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8 Looking South

The role of Portuguese democratisation in the Socialist International's initiatives towards Latin America in the 1970s

Ana Monica Fonseca

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the role that the Socialist International (SI) and Western European Socialist and Social-democratic parties had during the Portuguese democratisation process. Simultaneously, we also wish to understand how Iberian democratic transitions impacted on the *modus-operandi* of the SI in other areas of the world, namely in Latin America. However, it is impossible to analyse the SI's perspective in this process without focusing on the role that some socialist and social-democratic European parties played during the 1970s. In this case, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) is particularly relevant. In fact, the SPD was the leading party in support of the Portuguese socialists, something that was part of its strategy of engagement with the democratisation of Southern Europe.¹

The specific characteristics of non-state actors and their transnational activities, namely their ability to overcome the governmental framework and interact transnationally without the constraints of state actors, turned them particularly interesting when analysing political regime change and democracy promotion.²

The Socialist International was one of the many non-state transnational actors of the Western bloc in the second half of the Cold War, and its relevance is clear if we understand that it combined some of the most influential West European socialist and social democratic parties. Founded in its modern form in 1951, the main guiding principle of the Socialist International was, as stated in the Frankfurt manifesto, to express “solidarity with all peoples suffering under dictatorship, whether fascist or communist, in their efforts to win freedom”.³ This means that the SI “was as fearful of Communism as it was opposed to Fascism”, something that will be determinant in the SI's position regarding the transition of the Iberian countries, particularly in the Portuguese case.⁴

The Socialist International and the Iberian dictatorships

In the 1970s, the Socialist International lived through a period of growing political influence, mainly because the majority of its member-parties were in government.⁵ Willy Brandt was elected West German chancellor in October 1969, the same year as Olof Palme was elected Sweden's prime minister; Bruno Kreisky reached the Austrian Chancellery in 1970; Joop den Uyl, from the Dutch Labour Party

(PvdA) was elected in 1973; and Harold Wilson, from the British Labour Party, took office in 1974. All these were leaders of Socialist and Social-democratic parties that would reinforce the SI visibility. As will see in the West German case during the Portuguese process of transition to democracy, this allowed for a combination of international support from both state and non-state actors.⁶

However, another reason lies behind the SI's increasing relevance in this period: the developments in the international system. Indeed, the evolution of the Cold War into a phase of détente, in the 1960s and 1970s, created a window of opportunity for other actors, both at the state and non-state level, to develop autonomous initiatives in the international politics.⁷ As James Callaghan, of the British Labour Party, recognised in January 1973, "there was now an opportunity [for the democratic socialists] to escape from the sterile exchanges of the Cold War".⁸ The West Germans, in particular, were especially successful in increasing their own autonomy in world affairs. The initial steps in this direction were taken by the Social Democratic Party of Germany's (SPD) government, from 1969 onwards, both by developing its Eastern policy (*Ostpolitik*) and by reinforcing its connection to Western Europe and favouring the enlargement of EEC.⁹ In this particular aspect, the leadership of Willy Brandt in Bonn is determinant, during and after his chancellorship. Willy Brandt's leadership of the SPD was determinant for the visibility of SI's international activity, mainly because he had access to a very powerful resource for its international activity: the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES).¹⁰ All these elements combined resulted in a strong West German leadership in the Socialist International.¹¹

Nonetheless, the main West German / European trend while dealing with the Iberian dictatorships (despite some important exceptions) was giving prevalence to the anti-Communist dimension of the two regimes. In this sense, and combining the strategy of "change through rapprochement" used in *Ostpolitik* (i.e. the best way to liberalise the Spanish and Portuguese regimes was to foster their approximation to Europe, to a more developed economic and political centre, and not by their isolation or even by demising the authoritarian regimes), the West German social-democratic governments always tried to keep good relations with Lisbon and Madrid in order to be able to rely on the strong existing ties if the occasion for the liberalisation of their authoritarian regimes arose.

In 1969, the new head of the Portuguese government, Marcelo Caetano,¹² allowed the participation of opposition lists to the legislative elections. Despite this permission, the opposition parties / political groups would remain illegal in the regime, being only authorised during the electoral period. Additionally, he allowed the return to Portugal of Mário Soares, in a clear gesture of political opening, carried out relevant reforms in the social field and extended voting rights to women, with the same conditions in which these were conceded to men – which nonetheless were somehow limited. All these initiatives nurtured a rising belief, in Portuguese society and internationally, that Caetano might "bring about a genuine liberalizing reform" of the New State.¹³ However, as it turned out, the elections proved to be the turning point for the expectations regarding the likelihood of a "Marcelist" liberalisation. Not only their outcome failed to reflect any kind of

political opening as, from this point onwards, it was made clear that Caetano was not able to carry forth any in-depth reform of the regime.¹⁴

The Socialist International's attention on the Portuguese socialists was further boosted in the early 1970s, especially after Mário Soares was again forced into exile in the summer of 1970, with the creation of a working group on Portugal. The first meeting of the Portugal Committee was on 3 March 1972 and had in its agenda issues related with the relations between Portugal and the European countries and with the EEC, as well as the representation of the Portuguese clandestine political forces in the Council of Europe.¹⁵ It was in the aftermath of the meetings of the Portugal Committee that Soares requested full membership of the ASP to the Socialist International, which was concluded in June of 1972. This amounted to a significant step forward in the path of Portuguese Socialists' international recognition.

In fact, the cooperation between the Portuguese Socialist Action (ASP) and the SI had increased since the elections in 1969, when the SI sent a team of observers to follow the electoral process in Portugal. The members of the team were Tom McNally (British Labour Party), Pierre Schori (Swedish Social Democratic Party), Luciano de Pascalis (Partito Socialista Italiano), Maria Vitoria Mezza (Partito Socialista Unitario Italiano) and Brendan Halligan (Irish Labour Party). The Commission was accompanied by Hans Janitschek, SI's general secretary.¹⁶ This mission was closely prepared with the assistance of Mário Soares and other exiled Portuguese socialists, and their goal was to "observe the electoral campaign and study all the aspects of the situation", as it was explained to Marcelo Caetano.¹⁷ However, the members of the SI's Commission were threatened to be arrested and were kicked out from Portugal only a couple of days after their arrival.¹⁸ The SPD had refused to be a part of this mission on the grounds that it would likely be counter-productive given Caetano's promises of liberalisation.¹⁹

On the other hand, the admittance to the SI entailed the partidarisation of the ASP. The Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP) was then founded on 19th April 1973 during a congress of the ASP at the FES Academy in Bad Münstereifel. Mário Soares was chosen as the new party secretary general. However, the political support granted by German Social Democracy in this foundational moment of the PSP was largely symbolic. In fact, the German representatives, Elke Esters (FES) and Hans-Eberhard Dingels (SPD), had little or no intervention in the Congress, being present merely as observers.²⁰

Until the end of the New State, the West German and West European leaders were manifestly interested in keeping in touch with the Portuguese socialists. Yet, their persistent hope that Marcelo Caetano might still prove able to liberalise the Portuguese regime prevented the leaders of the SPD, the majority of whom held offices in the government, from engaging in a closer and more blatant communication with the Portuguese Socialist opposition.²¹

However, during 1973 and the first months of 1974, there was a shift in the approach to Portugal by German Social Democracy. On the one hand, on a formal governmental level, the bilateral relations remained stable and constant.²² On the other hand, in so far as the stance of the informal actors was concerned, namely

the Social Democratic party and the Ebert Foundation, there was a strengthening of the support granted to the Portuguese Socialist opposition, which materialised firstly in the aforementioned foundation of the Socialist Party at an FES academy near Bonn, and culminated in frequent contacts throughout the first trimester of 1974.²³ Throughout the months prior to the coup of 25th of April of 1974, there was a constant tension between these two sides that vanished only on the eve of the coup, when the SPD finally agreed to openly receive a delegation of the Socialist Party. This high-level invitation, requiring the presence of the PS leader, was the reason why Mário Soares was in Bonn on the 25th of April, when the Portuguese dictatorship was finally overthrown.

“Watering the carnations”: West European Social-democracy support to Portuguese and Spanish democratic forces

The Portuguese transition to democracy that began in April 1974 was characterised by a period of intense fighting between the democratic forces (in particular by the Socialist Party) and the forces at the extreme left. Until the approval of the democratic constitution, in April 1976, there was a constant presence of West European social-democratic parties (and governments), which were profoundly engaged with Soares’ Socialist Party. On the left spectrum of the political scenario in Portugal, there were also important international solidarities. The Soviet Union and the GDR strongly supported the Communists and some other extreme left tendencies in Portugal. The Western engagement was embodied by the Federal Republic of Germany’s Social-Democratic Party, headed by Willy Brandt. The SPD, taking “advantage of the resources of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and skilfully appealing to the Government of Helmut Schmidt”, was able to develop a comprehensive support strategy to the socialists (and, in a lesser extent, to the Popular Democratic Party of Sá Carneiro and Rui Machete).²⁴

This strategy encompassed several types of support. Financial support, for example, by assisting the PS in buying office supplies, paper and cars to sustain the party organisation, or by paying the salaries of some party staff. There was also important organisational inputs given by the Ebert Foundation experts, namely when was necessary to define the party’s national, regional and local structure, or when it was necessary to establish a successful electoral campaign (something which the PS and all the other political parties experienced the first time in the spring of 1975); political and moral support were particularly felt in times of growing tension, as, for example, in the fall of 1974, when General Spínola left his position as head of state (president of the Republic) and Willy Brandt made his first visit to Lisbon. Or, by the fact that there was always an Ebert or SPD representative (point of contact) in Lisbon, who would eventually work as a direct channel to Bonn.²⁵

However, despite the major internal impact that this support had in the Portuguese scenario (as it would definitively position the PS as one of the best prepared parties to capture the attention of the population), the most important element of the strategy of engagement with the Portuguese democratisation came

through the mobilisation of the European socialist and social-democratic parties through the Socialist International. This allowed for a growing material support to the PS but also the reinforcement of the visibility of the party's international connections, mostly with the northern European countries, which seemed so distant from Lisbon just a few months ago.²⁶

Through all these levels of action, we can have an overview of the interconnected strategy behind the support of the European Social-democratic parties to the Portuguese Socialist Party of Mário Soares and, therefore, to the democratisation of Portugal. There was a combined effort, which added a particular international presentation of the Portuguese case as a real threat to the developments in terms of détente. Brandt himself was concerned in explaining his position both in Washington and in Moscow. In the United States, he and his SPD fellows (particularly Chancellor Schmidt) concentrated in demonstrating that the Western European parties would not accept any type of military intervention “à la Chile” and strongly defending that Soares should be supported unconditionally; in Moscow, Brandt personally told Brejnev that any communist takeover in Lisbon would endanger the whole process of détente – let’s not forget that Helsinki’s final Act was signed precisely during the Portuguese “Hot Summer” (July/August 1975). As we all know, despite the radicalisation of the Portuguese process, in particular during the summer of 1975, Portugal eventually became a pluralist and representative democracy, with the first constitutional government being headed by Mário Soares. This might just be the most obvious image of the success of the Social Democrat strategy towards Portugal.

The case of the Spanish transition, which began later but which was, by this time, already expected (Franco was very old and sick), was a little bit different. The transition was not made by any revolutionary means nor it was as radicalised as the Portuguese one; instead it was a *transición pactada*, meaning that there was an agreement between almost all of the political forces to reach an understanding in order to establish a democratic regime. This would take its time, and it was in December 1978 that the democratic constitution was approved. Nonetheless, the Spanish example was also very important and reflected clearly the lessons learned with the Portuguese process. Because of the Portuguese revolutionary transition, all eyes were in Spain as the time for the transition approached.

Franco’s chosen successor, Prince Juan Carlos, had already assured the European leaders that he would try to liberalise and democratise the regime – it was just a matter of seeing how long and at what pace it could be done. The major fear regarding the Spanish transition was the risk that it would easily turn into a violent civil conflict (one must not ignore the profound impact that the Spanish Civil war had in the memories of most of the political leaders of this time, and most particularly in Willy Brandt’s mind and political formation). The Communist Party of Santiago Carrillo was (as in the Portuguese case), the better organised of the opposition forces and most European leaders looked at it with deep distrust, associating it with Moscow and as similar to the Portuguese PCP. In order to avoid a renewal political radicalisation in the Iberian Peninsula, the Socialist and Social democratic parties of Western Europe – again, under the leadership

of Brandt and the SPD (never forgetting the incredible material support given by the Ebert Foundation) – took measures to create the conditions as to have an progressive party which could work as an alternative to the Communists both to the electors and to the political authorities. In this sense, the newly elected PSOE General-Secretary Felipe Gonzalez emerged as the ideal man to be supported by the SPD and the other European forces. Indeed, it was in Lisbon, in October 1974, that Gonzalez met Brandt for the first time, beginning a very close and fruitful relationship almost immediately. Gonzalez transformed the PSOE into a balanced and pro-European party, with a clear and intelligent strategy to force the government to negotiate with the opposition, through a cautious approach to the development of close relations with the other socialist tendencies (which were dispersed in the Spanish political panorama).²⁷

Again, the support given to the PSOE by the West German and West European sister-parties was well succeeded. Reaching government only in 1982 (mostly due to the internal characteristics of the *transicion pactada*), Felipe Gonzalez was already a respected and international recognised political leader before that.

Lessons learned? The Iberian democratisation and its impact on the SI strategy towards Latin America

Bearing this in mind, we can say that the main consequences of the Iberian democratisation processes to the future strategy of the Socialist International were twofold: first, the Portuguese and Spanish transitions could work as examples of successful processes of regime change, both from right wing authoritarian regimes to pluralist democracies. They were two cases where the democratic moderate left forces were the winners, having defeated not only the authoritarian resistance but also powerful communist tendencies. A second and very important consequence, especially in the case of Latin America, was that the Iberian democratisation gave the SI the front men for its missions. Both Soares and Gonzalez were respected and recognised internationally, and they would make good use of the historical, linguistic and cultural connections between the Iberian and the Latin American countries. As Willy Brandt himself said in the opening remarks of the Estoril Conference, there were “already useful experiences in Latin *Europe*, which hopefully will constitute grounds for hope for Latin *America*”.²⁸ There was clearly the idea that the Iberian experiences should play a decisive role in the expansion of the IS strategy towards Latin America.

In any way, Soares had already a reputation in Latin America. Already since 1970 that Soares visited the region sent by Ebert Foundation. Indeed, during his exile, the Ebert Foundation paid to Soares in exchange for “technical advice” precisely on Latin America and in the end of 1973, he made an important journey to Brazil, Peru and Chile, where he contacted the “progressive forces in these countries”. This journey was also very important to the Soares image with the West German social democrats, reflecting a man compromised with democracy and willing to collaborate on the same ideological principles as Willy Brandt.²⁹ In the countries he visited, Soares did lectures, met people and tried to speak of

the European social democracy and its usefulness as a natural ally in the struggle against military dictatorships. He then developed friendships and contacts that were then explored by the Socialist International.³⁰

In this sense, there were already some contacts and a growing interest of the European social-democratic parties towards Latin America. The journal *Nueva Sociedad* was first published in 1972 as an initiative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Venezuela (although today its headquarters are in Buenos Aires) and its objective was to “advocate the development of political, economic and social democracy in the region” – in fact, Mário Soares was part of the first editorial committee of the journal.

This growing attention of the SI towards the South American continent gained momentum in May 1976, with the Caracas Conference. We have heard already what this event meant for the evolution of the SI strategy in that region. Between the Caracas conference and the Estoril Conference, the SI was very active in establishing a common ground for the relations with the parties of the region.

Still during the Caracas conference Brandt, together with Mário Soares, Gonzalo Barrios (AD, Venezuela) and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (PRI, partido revolucionario institucional, México) established a contact group. The main goal of this group was to tighten the contacts between its representatives of both continents and to find solutions for a greater cooperation between the European and Latin American parties. This group met in several occasions during the Caracas Conference (several times a day, as the schedule of the agenda allowed) and during these meetings, the ideas and goals of the group become more organised. In this sense, the first and most immediate objectives of the “Group of the 4” (as the German Social-democrats called it, *Vierergruppe*) was to organise further meetings of the group and of the Latin American representatives, to establish a relief fund to support the Latin American parties (which should not be used against the governments) and to create some sort of institution (a foundation or documentation centre) which could reflect externally the organisation of such a cooperation between the European and Latin American parties. The most discussed objective was the relief fund, which would then remain an open question as it raised significant political reserves. The presidency of the Group was on Gonzalo Barrios, from the Venezuelan AD, to symbolise the decentralisation of the traditional relations.³¹

The Caracas meeting was a kick-off from the broader strategy of the SI to overcome Eurocentrism, considered by Brandt as the institution’s major weakness – in particular, considering that it should play a role in the international developments. In that sense, three major missions were organised in 1977 and 1978: first, a delegation headed by Olof Palme visited southern Africa; the Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky was sent to the Middle East and Mário Soares was the leader of the SI Mission to Latin America, which took place in March 1978. There were also other meetings of the SI structures in Asia and Africa, and in 1978, the SI Congress met in Vancouver, Canada.

However, we will focus on the Latin American mission of March 1978. This mission, headed by Soares, was proposed in the Bureau meeting of the International gathered in Rome, in the beginning of June 1977. The historical

leader José Peña Gomez, from the Dominican Revolutionary Party, was who advocated such a mission, calling the attention “to the spread of dictatorships in Latin America in the recent years” and considering that “the mission was necessary because of the support which it would give to democratic political parties” in the region.³² The mission, which includes visits to Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, took place between 15 and 25 March 1978. This was mainly a good-will and information mission. It was not the mission’s purpose to “give any solutions or instructions” to the partner parties – instead, it should deepen the knowledge on both sides and contribute to the networking and development of contacts between the representatives of the European and Latin American similar parties. Obviously, behind these general goals, there was the objective of showing “active solidarity with the people and similar parties living under dictatorship and underdevelopment”. The main recommendations of the Mission showed that there was an increasing need for a deeper knowledge of and engagement with the problems of the region. There was growing openness from the democratic parties in Latin America to receive support from the SI, but there was also a need for greater integration of the Latin American parties in finding their own solutions for some of their problems. Of the concrete proposals presented in the mission report, I point out the urge for a clear and coherent position of the democratic socialist parties in SI in defence of the human rights and against the dictatorships, particularly showing their support to those parties with similar ideological principles fighting these regimes. This support should be even more relevant in those cases where there were electoral competition, which was the case of several countries in this period – the Latin America Committee should play a determinant role in this sense and the mission recommended that it should be “initiated immediately”. The expansion of the IS membership to more parties in Latin America was also seen as something very positive, as the rising number of applications already showed.³³

The mission was a success and had great international visibility. However, it was necessary to give a greater demonstration of interest from the European parties in Latin America – and to explore the willingness of those parties to become closer to the SI. In this sense, and by a proposal of Mário Soares, the Portuguese Socialists organised an International Conference to take place in Lisbon, which should be the European response to the Caracas Conference. Having received immediate support from Willy Brandt, according to his chief-of-staff, and former Ebert Representative in Venezuela, Klaus Lindenberg,³⁴ Soares decided to summon the first meeting of Latin American and European representatives of the Democratic socialism in Europe. This conference gathered between 30 September and 2 October 1978 in Estoril and brought together representatives of 28 countries.

However, and as a preparation for the Estoril Conference, a mission to the countries that were not previously visited by Soares was organised. This time, it should be done in greater discretion and only two men would take part: Klaus Lindenberg, Friedrich Ebert representative in Venezuela, and Bernardino Gomes, close aid to Mário Soares in the Socialist Party. These two men visited eight countries between 18 August and 14 September 1978: Venezuela, Brazil, Paraguay,

Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, contacting with representatives of several political forces. There was no press and no grand receptions. This mission was paid and organised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and it was the decisive moment for the study of the current situation in Latin America and for the planning of the perspectives for its further development. It was also important to have a clearer idea of who should be the partners in each particular country (especially if there were several political forces who allegedly were close to social-democratic values).³⁵

The Estoril Conference gathered more than 40 party representatives and had a major impact, either in the public opinion, as in the international role played by the PS and Mário Soares. It was very important for the definitive launch of the Latin America Offensive by the Socialist International. The Lisbon Declaration, approved in the end of the Conference and later adopted by the SI Congress in Vancouver, became the SI's official document regarding Latin America for that period. In this declaration, it was recognised that the Conference had a major goal of bringing together parties and political forces that shared the principles of "liberty, democracy and social progress". Besides this, the Iberian countries, which were presented as being in transition between Latin America and developed Europe, were the grand examples of the possibility of success that the progressive forces of Latin America should follow. Both Portugal and Spain showed that it was possible to obtain the victory of progressive forces, thus defeating any form of dictatorship, either to the right or to the left. And the Latin American forces should follow this. Finally, the Lisbon Declaration stated that there should be a more active and conscious support by the European and North American parties and governments, to the forces in the region, to help them fight against the authoritarian regimes and promote democratisation.³⁶

Conclusion

The contacts between the Portuguese Socialists and German Social Democracy, both the Ebert Foundation and the SPD alike, were established in the mid-1960s, but only after 1970, with Mário Soares' exile and the ensuing corroboration that all hopes regarding a "Marcelist Spring" had been unfounded, did these contacts become of any consequence. The admission of the ASP to the Socialist International in 1972, the foundation of the Portuguese Socialist Party, a year later, at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Academy, and the presence of Mário Soares in the West German capital on the 25th of April of 1974 are instances that demonstrate the intensification of the relationship between Portuguese Socialists and German Social Democrats. All these episodes, punctuated by the constant contact with Mário Soares and other Portuguese Socialists, mirror the rising West German interest in the creation of a strong Socialist opposition that might play an important role in a setting of political transition. However, as the reactions to the information conveyed by Mário Soares on the 24th of April of 1974, in Bonn, demonstrate, no one in FRG expected the fall of the longest dictatorship in Western Europe to happen on such short notice.

When the coup of the 25th of April of 1974 took place, it was German Social Democracy that held the contacts with the Portuguese opposition and the instruments to deal, as no other political force in West Germany and in the Western bloc, with the political instability that was foreseeable in the process of political transition in Portugal. The presence in Portugal of a number of representatives from the Ebert Foundation made it possible to delineate a strategy of engagement with the Portuguese Socialists with a view to the establishment of a pluralistic democracy. The evolution of the political situation yielded a diversification in the SPD initiatives for the promotion of Portuguese democratisation. The support given to the organisation and growth of the Socialist Party was a main goal, so that it might become the dominating party in the Portuguese political scene. To this end, the FES provided material backing to the party, while the SPD contributed with ideological guidance and moral and political support. At the same time, the German Social Democracy did not hesitate to summon the highest authorities to give their support to the Portuguese moderate forces, leading a number of international initiatives. The clearest examples of that are Willy Brandt's meeting in the Soviet Union and the creation of the "Friendship and Solidarity Committee for Portuguese Democracy and Socialism". These international activities assured the support of Western Europe to the Portuguese moderate forces in the struggle for the establishment of a pluralistic parliamentary democracy, which came to actually happen during the first semester of 1976.

Thus, the Socialist International was another instrument available for the West German Social-Democracy's solidarity with the Portuguese democratic forces. Although it combined several West European socialist and social-democratic parties, who were, all of them, supporting the Portuguese socialists, the leading figures and the wide range of resources available in the SPD make it the most important party to assist the PS and Mário Soares, before and after the Carnations Revolution. SI's main role was, as referred to earlier, the constant call for attention for the needs of the Portuguese socialists and the triangulation between the PS and the other European countries. Also, because of the SI's growing importance in the international system, it was another voice of international pressure regarding the evolution of the Portuguese situation, in particular in the summer of 1975.

But the Portuguese democratisation process also taught significant lessons for the European socialists. Understanding the importance of having good contacts within the political oppositions as a way for easing the influence of regime change, the Socialist International and the individual socialist and social-democratic parties developed strategies of supporting the sister-parties from other dictatorships. This is particularly clear regarding the Spanish transition (although there were already many contacts before 1974), but it is also evident when we observe the Socialist International's activity in the second half of the 1970s. Clearly influenced by Willy Brandt's presidency and his beliefs on the North-South dialogue, the Socialist International will develop a strategy of close contacts with several parties in Latin America. Mário Soares and Felipe Gonzalez, the highest examples of the success of international party solidarity, were important assets in this strategy.

Notes

- 1 Ana Monica Fonseca, “«É Preciso Regar os Cravos!» A Social-democracia alemã e a transição para a democracia em Portugal (1974–1976)” (PhD diss., ISCTE-Lisbon University Institute, 2011).
- 2 Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Wolfram Kaiser, ed., *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. Governing Europe, 1945–1983* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010); Anne-Marie le Gloannec, ed., *Non-State Actors in International Relations. The Case of Germany* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).
- 3 Declaration of the Socialist International adopted at its first congress held in Frankfurt-am-Main on 30 June–3 July 1951, accessed April 14, 2021. <https://www.socialistinternational.org/congresses/i-frankfurt/>.
- 4 Pilar Ortuño Anaya, *European Socialists and Spain. The Transition to Democracy, 1959–1977* (London: Palgrave, 2002), 19.
- 5 Lawrence Whitehead, “International Aspects of Democratization”, in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, edited by Guillermo O’Donnell et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3–46. According to the SI Bureau Report 1972–1976, there were “22 parties in government or sharing government responsibilities” in this period. See “Bureau’s Report – Draft Introduction” – Institute for Social History (IISH), Amsterdam, Socialist International Archive (SI), 293.
- 6 Fonseca, «É Preciso Regar os Cravos!».
- 7 Odd Arne Westad and Paul Villaume, eds., *Perforating the Iron Curtain. European Détente, Transatlantic Relations and the Cold War, 1965–1985* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010); Matthew Evangelista, “Transnational Organizations and the Cold War”, in *The Cambridge History of Cold War. Vol. 3 Endings*, edited by Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 400–421.
- 8 “Party Leaders’ Conference, Paris”, January 13–14, 1973, Confidential Summary – Institute for Social History (IISH), Amsterdam, Socialist International Archive (SI), 347.
- 9 Ulrich Lappenküpper, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949 bis 1990* (Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 2008).
- 10 Patrick von zur Mühlen, *Die internationale Arbeit der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Ost-West – Konflikt* (Bonn: Dietz Verlag, 2007).
- 11 Bernd Rother and Wolfgang Schmidt, “Einleitung”, in *Berliner Ausgabe. Vol. 8, Über Europa Hinaus. Dritte Welt und Sozialistische Internationale*, edited by Willy Brandt (Bonn: Dietz Verlag, 2006), 15–109.
- 12 Marcelo Caetano was a law professor and had been minister of colonies (1945–1947) and head of the National Union (from 1947 onwards), the single party of the Estado Novo. He was also rector of University of Lisbon between 1959 and 1962, when he resigned because of the clashes between the political police and the students. Caetano was seen as a possible but not a perfect successor to Salazar. In September 1968, following Salazar’s deteriorating health, Caetano was named prime minister. See Filipe Ribeiro Menezes, *Salazar. A Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009), 598–610.
- 13 Mário Soares was the lawyer that had represented, among other opponents of the regime, the family of General Humberto Delgado after his assassination in 1965. Soares had been, since 1964, the leader of the Acção Socialista Portuguesa, Portuguese Socialist Action (ASP) and was, since 1968, exiled in São Tomé and Príncipe. See Pedro Oliveira, “A Sense of Hopelessness? Portuguese Oppositionists Abroad in the Final Years of the Estado Novo, 1968–1974”, *Contemporary European History* 26, no. 3 (2017): 465–486, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777317000248> and Fernando Rosas,

- A Transição Falhada. O Marcelismo e o Final do Estado Novo (1968–1974)* (Lisbon: Editorial Notícias, 2004), 16.
- 14 Norrie MacQueen and Pedro Aires Oliveira, “‘Grocer meets Butcher’: Marcello Caetano’s London Visit of 1973 and the Last Days of Portugal’s Estado Novo”, *Cold War History* 10, no. 1 (2010): 29–50, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740902764551>; António Costa Pinto, “Twentieth Century Portugal: An Introduction”, in *Contemporary Portugal: Politics, Society and Culture*, edited by António C. Pinto (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 1–46.
 - 15 “Procès-verbal de la première réunion du Comité du Portugal de l’Internationale Socialiste”, Circulaire n° p.5/72, 06.04.1972 – IISH, SI, 779.
 - 16 “Statement by the Commission of the Socialist International”, 24.10.1969 – Institute for Social History (IISH), Amsterdam, Socialist International Archive (SI), 778.
 - 17 Letter from Hans Janitschek to Marcelo Caetano, 21.10.1969 – IISH, SI, 778.
 - 18 Cable from the Socialist International to Marcelo Caetano, 24.10.1969 – IISH, SI, 778.
 - 19 Letter from Hans-Eberhard Dingels to Hans Janitschek, 09.10.1969 – IISH, SI, 778.
 - 20 According to the former head of the PS’s International Department, Rui Mateus, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation paid for the travel expenses of the participants but had no direct intervention in the process. Rui Mateus, *Contos Proibidos. Memórias de Um PS Desconhecido* (Lisbon: D. Quixote, 1996), 42–44. The same was confirmed by Elke Esters (Sabel), former delegate of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation for Portugal during the 1970s, in interviews with the author in July 2014 in Bonn, and in Lisbon in April 2016.
 - 21 Fonseca, «É Preciso Regar os Cravos!», 77.
 - 22 Rui Lopes, *West Germany and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1968–1974. Between Cold War and Colonialism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014).
 - 23 Fonseca, «É Preciso Regar os Cravos!», 78–79. The first international event of the Portuguese Socialist party was in July 1973, when Soares and others were invited to London by the Labour Party in anticipation of Caetano’s visit to the United Kingdom, to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. See MacQueen and Oliveira, “Grocer meets Butcher”, 29–50.
 - 24 Ana Monica Fonseca, “From Iberian Peninsula to Latin America: The Socialist International’s Initiatives in the First Years of Brandt’s Presidency”, in *Willy Brandt and International Relations. Europe, the USA and Latin America, 1974–1992*, edited by Bernd Rother and Klaus Larres (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 179–193.
 - 25 Fonseca, «É Preciso Regar os Cravos!»
 - 26 On the international relations during the final years of the Portuguese dictatorship, see: Rui Lopes, “Accommodating and Confronting the Portuguese Dictatorship within NATO, 1970–4”, *The International History Review* 30, no. 3 (2016): 1–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2015.1046388>.
 - 27 António Muñoz Sanchez, “Aportación al estudio de la influencia de los factores internacionales en la transición democrática española”, *Memoranda*, 3 (1998): 55–67. See also Charles Powell, “International Aspects of Democratization. The Case of Spain”, in *The International Dimensions of Democratization. Europe and the Americas*, edited by Lawrence Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
 - 28 Willy Brandt, “Sessão de Abertura da Conferência do Estoril”, in *Processos de Democratização na Península Ibérica e na América Latina. Conferência de Lisboa, 30 Setembro a 2 de Outubro de 1978* (Lisbon: Partido Socialista, 1978), 42.
 - 29 Fonseca, «É Preciso Regar os Cravos!»
 - 30 Soares’ interview with Maria Joao Avelaz.
 - 31 “Besprechungen in Caracas und Mexiko ueber möglichkeiten und formen zukünftiger zusammenarbeit auf parteien-ebene”, Klaus Lindenberg, 31.05.1976 – AdsD, Klaus Lindenberg Depositum, 91.
 - 32 Notes on the Bureau’s meeting in Rom, 2–3 June 1977 – AdsD, 1/WBASI00003.

- 33 “Informe de la mission de la Internacional Socialista a la America Latina”, 15–25. Marzo. 1978 – IISH, SI Archive, 1127.
- 34 Author’s interview with Klaus Lindenberg, Bonn, 09.04.2014.
- 35 Author’s interview with Klaus Lindenberg, Bonn, 09.04.2014.
- 36 Declaração de Lisboa, 03.10.1978, in *Processos de Democratização na Península Ibérica e na América Latina. Conferência de Lisboa, 30 Setembro a 2 de Outubro de 1978* (Lisbon: Partido Socialista, 1978).