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# **MIGRATION FLOWS**

### DYNAMICS AND WAYS OF MANAGEMENT

Rui Pena Pires\*

<sup>\*</sup> Professor in the Sociology Department of ISCTE, researcher in the Centre for Research and Sociology Studies (CIES-ISCTE), has published, among other studies, *Os Retornados: A Social Graphic Study* (1987), on a joint author basis, and *Migration and Integration: Theory and Applications to the Portuguese Society* (2003).



The objective of this text is twofold: to identify the key evolutionary trends in international migration in the medium term and to assess the adequacy of migration flow management policies, taking into account the outcome of past experience as well as the outcome of the trends identified. In both cases, discussion is divided into two related areas: firstly, the international and European context and secondly, the national context.

#### 1. The international and European context

The debate on the dynamics and ways of managing international migration flows to the European Union can be based on the search for an answer to two questions:

- Does the transformation of the EU into one of the world's main poles of attraction for immigration suggest the existence of an intense and continued migration pressure in the medium term?
- Is it possible to effectively control and manage migration flows to Europe within a context of increasing globalisation?

The assessment of migration dynamics and their control and regulation in Portugal depends on the answer to these two questions.

# 1.1. Migration pressure or migration deficiency?

In an era of globalisation, human mobility is also increasingly global. On the one hand, however, migrations constitute only a small part of international mobility flows<sup>2</sup>. On the other, their globalisation has resulted in the development of new regional centres of attraction and new migration hubs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This text is the result of the debate that took place in two workshops on 22 and 29 September, 2006, as part of the Gulbenkian Immigration Forum co-ordinated by Antonio Vitorino. In addition to the author, individual participants included Carlos Trindade (CGTP), Catarina Oliveira (ACIME), Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (Sciences Po/CERI), Francisco Alves (SEF), João Pedro Henriques (IEFP), João Peixoto (ISEG/Socius), José Cordeiro (UGT), Mónica Goracci (OIM), Nuno Jorge (IEFP), Paulo Pedroso (ISCTE), Rui Marques (ACIME) and Sandra Pratt (CE-DGJLS). The text seeks to incorporate the contributions of all those present, whom I thank. The resulting summary, however, is the sole responsibility of the author.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> It is tourism, not migration, which lies at the heart of the international mobility of individuals today. Citing just one example, nearly 390 million tourists visited Europe in 2000, according to data from the World Tourism Organization (see the WTO web site, http://www.unwto.org/facts/menu.html).

Globally, it is estimated that there will be approximately 200 million international migrants at the beginning of the new century (2005). If this figure is high in absolute terms, it represents only about five per cent of the world's population in relative terms. In other words, 95 per cent of the earth's inhabitants are born, live and die in a single country. Though still low, the relative weight of international migration is set to rise, given that the growth rate for migration, though stable in recent years, is higher than the growth rate of the world's population (Wenden, 2005).

In Europe, however, the perception exists that migration pressure is much greater than what is revealed by these numbers. This is partly due to a discrepancy between what public opinion considers to be «desirable immigration» and what is «real immigration». This is also due to the unequal distribution of migration flows: Western Europe is one of the principal poles of attraction in the international migration system, with about 1.4 million entries each year, a number that is now approximately 1.5 times greater in absolute terms than the number of entries into the United States and Canada (Wenden, 2005). According to data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2005), Europe was the only continent in which the migration rate increased during the 1990s compared to the previous two decades (rising from an average annual growth rate of 1.7 per cent between 1980 and 1990 to 2.2 per cent during the following decade). However, it should be noted that not only has migration growth continued to be greater in North America (with an average annual growth rate of 3.9 per cent between 1990 and 2000, compared to 4.2 per cent during the previous decade) than in Europe, but the percentage of immigrants in Europe (about 6 per cent in 2000) will still be less than half the amount in the US and Canada (about 13 per cent for the same year).

# 1.1.1. The regional distribution of international migration

Western Europe has become a region of attraction at a time in which new regional migration hubs are emerging (Castles and Miller, 2003; Massey, *et al.*, 1998; Wenden, 2005). The most recent and dynamic of these are located in the so-called Third World, which is why 60 per cent of today's migrants travel solely in the southern hemisphere and not between the South and North. The Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia stand out amongst the regional South-South hubs, as does Southern Africa to a lesser degree (with its centre in South Africa, Namibia and Botswana). The emergence and development of these new migration hubs could decrease the pressure on the South-North routes, above all where these depend more on pull factors than on push factors.

In the second case (pressure caused by push factors), many of the migration flows today originate from Sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser degree, some Latin American countries. Sub-Saharan Africa is now experiencing the greatest demographic growth in the world<sup>3</sup>, having begun the demographic transition process at a later stage. It is also the most depressed region in the global economy. The old relationships forged with Europe during the colonial period now serve as channels of escape from situations of poverty and state collapse in which the migrant's lack of hope is far greater than the partially known difficulties of integrating in the destination country.

Some indicators taken from the UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP, 2005) illustrate this situation: in 2005, Sub-Saharan Africa had a score of 0.515 on the Human Development Index, almost half the value of OECD countries (0.911) and well below the international weighted average (0.741). When a comparative evaluation is made of the region's demographic and economic weight, the numbers are even more striking: in 2004, Sub-Saharan Africa was home to 10.7 per cent of the world's population but only produced 1.2 per cent of the world's GDP<sup>4</sup>. In addition, were it not enough that the per capita GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa is just two per cent of that of the OECD countries, the growth of this variable in the last 30 years for the region was negative (-0.7 per cent per year, on average) and positive for the OECD (+2 per cent per year, on average).

Migration pressure on Europe from Sub-Saharan Africa should therefore continue in the near future, although the demographic transition now under way in Africa, combined with the unfortunate increase in mortality caused by HIV/AIDS, suggests a long-term decrease in its intensity.

# 1.1.2. The «dualisation» of labour migration

Unlike the 1960s, when international migration consisted largely of rural populations with a low or nonexistent level of education, the fastest-growing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> According to data from the United Nations Population Division, and if current trends continue, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa will more than double between 2000 and 2050. This is the only region in the world in which the population growth curve will not yet have been altered during that time, even when taking into account the spread of HIV/AIDS (United Nations, 2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The scenario is even more complicated when one finds that even this small portion of the GDP coming from Sub-Saharan Africa is heavily concentrated in a single country, South Africa. Although it represents only seven per cent of the region's population, the nation produces 38 per cent of the total regional GDP (UNDP, 2005).

labour migration flows today are composed of skilled urban dwellers with aspirations of social and professional mobility. This growing «brain drain» is the object of selective and competitive attraction processes in the destination countries (Schiff and Ozden, 2005).

In absolute terms, these skilled and highly-skilled migrants come primarily from the former Soviet Union and East Asia (led by India). In relative terms, Sub-Saharan Africa is most affected by group migration away from the continent or internally toward South Africa (which currently practises a policy of actively recruiting skilled workers from neighbouring countries).

At the receiving end, the United States has benefited most from this migration, followed by the traditional immigration countries (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and some European countries (such as the United Kingdom). In this context, the European problem is not so much migration pressure as the ability to competitively attract human resources needed to support ongoing economic and technological development, above all because other competitors in this "brain market" also recruit within Europe.

Other changes, such as the much vaunted trends towards transnational community development, are either little studied or poorly documented, above all when looking to the future. In this respect, a greater awareness is needed of the social reality and the most likely development trends arising from it in the medium term.

# 1.2. Migration management and regular migration

Managing migration flows means much more than controlling migration demand. In general, a distinction should be made between migration policy objectives according to the nature of the migration flows concerned. The dilemmas involved in linking differentiated responses to differentiated flows should also be identified.

# 1.2.1. A multifaceted management policy for migration flows

When migration flows result from socio-economic collapse, that is, when they result from push factors that are relatively independent of attraction at the destination country, then the effectiveness of migration policies is measured by the effectiveness of entry control. In this sense, preventing and controlling the volume of these migrations constitutes a central policy objective.

Prevention involves co-operating with the countries of origin with the aim of promoting socio-economic development. Traditionally carried out at the intergovernmental level, this co-operation would be better served if it were extended to new partners, particularly diaspora communities, who could be mobilised to support development in the countries of origin, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in the origin and destination countries (Farrant, MacDonald and Sriskandarajah, 2006).

*Control* involves border management, which demands co-operation not only among destination countries but also among countries of origin, transit, and destination, as well as greater monitoring of the destination labour markets.

When migration flows result from the convergence of push and pull factors, above all if skilled labour is involved, the policies benefit from a combination of regulating the push factor and promoting the pull factor. *Regulation* will mean, above all, making effective channels available for migration to happen regularly. *Promotion* will mean creating selected recruitment instruments which begin in the country of origin and operate throughout the entire migration route.

The equation which results from this combination is simple to express but difficult to solve: is it possible, in the destination country, to determine the needs for migrant labour and select the immigrants according to those needs? Above all, is it also possible to put into practice a migration flow management policy guided by those prediction, control and selection criteria without creating a web of procedures so restrictive that it mainly produces negatively selected irregular migration?

# 1.2.2. Dilemmas in migration flow management

In managing migration flows, a number of dilemmas converge which must be resolved through a combination of policies. Amongst those dilemmas, two feature prominently:

- respond reactively to immigrant demand in the country of origin and, at the same time, actively select immigration according to the needs of the destination country;
- move forward in the creation of a European immigration policy and, at the same time, effectively regulate the national variations formed by the differentiation of migration networks.

The need for immigrant labour. Establishing quotas for legal immigration which are dependent upon the assessment of the need for immigrant labour in the destination country has been based more on the need to address public

perception of immigration as a threat than to address the effectiveness of foreign labour market planning. Insistence on this dependency, however, has had some negative trade-offs:

- insufficient links between needs and rights, particularly in the regulation of non-labour migration flows such as those of refugees and family reunification;
- absence of reasonable responses to migration pressure occurring independently of the destination country's needs and the resulting irregular migration, particularly in the destination countries where informal labour markets are more active;
- difficulty in effectively estimating the destination country's needs and following their rapid transformation.

In order to reduce those negative trade-offs, greater transparency for public opinion would be useful, thus making clear the three-part objective of migration flow management policies: respond to the needs of the destination country, control (but not suppress) migration pressure from the most depressed regions of the world's economy and link needs with rights.

Secondly, it will be necessary to improve the estimates of needs for immigrant labour by creating an information system that not only enables regular monitoring of those needs, but also allows the identification of real rather than abstract demands. Without these changes, regulation guided by estimates for need could end up being part of the problem more than contributing to its solution. One such example can be found in recent Portuguese reports on the need for immigrant labour. Not a single one identified the demand (in the destination country) for domestic help, and yet this demand is one which has grown the most in recent years, being met largely by female immigrants in an irregular situation.

In this context, reference should also be made to the adequacy of immigrant labour selection systems (like the Canadian and Australian «point systems») used in the European context. The effectiveness of these systems depends firstly on the degree to which the labour market is formalised and secondly on the neighbourly relationships at the regional level. When neighbourly regional relationships are less developed and demographically more dynamic, then migration pressure cannot be regulated by a point system, irregular immigration increases and the domestic and immigrant labour markets tend to become dualised, thus compromising the formal institutionalisation of employment systems. Such is the case in the United States, which faces pressure from Mexico (and Central America in general) and in Western Europe, which faces pressure from the East and, above all, the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa.

European management of immigration. One part of the answer to the problems discussed in the previous section could be better provided at the European level than at the national level. As in other fields, however, only the response needs which are ineffective at the national level should be provided at the European level. Many of the migration flows depend upon networks created over decades; this dependency will continue to manifest itself differently throughout Europe and will also demand different national responses.

With this caveat, it is still possible and desirable to increase European cooperation, in particular as part of the solution to the variable and temporary nature of the need for immigrant labour. That co-operation could develop into the creation of overall estimates of European needs and the possibility of a wider circulation of immigrant workers within Europe, thus providing a partial response to the temporary nature of immigrant labour demand and the changing needs of European economies.

The other part of the answer involves a more flexible management of borders in order to avoid the systematic transformation of temporary migrant labour into permanent migration. It is known that when border-crossing is difficult, migrants tend to reduce their risk of being detained at that border by settling at the destination instead of increasing mobility between the countries of origin and destination (Wenden, 1999; Durand and Massey, 2004). As the risk of detention is a social (and not just national) variable, the rigidity of the border tends to produce negative selectivity for settlement: those who have more resources will circulate; those who have less will remain. Managing temporary migrations in specific terms, however, is something which would be difficult to achieve without multiple negative effects if it is not done on a supranational scale.

#### 2. The national context

As already mentioned, the European migration landscape is characterised by a tapestry in which common dynamics are interwoven with specific regional and national characteristics. Identifying that tapestry is a necessary condition for estimating the trends of international migration flows to Portugal and to effectively assess the national management policy of those flows.

#### 2.1. Immigration trends in Portugal

Just over 400,000 foreigners live in Portugal today. This represents between

four and five per cent of the total resident population and almost ten per cent of the active population. This over-representation of active residents is indicative of recent migration flows to Portugal which could increase as a result of family reunification even if the labour mobility that caused these flows decreases or stops. That growth through reunification, should it happen, could change the actual relative weight of the different migration flows to Portugal. However, this will not be the only factor to consider in the evolution of traditional flows, the emergence of new flows and the reshaping of those which already exist.

#### 2.1.1. Evolution of traditional flows

In the recent history of immigration to Portugal (post-1974), it is possible to distinguish four successive phases (Pires, 2003).

The first phase (from 1975 to the mid-1980s) is dominated by post-colonial immigration from Africa, with the largest flows coming from Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Angola. In the first two cases, the flows are dominated by a labour component of low-skilled, economically active young people. In the third case, this combines with a component of refugees and presents a cyclical dynamic that follows the vicissifudes of the civil war in the source country.

The second phase, which begins with Portugal's accession to the then-EEC in 1986 until the end of the 1990s, sees the continuation of African immigration with an even more pronounced labour component. This is accompanied by the revival and growth of European immigration and by the small counter-current of Brazilian immigration independent of the Portuguese emigration to Brazil. During the first two phases (between 1980 and 1999), the foreign-born population with residence permits in Portugal rose from 58,000 to 191,000 individuals, which represented a positive variation of 229% and an average annual growth rate of 6.1 per cent. The process of European integration was crucial to this growth and diversification of immigration. First, integration facilitated intra-Community mobility of the workforce, which took the form of a revived emigration of economically active, unskilled Portuguese to more developed European economies. Second, the availability of Community funds to build infrastructures led to a growing demand for unskilled immigrant labour resulting from the scarcity caused by that emigration revival. Third, integration accelerated the internationalisation of the Portuguese economy and the transfer of foreign capital into the country. This was a decisive factor in the growing numbers of professional immigrants from Western Europe and, to a lesser degree, the United States. Finally, on a symbolic level, restoring the value of Portugal's image abroad will have helped create new appeal in countries like Brazil.

In the third phase, concentrated at the turn of the century, immigration from the East (Ukraine in particular) joins the flows already mentioned. With regard to the traditional migration flows, a deceleration in African immigration is observed. New flows originating from Brazil also emerge which are more unskilled and more geographically diversified (particularly with the progressive increase in migration from Minas Gerais). In terms of migration flow management, this is a period characterised by the ephemeral but predominant use of the \*temporary presence permit\* (autorização de permanência) regularisation scheme, in particular for immigrants from the East. Within a few years, the figures for Ukrainian immigration, the most significant in this category, had exceeded 64,000 by the end of the twentieth century and start of the twenty-first. During this phase, immigration tends to be motivated by demand in the destination country, propelled by the growth of subcontracting practices (above all in construction and the cleaning and security services), the development of tourism and by the concentration of trade resulting from the appearance of large-scale distribution.

In a fourth phase, which begins with the economic recession in Portugal and continues until today, a parallel recession can be observed in immigration from Africa, which is today less than that of the EU, and from the East, with the eventual return or re-emigration of many Ukrainians and Romanians. This phenomenon is demonstrated by the gradual non-renewal of nearly half of the temporary presence permits granted in 2001. Only Brazilian immigration remains high, which should now be the dominant demographic of immigration in Portugal. Some data also suggests that the (lower) immigration rates from the East could now be based on formal or informal processes of family reunification.

# 2.1.2. Emergence of new flows?

In an attempt to carry out a small forecasting exercise, it now appears clear that Portugal will be faced with a period of marked decrease in the immigration (of foreigners) as well as the growth and diversification of emigration (of Portuguese).

In the case of immigration, the deceleration has been caused more by the reduction in demand for immigrant labour due to the economic recession than by the increased effectiveness of migration flow control. However, everything suggests that this reduction will be limited, as the combination of three trends should increase the demand for immigrant labour once more as the economy recovers:

- continuation of high levels of emigration<sup>5</sup>, which will eventually expand to the skilled sectors of the Portuguese population<sup>6</sup>;
- persistence of a demographic model marked by aging and a low birth rate, which makes it difficult for generations to be replaced in a labour market with few domestic reserves (owing to high rates of employment and feminisation):
- continued growth of non-transferable activities, whether unskilled (construction, cleaning and security, tourism) or a combination of unskilled and highly skilled resources (caring for the elderly and the health professions).

Within this framework, the current decrease in immigration (with the exception of Brazil) will not mean less urgency in redefining migration flow management policies, as immigration is a structural characteristic of Portuguese society today.

On the other hand, African migration pressure on all of Southern Europe will also continue, as it is not possible to change, in the short-term, the socio-economic contrasts that are causing it in the first place. Greater effectiveness in the European control of its southern border could, furthermore, result in a diversification of maritime entry routes into the EU. If this happens, Portugal may become involved in the effects of the neighbouring migration pressure that it has escaped thus far.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>One indicator (amongst others) of the persistence of high immigration levels can be formulated from data published by the Bank of Portugal on emigrant remittances: from 2002 to 2004, the remittances sent to Portugal by Portuguese living abroad were five times higher than the remittances sent abroad by foreign immigrants resident in Portugal [from http://apl1.bportugal.pt/estatisticasweb/(ckmpdurfyt4o5055o34mbt55)/default.aspx]. New destinations in this recent phase of emigration can also be demonstrated by the same data, which reveal the appearance of new destination countries other than those of the 1960s: above all, Switzerland (in second place just after France, in terms of the volume of remittances sent to Portugal in the time period mentioned above) and the United Kingdom (in fifth place). Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands are also featured (in eighth, ninth and tenth place, respectively). For an assessment in the same context, but which points to a lower volume of emigration, see Peixoto (2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This eventual \*brain drain\* is demonstrated by the fact that in 2000, around 20 per cent of graduates of Portuguese nationality born in Portugal were working abroad, according to a study carried out by the World Bank (Schiff and Ozden, 2005). However, one of the limitations of this indicator should be taken into account as regards its sample (which was pointed out by the study's authors): the numbers analysed do not refer to graduates of higher education in Portugal who emigrated after concluding their studies, but rather to the number of Portuguese citizens born in Portugal but who are residing abroad and are graduates, irrespective of the country where their diploma was obtained. That is, the figures include the children of Portuguese immigrants who travelled with their parents and completed part or all of their studies in a foreign country.

In contrast to these trends, new pressures are being exerted on the EU-27 labour market, with some forecasting exercises predicting a general shortage of human resources in the medium term (2020). Given the slow pace of demographic changes, this shortage cannot be corrected within that time period through probirth policies. For this reason, resorting to immigration may become common practice throughout the EU and, in particular, in the countries most affected by intra-Community migration. The combination of emigration and immigration, which has characterised the Portuguese migration pattern since the mid-1980s, could therefore become commonplace amongst EU Member States in the next fifteen years.

In the case of Portugal, this combination, which has been based until now on the most unskilled sectors of the labour market, could expand to highly-qualified sectors, particularly in the areas of health and social protection. If what is commonly known as a "brain drain" appears to be emerging in these sectors, in terms of immigration, this drain will only be partially compensated by the international mobility of doctors.

Finally, the high growth potential of Asian immigration, from the Indian subcontinent in particular, should also be noted, given the extreme sex-ratio imbalance of new migrations from those regions (Pires 2003). This imbalance reached its peak among Indian and Pakistani citizens with temporary presence permits (49 and 98, respectively). Amongst immigrants from the East, the imbalance is much less pronounced (about five for Ukrainians with temporary presence permits). However, in a larger population, it is still high enough to produce migrations for the purpose of family reunification, which can compensate for the decrease or even interruption of labour migration (as happened in the 1970s in the then Federal Republic of Germany).

In conclusion, there is no sign that the deceleration in immigration will continue for a long period of time. On the contrary, immigration should resume its former growth rate, but this time within a more diverse framework in terms of countries of origin as well as qualifications and motives for migration.

# 2.2. National management of migration flows

In Portugal, migration flow management has been carried out primarily through the quest to control the movement of people at the external border by means of increasingly diverse and complex legal instruments. This control has been based on conditions for granting permits to reside and work in Portugal and on the assumption that it is possible to effectively adapt the demand for migrant

labour to national labour market needs. These assumptions and guidelines need to change so that the national management of flows can be more effective in creating legal entry channels for migration than in the past.

# 2.2.1. Assumptions: illusions and reality

The assumptions that have dominated the national management of migration flows can be summarised in three points:

- it is possible to increase globalisation but restrict and control migration, receiving only those immigrants who are wanted;
- it is possible to make a national, market-based employment system compatible with rigorous planning for the use of migrant labour;
- it is possible to produce a socially "pure" immigrant population, that is, without the poverty and marginalisation factors which exist in any other population.

None of these assumptions is realistic; nor can they support the creation of effective immigration policies. Furthermore, their adoption tends to produce a gap in public opinion between the perception of immigration as an uncontrolled phenomenon and the actual gain in state control of migration flows. This occurs above all when analysed from the perspective of those seeking to migrate to the EU (Cornelius, et al., 2004). A simple figure illustrates this gap: in a region of the world where the annual number of immigrant entries already exceeds one million, the (effective) detection of 45,000 persons seeking to migrate illegally by sea is portrayed by the media in catastrophic terms.

In contrast to those assumptions, it should be noted that:

- in democratic societies, immigration is an imperfect meeting between the demand, at the origin, for an alternative lot in life and the demand for diverse human resources at the destination;
- in market economies, the estimate for labour needs can support the creation of training and recruitment policies for domestic and/or foreign labour. However, this is not useful as a basis for sophistic reasoning to limit the entry of those seeking to immigrate;
- in legal states, it is neither possible nor desirable to refuse social protection to residents according to their national status. The migration balance should therefore incorporate a cost-benefit logic which replaces the current trend of reducing those costs to zero.

In short, new migration policy instruments are needed which can ensure an effective management of existing and foreseeable migrations in the short and medium term.

#### 2.2.2. New instruments

New instruments for managing migration flows should allow:

- a differentiated response to differentiated flows;
- a linkage between national, European and international levels of decisionmaking.

These requirements are combined in a variety of ways. For example, if skilled migrant labour can be recruited effectively and with essentially national policies, then the promotion and control of more unskilled temporary migration demands a European co-ordination. Finally, the control of migration resulting from pressures at the source requires that co-operation to be expanded to include the countries of origin. A more effective migration management policy for Portugal would therefore involve:

- creating a more positive and «naturalised» image of immigration in public opinion;
- differentiating the regulation and control of migrations according to their nature;
- expanding co-operation within Europe and with the countries of origin. New instruments which could achieve those guidelines include:
- greater transparency in the treatment of national and international information about immigration, thus promoting the public image of migration;
- simplification of requirements for entry, circulation and settlement for the most qualified migrants and defining them in simple and objective terms (for example, all migrants who earn four or five times more than the national minimum wage), as well as a simplification of procedures for recognising the academic and professional qualifications of those migrants;
- a periodically updated system in which the labour needs of individual countries are circulated on an international level;
- organisational support for labour migrations starting from the country of origin;
- international contracting and the simplification of transferring social benefits whilst facilitating temporary migrations;

 replacement of attempts to plan the immigrant labour market with monitoring of the labour market in general; this would be a requirement for reducing the trends toward a dual market system and the informality which facilitate illegal immigration.

#### 3. Recommendations

In seeking to systematise the results of the previous discussion in real terms, a set of four recommendations is thus identified.

- Since it is necessary to improve the ability to estimate international migration trends in the medium term, it is recommended that *prospective studies* of international migration flows be carried out periodically, whether at the national level by the *Observatório da Imigração* (Immigration Observatory) or at the European level by an agency to be specified.
- 2. Taking into account the increasing globalisation of international migrations, which takes the form of more diverse composition and direction of migration flows, it is recommended that a new political approach to flow management be created by combining four objectives: *prevention* and *control* of migration pressure starting from the origin and *regulation* and *promotion* of immigration caused by demand at the destination.
- 3. Considering that one of the fundamental criteria for evaluating the improvement of migration flow management consists of reducing irregular immigration, it is recommended that mechanisms be used which allow diversified channels for legal migration to be created, starting from the country of origin: simplify the requirements to enter, circulate and remain for the most qualified migrants; create conditions for the existence of temporary migrations through multi- and bilateral agreements for border control and transferral of social benefits and institutionalise organisational support for the channelling of migration flows, starting from the origin.
- 4. Taking into account the gain in effectiveness when the management of international migration flows is defined and applied at the supranational level, the progressive management, co-ordinated at the European level, of migration flow management is recommended; this should be carried out according to need estimates for immigrant labour, in particular for intra-European circulation of temporary immigration, to be harmonised within the EU.

As mentioned by one of the participants in the workshops that gave rise to this text, the only known model of effective regulation of labour migration is the European labour market, which is based both on the *free circulation* of workers and on *development aid*. Though this model cannot be applied broadly in the short or medium term, it is nevertheless possible to move progressively in this direction, applying the four recommendations made here to that gradual process.

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ANNEX
Foreign population resident in Portugal in 2004

|                          | Residence<br>permits | Temporary presence permits | Total   |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|---------|
| Total                    | 265,361              | 183,833                    | 449,194 |
| Europe                   | 83,859               | 101,106                    | 184,965 |
| UE-15                    | 73,689               | 0                          | 73,689  |
| Germany                  | 13,128               | 0                          | 13,128  |
| Belgium                  | 2,658                | 0                          | 2,658   |
| Spain                    | 15,916               | 0                          | 15,916  |
| France                   | 9,312                | 0                          | 9,312   |
| The Netherlands          | 5,366                | 0                          | 5,366   |
| Italy                    | 4,592                | 0                          | 4,592   |
| United Kingdom           | 18,005               | 0                          | 18,005  |
| Other European countries | 10,170               | 101,106                    | 111,276 |
| Belarus                  | 92                   | 1,101                      | 1,193   |
| Bulgaria                 | 776                  | 2,849                      | 3,625   |
| Russia Federation        | 1,158                | 7,053                      | 8,211   |
| Republic of Moldova      | 1,042                | 12,647                     | 13,689  |
| Romania                  | 1,211                | 10,944                     | 12,155  |
| Ukraine                  | 1,497                | 64,730                     | 66,227  |
| Africa                   | 123,093              | 29,808                     | 152,901 |
| PALOP                    | 116,055              | 24,475                     | 140,530 |
| Angola                   | 26,702               | 8,562                      | 35,264  |
| Cape Verde               | 55,590               | 8,574                      | 64,164  |
| Guinea-Bissau            | 20,825               | 4,323                      | 25,148  |
| Mozambique               | 5,010                | 461                        | 5,471   |
| São Tomé and Príncipe    | 7,928                | 2,555                      | 10,483  |
| Other African countries  | 7,038                | 5,333                      | 12,371  |
| The Americas             | 45,161               | 39,054                     | 84,215  |
| Canada                   | 1,863                | 30                         | 1,893   |
| United States            | 7,998                | 63                         | 8,061   |
| Brazil                   | 28,956               | 37,951                     | 66,907  |
| Venezuela                | 3,470                | 0                          | 3,470   |
| Other American countries | 2,874                | 1,010                      | 3,884   |
| Asia                     | 12,410               | 13,724                     | 26,134  |
| China                    | 5,309                | 3,909                      | 9,218   |
| India                    | 1,699                | 3,389                      | 5,088   |
| Pakistan                 | 1,358                | 2,854                      | 4,212   |
| Other Asian countries    | 4,044                | 3,572                      | 7,616   |
| Oceania                  | 553                  | 19                         | 572     |
| Stateless persons        | 273                  | 39                         | 312     |
| Unknown                  | 12                   | 83                         | 95      |

**Note**: the data for residence permits are provisional.

**Source**: Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (Borders and Foreigners Service).