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Intergroup Conspiracy Beliefs and Anti-Asian Aggression During COVID-19: The Role of Intergroup Emotions, Ingroup Identification and Norms

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Master in Psychology of Intercultural Relations

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CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS
E HUMANAS

Department of Social and Organizational Psychology

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I dedicate this work to my mother, my sister, and my adorable nephew Leon

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Resumo

Prévios estudos focam o carácter intergrupal das crenças conspiratórias e as emoções para explicar ligações entre crenças conspiratórias e a agressão. Porém, nenhum estudo investigou o papel das emoções intergrupais, das normas do endogrupo e da identificação grupal, em relação às crenças conspiratórias intergrupais (ICB), e da agressão racial verbal (VRA) contra os chineses durante a COVID-19. Examinámos se as normas do endogrupo, dependentes da identificação como portugueses, moderavam a associação direta entre ICB e VRA. Investigámos se a ligação indireta entre ICB e VRA, através de emoções entre grupos, era moderada pela identificação grupal no Caminho A, e se a ligação indireta era moderada pelas normas intergrupais, dependendo da identificação no Caminho B. Para tal, avaliámos a VRA num cenário de chat e realizámos um estudo de métodos experimental/correlacional com 161 participantes portugueses (M_{age} = 26,2, SD = 9,3). Avaliamos o ICB, as emoções intergrupais e a identificação. Os participantes foram aleatoriamente atribuídos a conspirações-oposição, -apoio, ou normas de grupo não relacionadas. Finalmente, o VRA foi avaliado. Os resultados revelaram associação da ICB à VRA sem moderação das normas e identificação intergrupais. Além disso, descobrimos associação entre ICB e as emoções intergrupais negativas sem moderação pela identificação. Encontramos, ainda, a relação entre emoções negativas intergrupais e ARV. Também descobrimos que as normas intergrupais e a identificação moderaram a relação entre as emoções negativas intergrupais e a ARV, porém não encontrarmos uma mediação moderada. Fornecemos importantes perspetivas sobre as associações ICB e VRA e o carácter intergrupal do ICB.

Palavras-chave: Crenças conspiratórias intergrupais, emoções intergrupais, identificação intergrupal, normas de grupo, agressão anti Asiática

Códigos de Classificação APA: 3000 Psicologia Social, 3020 Processos de Grupo e Interpessoais

Abstract

Although the intergroup-character of conspiracy beliefs has been identified previously, and emotions have recently been found to explain the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and aggression, no study has investigated the role of intergroup-emotions, ingroup norms, and ingroup identification in connection to intergroup conspiracy beliefs (ICB), and verbal racial aggression (VRA) against the Chinese during COVID-19. Therefore, we examined whether ingroup norms, depending on identification with the Portuguese, moderated the direct association between ICB and VRA. Furthermore, we investigated whether the indirect link between ICB and VRA, via intergroup-emotions was moderated by ingroup identification on Path A, and whether the indirect link was moderated by ingroup norms, depending on identification on Path B. To test these hypotheses, we assessed VRA in a bystander chat-scenario and conducted a mixed experimental/correlational study with 161 Portuguese participants (M_{age} = 26.2, *SD* = 9.3). After assessing ICB, intergroup-emotions and identification, participants were randomly assigned to conspiracy-opposing, -supporting, or unrelated ingroup norms. Finally, VRA was assessed. Results revealed that ICB was associated to VRA, but ingroup norms and identification did not moderate this relationship. Further, we found that ICB was associated to negative intergroup-emotions, however, this relationship was not moderated by identification. Moreover, we did find that negative intergroup-emotions were related to VRA and while we did find that ingroup norms and identification moderated the relationship between negative intergroup-emotions and VRA we did not find a moderated mediation. This study provides important insight into the associations between ICB and VRA and the intergroup character of ICB.

Keywords: Intergroup conspiracy beliefs, intergroup emotions, ingroup identification, group norms, anti-Asian aggression

APA Classification Codes: 3000 Social Psychology, 3020 Group & Interpersonal Processes

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Glossary of Acronyms

ICB	Intergroup conspiracy beliefs
VRA	Verbal racial aggression
SIT	Social Identity Theory
TBP	Theory of Planned Behaviour (TBP)
e.g.	Exempli gratia
i.e.	Id est
ISCTE	Instituto Universitário de Lisboa/ University Institute of Lisbon
SES	Socioeconomic status
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
EFA	Exploratory factor analysis
CFA	Confirmatory factor analysis

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted all our lives, mostly in negative ways. However, not everyone is affected by the pandemic and its consequences in the same way. Since the start of the pandemic there has been a worrisome rise in harm towards people from East-Asia or East-Asian descent. Since the beginning of the pandemic Lee and Waters (2021) showed that 30% of Asian American participants had experienced more discrimination and the UK the police registered an increase of attacks by 300% (Haynes, 2021). Unfortunately, this is a trend that can be observed in many countries with many horrific violent incidents reported (Chen et al., 2020), of which one perpetrator admitted that he stabbed a family assuming they were Chinese and "infecting people with the coronavirus" (Boboltz, 2020, p.2). This statement represents another development during the pandemic: A new visibility of conspiracy narratives and among them intergroup conspiracy beliefs (ICB), a conspiracy narrative about a social group, specifically about the Chinese government creating the COVID-19 virus as a bioweapon for political advancement (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020).

The researchers found an increase in conspiracy beliefs from 28% to 38% among social media and conversative media consumers in the US between March 2020 to July 2020. Karyotis (2020) reported that 15.3% of the general population in the UK believes the virus was created intentionally, another 7.1 % believes it was created accidentally in a laboratory in Wuhan. Furthermore, about 64% blame the Chinese government for spreading the virus in the UK. Although the consequences of conspiracy narratives have only started to be studied more extensively, some research has pointed out that conspiracy narratives could increase violent intentions and acceptance of aggressive behaviour (Rottweiler & Gill, 2020; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Therefore, it could be suspected that the rise of the intergroup conspiracy narratives about China and the pandemic could be linked to the increased aggression towards people from East-Asia around the world.

However, to our knowledge research has not investigated this relationship thus far. Therefore, we aimed to examine in a systematic way whether there is indeed an association between ICB, and aggression against the Chinese, and under which circumstances this relationship manifests. To do so, we first looked at conspiracy beliefs and their relationship with aggression. Second, factors were established that could explain their relationship, focussing specifically on intergroup emotions. Lastly, variables that could enhance or weaken their link were identified. Accordingly, the current study focussed on the intergroup character of conspiracy narratives, looking at ingroup norms and ingroup identification. It is important to

note that aggression based on racism can be conceptualised as verbal or physical aggressive behaviour that includes intentional attacking and hostile behaviour based on racism. In this study we focussed on verbal aggression based on racism, which we refer to as verbal racial aggression (VRA). VRA was operationalised in an indirect way. White participants VRA was measured in an intergroup situation in which they first observed an ingroup member express VRA directed at a person from Chinese descent and only after that decide to join in, do nothing, or intervene in the situation. Intentionally, conspiracy narratives are not referred to as “conspiracy theories'' because this would imply a scientific notion, which conspiracy narratives usually do not have.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Background

2. 1. Conspiracy Beliefs and Racial Aggression

Conspiracy narratives are not a new phenomenon and are more widely spread than one might think. Drochon (2018) showed that across Europe the percentage of people believing in some conspiracy narratives is fairly high (about 50%), with the Portuguese population believing the most in conspiracy narratives overall. A conspiracy narrative "attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and public events" as secret plots by powerful and malicious groups (Douglas et al., 2019b, p. 4). Leman and Cinnirella (2013) showed that especially major large-scale social events (like the COVID-19 pandemic) trigger conspiracy beliefs, as these beliefs reduce the complexity of these events into a mono-causal explanation. This serves to reduce feelings of powerlessness and increases a sense of psychological control (Douglas et al., 2019a; van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). Moreover, conspiracy narratives serve a social motive. They enhance the positive image of one's ingroup, by identifying a threatening social group who "are to blame" for the ingroups hardship (Biddlestone et al., 2020; Douglas et al., 2019a; van Prooijen & Song, 2021). As such, research has emphasized that conspiracy narratives clearly share aspects of intergroup conflict (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018) fostering a distinction between the good ingroup and a hostile outgroup, leading to the term "intergroup conspiracy theory" (Cichocka et al., 2016a; Jolley et al. 2020; van Prooijen & Song, 2021).

Primarily social groups that are stereotypically understood as competent yet cold (e.g., the Chinese) are identified as a threat and therefore targets of intergroup conspiracy narratives (Winiewksi et al., 2015). Within the European context this often implies non-White groups which are perceived as threat to White groups. In other regions of the world, White people can also be portrait as the conspiring outgroup (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015), thus who is the in- and outgroup is depended on the context. However, because this study is conducted in Europe where the population is predominantly White, we will focus on conspiracy beliefs, and their consequences, held by White Europeans directed at Chinese or Chinese descendants. The perceived threat to the own group has been shown to increase conspiracy beliefs about the outgroup (Winiewksi et al, 2015; van Prooijen & Song, 2021). Especially in times of uncertainty, threat perceptions by an outgroup might be particularly high and people cope with this perceived ingroup threat by resorting to ICB (Newheiser et al., 2011). Considering that under perceived threat from an outgroup, violence against an outgroup is often more approved of (Lantos & Molenberghs, 2021), it is conceivable

that in a European context ICB could be associated White people's VRA towards an outgroup like the Chinese during the pandemic. Although research about the link is still rare, indeed conspiracy beliefs appear to play a role in violent behavioural intentions.

In their national representative study in the US, Uscinski and Parent (2014) showed that people who believed in conspiracy narratives are also more likely to find violence against the government acceptable. Moreover, Rees and Lamberty (2019) reported that people who have the tendency to believe in conspiracy narratives report not only higher acceptance of violence but also higher readiness to act violent themselves. Furthermore, Jolley and Paterson (2020) found that the belief in the G5 Covid-19 conspiracy narrative was associated with justification and willingness to engage in violence against G5 poles and that this was translatable to general conspiracy beliefs and general justification of violence (e.g., to insert own interests or restore order). Additionally, Rottweiler & Gill (2020) established a direct link between conspiracy narratives and the support for violence. Specifically, the researchers found that people who believed in conspiracy beliefs were more likely to support the ingroup they most identified with before (e.g., political, social, ethnic etc.), even if the ingroup would resort to violence and engage in violence themselves when an ingroup member would be attacked by the police. To conclude, conspiracy beliefs do not only appear to be associated to aggressive behaviour, but also appear to be connected to intergroup behaviour. Therefore, it seems plausible that the spread of intergroup conspiracy narratives about China and the pandemic could have triggered VRA towards the Chinese during the COVID-19 pandemic among White Europeans.

2.2. The Role of Emotions and Ingroup Identification

However, studies show that by their nature, beliefs alone often do not adequately explain the expression of negative behaviours against racialized outgroups (Mackie et al., 2000). Especially, in intergroup conspiracy contexts in which threat perception by the outgroup might be high (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015), it is possible that negative emotions like anger or fear could explain the process through which beliefs could impact aggressive behaviour towards an outgroup. Indeed, recent studies suggest that certain negative emotions might result from adopting conspiracy beliefs (Jolley & Paterson, 2020; Peitz et al., 2021), since such beliefs encompass the perception of the outgroup intentionally harming the ingroup (van Prooijen & Douglas 2017), which in turn has been shown to increase anger (Giner-Sorolla & Russell, 2019). Interestingly, Peitz et al. (2021) showed that conspiracy beliefs were significantly associated with emotions such as anger or anxiety and that those, in turn, were negatively related to health compliant behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, anger seems to play a crucial role in triggering

aggressive behavioural tendencies (Cuddy et al., 2007). As the first study ever, Jolley and Paterson (2020) found that anger explained the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and participants' justification of and readiness to engage in violent behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, other emotions that could also explain this relationship have not been investigated so far, even though fear has also been shown to be associated with both outgroup aggression and conspiracy beliefs (Halperin & Gross, 2011; Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015; Peitz et al., 2021). Thus, it appears that emotions could be crucial in explaining the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and aggressive behaviour. Initial research points to the idea, using the Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) as framework (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015; Hebel-Sela et al., 2022), that this could also hold in the context of ICB and consequent aggression towards an outgroup. However, to this day the role of emotions in explaining the relationship between intergroup conspiracy beliefs and aggression in an intergroup context remains unstudied.

The Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET, Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie et al., 2008) provides an interesting framework for the role of emotions in intergroup contexts. The IET emphasizes the important role of intergroup emotions and consequent behaviour towards an outgroup. It states that when ingroup membership is salient, for example by mentioning the ingroup, or hearing the national anthem, self-categorization (shifting perception of the self as unique to being part of a group) causes ingroup members to share emotional responses towards an outgroup (Mackie et al., 2008; Smith & Mackie, 2015). Hence, ingroup members feel the emotions less as individuals and rather on behalf of their group. These emotions consequently direct intergroup behaviour. Given the established intergroup character of conspiracy beliefs, it is conceivable that ICB could be associated to intergroup emotions felt towards the “conspiring” target (i.e., in the context of the current study the Chinese), which in turn could explain VRA towards that target. Interestingly, Maitner et al. (2016) and Mackie et al. (2008) stressed that the more individuals identify with the ingroup, the more extreme they will interpret intergroup events (i.e., the alleged conspiracy) and as such the more intensely they will feel the intergroup emotions on behalf of their ingroup. Thus, intergroup emotions are amplified the more individuals identify with the ingroup (Mackie et al., 2008). Consequently, intergroup emotions could not only explain the relationship between ICB and VRA, but the intensity of the intergroup emotions felt by ingroup members could also depend on the level of identification with the ingroup.

In line with this finding, Andreychik and Gill (2009) found that people who identified more with being White showed lower prosocial emotional responses towards Black people. Furthermore, Zhang (2019) found that the more participants identified with being White, the more likely they felt negative and the less likely they felt positive intergroup emotions towards Asians. Given the established social motives and

intergroup characteristics of conspiracy beliefs, it is conceivable that the same mechanisms hold in the context of ICBs. This would imply that people who hold ICBs about the Chinese, who strongly identify with their ingroup, might experience stronger negative intergroup emotions towards the Chinese, because the threat of the conspiring outgroup is interpreted more strongly.

2.3. The Role of Ingroup Norms

Although intergroup emotions towards the Chinese appear to be an important factor when it comes to VRA, an integrated framework of the Social Identity Theory (SIT) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TBP) additionally stresses the importance of group norms in influencing people's behaviours in intergroup contexts (Fielding et al., 2008). Ajzen´s (1991) TBP points out the importance of behavioural intentions guided by among others subjective norms (i.e., the pressure we feel from others to perform a behaviour) on behavioural outcomes. The SIT by Tajfel and Turner (1979) adds to this the importance of group norms (i.e., the informal codes of conduct and beliefs within a specific group) of relevant ingroups which serve as orientation for our behavioural intentions (Terry & Hogg, 1996; Fielding et al., 2008). This stresses that ingroup norms impact behaviour if the group is essential to our identity. Thus, for example behaviour towards a racialised outgroup would be informed by the norms of the ingroup (e.g., White Europeans); even more so if the ingroup is a relevant part of the social identity.

Globally, research is making a distinction between injunctive norms (i.e., what group members are supposed to do) and descriptive norms (i.e., what group members belief or do) and while both norms play a role in influencing behaviour, for the current study we will focus on descriptive norms, as they have shown to be relevant in the context of conspiracy beliefs (Cookson et al. 2020a). Within the framework of these theories, perceived group norms have consistently been found to be relevant predictors for people's behaviour and attitudes, also in intergroup contexts (Terry & Hogg, 1996; Fielding et al., 2008). For example, exclusive group norms have been shown to enforce aggressive behaviour in school contexts (Nesdale et al., 2008) and male sexual aggression against women has been shown to be influenced by male group norms (Zounlome & Wong, 2019). Additionally, Palmer et al. (2015) showed that verbal aggression towards outgroup members was more approved when consistent with ingroup norms in the school context. Concluding, group norms appear to play a role in enhancing or inhibiting aggression against an outgroup, implying that people who perceive that an ingroup approves of their beliefs are more likely to act on these beliefs, especially when the ingroup is a central part of the self.

Although this is a very recent line of research group norms also appear to play a role in the context of conspiracy beliefs and are suggested to be important to consider in interventions. Cookson et al. (2021b)

showed that manipulating ingroup norms indirectly increased behavioural intentions of parents who are believing in anti-vaccine conspiracies to vaccinate their children. Another study by Cookson et al., (2021a) demonstrated that people who perceived their (prescribed and chosen) ingroup to believe in conspiracy narratives about COVID-19 also endorsed these conspiracy narratives themselves to a higher degree and even more so for people who highly identified with their norm group. Thus, ingroup norms of relevant ingroups seem to have an impact on enforcing aggressive behaviour, conspiracy beliefs, and decrease negative behavioural outcomes caused by conspiracy beliefs. Considering that conspiracy beliefs have been shown to be associated to increased acceptance of aggression, it is conceivable that people who are confirmed in their conspiracy beliefs by a relevant ingroup feel that VRA is more legitimate, while people who are disconfirmed in their beliefs feel that VRA is less legitimate. Thus, perceived ingroup norms could moderate the link between ICB and the VRA against the Chinese and this could even more so be true for people who identify strongly with the norm conveying ingroup.

The impact ingroup norms have on our behaviour heavily depends on how central that group is to ourselves, thus how strongly we identify with the ingroup (Fielding et al., 2008; Neighbors et al., 2010; Terry & Hogg, 1996). This phenomenon has been found across a wide range of behaviours (Åstr⃠sm & Rise, 2001). For example, in the context of ICBs and national identity (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015) and in the context of ingroup norms and ICBs (Cookson et al., 2021a). In their study Cookson et al. (2021a) showed that participants who strongly identified with a chosen ingroup reported the strongest association between the ingroup conspiracy norms and personal conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19. Thus, depending on the level of identification with the ingroup, ingroup norms could enhance or inhibit the link between conspiracy beliefs and aggressive behaviour.

In the same vein, perceived ingroup norms about conspiracy beliefs could also moderate the indirect link between negative intergroup emotions and VRA against the Chinese, even more so for people who highly identify with that ingroup. This is because the negative intergroup emotions, experienced due to the idea of the conspirators intentionally harming the ingroup, could lead to a stronger expression of racial aggression when the ingroup norm context would support conspiracy beliefs, especially for people who strongly identify with that ingroup. While experiencing negative intergroup emotions based on ICB and being disconfirmed in conspiracy beliefs by the ingroup could decrease VRA mostly if the ingroup is a central part of our identity, thus identification is high. This is supported by Mackie and Smith (2018) who suggested that when ingroup norms do not match the intergroup emotions people feel, ingroup members will adjust their emotions. Consequently, it is conceivable that also their behaviour towards the outgroup should be adjusted, even more so for people who strongly identify with their ingroup. As noted before

Mackie et al. (2008) pointed out that the consequences of intergroup emotions are intensified the more individuals identify with the ingroup. Thus, ingroup norms, depended on the level of group identification could moderate the indirect relationship of intergroup emotions and subsequent VRA against the Chinese. However, in the context of ICBs, group identification and ingroup norms have so far not been tested.

In the context of intergroup emotions, group identification can be shared by small scale groups, but also larger, bigger groups that factually only have loose ties, for example a national identity (Smith & Mackie, 2015). Investigating group identification and ingroup norms based on national categories could be insightful because studies have shown that conspiracy beliefs about other countries during the COVID-19 pandemic were associated with nationalist/patriotic ideas (Rieger, 2020). Additionally, Górska et al. (2022) pointed out that especially the pandemic could have triggered insecurities that were specific to the nation in terms of shutting down borders and financial stability, which could have led to a greater focus on a threat on national identity. As mentioned above, Drochon (2018) showed that conspiracy beliefs are especially prominent in Portugal. Moreover, also levels of racism in Portugal appear to be one of the highest among European countries (Vale & Pereira, 2018). Although there is little data specifically on Anti-Asian racism, a qualitative study by Matias (2007) gives important insight on how Asians and especially the Chinese are viewed as socially cold, in-hygienic and a threat to commerce by the Portuguese public. Additionally, França et al. (2022) discussed that although Chinese immigrants are subject to different racism in Portugal than other, for example black immigrants, they also showed that, like in many other European countries, Chinese students were exposed to racial microaggression in Portugal during COVID-19. Considering the above, Portugal is an important country to look at in terms of ICBs about the Chinese during COVID-19 and the associated VRA.

Considering that aggressive behaviour against racial outgroups is often guided by prejudice (Messner, 2004; Parrott & Zeichner, 2005) and prejudice has also been shown to be linked to higher levels of conspiracy belief against social groups (Swami, 2012; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014), it appeared as an important control factor to consider in the present study to determine whether ICB has an effect over and above prejudice against the Chinese.

2.4. Current study

Although conspiracy beliefs have been studied more extensively in the last years, research on its association to VRA against the Chinese is virtually non-existent. No study before has investigated the moderating role of ingroup norms and ingroup identification on the direct association of ICBs and VRA. Furthermore, no study before has looked at the moderating role of ingroup norms and ingroup

identification on the indirect link between ICBs and VRA via intergroup emotions. Lastly, no study thus far has examined the moderating role of ingroup identification on the association between ICB and intergroup emotions.

Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to investigate the link between ICB and VRA against the Chinese (see Fig. 2.1). Furthermore, the study aimed to investigate whether the relationship between ICBs and VRA was moderated by ingroup norms, depending on the ingroup identification with Portuguese people. Moreover, we wanted to understand whether negative intergroup emotions could explain the relationship between ICBs and VRA towards the Chinese. Additionally, we intended to investigate whether the mediated relationship between ICBs and VRA, via intergroup emotions, more specifically the link ICB and intergroup emotions was moderated by ingroup identification with Portuguese people. Lastly, we aimed to understand whether ingroup norms, depending on the level of ingroup identification moderated the mediated relationship between ICBs and VRA, via intergroup emotions, more specifically the link between intergroup emotions and VRA.

In times of continuous crisis, susceptibility to conspiracy narratives will continue to rise and with it, its negative consequences for individuals, intergroup relations, and society in general. This study gives important insights into the potentially dangerous associations of intergroup conspiracy narratives for society and intergroup relations, providing us with a more detailed understanding of why and under which circumstances these narratives can lead to aggression against vulnerable groups. Therefore, we proposed, based on the study by Jolley and Paterson (2020) and Rottweiler and Gill (2020) who demonstrated that conspiracy beliefs were associated to the readiness to engage in violence that:

H1: ICB about the Chinese in the COVID-19 context would be positively associated with higher VRA towards the Chinese.

Moreover, based on Palmer et al. (2015), Cookson et al. (2021a) and Cookson et al. (2021b) it was hypothesized that:

H2: Ingroup norms, depending on the level of identification with the Portuguese, would moderate the relationship between ICBs and VRA against the Chinese.

The moderation was expected to unfold in a way that participants higher in ICB, who are exposed to conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms would score higher in VRA, and that this would be more pronounced if participants identify strongly with being Portuguese. While participants holding stronger ICB who are exposed to conspiracy-opposing ingroup norms would score lower on VRA, even more so when they strongly identify with being Portuguese.

Furthermore, based on Jolley and Paterson (2020) who showed that anger mediated the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and justification of violence it was hypothesized that:

H3: The relationship between ICB and VRA would be partially mediated by negative intergroup emotions towards the Chinese.

It was expected that higher scores in ICB would be associated with higher negative intergroup emotions and that negative intergroup emotions in turn would be associated with higher scores on VRA against the Chinese.

Based on Mackie et al. (2008), Maitner et al. (2016) and Zhang (2019) who proposed that stronger ingroup identification leads to intensified emotional responses towards an outgroup it was hypothesized that:

H4: Higher identification with being Portuguese would moderate the mediated relationship between ICB and VRA via intergroup emotions, such that the association between ICB and negative intergroup emotions would be stronger for high identifiers and weaker for low identifiers.

Finally, based on Mackie and Smith (2018) it was hypothesized that:

H5: Ingroup norms, depending on the level of ingroup identification, would moderate the mediated relationship between ICB and VRA via intergroup emotions, such that the association between negative intergroup emotions and VRA would be stronger for participants after exposure to conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms, especially for high identifiers. While the association between negative intergroup emotions and VRA would be weaker for participants after exposure to conspiracy-opposing ingroup norms, especially for high identifiers.

These hypotheses were tested online. A scale was created to assess participants' VRA in an indirect way. Participant's belief in intergroup conspiracy narratives as well as their level of prejudice, group identification and intergroup emotions towards the Chinese were assessed before they are exposed to a Twitter post about the alleged percentages of Portuguese that either oppose or support intergroup conspiracy narratives or a post unrelated to conspiracy narratives. Thereafter, all participants were assessed in their VRA with a chat scenario in which their (un)willingness to intervene while witnessing VRA from a person with a Portuguese name towards a person from Chinese descent.

Figure 2.1

Proposed Moderated Mediation Model



Chapter 3

Methods

3.1. Participants

G*power (Faul et al., 2009) analysis was conducted to assess the necessary number of participants for the current model. To achieve a small effect size (f^2 = .05), with an alpha of .05 and a power of .95, 481 participants would have been necessary. Inclusion criteria for participants included being Portuguese and above 18 years old. A total of 307 responses were gathered. Out of those participants were excluded from the final analysis who were part of a pilot study (n = 6) to initially test the surveys overall comprehensibility, who had an incomplete survey below 40% (n = 96), who had at least one scale with less than half of the items answered or missing of critical demographics (age and gender) (n = 9) and who did not pass the manipulation check (n = 13). Furthermore, three extreme outliers were detected after performing preliminary regression analysis and subsequently excluded, leaving a total of 180 for further analysis. All participants were above 18 years old, with a minimum age of 18 and a maximum age of 80. Out of these 180 participants, 161 indicated being White/White Portuguese, four indicated being Black/Black Portuguese, two indicated being Asian/Asian Portuguese. 13 participants indicated having a different, or mixed origin. Due to low numbers of non-White participants, it was not plausible to compare the White majority of participants to the non-White racially mixed samples. Therefore, it was decided to exclude all non-white participants from further analysis, leaving 161 participants for the final analysis.

As shown in Table 3.1 descriptive analysis of the sample showed that the majority indicated being women (70.8%). Most participants answered being little, to not at all religious (78.3%), having a university degree (92.8%), and consuming ≤ 30 minutes of news per day (61.4%). Other demographics demonstrated a less clear picture (see Table 1). Participants were gathered via social media, convenience sampling and QR-code distribution in public spaces. They were randomly assigned to either the control condition or the Condition 2 or 3 by the program Qualtrics.com. Participation was voluntary and an incentive for participation was provided by a small lottery to win one out of three 20€ LIDL vouchers.

Table 3.1

Sociodemographic Characteristics of Participants

	Total		Condition 2		Condition 3		Control Condition	
	N = 161	100%	*n = 48*	29.8%	*n = 59*	36.7%	*n = 54*	33.5%
Gender								
Female	114	70.8%	40	83.3%	39	66.1%	35	64.8%
Male	44	27.3%	8	16.6%	17	28.8%	19	35.2%
Non-binary	3	1.9%	0		3	5.1%	0	
Religiosity								
Disagree fully – little	126	78.3%	39	81.3%	46	78.0%	41	78.8%
Agree little - very	23	14.4%	8	16.6%	7	11.9%	8	15.4%
Neither	10	6.3%	1	2.1%	6	10.1%	3	5.8%
Education								
No University	11	7.2%	2	4.3%	4	7.1%	5	10%
University	142	92.8%	45	95.7%	52	92.8%	45	90%
News consumption/day								
≤ 30 minutes	97	61.4%	29	60.4%	43	72.9%	25	49.0%
60-150 minutes	59	37.3%	18	37.5%	16	27.1%	25	49.0%
≥ 180 minutes	2	1.3%	1	2.1%	0	0	1	2.0%
Political Ideology								
left-extreme left	59	44.4%	17	42.5%	21	43.8%	21	46.7%
right-extreme right	35	26.3%	9	22.5%	13	27.1%	13	28.9%
Neither	39	29.3%	14	35%	14	29.1%	11	24.4%
Make ends meet								
Difficult-Very difficult	38	23.9%	15	25.4%	8	16.7%	15	28.8%
Easily-Very Easily	63	39.6%	24	40.7%	22	45.8%	17	32.7%
Neither	58	36.5%	20	33.9%	18	37.5%	20	38.5%
	M (*SD*)		*M* (*SD*)		*M* (*SD*)		*M (SD)*	
Age (years)	26.2 (9.3)		25.5 (9.4)		26.9 (9.1)		25.9 (9.5)	

Note: Condition 2 (conspiracy-opposing ingroup norms), Condition 3 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms.

3.2. Materials

3.2.1. General demographics

General demographics of participants were assessed. Namely gender, age, nationality, origin, religiosity, political ideology, socio-economic status, education level, time spent consuming news, and type of news outlet.

3.2.2. Intergroup conspiracy beliefs

To assess belief in intergroup conspiracy narratives a scale from Biddlestone et al. (2020) about COVID-19 conspiracy narratives was adapted to fit the purpose of the current study. More specifically, three items were created and adapted to ask about China's alleged involvement in the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, “The coronavirus was purposefully created and released by China, as a biological weapon. For each of the statement’s participants had the option to answer on a 7-point Likert-Scale (1 = *strongly agree to* 7 = *strongly disagree*). Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a satisfactory model fit index with a total explained variance of 67.88% (KMO = .70). Internal consistency for the three items was adequate (α = .76). A mean score was computed where higher values indicated a higher endorsement of ICBs.

3.2.3. Intergroup emotions

To activate participants' self-categorization as “Portuguese” in a subtle way, the study was introduced as being “about nationalities”. Additionally, the Feeling Thermometer to assess prejudice (see below) also asked to indicate participants feelings towards the Portuguese. Similar as in Zhang (2019), intergroup emotions were then measured by asking participants to indicate their emotions towards the Chinese in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. According with Halperin and Cross (2011) and Crisp et al. (2007) the context (“COVID-19 pandemic'') and the emotion´s target group (“Chinese”) were specifically mentioned to reinforce the emotions felt towards this group. In an adapted version from Peitz et al. (2021) who measured anger by using two items and fear using one items, we measured anger by asking for participants level of anger and contempt, and fear respectively. Additionally, we measured positive emotions (i.e., happy, sympathy) towards the Chinese to compare emotional valance. For each of the intergroup emotions, participants answered on a 7-point Likert Scale (1 = *Strongly agree that this is how I feel* to *7 = Strongly disagree that this is how I feel*). Contrary to our expectations, an EFA of combined negative emotions (i.e., anger, contempt, and fear) extracted only one factor which accounted for 82.07% of the variance (KMO = .73). Therefore, it was decided to combine the three negative intergroup emotions into one variable “negative emotions” with high internal consistency (α = .89). Additionally, Cronbach's α

coefficients showed acceptable internal consistency for the positive emotions' subscale (α = .75). A mean score was computed where higher values indicated a higher endorsement of intergroup emotions.

3.2.4. Group identification

Group identification was measured with a shortened version of the Multicomponent In-group Identification Scale (MGIS). This scale was created by Leach et al. (2008) and adapted for the Portuguese context by Ramos and Alves (2011). Out of the two dimensions Self-definition and Self-Investment, the current study used the Self-Investment dimension only, as it has been shown to be more relevant in the context of ingroup norms (Masson & Fritsche, 2014), because Self-Investment assess the bond individuals feel with their ingroup, leading more to behavioural outcomes directed to outgroups. Out of the dimension of Self-Investment, the two sub-scales centrality and solidarity seemed to fit best for the purpose of the current study. Centrality assesses the extent to which people give importance to their ingroup, it has been shown to make individuals more sensitive to intergroup events, especially in terms of threat to their ingroup (Leach et al., 2008) and might encourage defending the ingroup against threat. One example item of centrality was "The fact that I am Portuguese is an important part of my identity". Solidarity was chosen as it is conceptualized as evoking behavioural commitment, investment, and a bond with once ingroup (Leach et al., 2008). One example item of solidarity was "I feel a connection with the Portuguese people". The third sub-scale of Self-Investment Satisfaction was purposefully left out from the assessment, as it focuses more on maintaining a positive perception and downplaying negative portrayals of the ingroup (Leach et al., 2008), while the current study was more interested in behaviour, especially towards the outgroup. Participants answered items of each of the two scales centrality and solidarity on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for solidarity and centrality was conducted using AMOS (Arbuckle, 2006). The results demonstrated a satisfactory fit to the current sample χ^2 (8) = 13.63, comparative fit index (CFI) = .99, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = .98, and root-mean-square-error of approximation (RMSEA) = .07 [.00, .13]. Cronbach's α coefficients showed good internal consistency for both centrality (α = .84) and solidarity (α = .82). This resulted in two separate group identification measures centrality and solidarity. Two mean scores were computed where higher values indicated a higher endorsement of both centrality and solidarity.

3.2.5. Manipulation of ingroup norms

Similarly, to the study by Hartmann et al., (2021) in which Twitter posts, likes and comments were used to manipulate perceived ingroup norms, alleged Twitter-Tweets and comments were also used to manipulate

Portuguese ingroup norms concerning ICBs about the Chinese during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the current study, participants were shown a Tweet by BBC, of an article about the WHO investigating the origins of the virus in Wuhan. Thereafter, depending on which condition group participants were randomly assigned to, they were exposed either to a post by Antena1, claiming that 73% of their listeners think China did not spread or create the virus purposefully (Condition 2) or to a post by Antena1, claiming that 73% of their listeners think China did spread or create the virus purposefully (Condition 3, see Fig. 3.1). Antena1 was chosen as a Portuguese public outlet because it is generally accepted as relatively neutral and trustworthy in Portugal. Lastly, participants in both conditions were shown two comments by alleged Portuguese Twitter-users, stating that they either oppose (Condition 2) conspiracy beliefs about China and the COVID-19 pandemic, or support (Condition 3, see Fig. F.2) conspiracy beliefs about China and the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants who were assigned to the control group (Condition 1), they were first exposed to a Tweet by BBC news showing an article about a conference concerning excessive antibiotics use, after which they saw a post by Antena1, claiming that 73% of their listeners think that people overuse antibiotics, and two comments by Portuguese Twitter users agreeing that we overuse antibiotics. To enhance the association to the Portuguese ingroup subtly, traditional Portuguese names were chosen for the two Portuguese Twitter users' Intergroup emotions.

Figure 3.1

Condition 3 (Antena1 Tweet, Conspiracy-Supporting Ingroup Norms)



Note: Translation of Tweet: "Do you remember this BBC post? Following our retweet, 73% of Antena1 listeners, in an opinion poll, indicated that they believe China has deliberately created or spread the virus". Translation of Graph title: "China has created or spread the virus intentionally". Translation of numbers: "73% Agree, 17% Disagree, 10% Don't know".

Figure 3.2.

Condition 3 (Twitter Users, Conspiracy-Supporting Ingroup Norms)

Note: Translations of Tweets. Ana: "From the beginning, China has tried to hide information about the origin of the virus". António: "When are they going to understand? The virus from China was created intentionally!!

3.2.6. Manipulation check

Participants in all three groups had to answer one manipulation check multiple choice question about the content they had just seen to make sure they understood that the Twitter users opposed (Condition 2 "She said China had collaborated with the WHO to find the origins of the virus") or supported (Condition 3 "She claimed that China had omitted information about the origin of the virus") conspiracy narratives about China and the COVID-19 pandemic or that Twitter users agreed that antibiotics were used excessively (Condition 1 "She said she hopes the health authorities will find a solution to the problem").

3.2.7. Verbal racial aggression

Measuring VRA directly was expected to be insensitive to social desirability and challenging, due to high levels of covert racism in Portuguese and other societies (Vale & Pereira, 2018) attributed to a general norm of anti-racism in the public. Therefore, we decided not to measure participants' direct willingness to express racial aggression towards a Chinese person, but instead create an indirect measure to observe participants readiness to join in into VRA. For that, we drew on literature from bystander interventions and cyberbullying to create a new measure. Bystander intervention studies clearly demonstrate that White majority members intervene less likely in attacks towards an non-White minority by an ingroup members

(Brewster & Tucker, 2016; Gönültaş & Mulvey, 2021) and that this is based on negative racial attitudes and the normalization of discriminatory behaviour (Özdemir et al., 2018; Gönültaş & Mulvey, 2021; Mazzone et al., 2018), while non-White minority members assist both White and non-White members to a similar degree (Gönültaş & Mulvey, 2021). Consequently, using a bystander intervention framework to measure indirectly participants' tendency for VRA was considered adequate for the development of a new indirect VRA scale. Participants were exposed to a situation in which they observed VRA in a chat scenario and had to decide if and to what extent they wanted to join in or intervene. In an adapted version from Abbott et al. (2020) and Shultz et al. (2014) "verbal racial aggression" against the Chinese was therefore assessed by introducing participants to screenshots of a simulated chat conversation (see Fig. 3.3), in which they witnessed someone with a traditional Portuguese name, attack someone with a traditional Chinese name in an escalation of VRA. The decision to evoke in- and outgroup identification by traditional names from either nation was based on wanting to find a way to evoke participants' association to someone who is Portuguese and White and someone who is from Chinese descent and Asian in a subtle way.

For each of the five racial attacks witnessed, participants had to choose at least two out of nine given answer possibilities (ranging from full support for aggressor to full support for victim), indicating how they would most likely react to the attacks. The nine different response possibilities (four to support the aggressor, one to do nothing and four to support the victim) ranged from public or private support to the aggressor (e.g., "I say something to Xiang similar to what Maria said to her, for example: I make a similar comment/question"), through confronting the aggressor publicly or privately (e.g., "I write a private message to Maria to show that I find her message funny/ok") to reporting the (e.g., "I report the incidence to the community event organizers"). Additionally, one open-ended response option was provided to participants to give the opportunity to express participants' individual responses, in case neither of the nine given answer possibilities felt suitable to them. These response possibilities were adapted from a study by Bastiaensens et al. (2014), who investigated bystander behaviour intentions to reinforce bullies or support the victim in online bullying scenarios.

After selecting the responses to each screenshot participants went on to the next screenshot hereby seeing the victims replies, like: "this is very nasty" to the previous message of the aggressor, before reading the next message of the aggressor. Similar as in Abbott et al. (2020) and Shultz et al. (2014), participants were able to read the responses of the victim to the aggressor's message after they indicated their response. It was chosen to let the victim reply to the aggressor condemning the attacks, to avoid creating the perception that the attacks are acceptable. Additionally, it was chosen to imply that the victim was a second-generation migrant from Chinese descent, and not Chinese without Portuguese affiliation to

understand the situation for Chinese descendants in Portugal. To calculate the responses for the open-ended responses, they were assigned codes from 1-9 representing values from full support to victim to full support to aggressor. To calculate the average response of each participant to each of the aggressors' attacks, a mean score of all responses to each attack was calculated. The chat conversation was set up with "chat-simulator.com" online. The chat-participants consisted of four people (i.e., the aggressor, the victim and two spectators, who did not engage in the conversation), who allegedly had to plan a fundraising for a community event and who did not know each other previously.

Figure 3.3

Example of content of screenshot five and six of chat scenario measuring VRA



Note: Translations of chat: Xiang H.: "This is really nasty! I thought we are organising a fundraising, not insult each other". Maria R.: "What do you mean by insulting each other? I am only saying that people may not want to come if many of you will are there". Xiang H.: "What is wrong with you? This is super offensive". Maria R.: "Offensive?! Offensive is that you call yourself Portuguese".

The first screenshot shown to the participants solely introduced the chat context to which participants could not react. In the second screenshot participants witnessed how the attacker expressed a

microaggression (“yes okey… but where are you really from?”), in the third screenshot, a stereotype with positive valence (“Ahh… we have an Asian in the group. We will not have a problem with accounting, haha”) in the fourth screenshot a stereotype with negative valence (“…it's because people can get worried about bringing dogs, haha”) in the fifth screenshot participants witnessed the attacker express explicit racism (“I am only saying that people may not want to come if to many of your people will be there”) and finally, in the sixth chat an escalation of explicit racism (“…it is offensive that you call yourself Portuguese”, see Figure 3.3). In the seventh screenshot, participants could not react anymore, but read the victim expressing they will report the incident and leave the chat.

Additionally, to control for gender, we decided to match the gender of participants with gender of the aggressor and victim, as research has pointed out that a gender mismatch between aggressor and participant can alter the intervening behaviour (Arman, 2020). For non-binary people or people who did not want to indicate their gender, both male and female names for aggressor were randomly assigned by Qualtrics.com. Additionally, the current study controlled for name preferences of participants as confounding variables, thus two gendered names (e.g., “Maria and Leonor” and “Martim and João”) per aggressor were chosen and randomly assigned per gender.

The responses of participants to the five chat scenarios were coded from 4 (highest level of VRA) to -4 (lowest level of VRA). EFA was conducted to investigate the underlying construct of VRA using SPSS (v.28). The EFA was run using participants' mean score responses to each of the attacks, resulting in five items representing the five chat scenarios. Based on the scree plot, one factor was extracted, which accounted for 62.64% of the variance (KMO= .75). As shown in Table 3.2, the factor included all five items with high factor loadings (≥ .50). Descriptive statistics of means, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis showed that, parallel to the escalation of aggression across the five attacks, participants' responses to the five items demonstrated increasing intervening behaviour (lower scores indicating less VRA). Item one (microaggression) showed the lowest intervening behaviour, (M = -1.62, SD = 1.47, min = -4, max = 4, S = 5.26, K = 5.05), to an increase in Item two (positive stereotype) (M = -1.66, SD = 1.54, min = -4, max = 4, S = 5.43, K = 3.37), over Item three, negative stereotype (M = -2.49, SD = 1.22, min = -4, max = 4, S = 9.65, K = 14.72) to Item four, overt racism (M = -2.79, SD = 1.24, min = -4, max = 4, S = 13.46, K = 25.40 and finally item five, escalated overt racism, resulted in the most intervening behaviour (M = -2.86, SD = 1.14, min = -4, max = 3, S = 11.14, K = 16.29). Correlation analysis demonstrated positive and significant correlations (p = < .001) between all five items of which none was below r(160) = .39 or above r(160) = .83. Additionally, internal consistency analysis revealed good reliability (α = .84) of the VRA scale. Consequently, then the

aggregated score for each of the five chat scenarios was calculated per participant resulting in one variable "verbal racial aggression" representing overall VRA across the five racial attacks.

Table 3.2

Results from Factor Analysis of Verbal Racial Aggression (VRA)

VRA Items	1
Factor: VRA	
1. Microaggression: "…but where are you really from"	**.50**
2. Positive stereotype: "We will not have problems with accounting, haha"	**.53**
3. Negative stereotype: "People might be worried for their dogs"	**.67**
4. Racism: "just saying people might not want to come if too many of you are there"	**.74**
5. Escalation of racism: "It is an offense that you call yourself Portuguese"	**.71**

Note. N = 161. The extraction method was principal component with an oblique (Promax with Kaiser Normalization) rotation.

3.2.8. Stereotypes

To measure stereotypes, the Anti-Asian American Stereotype Scale was adapted to the Portuguese context (Lin et al., 2005). From this Scale, six items were chosen based on the highest factor loadings with example items like: "Asians generally avoid being the center of attention at social gatherings." Participants could respond on a Likert-Scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Cronbach's α coefficients showed adequate internal consistency (α = .78). A mean score was computed where higher values indicated a higher endorsement of stereotypes.

3.2.9. Feeling Thermometer

To assess prejudice towards Chinese people the Feeling Thermometer was used, similarly as in a study conducted by Miller et al. (2004). The scale assessed on a 7-point Likert-Scale (1 = *very cold* to 7 = *very warm*) how participants feel about different social groups. To identify whether prejudice was specific to the Chinese, or generalized towards other Asians, participants were also asked to indicate their feelings

towards the Taiwanese (who are culturally close to the Chinese), as well as towards Asians in general. To not expose the focus of the study entirely we additionally asked for participants' feelings towards other social groups. For example, the Portuguese, Europeans, or Angolans.

3.3. Procedure

Participants entered Qualtrics.com, in a period between April and July 2022, via link or QR-code and were presented with the informed consent, reading the deception that the study would assess attitudes and nationalities in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and receiving a small disclaimer that this study contains biased language based on nationality. Participants who did not consent, were directed to the end of the survey. Participants who gave consent firstly indicated their age and gender. Thereafter, they continued filling in the Feeling Thermometer, the Anti-Asian Stereotype scale, the conspiracy belief measure, the intergroup emotions measure as well as the group identification measures centrality and solidarity. Each item of all subscales was presented in randomized order. In the following, participants were randomly divided into three groups: The Condition 2 (conspiracy opposition), the Condition 3 (conspiracy support) and the Control Condition (excessive antibiotics use). Participants were then exposed to the BBC and Antena1 Tweet, followed by the two comments of Twitter-users, which differed in their content, based on the group they were assigned to. Then, participants were exposed to the manipulation check questions. In the following each participant was assigned to the chat scenario that matched their gender, and randomly assigned to one of the two gendered name conditions. Thereafter, participants were exposed to the chat scenario indicating which of the responses they would be most likely to give to witnessing VRA.

After finishing the chat scenario, participants were asked to indicate some remaining demographic questions. At the end, participants received disclosure on the full purpose of the study and an extensive debriefing, talking about the reproduced racism within the study, arguing for why the attacks are problematic as well as the debunking of the conspiracy narratives they were exposed to. Additionally, they were provided extra resources in case they would like to further expand their knowledge on both racism and conspiracy narratives. The debriefing was also made available as an audio, to make it more attractive for participants to receive the information provided in the debriefing. As a last step, participants were directed to another cite to indicate their details, in case they wanted to participate in the lottery to win a 20€ LIDL voucher.

CHAPTER 4

Results

Pearson correlations of all model variables were computed (see Table 4.1), which demonstrated that all correlations were in the expected direction. Additionally, while in absolute terms VRA scores were relatively low (*M* = -2.28, *SD* = 1.04), ICB were in the medium range (*M* = 3.81, *SD* = 1.34) The normality assumptions were met.

Table 4.1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Model Variables

Variable	*N*	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Positive emotions	161	4.07	1.14	—					
2. Negative emotions	161	3.81	1.49	-.41**	—				
3. Centrality	161	4.65	1.44	-.18*	.12	—			
4. Solidarity	161	5.24	1.09	.10	-.05	.54**	—		
5. VRA	161	-2.28	1.04	-.07	.27**	.15	.16*	—	
6. ICB	161	3.81	1.34	-.33**	.38**	.21**	.21**	.34**	—

Note: Higher scores in VRA indicate more aggression.

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

To rule out biased responses of participants based on the name of the aggressor in the chat, one-way ANOVA was run comparing VRA scores of each of the two names per gender of aggressor. Results demonstrated that there was no significant difference ($p > .05$) between female aggressor names (Maria or Leonor) or male aggressor names (Martim and João) on the VRA.

Based on these initial findings, the hypothesized model was tested using Model 71 of the PROCESS Marco (v. 4.1; see Hayes, 2022). Bootstrapping was used to obtain indirect effects of ICBs (X) on VRA (Y) mediated by negative (M1) and positive (M2) intergroup emotions. The Helmert method was used for the multicategorical moderator (Z) ingroup norms with 3 levels ((1) control, (2) opposition and (3) support), so that the Z2 contrast would compare conspiracy-opposition vs. -support. The Z1 contrast (control condition vs conspiracy-opposition vs -support) was not relevant for the purposes of the present study. Due to the

two subscales of ingroup identification, solidarity (W, Model A) and centrality (W, Model B) were run as the moderators in two separate models. Nonetheless, in Model A, centrality was included as a covariate, while in Model B, solidarity was included as a covariate. Other covariates (political ideology, SES, religiosity, stereotypes, and prejudice) were initially included in the model. However, none of them, except for prejudice, showed to be significantly associated with the model variables, therefore, they were excluded in the final models for simplicity.

4.1. Model A

For Model A (solidarity (W), centrality as covariate) the results indicated that, consistent with our Hypothesis 1, the direct association between ICB and VRA was positive and significant b = .18, SE = .08, p = .037, 95% CI [.01, .34], demonstrating that participants higher in ICB also scored higher on VRA (see Appendix B, Table B.1). Notably this effect was obtained even while controlling for prejudice. However, contradicting to Hypothesis 2, neither the two-way interaction between ICB and ingroup norms, nor the two-way interaction between ICB and solidarity, nor the three-way interaction between ICB, ingroup norms and solidarity on VRA were significant (ps > .170). However, albeit in unexpected directions, we did find a significant and positive slope for participants in Condition 2 (conspiracy-opposing ingroup norm), indicating that for participants with higher levels of solidarity, higher ICB was associated with higher VRA (+1 SD; b = .44, SE = .21, p = .038, 95% CI[.03, .85]). Moreover, there was a marginal significant and positive slope for participants in Condition 2, indicating that for participants with average scores in solidarity, higher ICB was marginally associated to higher VRA (0 SD; b = .24, SE = .12, p = .053, 95% CI[-.00, .48]. However, it cannot be concluded that ingroup norms and solidarity moderated the relationship between ICB and VRA.

As expected for Path A, ICB was positively associated to negative intergroup emotions b = .39, SE = .10, p < .000, 95% CI[.19, .58], and negatively associated to positive intergroup emotions b = -.25, SE = .08, p = .002 95% CI[-.41, -.09], showing that ICB about the Chinese was connected to more negative, and less positive intergroup emotions towards the Chinese. However, contradicting Hypothesis 4, no interaction was found on Path A between ICB and solidarity on neither positive nor negative intergroup emotions (ps > .756). Therefore, it cannot be concluded that solidarity moderated the relationship between ICB and intergroup emotions. Withal, albeit in surprising directions, solidarity was negative and marginally significant in association with negative intergroup emotions b = -.26, SE = .13, p = .053, 95% CI[-.52, .00] and positive and significant in association with positive intergroup emotions b = .30, SE = .13, p = .019, 95% CI[.05, .55]. This indicates that participants who scored higher in solidarity, also scored higher on positive

intergroup emotions and (marginally) lower on negative intergroup emotions towards the Chinese. Looking at the covariates, prejudice against the Chinese did show as positive and significant covariate in association to negative intergroup emotions *b* = .25, *SE* = .07, *p* < .000, 95% CI[.11, .38] and in a negative and significant association to positive intergroup emotions *b* = -.13, *SE* = .06, *p* = .040, 95% CI[-.25, -.01], showing that people who held more prejudice against the Chinese also scored higher on negative and lower on positive intergroup emotions. Additionally, centrality appeared as negative and significant covariate in relation to positive intergroup emotions *b* = -.18, *SE* = .09, *p* = .040, 95% CI[-.35, -.01] but not for negative intergroup emotions, indicating that people who scored higher on centrality scored lower on positive intergroup emotions.

Furthermore, consistent with our expectations on Path B, negative intergroup emotions were positively and significantly associated with VRA *b* = .16, *SE* = .08, *p* = .042, 95% CI[.01, .31]. Therefore, it can be concluded that participants scoring higher on negative intergroup emotions also scored higher on VRA. However, contrary to our expectation positive intergroup emotions were not related to VRA. Additionally, although neither the two-way interaction of negative intergroup emotions and solidarity, nor the two-way interaction of negative emotions and ingroup norms on VRA were significant (*ps* > .346), we did find a significant three-way interaction for Path B, in accordance with Hypothesis 5, between negative intergroup emotions, ingroup norms (contrast Z2, conspiracy-support vs -opposition) and solidarity on VRA *b* = -.38, *SE* = .18, *p* = .038, 95% CI[-.75, -.02]. Test of conditional M*W interactions at values of Z showed that an interaction was observed for Condition 3 (*b* = -.30, *F*(1,135) = 4.95, *p* = .028) but not for Condition 2 (*p* = .513). On closer inspection, we could see that the interaction was observed by a difference in Condition 3 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms) that was not present for Condition 2 (conspiracy-opposing ingroup norms). While in Condition 2 (conspiracy-opposing ingroup norms), no slopes were significantly different from 0 (*ps* > .221), we did find a significant and positive slope in Condition 3 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms) at lower levels of solidarity (-1 *SD*; *b* = .43, SE = 2.0, *p* = .033, 95% CI [.04, .81]), indicating that the relationship between negative intergroup emotions and VRA changed as a function of low solidarity and Condition 3 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms. All other slopes were non-significant (*ps* > .12). As can be seen in Figure 4.1, participants in Condition 3 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms), who scored lower in solidarity and lower in negative intergroup emotions also scored lower in VRA, while participants in Condition 3 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms), who scored lower in solidarity but higher on negative intergroup emotions scored higher on VRA, this was not observed for Condition 2 (conspiracy-opposition ingroup norms). Therefore, it can be concluded that lower levels of solidarity in Condition 3 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms) altered the relationship between negative

intergroup emotions and VRA which was not observed in Condition 2 (conspiracy-opposing ingroup norms).

Lastly, contradicting Hypothesis 3, the bias corrected percentile Bootstrap indicated that the indirect effect of intergroup emotion on the relation between ICB and VRA was not significant at any levels of the moderator's solidarity and ingroup norms (see Table 4.2). For instance the indirect effect between ICB and VRA via negative intergroup emotions was non-significant when solidarity was low and ingroup norms were conspiracy-supporting *b* = .17, *SE* = .11, CI[-.01, .41]. Thus, it cannot be concluded that solidarity and ingroup norms moderated the indirect path between ICB and VRA via negative intergroup emotions.

Figure 4.1

Three-way Interaction between Ingroup Norms (Condition 2 vs 3), Solidarity, and Negative Intergroup Emotions on VRA.



Note: Slope is significant only for low solidarity in Condition 2 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms). Ra_Agg stands for verbal racial aggression.

Table 4.2

Summary of Moderated Mediation Analysis of Solidarity on the Relationship between ICB on VRA via Negative and Positive Intergroup Emotions

Solidarity	Condition	Effect	B	SE	t	p	%CI
Low	1	Direct	0.05	0.37	0.13	0.896	[-0.68, 0.78]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.10	0.10	-	-	[-0.06, 0.33]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.02	0.05	-	-	[-0.13, 0.08]
Low	2	Direct	0.04	0.19	0.23	0.820	[-0.33, 0.42]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.03	0.09	-	-	[-0.01, 0.41]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.03	0.08	-	-	[-0.22, 0.10]
Low	3	Direct	0.17	0.17	1.02	0.311	[-0.16, 0.51]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.17	0.11	-	-	[-0.01, 0.41]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.11	0.09	-	-	[-0.30, 0.04]
Average	1	Direct	0.22	0.21	1.08	0.283	[-0.19, 0.63]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.08	0.06	-	-	[-0.01, 0.23]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.03	0.06	-	-	[0.16, 0.10]
Average	2	Direct	0.24	0.12	2.0	0.053	[-0.00, 0.48]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.06	0.06	-	-	[-0.04, 0.20]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.03	0.05	-	-	[-0.12, 0.06]
Average	3	Direct	0.07	0.09	0.75	0.453	[-0.11, 0.25]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.04	0.05	-	-	[-0.07, 0.14]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.02	0.04	-	-	[-0.10, 0.06]
High	1	Direct	0.40	0.29	1.35	0.178	[-0.18, 0.98]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.07	0.09	-	-	[-0.07, 0.26]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.05	0.12	-	-	[-0.23, 0.21]
High	2	Direct	0.44	0.21	2.10	0.038	[0.03, 0.85]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.09	0.08	-	-	[-0.07, 0.26]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.04	0.06	-	-	[-0.14, 0.13]
High	3	Direct	-0.04	0.18	-0.21	0.834	[-0.40, 0.32]
		Indirect (neg.)	-0.09	0.08	-	-	[-0.27, 0.03]
		Indirect (pos.)	0.09	0.06	-	-	[-0.01, 0.24]

Note. Indirect (neg.) = indirect effects of negative intergroup emotions. Indirect (pos.) = indirect effects of positive intergroup emotions.

4.2. Model B

For Model B (centrality (W), solidarity as covariate) final results indicated that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the direct association between ICB was positively and significantly related to VRA *b* = .19, *SE* = .09, *p* =

.032, 95% CI[.02, .36], even after controlling for prejudice and solidarity (see Appendix B, Table B.2). Therefore, it can be concluded that higher ICB was indeed associated with higher VRA. Contradicting to Hypothesis 2, neither the two-way interaction between ICB and centrality, nor between ICB and ingroup norms, nor the three-way interaction between ingroup norms, centrality, and ICB on VRA was found (*ps* > .304). However, albeit in unexpected directions, we did find a significant and positive slope for Condition 2 (conspiracy-opposing ingroup norm). The slope for Condition 2, indicated that higher ICB was associated to higher VRA, for high levels of centrality *(+1 SD; b* = .52*, SE* = .26*, p* = .047). Nonetheless, it cannot be established that centrality and ingroup norms moderated the association between ICB and AVRA.

As expected on Path A, ICB was significantly and positively associated to negative intergroup emotions *b* = .39, *SE* = .10, *p* < .000, 95% CI[.19, .58], and significantly and negatively associated to positive intergroup emotions *b* = -.26, *SE* = .08, *p* = .003, 95% CI[-.42, -.09]. Indicating that ICB was positively related to negative and negatively related to positive intergroup emotions. However, contradicting Hypothesis 4, no interaction was found on path A between ICB and centrality on neither positive nor negative emotions (*ps* > .650). Accordingly, it cannot be concluded that centrality moderated the relationship between ICB and intergroup emotions. Centrality did appear to be negatively and marginally significantly associated with positive intergroup emotions *b* = -.18, *SE* = .10, *p* = .056, 95% CI[-.37, .01], implying that participants who scored higher in centrality, scored marginally lower on positive intergroup emotions.

Looking at the covariates, prejudice against the Chinese did show to be positive and significant in association to negative intergroup emotions *b* = .25, *SE* = .07, *p* < .000, 95% CI[.12, .38] and in a negative and significant association to positive intergroup emotions *b* = -.13, *SE* = .06, *p* = .04, 95% CI[-.25, -.01]. Thus, participants who scored higher in prejudice against the Chinese also scored significantly higher in negative and lower in positive intergroup emotions. Additionally, with a surprising direction of relation solidarity appeared as negative and significant covariate in relation to negative intergroup emotions *b* = -.25, *SE* = .13, *p* = .046, 95% CI[-.50, -.01], and as positive and significant in relation to positive intergroup emotions *b* = .32, *SE* = .13, *p* = .014, 95% CI[.06, .57]. Implying that the higher participants levels of solidarity the more they reported positive and the less negative intergroup emotions.

Contrary to our expectation neither negative intergroup emotions, although marginally significant *b* = .13, *SE* = .08, *p* = .099, 95% CI[-.03, .29], nor positive intergroup emotions were significantly related to the outcome variable VRA. Additionally, contradicting Hypothesis 5, no two-way interaction between intergroup emotions and centrality, nor intergroup emotions and ingroup norms, nor the three-way interaction of centrality, ingroup norms and intergroup emotions on VRA was found (*ps* > .650). Indicating

that ingroup norms and centrality did not moderate the relationship between intergroup emotions and VRA.

Lastly, contradicting Hypothesis 3, the bias corrected percentile Bootstrap indicated that the indirect effect of intergroup emotion on the relation between ICB and VRA was not significant at any levels of the moderator's centrality and ingroup norms (see Table 4.3). For instance the indirect effect between ICB and VRA via negative intergroup emotions was non-significant when centrality was low and ingroup norms were conspiracy-supporting b = .17, SE = .11, CI[-.04, .41]. Thus, it cannot be concluded that solidarity and ingroup norms moderated the indirect path between ICB and VRA via intergroup emotions.

Table 4.3.

Summary of Moderated Mediation Analysis of Centrality on the Relationship between ICB on VRA via Negative and Positive Intergroup Emotions

Solidarity	Condition	Effect	B	SE	t	p	%CI
Low	1	Direct	0.21	0.29	0.72	0.472	[-0.36, 0.78]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.06	0.09	-	-	[-0.08, 0.26]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.01	0.06	-	-	[-0.16, 0.10]
Low	2	Direct	-0.04	0.23	-0.16	0.874	[-0.50, 0.43]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.04	0.10	-	-	[-0.08, 0.30]
		Indirect (pos.)	0.03	0.07	-	-	[-0.15, 0.15]
Low	3	Direct	0.04	0.19	0.23	0.815	[-0.33, 0.41]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.17	0.11	-	-	[-0.04, 0.41]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.08	0.07	-	-	[-0.23, 0.03]
Average	1	Direct	0.26	0.20	1.31	0.193	[-0.13, 0.66]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.07	0.06	-	-	[-0.01, 0.22]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.04	0.06	-	-	[0.17, 0.10]
Average	2	Direct	0.24	0.16	1.54	0.126	[-0.07, 0.56]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.04	0.05	-	-	[-0.04, 0.18]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.04	0.04	-	-	[-0.12, 0.04]
Average	3	Direct	0.05	0.09	0.58	0.562	[-0.13, 0.24]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.04	0.05	-	-	[-0.06, 0.14]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.02	0.04	-	-	[-0.09, 0.05]
High	1	Direct	0.32	0.34	0.93	0.354	[-0.35, 0.98]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.08	0.09	-	-	[-0.04, 0.29]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.06	0.10	-	-	[-0.25, 0.18]
High	2	Direct	0.52	0.26	2.00	0.047	[0.01, 1.04]
		Indirect (neg.)	0.04	0.05	-	-	[-0.05, 0.17]
		Indirect (pos.)	-0.11	0.09	-	-	[-0.28, 0.10]
High	3	Direct	-0.07	0.16	0.40	0.693	[-0.26, 0.40]
		Indirect (neg.)	-0.06	0.06	-	-	[-0.21, 0.04]
		Indirect (pos.)	0.04	0.05	-	-	[-0.03, 0.15]

Note. Indirect (neg.) = indirect effects of negative intergroup emotions. Indirect (pos.) = indirect effects of positive intergroup emotions.

4.3. Additional analysis

Two additional analyses were run with the aim to test the role of prejudice (X) as a predictor in place of ICB, centrality as moderator (W, Model C), solidarity as moderator (W, Model D), negative (M1) and positive (M2) as mediatory, ingroup norms (Z) as moderator and ICB as covariate.

Neither for Model C nor for Model D was prejudice against the Chinese significantly related to the outcome variable VRA (*ps* > .268), while ICB as covariate was significantly and positively related to VRA (*p* < .40). Additionally, no three-way interactions of the main effect were found. Neither between prejudice, ingroup norms, and solidarity on VRA, nor between prejudice, ingroup norms and centrality on VRA (*ps* > .623).

In Model C, we did find a positive and significant relation between prejudice against the Chinese and negative intergroup emotions *b* = .24, *SE* = .07, *p* < .000, 95% CI[.11, .38], and a negative and significant relation between prejudice and positive intergroup emotions *b* = -.13, *SE* = .06, *p* = .043, 95% CI[-.25, -.00]. Additionally, ICB was also found to be positively and significantly associated to negative intergroup emotions *b* = .37, *SE* = .10, *p* < .000, 95% CI[.18, .57] and negatively and significantly to positive intergroup emotions *b* = -.26, *SE* = .08, *p* = .001, 95% CI[-.41, -.10]. For Model D we found similar results. Prejudice and negative intergroup emotions were positively an significantly related *b* = .25, *SE* = .07, *p* < .000, 95% CI[.12, .38] and prejudice and positive intergroup emotions were negatively and significantly related *b* = -.13, *SE* = .06, *p* = .043, 95% CI[-.25, -.00]. Additionally, ICB was also found to be positively and significantly associated with negative intergroup emotions *b* = .38, *SE* = .10, *p* < .000, 95% CI[.19, 57] and negatively and significantly with positive intergroup emotions *b* = -.26, *SE* = .08, *p* = .002, 95% CI[-.41, -.10]. Furthermore, no moderated mediation of neither solidarity nor centrality on path A was found between prejudice and VRA. Considering these analyses, we can conclude that ICB appears to be a better predictor in our Models than prejudice.

Chapter 5

Discussion

The negative consequences of conspiracy beliefs have been the subject of studies only in the last ten years (Douglas et al. 2019a), suggesting that they could be a driving force in violent behaviour against targets of the conspiracy narratives (Uscinski & Parent, 2014; Rottweiler & Gill, 2020; Jolley & Paterson, 2020). However, their adverse associations of VRA towards the Chinese during the COVID-19 pandemic have not been studied thus far. Even though the involvement of conspiracy beliefs in anti-Asian racism during the pandemic has been suggested by many (Asmelash, 2020; Singh, 2021; Ruiz, 2021). To our knowledge, we are the first study to provide scientific evidence for its connection.

The purpose of the present study was to investigate the link between ICBs and VRA against the Chinese. Furthermore, the study aimed to investigate whether the relationship between ICBs and VRA was moderated by ingroup norms, depending on the ingroup identification with Portuguese people. Moreover, we wanted to understand whether negative intergroup emotions could explain the relationship between ICBs and VRA towards the Chinese. Additionally, we intended to investigate whether the mediated relationship between ICBs and VRA, via intergroup emotions, more specifically the link ICB and intergroup emotions was moderated by ingroup identification with the Portuguese people. Lastly, we aimed to understand whether ingroup norms, depending on the level of ingroup identification moderated the mediated relationship between ICBs and VRA, via intergroup emotions, more specifically the link between intergroup emotions and VRA.

Moreover, because no psychometric measure of indirect VRA existed prior to this study, we developed a new measure, considering the sensitivity of and the resulting difficulty to assess VRA directly. Consequently, drawing from cyberbullying and bystander intervention literature (Shultz et al., 2014; Abbott et al., 2020) and an adapted answering scheme from Bastiaensens et al. (2014), we created a measure assessing individuals' VRA. Participants were presented with five screenshots, in which they observed a Portuguese ingroup member attack a person from Chinese descent, after which they had to indicate to what extent participants wanted to join in into attacking, do nothing or intervene behalf of the racially attacked individual from Chinese descent. EFA demonstrated that the new psychometric measure assessed one underlying construct. Internal consistency of the new scale demonstrated to be good, and correlation analysis showed high and positive correlations between all items.

Additionally, concerning our main analysis seven major findings were reported. First, ICBs demonstrated to have a positive association with VRA. Second, no interaction of ICB, ingroup norms and

neither centrality nor solidarity on VRA was found. Although we did find significant and positive slopes for conspiracy-opposing ingroup norms and high solidarity (Model A) and high centrality (Model B), albeit in unexpected directions. Forth, ICB was positively associated with negative and negatively associated with positive intergroup emotions in both Model A and B, however, no moderation of ingroup identification (solidarity and centrality) between ICB and intergroup emotions was found. Fifth, in Model A, when solidarity served as moderator, negative intergroup emotions did have a positive association with VRA, while for Model B, when centrality served as moderator, only a marginal positive association between negative intergroup emotions and VRA was found. Sixth, we did find a moderation of ingroup norms, depending on the level of ingroup identification, of the relationship between intergroup emotions and VRA in Model A, while we did not find this moderation in Model B. Lastly, no moderated mediation between ICB and VRA via intergroup emotions was found.

The current study provides first evidence that ICBs about the Chinese and the COVID-19 pandemic are indeed related to the VRA against the Chinese. Thus, we are making an important and timely contribution to recent literature about the possible negative and harmful implications of conspiracy beliefs (Uscinski & Parent, 2014; Rottweiler & Gill, 2020; Jolley & Paterson, 2020). Furthermore, these novel results expand the literature on the emphasis of the intergroup character of conspiracy beliefs (Cichocka et al., 2016b; van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018), by shedding light on the potential detrimental consequences for vulnerable minority groups in the European context and the direct association between ICB and adverse intergroup behaviour. Interestingly, we demonstrated that while on the one hand VRA scores were not high in absolute terms, indicating a low overall willingness to express VRA, intergroup conspiracy beliefs about the Chinese one the other hand appeared to be more commonly accepted.

Although in our study we measured VRA indirectly in a bystander intervention chat scenario, it has important implications for direct racial aggression. Research demonstrated that Whites who are less likely to intervene as bystanders when a non-White person is being attacked, hold themselves more racist beliefs and find those attacks more normative (Özdemir et al., 2018; Mazzone et al., 2018; Gönültaş & Mulvey, 2021), which gives us insight into participants potential own behavioural tendencies towards non-White minorities. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that bystander intervention is very effective in supporting victims, also online (Mujal et al., 2021; Polanin et al., 2012; Rudnicki et al., 2022). Consequently, lowered willingness due to ICBs of Whites to intervene in face of racial attacks, will put targets of intergroup conspiracy narratives in an even more vulnerable position. Multiple studies show that racially targeted minority groups suffer negative mental health consequences, also when attacks happen online (Wu et al., 2020; Del Toro, 2022), demonstrating that racial aggression does not have to escalate into

physical violence for it to be harmful. Interventions that tackle the negative consequences of intergroup conspiracy narratives, need to include measures to protect these targeted minorities online and offline.

The present results did not confirm that ingroup norms, depending on the level of ingroup identification (neither solidarity nor centrality), moderated the relationship between ICB and VRA. However, we did find that ICB was associated to higher levels of VRA for both higher solidarity and higher centrality in Condition 2 (conspiracy-opposing ingroup norms). This is suggesting that for those participants higher in centrality and solidarity who were exposed to the conspiracy-opposing ingroup norm condition, higher ICB was associated to higher VRA. However, these findings should be interpreted carefully, as the interaction term was non-significant, which could indicate an issue of power within the study. Nonetheless, the direction of the slopes might provide us with some insight, even though the findings are not in line with previous research demonstrating that higher group identification led people to conform more to ingroup norms in intergroup contexts (Fielding et al., 2008) and in the context of conspiracy beliefs (Cookson et al., 2021b).

A possible explanation for this could come from the “backfire'' effect (Enders & Smallpage, 2019) and the loyal deviance literature (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014). One the one hand, the backfire effect states that especially when a conspiracy narrative reflects a person's general worldview (e.g., Chinese as an evil force) and they are confronted with counter arguments by others, they demonstrate a stronger commitment to the conspiracy narratives and possibly their consequences afterwards (Dow et al., 2021). On the other hand, loyal deviance describes a phenomenon in which people who highly identify with an ingroup sometimes deviate from the norms of their ingroup. They do so when they perceive the norms as not adequately reacting to a perceived threat from an outgroup, for example, when there is a perceived threat from an outgroup (hostile conspiracy) but the ingroup holds egalitarian norms towards this outgroup (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2009; Crane & Platow, 2010; Jetten & Hornsey, 2014; Gabarrot & Falomir-Pichastor, 2017). Thus, highly identified group members who perceive their own ingroup as acting against the best interest of the group overall, by leaning towards an outgroup norm (e.g., opposing conspiracy narratives about China), may act in deviance from other ingroup members (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2009; Jetten & Hornsey, 2014; Gabarrot & Falomir-Pichastor, 2017; Ramdass, 2022). This reactance can even lead to stronger prejudice against the outgroup, as a form of counter-conformity (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2009). They do so to protect the ingroup from the perceived threat and prevent perceived blurring of boundaries between the in- and outgroup (Crane & Platow., 2010; Ramdass, 2022). This phenomenon was not observed for people scoring low in group identification. Hence instead of the expected norm conforming behaviour usually observed in high identifiers, participants with a strong Portuguese

identification, may have counter-conformed when seeing ingroup members defend the Chinese because the conspiracy-opposing norm goes against their strong ICBs. Consequently, they overcompensate the conspiracy-opposing ingroup norm leading them yet to score even higher on VRA. While participants with lower ICBs, seeing the ingroup defend the Chinese does not lead to counter-conformity as personal and group perception do not conflict. Consequently, they adherence to the ingroup norms. One possible explanation why in Condition 3 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms), higher ICBs were not associated to higher VRA as a function of ingroup norms and group identification (both solidarity and centrality), could be that the ingroup norms were adhered to independent of personal ICB and at higher belief in conspiracy narratives no loyal deviance, expressed in overcompensation was needed since ingroup norms were in accordance with threat perception.

Although it needs to be interpreted with care, this finding gives us potential insight into mechanisms of ICBs and a more detailed understanding of its complexity. Biddlestone et al. (2022) recently pointed out that conspiracy beliefs have a strong connection to an anti-establishment perception of society, which might contribute to varying levels of "us" and "them" within one's own nation. As such, trying to change strong ICB by norms of looser groups, like a national identity, may backfire. This is because the wider society is perceived as complicit with established (conspiring) elites (van Prooijen, 2018; Biddlestone et al., 2022). Thus, rather than following societal norms, people who hold strong ICB and identify strongly with the national identity, may perceive themselves as acting heroically against the national majority (as a form of loyal deviance), to protect the national identity and "the real" people from elites (van Prooijen, 2018; Biddlestone et al., 2022). This would imply that, rather than conforming to other national ingroup members, people who hold strong conspiracy beliefs act against societal norms, despite, or precisely because they identify strongly with the nation. In line with this, Pummerer (2022) suggests that people with strong conspiracy beliefs, withdraw themselves into smaller norm groups in which they build new norms. Thus, while norm interventions may still be a powerful tool (Pummerer, 2022; Cookson et al., 2021b), these people might rather benefit from interventions that are more tailored to their specific norm context.

Furthermore, the study contributes to the understudied connection between ICBs and intergroup emotions. It adds to initial evidence about this connection by demonstrating that ICBs were indeed positively associated with negative intergroup emotions and negatively associated to positive intergroup emotions towards the Chinese. The findings are in line with recent studies by Jolley and Paterson (2020) and Peitz et al. (2021) who showed that conspiracy beliefs were significantly related to anger and anxiety. Additionally, the current study extends initial evidence by demonstrating that this relationship also holds

for intergroup contexts and intergroup emotions. This implies that conspiracy beliefs about social groups are associated with more negative and less positive emotions about this group, which in turn can result in negative consequences (Smith & Mackie, 2015). Although we implied that the adoption of ICBs results in negative emotions in accordance with Jolley and Paterson (2020) and Peitz et al. (2021), other studies also suggest ICBs may be the result of existing negative emotions (Douglas et al., 2020). Additionally, it is also conceivable that they build a reciprocal self-reinforcing relationship, in which conspiracy beliefs about social groups cause negative emotions about that group, which over time could lead to more ICBs. Further investigation manipulating ICBs, and intergroup emotions is necessary to disentangle this relationship.

Moreover, the present results indicated that neither centrality nor solidarity moderated the relationship between ICB and intergroup emotions. This is not in line with the IET, which postulates that in intergroup contexts, higher ingroup identification will intensify emotional reactions towards an outgroup (Smith & Mackie, 2016). Furthermore, it contradicts research by Zhang (2019) who demonstrated that in an intergroup context stronger identification with being White was associated with stronger negative intergroup emotions towards Asians. This discrepancy could have emerged because identification with the Portuguese might have not been a relevant enough ingroup in the context of ICBs and intergroup emotions. Although the outgroup "Chinese" is framed in national terms, it is conceivable that conspiracy beliefs held about Chinese people are not only strictly associated to people who hold the Chinese passport but extended to other non-White East-Asians stereotypically perceived as Chinese. Hence rather a racial, as opposed to a national attribution. This on the other hand could suggest that the identification with the national ingroup "Portuguese" would also rather be based on phenotypical traits. As suggested by Consentio (2020) conspiracy beliefs about non-White social groups are often linked to White ethnonationalist ideas. Thus, a more relevant ingroup in the context of ICBs and intergroup emotions could have been the identification with being White in addition to being Portuguese. Therefore, intergroup emotions felt towards the Chinese during the pandemic due to ICBs would have not been intensified by identification with being Portuguese only, but by strong identification with being White.

Yet other research points to the idea that ingroup identification may not automatically affect negative intergroup outcomes. Instead, a more extreme way of relating to the national ingroup, like national collective narcissism (i.e., conviction of the greatness of one's (national) group, Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a) could be more relevant in the context of ICBs. Golec de Zavala (2019a) demonstrated that although ingroup identification and collective narcissism are related, it was mostly collective narcissism that is associated with negative individual emotions. Furthermore, Cichocka et al. (2016b) showed that although Polish national identification was associated with higher conspiracy beliefs, once they accounted for

collective narcissism, this relationship did not prevail. This could imply that group identification might only interplay with conspiracy beliefs, and affect possible consequences like negative intergroup emotions, if the identification is based on national narcissistic tendencies. While group identification built on commitment, and importance of group (solidarity and centrality) by itself might not have this effect. This idea is supported by the fact that, in the current results, solidarity was associated with positive intergroup emotions towards the Chinese. A possible reason why centrality was associated negatively with positive emotions towards the Chinese could be that centrality, rather than solidarity, resembles collective narcissism to a bigger extent (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019b), as both are sensitive to external threat perceptions (Leach et al., 2008). More research is needed to understand the emotional consequences of different forms of identification with both being Portuguese and White to identify how they intersect with ICBs to affect intergroup emotions about the Chinese.

An additional reason that could also explain why neither solidarity nor centrality moderated the relationship between ICB, and intergroup emotions can be found in the way we measured intergroup emotions. While we did ask for feelings towards the Chinese in the context of COVID-19, we did not specifically make salient participants ingroup (i.e., Portuguese) at the moment of assessing intergroup emotions, but only before that. This could have caused participants not to have very salient the Portuguese ingroup when indicating their emotions towards the Chinese, causing them to reply to the intergroup emotions measure not specifically thinking of themselves as Portuguese but rather as individuals. This could have resulted in ingroup identification not changing the relationship between ICB and intergroup emotions, since emotions were not felt on behalf of the ingroup.

Moreover, while we did find a positive and significant association for negative intergroup emotions and VRA in Model A, we only found a marginally positive and significant association in Model B. This implies that participants who scored higher in negative intergroup emotions also scored higher in VRA against the Chinese, but only in Model A. Overall, this is in line with previous research which demonstrated that negative emotions towards an outgroup, especially anger, predicted outgroup aggression (Smith & Mackie, 2015; Cuddy et al., 2007). Additionally, we expand past literature demonstrating that negative intergroup emotions about the Chinese in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic were related to VRA against the Chinese. To our knowledge, this is the first study to link negative intergroup emotions and VRA against the Chinese during the COVID-19 pandemic. It was somewhat surprising that negative emotions were not more consistently associated with our outcome variable VRA, across both Model A and B. One possible explanation could be that our outcome measure VRA did not primarily capture a response of participants guided by negative intergroup emotions, but rather a more deliberate response, requiring

cognitive effort to follow the chat conversation while simultaneously choosing from different options how to respond to the chat. Other research could investigate the relationship between intergroup emotions and VRA against the Chinese using other measures of VRA that might better capture an emotion driven, quick response by participants. An explanation as for why in Model B, with centrality as moderator, negative intergroup emotions were less associated with VRA, comes perhaps from the interaction term of centrality and negative intergroup emotions. This might have accounted for shared variance that was consequently not better explained by negative intergroup emotions by itself. This could be due to the fact that centrality is associated with threat perceptions from the outgroup (Leach et al., 2008). Perhaps when it is felt in addition to negative intergroup emotions it might explain some shared variance of VRA. More research is needed to investigate the interaction of centrality and negative intergroup emotions on outgroup aggression further.

Furthermore, the current results demonstrated that indeed solidarity (but not centrality) and ingroup norms did moderate the relationship between negative intergroup emotions and VRA, although in unexpected directions. The interaction unfolded in a way that those participants exposed to conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms, who scored lower in solidarity and lower in negative intergroup emotions expressed lower VRA, while those lower in solidarity and higher in negative intergroup emotions expressed higher VRA. This was not observed in the conspiracy-opposing ingroup norm condition. Contrary to our predictions, we did not observe a significant interaction between ingroup norms and high identifiers. Although these results are rather difficult to interpret without some level of contradictions, literature on group identification may provide some answers.

People in intergroup contexts who are lower in ingroup identification are in general more concerned with their personal matters, as compared to those of the ingroup. However, when it comes to ingroup norms they might be “opportunists'' (Gabarrot & Falomir-Pichastor, 2017, p. 224). They adhere to ingroup norms more whenever it serves personal interests. Thus, when ingroup norms (e.g., ingroup norms portraying the ingroup as threat) are in line with personal feelings about an outgroup, they might take the opportunity to act more on their personal perception, than without the opportunity (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2009; Gabarrot & Falomir-Pichastor, 2017). As for participants in the current study it should be noted that those who were lower (-1 *SD*) on solidarity, still scored a moderate level of solidarity since in our sample, mean levels of solidarity were relatively high, while standard deviation was relatively low (M = 5.2, SD = 1.1). Therefore, while being lower identified, this did not mean that those participants were unaffected by or disregarded the ingroup norms in completeness.

Thus, when the level of negative intergroup emotion was higher, being lower identified with an ingroup that is promoting that the Chinese are conspiring (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norm), might have increased expression of VRA because the norm was congruent with their personal perception and additionally provided a justification for the negative intergroup emotions felt, leading them to take the opportunity to express VRA against the Chinese. While when the level of negative intergroup emotions was lower, the ingroup norms affected these lower identified group members to a lesser extent, as the norms were of little value to their emotional experience. Consequently, they score lower in VRA. On the other hand, lower identified members who are exposed to ingroup members defending the Chinese (conspiracy-opposing ingroup norm) might not act on their negative intergroup emotion as much, as the context does not provide the opportunity. Thus, it is possible that the "opportunist" effect of lower identified group members is especially strong in the face of negative intergroup emotions.

Interpreting why the relationship between negative intergroup emotions and VRA did not change for higher identified participants in neither Condition 2 (conspiracy-opposing ingroup norms), nor Condition 3 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms) is rather challenging. It is conceivable, that people who highly identified with their ingroup might have had more conflicting and different motivations as compared to lower identified group members, because they feel a stronger commitment to the ingroup goals (Leach et al., 2008). It is possible that people who identify strongly with their ingroup might be particularly interested, more than lower identified group member, in preserving a positive external image about the ingroup. Thus, in Condition 3 (conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms), a possible reason why higher negative intergroup emotions were not associated with higher VRA as a function of ingroup norms and group identification, could be that when negative intergroup emotions were lower, ingroup norms were adhered to independent of personal emotions. While at higher negative intergroup emotions, instead of an expected increase in VRA, high identified group members could have become increasingly aware of external norms (i.e., the general anti-racist norm in Portugal). That is because feeling higher negative intergroup emotions in combination to seeing the ingroup express negative views about the Chinese (i.e., conspiracy-supporting ingroup norms) could cause them to shift towards a motivation of preserving an ingroup image as moral and anti-racist, which consequently would manifest in not expressing higher VRA, despite feeling more negative intergroup emotions. This could imply that under certain circumstances, higher identified group members might become more motivated to preserve the image of the ingroup as moral, especially when their personal feelings also conflict with the image of the ingroup.

One the other hand, in Condition 2 (conspiracy-opposing ingroup norms), more negative intergroup emotions were not associated to more VRA as participants who identified stronger with the ingroup were

still motivated to comply to the ingroup norm to some degree, since the norms were in line with preserving a positive ingroup image as moral and anti-racist, despite of the incongruency between emotions and ingroup norms.

Additionally, while Zhang (2019) showed that it is possible to hold conflicting emotions about Asians, Cichocka et al. (2018) demonstrated that under some circumstances stronger ingroup identification can lead to more prosocial intergroup behaviour. In the present study we also observed that people who scored stronger in solidarity, also scored higher on positive intergroup emotions. Thus, while lower identified participants adhered more to the ingroup norm when the context allowed for the expression of negative intergroup emotions, high identified members might have had many conflicting motivations, in terms of ingroup norm conformity, intergroup relations and conflicting negative and positive intergroup emotions. These results add an important nuance to the association between negative intergroup emotions and aggressive behaviour towards an outgroup, indicating that when the ingroup provides a context for negative intergroup emotions, it might be especially lower identified ingroup members who adhere to the present norm context, while highly identified group members might experience conflicting motivations because they are more concerned with the external image of their ingroup. However further research is necessary to disentangle the complex relationship between intergroup emotions, ingroup identification and ingroup norm conformity on aggressive intergroup behaviour.

Moreover, although we did find an association between ICB and intergroup emotions and an association between negative intergroup emotions and VRA, conditional indirect effects indicated that the indirect effect of intergroup emotion on the relation between ICB and VRA was not significant at any levels of the moderators. Thus, no moderated mediation occurred. This is not in line with previous research by Peitz et al. (2021) and Jolley and Paterson (2020) who showed that emotions did explain the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and (aggressive) behavioural intentions. As already discussed above, this could have been the result of our outcome measure VRA not primarily capturing a response of participants guided by negative intergroup emotions, but rather a more deliberate response. Another possible explanation for these findings might be issues of power within the study, meaning that a moderated mediation might have taken place, but due to low sample size, it was not possible to detect it. Indications for this come from Model B, in which ICBs were associated with negative intergroup emotions, which were in turn associated with VRA, while still no mediation occurred. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the moderated mediation did not occur due to a hidden variable not investigated in the current study. For example, Jolley and Paterson (2020) found participants who scored high in paranoia (the feeling of being personally targeted by evil actors), in addition to scoring high in anger demonstrated

the highest levels of aggression, when conspiracy beliefs were high. Additionally, threat perceptions have been consistently linked to both conspiracy beliefs and outgroup aggression. Therefore, threat could play a pivotal role in moderating the mediated relationship between ICBs and VRA via negative intergroup emotions (van Prooijn & Song, 2021). This suggests that under certain circumstances, negative emotions alone may not sufficiently explain the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and VRA. Further studies are necessary to shed light on the role of paranoia and threat in association to ICBs and VRA.

Lastly, the current results provide further evidence that ICBs are associated with VRA above and beyond prejudice. This extends previous research by Bilewicz et al. (2013) who demonstrated that the intention to discriminate based on anti-Semitism, was better predicted by conspiracy beliefs about the Jewish than anti-Semitism. This gives us important insights about the nature of intergroup conspiracy beliefs. Although intergroup conspiracy beliefs are clearly linked to prejudice (Douglas et al., 2019a), VRA or discriminatory behaviour cannot be solely explained by peoples prejudiced views. It is possible that ICBs trigger stronger aggressive behavioural tendencies due to their notion of threat from a hostile outgroup. This could explain the stronger association to VRA, as the legitimacy and felt necessity to act against the outgroup is heightened by the threat perception.

5.1. Limitations and Future Research

The current study should also be interpreted in the light of its limitations. Firstly, the necessary minimum number of participants needed for our analysis was not met, resulting in reduced power. Therefore, the current results should be interpreted with care, especially in respect to the three-way interaction. Furthermore, due to a high percentage of participants with a higher educational level, results may not be generalizable to the broader Portuguese context. Studies suggest that people with lower educational levels often hold more conspiracy beliefs as they feel more uncertainty and less control over their environment (Lamberty, 2020). Therefore, it is conceivable that the level of intergroup conspiracy beliefs and their relationship to the other model variables might differ in a more representative Portuguese sample.

Furthermore, we choose to measure VRA in an indirect way to increase participants readiness to respond in an honest way and decrease constrains of social desirability. However, an indirect measure also comes with limitation, for example, it is possible that the measure was confounded by hidden variables that we were not able to control for. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that due to the sensitively of the topic, participants could have still felt some pressure to respond in ways that correspond with the overall anti-racist norms present in Portugal (Vala & Pereira, 2018). Notably, Vigil-Colet et al. (2012) has

pointed out that especially for aggression measures, social desirability can be prominent. This could have resulted in over-reported victim supporting behaviour. Therefore, actual VRA in an unobserved environment might be divergent. Furthermore, as we did not manipulate ICBs, thus no conjecture of causality can be made. Therefore, subsequent research is necessary to investigate the direct consequences of ICBs on intergroup emotions and VRA.

Additionally, although we did consider the radio station Antena1 appropriate for our norm manipulation, as it is a relatively neutral and widely accepted outlet in Portugal. The fact that we only chose one outlet makes it difficult to evaluate whether results were affected by the specific radio station. It is conceivable that not for all participants "Antena1 listeners" were perceived as representative of Portuguese people in general. This could have caused some dissonance to the effect ingroup norms had on the participants, making the norm manipulation less strong. Future studies could test different news outlets when testing the effect of ingroup norms in the context of ICBs and VRA to examine whether the type of outlet changes the outcome of the manipulation.

Moreover, we decided to evoke in- and outgroup identification by giving traditional names from either nation to the attacker and the victim in the chat scenario. We chose to do so to arouse participants' association to someone Portuguese and White and someone from Chinese descent and Asian. However, we are aware that this is not without limitation because non-White Portuguese too can hold traditional Portuguese names. Although this seemed like the most subtle and effective way, we encourage other research to make in- and outgroup distinction more explicit. Additionally, implying that the victim was a second-generation migrant from Chinese descent, and not Chinese without Portuguese attachment, might have caused some Portuguese participants to sympathies more with the victim, especially those participants with a more inclusive Portuguese identity. Other research could investigate the consequences of ICBs in other situations in which the attacked outgroup has no affiliation with the attacking ingroup at all.

To extend the findings of the current study, future research could focus on several aspects. First and foremost, future studies could shed further light on the role of normative influence in moderating the relationship between ICBs and VRA. Specifically, studies could investigate whether different norm contexts of ingroups with stronger ties could play a stronger role in preventing VRA based on ICB. For example, similarly as in the study conducted by Cookson et al. (2021a), instead of a predefining an ingroup, future studies could let participants choose their ingroups themselves and consequently assess whether participants who identify with groups in which ICBs are more normalized score higher on VRA against the Chinese. Building on that, future studies could shed further light on the intergroup aspect of conspiracy

beliefs and their relation to intergroup emotions by specifically manipulating the salience of individual and social group identities. By that, examining the different consequences of identifying as individual or as group on the relationship between ICBs and intergroup emotions towards the Chinese.

Secondly, while in the current study we chose to let the victim respond to the aggressor's racism in a condemning way, to not further normalize the racist comments by the aggressor, studies have suggested that bystanders are more likely to support a victim if the victim is defending themselves (Holfeld, 2014). This implies that participants in the current study might have helped more, consequently leading to reduced VRA scores, because the victim was defending themselves in the chat scenario. However, while in real life victims might also defend themselves, this is not always physically or emotionally possible. Therefore, future studies should investigate how the relationship of ICBs with VRA changes, when participants' witness VRA without the victim defending themselves.

Third, future studies could investigate the moderating role of threat on the relationship between ICBs and VRA. Threat perception could be particularly interesting, as it has also shown to impact outgroup aggression (Lantos & Molenberghs, 2021) and to play a major role in intergroup conflict. As such it could enhance people's willingness to act on ICBs by aggressing against the conspiracy target. That is because the perceived need to defend themselves or their ingroup against a hostile conspiring outgroup could increase with the level of threat perception. Furthermore, additional research should examine more narcissistic components of ingroup identification and their role in explaining the relationship between ICBs and VRA. Narcissistic attachment, rather than ingroup identification with one's nation might be particularly interesting to consider when investigating VRA as it has been consistently linked to outgroup aggression (Golec de Zavala et al, 2019b). As such, people who hold ICBs, who are also high on national collective narcissism could be especially ready to aggress against a perceived outgroup, labelled as not part of the country.

Moreover, while in the current study we focussed on normalising ICBs in our norm manipulation, to assess the impact of the normalisation of conspiracy beliefs on VRA, future studies could focus on the normalisation of violence by itself that is justified by ICBs. This is highly relevant as normalisation does not only occur for intergroup conspiracy narratives but also violence based on intergroup conspiracy beliefs is often normalised by people (Berecz & Devinat, 2017). The normalisation of violence justified by ICBs could further increase readiness to aggress against conspiracy narrative targets and could thus be even more damaging for vulnerable groups. As such, it is imperative to also analyse this form of normalisation behaviour.

Lastly, future studies should disentangle the role of ingroup norms and ingroup identification and shed light on why high identifiers appear to deviate from ingroup norms in the context of ICBs, while in the context of negative intergroup emotions they might be more concerned with preserving the ingroups imagine as moral. We suggest examining literature on role that loyal deviance and investigate further its unstudied connection to ICBs and VRA. Additionally, different forms of ingroup identification should be disentangled in their role in moderating ICBs and VRA, for example, narcissistic national identification should be separated from other forms of ingroup identification.

5.2. Conclusion

Intergroup conspiracy narratives have not been present only since the COVID-19 pandemic and will not vanish with its end. They are an overshadowing and widespread phenomenon, that will always flourish in times of crises, with detrimental consequences for their targets and society (Bilewicz, 2013; Douglas et al., 2019a). Unless the public responds to it timely and adequately. To do so, we need to get a more detailed and nuanced understanding of its intergroup character in terms of mechanisms and violent consequences.

Our study contributed to this by showing that higher ICBs about the Chinese in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic are indeed related to higher VRA against the Chinese. Additionally, we did contribute to a better understanding of the connection of ICBs and intergroup emotions. More research is needed to understand under which circumstances (e.g., threat, paranoia) intergroup emotions could explain the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and VRA more consistently. Furthermore, we enriched existing literature by shedding light on the nuanced intergroup aspects of conspiracy beliefs. While we did not find that ingroup identification with the national ingroup, based on solidarity and centrality, affected the relationship between ICBs and intergroup emotions, more narcissistic attachment to the national group could provide a clearer picture. Moreover, we demonstrated that ingroup norms offer an interesting, although intricate perspective on conspiracy belief interventions, suggesting that for people who are stronger ingroup identifiers who hold strong conspiracy beliefs, a norm-manipulation by an ingroup with loose ties could backfire.

Concluding it can be said that despite the limitations, the current study contributes to an important, timely and growing field of research on the consequences of ICBs, putting a special focus on their intergroup aspect and their association to negative intergroup relations. Understanding these relationships better will be essential to protect vulnerable groups targeted by intergroup conspiracy narratives.

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Appendix A

Complete Survey

Start of Block: Informed consent

Q15/Informed consent **TEMA E OBJETIVOS DO ESTUDO**

Muito obrigado por considerar, desde já, responder a este inquérito que analisa as **atitudes face a nacionalidades no contexto da pandemia Covid-19, em interações online.** Este estudo insere-se num projeto de investigação que decorre no Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa.

PARTICIPAÇÃO NO ESTUDO

A sua participação é totalmente voluntária e deverá tomar, **aproximadamente, 10-13 minutos, e consiste em responder a perguntas de resposta múltipla e ler tweets do Twitter**.

Os dados recolhidos são confidenciais e anónimos, e a análise dos dados será realizada para o conjunto dos participantes. Em nenhum momento do estudo lhe será solicitado que se identifique. Os resultados serão utilizados para fins estritamente académicos e científicos. **Poderá interromper a sua participação no estudo a qualquer momento** e a sua participação não tem quaisquer riscos associados. Posteriormente, se assim o desejar, poderá solicitar o acesso aos seus dados, e/ou a sua remoção da base de dados, devendo, para tal, indicar o seguinte Código de Participante: ${e://Field/Random%20ID}.

Gostaríamos de informar que será apresentada linguagem tendenciosa baseada na nacionalidade reportando a comunicações online entre indivíduos. Recomenda-se que as pessoas que não desejem ser expostas a este tipo de linguagem, não participem neste estudo. No final do estudo, será apresentado um esclarecimento completo sobre os objetivos do mesmo e os investigadores estarão disponíveis para responder a qualquer questão que possa ter.

SORTEIO VOUCHERS

Ao participar no estudo habilita-se a ganhar um (de 3) Vouchers no valor unitário de 20€, que poderá utilizar no LIDL.

CONTACTOS

O inquérito está a ser realizado no âmbito de uma dissertação, no Mestrado em Psicologia das Relações Interculturais, no Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, pela Femke Becherer (ffbre@iscte-iul.pt), sob a orientação do professor Ricardo Borges Rodrigues (ricardo.rodrigues@iscte-iul.pt). Estamos disponíveis para esclarecer qualquer questão que possa ter sobre o estudo. Se tem 18 ou mais anos e gostaria de participar no estudo, agradecemos, desde já, a sua amável colaboração e contributo.

Se selecionar a opção "não dou o meu consentimento", em baixo, não participará no estudo, mas agradecemos desde já o seu tempo e a sua consideração.
Se selecionar "Dou o meu consentimento", declara que compreendeu os objetivos do estudo e que pretende participar.

- ◯ **Dou** o meu consentimento (1)
- ◯ **Não dou** o meu consentimento (2)

Skip To: End of Survey If TEMA E OBJETIVOS DO ESTUDO Muito obrigado por considerar, desde já, responder a este inquérito... = Não dou o meu consentimento

End of Block: Informed consent

Start of Block: Gender & Age

Gender Género

- ◯ Feminino (1)
- ◯ Masculino (2)
- ◯ Não-binário (3)
- ◯ Prefiro não dizer (5)
- ◯ Outra (4) _____

Age Idade

_____

End of Block: Gender & Age

Start of Block: Prejudices & Stereotypes

Gostaríamos de conhecer os seus sentimentos em relação a alguns grupos, indicando, numa escala de 1 (muito frio) a 7 (muito caloroso), como se sente em relação a cada grupo. Não existem respostas certas ou erradas; apenas a sua opinião.

Page Break

Prej. 1
Como se sente relativamente aos seguintes grupos?

	Muito frio 1	2	3	4	5	6	Muito caloroso 7
Asiáticos ()							
Taiwaneses ()							
Angolanos ()							

Page Break

Prej. 2 Como se sente relativamente aos seguintes grupos?

Muito frio 1	2	3	4	5	6	Muito caloroso 7

Portugueses ()	
Ganeses ()	
Europeus ()	

Page Break

Prej. 3 Como se sente relativamente aos seguintes grupos?

	Muito frio					Muito caloroso
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Africanos ()						
Chineses ()						
Espanhóis ()						

Page Break

Stereotype measure

Indique, por favor, em que medida discorda / concorda com as afirmações, considerando a escala de resposta 1 (discordo fortemente) e 7 (concordo fortemente).

	Discordo fortemente 1 (1)	Discordo 2 (2)	Discordo um pouco 3 (3)	Não discordo nem concordo 4 (4)	Concordo um pouco 5 (5)	Concordo 6 (6)	Concordo fortemente 7 (7)
Como grupo, os asiáticos estão constantemente em busca de mais poder. (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Os asiáticos são um grupo obcecado por competição. (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Muitas vezes, os asiáticos pensam que são mais inteligentes do que todos os outros. (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Asiáticos dedicam menos tempo à socialização do que os outros. (4)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Os asiáticos geralmente evitam ser o centro das atenções em reuniões sociais. (5)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Os asiáticos dão alta prioridade às suas vidas sociais. (6)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

End of Block: Prejudices & Stereotypes

Start of Block: Conspiracy believes

Consp. believes Indique, por favor, em que medida discorda / concorda com as afirmações, considerando a escala de resposta 1 (discordo fortemente) e 7 (concordo fortemente).

	Discordo fortemente 1 (1)	Discordo 2 (2)	Discordo um pouco 3 (3)	Não discordo nem concordo 4 (4)	Concordo um pouco 5 (5)	Concordo 6 (6)	Concordo fortemente 7 (7)
A China está deliberadamente ocultando do público informações sobre as origens do coronavírus. (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
O coronavírus escapou do laboratório de bioquímica em Wuhan, China. (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
O coronavírus foi propositalmente criado e lançado pela China, como uma arma biológica. (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

End of Block: Conspiracy believes

Start of Block: Group Identification

Group Iden.
Indique, por favor, em que medida discorda / concorda com as afirmações, considerando a escala de resposta 1 (discordo fortemente) e 7 (concordo fortemente).

	Discordo fortemente 1 (1)	Discordo 2 (2)	Discordo um pouco 3 (3)	Não discordo nem concordo 4 (4)	Concordo um pouco 5 (5)	Concordo 6 (6)	Concordo fortemente 7 (7)
Eu penso muitas vezes no facto de que sou português/esa. (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
O facto de que sou português/esa é uma parte importante da minha identidade. (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Ser português/esa é uma parte importante de como eu me vejo a mim mesmo. (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Eu sinto uma ligação com os/as portugueses/as. (4)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Eu sinto solidariedade para com os/as portugueses/as. (5)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Eu sinto dedicação para com os/as portugueses/as. (6)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

End of Block: Group Identification

Start of Block: Anger

Anger
Em seguida, considerando o contexto da pandemia COVID-19, indique, por favor, o que os chineses o/a fazem sentir a si, considerando a escala 1 (é exatamente como me sinto) a 7 (não é nada como me sinto).

	Concordo totalmente que é assim que me sinto 1 (1)	Concordo que é assim que me sinto 2 (2)	Concordo um pouco que é assim que me sinto 3 (3)	Não concordo nem discordo que é assim que me sinto 4 (4)	Discordo um pouco que é assim que me sinto 5 (5)	Discordo que é assim que me sinto 6 (6)	Discordo totalmente que é assim que me sinto 7 (7)
...zangado/a (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
...simpatia (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
...feliz (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
...desprezo/a (4)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
...com medo (5)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

End of Block: Anger

Start of Block: CN sopport

CN Support Em seguida, serão apresentadas capturas de tela de uma interação no Twitter (2 postagens e uma seção de comentários) sobre a pandemia COVID-19.

Por favor, leia o material e as postagens e comentários com atenção.

Depois de ler o informação, **serão colocadas questões sobre o conteúdo dos tweets, bem como os comentários.**

Page Break

CN Support.

Há algum tempo, a BBC News publicou um artigo sobre a Organização Mundial da Saúde e os seus esforços para identificar a origem do vírus COVID-19 na China.

Page Break

Q30 Porque o post da BBC News gerou alguma polémica, a rádio portuguesa Antena 1 decidiu realizar uma pequena sondagem de opinião junto dos seus ouvintes.



Page Break

Cn support A Antena 1 recebeu muitas respostas ao seu inquérito de opinião e comentários no seu Tweet, que reproduzimos abaixo e pedimos que leia.

Page Break

Q43 Em seguida, colocamos duas perguntas sobre o conteúdo das postagens e os comentários.

CN supp_manip. % Que percentagem de pessoas afirmou acreditar que a China criou ou espalhou o vírus intencionalmente?

- Mais de 50% (1)
- Mais de 60% (2)
- Mais de 70% (3)

CN supp_manipl. Ana Qual foi a opinião apresentada pela Ana no seu tweet?

- Afirmou que a OMS está a mentir (1)
- Afirmou que não se importa com o estudo (2)
- Afirmou que a China omitiu informações sobre as origem do vírus (3)

End of Block: CN sopport

Start of Block: CN rejected

Q22 Em seguida, serão apresentadas capturas de tela de uma interação no Twitter (2 postagens e uma seção de comentários) sobre a pandemia COVID-19.

Por favor, leia o material e as postagens e comentários com atenção.

Depois de ler o informação, **serão colocadas questões sobre o conteúdo dos tweets, bem como os comentários.**

Page Break

CN Opposition.

Há algum tempo, a BBC News publicou um artigo sobre a Organização Mundial da Saúde e os seus esforços para identificar a origem do vírus COVID-19 na China.

Page Break

Q31 Porque o post da BBC News gerou alguma polémica, a rádio portuguesa Antena 1 decidiu realizar uma pequena sondagem de opinião junto dos seus ouvintes.



Page Break

Q32 A Antena 1 recebeu muitas respostas ao seu inquérito de opinião e comentários no seu Tweet, que reproduzimos abaixo e pedimos que leia.



Page Break

Q44 Em seguida, colocamos duas perguntas sobre o conteúdo das postagens e os comentários.

Page Break

Cn_rejec. manip. % Que porcentagem de pessoas afirmou acreditar que a China criou ou espalhou o vírus intencionalmente?

- Mais de 50% (1)
- Mais de 60% (2)
- Mais de 70% (3)

CNreject. manip. Ana Qual foi a opinião apresentada pela Ana no seu tweet?

- Ela afirmou que a OMS era uma instituição importante (1)
- Afirmou que não se importa com o estudo (2)
- Ela afirmou que a China colaborou com a OMS para encontrar as origens do vírus (3)

End of Block: CN rejected

Start of Block: CN Control

Q34 Em seguida, serão apresentadas capturas de tela de uma interação no Twitter (2 postagens e uma seção de comentários) sobre o uso excessivo de antibióticos.

Por favor, leia o material e as postagens e comentários com atenção.

Depois de ler o informação, **serão colocadas questões sobre o conteúdo dos tweets, bem como os comentários.**

Page Break

Control Condition.

Há algum tempo, a BBC News publicou um artigo sobre uma conferência de autoridades de saúde para discutir infecções resistentes a antibióticos.

Page Break

Q36 Porque o post da BBC News gerou alguma polémica, a rádio portuguesa Antena 1 decidiu realizar uma pequena sondagem de opinião junto dos seus ouvintes.



Page Break

Q37 A Antena 1 recebeu muitas respostas ao seu inquérito de opinião e comentários no seu Tweet, que reproduzimos abaixo e pedimos que leia.



Page Break

Q42 Em seguida, colocamos duas perguntas sobre o conteúdo das postagens e os comentários.

Page Break

Q39 Que porcentagem de pessoas afirmou acreditar que usamos antibióticos em excesso?

- Mais de 50% (1)
- Mais de 60% (2)
- Mais de 70% (3)

Q41 Qual foi a opinião apresentada pela Ana no seu tweet?

- Ela afirmou que não acha que as autoridades de saúde encontrarão uma solução. (1)
- Afirmou que não se importa com o estudo (2)
- Ela afirmou que espera que as autoridades de saúde encontrem uma solução para o problema (3)

End of Block: CN Control

Start of Block: Block 10 / Joao

Q38 Em seguida serão apresentadas capturas de tela de uma conversa online de um grupo criado para organizar uma ação de angariação de fundos, parte de um evento comunitário. Importa referir que estas pessoas não se conheciam anteriormente.

Por favor, leia as mensagens e imagine que faz parte deste conversa online. Pedimos-lhe que indique na lista apresentada as **DUAS reações** que acha que teria se estivesse neste grupo.

Page Break

Q45 / 1st screenshot

Q47/ 2nd screenshot



Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo ao Chen semelhante ao que o João** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem do **João engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o João** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dele **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Chen** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem de João não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o João** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dele engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar ao Chen** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q50/ 3rd screenshot



Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo ao Chen semelhante ao que o João** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem do **João engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o João** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dele **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Chen** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem de João não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o João** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dele engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar ao Chen** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q53 / 4th screenshot

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo ao Chen semelhante ao que o João** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem do **João engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o João** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dele **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Chen** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem de João não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o João** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dele engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar ao Chen** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q54 / 5th screenshot



Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo ao Chen semelhante ao que o João** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem do **João engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o João** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dele **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Chen** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem de João não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o João** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dele engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar ao Chen** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q55 / 6th screenshot

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo ao Chen semelhante ao que o João** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem do **João engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o João** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dele **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Chen** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem de João não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o João** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dele engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar ao Chen** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q56 /7th screenshot

Abaixo poderá ler como a conversa terminou.



End of Block: Block 10 / Joao

Start of Block: Block 11 /Martim

Q57 Em seguida serão apresentadas capturas de tela de uma conversa online de um grupo criado para organizar uma ação de angariação de fundos, parte de um evento comunitário. Importa referir que estas pessoas não se conheciam anteriormente.

Por favor, leia as mensagens e imagine que faz parte deste conversa online. Pedimos-lhe que indique na lista apresentada as **DUAS reações** que acha que teria se estivesse neste grupo.

Page Break

Q58 / 1st screenshot

Q51 / 2nd screenshot



Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo ao Ming semelhante ao que o Martim** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem do **Martim engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Martim** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dele **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Ming** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem de Martim não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Martim** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dele engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar ao Ming** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q59 /3rd screenshot



Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo ao Ming semelhante ao que o Martim** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem do **Martim engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Martim** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dele **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Ming** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem de Martim não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Martim** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dele engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar ao Ming** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q60 / 4th screenshot



Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo ao Ming semelhante ao que o Martim** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem do **Martim engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Martim** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dele **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Ming** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem de Martim não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Martim** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dele engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar ao Ming** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q61 / 5th screenshot



Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo ao Ming semelhante ao que o Martim** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem do **Martim engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Martim** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dele **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Ming** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem de Martim não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Martim** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dele engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar ao Ming** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q62 / 6th screenshot



Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo ao Ming semelhante ao que o Martim** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem do **Martim engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Martim** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dele **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Ming** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem de Martim não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para o Martim** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dele engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar ao Ming** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q63 7th screenshot Abaixo você pode ler como a conversa terminou



End of Block: Block 11 /Martim

Start of Block: Block 12/ Leonor

Q68 Em seguida serão apresentadas capturas de tela de uma conversa online de um grupo criado para organizar uma ação de angariação de fundos, parte de um evento comunitário. Importa referir que estas pessoas não se conheciam anteriormente.

Por favor, leia as mensagens e imagine que faz parte deste conversa online. Pedimos-lhe que indique na lista apresentada as **DUAS reações** que acha que teria se estivesse neste grupo.

Page Break

Q75 (Screenshot exactly resemble the ones above, only the names of aggressors were changed)

Q69

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

- [ ] **Digo algo á Hua semelhante ao que a Leonor** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem da **Leonor engraçada/ok** (2)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Leonor** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dela **engraçada/ok** (3)
- [ ] **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**
- [ ] **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Hua** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem da Leonor não é engraçada/ok** (6)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Leonor** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dela engraçada/ok** (7)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar à Hua** (8)
- [ ] **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**
- [ ] **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q71

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo á Hua semelhante ao que a Leonor** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem da **Leonor engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Leonor** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dela **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Hua** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem da Leonor não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Leonor** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dela engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar à Hua** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q72

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

- [ ] **Digo algo á Hua semelhante ao que a Leonor** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem da **Leonor engraçada/ok** (2)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Leonor** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dela **engraçada/ok** (3)
- [ ] **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**
- [ ] **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Hua** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem da Leonor não é engraçada/ok** (6)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Leonor** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dela engraçada/ok** (7)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar à Hua** (8)
- [ ] **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**
- [ ] **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q73

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo á Hua semelhante ao que a Leonor** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem da **Leonor engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Leonor** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dela **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Hua** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem da Leonor não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Leonor** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dela engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar à Hua** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q74

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo á Hua semelhante ao que a Leonor** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem da **Leonor engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Leonor** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dela **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Hua** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem da Leonor não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Leonor** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dela engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar à Hua** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q70 Abaixo você pode ler como a conversa terminou

End of Block: Block 12/ Leonor

Start of Block: Block 13 /Maria

Q78 Em seguida serão apresentadas capturas de tela de uma conversa online de um grupo criado para organizar uma ação de angariação de fundos, parte de um evento comunitário. Importa referir que estas pessoas não se conheciam anteriormente.

Por favor, leia as mensagens e imagine que faz parte deste conversa online. Pedimos-lhe que indique na lista apresentada as **DUAS reações** que acha que teria se estivesse neste grupo.

Page Break

Q79

Q77

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo á Xiang semelhante ao que a Maria** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem da **Maria engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Maria** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dela **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Xiang** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem da Maria não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Maria** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dela engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar à Xiang** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q80

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo á Xiang semelhante ao que a Maria** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem da **Maria engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Maria** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dela **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Xiang** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem da Maria não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Maria** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dela engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar à Xiang** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q81

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

- [ ] **Digo algo á Xiang semelhante ao que a Maria** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem da **Maria engraçada/ok** (2)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Maria** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dela **engraçada/ok** (3)
- [ ] **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**
- [ ] **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Xiang** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem da Maria não é engraçada/ok** (6)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Maria** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dela engraçada/ok** (7)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar à Xiang** (8)
- [ ] **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**
- [ ] **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q82

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

☐ **Digo algo á Xiang semelhante ao que a Maria** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem da **Maria engraçada/ok** (2)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Maria** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dela **engraçada/ok** (3)

☐ **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**

☐ **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Xiang** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem da Maria não é engraçada/ok** (6)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Maria** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dela engraçada/ok** (7)

☐ **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar à Xiang** (8)

☐ **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**

☐ **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q83

Selecione abaixo as DUAS reações que provavelmente teria:

- [ ] **Digo algo á Xiang semelhante ao que a Maria** lhe disse, por exemplo: faço um comentário/pergunta semelhante (1)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para mostrar que acho a mensagem da **Maria engraçada/ok** (2)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Maria** para mostrar que acho a mensagem dela **engraçada/ok** (3)
- [ ] **Partilho a conversa com outras pessoas** fora do fórum de chat para **nos rirmos da conversa (4)**
- [ ] **Não respondo**/ignoro a conversa (5)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Xiang** para mostrar que eu acho que a **mensagem da Maria não é engraçada/ok** (6)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem privada para a Maria** para mostrar que **não acho a mensagem dela engraçada/ok** (7)
- [ ] **Escrevo uma mensagem no grupo** para **apoiar à Xiang** (8)
- [ ] **Relato o incidente aos organizadores do evento comunitário (9)**
- [ ] **Outros** (10) _____

Page Break

Q84 Abaixo você pode ler como a conversa terminou

End of Block: Block 13 /Maria

Start of Block: Demographics

Q4 Por fim, algumas perguntas sociodemográficas.

Q7 / Origins Qual ou quais das seguintes opções considera que melhor descreve(m) a sua pertença e/ou origem?

- ○ Branco /Português branco /De origem europeia (1)
- ○ Negro/Português Negro/Afrodescendente/De origem africana (2)
- ○ Asiático/Português de origem asiática/De origem asiática (3)
- ○ Cigano/ Português cigano/Roma/ De origem cigana (4)
- ○ Outro grupo. Qual? (5) _____
- ○ Origem mista. Quais? (6) _____

Q93 Indique a sua nacionalidade.

_____

Page Break

Q8 Grau de educação

- ○ Sem educação formal (1)
- ○ 4.º ano (2)
- ○ 7.º ano (3)
- ○ 9º ano (4)
- ○ 12º ano (5)
- ○ Frequência universária (indique a área) (6) _____
- ○ Licenciatura (indique a área) (7) _____
- ○ Mestrado (indique a área) (8) _____
- ○ Doutoramento (indique a área) (9) _____
- ○ Prefiro não dizer (10)
- ○ Outro (11)

Q6 Indique a sua visão política na escala abaixo:

- ○ Extrema esquerda (1)
- ○ Esquerda (2)
- ○ Centro (3)
- ○ Direita (4)
- ○ Extrema direita (5)
- ○ Prefiro não dizer (6)

Q85 / Socio-economic Pensando no rendimento mensal total do seu agregado familiar, o seu agregado familiar consegue fazer face às despesas?

- ○ 1 com muita dificuldade (1)
- ○ 2 com alguma dificuldade (2)
- ○ 3 nem difícil nem fácil (3)
- ○ 4 com alguma facilidade (4)
- ○ 5 com muita facilidade (5)

Q9 Indique, por favor, em que medida discorda / concorda com as afirmações, considerando a escala de resposta 1 (discordo fortemente) e 7 (concordo fortemente):

"Toda a minha abordagem da vida é baseada na minha religião/espiritualidade":

- ○ 1 Discordo fortemente (1)
- ○ 2 Discordo (2)
- ○ 3 Discordo um pouco (3)
- ○ 4 Não discordo nem concordo (4)
- ○ 5 Concordo um pouco (5)
- ○ 6 Concordo (6)
- ○ 7 Concordo fortemente (7)

95 Num dia típico, quanto tempo passa a assistir, a ler ou a ouvir notícias sobre política e assuntos da atualidade?

- ○ nenhum (1)
- ○ 30 minutos (2)
- ○ 60 minutos (3)
- ○ 1 hora e 30 minutos (4)
- ○ 2 horas (5)
- ○ 2 horas e 30 minutos (6)
- ○ 3 horas (7)
- ○ mais de 3 horas (8)

Q97 Por favor, indique de que fontes obtém a maioria das informações sobre política e assuntos da atualidade?

- ☐ Emissoras de TV (inclusive através dos seus sites online) (1)
- ☐ Emissoras de Rádio (inclusive através dos seus sites online) (2)
- ☐ Jornais e Revistas (inclusive através dos seus sites online) (3)
- ☐ YouTube (4)
- ☐ Facebook (5)
- ☐ Whatsapp (6)
- ☐ Twitter (7)
- ☐ Telegrama (8)
- ☐ Família e amigos (9)

End of Block: Demographics

Start of Block: Block 8/debriefing

Q90 **EXPLICAÇÃO DO ESTUDO.** Obrigado por ter participado neste estudo. Como foi indicado no início da sua participação, o estudo tem como objetivo avaliar as atitudes face à pandemia COVID-19 num contexto de interação online entre pessoas de diferentes nacionalidades. **Para melhor testarmos as hipóteses do estudo, não foi possível indicar-lhe os objetivos mais específicos. No seguinte áudio gostávamos de partilhar toda a informação sobre o estudo e os seus objetivos. Se preferir, pode, também, ler o texto abaixo.** No final, disponibilizamos alguns recursos sobre o tema em análise.

Audio:

Text version: Chat falso: em primeiro lugar, é importante referir que a conversa apresentada (chat) foi inventada para esta investigação. Com este chat e as **respostas dos participantes pretendemos medir**

o nível de agressão verbal que seria aceite pelos participantes antes de intervirem. Como pode verificar, as afirmações no chat continham um forte discurso racista. A reprodução do discurso racista ou de ódio é problemática, uma vez que pode contribuir para a perpetuação destas ideias. Após uma ponderada consideração dos custos e benefícios, decidimos, neste estudo, reproduzir alguns elementos deste discurso de modo a as circunstâncias em que as crenças conspiratórias podem intensificar a violência contra grupos vulneráveis. No entanto, é **extremamente importante abordar este discurso de uma forma mais específica e detalhar as razões pelas quais é problemático: Tópico 1: "Mas de onde é que realmente és?":** Esta pergunta é colocada com alguma regularidade às pessoas racializadas. Nesta pergunta, o que está implicado é que a pessoa não é de, por exemplo, Portugal, porque temos uma imagem específica, um estereótipo, sobre como as pessoas portuguesas são. Portanto, perguntando isto está implícito que, uma vez que a pessoa não é branca, deve, realmente, ser de outra parte porque se "realmente" fosse portuguesa, não seria negra. Então, o que se está a perguntar nesta questão é "porque é que és negro?". Pergunte-se a si próprio: perguntaria a uma pessoa branca, e nativa em Português, a questão de onde é que realmente são? Agora, poderá dizer que perguntar a alguém sobre a sua origem pode revelar um interesse genuíno em querer saber mais sobre a pessoa. No entanto, se é uma das primeiras coisas que pergunta a alguém, quando não conhece a outra pessoa, pode ser uma pergunta intrusiva e, possivelmente, não será a primeira pessoa a colocar esta questão. Quando este tipo de perguntas se repetem, podem gerar nas pessoas o sentimento de que, apesar de serem portuguesas, outras pessoas pensam que, verdadeiramente, não são. Há outras perguntas que se podem fazer quando estamos a conhecer uma pessoa. **Tópico 2: "Não vamos ter problema nenhum com a contabilidade, haha":** Tal como perguntar a alguém de onde é que é, esta pergunta pode parecer positiva quando não se consideram as consequências deste comentário. No entanto, o estereótipo de que as pessoas asiáticas são boas a matemática pode ser altamente prejudicial, porque o que o faz é colocar as pessoas em caixas. E ao fazermos isso, retiramos, não só individualidade das pessoas, como também ignoramos a variabilidade que existe entre todas as pessoas em termos de habilidade para a matemática ou para qualquer outra coisa. Retirando a individualidade desumanizamos as pessoas asiáticas, podendo retratá-las como máquinas. O outro lado do estereótipo, que está sempre implícito, é que qualquer pessoa que é boa a matemática deve ser um nerd, sem jeito para as interações sociais, uma pessoa fria. **Tópico 3: “É que as pessoas podem ficar preocupadas em trazer os seus cães, haha”:** A suposição de que “os chineses” comem carne de cão é um estereótipo negativo persistente. E, ainda que exista um festival na China onde se come carne de cão, o festival é frequentado por uma minoria de chineses e por muitos turistas ocidentais também. E, embora exista um clamor no Ocidente da parte de algumas pessoas contra este festival, o ativismo mais antigo e mais forte contra o festival vem das próprias pessoas chinesas, portanto, há muita gente na China que se opõe ao consumo de carne de cão. Como vimos no sobre a matemática, as pessoas têm diversas habilidades, visões e comportamentos, e generalizarmos de uma pessoa para todas é prejudicial e desumano. Além disso, é importante dar-nos conta de que, enquanto no Ocidente comer um cão é um pensamento terrível, comer outros animais tais como porcos ou vacas, não é visto como algo mau. Por exemplo, algumas pessoas na Índia consideram a vaca como sagrada. Imagine como estas pessoas veem o nosso consumo diário de carne de vaca. **Tópico 4: “Estou só a dizer que as pessoas poderão não querer vir se muitos de vocês estiverem lá”:** Esta é uma expressão de racismo explícito. Sugerir que as pessoas não querem estar no mesmo local se houver pessoas com origem do Leste da Ásia favorece a segregação das pessoas, promove um sentimento de discriminação, de quenão são bem-vindas em espaços públicos que pertencem a todos. **Tópico 5: “ofensivo é chamares-te a ti próprio Português”:** Esta é, de novo, uma

expressão mais explícita de racismo e de discurso de ódio e neste ponto, não há nada de implícito. Se alguém se sentir ofendido(a) porque uma pessoa racializada se considera portuguesa, isso reflete uma ideologia de supremacia branca e de racismo que é altamente violenta. Agora, relativamente ao resto do estudo: Durante a pandemia, circularam teorias da conspiração sobre a China, enquanto criadora e disseminadora intencional do vírus. No entanto, a **científica atual sugere que é altamente provável que o SARS-CoV-2 tenha os seus antecedentes no reino animal,** uma vez que apresenta semelhança com o coronavírus encontrado em morcegos (SARSr-CoV RaTG13). **A explicação mais plausível é que o vírus do morcego teria mutado com outro vírus de outros animais e, portanto, teria passado aos animais e, finalmente, aos humanos.** Além disso, não foi estudado nenhum vírus com a composição genética do SARS-CoV2 (o vírus da pandemia). Portanto, nenhum vírus estudado no laboratório poderia ser o antecessor do vírus que causou a pandemia. **Finalmente, não existe de nenhum acidente no laboratório de Wuhan, enquanto que outros acidentes em laboratórios foram sempre gravados e imediatamente publicados. De acordo com a evidência disponível, a teoria de que o vírus escapou (acidentalmente ou intencionalmente) é altamente muitíssimo improvável.** Conspiração: Durante os tempos de pandemia, narrativas sobre uma pessoa mal intencionada ou um grupo de pessoas que criaram ou inventaram o vírus para prejudicar a sociedade foram disseminadas rápida e globalmente. **A investigação mostra que, em tempos de crise e de incerteza, estas narrativas aparecem com facilidade e podem dar às pessoas respostas para um evento complexo gerador de incerteza e medo. É mais fácil imaginar alguém mal intencionado que um vírus do que compreender a complexidade de como os vírus se comportam e mutam**. Portanto, responsabilizar e culpabilizar alguém pela situação pode dar-nos uma ideia de controlo (parece que percebemos o que acontece), é um bom sentimento sobre nós próprios porque, afinal de contas, sabemos o que se está a passar e os outros não sabem. Acreditar nestas narrativas pode, portanto, ajudar as pessoas, embora os seus efeitos últimos ultrapassem largamente os eventuais benefícios. **Estas teorias da conspiração são comuns.** Enquanto seres humanos somos propensos a identificar no mundo padrões que sugerem ligações entre eventos que, verdadeiramente, não estão relacionados. Esta característica, torna-nos **susceptíveis a informação que não é verdadeira se sermos manipulados. Além disso, os estudos têm demonstrado que as pessoas que têm crenças conspiratórias estão mais propensas a aceitarem a violência, o que pode ter consequências muito negativas para a sociedade.** Twitter falso: Todo o conteúdo do Twitter que foi apresentado neste estudo foi inventado; não é, portanto, real. Este procedimento foi adotado para criar a impressão de que um amplo grupo de pessoas acreditam na conspiração de que a China criou ou espalhou o vírus propositadamente. **Queríamos investigar se, o facto de as pessoas estarem expostas a uma maioria que acredita na narrativa da conspiração, torna os participantes mais susceptíveis a aceitar posições racistas expressas por terceiros. Para concluir:** Os investigadores têm verificado que as pessoas que têm crenças conspiratórias estão mais dispostas a aceitar ou a reproduzir ações violentas contra grupos sociais que em determinados contextos são minoritários.

Durante os tempos da pandemia, as pessoas do leste asiático sofreram um aumento muito pronunciado de ataques violentos. Este estudo pretende contribuir para o conhecimento sobre este fenómeno de modo a desenvolver intervenções que o possam combater.

Mais especificamente, pretendemos avaliar se a exposição dos participantes a uma maioria que não apoia as teorias conspirativas podem reduzir o efeito das teorias conspirativas dos participantes, aumentando a probabilidade de intervirem numa situação de discriminação contra as pessoas

chinesas. **Para mais informações:** No website seguinte poderá aceder a **informação mais detalhada sobre a origem do vírus** e a inexistência de evidência que sustente a possibilidade de acidente ou uma ação deliberada com origem no laboratório de Wuhan: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7995093/ Se pretender **saber mais sobre teorias da conspiração** em geral, visite o seguinte website: https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/bjso.12397 Se gostava de ter conhecer algumas ferramentas para **detetar e desmascarar narrativas conspirativas** visite o website: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/28/media/information-coronavirus-reliable-sources/index.html Se pretender ter **mais informação sobre diferentes formas de racismo,** poderá consultar os seguintes vídeos:

- Dear White People (Netflix)
- https://youtu.be/EC-IywB3dEA
- https://youtu.be/0AOvAdY11Yg
- https://youtu.be/eBfw2WqNDj0

Como referido acima, ao finalizar este questionário, será reencaminhado para um formulário de recolha de informação individual **(Nome e Email) para a participação no sorteio de três Vouchers LIDL, no valor de 20€ cada. Se pretender não participar no sorteio, não preencha a informação. Não será possível associar esta informação (para o sorteio dos vouchers) às suas respostas anteriores ao questionário.** Desta forma podemos assegurar o anonimato das suas respostas.

Muito obrigada, mais uma vez, pela sua amável participação!

End of Block: Block 8/debriefing

Appendix B

Table B.1.

Summary of Moderation Analysis of Solidarity and Norms on the Relationship between ICB on VRA in Model A

Variable	B	SE	t	p	%CI
ICB	0.18	0.08	2.10	0.037	[0.01, 0.34]
Neg. Emotion	0.16	0.08	2.06	0.042	[0.01, 0.31]
Pos. Emotion	0.12	0.15	0.80	0.423	[-0.17, 0.40]
Solidarity	0.18	0.13	1.39	0.177	[-0.08, 0.44]
ICB x Solidarity x Z2	-0.28	0.20	-1.38	0.170	[-0.68, 0.12]
Neg. emo. x Solidarity x Z2	-0.38	0.18	-2.10	0.038	[-0.75, -0.02]
Pos. emo. x Solidarity x Z2	-0.39	0.32	-1.21	0.228	[-1.02, 0.24]

Note. Z2 = Compares conspiracy-opposition vs. -support norm manipulation.

Table B.2.

Summary of Moderation Analysis of Centrality and Norms on the Relationship between ICB on VRA in Model B

Variable	B	SE	t	p	%CI
ICB	0.19	0.09	2.16	0.032	[-0.02, 0.36]
Neg. Emotion	0.13	0.08	1.66	0.099	[-0.03, 0.29]
Pos. Emotion	0.13	0.14	0.88	0.381	[-0.16, 0.41]
Centrality	-0.00	0.09	-0.04	0.970	[-0.18, 0.18]
ICB x Centrality x Z2	-0.19	0.17	-1.14	0.258	[-0.51, 0.14]
Neg. emo. x Centrality x Z2	-0.21	0.15	-1.40	0.164	[-0.52, 0.09]
Pos. emo. x Centrality x Z2	-0.35	0.34	-1.03	0.305	[-1.01, 0.32]

Note. Z2 = Compares conspiracy-opposition vs. -support norm manipulation.