

# iscte

INSTITUTO  
UNIVERSITÁRIO  
DE LISBOA

---

Populism and Social Policies: A study about CHEGA's Party positions  
on Social Policy

Ana Rita Magalhães Godinho Silva Gonçalves

Master in Political Economy

Professor João Miguel Carvalho

Guest Assistant Professor at ISCTE – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

September 2023



CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS  
E HUMANAS

---

Department of Political Economy

Populism and Social Policies: A study about CHEGA's Party positions  
on Social Policy

Ana Rita Magalhães Godinho Silva Gonçalves

Master in Political Economy

João Miguel Carvalho

Guest Assistant Professor at ISCTE – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

September 2023

*To the strongest woman I know  
Her love is unconditional,  
Her caring heart never ceases to grow,  
From whom I learned to love and cherish,  
To my beautiful and amazing grandmother.*



## **Acknowledgments**

I would like to express my deep gratitude to the master's director, Professor Paulo Marques and my research supervisor, Professor João Carvalho, for their patient guidance, enthusiastic encouragement, and useful critiques of this research work.

Finally, I wish to thank my parents, sister and boyfriend for their support and encouragement throughout my studies.



## Resumo

Até recentemente, Portugal era um dos poucos países europeus sem uma força política de extrema-direita. Nas eleições legislativas de 2019, o recém-formado partido CHEGA – criado a 9 de abril de 2019 – conquistou um assento parlamentar. Embora a proporção dos votos tenha pouca representação no panorama parlamentar (1.3%), o CHEGA tem demonstrado um forte crescimento, o que pode ser observado nas Eleições Presidenciais de 2021. Estas estabeleceram a ascensão de André Ventura como líder do partido e único representante no Parlamento português, tendo terminado em terceiro lugar na corrida à Presidência em 2021, com 11.90% dos votos. Em 2022, o partido obteve 7.13% dos votos, colocando o CHEGA acima de forças políticas como o BE (Bloco de Esquerda) e Iniciativa Liberal (IL) – tornando-se assim, a terceira força política em Portugal (Mendes, 2021:329).

O nativismo e o populismo dos Partidos Populistas de Direita Radical dotam o CHEGA de liberdade para resistir às organizações internacionais e limitar os direitos dos trabalhadores migrantes. Isto implicaria que as desigualdades não se limitassem apenas à gravidade do chauvinismo social, mas também ao tratamento diferenciado dos grupos migrantes no mercado de trabalho (Chueri, 2022: 85).

O CHEGA defende que não só o Estado social deve ter uma dimensão modesta, como os benefícios que oferece devem ser restritos aos cidadãos portugueses. O CHEGA só é superado pela ELAM (Chipre), EL (Grécia) e RN (França) em termos de chauvinismo assistencialista. Atualmente, a posição do CHEGA é singular no sistema partidário democrático português, fundado em 1974. Desde então, o Estado português tem trabalhado para o alargamento do Estado Social e pela implementação de políticas de imigração acolhedoras e liberais (Fernandes, 2023).

Palavras-chave: CHEGA, Partido Político Populista de Direita Radical, Nativismo, Chauvinismo Social.





## **Abstract**

Until recently, Portugal was one of the few European countries without a significant far-right political force. In October of 2019's legislative elections, the newly formed party CHEGA – created on April 9<sup>th</sup>, 2019 – won one parliamentary seat. And even though it's votes accounted very little in the great scheme of things (1.3%) the party has continuously grew, which can be observed in the 2021's Presidential Elections. This established André Ventura's rapid rise as the party's leader and sole representative in Parliament, who finished third as presidential candidate, in 2021 with 11.90% of the votes. In 2022, the party obtained 7.13% of the votes, putting CHEGA above political forces such as the BE (Left Bloc) and Liberal Initiative (IL) (Mendes, 2021:329).

The nativism and populism of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP) offer them more freedom to resist international organizations and limit the rights of labor migrants. This would imply that the inequalities are not just limited to the severity of welfare chauvinism but also to the various migrant groups' treatment in the labor market (Chueri, 2022: 85).

The political platforms and manifestos of CHEGA argue that not only should the welfare state be modest in size, but that the benefits it offers should be virtually and entirely restricted to Portuguese natives. CHEGA is only outdone by ELAM (Cyprus), EL (Greece), and RN (France) in terms of welfare chauvinism. Furthermore, CHEGA's stance is singular in the Portuguese democratic party system, which was founded in 1974 and has since come to an agreement on the importance of extending the welfare state and implementing welcoming and liberal immigration policies (Fernandes, 2023).

Keywords: CHEGA, Populist Radical Right Wing Political Party, Nativism, Welfare Chauvinism.



# Summary

<b>Acknowledgments</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>Resumo</b> .....	<b>v</b>
<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>vii</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>1.1. Political Context</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1.1. Research Context and General Framework.....	3
1.2. CHEGA’s evolution .....	5
1.2.1. CHEGA and its peers: PRRPs across Europe .....	5
<b>Literature Review</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>2.1. Main Concepts</b> .....	<b>9</b>
2.1.1. Nativism.....	9
2.1.2. Authoritarianism .....	10
2.1.3. Populist Radical Right-Wing Parties .....	10
2.1.4. Producerism .....	12
<b>2.2. Welfare Studies</b> .....	<b>12</b>
2.2.1. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, according to Esping-Andersen .....	12
2.2.2 The Employer Centered-Approach, according to Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice	
14	
2.2.3 Welfare state in Portugal.....	14
<b>2.3. Welfare Chauvinism</b> .....	<b>15</b>
2.3.1. Welfare Chauvinism and Family Policy .....	16
2.3.2. The Social Investment Paradigm.....	18
<b>Methodology</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>3.1. Research questions and puzzle gap</b> .....	<b>21</b>
3.1.1. Justification for case study and its selection .....	21
3.1.2. Motivation .....	22
<b>3.2. Research methodology and information</b> .....	<b>22</b>

3.2.1.	Research Goals .....	23
3.2.2.	Empirical Research Methodology .....	23
3.2.3.	Empirical information .....	24
	<b><i>CHEGA as a PRRP</i></b> .....	<b>25</b>
	<b>4.1. CHEGA’s Economic Thought</b> .....	<b>26</b>
4.2.	CHEGA and Welfare Chauvinism .....	28
4.2.1.	Social Housing .....	29
4.2.2.	Social Benefits.....	29
4.2.3.	CHEGA and RSI in Azores.....	31
4.2.4.	Health Services.....	33
4.3.	CHEGA: racism, xenophobia, and social minorities .....	33
4.3.1.	National Preference Policy and The Great Replacement.....	35
4.3.2.	Multiculturalism and the Roma community.....	36
	<b><i>Conclusions</i></b> .....	<b>39</b>
	<b><i>References</i></b> .....	<b>43</b>
	<b><i>Attachment I</i></b> .....	<b>51</b>
	<b>Other relevant concepts</b> .....	<b>51</b>
	Populism .....	51
	Meritocracy .....	51
	Inequality .....	51
	Democracy .....	52
	The people.....	52
	The elite	52
	The general will .....	53
	Welfare State.....	53
	<b><i>Attachment II</i></b> .....	<b>55</b>
	Populist rhetoric indicators .....	55
	<b><i>Attachment III</i></b> .....	<b>57</b>
	Access to welfare: restrict welfare to native majority vs. equal access to welfare .....	57
	<b><i>Attachment IV</i></b> .....	<b>58</b>
	<b>Summary of core economic features in CHEGA, as of 2019</b> .....	<b>58</b>

<b>CHEGA’s Position .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>Taxes .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>State vs. Market .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>Economic Protection.....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>Social equality and justice mechanisms.....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>Political privileges and expenses .....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>The common-good .....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b><i>Attachment V</i> .....</b>	<b>60</b>
Summary of core producerist features in CHEGA .....	60
<b><i>Attachment VI</i>.....</b>	<b>61</b>
CHEGA’s Housing Program resolution.....	61



## CHAPTER I

# Introduction

### 1.1. Political Context

Even though Populism is a phenomenon that dates to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, over the past decade, several populist leaders have risen to positions of significant power across the globe, as evidenced by Trump's victory in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election and the British public's decision to leave the European Union (Brexit). The populist wave has been growing even before that, with populist leaders like Vladimir Putin in Russia (in power since 2000), Xi Jinping in China (in office since 2012), and Recep Erdogan in Turkey leading the way (since 2014) (Devinney & Hartwell, 2020: 33).

Populist parties have attained electoral success in Europe by displacing parties that had previously controlled the party system. Explanations for these parties' popularity have generally centered on economic inequities between countries, instability, and rising immigration and refugee numbers. Today, the relevance of Populism cannot be overstated (Serrano, 2020: 221).

All the same, empirical studies claim that Welfare Chauvinism has grown to be an essential part of PRRPs' anti-immigrant agendas and a key factor in their electoral success. This is more than just a rhetorical issue. Studies have demonstrated that PRRPs are able to affect integration policies and implement restrictions on immigrants' access to social rights when forming governments with mainstream parties. In other words, many of the PRRPs' stances on immigration and integration have started to be adopted by mainstream right-wing parties (Chueri, 2022: 84).

The party system in Portugal has remained stable, with two hegemonic parties in the center – the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) – alternating in power. With or without coalitions with smaller parties on the right or with alliances on the left – the latter in the 2016-2019 legislature (Serrano, 2020: 221). However, the 2019 legislative elections shook the system's stability by allowing three new political formations into Parliament and weakening the two parties on the right of the parliamentary spectrum. Thus, Livre (L), CHEGA (CH), and Iniciativa Liberal (IL) were given parliamentary representation with one deputy each.

While Livre (LI) can be seen as a radical leftist political party, and Iniciativa Liberal as a liberal, CHEGA is clearly a populist radical right-wing political party (Serrano, 2020: 221-222).

As of January 2023, CHEGA was the third political force in Portugal, representing the radical right in the Portuguese Parliament with twelve elected representatives. CHEGA voters are right-wing men who are dissatisfied with the way democracy works, rather than older citizens. This suggests that Iberian populist radical right supporters are not older people nostalgic for the authoritarian regimes of the past, but rather a new generation of people drawn to the radical right. CHEGA voters tend to be less educated and more religious than the general population, since they prefer to live in rural rather than urban areas (Heyne & Manucci, 2021). Today, in Europe, only three countries – Ireland, Luxembourg, and Malta –, do not have representatives of the extreme right or the radical right in their National Parliaments. Thus, by managing to elect a deputy to the Parliament – the accomplishment was portrayed as historic. For the first time since the fall of *Estado Novo*, a party associated with the extreme right won a parliamentary seat (Santana, 2021: 2).

Furthermore, voting for populist radical right parties is seen as an expression of democratic discontent stemming from mistrust of the political elite, dissatisfaction with how democracy works, and disillusionment with traditional parties. Finally, citizens who support populist radical right parties are more likely to obtain political information from tabloid newspapers and social media (Heyne & Manucci, 2021).

On an international level, the emergence of PRRPs and heightened nationalist tendencies can be seen as a sign of de-globalization or, in other instances, a shrinkage of trust in international relations, as well as the globalized world (Flew, 2020: 21). Hence, the most successful newcomers to European party politics over the past few decades have been radical right parties, going above and beyond to disrupt the political scene, as well as aiming to shape political policy unswervingly (Enns-Jedenastik, 2022: 154-155).

Theoretical and empirical studies on the economic effects of globalization emphasize that transnationally mobile manufacturing and financial companies, as well as highly qualified professionals, technical employees, and managers, are the “winners” of globalization. Market globalization, on the other hand, causes losses and new economic insecurity for occupational strata and industries – repercussions, trade, capital mobility, and labor immigration may all contribute to a drop in relative wages and the employment of an increasing number of lesser skilled workers. Furthermore, the historic middle class may face economic hardship (Swank & Betz, 2018: 8-9).



This is directly correlated to nativism and growing migration, which is a consequence of globalization – a reaction of constituents assessments to globalization’s macroeconomic and sociocultural impact on their personal lives. Accordingly, those that gain from the new opportunities created by globalization tend to be more cosmopolitan, while those who are disadvantaged by globalization tend to be more conservative. Consequently, such polarization is also mirrored in the microstructural composition of the electoral seats of the radical populist right (Betz & Swank, 2018: 7).

On a domestic level, this also tells us that the domestic institutions are not responding to the people’s needs and so, the electorate grows discontent which is transformed into votes on PRRPs (Betz, 2018). Which is contrary to what a strong welfare state promotes. Betz & Swank (2018: 4) argue that a well-rounded welfare state is composed by *solidaristic institutions*, which weaken eco-financial constraints, as well as advocating for social equity, justice, and fairness. Thus, theoretically, weakening the support of PRRPs. Thus, begging the question: *does the Portuguese Welfare State works properly?* Since a strong Welfare State is very much different than a broad one. When combined with the effects of high immigration and socioeconomic crisis, we find the secret recipe for a PRRPs success. Correspondingly, CHEGA filled in the gap in between the political parties by establishing itself as a force of change on the conservative right.

This goes to show that PRRPs tend to create a mix of expansion and retrenchment regarding economic and social policy, only advocating for their expansion when its politically beneficial for the party (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2022: 155).

This said, my topic for this project would be CHEGA’s Welfare Chauvinism and Social Policy evolution as a Populist Radical Right-Wing Political Party (PRRP): understanding if the chauvinism in the party’s discourse reflects on their views regarding social policy. The relevance of this study not only englobes the study of PRRPs, but also, how they take different ramifications and approaches, particularly, in Portugal, a country being stormed by the new radical right and populism – especially in the realm of the welfare state, its dimensions, nativism and relationship with social policy.

### **1.1.1. Research Context and General Framework**

To cite a few examples, Portugal is one of the European countries with the highest level of agreement with questions designed to assess racist beliefs. In a 2014 survey, more than 50 per cent of Portuguese respondents agreed that ‘some races or ethnic groups are born less intelligent than others’ and that ‘some cultures are much better than others’. Similarly, PRRP parties’

emphasis on ‘law and order’ issues finds a receptive public in Portugal, with 95% of respondents believing crime should be punished more severely (European Commission 2015). Santana-Pereira and Cancela (2020) note the prevalence of populist attitudes among the Portuguese, concluding that they were only waiting to be politically activated (Mendes, 2021:329-331). Nevertheless, demand-centered theories are the core of populist contagion theories: mainstream parties include PRRP positions in their electoral manifestos out of fear of electoral repercussions (Careja & Harris, 2022: 214). Furthermore, the study will be conducted under a Political Economy lens, to guarantee the best research treatment and analysis – in specific, in the realm of Chauvinism in Social Policy.

Accordingly, I also intend to explore the following aspects:

- What makes CHEGA a PRRP?
- How does CHEGA differ from traditional right-wing parties?
- Does CHEGA economic thought reflect Chauvinism? If so, is it stated in its views regarding social policy?
- Is CHEGA only xenophobic against immigrants or it is also xenophobic against ethnic minorities?
- Is welfare chauvinism a consequence of nativism?
- Is CHEGA Producerism oriented regarding its economic ideas?
- Chauvinism as a part of CHEGA’s populist strategy.

Appropriately, this thesis aims to critically understand the welfare policies and welfare rhetoric linked with CHEGA as a PRRP and their approach to social citizenship. Manly due to the role social citizenship plays in the mainstreaming and normalization of radical-right political agendas in contemporary European societies. So, it demands the question: is CHEGA chauvinist when it comes to its social policies as a PRRP? And if so, is it a result of its nativism? Accordingly, my thesis will be organized in five parts: (1) Introduction, in which I explain the political context, CHEGA’s evolution, CHEGA and its peers, research context and general framework; (2) literature review on Nativism; Authoritarianism; PRRPs; Producerism; Welfare Studies; Welfare Chauvinism; Welfare Chauvinism and Social Policy; The Social Investment Paradigm; (3) Methodology consisting of research questions, puzzle gap, research methodology, motivation, timeline, limitations, and empirical information; (4) CHEGA as a PRRP, CHEGA economic thought, CHEGA and welfare chauvinism, CHEGA in comparison; (5) Conclusions.

## **1.2. CHEGA's evolution**

CHEGA, as perceived by Marchi (2020), is André Ventura's personal endeavor. "André Ventura departs the PSD with a hand full of nothing and another full of nothing" – because he lacked backing and links to the country's economic, political, and cultural elites (Marchi, 2020: 20). For the author, Ventura's personal experience as a son of the petty bourgeoisie of Lisbon's suburbs enables him to embody the *champion of the people* to repressed beliefs and concerns of an audience increasingly disaffected with the conventional right. This new party, which is "substantially integrated into the Portuguese world, and not merely on the right" (Marchi, 2020: 135), is focused on native factors rather than "the reproduction of foreign models, notably European and American right-wing populism, of which it will be continually accused" (Marchi, 2020: 51).

According to Marchi (2020), the populist tactic is employed to overcome the lack of monetary means and the stigmatization which has always been a focus in the media. CHEGA differs from earlier political efforts of the same ideological framework in that it allows for the use of social networks. Therefore, Ventura frequently makes controversial statements to "maximize his polemical instinct on issues that fracture society" (Marchi, 2020: 47), to pursue a political differentiation strategy aimed at bringing together specific electoral segments metropolitan belts, and to break through the party's "media blockade" (Marchi, 2020: 63).

### **1.2.1. CHEGA and its peers: PRRPs across Europe**

In modern Europe, the Populist Radical Right mobilizes primarily through political parties that compete for seats in parliament and influence government policies, either directly or indirectly. Street politics has traditionally been associated with the extreme right, specifically neo-Nazis and other far right groups, but this has begun to shift in recent years. Indeed, the refugee crisis has fueled an increase in extreme right and radical right street politics. Until 2015, the populist radical right was almost entirely a phenomenon of political party literature, with street politics dominated by small, often violent, extreme right groups. While far-right activists and groups continue to be primarily involved in street politics, they are not alone. In recent years, a few radical right non-party organizations that are solely concerned with extra-parliamentary politics have emerged (Mudde, 2017: 27, 30).

As persuasively shown by recent election results, PRRPs have taken the lead in many European Union nations – including Germany, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden. PRRPs have been consistently successful in winning elections in Finland, Austria, France, Poland, Greece, and Hungary by using nationalist and anti-immigrant political methods that generally rely on constrained, nationalist conceptions of social citizenship. Partly, this stems from a substantial re-emergence of radical, nationalist, and anti-immigration plans in European politics. Thus, welfare nation state politics are, at least, one reason for this achievement (Ketola & Nordensvard, 2018: 172-173). When analyzing the economic stances of seven populist extreme right parties in Europe, Otjes *et al.* (2018) also uncovers a “uniform nativist” approach that clearly depends on welfare chauvinism justifications. These strategies work well, as demonstrated by Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2014), mainstream parties do respond to the rhetoric of Welfare Chauvinism by intensifying their criticism of diversity and adopting more pro-benefit views (Ketola & Nordensvard, 2015: 177-179).

So, when analyzing CHEGA, we can understand it holds the same set of racist assumptions and biases about immigration as the radical right in Europe. The party’s records make a strong connection between immigration and elevated security dangers and generalized instability. Additionally, it is believed that hiring foreigners typically results in lower compensation. CHEGA contends that most people from the middle and lower classes suffer because of immigration because they are ultimately responsible for paying its costs. As a result, it also supports severely restricting immigrants’ social and political rights. Consequently, Portuguese nationals, including those in the diaspora who aspire to return, and foreigners legally existing in the country must be given preference in an immigration program in access to employment and the growth of their professional and financial standing. The party contends that there must be strict restrictions on the acquisition of nationality by children of immigrants born in Portugal. Thus, immigrants should be admitted only if they clearly have the potential to integrate into Portuguese society and culture. If immigrants do not speak Portuguese, their access to social benefits should also be restricted (Fernandes, 2023).

Hence, CHEGA suggests that there should be an annual public list of the professions and the quantity of individuals that the nation lacks to put these ideas into practice. Adaptability to the local language and culture is one of the prerequisites for the selection tests, which are required of any foreign individual seeking a work visa for Portugal. Housing access would be subject to the same standards. Additionally, CHEGA suggests establishing a system of short-stay visas for industries that draw seasonal labor flows of low-wage immigrants. Accordingly, the Portuguese State should have the right to use severe coercion, with the potential for forcing immigrants to leave the nation during times of increased unemployment (Fernandes, 2023).

The growth of populist radical right parties (PRRPs), a party family characterized by an ideology of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism, is a significant factor in the delicate connection between political parties and the welfare state. Thus, the welfare state played a very small role. The literature explaining the emergence of PRRPs, has focused primarily on socio-cultural issues like immigration, European integration, and (opposition to) multiculturalism (Rathgeb & Busemeyer, 2022: 2-3). Thus, I pretend to explore these factors in relation to CHEGA.



## CHAPTER II

# Literature Review

### 2.1. Main Concepts

To completely understand the research theme, it is important to bear in mind some knowledge regarding certain concepts. Thus, our main concepts are *nativism*, *authoritarianism*, *populist radical right-wing parties*, *welfare chauvinism* and *producerism*. All concepts are explained considering their connection to populism and PRRPs (see Attachment I for other relevant concepts).

#### 2.1.1. Nativism

Nativism can be understood as a political strategy that promotes the interests of native populations above those of foreigners, especially by advocating for immigration restrictions. Thus, Nativism is a typical technical word in academic research – those who embrace this political viewpoint, on the other hand, do not usually accept the name. “Nativists do not believe themselves to be nativists”, wrote Ozgur Dindar. For them, “it is a derogatory phrase, and they prefer to refer to themselves as ‘patriots’ ” (European Center for Populism Studies, 2022a).

Nevertheless, according to Mudde (2007), the populist radical right blends populism with authoritarianism and nativism as major ideological elements (European Center for Populism Studies, 2022a). In politics, the most visible manifestations of nativism are welfare chauvinism, support for technocracy and “first” policies, and the denial of rights to non-natives based on cultural incompatibility (Swank & Betz, 2018: 4).

In generic terms, nativism is a combination of nationalism and xenophobia that identifies all nonnative ideas or persons as a threat to the nation (Mudde, 2007: 19). Giving this discriminatory premise, immigration cannot ensure the survival of the country; only native reproduction can. The native nuclear family, which is the country’s smallest building component or “the ultimate cell of society”, has thus traditionally played a crucial role in the worldview of the radical right (Norocel, 2010; Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 71). To ensure the country’s continued survival, it is essential to maintain and improve its reproductive capacity (Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2022: 157-158).

### **2.1.2. Authoritarianism**

Authoritarianism can be described as the belief in a strictly ordered society in which violations of authority are severely punished. It is an ideological feature shared by most right-wing ideologies (e.g., conservatism) and many religions (e.g., Roman Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity). In terms of concrete policies, authoritarianism manifests itself as strict law & order policies, which calls for more police officers with greater competencies and less political involvement in the judiciary arena. It also implies that social problems such as drugs and prostitution are viewed as security issues first and foremost, rather than health or economic issues. As a result, authoritarians advocate for harsher punishments and fewer rights for criminals, as well as more discipline in families and schools (Mudde, 2017:26).

According to Mudde (2007: 23, 93), from an authoritarian viewpoint, a “strictly controlled society, in which violations of authority are to be punished harshly”, is preferable. Several established social hierarchies, including gender hierarchies, are included in the tight order that is indicative of authoritarian ideology. Hence, a strict separation of labor between men and women is supported by radical right ideology – the private realm and unpaid work remain the purview of women, whereas the public sphere and paid jobs are seen as male areas (Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2022: 158).

### **2.1.3. Populist Radical Right-Wing Parties**

Portugal is out of the main Populism indexes and data collections. Plus, the studies done on Populism in Portugal are based on the lack of its success after the 2008 economic crisis (Silva & Salgado, 2017: 276). Or, more recently, focusing on the far-right Portuguese party CHEGA, which employs extremely populist and worrisome ideology and speech (Serrano, 2020).

So, when you think about PRRPs in Europe, these political parties have some specifiers – since most of them have the capacity to affect the creation of socioeconomic policies because of their current representation in many Western European parliaments. Nonetheless, the impact of PRRPs on migration policy—which is regarded as its “central issue”—has received almost all the scholarly attention to date. The existing findings demonstrate that the inclusion of PRRPs in right-wing governments has significant ramifications for socioeconomic policies. In contrast to right-wing governments, PRRPs



refrain from cutting back on the welfare State and are less likely to engage in deregulation because of their diverse constituents (Röth *et al.*, 2017: 325).

The extreme right's culturally conservative electorate prioritizes consumerist programs and has particularistic tastes (Busemeyer *et al.*, 2021). Since the emphasis is on *prioritization*, most voters – regardless of political affiliation – favor social policies, whether they are investing or consumption oriented. On the other hand, the conflict between social investment and consumption is anticipated to worsen along the lines of universalistic and particularistic preferences in the current scenario – where expansion implies costs (Enggist & Pinggera, 2022:103).

Chueri (2023: 84), compared the effects of PRRPs and mainstream parties on the social rights of various migrant groups through an event-history analysis of the Determinants of International Migration Policy database along with a qualitative examination of the indexation of family benefits in selected European Countries. The findings show that the PRRPs' support for limitations on intra-EU migrants' eligibility to social assistance is the primary distinction between them and mainstream right-wing parties in Western Europe.

Paul Taggart and Hans-Georg Betz argued that new radical and extreme right parties needed to be contextualized within post-industrial society and welfare state transformations (Betz, 1994; Taggart, 1995; 1996). However, and most importantly, Taggart and Betz popularized the term Populism. Thus, in their own ways, argued that successful right-wing parties (as opposed to traditional Fascist or Nazi parties) were populists, mobilizing voter resentment against political elites. Taggart defines Populism as a political ideology in which charismatic leaders mobilize the authentic heartland against political and economic elites (Taggart, 2000, pp.91–98; Zaslove, 2009: 310).

Populist radical right denotes a populist variant of the radical right. Given that nativism, rather than populism, is the ultimate core feature of this party family's ideology, radical right should be the primary term in the concept (Zaslove, 2009: 310-311).

Thus, according to Mudde (2007), the Populist Radical Right is structured around three central ideological traits: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. In addition, the populist radical right has been associated with producerism, as it will be reviewed in the next section.

#### **2.1.4. Producerism**

According to Mény & Surel (2000) and Canovan (2005), Producerism or Economic Populism can be understood as the indication that the economic welfare of ‘the people’ is being ignored or cast-aside by the ‘elite’ – having to be re-established, particularly by reinstating the nation’s economic sovereignty.

Thus, when associated with PRRPs, it signifies the notion of Producerism as it follows: “the ‘producers’ of the nation’s wealth should enjoy the economic fruits of their own labors” (Breteizer, 2014: 145). Accordingly, producers contribute to economic growth – *the people*, a group of diligent, productive, and commendable people, who are seen as the strength of economic success, and guardians of honorable values –, as opposed to parasites at the top and bottom of society – aristocrats, bankers, indigenous people, the undeserving poor, and immigrants (Berlet & Lyons, 2018).

The political economy of right-wing populists is knotted with cultural values in the creation of the ‘true’ people as an economic group whose quality of life is weakened and at risk, and so needs to be reinstated (Ivaldi & Mazzoleni, 2019: 1). Accordingly, previous studies mostly emphasized nativism and welfare chauvinism as the main economic reaction by PRRPs. Most of the research studies the cultural aspect of European right-wing populist politics, highlighting issues of immigration, national identity, and Islam (Betz & Immerfall, 1998; Mudde, 2007; Betz, 2017; Marzouki, McDonnell & Roy, 2017).

Nevertheless, Berlet (2005: 124) defends that producerism works with structures and narratives developed around valiant myths of national rebirth. These ideas grow from the impression that reversing to outdated social hierarchies would guarantee dominance of the ethnologically and economically defined group of the ‘true people’, which is at risk of losing its influent status.

## **2.2. Welfare Studies**

### **2.2.1. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, according to Esping-Andersen**

Esping-Andersen’s work on the three existing economies of the welfare state aligns with the Power Resources Approach, which indicates that the growth of welfare states is tied to the influence of specific political factions and class struggles. So, distinct socioeconomic strata are related to different forms of power resources (Korpi, 2006: 168).

As a driving element in the organization of social connections, the welfare state is a stratification system (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 23). As a result, different stratification systems and inequities in social rights produce diverse measures between the state, market, and family. As a result, rather than being distributed linearly, the identified welfare-state modifications are clustered by regime kinds. To organize Esping-Andersen's three regime types: liberal, corporatist, and social-democratic, I present the table below:

<b>Liberal Tradition</b>	<b>Corporatist Tradition</b>	<b>Social-democratic Tradition</b>
United States, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom	Germany, Austria, Italy, France	Scandinavian Countries (Denmark, Sweden, Holland)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Means-tested assistance and modest social-insurance plans dominated.</li> <li>• Caters to low-income working-class or state-dependents.</li> <li>• The state encourages the market, either passively or actively.</li> <li>• The progress of social reform is circumscribed by traditional, liberal work-ethic norms.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shaped by conservative reforms promoted by the church.</li> <li>• Establishment of particularly privileged welfare provisions for the civil service.</li> <li>• Consolidate divisions among wage-earners.</li> <li>• Ties the loyalties of the individual to the monarchy or central state authority.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mix of liberal and socialist welfare ideas: social democracy as the dominant force behind social reform.</li> <li>• Promotes an equality of the highest standards, not an equality of minimal needs: universalism of rights.</li> <li>• Privileges tailored to the benefit, taste, and expectation of the middle-class.</li> <li>• Commitment to full employment.</li> <li>• Fusion between welfare and work.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Level of the de-commodification of work:</u> low.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Level of the de-commodification of work:</u> moderate.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Level of the de-commodification of work:</u> high.</li> </ul>

Table 1: *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*

Even if the revealed welfare-state alterations are grouped by regime types rather than being distributed linearly, it is critical to emphasize that there is no such thing as a single pure case. This means that each regime has some sway over the others. Accordingly, there is no welfare regime better than the other, these can only be judged regarding their levels of de-commodification, efficiency, equity, and equality (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 28-29).

### **2.2.2 The Employer Centered-Approach, according to Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice**

The phenomenon of globalization has fostered the underlying idea that as corporate power grows, so does the welfare state (Estevez-Abe *et al.*, 2001: 1). As a result, Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice believe that social protection enhances the market by supporting economic players in overcoming market deficiencies in skill formation. The authors demonstrate a strong relationship between critical components of social protection and the dominant kind of labor skills across advanced economies. According to the authors, different types of social protection are to blame for varying skill equilibrium within countries (Estevez-Abe *et al.*, 2001: 1).

Firms in nations like the United States or the United Kingdom, on the other hand, would struggle to implement a comparable strategy due to the relative shortage of firm-specific and industry-specific talents. The lack of institutional guarantees for specific skill investments in the latter set of countries means that workers are far less likely to share the cost of skill learning. As a result, this theory contends that the type of social protection a country provides has an impact on its competitiveness in global markets (Estevez-Abe *et al.*, 2001: 2). Firms do not have perfect control over the product market strategies they pursue, which may need highly specialized competencies. Businesses' options are limited when only one required talent is available. The availability of skills necessitates proper social security (Estevez-Abe *et al.*, 2001: 2).

### **2.2.3 Welfare state in Portugal**

Portugal has been cutting on social justice, which has had a significant influence on the welfare state. This may be seen nearly from the commencement of the country's welfare state. Indeed, the initial retrenchments can be traced back to before Europe's financial crisis, which led to the Portuguese government to request a bailout in 2011. The peculiarities of the 'economy' can be explained by examining the features of the Portuguese welfare state. Three distinct approaches to Southern European welfare states can be found in the existing literature: 1) An immature version of Esping-Andersen's (1990 in Zartaloudis, 2014), explaining it as a conservative or corporatist model; 2) The Southern European welfare state as sharing a set of distinguishing characteristics that resulted in a different kind (Zartaloudis, 2014); 3) The welfare state of Southern Europe - in reality, a welfare society in which social security is provided through family and social networks rather than the state, leading to a 'social welfare regime' (Santos, 1992).

The view that the Southern European welfare state's failure has resulted in low employment rates, high poverty, high inequality, and a wide divide between labor market experts and foreigners, limited redistribution, and inefficient social spending is shared by these approaches. Santos (1991) defines the Portuguese welfare state as a *quasi-welfare state*. In general, it is closer to the Anglo-Saxon mode in terms of the breadth of services and tools it seeks to supply, in addition to the financing mechanisms, but less so in terms of the financing mechanisms (Brito, 2019: 8).

### **2.3. Welfare Chauvinism**

Welfare chauvinism – welfare state nationalism – is the political belief that welfare benefits should be restricted to specific groups, particularly natives of a country rather than immigrants or certain ethnic groups – in CHEGA's case, the party believes that welfare benefits should exclude the gypsy community. Thus, its conceptualization stems from party politics, individual-level attitudes, and policy reforms (European Center for Populism Studies, 2022b; Careja & Harris, 2022: 213). Also, recent arguments from the literature on welfare states have demonstrated that the debate over the welfare state is no longer just about its size, but also about its aims, guiding principles, and the needs of those whom the welfare state should serve (Beramendi et al., 2015; Bremer & Bürgisser, 2020; Busemeyer & Garritzmann, 2017). Should the welfare state prioritize providing a safety net for the unemployed rather than investing in people's ability to earn more money? As a result, welfare politics and the economy have taken on multiple dimensions (Hausermann, 2010; Roosma *et al.*, 2013; van Oorschot & Meuleman, 2012).

According to Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik's (2014), welfare chauvinism is a political viewpoint that promotes nativism as the primary organizing principle of social policy: members of *the native in-group*, as defined by citizenship, ethnicity, race, or religion, should receive most welfare benefits. Members of *the non-native out-group*, on the other hand, should receive little to no social support. Welfare chauvinism thus crosses the left-right divide by combining a leftist welfare stance toward natives with a rightist position toward non-natives (European Center for Populism Studies, 2022b).

Keeping in mind that conceptualization and operationalization of welfare state chauvinism can be done in two ways: (1) refusing to accept immigration; (2) support for welfare state redistribution (implied support for welfare states and exclusion of immigrants) (Careja & Harris, 2022: 217).

In a very simplistic way, welfare chauvinism consists of an anti-immigration, nativist perspective on social policies (Fenger, 2018: 190). Welfare state politics, which are traditionally seen as one of the main issues of the economic dimension, have fundamentally transformed over the last decades. Structural changes have had lasting effects on both citizens' demand for social protection and elites' leeway for providing the demanded coverage. These structural changes have come in the form of the rise of the service sector, educational expansion, demographic changes and altered family structures, which, in a highly interrelated way, have affected the demand and supply sides of social policy alike (Enggist & Pinggera, 2022: 106). When associated with PRRPs, is a useful instrument in convincing voters – even if these voters are not benefited by a shrinkage of the welfare state. On the other hand, direct decreases in non-citizens support might satisfy specific political groups of voters – classically the male, primary workforce in industrial work (Busemeyer & Rathgeb, 2021: 7).

As previously mentioned, welfare chauvinism can also be instrumental in gatekeeping social citizenship and making the access to positive social rights harder: either by shrinking the resources available in welfare or by sealing its access to certain immigrant groups or minorities. Thus, PRRPs tend to rethink the welfare state as a welfare nation state, this goes back to the notion of the people that build said welfare state. Therefore, instead questioning the legitimacy of the redistributive welfare system, these parties reframed it in tighter terms: it's a governmental aid going to an autonomous and restricted political community limited by clear rules. Accordingly, Enser-Jedenastik (2018) reasons that these techniques are more noticeable in states that support welfare programmes which draw on universal and means-tested principles (Ketola and Nordensvard, 2018: 4, 8).

### **2.3.1. Welfare Chauvinism and Family Policy**

Oddly, an area of social policy that tends to be left in the dust is family, considering how strongly ideologically committed extreme right parties are to some family and gender roles – oftentimes quite conservative. In what regards family policy, Nativism tends to have particular importance, since it argues that the nation's survival depends on the native population's ability to procreate. However, PRRPs lean towards very limited pro-natalist agenda, in what concerns measures that uphold conventional gender roles in the home.

Empirically, this suggests opposition to services rendered outside of the family – childcare – but support for financial rewards – such as family allowances. Nonetheless, PRRPs are not afraid to retrench these supports if racial diversity rises. As more benefits go to nonnative recipients, family allowances lose some of their appeal. Contrarily, childcare services may be considered to promote the linguistic and cultural integration of immigrants – while they are being exploited for their cheap labor (Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2022: 155).

According to Ennsner-Jedenastik (2022: 155-157), PRRPs tend to have little effect on family policy, however, their measures tend to cause a shift in the family’s spending: when these political parties are in power, the population tends to spend more in childcare, while receiving lower (or even none) family allowances and state aid. This means that many benefits and services that are subsidized or offered by the government make up public policies that are geared at families – being divided in several categories.

We can understand this system in a de-familialization vs. familialization dichotomy (Leitner, 2003: 358): while policies that encourage and improve families’ ability to care for their dependents are known as familiarizing policies (e.g., children or elderly family members); contrarily, de-familiarizing policies offer care options outside the family, relieving families of the need to provide for their members (and decrease the dependence of those being cared for on their family). This distinction is essential given that PRRPs differ greatly from mainstream parties in these two areas. They strongly support familialization due to their pro-natalist worldview, whereas de-familialization is at best weakly supported due to their commitment to traditional gender roles. Hereafter, even while socially conservative parties do not inherently oppose redistributive social programs, they should not be anticipated to enhance childcare supply. Examples of such parties are the radical right party family. This position’s logical extension should make significant monetary transfers to families simple to reconcile. Thus, the best way to understand welfare chauvinism is to think of it as nativism applied to social policy. Usually, radical right parties favor liberal policies for the native people while limiting or eliminating advantages for non-natives (Rathgeb, 2021; Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2022:159).

### **2.3.2. The Social Investment Paradigm**

The social investment paradigm is the most widely accepted approach to the debate over what the welfare state should accomplish (Beramendi *et al.*, 2015; Esping-Andersen *et al.*, 2002; Hemerijck, 2013; Morel *et al.*, 2012). Social investment policies have a different logic than “passive” or “consumptive” social policies because they are intended to “create, mobilize, or preserve skills” (e.g., childcare, tertiary education, and active labour market measures) (Garrizmann *et al.*, 2017: 37) to support citizens’ earning capacity. Enggist & Pinggera (2022: 106-109), argue that according to the literature, the working-class voters’ focus on self-interest, the link between consumer support and particularistic socio-cultural attitudes, and trust issues all contribute to the radical right electorate’s predominately consumption-oriented perspective. In addition, there is a connection between radical right support and a preference for consumption over investment that goes beyond self-interest.

Thus, as part of CHEGA’s strategy, they claim that the corrupt elites who disregard the interests of the people have devised, implemented, and even undermined welfare and social policy on purpose. Therefore, PRRPs create a relation between welfare, social policy, and nationalist tendencies – which is heightened by their thin-centered ideology. Accordingly, CHEGA argues that welfare and social policy are often administered and benefit by the wrong individuals. Thus, their creation and implementation does not serve the interests of the common people. This leads us to the issue of welfare access, which, according to CHEGA indicates that corrupt elites have allowed undeserving immigrants access to promote multiculturalism. This is perceived as undermining the nation state and lowering the standard of social welfare policies (Ketola & Nordensvard, 2015: 174).

In the case of Portugal, CHEGA does not only believe that the wrong people administer the social funds in an ineffective way, but they also attribute them to the wrong people. CHEGA’s public enemy is undoubtedly the Roma community, which is known by abusing subsidies, being unintegrated in society and not obeying the law – specially, claiming RSI without need or committing fraud, by collecting subsidies for people that do not exist or that are dead.

So, when we talk about Chauvinism in social policy, in what regards PRRPs, we think about the risks that the redesign of the welfare nation state would carry. This



reimagining refers to a specific perception of the demographics of the people who comprise the welfare state. The redistributive welfare state is thus reframed in more limited terms as belonging to a sovereign and exclusive political community constrained within clearly defined borders, rather than necessarily calling into doubt its legitimacy. Such policy stances, Enser-Jedenastik (2018) contends, are more prevalent in nations that support welfare programs that draw either on equality (universal) or need-based principles (means tested).



## Methodology

### 3.1. Research questions and puzzle gap

Thus, after research, analysis, and reflection, I decided on the following research question: *Is CHEGA chauvinist when it comes to its social policies as a PRRP?*

Therefore, our puzzle/ gap entails the following: CHEGA empowers a populist political strategy, being a PRRP, which goes in hand with their radical-right political ideology. The party's populist tendencies create space for xenophobia, racism and discrimination against migrants and minorities, as well as Chauvinism – e.g., Roma community, as well as impoverished black communities in shanty towns. But is the Chauvinism presented in the party's discourse in the Parliament, Social Media and Electoral Campaigns present in the social policies they propose? Accordingly, if there is Chauvinism regarding social policy, is it clearly present in their economic thought? Those are some of the aspects I pretend to explore.

#### 3.1.1. Justification for case study and its selection

The aim of my thesis is to understand how a PRRP's – CHEGA – economic thought has evolved since its foundation in 2019. By studying this evolution, I pretend to understand if there is Welfare Chauvinism when it comes to social policies. And, if there is Chauvinism in its Social Policy, if this correlates with the economic program CHEGA defends, as well as understanding if it fits the text-book logic of chauvinism. The case of Portugal gains relevance due to the rapid rise of CHEGA, not only as PRRP, but also as a recent political party. Also, it is a drastic change in the political landscape: Portugal went from having one conservative right-wing party (CDS) – which lost its representation in the Parliament in 2022 – to a PRRP with dramatic views on multiculturalism, immigration, and state centrality. I believe we can learn a great deal from the Portuguese case study, particularly, how factors like the heritage of Salazarism, rooted social stigma towards the Roma community, and brewing dissatisfaction with democratic institutions – existing and in power political parties – can influence the rise of parties like CHEGA to spread their ideas through the electoral population.

Also, a single case study on CHEGA, Welfare Chauvinism and Social Policy not only serves as a great source of exploratory data, but it is also crucial since there is very little on

CHEGA as a Welfare Chauvinistic PRRP. This way, I can test and explore an argument – CHEGA as a PRRP with Chauvinist tendencies in its social policies.

Hereafter, the same method of case study can be applied to similar situations in other countries. Thus, being an evolution for the studies of Welfare Chauvinism, Populist Radical Right-Wing Political Parties and how differently they present themselves in different scenarios.

### **3.1.2. Motivation**

I decided to carry out an analysis on CHEGA's evolution on Social Policy as a PRRP. Thus, understanding if the Chauvinism in the party's discourse reflects on their views regarding social policy. My interest in this topic reflects the fact that CHEGA is not only the first PRRP in recent history in Portugal, but also because it is understudied. CHEGA can also be viewed as an interesting political phenomenon from the point of view of Political Science. This way, I pretend to understand what makes CHEGA Chauvinist in Social Policy, which social groups are targeted and how are they excluded of Social Policy, especially in Social Benefits, Housing and Health.

## **3.2. Research methodology and information**

The present dissertation will have the form of a single case study: which can be defined as intensive investigation of a single case or a limited number of cases based on observable data to transpose their findings into a wider set of cases (Gerring, 2017, p. 28). They aim to develop in-depth studies to test theories about a particular phenomenon, or to develop new theoretical proposals on the selected phenomenon that extend to a broader set of cases (Brady and Collier, 2010). Thus, it allows the understanding of cases through the examination of the available theories, as well as the formulation of new explanations about cases considered avoidant or unexplained in the existing literature. Case studies are repeatedly applied in the evaluation of public policies, although these tend to examine the process of formulating and implementing these policies, as well as the results achieved.

Even though this project provides a complete general framework, it is not devoid of limitations. It focuses on the chauvinism portrayed in the political-economic thought of a specific party, in a country with a very particular political framework. Also, due to the specificity of the research, it can't be easily extrapolated nor generalized to similar cases without resembling research on the case to be studied. On the other hand, it is a crucial case study as it represents a milestone in the studies of Welfare Chauvinism and PRRP's.

### **3.2.1. Research Goals**

Therefore, to answer the elaborated question, I must fulfill the following research objectives. The general objective is to contribute to the literature on PRRP in Portugal. For the specific objectives, I intend to understand what makes CHEGA a PRRP, as well as to understand if there is Chauvinism when it comes to the social policies CHEGA proposes. It serves to understand how the populism manifested by CHEGA fits into the logic of Chauvinism, and to compare the textbook characteristics of Chauvinism in social policy to the ones found in CHEGA.

### **3.2.2. Empirical Research Methodology**

For this thesis, a qualitative research strategy will be used, in the form of a case study – guided by an inductive mode of analysis. Thus, my findings would be more expansive and comprehensive than precise and reductionist. Thus, it would be a single case study (diachronic) – as it demonstrates temporal variation (2019-2022).

Accordingly, I would like to deliver an interpretative case study, as I would use a theoretical framework to provide an explanation on the topic. Thus, data will not be in the form of numbers, rather in the following forms: Literature review, Discourse analysis, Law Projects/Proposals analysis, Social Media analysis, Electoral Programs/Political Party Manifestos analysis, as well as other Political Programs.

One of the main characteristics of qualitative strategies is to recognize the high complexity inherent to social reality. Therefore, this research strategy admits the potential purpose of political phenomena. That is, that similar phenomena can derive from different causation processes rather than adopting monocausal perspectives of social reality (Peters, 2003). To be able to study political phenomena characterized by equifinality, qualitative investigations tend to elaborate explanations with a lower degree of generalization and a contingent nature (Goodin & Tilly, 2006). Another one of the main characteristics of case studies relates to the adoption of a deterministic perspective on causative relationships rather than employing a probabilistic perspective (Brady & Collier, 2010).

On the other hand, case studies do not have the ability to determine estimates of the causal effects or magnitude of an independent variable in a wide range of cases (George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2017). Contrary to the process of generalizing causal inferences by the application of statistically derived principles, the conclusions of case studies only have external validity for a small population of cases. To ensure the external validity of the causal inferences,

their conclusions are restricted to populations of cases that are relatively homogeneous in conceptual and causal terms, rather than being applied to cases that are arbitrarily chosen (Mahoney, 2010; Beach & Pedersen, 2016).

To provide more complicated and contingent explanations that only apply to a certain subset of cases, case studies frequently sacrifice parity and generalization of their conclusions to a large population of cases (George & Bennett, 2005).

### **3.2.3. Empirical information**

Accordingly, for the original part of my dissertation, I pretend to gather empirical information to understand if CHEGA expresses welfare chauvinism in its political program and proposals. Thus, like I've mentioned before, I want to explore whether the party is just xenophobic against immigrants or whether it is also xenophobic against ethnic minorities – particularly, the Roma community.

## CHAPTER IV

# CHEGA as a PRRP

Until 2015, the Populist Radical Right was almost entirely a party phenomenon, with street politics dominated by small, often violent, extreme right groups. While far-right activists and groups continue to be primarily involved in street politics, they are not alone. In recent years, a few radical right non-party organizations that are solely concerned with extra-parliamentary politics have emerged (Mudde, 2017: 30).

Right-wing Populists only comprehend democracy from the perspective of the majority. Their success typically depends on their capacity to portray themselves as representing the will of “the people” — that is, the majority — as opposed to the objectives of the ‘elites’ (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2016 as cited by Öniş & Kutlay, 2020: 110). By portraying the opposition as members of the “establishment” rather than “regular people”, they are also successful in destroying it. Several eye-catching examples show how anti-elite feeling contributed to the development of right-wing populist politicians (Öniş & Kutlay, 2020: 110).

Academics like Ennsner-Jedenastik (2018) and Lefkofridi & Michel (2017), argue that in-depth examinations of frames, views, and issues are used in a secondary area of party politics research to examine *how* PRRPs utilize welfare chauvinism rather than *whether* they do so. When it comes to systems of redistribution that follow a “need” or “equality” logic, like child benefits or social assistance, believing that PRRPs are more likely to adopt welfare chauvinism language than contribution-based programs like unemployment benefits (Careja & Harris, 2022: 214).

On the other hand, Mariana Mendes & James Dennison (2021) suggest that CHEGA’s ability to deflect the stigma of extremism, as well as the crisis of the center-right parties comes from the current relevance of issues addressed by the radical right. Accordingly, it is worth reflecting on the longevity of CHEGA and what it might represent. The party’s high personalization and weak ideological homogeneity threaten its survival. However, the European example shows that these new parties can adapt to the evolution of events, being a symptom of much deeper transformations in society (Santana, 2021: 1).

According to Minkenberg (2000), we can say that CHEGA differs from the traditional far right since the decline of the existing fascist parties – which culminated in their oblivion – and the creation of a “new right” because of opposition led to the emergence of the radical right of today. Which, according to Ignazi (1992), stems from the fact that these new parties

tend to reject any legacy of the fascist experience between wars, although they share some traits – such as anti-democratic values and an anti-establishment position. Mudde (2010), clarifies this idea in the following way: the contemporary right-wing radicalism accepts procedural democracy, despite being against some key features of liberal democracy – in particular, political pluralism and limitations on popular sovereignty (Santana, 2021: 3).

In terms of populist identity and framing, CHEGA is unmistakably a populist party. It commonly promotes anti-elitist statements and black-and-white thinking, opposes multiculturalism, and advocates for a single national and religious culture. CHEGA also supports the death sentence, more stringent border controls, and the chemical castration of sexual criminals. The party, according to the expert survey, holds that *the will of the people* is the most important political principle; that those who disagree with their political views are misinformed; that the system is unfair to regular people; that politics is ultimately a battle between good and evil; and that the political class and professional politicians are typically corrupt and opportunistic; disliking the political culture based on pluralism, compromise, and cooperation (Fernandes, 2023).

But there is one key detail, which largely explains CHEGA's success: there was an opening in the Portuguese party system due to the convergence of the two mainstream parties (Carvalho, 2022). This means that there was enough dissatisfaction with the existing parties and distrust in democratic institutions and its instruments, that some of the voters felt persuaded to vote for this new political force, as CHEGA not only took the “political opening” for a radical right-wing party, but also played its cards to be *the savior of the people*, a new face for the political fight.

#### **4.1. CHEGA's Economic Thought**

Welfare chauvinism has roots in Europe's growing immigration problem. Between 1990 and 2019, the average member state of the former EU-28 saw a more than doubling of its foreign-born population (United Nations, 2019). Since immigrants tend to be younger than natives and frequently have greater reproduction rates – as immigrant populations are rising, more nonnatives are exploiting family benefits (Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2022: 160). Since social rights for migrant workers are a corollary of freedom of movement in the European Union, enacting openly welfare chauvinistic policies therefore frequently encounters practical or legal obstacles (Lenaerts & Heremans, 2006; Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2022: 160). On the other hand, high immigration rates might sway radical right parties' opposition to public daycare, especially if



it becomes evident that immigrants and their offspring will live there permanently rather than just temporarily. Education has traditionally been a tool for establishing nations and assimilating immigrants. Thus, the extreme right may view early childhood education as a tool used by the native majority to maintain its cultural and linguistic dominance (Bandiera *et al.*, 2019; Lleras-Muney & Shertzer, 2015; Enns-Jedenastik, 2022: 160). It is important to note that this analysis takes a comparative approach when set side by side with this thesis.

Often, academics tend to cut the cord between economic and cultural aspects from the main causes of populist rise. Effectively, the rise and extraordinary tenacity of right-wing populist leaders and their associated parties in a variety of different national contexts can be explained by a complicated mix of both cultural and economic factors. Although economic issues are crucial for illiberal-authoritarian right-wing populists to maintain their “performance legitimacy”, they are insufficient to account for the populists’ success. As Kurt Weyland (2001: 14) points out, populism is also a political strategy “through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, un-institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers”. As such, the leadership factor is integral to their capacity to garner broad-based political support. This, in turn, is effective to a certain extent due to its strong appeal to improve the economic position of the “under-represented” against vested interests, but it also does so by promoting the identity claims of the majority, whose rights and liberties have previously been restricted by the “establishment”. (Öniş & Kutlay, 2020: 112).

According to research, trust in political and governmental institutions is crucial in determining whether people will support social investments. Trust in political agents is crucial for supporting (social) investment measures because they can only be expected to pay off in the long run, are laden with significantly more uncertainty than known, existing consumption policies, and depend on good implementation (Garrizmann *et al.*, 2018; Jacobs & Matthews, 2017).

Regarding the socioeconomic identity of the party, CHEGA is a European populist party on the economic right. When analyzing the party’s positioning in the left-right dimension, CHEGA is highly supportive of unconstrained market freedom, deregulation, labour-market flexibilization and welfare state retrenchment. CHEGA disagrees strongly with issues such as increasing in government spending, higher taxation, a stronger state role in regulating the economy, wealth redistribution, higher taxation of bank and stock market gains, adoption of basic income and stricter rules to new employees. It also disagrees with economic policies like stronger financial support to unemployed workers and increase in pension benefits, while

espousing free market competition in health care and education (Fernandes, 2023) (see Attachment IV).

Thus, CHEGA has supported a voucher system in housing, schools, and hospitals as well as a drastic reduction in taxes, the end of progressive taxation, and the adoption of a single-bracket tax, arguing that the primary source of state revenue should come from taxes on consumption. CHEGA has also argued that health and education should be privately run, with the state serving only as a regulator. In this respect, CHEGA is very similar to Vox in Spain; both are ultra-liberal in economic matters and conservative in social ones. This similarity may be explained by the fact that both parties were established and experienced electoral growth while the national governments were led by left-wing progressive socialist regimes (Fernandes, 2023) (see Attachment IV).

#### **4.2. CHEGA and Welfare Chauvinism**

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung directed a comparative study of nine (9) populist parties on Populism in Europe, in which uses Welfare egalitarianism versus Welfare chauvinism to distinguish between political parties that support redistribution and egalitarianism and those that merely care about their own (ethnic) ingroup (see Attachment 3, graph 1). It is important to make this distinction since right-wing populist parties frequently pursue economic policies that are like those of the (center) left – which stems from its thin centered ideology. Therefore, a closer examination is required to prevent focusing solely on the economic aspect of political struggle, which can give far-right populists an unfavorable impression of being economically left-wing. This may be the truth in some instances, but it is only true when it comes to policies that are directed at the native people. It is crucial to expose the more deceptive aspects of the far-right policy plans (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2023).

According to Tiago Fernandes (2023), when comparing CHEGA with similar parties, it is not only one of the political parties with the most socioeconomic right-leaning positions – advocating for a complete marketization of society and a significant shrinkage of the welfare state –, but it also ranks highly in terms of welfare chauvinism. Thus, it is important to note that this analysis explores a comparative dimension, whereas the remaining of the thesis takes more to a single-case study approach.

Hence, CHEGA suggests that there should be an annual public list of the professions and the quantity of individuals that the nation lacks to put these ideas into practice. Adaptability to the local language and culture is one of the prerequisites for the selection tests, which are required of any foreign individual seeking a work visa for Portugal. Housing access would be

subjected to the same standards. Additionally, CHEGA suggests establishing a system of short-stay visas for industries that draw seasonal labor flows of low-wage immigrants. Accordingly, the Portuguese State should have the right to use severe coercion, with the potential for forcing immigrants to leave the nation during times of increased unemployment (Fernandes, 2023).

#### **4.2.1. Social Housing**

Accordingly, in CHEGA's Political Manifesto (2019a: 7), point 47th, the party argued that one of the economic measures it promises to fight for would be the annulment of the Basic Law on Housing, which mandates that the State of Portugal has the obligation to provide housing for all citizens regardless, among other criteria, of the territory of origin or nationality. CHEGA understands that it should not be the obligation of the State to provide social housing to foreign citizens - immigrants, migrants, or refugees - residing in national territory based on measures of positive discrimination as indicated by the same Law. Furthermore, according to measure 46th (CHEGA, 2019a: 7), the Guaranteed Minimum Income, must correspond to the obligation of services provided to the community, which would establish compulsory Community service during the granting of unemployment benefits (see Attachment III).

In addition to these, CHEGA's most recent political campaign on housing regulations – *Habitação com Confiança* – defends the indication of available public housing with improper use, fraudulent or lacking works, as well as the creation of sanctions for the improper or fraudulent use of public housing – which would go in hand with their policy to reduce social housing benefits to certain ethnic groups, particularly, the Roma community (see Attachment VII).

In the realm of Social Housing, CHEGA argues that the Affordable Lease Project gave very little fruits, stating that in July of 2021, only 467 contracts were celebrated, in a total of 19 thousand applications. This happened largely because landlords do not trust the subsidies given by the Government, nor trust the Housing Market (CHEGA, 2022b: 1-2). CHEGA argued that this project makes evident a social requirement for those who rent a house, forcing landlords to replace the State in what are their obligations and not those of landlords (CHEGA, 2022b: 3).

#### **4.2.2. Social Benefits**

So, when analyzing CHEGA, we can understand it holds the same set of racist assumptions and biases about immigration as the radical right in Europe. The party's records make a strong connection between immigration and intense security risks and generalized instability. Additionally, it is believed that hiring foreigners typically results in lower compensation.

CHEGA contends that most people from the middle and lower classes suffer because of immigration because they are ultimately responsible for paying the social costs of immigration. As a result, CHEGA also supports severely restricting immigrants' social and political rights. Consequently, Portuguese nationals, including those in the diaspora who aspire to return, and foreigners legally existing in the country must be given preference in an immigration program in terms of access to employment and the growth of their professional and financial standing. The party contends that there must be strict restrictions on the acquisition of nationality by children of immigrants born in Portugal, and that only immigrants who clearly have the potential to integrate into society and culture should be admitted. If immigrants do not speak Portuguese, their access to social benefits should also be restricted (Fernandes, 2023).

In 2020, according to statistical data, the rapid rise in beneficiaries from Social Insertion Income (*Rendimento Social de Inserção- RSI*) – which will be referred as RSI from now on – was a consequence of accelerated deterioration of the economic and financial context (Segurança Social, 2023; Esquerda, 2023). This subsidy is supported with the Portuguese's taxes, it has often been used as a form of parallel support, often idle, by its beneficiaries. Even more so by the possibility of its continuous renewal over time (Segurança Social, 2023; Ventura, 2020e).

Also, the levels of supervision over RSI beneficiaries have consistently decreased, which has not only opened the door to individual or community fraud, but has also created in society at large, a perception of enormous injustice on the part of families who must bear their expenses in full, sometimes with miserable resources, without any support from the State. According to Ventura (2020e), the RSI is also creating strong roots of subsidy dependency in some communities and ethnic minorities – such as the Roma community – perpetuating dependence on the state, the public resources, and discouraging full integration into the community through work and a fair tax contribution.

CHEGA argues that the beneficiaries of the RSI should be evaluated by the GTS (*Gabinete de Trabalho Social*) immediately at the time of the allocation of RSI benefits, which will define the possibility of a contribution through community work and the ways in which it should take place throughout the duration of the RSI benefit. In fact, in areas as diverse as the social area, the reforestation of the territory or the construction and maintenance of roads, as well as green areas, there is a tremendous shortage of labor. This shortage can be partially remedied with RSI beneficiaries who are able to provide this type of work (Ventura, 2020e).

### 4.2.3. CHEGA and RSI in Azores

According to the Program of the XIII Regional Government of Azores (2020), People always come first, in the name of social cohesion. Claiming that social policies must be directed towards the dignity of the person, favoring its full integration into a society which dispenses with the absolute control of public authorities, and which is based on the primacy of participatory citizenship and equal opportunities. Instead of nurturing addictions, this government defends that it is necessary to create opportunities. Health and Social Solidarity are at the forefront of a personalist policy, alongside Education and Culture, Qualification and Employment. This government wants to protect and promote the Azoreans - in their own islands, municipalities, and parishes - with integrated policies that allow the Azores to overcome the challenges of demography (2020, 16).

It is a fact that one of CHEGA's political flags is the fight against the abuse of the RSI – , amongst social benefits abuse and distribution. In a political debate, Ventura argued that “half of the population in Azores works and the other half sucks on the state and benefits from the RSI” (Leal & Sampaio, 2022). This statement was widely inaccurate.

In 2020, CHEGA signed a Parliamentary Agreement that made the party part of the Azores XII Regional Government. This Government's guiding principal is sustainability: sustainable in finance, public policies, economy, society and environmental (XIII Regional Government of Azores, 2020:16). Thus, CHEGA's Parliamentary Agreement with the PSD/CDS-PP/PPM coalition allowed the latter to attain absolute majority (DN/Agência Lusa, 2020). In the national landscape, this political agreement came with many interrogation points – most of them questioning how PSD, a social-democratic party has created an agreement with a PRRP. The leader of the PSD/Azores, José Manuel Bolieiro, defended the Parliamentary Agreement as a matter of convenience, even though many scholars interpretate this as *the first shoe to drop*. In the sense that *can a regional agreement be just that?* When looking at it, it looks more to legitimize CHEGA as a partner for future coalitions, while showing that there are more alternatives than center-left coalitions (DN/Agência Lusa, 2020).

The Autonomous Region of the Azores (RAA) is plagued by poverty and heightened social disparities. Thus, according to Social Security reports, in November 2021, in the Azores, there were 12,778 RSI beneficiaries, 1.7% less compared to October 2021 and 10.4% less compared to November 2020. In total, there were 4,787 families who received an amount of 273.05 euros, while the remaining beneficiaries received only 83.96 euros, the lowest amount of RSI in Portugal – indicating that between the years of 2018 and 2020, the RSI beneficiaries have been decreasing – largely due to the decreasing unemployment rates (Segurança Social,

2023). André Ventura, the party's leader publicly argued that 50% of the Azorean population was benefiting from the RSI – when, in 2021, there were 12.778 beneficiaries, being that 37% of them were children from one-parent families, living in abject poverty; and 1.3% being elderly people. Finally, when comparing the RSI beneficiaries decreasing to continental Portugal, it has been the most significant decrease between December 2019 and December 2020 (Segurança Social, 2023). On this note, it is important to remember that the RSI in the Azores is the lowest in Portugal, amounting to a subsidy of around 86,11 euros, per beneficiary (Segurança Social, 2023).

Thus, not only were Ventura's discourses fallacious on this realm, but they were also statistically incorrect. Furthermore, one of the objectives of the XIII Government of the Azores, to strengthen the Regional Plan to Combat Poverty and to incorporate measures to monitor and evolve the indicators, to adapt the measures to the social reality. This can be achieved by define as a strategic objective, during the current Legislature, the creation of conditions for economic development and the promotion of social, labor, personal, social and professional skills, breaking the cycle of poverty, thus allowing to reduce, through social and labor insertion, the number of beneficiaries of the RSI, of working age, with the ability to work, increasing their collaboration with the community where they are inserted, in the understanding that the granting of this support should be temporary, and its allocation should be monitored, in compliance with the law environmental (XIII Regional Government of Azores, 2020: 22-24).

Consequently, promoting policies of effective justice and social solidarity, to create a fairer region, with less social asymmetries, which implies a strong social commitment to the poorest and most vulnerable, including pensioners and pensioners (XIII Regional Government of Azores, 2020: 26). As of October 2022, there were 3,808 families and 9,905 beneficiaries of IHR in the Azores, corresponding to a year-on-year variation (October 2021-October 2022), of 1,113 fewer families and 3,238 fewer beneficiaries. Furthermore, regarding the inspection processes for IHR beneficiaries, Artur Lima pointed out that between 2021 and 2022 697 inspection actions were carried out, while between 2019 and 2020 only 238 were carried out (Vice-Presidência do Governo Regional, 2022).

Thus, it is no surprise that CHEGA's main demand to support the PSD coalition, was to create and apply measures that allow the reduction in the number of RSI beneficiaries – particularly, the ones that are included in active population (Agência Lusa, 2022). Furthermore, CHEGA also committed to “the creation of a regional office for the fight against corruption, having also committed itself to triggering, in accordance with its own competences, a project for a regional constitutional revision that includes, among other aspects, the reduction of the

number of deputies in the autonomous region of the Azores” (RTP, 2020). So, CHEGA’s main demand, which was to reduce subsidy dependence and heighten RSI attribution and control was in fact implemented and presented some success, but the remaining measures are yet to be attained (Agência Lusa, 2020; RTP, 2020).

#### **4.2.4. Health Services**

In its 2019 Political Programme, CHEGA defends the privatization of hospitals and health centers – arguing that the State should not, ideally, interfere as a provider of goods and services in the Health Market but be only, an impartial and competent arbitrator, a regulator who is fully aware of the complexity, and sensitivity of this Market. In this sense, it is proposed to “concentrate the action of the State, in this case through the Ministry of Health, in a function essentially of arbitration, regulation and inspection”, or “to promote the private management of public hospitals, with public demonstration of the benefit obtained and reduction of costs for the taxpayer”, among other measures (CHEGA, 2019c: 49).

Furthermore, Ventura’s party advocates for the suppression of free access to health services for illegal immigrants and reimbursement for all legal residents who do not have a minimum of 5 years of residence in Portugal, apart from emergency services (measure 51<sup>st</sup>). It is important to remember that one of the realms of the Welfare State is to provide free healthcare, accessible to all – this way, CHEGA would simultaneously incur in constitutional changes. Thus, these proposals advocate a sort of Health Chauvinism, in which the native population, would keep on benefiting from free healthcare, while non-natives or recently legal residents would have to pay out of pocket to use the same healthcare services.

Likewise, CHEGA promotes that all illegal immigrants must be deported to their countries of origin, as well as of all immigrants who, even if their situation is legal, commit crimes that lead to effective prison sentences. Thus, any immigrant in an illegal situation within the country will be excluded from the possibility of regularizing their situation and receiving any support from the Portuguese State (measures 58<sup>th</sup> and 59<sup>th</sup>) (CHEGA, 2019a: 7-8) (see Attachment V).

### **4.3. CHEGA: racism, xenophobia, and social minorities**

When trying to understand CHEGA’s position regarding social minorities and immigrants it is important to understand how the party positions itself in the realm of International Relations. The first indicator of this PRRP’s nativism is the promise to inform the United Nations of Portugal’s withdrawal from the Global Compact for Migration, arguing that the issue of

immigration must be treated according to the reality and sovereignty of each country. Even though Ventura's party leaves space for citizenship applications, these would be extremely demanding regarding Portuguese language proficiency (spoken and written), as well as social and cultural integration – thus, going as far as rejecting citizenship to asylum seekers (CHEGA, 2021: 15). Subsequently, any terrorist act or violation against the sovereignty, security and independence of Portugal will inevitably result in loss of citizenship to anyone of foreign origin (measures 60<sup>th</sup> and 61<sup>st</sup>) (CHEGA, 2019a: 8).

In the same line of thought, this PRRP exposes its nativism and xenophobic tendencies by arguing that once in a position of substantial power, it would not only establish quotas of origin privileging the nationalities that share with Portugal the language and culture; as well as it would reject political and religious practices that offend the Portuguese legal system (mainly, anti-Semitism, gender ideologies, the application of Sharia Law, excision, forced marriages of minors, the inhibition of their attendance at Compulsory Minimum Schooling, Racism of any nature, among others) (measure 63<sup>rd</sup>) (CHEGA, 2019a: 8). Thus, it is fair to argue that CHEGA's nativism leads to its welfare chauvinism, as its ideas of national preference, as well as the argument of a failing multiculturalism are applied in an extreme way to the most basic social components of the Welfare State. Particularly, in the realms of social housing, health services, and social benefits.

This party justifies its extremist views regarding immigration with the idea that migration policies and the attribution of citizenship to foreigners – especially in an international context of strong immigration pressure on Europe –, entail risks for the survival of the Portuguese as a people with their own identity, as well as for their collective prosperity and security, risks that must be responsibly assumed. Thus, CHEGA defends that the migration policies must comply with criteria such as clarity, objectivity, quantification, and long-term perspectives that ensure the conscious and explicit consent of the Portuguese. Especially, individuals belonging to the middle and lower classes (CHEGA, 2021: 16).

CHEGA treats their approach to migrations as a matter of guaranteeing national cohesion, arguing that it guarantees the safeguarding of humanitarian reasons and economic interests of migration, while privileging the duty to safeguard the socio-cultural cohesion of Portugal and Europe against the ascendancy of multiculturalism, considering that people must assume responsibilities for the self-esteem and self-preservation of their human, historical, and civilizational dignity. Consequently, defends the creation of a basis of communitarian nature to understand and identify problems of subsidization, criminal or behavioral nature, as well as the



specific internal dynamics that give rise to various types of inter-human conflict (CHEGA, 2021: 14).

On the other hand, CHEGA has a much different approach to Gold Visas – temporary residency permits for foreign investors. For CHEGA, these Visas should be easier to attain, as they are supposed to favor the Portuguese economy and going as far as defending specific Visas for digital nomads – arguing that either in financial terms or in terms of attracting knowledge, or as an added value for the repopulation of the interior of the country, since this form of work organization is not conditioned by a specific location, and can be exercised in any place that has internet (CHEGA, 2022a: 1-2).

#### **4.3.1. National Preference Policy and The Great Replacement**

The Great Replacement – *Le Grand Remplacement* (2011) – consists of a racist thesis defended and popularized by Renaud Camus. In layman’s terms, this is a conspiracy theory largely supported by white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and extreme/radical rightists. It defends that friendly immigration policies, particularly those affecting nonwhite immigrants, are part of a scheme to undermine or “replace” white people’s political authority and culture in Western countries (National Immigration Forum, 2020: 2). CHEGA makes use of this theory to justify part of its xenophobic and racist discourse while supporting it with the so-called Substitution Theory or Demographic Substitution – which argues that the European continent is substituting its habitants with immigrants and its children. Ventura goes as far as arguing that in a 30-year time, the European Union will have habitants of every continent but its own (Reis, 2022). In 2019, 4.4% of the EU population were immigrants – thus, only counting migrants from “third countries”. This is one of the frequent fallacies popular amongst radical right parties: they present inflationist numbers because they count on the migrations of Europeans in the continent. Another classic is to calculate future population projections based on fertility rates in the countries of origin – even though, it is more than proven that the fertility rate of immigrants converges with that of the countries to which they immigrate to, thus having fewer children in the first generation (Hakim, 2003; Ventura, 2022).

Now, in Portugal, the decreasing birth rate can be attributed to several problems, especially the following: low wages, high living cost, inability to secure proper living conditions, lack of social investment in childcare (daycares and kindergartens), as well as inappropriate and rather short parental leaves – and more recently, lack of medical care and attention to pregnant women and new-mothers as many maternities have been closing on and off.

A great example of CHEGA's chauvinism and National Preference is the fact that in 2021, the party advocated for the end of the requirement "diversity of social and cultural contexts" of access to the profession of PSP (Public Security Police) agent. Arguing that this type of exigency is an affront to the criteria of equal access to employment and the profession. This party takes a criterion envisioned to create a police force more cultural and ethnically diverse. Furthermore, CHEGA also criticizes that there's a pre-requirement which determines that 20% of candidates to the Public Security Police (PSP) must be women – a requirement introduced to create space for women in the police force (CHEGA, 2021b).

The use of these theories reflects CHEGA's nativism, which inevitably leads to welfare chauvinism, not only to immigrants, but specially to the Roma community.

#### **4.3.2. Multiculturalism and the Roma community**

Notwithstanding that the Roma become scapegoats for the cleavages created and for the socio-economic and political situations that surpass them. The observation of racist and xenophobic phenomena has not only attracted attention in political circles but has also sparked debate in the scientific community, both at international level, particularly in Europe, and, although to a lesser extent, in Portugal (Silva & Silva, 2002: 57-58).

According to José Gabriel Pereira Bastos (2007), the marginalization of Roma groups today is the result of a long historical process in which they have been systematically persecuted for centuries by reigning sovereignties and various nation-states, but they now constitute Europe's largest ethnic group (Caré, 2010: 28).

As Cortesão and Pinto (1995) argue, it is considered that in Portugal there have been increasingly explicit forms of exclusion in relation to the Roma since 1990, due to, among other aspects, the recent evolution of the social and economic fabric and the characteristics that make up the Roma identity. Faced with the decrease in the weight of the itinerant trade, the multiplication of large commercial areas, consumerist demands, and the proliferation of substitute industries for certain artisanal products, the Roma ethnic minority, traditionally dedicated to such activities, seems to be forced to sedentarism and even to open its own fixed stores, which totally transforms the secular habits of this community (Silva & Silva, 2002: 65).

As a result, it is critical to rebuild social and political spaces that allow acceptance and recognition of the different or strange, of their sociocultural identity, and of their ways of life to gain genuine multicultural experiences without implying the subordination of one culture to the other. However, this can only happen within the context of strategic and critical multiculturalism, not just tactical diversity. In contrast to extremist perspectives that believe

that only within the framework of a communist society can a multicultural society be realized. Nonetheless, it is critical to identify some opportunities in the near and medium term (Silva & Silva, 2002: 80).

Mendes (2005) believes that the stereotype in relation to Roma people, constructed in the collective unconscious of the entire Portuguese society, will go back to the beginning of the presence of this ethnic group in various European countries, having gained deep roots in the non-Roma imaginary. This will result in beliefs and labeling of that social group as cunning, deceitful, and contemptuous of the property of others, among other complaints and allegations that have permitted the preservation of a stereotyped image with the majority society throughout history. Little conducive to a cultural approximation, which allows clarifying the connotations of “dangerous classes”, “idle” and “undesirable”. Beliefs revealing some irrationality that will have been at the basis of various persecutors movements inflicted on this ethnic group over the last centuries, such as the documented extermination during World War II, facts that have contributed to a centrifugal movement of social exclusion (Caré, 2010: 29).

In several instances, Ventura degraded and persecuted the Roma community, calling them a failure of multiculturalism and State leaches. CHEGA’s leader argues that this community makes to effort to assimilate to the Portuguese society. In 2022, CHEGA proposed in the Portuguese Parliament implementing an “updated study on the characterization of Roma communities” – being that most parties failed the proposal – that should integrate an update to the 2013/2014 study prepared by the ACM - High Commissioner for Migration and the IHRU, and that ensures civil society engagement. Other deputies argued that this study could be important to understand the dynamics of the Roma regarding child marriage, gender ideology, school, and education, as well as subsidy dependence, amongst other factors. Nevertheless, Ventura argued that the first step to integrate the gypsy community in the Portuguese society would be to understand their dynamics – most of the Parliament saw this proposal to ostracize and persecute the community.

In the same line of thought, in 2019, with the outbreak of COVID-19, CHEGA’s leader – André Ventura – proposed in the Portuguese Parliament that the Roma community should be subjected to forced confinements under the guise of avoiding the virus’ spreading even more. This is one of the instances CHEGA has directly attacked Roma people – since this party very much opposed the use of masks and confinement in general. This was not only unconstitutional, but also a violation of the Equality Principle as it is discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin – considering them all people who do not comply with the law and who are a problem for Portuguese society. It’s also a vote gathering mechanism: it is a known fact the Roma

community, for several centuries was forced to be nomad – until the end of Estado Novo, gypsies could not remain in the same place for more than 24 hours or they could be arrested or fined – and to hide their culture and ideas from the Portuguese society.

In a way, it's not absurd to affirm that centuries of discrimination and ostracization and, in more recent history, the multicultural thesis wave, have contributed for the seclusion of the Roma community. In a first instance, as the rejection of their identity and culture and more recently, the acknowledgement and failing of multiculturalism: as it was not able to assimilate and integrate these communities in the Portuguese Society. This shows us that CHEGA's self-responsibility ends up legitimizing welfare chauvinism. But again, also shows that the lack of integration and assimilation of the Roma community (as well as migrants) exposes them to a certain degree of social vulnerability. Which can turn them into social parasites. Nevertheless, these individuals are associated with their characteristics rather than the social dynamics that produce the social marginalization from which they are victims. This way, by promoting itself as the force of change, CHEGA also tries to legitimize itself despite of its racism and xenophobia. At the same time, it also tries to legitimize Welfare Chauvinism with the idea that they are "saving the nation from the usurpers" and protecting the rights of natives – as in the descendants of Portuguese people, have were born and live in Portugal.

Accordingly, CHEGA's self-responsibility is an attempt to justify its actions and positioning regarding social policy and welfare. By acting as a source of morality and "dedicating" itself to preserve Portugal and its values, CHEGA builds in the idea of champion of the people – pertaining itself as the only political force that can change the political paradigm.

In short, this empirical data suggests that CHEGA is indeed chauvinist in its social policy proposals. Nevertheless, this chauvinism is a consequence of the party's nativism and is justified by the accountability of the party to alter the current political archetype. Also, CHEGA's authoritarian tendencies when combined with its populist facet creates a powder barrel that's ready to explode at any minute.

## Conclusions

### 5.1. Discussion: CHEGA and Populist Radical Party's Literature

Portugal is not an exception to the emergence of the Populist Radical Right. In other words, CHEGA is poised to become a political force precisely because it symbolizes “a radicalization of the ideals of the mainstream” – while the extreme right continues to be sidelined (e.g., Erguete), it is not entirely hostile to democracy (Mudde, 2020: p. 177). On one hand, academics tend to believe that Radical Right-wing Populism values are foreign to Western democracies and, as such, support for these parties only becomes evident in periods of crisis. That is, when societies are under “extreme conditions”. On the other hand, Mudde (2010), argues that there is not enough empirical data to prove a causal link between these changes and voters' individual choices and the many political outcomes that might result. In this approach, comprehending the electoral success of the new radical right demands paying attention to a wide range of factors, such as the design of political opportunities (Santana, 2021: 5).

Thus, it is imperative to reiterate that CHEGA portrays itself as a right-wing, conservative, reformist, liberal and nationalist political party. Accordingly, for CHEGA, the ideal of the invisible hand, by Adam Smith (1759-1776), represents the defense of the free market of ideas as a fundamental to the self-regulation of society, as the free market is fundamental to the self-regulation of the economy. Nevertheless, CHEGA sees itself as the force responsible for rescuing the identity, historical and civilizational value of national feeling. Arguing that subjugated to the moral primacy of self-responsibility, nationalism generates unbelievable collective virtues. The more than eight centuries of exceptional human potential. (CHEGA, 2021: 6).

When analyzing and comparing CHEGA's programmes from 2019 and 2021, all the key elements persist: *populist, nativist and authoritarian*. Essentially, the party's narrative has very little changes, staying rather coherent over time. I would say that the key differences between 2019 and 2021 political programmes is only two: the first is much rawer and sensationalist; secondly, in 2019, CHEGA completely adopts an anti-state position – while in 2021, the party talks about social protection for the Portuguese people. However, this refers to natives and not to all Portuguese people – the instruments and measures created would not be broad to the entire population of the national territory – excluding immigrants, subsidy abusers

and the Roma community. In simple terms, CHEGA believes that the State is meant to favor the native-born, who should be given ultimate priority in the rights and privileges that come with citizenship – which is a consequence of its nativism. Therefore, Welfare Chauvinism is a consequence of the party’s nativism – being that welfare would only be accessible to a certain group of people (Swank & Betz, 2018: 4).

## **5.2. Findings and conclusions**

Thus, directly naming its targets: immigrants, subsidy abusers and Roma people. If CHEGA ever attains a position of significant governmental power, it will likely create a strong welfare retrenchment as well as decentralization of the State – decrease in subsidies, inexistent social housing, privatization of Health and Education. In socioeconomic crisis situations, CHEGA might advocate for some type of social protection or assistance, but it would be residual and focused on certain society groups. Thus, the State would act as an arbiter and mediator: it would act as a fiscal for the companies managing schools and hospitals; at the same time, it would be a mediator between the people and the firms. These would be followed by a heightened monetary support of certain public departments – in particular, the Police and Judiciary field – as well as more aggressive persecution laws and policies, to combat crime rates. Fighting for constitutional changes would be expected, predominantly in what regards prison sentences and welfare prerogatives.

A great example of CHEGA’s actions if it ever achieves a position of great political power – absolute majority in the Portuguese Parliament – is its participation in the Azores Regional Government. Even though its participation is in a coalition with PSD, it serves as a great sample to what might happen in the future: a decrease of the Social State accompanied by aggressive constitutional changes.

The bond between economic populism and producerism provides a modern and rich angle from which to analyze PRRPs throughout distinct circumstances and extend the existing understanding of Populism (Ivaldi & Mazzoleni, 2019: 23). Thus, interesting studies for the future would entail comparative analysis between different PRRPs, in nations with diverse political heritages: to know and understand how these parties can prosper in different contexts is essential to categorize them in what concerns social policy, populist rhetoric, as well as its tendencies to Chauvinism and Producerism. It is important to analyze how the variation in these factors can affect the success of a PRRP. On the other hand, it would also be interesting to understand how Welfare Chauvinism can present itself according to the dimension of the Social

State. In this realm, it is motivating to understand why in Portugal the Chauvinism in Social Policy is directed to the realms of Social Housing and Subsidy Attribution, more than to Health or Education. Partly, it tells us that Education and Health have an universal status even for the Populist Radical Right – mainly because these mechanisms can fortify the longevity of a society, as well as its cultural growth. As for Social Housing and Subsidy Attribution, these are easier to manipulate and reduce access. On the realm of Social Housing, its attribution would be diminished, as CHEGA argues, it creates dependency on the State; for Subsidy Attribution, the access would be extremely strict, as to avoid subsidy dependency and when attributed it would depend on a list of factors – like a *rights and duties* deal.

Finally, CHEGA's existence opens doors for the growth of Radical Populist Right in Portugal. In fact, it is interesting that the democratic mechanisms and the memory of Salazarism have kept Radical Right at bay from mainstream Politics. Nevertheless, rooted social stigma towards certain social groups – immigrants, impoverished people, as well as the Roma community –, which combined with Portugal's colonial history creates the necessary imaginary for nationalist sentiments and conservatism. This creates a boiling pot when discontent towards democratic institutions is added into the mix. Thus, it is expected that CHEGA will grow even more as a political party in the future since *the people* have lost trust in the Central Block Parties – PS and PSD. Nevertheless, CHEGA's success is more dependent on the socioeconomic evolution of Portugal's situation, than its own instruments and populist tactics. Accordingly, in the future, it would be interesting to understand if the current populist and radical-right wave that hovers over the European continent is part of history's cyclic nature or a groundbreaking event in contemporary politics.





## References

Albertazzi, D & Mueller, S 2016, Populism and Liberal Democracy: Populists in Government in Austria, Italy, Poland, and Switzerland. in C Mudde (ed.), *The Populist Radical Right: A Reader*. Extremism and Democracy, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 507-526.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315514574>

Alexopoulou, K., & Amaral, L. (2022). Desafios ao desenvolvimento do Estado de bem-estar social em Portugal e na Grécia: uma história de dois países sob pressão da Troika. *RBEST Revista Brasileira De Economia Social E Do Trabalho*, 4(00), e022005.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.20396/rbest.v4i00.16533>

Agência Lusa, (2022). Governo dos Açores diz que é preciso credibilizar RSI para combater “divisionismos ignorantes” [online]. *Observador*. 3 de fevereiro, 2022.

Available at:

<https://observador.pt/2022/02/03/governo-dos-aco-res-diz-que-e-preciso-credibilizar-rsi-para-combater-divisionismos-ignorantes/>

Barbosa, J.R. (2015). *Chauvinismo e extrema-direita: crítica aos herdeiros do sigma* [online]. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2015, p. 392.

Berlet, C. “When Alienation Turns Right: Populist Conspiracism, the Apocalyptic Style, and Neo-Fascist Movements”, in Langman, L. and D. Kalekin-Fishman (eds.). *The Evolution of Alienation. Trauma, Promise, and the Millennium*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005, p. 124.

Berlet, C., & Lyons, M. N. (2018). *Right-wing populism in America: Too close for comfort*. Guilford Publications.

Betz, H.-G. (2017). “Nativism Across Time and Space”, *Swiss Political Science Review* 23(4), pp. 335- 353.

Betz, H.-G. & Immerfall, S. (1998). *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

BRITO, L., (2019). *Social justice and the Portuguese Welfare State – National Report* [online]. Lisboa: Ethos.

Available at: [https://www.ethos-europe.eu/sites/default/files/5.5\\_portugal.pdf](https://www.ethos-europe.eu/sites/default/files/5.5_portugal.pdf)

Canovan, M. (2005), *The People*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Caré, M. (2010). *Ciganos em Portugal: educação e género – Master Thesis (UL-IE)* [online].

Available at: <https://repositorio.ul.pt/handle/10451/2554>

Careja, R., & Harris, E. (2022). Thirty years of welfare chauvinism research: Findings and challenges. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 32(2), pp. 212–224.

CHEGA, (2019). *70 Medidas para reerguer Portugal* Manifesto Político: CHEGA- Eleições Legislativas, 2019 [online]. LISBOA.

Available at:

<https://partidochega.pt/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/70-MEDIDAS-PARA-REERGUER-PORTUGAL-CHEGA.pdf>

CHEGA, (2019b). Declaração de Princípios e Fins [online]. *Partido CHEGA*.

Available at: <https://partidochega.pt/index.php/declaracao-principios/>

CHEGA (2019c). Programa Político CHEGA, 2019 [online]. *Partido CHEGA*.

Available at: [https://partidochega.pt/index.php/programa\\_politico/](https://partidochega.pt/index.php/programa_politico/)

CHEGA (2019d). Estatutos Partido CHEGA [online]. *Partido CHEGA*.

Available at: <https://partidochega.pt/index.php/estatutos/>

CHEGA (2021). Partido CHEGA: Programa Político, 2021 [online]. *Partido CHEGA*.

Available at: [https://partidochega.pt/index.php/programa\\_politico/](https://partidochega.pt/index.php/programa_politico/)

CHEGA (2021b). CHEGA quer mérito no acesso à profissão de polícia e não pertença a minorias étnicas ou culturais [online]. *Partido CHEGA*.

Available at:

<https://partidochega.pt/index.php/2021/11/07/chega-quer-merito-no-acesso-a-profissao-de-policia-e-nao-pertencia-a-minorias-etnicas-ou-culturais/>

CHEGA (2022). Plano de Emergência e Salvação Nacional [online]. *Partido CHEGA*.

Available at: [https://partidochega.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Plano\\_CH.pdf](https://partidochega.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Plano_CH.pdf)

CHEGA, (2002a). *Projeto de Lei n.º 130/XV/I.*ª Projeto de Lei [online].

Available at:

<https://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=6148523063484d364c793968636d356c6443397a6158526c63793959566b786c5a79394562324e31625756756447397a5357357059326c6864476c32595339685a6d51774f4455345979316b4d4749774c5451314e474974596d466a4e7930774d5459324d6a5a6a4f4745304d4759755a47396a65413d3d&amp;fi ch=afd0858c-d0b0-454b-bac7-016626c8a40f.docx&amp;Inline=true>

CHEGA (2022b). *Projeto-lei n.º 131/XV/I.*ª Projeto de Lei [online].

Available at:

<https://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=6148523063484d364c793968636d356c6443397a6158526c63793959566b786c5a79394562324e31625756756447397a53573>

[57059326c6864476c325953396a4e444d774d7a4e6d5a5330315a5455784c5451794e6a59744f47517a4f5330324d6d457a4d32466a596a6b345a5441755a47396a65413d3d&fich=c43033fe-5e51-4266-8d39-62a33acb98e0.docx&Inline=true](https://www.britannica.com/topic/democracy)

Chueri, J. (2023). What distinguishes radical right welfare chauvinism? Excluding different migrant groups from the welfare state. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 33(1), pp. 84–100.

Dahl, R. A. (2022). Democracy [online]. *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/democracy>

Diário de Notícias/ Agência Lusa (2020). Açores. PSD diz que coligação de direita tem "solução parlamentar estável" [online]. *Diário de Notícias*. 7 de novembro de 2020.

Available at: <https://www.dn.pt/poder/acoress-psd-diz-que-coligacao-de-direita-tem-solucao-parlamentar-estavel--13009728.html>

Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. (2018). National populism: The revolt against liberal democracy, p. xxiv. Penguin UK.

European Center for Populism Studies (2022a). Nativism. *European Center for Populism Studies/ Dictionary of Populism* [online].

Available at: <https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/nativism/>

Enggist, M. & Pinggera, M. (2022). Radical right parties and their welfare state stances – not so blurry after all? *West European Politics*, 45(1), pp. 102-128.

Ennsler-Jedenastik, L. (2022). The impact of radical right parties on family benefits. *West European Politics*, 45(1), pp. 154-176.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) “The three political economies of the welfare state”. In: Esping-Andersen, G.; *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 9-34.

Esquerda (2023). Número de beneficiários do RSI é o mais baixo dos últimos 17 anos. *Esquerda* [online].

Available at: <https://www.esquerda.net/artigo/numero-de-beneficiarios-do-rsi-e-o-mais-baixo-dos-ultimos-17-anos/85545>

De la Torre, C. (1997). Populism and Democracy: Political Discourses and Cultures in Contemporary Ecuador. *Latin American Perspectives*, 24(3), pp. 12–24.

Devinney, T. & Hartwell, C. (2020). Varieties of Populism. *Global Strategy Journal*, 10(1), pp. 32-66.

European Center for Populism Studies (2022b). *Welfare Chauvinism* [online].

Available at: <https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/welfare-chauvinism/>

- Fenger, M. (2018). The social policy agendas of populist radical right parties in comparative perspective. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy* 2018, vol. 34 (3), pp. 188–209.
- Fernandes, T. (2023). CHEGA, in Populism in Europe - A comparative study of 9 populist parties [online]. *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*. Available at: <https://athens.fes.de/projekte/populism-in-europe>
- Fischer, A.M. (2020). The Dark Sides of Social Policy: From Neoliberalism to Resurgent Right-wing Populism. *Development and Change*, vol. 51, pp. 371-397.
- Flew, T. (2020). Globalization, neo-globalization, and post-globalization: The challenge of populism and the return of the national. *Global Media and Communication* 2020, vol. 16(1), pp. 19–39.
- Hakim, C. (2003). A new approach to explaining fertility patterns: Preference theory. *Population and development review*, vol. 29(3), 349-374.
- Heywood, A. (2014). *Global politics*. Palgrave, Macmillan (2nd ed.).
- Heyne, L. & Manucci, L. (2021). A new Iberian exceptionalism? Comparing the populist radical right electorate in Portugal and Spain. *Political Research Exchange*, vol. 3(1). DOI: [10.1080/2474736X.2021.1989985](https://doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2021.1989985)
- Ivaldi, G. & Mazzoleni, O. (2019) Economic Populism and Producerism: European Right-Wing Populist Parties in a Transatlantic Perspective. *Populism*, vol. 2(1), pp.1-28.
- Ketola, M. & Nordensvard, J. (2014). Nationalist Reframing of the Finnish and Swedish Welfare States – The Nexus of Nationalism and Social Policy in Far-Right Populist Parties. *Social Policy & Administration*, p. 49.
- Ketola, M. & Nordensvard, J. (2018). Reviewing the relationship between social policy and the contemporary populist radical right: welfare chauvinism, welfare nation state and social citizenship. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy*, pp. 172-187.
- Ketola, M. & Nordensvard, J. (2018). “Social policy and populism: welfare nationalism as the new narrative of social citizenship” in Needham, C., Heins, E., and Rees, J. *Social Policy Review*, vol. 30, pp. 161-181. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Kim, C. H., Choi, Y. B. (2017). How Meritocracy is Defined Today? Contemporary Aspects of Meritocracy. *Economics and Sociology*, vol. 10 (1), pp. 112-121.
- Kriesi, H. (2014). The Populist Challenge. *West European Politics*, 37(2), pp. 361–378. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.887879>
- Koh, S. Y. (2020). Inequality. *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, pp. 269-277.

- Korpi, W. (2006). Power resources theory and employer-centered approaches in explanations of welfare states and varieties of capitalism: Protagonists, consenters, and antagonists. *World Politics*, 58(2): 167-206.
- Leal, S. & Sampaio, G. (2022). Ventura sobre o RSI nos Açores: “Anda metade a viver à conta dos outros que estão a trabalhar” [online]. Tem razão? *Polígrafo*. 3 janeiro, 2022.  
Available at:  
<https://poligrafo.sapo.pt/fact-check/ventura-sobre-o-rsi-nos-aco-res-anda-metade-a-viver-a-conta-dos-outros-que-estao-a-trabalhar-tem-razao>
- Marchi, R. (2020). *A nova direita anti-sistema: o caso do Chega*. Lisboa: Edições 70.
- Marzouki, N. & McDonnell, D. & Roy, O. (2017). *Saving the People. How Populists Hijack Religion*. Oxford, OUP.
- Mazzarella, W. (2019). The Anthropology of Populism: Beyond the Liberal Settlement. *Annual Review of Anthropolgy*, 2019, vol. 48, pp. 45–60.
- Mendes, M. (2021). ‘Enough’ of What? An Analysis of Chega’s Populist Radical Right Agenda. *South European Society and Politics*, 26(3), 329-353.  
DOI: [10.1080/13608746.2022.2043073](https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2022.2043073)
- Mény, Y. & Surel, Y. (2000). *Par le Peuple, Pour le Peuple. Le Populisme et la Démocratie*. Paris: Fayard.
- Minkenberg, M. (2000). The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-modernity. *Government and Opposition*, 35(2), pp. 170–188.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Mudde, C. (2010). The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy. *West European Politics*, 33(6), pp. 1167–1186.
- Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C.R. (2017). *Populism: a very short introduction*. Oxford University Press 2017.
- Mudde, C. (2017). *The Populist Radical Right/a reader*. Routledge.
- Mudde, C. (2020) *The Far Right Today*. Cambridge 2019.
- Norris, P. (2020). Measuring populism worldwide. *Party Politics*, 2020, Vol. 26(6), pp. 697–717.
- National Immigration Forum (2020). *The ‘Great Replacement’ Theory, Explained*, pp. 1-6 [online].  
Available at:

<https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Replacement-Theory-Explainer-1122.pdf>

Öniş, Z. & Kutlay, M. (2020). The Global Political Economy of Right-Wing Populism: Deconstructing the Paradox. *The International Spectator*, 55(2), pp. 108-126.

Poblete, M. E. (2015). How to assess populist discourse through three current approaches. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 20:2, pp. 201-218.

Governo Regional dos Açores (2020). *Programa do XIII Governo Regional dos Açores* [online].

Available at: <https://portal.azores.gov.pt/programa-xiii-governo>

Rathgeb, P. & Busemeyer, M.R. (2022). How to study the populist radical right and the welfare state? *West European Politics*, 45(1), pp. 1-23.

Reis, B., (2022). As batotas de Ventura sobre a teoria da substituição [online]. *Jornal Público*.

Available at:

<https://www.publico.pt/2022/05/21/politica/opiniao/batotas-ventura-teoria-substituicao-2007097>

Rodrigues, E.V. (2010). O Estado e as Políticas Sociais em Portugal: discussão teórica e empírica em torno do Rendimento Social de Inserção. *Sociologia: Revista do Departamento de Sociologia da FLUP*, vol. XX, 2010, pp. 191-230.

Röth, L., Afonso, A., & Spies, D. (2018). The impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on socio-economic policies. *European Political Science Review*, 10(3), pp. 325-350.

RTP (2020). Chega anuncia acordo com PSD sobre Governo na Região Autónoma dos Açores [online]. *RTP*. 6 de novembro, 2020.

Available at:

[https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/politica/chega-anuncia-acordo-com-psd-sobre-governo-na-regiao-autonoma-dos-aco-res\\_n1273210](https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/politica/chega-anuncia-acordo-com-psd-sobre-governo-na-regiao-autonoma-dos-aco-res_n1273210)

Sandel, M.J. (2018). Populism, liberalism, and democracy. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 44(4), pp. 353–359.

Santana, M. (2021). *A Direita Radical Populista em Portugal*/ working paper by Margarida Santana. Observatório Político.

Serrano, E. (2020). Populismo em Portugal: o factor media. *Media & Jornalismo*, 20(37), pp. 221-239.

Segurança Social (2023). *Rendimento Social de Inserção in Estatísticas* [online].

Available at:

[https://www.seg-social.pt/estatisticas-detalhe/-/asset\\_publisher/GzVlhCL9jqf9/content/rendimento-social-de-insercao-8?fbclid=IwAR1wJlgZje2G1izPCRKqphVzpM3IfKb1D11dgs3JD\\_6Kde1AHqgXkYuedhw](https://www.seg-social.pt/estatisticas-detalhe/-/asset_publisher/GzVlhCL9jqf9/content/rendimento-social-de-insercao-8?fbclid=IwAR1wJlgZje2G1izPCRKqphVzpM3IfKb1D11dgs3JD_6Kde1AHqgXkYuedhw)

Silva, F. & Salgado, S. (2017). Why no populism in Portugal? *Populus: Repensando o Populismo*, pp. 240-266.

Silva, M. C. & Silva, S. (2002). Práticas e representações sociais face aos ciganos. O caso de Oleiros, Vila Verde. *Antropológica*, pp. 58-80.

Spicker, P. (2021). Social Policy. *An introduction to Social Policy* [online].

Available at: <http://spicker.uk/social-policy/socpol.htm>

Swank, D., & Betz, H. G. (2008). Globalization, institutions of social solidarity, and radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. *Socio-Economic Review*, vol. 1, pp. 215-245.

Ventura, A. (2020a). *Inquérito Parlamentar N.º 4/XIV/1.ª*. Inquérito Parlamentar [online].

Available at:

<https://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=6148523063484d364c793968636d356c6443397a6158526c6379395953565a4d5a5763765247396a6457316c626e527663306c7561574e7059585270646d45765a5449774d546c6b4e3255745a6a42684e4330305a4441334c546b7a4f5467744d7a4a6b4e7a41315a5749775a5467354c6d527659773d3d&fich=e2019d7e-f0a4-4d07-9398-32d705eb0e89.doc&Inline=true>

Ventura, A. (2020b). *Projeto de Resolução N.º 378/XIV*. Projeto Resolução [online].

Available at:

<https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalheIniciativa.aspx?BID=44687>

Ventura, A. (2020c). *Projeto de Resolução N.º 740/XIV/2.ª*. Projeto Resolução [online].

Available at:

<https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalheIniciativa.aspx?BID=45428>

Ventura, A. (2021a). *Projeto de Revisão Constitucional N.º 3/XIV*. Projeto de Revisão Constitucional [online].

Available at:

<https://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=6148523063484d364c793968636d356c6443397a6158526c6379395953565a4d5a5763765247396a6457316c626e527663306c7561574e7059585270646d45764f57453159574a6a4e7a49745a6a426c4d4330305a444d>

[354c574534597a4974593249354e32566a4e4463774e5441344c6d527659773d3d&fich=9a5abc72-f0e0-4d39-a8c2-cb97ec470508.doc&Inline=true](https://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=6148523063484d364c793968636d356c6443397a6158526c6379395953565a4d5a5763765247396a6457316c626e527663306c7561574e7059585270646d4576596d4d7a4f544d7a4d5751744d574d304e7930304e5467344c54686c4f444574597a426a4f44686a4f4451314f444d324c6d527659773d3d&fich=9a5abc72-f0e0-4d39-a8c2-cb97ec470508.doc&Inline=true)

Ventura, A. (2021b). *Projeto de Revisão Constitucional N.º 4/XIV*. Projeto de Revisão Constitucional [online].

Available at:

<https://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=6148523063484d364c793968636d356c6443397a6158526c6379395953565a4d5a5763765247396a6457316c626e527663306c7561574e7059585270646d4576596d4d7a4f544d7a4d5751744d574d304e7930304e5467344c54686c4f444574597a426a4f44686a4f4451314f444d324c6d527659773d3d&fich=bc39331d-1c47-4588-8e81-c0c88c845836.doc&Inline=true>

Ventura, A. (2021b). *Projeto de Resolução N.º 1537-XIV*. Projeto de Resolução [online].

Available at:

<https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalleIniciativa.aspx?BID=121303>

Ventura, A. (2020e). *Projeto de Resolução N.º 597/XIV/1ª*. Projeto de Resolução [online].

Available at:

<https://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=6148523063484d364c793968636d356c6443397a6158526c6379395953565a4d5a5763765247396a6457316c626e527663306c7561574e7059585270646d45764e575a6d5a6a55794f5459744d7a51334e5330304d47566b4c574a6b4f446b74596a68684d444a6d4d47566b4d4452684c6d527659773d3d&fich=5fff5296-3475-40ed-bd89-b8a02f0ed04a.doc&Inline=true>

Vice-Presidência do Governo Regional (2022). *Açores abaixo do patamar dos 10.000 beneficiários de RSI* [online].

Available at: <https://portal.azores.gov.pt/web/comunicacao/news-detail?id=9130040>

Zaslove, A. (2009). The populist radical right: Ideology, party families and core principles. *Political Studies Review*, 7(3), pp. 309-318.



## **Attachments**

### **Attachment I**

#### **Other relevant concepts**

##### **Populism**

Populism can be interpreted as an ideology, a looser “set of ideas,” or a form of political rhetoric (Norris, 2020: 697). Thus, for this research proposal, I will follow the notion of Populism as a political program or movement that advocates for, or professes to advocate for, the ordinary man or woman, generally in opposition to a real or imagined elite or establishment. Populism typically blends components of the left and right, opposing strong economic and financial interests while also commonly challenging established liberal, socialist, and labour parties. Accordingly, Populism has three main concepts: the people, the elite, and the general will (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2020). Thus, Populism is a thin centered ideology, as it can take different forms, depending on the tactics being used, and most of all on the persona using it. Meaning that it can be attached to any thick centered ideology (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2020: 6).

##### **Meritocracy**

In what concerns meritocracy, it can be understood as a social system in which an individual's development in society is based on his or her ability and qualities rather than family, fortune, or social background. Since sociologist Michael Young created the term meritocracy in 1958, the concept has gotten a lot of attention. Meritocracy has become widely acknowledged as a beneficial system in Western nations, and the ideology has become inextricably linked with the concepts of capitalism and egalitarian principles, which are central to the concept of the “American Dream”. However, from a different perspective, a few experts have presented evidence suggesting the basic notion of meritocracy evolved early in Asia, indicating an antecedent to Western countries' meritocratic practices. Hobson (2004) contended that the idea of merit initially started in China and later came to the West through the diffusion of Confucian ideas (Kim & Choi, 2017: 112).

##### **Inequality**

Inequality can be defined as the uneven and/or unfair allocation of resources and opportunities among individuals of a society. Thus, it may mean different things to different individuals in

distinctive situations. Accordingly, inequality debates are exacerbated by a rift between the moral ethics of fairness and social justice on the one hand and the normative concept of “deservingness” on the other. Inequalities inside social groups, as well as those between social groupings, have received more attention in recent years (Koh, 2020: 269).

### **Democracy**

The literal meaning of democracy is ruled by the people. Thus, it is viewed as a political system and/or regime constituted by four key-elements: (1) a system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections; (2) active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; (3) Protection of the human rights of all citizens; and (4) a rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens. Like many other regimes, democracies can take several forms, as it was seen throughout the history of time (Dhal, 2022; Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013).

### **The people**

One of the core concepts of populism, the people can be painted in many different lights. Laclau (2005) defends that it is an empty word, mutable and that’s what marks populism such a mighty political ideology and phenomenon. If populism can frame the people in a way that appeals to different electorates and articulate their burdens, it can create a shared identity among different groups and enable their support for a shared cause. It can also be addressed as the common people, the less fortunate or the nation. Thus, the common people may refer to a wider class notion that combines socioeconomic positioning with certain cultural rituals and popular beliefs (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2020:9-11).

### **The elite**

In any circumstance, the elite is defined on its power. This encapsulates individuals with prestigious socioeconomic positions, often in the fields of technology, politics, economics, media, and arts. All of these are depicted as one homogenous corrupt cabal that works against the people's general will. Thus, morality is critical because the contrast is between the pure people and the corrupt elite (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2020:11-12).

Many analysts have suggested that populists cannot, by default, maintain power because of their inherent anti-establishment stance. After all, they'd be (a part of) "the elite." However, this misses both the moral and not situational core of the gap between the people and the elite,

as well as the ingenuity of populist leaders. The link between the elite and economic power is especially advantageous for populists in power since it helps them to "explain" their lack of political success. Populists frequently argue that the elite are not only ignoring the interests of the people but are actively working against the interests of the country (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2020:12-13).

Finally, populism and nationalism can be entirely united when the divide between the people and the elite is both moral and ethnic. The elite are not just viewed as agents of an extra-terrestrial power, but as aliens themselves. Surprisingly, considering that Europe's elite is virtually entirely "native," this rhetoric is not as prominent among xenophobic populists (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2020:9-14).

### **The general will**

Schmitt (1929) believes that the presence of a homogenous population is necessary for the establishment of a democratic system. In this view, the general will be founded on people's unity and a clear distinction of those who do not belong to the demos and, as a result, are not recognized as equals. In sum, populism may justify authoritarianism and illiberal assaults on anybody who (supposedly) threatens the homogeneity of the people since it suggests that the popular will is not only transparent but also absolute. Thus, a good populist politician would be able to, according to Margaret Canovan (2005), enlightened enough to see what the general will is, and charismatic enough to form individual citizens into a cohesive community that can be counted on to will it (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2020:16-17).

### **Welfare State**

According to Spiker (2021), the concept of a welfare state is immensely diversified and so can have multiple meanings: (1) the ideal model: the welfare state as an optimal archetype of provision, in which the state takes responsibility for arranging inclusive and collective welfare mechanisms for its citizens; (2) state-provided welfare: welfare benefits provided by a nation's state, most notably in the United States of America; (3) welfare state as a social protection system: social protection consists of a combination of government, independent, voluntary, and autonomous public services.

Instead, Therborn (1983) argues that in a real welfare state, most of the state's everyday operations must be committed to the service of households' welfare requirements. Titmuss (1958) distinguished two types of welfare states: residual and institutional. In the first case, the

state takes responsibility only when there is a market failure. In contrast, the welfare state in the latter is universalist and institutionally committed to wellbeing. According to Day (1978) and Myler (1984), there is a need to logically establish precise criteria for judging different forms of welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 20-21).

## Attachment II

### Populist rhetoric indicators

Regarding the indicators that suggest a populist rhetoric, I propose to focus on the following ones:


- The pure vs. The elite: the creation of a “us vs. them” mentality, in which the political party aligns with the struggles of the minority and villainizes an elite – which is seen as the corrupt enemy.
  - Growth of nativist, authoritarian and populist attitudes, especially related to issues of immigration, law and order, as well as dissatisfaction with democracy (Mudde, 2007).
  - Support for the new extreme right is viewed as a protective stance by the public, who believe that ethnic variety is bad for democracy and encourages conflict (Bowen, 1996 cited by Mudde, 2007). It should be highlighted that insecurity and crime are intimately related, which makes the security language of these parties particularly appealing (Santana, 2021: 4)
- Champions of the people/ Almighty saviors: the political figure and/or party present themselves as the saviors/ champions of the people – this means they present themselves as the only person/party/force able to change the state of things.
  - Thus, voting for the populist extreme right in elections can signify a protest mainstream party, clientelist thinking, and corruption in general (Kitschelt, 2002 quoted by Mudde, 2007; Santana, 2021: 4-5).
- Creation of a common enemy: frequently, the common enemy is the corrupt elite or impoverished minorities. By creating a common enemy, the political party or persona can relate with the target electorate – which not only makes the communication process easier, but also creates a proximity between the target group and the political force.
- This is characteristic of the new radical right, that represents the modernization losers – those who perceive themselves as being harmed by changes on a global scale, such as modernization, mass immigration or post-industrial society (Mudde, 2007).
- Weaponizing the people’s discontents: much like the creation of a common enemy, the weaponization of the people’s discontents helps not only the political force to become

relatable, but to attract more electorate, as this tactic is common when wanting to convince voter from all points of the political spectrum.

- In what regards economic discontents, it is not the disadvantaged groups that most identify with the populist radical right, but rather the so-called “welfare chauvinists”, people who feel at a disadvantage in a process of differentiating life opportunities (Santana, 2021: 4).
- The study of these indicators has the purpose to understand if the empirical analysis fits the parameters for CHEGA as a PRRP. Accordingly, the indicators presented are the ones that when found in the discourse matched the textbook marks for a populist discourse (see Attachment II for comparative table).

# Attachment III

Access to welfare: restrict welfare to native majority vs. equal access to welfare



Graph 1

## Attachment IV

### Summary of core economic features in CHEGA, as of 2019

	<b>CHEGA's Position</b>
<b>Taxes</b>	<p>Abolition of the Municipal Property Tax (IMI).</p> <p>Elimination/ reduction of tariffs on Electricity, Water and Gas.</p> <p>Abolition of IRC for micro companies with up to 3 employees with an annual turnover of less than 150 thousand euros.</p> <p>Total abolition of taxes on assets taxed in cases of inheritance, for all legitimate beneficiaries (direct family members).</p> <p>Support for self-employed workers with a reduction in the quarterly VAT rate whenever the salary (monthly average) is lower than the Minimum National Salary.</p>
<b>State vs. Market</b>	<p>The State can intervene in economic activity as an arbitral and regulatory entity (correction of market inefficiencies) and never as a dynamizer, much less a driver.</p> <p>In compliance with the fundamental Principle of Subsidiarity, the entity of the State will be merely supplementary and/or complementary in the provision of services and supply of products and only after exhausting all private, social, mutualistic, or cooperative alternatives for the provision of these services.</p>
<b>Economic Protection</b>	<p>The State has the duty to protect citizens from the Financial System by preventing banks or creditor companies from taking possession of their clients' homes, when the default of the bank's client is due to unemployment, illness or negligence of the bank when granting the mortgage.</p> <p>Review or renegotiation of all PPPs that are harmful to the public purse, in which private companies collect profits and investments are made by the state, harming all taxpayers.</p>
<b>Social equality and justice mechanisms</b>	<p>Combat the inequalities of opportunity that separate citizens from rural and urban areas.</p> <p>Promotion of tax support for Industry and Commerce in rural areas and the interior of the country.</p> <p>New pensionary model based on the guarantee of a minimum pension reassessed with the cost of living, able to guarantee the right of citizens to have their own savings at the end of working life that complements the supports. Proposal for a maximum ceiling for reforms and an initial minimum value of 400 euros.</p>



<p><b>Political privileges and expenses</b></p>	<p>Reduction of political expenses, namely with the reduction of the number of deputies in the Assembly of the Republic. Elimination of duplicate and/or unnecessary positions, support to Foundations that overlap each other in ideological terms, purpose, among others.</p> <p>Ending the privileges of deputies, putting them on equal rights with most citizens, as well as ending the perks of high office public, such as cars or drivers, in everyday life.</p>
<p><b>The common-good</b></p>	<p>CH's economic program aims to promote the common good of the Portuguese in a climate of peace, cooperation, social cohesion, and prosperity.</p>
<p><b>Organization of economic institutions</b></p>	<p>The fundamental economic institution of Society is the family, which is based on love; followed by the businesses (firms), which is based on self-interest; and only lastly, the state, which is based on force.</p> <p>Prioritizes family businesses.</p> <p>CHEGA defends a bottom-up economic organization in compliance with the fundamental Principle of Subsidiarity.</p>
<p><b>State Model</b></p>	<p>Minimalistic state: CHEGA defends a flexible, minimalistic state. Promoting that political and public powers must not annihilate or replace private or cooperative forms of social or business intervention, but rather coexist with them.</p> <p>CHEGA advocates and promotes private property, considering it to be a constitutive element of the human persona – an important indicator of personal freedom. Opposing Socialism that privileges equality and sees public property as an important means of achieving it.</p>

*Source: Programa Político CHEGA, 2019 (2021, 17-20)*

*Table 2*

## Attachment V

### Summary of core producerist features in CHEGA


	<b>CHEGA</b>
<b>Producers</b>	<i>‘Portugueses de bem’</i> : the families, firms, and the State; lower and middle classes, small businesses, family businesses
<b>Non-productive elites</b>	Big government, Bureaucrats, Political establishment, Socialists
<b>Conspiracism</b>	Cultural Marxism and Massifying Globalism, Gender Ideology, Multiculturalism
<b>Subordinate groups</b>	Immigrants, social-welfare fraudsters, social-welfare abusers, social/ethnic minorities
<b>Economic policies</b>	Economic Liberalism, Keynesianism, Capitalism, Free Market, Minimum State

Source: *70 Medidas para reerguer Portugal*.

Table 3

# Attachment VI

## CHEGA's Housing Program resolution



**PROGRAMA**  
**HABITAÇÃO**  
**COM CONFIANÇA**

- 1 Isenção do pagamento de IMT e imposto do selo** para compra de habitação própria e permanente, cujo valor patrimonial não ultrapasse os 250 000 euros.
- 2 Isenção de IMI para a habitação própria permanente** cujo valor patrimonial não ultrapasse os 250 000 euros e para segundas habitações que estejam no mercado de arrendamento, a preço acessível (remetia a definição de preço acessível para o governo) bem como se destinem a alojamento estudantil.
- 3 Redução do imposto sobre as rendas** recebidas para 5% para contratos de longa duração e 10% para os restantes (ao invés dos 25% proposto pelo Governo).
- 4 Benefícios fiscais para quem reabilitar prédios devolutos.** Criação de linha de financiamento bonificada para a reabilitação de imóveis devolutos que sejam para integrar no mercado de arrendamento a preços acessíveis ou para habitação própria permanente.
- 5 Redução do IVA da construção civil** para efeitos de restauro, reabilitação, reparação de prédios devolutos.
- 6 Apoios directos para famílias** cujas taxas de esforço<sup>\*</sup> tenha aumentado significativamente em virtude do aumento das taxas de juros, quando se trate de imóveis até aos 250 000 euros ou 300 000 nos distritos com maior carência de habitação e se trate de habitação própria permanente, durante um período de seis meses, mas prorrogável em caso de as circunstâncias se manterem.
- 7 Regresso do crédito bonificado para jovens.** Neste caso o Estado é também fiador durante 5 anos.
- 8 Limitação do número de rendas que podem ser pedidas no início do contrato** para 3 (uma a título de caução, a do mês e outra de entrada).
- 9 Levantamento da habitação pública disponível,** com uso indevido, fraudulento ou a carecer de obras.
- 10 Criação de sanções para o uso indevido ou fraudulento de habitação pública.**

\* Segundo o Banco de Portugal "A taxa de esforço é a proporção do rendimento dos mutuários afeto ao pagamento de todos os seus contratos de crédito."

Image 1