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## **An Insight on Intergovernmental Organization Membership**

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Master (Msc) in International Management

Supervisor:

Doctor Maria do Rosário Costa e Silva da Veiga, Assistant Professor,  
Department of Accounting, ISCTE-IUL

October, 2022



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Business School

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## Resumo

As organizações intergovernamentais (OIGs) existem há muitos anos e não parecem vir a ser uma realidade rara num futuro próximo. Estas organizações têm muitos benefícios que as mantêm atrativas para os estados membros e respectivas populações. Por outro lado, mesmo que raro, não é inédito que os estados saiam das mesmas. Enquanto muitos investigadores se têm debruçado sobre a entrada e saída das nações das OIGs, este trabalho foca-se num terceiro aspeto, nomeadamente nas diferentes condições que afetam a recusa de afiliação de países às OIGs. Foi adoptada uma abordagem de pesquisa quantitativa para encontrar a correlação entre o Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) e a opção de um país não se juntar a uma OIG. Os resultados apresentam uma baixa correlação entre o PIB e a ausência de filiação de países a OIGs. Essa constatação é importante para entender que nem sempre o PIB é o motivo da decisão de um país, apesar das taxas de adesão das OIGs.

**Palavras chave:** Organizações Intergovernamentais, Membros, Produto Interno Bruto  
**Classificação JEL:** F53, O19



## **Abstract**

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have been around for many years and they do not seem to be a rare commodity in the foreseeable future. IGOs have many benefits that keep them attractive to states and their people. On the other hand, however rare, it is not unheard of for states to withdraw from IGOs. As many researchers delve into joining and leaving IGOs, the empirical method of the current work focuses on a third aspect that looks into how different variables affect the withholding of membership of IGO. To find the answer to this question, the approach of quantitative research is taken to find the correlation between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the withholding of a country from IGO membership. The results explain that GDP has a low correlation with the withholding of IGO membership. This finding is important to understand that GDP is not always the reason for the decision of a country, despite the IGOs membership fees.

**Keywords:** Intergovernmental Organizations, Membership, Gross Domestic Product

**JEL Classification:** F53, O19





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## CHAPTER 1

### **Introduction**

International Organizations (IOs) have been around since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. After the constitution of the first IO, the International Telecommunication Union, many other organizations have been created so that countries from all over the world could come together for a common cause and goal. IOs and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) are very similar, but IOs encompass any institution that draws membership from three or more states that are held together by an agreement (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020). IGOs are similar, but rather, it needs to have at least an internationally recognized treaty and they have a permanent secretariat or headquarters for the institution (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020; Pevehouse et al., 2004).

The current work focuses on IGOs, which can be considered a subset of IOs. Therefore reference to IOs can be interchangeably considered as IGOs, when mentioning a governmental based IO. The main goal of this research is to determine what makes a country abstain from an IGO. In order to justify the interest of the topic, the dissertation will explore the themes of trust and motivation: what makes states want to join or leave these organizations. There are many International Relations (IR) scholars who have written and researched about IOs, but there has been no research done on the topic of countries purposefully holding back their membership from IOs, and IGOs. There are studies explaining the decision of a country to leave and what makes IOs attractive enough to join (Rey and Barkdull, 2005, (1, 7,22); Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020; Gray, 2018; Miller et al., 2018; von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019); however, the reasons to not be a part of an IGO or an IO is unknown. This research would contribute for IGOs understanding on how they could establish rapport with a certain country that might be joining. More specifically, in the empirical analysis, the scope will focus on the relation between withholding and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Furthermore, IOs could understand commonalities of the states that have joined. Lastly, the contribution of this paper will give an insight to the states considering being part of an international structure.

The work is divided into six parts. The first part establishes the structure of the dissertation. The second part reviews academic literature that helps establish the relationship between countries and IOs: what makes them trustworthy, why states want to join and how international institutions fail to deliver, pushing states to leave. The third aspect of this dissertation is its empirical work that will explore how the GDP of a country affects its membership based on the framework that the literature presented in the previous part. This leads into the results, followed by the analysis. Lastly, the conclusion will point out

how this work can contribute to IO research, while also establishing a point of premise that can be looked into, for future retention of state membership.

## CHAPTER 2

### Literature Review

By understanding the factors that make IOs attractive to join while also exploring the reasons why some states leave, this paper will explain why some states might be reluctant to join. We will associate trust with legitimacy, since without trust, there is no legitimacy, in general and vice versa. In this context, we assume the notion of trust and legitimacy is rooted in the same foundation (Torgler, 2007).

#### 2.1. Trust

The concept of trust and legitimacy in an IO can be summed up in four parts, as to why its members believe in them. The first idea is that IOs in general are very big organizations: the reason they have become their size is due in part to its members believing in what they have to offer. The second idea revolves around the understanding that IOs are not controlled by the government, rather IOs help them as third parties. The third idea relates to the second point, but focuses on the fact that they are separated entities from the government. Consequently, they have the luxury of having the reputation of unbiased views. Lastly, comradeship instills a sense of trust that can only exist when there is a common interest for everyone (Baccini et al., 2013).

##### 2.1.1. Size

International Organizations emerged in the 19th century, but the fact that they are still present, and thriving, may indicate that they will be here for a while longer. Size in this context refers to the importance of an IO and how they add value to society. The fact that states have not abandoned them is a testimony to their grandeur. It also shows that they are a value to society that they have a great potential (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). Exploring trust that states have for IOs indicates that there is a sense of loyalty and, across the board, a sense of duty to uphold what IOs represent.

In this particular context, the term size refers to the notoriety of the entity. Most people know and understand the basic functions and purpose of international organizations. People know them by their acronyms better than their full name: WHO, UNICEF, UN, just to name a few. They have been constant, important explanatory and dependent variables over the past fifty years in international relations (Pevehouse et al., 2004). Many have been created as a result of wars. However, some of the oldest IOs, like the Universal Postal Union (UPU), laid the functions for how mail is delivered in this particular case (Universal Post Union, n.d.-b). This constant in the public and international eye is a testament to their existence: they represent trust and legitimacy.

Like any legal entity, IOs are held to a standard of legal obligations, and in their cases, international laws (Campbell et al., 2018). The notion that IOs are held at such a standard, on an international level, that “duty of due diligence has emerged as a principle of customary international law” can be agreed by Campbell et al. (2018, p. 565). In other words, due diligence refers to the guarantee that a state will protect other member states from alien nations that are “within its territory and operate as an affirmative defense to liability for harms that nonetheless occur” (Campbell et al., 2018, p. 565). Simple example of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), where its member states will come to the aid of one another if an attack occurs on their respective lands from non-member states.

IOs benefit from the view of the public for their trustworthiness, they can exert more power when states see the legitimacy in their actions (Stephen, 2018). For example, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), is seen as the police force for the international community and are efficient to pursue their cause, their Red Notices have a sense of worth to them when in reality, Red Notices are just a formality of a wanted criminal- there is no enforcement action of Red Notices (Calcara, 2020). Furthermore, better informed citizens may be better aware of IO efforts, which makes them trust the organizations even more (Torgler, 2007).

The use of expansive media coverage makes the presence of IOs trustworthy. When people see and hear about these organizations on a regular basis, they deem them important enough to be credible (Dingwerth et al., 2020). The media, for IOs, serves the audience a heuristic approach that indirectly assesses the authority of the organization (Dingwerth et al., 2020). When an IO is the source of an information, it increases a person’s perceptions of the truth of reported achievement, and increases perceived high performance compared to national government reporting identical information (James and Petersen, 2017). In other words, a source will be more valid coming from an IO than a government agency, even if they report the same information to its citizens. There are case studies that suggest IOs are seen by citizens as having more “credibility than national governments in reporting on relative national performance, even when they are providing the same information” (Broome et al., 2017; James and Petersen, 2017). This point is highlighted in the next part of IO dependability that people and member states see them as partners working towards the same goals.

### **2.1.2. Not government**

International organizations would not be able to have their credibility and ability to exert power on the world stage if governments did not do their parts on solving mutual issues. The important fact is that they work in partnership with them, and not for the government. There is a fine line that they walk: IOs need to have the legitimacy from government officials, while also having that separation that differentiates them from being the government.

The concept of having these entities connected to political systems is an advantage to them and to us as a society. The paper by Dingwerth et al. (2020), proves that politicization is linked to IO legitimization and therefore are independent of objective institutional features. IOs getting the seal of approval by a government gives them the additional legitimacy that others would not have otherwise. Political trust in IOs is a proxy to a certain trust in the government (Torgler, 2007). In other words, political trust might influence a perceived notion of trust in IOs but also the perceived institutional quality of a country (Torgler, 2007). If a problem or scandal, in terms of policies, arises in an organization, it will not be the IO itself that is responsible for the bad outcome, but rather the states in these organizations; member states choose between themselves what passes and what gets rejected (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). For example, if a particular IO is trying to pass a policy that would allow a third world country to get additional funds but it does not pass, the IOs would not be at fault, but rather Country X that rejected the policy would be blamed for the decision. Formal IOs are prominent participants in many critical episodes in international politics; the UN and its peacekeeping efforts in Sudan (AfricaNews, 2022), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loaning Greece money from its sovereign default (Thomsen, 2019), and the WHO who set standards on how to deal with COVID 19, just to name a few instances (Abbott and Snidal, 1998).

IOs are an important alternative, in influence, to national governments as they are institutionally mandated and endowed with resources to, for instance, help bailouts for distressed economies, coordinate crisis management policies or development financing, while also differing from national governments in their source credibility (Broome et al., 2017; James and Petersen, 2017). Intergovernmental organizations, as the name indicates, perform many of the same functions as IOs but without the coercive powers that a government agency might have (Rey and Barkdull, 2005). IGO and its administrative secretariats have their benefits for depoliticizing their activity, or at least, for avoiding visible political squabbles and keeping political tension low; for example, trusting them can be seen as a subcategory of international trust (Petiteville, 2017). The IOs baseline is to spread the benefits of their expertise while also acting as conveyor belts for the transmission of norms and models of "good" political behavior, their use of expertise seems unavoidable and legitimate (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). But the dependence of an IO on expertise, is particularly important as it is a palliative source of legitimacy for institutions which cannot claim the same democratic legitimacy as states (Petiteville, 2017). They work with governments to get the information, while also having the databases to be able to compile data from everywhere, and still being a separate entity from governments not to have any biases. IOs also have the resources to find their information, when governments might not be able to allocate funding for such research. These institutional sources may be discerned as having greater honesty than national governments reporting on themselves, since they do not have a need to misrepresent information in their favor (James and Petersen, 2017). James and Petersen (2017) continue to add that citizens



are more skeptical about government agencies if they self-reported high performance, in contrast to the same information from an independent, non-governmental, source. Any IO will wholeheartedly share statistical data about each country for the benefit of the truth, rather than what would look good for a certain country.

IOs have the benefit of having both feet on both sides of the camp: working with governments while also having the ability of not being considered them. Of course the government plays a vital role on their legitimacy and whether they are worth the trust of people, but in the end, IOs are for the benefit of the people of each of the respective member states.

### **2.1.3. Neutral Policies**

Relating to the previous Subsection 2.1.2, the presumption of separation from the government gives IOs the legitimacy of unbiased status. Being neutral in this context is having the simple idea of not having coercion into decision making. In general, people gravitate towards facts and data that are seen as neutral and backed. IOs present themselves as the neutral option for producing a reliable unbiased consensus in what they publish because they are free of national biases (Rey and Barkdull, 2005; Abbott and Snidal, 1998). The legitimacy of IOs is therefore greatly dependent on their ability to maintain a perception that they abide by their neutrality and impartiality when delivering tasks, thus making themselves depoliticize their initiatives as much as possible (Petiteville, 2017).

IOs are created to make sure that governments work for the people rather than governments making their own decisions for their personal gains. Most articles agree that a trustworthy and legitimate IO is the whole reason why people still believe in them and that their impartiality makes them credible (Petiteville, 2017; Abbott and Snidal, 1998). Namely, democratic constituencies have an incentive to pay specific attention to the transparency and accountability of IOs (Dingwerth et al., 2020). IOs act as representatives of the international community; it allows them to generate information on policy consequences that is regarded as disinterested and thus credible (Thompson, 2006). There is no need for them to blemish facts when their practices reflect a sense for symbolic legitimacy rather than efficiency (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). These organizations have everything to justify that there is nothing other than truthfulness in their actions, which people grasp and appreciate enough to trust them.

### **2.1.4. Idea of comradeship**

The drive that makes an IO trustworthy is the comradeship that is needed from each country. This comradeship is built on the insistence that part of their mission is to spread, ingrain, and enforce global values and norms; in other words, they are seen as the *missionaries* of our time (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). They have a sense of credibility that, as a society, people believe in.

Working together makes it easier to trust the other parties as there is a sense of similarity that two countries have in being a member in an organization. Rey and Barkdull

(2005, p. 388) backs this idea: “joint membership in IGOs reduces the likelihood of conflict between the two states”. Torgler (2007, p. 69) adds that “a safe environment guarantees that the international network is maintained [and that] such conditions may foster trust in IOs.” Abbott and Snidal (1998) agrees that if the approval of an IO is high, it limits the needs of a state and the duration to retaliate when disadvantageous decisions are made. When an IO has the credibility about them, states will take a step back and realize that disrupting beneficial international relationships is not worth getting worked up for when everyone wants to maintain the peace (Rey and Barkdull, 2005). As much as IOs are collective organizations, states also act in their own interest ”of [continuing] to align [their]behavior with normative expectations in order to be seen as legitimate member[s] and continue deriving gains from membership” (Miller et al., 2018, p. 119). It is a win-win situation when an organization is reputable enough that their own members want to entrust themselves in this organization for their own benefits.

Many academics collectively agree to say that this confidence leads to a cohesion that is not present in other global partnerships (Erciyas, 2018; Miller et al., 2018; Rey and Barkdull, 2005). IOs can bring the worst of enemy states together to fight injustices in other parts of the world that they mutually agree to help. IOs have been created and dissolved, but their concept of unity, trust and cooperation is ever present, as long as states find common goals to achieve for the common good.

## **2.2. Why states join**

There are many reasons to join an organization, reasons which can be divided into three subsections. The first delves into the simple idea of states wanting a part on the world stage. They want to have a voice in matters that they can contribute to and can use to their benefit. The second looks into states that want to change their image. It is more likely that democratic states join these organizations and as mentioned before, the notion of belonging attracts states who want a sense of belonging to a cause. The last brushes on the geopolitics and how joining IOs gives states an image of contributing to global issues rather than uncommitted states that only have their interest at heart

### **2.2.1. Political Voice and Personal Gain**

As Malala Youssef once perfectly said, “When the whole world is silent, even one voice becomes powerful;” she encompassed what an IO means to states that do not have the same political presence as the U.S. or China (ME, 2021). One can consider *weaker* states, states that do not represent 0.50 percent of world GDP shares from the chart in Annex A. The particular data was extracted from Worldometers (2017). However, all the other countries not found on the list were found in these respective sources: “Djibouti GDP 1985-2020”, 2020, “Federated States of Micronesia GDP - Gross Domestic Product 2017”, 2017, “GDP (current US\$) - Nauru — Data”, 2017, “Kosovo GDP 2008-2022”, n.d., “Liechtenstein GDP - Gross Domestic Product 2017”, 2020, “Monaco GDP 1970-2022”, 2022, “North Korea GDP - Gross Domestic Product 2017”, 2017, O’Neill, 2014, O’Neill,

2022a, O'Neill, 2022b, "Syria GDP - Gross Domestic Product 2017", 2019, "Vatican City Country facts PopulationData.net", 2019, and "Venezuela Real GDP Growth — Economic Indicators — CEIC", 2021. All of the given GDPs are for the year 2017.

From the 195 sovereign nations in the world listed in the UN, 26 of them represent more than 0.50 percent of the world GDP. In other words, 13.3 percent of the countries in the world represent 83.07 percent of the GDP. For weaker states, becoming a member of an IO is an opportunity to increase their political clout and bargaining power (Thompson, 2006). Balik (2008) brings forth the fact that small states, if they have the incentive, will be able to succeed in an issue of international concern, while also contributing to the credibility and effectiveness of the particular IO that gives them the opportunity for discussion. IOs give states an autonomous and powerful voice in global politics (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999).

While very intriguing for smaller states, IOs attract the powerful ones as well. These bigger states join IOs for the same reasons that the smaller ones do: self-gain. States, in general, join IOs who represent what they want to convey but the bigger one joins in order to push their political agendas and to "boost their propaganda machines" (Calcara, 2020, 131; Gray, 2018). Petiteville (2017) agrees that states use these organizations to promote their national interest. For example, Italy and China are tied for the most UNESCO world heritage sites (Buchholz, 2021) - the benefits of being inscribed in the World Heritage List is raising awareness for the sites, while also receiving "financial assistance and expert advice" (Buchholz, 2021). These countries do have a rich history with many important cultural significance; nevertheless, the list of the top five countries that are on the list are all above the 0.50 percent of world GDP representation. Dingwerth et al. (2020) rationalize how, in a nutshell, these powerful countries justify their presence among weaker states by using their "democratic narrative strategically to disguise the unequal distribution of power, and influence among member states or to legitimize this inequality to themselves and their populations" (Dingwerth et al., 2020, 719).

International organizations are a means to an end, for both sides of the spectrum. Even the most powerful of states use these organizations for their benefits, as stated previously.

### **2.2.2. Democracy and Cooperation**

Connections created through joining international organizations are a way for states to establish a status and to change the way they are perceived on the world stage. Like mentioned in the previous Subsection 2.1.4, comradeship amongst states, in IOs, is highly sought after since they are commonplace that states can gather to discuss particular issues and make interactions more efficient, including reducing transaction costs and increasing information sharing (Miller et al., 2018). This information sharing is vital to IOs for facilitating the negotiation and implementation and implementing agreements, resolving disputes, managing conflicts, carrying out operational activities like technical assistance, elaborating norms that Abbott and Snidal (1998) discuss thoroughly. The partnerships

created through these organizations allow states to exchange and develop strong relations that lead development of complementary practices among other actors and thereby increasing joining benefits within an institutional system (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020).

IOs can simply be defined as collaboration between member states that join when they are motivated either either to respond to others like them, or overcoming global failures, or simply to be part of a group that have similar characteristics (Baccini et al., 2013; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). As Rey and Barkdull (2005) explains, joining IOs, specifically IGOs, reflects a general orientation towards seeking a broad agreement among all affected parties on a course action; it is the best means of getting a consensus agreement to a solution (Rey and Barkdull, 2005).

The concept of reached consensus agreements translates to a democratic due process working, which IOs are able to guarantee (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). The advantage of IOs, being centralized and independent, allows states to accomplish goals much more easily than from a decentralized organization (Pevehouse et al., 2004). They are free to make their own decisions without being held back by third parties. It is a known notion that free and democratic states are more likely to join these organizations. Rey and Barkdull (2005) emphasizes that states that have a higher responsiveness to popular demands are more likely to join IGOs. Younger democracies see IGOs as a way to be able to support democratic transitions in other countries while also enhancing their global status by separating themselves from being a previously more restrictive state (Kim and Heo, 2017). For instance, when the Ivory Coast gained its independence in 1960 (RIM, 2012), they joined many international organizations like The International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1960 (International Maritime Organization, 2019), World Organization for animal health (OIE) in 1962 (Russia et al., 2017) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1963 and the IMF that same year (World Bank, n.d.; International Monetary Fund, 2017), just to name a few. Even if it is not the first country to come to mind to represent the definition of a democracy, Ivory Coast is an example of opening itself up to IOs once they gained their independence from France in 1960 (RIM, 2012). States also join these IOs seeking better rank themselves, in comparison with other countries. These international rankings have a role in showing people the relative performance that their government is doing (James and Petersen, 2017). This transparency helps citizens of member states develop a better understanding of their government actions. It is also a reason why more democratic states seek IOs aid.

### **2.2.3. Geopolitical reasons**

The above Subsection 2.2.2, Democracy and Comradeship, stipulates how democratic countries are more likely to be attracted to joining IOs. Additionally, there is also incentives that attracts democratic states to join: the appeal of the international trade and the geopolitical policies. International trade, not only, trade in terms of finance, but also in terms of conversations. Geopolitics relates more precisely in this thesis, as the geography of a state in relation to its politics/ relationship with another country.

IOs can be seen as a big mixer because they allow countries to get to know one another. As mentioned previously, IOs are a vehicle for ideas to pass through each member state. They do so by legitimizing or delegitimizing ideas that certain members might have by, in the narrow sense, reducing transaction cost (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). This diffusion of information can be discussed without having the stigma that it might be implemented. The network of IOs allows conversation to occur as it implements a common standard of transparency which lowers this "transaction cost" allowing this ease of interaction between members (Baccini et al., 2013). Another benefit that IOs bring to the table is the facilitate the democratic development of its members by indirectly and directly enhancing the international trade of the states: additionally, the empirical analysis of Kim and Heo (2017) supports the statement that proves that IOs play a big role in enhancing economic openness and facilitating economic integration.

The importance of geopolitics in IGOs are evident with organizations that have a specific group of member states like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that only deal with regional goals. IGOs, more specifically, are instrumental in keeping a sense of peace in geopolitics. IGOs are different from the regular IOs as they are subject to international laws and they are formed by treaties. This holds each member state accountable for its actions and allows it to create alliances when deemed necessary. IGOs like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or even the European Union (EU) come together to effectively coordinate policies in the presence of similar geostrategic and regional interests (Baccini et al., 2013). Governments will react, in terms of joining or going to another, to IGOs whether or not a main competitor is thinking of joining a certain IGO. Recently, the process has been observed with the application of Sweden and Finland joining NATO (Deni, 2022). With the threats that the Russian government is posing in that region of the world, it has made nonmember countries rethink about joining certain IGOs. This alliance that brings countries together nurtures a desire for peace, cooperation and good will.

### **2.3. Why states leave**

In the piece by Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2020), the author observed that the act of terminating and leaving an organization is very rare. However, it still happens.

This part of the dissertation will focus on the two main reasons why members decide to leave IOs. The first reason can be attributed to internal conflicts that can arise from dissatisfaction with the organizations or the domination of powerful states versus weaker ones. The second reason is more related to domestic issues: a change of government that does not see a value in being part of an IO, for instance.

### **2.3.1. They do not agree**

This subsection will explore two main themes of states not agreeing with IOs. The first relates to internal conflicts that arise, therefore resulting in the exodus of states. Secondly, the power struggle that some states experience is too much for them to handle.

#### **2.3.1.1. Internal conflict**

Internal conflicts are often the spark that just make a country leave. Like in any entity, change is inevitable and part of the evolution process. At the beginning, IOs are created by original members and they establish their mission statement (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Overtime, these organizations will change according to the times: and in that process, organizationally, dysfunctionally and inefficiency will be more prevalent (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). If an IO cannot perform to the standards its members have set for it, it will trigger member states to leave (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019). Not only if organizations change drastically to the point of dysfunctionality, but also if they change in terms of taking stances in polarizing ideals. The exodus of Israel and the United States (U.S.) from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2011 was (Kramer, 2019), in simple terms, triggered by the acceptance of the Palestinian State as a member (Petiteville, 2017).

As IOs lack the authority to effectively enforce norms and laws, there is a sense of invalidity to their authority as a global voice (Rey and Barkdull, 2005). On the other hand, there is a legitimacy drift that occurs when organizations lack the ability to change and thus fail to adapt to changing times: therefore, members that do not see a benefit in refractory organizations will cause them to leave (Stephen, 2018). Moreover, these institutions that no longer can provide efficacious benefits, e.g., information, centralization, and independence drive states away as there are no more benefits to gain from (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019). von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019, p. 337) demonstrated that the members that do leave at a higher rate, are democratic states. These democratic states are stable on a political and economic level that non-democratic states cannot afford to not be a part of IGOs.

#### **2.3.1.2. Strong vs. Weak**

Let us consider that there are two groups of members that join IOs; there are the members that join in order to dictate and reap the benefits, and on the latter, there is the group of members that share and work to benefit all its confreres, they shall be known as the *stronger* and *weaker* states respectively. It is pertinent to say that these stronger and weaker states contribute to IOs and IGOs in different manners. We will delve into the reasons why weaker states leave IOs.

To abridge previously mentioned in the Section 2.2, Why states join, states join in order to grow their international standings and gain respect on the global stage; however, if stronger countries abuse their power, developing countries might be implicitly coerced into accepting unjust or unethical international agreements or financial arrangements

(Temkin, 2004). As many of these IOs function on membership size and contribution, it is easier for weaker states to be left behind or ignored when it comes to making impactful decisions.

On the other hand, stronger states use IGOs to bargain, for such matters like geopolitical factors, democracy levels of countries and other issues that pertain to globalization (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019; Copelovitch and Pevehouse, 2019). Weaker states can see through their tactics of stronger states bargaining for their benefit and therefore causing withdrawal as they can attest to the unwarranted bargain by their fellow peer (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019). Free from interference from third parties, IGOs independence is constrained by their powerful member states, especially, since they can limit their autonomy while also interfering in operations according to (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). The most common states to withdraw according to von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019, p. 340) research, Indonesia, Poland, Panama, and Thailand are in the group of frequent withdrawers that are not considered *strong* states per se. The power balance is not at an equilibrium: not all states can be certain that their voices will be heard during important deliberations

### **2.3.2. Change in government**

Governments play an active role in the image of how other countries perceive them. More often, stable democratic countries will remain in an IGO they see as doing its job and helping its respective members. However, interior affairs may bring a change of government that is less liberal and more authoritarian, or a government more inclined to push a nationalistic agenda on its people.

Being part of an IO is like being part of a community and when a member leaves, it is leaving its community. Many leave as a way to represent a nationalistic agenda of putting their country first. Authoritarian leaders, accustomed to unilateral action, find the consultation process of IGOs tedious and unnecessary (Rey and Barkdull, 2005). Once a country joins an IO, it cooperates with others in order to obtain the best outcome for all. On the contrary, authoritarian regimes want a unilateral type of government and having outsiders interfere makes it harder for them to achieve their purpose. As Kim and Heo (2017, p. 424) reiterates, organizations could cause economic difficulties by suspending trade or other financial benefits, which could weaken the legitimacy of nationalistic governments.

Moreover, the rise of right-wing populism questioning the legitimacy of international authority in general is a clear indication that withdrawal is imminent (Dingwerth et al., 2020). One of the most recent and public withdrawals of the United Kingdoms vote to leave from the European Union (EU) in 2016 (“Brexit - UK’s withdrawal from the EU - EUR-Lex”, 2018). Even though the prime minister at the time was against the withdrawal, and thus resigned once it was voted, the rise of its right wing populace made the withdrawal to occur (Stewart et al., 2016). Withdrawals can indicate an important phenomenon as they may have implications for the policy of the country and international

cooperation (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019). During his presidency, Donald Trump withdrew from 11 organizations ranging from the United Nations Human Rights Council (NHRC) to the World Health Organization (WHO) (Shukla, 2020). These withdrawals were not as random as one might think. The termination of these IOs was the desire to push the "America first" agenda. As von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019, p. 247) supports, nationalistic parties in power have a tendency to push for withdrawals from IOs and IGOs.

As much as one can blame the rise of right wing and nationalist views being the catalyst of retreating from IOs, one factor to take into consideration is that many IGOs require a certain fee to become a member and some countries, over time, are not able to provide the funds to be part of the club. Low economic growth rates may trigger IGO withdrawal, in part, due to budget cuts or decreasing state power (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019). von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019, p. 354) claimed that a change in government orientation increased the baseline risk of withdrawal by 74 percent and that economic recessions may make states more inclined to leave IOs. In other words, the drastic shift in government power, especially in times of economic difficulty, will see a rise in member states throwing in the towel and leaving organizations that do not adhere to what they want.

### **2.3.3. Effects of withdrawing**

The physical act of leaving an IGO is very rare and it is a full process. It takes a lot of time and resources to make the exit occur (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020). Once they have withdrawn, past members will lose out on the benefits, and the organization themselves will lose out on funding. The act of leaving an IO does not happen often and there are consequences when members decide to part ways. On the one hand, the withdrawal of a country can affect the funding IOs receive from the withdrawn member (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019). As more countries withdraw from IOs, IOs lose credibility in their authority and effectiveness as an organization that brings countries together to solve problems (Copelovitch and Pevehouse, 2019).

Leaving IOs and IGOs is a rare event, it will question as to the reasoning of the withdrawal and states will question whether or not the leaving was warranted. On the other hand, states that withdraw, do not have access to the social bond that was shared when being a member; their exit reduces the social incentives to comply with community norms and rules (Miller et al., 2018). All the benefits of being in an IO will be gone and the ease of communication between countries will have added challenges as they do not have the common ground of the organization any more.

Being part of and IO is being part of a club on a global scale with many factors and consequences. Just the mere certitude of not having to deal with such downsides of the global organizations can deter countries from even joining. In the next part of the dissertation, it will determine certain reasons that make a state withhold memberships from IGOs.





## CHAPTER 3

### Methodology

Based on the articles mentioned in the literature review, it can be established that there is a benefit and a drawback to being in IGOs. The focus of the current work is to investigate the reasons for a state to make a decision to join an IGO or to withhold from it. To date, these reasons have not yet been the target of extensive research. The current work will focus on one of the possible reasons. The idea that the finances of a country can play a role in the exodus of the members is introduced by von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019). In order to analyze that concept, one angle can be drawn up in order to find a possible answer to such a question. The idea that the GDP of a state plays a role in whether the state can afford the membership fee associated with the IGO. In other words, the poorer the country, the more likely they will withhold membership. In an effort to explain the theory, the current work gathers data of countries GDP and withholding from a selected IGO sample, and then attempts to model the effects of GDP on membership.

#### 3.1. Data acquisition

This section walks through the various methods done for data acquisition, and also refers to the reason for the selection of the dependent and independent variables.

##### 3.1.1. Selection of Intergovernmental Organization

In order to analyze these theories, the methods described by Given (2008), codes and coding were created as a result of the raw data method that was gathered. To establish a starting point to collect the data, the decision was to select 24 IGOs that were not restrained by membership geography or exclusivity, i.e., any state could become a member. The list includes IGOs that belong to the UN and IGOs that are not related to them. The sample had to be picked out of convenience based on the fact that information of the organization must have been transparent. Anyone would be able to find the data on the respective IGOs website.

Additionally to incorporating these organizations, all the chosen IGOs have a membership fee associated with being a member. In each of the organizational constitutions, there is a clause that states how budgets will be disbursed each year. All the IGOs have a form of a fee, ranging from a minimum payment all the way to a member state paying a fee in accordance to their *wealth*. The assumption is that all IGOs have a membership fee in order to be able to function. In order to find the each IGOs membership fee, each constitution was read through the following sources: Food and Agriculture Organization, n.d.-b, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2016a, World Bank, 2021, International

Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2022, International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009, INTERPOL, 2021, International Finance Corporation, 2020, International Fund for Agricultural Development, n.d.-b, International Labour Organization, 2021, International Maritime Organization, 1958, International Monetary Fund, 2020, International Telecommunication Union, 2021, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 2021, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.-a, U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1945, U.N. Children’s Fund, 1989, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 1964, Universal Post Union, 2018, World Health Organization, 2005, World Intellectual Property Organization, 1979, World Meteorological Organization, 2015, World Organisation for Animal Health, 2022, and World Trade Organization, 1944.

TABLE 3.1. Selected sample of twenty-four IGOs

	Name	Established
*	Food and Agricultural Organization (FOA)	1945
*	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	1957
	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)	1944
	International Center for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID)	1957
*	International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)	1947
	International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)	1923
*	International Finance Corporation (IFC)	1956
*	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	1977
*	International labour Organization (ILO)	1919
*	International Maritime Organization (IMO)	1948
*	International Monetary Fund (IMF)	1945
*	International Telecommunication Union (ITU)	1865
	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)	1988
	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	1997
*	The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	1945
*	UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)	1946
*	UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)	1964
*	UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	1966
*	Universal Postal Union (UPU)	1874
*	World Health Organization (WHO)	1948
*	World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	1967
*	World Meteorological Organization (WMO)	1950
	World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)	1924
*	World Trade Organization (WTO)	1995

Table 3.1 has the list of the twenty-four selected IGOs. The ones marked with an asterisks (\*) fall under the umbrella of UN organizations. To give a wide range of samples,

the IGOs chosen range from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FOA) to World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) to The World Trade Organization (WTO). All the information for each respective IGOs was found on their respective sites which included their name and establishment, Food and Agriculture Organization, n.d.-a, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2016b, World Bank, 2016, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, n.d., International Civil Aviation Organization, n.d., INTERPOL, 2017b, International Finance Corporation, 2019, International Fund for Agricultural Development, n.d.-a, International Labour Organization, 2019, International Maritime Organization, 2021, International Monetary Fund, 2012, International Telecommunication Union, 2019, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, n.d., Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2019, U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2021, U.N. Children's Fund, 2022, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, n.d.-a, U.N. Industrial Development Organization, n.d., Universal Post Union, n.d.-b, World Health Organization, 2019, World Intellectual Property Organization, 2019, World Meteorological Organization, 2016, World Organisation for Animal Health, n.d., and World Trade Organization, 2019.

### **3.1.2. Creation of the list of countries**

With the IGO list established, it was necessary to determine the list of countries to analyze. Based on the U.S. Department of States Independent States in the World - United States Department of State (2019), there are 196 countries including the State of Palestine and the Vatican City State. The list of countries was gathered and grouped together by regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Americas, Oceania. The list of countries can be seen below.

### **3.1.3. Creation of the dependent variable**

The purpose is to determine the relation between withholding and financial state of a country, which makes it the dependent variable. The next step was to determine from the 24 IGOs, which country was missing from each organization. It was not determined whether a country had once been a member once, but rather if the country was not a member. For example, when Israel and the United States withdrew from The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as described by Petiteville (2017) in her article, the fact that they are not members of the IGO would be counted as an abstinence of membership. On the websites of each individual IGO, the list of members could easily be found: Food and Agriculture Organization, 2019, World Bank, n.d., International Civil Aviation Organization, 2019, INTERPOL, 2017a, International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2018, International Labour Organization, n.d., International Maritime Organization, 2019, International Monetary Fund, 2017, International Telecommunication Union, n.d., Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.-b, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, n.d.-b, U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, n.d., U.N. Children's Fund, 2019, U.N. Industrial Development

TABLE 3.2. List of countries defined by regions

Region	Countries
Africa	Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Asia	Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea, Republic of (South) Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen.
Europe	Armenia, Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Vatican City State.
America	Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Oceania	Australia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

Organization, 2019, Universal Post Union, n.d.-a, World Health Organization, n.d., World Intellectual Property Organization, 2019, World Meteorological Organization, 2015, Russia et al., 2017, and World Trade Organization, 2021. Based on the process of elimination, given the list of members it was determined which country was absent from the organization. The process was repeated for each of the 24 selected IGOs to obtain the sample data. To organize the raw data, a system of codes and coding were initially applied to categorize if a state was a member of an IGO. At the end, each country was tallied with

the IGOs they are not members of. To simplify the process, multiple excel sheets were created.

TABLE 3.3. Sample of the taken process of elimination for the dependent variable

Country	GDP (nominal, 2017)	Withholding	FAO	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	ICSD
Australia	1,323,421,072,479.00	2					
Fiji	5,061,202,767.00	0					
Kiribati	185,572,502.00	5		x			x
Micronesia	336,427,500.00	7		x			
Nauru	336,427,500.00	8		x			x
New Zealand	204,139,049,909.00	1					
Palau	289,823,500.00	4					
Samoa	840,927,997.00	2		x			
Tuvalu	39,731,317.00	6		x			x
Vanuatu	862,879,789.00	0		x			x

The Table 3.3 demonstrates a sample of the form of gathering the data for the withholding. A complete table can be found in the Annex B with the 24 IGOs and the 196 countries.

### 3.1.4. Definition of the independent variable

To relate withholding of membership with the finance of a country, it is necessary to define an independent variable associated with that: the GDP of each country. GDP is a metric that can represent a country's economic standing. To find the information, it was essential that the GDPs were from the same year to make the results consistent. As all the GDPs were imputed within their respective country, it allowed for all the countries to be uniform. Once all the data had been gathered, the data points could be presented and shown on a graph.

## 3.2. Model and metrics

Given the purpose to relate the two defined variables, it is necessary to decide a model to fit, and metrics to define how well it represents the relationship between the variables.

### 3.2.1. Model

Given a first analysis to the raw data, the chosen model to explain the relation between withholding from an IGO membership and the GDP was the quadratic regression.

$$f(x) = ax^2 + bx + c \quad (3.1)$$

The quadratic Equation 3.1 represents the quadratic regression model to be used, where  $f(x)$  being the dependent variable is the number of IGOs a state is not a member (withholding), and  $x$  the independent variable is logarithmic of base ten of the GDP.

In the Chapter 4, the Results of the empirical method, the least square method will be put into practice in order to find the optimal fit to the model  $f(x)$  into the data, i.e.,

the fit that reduces the sum of the offsets of the raw data point from the modeled curve. As Wolberg (2006) describes the least squares method, the results of the raw data will generate a quadratic regression that can be used to predict how countries will react to joining IGOs in relation to their GDP.

### 3.2.2. Metrics

The coefficient of determination,  $R^2$ , will be used to analyze how correlated the variables are to each other. The coefficient of determination can be calculated given the equation:

$$R^2 = 1 - \frac{SS_{res}}{SS_{tot}} \quad (3.2)$$

Where in the Equation 3.2,  $SS_{res}$  is the residual sum of squares, also known as the unexplained variation, and  $SS_{tot}$  is the total sum of squares, directly related with the total variation. These values are calculated by the given equations:

$$SS_{res} = \sum_i (y_i - f(x_i))^2 \quad (3.3)$$

$$SS_{tot} = \sum_i (y_i - \bar{y})^2 \quad (3.4)$$

Where, in Equation 3.3,  $y_i$  is the observed withholding, and  $f(x_i)$  is the modeled withholding given the observer independent variable. And where, in Equation 3.4,  $y_i$  is the observed withholding and  $\bar{y}$  the average of the observed withholding.

### 3.3. Tools

All the raw data was imputed into an excel spreadsheet to simplify graphing and calculating the variables. Additionally a programming language, Python 3.10, was used as an auxiliary to compute the least squares method, fit the model to the data, and generate the presented figures.

## CHAPTER 4

### Results

The empirical results can be analyzed for the relationship between GDP and the number of withholdings. These results will be present in a graphical format described as follows. The horizontal axis, for the independent variable, represents the GDP of the countries. The logarithmic scale of base 10 of the GDP is used, for example, a value of 6 is equivalent to one million and a value of 8 is equivalent to one hundred million, since there is such a disparity between countries that this scale can better represent the relation between the different wealth level of the countries. The vertical axis, for the dependent variable, represents the number of IGOs a country is withholding. Then on the top right of the graph, the key is present with the values for the quadratic equation of the particular graph and the coefficient of determination, i.e., an indicator to how correlated the dependent variable is to the independent variable.




FIGURE 4.1. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding

In Figure 4.1 the relationship between the GDP of a state and the withholding from IGOs can be observed. This particular graph represents all the countries put together. Visually, one can see that there seems to be a weak negative correlation. The wealthier the country, the less likely they will withhold from IGOs. To model this correlation, Figure 4.1 has two fits, the linear fit and the quadratic fit. Both of the models have a low coefficient of determination, i.e., the correlation between the variables is not well



explained by the models, but the quadratic regression presents better results. Therefore, only the quadratic fit will be used in the subsequent results. As the graph in Figure 4.1 does not represent a good correlation between withholding and GDP, a next logical step is to analyze this correlation at a regional level.




FIGURE 4.2. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding in Africa

Compared to Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 focuses on African countries. The list of African countries included in this graph can be found in Table 3.2 of Chapter 3. The scales on both the horizontal and vertical axis have been reduced as, on average, the continent is not as wealthy as their counterpart neighbors. The correlation between the variables in Africa is 11.2 percent based on the variation calculation.

It can be concluded that African countries tend to withhold less as most of them withhold between 1 and 0. The quadratic equation does not represent the data points accurately as only three countries withhold more than 1 IGO. However, like the Figure 4.1, wealthier countries have the tendency of withholding less.

Looking at the Figure 4.2 graph, on the horizontal axis, around 10.5  $\log_{10}$  GDP and below, there are only three countries that withhold more than 1 IGO. At 11 and above, two countries withhold one, and the others are members of all the sampled IGO are at zero.

Figure 4.3 includes the Asian countries and the Middle East. Compared to the African graph, the Asian graph has a bigger scale. The obvious outliers State of Palestine, point (10.16, 18), that is withholding from 18 IGOs and North Korea (10.24, 10), withholding from 10 IGOs. If the two outliers were taken out of consideration, the scale would be much more condensed in terms of withholding and GDP.




FIGURE 4.3. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding in Asia

The curve is much more flat, almost a line, compared to other countries and it does not seem to curve at the end. Figure 4.3 is the only graph that does not curve up at the end. There is a big disparity between these countries in this continent as there are a couple countries above withholding 5, when most are close to zero. This all be confirmed with the  $R^2$  being 0.089.




FIGURE 4.4. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding in America

Like Figure 4.2, Figure 4.4 has a smaller vertical axis scale but this graph includes the wealthiest country in the world. Like the other countries, the less wealthy nations tend

to withhold more. The only reason the curve goes up at the end is because of the United States (13.29, 2). If it was not for the outlier, the curve would not go up, but rather it would be a line that has a slight negative slope. The curve gives the most average distance between each data point, therefore curving up for the United States.

Most of the countries are in the range of one and zero withholdings and the ones that are above them are withholding for reasons that will be brought up in the analysis. Looking at the correlation, it can be considered weak as the data shows that the confidence is 13 percent.




FIGURE 4.5. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding in Europe

Europe clearly expresses the theme that less wealthy countries withhold more than the wealthy. Europe has the smallest countries, on average size, but these countries are not necessarily poor. The smallest country in the world has a higher GDP than four other countries (Annex A). Compared to the figures, European countries have a more concentrated GDP. Most of the countries fall within  $\log_{10}$  GDP 10 to 12 on the horizontal axis.

Based on the graph in Figure 4.5, it can be agreed that most of the countries with a  $\log_{10}$  GDP less than 10 tend to withhold more than 6 IGOs. Then from 10 to 11, there are four countries that withhold from two and three IGOs. Lastly, above 11 GDP, all the countries stay in the range of one to zero withholdings. Regarding the correlation, the graph has the strongest correlation between the GDP and the withholding compared to the other regions at an  $R^2$  being 0.583.

As observer in Figure 4.6, Oceania has the least amount of data points with 14 countries versus Africa with 55 countries. Like all the other regions, the less well-off countries abstain more than the four wealthiest countries in the graph, until the wealthiest ones




FIGURE 4.6. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding in Oceania

start to withhold more. There is a slight curve present, however, the correlation is weak with  $R^2$  being 0.248.




FIGURE 4.7. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding per continent

Figure 4.7 represents the same data as Figure 4.1, however, this one differs in terms of curve fits, as each region is differentiated by colors. With each region broken down individually, there are apparent commonalities all across the graphs. It was also important to see each region differed from one another.

With the average data of all points having an  $R^2$  of 0.128, it can be observed that the correlation between GDP and withholding is weak. There is a pattern of less wealthy states withholding membership, however it depends where. Africa, at  $\log_{10}$  GDP of 10, their curve is already flat-lining as their more wealthy countries withholding at 1 or less. However in the same area for Europe, all the countries below 10 are still withholding seven or more IGOs; their curve is going down at that point, and it will not flat-line for another interval until GDP 11.

The next chapter will analyze the data points and look into the outliers of the regions to try and understand the reasons for their anomaly.

## CHAPTER 5

### Analysis

From the results, it can be concluded that GDP is a weak factor to the decision of a country to withhold membership. The findings can be used as a guide to predict that up until a certain GDP, states will tend to withhold membership less than poorer countries in each region.

#### 5.1. Outliers

As mentioned above, the reason that the data points were separated into regions was to give an insight as to whether correlation is stronger in some regions rather than other; or if it is across the board that there is no correlation. Outliers are value points that differ considerably compared to other points whether it is an error on the data collection or the representation of a real value (Wolberg, 2006). In this case, all outliers represent the true value for each variable. For each region, there are evident outliers that affect the calculation of the correlation. This section will be analyzing how much of a difference outliers have on  $R^2$  and whether these affect the correlation between the variables, GDP and withholding.

In Africa, South Sudan (9.54, 4) would be considered the outlier of the region, as they are withholding two times more than the second highest withholder.




FIGURE 5.1. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding in Africa without outliers

In Figure 5.1, with the point of South Sudan was taken out, it can be observed the  $R^2$  slightly increases from 0.112 to 0.123.

From the results in Figure 4.3 present in Chapter 4, it can be observed the  $R^2$  is 0.089, the lowest between all continents. Two obvious outliers are Palestine and North Korea that have reasons beyond their financial status, which will be presented in the next section.




FIGURE 5.2. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding in Asia without outliers

If the points of Palestine (10.16, 18) and North Korea (10.23, 10) are removed from the graph, as represented in Figure 5.2,  $R^2$  increases to 0.151.  $R^2$  increases almost 90 percent as much by taking these two outliers. The curve flattens as it is not making up for the outlier points.

From Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4, it can be considered that the U.S. (13.29, 2) is an outlier with its big  $\log_{10}$  GDP being passed 13. Additionally, Cuba (10.98, 5) is another outlier with a withholding of 5, not entirely explained by its  $\log_{10}$  GDP.

Figure 5.3 represents the removal of the aforementioned outliers in America. Once the U.S. and Cuba are not represented in the data,  $R^2$  increases almost three folds. As Cuba is no longer part of the equation, the least squares method does not need to compensate for Cuba withholding from 5 IGOs, therefore the curve goes slightly downwards.

Europe will also have the same effect if taking the outlier out of the equation. The identified outliers in Figure 4.5 from Chapter 4 are the three countries that GDP and withholding do not follow the curve trend. The Vatican City State (8.49, 20), Kosovo (9.85, 17) and Liechtenstein (9.81, 15) are small nations that withhold at a higher rate than that of the average country. For example, if the Vatican was not present,  $R^2$  would




FIGURE 5.3. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding in America without outliers

fall from its current state of 0.58 to 0.37; however, if the Vatican was kept in the graph and Kosovo and Liechtenstein were removed,  $R^2$  would increase to 0.73.




FIGURE 5.4. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding in Europe without outliers

Figure 5.4 assumes the three nations are considered outliers, and have been removed for the quadratic fit; what is left is a weaker correlation than before. The curve went down, and flattened out since the scale would need to be at 10 instead of 20 on the horizontal axis, and the vertical axis scale would start at 9 instead of 8.



Analyzing Figure 4.6 from Chapter 4, where the graph for Oceania is present, it can be considered the outliers in this group are all the countries that withhold more than 7 IGOs.




FIGURE 5.5. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding in Oceania without outliers

Figure 5.5 represents the Oceania continent with the two countries that withhold 7 or more are omitted from the quadratic fit computation. It can be observed that the  $R^2$  increases from 0.248 to 0.365. Despite their sample size, its correlation is just as weak as the other regions.

In an analogous process of outlier removal from each continent, all outliers are removed from the visual representation of the entire data set. The new graph also includes the quadratic regression that fits with the region outliers being omitted.

Figure 5.6 represents a situation with all the outliers of each region were taken out of the graph with all the data points. It can be observed that the  $R^2$  would increase from 0.128 to 0.178, when taking 10 countries out of the 196 countries. Compared to Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4, Figure 5.6 has a flatter curve as the least squares method does not compensate as much for the outlier points. Even as the outliers have been taken out of the equations,  $R^2$  still remains ambiguous and the correlation is still weak.

However, outliers play a role in the results as they draw reasons as to why GDP may not be a factor in joining IGOs. Most of these outliers have one thing in common, the reason as to their point difference is not because of the GDP relationship, but rather external reasons. Going through each individual graph, there is an explanation as to their outliers.

Another conclusion that can be taken from observing the graphs, is there might be an upwards curve after a certain point, yet, it does not model the relationship between




FIGURE 5.6. Graphic representation of the correlation between GDP (2017) and withholding without outliers

GDP and withholding correctly. It can be assumed that this model can only represent this relationship on the left of the horizontal axis of GDP.

## 5.2. Explanation for the outlier classification

One of the drawbacks to this research is that it does not take into consideration whether some of the nations were once part of the IGO and then left the organization.

The outlier countries in this particular research can be grouped into two separate theories: political regimes and size. Political regime in this instance relates to the established government body of the country; and size is in relation to the land size.

Countries can be classified in five groups in terms of regimes as defined in the Global Report 2017 (Marshall, 2017).

TABLE 5.1. All outliers with GDP, Regime and Withholding

Country	Regime	$\log_{10}$ GDP	Withholding
South Sudan	SF	9.54	4
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (North)	AUT	10.24	10
State of Palestine	AUT	10.16	18
Kosovo	DEM	9.86	17
Liechtenstein	DEM	9.81	15
Vatican City State	AUT	8.5	20
United States	DEM	13.29	2
Cuba	AUT	10.99	5
Federated States of Micronesia	DEM	8.56	7
Nauru	DEM	8.53	8

The countries that have been considered outliers, and omitted from the quadratic fit computations, are presented with their regime status, their GDP and Withholding, in Table 5.1. Simply, “SF” represents a state failure, “AUT” indicates that a country is governed by an institutionalized regime and “DEM” refers to an institutionalized democracy that can be labeled in the Global Report 2017 (Marshall, 2017). The ten countries above stick out from their neighboring states due to political affiliation, foreign policies, and country size.

North Korea is cut off from the rest of the world and will try to limit themselves to Western influence, in a nutshell. Cuba has recently started opening its borders after being sanctioned from the U.S. since the Cuban Missile Crisis. As much as these two countries are considered to be very closed off to the world, they are not the countries with the highest withholdings. For the African region, South Sudan sticks out since the region hovers around the area of zero to one withholdings; however, South Sudan has been experiencing a collapse of central authority which can be seen with its high withholding in the area (Marshall, 2017). The State of Palestine has a complicated government and relationship with its neighbors. Some countries do not define Palestine as a state under international law: although, according to the United Nations (UN), out of the 138 of the 193 UN members, Palestine is considered a sovereign state (Shveitser, 2019). Out of majority, Palestine is considered a state in this research. Kosovo has recently gained its independence from Serbia and is slowly getting adapted to the world of IGOs. Like Palestine, a majority of countries accept its sovereignty as it has only been a country since 2008. The fact that not all countries have accepted its independent state status, does not discredit the IGOs they belong to. The U.S. is subjugated to being an outlier, not for its financial status, but rather the withholding of two IGOs in relation to its GDP. As mentioned in the Chapter 2, the Literature Review, the U.S. withdrew from UNESCO as a result of political reasons that supported Israel.

The last countries not discussed do not fall in the category of political reasoning but rather that their land size is very small and they do not have the resources to be able to qualify for memberships. The Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, and the Vatican City State are excluded from the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (International Labour Organization, n.d., World Trade Organization, 2021). Already from the IGOs they are excluded from, they do not have the necessary business to be able to contribute to them. The Federated States of Micronesia, and Nauru as island nations do not necessarily have the infrastructure to be able to oversee “multilateral trade relations” as stated in the WTO constitution (World Trade Organization, 1944). Lastly, Liechtenstein and the Vatican City State are a very small yet wealthy nations: to put it into perspective, the GDP of Liechtenstein in 2017 was 6.7 billion USD with a land density of 160  $km^2$  and the Federated States of Micronesia and Nauru combined have a GDP of 640 million USD with a combined land of 730  $km^2$  in the same year (Worldometer, 2022). If they wanted to, they could afford to participate in

IGOs but as small states, they are limited in what they can participate in. For example, Liechtenstein and the Vatican City State cannot join the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as they do not have the space for an airport located inside their lands.

Of course each country might have their own concerns as to joining an IGO, but the claim that GDP has a considerable impact in the decision of joining an IGO is not viable even if taking outliers out as a consideration.



## CHAPTER 6

### Conclusions

IOs have a duty to its members and to the world. They have a positive reputation of setting goals and following through with their intentions. In this dissertation, the benefits have been highlighted to being a member state of IOs and IGOs. Ranging from political benefits to its unbiased positions, states and people have a positive view about these organizations. Reasons to withdraw have been attributed to internal conflicts and a change of times. As the two sides of IGOs were presented, it was imperative to recognize the third side that relates to the thesis question as to the reason states withhold membership. To explore the reasons why states withhold memberships, the approach of the current work was to analyze how the financial state affects the membership of a country. The metric chosen to represent this was GDP.

The results from the research concluded that the GDP of a country does not strongly correlate to its withholding, but present a weak correlation that cannot be completely dismissed. However, it is important to acknowledge that there are other factors that might make a country hesitant to join IGOs.

Understanding the hesitancy of a state to join IGOs will let organizations know how to reach for those states that tend to withhold. Future research should continue with investigating different variables that can affect these states withholding. As mentioned in the analysis, the outliers are outliers for many reasons; ranging from regimes to the size of the country. Additionally, instead of looking into 24 different IGOs, one could sample a larger number of IGOs to have a wider range to compare data, as there are a myriad of other IGOs and IOs that can be worth investigating. Although this research was approached as a quantitative method, it would be worthwhile to qualify this topic to get a deeper understanding of each country to come up with common denominators as to their withholding.

Even though this paper found that GDP is not very strongly correlated, from the data, it is observed that lower GDPs yield higher withholding of membership. This paper will be able to contribute to the elimination of GDP as the determinant variable to states joining IGOs.

IOs are strong intuitions that will be able to continue on for many more decades to come; however, if they can pinpoint what changes a country from withholding to joining, they might be able to market themselves in a way to attract the missing member.



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APPENDIX A

**Gross Domestic Product 2017**



Country	GDP (nominal, 2017)	Share of World GDP	Country	GDP (nominal, 2017)	Share of World GDP	Country	GDP (nominal, 2017)	Share of World GDP	Country	GDP (nominal, 2017)	Share of World GDP
Alghanistan	\$19,543,976,895	0.02%	Ecuador	\$104,295,862,000	0.13%	Lithuania	\$47,544,459,559	0.06%	Sao Tome & Principe	\$392,570,293	0.00%
Algeria	\$13,038,538,300	0.02%	Egypt	\$235,369,129,338	0.29%	Luxembourg	\$62,316,359,824	0.08%	Saudi Arabia	\$686,738,400,000	0.85%
Algeria	\$167,555,280,113	0.21%	El Salvador	\$24,805,439,600	0.03%	Madagascar	\$11,499,803,807	0.01%	Senegal	\$21,070,225,735	0.03%
Andorra	\$3,012,914,131	0.00%	Equatorial Guinea	\$12,293,579,173	0.02%	Malawi	\$6,303,292,264	0.01%	Serbia	\$41,431,648,801	0.05%
Angola	\$122,123,822,334	0.15%	Eritrea	1,900,000,000	0.00%	Malaysia	\$314,710,259,511	0.39%	Seychelles	\$1,497,959,569	0.00%
Antigua and Barbuda	\$1,510,084,751	0.00%	Estonia	\$26,611,651,599	0.03%	Maldives	\$4,865,546,027	0.01%	Sierra Leone	\$3,775,047,334	0.00%
Argentina	\$637,430,331,479	0.79%	Eswatini	\$4,433,664,364	0.01%	Mali	\$15,334,336,144	0.02%	Singapore	\$323,907,234,412	0.40%
Armenia	\$11,536,590,636	0.01%	Ethiopia	\$80,561,496,134	0.10%	Malta	\$12,518,134,319	0.02%	Slovakia	\$95,617,670,260	0.12%
Australia	\$1,323,421,072,479	1.64%	Finland	\$5,061,202,767	0.01%	Marshall Islands	\$204,173,430	0.00%	Slovenia	\$48,769,655,479	0.06%
Austria	\$416,835,975,862	0.52%	France	\$2,582,501,307,216	3.19%	Mauritania	\$5,024,708,656	0.01%	Solomon Islands	992,007,403	0.00%
Azerbaijan	\$40,747,792,238	0.05%	Gabon	\$2,582,501,307,216	3.19%	Mauritius	\$13,266,427,697	0.02%	Somalia	5,610,000,000	0.01%
Bahamas	\$12,162,100,000	0.02%	Ghana	\$15,013,950,984	0.02%	Mexico	\$1,150,887,823,404	1.42%	South Africa	\$348,871,647,960	0.43%
Bahrain	\$35,432,686,170	0.04%	Gambia	\$1,489,464,788	0.00%	Micronesia	\$336,427,500	0.00%	South Korea	\$1,530,750,923,149	1.89%
Bangladesh	\$249,723,862,487	0.31%	Georgia	\$15,081,338,092	0.02%	Moldova	\$8,128,493,432	0.01%	South Sudan	3,500,000,000	0.00%
Barbados	\$4,673,500,000	0.01%	Germany	\$3,693,204,332,230	4.56%	Monaco	6,430,000,000	0.01%	Spain	\$1,314,314,164,402	1.62%
Belarus	\$54,456,465,473	0.07%	Greece	\$203,085,551,429	0.25%	Mongolia	\$11,433,635,876	0.01%	Sri Lanka	\$87,357,205,923	0.11%
Belgium	\$494,763,551,891	0.61%	Grenada	\$1,126,882,296	0.00%	Montenegro	\$4,844,592,067	0.01%	St. Vincent & Grenadines	\$785,222,509	0.00%
Belize	\$1,862,614,800	0.00%	Guatemala	\$1,126,882,296	0.00%	Morocco	\$109,708,728,849	0.14%	Sudan	\$117,487,857,143	0.15%
Benin	\$9,246,696,924	0.01%	Guatemala	\$75,620,095,538	0.09%	Mozambique	\$12,645,508,634	0.02%	Suriname	\$2,995,827,901	0.00%
Bhutan	\$2,528,007,911	0.00%	Guinea	\$10,472,514,515	0.01%	Myanmar	\$67,068,745,521	0.08%	Sweden	\$535,607,385,506	0.66%
Bolivia	\$37,508,642,113	0.05%	Guinea-Bissau	\$1,346,841,897	0.00%	N Korea	17,365,000,000	0.02%	Switzerland	\$678,965,423,322	0.84%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$18,054,854,789	0.02%	Guyana	\$3,621,046,005	0.00%	Namibia	\$13,253,698,015	0.02%	Syria	16,340,000,000	0.00%
Botswana	\$17,406,565,823	0.02%	Haiti	\$8,408,150,518	0.01%	Nauru	\$336,427,500	0.00%	Tajikistan	\$7,146,449,583	0.01%
Brazil	\$2,053,594,877,013	2.54%	Honduras	\$22,978,532,897	0.03%	Nepal	\$24,880,266,905	0.03%	Tanzania	\$53,320,625,959	0.07%
Brunei	\$12,128,089,002	0.01%	Hungary	\$139,761,138,103	0.17%	Netherlands	\$830,572,618,850	1.03%	Thailand	\$455,302,682,986	0.56%
Bulgaria	\$58,220,973,783	0.07%	Iceland	\$24,488,467,010	0.03%	New Zealand	\$204,139,049,909	0.25%	Timor-Leste	\$2,954,621,000	0.00%
Burkina Faso	\$12,322,864,245	0.02%	India	\$2,650,725,335,364	3.28%	Nicaragua	\$13,814,261,536	0.02%	Togo	\$4,757,776,485	0.01%
Burundi	\$3,172,416,146	0.00%	Indonesia	\$1,015,420,587,285	1.25%	Niger	\$8,119,710,126	0.01%	Tonga	\$427,659,795	0.00%
Cabo Verde	\$1,772,706,451	0.00%	Iran	\$454,032,768,724	0.56%	Nigeria	\$375,745,486,521	0.46%	Trinidad and Tobago	\$22,079,017,627	0.03%
Cambodia	\$22,158,209,503	0.03%	Iraq	\$192,060,810,811	0.24%	North Macedonia	\$11,279,509,014	0.01%	Tunisia	\$39,952,095,561	0.05%
Cameroon	\$34,922,782,311	0.04%	Ireland	\$331,430,014,003	0.41%	Norway	\$399,488,897,844	0.49%	Turkey	\$851,549,299,635	1.05%
Canada	\$1,647,120,175,449	2.04%	Israel	\$353,268,411,919	0.44%	Oman	\$70,783,875,163	0.09%	Turkmenistan	\$37,926,285,714	0.05%
Central African Republic	\$1,949,411,659	0.00%	Italy	\$1,943,835,376,342	2.40%	Pakistan	\$304,951,818,494	0.38%	Tuvalu	\$39,731,317	0.00%
Chad	\$9,871,247,732	0.01%	Jamaica	\$14,781,107,822	0.02%	Palau	\$289,823,500	0.00%	Uganda	\$25,995,031,850	0.03%
Chile	\$277,075,944,402	0.34%	Japan	\$4,872,415,104,315	6.02%	Panama	\$62,283,756,584	0.08%	Ukraine	\$112,154,185,121	0.14%
China	\$12,237,700,479,375	15.12%	Jordan	\$40,068,308,451	0.05%	Papua New Guinea	\$20,536,314,601	0.03%	United Arab Emirates	\$382,575,085,092	0.47%
Colombia	\$314,457,601,860	0.39%	Kazakhstan	\$162,886,867,832	0.20%	Paraguay	\$39,667,400,816	0.05%	United Kingdom	\$2,637,866,340,434	3.26%
Comoros	\$1,068,124,330	0.00%	Kenya	\$79,263,075,749	0.10%	Peru	\$211,389,272,242	0.26%	United States	\$19,485,394,000,000	24.08%
Congo	\$8,701,334,800	0.01%	Kiribati	\$185,572,502	0.00%	Philippines	\$313,595,208,737	0.39%	Uruguay	\$56,156,972,158	0.07%
Costa Rica	\$57,285,984,448	0.07%	Kosovo	7,184,445,955	0.01%	Poland	\$52,465,839,003	0.07%	Uzbekistan	\$49,677,172,174	0.06%
Cote d'Ivoire	\$37,353,276,059	0.05%	Kuwait	\$120,126,277,613	0.15%	Portugal	\$219,308,128,887	0.27%	Vanuatu	\$862,879,789	0.00%
Croatia	\$55,213,087,271	0.07%	Kyrgyzstan	\$7,564,738,836	0.01%	Qatar	\$166,928,571,429	0.21%	Vatican City State	315,000,000	0.00%
Cuba	\$96,851,000,000	0.12%	Laos	\$16,853,087,485	0.02%	Romania	\$219,308,128,887	0.27%	Venezuela	56,156,972,158	0.00%
Cyprus	\$22,054,225,828	0.03%	Latvia	\$30,463,302,414	0.04%	Russia	\$11,883,923,504	0.26%	Vietnam	\$223,779,865,815	0.28%
Czech Republic (Czechia)	\$215,913,545,038	0.27%	Lebanon	\$53,576,985,687	0.07%	Rwanda	\$9,135,454,442	0.01%	Yemen	\$31,267,675,216	0.04%
Denmark	\$329,865,537,183	0.41%	Lesotho	\$2,578,265,358	0.00%	Saint Kitts & Nevis	\$992,007,403	0.00%	Zambia	\$25,868,142,073	0.03%
Djibouti	2,910,000,000	1.00%	Liberia	\$3,285,455,000	0.00%	Saint Lucia	\$1,737,504,296	0.00%	Zimbabwe	\$22,040,902,300	0.03%
Dominica	\$496,727,000	0.00%	Libya	\$38,107,728,083	0.05%	Samoa	\$840,927,997	0.00%			
Dominican Republic	\$75,931,656,815	0.09%	Liechtenstein	6,474,000,000	0.01%	San Marino	\$1,632,860,041	0.00%			
DR Congo	\$37,642,482,562	0.05%									

FIGURE 1.1. Gross Domestic Product 2017 by country

## APPENDIX B

### Process of elimination for country withholding

Country	GDP (2017)	Withholding	FAO	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	ICSD	IFAD	IFC	ILO	IMF	IMO	INTERPOL	ITU	MIGA	OIE	OPCW	UNICEF	UNCTAD	UNESCO	UNIDO	UPU	WHO	WIPO	WMO	WTO	
Afghanistan	19,543,976,895	1										x															
Albania	13,038,538,300	0																									
Algeria	167,555,280,113	0																									
Andorra	3,012,914,131	10		x	x		x	x	x	x												x					
Angola	122,123,822,334	0																									
Antigua and Barbuda	1,510,084,751	1														x											
Argentina	637,430,331,479	0																									
Armenia	11,536,590,636	0																									
Australia	1,323,421,072,479	2						x														x					
Austria	416,835,975,862	0																									
Azerbaijan	40,747,792,238	0																									
Bahamas	12,162,100,000	1																									
Bahrain	35,432,686,170	1						x																			
Bangladesh	249,723,862,487	0																									
Barbados	4,673,500,000	0																									
Belarus	54,456,465,473	1						x																			
Belgium	494,763,551,891	1																									
Belize	1,862,614,800	0																									
Benin	9,246,696,924	0																									
Bhutan	2,528,007,911	3		x					x																		
Bolivia	37,508,642,113	0																									
Bosnia and Herzegovina	18,054,854,789	0																									
Botswana	17,406,565,823	0																									
Brazil	2,053,594,877,013	0																									
Brunei Darussalam	12,128,089,002	6						x	x	x																	
Bulgaria	58,220,973,783	1						x																			
Burkina Faso	12,322,864,245	1																									
Burundi	3,172,416,146	2																									
Cabo Verde	1,772,706,451	0																									
Cambodia	22,158,209,503	0																									
Cameroon	34,922,782,311	2		x																							
Canada	1,647,120,175,449	1																									
Central African Republic	1,949,411,659	1																									
Chad	9,871,247,732	1																									
Chile	277,075,944,402	0																									
China	12,237,700,479,375	0																									
Colombia	314,457,601,860	0																									
Comoros	1,068,124,330	1																									
Congo	8,701,334,800	0																									
Costa Rica	57,285,984,448	1																									

FIGURE 2.1. Process of elimination for the withholding (part 1)

Country	GDP (2017)	Withholding	FAO	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	KSD	IFAD	IFC	ILO	IMF	IMO	INTERPOL	ITU	MIGA	OIE	OPCW	UNICEF	UNCTAD	UNESCO	UNIDO	UPLU	WHO	WIPO	WMO	WTO	
Costa Rica	57,285,984,448	1																	X								
Côte d'Ivoire	37,353,276,059	1											X														
Croatia	55,213,087,271	0																									
Cuba	96,851,000,000	5			X										X												
Cyprus	22,054,225,828	1																	X								
Czech Republic	215,913,545,038	1																									
Democratic Republic of the Congo	37,642,482,562	0							X													X					
Denmark	329,865,537,183	1																									
Djibouti	2,910,000,000	0																									
Dominica	496,727,000	1														X											
Dominican Republic	75,931,656,815	0																									
Ecuador	104,295,862,000	0																									
Egypt	235,369,129,338	1															X										
El Salvador	24,805,439,600	0																									
Equatorial Guinea	12,293,579,173	1																									
Eritrea	1,900,000,000	1																									
Estonia	26,611,651,599	2																									
Eswatini	4,433,664,364	1										X															
Ethiopia	80,561,496,134	0																									
Federated States of Micronesia	367,000,000.00	0																									
Fiji	5,061,202,767	5														X											X
Finland	252,301,837,573	0																									
France	2,582,501,307,216	1																									X
Gabon	15,013,950,984	0																									
Gambia	1,489,464,788	1																									
Georgia	15,081,338,092	0																									
Germany	3,693,204,332,230	0																									
Ghana	58,996,776,238	0																									
Greece	203,085,551,429	1																									
Grenada	1,126,882,296	1																									
Guatemala	75,620,095,538	1																									X
Guinea	10,472,514,515	1																									
Guinea-Bissau	1,346,841,897	1																									
Guyana	3,621,046,005	0																									
Haiti	8,408,150,518	0																									
Honduras	22,978,532,897	0																									
Hungary	139,761,138,103	0																									
Iceland	24,488,467,010	1																									
India	2,650,725,335,364	0																									X
Indonesia	1,015,420,587,285	0																									
Iraq	454,012,768,724	0																									

FIGURE 2.2. Process of elimination for the withholding (part 2)

Country	GDP (2017)	Withholding	FAO	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	ICSD	IFAD	IFC	ILO	IMF	IMO	INTERPOL	ITU	MIGA	OIE	OPCW	UNICEF	UNCTAD	UNESCO	UNIDO	UPU	WHO	WIPO	WMO	WTO		
Iraq	454,012,768,724	0																										
Ireland	331,430,014,003	0																										
Islamic Republic of Iran	192,060,810,811	0																		X								
Israel	353,268,411,919	2															X											
Italy	1,943,835,376,342	0																										
Jamaica	14,781,107,822	0																										
Japan	4,872,415,104,315	0																										
Jordan	40,068,308,451	0																										
Kazakhstan	162,886,867,832	0																										
Kenya	79,263,075,749	0																										
Kiribati	185,572,502	6					X								X	X						X			X	X		
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (north)	17,365,000,000	10		X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X													X		
Korea, Republic of (South)	1,530,750,923,149	0																									X	
Kosovo	7,184,445,955	17	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Kuwait	120,126,277,613	0																										
Kyrgyzstan	7,564,738,836	1										X																
Laos People's Democratic Republic	16,853,087,485	0																										
Latvia	30,463,302,414	3					X											X				X						
Lebanon	53,576,985,687	0																										
Lesotho	2,578,265,358	1									X																	
Liberia	3,285,455,000	0																										
Libya	38,107,728,083	1																										
Liechtenstein	6,474,000,000	15	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Lithuania	47,544,459,559	2					X																					
Luxembourg	62,316,359,824	0																										
Madagascar	11,499,803,807	0																										
Malawi	6,303,292,264	0																										
Malaysia	314,710,259,511	0																										
Maldives	4,865,546,027	1		X																								
Mali	15,334,336,144	1										X																
Malta	12,518,134,319	1																										
Marshall Islands	204,173,430	7		X						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Mauritania	5,024,708,656	1													X													
Mauritius	13,266,427,697	1																										
Mexico	1,150,887,823,404	0																										
Micronesia	336,427,500	8		X			X								X	X						X					X	
Moldova	8,128,493,432	0																										
Monaco	6,430,000,000	8													X												X	
Mongolia	11,433,635,876	0																										
Montenegro	4,844,592,067	0																										
Monrocco	109,708,728,849	0																										

FIGURE 2.3. Process of elimination for the withholding (part 3)

Country	GDP (2017)	Withholding	FAO	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	ICSD	IFAD	IFC	ILO	IMF	IMO	INTERPOL	ITU	MIGA	OIE	OPCW	UNICEF	UNCTAD	UNESCO	UNIDO	UPU	WHO	WIPO	WMO	WTO	
Morocco	109,708,728,849	0																									
Mozambique	12,645,508,634	0																									
Myanmar	67,068,745,521	0																									
Namibia	13,253,698,015	0																									
Nauru	336,427,500	1																			X						
Nepal	24,880,266,905	0																									
Netherlands	830,572,618,850	0																									
New Zealand	204,139,049,909	4																									
Nicaragua	13,814,261,536	0																									
Niger	8,119,710,126	1										X															
Nigeria	375,745,486,521	0																									
North Macedonia	11,279,509,014	1																				X					
Norway	399,488,897,844	0																									
Oman	70,783,875,163	0																									
Pakistan	304,951,818,494	0																									
Palau	289,823,500	0																									
Panama	62,283,756,584	0																									
Papua New Guinea	20,536,314,601	2		X																							
Paraguay	39,667,400,816	0															X										
Peru	211,389,272,242	0																									
Philippines	313,595,208,737	0																									
Poland	526,465,839,003	0																									
Portugal	219,308,128,887	1																									
Qatar	166,928,571,429	0																				X					
Romania	211,883,923,504	0																									
Russian Federation	1,578,417,211,937	1																									
Rwanda	9,135,454,442	1										X															
Saint Kitts and Nevis	992,007,403	2																									
Saint Lucia	1,737,504,296	0																									
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	785,222,509	3							X																		
Samoa	840,927,997	2		X																							
San Marino	1,632,860,041	7						X	X	X																	
São Tomé and Príncipe	392,570,293	1		X																							
Saudi Arabia	686,738,400,000	0																									
Senegal	21,070,225,735	0																									
Serbia	41,431,648,801	1							X																		
Seychelles	1,497,959,569	1																									
Sierra Leone	3,775,047,334	0																									
Singapore	323,907,234,412	3																									
Slovakia	95,617,670,260	2							X																		
Slovenia	48,769,655,479	1							X																		

FIGURE 2.4. Process of elimination for the withholding (part 4)

Country	GDP (2017)	Withholding	FAO	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	ICSD	IFAD	IFC	ILO	IMF	IMD	INTERPOL	ITU	MIGA	OIE	OPCW	UNICEF	UNCTAD	UNESCO	UNIDO	UPU	WHO	WIPO	WMO	WTO
Slovenia	48,769,655,479	1						X																		
Solomon Islands	992,007,403	4		X			X								X	X										
Somalia	5,610,000,000	1		X																						
South Africa	348,871,647,960	1															X									
South Sudan	3,500,000,000	4		X							X										X					
Spain	1,314,314,164,402	0																								
Sri Lanka	87,357,205,923	0																								
State of Palestine	14,498,100,000	18	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X						X	X	X	X	X
Sudan	117,487,857,143	0																								
Suriname	2,995,827,901	1		X																						
Sweden	535,607,385,506	0																								
Switzerland	678,965,423,322	0																								
Syrian Arab Republic	16,340,000,000	0																								
Tajikistan	7,146,449,583	1										X														
Tanzania	53,320,625,959	0																								
Thailand	455,302,682,986	0																								
Timor-Leste	2,954,621,000	1		X																						
Togo	4,757,776,485	0																								
Trinidad and Tobago	22,079,017,627	0																								
Tunisia	39,952,095,561	0																								
Turkey	851,549,299,635	0																								
Turkmenistan	37,926,285,714	1																								
Tuvalu	39,731,317	6		X			X	X					X				X								X	
Uganda	25,995,031,850	0																								
Ukraine	112,154,185,121	1												X												
United Arab Emirates	382,575,085,092	0																								
United Kingdom	2,637,866,340,434	1																								
United States	19,485,394,000,000	2																			X					
United States of America	56,156,972,158	0																			X	X				
Uruguay	49,677,172,714	0																								
Uzbekistan	862,879,789	0																								
Vanuatu	315,000,000	20	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Vatican City State	56,156,972,158	0																								
Venezuela Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	223,779,865,815	0																								
Viet Nam	31,267,675,216	0																								
Yemen	25,868,142,073	0																								
Zambia	22,040,902,300	0																								
Zimbabwe		0																								

FIGURE 2.5. Process of elimination for the withholding (part 5)