	<b>GL</b> (9); PvdA (8); <b>SP</b> (6); CDA (5); VVD (4); <b>D66</b> (1)	PvdA (11); <b>SP</b> (7); <b>GL</b> (6); CDA (5); VVD (4); D66 (2)	<b>GL</b> (8); PvdA (8); <b>D66</b> (6); <b>SP</b> (5); VVD (4); CDA (3)	<b>SP</b> (8); <b>GL</b> (8); <b>D66</b> (7); VVD (4); PvdA (4); Gewoon Nijmegen

Source: <https://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen/detail/TK19940503/623189>

Between the years 2002 and 2018, there has been an increase in the representation of progressive parties in local elections, particularly the D66. Since the 2010 elections, its representation has been growing, in the three municipalities, which made it possible to have representation in the city executive, being part of a coalition, as we can see in the table above.

Table 6. 5 - Composition of the city executive (government coalitions), by municipality (2002-2018)

Municipalities	Political alliances			
	2002-2006	2006-2010	2010-2014	2014-2018

<b>Utrecht</b>	————	————	<b>GL; D66;</b> PvdA; VVD	<b>D66 (7);</b> <b>GL (4); SP</b> <b>(3); VVD (4)</b>
<b>Wageningen</b>	————	————	————	<b>D66 (2);</b> <b>GL (3);</b> Stadspartij (1)
<b>Nijmegen</b>	PvdA (3); <b>GL</b> <b>(2); SP (2)</b>	PvdA (3); <b>GL (2); SP</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>D66 (3);</b> <b>GL (3); PvdA</b> <b>(2); CDA (1)</b>	<b>GL (3);</b> <b>SP (3);</b> PvdA (2), Nijmeegse Fractie (1); VSP (1)

**Source:** <https://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen/detail/TK19940503/623189;>  
[https://www.huisvandenijmeegsegiedenis.nl/info/Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen\\_2006](https://www.huisvandenijmeegsegiedenis.nl/info/Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen_2006) and  
city government programs

This evidence showed us the “progressiveness of the municipalities”. We noticed that some of the parties that can be characterized as “progressive” have been gaining prominence in local governments since 2010. That was the case with the Green Left, the Democrats 66 and the socialist parties. The progressiveness of the municipalities is not only measured by the most elected parties for the city council but also, mainly, the parties that are part of the city executive, forming a coalition. Progressive alliances are characterised by coalitions, traditionally, between a social democratic left and liberals (Wheatcroft, 2010). Every municipality in the Netherlands has a council and an executive. The council is elected for a term of four years, just like the aldermen but they are not full-time workers like the aldermen<sup>38</sup>. They receive a general allowance and an allowance for expenses. However, they have representative, controlling and policy-making functions (NIMD and IPP, 2008: 63). Parties like GL and D66 have become more influential in the city’s executive of Utrecht, Nijmegen and Wageningen. This is particularly true in the case of D66. Between 2002 and 2010 they were residual in the local elections but after 2010, they became more active in the local governments of these cities, even being part of coalitions in the city executive. This was the case in Utrecht municipality in the local elections of 2010, on the 4<sup>th</sup> of March 2010. *Groenlinks* emerged as the main party and started a coalition between D66, PvdA and VVD. It was called the “green, liberal and social” alliance. In the elections of 19th March of 2014, D66 were the major party

<sup>38</sup> The alderman cannot be a councillor at the same time.

(with 13 seats) and won the portfolio of income and work in a coalition that entailed the GL and SP. In the same elections, in the municipality of Wageningen, D66 and GL were also the major parties in the city council and together with the local party of *Stadspartij* made the city executive coalition. The two major parties that came out of the elections were the D66, with the portfolio of participation, economic affairs, and finance and *Groenlinks* and led the city executive. In Nijmegen, the same progressiveness representation of the parties was maintained, having a more leftist coalition with GL, SP and PvdA.

In the three municipalities, there were progressive parties in government coalitions. GL, D66, SP and partly the PvdA, were the main players (interview Hoeijmakers, 26<sup>th</sup> June 2021). They were the ones who were enrolled in the city executives and city councils, they were the ones presenting motions in the city council and setting the issue in the party's agenda. The fact that the initiative came from the left and centre parties in progressive alliances at the local council and since the presence of D66 and *Groenlinks* grew in local governments, the idea entered the political agendas of these parties, allows us to say that the more progressive alliances a municipality has, the more likely is for these policies to emerge. Nevertheless, there were other municipalities which were interested in this initiative but did not adopt it. Eindhoven, Den Bosch, Arnhem, and Roosendaal were another four municipalities in which their mayor showed interest in having this policy experiment. Most of them lacked progressive party alliances in their city executive. In Arnhem, there was, also, a progressive alliance in their executive. D66, GL and SP together with CDA were part of the city coalition and Mark Coenders (from *Groenlinks*), councillor of Arnhem, joined the municipal network in spreading UBI. In fact, between 2015 and 2016 a network of convergence for the possibility of experimenting with a UBI begins to be designed among the various municipalities. 42 municipalities emerge on the political scene as possible sites for political experimentation. Councillor Mattias Gijsbertsen (*Groenlinks*) from Groningen was in contact with the Social Democrats' MP, Lodewijk Frans Asscher (PvdA) to negotiate the possibility of promoting a benefit that would not be cut off when a Minimum Income recipient started working. On 6th February 2015, the deputy mayor of Den Bosch, Jan Hoskam (VVD), also interested in UBI, and a supporter of the reworked version of the budget that the PvdA presented, saw in that budget the possibility to channel money into a UBI test. The mayor of Den bosh (CDA) himself, started a network of contacts with his counterparts in Tilburg and Eindhoven for the hypothesis of a joint RBI test. However, on 16 June 2015, after town hall meetings, the Den Bosch executive decided to abandon the idea in the face of opposition. The following week, on 22nd June, the mayor of Rosendaal - Hans Verbraak (CDA) – breathed new life into the municipal network and involved Tilburg in a possible new UBI test proposal.



Process-tracing the *Weten Wat Werkt* (a basic income-inspired policy)

6.4. 2010-2014: the emergence of progressive party alliances in the city councils

The election on the 4<sup>th</sup> of March 2010, in Utrecht, put Victor Evehardt (D66) as the new elected public official for public health portfolio, for the mandate 2010-2014. In an election where the Green Left emerged as the main party, D66 were part of a coalition that had two more parties, the PvdA and VVD. It was called the “green, liberal and social” alliance. In the elections of 19<sup>th</sup> March 2014, D66 emerged as the major party (with 13 seats) and won the portfolio of income and work, this time in a coalition between GL, SP and VVD.

Table 6. 6 -2014-2018 Utrecht city elections

<b>PARTIES</b>	<b>CITY COUNCIL COMPOSITION</b>
<b>D66</b>	13
<b>GL</b>	9
PVDA	5
<b>SP</b>	4
<b>VVD</b>	5
CDA	3
CHRISTIAN UNION	2
ANIMALS PARTY	1
STUDENT PARTY	1
INTEREST FOR THE CITY	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	45 seats

In the same elections (of 2014), in Wageningen’s municipality, D66 and GL were also the major parties in the city council and together with the local party of *Stadspartij* made the city executive coalition. The two major parties that came out of the elections were the D66 and *Groenlinks* who led the city executive.

Table 6. 7 -2014-2018 Wageningen city elections

<b>PARTIES</b>	<b>CITY COUNCIL COMPOSITION</b>
<b>D66</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>GL</b>	5
SP	2
VVD	2
PVDA	3
<b>STADSPARTIJ</b>	5

CDA	2
CU	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	25 seats

In Nijmegen, there was a more leftist coalition with GL, SP and PvdA in the city executive. The GL had the Portfolio of welfare and social assistance.

Table 6. 8 -2014-2018 Nijmegen city elections

<b>PARTIES</b>	<b>CITY COUNCIL COMPOSITION</b>
D66	7
<b>GL</b>	8
<b>SP</b>	8
VVD	4
<b>PVDA</b>	4
CDA	2
VSP	2
JUST NIJMEGEN	2
NIJMEGEN GROUP	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	39 seats

In the three municipalities there were left and centre, all progressive parties in government coalitions, between 2014 and 2018.

### 6.5. Defining the problem


When the 2014 elections were held, there were some municipalities that were applying the Work and Social Assistance Act (2003) in a more rigorous way, following a strict workfare approach towards the beneficiaries of the welfare. The new law required local municipalities (responsible for implementing social assistance policy) to demand a “compensation/service in return” (*tegenprestatie*) from social assistance beneficiaries who did not apply for work. However, municipalities were allowed to decide what this “compensation” would be. Rotterdam, during the mandate of Marco Florijn (PvdA), which had a majority of right-wing council composition<sup>39</sup>, applied a “strict” policy of the social assistance law of 2003. Social beneficiaries were obliged to firm a document one day every week (Binnenlands Bestuur, 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2018), or to get up at 7 am to pick up trash off the streets (interview Sanders, 5th

<sup>39</sup> The city board of mayor and aldermen was formed by three parties: Leefbaar Rotterdam (right populist), D66 (social-liberal), and CDA (Christian-democratic).

## Basic income in Europe

July 2021), dressed in fluorescent waistcoats, very similar to those that under-age criminals sentenced to community service have to wear (interview Betko, 23rd June 2021). The period of implementation of the policy lasted until 2014 when the new participation act was approved. In October 2014, it was approved the PA act law, which was implemented in January 2015. The idea of the central government was for municipalities to be even stricter in the workfare approach (interview Sanders, 5<sup>th</sup> July 2021 and Betko, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2021).

Figure 6. 2 – Identification of problems by the advocacy coalitions



The excessive control and monitorization of social assistance are linked to the case of the Dutch municipalities. Although this was put on ‘paper’ as a policy innovation experiment with fewer conditions than the existing welfare scheme, the idea was to reduce, and “relax” the social assistance workfare rules. There were parties, from the right spectrum against this initiative. However, since the beginning of the process, the Dutch municipalities, and particularly the public official of Utrecht, the new elected alderman for income and work, manifested a clear motivation for doing this. His motivation was to change the PA Act law and its philosophy of workfare approach: “I wanted to change the system...change the law” (interview Evehardt, 15th February 2021).

In Utrecht, Victor Evehardt was “dissatisfied with how this process regarding the distribution of social benefits was having and very dissatisfied with all kinds of new regulations from the central government” (interview Groot, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2022). He was seen as an “experimental alderman” for what he did in legalizing Marijuana treatment (interview Sanders, 5<sup>th</sup> July 2021). When the 2014 elections came, the D66 (who won the elections) started to think about how they could put onto the agenda an idea such as basic income. Driven by a law that gave municipalities powers to pursue the orientation for a workfare approach of the central state, D66 were kind of hesitant to talk about the word “basic income” (interview Hoeijmakers, 26th June 2021) but this particular public official was in favour of the idea and started to promote it in the city council (interview Evehardt, 15th February 2021).

The motivation for local actors to mobilize around this social change was, intrinsically, related to the way the Work and Social Assistance Act (2003) was being applied by social services. Between 2010 and 2014, D66 was already putting this idea onto the agenda, but once the new law of social assistance emerged, in 2015, the idea of having fewer conditions for welfare beneficiaries became more and more relevant.

The new elections and Victor Evehardt having the portfolio of income and work gave the leading party (D66), the political resources they needed to pursue this idea. In fact, the two major parties that came out of these elections were in favour of this idea, the Democrats 66 and *Groenlinks*.

In Wageningen, like in Utrecht, the party responsible for the initiative in favour of BIIP was the D66. Dennis Gudman (D66) who was the alderman of economic affairs and finance, was also active in promoting this idea in the city council. And like in Utrecht, the major concern was in how the national government was applying the social assistance policy (2003-2014), with a strict and rigorous workfare approach. That was when the first ideas of basic income started to emerge in the Netherlands.

In 2014, Rutger Bregman, a journalist in the Netherlands newspaper “De Correspondent” wrote a series of articles about Basic income. The articles were later compiled into a book called “Utopia for Realists: The Case for a Universal Basic Income, Open Borders, and a 15-hour Workweek” (2016). On 12/04/2015, there was a television series in the Netherlands called “*tegenlicht*” that went to the air. The social context that the Netherlands lived in at the time, like in all of Europe, was of economic crisis. All of these events, together, helped to shape the societal climate in the Netherlands and putting the basic income idea into the agenda of parties and also to have local actors interested in the idea.

#### 6.6. Developing an advocacy coalition on the subnational level and decision coupling on national level

In the Netherlands, most municipalities have committees made up of experts. These committees are given a remit by the municipal executive to make recommendations (NIMD and IPP, 2008: 63). Therefore, it was not surprising they appeared In Utrecht, when the D66 were part of the coalition government, between the years of 2010-2014. The secretary of the D66 party and member of the programme committee of D66 (assuming a role as party expert) was an economist at Utrecht University and advocate of UBI, Mark Sanders. As an academic, he had a particular interest in the economy of sustainable development, innovation, and entrepreneurship. He is a social security economist by training with a higher motivation in the idea of basic income. As the right-hand of the alderman, Sanders and Everhardt, during the first mandate, started to get in touch with the social assistant officials to know how they felt

about having to comply with so many measures of the Work and Social Assistance Act (2003). Everhardt was “pushing on the political side” and Sanders was “working in the shadow behind him to set a policy in a responsible way” (interview Sanders, 5th July 2021).

When they started to interview the state’s officials about how they applied the law and what it should be done to improve, they came across a perception that the social assistance needed more instruments to do the work effectively (Interview Sanders, 5th July 2021). When D66 conquered most of the votes in the city elections of 2014, Victor Evehardt became the alderman for income and work and started to execute the programme. This was about the time when Loek Groot, a professor of economics with a thesis on basic income (“Basic Income and Unemployment”, 1999), entered the project of designing the policy. Mark Sanders was building a team with a prospectus of having the approval to design the policy. Stephanie Rosenkranz, another professor of economics, and Timo Verlaat were also invited by Mark Sanders to help design the project.

ACF is usually motivated in converting the beliefs of the advocacy coalitions into policy (Carboni, 2012). Sharing the same views on economy of sustainable development, innovation, and entrepreneurship and being against the workfare approach of the state towards citizens, an advocacy coalition started to compose, in the city council. It was composed by public officials, party experts, researchers, but also project leaders. In Wageningen, once the motion was approved in June, the city executive hired an independent advisor as a project manager to design a project a BIIP. Hans Zuidema had the task of not only preparing the proposal to deliver to the minister of social affairs but also engaging with the epistemic communities of Wageningen and Tilburg University. Ruud Muffels was the leading researcher in designing the policy and engaging the scientific community of all the cities in this policy innovation.

In Nijmegen, April Ranshuijsen and Lisa Westerveld, councillors from *Groenlinks* party, presented a motion that was approved on the 21<sup>st</sup> of October 2015. Although *Groenlinks* were part of the left coalition in the city executive (GL – portfolio of welfare and social assistance, SP and PvdA), the motion was presented by these two deputies of the city council. This motion was the most radical and innovative of the three motions presented in the city council. SP and PvdA also presented motions. The motion from the SP party was not that different from the GL. The PvdA presented the less innovative policy design of all. The *Groenlinks* motion did not predict any limit on the amount the beneficiary could accumulate, and it predicted the amount to be earned by the beneficiary to be equal to the amount of the social assistance minimum income. The SP proposal predicted the amount of extra money, on top of the benefit: “Participants in the experiment may earn extra, with half of the net additional services being offset against the benefit”. If the additional earnings on an annual basis net exceed C 12,000, the excess will be fully offset against the benefit. On balance, this allows a beneficiary to earn C 500 net per month on average annually”. As for the PvdA motion it only predicted the

possibility for the beneficiary to earn extra money settled at a “maximum €196 per month”. The motion from PvdA’s party was not more than a proposal for the beneficiary to earn extra money on top of the social assistance amount, settled at a “maximum €196 per month”.

In Wageningen, there was one motion written by Mark Goebbels (D66) and submitted in the city council. On 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2015, the motion was approved by D66, *ChristenUnie*, PvdA, *GroenLinks* and *Stadspartij*. Of all the parties represented at the city council, only the right-wing liberals of VVD did not approve the motion. A month after, in July, the mayor of Utrecht, Jan Van Zanen, was elected president of the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG). VNG was in favour of trying out a new approach to social welfare policies (VNG press release, 27/06/2016) and is seen as the most important organisation in municipal representation and the 2<sup>nd</sup> phase of decentralisation (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014: 218).

In all the municipalities, they were all parties of the centre and left spectrum, never on the right spectrum of politics, which is in line with the ones that argue that basic income is more popular among leftist parties (Lee, 2018, Parolin and Siöland, 2020 and Vlandas, 2020). These parties were the ones setting this idea (of having fewer conditions in the social assistance) in the agenda, submitting the motions and approving them. The interest of some parties in the idea is not new, as we showed previously with D66, GL and PvdA. However, there were new parties that entered this alliance in favour of the motion which doesn’t have the tradition of arguing in favour of the basic income, like the CU or SP. But this was not put in motion as a UBI idea, but rather as a policy which was unconditional in the activation, allowing the beneficiaries to complement their benefit with earnings from work. It was never formulated as a UBI but rather as a way to restrict the workfare conditions associated with the PA Act. The idea of trusting people, instead of the mistrust that the Work and Social Assistance Act (2003) and the participation act (2015) were promoting, was the baseline of the motions the main parties in the municipalities were presenting.

*The role of public officials in heading the negotiations with the higher-level governance: the home of Staten-Generaal (Den Haag)*

The first hearing with the minister of employment and social affairs, headed by Jetta Klijnsma (secretary of employment and social affairs/PvdA) was on the 25<sup>th</sup> of September 2015. In October 2015, Utrecht, Groningen, Wageningen and Tilburg started those negotiations, at the same time Nijmegen voted in favour of the motions to implement a BIIP. In December 2015, Nijmegen entered the negotiations. This process of negotiation, between municipalities and The Hague (home of *Staten-Generaal*), was led by the alderman of the Utrecht municipality, Victor Everhardt (interview Everhardt, 15<sup>th</sup> February 2021 and interview Hoeijmakers, 26<sup>th</sup> June

2021). The alderman from the biggest city of all the five cities involved was the leading actor in the negotiations with the minister of employment and social affairs.

Victor Everhardt assumed the position of leading the negotiations, “pushing on the political side”. During a year of negotiations with the minister, there were five meetings with the municipalities. After this year of negotiations, there was a preliminary text from the secretary of employment establishing a few rules that contradicted the parameters that were in the motions from the municipalities. The PA annex, as it was known (Van der Veen, 2019: 6), stipulated the counterpoints of the proposal. In this document, it was said that: a) people, once they started to benefit from the policy, they would not be able to leave even if they wanted to; b) there would have to be an increase in the intensification of the conditionality to counterbalance the current minimum income schemes (which, by the PA act law, were already very intensive in their workfare approach).

The municipality of Nijmegen entered the negotiations after the date of the first hearing with the central government. By that time, the other cities, Utrecht, Groningen, Wageningen and Tilburg, were already in negotiations with the secretary of employment (after their city councils approve the motions in favour of the BIIP, in June and July). One factor that led to this delay was the fact that, unlike Wageningen or Utrecht, the initiative did not come from the city executive but from the city council. As we have previously seen, councillors are not full-time workers, but they have representative, controlling and policy-making functions.

### *The role of science in advocating in the negotiations*

In Nijmegen, the motion from SP and GL specifically demanded the presence of scientists in the policy design and implementation: “Scientists or experts have to be closely involved in the elaboration, implementation and evaluation of this experiment. The implementation and evaluation must be scientifically sound”. Once the motion was approved and it was clear that the municipality would enter the negotiations with the central government for the implementation of a BIIP, the municipality hired, as a project manager, a researcher of the Nijmegen University who was already enrolled in the municipality as a policy advisor for social assistance. Janos Betko had the main task of how this policy innovation was possible within the legal framework of the Netherlands. He was also a PhD researcher at Radboud University. The cities that had adopted this policy innovation, all have universities, having privileged contact with the epistemic communities of the respective universities. In Utrecht, the linkage to the epistemic communities was in the social position of local academics, from the University of Utrecht, in the party staff as members of the programme committee of D66. In Wageningen, this was done through a project leader, an acquaintance of Mark Goebbels (D66) that was hired to design the project and build a network with Ruud Muffels who, then, led the research design

and engaged the scientific community around this project. In Nijmegen, the engagement was done through a researcher at the Radboud University and a civil servant at the municipality of Nijmegen. The scientific community entered the negotiations and tried to convince the minister that this was a “no way out” (interview Groot, 8th February 2022). This process of convincing the minister took another year but, in the end, the government gave in to their demands. However, the second demand was not dropped, and the municipalities had to check on the beneficiaries every once in a while, but this was done with another control group (interview Betko, 23rd June 2021 and Groot, 8th February 2022). But this was not what was expected by the actors in the process and what was on the motions approved in the city councils. On the municipalities' side, all the motions, presented by the parties, wanted the beneficiaries to enter and stay voluntarily and not oblige the beneficiary to stay with the benefit. The beneficiaries would have the possibility of opting out whenever they wished. Also, the policy would be unconditional which meant that there would be no obligation of applying for a job and no sanctions if people did not do that. The amount would have to be the same as the social assistance policy in the Netherlands. The main objection of the central state to this proposal from the municipalities was two-fold. The social assistance program is supported by civil servants from the government, so they are the ones that monetarize the beneficiaries if they are looking for work, etc. If the social assistance is unconditional, then their job is put in question. Moreover, even if the conditionality characteristic has no effect on the participation of people in the labour market, the fact is that, by insisting they will eventually find work. Since they want to keep the system as it was designed, they wanted to show that the conditionality is a good thing because it makes people find work (interview Groot, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2022).

When the municipalities presented their motions, and what they wanted to do with the PA act, to the minister, there was a lot of resistance, mainly because of the liberals. In 2015, PvdA party was also in the central government in coalition with the liberals (VVD), who were against this policy. VVD did not want this policy experiment to go forward. This coalition governed the Netherlands between 2012 (November) and 2017 (October). It is only natural to think that the party with government responsibilities at the national level, with implications for the municipalities as they were the ones that had to approve or reject this initiative, that the same party, although in a different level of governance had to act accordingly.

The ministry which was from the social democrats was against the PA Act from the beginning, participating in the street protests against the PA Act reform at Den Hague (Het Parool, 25<sup>th</sup> February 2016). But she was in the government with the liberals and just like what happened in the social agreement of 2012 when they did the coalition, PvdA had little room to manoeuvre. The rules presented in the PA annex made the negotiations reach an impasse, as the municipalities became very keen on dropping out of this initiative. The first rule was the main problem because once the scientific community was involved, they would have to pass



this proposal to an ethical committee and from an ethical point of view this was not acceptable (interview Betko, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2021 and Groot, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2022). Finally, the municipalities agreed on controlling the beneficiaries in a cooperation style and not sanctioning them.

The presence of the epistemic communities gave more confidence to decision-makers and helped to minimise uncertainty around innovation with the knowledge they implemented in the policy innovation. This gave the police the robustness and structure that was desired for which the civil servants and aldermen were no different to it. These communities attract the attention of policymakers because they are a "distinct voice whose language is rooted in ideas rather than interests" (Dunlop, 2016: 276). In this particular process, the party expert, researchers and project leaders assumed a role as technology innovators and evidenced the role of science and the expertise of research in advocacy coalitions. It was previously evidenced the role of these particular actors as strategic policymakers in the climate change field (Gabehart et al., 2022). But this case, shows how they can operate as strategic policymakers in the social policy context, as well. It is the power of knowledge that makes these policies flourish in conditions of uncertainty which characterize most of the time the decisions of policymakers. With the knowledge of the social scientists, a guarantee of merit was provided and that was essential to negotiate the terms with the central government the parameters that would determine the policy. This was a crucial step in the policymaking as, after the first hearing with the minister of social affairs and employment, the scientific community in the project became part of the meetings with the minister of employment and social affairs.

### *The appearance of a political broker*

Besides the local actors, a particular individual helped to promote the idea. Sjir Hoeijmakers, a recent graduate from Tilburg University (after a bachelor's in mathematics and physics at Utrecht University) developed a crowdfunding campaign around the idea of basic income. Member of the D66 party and an advocate for the basic income he worked as an advisor, assuming the role of process broker for the municipalities to achieve the implementation of the *Weten Wat Werkt*. Although he had no formal employment, in order to promote the idea, he did a series of basic income talks and helped the municipalities that wanted to innovate in this matter (*Algemeen Dagblad*, 1<sup>st</sup> of June 2015). This type of actor is very common in the ACF theory. Its role is mainly of mediation between different coalitions, and its "principal concern is to find some reasonable compromise which will reduce intense conflict" (Sabatier, 1988: 133).

### *2016: A coalition between progressive left and centre parties in higher-level governance*

On 10<sup>th</sup> November 2016, there was a plenary at the second chamber of the general state (the House of Representatives in the Netherlands). On this day, a member of the parliament from the GL party, Linda Voortman urged the ministry to give more room for the beneficiaries to accumulate more money when they find work, to increase the duration of the experiment and abolish the intensification group.

*“One of the good aspects of the Participation Act is that the law puts the responsibility on the municipalities...One of the great wishes of municipalities was to experiment with assistance without repression and nonsensical rules but with more additional income and freedom. They wanted to experiment with social assistance, based on trust within this strictest welfare law ever”* (intervention of Voortman at the national parliament, 10<sup>th</sup> November 2016)

In this plenary, Linda Voortman put her finger on the wound and implied that the idea for the PA annex was a choice from the party in the coalition, the VVD. After the plenary, GL presented a motion which was voted in favour by GL, D66, SP, and PvdA. The same parties that, at the local level, put forwards the motions and approved them at the city council, the left and centre progressive alliances. This motion was a stepping-stone towards the approval of the change in the policy by the national government (Interview Betko, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2021).

In this table above, we can see the parties that proposed the motions in favour of the BIIP and the parties that voted in favour.

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Table 6. 9 - Motions in favour of BIIP


<b>Political arena</b> (city council / national parliament)	<b>Party responsible for the motion / main actors</b>	<b>Parties in favour</b>	<b>Main requests</b>
<b>Utrecht's city council</b>	D66 (Sanders/Evehardt)	D66 (centre), GL, SP, PvdA (left)	
<b>Nijmegen's city council</b>	GL (Ranshuijsen and Westerveld)	SP, GL, PvdA (left), D66 (centre)	a basic amount at least at the level of the level of assistance; participants in the experiment may earn extra without this amount being settled; Participants are exempted from as many obligations as possible that can be obstructive/ such as the obligation to apply; The duration of the experiment is several years; Scientists or experts are closely involved in the elaboration (Motion: Experiment with confidence, 25 <sup>th</sup> November of 2015)
<b>Wageningen's city council</b>	D66 (Gudman)	CU, PvdA, GL (left), D66 and Stadspartij (centre)	Duration of at least 2 years; The amount of the monthly allowance is equal to the current social assistance benefit; Participation is on a voluntary basis; allowance is unconditional, meaning no obligation to apply for a job (motion Confidence experiment with social assistance, 30 <sup>th</sup> June of 2015)
<b>Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal</b>	GL (Linda Voortman)	GL, SP, PvdA (left) and D66 (centre)	"Give room for variation in the experiments and that possibly municipalities other than the four with which the State Secretary has spoken, also be able to carry out your own experiment" (motion from GL)

			“Give more room for additional income, (increase) the duration of the experiment and (abolish) the intensification group” (Intervention of Linda Voortman in national parliament, 10th November 2016)
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The following graphic is a Multiple similarity analysis of the different parties involved in the process. We will see the proximity between liberal conservatives and social democrats in the social space in their position "against" the policy. However, on the left side of the map, the social democrats appear again, this time in their "in favour" positioning. In the "map of codes" below, we can see the proximity of the codes referring to the ideology "in favour" and "against" the policy. As we explained above, because of the positioning of the social democrats in the Multilevel dynamics, which resulted in the approval of the policy, they appear on the map away from the liberal conservatives. The colour of the balls represents the difference between the parties in terms of being "in favour" (green), "against" (red) and "neutral" (Yellow). The size of the balls allows us to gauge how much the categories associated with "for" and "against" have been mentioned. In this sense, we see that the liberal conservatives, the social democrats, the social liberals, greens are the parties that are most referred to by the interviews. They are the parties that had the most relevance in the process, for different reasons.

This graphic illustrates the main parties in the political process behind the outcome. The social liberals and the green left on one side, pushing for policy innovation, at the local level, and the conservative liberals and social democrats on the other, pushing back. However, the social democrats maintain a position 'behind' the conservative liberals, as they were the ones, in the final stage, to sign the motion in the Dutch parliament (for the policy innovation) and put down the Law on participation in temporary decree Experiments. The lines allow us to see, by their thickness, the connection between the parties. Here we can see that there is a strong link between the parties in the Netherlands, at the national and local levels. This is a policy that is not consensual, even in parties that tend to support it. However, we can see that there is a clearer positioning of parties on the left and centre in relation to the policy. Progressive alliances help explain the emergence of the policy if we take into account two factors: multi-level alliances (politics stream) and the fact that the policy did not call itself Unconditional Basic Income, which led to several parties allying in its approval. There is evidence in the literature about these coalitions. In the reform of the EU fishery common policy, Orach et. al (2017) have identified the particular relevance of coalition-building which was key to getting the bill approved in the EU parliament. The major EU green groups, birdlife Europe, Greenpeace, WWF and OCEANA formed a green NGO "super-coalition" that helps to better achieve their goals. An additional factor was the politics stream, meaning, the orientation in relevant positions in the EU parliament of actors with a pro-environmental opinion (Orach et. al, 2017). If there are advocates of a solution in relevant political arenas, they can push for the solution and get it approved. In decentralized contexts local parties can influence state-level parties to boost local initiatives, therefore, influencing another political arena. This is what we saw in the case of the Netherlands.

Graphic 6. 1 - Multiple similarity analysis of all documents "parties' representation by its ideology"



**Source:** MAXQDA, based on content analysis of interviews to relevant actors. Own creation.


## Basic income in Europe

Table 6. 10 - Epistemic Communities and their influence in policy change

<b>Stream</b>	<b>Type of entrepreneur</b>	<b>Actor</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Role</b>
<b>Politics</b>	Progressive political alliances	Green left (GL) and social liberals (D66)	June 2015	Putting down a motion in favour of BIIP
	Policy entrepreneur	Alderman of income and work (“experimental alderman”), alderman of economic affairs and finance Deputy in Dutch parliament	March 2010 – June 2015	Leading the negotiations; lobbying for the policy, couple the streams
<b>Policy</b>	Technology innovator	Mark Sanders – innovator, member of the programme committee Janos Betko - policy advisor for social assistance Hans Zuidema – project manager	June 2016- january 2017	Participating in the negotiations. Minimise uncertainty around innovation, give more confidence to decision-makers, provide information to policymakers, create a network of knowledge-based experts and participating in the negotiations.
<b>Process</b>	Process Broker	Sijr Hoeijmakers	September 2015-january 2017	Facilitator, connecting stakeholders, networking and building trust

On 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2017, a general administrative order was designed and put forward to give space for the change in the social assistance policy. The Decree of 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2017 established the Law on Participation in Temporary Decree Experiments (Law on Participation in Temporary Decree Experiments) and was approved by the King Willem-Alexander on behalf of the Minister of social affairs and Employment, Jetta Klijnsma.

Figure 6. 3 - The progress of the decree of 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2017



On 15<sup>th</sup> of March of the same year, PvdA entered the elections with the programme “a connected society”, which had the basic income again in the agenda, approved by 61% of the militants of the party.

6.7. Available resources

In the Dutch municipalities only, Utrecht is part of Eurocities. The regulation of EUROCITIES implies that cities with a population of 250.000 people can become members. Of all the municipalities, only Utrecht is in this range, the others being in an inferior range.

Table 6. 11 - Requirements of population to Eurocities

Cities	Population (<100.000)	Cities	Population (>100.000)
Barcelona	1,604,555	Utrecht	358.974
		Groningen	232.652



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	Wageningen	222.601
	Nijmegen	177.605

Although the regulation stipulates the above, EUROCITIES, as a municipal network, is designed for “European metropolises” (Eurocities, 2011) which does not privileges the Dutch municipalities, since none is a metropole. The regulation for allowances of the European social fund (ESF) 2014-2020 was predicted on 31<sup>st</sup> of March 2014 and it gave the municipalities the possibility to apply for allowances in programs within this European fund for social innovations: “the development and implementation of new ideas for products, services and processes that can address societal challenges in the field of active inclusion” (art<sup>o</sup> 1 ESF subsidy scheme 2014–2020). However, it was not because they were not part of EUROCITIES that they did not a resource to European funds. When the municipalities entered the process of negotiation with the central government, the Dutch municipalities required the European social fund for the funding for the evaluation of the policy – the program social innovation and transnational corporations (SITS). The ESF privileges the most social inclusion policy innovations. The project “Experiment with the participation act” was required after the approval of the central government of the Netherlands. Although this was already in motion before the approval, they needed the approval to apply. The funding only started on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2018, less than one year later of the approval of the central government. The funding only financed the evaluation of the project as the policy was paid by the central government through the funds, which they transfer to the municipalities which they can use freely if there is some left after the normal expenses.

The municipalities were able to receive 47% of the funding necessary for the evaluation of the project: 190.000€ Besides the fact that the description of the project has to fit the concept of “social innovation”, the funding was a co-funding which implied a 50% of the funding necessary. Besides, it entailed some conditions on how to spend the money (art<sup>o</sup> 12 and 13<sup>o</sup>, ESF Grant Scheme 2014-2020). For example, the research was one of the items eligible but not the trips that were necessary (Interview Betko, 23rd June 2021). Article 13<sup>o</sup> predicted that are ineligible for funding “the same costs already financed under national grant programmes so that the total funding of eligible costs exceeds 100%”. We were able to identify five structuring elements that contributed to the emergence of this policy innovation, the *Weten Wat Werk* (2017).

Table 6. 12 - Structuring elements for social innovation and the emergence of *Weten Wat Werkt* (2017)

Structuring elements	Actors and institutions	Main strengths of the elements
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<b>Evolution in the decentralization of competencies</b>	Art <sup>o</sup> 83 of PA act law (2015)	Gave policymakers the incentive to look for efficient ways to organize welfare services
<b>Gaining the Political resources</b>	Progressive alliance of left and centre parties. Elected public official with interest in the UBI with the portfolio of social affairs	Gave the municipalities the progressiveness to pursue social change. Relevant social position for the public officials
<b>Political landscape</b>	Progressive alliance of left and centre parties in favour of the social innovation	Increased the political support in favour of the policy innovation
<b>Entrance of epistemic community in the negotiation</b>	Utrecht university, Wageningen University and Radboud University	Gave the proposal a guarantee of merit by its scientific configuration
<b>Central government amendments and consensus</b>	PA annex	Set duration limits to the policy, limits to the increasing amount and created an intensification group

The Dutch municipalities wanted to change the law and show the central government that the PA Act was not the way to go. This, as the leading public official for social affairs of Utrecht said, is the only way possible for the law to be changed. They had to present a project of innovation to the central government and with the results achieved with this experimental project, within the law, they were able to lift some of the conditionalities of the central government. This was done within an institutional setting that provided the possibility for municipalities to deviate, to innovate but this was never a total autonomy as they had to request this implementation. Central government remained an actor in the system acting as a veto player in the final decision. A decision that was very tied to the political ideology of the party in governance. So, the accessible venues, unlike what seemed in the beginning, were not so favourable as the ones in Barcelona and it was only due to the work of the public officials, party experts and researchers, involved in an advocacy coalition, that the policy innovation of a basic income-inspired policy could be implemented. This explains why some municipalities


## Basic income in Europe

managing to implement a policy innovation with a high “degree of innovativeness” and others do not.

### 6.8. Advocacy coalitions into the multilevel reinforcing dynamics

By applying the same model into the multilevel reinforced dynamics context in the Netherlands we were able to identify a different process. The problem stream was manifested by an excessive control and monitorization of social assistance beneficiaries in Netherlands. An event that changed the approach of the municipalities towards their citizens was the PA act of 2015, which enabled them to be more aggressive and autonomous in the monitorization. A rigid workfare approach of the state’s control of their citizens, led by the municipalities that had the main example in the Rotterdam city council. Nevertheless, the same change in the legal system enabled municipalities to propose alterations to this workfare approach.

Figure 6. 4 - Model of Analysis of the Dutch municipalities’ case



On the subnational/local level, a coalition between different actors in the city council took place. A coalition between progressive alliance between parties from the centre and left spectrum (social liberals, greens – the main political parties), party experts, researchers, and project leaders, in the city council enabled a motion in favour of a basic income inspired policy experiment to take a place at the local level. They all shared the same policy beliefs towards

the workfare approach of the social assistance law and the economy of sustainable development and innovation. This was evidenced in the motions approved by the city council by the different political parties.

Following the motion, it followed a process of negotiation in which the public official and researchers from party experts and universities were active on the national level to achieve decision coupling. The process was mediated by a process broker who connected the different parts in the process. The role of the same advocacy coalition, on the local level, was to convince the state's government that this policy innovation was worthwhile. This role was led by the public official of Utrecht, "an experimental alderman". This process was dependent on the central government and their ideology at the time. The liberals were against this Policy innovation. However, the decision coupling was made through two factors: a) The influence of the advocacy coalition at the local level which influenced the mood of the political parties at the national level (through the national parliament); b) another advocacy coalition composed by the same characteristics (progressive alliance between political parties of the centre and left spectrum, party experts and researchers), but fostering policy innovation at the national level. Nevertheless, the existence of a process broker and two coalitions operating across both levels was not enough to achieve a policy innovation like the one that the advocacy coalition at the local level wanted in the first place. They were always dependent on another actor in the system (Jong, 2016) – the central government's political ideology at the time. Unlike the case of Barcelona in which there was a coincidence between local level and EU-level made possible for actors to achieve agenda coupling and decision coupling, the Dutch municipalities could not achieve agenda coupling. All they had was a national law that allowed innovation but with the approval of the central government. They were able to implement the policy innovation but with less innovativeness than what they wanted in the beginning.

#### 6.9. 2019: an idea that stood still

The main goal of the basic income-inspired policy social innovation, of the Dutch municipalities, was to change the law, but in the end, they did not make it. In 2017, after the Temporary Decree Experiments in February, the minister of employment and social affairs, Jetta Klijnsma was nominated to be King's commissioner, in Drenthe, in December of that year. This produced a change in Mark Rutte's II government. On the 26th of October 2017, Tamara van Ark (VVD) became the new minister of social affairs, leading the process of post-*Weten Wat Werkt*. Being a member of the VVD, she stood with the party in their position against the reform. She argued in favour of the drop-out of the unconditionality feature arguing that "almost no one has won nothing with the enormous change in the system" (*de Volkskrant*,

20 November 2019<sup>40</sup>). The new minister defended that municipalities should be more rigorous with the beneficiaries of social assistance otherwise they will prefer to choose welfare instead of work. The minister followed the line of thought of the party when they argued that “there is no free money”. The negative response to the question – Is it fair for a person to receive from the State without compensation? – marked the position of the party regarding the basic income-inspired policies. Ark talks about reciprocity – “you have to give something back to society (for the help the state is providing)” – otherwise it will not work (*deVolkskrant*, 20 November 2019).

6.10. Conclusions: Multilevel reinforcing dynamics: the political ideology division around the basic income influenced the multilevel dynamics between the subnational level and national level.

This case study shows that decentralization of powers does not provide a proper structure for municipalities to innovate, as one might think. Previous to 2015, the debate on basic income was very much linked to the party’s programme of *Groenlinks*, D66, PvdA, in the eighties. After 2015, there was a clear willingness for change by the political actors. The PA Act law had a clear workfare orientation that enabled municipalities to take up a more rigorous control of the beneficiaries. This was the motivation for the public officials, in several municipalities, together with party experts, researchers, and project leaders to build an advocacy coalition in “fighting for change”. They shared the same policy belief towards the workfare approach of social assistance law (*Bijstand*) and in wanting to build trust with the beneficiaries by making rules less strict. As the PA act law that put emphasis on the workfare approach, it gave municipalities the possibility to innovate and deviate from that same orientation.

Contrary to the Barcelona case, in which the regional government did not allow municipalities, even temporarily, to create entitlement benefits (the Dutch municipalities had that possibility due to article 83 in the new law of the PA Act 2015), they were not dependent on the approval of the central government. Central government appears as an actor in the system (Jong, 2016) and can act as veto players in the request for innovation and deviation from the social assistance law. In this decentralization process, the central government can assign or decrease tasks and powers. This makes the Dutch municipalities much tied and dependent on political ideology of political parties in the central government. The institutional settings of the Dutch municipalities had an influence (negative) on the accessible venues.

The liberal government, which was representing the central government at the time, did not want to approve this project. However, a second advocacy coalition emerged at the national

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<sup>40</sup> Interview of Tamara van Ark by Gijs Herderschee.

level, composed by progressive parties of green left and far-left parties (Socialists), moderate left (Social democrats) and central parties (D66), together with party experts and researchers who were part of the negotiation process with the secretary of state of employment and social affairs. A second motion was approved, in the national parliament, giving strength to the initiative the first advocacy coalition, in the subnational level. This was necessary to unblock the situation and make the policy emerge. Nevertheless, it was not enough to make the policy as innovative as it was presented by the local parties. They had to drop the unlimited feature of the policy.

As we said at the beginning of this study, there are moments in which the institutional context reproduces the existing framework and there are moments in which is possible for change to occur beyond the existing framework. The appearance of advocacy coalitions in fostering the policy innovation is one of those moments. Nevertheless, the political ideology division in this matter (divisions about the unconditionality – “there is no such thing as free money”) is still an issue for the minimum income schemes. We might think that the decentralization process that the municipalities experienced, especially with the new law, could lead to more possibilities for innovation. However, this was not the case which leads us to refuse that explanatory factor that would say that the greater the decentralisation to the local level, the more likely is for these policy innovations to emerge (Obinger et al., 2005 and Rogers, 2021).

In sum, ideology was of great importance in this process. Political parties of the left and centre, researchers and party experts interested in economy of sustainable development, innovation, and entrepreneurship reunite forces and fought for this initiative. However, right-wing party (VVD), in the central government, made the innovation so less innovative to the point there was not much innovation left in the policy. This stated a clear division on this theme between left-centre and right. The political leadership of the public officials and the expertise of researchers showed the role of science in the advocacy coalitions and in fostering policy innovation.

## Part III

### Chapter seven

#### 7. Barcelona and Dutch municipalities compared: determinants for the emergence of a policy innovation in the local social policy context

##### 7.1. Institutional settings: Accessible venues and available resources

The structural factor, in this case, is the institutional settings, the accessible venues for both cases. In the Dutch municipalities, the decentralization process, in the social domain, was two sides of the same coin. Although they could deviate from the national social assistance policy, they had to submit a proposal to the central government which made them more dependent on the ideology of political parties (which had the capacity to veto the municipalities' initiative). The PA act law gave municipalities, in the Dutch provinces, the ability to make policy decisions on child and youth support, long-term care, and income policies which led to municipalities, in the Netherlands, having more administrative and financial autonomy over these policies. The previous reform, the Work and Social Assistance Act of 2003 (9/10/2003) already allowed municipalities to be responsible for "welfare to work" social assistance programs, however, this decentralization process has expanded this responsibility (Vermeulen, 2015). This process allowed municipalities to have more efficient management of the costs of providing social support (Boersma et al, 2013 and Vermeulen, 2015). But, as it gave more autonomy and responsibility over to the municipalities, it had a clearer orientation towards activation, a workfare approach of the social assistance policy, and that responsibility passed to the municipalities. This triggered many public officials, in the city council, and city deputies to contest this orientation from the central government and persuade them to change the law. And, although this new law put a great emphasis on the workfare approach, it also allowed municipalities to deviate from this approach through an innovation article (art. 83<sup>o</sup>) which allowed, in the first place, municipalities to implement an experimental innovation policy.

In Barcelona, the situation was different. They did not have much room to manoeuvre in this domain (within the institutional framework). There were reforms in the wake of the new statute of the autonomous region of Catalonia in 2006, like the law 13/2006 of 27 July. This law clarified the regulatory criteria that municipalities have to solve the economic benefits of social emergencies. The government of the region of Catalonia determines some parameters into which the municipalities, that want to create those benefits, have to fit. These have to be of a specific, basic and urgent nature – "The economic benefits of social urgency are intended to

address situations of specific, urgent and basic need" (art. 30 of law 13/2006<sup>41</sup>). Student grants, supplements for families with children aged between 0 and 16, subsidies for rent payments, etc.) are included in these criteria. These social benefits are not expected to be above 200€ or to last more than three or four months (Navarro-Varas and Porcel, 2017: 27). Therefore, the local governments did not have the legal powers to create new entitlement benefits.

Basic income is seen as a possible alternative to the insufficiencies that the existing minimum income schemes have. Looking at the policy legacy and the policy debate around the idea of basic income, we see that it has a long history in the Netherlands than in Spain. The Netherlands has a long history of social assistance policy. They were one of the first European countries to have a minimum income scheme. In 1965 (*Algemene Bijstandswet*) which replaced the Poor Management Regulations Act of 1854. The Netherlands has one of the highest minimum income schemes in Europe, alongside Denmark (Wang e Vliet (2016: 337) e Crepaldi et al (2017: 73). It is not surprising that the leftist parties and centre have discussed basic income as a possible alternative in their party commissions'. *Groenlinks* was the main party to put this onto their agenda. But also, the D66 and PvdA made basic income the debate in the year 1995 (Vanderborght, 2004). Even in the party most in favour of UBI there is no consensus among its members. After the 1998 government, the UBI debate waned, to the extent that in 2002 one of the most vocal parties and UBI advocates, the *Groenlinks*, removed the idea from its electoral programme. The idea came back to the party's agenda in 2014.

In Spain and Catalonia, in particular, the debate did not take place at the same level. The political parties did not take an interest in taking the debate to another level. However, the events of 2011 were a trigger in this matter. It helped to take the discussion to another level as a newly formed party – Podemos – emerging from the social movement known as Indignados (Romanos, 2017) was one of the parties that set this idea onto the political agenda<sup>42</sup>. Nevertheless, this idea was always part of a wider debate around the welfare state and the social assistance policies, in its generosity and access to the benefits. It was the first time an idea like the basic income was put on an electoral programme (the European elections of 2014). It was not surprising since the events that started years before had opened the debate. The cuts imposed by the TROIKA, were in a period when people needed them the most. The increase in claims of social benefits together with cuts in regional benefits (decrease of the Catalanian RSI, in 2011) led to a strong civic and political mobilisation around a change of paradigm. There were also social movements in particular cities and regions of Spain. In Barcelona, the *Guaynem* movement and PAH were major movements that were linked to the

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<sup>41</sup> The law 13/2006, of 27<sup>th</sup> July, of economic social benefits and the law 12/2007 of 11<sup>th</sup> October. of social services.

<sup>42</sup> The proposal was approved by 80% of the members of Podemos (Noguera, 2019: 292).



emergence of the newly formed party, *Barcelona en Comú*, which is a party formed by an alliance of PODEMOS and other leftist parties. So, it is not surprising that they would be in favour of debating this idea. While Spain had a strong social mobilisation of protests against austerity policies and living conditions, the Netherlands did not feel the effects of the crisis as Spain did (Anastasopoulou, 2015). Its unconditional character as opposed to the strong demands for activation under the threat of severe penalties that could lead to the loss of the benefit and its basic character as opposed to the insufficiency that the provision of the minimum income schemes had made this idea a banner of the electoral programmes of parties like Podemos and the *Barcelona en Comú* (2015). Tracing back the parliamentary debates between 2014 and 2017, the main arguments were pointing to the lack of sufficiency of the social assistance benefits and the difficulty in accessing the benefit, which was one of the main complaints of the public officials, the strict regulations of the social assistance.

The institutional settings that Barcelona and the Dutch municipalities played a different role for both cases. The accessible venue for the Dutch municipalities was made via national parliament through advocacy coalitions in favour of the policy. Access to the process broker, researchers, party experts and political parties was a strategic venue for achieving policy outcome. Although this was the only case with two advocate coalitions, on two different levels (subnational and national), fostering the same result, the outcome was not as it was expected as the possibility for innovation was tied to the political ideology of the actor, in the central government system. In the Barcelona case, the accessible venue was made via EU-level by lobbying in European networks of municipalism and making the best out of European legal instruments and initiatives for innovation in the area of urban sustainable policy. Access to social policy experts were key to enable the policy outcome. This strategic venue was essential as there was a coincidence between European agenda for innovation in the area of urban sustainable development and the municipalism ideology which the new elected government had.

7.2. The policy core belief: Municipalism can foster multilevel reinforcing dynamics on the EU-level in the social policy context.

When we started this thesis, we called this policy innovation, in the context of social policy, a basic income-inspired policy. The reason for that was, never this policy was meant as a basic income, rather a minimum income scheme unconditional – in the sense that is without means of control of the beneficiary and unlimited – the latter, in the sense that the beneficiary can accumulate this with income from work. This is not a universal policy – in the sense that is without means tested, with no conditions of access the policy. It still remains as means tested. Basic income ideas were, in these two cases, based on the left political spectrum. Even in the case of the social liberals (centre), the issue that make them more to the left is, precisely, the libertarian idea behind the policy innovation. In the Dutch municipalities, the parties in favour of the idea were from the left and, also, centre and Christian parties, who opposed the idea of controlling the beneficiaries.

By finding out the factors that led to the emergence of the policy innovation in the two cases, we were able to also find out the dynamics between the different actors in the process and the dynamics between the different levels of governance. The policy beliefs were an important factor of the emergence of the policy – they were different in the two cases. In Barcelona the idea was to prove that it was possible for the city to have an income policy and not be subject to the *Generalitat* regional government. The municipalism ideology is much linked with the “democratic autonomy of municipalities” (Thompson, 2021: 317) and linked with the left ideology of Left-wing movements with programs for change (e.g., left green municipalist movements). The “rebel” side of these projects is not just about new ideas, is about reorganizing the power relations between different tiers of government. It is about going beyond the state governance (Thompson, 2021). This opened an opportunity for the leftist parties with a municipalistic agenda for change (*Barcelona en Comú*) to argue in favour of a basic structure for the reconstruction of social rights. The new elected public official in the area of social affairs, a politician who came from the young ecologists and the left green of Catalonia, had a political trajectory related to the environment, feminism and socialism themes. Themes which many times are linked to the arguments in defence of the basic income idea. Feminism and the empowerment it could give to women (Robeyns, 2001) and an ecological basic income in defence of a greener and sustainable world (Pinto, 2018). We find evidence of these features (of municipalism) in the political organization project of *Barcelona en Comú* (Commons). This movement was led by Ada Colau, an activist for housing evictions by those affected by mortgages (PAH – *Plataforma de Afectats per la Hipoteca*). This movement was created in February of 2009 and the main concern was to “change the laws and recover the

right to housing” (Forti and Spina, 2019: 13). With the 2008 crisis and the new *Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil* from the Rajoy’s government (2011-2018), which predicted that in case of insolvency, the person who contracted the mortgage would lose their house but still would have to pay the mortgage. This gave visibility to Ada Colau to form a movement that had the housing emergency as the main issue, a movement that was the antechamber of the party *Barcelona en Comú* (2015). The digital platform "*Guanyem Barcelona*" was made public on 26<sup>th</sup> June 2014 and had a great diffusion. In less than one month they collected 30,000 signatures, in December they decided to move towards the constitution of a party and the consequent submission to the municipal elections the following year (interview Joan Subirrats, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2021). The electoral programme was built around ideas like “taking back institutions”, “winning back the city”, and creating a “citizens municipal platform” ([barcelonaencomu.cat](http://barcelonaencomu.cat), March 2016). This is a party that strongly believes that European politics has a direct impact at the local level, therefore, the party proposed a municipalist agenda around the idea that Europe should defend life and the common good '*municipalisme del bé comú*' (Blanco and Gomà, 2016). *Barcelona en comú* had a very own vision of European politics of what it should be. A solidaristic Europe, for the community, would stop evictions, make access to housing a right, and improve working conditions, against speculation. A “fearless Europe” that would go beyond the nation-state logic, facing the politics of the State (government program of May 2016). A true agenda for change. Moreover, in Barcelona, the left parties were always, since the transition to democracy, a political reality. Since 1979, there were 32 years of socialist government and they were never in power in the city council, by themselves. They were in coalition with leftist parties, to the left of the socialists. The ideology of left-wing progressive political alliances. In every government, they were present, apart from the one in which the *CiU* was in power, between 2011 and 2015. In that year, the left came back to power but this time, the left of the socialists was in power as the leading government. an alliance of different leftist fronts – *Podemos*, the Catalan green initiative, the united and alternative left (former coalition in the Barcelona city executive), the *procès constituent* and the X movement (Catalan pro-nationalism movement), and Equo (branch of Spain's green party in Catalonia). The new municipalism in which the *Bcomú* fits presupposes a dynamic rupture with the existing framework on which we can corroborate the preposition that states that the greater the presence of more (radical) left-wing parties in the executive, the more likely is for such policy innovation to emerge.

In the Dutch municipalities the motivation was to change the system that made them in charge of controlling the beneficiaries of social assistance (PA act law). In the Dutch municipalities, the progressive alliances were more of the traditional style in Europe, meaning, coalitions between a social democratic left and liberals (Wheatcroft, 2010). The coalition in Utrecht, Nijmegen and Wageningen was different. More diversified and, secondly, the ideology

of these parties was not the same as the case of Barcelona. In the 2014 elections, the progressive parties like Democrats 66 (centre), *Groenlinks* (left) and the socialists from the SP (far left) became part of progressive political alliances in the municipalities where the PI emerged. But these parties, although favourable to a more decentralized context and in favour of social assistance with fewer rules they had not have a municipalistic project like the far-left party of *Bcomú* had. On social and economic inequalities, the D66, although further to the right-wing, appeared on the centre-left, followed by PvdA on the moderate left and *Groenlinks* and SP on the more radical left (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014: 76 and NIMD and IPP, 2008: 16).

Table 7 1 – Framework of the ideology of the parties – in Barcelona and Dutch municipalities – that approved the motion and were in the city council.

Left	Centre	Right
<p><b>Socialists</b> (SP)</p>	<p><b>Green</b> <b>Left (GL)</b></p>	<p><b>Social</b> <b>liberals (D66)</b></p>
<p><i>Bcomú</i> (Podemos, EQUO, Greens, alternative left, <i>Procès</i> and X movements)</p>		<p>Social Democrats (PvdA)</p>

Source: NIMD and IPP, 2008: 16

This diversification in the composition of the city councils in the Netherlands (which is quite common), as the societal climate factor (in the politics stream), had an impact on entrepreneurial activities. The political agenda of the parties of the Dutch municipalities was different. In Utrecht, there was a progressive alliance between a more radical left and the Social Democrats, the green left. A left that is ecological and socially progressive oriented, and a progressive liberal party with social roots, the D66. In Wageningen, the same kind of progressive alliance as Utrecht and Nijmegen, there was a more to-the-left alliance.

In Barcelona, there was an alliance of lefts, between a more radical left whose party has roots in the recent civil protest associated with the civic movements of the Indignados (2011), PAH (movement against evictions) and which brings together various members of different radicalised lefts advocating environmentalist, nationalist, anti-capitalist, etc. programmes and the traditionally elected left in Barcelona, the socialists. They did not have a municipalistic project (with an agenda for change) as *Barcelona en Comú* had. They manifested a strong emphasis on the strict rules that were being applied to the social assistance policy. This can be seen in the table above, as we can identify the position in the ideological spectrum of the SP (of the Dutch municipalities) and *Bcomú* (of Barcelona) as being more to the left. We have to notice that SP is a party that was in a coalition, but it was not the main party in the alliance,

and they never had a portfolio of social affairs, unlike *Bcomú* who was the leading party in a coalition, and they had the portfolio of the social affairs.

D66 and GL were the leading parties in putting down the motions in favour of the basic income-inspired policies (social assistance with fewer rules). So, the support in favour of an experiment with fewer conditions (unconditional), in the Dutch municipalities case, came from the left and centre parties – D66 (centre), SP (Radical left), GL, CU (left), PvdA (moderate left). Of all the parties represented in the city councils, all the left and centre parties in the respective municipalities voted in favour. The entrepreneurial activities were to convince the political parties in the political arenas – a negotiation strategy.

In the Barcelona city council, they did not depend on political parties, to have their initiative approved. The entrepreneurial activities of the advocacy coalition actors were in lobbying for income policies and housing emergency on the EU-level, via European networks of municipalism and in thinking of ways how to use European legal instruments in favour of those ideas. This strategy turned out to be perfect for the municipality to achieve the policy outcome, as we will see in the prepositions below.

### 7.3. Advocacy coalitions into a MRD context help to couple the streams on higher-level governance.

This proposition was confirmed in the two cases, but on different levels and different streams. In both cases, the work done by the public officials were highly relevant corroborating other studies in which the same actors had a high relevance to the outcome (Hoppe et al., 2015). Both cases acknowledge the importance of the public officials and experts/researchers in lobbying for the policy innovation, in “getting things done”, by using their ability to explore and experiment (Jordan and Huitema, 2014a) and their high level of endurance (Audrestsch et al, 2021: 241) and Both cases confirm the relevance of the Multilevel reinforcing dynamics approach (MRD) to the basic income-inspired policies.

In Barcelona, the capacity was developed by the new elected public official in Barcelona for social affairs who developed networks and collaborations with the EUROCITIES and other cities in Europe. Barcelona has historical roots in European networks of municipalism. It was one of the founding fathers of EUROCITIES and one of the main cities to promote debates about the role of cities in a united Europe. A former alderman had been president of the social inclusion commission of United Cities and local governments between 2007 and 2011 (UCLG) and a former mayor of Barcelona (Pascal Maragall) had been president of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). In this strategy, the public official for social affairs in Barcelona invested in EUROCITIES in order to promote the debate around two main issues that were of high relevance to the newly elected government: housing emergency and

income policies. The new elected alderman led the process by creating an office for innovation and hiring a director of innovation and, also, by becoming vice-president and president of the Commission of social affairs in EUROCITIES. An advocacy coalition emerged in a political subsystem composed by a new public official (of left-wing), a social policy expert/UBI advocate. The innovation office was headed by a very skilled entrepreneur who was, at the same time, a member of the Spanish network for a basic income (*Red renta básica*). Seen as an “innovator” (focus group with IRDBCC<sup>43</sup>, 27<sup>th</sup> of October 2021) “he completely changed the way the municipality saw the social policy” (focus group with IRDBCC, 27<sup>th</sup> of October of 2021) because he was in that position. He had the know-how of the law, the technology, and the contacts of the evaluators of UIA. He was able to “move throughout Europe, to connect people” (interview Rebollo, 8th March 2022). His expertise and technical skills in social policy were critical to design a project to submit to UIA to bid for funding, from the European Union. Meanwhile, the alderman for social affairs was requesting meetings with the commissioner of regions (department for regional and urban policy), responsible for the EU Commission's policies on regions and cities and in the EUROCITIES Social Affairs Forum to put two main issues on the agenda for cities. She used her knowledge, political sensitivity, and the ideological line” to make this policy innovation a priority in the party’s agenda. A feminist and ecologist from ECV party arguing in favour of UBI (Robeyns, 2001 and Pinto, 2018) and a technology innovator with the knowledge and contacts in the innovative urban action. These skills were of key importance to occupy relevant positions in political spaces such as EUROCITIES and to take advantage of European policy agenda for innovation. The municipalism ideology, characteristics of the actors in the advocacy coalition allowed them to have access to important resources such as European platforms of political influence and the European political and legal instruments.

In the Dutch municipalities, the strategy of the actors in the advocacy coalition was different. The Advocacy coalition was composed by a public official, a party expert, researchers and project leaders. Their main roles were linked to leading the negotiations with the central government, minimizing uncertainty around innovation, giving more confidence to decision-makers, providing information to policymakers. In the Netherlands, most municipalities have committees made up of experts. These committees are given a remit by the municipal executive to make recommendations (NIMD and IPP, 2008: 63). Unlike Barcelona, this process was mediated by a process broker. This actor played a role of a facilitator on the agreement on the policy. He connected stakeholders and did a lot of networking and “build trust” among the different actors involved. Since one of the negotiation strategies involved gathering the different parties in favour of the motion, the entrepreneurial activity of the party

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<sup>43</sup> International relations department of Barcelona’s city council.

expert was to “work in the shadow to set a policy in a responsible way”. The strategy of the researchers together with public officials, from the different municipalities, was to negotiate the terms with the central government and having the motions passed in the city council and Dutch parliament.

7.4. Lower-level governance advocacy coalitions’ who foster innovation on the higher-level governance facilitate agenda coupling on higher-level governance and decision coupling on lower-level governance.

This proposition was only confirmed in the case of Barcelona. While Barcelona’s actors played a relevant role on the EU-level in coupling the agenda stream and decision stream on local level, thus reinforcing the multilevel dynamics, Dutch municipalities’ actors played a relevant role on the national level in the decision stream. Barcelona’s case is an interesting case of multilevel reinforcement dynamics and how EU-level MRD can be taken into account to understand how actors open policy windows to implement policy innovation in the social policy context. Reitig had already evidenced that entrepreneurs could negotiate on two governance levels and actively couple streams on one level (Rietig, 2020: 58). But we were able to emphasise the role of advocacy coalitions (into the MRD context) in coupling the streams on another level. ACF is a framework that “brings attention to how individuals form coalitions and engage in various political strategies to learn and influence policy” (Gabehart et al, 2022: 1). The characteristics of the advocacy coalitions were similar in the two cases as they were composed by left-wing politicians, social policy researchers and social activists. This also tells us about the type of coalitions, their characteristics, in social policy. It is different from other public policy sectors, like health policy (Carboni, 2012) but similar to climate change (Gabehart et al, 2022). In social policy, coalitions are made up of experts in the area, researchers, party politicians interested in a particular idea and, sometimes, project leaders, party experts and advocates in the field. The Barcelona case allows to acknowledge the belief system of municipalism to help create an advocacy coalition which fostered the policy on the EU-level. Municipalism, as an idea, was a trigger that enabled entrepreneurial activities of advocacy coalitions as it promoted multilevel reinforcing dynamics on the EU-level in the social policy context, making a good example of connection between municipalism and European Union. In a bottom-up approach, they couple agenda streams on EU-level. This recognized the interdependencies between EU-level policy agenda for innovation and urban sustainable development and local level social policy ideas of municipalistic political projects.

Dutch municipalities’ advocacy coalitions couple the decision stream on the national level. In the Dutch case, there was not an agenda coupling. The advocacy coalitions on local level were dependent on another actor in the system (Jong, 2016) – the central government’s

political ideology. According to the new law (PA act), which allowed for innovations to emerge in the social domain, they had to request approval from the central government. This made the central government an actor in the system (Jong, 2016) because they could act as a veto player in the request for innovation and the Dutch municipalities were much more dependent on the political actors in the central government and their ideology. A dependency on political actors and ideology that Barcelona did not have which enable the actors to couple the streams on the EU-level.

European Union provide political opportunities and new resources for domestic actors (Börzel, 2003), and, in this case, EU had an agenda for innovation present in the IUA and the Commission delegated regulation of 522/2014. But EU not only had a favourable agenda for innovation in the area of urban sustainable development, but they also provided the financial support to implement the Policy innovation at the local level.

Table 7. 2 - European policy agenda for innovation in the area of urban sustainable development

Years	Features	Description
1989	ERDF article 10 of European commission	possibility for <i>regions</i> of European member states to elaborate their projects of innovation and tackle some problems they faced
2014	ERDF article 8 Commission	support for actions in the area of <i>urban</i> sustainable development that are relevant for the EU (art 8, 1303/2013 EU)
2014	delegated regulation 522/2014 of the European parliament	allowing local <i>urban</i> authorities with, at least, 50,000 inhabitants to create proposals (article 2/a)
2014	Urban Innovative Actions of the European union	empowered to select innovative proposals based on a panel of experts who would assess the proposal according to criteria of a) new solutions; b) quality of the proposal; c) relevant partners; d) ability to achieve the proposed results; e) transferability of the proposed solutions (art 3/ a) b) c) d) e). Each innovative proposal can last up to 4 years (art 3/6)


They often have their own policymaking agenda in which they can influence lower levels of governance. Lower-level governance have to have their own societal stakeholders or policy entrepreneurs to implement such agendas. Having an advocacy coalition between public officials and researcher/advocates of UBI, at the local level, enabled them to couple the streams and foster the PI on the EU-level. Skilled actors like the researchers use their expertise to achieve results through European legal instruments and the know-how of programs of the European Union to support innovative actions of local governments. As the case of Barcelona



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has showed us, social policy expert in ACF had the task of expressing the European directives in the most favourable way. While the public official opened a policy window in European networks of municipalism (EUROCITIES), by setting the problem onto the European urban agenda. Policy entrepreneurs across the two-level governance facilitated further decision coupling and enabled EU-level agenda coupling via European initiatives, like IUA. This enabled the actors to put in evidence their skills like the sensitivity and the support and ideological line of the public official and the political intensity and the special vision of how to use the technology of the director of innovation.

Figure 7. 1 - Model of analysis - 'Euromunicipalism'



The actors in the advocacy coalition in the department of Innovation and social affairs of the city council shared the same policy core beliefs in relation to the idea of having an income policy of basic income in the city, an unconditional and more generous benefit, but not universal. Municipalistic projects are characterised by the desire to go beyond state/regional governance. These ideological points – 'right to the city', the 're-appropriation of institutions' and the 'municipalisation of Europe' – were fundamental in explaining the entrepreneurial activities of two key actors – the political entrepreneur and the technology innovator. The profile, the characteristics of these entrepreneurs and their capabilities were developed on the basis of the social positioning they occupied in two political and governance structures – the city council. Another element was the fact that the political party elected was also an alliance

of progressive leftist parties. This case acknowledges the actors' ideology in fostering principles of the left, going beyond state governance (Thompson, 2021) and combining their willingness with the capacity provided by the European instruments and European networks of municipalism.

Table 7 3 - The policy innovation subsystems: actors, beliefs, and venues

	<b>Policy core belief</b>	<b>Accessible venues</b>	<b>Available resources</b>
<b>Barcelona</b>	Wanting to prove that it was possible to have an income policy (on the local level)	EU-level	Advocacy coalitions' resources: lobbying in European networks; Exploit policy windows; acquiring bid for funding ACF coupling agenda on EU-level MRD
<b>Dutch Municipalities</b>	Changing the law	National level	Advocacy coalitions' resources: Putting down a motion in favour of PI; connecting stakeholders, networking and building trust ACF coupling decision on national level

Table 7 4 - Differences between municipalities

	<b>Features of the municipality</b>		<b>Characteristics and background of the advocacy coalition actors</b>		
	Institutional setting	<i>European international Networks' presence</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	Profile	Tasks
<b>Barcelona</b>	Institutional limitation	Historical participation of the municipality in european	Radical change in government structure (left-wing) –	party politicians (left-wing)/public officials, (innovative) experts/researcher	Think of ways to improve income policies,

		municipalis m networks	municipalism project arguing in favour of the autonomy of the municipality towards the state and in municipalizin g Europe	s, advocates of UBI	lobbying for the policy, couple the streams, acquiring bid for funding
<b>Dutch municipalitie s</b>	favourable institution al setting for innovation in the social domain	—————	Change in government structure (left and centre alliance) - implement new forms of social security	party politicians (left-centre)/public officials, (innovative) experts/researcher s, advocates of UBI	Think of ways of “changing the system”, lobbying for the policy, couple the streams, negotiatio n

7.5. Discussion, limitations of the study, and future research

The basic income-inspired policy in two case selection helped to understand the dynamics between the different layers of governance in a multilevel framework. This policy innovation is a good example of MRD. The notions of the MSF – coupling the streams, policy entrepreneurs and policy window were highly relevant to explain the emergence of the PI. This policy would not have emerged if were not for the entrepreneurial activities of the public officials and the researcher/experts in advocacy coalitions. Hence, it corroborates what previous studies have evidenced, the agency role of public officials (Hoppe et al., 2015). Reitig had already evidenced that entrepreneurs could negotiate on two governance levels and actively couple streams on one level (Rietig, 2020: 58). However, we were able to find that ACF can be an important policy

analysis tool into the multilevel reinforcing dynamics by identifying how advocacy coalitions and belief systems and policy subsystems can be applicable. However, this political lens has to be viewed in these case studies with caution, meaning that, although some important notions of this theory is applicable here, the theoretical framework as it is evoked by the author is not entirely applicable. In the ACF theoretical framework, coalitions happen on various levels of governance, this was not the case in this study as the coalitions happened mainly on the local level. Only in the Netherlands case, a coalition B happened on the national level, with the same type of coalition but some different actors. Also, advocacy coalitions normally take place when an external event happens during the timeline of the analysis, that is why it is suggested to the researcher to adopt a long-term perspective (for example, 10 years or more). This was not the case in these case studies, as the timeline was shorter. Nevertheless, we think we were able to do some contributions to the theoretical framework of the MRD and we believe this study provided a good contribution by evidenced how the ACF is a policy analysis tool for the MRD context.

This study also showed the role of science and the expertise of researcher in advocacy coalitions, which was also, something that lacked in studies of ACF and shows how the experts and researchers can play a role as strategic policymakers in the social policy context, like in the climate change field (Gabegart et al, 2022). But, also, it corroborated the idea of the Multiple streams' framework of Kingdon as a relevant framework to explain the interdependencies between levels of governance when coupling the streams.

Although this study made relevant contributions to the MRD framework and the policy innovation (in the social policy context) field, it has some limitations that should be properly tackled in future research. It is a two-case study with a single policy area, so external validity is a key limitation. From the outset, it is a case study that opens research questions and hypotheses for further research, but generalisations are impractical. It would be interesting to examine other cases in European countries, according to the frameworks developed in this study. For example, if we look to other cities that could have had this PI in their municipalities. The case of Scotland for instance, is the most similar to the case of the Dutch municipalities because the Scottish government in order to implement such an innovation have to do it through the UK parliament, since they only control 15% of the social security budget. They had the parliamentary majority (Scottish parliament) to support and the councillor for social justice, Mark Carvor, was also fighting for this. However, the willingness and capacity of the municipalities in order to take advantage of different resources, like Barcelona did, did not manifest. But, above all, no support from actors in the UK government would enable a policy like this, even with a lesser "degree of innovativeness", to be implemented as it happened with the Minister of social affairs and Employment in the Netherlands. They needed that feasibility from the UK government.

## Basic income in Europe

Portugal, on the other hand, is developing a process of decentralization (law 50/2018), in the social domain. This new law allows municipalities to execute and follow the beneficiaries of social assistance. Portugal has one of the lowest minimum income schemes in Europe. Portugal was a case where local actors did not exert any influence on the attempt to implement a UBI policy. If we go back to 2017 year, the city council had an alliance between socialists and the left bloc. None of them endorses a basic income. Despite being a left-wing party, with a party programme whose ideas are close to *Barcelona en comú* or *Groenlinks*, there are three missing elements. It does not have the idea in the party programme, unlike parties like LIVRE, which entered the government coalition of 2021-2025. A political left-wing party, with the leader of the party, has been a dissident of *Bloco de esquerda*, another left-wing party, which is the most similar to PODEMOS. LIVRE had this proposal, of having a basic income experiment, in their political programme, for the elections of 2022. Although they were in favour of this, since the beginning, and having had a proposal of policy experiment for the island of São Miguel, in the autonomous region of Azores, through the local candidate of José Azevedo, in neither of the regions (Azores or Lisbon), has LIVRE won the electoral resources, as *Bcomú* had in Barcelona. In the municipal elections of 26<sup>th</sup> September 2021, LIVRE won seven aldermen for the city council with the coalition between LIVRE and the socialists (although the socialists did not win the elections). But, never in the political programme for Lisbon was a political proposal of an income policy, like the basic income, for the city. Never had they had a public official 'fighting for the policy' as it happened in the Netherlands and Barcelona. Also, they were a secondary political force rather than a leading force unlike *Bcomú*, in the case of Barcelona, or green left and D66, in the Dutch case.

It is without a doubt that a PI like this would be an improvement for a country like Portugal with one of the lowest minimum income schemes in Western Europe and a high level of people living below the poverty line. Moreover, the big cities, Lisboa and Porto are having an exponential increase the housing costs, expelling many of the Portuguese residents out of the city. With these problems, an income policy would empower people like we have seen in these two case studies, giving the possibility of combining income with social benefit and not putting conditionalities in the activation. It would be a structural transformation in the social protection scheme of social assistance, of course, but it could also mean a transformation in the transitory regimes of the beneficiaries of social assistance.

Possible future research could acknowledge the importance of different solutions to the social policy context and other levels of governance to the outcome. ACF and also MSF could be applied to other cases of policy innovation. It would also be good to see how the progressive alliances can be applied to the MRD, especially at the EU-level. Although the Dutch case has provided us with interest insights about the relevance of the progressive alliances on the

national level, future research should try to understand the role of these political alliances in coupling the streams on the EU-level.

Policymakers should learn from this case to (re)think about the benefits of the local level and to provide suitable resources to guarantee the successful implementation of those innovations. EURO CITIES can be acknowledged as a possible example of policy learning as it can give information for policymakers to learn about implementation of policy innovation of income policies at the local level. This could motivate policymakers in using EU-level in order to foster policy innovation in the context of social policy that would go in line with municipal agendas. We can learn from the entrepreneurial activities in opening policy windows on different levels and how these coalitions in social policy context operate.

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### Appendix C

#### List of documents included in the preference attainment analysis:

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## Basic income in Europe

### Annex

#### Annex A

Table 4 – Features of the basic income-inspired polices in five locations.

	BASIC INCOME STRUCTURE		MINIMUM INCOME STRUCTURE		
	Marica	Finland	Dutch municipalities	Barcelona	Ontario
<b>SELECTION PROCESS</b>	Means-tested (below 3135R\$)	Unemployed; age	<i>Means-tested, age, household typology</i>	<i>Means-tested, age, household typology</i>	<i>Means-tested, age, household typology</i>
<b>WORK REQUIREMENTS</b>	No	No	No	No	No
<b>LEVEL OF ALLOCATION</b>	Individual	Individual	Household	Household	Household
<b>AMOUNT</b>	Fixed	Fixed	Variable	Variable	Variable
<b>VARIATION OF THE AMOUNT ACCORDING TO THE INCOME</b>	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
<b>CONDITION OF RESIDENCY AND AGE</b>	Born and resident in Marica for over 3 years; Foreigners in Marica for over 5 years	Residents in Finland for over 2 years, between 25 and 58 years old	Residents in Netherlands and foreigners living legally between 27 and 65 years old	Residents in Barcelona for over 2 years between 25 and 60 years	Residents in Ontario for over 2 years between 18 and 64 years old

<b>GENEROSITY OF THE AMOUNT IN RELATION TO THE MEDIAN OF INCOME AND MINIMUM WAGE</b>	130R\$ = 13% of the minimum wage – 998R <sup>44</sup> (law decree 9.661/2019) and 26% for a monoparental family	560€ = 37% of the median – 1498€ e 47% for a monoparental family (Finland does not have a minimum wage by law)	1026€ = 66% of the median (single household) – 1558€	662,60€ = 63% of the median – 1059€	69% of the minimum wage - \$2041,60 <sup>47</sup>
			66% of the minimum wage – 1551,60€ <sup>45</sup>	Minimum wage – 94% of 707,60€ <sup>46</sup>	
<b>DURATION</b>	Undetermined	2 years	3 years	2 years	3 years <sup>48</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Brazil implemented the "Basic citizenship income" in 2019, so we compare it to the SMN in force that year (Decree 9.661/2019).

<sup>45</sup> Eurofund Website (2020), "*Statutory minimum wages in the EU 2017*", available in: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2017/eu-member-states/statutory-minimum-wages-in-the-eu-2017> e <https://www.government.nl/topics/minimum-wage/news/2016/11/11/statutory-minimum-wage-as-of-1-january-2017>

<sup>46</sup> In 2018, Spain had a considerable increase in the Minimum income scheme (from 708€ to 859€) which changes the level of generosity of the B-Mincome to 77%.

<sup>47</sup> Available in: <https://www.ontario.ca/document/your-guide-employment-standards-act-0/minimum-wage> (visited in 15/10/2020)

<sup>48</sup> The Ontario policy was slated for three years but lasted only one due to the change of government.



## Basic income in Europe

### Annex B

Table 5 – Similarity analysis

Docu- ment name	Torrens	Albert	Oscar Rebollo	Focus Group	Joan Subirrats	Ricard Gomà	Laia Ortiz	Victor Evehardt	Loek Groot	Timo Verlaat	Janos Betko	Dennis Gudman	Hans Zuidema	Sjir Hoeijma- kers	Mark Sanders
Torrens	1,00	0,87	0,92	0,86	0,91	0,89	0,88	0,73	0,76	0,77	0,73	0,73	0,79	0,68	0,73
Albert	0,87	1,00	0,91	0,85	0,88	0,88	0,83	0,72	0,79	0,78	0,74	0,68	0,80	0,71	0,74
Oscar Rebollo	0,92	0,91	1,00	0,86	0,91	0,89	0,90	0,76	0,78	0,77	0,76	0,71	0,81	0,72	0,76
Focus Group	0,86	0,85	0,86	1,00	0,87	0,85	0,86	0,82	0,82	0,85	0,82	0,78	0,85	0,77	0,78
Joan Subirrats	0,91	0,88	0,91	0,87	1,00	0,88	0,89	0,77	0,83	0,82	0,77	0,72	0,82	0,76	0,79
Ricard Gomà	0,89	0,88	0,89	0,85	0,88	1,00	0,87	0,72	0,74	0,73	0,72	0,70	0,78	0,67	0,72
Laia Ortiz	0,88	0,83	0,90	0,86	0,89	0,87	1,00	0,69	0,71	0,72	0,71	0,67	0,74	0,64	0,71
Victor Evehardt	0,73	0,72	0,76	0,82	0,77	0,72	0,69	1,00	0,84	0,83	0,86	0,86	0,85	0,81	0,80
Loek Groot	0,76	0,79	0,78	0,82	0,83	0,74	0,71	0,84	1,00	0,91	0,82	0,78	0,85	0,79	0,90
Timo Verlaat	0,77	0,78	0,77	0,85	0,82	0,73	0,72	0,83	0,91	1,00	0,83	0,77	0,84	0,86	0,85
Janos Betko	0,73	0,74	0,76	0,82	0,77	0,72	0,71	0,86	0,82	0,83	1,00	0,76	0,85	0,81	0,84
Dennis Gudman	0,73	0,68	0,71	0,78	0,72	0,70	0,67	0,86	0,78	0,77	0,76	1,00	0,83	0,72	0,76

Hans Zuidema	0,79	0,80	0,81	0,85	0,82	0,78	0,74	0,85	0,85	0,84	0,85	0,83	1,00	0,76	0,85
Sjir Hoeijmakers	0,68	0,71	0,72	0,77	0,76	0,67	0,64	0,81	0,79	0,86	0,81	0,72	0,76	1,00	0,77
Mark Sanders	0,73	0,74	0,76	0,78	0,79	0,72	0,71	0,80	0,90	0,85	0,84	0,76	0,85	0,77	1,00

## Annex C – Interview Guide

First of all, let me thank you for your participation. This survey is based on gathering information about the policy-making process that led to emergence of the basic income-inspired policy in Barcelona (to interviewees in Barcelona), Utrecht, Nijmegen and Wageningen (to interviewees in Dutch municipalities). The data you reveal here will be completely confidential and will be used for scientific treatment only.

### **Problems and solutions**

- What major event triggered shaped the debate and agenda-setting of UBI policy experiment?
- This UBI policy in the Netherlands/Barcelona can be seen as a social policy, but the UBI as an idea is not a social policy. In what framework does this SI fit? What problems were you trying to solve?
- This policy being a social policy with some features of the idea of UBI, how satisfied were you with the way it turned out?
- How did this appear in the agenda of the political party?

### **Policy tactics/strategies (of the actors)**

- UBI had a strong spread between 2014 and 2016 (with BIEN, for example). At what moments was your association most active?
- What was your role in the policy process?
- What is your relationship with other organizations promoting UBI? Have you helped or received help to promote the policy?
- About the political parties that are pro-UBI (e.g., Groenlinks, D66, Barcelona en Comú etc.), what was your role in interacting with the parties and how successful was that contact with the political parties?
- Among the different dissemination channels (forums promoted, meetings/events, relations with parties and other advocacy organizations, etc.) what strategies do you think were most effective in promoting UBI to policy makers and why?
- Were there other actors with whom you interacted during the advocacy process (trade unions, social organisations, NGOs, think tanks)
- Of all the actors involved in this process, who would you say was the most influential?
- Why did this policy did not have continuity?

- How was the approval of the SI in the city council?
- Was there opposition against this initiative from the other parties?

**End of the interview. Thank you for your participation!**