

Missionary populism against nativist populism: The debate between Olavo de Carvalho and Alexander Dugin

Abstract

The present article discusses the relationship between populism and the Far-right, suggesting that these issues should not be studied in hermetic, *per se*, fields. It is proposed that populism could be a thinner or thicker ideology, while Far-right should be divided into sub-fields of analysis. Since adjacent topics of both subjects, such as nationalism, can also be thinner or thicker, the idea is to study both themes intertwining these adjacent topics. The aim is to clarify keenly one of the most important points in populism, the “people”. What the “people” really is, varies widely from case to case, and according to the article at hand, also within the Far-right phenomena. Thus, studies on right-wing populisms should be undertaken by assuming populism as a secondary feature of these phenomena, due to various styles of right-wing politics and the respective types of society, or “people”, they aim to maintain. To demonstrate this, the main differences between the ideological lines of Brazilian author Olavo de Carvalho and Russian author Alexander Dugin are elucidated, analysing specifically their debate-turned-book that attracted strong interest internationally. Most evidently, the *Olavist* right-wing thought recovers the American Christian Right ideology, while, in contrast, Dugin’s nativist ideologies aim at a world divided into ethno-cultural spaces.

Key-words: far-right, populism, nativism, Christian right, globalism

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1. INTRODUCTION

The rise of the right in recent years has been marked by the strengthening of related political parties and social movements in several countries.¹ Trump's rise to power in the USA, Brexit in Great Britain, the electoral success of Matteo Salvini in Italy, the right-wing government in Austria, as well as the growth of parties such as the *Rassemblement National* and *Reconquête* in France, the AfD in Germany, and Swedish Democrats in Sweden, are indicators of right-wing forces in power, or *en route* to power. All these phenomena belong to a right wing with common features, and are, therefore, classified as a new extreme right, post-industrial right,² radical populist right, national populism,³ nativist right-wing,⁴ or identitarianism.⁵ The Far-right is the groups and movements that act outside mainstream, conventional politics – the extreme right - and the parties competing inside democracy's rules, although critical of representative democracy – the radical right.⁶ Typical characteristics are isolationist policies, cultural and economic nativism, and an interpretation of politics as constituting a struggle between the people, as a virtuous organic entity, and the elites.⁷

At the same time, several public intellectuals rose to prominence by drafting speeches and opinions associated with these right-wing political ideas. Frequently, they propound populist discourses aimed at denouncing supposed conspiracies of national and international elites, as well as the clash between these very elites and virtuous, pristine peoples.⁸ Warnings about a possible end of the western world, by figures such as Alain de Benoist, Guillaume Faye, Éric Zemmour - now leader of *Reconquête* - and Rénaud Camus⁹ in France, Jared Taylor, Richard Spencer, and Greg Johnson in the USA, and Alexander Dugin in Russia¹⁰ have obtained considerable prominence. Thereby, it is important to note that the exact definition of what is the 'West' varies from author to author. The intellectuals mentioned above tend to have an ethnic idea about the West. Dugin, for example, argues that the origins of the western man come from the Indo-Aryan expansion.¹¹

In a different way, recently deceased Brazilian writer and journalist Olavo de Carvalho, more distant to such an ethnic world framing, became notorious in social media. Writing and speaking through hangouts from the American state of Virginia, he gained particular prominence.¹² Considered a fascist, conspiracy theorist and islamophobe by some authors,¹³ he incisively criticized the Brazilian and western academic classes, with emphasis on his book, *O imbecil coletivo: atualidades inculturais brasileira*.¹⁴ Carvalho is usually linked to Brazilian current right-wing president, Jair Bolsonaro (Liberal Party), and some authors consider him the main intellectual mentor behind Bolsonaros's regime, since he decisively influenced the appointment of two ministers to the

government.¹⁵ He also has connections to the President's sons, particularly Eduardo Bolsonaro,¹⁶ but also to Carlos Bolsonaro, city-counselor of Rio de Janeiro for *Partido Social Cristão* (Christian Social Party). Moreover, Carvalho is thought to be the mind behind what is currently called the "hatred cabinet", the President's advisors responsible for his campaign in social media.

In Russia, and also beyond, Alexander Dugin exerted great influence in politics and the military, having frequently contributed to minor movements and parties, as well as having been advisor in the Duma, the Russian parliament, including for United Russia, Vladimir Putin's party.¹⁷ Dugin coordinated several intellectual circles in Russia,¹⁸ but also demonstrated closeness to nationalist and identitarian parties and movements throughout Europe,¹⁹ exerting considerable influence on them. Many authors place both, Carvalho and Dugin, among the main right-wing intellectuals who share the ideological and theoretical platform of Steven Bannon, ex-advisor of former American president Donald Trump.²⁰ Additionally, Carvalho and Dugin are regarded as an important part of a broader framework, connecting the common interests of several important right-wing actors, influencers and groups in Europe and in the USA.²¹

This article aims to address the studies of Far-Right and populism.²² To my opinion, the quality of such studies in both areas suffers from extreme internal heterogeneity with regard to the concepts and empirical cases studied. At least concerning the Far-right, populism cannot be a field of studies *per se*, due to the enormous variety of ideologies related not only to it but also to the Far-right itself. Populism as a thin ideology does not suffice as a concept,²³ as it can adapt to practically any other form of world visions, which also can be thin ideologies. So, the goal of the article is to show that right-wing populisms must be studied through a deep analysis of their fundamental ideological lines, taking into account that they can be thinner or thicker ideologies, in the same way as populism itself can be. That is, one must study these subjects investigating deeply what kind of society, or "people" they are really defending and talking about. Only then it is possible to single out the weight of the populism concept in them, as well as what kind of right-wing one is dealing with. I start from the hypothesis that, as much as populism is not a phenomenon *per se*, the Far-right is also not a definite issue; the latter, therefore, requires division into sub-fields.

To corroborate this hypothesis, the article has as its empirical case of analysis the main differences between the *Olavista* and the Duginist perspective. Thus, populism, at least in the Far-right studies field, should be rather an auxiliary analytical tool - thinner or thicker - since the Far-right itself already engulfs a too varied set of ideologies, more or less thick. Therefore, what comes as the main focus of analysis is the kind of people both Far-Right populists aim to defend.

This article is a comparative analysis of the debate between both authors,²⁴ specifically of the part in which they discuss Globalism and its main opponents. It clearly reveals the divergence between Carvalho and Dugin, the former being closer to an American Christian Right and the latter closer to a European nativist and ethnic-cultural right. From this analysis, I seek to indicate the fundamental differences between both points of view, so as to detail their theoretical and ideological differences. Other writings by both authors may be used, but the main analytical focus is the debate-turned-book. Due to the differences in the bibliographical weight, the analysis is centred a little more on Carvalho. The writings of Carvalho and Dugin were chosen for four reasons: they are often considered to be part of the same conservative, ideological web,²⁵ they have considerable influence on their own countries' politics and, albeit operating on the same ideological field, they clashed in a debate followed by over two hundred thousand people in social media in 2011.²⁶ Finally, both they frame the "people" transcending their own countries boundaries. This configures some sort of international populism, with Dugin being an important author amidst the European Far-right. Such an entanglement clearly shows that the very concepts of populism and Far-right, as conducted in academic debates, must be more keenly worked on.

2. POPULISM AND THE FAR-RIGHT

Nowadays, most of the Far-right is considered as populist²⁷ and populism is seen as a struggle between pure, pristine and virtuous people, versus corrupt, established elites, who keep themselves more and more distant from the "people".²⁸ These elites may be political, economic, bureaucratic, or mainstream intellectuals, possibly being a cluster of convergent interests among them all. The Far-Right, aside from being the umbrella concept engulfing the extreme and radical right-wings, is described as necessarily populist, nativist and ethnocentric.²⁹ Once nationalism is intrinsically related to the Far-right, one could state that nationalism and populism go always hand-in-hand. Furthermore, since they relate so closely to each other, nationalism would always be closer to an ethnic type. This inspired Cas Mudde himself to state that Nativism, not Populism, should be the word of the year, highly emphasising the ethnocentric features of right-wing populisms.³⁰

However, that is not what happens always in reality, as the debate between the two opinion makers Carvalho and Dugin displays. They present highly divergent types of nationalism, in a way that corroborates Eric Kaufmann and collaborators.³¹ Once nationalism can adapt to other ideological traditions such as socialism, liberalism, multiculturalism, religion and racism,³² it also turns into a thin ideology. Topics that are adjacent to populism, may as well be thin ideologies, and have their

own adjacent topics. Thus, according to Kaufmann and collaborators,³³ the thin-thick prefix is a matter of degree, rather than a categorical distinction. For example, by stating that the Far-right is necessarily nativist,³⁴ one assumes that it is nationalist, meaning that the very Far-right could be a thin concept. Moreover, populism is a concept often cited interchangeably with other phenomena and adjacent topics such as nativism or Euroscepticism,³⁵ many times resulting in sloppy conceptualizations and problematic inferences.³⁶

The idea that populism, as a thin ideology,³⁷ could fit in practically any ideology,³⁷ can be extended to its adjacent topics. While it is increasingly studied in comparative perspective,³⁸ it seems important to ascertain more profoundly the current types of right-wing ideologies throughout populism and the Far-right magnetic field. Populism as a concept engulfing a wide field of analysis from Latin-American populisms to European Far-right may be problematic.³⁹ But this difficulty is evident even inside a more restricted range such as the Far-right field, as the *Carvalho versus Dugin* debate displays. This is due to the difficulty in defining what the ‘people’ is; it can be uniclassist, pluriclassist, urban masses, rural communities or ethnic groups. It varies so widely, that some authors state the need for a minimum definition of populism,⁴⁰ something keenly problematized by others for quite similar reasons,⁴¹ the capaciousness of the populist concept.

Furthermore, minimal definitions on populism cannot grasp by themselves the specificity of particular populist politics, explain their prominence, or evaluate them normatively in conclusive matters.⁴² Thus, according to De Cleen and Glynos’ studies on populism,⁴³ as phenomena *per se*, and with a thin ideology approach, should move towards an analysis of the demands that are brought together by specific cases of populist politics. For example, many left-wing populisms are analysed in terms of struggles between “the people” and the “elites”, but without a thorough analysis of what kind of left content lie beneath it.⁴⁴ In this context, a shift beyond populism *per se* studies makes itself necessary to a fuller and keener comprehension of left politics. In this article, a similar improvement is proposed with regard to the Far-Right. It is stated that the Far-right, as a complete autonomous field of study, does not contribute to its better comprehension.

On the contrary, it makes it a, somehow, rarefied concept, as Far-right studies already do, to some extent. Therefore, it turns out to be very important to conduct an analysis on the question of what kind of ideological content the political groups in the Far-right express, to single out their internal differences, having populism as just a set of features that may adapt to a convergence of other ideological lines. Taking into account the importance of defining what the “people” is in populist and Far-right thought, I focus on some of the other ideological lines such as ethnonationalism,

nativism and the Christian Right. In the debate mentioned above,⁴⁵ it is possible to identify differences which show the two authors far apart on the Far-right ideological axis. Once transformed into policies, their purposes would unfold quite differently in a social, cultural and geopolitical sphere. The “people”, a usual term in populist discourse, and highly varied from case to case,⁴⁶ clearly has different meanings to them.

Thus, I intend to address it in a discursive frame having the writings of Olavo de Carvalho and Alexander Dugin as empirical basis of analysis to raise more questions about the Far-right, populism and the interaction between them. The article at hand starts from the hypothesis that Carvalho is closer to the American Christian Right, than to a nativist, identitarian right. Carvalho overwhelmingly criticises Islam and Global institutions as being a threat - a characteristic of the European Far-right - despite using the language and cognitive short cuts of a more nativist right.⁴⁷ On the other side, Dugin recovers a style of nationalism which has its roots in the ethnic models of identity of Eastern Europe, galvanized in the first Eurasian intellectual movement. This trend deals with cultural and biological ways of framing identities, something also present in movements of the New Right in Europe,⁴⁸ particularly, the Identitarians, with whom Dugin is associated.⁴⁹ Thus, I borrow the proposal of making conceptualizations from the studies of populism connected to the Far-right to avoid a too wide concept of populism, or its simplistic reifications.⁵⁰ This narrower framework is taken here as the so-called adjacent topic that goes hand-in-hand with research on populism. In the present study, the same populist styles may be applicable not only to countries but also to eventual political blocs across them, as in the case of the Brazilian and Russian authors. This is due to their warnings about global power, as well as transnational oppositions to it.

Therefore, this study, by ascertaining to which field of the Far-right Carvalho and Dugin belong, suggests that they are so divergent, that the set of ideological lines in their thoughts deserve more attention than their populist features. However, also the Far-right is not prone, *per se*, to cover a variety so extensive of ideological types within it. I point out that, although Carvalho openly praises populist-right governments and parties in the Northern Hemisphere, Alexander Dugin tends to be ideologically closer to them, which was observable in their heavy debate in 2011. The Russian author, with his ethnic-nationalist world view is,⁵¹ in a way, more related to the ethnic shift. This phenomenon could be considered the social, core dynamics in the surge of the Far-right,⁵² that is, the fear with regard to sudden ethnodemographic changes in local and national scales. Furthermore, Olavo de Carvalho states that what feeds this new Far-right wave is the defence of western societies from the advances of Globalism and Islam, using the West and Christendom as interchangeable concepts. By so doing, he does not take into account that the Identitarian, nativist right is more

focused on the west, viewing European peoples in an ethnic-cultural world frame.⁵³ For them, the islamisation of Europe is just the final stage of an ethnic replacement process, and cannot be seen as a mere religious question / struggle.⁵⁴ Thus, there is an ethno-traditional nationalism in the contemporary Far-right,⁵⁵ that converges with Dugin's world view, and diverges with Olavo de Carvalho's one.

The debate between Carvalho and Dugin focused on Globalism, that is, what are the main forces behind transnational power structures capable of obliterating local governments, in order to create something like a global government. Both the Brazilian and Russian considered this discussion to be extremely important, by pointing to the dangers connected to the forming of closed elites. These could dictate the course of the political, economic, or even the social and cultural life of entire human populations around the planet. Such affirmations represent populism, in the sense attributed by Cas Mudde,⁵⁶ at a global level. But when Carvalho and Dugin analyse the forces that make up the global elites and their origins, as well as their opponents, their divergencies are enormous, despite agreeing on some effects of Globalism. Most certainly there is a political view with populist features in national and transnational levels, in both authors' world frame, with corrupt and shady elites which plot to assure their own power. However, although sometimes these elites may be the same, or at least close to each other, their social bases are not the same, according to the authors' statements. And mainly, what they regard as pure and pristine peoples opposed to the established elites diverges remarkably. For the Brazilian, it is the keepers of the Judeo-Christian tradition and institutions, wherever they are found on the globe and for the Russian, it is ethnic and cultural niches that define political blocs. That is, the conceptualization of populism as a thin ideology and a minimum concept, as well as the Far-right as a nativist ethnocentric project, are not sufficient to clarify what these phenomena really are.

3. THE DEBATE: THE SUPRANATIONAL ELITES AND THOSE WHO RESIST THEM

3.1. The USA and a New World Order under construction

According to Dugin, the great driving force behind a global government in construction is found in the North-American unipolarity of the Post-Cold War era. This polarity was rooted in a vision of a particular kind of western world, elevated to its highest level by Judeo-Christian-based North-American civilization. Built on its pillars of individual autonomy and the free market, this world vision, in a more advanced modern era, was transformed into the contemporary model of globalisation, managed, mainly, by the USA: by its immense capital that spreads throughout the

world, by the multinationals managed by predominantly North-American business conglomerates, and by its military presence in various points of the globe.⁵⁷ Following an analytical line of thought in a Weberian tone, Dugin believes that the spirit of capitalism, which emerged from the tail-end of protestant Calvinist ethics located mainly in the USA, is the main force that threatens to control, or even to destroy, peoples and nations that do not comply with its model. Particularly those classified as holistic and communitarian, where the individual does not supersede the community.

What Dugin calls the New World Order is not a current situation, but a possible scheme of global power that may become established in the future, originating from the current play of forces between American unipolarity and local nationalisms and regionalisms.⁵⁸ From his perspective, American unipolarity subdivides into three big projects:

1 – A Neocon⁵⁹ Project, a *strictu sensu* American Empire, with a central territorial zone that is technically and socially developed, while keeping external spaces in a permanent framework of disruption and fragmentation.

2 – A Democrat/Obamist Project, in which the USA would cooperate with friendly powers from the European Union, Australia, Japan, Israel, amongst others, and would pressure the “scoundrel countries”, such as North Korea, Belarus, Venezuela, Iran, or the regional powers more belligerent towards the Americans, like Russia and China.

3 – An International Relations Council Project, where figures such as George Soros would be included, defending the creation of a “United States of the World”, governed by the global elites in general terms.⁶⁰

For Dugin, the three proposals have elements that constitute a common axis.⁶¹ These elements are the free market, human rights, and liberal democracy, which, as a set of values, would have a world spirit and a specific original territory, the West in a broader dimension, and the USA in a more specific dimension. This would be the gestation space of a hyper-modern and ultra-individualist culture, economically centred on the financial sector, and focused on what Dugin calls post-humanism. The representative liberal democracy, very consolidated in this space, would only be a mechanism of destabilization for so-called developing countries. According to Dugin, the American-centric New World Order would have as its main source of opposition the non-western nations and their respective cultural, ethno-cultural, or ethno-religious nuclei. It is important to remember that, according to this intellectual, the countries of the Anglo-Saxon North Atlantic world would not, necessarily, be closed to a more local ethno-cultural self-image, and would have their own traditional groups and culture cores, albeit suffocated by a growing and homogenising post-modernism. According to Dugin’s vision, in the case of the USA, these groups would be found in

“Heartland America”, the rural America and its small or even medium-size cities which do not belong to the more cosmopolite coastal regions.

The ethnocentrism of the globalism pointed out by Dugin appears to be a further stage in the development of capitalism that Max Weber envisaged.⁶² It would succeed the protestant ethic, when the ascetic religious elements of Calvinism - the basis of modern capitalist society - would disappear, and only the market mechanisms it had generated would remain, coordinating the system of social values, but stripped of any religious element. Dugin identifies three groups of forces that would stand up to the globalising project of modern - or post-modern - America.

1 – The first is the Islamic project, with its utopia of a world-wide caliphate. This is composed of transnational organizations that argue for the application of an Islamic legal code in a trans-ethnic, transcultural and transnational perspective.

2 – The second is that of the Latin-American left, represented by countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Dugin states that Latin America holds holistic and collectivist features inherited from its pre-Columbian indigenous populations and from local forms of the Christian doctrine. This collectivist tendency culminated in the neo-socialist project, whose central nucleus is in Latin America.

3 – The third is the Eurasian project, which Dugin explicitly defends during the debate, and in which he places himself as a representative. Eurasianism is the doctrine of the multi-polar world, of an alternative globalisation with great civilisational spaces making up power blocs that balance each other across the globe. The blocs would be spaces of political, military and economic cooperation, rooted in a common identity of the member nation-states.⁶³

These specifications clearly show the importance of territorially entrenched civilisational traditions in Dugin’s vision of the world, as opposed to Carvalho’s, for whom civilisational traditions are not necessarily fixed to a land of origin.

3.2. The three global projects according to Olavo de Carvalho

Olavo de Carvalho distinguishes three forces that aspire to global dominance. Those forces sometimes overlap, creating points of fusion, depending on possible mutual interests that may circumstantially emerge, or sometimes clash, since their projects present deep differences. These three projects are:

1 – The Sino-Russian project, the governing elites of China and Russia, with an emphasis on their secret services. Its sociological composition would be in the communist *nomenklatura* originating

from the pre-1990 era. According to Carvalho, even after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian political elites remained the same, as was also the case in China after the reforms of Deng Xiaoping.

2 – The project of the Western financial elites, represented by the Club Bilderberg, the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Trilateral Commission. Carvalho named these financial elites the “Consortium”, and from this, developed his theory of meta-capitalism. For Carvalho, this group of financial mega-powers had reached such an elevated level of economic power that classic market liberalism no longer interested them, so they defended manifestly political power structures whose only objective was to preserve their status as modern financial dynasties. The sociological composition of this group consists of mega-financiers and mega-bankers.

3 – The Islamic project, or the worldwide *Ummah*, the universal Muslim community. Olavo de Carvalho does not see this project as a resumption of traditional religious values, but rather as a strictly political project with a religious gloss, to him a type of Islamic version of Liberation Theology⁶⁴. The Islamic project consists of a cooperation between organisations acting at a transnational scale and in some national states. The sociological composition would be made up of religious-judicial elites who interpret the law.⁶⁵

Thus, power over the world would be divided between the military (the Sino-Russian *nomenklatura*),⁶⁶ bankers, and preachers. Despite frequently overlapping and mutually defending each other, according to their circumstantial needs, each of these three actors and their global projects would have their own class of opponents. According to the Brazilian author, the Sino-Russian project, with which he associates Dugin's Eurasianism, would describe its big opponent as the North-Atlanticist civilisation led by the USA. The philosophical, theoretical and ideological crux of this civilisation is the liberal ideal of an open society, the *Offene Gesellschaft*, of Karl Popper, anchored in a rationalist-scientific mentality based on the Enlightenment and opposed to any type of spirituality.

Western globalism would have, in Carvalho's view, as its great opponent “generic terrorism”, although who these agents of terrorism are is never very clearly defined. He describes them as a vestige of barbarian beliefs, which could come from both Islamic fundamentalism and the Christian Right, associated with groups not yet absorbed by the ideals of the Enlightenment. In turn, political Islam sees the enemy in western hedonism and materialism, as well as western military interference in Islamic space, which it calls “New Crusades”. According to Carvalho, Islam would see Russia and China as potential allies in this fight. More, he states that, as political Islam is a type of socialism with a religious gloss, and the Sino-Russian bloc is the continuity of the “oriental” forces of the Cold War, there will be greater collaboration between political Islam and those forces. This

becomes manifest in the support in arms given by the Russians and Chinese to radical Islamic organisations, as well as in the omission of Russia and China when Islamists mention their enemies.⁶⁷

4. RATIONALISM, LOCAL CULTURES, CHRISTIANITY AND THE DISPUTE OVER THE EURO-AMERICAN FAR-RIGHT

Although Carvalho agrees with Dugin that the theoretical-philosophical matrix of the western globalist elites is liberalism, he rejects the idea that this is an intrinsic manifestation of American civilisation, where the proposal of a Popperian open society is supposedly something introduced and grafted on by intellectual elites who had little to do with the Christian values of Americans.⁶⁸ Like Dugin, Carvalho also praises the Americans of the Midwest and interior, but for different reasons. While the Russian sees the inhabitants of the “American Heartland” as the American cultural core, the Brazilian interprets them as Americans carrying universal Christian values - transmissible to other populations, who founded the USA, and who have not yet been corrupted by the cultural revolution started by the intellectual elites of the USA itself. Unlike Dugin, Carvalho does not believe that there is a Popperian west underpinned by the ideas of an open, rational, scientific, enlightened society, centred on the USA, which is trying to impose itself on all the rest of a universe composed of local traditional cultures more or less isolated from each other. That is the view of Dugin, who sees his Eurasianist movement as the main force restraining American Imperialism and its imposition of the free market, of liberal democracy, and of human rights. There is a struggle between the open society, *Offene Gesellschaft*, in expansion, and the various closed cultures and communities, *Gemeinschaft*,⁶⁹ of which Dugin proposes Eurasianism to be the main representative.

Carvalho rejects this dichotomy between open society and closed society, and affirms that American society is, at its essence, Christian, and opposed to the values of the Enlightenment. The USA will not be the driving force behind the expanding *Gesellschaft*, or *Offene Gesellschaft*, seen as so threatening by Dugin. According to the Brazilian author, the American conservative and Christian sectors will be a great point of resistance to the western globalist project that, although headed by an elite of bankers and financiers who have nothing to do with any left-wing position, brings in its tail a group of proposals viewed as Cultural Marxism.⁷⁰ To Carvalho, the post-modern and post-human society identified in American style globalism by Dugin, is a product of subversion campaigns undertaken by the Soviets during the Cold War, and also of the cultural war produced by

western intellectual elites, connected to racial and sexual minority identities, ecology, environmentalism, and Paulo Freirean education.⁷¹

Thus, Carvalho sees the Western crisis as a product of the convergence between an international meta-capitalist class, the *Consortium*, who no longer cares about the free market, but instead wants an increasingly larger space of control over their own monopoly, and the intellectual elites of so-called cultural Marxism. As the *Consortium* only works based on its power, it does not care about defending a society based on Western Judeo-Christian values, from which modern capitalism emerged, or any other kind of society. It may very well align with forces that argue for the cultural revolution that has destroyed the fundamental values of the West, being these its own intellectual elites, or political forces external to the West itself.⁷² Therefore, the *American Heartland* is, to Carvalho, the great centre of resistance to this convergence of anti-Western and anti-Christian forces, which operate in the US, and abroad. It is, according to him, permanently harassed by the American intellectual elites, and labelled as reactionary, fanatical and intolerant, but it resists the cultural revolution of western intellectuals, and the advance of Islam, just as it resisted Soviet communism until 1990. At a certain point during the debate, Carvalho confronted Dugin with his statement that the traditional right in the USA was not dying, as the Russian had supposed, but was alive and present, having as its utmost manifestation the Tea Party, very strong in the states of Middle America.

While, for Carvalho, the American Heartland is the main representative of a value system that could be at the core of the West, and could be spread to any territory or population, for Dugin it is only the American ethnic and cultural core. Dugin sees these central values as restricted to a civilisation formed in North America and as untransmissible to any other cultural niche, or populational stock. The Russian writer shares this conceptualization with the Alt-right, and some of the main groups supporting Donald Trump at least until his electoral victory in 2016.⁷³ It is important to note, that the support for Trump by European nationalists is a shift away, at least momentarily, from their traditional anti-Americanism. Trump was able to elevate the USA to the status of a particular culture and not only to this of an exporter of a globalizing spirit throughout the world. This resulted in sympathy even from some Russians, as Dugin himself, whose Eurasianist think tanks, like the Floryan Geyer Club and the Anti-Orange Committee, were always expressly anti-American.⁷⁴ Both authors supported Trump in the 2016 elections, placing in him their hopes for North-American society's manifestation against the globalist elites.⁷⁵ They also tend to support nationalist candidates in Western Europe, such as Marine Le Pen, and Nigel Farage, whose UKIP led the Brexit victory in 2016. However, they picked up on different ideological elements when expressing sympathy for

these political manifestations, depending on the differences between theoretical approaches and concepts with which each one works, as well as the set of authors contributing to them.

5. INTELLECTUAL, THEORETICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

Dugin's theoretical-philosophical bases range from Eurasianism, traditionalism, German revolutionary conservatism, *Nouvelle Droite* intellectuals, and even esoteric Aryan occultism.⁷⁶ However, in the debate itself, Dugin specifically emphasises a theoretical scope that is basically divided into two axis, although other schools of thought are not totally absent. The first, is more philosophical, and primarily features names such as perennialist/traditionalist René Guénon and his interpretation by Julius Evola,⁷⁷ as well as the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. The second is more connected to anthropology and philology, and names such as Marcel Mauss, Louis Dumont, Claude Lévy Strauss, Georges Dumézil, Nikolay Trubetskoy⁷⁸ and Franz Boas⁷⁹ are quoted throughout the debate. What can be perceived as a point of convergence between the two axes, from Dugin's own interpretation, is their anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment aspects,⁸⁰ the concept that each civilization, cultural nucleus, or nation should have its own logic and particular way of conceiving reality, and its signs, symbols and meanings that are very hard to communicate to individuals from other cultural nuclei.

The thoughts of Guénon and Evola are, somehow, at the centre of Dugin's thought, with their critique of modernity, seen as an ephemeral manifestation of decadence, removed from any trace of spiritual life, and destined to collapse. Guénon could be regarded as an Integral Traditionalist, and Evola's work as some kind of (re)interpretation of the former.⁸¹ While, for Guénon, this collapse would come more or less spontaneously, Evola believed an agent was needed, who was capable of assuming a leadership role during this collapse, and whose actions would involve a greater degree of reflexivity. This agency would be represented by the return of a warrior elite, and he identifies a great inspiration in the warrior caste of the Hindu civilisation, the *Kshatryias*.⁸² Thus, Evola advocates political action for the world, directed towards practical activity, something non-existent in Guénon. This is the reason why Evola, as well as Dugin, are not considered by some authors as Integral Traditionalists, but a kind of neo-traditionalists.

Evola breaks with the traditionalist "quietism" from authors such as René Guénon and Fritschjof Schuon, advocating for mundane action, on a warrior-like basis.⁸³ Dugin would be rather a non-conformist, who uses traditionalist thought, together with Nietzschean philosophy, some anthropological schools of thought, inter-war German revolutionary-conservatism, and European

New Right intellectuals, supporting an ethnic-nationalist world framing.⁸⁴ Ethnic and nationalist world framing were not regarded in a positive tone by Integral Traditionalists, which perceived a perennial wisdom present in all world religions.⁸⁵ However, Evola adapted it somehow, to a non-quietist philosophy, as Dugin did it in a way to adapt traditionalism to an ethnic political project. The Italian author is important in Dugin's political philosophy because, in his analysis of the pre-modern world, there were three castes/estates in practically any civilisation, those of the warriors, the priests, and the merchants. Following Evola, Dugin states that modernity places merchants in first place, with the warrior class serving their interests while the clergy slowly disappears. Eurasian societies, however, maintain the model that prioritises the warriors and priests, according to Dugin. The Evolian warrior caste is deeply connected to the will of power, and the politicization of life, traits that are found and discussed in the debate. In this sense, it could be said that Integral traditionalism is only a small part of Dugin's political thought, especially if we take into account the weight of *Nouvelle Droite* and *European New Right* world vision in it.

Dugin also uses the concepts coined by Carl Schmidt of *thalassocracy* and *tellurocracy*. The first is connected to sea-faring civilizations, more focused on commercial territorial expansion, while the latter refers to land-based civilisations, more directed towards territorial enclosure and with greater emphasis on military and clerical elements. Historically, the two civilizational models had the tendency to clash. The USA would be a great example of modern *thalassocracy*, as Russia would be of modern *tellurocracy*, although, that did not impede Dugin from having positive stances towards certain American political trends, as happened when he supported Trump in 2016. Dugin regarded Trump as something out of the classical cleavage between Democrats and Republicans, which, at the end of the day, represent almost the same model of American thalassocracy,⁸⁶ and describes the USA as also having a land-based civilisation.

The culmination of Duginian political philosophy, his geopolitical theory of the great civilisation blocs, is the Evolian politicisation of the warrior and clerical castes locally sustained by their *ethnos*,⁸⁷ also the *Gemeinschaft*, in traditional and pre-Enlightenment terms. Thus, religions, even the so-called more universal religions,⁸⁸ are not exportable value systems, but instead, just a part of the anthropological and mythological pantheon of a given location, of a specific culture. The convergence of this group of theories in Dugin's most eminently political proposal is what he calls the *Fourth political theory*,⁸⁹ an attempt to surpass the three great failed projects of modernity, that is, liberalism, Marxism/socialism, and fascism. Thus, one could state that Dugin recovers one of the main elements from the first Eurasianists, that is using ethnosociology as a method to comprehend different peoples and their particularisms. The first wave of eurasianists proposals aimed at thinking

of a way to organize politically the great ethnic panoply that extended through the Russian Empire after the expected fall of the Bolshevik regime.⁹⁰ For Eurasianists, state patriotism, loyalty to the state was of no use, if such a state was not achieved and driven by an ethnic collectivity, conscious of its unique and non-transferable place in the world.⁹¹ Philology is also a research field from the first Eurasianists that is adopted by Dugin and his neo-Eurasianism. The ethnonationalism, or ethnoregionalism from the first wave of Eurasianism, is a world-frame that is resonant with the one from French *Nouvelle Droite*, and having Dugin as its linking point, extends the Eurasianist world view to Western Europe. In fact, Dugin is really close to *Nouvelle Droite*, perhaps one of its thinkers, or at least, its Russian version.

Carvalho also works with a varied swathe of authors, but the core of his thinking is based on ancient philosophy, especially Plato and Aristotle, and on the Christian philosophy of Saint Augustine and St Thomas of Aquinas,⁹² with much criticism of Kant and all thinking that supposedly accepts the *a priori* cognitive categories developed by the German philosopher. Carvalho criticises Dugin, stating that the Russian philosopher, despite his call for tradition, uses a group of cognitive categories that were a part of the Scientific Revolution, originating from the Enlightenment and necessary for the formulation of the conceptual repertoire of modern science, including Anthropology. For Carvalho, studies about ethnic and cultural identities, that define the capacity of non-western people to give a logical meaning to their own existence, despite defending the non-universality of Kantian categories, can only be done by starting from these same categories and the same rationalism. He affirms that anthropological culturalism is a form of modern rationality, and those who defend non-modern and non-western images of the world from this theoretical standpoint will just go round in circles, trying to escape the cognitive categories of the Enlightenment, without ever being able to do so. In summary, for Carvalho, the use of culturalism is an attempt by intellectuals to escape the categories set up *a priori* by Kant, while ultimately making use of those same categories. Those studying culture, according to him, deny the universality of the Enlightenment world view, without actually moving away from their scientific framework, while also believing themselves to be the only ones capable of revealing the thought categories and value systems of peoples that differ from their own.⁹³

Carvalho does not accept the dichotomy between the open Popperian society and closed cultural communities. He rejects culturalism for believing that the world can be understood similarly by different peoples. However, he does not accept Popperian liberalism, as he believes it brings with it the Kantian line of *a priori* categories, from which individuals would always be following those supposedly hidden categories that establish paths and limits for their actions in the world. Carvalho

defends the idea that basically all modern thought is articulated in these terms, starting from Kant, including the Marxist class dialectic, Darwinist Evolution and the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, among others. This is what he calls the “de-conscientization” of the individual, the loss of their autonomy and capacity to mature their own consciousness regarding the world. It is as if it was a type of open society, as opposed to the hermetic *Gemeinschaft*, but totally removed from the Kantian/Popperian model of values that came from Enlightening universalism.

What Carvalho argues for is what he considers to be a pre-modern open society, rooted in the philosophical theology that came from the synthesis of ancient Greek thought and Christian philosophy. The discussion about the cognizant and intelligible capacity of man presented by Classical philosophy plus Christian philosophy and its proposed relationship to the divine, are the true foundations of an open society, according to Carvalho. He calls closed societies, not only local cultures in their anthropological sense, but applies the term to the entire conceptual framework that emerged from Enlightenment philosophy, and the potential political ramifications that surround it. A politico-philosophic-scientific trail that starts with Kant, passing through a series of authors and scientific and philosophical theories, reaching Marx and ends in characters such as Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler and Pol Pot. Olavo de Carvalho states that fascism and communism are part of the same political family, and accuses fascism of also being left-wing. According to him, the difference between fascists and communists is only one of discourse, both political models presenting very similar political, economic, and social features. The loss of freedom of individual consciousness in regard to cognitive categories submerged in areas that supposedly remove the consciousness of the individual, and coordinate every type of action in the world, is the embryo of what he calls “revolutionary hubris”, within which he also locates Dugin’s Eurasianism.

I make a link here between Carvalho’s thought and the world vision from the American Christian Right. This web of activists stems initially from the 1950’s and 1960’s, reaching a peak in the 1980’s and 1990’s, with great influence in the Republican Party.⁹⁴ Having the state of Virginia as one of its main centres,⁹⁵ it had as a turning point the case *Roe vs. Wade*, in which the Supreme Court decided in favour of or in the right to abortion in the USA. As Carvalho, it also places fascists and communists in the same political field and tends to reject - sometimes violently - modern science and all Enlightenment thoughts that come in its wake, as well as cultural or ethnic particularisms. In the 1990’s, this violence was materialized in bombings and anthrax attacks to some facilities like abortion clinics.

Beginning, basically, from the Preacher Francis Schaeffer's writings on, Christian groups decided to abandon political quietism and traditional protestant-catholic rivalry, to create a common platform for diverse Christian denominations.⁹⁶ This platform has three points as its main pro-family axis: anti-abortion, anti-LGBT, and anti-feminism agendas. It also treats the concepts of Christianity and American national identity as interchangeable (something Carvalho does for the whole West), many times resorting to Biblical and Christian citations in the Founding Fathers' speeches, or in the American Constitution itself. Public as well as private education is a main issue to the Christian Right, which advocates to rechristianize America through Christian schools, and eventually defending the right of Home Schooling.⁹⁷ Some organizations, born from Christian right movements, had national impact in the USA, such as Moral Majority, from Preacher and televangelist Jerry Falwell, or Christian Coalition, from Preacher Pat Robertson, and Eagle Forum and Focus on the Family from Catholic activist, Phyllis Schlafly.

Carvalho mentions authors such as Anne Coulter, who displayed, during the ascension of Trump, a more ethnic Anglo-Saxon centred vision, and Michael Savage, who is accused of defending the "white genocide" theory. However, the majority of Carvalho's references used to oppose Dugin's ethno-cultural particularisms, in the American scenario, comes from the Christian Right, and a market-oriented set of opinion makers. These are Thomas Sowell, Rush Limbaugh, Phyllis Schlafly, Star Parker, Neil Cavuto, Larry Elder, Cal Thomas, and Walter Williams. Cal Thomas was once vice-president of Moral Majority, while Star Parker was a black republican and activist who tried to give religious groups more presence in government programs. Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams are black conservative economists, and Larry Elder, also black, is a republican and a conservative radio host involved in polemics in regard to feminist issues. Carvalho's views of race relations in the USA converge with the opinions of these black conservatives, in such as that they agree that black communities' problems come from the way they are treated or even manipulated by liberals and leftists. In the debate, Carvalho points to the loss of religious values, and the influences from liberal educators, as the cause of aggressive behaviour of young black Americans, and high crime rates in their communities. This is a vision with which Alt-Right and Identitarians opinion makers do not agree, since they see group behaviour in a more determinist prism, be it biogenetic determinism, cultural orientation, or both.

In regard of René Guénon, and his more warrior-style interpreter, Julius Evola, Carvalho has, it is true, some points in common. The hostile stance towards liberal modernity, its supposed lack of spiritual values, the role of science, all are traits of modernity regarded by the three men with real *opprobrium*. Olavo de Carvalho gets to the point to praise them for what he interprets as their anti-

atheism.⁹⁸ However, in the debate with Dugin, it is clear how their common points come to a halt there. Carvalho regards the idea of cyclical time from perennialists as unacceptable, stating that time and history do not flow in cycles, but in a linear path, and that there is not a set of historical eras, which repeat themselves cyclically. The idea of Kali Yuga, a time of decadence and destruction, from which a new golden era emerges, is not taken up by Carvalho. Dugin, directly influenced by Guénon and Evola, affirms that modernity is coming to a Kali Yuga, and that then different civilizations will reach new golden eras. This is a central point in the world view from Guénon, Evola, and Dugin, something that is outside of the axis of Carvalho's thinking. The Perennialist statement that all traditional religions are different ways to manifest eternal truth is, as well, only partially picked up by Carvalho. True, he recognizes value in most religious traditions with centuries of history, but he does not put them all at the same level. He only believes that there is more richness in their philosophical traditions than in much of the supposedly atheist modern philosophical and scientific thought. For him, the Jewish-Christian tradition not only occupies a special place among the many religious traditions, but is a way of extending western values to non-western populations. In his appraisal of Christian communities' resilience in areas as China, Cuba and Middle Eastern countries, he displays that world view.

It could be said that the debate, in fundamentally political terms, was between the Christian right-like ideology from Carvalho and the ethnopluralism, Nouvelle Droite-like particularisms represented by Dugin. Theoretically, both writers diverge considerably. However, although they are not in the same ideological plane, when Carvalho shows sympathy for the same political forces that Dugin supports, he is sympathising with organisations that have, to a greater or lesser degree, a positive dialogue with Eurasianism. Marine Le Pen, for example, proposed a Washington-Paris-Moscow axis in support for Trump and Putin.⁹⁹ It is striking how different conceptual and theoretical frames lead to different visions of the same phenomena, although supporting them. In what concerns migration, a highly relevant issue for the far-right, Carvalho regards it as dangerous as far as it comes from Islamic masses. He goes so far as to affirm that, if migration is not Islamic, but Christian, it is welcome. He says Europeans will be thankful when masses of Latin-Americans and sub-Saharan Africans of Christian faith head to Europe, to rechristianize the old continent.¹⁰⁰

Dugin, in an interview for the Visegrad Post, regards the Visegrad Bloc¹⁰¹ - to which he refers also as the Eastern European bloc - as a particular cultural niche, who could present an alternative model of identity for Europe, and North America.¹⁰² One of the main points singled out by Dugin, is the negative stance towards mass immigration found among Visegrad countries, without specifying where migrants come from, or what faith they practice. He also puts Polish Catholicism, Hungarian

ethnicism and Czech pride as equivalent elements of the particular cultures from each country. Although sometimes it may look that Dugin's world view is not an ethno-racial one, due to its lack of biological and explicit racialist elements,¹⁰³ this interview shows a different scenario. For Dugin, Visegrad countries are ethnic nuclei, but with traits in common, which give them the possibility to be a single political bloc.¹⁰⁴ Poland and Hungary are countries praised also by Olavo de Carvalho,¹⁰⁵ but in a different bias, once he sees in these countries renewed Christian elements, not ethnic ones. In Dugin's statements, great worries concerning ethnocultural blocs and the ethnic shift phenomenon are clearly observable, which is not the case for Carvalho's views.

6. CHRISTENDOM, ETHNONATIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL POPULISM IN CARVALHO'S AND DUGIN'S WORLD FRAME

It is striking that Duginian Eurasianism is one of the intellectual inspirations of a right to which Carvalho sometimes shows signs of sympathy in his podcasts, tweets, and general online activity.¹⁰⁶ Eurasian theory is incorporated into *Nouvelle Droite* intellectual *milieu*¹⁰⁷ and also into the identitarian movement¹⁰⁸ in its geopolitical aspect, which argues for the hypothesis of a European bloc stretching from "Iberia to Siberia", a Europe of ethnic nations, not of markets. Although this idea of a cultural, and political Eurosiberian bloc is much closer to authors as Guillaume Faye and Jean Thiriart than to Dugin, their defenders find inspiration in the latter's writing on Eurasianism. A new united political and cultural area based in nationalities and regionalities, identified through their culture, ethnicities, and even their bioculture, or biological race. Bioculture is understood to mean the idea of a link between a culture and the biogenetic features of its creators. Something very evident in the Alt-right and identitarian movement is the connection of cultural identities and biological identities. This includes fields of study in the natural sciences such as the ethology of Konrad Lorenz and the palaeoanthropology of Robert Ardrey.¹⁰⁹ Their vision is set out from the perspective of the nation as a great bioculturally-constructed historical agent.¹¹⁰

This theoretical framework, which Carvalho would interpret as a product of anti-Christian occultism from the 19th century onward,¹¹¹ is placed side by side with Eurasianism for a whole series of right-wing movements.¹¹² To a greater or lesser extent, they are movements that are in contact with the same parties and the same groups that Carvalho often interprets simply as a western reaction against globalism, and which he emulates. They perceive the nation from an ethnocultural perspective, whose role is central for organising the meaning of collective life. The parties of the so-called new populist right-wing are those that most represent the demands of these groups in the

representative parliamentary sphere.¹¹³ Carvalho sometimes uses the language of these groups, and demonstrates sympathy and support for what he interprets as a reaction against Globalism and Islam, but his theoretical and ideological concepts are categorically rejected by these groups. This is because, be it the Alt-right, European identitarians with heavy *Nouvelle Droite* intellectual influence, or the Evolian interpretation of Traditionalism, to all these groups, both liberalism and socialism come from the same Judeo-Christian civilisational matrix. For the heirs of the intellectual tradition of Alain de Benoît, Judeo-Christianity was the first and most archaic form of universalism. Pure liberalism, to them, as well as Marxist class dialectic, or even the cosmopolitan multiculturalism of the new left, are just different manifestations of the same Judeo-Christian value nucleus.

Carvalho, in frank opposition to Dugin, defends the idea that nations are not historic agents,¹¹⁴ but instead playing fields for great transnational networks such as dynasties, religious orders, and even angels and demons.¹¹⁵ He places Judeo-Christian values as the core of western civilisation, distancing himself from some of the most important elements of the ideology that supports the more explicitly anti-globalist right-wing of the northern hemisphere nowadays: the one with ties to Eurasianism.¹¹⁶ Although Dugin is a Christian, he is an Orthodox Christian who sees religions as part of cultural or national particularism, not as systems of values expansible to all corners of the globe, as Carvalho does. In this matter, it is possible to say that Carvalho finds himself in the sphere of what Eric Kaufmann and colleagues called Missionary Nationalism.¹¹⁷ The type of American nationalism, strongest in the 1980's and 1990's, which aimed to expand a particular kind of civilisation to other whole parts of the globe and to fight communism. Still according to Kaufmann and colleagues, Missionary Nationalism has, in the last years given way to a kind of nationalism connected to quotes such as "I don't recognize my country".¹¹⁸ Western European radical right parties and Trumpism are examples of this shift, although Missionary Nationalism is more connected to American republican governments from the 1980's and 1990's. It is this Missionary Nationalism in a Christian ultra conservative bias that Carvalho recovers.

Although the western radical right is more ethno-traditional nationalist, if compared to the more authoritarian ethno-nationalisms from Eastern Europe, there is an ethnocultural axis that permeates them.¹¹⁹ The far-right has its own peculiar form of transnationalism, however it is ethnic, and ethno-European,¹²⁰ not in the bias of a - in weberian words - universalist religion. This is manifested explicitly in the Alt-right and implicitly in other organised groups of the pro-Trump right-wing, which frequently emphasise the European origins of North-American majorities.¹²¹ Trump's election, besides being a defeat for the Democrats, was, at least at first, also a defeat for the

Christian Right,¹²² as the movements organised around the bible in the style of *Phylis Schafly*¹²³ had to compete with movements that orbit the *Nouvelle Droite*, Alt-right and the Manosphere, which is a group of masculinist movements and authors with biological and neo-Darwinian tinges.¹²⁴ Trump's right-wing have a much greater nativist and cultural framing with regard to American nationalism, visualising supposed needs, uses and habits of those seen as more genuinely American.¹²⁵ This does not mean that the Christian Right has been completely obliterated, given that one of its best-known representatives, Jerry Falwell Jr, supported Trump. However, it did not have the prominence it had with figures like Reagan and Bush, father and son.¹²⁶

Furthermore, most of the Christian Right leadership did not support Trump, due to his economic and cultural nativism.¹²⁷ And the ones who did so, did because of Trump's nominations to the Supreme Court, since many battles engaged by the Christian right are conducted in the judicial sphere.¹²⁸ That is, if Carvalho is ideologically connected to the broad political spectrum represented by Trumpism, it does so only to its secondary layers, not to the core ones. These points illustrate some specificities of the Brazilian right-wing, due to the enormous impact Olavo de Carvalho has on it, and how it still exhalates a Latin-American right-wing with cold war tinges, with striking dissimilarities in regard to Dugin. The political line Carvalho highly esteems as what he calls American Christian nationalism, or the defence of Judeo-Christian values, is a type of conservatism centred more on defending Christian values, on the family as a fundamental social unit,¹²⁹ on a negative stance towards science, especially evolution,¹³⁰ and on anticommunism.¹³¹ These are outside of the mainstream of the new Euroamerican right-wing movements and parties, which, in turn, have been in much greater dialogue with Neo-Eurasianism and Russian nationalism.¹³² True, the nativist, ethno-cultural Far-right often defends traditional family, and Christianity. But it does so due to the assumption that family values will recover the demographic deficit among the population viewed as native in their countries. And Christianity is defended in a rather loose and vague way, with most far-right parties not being truly religious parties.¹³³

Carvalho uses some of the terms and cognitive shortcuts used by those groups, but he defends something different, as well as a different ideological core. What he argues for is the recovery of what he calls the high western classic culture synthesized in the convergence between Greek and Christian philosophical tradition, in a way in which the latter takes precedence over the former, as the Christian social doctrine is at the centre of his thinking.¹³⁴ Thus, Carvalho centres on Jewish-Christian civilisation wherever it is found, and on its potential union with institutions of every kind, including international ones. That is, an anti-telurical civilisation, something completely opposite to Dugin's proposals. For the Russian author, the civilisational matrix is located in territorial, cultural

historical, cradles, not being easily accessed by people from other cultural and ethnic backgrounds. In that sense both authors present a populist discursive style, whereby, it is remarkable that it is an international one. Be it in the sense of the elites they attack, be it the pure pristine people they frame as opposed to these elites, since the people can also be located in more than one nation. However, for the Brazilian, the people are the Christians and eventually Jews, wherever they are found, while for the Russian, is the enlarged ethnic and cultural blocs. Albeit they feed nationalist feelings in their countries, one could say that their populist-like discourses are international in the last instance.

Carvalho seems to absorb some elements of the more recent Euroamerican right, giving it a different meaning, sometimes translating it, for the Brazilian public, as an international Christian reaction against globalism, frequently mentioning and praising the well-known Brazilian author Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987)¹³⁵ and all his praise for ethnic and cultural mixing, something seen as pure deracination by the identitarian Euroamerican right.¹³⁶ What Carvalho argues for is the return of church doctrine in its social and institutional perspective, not just its cultural aspect, establishing itself within the nation, but also directed beyond it. The results, in practical terms, can be extremely varied, but one aspect that seems discernible is that of biblical elements merged with state institutions and public policies, acting within a confluence between the Catholicism of specific groups connected to Carvalho, and the evangelical electoral masses in Brazil, potentially influenced by the impact of Olavism.¹³⁷ In an international sphere, Carvalho's proposals tend towards Christian populations and the defence of Israel against Muslims, as he views in the Middle Eastern country the cradle of Judeo-Christendom, and an ultimate defence line against global powers.

Even though he cites some Muslim authors and praises the work of Confucius and of Buddha, as well as the writings of Guénon and Evola due to what he considers their anti-atheism,¹³⁸ Carvalho's particular cult of tradition is immersed in the Jewish-Christian universe. All the polemics, in which he was involved, related to a supposed defence of flat earth theories, are more connected to his radically conservative Christian anti-science world view, than to perennialist esoterism. Such world view is separated from the traditionalist proposals analysed by Mark Sedgwick in *Against the Modern World*,¹³⁹ as well as from all their supposed heirs, condensed in the modern Far-Right and analysed in the book also organised by Sedgwick, *Key Thinkers of the Right*.¹⁴⁰ The statement of Olavo de Carvalho as part of a group of prominent traditionalist-inspired political figures such as Steve Bannon and Alexander Dugin¹⁴¹ is something that needs to be better examined, as his traditionalism is exclusive to the Jewish-Christian tradition, and detached from the perennial Guenonian traditionalism, its Evolian reinterpretation, like in Dugin's more nativist thought.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The epicentre of the *Olavist* Christian right lies in the exoteric doctrine¹⁴² of philosophy and theology, possessing the potential for permanent social and territorial expansion. In contrast, the epicentre of the Neo-Eurasianist, Duginist right and its allied ideologies as condensed in the European New Right¹⁴³ is more synchronised with what Ernest Gellner considers to be the core of nationalism.¹⁴⁴ That is, the congruence between state and culture, or with Anthony Smith,¹⁴⁵ and his idea of the nation-building from pre-modern ethnic nuclei,¹⁴⁶ albeit extended to blocs of culturally close nations. In this nationalism of right-wing European populisms, Christianity exists as part of a local mythological, symbolic and anthropological pantheon, being referred to in loose terms¹⁴⁷ and is secondary in regard to ethno-national identity. In *Olavist* thought, Christianity is a central, core institution, not a complement to an anthropological, cultural mosaic that makes up a local identity. It transverses national and regional narratives, and can be expanded to any nation and ethnicity. In this case, the nation is secondary when faced with Christianity, its social doctrine, and its universal scope.

In summary, the discourse presented by Olavo de Carvalho in the debate turned to the principles of hyper-conservative Judeo-Christianity, while that of Alexander Dugin turned to ethnopluralism, so the former is located much closer to the Christian Right. As the Far-right is the axis that stems from the extreme-right, more turned to movements and extra-parliamentary organisations, to the radical right, that accepts to a certain degree democratic rules,¹⁴⁸ Carvalho's world frame can be classified as explicitly Christian Far-Right, since his positions towards representative systems are not exactly clear.¹⁴⁹ Dugin is closer to the *Nouvelle Droite*, identitarianism of the European Far-right, and even those from North America connected to some sectors of Trumpism. The right-wing that enshrouds Dugin's ideas could be regarded as a sort of extension towards the West of the first Eurasianist ideologies from Nikolai Trubetskoi and Piotr Savitsk, amidst others.¹⁵⁰ They are the ones who articulated an Ethnosociology with features issuing from the cultural/social and natural sciences, to recognize the identities of peoples and nations, and then, sketched state structures for them.

In the same way Latin-Americanists encountered several difficulties in finding a common concept of populism to Latin America, this article revealed how it is difficult to do this with regard to the contemporary Far-right. The world frame and ideology of the two authors analysed here are so divergent and so distinct in their possible political and practical unfolding, that just labelling them as right-wing populists, or far-rightists would be quite simplistic. The current article does not intend to propose that the concept of populism and Far-right should be completely jettisoned. However,

each ideological line constitutive of the Far-right, prone to be thinner or thicker, depending on the case, can be associated to a thinner or thicker populism. Therefore, the Far-right should be divided into sub-fields, and populism should remain a discursive style and analytical tool adjacent to it, also varying within the thin-thick gradation. Thus, it intertwines with Far-Right sub-types forming particular right-wing cases with varying degrees of populist features. In the case analyzed in this article, it can be said that there is a Christian Far-right close to Missionary Nationalism and a Nativist Far-right close to Ethnonationalism, clashing with each other. Both with a good degree of populism, as long as they regard the “evil” and corrupt elites as powerful supranational organizations and institutions. That is how the minimal definition of populism should be hinged with Far-right studies, in a way to clarify what “pure people” are, according to each specific populist right.

¹ M. Caiani. Radical right-wing movements: Who, when, how and why? *Sociopedi.Isa* (2017), pp. 1-15.

P. Castelli Gattinara. and A. Pirró. The far right as a social movement. *European Societies*, 21 (2019), pp. 447-462.

J.P. Zúquete. *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2018).

² P. Ignazi. The re-emergence of the extreme right in Europe. *Reihe Politikwissenschaft*. 21 (1995), pp. 1-15.

³ C. Mudde. *The ideology of the extreme right*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

C. Mudde, and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. Voices of the peoples: Populisms in Europe and Latin America compared. *Kellog Institute*. Working paper 378 (2013), pp. 1-43.

⁴ Castelli Gattinara and Pirró, The far right as a social movement, *op. cit.* Ref. 1.

⁵ Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

⁶ G.Michael. *The enemy of my enemy: the alarming convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right*. (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

C. Mudde, and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. Voices of the peoples: Populisms in Europe and Latin America compared. *Kellog Institute*. Working paper 378 (2013), pp. 1-43.

⁷ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, Voices of the peoples: Populisms in Europe and Latin America compared, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.

⁸ Mudde, *The far-right today*, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, Voices of the peoples: Populisms in Europe and Latin America compared, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.

A.P. Taguieff. Taguieff décortique les théories du complot. *L'express*, (may 2018).

⁹ The work of the French writer Rénaud Camus, *Le Grand Remplacement*, became an icon for these groups, due to his thesis that the native national majorities of the European continent are being replaced by non-European populations.

¹⁰ Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

¹¹ A. Dugin and O. de Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho*. (Vide Editorial, 2012).

¹² M. Sedgwick. Limited Guénonian influence in incoming Brazilian government. *Traditionalists: a blog for the study of traditionalism and traditionalists moderated by Mark Sedgwick*. (2018).

B. Teitelbaum. *War for eternity: inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*. (New York: Harpers Collins Publisher, 2020).

In an article from 2018, Mark Sedgwick states that Carvalho distances himself from Guénonian and Evolian tradition. However, in an article from 2019, he places Carvalho in the French *Nouvelle Droite* tradition of thinking, which Sedgwick himself identifies with the readings of Guénon and Evola.

¹³ N. Cruz. Neo-fascismo e conspiracionismo brasileiro: o Mídia Sem Máscara e o eixo do Mal. *Revista de História Comparada*. 13 (2019), pp. 216-258.

N. Cruz. Islamofobia e elementos fascistas no discurso de Olavo de Carvalho e do movimento Mídia sem Máscara. *Revista de Ciências Sociais*. 51 (2019), pp. 337-389.

¹⁴ The collective imbecile: Brazilian incultural current affairs.

¹⁵ M. Sedgwick. The worrying ideology that helps Trump's new friendship with Brazil. Oupblog. *Oxford University Press's academic insights for the thinking world*. (2019).

Teitelbaum, *War for eternity: inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*, *op. cit.* Ref. 12.

¹⁶ Teitelbaum, *ibid.*

¹⁷ M. Mathyl. The national-bolshevik party and Arctogaia: two neo-fascist groupuscules in the post-soviet political space. *Patterns of Prejudice*. 36 (2002), pp. 62-76.

Teitelbaum, *War for eternity: inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*, *op. cit.* Ref. 12.

¹⁸ A. Umland. 2013. New extremely right-wing intellectual circles in Russia. The Anti-Orange Committee, the Isoborsk Club and the Florian Geyer Club. *Russian Analytical Digest*. 135 (2013), pp. 2-6.

¹⁹ M. Laruelle. Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? *Occasional Papers*. 294 (2006), pp. 1-26.

A. Shevkhohtsov, and A. Umland. Is Alexander Dugin a Traditionalist? Neo- Eurasianism and Perennial Philosophy. *The Russian review*. 68 (2009), pp. 663-678.

Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

²⁰ M. Laruelle. Alexander Dugin and Eurasianism. In. M. Sedgwick (Ed.) *Key thinkers of the new right: behind the new threat to Liberal Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press (2019), pp. 155-170.

Teitelbaum, *War for eternity: inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*, *op. cit.* Ref. 12.

²¹ Teitelbaum, *ibid.*

Sedgwick,. The worrying ideology that helps Trump's new friendship with Brazil. Oupblog. *Oxford University Press's academic insights for the thinking world*. *Op. Cit.* Ref. 21.

²² It is worth noting that this article is centered in *Olavismo*, rather than *Bolsonarismo* as a whole, in what concerns the Brazilian case.

²³ C. Mudde. The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39 (2004), pp. 541-563.

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, *Voices of the peoples: Populisms in Europe and Latin America compared*, *op. cit.* Ref. 3

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- ²⁴ Dugin is considered the most influential thinker in neo-Eurasianism, and a great influencer of Russian politics. He is seen as the convergence of Eurasian doctrines from the start of the 20th century, as well as Guénonian traditionalism and Evolian thought, and the revolutionary German conservatism of the interwar period.
- ²⁵ M. Laruelle. Alexander Dugin and Eurasianism. In. Mark Sedgwick (Ed.) *op. cit* Ref. 20.
Teitelbaum, *War for eternity: inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*, *op. cit.* Ref. 12
Sedgwick,. The worrying ideology that helps Trump's new friendship with Brazil. Oupblog. *Oxford University Press's academic insights for the thinking world. Op. Cit.* Ref. 21.
- ²⁶ Teitelbaum, *War for eternity: inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*, *op. cit.* Ref. 12.
- ²⁷ Mudde, *The far-right today*, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.
- Taguieff, Taguieff décortique les théories du complot, *op. cit.* Ref. 8.
- ²⁸ Mudde, The Populist zeitgeist, *op. cit.* Ref. 24.
C. Deiwiks. 2009. Populism. *Living reviews in democracy*. 1 (2009), pp. 1-9
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, Voices of the peoples: Populisms in Europe and Latin America compared, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.
B. Bonikowski, D. Halikiopoulou, E. Kaufmann, and M. Rooduijn. Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange. *Nations and Nationalism*, 25 (2019). pp. 58-81.
- ²⁹ Mudde, *The far-right today*, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.
- ³⁰ C. Mudde. Why nativism, not populism, should be declared word of the year. *The Guardian* (2017).
- ³¹ Bonikowski, Halikiopoulou, Kaufmann, and Rooduijn. Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange. *op. cit.* Ref. 28.
- ³² Bonikowski, Halikiopoulou, Kaufmann, and Rooduij, *ibid.*
- ³³ Bonikowski, Halikiopoulou, Kaufmann, and Rooduij, *ibid.*
- ³⁴ Mudde. Why nativism, not populism, should be declared word of the year. *op. cit.* Ref. 30.
Mudde, *The far-right today*, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.
- ³⁵ M. Rooduijn. State of the field: How to study populism and adjacent topics? A plea for both more and less focus. *European Journal of Political Research*. 58 (2019), pp. 362-372.
- ³⁶ Rooduijn. State of the field: How to study populism and adjacent topics? A plea for both more and less focus, *ibid.*
- ³⁷ Deiwiks. 2009. Populism, *op. cit.* Ref. 28.
C. De la Torre, and O. Mazzoleni. Do we need a minimum definition of populism? An appraisal of Mudde's conceptualization, *Populism*, 2 (2019), 79-95.
Rooduijn. State of the field: How to study populism and adjacent topics? A plea for both more and less focus, *op. cit.* Ref. 35.
B. De Cleen, and J. Glynos. Beyond populism studies. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 20 (2021), pp. 1-15.
- ³⁸ K. Hawkins. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. The Ideational Approach to Populism. *Latin American Research Review*, 52 (2017), pp. 513-528.
- ³⁹ De la Torre, and Mazzoleni. Do we need a minimum definition of populism? An appraisal of Mudde's conceptualization, *op. cit.* Ref. 37.
- ⁴⁰ Hawkins. and Rovira Kaltwasser. The Ideational Approach to Populism. *Op. Cit.* Ref. 38.
- ⁴¹ De la Torre, and Mazzoleni. Do we need a minimum definition of populism? An appraisal of Mudde's conceptualization, *op. cit.* Ref. 37.

De Cleen, and Glynos. Beyond populism studies, *op. cit.* Ref. 37.

⁴² De Cleen, and Glyno, *ibid.*

⁴³ De Cleen, and Glyno, *ibid.*

⁴⁴ De Cleen, and Glyno, *ibid.*

⁴⁵ Turned into a book in 2012, entitled *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho* [The USA and the New World Order: a debate between Alexander Dugin and Olavo de Carvalho]

⁴⁶ Deiwiks. 2009. Populism, *op. cit.* Ref. 28.

De la Torre, and Mazzoleni. Do we need a minimum definition of populism? An appraisal of Mudde's conceptualization, *op. cit.* Ref. 37.

⁴⁷ G. Guimarães. Ocidente, Direitas e Islã: a perspectiva de Olavo de Carvalho. *Locus: Revista de História*, 27 (2021), pp. 150-178.

⁴⁸ Laruelle, Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? *op. cit.* Ref. 27.

C. Lindholm. and J.P. Zúquete. *The Struggle for the world.* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010).

⁴⁹ Laruelle, Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? *op. cit.* Ref. 27.

Shevkhovtsov and Umland. Is Alexander Dugin a Traditionalist? Neo- Eurasianism and Perennial Philosophy, *op. cit.* Ref. 28.

Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

⁵⁰ De Cleen, and Glynos. Beyond populism studies, *op. cit.* Ref. 37.

⁵¹ Shevkhovtsov and Umland. Is Alexander Dugin a Traditionalist? Neo- Eurasianism and Perennial Philosophy, *op. cit.* Ref. 28.

⁵² R. Eatwell and M. Goodwin. *Populismo: A revolta contra a democracia liberal.* (Porto Salvo, Saída de Emergência: 2020).

⁵³ Castelli Gattinara and Pirró, The far right as a social movement, *op. cit.* Ref. 1.

Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

⁵⁴ Zúquete, *ibid.*

⁵⁵ E. Kaufmann. *Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities* (New York: Abrams Press: 2019).

⁵⁶ Mudde, The Populist zeitgeist, *op. cit.* Ref. 24.

Mudde, *The far-right today*, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.

⁵⁷ Dugin and Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho*, *op. cit.* Ref. 11.

⁵⁸ Dugin and Carvalho, *ibid.*

⁵⁹ Neo-conservatives: a school of thought tuned to market-liberalism, formed by names such as Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell.

⁶⁰ Dugin and Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho*, *op. cit.* Ref. 11.

⁶¹ Dugin and Carvalho, *ibid.*

⁶² M. Weber. *A Ética Protestante e o espírito do Capitalismo*, (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2004).

⁶³ Dugin and Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho*, *op. cit.* Ref. 11.

⁶⁴ Liberation Theology is the movement of sectors of the Catholic Church towards actions aimed exclusively at socially disenfranchised groups. It originated in France and Belgium, but gained genuine importance in Latin America, where it became very strong. Its opponents and critics accused it of being “communists in Christian garb”.

⁶⁵ Dugin and Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho, op.cit.* Ref. 11.

⁶⁶ Carvalho says communist elites never survived without a police and military elite to back them up, thus one could state that the Russian and Chinese political elites were organisationally no different from military elites.

⁶⁷ Dugin and Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho, op. cit.* Ref. 11.

⁶⁸ Here one can understand the influence of the *American Christian Right* in Carvalho’s thoughts.

⁶⁹ The concepts of *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* are prominent in the work of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. The first is the open society, coordinated by values guided by the Enlightenment, by abstract categories comprehensible to any human population, widely associated to Kantian and Popperian theories. The second is the closed community, driven by symbolic, esoteric-emotional categories, non-transmissible to those who are not members of the community. It is worth remembering that Popper refers to his open society as *Offene Gesellschaft*.

⁷⁰ By Cultural Marxism the author refers to the demands from the left-wing that go beyond class struggle.

⁷¹ The teaching and literacy method of Brazilian educationalist Paulo Freire is interpreted by Olavo de Carvalho as a mechanism for introducing left-wing ideas into the field of collective subjectivity.

⁷² Dugin and Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho, op. cit.* Ref. 11.

⁷³ Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe, op.cit.* Ref. 1.

A. Nagle. *Kill all normies: online culture wars from 4chan and tumblr to Trump and the alt-right.* (Hants, UK: Zero Books, 2017).

⁷⁴ Umland. 2013. New extremely right-wing intellectual circles in Russia. The Anti-Orange Committee, the Isoborsk Club and the Florian Geyer Club, *op. cit.* Ref. 26.

⁷⁵ In a video by the think tank Katechon, Dugin explicitly supports Trump, stating that he defends the interests of the more genuine Americans, the “ranch Americans”.

https://www.youtube.com/redirect?q=http%3A%2F%2Fkatechon.com%2Fdirectives%2Ftrump-w&redir_token=XgwW5ptWgikKpyzsvFlszjNdFo98MTU4MTM1MjM4MUaxNTgxMjY1OTgx&v=aOWIoMtIvDQ&event=video_description

⁷⁶ Laruelle, Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? *op. cit.* Ref. 27.

⁷⁷ Authors such as Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland do not consider Evola a traditionalist, but rather a man who reinterpreted Guénon’s Traditionalism/Perennialism.

⁷⁸ Trubetzkoy was one of the founders of Eurasian theory, at the start of the 20th century.

⁷⁹ Boas is the founder of American Cultural Anthropology and considered by many to be the father of the so-called “politically correct”, which Neo-Eurasianism places itself incisively against. However, it starts from an anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment point of view, by emphasizing local cultural systems and the sense of self that they confer to the world around them. Maybe this is why Dugin leans on Boas to develop his theory of major civilisational blocs, in spite of Boas regarding cultures as always fluid and changing.

⁸⁰ However, Levi-Strauss is ultimately seen as a Kantian, as what he calls savage thought, or raw thought, is just a specific way of manifesting the Kantian *a priori* categories.

⁸¹ Shekhovtsov and Umland. Is Alexander Dugin a Traditionalist? Neo- Eurasianism and Perennial Philosophy, *op. cit.* Ref. 28.

⁸² J. Evola. *Fascism viewed from the right.* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2013).

⁸³ Shevkhovtsov and Umland. Is Alexander Dugin a Traditionalist? Neo- Eurasianism and Perennial Philosophy, *op. cit.* Ref. 28.

⁸⁴ Shevkhovtsov and Umland, *ibid.*

⁸⁵ Shevkhovtsov and Umland, *ibid.*

⁸⁶ Dugin and Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho*, *op. cit.* Ref. 11.

⁸⁷ Shevkhovtsov and Umland. Is Alexander Dugin a Traditionalist? Neo- Eurasianism and Perennial Philosophy, *op. cit.* Ref. 28.

Dugin and Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho*, *op. cit.* Ref. 11.

⁸⁸ Such as Christianity, Islam and Buddhism.

⁸⁹ A. Dugin. *La cuarta teoria política*. (Barcelona: Ediciones Nueva Republica, 2013).

⁹⁰ A. Ivanov, I. Fotieva, M. Shinshin, S. Belokurova. The ethnocultural concept of classical Eurasianism. *International Journal of Environmental and Science Education*, 11 (2016), pp. 5155-5163.

⁹¹ Ivanov, Fotieva, Shinshin, and Belokurova, *ibid.*

⁹² Dugin and Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho*, *op. cit.* Ref. 11.

He was also greatly influenced by Eric Voegelin, Louis Lavelle and Edmund Husserl.

⁹³ A problematic point regarding this interpretation of anthropology by Olavo de Carvalho is that the intellectual Gilberto Freyre, who he greatly praises, is a product of North American cultural anthropology, having been a student of Franz Boas himself.

⁹⁴ K. H. Conger. The Christian Right in US politics. In. P. D. Djupe, M. J. Rozell and T. G. Jelen (Eds.), *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

A. Winter. Anti-abortion extremism and violence in the United States. In: George Michael (Ed.) *Extremism in America*. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida), 2013. pp. 218-248.

⁹⁵ Conger, The Christian Right in US politics, In. Djupe, Rozell and Jelen, *op. cit.* Ref. 94.

C. Larson, D. Madland and C. Wilcox. Religious Lobbying in Virginia: How Institutions Can Quiet Prophetic Voices. In. E. Cleary and A. Hertzke (Eds.) *Representing God in the Statehouse: Religion and Politics in the American States*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield., 2005), pp. 55-72.

⁹⁶ M. Bendyna, J. C. Green, M. J. Rozell, and C. Wilcox. Catholics and the Christian Right: A View from 4 States". *Journal for the Science Study of religion*. 39 (2000), pp. 321-332.

S. Dowland. Family values and formation of the Christian Right agenda. *Church History*, 78 (2009) pp. 606-631.

C. Lugg. The Christian Right: a cultivated collection of interest groups. *Educational Policy*. 15 (2001) pp. 41-57.

C. Wilcox, M. J. rozell, and R. Gunn. Religious coalitions in the New Christian Right. *Social Science Quarterly*, 7(1996), pp. 543-558.

⁹⁷ Lugg. The Christian Right: a cultivated collection of interest groups, *op. cit.* Ref. 96.

⁹⁸ Teitelbaum, *War for eternity: inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*, *op. cit.* Ref. 12.

⁹⁹ Mudde, *The far-right today*, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.

¹⁰⁰ V. Bruno, V. Philosophy, mysticism and world empires: elements of the philosophy of Olavo de Carvalho. *The Political Science Reviewer*. 43 (2019), pp. 1-34.

¹⁰¹ Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia, countries that have become known for their anti-EU and anti-immigration policies.

¹⁰² A. Dugin. The opinion of a Russian nationalist about Central Europe. *Visegrad Post: unravelling central Europe*. (May 2018).

¹⁰³ Laruelle, Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? *op. cit.* Ref. 27.

¹⁰⁴ In this interview, Dugin mentions that the Visegrad Bloc could be, eventually, extended to Italy and Switzerland, which are not Eastern European countries. However, their right-wing surge, added to the fact that they are European countries show how Dugin's world view could be connected to a European world in the ethnic and even white racial senses. Besides of that, in the very debate with Carvalho, Dugin states that origins of western man are in the Indo-Aryan expansions, in which Russians and eastern Europeans are included.

¹⁰⁵ Teitelbaum, *War for eternity: inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*, *op. cit.* Ref. 12.

¹⁰⁶ Teitelbaum, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Laruelle, Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? *op. cit.* Ref. 27.

¹⁰⁸ Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

¹⁰⁹ Both Lorenz and Ardrey articulate a theoretical framework that heavily emphasises questions of aggressiveness and territoriality. Lorenz centred his studies on animals, and Ardrey on the territorial aspect of prehistoric man. In both cases, there was a notable focus on the instinct of specific groups to defend a certain territory for their own population. Identitarians have taken the premises of Lorenz and Ardrey to question the idea of a global world without borders, as something that would be against human nature.

¹¹⁰ Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op. cit.* Ref. 1.

¹¹¹ For Olavo de Carvalho, the modern science that has developed from the 19th century on, is part of the revolutionary movements and hubris. Darwinist theories are, to him, manifestations of occultism. In the *Imbecil Coletivo* [Collective Idiot] he also states that gender theories are as stupid as any racist theory derived from biology formulated in the USA or Europe. By bringing natural science authors to the debate, the identitarian right places itself clearly outside of the theoretical-ideological realm of Carvalho and the Brazilian right he helped to create.

¹¹² F. Stéphane. La nouvelle droite et les Indo-Européens. Une Anthropologie d'extreme droite. *Terrain: Anthropologie & Sciences Humaines*, 56 (2011) 136-151.

Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

¹¹³ Zúquete, *ibid.*

M. Lyons. Ammon Bundy, the refugee caravan, and Patriot movement race politics. *Threewayfight. An insurgent blog on the struggle against the state and fascism*. (2019).

¹¹⁴ Dugin and Carvalho. *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial: um debate entre Alexander Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho*, *op. cit.* Ref. 11.

¹¹⁵ Dugin and Carvalho, *ibid.*

In the debate with Dugin, he considers angels and demons to be among the main historic agents, together with religious orders and dynasties. The nation, or nation state, is to him something puerile, which is only a part of a game of power by the powerful elites that operate at an international scale.

¹¹⁶ Lindholm. and Zúquete. The Struggle for the world, *op. cit.* Ref. 71.

Mathyl. The national-bolshevik party and Arctogaia: two neo-fascist groupuscules in the post-soviet political space, *op. cit.* Ref. 24.

A. Umland, A. Double headed Eurasia. *Krytyka*. 7-8 (2015), pp. 28-29.

Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

¹¹⁷ Bonikowski, Halikiopoulou, Kaufmann, and Rooduijn. Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange. *Op. Cit.* Ref. 28.

¹¹⁸ Bonikowski, Halikiopoulou, Kaufmann, and Rooduijn, *ibid.* (page 26)

¹¹⁹ Bonikowski, Halikiopoulou, Kaufmann, and Rooduijn, *ibid.*

¹²⁰ T. Bar-On. Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite. *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (2011), pp. 199-223.

¹²¹ Nagle. *Kill all normies: online culture wars from 4chan and tumblr to Trump and the alt-right*, *op. cit.* Ref. 94.

¹²² Nagle. *Kill all normies: online culture wars from 4chan and tumblr to Trump and the alt-right*, *ibid.*

Bonikowski, Halikiopoulou, Kaufmann, and Rooduijn. Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange. *Op. Cit.* Ref. 28.

¹²³ The majority of North-American political authors and figures mentioned by Carvalho in the debate - as Phylis Schlafly - as representatives of conservative North-American tradition are not in the consciousness of the more exclusively Trumpist right-wing – with exception, perhaps, of Anne Coulter and Michael Savage. *Schlafly* is maybe the best illustration of that lurch to Trumpism from the established frame of the Republican Party.

¹²⁴ According to Mathew Lyons, Trump was able to unite these various facets of the right-wing aimed at ethnic and gender issues into a united front against the established elites.

¹²⁵ K. Roberts, and P. Ostiguy. Putting Trump in comparative perspective: Populism and the politicization of the sociocultural low. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 23 (2016) pp. 25-50.

¹²⁶ Roberts, and Ostiguy. Putting Trump in comparative perspective: Populism and the politicization of the sociocultural low, *op. cit.* Ref. 125.

¹²⁷ Conger, The Christian Right in US politics, In. Djupe, Rozell and Jelen, *op. cit.* Ref. 94.

¹²⁸ Conger, The Christian Right in US politics, In. Djupe, Rozell and Jelen, *ibid.*

¹²⁹ Dowland. Family values and formation of the Christian Right agenda, *op. cit.* Ref. 114.

¹³⁰ Conger, The Christian Right in US politics, In. Djupe, Rozell and Jelen, *op. cit.* Ref. 94.

¹³¹ Nagle. *Kill all normies: online culture wars from 4chan and tumblr to Trump and the alt-right*, *op. cit.* Ref. 94.

Kaufmann. *Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities*, *op. cit.* Ref. 55.

Frequently the Christian right-wing and the racial right-wing are not completely separate. In the 1950s, many organisations connected to the Christian movement were opposed to the integration of black people in certain public spaces in the southern states of the USA. Sometimes there are also points of overlap between them.

¹³² Mathyl. The national-bolshevik party and Arctogaia: two neo-fascist groupuscules in the post-soviet political space, *op. cit.* Ref. 24.

Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

Mudde, *The far-right today*, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.

¹³³ Mudde, *The far-right today*, *ibid.*

¹³⁴ Carvalho states that the salvation of Brazil consists of three converging paths. Recovery of the Portuguese language, recovery of high culture – in a pedagogical sense, not anthropological one - and recovery of the conservative elements of the Catholic Church, as opposed to its more liberal wings.

¹³⁵ Despite being heavily criticized by Brazilian Black Movements, for his supposed lenience towards Brazil's slavery past, and his appraisal for the Portuguese, Gilberto Freyre still defended a type of race and ethnic mixing that probably would be abhorred by Alt-right and Identitarians in Europe and USA. Freyre is considered the father of the "Three races myth", which suggests that the admixture of Portuguese, sub-Saharan Africans and indigenous peoples is at the core of Brazil's national identity.

¹³⁶ Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

¹³⁷ Although Carvalho criticizes Brazilian and American evangelicals and protestants in general, eventually, he states that evangelicals are the last true Brazilian Christians, due to the supposed liberal, or even socialist tendencies in the Brazilian Catholic Church. Some of his disciples, various in high political positions within the Bolsonaro government, are also evangelical.

¹³⁸ Teitelbaum, *War for eternity: inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*, *op. cit.* Ref. 12.

¹³⁹ M. Sedgwick. *Against the modern world*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

¹⁴⁰ M. Sedgwick ed. *Key thinkers of the radical right: behind the new threat to liberal democracy*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019)

¹⁴¹ Teitelbaum, *War for eternity: inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*, *op. cit.* Ref. 12.

¹⁴² *Exoteric* and not *esoteric*. The difference is that in the second case esotericism is connected to hermetic societies, valued by the perennialist traditionalist school of thought. In the first case it is something opened, turned towards external social worlds.

¹⁴³ Shevkhovtsov and Umland. Is Alexander Dugin a Traditionalist? Neo-urasianism and Perennial Philosophy, *op. cit.* Ref. 28.

¹⁴⁴ E. Gellner. *Nations and Nationalism*. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1983).

¹⁴⁵ A. Smith. *Ethnic origins of nations*. (Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2019).

¹⁴⁶ A point in the debate between Carvalho and Dugin where those differences become very evident is when they discuss the origin and the expansion of western peoples. For the Russian author this lies in the migrations of the Indo-Arian shepherds from Persia towards the Europe and Indian sub-continent, thousands of years before the Christian era, what he defines as the gestational nucleus of European ethnicities, with their cultural connections to India. For the Brazilian author, it is in the Christian crusader knights and then in the European maritime expansion that brought Christianity to all the continents. In Dugin's statement, the interest in the palaeolithic and Indo-European origins of Europeans in the imaginary of the Identitarians and those who yearn for Eurosiberia is evident.

¹⁴⁷ Mudde, *The far-right today*, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.

Zúquete, *The Identitarians: the movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*, *op.cit.* Ref. 1.

¹⁴⁸ Mudde, *The far-right today*, *op. cit.* Ref. 3.

¹⁴⁹ Carvalho flirts sometimes with military coups and interventions, although he also defends the existence of a party representing the interests of Conservative Christians inside the Brazilian political and party landscape.

¹⁵⁰ Ivanov, Fotieva, Shinshin, and Belokurova. The ethnocultural concept of classical eurasianism, *op. cit.* Ref. 90.

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