The impact of *laicité* on perceived discrimination, identity integration and acculturation orientations of Muslim women in France.

Laura Esteves Gonçalves

Master in Psychology of Intercultural Relations

Supervisor:
Dr. Ana Rita Taborda Monteiro Guerra, Integrated researcher, ISCTE
- Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

October, 2023

iscte
**CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS
E HUMANAS**

Department of Social and Organizational Psychology

The impact of *laicité* on perceived discrimination, identity integration and acculturation orientations of Muslim women in France.

Laura Esteves Gonçalves

Master in Psychology of Intercultural Relations

Supervisor:
Dr. Ana Rita Taborda Monteiro Guerra, Integrated researcher, ISCTE - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

October, 2023

Le racisme est une plaie de l'humanité

Frantz Fanon

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deep appreciation to Dr. Rita Guerra, my supervisor. She stood by my side and provided unwavering support, especially during moments when I doubted my own capabilities. I want to extend my heartfelt thanks to her for her invaluable guidance, encouragement, and the wealth of knowledge she imparted to me. Rita, your contributions have been instrumental in making this endeavor achievable, and I hope it marks the beginning of many more to come.

I wish to extend my deepest thanks to Nissrine, who not only provided invaluable assistance in translating my questionnaire but was also one of the first individuals who inspired this work. Her words remain etched in my memory when she shared the story of a young girl who faced discrimination at university for wearing a headscarf. Nissrine wanted to express her support by wearing the headscarf herself, but her mother discouraged her, believing it would hinder her future career. No one should have to forfeit a significant part of their identity to access employment, housing, or any other fundamental rights. This work is dedicated to her.

A massive thank you goes out to Firdaws and her family for their invaluable contribution. Not only did they diligently proofread the translations, but they also shared my questionnaire countless times. Their involvement was crucial in completing this work, and I am grateful to have met her a year ago in a kiosk; a meeting that has become one of the dearest to my heart. Thank you for being yourself and accompanying me not only in this work but also in life.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Selim, who meticulously reviewed all the translations with me and helped keep me motivated between almond purchases. Thank you for making me laugh when we were thinking about all the possible strategies to share my work.

I also want to thank Theo, who listened to me vent my frustrations countless times during moments of doubt and played an essential role in helping me believe in myself and my work. The recent messages of support speak volumes about the precious friendship we share. Thank you for being a part of my life and making it brighter.

Resumo

Há um crescente debate sobre a visibilidade das comunidades Muçulmanas em França e, especificamente, sobre o uso do véu em espaços públicos, invocando o princípio da laicidade (i.e., *laicité*). O objetivo do estudo atual foi analisar o impacto de diferentes formas da norma cultural de laicidade (nova *laicité* e *laicité* tradicional) nas orientações de aculturação, na percepção de discriminação e na percepção de compatibilidade da identidade de mulheres Muçulmanas na França. As participantes (N = 74) foram distribuídas aleatoriamente por uma de três condições experimentais: *laicité* tradicional, nova *laicité* e uma condição de controlo não relacionada. No geral, os resultados mostraram que tanto as formas nova *laicité* como a *laicité* tradicional tiveram um impacto negativo na compatibilidade da identidade, de modo que as participantes nessas condições relataram menor percepção de compatibilidade da identidade comparativamente às participantes na condição de controlo. Não foram encontrados outros efeitos principais da condição na discriminação percebida e nas orientações de aculturação. As análises de mediação mostraram ainda que a nova *laicité* e a *laicité* tradicional (em comparação com o controlo) tiveram um impacto negativo na compatibilidade de identidade, que, por sua vez, esteve associada a uma menor adoção da cultura francesa e uma menor manutenção da cultura em domínios públicos.

Palavras-chave: laicité, aculturação, identitdade, discriminação

Abstract

There is an increasing debate on the visibility of Muslim communities in France and specifically about the use of the veil in public spaces, invoking the principle of *laicité*.The aim of the current study was to analyze the impact of different forms of the cultural norm of laicité (new *laicité* and traditional *laicité*) on the acculturation orientations, perceived discrimination and perceived identity compatibility of Muslim women in France. Participants (N = 74) were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: traditional *laicité*, new *laicité*, and a control, unrelated condition. Overall, results showed that both new and traditional forms of *laicité* had a negative impact on identity compatibility, such that participants in those conditions reported lower perceived identity compatibility relative to those in the control condition. No other main effects of condition were found for perceived discrimination and acculturation orientations. Importantly, mediation analysis showed that new and traditional *laicité* (vs control) had a detrimental impact on identity compatibility, which in turn was associated with lower adoption of the French culture and lower culture maintenance in public domains.

Keywords: laicité, acculturation, identity, discrimination

Index

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The recent 2022 elections in France have once again ignited a debate on the visibility of Muslim communities. Marine Le Pen, a presidential candidate and representative of the National Rally (RN), an extreme right-wing party, referred to the veil as an "Islamist uniform" and expressed her intention to ban it in public spaces, invoking the principle of *laicité*. Traditional *lacité* is a fundamental constitutional principle of the French Republic, corresponding to the strict separation of Church and State. Its history stems from the efforts of the French population to free themselves from the influence of the Catholic Church. Evolving through various forms, *laicité* approached its modern form in the 1880s with a series of laws, known as the Jules Ferry laws, which laid the foundations for a secular society by establishing teacher training schools and making public education free, compulsory, and secular (Jansen, 2006). It represents a socio-political concept established through legal frameworks, setting normative guidelines regarding cultural and religious diversity within French society (Lankester et al., 2021). More recently, Baubérot (2012) made a distinction between traditional *laicité* and the new *laicité* to explain the underlying issues of its political reappropriation.

New *laicité* encompasses the notion that religion should be kept out of the public domain, treated as a private matter, and underscores the clear separation between the State and religious organizations. As a consequence, it restricts the concept of freedom of religion by shifting the focus from state neutrality to the requirement of religious neutrality for all citizens when engaging in public matters. (Nugier, et al., 2016)

Research suggests that the emerging political appropriation of the principle of *laicité* is a means to mask certain prejudices against North African and Muslim people in France (Barthélemy & Michelatt, 2007; Baubérot, 2012, Brubaker, 2001). Consistent with this reasoning, research has shown a positive association between prejudice against minorities and the new *laicité* (Nugier, 2016), implying that the new *laicité* can be employed as a means to stigmatize individuals of North African origin. In line with this rationale, recent research has demonstrated that reinforcing beliefs of the new *laicité* among French majority citizens increased their support for discriminatory policies (Troian, 2019).

However, little is known about the impact of this new form of *laicité* on minority groups. The current research aims to expand upon previous knowledge on this topic by

examining the effects of the new *laicité* (in contrast to traditional *laicité*) among one of the most discriminated groups in France, Muslim women, and understanding its impact on perceived discrimination, identity integration and acculturation orientations. This new form of *laicité* conveys, for example, the norm that a Muslim woman should not wear her Islamic veil in public spaces, even if it is not prohibited by law (Nugier et al., 2012). This focuses the debate on women, as wearing the veil is considered one of the "indicators of unsuccessful integration" in France. (Fernando, 2010). Its prohibition has less to do with religious practices and more to do with the construction, in the French context, of the veil as a visible manifestation of the "immutable essence of being a Muslim" (Davidson, 2012, p.2).

According, to a study published this year by the Ballard Brief, 42% of Muslims in France reported experiencing discrimination, with this percentage increasing to 60% among women who wear a veil. More than a third stated that these incidents occurred within the last five years, indicating that this issue still persists without a resolution (Dille, 2023)

Discrimination has a detrimental impact on individuals, and there is consistent meta-analytical evidence of its negative effects on well-being (Priest et al., 2013; Schmitt et al., 2014). In addition to affecting psychological well-being, perceived discrimination also has been linked to the degree of social identification of minority group members and their acculturation orientations (Berry et al., 2006; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). For instances, contextual approaches to acculturation demonstrate that perceived discrimination among immigrants and immigrant descendants affects their acculturation orientations regarding their cultural group and the majority/mainstream society (e.g., Te Lindert et al., 2022). Perceived discrimination has also been associated with the social identification of minorities. There is empirical evidence indicating that the perception of discrimination can lead to the development of what is termed "reactive ethnicity" (Çelik, 2015). That is, perceived discrimination has been empirically linked to an increase in the ethnic identification of immigrants (Çelik, 2015; Rumbaut, 2008) and a decrease in their identification with the host national society, which can be perceived as a form of disidentification through rejection (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009).

Previous research also highlights the significance of multiple identities in the acculturation of immigrants, specifically integration (e.g., Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013). Many first and second-generation migrants find it essential to identify with both their original culture and the dominant national culture to define themselves (Giguere et al., 2010; Pyke & Dang, 2003). In the acculturation literature, biculturalism is one of four possible acculturation orientations: integration (involvement in both dominant and ethnic cultures), assimilation

(involvement in the dominant culture only), separation (involvement in the ethnic culture only), and marginalization (involvement in neither culture) (Berry, 2003). Traditionally, cultural psychologists have focused on differences between bicultural individuals (those using the integration strategy) and other acculturating groups (using assimilation, separation, or marginalization). Recent research suggests that bicultural or integrated individuals are not a homogeneous group, and there are variations among them (Huynh et al., 2011).

This dual cultural identity is shaped and reinforced by the norms imposed by a cultural group. These norms serve as a means to define and negotiate individual actions (cognitive, behavioral, or emotional) and the adequacy of their behavior (Giguere et al., 2010). *Laicité*, as a strong cultural norm in the French context, has been shown to impact attitudes of majority group members. However, less is known about the effects of different forms of *laicité* among minority groups. This research aims to examine the impact of new *laicité* (compared to traditional *laicité*) on Muslim women perceived discrimination, identity integration (i.e., perceived identity compatibility) and acculturation.

Literature Review

1. *Laicité* as a cultural norm impact on acculturation

Since the late 1980s, France has faced increased visibility of Islam, exemplified by the "Islamic headscarf" controversy. During this time, Muslim students were suspended for refusing to remove their veils in class. As a result, in 2004, the "French Law on Secularity and Conspicuous Religious Symbols in Schools" was passed, based on the findings of the Stasi Commission (Stasi, 2003), which promoted secularism in the name of gender equality. The Commission's findings underscored the significance of the headscarf in Islam, which, while seen as compatible with the Republic, was also associated with the promotion of sexist behaviors, derogatory language, and violence against Muslim women (Hauser, 2021). Prior research suggests that Muslim women in France are perceived in a complex manner as both gendered and racialized, largely due to laicité (Gaudin, 2016; Lizotte, 2020; Hopkins, 2015). This ambivalent perception portrays them as both victims of paternalism and as individuals who have voluntarily chosen to wear the veil. Furthermore, Muslim women in France are also seen as symbols of communitarianism, proselytism, and Muslim misogyny (Gaudin, 2016; Lizotte, 2020), in what Hopkins (2015) terms "sexist Islamophobia. » The ban on wearing the veil transforms into a means of controlling the public sphere, deemed essential for fostering and safeguarding a diverse civic culture. Yet, in practical terms, it equates to a manifestation of "polite racism."(Antonius 2002; Khosrokhavar 2009). This prohibition ultimately has less to do with religious practices than with how the veil is perceived in the French context, as a visible manifestation of the ''immutable essence of Muslim identity" (Davidson 2012,2).

Social psychological research suggested that *laicité*, as a cultural norm, can impact the acculturation orientation of Muslim people in France. Acculturation can be briefly defined as « a process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members. At the group level, it involves changes in social structures and institutions and in cultural practices. At the individual level, it involves changes in a person's behavioral repertoire. » (Berry, 2005, pp. 698). It can take different forms (assimilation, integration, marginalization, separation) depending on how individuals desire (or not) to maintain their heritage culture and identity

and to engage in contact and participate in the receiving society (Berry, 1997). Indeed, Badéa (2012) begins defining the French integration model showing that French individuals who strongly identify with the national level of "republicanism" tend to adhere more to assimilation and, as a result, express more prejudices towards immigrants.

However, other research has shown that the integration model in France is more complex than mere assimilation (Kamiejski et al., 2012; Nugier et al., 2016a; Roebroeck & Guimond, 2016). *Laicité* takes on various forms, as discussed previously. Research has identified three central aspects: the public expression of religious beliefs, state protection of religious cults, and equality among different religious cults (Cohu, 2017). This definition aligns with what Kamiejski et al. (2012) referred to as "citizenship," which pertains to the traditional content of *laicité*. Individuals who are less inclined to support these three fundamental aspects of *laicité* tend to favor assimilation, meaning the idea that immigrants should abandon their own culture to fully adopt the culture of the host country. Furthermore, adherence to the "citizenship" factor is associated with a lower predisposition to prejudice, while adherence to the *laicité* factor is linked to a stronger predisposition to prejudice. Additionally, the *laicité* factor, as defined by Kamiejski et al. (2012), is strongly opposed to multiculturalism, while the "citizenship" factor aligns with multicultural ideology. It's important to note that *laicité* has no connection to social dominance, unlike citizenship, which is correlated with the component of social dominance orientation related to equality rather than a desire to dominate other groups. An explanation for these apparently contradictory results lies in the fact that the current population's understanding of *laicité* has deviated to some extent from the historical definition of *laicité* and has become what Baubérot (2012) calls the new *laicité*. This new *laicité* extends religious neutrality to all French citizens, thereby relegating any religious manifestation to the private sphere, considering it an end in itself. Baubérot also reminds us that in 1905, all amendments restricting this freedom, including one regarding wearing religious clothing, have been rejected. This norm plays a role as an intergroup ideology, influencing attitudes towards diversity. Overall, these findings underline that *laicité* has become a cultural norm of integration deeply rooted in the French republican model (Kamiejski, et al., 2012).

Previous research showed the negative impact of *laicité* on the evaluations of cultural groups. The link between adherence to *laicité* and negative evaluations of cultural origin groups, such as Moroccans, shows the importance of this norm for understanding intergroup relations between majority and cultural minority groups (Badea et al., 2015). Complementing these findings, recent research showed that only activating new *laicité* among French majority

citizens increased their support for discriminatory policies, indirectly via increased national identification, whereas this detrimental indirect effect was not found for traditional *laicité* (Adam-Troian et al., 2019).

To the best of our knowledge, no previous research examined the impact of new and traditional form of *laicité* among minority cultural groups in France, specifically among Muslim women. Recent research examined the effects of the ban on wearing the veil in France in 2004, showed that this prohibition had negative consequences for the integration of Muslim women. The ban led to an increased perception of discrimination among affected women and influenced their identities, reinforcing both their French and religious identities depending on which part of their identity was already more important (Abdelgadir & Fouka, 2020).

Thus, in the current research we aim to examine the impact of new and traditional *laicité* on Muslim women acculturation orientations. To do so, we take an ecological approach to acculturation which means the surrounding context shapes the connection between acculturation and adaptation (Salo & Birman, 2015), relying on the Relative Acculturation Extended Model (RAEM, Navas et al., 2005). This model builds on Berry's (1997) acculturation approach, proposing that: immigrants' acculturation orientations toward culture maintenance and culture adoption vary depending on the specific domain of acculturation: private or public, as well as on the real vs. ideal plane. Navas and colleagues (2005, 2007) proposed that immigrants tend to use "assimilation" or "integration" orientation in more public or peripheral domains (e.g., politics, work, or the economy), where adopting elements of the dominant culture is often necessary for survival. In contrast, as they move into more central or private domains (e.g., family, religion, thought processes), immigrants tend to opt for "separation", favoring the maintenance of the heritage culture over the adoption of the receiving society culture. Additionally, the key differentiation of the model, as highlighted by Navas et al. (2005), lies in distinguishing between acculturation strategies and attitudes. In other words, it distinguishes between what immigrants declare they are putting into practice in their new society and what the natives perceive they have adopted (the real plane), as well as the options that immigrants would prefer to choose and that natives would wish for immigrants (the ideal plane). This distinction is crucial for understanding why we use this model, even though we do not directly apply it. In the current research we focus solely on the real plane, that is on the acculturation orientation that Muslim women put in practice and not the ideal plane.

We thus expect that *laicité* in France impacts the acculturation orientations of Muslim women. More specifically, we expect that the new *laicité* norm (vs. Traditional *laicité* and control conditions) triggers less desire for culture maintenance and less desire to adopt the French culture, both in public and private spaces.

2.   Impact of *laicité* on discrimination

In recent years, researchers, including Guimond and colleagues (2013), have put forth the idea that the impact of an integration policy on prejudice and discrimination against immigrants is related to how this policy is perceived as a widely accepted element.

This proposal aligns with the works of Falomir-Pichastor and colleagues (2004,2007; Gabarrot et al., 2009), emphasizing the significance of the perception of the legitimacy of norms within the majority group in influencing discriminatory behaviors.

Nugier and colleagues (2016a) conducted a study to assess the normativity of the new *laicité*. Their findings suggested that non-compliance with this norm leads to more negative evaluations and an intention for social sanction, especially among individuals with high levels of prejudice. In line with these findings, another study revealed that participants are more inclined to exert social pressure against a "deviant" Muslim target than a "deviant" Catholic target, implying that the norm of new *laicité* is primarily directed against Islam (Anier, 2019).

The new *laicité* significantly deviates from the concept of providing a secular critique of Islam, as proposed by the Stasi Commission. Instead, it has consistently been associated with the expression of prejudices, not only specifically against Muslim communities but also against individuals of North African origin and immigrants in general (Kamiejski et al., 2012; Roebroeck & Guimond, 2015). It is worth noting that support for *laicité* is positively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes among right-wing individuals, while this trend is entirely reversed among left-wing individuals (Barthelemy & Michelat, 2007). These findings illustrate the role of *laicité* as a set of beliefs that regulates a person's orientation toward diversity in intergroup relations. Recent research has showed that individuals leaning towards equality adhere to *laicité*, but support *laicité* also increased among anti-egalitarian individuals in situations of threat (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017). Thus, the maleable nature of *laicité* reflects how it can be considered a socio-cognitive construct, in contrast to traditional *laicité*, reflecting the distorted use of a legal concept in line with pre-existing motivations.

In France, the media coverage and political exploitation of *laicité* have contributed to legitimizing subtle discrimination against Maghrebi populations and Muslim communities, suggesting that, in the minds of the French, religion and culture are now partly conflated (Anier, 2019). Consequently, the private practice of religion, defining new *laicité*, would also be interpreted as the private preservation of one's own culture and the adoption of the French way of life. In contrast, traditional *laicité* would be associated with both religious and cultural freedom. The results of Anier's study (2019) support this idea, showing that non-adoption of French culture and non-identification with France seems to be incompatible with the new *laicité* norm but not with traditional *laicité*. Ultimately, these results suggest that the current concept of *laicité* reflects two different positions on diversity in general, not just religious diversity, as previously suggested by various researchers (Baubérot, 2012; Kamiejski et al., 2012; Pena-Ruiz, 2006; Roebroeck & Guimond, 2016).

There is a divide in the literature regarding how acculturation and discrimination interact. Research conducted by Fox and colleagues (2017) shows that discrimination against minority group members can enhance the incentives to abandon inherited cultural behaviors to gain access and acceptance within the host community. However, the reverse effect can also occur since increased discrimination can discourage acculturation by creating an inhospitable atmosphere that does not invite minority group members to participate in the majority culture (Fox et al., 2017). Indeed, perceived discrimination has been shown also to increase the identification with the ethnic ingroup, what is sometimes referred as reactive ethnicity (Çelik, 2015). Perceptions of discrimination have been linked to an increase in immigrants' ethnic identification (Çelik, 2015; Rumbaut, 2008) and a decrease in their identification with the host national society, which can be seen as a form of disidentification due to rejection (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). These findings align with the Rejection Identification Model (Branscombe et al., 1999), which suggests that discrimination directly harms well-being, but this effect can be mitigated by an increased ethnic identification among minority groups (Branscombe et al., 1999). Besides impacting ethnic identification, perceived discrimination has also been found to affect acculturation orientations and the overall sociocultural and psychological adaptation of immigrant youth to their new environment (Berry et al., 2006). When young individuals perceive discrimination targeted at them, their inclination to integrate into the broader society diminishes and they tend to distance themselves from the larger society (Berry et al., 2006). This also correlates with decreased psychological well-being (Greene et al., 2006; Virta et al., 2004)and reduced effectiveness in school and community life (Vega et al., 1995).

According to Sabatier (2008), the perception of discrimination acts as a barrier to integration and identification with the receiving society, especially when individuals perceive rejection by the national group. This perception of discrimination can be particularly concerning for Muslim women due to their religious identity, potentially making them more vulnerable to this impact (Sabatier, 2008). Yazdiha (2018) found that gender was a robust predictor of perceptions of discrimination, as French Muslim women perceive greater hostility than Muslim men. This result might be explained by French anti-veiling policies that directly identified Muslim women as subjects of public concern. This supports the proposal that national policy and discourse shape the context in which perceptions of discrimination are formed.

Longitudinal research investigating the relationship between discrimination and acculturation strategies is scarce, and the findings have been inconsistent. To illustrate, among Latino university students, the perception of discrimination on campus was found to predict well-being over time. This effect was mediated by ethnic identity and activism, offering support for the rejection-identification model (Cronin et al., 2012).

Yazdiha (2019) also shows that perceived Islamophobia positively predicts the endorsement of marginalization as an acculturation orientation. It also demonstrates that native-born Muslims are more likely to perceive societal hostility than Muslim immigrants in more inclusive contexts. The concept of the "immigrant paradox" is often used to explain that the second generation exhibits less favorable psychological and sociocultural outcomes than their foreign-born peers (Berry et al., 2006). De Vroome and colleagues (2014) also found that second-generation immigrants reported more experiences of discrimination. Other studies, however, found no differences in perceived discrimination between first and second-generation immigrants of ethnic minorities in Germany (Fleischmann et al., 2019). Further studies have also revealed no differences in terms of acculturation orientations and adaptation outcomes among different generations of young immigrants (Berry & Hou, 2017; Motti-Stefanidi et al., 2018).

This could be due to the fact that there are other important variables to consider in explaining immigrants' adaptation (Guerra et al., 2019), such as the multicultural policies of the host country, the ethnic origin of immigrants, and the different domains in which acculturation occurs. As proposed by the RAEM (Navas et al., 2005; 2007), there is no objection to making an effort and adopting cultural elements of the host society in peripheral areas (school, consumer habits). In central areas (family, religion, and values), which belong to a more private sphere of people's lives and largely define identity, and where no contact or

relationship with the host society peers is needed to survive, immigrants maintain and prefer to maintain their original customs rather than adopt or prefer to adopt to a greater extent. This perspective aligns with research on situated identity conducted by Noels and colleagues, suggesting that these differences are more pronounced in private domains (i.e., family, friends) than in public domains (Noels et al., 2010; Noels et al., 2015; Zhang & Noels, 2013).

We aim to explore whether perceived discrimination mediates the effect of new *laicité* (vs. traditional *laicité* and control) on Muslim women's desire for culture maintenance and culture adoption (both in private and public domains). Specifically, we expect that the new *laicité* condition (vs. traditional *laicité* and control) triggers more perceived discrimination, which, in turn, is associated with a lower desire for culture adoption (both in private and public settings) and a higher desire for culture maintenance (both in private and public settings).

3. *Laicité* and perception of identity compatibility

The concept of identity is inherently complex, shaped at the same time by our self-perception and how others perceive us. It plays a central role in the development of our self-esteem and our sense of belonging to various social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986; Turner et al., 1987). How others perceive us, as well as our own evaluation of the recognition or lack of recognition of our identities, significantly influences our self-understanding within the categories to which we identify. This recognition plays a crucial role in the construction, negotiation, and expression of our identity (Blackwood et al,.2013; Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011).

Identity recognition is defined as the validation of our identity by others, while non-recognition occurs when our identities are not validated or are even denied by others. Research has shown that the lack of identity recognition can negatively affect our self-esteem, particularly for individuals belonging to seemingly "incompatible" or conflicting social groups (Verkuyten, 2006). Recent research has shed light on a previously overlooked form of rejection among minorities, which Maghrebi-French individuals may also experience: the non-recognition of their national identity (Blackwood et al., 2013; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011). This involves a lack of recognition of their national belonging by French individuals without an immigration background, who identify as natives. Maghrebi-French individuals may not feel fully recognized as French due to this

non-recognition of their national identity, for example, being perceived as members of ethnic or religious groups rather than as French by the majority society (da Silva, 2021).

Non-recognition of national identity entails that individuals relegated to membership in a disadvantaged subgroup (in this case, Maghrebi-French individuals) have their national affiliation denied by a privileged subgroup (native French). This occurs when the privileged subgroup emphasizes the religious and/or ethnic affiliation of members of the disadvantaged subgroup, implying a devaluation of their national identity. This particularly occurs when this affiliation to an ethnic or religious subgroup is seen as incompatible with national identity (Badea et al., 2020). Feelings of non-recognition depend on group identification: for individuals to feel unrecognized, they must identify with the group from which they are excluded. In other words, it is precisely because they consider themselves French that the denial of their national belonging becomes significant.

In France, women experience identity incompatibility due to a series of historical, political, and social factors, as highlighted by the study conducted by da Silva and colleagues (2022). Integration policies have long focused on the concept of assimilation, which encouraged individuals from ethnic and religious minorities to abandon their cultural and religious identities to assimilate into the dominant culture. These policies and the colonial legacy created tensions and influenced the perception of Muslim women who wished to preserve their religious identity by wearing the veil, contributing to their being seen as "others" (Modood, 2005; Sayad, 1999). also helping to shape persistent stereotypes and prejudices that contribute to the non-recognition of Maghrebi individuals and Muslim women in France (Memmi, 2003). New *laicité* in France restricts public expression of religion, especially Islam. French politicians across different political affiliations have utilized this selective interpretation of *laicité* for political gains (Scott, 2010), reinforcing the negative perception of the religious identity of veiled Muslim women, contributing to their non-recognition (Bowen, 2011).

Religious identity, particularly Muslim identity, lies at the heart of the non-recognition of Muslim women in France, as they face negative stereotypes related to their religious identity (Cesari, 2009). Veiled women are often associated with oppression, significantly affecting how their identity is perceived and their experience of non-recognition (Sayad, 1999). The study conducted by da Silva and colleagues (2022) highlights that the issue of misrecognition of Muslim women wearing the headscarf is considerably more problematic in France than in the Netherlands. This observation suggests that there is a complex relationship between government policies, colonial legacy, and social perception. The study's participants

emphasize that the strict regulations associated with the new *laicité* in France, which involve the display of religious symbols, as well as the assimilationist integration policy, play a significant role in the misrecognition of the identity of Muslim women in France. Furthermore, they underscore that French politicians, irrespective of their political affiliation, have a substantial impact in fostering and legitimizing biases, partly in connection with the implementation of laws related to the new *laicité*.

Being a bicultural individual encompasses a diverse range of people, including immigrants, their children, refugees, ethnic minorities, temporary travelers, indigenous peoples, biracial individuals, international adoptees, and those in intercultural relationships (Benet-Martínez & Hong, 2014). These individuals are immersed in the process of acculturation, which involves adapting both behaviorally and psychologically to a second culture. In cases where individuals are born into two cultures, they are required to learn and adapt to both (Schwartz and al., 2010. Throughout this process of adjustment, they grapple with varying sets of emotional, behavioral, and cognitive expectations originating from their affiliations with multiple cultural groups. These expectations have a far-reaching impact on different aspects of their lives, influencing behaviors, values, and identities (Berry and al., 2006).

Bicultural individuals face the challenge of negotiating between multiple, and sometimes conflicting, cultural identities and value systems in their everyday lives. To address this challenge, Benet-Martínez and her colleagues introduced Bicultural Identity Integration (BII) as a theoretical framework to understand how bicultural individuals cognitively and affectively organize their cultural identities (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Benet-Martínez et al., 2002). This approach explores individuals' feelings and perceptions regarding the extent to which their cultural identities overlap and converge, specifically the degree to which they experience harmony versus conflict and blending versus separation among their internalized cultural streams (Benet-Martínez, 2019).

Research has suggested that individual differences in BII can moderate the acculturation process regarding the appropriate use of cultural knowledge in a specific cultural context (Benet-Martínez et al., 2002). High levels of BII are generally associated with increased psychological well-being among immigrants and ethnic minorities. This means that individuals who integrate their two cultural identities can use behavioral skills related to both cultural streams in accordance with the requirements of the cultural context. BII measures the perception of compatibility or opposition between an individual's ethnic and cultural

identities. Biculturals with high BII consider their two cultural identities as compatible, while those with low BII perceive them as opposed (Benet-Martínez et al., 2002).

Huynh, Benet-Martínez, and Nguyen (2018) also significantly differ in how the first and second generations negotiate their identity. For second-generation individuals who were raised in the dominant society, their bicultural identity appears to be more influenced by their identification with their culture of origin. In other words, the bicultural identity of the second generation is strongly linked to their ethnic identity. Conversely, for first-generation individuals, cultural harmony is predicted by factors related to their personality, especially neuroticism. This suggests that the perception of cultural harmony is more influenced by individual personality-related factors among first-generation immigrants.

Building on this research, we explore if perceived identity compatibility mediates the effect of new *laicité* (vs. traditional *laicité* and control) on desire for culture maintenance and culture adoption (both in private and public). Specifically, we expect that the new laicité condition (vs. traditional *laicité* and control) triggers less perceived identity compatibility which in turn is associated with lower desire for culture adoption (private and public) and higher desire for culture maintenance (private and public).

4.   Present research

Based on the previously reviewed research, this study aimed at examining the impact of two forms of *laicité* (traditional, new) on Muslim women perceived discrimination, perceived identity compatibility and acculturation orientations. Specifically, building on previous research we propose 3 main hypotheses:

H1: We expect that the new *laicité* condition (vs. traditional *laicité* and a control, unrelated, condition) triggers less desire for culture maintenance and less desire to adopt the French culture, both in public and private spaces.

H2: We expect that the new *laicité* condition (vs. traditional *laicité* and a control, unrelated, condition) triggers higher perceived discrimination and lower perceived identity compatibility.

H3a We explore if perceived discrimination mediates the effect of new *laicité* condition (vs. traditional *laicité* and a control, unrelated, condition) on desire for culture maintenance and culture adoption (both in private and public). Specifically, we expect that the new *laicité* condition (vs. traditional *laicité* and a control, unrelated, condition) triggers more perceived discrimination, which in turn is associated with lower desire for culture adoption (private and public) and higher desire for culture maintenance (private and public).

 H3b We explore if perceived identity compatibility mediates the effect of new *laicité* condition (vs. traditional *laicité* and a control, unrelated, condition) on desire for culture maintenance and culture adoption (both in private and public). Specifically, we expect that the new *laicité* condition (vs. traditional *laicité* and a control, unrelated, condition) triggers less perceived identity compatibility which in turn is associated with lower desire for culture adoption (private and public) and higher desire for culture maintenance (private and public).

Finally, considering previous research showing that generational status (1st vs 2nd) impacts acculturation orientations ((Berry & Hou, 2016; Motti-Stefanidi et al., 2018) and perceived discrimination (Fleischmann et al., 2019), we also explore the impact of generational status, specifically if it moderates the impact of new and traditional *laicité* on our dependent variables.

CHAPTER 3

Methods

1.   Participants and Procedure

Participants were women of Muslim faith living in France with at least 18 years old. A priori power analysis conducted with G*power 3 (Faul et al., 2007) assuming a medium effect size (f=.25) and an alpha of .05. Results showed that a total sample of 158 participants was required to achieve a power of 0.80. A total of 176 participants responded to the online survey. Two men and one person who self-identified as other were excluded from the analysis. Of the remaining 173 participants, we excluded 30 participants who only opened the questionnaire and did not answer any questions, and 69 participants because they had only answered the demographic questions. In total, we were only able to retain 74 participants with a mean age of 33.03 years (SD = 11.07, range: 18-62). Most participants were employed (35%) or students (23%), completed a bachelor or postgraduate degree (85%). Regarding citizenship, 81.1% reported being a French citizen. Regarding country of birth, 67.6% was born in France (2nd generation) and 31.4% was born elsewhere (1st generation). Of those who were not born in France (N = 24), 13 reported being born in Morocco, 4 in Algeria, 1 in Tunisia, and 1 in Italy. Most participants reported not using religious symbols in their daily life (e.g., hijab, sitar, etc), and 32.4% reported using such symbols.

Participants were recruited using convenience/snowball sampling via different social media platforms, word-of-mouth, social networks, distribution of QR codes in places of worship as well as in cafés and places selling Halal products. All materials were subjected to ethical approval by ISCTE Ethical Committee (28/03/2023). An anonymous link was used to enable participants to respond to the questionnaire. The first page of the questionnaire included a brief informed consent statement, outlining the research without revealing its complete purpose. It emphasized aspects of anonymity, voluntary participation, and confidentiality. After agreeing to participate, participants were initially asked to respond to sociodemographic questions. They were then randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions and asked to read fictional scenarios depending on the experimental condition: control, traditional *laicité* or new *laicité*. Following the reading of these fictional scenarios, participants were presented with various measures related to acculturation, bicultural identity integration, religious identity, perceived discrimination, and a manipulation check.

At the end of the survey participants were debriefed with a detailed explanation of the study procedure. Participants were informed about the study's objectives, which include examining how *laicité* impacts their experiences of discrimination, bicultural identity and acculturation. They were also provided with a list of scientific articles on the topic and a list of associations combating discrimination in France. The researcher's email address was also made available to the participants.

We followed APA Code of Conduct recommendation to offer reasonable steps to correct any misconceptions that participants may have of which the researchers are aware, and of personal and external contacts for people to address any unpleasant experiences/outcomes related to the study.

2.   Materials and Measures

All the scales were originally in English and were translated into French and Arabic, so participants could choose in which language they answered the questionnaire. Following the sociodemographic section, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, filled in all measures of interest and finally received the debriefing information.

The sociodemographic questions aimed to collect demographic information through self-assessment questions. Participants answer questions regarding their age, gender, education level, employment status, school attendance in France, French citizenship, country of birth, and the wearing of religious symbols.

2.2.1. **Perceived discrimination** was measured with the Everyday Discrimination Scale (Williams, et al., 2003), using 9 items, such as "You are treated with less courtesy than other people." All items were measured using a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 ("Never") to 6 ("Almost every day »). We created a composite score where higher values mean higher levels of perceived discrimination ($\alpha = .93$).

2.2.2. **Identity compatibility/integration** was measured with the Bicultural Identity Integration Scale—Version 2 (BIIS-2) (Huynh et al., 2018). The scale is composed of 17 items that assess how bicultural individuals cognitively and affectively organize their two cultural identities. All items are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). A sample item : « I find it easy to harmonize Muslim and French cultures ». We created a composite score where higher values mean higher levels of perceived identity compatibility ($\alpha = .79$). Although the original scale has two sub-dimensions

(blendness vs compartimentalization and harmony vs conflict), considering the very small sample size of the current study, and the consequent loss of statistical power, we opted for creating a single composite score of identity integration as previously done (Benet-Martínez et al., 2002)

2.2.3 **Acculturation orientations** were measured with Navas and colleagues (2014) items assessing culture maintenance and culture adoption, both in private (friendships, family relationships, religious choices, way of thinking) and the public domain (work, school, consumer habits). Participants indicated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 'not at all' to 5 = 'a lot') to what extent they adopted the French culture in each domain (private and public: How much have you adopted the traditions of France, in each of the following domains or contexts?) We created two composite scores where higher values mean higher levels of culture adoption in the private domain (α = .89) and higher levels of culture adoption in the public domain (α = 73). Regarding orientations towards culture maintenance, we adjusted the items used for the first and the second generation of immigration: 1st generation participants indicated " To what extent do you currently maintain the Muslim traditions of your country of origin, in each of the following areas or contexts? (private: friendships, family relationships, religious choices, way of thinking; and public: work, school, consumer habits). Second-generation participants indicated "To what extent do you currently maintain the Muslim traditions of your parents' country of origin, in each of the following areas or contexts?. We created four composite scores where higher values mean higher levels of culture maintenance in the private (α = .77) and public domains (α = .86) for 1st generation participants, and higher levels of culture maintenance in the public private (α = .69) and public (α = 87) domain for 2nd generation participants.

2.2.4 **Religious identification** was measured with 6 items from Verkuyten (2007). Participants indicated on a 5 Likert scale (1= strongly disagree to 5= Strongly agree) to what extent being a Muslim was an important part of their identity (Sample items: "My Muslim identity is an important part of my self"; 'I identify strongly with Muslims"). We created a composite score where higher values mean higher levels of religious identification (α = .95).

2.2.5 **Manipulation check** was assessed with 4 items adapted from Roebroeck and Guimond (2016), two assessing new *laicité* and two items assessing traditional *laicité*. Participants indicated using a 5-point Likert scale (1= Not at all, 5 = Very much) which

statement best represented their views on *laicité* (sample item for traditional *laicité* "Freedom to practice the religion of one's choice," sample item for new *laicité* "Religious practices should remain in a private context"). We created two composite scores of new *laicité* ($r = .71$, $p <. 001$) and traditional *laicité* ($r = .19$, p = .12)

3.   Manipulations

In the traditional *laicité* conditions, participants were required to read a fictional short article: "François Kraus, director of Ifop's political department, declared in La Dépêche du Midi: " A large majority of French citizens supports *laicité*". The CNRS, requested by the government, has published a vast survey that reflects the opinion that the French have of *laicité*. This survey follows on from the one carried out by the Jean Jaurès Foundation and for the National Committee for Secular Action. In this new study we can see that more than 80% agree that each citizen should be free to choose the religion of his or her choice and 72% agree that each religion should be considered as equal." Participants were also presented with a bar graph supporting the information, where they saw the level of agreement with statements representing traditional *laicité* that were retrieved from Roebroeck and Guimond (2016) scale to assess this construct (i.e., Every citizen should be free to practice the religion of their choice; A French person should be recognized as an individual, not merely as a member of a specific community (cultural, religious, sexual, etc.);   In a democratic state, all religions should be regarded as equal; It is crucial to respect the legal equality of all citizens, regardless of their origin, race, or religion).

In the new *laicité* condition participants were required to read a different fictional short article: "François Kraus, director of Ifop's political department, declared in La Dépêche du Midi: " A large majority of French citizens supports *laicité*". The CNRS, requested by the government, has published a vast survey that reflects the opinion that the French have of *laicité*. This survey follows on from the one carried out by the Jean Jaurès Foundation and for the National Committee for Secular Action. In this new study we can see that 80% of the French agree that religious signs should be banned in schools and 72% agree that religious practices should be kept as private as possible and not public.". Similar to the traditional *laicité* condition, participants were also presented with bar graph supporting the information, where they saw the level of agreement with statements representing new *laicité* that were retrieved from Roebroeck and Guimond (2016) scale to assess this construct (i.e., "It would be normal for the state in France to finance the construction of mosques, synagogues, and temples", "It seems perfectly normal to me that visible religious signs are prohibited in public schools in France", "As much as possible, religious practices should be private rather than public", "I don't mind that on the French identity card photo, Catholics or Muslims can retain a visible sign of their faith").

In the control condition participants were required to read non-related about the impact of different sports practices on health: "We spend more and more time in front of screens - TVs, smartphones, tablets and computers. And when we are texting, watching videos, playing online games, browsing the internet or chatting on social media, we are usually sitting. Time spent in cars and on public transport is also on the rise. And the increasing use of technology means that many people spend their days sitting at work. Researchers believe that sedentary behaviour poses a health risk because it can lead to weight gain. Obesity is a risk factor for at least 11 types of cancer. Here are the results of a study by Leandro Garcia's team (University of Cambridge) published on 28 February 2023 in the British Journal of Sports Medicine, which studied the probability of reducing certain cancers by walking and pilates." Participants were also presented with a bar graph summarizing these findings (see full materials in Appendix).

Results

Statistical analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics (26). First, we conducted Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to evaluate the efficacy of the manipulation, then to test H1 and H2 we conducted Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAS) controlling for participants religious identification because previous research showed that this is related to several of our measures of interest and bivariate correlations showed this was also the case in our sample (see Table1). We used post-hoc pairwise comparisons to further examine differences between the experimental conditions. Finally, H3 was tested with regression-based analysis using SPSS Process macro (Hayes, 2018).

Table 1

Bivariate correlations

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. ID	-								
2. PD	.046	-							
3. RI	.071	.290*	-						
4. CMP1	-.158	.090	.676*	-					
5. CMPR1	-.061	.145	.787*	.732*	-				
6. CMP2	.206	.255	.808*	a	a	-			
7. CMPR2	.359*	.225	.632*	a	a	.600*	-		
8. CAP	.277*	-.013	-.192	-.177	-.195	-.167	-.248	-	
9.8. CAPR	.172	-.039	-.197	.042	.050	-.257	-.140	.584*	-

Note: ID = Identity compatibility; PD = Perceived discrimination; RI = Religious identification; CMP1 = Culture Maintenance public 1st generation; Culture Maintenance Private 1st generation; CMP2 = Culture Maintenance Public 2nd generation; CMPR2 = Culture Maintenance Private 2nd generation; CAP = Culture Adoption Public; CAPR = Culture Adoption Private
* $p < 0,05$. a = cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.

1. Manipulation check

We tested the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with conditions (new *laicité*, traditional *laicité*, and control) as the independent variable and the two composite scores of the manipulation check (traditional *laicité* and new *laicité*) as dependent variables. The effect of conditions on new *laicité* was significant, $F(2,67) = 6.35$, $p = .003$. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that agreement with new *laicité* was lower in the new *laicité* condition *(M = 2.31, SD = 1.01)* compared to the control ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.12$) and traditional ($M = 2.65$, $SD = 1.09$) conditions. No differences were found between the control and traditional *laicité* conditions. The effect of the experimental manipulation on traditional *laicité* was not significant, $F(2,67) = .526$, $p = .593$.

2. Effects of *laicité* on acculturation orientations

To test H1, we first conducted two ANCOVAS with condition (new *laicité*, traditional *laicité*, control) and generational status (1st vs. 2nd) as independent variables, culture adoption (private and public) as dependent variables, and religious identification as the covariate.

Regarding the culture adoption in the public domains, results showed that religious identity was not related to culture adoption, $F(1,71) = 1.26$, $p = .266$. There was no significant main effect of condition, $F(2,71) = .547$, $p = .581$, nor of generational status, $F(1,71) = .250$, $p = .619$. Finally, the interaction effect of generational status and experimental condition, $F(2,71) = .287$, $p = .751$, was also not significant (see means by condition in Table 2). Similar findings were found for acculturation orientations towards culture adoption in the private domains. religious identity was not related to culture adoption in private domains, $F(1,70) = 1.81$, $p = .184$. There was no significant main effect of condition, $F(2,70) = .082$, p = .922, nor of generational status, $F(1,70) = .158$, $p = .692$. Finally, the interaction effect of generational status and experimental condition, $F(2,70) = .007$, $p = .993$, was also not significant (see means by condition in Table 3).

Table 2

Marginal means of culture adoption in the public domains by condition

Condition	EM	SE
Control	3.746$_a$	.258
New *Laicité*	3.439$_a$	.264
Traditional *Laicité*	3.391$_a$	.261

Note. EM = Estimated marginal mean controlled by covariate; SE = standard error . Values in the same column that do not share the same subscript are statistically different at $p < 0.05$, and the estimated marginal mean is controlled by covariate.

Table 3

Marginal means of culture adoption in the private domains by condition

Condition	EM	SE
Control	2.719$_a$	.290
New *Laicité*	2.660$_a$	.293
Traditional *Laicité*	2.556$_a$	.290

Note. EM = Estimated marginal mean controlled by covariate; SE = standard error. Values in the same column that do not share the same subscript are statistically different at $p < 0.05$, and the estimated marginal mean is controlled by covariate.

Regarding acculturation orientations toward culture maintenance (private and public domains), we conducted separate ANCOVAS for 1st and 2nd generation participants, considering they answered to different versions of the measures. Results for culture maintenance in private domains for 2nd generation participants showed that religious identification was significantly related to culture maintenance orientations, $F(1,48) = 66.67$, $p < .001$, whereas the main effect of experimental condition was not significant, , $F(2,47) = .538$, $p = .588$, (see means by condition in Table 4). Similar findings were found for

acculturation orientations towards culture maintenance in public domains for 2nd generation participants: religious identification was significantly related to culture maintenance orientations, $F(1,48) = 27.06$, $p < .001$, whereas the main effect of experimental condition was not significant, , $F(2,48) = 1.17$, $p = .321$, (see means by condition in Table 5).

Table 4

Marginal means of culture maintenance in private domains for 2nd generation by condition

Condition	EM	SE
Control	3.557$_a$	.192
New *Laicité*	3.731$_a$	.202
Traditional *Laicité*	3.885$_a$	.184

Note. EM = Estimated marginal mean controlled by covariate; SE = standard error. Values in the same column that do not share the same subscript are statistically different at $p < 0.05$, and the estimated marginal mean is controlled by covariate.

Table 5

Marginal means of culture maintenance in public domains for 2nd generation by condition

Condition	EM	SE
Control	3.003$_a$	.196
New *Laicité*	2.631$_a$	.206
Traditional *Laicité*	3.006$_a$	.183

Note. EM = Estimated marginal mean controlled by covariate; SE = standard error . Values in the same column that do not share the same subscript are statistically different at $p < 0.05$, and the estimated marginal mean is controlled by covariate.

Results for culture maintenance for 1st generation participants should be interpreted with caution considering the very low number of participants per condition (<9). Results showed that religious identification was significantly related to culture maintenance

orientations in private domains , $F(1,22) = 26.29$, $p < .001$, whereas the main effect of experimental condition was not significant, , $F(2,22) = .279$, $p = .759$, (see means by condition in Table 6). Similar findings were found for acculturation orientations towards culture maintenance in public domains for 1st generation participants: religious identification was significantly related to culture maintenance orientations, $F(1,22) = 17.35$, $p < .001$, whereas the main effect of experimental condition was not significant, , $F(2,22) = .756$, $p = .484$, (see means by condition in Table 7).

Table 6

Marginal means of culture maintenance in public domains for 1st generation by condition

Condition	EM	SE
Control	3.664ₐ	.302
New *Laicité*	3.399ₐ	.290
Traditional *Laicité*	3.380ₐ	.290

Note. EM = Estimated marginal mean controlled by covariate; SE = standard error . Values in the same column that do not share the same subscript are statistically different at *p* < 0.05, and the estimated marginal mean is controlled by covariate.

Table 7

Marginal means of culture maintenance in public domains for 2nd generation by condition

Condition	EM	SE
Control	3.356ₐ	.333
New *Laicité*	2.767ₐ	.320
Traditional *Laicité*	3.148ₐ	.321

Note. EM = Estimated marginal mean controlled by covariate; SE = standard error . Values in the same column that do not share the same subscript are statistically different at *p* < 0.05, and the estimated marginal mean is controlled by covariate.

3. Effect of *laicité* on perceived discrimination and perceived identity compatibility

To test H2, we conducted two ANCOVAS with condition (new *laicité*, traditional *laicité*, control) and generational status (1st vs. 2nd) as independent variables, and perceived discrimination, and perceived identity compatibility as dependent variables, and religious identification as the covariate. The results of the ANCOVA demonstrated that religious identification was related to perceived discrimination, $F(1,68) = 4.38$, $p = .040$. However, the main effect of the experimental condition $F(2,68) = .252$, $p = .778$ was not significant, and the main effect of generational status only approached significance (1st vs. 2nd), $F(1,68) = 2.97$, $p = .090$ ($M^{1st\ generation} = 1.72$ $SE = .208$, $M^{2nd\ generation} = 2.15$, $SE = .14$), with second generation participants reporting higher perceived discrimination. The two-way interaction effect between the conditions and generational status was also not significant, $F(2,68) = .379$, $p = .686$ (see Table 8 for estimated marginal means by condition).

Table 8

Marginal means of perceived discrimination by condition

Condition	Mean	Std. Error
Control	1.826$_a$	.205
New *Laicité*	2.035$_a$	.208
Traditional *Laicité*	1.957$_a$	.235

Note. EM = Estimated marginal mean controlled by covariate; SE = standard error . Values in the same column that do not share the same subscript are statistically different at $p < 0.05$, and the estimated marginal mean is controlled by covariate.

Regarding perceived identity compatibility, the results showed that religious identity was only marginally related to perceived identity compatibility, $F(1,69) = 3.33$, $p = .073$. The main effect of condition was significant, $F(2,69) = 9.23$, $p < .001$. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that perceived identity compatibility was lower in the new *laicité* condition compared to the control condition, as well as in the traditional *laicité* condition relative to the control (see Table 9). The main effect of generational status (1st vs. 2nd) was

not significant, $F(1,69) = 1.77$, $p = .188$. There was no significant interaction effect between the experimental condition and generational status $F(2,69) = .1.56$, $p = .219$.

Table 9

Marginal means of perceived identity compatibility by condition

Condition	Mean	Std. Error
Control	3.89$_a$	.13
New *Laicité*	3.15$_b$	.13
Traditional *Laicité*	3.29$_b$	.12

Note. EM = Estimated marginal mean controlled by covariate; SE = standard error . Values in the same column that do not share the same subscript are statistically different at $p < 0.05$, and the estimated marginal mean is controlled by covariate.

4.   Indirect effects of *laicité* via perceived identity compatibility

To examine the indirect effect of *laicité* (experimental manipulations) on acculturation orientations (public and private) (H3), we used Model 4 from the PROCESS extension for SPSS (Hayes, 2013).   The experimental conditions were entered as a predictor (dummy coding, using the control condition as the reference group, see Table10). Perceived identity compatibility was entered as the mediator and acculturation orientations toward culture adoption and culture maintenance, private and public, were the outcome variables. Indirect effects were calculated with bootstrapping with 5000 resamples and 95% confidence intervals. Perceived discrimination was not included as a mediator because previous analyses showed that this variable was not affected by our manipulation.

Table 10

Dummy coding used for estimating the mediation models

Dummy-coding	New	Traditional
Control	0	0
Control vs New *Laicité*(X1)	0	1
Control vs Tradicional *Laicité* (X2)	1	0

The analyses for culture adoption public domains, showed, a significant and negative the indirect effect of the experimental manipulation via perceived identity compatibility (see Table 11) on culture adoption. Specifically, participants in the new and traditional *laicité* conditions (relative to the control) showed lower levels of identity compatibility, which in turn was positively related to culture adoption orientations in the public domain. That is, the lower the levels of identity compatibility, the lower the levels of culture adoption in the public domains.

Table 11

Indirect effects of condition on culture adoption public domains via perceived identity compatibility

					R^2
Model 1		Outcome: Identity Compatibility			.36
	Coeff.	SE	*t*	*p*	
X1	-.49	.17	-2.86	.005	
X2	-.43	.16	-2.62	.010	
Model 2		Outcome: Culture Adoption Public			.08
	Coeff.	SE	*t*	*p*	
X1	-.05	.33	-.15	.878	
X2	-.14	.31	-.46	.645	
Identity Compatibility	.45	.22	2.06	.043	

	Bootstrapping results for indirect effect			
	Effect	SE	LL95%CI	UL95%CI
Indirect effect of X1 via incompatible identity	-.23	.13	-.51	-.01
Indirect effect of X2 via incompatible identity	-.20	.12	-.47	-.01

Note. In all models, the reported regression coefficients are unstandardized. 5000 bootstrap samples; LL – lower limit; UL – upper limit; CI – Confident interval; X1 = control vs. new *laicité*, X2 = control vs. traditional *laicité*

Results found for acculturation orientations towards culture adoption in the private domains did not show a significant indirect effect of the experimental condition (see 11). Participants in the new and traditional *laicité* conditions (relative to the control) showed lower levels of identity compatibility, however these were not in turn related to culture adoption orientations in the private domain.

Table 12

Indirect effects of condition on culture adoption private domains via perceived identity compatibility

					R^2
Model 1		Outcome: Identity Compatibility			.12
		Coeff.	SE	*t*	*p*
	X1	-.47	.17	-2.72	.008
	X2	-.41	.16	-2.47	.015
Model 2		Outcome: Culture Adoption Private			.02
		Coeff.	SE	*t*	*p*
	X1	.04	.40	.10	.914
	X2	-.03	.38	-.08	.934
Identity Compatibility		.35	.27	1.30	.195
		Bootstrapping results for indirect effect			
		Effect	SE	LL95%CI	UL95%CI

Indirect effect of X1 via Identity Incompatible	-.16	.14	-.47	.08
Indirect effect of X2 private via Identity Incompatible	-.14	.12	-.43	.06

Note. In all mediation models, the reported regression coefficients are unstandardized. 5000 bootstrap samples; LL – lower limit; UL – upper limit; CI – Confident interval; X1 = control vs. new condition, C2 = control vs. traditional condition.

Regarding acculturation orientations toward culture maintenance, we conducted analyses for the second-generation participants only, as it was not appropriate to do so with a very small sample of 22 participants. Results found for orientation towards culture maintenance in public domains, for second-generation participants only, showed that a significant and negative the indirect effect of the experimental manipulation via perceived identity compatibility (see Table 13) on culture maintenance. Specifically, participants in the traditional and new *laicité* conditions (relative to the control) showed lower levels of identity compatibility, albeit only marginally for the latter, which in turn was positively related to culture maintenance orientations in the public domain. That is, the lower the levels of identity compatibility, the lower the levels of culture maintenance in the public domains. The indirect effect was only significant for traditional *laicité* vs control (X2), but not for the new *laicité* vs control (X1).

Table 13

Indirect effects of condition on culture maintenance public domains via perceived identity compatibility

					R²
Model 1		Outcome: Identity Compatibility			.10
	Coeff.	SE	*t*	*p*	
	X1	-.36	.20	-1.80	.078
	X2	-.38	.19	-2.01	.050
Model 2		Outcome: Cultura maintenance public			.20
	Coeff.	SE	*t*	*p*	
	X1	.18	.33	.55	.583

X2	.61	.31	1.92	.060
Identity Compatibility	.72	.23	3.00	.004

Bootstrapping results for indirect effect

	Effect	SE	LL95%CI	UL95%CI
Indirect effect of X1 via Identity Compatibility	-.26	.19	-.73	.03
Indirect effect of X2 via Identity Compatibility	-.28	.18	-.69	-.01

Note. In all mediation models, the reported regression coefficients are unstandardized. 5000 bootstrap samples; LL – lower limit; UL – upper limit; CI – Confident interval; X1 = control vs. new condition, C2 = control vs. traditional condition.

Finally, results found for acculturation orientations towards culture maintenance in the private domains did not show a significant indirect effect of the experimental condition (see Table 14), although they were in the expected direction. Differently than for the previous models, after accounting for the effect of perceived identity compatibility, the effects of the experimental conditions on culture maintenance were still significant (see table 14), such that participants reported stronger support for culture maintenance in the private domains in the new and traditional conditions than in the control.

Table 14

Indirect effects of condition on culture maintenance private domains via perceived identity compatibility

					R^2
Model 1		Outcome: Identity Compatibility			.09
	Coeff.	SE	*t*	*p*	
X1	-.36	.19	-1.83	.073	
X2	-.33	.18	-1.76	.085	
Model 2		Outcome: Culture maintenance Private			.17
	Coeff.	SE	*t*	*p*	
X1	.85	.43	1.98	.053	

X2	.99	.41	2.41	.020
Identity Compatibility	.68	.31	2.16	.036

Bootstrapping results for indirect effect

	Effect	SE	LL95%CI	UL95%CI
Indirect effect of X1 via Identity Compatibility	-.24	.23	-.84	.07
Indirect effect of X2 via Identity Compatibility	-.22	.19	-.67	.06

Note. In all mediation models, the reported regression coefficients are unstandardized. 5000 bootstrap samples; LL – lower limit; UL – upper limit; CI – Confident interval; X1 = control vs. new condition, C2 = control vs. traditional condition.

.

CHAPTER 5

Discussion

In France, *laicité*, and more precisely the new *laicité*, has been used as a strategy to respond to the increasing visibility of Muslim communities. Recent research has shown a connection between new *laicité* and the increase in prejudice towards Muslim communities (e.g., Anier et al., 2018), described as "a socially accepted way to justify prejudice" (Troian et al., 2018, p. 101). In contrast, traditional *laicité* has been associated with decreased discrimination, in line with other research on the impact of the attacks against Charlie Hebdo (Nugier & Guimond, 2016). Most research on the impacts of *laicité* focused only on consequences for majority group members and recognized that one of the limitations of this line of work was not focusing on the immigrant population affected by the new *laicité* norm. (Anier et al., 2018)

We attempted to address this gap because, to the best of our knowledge, no study directly investigates how new *laicité* (vs. traditional *laicité*) impacts the acculturation orientations, perceived discrimination and perceived identity compatibility of Muslim women in France.

Overall, the present study revealed mixed results, not in line with what has been found for the majority group members in France. Firstly, manipulating traditional or new *laicité* did not have a direct impact on the maintenance of Muslim women heritage culture nor on the adoption of French culture, both in public and private domains. Religious identification, however, was a significant predictor of culture maintenance orientations in both public and private domains. Indeed, as shown by bivariate correlations, the more Muslim women, of 1st and 2nd generation, identified with their religion, the more they indicated they maintained their culture of origin in private and public domains.

Navas and colleagues (2005) referred to religion as being part of the "hard core" of a given culture, which is very resistant to change over time and has a greater tendency to be preserved. We do not know the exact nature of this relationship, and we can only assume, in line with other studies, that for Muslim minorities in particular, religious identity is typically very important (Verkuyten, 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). When facing uncertainty about acceptance into an important ingroup, individuals tend to present themselves as committed group members (Noel et al., 1995). Indeed, research showed, that the perceived ingroup norm to maintain own ethno-religious culture is associated with religious group identification (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012). That is, the more Muslim minorities perceived this ingroup pressure, the stronger their identification with their religious group. Previous research also

suggested that there is a link between religious identity and culture maintenance, indicating that more culture maintenance was consistently associated with higher religiosity among Muslim immigrants (Saroglou & Mathijsen, 2007). In line with these findings, recent research also showed that, that Muslim immigrants with stronger religious identification tended to favor acculturation dimensions that indicated the preservation of their culture (Benoit, 2023).

However, there was no effect of the experimental condition on acculturation orientations (i.e., culture maintenance and culture adoption). There could be several reasons for this. First and foremost, our sample size was very small, with a total of 74 participants, whereas our G*power 3 calculations (Faul et al., 2007) indicated that a total of 158 participants was required to achieve a power of 0.80, which may contribute to the non-significant results. Furthermore, results showed that our manipulation did not work as intended, since participants in the new *laicité* condition did report higher levels of new *laicité* relative to those in the traditional and control conditions. It is important to replicate this study with a larger number of participants to increase statistical power and to further evaluate the efficacy of the manipulation of *laicité*.

In contrast to the results observed for the majority (Nugier & Guimond, 2016; Anier et al., 2018), traditional and new *laicité* did not impact the perception of discrimination of Muslim women in the current study. As stated before, the manipulation may not have been effective in activating the different meanings of new and traditional forms of *laicité*. However, results showed, in line with previous research, a marginal effect of generational status on the perception of discrimination. Specifically, second-generation Muslim women revealed higher perceived discrimination than first-generation ones (Yazdiha, 2018; Verkuyten, 2014; Gaudet et al., 2005). As suggested by Heim and colleagues (2011), discrimination appears to be a more significant barrier for second-generation immigrants than for first-generation immigrants, making integration into the new society more challenging (Verkuyten 2014; Fleischmann et al., 2019)

This can be explained, first and foremost, by the fact that individuals of the second generation are more exposed to experiences of discrimination than first-generation individuals due to their numerous opportunities for interaction in socialization contexts such as schools and workplaces, with peers and adults such as teachers (Giuliani et al., 2018).

The higher language skills of the second generation are likely to facilitate and increase opportunities for interaction within the host society, making them more aware of the subtleties of injustice and discrimination (Davidson & Inman, 2013). Finally, as suggested by Liu and Suyemoto (2016), while first-generation adults born outside the host country attribute

experiences of discrimination to their immigrant status, individuals of the second generation (as well as 1.5 generation individuals who grew up in the host society) consider themselves as members of the host society and perceive discrimination as a result of their distinct characteristics (related to ethnicity, race, or religiosity). Thus, the second generation is likely to attribute their negative experiences in the host society to social obstacles and systemic rejection, and they are less optimistic and more disillusioned about the future than the first generation (Wiley et al., 2012).

Similar to the findings for acculturation orientations, religious identification was also strongly related to perceived discrimination. This finding is consistent with previous research showing that more religious Muslims are more sensitive to the perceptions that individuals in Western societies have of their religious group (Litchmore & Safdar, 2015) suggests. Furthermore, the perception of Islam as a threat to "Western" identity and dominant values triggers a defensive intensification of identification with the Muslim group (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007).

We also examined the impact of *laicité* on the perceptions of identity compatibility. Our results indicated that participants exposed to both the new and traditional *laicité* perceived lower identity compatibility compared to those in the control condition. These results are important as they demonstrate a direct consequence of *laicité*. In fact, the 2004 laws further emphasized the salience of Muslim and French identities, and for some, they defined the wearing of the Muslim veil as a "violation of French laicité and, by implication, a sign of intrinsic otherness for anyone practicing Islam in any form" (Scott, 2005, p.120).

Previous research showed that politicians are perceived as a significant source of misunderstanding. Through their power and influence, politicians shape how Muslims are stigmatized and negatively perceived, legitimizing these women's experiences of misunderstanding. While Dutch participants mention far-right politicians, the French sample perceived politicians across the political spectrum as a significant source of misunderstanding, implying the severity of misunderstanding in France (da Silva et al., 2022). Moreover, they also believe that this misunderstanding is due to the perpetuation of historical colonial stereotypes and institutional factors such as *laicité* laws and integration policies. They considered France to be a special case of misunderstanding (see also Najib & Hopkins, 2020).

Presenting Muslim and French identities as incompatible may lead French Muslim women, who had previously identified easily with both their religious community (perhaps by wearing the veil) and France (their country of birth), to align more with one group or the other (Abdelgadir & Fouka, 2020). This argument is in line with the work of Badea et al. (2011),

which shows that the perception of French rejection directly affects French identification. In such a national context, a strong identification with the ethnic/religious group is more likely than a dual identity in which there is also a sense of attachment to the nation-state (Benet-Martínez et al., 2002).

Furthermore, our results show that religious identification was also positively associated with the perception of identity compatibility. We can relate these findings to previous studies, particularly those conducted by Muldon (2007) and his team which established a link between individual feelings of security and the significance of religious identity. Furthermore, the work of Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) revealed that participants in their studies exhibited a stronger identification with their Turkish ethnic group and their Muslim identity when they perceived more rejection from the dominant majority group. This recognition of rejection was correlated with a greater orientation and commitment to the minority ethnic group. Hence, the identification with the minority group can be interpreted as a strategy adopted by disadvantaged groups to cope with uncertainty and the consequences of rejection and devaluation of their ethnic group. This relationship suggests that the perception of rejection strengthens identification with the minority group while weakening national identification.

Finally, regarding the indirect effects of new and traditional *laicité*, results revealed that only the public domains of culture adoption and culture maintenance were indirectly affected by the manipulation. Specifically, participants exposed to the conditions of new *laicité* and traditional *laicité* (compared to the control group) showed lower levels of perceived identity compatibility. In other words, these conditions led to a reduced perception of compatibility between the participants' heritage identity and their French identity. Then, as perceived identity compatibility decreased, participants were less likely to adopt the dominant culture in the public domains.

Similar results were found in the culture maintenance but only for traditional *laicité*. Overall, these findings are partially in line with our hypothesis (H3b): we expect that the new *laicité* condition (vs. traditional *laicité* and a control) triggered less perceived identity compatibility which in turn is associated with lower desire for culture adoption (private and public). Indeed, the negative effect of laicité on culture adoption occurred via decreased levels of identity compatibility, albeit only for the public domains of acculturation. Additionally, not in line with the expected, new and traditional *laicité* had similar negative indirect effects via decreased perceived identity compatibility, contrary to the hypothesized.

We expected not to find a difference between the control group and traditional *laicité*. These findings could suggest that the participants did not distinguish between traditional and new *laicité*. In fact, if we look at our manipulation check results, they revealed that agreement with new *laicité* was lower in the new *laicité* condition compared to the control and traditional *laicité*.

Members of minorities often have two or more cultural identities (Ajrouch & Jamal, 2007; Chryssochoou & Lyons, 2011; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). For example, Muslims may identify with their religion, ethnic origin, or host country, which can be referred to as national identity (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). Since these identities often compete and overlap (Chryssochoou & Lyons, 2011), situational cues that make certain aspects of identity more salient than others are crucial for the perception of threats to social identity (Major & O'Brien, 2005).

Media representations and political campaigns serve as significant situational cues, highlighting various aspects of minority identities (Major & O'Brien, 2005; Saleem & Ramasubramanian, 2017), which shape different aspects of social identity (Reinemann et al., 2017). In our case, the political and media appropriation of *laicité* and the resulting laws highlight certain aspects of their identity. The veil even becomes the symbol of failed integration (Fernando, 2010). If these representations are negative, they can trigger threats to social identity among members of the Muslim minority in Western societies (Saleem & Ramasubramanian, 2017). From this threat, a stronger identification with their religiosity can emerge (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Carvalho (2013) has also emphasized the potential link between veil bans and increased religiosity and identification among younger generations. However, further research is needed to understand how religious identity, discrimination, and identity compatibility are interconnected.

1.   Limitations and future research

This study presents some limitations. First, as previously highlighted, we did not reach the minimum required number of participants to ensure statistically power. One possible explanation may be linked to the currently tense French context. During data collection, various events unfolded, such as the controversy surrounding Ababbya, a young individual from a disadvantaged neighborhood killed by the police. These events intensified an

atmosphere of mistrust, as reported by the participants when approached. These controversies underscore the need for research that engages with minority perspectives on how they feel within such a context, especially since most work on *laicité* primarily focuses on the majority. One direct consequence of the small number of participants could be the lack of a significant effect of our experimental condition on our dependent variables. As a result a of the sample size and lack of power, the current findings must be interpreted with caution and should be replicated with a larger sample.

The manipulation used to activate different forms of *laicité* was based on previous research conducted with the majority group (Latasa, 2019). However, the results showed that it was not effective in differentiating traditional *laicité* from the new *laicité*. To our knowledge, the only studies that address the minority perspective are qualitative studies. It is likely that despite our attempts to be culturally sensitive (including offering the questionnaire in Arabic), our study design was not sufficiently sensitive. Furthermore, the conceptual equivalence, as theorized by Okazaki and Sue (2016), of *laicité* has never been demonstrated, and our study suggests that, unlike the majority, the minority does not differentiate between traditional and new *laicité*. A plausible explanation could be that, for the minority, *laicité*, whether traditional or new, is perceived as a source of threat. This finding raises the question of whether our study design was culturally nuanced enough and highlights the importance of conceptual equivalence in psychological research, particularly when dealing with culturally diverse groups. Future studies should verify what the norm of *laicité* entails.

A closer examination of our demographic data revealed that only 31.4% (24) of participants belong to the first generation, while 67.6% belong to the second. This limited number makes it challenging to make meaningful comparisons between these two groups.

Finally, we did not directly include religious identity in our conceptual model but used it as a covariate. Nevertheless, religious identity had a significant impact on all other variables. Previous studies have shown that religiosity plays a positive role in the acculturation process and adaptation to the host society for immigrant populations (Abu-Rayya & Abu-Rayya, 2009; Harker, 2001). However, the literature is still limited when it comes to understanding the relationship between religious identity and adaptation among Muslim immigrants (Giuliani et al., 2018). Future research should explore this variable, considering it as a potential mediator in the relationship between *laicité* and acculturation strategies.

2.   Conclusion

By examining the impact of *laicité* on the acculturation orientations of Muslim women in France as well as on its impact on perceived discrimination and identity compatibility, this study contributed to scarce existing literature on this topic involving Muslim minority communities. Despite the limitations associated with the small sample size and the need for caution when interpreting the results, we were able to demonstrate that identity compatibility is negatively impacted by *laicité*, and in turn impacted acculturation orientations. Indeed, *laicité* leads to a reduced perception of identity compatibility among second-generation Muslim women, which, in turn, was related to less culture adoption. Overall, this study highlighted the potential detrimental impact on *laicité* for Muslim women in French, especially on their identity compatibility, while also highlighting the importance of considering other important factors such as generational status and religious identification.

References

Abdelgadir, A., & Fouka, V. (2020). Political secularism and Muslim integration in the West: Assessing the effects of the French headscarf ban. *American Political Science Review*, *114*(3), 707-723.

Abu-Rayya, H. M., & Abu-Rayya, M. H. (2009). Acculturation, religious identity, and psychological well-being among Palestinians in Israel. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *33*(4), 325-331.

Adam‑Troian, J., Arciszewski, T., & Apostolidis, T. (2019). National identification and support for discriminatory policies: The mediating role of beliefs about laïcité in France. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *49*(5), 924-937.

Ajrouch, K. J., & Jamal, A. (2007). Assimilating to a white identity: The case of Arab Americans. *International Migration Review*, *41*(4), 860-879.

Anier, N. (2018). Le rôle des normes culturelles d'intégration dans l'explication des comportements de discrimination: Le Cas de la Laïcité (Doctoral dissertation, Université Clermont Auvergne [2017-2020]).

Anier, N., Roebroeck, E., Kleinlogel, E. P., Badea, C., Nugier, A., Berthon, M., & Guimond, S. (2019). The effect of the normative context on intergroup discrimination: implications for the scientific value of exact and conceptual replications. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *73*, 43-58.

Antonius, R. (2002). Un racisme respectable. *Ce qui a changé après le*, *11*, 253-270.

Badea, C. (2012). Modèles d'intégration, identification nationale et attitudes envers les immigrés en France. *L'Année psychologique*, (4), 575-592.

Badea, C., Er-Rafiy, A., Chekroun, P., Légal, J. B., & Gosling, P. (2015). Ethnic in-group evaluation and adhesion to acculturation ideologies: The case of Moroccan immigrants in France. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *45*, 47-55.

Badea, C., Bender, M., & Korda, H. (2020). Threat to national identity continuity: When affirmation procedures increase the acceptance of Muslim immigrants. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *78*, 65-72.

Barthélemy, M., & Michelat, G. (2007). Dimensions de la laïcité dans la France d'aujourd'hui. *Revue française de science politique*, *57*(5), 649-698.

Baubérot, J. (2012). La laïcité française: républicaine, indivisible, démocratique et sociale. *Cites*, (4), 11-20.

Benet-Martínez, V., Leu, J., Lee, F., & Morris, M. W. (2002). Negotiating biculturalism: Cultural frame switching in biculturals with oppositional versus compatible cultural identities. *Journal of Cross-cultural psychology*, *33*(5), 492-516.

Benet‑Martínez, V., & Haritatos, J. (2005). Bicultural identity integration (BII): Components and psychosocial antecedents. *Journal of personality*, *73*(4), 1015-1050.

Benet-Martínez, V., & Hong, Y. Y. (2014). Introduction: The psychology of multicultural identity and experiences.

Berry, J. W., Phinney, J. S., Sam, D. L., & Vedder, P. (2006). Immigrant youth: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation. *Applied psychology*, *55*(3), 303-332.

Berry, J. W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. *Applied psychology*, *46*(1), 5-34.

Berry, J. W. (2003). Conceptual approaches to acculturation. American Psychological Association.

Berry, J. W. (2005). Acculturation: Living successfully in two cultures. *International journal of intercultural relations*, *29*(6), 697-712.

Berry, J. W., Phinney, J. S., Sam, D. L., & Vedder, P. E. (2006). Immigrant youth in cultural transition: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation across national contexts. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Berry, J. W., & Hou, F. (2017). Acculturation, discrimination and wellbeing among second generation of immigrants in Canada. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *61*, 29-39.

Bierwiaczonek, K., Waldzus, S., & van der Zee, K. (2017). Protective or harmful? Exploring the ambivalent role of social identification as a moderator of intergroup stress in sojourners. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *60*, 1-11.

Blackwood, L., Hopkins, N., & Reicher, S. (2013). I know who I am, but who do they think I am? Muslim perspectives on encounters with airport authorities. *Ethnic and racial studies*, *36*(6), 1090-1108.

Bowen, J. R. (2011). How the French state justifies controlling Muslim bodies: From harm-based to values-based reasoning. *Social Research: An International Quarterly*, *78*(2), 325-348.

Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T., & Harvey, R. D. (1999). Perceiving pervasive discrimination among African Americans: Implications for group identification and well-being. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *77*(1), 135.

Carvalho, J. P. (2013). Veiling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(1), 337-370.

Çelik, Ç. (2015). 'Having a German passport will not make me German': Reactive ethnicity and oppositional identity among disadvantaged male Turkish second-generation youth in Germany. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *38*(9), 1646-1662.

Cesari, J. (2009). The securitisation of Islam in Europe (Vol. 15). CEPS.

Cheryan, S., & Monin, B. (2005). Where are you really from?: Asian Americans and identity denial. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *89*(5), 717.

Cohu, M., Maisonneuve, C., & Testé, B. (2018). Construction et validation de l'échelle de mesure des croyances relatives à la laïcité. *Psychologie Française*, *63*(4), 337-356.

Cohu, M. (2017). Approche psychosociale des croyances relatives à la laïcité: Création d'un outil de mesure et mise en relation avec la perception des minorités culturelles et ethniques en France (Doctoral dissertation, Université Rennes 2).

Cronin, T. J., Levin, S., Branscombe, N. R., van Laar, C., & Tropp, L. R. (2012). Ethnic identification in response to perceived discrimination protects well-being and promotes activism: A longitudinal study of Latino college students. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *15*(3), 393-407.

da Silva, C., de Jong, J., Feddes, A. R., Doosje, B., & Gruev-Vintila, A. (2022). Where are you really from? Understanding misrecognition from the experiences of French and Dutch Muslim women students. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, *10*(1), 201-217.

De Vroome, T., Martinovic, B., & Verkuyten, M. (2014). The integration paradox: Level of education and immigrants' attitudes towards natives and the host society. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, *20*(2), 166.

Epstein, B. S. (2013). A Review of "Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France" Davidson, Naomi, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 320 pp., $25.95, ISBN 978-0-8014-7831-4 Publication Date: July 2012.

Falomir‑Pichastor, J. M., Muñoz‑Rojas, D., Invernizzi, F., & Mugny, G. (2004). Perceived in‑group threat as a factor moderating the influence of in‑group norms on discrimination against foreigners. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *34*(2), 135-153.

Falomir‑Pichastor, J. M., Gabarrot, F., & Mugny, G. (2009). Group motives in threatening contexts: When a loyalty conflict paradoxically reduces the influence of an anti‑discrimination ingroup norm. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *39*(2), 196-206.

Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A. G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G* Power 3: A flexible statistical

power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. *Behavior research methods*, *39*(2), 175-191.

Fernando, M. L. (2010). Reconfiguring freedom: Muslim piety and the limits of secular law and public discourse in France. *American ethnologist*, *37*(1), 19-35.

France. Commission de réflexion sur l'application du principe de laïcité dans la république, & Stasi, B. (2003). Rapport de la Commission de Reflexion sur l'Application du Principe de Laicite dans la Republique Remis au President de la Republique le 11 Decembre 2003. La documentation française.

Fleischmann, F., Leszczensky, L., & Pink, S. (2019). Identity threat and identity multiplicity among minority youth: Longitudinal relations of perceived discrimination with ethnic, religious, and national identification in Germany. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *58*(4), 971-990.

Fox, M., Thayer, Z. M., & Wadhwa, P. D. (2017). Acculturation and health: the moderating role of sociocultural context. *American anthropologist*, *119*(3), 405-421.

Gabarrot, F., Falomir‑Pichastor, J. M., & Mugny, G. (2009). Being similar versus being equal: Intergroup similarity moderates the influence of in‑group norms on discrimination and prejudice. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *48*(2), 253-273.

Gaudet, S., Clément, R., & Deuzeman, K. (2005). Daily hassles, ethnic identity and psychological adjustment among Lebanese‑Canadians. *International Journal of Psychology*, *40*(3), 157-168.

Gaudin, P. (2016). 'République and laïcité' What is at stake in contemporary France?. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, *42*(4-5), 440-447.

Giguere, B., Lalonde, R., & Lou, E. (2010). Living at the crossroads of cultural worlds: The experience of normative conflicts by second generation immigrant youth. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *4*(1), 14-29.

Giuliani, C., Tagliabue, S., & Regalia, C. (2018). Psychological well-being, multiple identities, and discrimination among first and second generation immigrant Muslims. *Europe's journal of psychology*, *14*(1), 66.

Greene, M. L., Way, N., & Pahl, K. (2006). Trajectories of perceived adult and peer discrimination among Black, Latino, and Asian American adolescents: patterns and psychological correlates. *Developmental psychology*, *42*(2), 218.

Grigoropoulou, N., & Chryssochoou, X. (2011). Are religious minorities in Greece better

accepted if they assimilate? The effects of acculturation strategy and group membership on religious minority perceptions. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, *21*(6), 499-514.

Guerra, R., Rodrigues, R. B., Aguiar, C., Carmona, M., Alexandre, J., & Lopes, R. C. (2019). School achievement and well-being of immigrant children: The role of acculturation orientations and perceived discrimination. *Journal of school psychology*, *75*, 104-118.

Guimond, S., & Roebroeck, E. (2017, October). L'attachement subjectif à la laïcité et le désir de domination. In *Colloque international «Diversité culturelle et citoyenneté: Enjeux éducatifs à l'heure de la globalisation»*.

Guimond, S., Crisp, R. J., De Oliveira, P., Kamiejski, R., Kteily, N., Kuepper, B., ... & Zick, A. (2013). Diversity policy, social dominance, and intergroup relations: Predicting prejudice in changing social and political contexts. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *104*(6), 941.

Harker, K. (2001). Immigrant generation, assimilation, and adolescent psychological well-being. *Social forces*, *79*(3), 969-1004.

Hauser, J. (2021). Education, secularism, and illiberalism: Marginalisation of Muslims by the French state. *French Cultural Studies*, *32*(2), 149-162.

Heim, D., Hunter, S. C., & Jones, R. (2011). Perceived discrimination, identification, social capital, and well-being: Relationships with physical health and psychological distress in a UK minority ethnic community sample. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *42*(7), 1145-1164.

Hopkins, N., & Blackwood, L. (2011). Everyday citizenship: Identity and recognition. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, *21*(3), 215-227.

Hopkins, C. T. (2015, January). Social reproduction in France: Religious dress laws and laïcité. In *Women's Studies International Forum* (Vol. 48, pp. 154-164). Pergamon.

Huynh, Q. L., Benet-Martínez, V., & Nguyen, A. M. D. (2018). Measuring variations in bicultural identity across US ethnic and generational groups: Development and validation of the Bicultural Identity Integration Scale—Version 2 (BIIS-2). *Psychological Assessment*, *30*(12), 1581.

Jansen, Y. (2006). Laıcité, or the Politics of Republican Secularism.

Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., Liebkind, K., & Solheim, E. (2009). To identify or not to identify? National disidentification as an alternative reaction to perceived ethnic discrimination. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*.

Kaduvettoor-Davidson, A., & Inman, A. G. (2013). South Asian Americans: Perceived

discrimination, stress, and well-being. *Asian American Journal of Psychology*, *4*(3), 155.

Kamiejski, R., Guimond, S., De Oliveira, P., Er-Rafiy, A., & Brauer, M. (2012). Le modèle républicain d'intégration: implications pour la psychologie des relations entre groupes. *L'Année psychologique*, *112*(1), 49-83.

Khosrokhavar, F. (2009). Islamic radicalism in Europe. In *Muslims in the West after 9/11* (pp. 239-254). Routledge.

Lankester, L. A., & Alexopoulos, T. (2021). From diversity ideologies to the expression of stereotypes: Insights into the cognitive regulation of prejudice within the cultural-ecological context of French laïcité. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *11*, 591523.

Latasa, M. (2019). Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité?: how different conceptions of laïcité and threat perception motivate dehumanization of Muslims and vote choices among (ir) religious majorities in France (Master's thesis).

Litchmore, R. V., & Safdar, S. (2015). Perceptions of discrimination as a marker of integration among Muslim-Canadians: The role of religiosity, ethnic identity, and gender. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, *16*, 187-204.

Liu, C. M., & Suyemoto, K. L. (2016). The effects of racism-related stress on Asian Americans: Anxiety and depression among different generational statuses. *Asian American Journal of Psychology*, *7*(2), 137.

Lizotte, C. (2020). Laïcité as assimilation, laïcité as negotiation: Political geographies of secularism in the French public school. *Political geography*, *77*, 102121.

Major, B., & O'brien, L. T. (2005). The social psychology of stigma. *Annu. Rev. Psychol.*, *56*, 393-421.

Martinovic, B., & Verkuyten, M. (2012). Host national and religious identification among Turkish Muslims in Western Europe: The role of ingroup norms, perceived discrimination and value incompatibility. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *42*(7), 893-903.

Memmi, A. (2003). The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957)(trans. Howard Greenfeld). *Boston, MA: Beacon*, 103.

Modood, T. (2005). Remaking multiculturalism after 7/7. *Open Democracy*, *29*(7).

Motti-Stefanidi, F., Pavlopoulos, V., & Asendorpf, J. B. (2018). Immigrant youth acculturation and perceived discrimination: Longitudinal mediation by immigrant peers' acceptance/rejection. *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology*, *59*, 36-45.

Navas, M., García, M. C., Sánchez, J., Rojas, A. J., Pumares, P., & Fernández, J. S. (2005).

Relative Acculturation Extended Model (RAEM): New contributions with regard to the study of acculturation. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *29*(1), 21-37.

Navas, M., Rojas, A. J., García, M., & Pumares, P. (2007). Acculturation strategies and attitudes according to the Relative Acculturation Extended Model (RAEM): The perspectives of natives versus immigrants. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *31*(1), 67-86.

Nguyen, A. M. D., & Benet-Martínez, V. (2013). Biculturalism and adjustment: A meta-analysis. *Journal of cross-cultural psychology*, *44*(1), 122-159.

Noel, J. G., Wann, D. L., & Branscombe, N. R. (1995). Peripheral ingroup membership status and public negativity toward outgroups. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *68*(1), 127.

Noels, K. A., Leavitt, P. A., & Clément, R. (2010). "To see ourselves as others see us": On the implications of reflected appraisals for ethnic identity and discrimination. *Journal of Social Issues*, *66*(4), 740-758.

Noels, K. A., & Clément, R. (2015). Situational variations in ethnic identity across immigration generations: Implications for acculturative change and cross‑cultural adaptation. *International Journal of Psychology*, *50*(6), 451-462.

Nugier, A., Oppin, M., Cohu, M., Kamiejski, R., Roebroeck, E., & Guimond, S. (2016). «Nouvelle laïcité» en France et pression normative envers les minorités musulmanes [Secularism in France and normative pressure against Muslim minorities]. *International Review of Social Psychology*, *29*(1), 15-30.

Okazaki, S., & Sue, S. (2016). Methodological issues in assessment research with ethnic minorities.

Pena-Ruiz, H. (2006). Culture, cultures, et laïcité. *Hommes & Migrations*, *1259*(1), 6-16.

Priest, N., Paradies, Y., Trenerry, B., Truong, M., Karlsen, S., & Kelly, Y. (2013). A systematic review of studies examining the relationship between reported racism and health and wellbeing for children and young people. *Social science & medicine*, *95*, 115-127.

Pyke, K., & Dang, T. (2003). "FOB" and "whitewashed": Identity and internalized racism among second generation Asian Americans. *Qualitative Sociology*, *26*, 147-172.

Ramasubramanian, S., Doshi, M. J., & Saleem, M. (2017). Mainstream versus ethnic media: How they shape ethnic pride and self-esteem among ethnic minority audiences. *International Journal of Communication*, *11*, 21.

Reinemann, C., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Strömbäck, J., & De Vreese, C. H. (2016). Populist political communication: Toward a model of its causes, forms, and effects. In *Populist political communication in Europe* (pp. 12-26). Routledge.

Roebroeck, E., & Guimond, S. (2015). Schooling, citizen-making, and anti-immigrant prejudice in France. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, *3*(2), 20-42.

Roebroeck 1, É., & Guimond, S. (2016). Pour une psychologie sociale de la laïcité: Identification et mesure de deux conceptions distinctes de la laïcité. *L'Année psychologique*, *116*(4), 489-518.

Rumbaut, R. G. (2008). Reaping what you sow: Immigration, youth, and reactive ethnicity. *Applied development science*, *12*(2), 108-111.

Sabatier, C., & Berry, J. W. (2008). The role of family acculturation, parental style, and perceived discrimination in the adaptation of second-generation immigrant youth in France and Canada. *European journal of developmental psychology*, *5*(2), 159-185.

Salo, C. D., & Birman, D. (2015). Acculturation and psychological adjustment of Vietnamese refugees: An ecological acculturation framework. *American journal of community psychology*, *56*, 395-407.

Saroglou, V., & Mathijsen, F. (2007). Religion, multiple identities, and acculturation: A study of Muslim immigrants in Belgium. *Archive for the Psychology of Religion*, *29*(1), 177-198.

Sayad, A. (1999). La double absence: des Illusions de l'émigré aux souffrances de l'immigré, le Seuil.

Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., Postmes, T., & Garcia, A. (2014). The consequences of perceived discrimination for psychological well-being: a meta-analytic review. *Psychological bulletin*, *140*(4), 921.

Schwartz, S. J., Unger, J. B., Zamboanga, B. L., & Szapocznik, J. (2010). Rethinking the concept of acculturation: implications for theory and research. *American Psychologist*, *65*(4), 237.

Schwartz, S. J., Meca, A., Ward, C., Szabó, Á., Benet-Martínez, V., Lorenzo-Blanco, E. I., &

Zamboanga, B. L. (2019). Biculturalism dynamics: A daily diary study of bicultural identity and psychosocial functioning. *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology*, *62*, 26-37.

Scott, J. W. (2005). Symptomatic politics: The banning of Islamic head scarves in French public schools. *French Politics, Culture & Society*, *23*(3), 106-127.

Scott M (2010, 3 March) Niqab heats up rights controversy. *The Montréal Gazette*. Available

at: id=84c9a518-0421-4c2b-8cb2-ad763e4ddd98.www2.canada.com

Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. *Organizational identity: A reader*, *56*(65), 9780203505984-16.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior.

Te Lindert, A., Korzilius, H. P., Stupar-Rutenfrans, S., & Van de Vijver, F. J. (2022). The role of perceived discrimination, intergroup contact and adoption in acculturation among four Dutch immigrant groups. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *91*, 297-310.

Troian, J., Bonetto, E., Varet, F., Barbier, M., & Monaco, G. L. (2018). The effect of Social dominance on prejudice towards North-African minorities: Evidence for the role of social representation of Secularism as a legitimizing myth. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *65*, 96-104.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. basil Blackwell.

Vega, W. A., Khoury, E. L., Zimmerman, R. S., Gil, A. G., & Warheit, G. J. (1995). Cultural conflicts and problem behaviors of Latino adolescents in home and school environments. *Journal of Community Psychology*, *23*(2), 167-179.

Verkuyten, M. (2006). Multicultural recognition and ethnic minority rights: A social identity perspective. *European review of social psychology*, *17*(1), 148-184.

Verkuyten, M., & Yildiz, A. A. (2007). National (dis) identification and ethnic and religious identity: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Personality and social psychology bulletin*, *33*(10), 1448-1462.

Virta, E., Sam, D. L., & Westin, C. (2004). Adolescents with Turkish background in Norway and Sweden: A comparative study of their psychological adaptation. *Scandinavian journal of psychology*, *45*(1), 15-25.

Wiley, S., Deaux, K., & Hagelskamp, C. (2012). Born in the USA: How immigrant generation shapes meritocracy and its relation to ethnic identity and collective action. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, *18*(2), 171.

Yazdiha, M. S., Naghibzadeh, M., Ghorbani, R., Emadi, A., Hoseinzadeh, B., & Gohari, A. (2018). The Relationship between Types of Delivery and Methods of Anesthesia with Occurrence of Jaundice in Term Neonates. *International Journal of Pediatrics*, *6*(7), 7959-7964.

Zhang, R., & Noels, K. A. (2013). When ethnic identities vary: Cross-situation and

within-situation variation, authenticity, and well-being. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *44*(4), 552-573.

Annexes

Appendix A – Informed Consent

Q1 Cette étude fait partie d'un projet de recherche mené à l'Iscte - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa. L'étude vise à comprendre comment la lecture d'informations en ligne affecte la façon dont les gens pensent et se sentent par rapport à différents groupes sociaux. Nous vous demanderons de lire quelques nouvelles en ligne et de répondre à quelques questions.

L'étude est menée par Laura Gonçalves (lgsa@iscte-iul.pt) et supervisée scientifiquement par le Dr. Rita Guerra (ana_rita_guerra@iscte-iul.pt) que vous pouvez contacter pour éclaircir vos doutes ou partager vos commentaires.
Votre participation à l'étude, est très appréciée car elle contribuera à l'avancement des connaissances dans ce domaine scientifique, consiste à lire un court article et à répondre à quelques questions. L'étude prendra environ 15 minutes.

Il n'y a pas de risques significatifs attendus associés à la participation à l'étude.
La participation à l'étude est strictement volontaire : vous pouvez choisir librement de participer ou de ne pas participer. Si vous avez décidé de participer, vous pouvez arrêter votre participation à tout moment, sans avoir à fournir de justification. En plus d'être volontaire, votre
participation est également anonyme et confidentielle. Les données obtenues sont uniquement destinées à un traitement statistique et aucune des réponses ne sera analysée ou rapportée individuellement. À aucun moment de l'étude, il ne vous sera demandé de vous identifier.

Je déclare avoir compris les objectifs de ce qui m'a été proposé, tels qu'expliqués par l'investigateur, avoir eu la possibilité de poser toutes les questions relatives à cette étude et avoir reçu une réponse éclairante à toutes ces questions, et accepter de participer à l'étude.

- J'accepte de participer (1)

- Je n'accepte pas de participer (2)

Appendix B – Questionnaire

Q63 Quel âge avez-vous (veuillez utiliser des chiffres pour représenter les années) ?

_____

Q64 Veuillez sélectionner votre sexe

- Homme (1)

- Femme (2)

- Autre (3) _____

Q65 Quel est le niveau d'études le plus élevé que vous ayez atteint ?

- École primaire (1)

- Collège (2)

- Lycée (3)

- Bac +2 (4)

- Bac +3 (5)

- Bac +5 (6)

- Bac +8 (7)

Q95 Avez vous passé votre école primaire, collège, lycée en France ?

- Oui (1)

- Non (Veuillez indiquer le pays ou vous avez étudié) (2)
  _____

Q66 Quel est votre statut professionnel actuel ?

- Étudiant (1)

- Au chômage (2)

- Employé(e) (3)

- Retraité(e) (4)

- Autre (5) _____

Q67 Êtes-vous citoyen français ?

- Oui (1)

- Non (2)

Q68 Êtes-vous né(e) en France ?

- Oui (1)

- Non (Veuillez indiquer le pays où vous êtes né) (2) _____

Q69 Vos parents sont-ils nés en France ?

- Oui (1)

- Non (Veuillez indiquer le pays) (2) _____

Q70 Portez-vous habituellement des symboles religieux tels que le hijab, la burqa, le sitar, etc.

- Oui (Veuillez indiquer lequel) (1)

  _____

- Non (2)

Q96 Veuillez lire le court article suivant qui a été publié récemment. Nous vous poserons ensuite quelques questions sur le contenu de l'article.

Q11 Nous passons de plus en plus de temps devant des écrans - téléviseurs, smartphones, tablettes et ordinateurs. Et lorsque nous envoyons des SMS, regardons des vidéos, jouons à des jeux en ligne, naviguons sur internet ou discutons sur les médias sociaux, nous sommes généralement assis. Le temps passé en voiture et dans les transports publics est également en augmentation. Et l'utilisation croissante de la technologie signifie que de nombreuses personnes passent leurs journées assises au travail. Les chercheurs estiment que le comportement sédentaire présente un risque pour la santé car il peut entraîner une prise de poids. L'obésité est un facteur de risque pour au moins 11 types de cancer. Voici les résultats d'une étude de l'équipe de Leandro Garcia (Université de Cambridge) publiée le 28 février 2023 dans le British Journal of Sports Medicine, qui a étudié la probabilité de réduire certains cancers par la marche et le pilates.

Résultats de l'étude de l'Université de Cambridge

Q13 Dans l'article que vous venez de lire, quel était le pourcentage de réduction du risque de développer un cancer du côlon en faisant 30 minutes de pilates par jour ?

New Laicité Manipulation

Q6 Veuillez lire le court article suivant qui a été publié récemment. Nous vous poserons ensuite quelques questions sur le contenu de l'article.

Q7 François Kraus, directeur du département politique de l'Ifop, a déclaré dans La Dépêche du Midi : " Une large majorité de Français est favorable à la laïcité ". Le CNRS, sollicité par le gouvernement, a publié une vaste enquête qui reflète l'opinion que les Français ont de la laïcité. Cette enquête fait suite à celle réalisée par la Fondation Jean Jaurès et pour le Comité national d'action laïque. Dans cette nouvelle étude, on constate que 80 % des Français sont d'accord pour interdire les signes religieux à l'école et que 72 % sont d'accord pour que les pratiques religieuses soient le plus possible privées et non publiques.

Résultats de l'étude CNRS 2020 : L'opinion des Français sur la laïcité

Q10 Dans l'article que vous venez de lire, quel est le pourcentage de Français qui sont d'accord pour dire qu'il serait normal en France que l'Etat finance la construction de mosquées, de synagogues et de temples?

Traditional laïcité Manipulation

Q2 Veuillez lire le court article suivant qui a été publié récemment. Nous vous poserons ensuite quelques questions sur le contenu de l'article.

Q3 François Kraus, directeur du département politique de l'Ifop, a déclaré dans La Dépêche

Résultats de l'étude CNRS 2020 : L'opinion des Français sur la laïcité

du Midi : " Une large majorité de Français est favorable à la laïcité ". Le CNRS, sollicité par le gouvernement, a publié une vaste enquête qui reflète l'opinion que les Français ont de la laïcité. Cette enquête fait suite à celle réalisée par la Fondation Jean Jaurès et pour le Comité national d'action laïque. Dans cette nouvelle étude, on constate que plus de 80% sont d'accord pour que chaque citoyen soit libre de choisir la religion de son choix et 72% sont d'accord pour que chaque religion soit considérée comme égale.

Q5 Dans l'article que vous venez de lire, quel est le pourcentage de Français qui sont d'accord pour dire que chaque citoyen doit être libre de pratiquer la religion de son choix ?

Q70 Dans votre vie quotidienne, combien de fois vous est-il arrivé l'une ou l'autre des choses suivantes parce que vous êtes une femme musulmane ?

	Jamais 1 (1)	Moins d'une fois par an 2 (2)	Quelques fois par an 3 (3)	Quelques fois par mois 4 (4)	Au moins une fois par semaine 5 (5)	Presque tous les jours 6 (6)
Vous êtes traité avec moins de courtoisie que les autres (1)						
Vous êtes traité avec moins de respect que les autres (2)						

Vous êtes moins bien servi que d'autres personnes dans les restaurants ou les magasins. (3)						65
Les gens agissent comme s'ils pensaient que vous n'êtes pas intelligent. (4)						
Les gens agissent comme s'ils avaient peur de vous. (5)						

Les gens agissent comme s'ils pensaient que vous êtes malhonnête. (6)						
Les gens agissent comme s'ils étaient meilleurs que vous. (7)						
Vous êtes insulté(e) ou injurié(e) (8)						
Vous êtes menacé ou harcelé. (9)						

Q71 Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec chacune des affirmations suivantes ?

	Pas du tout d'accord 1 (1)	Pas d'accord 2 (2)	Ni d'accord ni en désaccord 3 (3)	D'accord 4 (4)	Tout à fait d'accord 5 (5)
Je trouve qu'il est facile d'harmoniser les cultures musulmane et française. (1)					
Je me sens rarement en conflit avec le fait d'être biculturel. (2)					
Je trouve qu'il est facile de concilier les cultures musulmane et française. (3)					

Je ne me sens pas coincé entre les cultures musulmane et française. (4)					68
Je me sens déchiré entre les cultures musulmane et française. (5)					
Être biculturel signifie que deux forces culturelles s'exercent sur moi en même temps. (6)					

J'ai l'impression que ma culture musulmane et ma culture française sont incompatibles. (7)					
Je me sens en conflit entre les façons de faire françaises et musulmanes. (8)					
Je me sens comme quelqu'un qui passe d'une culture à l'autre. (9)					
Je me sens pris entre la culture musulmane et la culture française. (10)					

Je ne peux pas ignorer mon côté musulman ou français. (11)					
Je me sens à la fois musulmane et française. (12)					
Je m'identifie mieux à une culture franco-musulmane combinée qu'à une culture musulmane ou française seule. (13)					
Je me sens franco-musulmane. (14)					

J'ai le sentiment de faire partie d'une culture commune. (15)					
Je ne mélange pas mes cultures musulmane et française. (16)					
Je sépare les cultures musulmane et française. (17)					

Q44 Dans quelle mesure maintenez-vous actuellement les traditions musulmanes de votre pays d'origine, dans chacun des domaines ou contextes suivants ?

	Pas du tout 1 (1)	Un peu 2 (2)	En quelque sorte 3 (3)	Assez 4 (4)	Beaucoup 5 (5)
Travail (1)					

Ecole (2)					
Habitudes de consomm ation (3)					
Amitiés (4)					
Relations familiales (5)					
Choix religieux (6)					
Manières de penser (7)					

Q101 Dans quelle mesure avez-vous adopté les traditions de la France, dans chacun des domaines ou contextes suivants ?

	Pas du tout 1 (1)	Un peu 2 (2)	En quelque sorte 3 (3)	Assez 4 (4)	Beaucoup 5 (5)
Travail (1)					
Ecole (2)					
Habitudes de consomm ation (3)					
Amitiés (4)					

Relations familiales (5)					
Choix religieux (6)					
Manières de penser (7)					

Q100 Dans quelle mesure maintenez-vous actuellement les traditions musulmanes du pays d'origine de vos parents, dans chacun des domaines ou contextes suivants ?

	Pas du tout 1 (1)	Un peu 2 (2)	En quelque sorte 3 (3)	Assez 4 (4)	Beaucoup 5 (5)
Travail (1)					
Ecole (2)					
Habitudes de consommation (3)					
Amitiés (4)					
Relations familiales (5)					
Choix religieux (6)					

Manières de penser (7)					74

Q74 Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec chacune des affirmations suivantes ?

	pas du tout d'accord 1 (1)	Pas d'accord 2 (2)	Ni d'accord ni en désaccord 3 (3)	D'accord 4 (4)	Tout à fait d'accord 5 (5)
Ma religion est une partie importante de mon moi (1)					
Je m'identifie fortement aux musulmans (2)					

Je suis très attaché aux musulmans (3)					75
Le fait d'être musulman est un élément très important de l'image que j'ai de moi-même. (4)					
Je suis fier de mes origines islamiques (5)					
Je ressens un fort sentiment d'appartenance à l'islam (6)					

Q52 Indiquez dans quelle mesure chacune des phrases suivantes définit le mieux la laicité ?

Q53 Liberté de pratiquer la religion de son choix.

- Pas du tout 1
- Un peu 2
- En quelque sorte 3
- Assez 4 (4)
- Beaucoup 5 (5)

Q92 L'égalité de toutes les religions.

- Pas du tout 1 (1)
- Un peu 2 (2)
- En quelque sorte 3 (3)
- Assez 4 (4)
- Beaucoup 5 (5)

Q55 Les pratiques religieuses doivent rester dans un contexte privé.

- Pas du tout 1 (1)
- Un peu 2 (2)
- En quelque sorte 3 (3)

- Assez 4 (4)

- Beaucoup 5 (5)

Q94 Le gouvernement français ne doit pas participé au financement d'édifices religieux.

- Pas du tout 1 (1)

- Un peu 2 (2)

- En quelque sorte 3 (3)

- Assez 4 (4)

- Beaucoup 5 (5)

Appendix C–Debriefing

Q75 Nous vous remercions d'avoir participé à cette étude. Comme nous l'avons indiqué au début de votre participation, nous nous sommes généralement intéressés à la manière dont la lecture d'informations en ligne affecte la façon dont les gens pensent et se sentent par rapport à différents groupes sociaux. Plus précisément, dans cette étude, nous avons cherché à savoir si la lecture de documents sur les principes de la laïcité française avait une incidence sur la manière dont les femmes musulmanes en France vivent la discrimination et sur la manière dont elles considèrent que leur identité française et leur identité religieuse sont compatibles. L'objectif est donc d'examiner si différentes formes d'expression des principes de laïcité en France (plus inclusives ou plus exclusives) influencent la manière dont les femmes musulmanes perçoivent leur relation avec la société non musulmane ainsi que leurs identités culturelles et religieuses.

Pour ce faire, nous avons utilisé une procédure courante dans les recherches psychologiques, où certains participants sont répartis de manière aléatoire pour voir différentes informations. Dans le cas présent, certains participants ont reçu un texte présentant une forme inclusive de laïcité, d'autres ont reçu un texte présentant une forme exclusive de laïcité (également appelée nouvelle laïcité), et d'autres encore ont reçu un texte sans rapport avec le sujet.
Les textes utilisés pour décrire les différentes formes de Laicite ont été fabriqués par l'équipe de recherche pour les besoins de cette étude et ne sont pas des données réelles provenant d'une étude nationale comme indiqué. Cependant, toutes les informations incluses dans ces textes ont été extraites de recherches antérieures qui ont développé des échelles pour évaluer les différentes formes de laïcité.

Nous vous rappelons que les coordonnées suivantes peuvent être utilisées pour toute question que vous pourriez avoir, tout commentaire que vous souhaiteriez partager, ou pour indiquer votre intérêt à recevoir
des informations sur les principaux résultats et conclusions de l'étude : Laura Gonçalves
(Laura Gonçalves (lgsa@iscte-iul.pt))

Si vous souhaitez obtenir de plus amples informations sur le sujet de l'étude, les sources suivantes
suivantes peuvent également être consultées :

Abdelgadir, A., & Fouka, V. (2020). Political secularism and Muslim integration in the West: Assessing the effects of the French headscarf ban. American Political Science Review, 114(3), 707-723.

Adam-Troian, J., Arciszewski, T., & Apostolidis, T. (2019). National identification and support for discriminatory policies: The mediating role of beliefs about laïcité in France. European Journal of Social Psychology, 49(5), 924-937

da Silva, C., de Jong, J., Feddes, A. R., Doosje, B., & Gruev-Vintila, A. (2022). Where Are You Really From? Understanding Misrecognition From the Experiences of French and Dutch Muslim Women Students. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 10(1), 201-217.

Latasa, M. (2019). Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité?: how different conceptions of laïcité and threat perception motivate dehumanization of Muslims and vote choices among (ir) religious majorities in France (Master's thesis).

Nugier, A., Oppin, M., Cohu, M., Kamiejski, R., Roebroeck, E., & Guimond, S. (2016). «Nouvelle laïcité» en France et pression normative envers les minorités musulmanes [Secularism in France and normative pressure against Muslim minorities]. International Review of Social Psychology, 29(1).

Voici également le contact de quelques associations qui peuvent aider si vous êtes ou avez été victimes de situations ou vous êtes sentie discriminée:

- Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme (LICRA), contact direct par mail en fonction de la région où vous habitez.

- Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples (MRAP), tel: 01 53 38 99 99, mail: accueil@mrap.fr

- SOS racisme, tel: 01 40 35 36 55, mail: servicejuridique@sos-racisme.org

Merci encore pour votre participation!