Severity, salience, and selectivity: understanding the varying responses to regional crises by Brazil and South Africa

Abstract

Political, military and humanitarian crises endanger regional order. But even though regional powers are expected to act as stabilizers in these cases, their responses to dire demands vary in intensity and loci. Reactions go from zealous engagement to prolonged indifference and reluctance, often leaning on global multilateral institutions as well as regional or ad hoc mechanisms. This study explores the variation in the provision of stability by regional powers via a mixed-methods approach. By contrasting the intensity of regional crises with issue salience at the UN General Assembly, we select crises that drew varying attention from regional powers, despite similar severity. Focusing on Brazil and South Africa as potential regional stabilizers, we compare responses to regional crises that displayed high (Haiti and Somalia) and low (Colombia and Congo-Brazzaville) salience. We find that domestic support, concerns with status and potential competition with other stabilizers tend to play a large part in calibrating regional power responses.

Keywords: regional powers, United Nations General Assembly, crises, Brazil, South Africa
INTRODUCTION

Regional powers are assumed to privilege the very regions that grant them such a label. As preeminent players, they are expected to become leading problem-fixers in their neighborhood and foremost representatives on the global stage. Yet, this expectation is often at odds with reality, as responses to regional ordeals vary significantly. Though some might view crises as opportunities spelled out differently, regional powers at times question whether backyard problems are ideal cues for the display of leadership.

Our object of inquiry lies in the varying degree of engagement exhibited by regional powers in response to regional crises. Hence, our primary aim is to assess the extent to which such players act towards their immediate region in times of need, and what factors explain variation in engagement. Given how reactions can play out in multiple venues, forum selection comprises a secondary focus. In short, we investigate when regional powers choose to respond to crises and where do they turn to. In doing so, we weave together literature on regional leadership, reluctancy, crises, and institutions, in the hope of clarifying the role of regional powers as stabilizers – a puzzling moniker at a time when these powers seem to increasingly shirk additional responsibilities. We concentrate on Brazil and South Africa and compare their responses to regional crises.

This study adopts a mixed-methods framework, grounded in interviews and secondary sources. We select crises based on type and on quantitative assessments of severity and issue salience at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This choice of forum is owed to its universal status. We then explore four case studies, which elicited varying levels of engagement, in spite of similar severity. For Brazil, we examine the Haiti earthquake and the Colombian conflict; for South Africa, the Somalian famine and the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville. As argued
by Mesquita and Chien (2021), scholarship often takes for granted the locations prioritized by regional powers. Our selection of cases will therefore also aim to test the traditional boundaries of what these countries consider to be their perimeters of responsibility whenever confronted with a call to action.

This article is divided in five sections. The first establishes the theoretical framework on regional powers and crisis management, and the second reviews the scholarship on Brazil and South Africa as providers of stability. The third section presents the research design and case selection, which are then analyzed in the fourth segment. Our last section sums up the results.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Regional powers and the provision of regional stability

Regional powers are defined based on varied features. Traits such as belonging to a specific region, displaying material predominance and influence over their neighbors comprise just a few (Destradi 2010). For the purpose of this article, the issues of regional engagement and of regional-global duality are of particular importance (Nolte 2010; Prys 2010). Regional powers pursuing greater global status are expected to consolidate a local power base. However, as Hurrell (2010: 21) argues, ‘you can be a global player without being a regional power’ and ‘it is the discretionality of your involvement within the region that is a potentially important indicator of your global power’. Avoiding local entrapments is a sign of significant resources and autonomy, and might prove smart policy whenever the neighborhood becomes unrewarding. Prys (2010) concedes that regional powers display varying attitudes towards their surroundings, ranging from ‘domination’ and
‘hegemony’ to ‘detachment’. In these cases, the type and amount of goods provided to the region are a telling sign of which role is preferred.

Security, dispute-settlement, or investment are examples of collective goods regional powers are expected to deliver. However, the style of provision envisaged is mainly proactive, i.e. when regional powers have clear designs for regional order and take the initiative of rolling them out (e.g. Nolte 2010: 893; Alden and Schoeman 2013: 114). Common cases include institution-building or financing infrastructure projects. The fact that such paymaster behavior is often expected but not always delivered (see Garzon, this volume) leads us to argue proactive provision comprises just one dimension of this behavior and that we should also account for a more reactive variant. That is, when matters exogenous to the will of the regional power – such as humanitarian disasters or local strife – downgrade regional stability and powerful players are expected to step in (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 2010: 746). Such instances offer regional powers opportunities for the display of leadership credentials.

If crises are considered the ‘demand side’ of regional security governance, suppliers of security can be found locally or externally (Kacowicz and Press-Barnatham 2016). The literature states that spheres of influence determine who gets to respond. A regional power might succor a country within its perimeter (lest another should fill this vacuum), but think twice before trespassing either the fold of other regional heavyweights (Mullenbach 2015; Guimarães and Maitino 2019) or of global powers that “wield power from afar” (see Mattheis, this volume). In addition, regional powers may choose crises commensurate to their political and material resources (Feldmann et al. 2019). Incentives to respond increase as geographical proximity and interdependence expose them to negative externalities of an unsolved crisis (Greig et al. 2019:
Exposure need not be geographically-bound; vital interests abroad, via trade and other links, also characterize sensitive interconnection.

Other variables can impact on the choice to respond. Domestically, a lack of consensus demotivates costly involvement abroad, especially for democracies (Regan 1998). Externally, divergent expectations by international audiences on what the country should do can also frustrate coherent action. When combined, these two sources lead to what can be termed reluctant foreign policies. In contrast, assertiveness requires internal consensus coupled with clear expectations of what responsibilities befit a regional power (Destradi 2018).

Though such factors – spheres of influence, resources, exposure, domestic consensus, and international expectations – illuminate whether or not regional powers respond, reactions can take many forms. In particular, given the interlinkages between the global and regional spheres, the question remains whether regional powers prefer to manage regional issues closer to home or push them toward higher international echelons.

Where to respond to crises

The manner through which stabilization demands are singled out, brought before an audience and dealt with is complex and multifaceted. Features of crises, such as their nature (e.g. war, natural disaster) or scope (regional, global), not to mention the lens through which they are framed, can shape action from the start. But once an issue reaches crisis status, how do states respond and what specific venue is chosen for dealing with the matter? Involvement might take on varied forms: unilateral, through an ad hoc coalition, or via international governmental organizations (IGO).
Concerning the latter, it is also important whether regional powers prefer a regional organization (RO) or the UN to manage the issue – or even both (Mullenbach 2005).

Inherent to this is the question of why would states resort to institutions instead of acting solo. Haas (1983: 190) underscores that IGOs should not be regarded as independent entities influencing regional matters. Rather, state interests guide the choice of who should act and how. Longitudinal data suggest that states overwhelmingly prefer to handle differences bilaterally. We underscore Abbott and Snidal’s (1998) two reasons why states act through IGOs: the perceived benefits of centralization and independence. On the former, states might perceive an organization to be better equipped, due to its resource pool and scope. The second reason is more political in nature. If local differences and mistrust lead to deadlock, resolution will require moving to a more neutral setting.

Centralization and independence can account for why states forego unilateral solutions and might even explain why some IGOs are preferred over others (e.g. a global organization might be more resourceful than a regional one). To this we can add insights derived from the literature on institutional overlap (Weiffen 2017), forum-shopping (Hofmann 2019), and regional/global governance (Kacowicz 2018). The relation between global and regional institutions can be characterized as institutional overlap if they share common members and mandates. Institutional overlap grants states latitude in choosing an arena, allowing them to select the one which maximizes benefits and imposes the lowest costs. The perception of such costs and benefits is case-sensitive and must be approached inductively. We might nonetheless hold a baseline expectation that, in a crisis management scenario, regional powers will weigh possible ‘outcomes’ per ‘input’ (e.g. results in terms of stabilization or reputation achieved per total assets committed via a given IGO).
In summary, a regional power might opt to remain detached from regional dynamics – which would amount to no provision – or, alternatively, it might tend to regional demands. In the latter scenario, whenever the agenda is intercepted by a local demand for stability, regional powers may assume reactive provision duties. The surveyed literature suggests the decision to supply stability will depend on variables such as (1) spheres of influence, (2) resource availability, (3) exposure to the crisis, (4) domestic consensus, and (5) international expectations. Some of these factors may also orient the choice of venue, depending on the perceived need for (a) centralization or (b) independence, and the (c) different sets of costs and opportunities attached to each forum.

**BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA AS REGIONAL STABILIZERS**

In this section we review the literature on Brazil and South Africa as providers of regional stability. Both have been contrasted in domains such as developmental cooperation (Westhuizen and Milani 2019) and democracy promotion within ROs (Vleuten and Hoffmann 2010). Given their copious characterization as archetypical regional powers, we skip typological discussions and focus on Brasília and Pretoria as crisis managers.

*Brazil*

Previous scholarship has emphasized two Brazilian contributions to regional stability and governance: development and humanitarianism, on the one hand, and democracy and political stability, on the other. The former underscores Brazil’s growing footprint in the development cooperation regime. This participation was attributed to the country’s effort to become a more active provider of international goods, to boost its influence in the broader Global South, and to
role expectations over redistributive policies during the Workers Party government (Westhuizen 2013; Westhuizen and Milani 2019). More importantly, Brazilian officialdom promoted cooperation as closely associated with security, seeing development as key to prevent further destabilization in fragile states (Mesquita and Medeiros 2016: 405). The prime example of Brazil’s security-cum-development outlook was Haiti (Hirst 2007). Data on Brazil’s disbursements confirmed Haiti as a top priority, while remaining resources went chiefly to Africa (Lima 2017). Hence, Brasília’s developmental engagement with the immediate neighborhood is still regarded by Guimarães and Maitino (2019) as somewhat halfhearted.

Brazil’s engagement with South America is much clearer on the political component. Growing attention has been devoted to its action (and sometimes lack thereof) in the political crises in Paraguay (1996, 1999, 2012), Bolivia (2008), Honduras (2009), Ecuador (2010) and Venezuela (2002, 2013-onwards). Brazilian intervention has been perceived as conditioned by resource availability and by a preference for consensus instead of unilateral positions (Feldmann et al. 2019; Guimarães and Tavares de Almeida 2017). Studies on ROs and democratic clauses, in turn, stress power asymmetries, while underscoring that norm enforcement is more feasible when Brazil has vital interests in the crisis-stricken country and shows convergence with extra-regional powers (Closa and Palestini 2018; Vleuten and Hoffmann 2010). The effects of institutional overlap on strengthening or relativizing democratic norms in South America has also been surveyed, yielding mixed results (Weiffen 2017).

South Africa

South Africa’s transition from apartheid to multiracial democracy inspired its approach towards promoting peace in Africa, infusing it with a strong belief in negotiation, comprehensive
agreements, and unity governments. Yet, realities on the ground, plus ‘divisions between various peacemakers and the presence of other interests including economic ones, have meant that South Africa has shifted from a more idealistic and universalist vision of continental peace, to a more pragmatic policy’ (Curtis 2019: 70, 86). Nonetheless, Pretoria acquired a significant resumé, playing a part in numerous political and military crises in Africa (e.g. Burundi, DRC, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Sudan) (Nieuwkerk 2012).

Because of the size of the continent and its political complexity, South Africa can hardly be considered the unipolar provider of continental stability. Rather, a constellation of sub-regional, continental, and global institutions plays a part in African stabilization. According to Boulden (2013), nearly half of UN Security Council meetings and resolutions address situations in Africa, and the relationship between the UN and the African Union (AU) is comparatively more robust than other regional-global linkages.

In addition, the continent has witnessed a growing regime complexity, with an overlap of IGOs jointly managing security issues (Brosig 2015). The sprawling role played by organizations comes at a cost (e.g. hampering more direct state action and greater deferral from South Africa on these matters), but this does not appear to compromise South Africa’s regional policy. In fact, Pretoria’s search for regional preeminence relies on both aggrandizing its status as a mediator and investing in regional governance structures (Alden and Schoeman 2011). This reliance on external parties is more marked in the humanitarian and developmental domain, as the country privileges contributions to multilateral bodies instead of direct bilateral assistance (Nganje 2019; Westhuizen and Milani 2019).
RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE SELECTION

The literature on international crises is split between large-N statistical analyses and small-N in-depth studies. Our investigation is closer to the latter since our interest lies in two concrete regional powers. Yet, studies of this sort present limitations, most notably idiosyncratic case-selection. Arbitrary sampling raises issues of selection bias and validity problems, such as how to establish which crises are indeed ‘relevant’.

To overcome these hurdles, we utilize a mixed-methods framework. We first employ large-N quantitative data to select our cases, which are then analyzed qualitatively. For our quantitative sampling, we focus on two aspects of crises – severity and salience – so as to objectively establish which episodes were more ‘relevant’ for Latin America and Africa. The severity of a crisis relates to its material destructiveness, and its salience refers to the attention it warranted by the political community. To ensure comparability, crisis type is also considered. Afterwards, we probe the actual response enacted by Brazil and South Africa. To verify causal determinants, we relied on interviews with senior diplomats and on secondary sources. We restricted our timeframe to 20 years, from 1994 (South Africa’s readmission to the UNGA) to 2013. This timespan covers moments of global and regional activism: the 1990s, which witnessed both a regionalist revival and greater UN engagement (Greig et al. 2019: 120), and the 2000s, when Brazil and South Africa enjoyed peak status as regional powers (Alden and Schoeman 2013).

*The severity of regional crises in Africa and Latin America*

Hermann (1969: 414) defines crises as situations which: (1) threaten the high priority goals of the decision-making unit, (2) restrict the amount of time available for response, (3) and surprise the
members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence. We choose to highlight two types of regional crises: natural disasters/humanitarian emergencies, and violent conflict.\(^2\) The former occurs when, in the wake of large-scale natural disasters, a regional cry to remedy such damages emerges. This demand is expected to increase proportionally to the human, material or environmental losses (Robinson et al. 2017). Violent conflicts in a region, likewise, trigger a demand for the restoration of peace. Armed violence can take the form of interstate war or clashes between governments and other non-state factions, within or across its borders (Petterson and Eck 2018; Greig et al. 2019). We hold that the more severe the crisis in terms of human casualties, the higher its expected salience (Mullenbach 2005: 547).

*Issue salience at the UNGA*

Previous scholarship has gauged issue salience in world politics by analyzing UNGA speeches (Hecht 2016). We turn instead to the text of resolutions, which expectedly carry greater political weight than verbal statements. Following Mesquita and Seabra’s (2020: 365-6) approach, we observe whether the text of resolutions – which were sponsored by the regional power during the drafting stage – addresses the region by mentioning the names of countries therein. These country names were organized in a keyword dictionary and applied to a corpus of resolutions. In total, we applied content analysis to 1,824 and 1,995 resolutions sponsored by Brazil and by South Africa, respectively.

Focusing on the UNGA provides a comparable metric due to its universal membership. By comparing how frequently Brazil and South Africa supported resolutions textually naming their neighbors, we can assess how salient a country was during a crisis. Frequent mentions to a country
in the wake of a crisis were considered a sign of strong salience, whereas low or non-existent mentions represented detachment.

Both dimensions of severity and salience are combined in Figure 1, which monitors 43 Latin American and Caribbean states and territories, along with 55 African countries across 20 years (1994-2013).
Figure 1: Severity and salience of military and disaster-related crises in Africa and Latin America (1994-2013)

Source: elaborated by the authors. For color version, see: https://rpubs.com/rafaelmesquita/r5afla2

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Diagram showing the severity and salience of military and disaster-related crises in Africa and Latin America (1994-2013). The diagram includes events such as the Congo Civil War, Eritrea-Ethiopia War, Zimb-Choera Outbreak, Somalia famine, Honduras cyclone, Venezuela floods, Colombian guerilla, and Haiti earthquake.
The two top plots represent crisis severity. Bubble-size indicates human casualties. Bottom plots indicate salience. Dashed lines represent the share of UNGA resolutions originally sponsored by the regional power and mentioning a regional peer. Solid lines indicate absolute frequency of keywords related to neighboring countries.

Regarding severity, Africa is more unstable than Latin America across all metrics. The only major events in the latter were natural disasters (particularly the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which was the single deadliest event of the entire sample), and the Colombian conflict. The African continent, in contrast, had more recurrent and deadlier events. Some countries display a pattern of losses across both dimensions, as humanitarian catastrophes and violent conflict compound one another (e.g. Somalia in the 2010s).

As for salience, Figure 2 disaggregates our dictionary, indicating the number of mentions to individual regional peers. The result reveals that the most frequently mentioned countries in Africa were Somalia (20-year average), Rwanda (1994-5), Angola (2002-4), and the DRC (2002-3). In Latin America, leading countries are Haiti (20-year average) and El Salvador (1995).
Figure 2: Mentions to regional peers per year (absolute keyword frequency)

Source: elaborated by the authors, based on UN data and Mesquita and Seabra (2020).
**Case selection**

Grave crises should elicit strong responses. If instead a severe episode is met with indifference or mild reaction, factors other than severity should be guiding regional power response. The data present both confirmations and deviations from this expectation. Some high-severity crises were salient (Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti), while others, though grave, were less mentioned (Republic of Congo, Eritrea-Ethiopia, and Colombia).

Based on this evidence, we selected four representative cases, so as to obtain a high-severity x high-salience case, and a high-severity x low-salience case for both regions. For Brazil, we chose the 2010 Haiti earthquake as an example of the former, and the Colombian conflict for the latter. Regarding South Africa, we chose the Somali 2010 famine and the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville, respectively. These selection criteria invariably push the boundaries of our traditional understanding on the sites of regional leadership for Brazil (the Caribbean, instead of South America) and South Africa (Horn of Africa, instead of Southern Africa). Yet, as the case studies will show, the actors themselves loosened the conceptualization of their own perimeter of responsibilities.

The varying salience is early evidence of the different levels of engagement by regional powers. However, as it represents exclusively UNGA-level activity and not the concrete actions on the ground, further examination is required. The ensuing qualitative analysis unfurls engagement by regional powers in multiple venues. We focus on the aforementioned variables to account for crisis response (spheres of influence, resource availability, exposure, domestic consensus, and international expectations) and forum selection (IGO resources, independence, and a cost/benefits assessment).
CASE STUDIES

Haiti

On 12 January 2010, a 7-point earthquake shook Haiti. With its epicenter close to the country’s capital, Port-au-Prince, the event resulted in massive loss of lives and infrastructure. An estimated 250,000 people died across the country – one of the deadliest natural disasters to date. Brazil had been present in Haiti since 2004 as the leader of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Its involvement was noteworthy for several reasons: it was the first time Brazil commanded a peacekeeping mission, and troops were provided chiefly by South American countries. The gesture was hence canvassed as a regional enterprise to secure leadership credentials (Hirst 2007). Brazil had an estimated 1,300 troops in Haiti when the disaster occurred. In total, 21 nationals died.

Brazil’s response to the earthquake was its strongest display ever of humanitarian relief. Estimates of Brazil’s disbursements range from US$200 to 339 million (Patriota 2010; UN Press 2010). Reactions were enacted through multiple channels. On the bilateral level, Brazil was a first responder and carried out essential tasks of rescue, logistics, and security. Between January and July, it delivered 3.7 tons of food supplies and equipment with intense air and sea mobilization from its armed forces (Brazilian Ministry of Defense 2011). Brazil’s expenditure in development cooperation went from US$38 million in 2009 to US$104 million in 2010, never again reaching similar levels (Lima 2017).

Brazil also resorted to ad hoc and institutionalized multilateral venues. At the UN level, it donated US$14.6 million in 2010 through several agencies. Upon request via UNSC Resolution
1908, Brazil sent an additional 900 troops, totaling 2,200. At the UNGA, Brazil introduced draft resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance, Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation as a Result of the Earthquake’s Devastating Effects’ (A/64/L.42) on 22 January, later adopted as Resolution 64/250.

Brazil also became one of the ‘supporting’ organizers of an international donors’ conference on 31 March, held in New York (UN Press 2010). Two novel mechanisms were then created: the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) and the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). The latter proved particularly relevant for Brazil. Only donor countries pledging over US$30 million could participate in HRF’s governing board. From the total of 19 donors listed, only six crossed that mark: Brazil (US$55 million), Canada (45), France (32), Japan (30), Norway (44) and the US (125) (HRF 2015). Importantly, Brazil was the first donor to pay its pledge in full. This was a strong display of willingness to sit at the table, outpacing even Northern donors. Response via ROs was also visible, even if piggybacking on other initiatives. For example, 40% of Brazil’s deposit to the HRF accounted for the country’s share in a joint fund of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Brazil also relied on specialized regional entities, such as the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO/OPAS) for sectoral cooperation.

What factors account for this powerful engagement? Due to geographical distance and scant interconnections, negative externalities triggered by the earthquake had little chance of overflowing into Brazil. There was no concern, for instance, with containing migration. Brazil had never been a traditional destination and this had not changed with the onset of the MINUSTAH in 2004. Only 164 Haitians had applied for long-term stay in Brazil between 2000 and 2009, with few asylum or refugee requests. In fact, Brazil’s post-earthquake policies increased its migrant intake: for the 2011-2015 period, over 35,000 Haitians required long-term residence and 34,000 requested refugee status in Brazil. Commercial interdependence was also negligible.
Brazil’s main exposure derived instead from its previous involvement via MINUSTAH. Since 2004, Brazil had become an integral party to peacebuilding efforts in Haiti. Losses to the mission carried extra weight as Brazil’s reputation as a stabilizer was at stake. MINUSTAH was Brasília’s highest-profile mission to date, warranting considerable expectations from the international community. Hence, Brazil had grave concerns in seeing its six-year investment come to naught overnight. Such concern with salvaging its efforts helps to explain Brazil’s involvement in the HRF. As the Fund would have an authoritative role in the reconstruction, Brazilian officials deemed it critical to be ‘part of the club of the very few’ deciding on Haiti’s recovery.7 As this quote reminds us, however, Brazil was not the only stabilizer in play. Haiti remains within the US sphere of influence and, before MINUSTAH and after the earthquake alike, Washington maintained a decisive influence. Still, this did not translate into US exclusivity. The literature agrees that Brazil’s involvement in Haiti had the contours of burden-sharing between the hemispheric hegemon and a rising power with growing responsibilities, thus revealing congruent expectations (Hirst 2007; Mesquita and Medeiros 2016). For Brazil, involving extra-regional actors and venues remained indispensable due to the scale of the earthquake, the amount of resources needed, as well as to technical and efficiency concerns (e.g. PAHO/OPAS on health projects) – though Brasília was nonetheless concerned with ‘maintaining the status’ and not losing preeminence to other players.8

High resource availability and political cohesion also proved decisive. Brazil registered its highest ever nominal GDP in 2010 and the budget for the Foreign Relations Ministry (MRE) was accordingly high. Importantly, the assets described above could only be channeled for humanitarian purposes due to political cohesion, i.e. South-South cooperation had become a high-priority goal for the Lula administration (Lima 2017). Though spending state resources in foreign
problems is a thorny issue in Brazil and in other developing countries (Westhuizen and Milani 2019: 36), there was domestic consensus on Brazil’s duty to mend the Haitian tragedy. The casualty of nationals and sheer scale of the catastrophe contributed to such mobilization. The speedy approval of facilitative legislation for Haitian migration and budgetary support by the Brazilian government attested to this disposition.

**Colombia**

One of the longest civil conflicts in the world, the clash between Colombian authorities and revolutionary guerrillas – the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) being the most well-known – began in the 1960s. Low intensity at first, the conflict with the central government increased from the 1980s on due to the FARC’s growing power, their rejection of a peaceful resolution, and the rise of drug cartels (Castro 2009). Given the 50-yearlong duration of hostilities, we focus only on developments up to 2013.

From the 1990s to the 2010s, demand for third-party mediation varied. Colombian President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) placed high hopes in the 2001 negotiations through a ‘Facilitating Commission’ comprising regional neighbors and European countries. The mechanism wrought little progress, forcing Pastrana to lean on the securitized approach promoted by the US and laid out in Plan Colombia. Preference for US support and military solutions reached an apex during Álvaro Uribe’s presidencies (2002-2010). As Viana (2009: 89) argues, Colombian engagement with IGOs receded, as Bogotá hoped to benefit from the legitimacy and resources of the UN, all the while resenting external oversight on matters such as human rights.
Common ground with regional peers also shrank. Uribe tried unsuccessfully to convince neighboring countries to classify the FARC as terrorists. The rise of left-wing governments in South America gave Bogotá a feeling of isolation, when not hostility from Venezuela and Ecuador, who lent quasi-official support to FARC activities. Consequently, RO participation became selective: OAS’ role was confined to an observer mission in 2004 (Viana 2009), whereas UNASUR remained, by and large, uninterested and inconsequential in the topic of narco-guerrillas and more occupied with Colombian-Ecuadorian-Venezuelan tensions (Quiliconi and Rivera 2019).

As the conflict endured, Brazil stood at the margins. Evidence of such detachment abounded. Villa and Ostos (2009: 22) and Castro (2009: 73) state that Brazil originally hoped for an invitation to join Pastrana’s ‘Facilitating Group’, to no avail. Likewise, in a September 2003 meeting with Uribe, Lula da Silva offered Brazil as neutral territory for tripartite talks between Uribe, the FARC, and the UN, again unsuccessfully. Brazil’s role was limited to diffusing collateral tensions (e.g. the 2008 Ecuador-Colombia crisis) and occasional support on specific hostage rescues. Though the demand for stabilization existed, Brazil was not considered a credible supplier. In summary, Brasília’s response laid between weak and unrequited.

Why the detachment? In terms of commercial interdependence, Colombia was not an important partner for Brazil and vice-versa. The US remained the top market, accounting for one-quarter to one-third of all Colombian trade, while Colombia’s participation in Brazil’s trade never surpassed 2%. The extensive shared border, in contrast, was a source of vulnerability. Refugee flows, border trespassing, spillover of armed violence and narcotrafficking were among Brazil’s chief concerns (Castro 2009). In practice, however, not all materialized. Migration, for instance, remained minor: from the nearly 2.2 million Colombian refugees for the 2000-2012 period, less
than 1% fled to Brazil, whereas 75% went to Venezuela and Ecuador (Ramírez et al. 2017: 82). The spillover of illegal activities, in turn, was more acute. The unabated rise in drug-related criminality and consumption in Brazil over the last 20 years, along with recurring arrests of Colombian and Brazilian criminals on both sides of the border were symptomatic of growing connections between Brazilian organized crime and Colombian narcotraffickers.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite such ripple-effects, Bogotá did not draw substantial political attention. Whilst ‘international narcotrafficking’ was ranked a chief external threat in a 2008 survey with Brazilian experts, the Colombian conflict per se was predominantly viewed as ‘important but not critical’ (Souza 2009: 42).\textsuperscript{14} Authorities were content to justify detachment based on Brazil’s constitutional mandate of peaceful resolution and non-interference (Castro 2009). However, even though diplomatic sources tended to downplay the scale of the threat (Lampreia 2010), it is worth noting the Brazilian military stepped up their presence in the Amazon in the early 2000s through surveillance projects (Monteiro 2011).\textsuperscript{15}

In addition, Brasília did not have sufficient resources. In fact, in comparison to US investments, all other players dwindled. Between 1997 and 2007, Washington provided Bogotá with US$4.9 billion in military aid. The European Commission, in contrast, only donated US$315 million (Viana 2009). Estimates of Brazilian humanitarian disbursements to Colombia range from US$100,000 to US$2.3 million, all under 1% of Brazil’s total donations and under 1% of global resources received by Colombia during this period.\textsuperscript{16}

The main factors explaining Brazil’s indifference were its comparatively reduced exposure to the conflict and the tacit acknowledgment of US predominance. Brazilian diplomacy ‘accepted the fact’ that Colombia was under US influence and that no regional alternative had been called for.\textsuperscript{17} The Bogotá-Washington link was robust on state and societal levels, as evidenced by the
trade and investment balance, as well as by overwhelming societal approval of Plan Colombia (Ticker 2011: 64-71).

It was somewhat disconcerting for Brazilian authorities that ‘even Finland would give its opinion on Colombia, whereas we, which were more affected by events, would not’. Brasília would traditionally prefer to see such matters settled on a bilateral or regional level (Quiliconi and Rivera 2019: 239). This ambition, however, was inconsequential, since Brazil had never been an active party, ROs were constrained, and Colombians themselves had a more positive view on welcoming extra-regional hegemons to address the conflict.

*Somalia*

On 20 July 2011, the UN officially declared a state of famine in the Horn of Africa, with a focus on southern Somalia. This crisis affected 3.1 million people in the region and killed over 260,000 Somalis. More than half of the entire country’s population was impacted, including 750,000 famine-affected and 3.3 million in need of immediate life-saving assistance (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick 2012). A combination of factors contributed to a fast deterioration of the situation, including a severe drought, rising global food prices, and escalating conflicts between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab. Despite forewarnings of a brewing crisis by late 2010, political risk assessments and donor geopolitical considerations outweighed humanitarian concerns, until the declaration of famine forced an actual response (Checchi and Robinson 2013).

In this context, South Africa found itself running against the clock. President Zuma had already called for a national comprehensive strategy for Somalia during his State of the Nation address in February 2011, which was to focus on institution-building and peacebuilding.
However, the priority at this point remained centred on a post-conflict scenario down the line. As warnings over Somalia’s famine increased, a more tailored-made response was cobbled together.

The main strategy was to lean on numerous local NGOs to provide immediate aid. The Gift of the Givers, in particular, assumed a central role with relief work in Somalia and in refugee camps in neighbouring countries. Soon afterwards, the South African government and the Gift of the Givers launched a mass mobilization effort, the Somalia Relief Campaign, to raise public awareness and galvanise South Africans to contribute. Transport was also provided through a South African National Defence Force (SANDF) C-130 to deliver food and medication to Mogadishu. Total aid delivered during these first months amounted to 122 tons, together with US$484,000 for the famine relief program, US$242,000 of which covered logistical costs.

As the year progressed, South Africa became increasingly involved at the multilateral level. On 27 July, the AU convened an emergency meeting to discuss Somalia, followed by a Pledging Conference in the next month. At this occasion, South Africa pledged US$280,000 to a dedicated AU fund for Somali humanitarian assistance. Afterwards, during the 31st Ordinary SADC Summit in August, South Africa offered to airlift SADC contributions. By November, that amounted to 264 tons of food assistance, later distributed via the UN World Food Program (WFP).

Meanwhile, in his address to the UNGA on 21 September, Jacob Zuma noted the ‘catastrophic effects of famine in Somalia and neighbouring countries’ and urged that ‘the response should not be left to the United Nations alone, but requires united action from all of us’. Similar pleas were made during the Fifth Summit of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum in October and during the COP 17 conference in December, both hosted by South Africa.

Two factors hindered a more robust approach. First, even though there was no outright spillover potential, it was difficult to disentangle the humanitarian crisis from concerns over piracy
on Somalian waters and the internal strife in-country, which fell outside of any explicit sphere of influence. The seizure of the Vega-5 vessel in the Mozambican channel on March 2011, in particular, raised red flags over South Africa’s capabilities to deter such threats closer to home. An overall focus on security and stability therefore worked against a more diligent and meaningful response to the famine itself.

A second limitation was found in the timing of this crisis, which, concurring with other hotspots throughout 2011, put a strain on diplomatic resources. Due to its non-permanent membership of the UNSC for the 2011-2012 period, South African officials were considerably in demand. As the year began, South Africa was heavily invested in the outcome of Côte d’Ivoire crisis; yet, it was also quickly absorbed by the downfall of Khaddaffi in Libya, followed by the secession of South Sudan. Resources were stretched thin and high-level priorities were often rearranged according to shifting international expectations.

However, despite these obstacles, South Africa still displayed a sizeable response. Two variables account for its actions. First, domestic consensus pushed South Africa to step up. The media coverage of the famine renewed public interest, leading to significant funds for Somalis at home and to a more sympathetic public discourse in South Africa. The official policy line clearly took those elements into account. Simultaneously, pressure by the Somalian diaspora in South Africa in tandem with a possible increase of refugees to the country provided additional incentives. The fact South Africa instituted a new unofficial policy restricting entrance for Somali asylum seekers, right as the level of migrants coming into the country from the Horn of Africa increased, attests to how the issue was being actively considered at the time and needed to be tackled at the source (Achour and Lacan 2012: 84).
Secondly, the associated effects of the campaign to get then-Minister of Home Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma elected as the next AU Commission Chairperson should not be overlooked. Given how her candidacy broke an unwritten rule that major African powers should avoid bringing forward officials for AU positions, it became necessary for South African authorities to be perceived as following up ongoing African crises. Considerable lobbying around the continent, especially after the first two rounds of voting deadlocked, emphasized South Africa’s willingness to look beyond its borders (van Wyck 2020). Status concerns enmeshed with supporting its candidate were therefore also likely in the mix as the situation unfolded in Somalia. Meanwhile, the venues of choice did not deviate from the traditional South African axis of engagement: the focus was centralized on the SADC, whence practical dividends could be more quickly extracted, as evidenced by the air bridge to Mogadishu. Support for broader efforts led by either the AU or other technical agencies like the WFP was granted as soon as they displayed greater effectiveness and/or expediency in tackling the growing famine.

*Republic of the Congo*

The 1997 civil war in the Republic of the Congo can be traced back to the country’s first multiparty elections five years prior. At that moment, General Sassou-Nguesso’s 27 years of one-party rule came to an end and was replaced by the administration of President Pascal Lissouba. However, clashes with militia groups endured into 1994, with an estimated 2,000 casualties. Three years later, Lissouba attempted to consolidate his position and disarm the ‘Cobras’, one of the militias still supporting Sassou-Nguesso, ahead of the 27 July presidential elections. That decision led to a new breakout of hostilities, causing as many as 10,000 deaths around the capital, leaving the country’s infrastructure in ruins and scattering a largely urban-based population across the region.
After weeks of skirmishes, Sassou-Nguesso’s fortunes turned in mid-October when its ally Angola sent up to 3,000 soldiers to ensure he returned to power. But militias from Lissouba’s camp continued to fight on and by late 1998 they were still in control of considerable parts of the country. Sassou-Nguesso only managed to assert full control through a combination of military offensives and offers of amnesty. His position solidified after a series of ceasefire accords in November 1999.

Yet, despite the quick escalation of hostilities, this crisis warranted reduced attention from the international community across the board. Several factors explain this outcome. First and foremost, the unfolding situation in the neighbouring DRC absorbed every potentially relevant stakeholder. The overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko by Joseph Kabila in 1997 led to a spiral of violence that would ensnare the region for years to come. In comparison, the Republic of the Congo comprised a smaller scenario, with lesser implications outside its own borders. At the same time, the number of key foreign actors involved with events in Brazzaville was more restricted: France wavered between ambivalence and supporting the winning-side, while Gabonese President Omar Bongo unsuccessfully attempted to mediate all factions. An initial peacekeeping mission approved by the UNSC was also never deployed due to a lack of a ceasefire on the ground.

In this context, South Africa’s role was virtually non-existent. Its more visible contribution consisted of selling weapons to the Lissouba regime. In 1996, South Africa approved the sale of US$14 million in weaponry to Congo-Brazzaville and in the following year, it sold a further US$7 million, including sensitive equipment valued at US$5.4 million (HRW 2000). However, such ties did not instil greater involvement. In fact, they became a nuisance once Sassou-Nguesso returned to power and sought to renegotiate previous contracts.

Much like the surrounding region, motives for South Africa’s lack of engagement were primarily tied to developments in the DRC. According to Landsberg (2002: 169), this was due to
the priority attributed to a secure environment in southern and central Africa, both to facilitate trade and prevent refugee flows. Accordingly, Mandela himself invested considerable political capital in mediation, both as President and after leaving office, to no effect. One could argue that by providing mediation efforts in the DRC, South Africa hoped for a positive contagion on nearby neighbours also undergoing crises, like in the Republic of the Congo. Mandela’s first attempt at a peaceful outcome, for example, nearly coincided with the outbreak of hostilities in Brazzaville. However, that linkage was never made explicit in official statements and soon became irrelevant in the face of continuing strife in Kinshasa, which took priority.

The fact that the Republic of the Congo was not a member of SADC also played a key part. The lack of a multilateral platform that could aggregate presidential diplomacy efforts was noticeable. At the time, resources were scarce and allocated preferentially to crises where the organization could play a collective role. Yet again, the DRC proved an example in contrast: in September 1997 – less than four months after the fall of Mobutu but already three months after the beginning of the civil war in Brazzaville – South Africa convinced its fellow SADC partners to bring the DRC in as a full-fledged member (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2018: 174). Even if the organization’s fault-lines later came into evidence with regard to the conflict in Kinshasa – with Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia directly intervening on behalf of Kabila while South Africa advocated for a negotiated solution – the Republic of the Congo was nonetheless still outside of the traditional regional purview and undeserving of a similar formal inclusion. Meanwhile, the direct participation of certain external actors in the conflict, with a previous record of regional rivalry and diverging agendas, dissuaded further South African involvement. Angola, much more exposed to the instability in nearby Brazzaville, became heavily invested in Sassou-Nguesso’s successful bid to return to power. It would seem South Africa (and other parties) was content to
sidestep extra friction over spheres of influence. Hence, Pretoria did not seek to stretch the perimeter of its regional responsibilities, opting instead to let Angola pursue its own direct approach.

All in all, not only were exposure levels minimal but regional efforts were centered in the DRC, thus diverting resources and leading to inattentiveness from South African officials. Ultimately, there were not even enough multilateral parties engaged with this crisis to begin with, as ‘neither the United Nations nor the Organization of African Unity (OAU) could organize a settlement. The role of outsiders in Congo made clear the post-Cold War “new world order”, with its stress on mediation and collective security’ had yet to reach this part of Africa (Clark 1998: 31).

CONCLUSION

Our goal was to discern what factors account for regional powers’ responses to crises in their neighborhood. Starting from the premise that high severity leads to high salience, we compared cases confirming and differing from this pattern. We observed that issue salience at the UNGA tended to match actual responses on the ground. Depending on the chain of events, this can be seen as either a sign that salient crises cannot be ignored by regional powers, which must then respond robustly, or that regional powers work towards improving the visibility of crises which they already intend to address anyways.

We then tested the effects of several variables in producing the observed responses, summarized in Table 1.
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<tr>
<th>(1) Spheres of influence</th>
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<th>(c) Costs and opportunities</th>
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<td><strong>UN, ROs, IO (IBSA), bilateral</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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Source: elaborated by the authors. We used dashes (−) to indicate insufficient information or non-applicable scenario (e.g. regional power did not intervene, forum selection was a non-issue).

We found involvement to be non-reluctant in cases where external expectations matched societal support (Destradi 2018). The Haitian and Somali episodes fit within this scenario, since they marshalled strong domestic consensus. Other variables contributed to galvanize public sentiment (e.g. exposure via refugee flows or the loss of nationals), not to mention crisis type itself, i.e. the humanitarian nature of the disasters helps to understand strong disposition to relieve human suffering.
Another key factor lies with international expectations, which in our cases were more visible in the form of reputational concerns. Both regional powers were willing to respond strongly if the episode implied serious consequences in terms of status. For South Africa, the coveted seat at the AU Commission justified demonstrating considerable resolve to address problems on all corners of the continent. For Brazil, reputational concerns were compounded by the sunk costs of the MINUSTAH. For both regional powers, we observe a clear concern with ‘living up’ to the aggrandized roles they sought to consolidate – even if the opportunities to do so lay somewhat on the edge of their most immediate neighborhoods.

Less symbolic and more concrete forms of exposure, such as migration and trade flows, yielded mixed results. South Africa’s concern with stanching refugee flows and preserving orderly trade routes correlated with its response intensity, whereas Brazil had weak migratory and commercial ties in both its cases. Hence, no single pattern emerges associating migratory and commercial interdependence to response strength.

The decision to not provide stability was traced back, among other factors, to the presence of competing and exclusivist suppliers. At a given point, the studied conflicts witnessed the entry of heavily invested external actors (the US in Colombia, and Angola in Congo-Brazzaville). The spheres of influence drawn by such interventions were clear to Brazilian and South African decisionmakers, who refrained accordingly. Resources were also important. Economic surpluses enabled Brazilian support to Haiti, whereas diplomatic overstretch was often cited as a cause for South African selectivity. Likewise, context matters in assessing resources availability: US aid to Colombia dwarfed other contributors, while Pretoria faced competing demands simultaneously (Congo-Brazzaville vs. the DRC; Somalia vs. Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and South Sudan).
In terms of forum selection, the need to muster resources was an important determinant of IGO selection (HRF in Haiti; the UN, the AU, SADC in Somalia). Calculations of institutional costs and benefits were also relevant, though at times the expected benefits were influence (HRF), and at times efficiency (PAHO/OPAS in Haiti; WFP in Somalia). Evidence from non-response cases was less clear. For both Colombia and Congo, the participation of extraneous powers led the two crisis-stricken countries to prefer bilateral contacts over multilateral solutions. A perceived lack of resources and neutrality might also account for Colombia’s choice for OAS over UNASUR, whereas the lack of an IGO with direct stakes in the Congolese war turned it into a non-issue – even though our focus resided in Brazilian and South African preferences, which were inconsequential in both cases.

This analysis is not without limitations. Notably, strong responses leave many empirical traces while inaction does not. Moreover, we tested a large set of variables against just four cases. Consequently, the amount of independent variation that we empirically observed is not satisfactory to safely generalize conclusions to all regional powers and crises alike. Also, crisis-type could not be kept constant and heterogeneity across cases could have an impact on salience (the UNGA being more forthcoming about humanitarian support than civil conflicts), the effect of some variables (spheres of influence were exclusionary for Congo and Colombia but invited burden-sharing in Haiti), and ultimately the strength of country response (it is easier to provide support for natural disasters than to intervene militarily).

Yet, our mixed-methods framework based on severity and salience also provides a roadmap that can be extended to similar crisis scenarios, within and apart from the universe of regional powers. In particular, we were also able to evidence how such countries do not necessarily abide by the strictest of interpretations over what constitutes a region, and under which conditions they
might feel tempted to stretch their reach. More importantly, if our conclusions hold, the prospects of Brazil and South Africa acting as regional stabilizers can be expected to decline in the future. The growing involvement of extra-regional hegemons in Latin America and Africa (e.g. US and Russia in Venezuela; China in Africa) should dilate their own spheres of influence, thus inciting even more passivity from Brazil and South Africa (see Hutto, this volume, on system-level influences). In addition, both countries have come to display declining material capabilities, less ambitious status-seeking agendas, and less internal consensus. None of these developments bodes well for expectations that the two regional powers might discard reluctant policies and become active providers of stability towards their neighborhoods. On the contrary, strong responses towards regional predicaments are more likely to become rarer, even in the face of severe crises.

REFERENCES


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1 Comparing 1,688 instances of maritime and territorial disputes, Hansen et al. (2008) show disputants only opted for an institutionalized solution in 10% of the cases.

2 Other types of crises could have been contemplated (e.g. democratic ruptures). Nonetheless, narrowing them to disasters and conflicts affords a common metric for severity (human casualties).
Data for the top two plots (crises severity) were extracted from multiple sources: Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) for natural disasters; and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) for violent conflict (Petterson and Eck 2018). The unit of observation is country-year. Data for bottom plots (salience) were extracted from the UN Digital Library System (https://digitallibrary.un.org/) and from Mesquita and Seabra (2020).

Given that content analysis could detect mentions to countries unrelated to crises, when assessing which cases to choose, we considered only mentions synchronic to crises and ignored mentions resulting from unrelated UN conventions and initiatives hosted by a given country (e.g. the ‘Mauritius Initiative’ from 2004 onwards). Figures 1 and 2 show, nonetheless, the original unfiltered counts.

Source: https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/337/flows. Brazil’s UN-level pledges also overlapped with bilateral initiatives that the country already planned to roll out in support of Haiti (Phone interview with senior Brazilian diplomat #1, who served in MRE’s Department for Central America and the Caribbean, 05 March, 2020).

Data compiled by the Observatório das Migrações Internacionais (OBMigra, https://portaldeimigracao.mj.gov.br/pt/observatorio)

Interview #1.

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The Medida Provisória N.480 on budgetary support was passed by President Lula da Silva on 26 January, 2010, two weeks after the earthquake.
A ‘Facilitating Commission’ was formed in March 2001, composed of Canada, Cuba, Spain, France, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Venezuela. Members were chosen in common accord with the FARC.


According to a 2017 estimate, approximately 35% of Colombian drugs were smuggled via Brazilian criminal organizations (Soto 2017). According to the UN 2011 World Drug Report, Brazil was the most prominent cocaine transit country in the Americas, in terms of total seizures, with the number of cases rising ‘from 25 in 2005 (amounting to 339 kg of cocaine) to 260 in 2009 (amounting to 1.5 mt)’ (UNODC 2011: 109).

Among 15 alternatives, ‘international narcotrafficking’ was the second most important external threat, evaluated as ‘critical’ by 64% of surveyed experts, ‘important but not critical’ by 33% and ‘not a threat’ by 3%. In contrast, scores for ‘the conflict between the guerrilla and the Colombian government’ were 29% (critical), 58% (important but not critical), 12% (not a threat). Figures on the Colombian conflict were similar on multiple editions of the survey (2001 and 2008) (Souza 2009).

The ‘no threat’ interpretation was also relayed in phone interview #2 (04 March, 2020) with a former senior Brazilian diplomat, who served in the Brazilian mission in Bogotá. Major military infrastructure projects included the Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM), launched in 2002, and the Calha Norte Project, which had a 10-fold budget increase between 2003 and 2005 (Monteiro 2011).
OCHA/FTS data for 2000-2013 indicate only one Brazilian donation to Colombia, within the framework of the WFP in 2009 (US$100,000). Data from Lima (2017) for 2009-2011 registers seven donations totaling US$2.3 million. Regardless, the former accounts for less than 0.02% of all humanitarian donations received by Colombia; and the latter for less than 0.7% of Brazilian disbursements. OCHA/FTS data at: https://fts.unocha.org/data-search/results/incoming?usageYears=2000%2C2001%2C2002%2C2003%2C2004%2C2005%2C2006%2C2007%2C2008%2C2009%2C2010%2C2011%2C2012%2C2013&locations=49&group=locations

Interview #2.

Interview #2. Note that Finland was not a mediator at first, but was later included in the Facilitating Commission, along with 10 additional European countries.

Address by President Jacob Zuma in Response to the Debate on the State of the Nation Address, National Assembly, Cape Town, 17 February 2011. Available at: https://www.gov.za/node/537769

As part of the SADC aid contribution to Somalia, Angola pledged 6,649 tons of food and non-food items, Mozambique pledged 65 tons of food, Namibia pledged 242 tons of food, and Tanzania pledged 503 tons of food and non-food items. South Africa transported it all to Somalia.

Remarks by Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Marius Fransman, at the Knowledge Sharing Workshop on Somalia - “South Africa’s Role in Peace-Building and Reconstruction of Somalia”, 19 September 2012, Cape Town.

Since the 1990s, up to four waves of Somali migrants have arrived in South Africa, drawn by the formal and informal socio-economic and political characteristics of the country, amounting to a nearly 30,000 diaspora in-country (Jinnah 2015).