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The substance of EU Democratic Governance promotion via transgovernmental cooperation: the Twinning programme in the Southern Neighbourhood (2004-2019)

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Mestrado em Políticas Públicas

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ISCTE - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

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Resumo

Face ao ceticismo relativamente ao impacto democratizante e “*Europeisante*” da Política Europeia de Vizinhança, vários investigadores da “Governança Democrática” reforçam a necessidade de salientar o impacto diferenciador da União Europeia nas estruturas domésticas dos seus Estados parceiros. Concretamente, esta vertente da literatura defende uma análise focada nas diferenças entre setores das políticas públicas e o seu impacto na transposição de normas Europeias através da cooperação funcional. Para os estudantes da “Governança Democrática”, o impacto da UE nos seus Estados vizinhos varia de acordo com o setor político e os contextos nacionais e locais, estando dependente de uma série de condições-chave, nomeadamente interesses políticos, económicos e securitários, o tipo de regime e a capacidade das instituições estatais, para além da relação estratégica entre atores e, finalmente, a complexidade técnica dos setores em análise.

Este projeto de investigação procura contribuir para a literatura com uma análise qualitativa-quantitativa de 222 Projetos Twinning implementados nos países da Vizinhança Sul da União Europeia entre 2004 e 2019. Os resultados desta dissertação apresentam esforços tímidos por parte da UE na promoção de normas de Governança Democrática na Vizinhança Sul, ainda que diferenciada entre setores e países. Esta variação pode ser explicada, segundo os resultados, pelas capacidades das administrações públicas dos países parceiros, a existência de custos de adoção políticos elevados, uma relação estratégica favorável à União e a complexidade técnica dos setores em análise.

Palavras-chave: Democracia; Governança; MONA; Política Europeia de Vizinhança; União Europeia

Abstract

While scholars of Europeanisation are often sceptical of the Europeanising and democratising potential of the European Neighbourhood Policy, students of “Democratic Governance” stress the need to highlight the European Union’s differentiated impact in partner countries’ domestic structures. Concretely, this research branch calls out for a policy differentiated analysis of the transposition of EU norms through transgovernmental functional cooperation. For “Democratic Governance” scholars, the EU’s impact in its Neighbours’ varies across policy sectors and contexts, being dependent on a set of key scope conditions, such as political, economic and security interests, regime type and statehood, as well as the strategic leverage between actors and, finally, the technical complexity of policy fields.

This research project aims to contribute to this literature through a qualitative-quantitative analysis of 222 Twinning projects implemented in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood between 2004 and 2019. This thesis finds that the EU’s Democratic Governance promotion efforts in the Southern Neighbourhood are timid, albeit varying across policy fields and countries. This variation is best explained by the capacities of the public administrations in partner countries, as well as the existence of political adoption costs, a strategic leverage favourable to the EU and the degree of technical complexity of policy fields.

Keywords: Democracy; Governance; MENA; European Neighbourhood Policy; European Union

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Research on Europeanisation – the impact of European integration on local values, norms, and institutions – has thrived since the 1990s, when students of the European Union (EU) started to explore how the integration process has shaped institutions, processes, and politics in Member-States and, later, in non-European partner countries. Focusing on this last dimension, research on external Europeanisation analyses the diffusion of EU norms, values, policies, and institutional models to external countries, reflecting the exposure to and the attractiveness of European norms, as well as the distribution of power between the EU and its outside partners (Olsen, 2002, pp. 938-39).

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), introduced in 2003 after the fifth enlargement of the EU to the East, sought to “*transform the domestic structures of its southern and eastern neighbours in order to foster peace, stability and prosperity in the two regions closest to its border*” (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1033; emphasis added). Due to its explicit goal of promoting EU norms and values, the ENP has provided an evident case study for better understanding the outcomes and constraints of external Europeanisation.

Notwithstanding the general scepticism towards the ENP’s effectiveness (Börzel and Risse, 2012; Delcour and Lecha, 2017), several authors have sought to study and interpret the scope conditions that define the outcome of the EU’s efforts at Europeanising its neighbouring countries. Particularly, scholars of Democratic Governance (Freyburg et al., 2015; Freyburg and Lavanex, 2017; Panchuk et al., 2017) have researched the Europeanisation and democratisation potential of functional cooperation within the ENP framework.

Functional cooperation – understood as the transfer of policy norms through sectoral policy cooperation – constitutes an essential mechanism in implementing the ENP goals and agreements between the EU and its neighbouring countries to the East and the South (Freyburg and Lavanex, 2017, p. 467). For Democratic Governance scholars, promotion of democratic policy norms – of transparency, accountability, and participation in decision-making – through functional cooperation prepares the legal-administrative basis for democratic government (Kostanyan et al., 2017, p. 30). However, these promotion efforts are influenced by a set of scope conditions – developed throughout the Europeanisation literature – that define the differentiated impact of the EU beyond its borders. Relevant scope conditions proposed in the literature (Börzel & Risse, 2012; Catalano & Graziano, 2016; Panchuk et al., 2017) include, for example, the existence of political, economic, or strategic adoption costs, the regime type and public administration capacity of partner countries, the technical

complexity of cooperation and, finally, the strategic leverage between the EU and its partners. When considered in the study of EU functional cooperation, these conditions differ between policy fields. Studying this differentiation has allowed Democratic Governance scholars to better understand the Europeanisation and democratisation impacts of functional cooperation in the ENP.

Considering the debate on the conditions that define the EU's Europeanisation and democratisation outcomes through functional cooperation, this research project proceeds with a qualitative-quantitative study of 222 policy-driven cooperation projects – implemented through the ENP Twinning instrument – that took place in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia (i.e. the Southern Neighbourhood), between 2004 and 2019.

The Twinning instrument promotes policy cooperation and alignment with the EU *acquis* and policy practices through the secondment of public officials from Member-States to assist their peers in partner countries (Roch, 2017, p. 74). Because the *acquis* often embeds rules of Democratic Governance applied in EU Member-States, it is expected that Twinning projects may also incorporate some degree of Democratic Governance content – of transparency, accountability, and participation (Freyburg, 2011, p. 1009).

In this thesis, I aim to tackle two research questions, further developed throughout this paper: (1) to what extent do norms of Democratic Governance appear in EU Twinning projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood?; and (2) what scope conditions account for the differences in the presence of Democratic Governance norms across projects, countries and policy areas? In this sense, my goal is not only to analyse the potential of democracy promotion through EU-sponsored functional cooperation, but also to understand which factors may influence it.

Before proceeding, I must make a brief note of the scope and limitations of my research project. While the Twinning projects under analysis have had an implementation phase – of important relevance to understanding the “practical” outcomes of democratization efforts – this phase of the project cycle is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, considering the limited resources and time to carry out this research project, I have chosen to focus on the proposed content of Twinning projects – as defined in each project's fiche (i.e. Terms of Reference), which describe the context, actions and objectives of each project. In sum, rather than researching the democratizing impact of Twinning projects *per se*, my research explicitly focuses on their democratization *potential*. That is, to what extent these projects' design includes norms of democratic governance. Nonetheless, as further debated in the conclusion, future research efforts ought to focus on the implementation phase of these projects as to better understand the democratizing potential of EU-sponsored functional cooperation in the Southern Neighbourhood.

Drawing from the Europeanisation and Democratic Governance literatures (see *Chapter 3*), the scope conditions considered in my research model are: (1) political liberalisation; (2) public

administration capacity; (3) political adoption costs; (4) commercial interests; (5) security concerns; (6) leverage between the EU and partner countries; and (7) technical complexity.

Following a similar study by Panchuk et al. (2017) in the Eastern Neighbourhood, I develop a qualitative-quantitative research model to account for these variables and their impact on the Democratic Governance substance of analysed Twinning projects. Concretely, after analysing the content of 222 Twinning documents representing the projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood between 2004 and 2019, I implement a regression model to understand the relationship between the proposed scope conditions and my dependent variable – the substance of Democratic Governance norms (and its sub-components of transparency, accountability, and participation).

My findings show that the EU promotes a generally low level of Democratic Governance in the Southern Neighbourhood. The data indicates that this has changed between 2004 and 2019, following broader EU external policy shifts. Democratic Governance promotion was stronger after the Arab Spring (2011-2013), reflecting the EU's strong emphasis on democratisation in the Mediterranean after this event. More recently, after 2017, Democratic Governance levels have reduced consistently, possibly reflecting a more realist and "geopolitical" EU, which no longer places values promotion at the forefront of its external policy (see Cinciara, 2017).

Nonetheless, I suggest that the Twinning instrument, albeit in a limited and timid manner, serves to promote Democratic Governance norms in policymaking in the Southern Neighbourhood. My research model has not found a statistically relevant influence of all proposed conditions in promoting democratic policymaking, but it has indicated that, contrary to the existing literature, the EU actively promotes some degree of democratic policymaking in contexts of high political adoption costs and weak public institutions.

Before reaching these conclusions, this thesis proceeds as follows. *Chapter 2* introduces the Europeanisation literature – with an emphasis on the promotion and diffusion of EU policy norms – before focusing on the European Neighbourhood Policy as an important venue for Europeanisation efforts.

Following this, *Chapter 3* presents the Democratic Governance literature and the Europeanisation and democratising potential of functional cooperation. While *section 3.1.* explains the concept of "Democratic Governance", *section 3.2.* presents the scope conditions proposed in the literature to explain and understand effective Democratic Governance promotion in the Neighbourhood. *Chapter 4* presents the Twinning instrument and its potential for democracy promotion and Europeanisation through functional cooperation.

In *Chapter 5*, I describe my research model – drawing from previous research carried out by Panchuk et al. (2017) – and the scope conditions considered in my study. In *Chapter 6* I present my

data and main findings. Finally, in *Chapter 7* I discuss my conclusions and propose new steps for further research.

CHAPTER 2

Europeanisation, differentiation, and scope conditions

The Europeanisation literature constitutes an important branch of EU studies, having primarily focused on describing and explaining the varying impacts of the EU on national politics, polities, and policies (Radaelli, 2006, p. 58). Concretely, Europeanisation studies are guided by the goal of understanding how to account for the differentiated impacts of European integration (Mastenbroek, 2018, p. 823), within and outside Europe.

The concept of “Europeanisation” can be broadly understood as the study of “if and how the EU has changed representation, governance and public policy in the member states and beyond” (Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2010, p. 189). Research on Europeanisation has thrived since the 1990s, when students of the European Union started to explore how the EU has shaped institutions, processes, and political outcomes in Member States. The enlargement towards the East and, later, the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), extended this research agenda towards future Member States and EU external partners (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 192).

The early Europeanisation literature, focusing on Member-States, identified the misfit between European and domestic policies, institutions, and political processes as the main necessary condition for domestic change, due to the demand for reform caused by such misfits (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p. 58; 2012, p. 197). In this sense, the process of Europeanisation is influenced by the presence of domestic scope conditions which are favourable to policy and institutional change (Börzel and Risse, 2003). Relevant scope conditions mentioned in the literature include, for example, the absence of multiple veto points that can hinder reform and the existence of strong norm entrepreneurs and advocacy networks favourable to change (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p. 69).

While earlier studies on Europeanisation were restricted to a matter of understanding the domestic consequences of European integration as an outcome of a top-down induced misfit supported by favourable internal scope conditions, recent research avoids assuming an entirely top-down process. Instead, scholars have focused on understanding the leading role of domestic actors in terms of a “bottom-up ‘use’” instead of a “top-down ‘pressure’” (Mastenbroek, 2018, p. 824). Recent scholarship thus encapsulates both the top-down dimensions of norms promotion and the bottom-up dimensions of reception, considering both the sender and the receiver side. Such an understanding assumes that the EU's impact might be very different depending on the context, and its implications on both the interests and actions of the sender and the receiver (Catalano & Graziano, 2016, pp. 365–366).

The transition from misfit-oriented analyses to a research approach focused on scope conditions and bottom-up “use” of top-down “pressure” has been greatly influenced by the external Europeanisation literature.

Olsen (2002, pp. 938-39) defines external Europeanisation as the diffusion of EU institutional and policy models to outside countries, reflecting the exposure to and the attractiveness of European norms, as well as the distribution of power between the EU and its external partners. The biggest challenge in the external Europeanisation research comes from the lack of effective attempts at Europeanisation of external countries with no prospects for a proper accession into the EU. In these cases, despite some harmonization in standards and regulations between EU and partner countries, "Europeanisation is always incomplete and selective insofar as internal and external pressures combine and produce mixed and differential outcomes" (Celata and Coletti, 2019, p. 11). A more decentred approach to Europeanisation has thus been explored in the literature, focusing on the scope conditions that influence these differentiated policy and political outcomes (see *section 3.1.* below for further details).

Recent external Europeanisation research has emphasised the importance of bottom-up variables – referred to as “scope conditions”, or “mediating factors” – in easing norms reception. These mediating factors are often related to the characteristics of recipient actors, such as regime type, domestic costs of compliance, among others. Nonetheless, analyses often refer to interrelated scope conditions, of both senders and receivers, such as the (a)symmetry of the relationship between the EU and the partner country, the nature of European strategic interests, etc. (Catalano and Graziano, 2016, p. 366).

Early in the literature, Börzel and Risse (2012, p. 198) summarised four essential scope conditions for external Europeanisation of partner countries: (1) domestic incentives for change; (2) regime type; (3) degree of statehood; and (4) power (a)symmetries between the EU and partner countries.

Drawing from earlier considerations on the absence of veto points and existence of strong advocacy networks in the Europeanisation literature (Börzel and Risse, 2003), several authors assume that when EU incentives and efforts align with *domestic interests*, ruling elites can use EU incentives to push their own political agenda and please their constituencies, thus regaining or consolidating their power. In other words, "[t]hose who profit from or are normatively aligned with the policies and rules emanating from Brussels will promote domestic institutional change" (Börzel and Risse, 2012, p. 199). Contrarily, in the absence of internal mobilization, EU incentives will do little to boost domestic institutional change.

Furthermore, when considering the *regime type* of partner countries, the literature points to the prevailing notion that undemocratic and non-Western partner countries will not be as receptive to adopt democratic and Westernized EU norms, due to high adoption costs and a perceived lack of

shared values (Börzel and Risse, 2012; Freyburg et al., 2015). Moreover, the absence of a proper “carrot” – such as the possibility of joining the EU – would detract partner countries from adopting costly reforms with no short-term gains.

Building on the “Limited Statehood” literature, Börzel and Risse (2012, p. 201) also propose that *state capacity* to enforce policy and political reforms will impact the success of external Europeanisation. On the one hand, degrees of limited statehood affect the ability of states to change institutions in response to EU pressures for adaptation. On the other, the EU is less likely to directly promote domestic change due to a lack of powerful internal reform coalitions to empower, and due to a concern not to destabilise its partner countries.

Stabilization concerns, in particular, became evermore evident in the Southern Neighbourhood and beyond after the Arab Spring, when the EU refrained from promoting stronger (democratic) domestic changes for fear that the chaos of regime change would lead to destabilization (see Cianciara, 2017). *Strategic interests* thus also play a strong role in determining the scope and degree of Europeanisation in partner countries, as will be further developed in *section 3.2*.

Finally, the literature points to the *power (a)symmetries* between the EU and partner countries as an important scope condition of Europeanisation. In essence, “the less asymmetrical the power relationship between the EU and target countries, the less effective are direct influence mechanisms of diffusion in inducing institutional change” (Börzel and Risse, 2012, p. 203). In other words, whenever the EU has a strategic leverage towards a partner country, reform is more likely, as direct influence is more effective, and vice-versa, when the partner country can profit from its strategic upper hand to reject costly reforms.

In sum, the adoption of European policy and institutional models in the Neighbourhood and beyond is obtainable only if favourable pre-conditions exist. This adoption becomes both partial and interactive, adapted to local and sectoral circumstances (Celata & Coletti, 2016, p. 18). Nonetheless, the literature has been sceptical about the EU’s influence on its neighbours and external partners, where the absence of membership perspectives, high domestic adoption costs, contrasting political norms and reduced state capacity hinder the chance of reform (Börzel and Risse, 2012, p. 194).

2.1. Europeanisation in the Neighbourhood

Notwithstanding the scepticism in the literature, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has provided an evident framework for Europeanisation through which the EU has aimed to induce its values and norms in bordering countries through their partial and progressive alignment with the EU *acquis* (Börzel, 2011).

As the fifth enlargement of the EU (2005-2007) shifted the EU's external borders towards less stable and prosperous regions, the European Commission sought to take a more unified and effective approach to the countries bordering the bloc to the East and to the South. The goal of this policy framework would be to create a ring of friendly, stable, and prosperous countries around the Union to guarantee the overall stability of the region (Kostanyan et al., 2017; Schimmelfennig, 2015; Wesselink & Boschma, 2017). As such, the ENP was introduced in 2003 by the EU to “transform the domestic structures of its southern and eastern neighbours in order to foster peace, stability and prosperity in the two regions closest to its border” (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1033, emphasis added; see also Tulmets, 2010, p. 315), thus reflecting a clear and strong Europeanisation effort.

The ENP draws from the objectives and processes of the EU's enlargement policy, applying them to a non-accession context. It builds on binding bilateral frameworks and a plethora of soft legal documents and cooperation programmes, such as the Twinning programme (van Vooren & Wessel, 2014, p. 516). Through bilateral cooperation, it constitutes an integrated policy framework which encompasses almost all policy themes in which neighbouring countries can collaborate with the EU, from the Environment to Justice and Home Affairs (Wesselink & Boschma, 2017, p. 5).

While in the enlargement process candidate countries had to follow the EU's directions to be able to enter the Union, ENP countries have no obligation to follow these rules. In fact, some countries have declined the invitation to participate in the ENP (e.g. Russia), while others do not take it as an external policy priority (e.g. Israel). In contrast to candidate countries, which agree to prepare to cede part of their sovereignty to the EU, ENP countries remain sovereign countries throughout the cooperation process (Tulmets, 2010, pp. 315-316).




Figure 1. European Neighbourhood Policy countries (Source: EU Neighbours, 2021).¹

¹ European Union Member-States (in blue), Eastern-ENP Partner Countries (in green), and Southern-ENP Partner Countries (in orange).

The countries targeted by the ENP are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine, within an East-South divide (Tulmets, 2010, p. 324; van Vooren & Wessel, 2014, pp. 542–543), as seen in Figure 1. Southern Neighbourhood countries, which provide the case study for this thesis, are highlighted in orange.

The rights and duties of ENP partners are inscribed in bilateral agreements with the EU called *Action Plans* (or Association Agreements), organized by objectives and topics very similar to the negotiation chapters defined for the accession countries (Tulmets, 2010, p. 316). Each individual Action Plan delineates negotiated common objectives, later detailed in national policy documents. The goal of this process is to give responsibility to third countries and to grant them co-decision power on the way they want to achieve the reforms and objectives agreed upon in the Action Plans (Kuijper et al., 2015, p. 556; Tulmets, 2010, p. 317). This strategy of co-ownership tries to increase the effectiveness in promoting reforms in partner countries through gradual and incremental processes, adapted to different cultural and moral environments and perspectives (Aliboni, 2009, p. 20).

Despite this, the literature on Europeanisation has been rather sceptical about the EU's influence on its neighbours through the ENP (see Delcour and Lecha, 2017). Europeanisation in the Neighbourhood is perceived as generically weak, due to the great institutional misfit between EU and partner interests, with high adoption costs and weak domestic reform coalitions (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 22). Indeed, while incentive-based mechanisms dominate the Europeanisation of Member-States and accession candidates, the lack of membership perspective

“curbs the ability of the EU to manipulate the utility calculations of Neighbourhood countries whose costs of adaptation are even higher (...) given their lower levels of government effectiveness and democratic quality” (Börzel and Risse 2012, p. 195).

Nonetheless, the EU has relied on capacity-building, through technical and financial assistance, and socialisation, through cooperation programmes, to attempt to induce domestic reforms in its neighbouring countries. Aware of the limits of conditionality in the context of the ENP, some authors have thus proposed an alternative level of norm promotion through functional cooperation, which capitalizes on capacity-building and socialisation. The “Democratic Governance” literature, in particular,

“[draws on] the assumption that the intensifying web of association relations between the EU and associated third countries introduces a new form of democracy [and norms] promotion through sectoral cooperation” (Schimmelfennig, 2015, pp. 21-23).

This policy-specific approach attempts to explain a selective and partial transfer of EU rules in the Neighbourhood, by considering the importance of Europeanisation through functional cooperation and the relevance of sectoral scope conditions in norm promotion (Schimmelfennig, 2015, pp. 23-24).

CHAPTER 3

Europeanisation and democratisation through functional cooperation

Despite having an important side of high-level political cooperation between EU officials and representatives from partner countries, programs of functional cooperation – understood as the transfer of policy norms through sectoral policy cooperation – lie at the heart of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Freyburg and Lavenex, 2017, p. 467). The Action Plans and Association Agreements developed with neighbouring countries in the scope of the ENP are implemented through several programmes of technical assistance, which seek to create the institutional capacity and legal frameworks necessary for the transposition of EU policy frameworks to partner countries, following the policy's objective of approximating partner countries to EU standards, norms, and values.

The literature on external Europeanisation and policy diffusion follows the thesis of “domestic analogy”, according to which actors prefer “an international environment that is ordered according to their own principles and procedures” (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 10). In this sense, the EU has invested in the development of a common Neighbourhood Policy to transform the domestic structure of bordering countries, ensuring a replication of its own norms and objectives (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1033). Most importantly, the EU has sought to project its fundamental principles to its external partners, starting from the belief that these are a “lesson for everybody” to achieve the same prosperity reached in the European space (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 11).

As such, for example, the EU promotes regional integration in the Southern Neighbourhood through the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), an organization gathering all EU members and 15 Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, “in charge of enhancing regional dialogue and cooperation amongst its Member States” (Union for the Mediterranean, 2017, p. 7). Furthermore, it promotes economic liberalization and market-building through Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) signed between the EU and Neighbourhood countries (see Smith, 2015). Finally, the EU has sought to promote, albeit to a varying degree,² its own constitutional norms – of Human Rights, Rule of Law, and Democracy – seen as pre-requisites for long-term stability in partner countries (Schimmelfennig, 2012, pp. 657-69).

² For a discussion on the shifts in democracy promotion through time within the ENP framework, see Cianciara, 2017.

Starting from these premises, the bulk of the external Europeanisation literature has focused on democracy promotion in the Neighbourhood, assessing the effectiveness of existing Europeanisation mechanisms and the importance of scope conditions in influencing democracy promotion efforts in the region (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008, p. 188).

Democratic Governance research, reflecting a recent trend in the Europeanisation and democratisation literatures, has sought to understand and reflect on the democratising potential of functional cooperation. Concretely, scholars of Democratic Governance (see, for example, Freyburg et al., 2015 or Panchuk et al., 2017) have tried to analyse the scope conditions which determine the transference of democratic norms through sectoral cooperation, drawing on previous research on policy Europeanisation.

For scholars of Democratic Governance promotion, a sectoral approach to Europeanisation and policy cooperation helps to explain the selective and partial transfer of EU norms in the Neighbourhood through a decentred analysis of sectoral scope conditions. Notwithstanding the existence of structural pre-conditions (such as regime type or degree of statehood), several authors (Celata & Coletti, 2016; Freyburg et al., 2015; or Panchuk et al., 2017) argue that most scope conditions have some degree of policy differentiation. For example, adoption costs may be higher in politicized policy areas, such as Justice and Home Affairs, but lower in depoliticized sectors, such as Tourism (Freyburg et al., 2015). Furthermore, strategic leverage between the sender (i.e. EU) and the receiver (i.e. partner country) can differ across policy subjects: with partner countries having the upper hand on migration control, but with the EU enjoying greater leverage in visa-related policies, for example (Panchuk et al., 2017). This leads to a differentiated outcome in democracy and norms promotion, with some policy sectors providing more effective venues for the potential transfer of democratic norms and Europeanisation efforts, and vice-versa.

Through a policy-centred approach, the Democratic Governance literature studies the transfer of democratic principles through functional cooperation between administrative actors (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 20). As such, this literature focuses on the process of Europeanisation via democratic norm promotion in policy reform, with the goal of understanding the influence of domestic and interrelated scope conditions in the transference of such norms. What are, then, the norms that define Democratic Governance? Before discussing the scope conditions that influence the potential of Democratic Governance promotion according to the existing literature, I further detail the concept of “Democratic Governance” and its characteristics.

3.1. What is Democratic Governance?

Democratic Governance research focuses on the transfer of democratic principles in the context of functional (i.e., policy-driven) cooperation between administrative actors. Democracy promotion entails here the provision of accountability, transparency, and participation norms in policymaking through transgovernmental functional cooperation (Freyburg et al., 2015; Panchuk et al., 2017; Wetzel, 2015). Drawing from the Europeanisation literature, Democratic Governance scholars have tried to understand which scope conditions determine the transference of transparency, accountability, and participation norms within sectoral cooperation between the EU and its neighbouring countries.

For Democratic Governance scholars, democracy promotion through functional cooperation prepares the legal-administrative basis for democratic government (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 26; Kostanyan et al., 2017, p. 30). On the one hand, it can provide legitimizing points of access for domestic societal agents to closely participate in and influence decision-making (Freyburg & Lavenex, 2017, p. 471). On the other, routine implementation of democratic procedures may gradually change public officials' beliefs on how policies should be drafted and implemented (Freyburg, 2011, pp. 1002-1003; Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 77). When successful, it can thus incentivize demands for a far-reaching democratization of the polity (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 21). As democratic reforms at the polity level require a public administration familiar with democratic modes of governance, democracy promotion through functional cooperation thus constitutes a steppingstone towards overall democratization (Freyburg, 2011, pp. 1002–1003).

Since functional cooperation is, in most cases, actively sought by regimes that see it as unthreatening and offering resources and support to boost policy-implementation capacity, it can occur in semi-autocratic political systems (Freyburg & Lavenex, 2017, p. 471). Transgovernmental networks between public administrations thus provide less public and potentially more effective channels for the transmission of norms (Slaughter, 2000, p. 202; Wetzel, 2015, p. 61).

Most Democratic Governance scholars (such as Freyburg et al., 2015 or Wetzel, 2015) understand this concept as being constituted by three main aspects that influence “democratic” forms of policy making: accountability, transparency, and participation.

In defining the Democratic Governance aspect of public policies, *accountability* is understood as the “enforced requirement [of public officials] to justify policy action under the threat of sanctions” (Wetzel, 2015, p. 64). This component can be either administrative – when policy reform entails the creation of internal accountability processes within the State or Public Administration – or external – when reform opens pathways for external accountability (Freyburg et al., 2015). Therefore,

accountability is present when there are channels of accountability, both internal and external, via monitorization, complaints and/or sanctions (Wetzel, 2015; Panchuk et al., 2017).

Transparency, on the other hand, is about the visibility of issues and policymaking procedures (Wetzel, 2015, p. 64; Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 49). It entails open access to information, official documents, impact studies and legal norms, as well as the availability of information on decision-making and policy formulation. In this way, a policy sector is transparent when information is freely accessible and shared with actors that are external to the Public Administration, such as Civil Society, media, and other public and private actors (Panchuk et al., 2017).

Participation refers to non-electoral forms of participation in decision-making through the involvement of non-state actors in policymaking (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 51; Wetzel, 2015, p. 65). This happens when local communities, interest groups, national and international Civil Society Organisations and other societal actors are included in decision-making activities through policy proposals, discussion groups, and other forms of policy outreach.

The existing literature on Democratic Governance promotion often focuses on the democratising impact of functional cooperation within the European Neighbourhood Policy framework. As stated previously, the Association Agreements and Action Plans implemented by the EU and partner states are put into place via transgovernmental policy networks, as a means of approximating legal and administrative standards in neighbouring countries to those of the EU. These networks are initiated at an intermediate level between government and society, operating among sub-units of governments and public administrations. While externalising its *acquis*,³ the EU transfers procedural rules on how decisions are made and implemented. Since the rules transferred through EU-sponsored functional cooperation are those of advanced European democracies, they would logically embody elements of Democratic Governance.

Cooperation is thus not only about sharing and delivering policy solutions, but also about introducing new modes of governance (Freyburg, 2011, p. 1004; Freyburg & Lavenex, 2017, p. 469). In this way, the “EU policy regimes extended to non-members come with requirements for participation, transparency and accountability typical of Democratic Governance” (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 17).

³ While this terminology is often used when referring to the Europeanisation of Member-States (or candidate countries), the term *acquis* is utilised in the Democratic Governance literature when referring to the transfer of EU procedural rules to external partners. In other words, external norm promotion through functional cooperation takes place “when parts of the *acquis communautaire* are extended to non-Member States” (Lavenex, 2004, p. 683; see also Freyburg and Lavenex, 2017, p. 469).

3.2. Scope conditions for effective Democratic Governance promotion

Democratic Governance scholars have sought to understand the scope conditions which determine the democratising potential of functional transgovernmental cooperation within the ENP framework. Drawing on previous discussions on the scope conditions of Europeanisation, these scholars have researched which scope conditions incentivise or limit the transference of transparency, accountability and participation norms between the EU and its neighbouring countries through policy cooperation, presenting a set of both sectoral and contextual factors.

In this section, I present the main scope conditions which are dealt with in the Democratic Governance literature. I have sought to present these in a logical way, and the order should not be taken as representing a scale of importance or chronology within the literature.

First, because the ENP is based on a logic of socialization and mutual possession, its reforming potential is often determined by the interests of the actors involved (Schimmelfennig, 2015). Research on interest-based dynamics in the literature thus points to three factors that can influence the democratizing potential of functional cooperation within the ENP: (1) *political*; (2) *economical*; and (3) *strategic or security* related.

Although transgovernmental policy cooperation generally operates without much publicity, when it affects *politicized* policy fields state officials may regard transnational exchange with suspicion (Freyburg, 2011, p. 1010). In this sense, EU democracy promotion is shaped by the nature and perceptions of state national elites and state officials (Dandashly, 2018, p. 68). A sector is politicized, or has high *political adoption costs*, when “[d]omestic elites can perceive the adoption and application of democratic rules and practices in sectoral policy making as a threat to their position” (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 73). Usually this refers to policy fields where there is high political interference, conflicting political interests, or corruption (Panchuk et al., 2017, p. 1048). In these sectors, democratic norm transfer is expected to be rather low, due to the existence of strong veto points.

In their analysis of Democratic Governance promotion efforts in Morocco, Moldavia and Ukraine, Freyburg et al. (2015) have pointed out that high political adoption costs impeded the adoption of democratic norms. Panchuk et al. (2017, 1057), on the other hand, analysing EU policy cooperation programmes with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia, noticed that high political costs incentivised higher odds of Democratic Governance norm adoption by partner countries.

On another note, Wetzel (2011), Langbein and Wolczuk (2012) notice that strong and *contrasting economic interests* – either on the EU’s or the partners’ behalf – impede the adoption of Democratic Governance norms. Conflicts between internal economic interests and external interests defined in EU-third country sectoral cooperation will lead to greater resistance to the transfer of European norms (among which there are democratic norms) to the sector seen as threatened by external interests

(Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 22; Wetzel, 2011, p. 990). In this sense, by resisting policy changes due to high *commercial adoption costs*, partner countries are indirectly resisting the adoption of democratic norms associated with reforms.

Furthermore, recent ENP scholarship has stressed the fact that the EU has been adopting an increasingly pragmatic approach in its Neighbourhood, especially following the Arab Spring (Browning & Joenniemi, 2008; Cebeci & Schumacher, 2017; Cianciara, 2017; EEAS, 2016; Furness et al., 2017). Most authors agree that, when *security or strategic interests* are at play, the EU will refrain from promoting democratic norms, placing its stabilisation interests ahead of its values (Kostanyan et al., 2017; Wetzel, 2011; 2015). Strategic and realist concerns are thus expected to have a negative impact in Democratic Governance promotion.

Following this logic of adoption costs and conflicting interests, other authors point to impact of the relationship of dependence and the *strategic leverage* that exists between sender and receiver in reform adoption as another condition for the democratizing impact of sectoral cooperation. For Democratic Governance scholars, promotion of democratic norms increases with the partner countries' dependence on the EU – be it because of financial or political support, or even the prospect of accession (Kostanyan et al., 2017) – which can serve to overcome high adoption costs. Conversely, if the partner country possesses a strategic asset on which the EU is dependent, it can use it to resist unattractive (democratic) norms (Freyburg et al., 2015).

Broadly reflecting these sectoral conditions, one contextual scope condition proposed in the Democratic Governance literature is the *degree of political liberalization* (i.e. regime type) of a neighbouring country. Most authors argue that a greater degree of political liberalization means a higher chance of adoption of Democratic Governance norms, seeing that there will be lower adoption costs and more favourable domestic coalitions (Freyburg et al., 2015; Panchuk et al., 2017).

Furthermore, another possibility proposed in the literature is that greater *institutionalization of functional cooperation* facilitates the adoption of democratic norms in the long term, as knowledge and policy transfer, as well as socialization between democratising and democratised actors, are more solid and constant (Freyburg et al., 2015). Institutionalization is thus understood in this regard as the existence of lasting and predictable cooperation programmes, such as long-term cooperation missions and a record of long-lasting and steady cooperation between the EU and the partner country.

Lastly, Panchuk et al. (2017) propose a novel explanatory scope condition in the Democratic Governance literature: the policy sector's *technical complexity*. For these authors, greater technical complexity incentivizes lesser democratic norm adoption, as the participation potential in this sector is relatively low and conscribed to those who possess the necessary knowledge to critically assess and participate in the policy field, thus discouraging the adoption of Democratic Governance norms (Panchuk et al., 2017).

In sum, as a branch of broader Europeanisation research, the Democratic Governance literature has sought to test and evaluate the impact of contextual and sectoral scope conditions in determining the degree of Democratic Governance promotion through functional cooperation mechanisms of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Relevant scope conditions presented in the literature thus include: interest-based dynamics, such as the existence of (1) political, (2) economic and/or (3) strategic interests; the (4) strategic leverage between the norm sender and receiver; the (5) degree of political liberalization (i.e. regime type) of partner countries; the (6) institutionalization of functional cooperation mechanisms; and, finally, the (7) technical complexity of the policy sector under analysis.

The Democratic Governance literature develops on the scope conditions already discussed in the Europeanisation literature (see *Chapter 2*), while improving its analytical scope through a sector-specific approach. Rather than perceiving these conditions at a national level – reflecting a direct overarching dynamic between partner countries and the EU – it points to the differentiated conditions and outcomes between policy fields. This differentiation allows for more thorough analyses of Europeanisation efforts, accounting for the policy area of cooperation as an essential factor in determining its outcome.

This thesis hopes to contribute to the existing literature on Democratic Governance promotion and Europeanisation by functional cooperation through a quantitative analysis of 222 Twinning projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood between 2004 and 2019. The Twinning programme offers a highly structured and institutionalised form of functional cooperation between the EU and Neighbourhood countries, making it an excellent case for studying the scope conditions of Europeanisation and democracy promotion through functional cooperation, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

The Twinning Programme and Europeanisation via functional cooperation

With functional cooperation as a tool for Europeanisation at its core, the ENP is implemented through several programmes of technical assistance, which seek to create the institutional capacities and legal frameworks necessary for the transposition of EU norms, standards, and values to partner countries. Technical assistance and functional cooperation through the ENP take place through the Twinning, the TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument) and the SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) programmes.

The Twinning programme funds the secondment of an advisor (or group of advisors) coming from an EU national public administration to support its peers in a partner country in transposing the EU *acquis* to national policy and legal frameworks to solve a pressing issue identified by the partner country. Partner countries are free to select their Twinning partners, focusing on Member-State(s) whose systems fit with their organisational culture and national interests (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore, 2003, p. 625). The implementation of Twinning projects lasts for at least twelve months, with an average budget of around one million euro.

TAIEX works similarly to Twinning, being also directed at supporting legislative approximation, but involves shorter term technical assistance, through workshops, expert missions, and study visits (European Commission 2021b). SIGMA, on the other hand, is a joint initiative between the EU and the OECD which is applicable to Neighbourhood countries (SIGMA, 2021). This programme's team of policy experts provide technical assistance to partner countries through monitoring reports and strategic papers (SIGMA, 2021; Wesselink & Boschma, 2017, p. 7–8).

Given its greater depth of intervention, longer time scope and allocated resources, Twinning stands out as the most effective tool of functional cooperation in comparison with the other ENP technical assistance tools, like TAIEX or SIGMA. Through Twinning-funded projects, officials from Member-States help beneficiary organisations from partner countries (usually a National Ministry and a specific department) in seeking effective responses to policy problems through training and support in legal and policy adaptation, following EU models and best practices. By providing an effective space for input and exchange of ideas, the Twinning programme allows beneficiary organisations to draft laws and regulations modelled after European practices and the EU *acquis* (Freyburg, 2011, p. 1009; Wesselink & Boschma, 2017, p. 7; Roch, 2017, p. 74).

Twinning was first launched in 1998 to facilitate the accession of Central and East European candidate countries (Panchuk et al., 2017, p. 1045), drawing from an institution-building approach developed during the German reunification process (Roch, 2017, p. 78). Due to its success in creating a space for policy cooperation and transposition of EU policy models, it was later extended to Neighbourhood Countries.

As a tool of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Twinning instrument assists the practical implementation of the partnership agreements (Action Plans) through institution-building (İşleyen, 2015, p. 678), via the cooperation between public bodies of EU member states and their counterparts in partner countries. Fundamentally, the cooperation projects implemented by the Twinning instrument provide technical assistance in law-drafting and policymaking, drawing on EU examples and assistance. Twinning projects cover various sectoral priorities covered in the Action Plans signed between the EU and partner countries, ranging from the Internal Market, Justice and Home Affairs, to Energy, Environment and Social policy (Panchuk et al., 2017, p. 1045; Tulmets, 2010, p. 318).

By promoting policy cooperation through the secondment of public officials from EU Member-States to assist their peers in partner countries, Twinning enables a voluntary process of organisational change and adaptation (Roch, 2017, p. 74). However, because this programme is directly financed by the EU, implemented projects are based on institutional and legal approximation with EU standards as the essential pre-conditions upon which external expertise and resources are granted (Roch, 2017, p. 75). Furthermore, “[g]iven that the *acquis* often embeds rules related to transparency, participation, and accountability [in policymaking], the policy solutions offered [within Twinning cooperation frameworks] thus incorporate elements of Democratic Governance” (Freyburg, 2011, p. 1009).

In sum, given its depth of intervention, time scope and resources, Twinning stands out, in comparison with other technical assistance tools (such as TAIEX or SIGMA), as the most structured and institutionalised form of functional cooperation within the European Neighbourhood Policy framework. Considering that institutional and legal approximation are the pre-requisites for access to EU funding through the Twinning programme, this mechanism is prone to serve to Europeanise partner countries. Furthermore, according to Democratic Governance scholars, such as Freyburg (2011) or Panchuk et al. (2017), Twinning stands out as an effective tool for Democratic Governance promotion, as rules and policy frameworks promoted by Member-State civil servants, following the *acquis* as a guiding example, are likely to embed norms of transparency, participation, and accountability. However, because of their voluntary character, both EU and Neighbourhood partner countries can directly influence the content of these projects.

Therefore, several researchers have tried to understand the scope conditions influencing the Europeanisation potential of the Twinning programme and its ability to promote Democratic Governance norms in partner countries.

Dandashly (2018), for example, observes that Twinning-funded projects implemented in Tunisia after the Arab Spring have sought to aid the democratic reform process in the country, working in a wide range of policy sectors to consolidate democratic practices and the rule of law (Dandashly, 2018, p. 71). However, similar projects implemented in Egypt after the Arab Uprisings have covered more depoliticized and technical areas, such as waste management and maritime safety, refraining from promoting democratic institutional building out of stabilisation concerns following an unsuccessful political transition (Dandashly, 2018, p. 75). As such, regime type and strategic concerns seem to play a crucial role in determining the outcome of Europeanisation and democratisation through Twinning projects in the Southern Neighbourhood.

Panchuk et al. (2017), on the other hand, developed a ground-breaking study in the Democratic Governance scholarship with the first quantitative analysis on scope conditions. While most existing studies on Europeanisation and Democratic Governance promotion are qualitative in nature (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 23), Panchuk et al. (2017) developed a new analytical framework to analyse the impact of relevant scope conditions identified in the literature through a quantitative analysis of 117 Twinning projects implemented in the Eastern Neighbourhood between 2006 and 2015. In their analysis, these authors concluded that the EU promotes mixed degrees of Democratic Governance substance across sectors and countries through Twinning. For Panchuk et al. (2017), this variation is best explained by the regime type of the partner country, the politicization of the target sector and its technical complexity (Panchuk et al., 2017, 1058-1060).

This research projects seeks to continue the research on the democratisation and Europeanisation impacts of the Twinning Programme, concretely in the Southern Neighbourhood, which is composed of mostly non-democratic regimes with active cooperation agreements with the EU. Hoping to contribute to the Democratic Governance literature and following the example of Panchuk et al. (2017), I carry out a quantitative study of 222 Twinning projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood between 2004 and 2019. Concretely, I aim to further develop and verify the impact of the scope conditions debated in the Europeanisation and Democratic Governance literatures.

Following the work of Panchuk et al. (2017, 1044), my research tackles two main research questions: (1) to what extent do norms of Democratic Governance appear in EU Twinning projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood?; and (2) what scope conditions account for the differences in the presence of Democratic Governance norms across these projects?

Research Objectives, Data and Methodology

In this thesis, I aim to understand the extent of Democratic Governance promotion via Twinning-funded projects implemented between 2004 and 2019 in the Southern Neighbourhood, while analysing the impact of a set of sectoral and contextual scope conditions in determining the difference in the presence of Democratic Governance norms across projects.

With this study, I aim to broaden the geographic and methodological focus of the Democratic Governance literature. By focusing on the Southern Neighbourhood, this thesis tackles a research tendency in the literature to study Eastern partnership countries (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 22). Furthermore, it studies and verifies the scope conditions presented in the literature through a quantitative analysis, whereas the bulk of the Democratic Governance literature is comprised of qualitative single-case studies (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 23).

This contribution studies the Twinning projects implemented in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia between 2004 and 2019. This time frame comprises the years between the first implementation of a Twinning project in these partner countries (2004), until the last year with available and consolidated data (2019).

Based on the scope conditions discussed in the previous sections, my analysis accounts for seven independent variables (two *contextual* and five *sectoral* scope conditions) and one dependent variable: the *Democratic Governance substance* of each Twinning project, constituted by three dependent sub-variables (*Transparency, Accountability and Participation*).

To infer the impact of each variable in the degree and substance of Democratic Governance in each project, I made use of a multiple regression model, via SPSS Statistics, as will be further explained below. Multiple regression analysis is suitable for reaching my research objectives, as it will allow for the quantification of the relative impact of each independent variable in the dependent variables, including the direction of the relationship (positive or negative) and the general fit of the proposed research model (Panchuk et al., 2017, p. 1054).

5.1. Data and methodology

As previously mentioned, my research aims at two main objectives: (1) to understand to what extent norms of Democratic Governance appear in EU Twinning projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood; and to (2) analyse the impact of a set of contextual and sectoral scope conditions in determining the differences in the presence of Democratic Governance norms across projects.

Concretely, I develop a quantitative analysis of 222 Twinning projects implemented in Southern Neighbourhood countries between 2004 and 2019. Each project has a corresponding “fiche”, which includes the project plan, its objectives, activities, and the resources to be employed in a two-to-three-year period. Each fiche also provides an in-depth policy background explanation, identifying the context and background of proposed reforms, including the problems they seek to tackle and the socio-political context which defines their content (Panchuk et al., 2017, p. 1051).

The Twinning fiches – which act as Terms of Reference for each Twinning project – outline the objectives of the secondment of EU public servants, the actions to be implemented, and resources to be employed in a two to three-year partnership (Panchuk et al., 2017, p. 1045-47). The procedural details of Twinning fiches are later expanded in “Twinning contracts”, which further define the priorities and mandatory results agreed upon in the project fiches. The programme is often criticised for the rigidity and lack of in-depth changes between fiches and contracts, thus rendering these fiches a sufficient and reliable source of information on implemented projects (Panchuk et al., 2017, p. 1051). Nevertheless, understanding the practical outcomes of Twinning projects and the actual implementation of Democratic Governance norms is beyond the scope of this research project. It must, however, inform future research on the topic, as I will further discuss in *Chapter 7*. This research project, due to time and resource limitations, focuses only on the proposed content of Twinning projects, in its formulation phase – I further develop on the limitations of this approach below.

Apart from the *contextual variables* identified in the following section (degree of regime *political liberalisation*, and *public administration capacity*), all variables were assessed and coded from the analysis of these fiches (see *Annex A* for an example of a Twinning fiche analysis).

All variables were coded using the SPSS statistical programme. Using this programme, I have built several regression models to account for the relative impact of the independent variables in the degree of *Transparency, Accountability, Participation* and overall *Democratic Governance* of each Twinning project.

As this study comprises the qualitative analysis of a large set of data through the textual analysis of the Twinning fiches, a minor degree of subjectivity is to be expected. Considering this, I have attempted to reduce this risk by carefully analysing the policy background presented in each Twinning fiche, supported by existing academic work and official policy documents whenever necessary to shed light on country and sector specific considerations.⁴

The data gathering for this research project was made in three separate phases, according to the availability of information and its format. The Twinning fiches of projects implemented between 2015

⁴ See *Annex A* for a description of a Twinning fiche analysis, and *Annex C* for a summary of the interpretation of each of the 222 Twinning projects under analysis.

and 2019 were gathered from the “circulation of fiches” general documents available in the Twinning official website, which provide a list of implemented projects and database references (European Commission, 2021c). The fiches implemented between 2004 and 2012 were unavailable in the Twinning official website but were provided by Dmytro Panchuk, from the University of Ghent, from a Commission database that was transferred to him in 2017. Lastly, the fiches of Twinning projects implemented between 2013 and 2015 were downloaded, one by one, from the EuropeAid database (European Commission, 2021a). After gathering the data, the Twinning fiches were sorted by country and policy sector, according to the official sector codes defined by the European Commission (2021c).

Before applying a multiple regression model to account for the relative impact of each independent variable in the independent variable, each Twinning fiche was analysed and coded following the coding framework developed in the next two sub-sections. Apart from the two contextual scope conditions (political liberalisation and public administration capacity), all other independent and dependent variables were coded through a qualitative analysis of project fiches’ content.

5.1.1 Independent Variables

Drawing from the discussions in the Europeanisation and Democratic Governance literatures (see *Chapters 2 and 3*), I propose seven independent variables in my research model, each related to the scope conditions mentioned in the previous chapters: (1) political liberalisation; (2) public administration capacity; (3) political adoption costs; (4) commercial interests; (5) security interests; (6) strategic leverage; and (7) technical complexity.

My first independent variable is *political liberalisation*. Drawing from the discussions on regime type as a scope condition for Europeanisation and Democratic Governance promotion, I hypothesise that

H1: The greater the political liberalisation of the partner country, the greater the Democratic Governance substance of the project.

In other words, in more liberalised countries, Twinning projects should be more likely to contain Democratic Governance provisions. While sectoral cooperation is often depoliticised, the degree of liberalisation of incumbent regimes can influence the inclusion of democratic norms in the cooperation agenda, as more autocratic regimes will hold a tighter grip on international cooperation forums. Furthermore, when a regime enjoys a certain degree of political liberalisation, this will, in theory, facilitate the further democratisation of policymaking (Panchuk et al., 2017, p. 1048).

To operationalise this first variable, I used the data available from the World Bank's "Voice and Accountability" meta-index, which captures the perceptions on civic participation, freedom of speech, freedom of association and press freedom in each partner country (World Bank, n.d.). In a spectrum from -2.5 to +2.5, this meta-index captures the precepted political liberalization of each country, per year (Kaufmann et al., 2010).

Drawing on the discussions on limited statehood, mentioned in *Chapter 2* but not yet explored in the Democratic Governance literature, my second independent variable is the *public administration capacity* of each partner country. That is, the material and political capabilities of public institutions. This hypothesis is put forward in the Europeanisation literature (Schimmelfennig, 2015) with a particular focus on the lack of implementation capacity in areas of limited statehood (Börzel and Risse, 2012). However, it is not yet fully explored in the general Democratic Governance literature. Therefore, it proves interesting to understand if there is a relationship between the capacity of public administrations to implement reforms and the attempted transfer of Democratic Governance norms, assuming that

H2: The greater the public administration's capacity, the greater the Democratic Governance substance of the project.

This hypothesis starts from the premise that more capable public administrations face lesser political costs and have greater material resources available to adapt to necessary reforms. This variable is operationalised using the World Bank's "Government Effectiveness" meta-index, which captures the perceptions on the quality of public services and their independence from political power, the quality of public policies and the credibility of public action in each country, every year, in a spectrum from -2.5 to +2.5 (Kaufmann et al., 2010; World Bank, n.d.)

Turning now to sector-related hypotheses, I analyse three hypotheses related to interest-based adoption costs, considering the political, economic, and security costs of proposed reforms. These variables will be operationalised through binary criteria, as explained in tables 1, 2 and 3, accounting for the presence or absence of adoption costs or conflicting interests.

First, in sectors where reform will lead to greater *political adoption costs* higher interference from domestic elites is to be expected, as these would perceive the intended transfer of Democratic Governance norms as threatening (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 71). Regarding political costs, I thus follow the general conclusions in the literature and hypothesise that

H3: The greater the political adoption costs within a sector, the lower the Democratic Governance substance of the programme.

Table 1: Operationalisation and coding matrix for *political adoption costs* (H3).

Political adoption costs	
High political adoption costs [1]	Project objectives are likely to expose political conflicts of interest, including corruption, in the beneficiary institution or sector.
No political adoption costs [0]	Project objectives are unlikely to expose political conflicts of interest, in the institution or the policy sector.

Second, I assume that adverse *commercial interests* will also negatively impact the attempted transfer of Democratic Governance norms. This follows from the general conclusion in the literature that conflicts between external and internal commercial interests will lead to greater resistance to the transfer of European norms and, inherently, the possibility of transfer of Democratic Governance norms, because of perceived high adoption costs on behalf of the partner country (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 22; Wetzel, 2011, p. 990). Therefore,

H4: *The greater adversity of commercial interests, the lower the Democratic Governance substance of the programme.*

Table 2: Operationalisation and coding matrix for *commercial interests* (H4).

Adversity of commercial/economic interests	
Adverse commercial interests [1]	Project objectives are likely to expose commercial conflicts of interest, within the beneficiary institution or sector, between the EU and the partner country.
Non-adverse commercial interests [0]	Project objectives are unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest, within the institution or the policy sector, between the EU and the partner country.

A third interest-based variable relates to the EU's *security interests* in the region, and the influence of strategic interests in Europeanisation and democratisation efforts, as debated in the literature. Starting from the premise that when security interests are at play, the EU places its stabilisation interests ahead of value promotion efforts (Kostanyan et al., 2017; Wetzel, 2011; 2015), I hypothesise that

H5: *The stronger the EU security interests in the sector, the lower the democratic substance of the programme.*

Table 3: Operationalisation and coding matrix for *security interests* (H5).

Existence/absence of security interests	
Existent [1]	Project objectives are likely to expose security interests on behalf of the EU.
Absent [0]	Project objectives are unlikely to expose security interests on behalf of the EU.

The sixth variable in my research model accounts for the relationship and degree of *strategic leverage* between the EU and the partner country, starting from the premise that the negotiating capacity of each actor influences the content of cooperation programmes. According to the Europeanisation and Democratic Governance promotion literature, the EU is expected to have a greater interest and capacity to promote its values and norms when it possesses a strategic upper hand. Conversely, the partner country, when having a strategic advantage, will focus on putting forward its domestic interests, thus overlooking costly democracy-related reforms (Börzel and Risse, 2012, p. 203). Therefore, I hypothesise that

H6: *The greater the degree of strategic leverage in favour of the European Union, the greater the Democratic Governance substance of the programme.*

This variable will be operationalised considering three possibilities, as shown in table 4, reflecting which partner possesses a strategic advantage.

Table 4: Operationalisation and coding matrix for *strategic leverage* (H6).

Leverage	
In favour of the EU [1]	Project objectives deal with issues of strategic importance for neighbouring countries.
Neutral [0]	Project objectives ignore issues of strategic importance for either of the partners.
In favour of neighbouring countries [-1]	Project objectives deal with issues of strategic importance for the EU.

Finally, the seventh independent variable, as first proposed by Panchuk et al. (2017), relates to the *technical complexity* of each policy sector. According to these authors, the technical complexity of each project influences the adoption of Democratic Governance provisions, as the participation potential in highly complex sectors will be relatively low and conscribed to those who possess the necessary knowledge to understand and partake in the policy field. I thus hypothesise that

H7: *The greater the technical complexity of the policy sector, the lower the Democratic Governance substance of the programme.*

Table 5: Operationalisation and coding matrix for *technical complexity* (H7).

Technical complexity	
Yes [1]	The project policy sector requires an advanced technical, scientific, or mathematical knowledge in its daily functioning.
No [0]	The project policy sector does not require an advanced technical, scientific, or mathematical knowledge in its daily functioning.

5.1.2 Dependent Variables

This thesis aims to understand to what extent norms of Democratic Governance appear in the Twinning projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood between 2004 and 2019, as well as to analyse the determinant impact of the identified scope conditions in the presence of *Democratic Governance* norms (*Transparency, Accountability, and Participation*) across these projects.

The coding criteria used to assess the *Transparency, Accountability, and Participation*⁵ substance of each project are shown in tables 6, 7 and 8 (based on Freyburg et al., 2015; and Panchuk et al., 2017).

Transparency relates to external access to information on policymaking (see table 6). *Accountability* refers to the existence of monitoring and accountability channels that allow members of the public body and members of broader society to monitor the actions and redress their complaints towards the institutions responsible for the project’s implementation (see table 7). *Participation* relates to the possibility of representatives from outside the public institutions to participate in project activities and in the policymaking activities in the long-term (see table 8). According to the analysis of

⁵ While referring to democratic (governance) principles, these variables are not to be confused with the first independent variable (political liberalisation). While the first refer to characteristics of policy and norms developed through the Twinning projects, the latter relates to the general political environment and regime type of partner countries.

each component, I assess the *Democratic Governance* substance of each project as the average value between the three components of Democratic Governance, as shown in table 9.

Table 6: Operationalisation and coding matrix for the *Transparency* component.

Transparency	
High [2]	Project encourages free access and sharing of information with Civil Society members, media and international actors.
Medium [1]	Project foresees discretionary access and sharing of information with a limited number of external actors.
Low [0]	Project does not foresee any explicit form of information sharing and access for external actors.

Table 7: Operationalisation and coding matrix for the *Accountability* component.

Accountability	
High [2]	Project seeks to enhance accountability within the institution/sector and create monitoring and accountability venues for Civil Society members and other public and international institutions.
Medium [1]	Project seeks to enhance internal accountability within the institution/sector but only provides limited access for external monitoring and accountability.
Low [0]	Project does not foresee any kind of internal or external accountability.

Table 8: Operationalisation and coding matrix for the *Participation* component.

Participation	
High [2]	Project encourages participation and feedback from Civil Society members and media during project activities and in the everyday activity of the beneficiary institution or sector.
Medium [1]	Project encourages participation and/or feedback from Civil Society members or media in project activities, but not in the everyday activity of the beneficiary institution or sector.
Low [0]	Project does not foresee any kind of participation during project activities or everyday activity of the beneficiary institution or sector.

Table 9: Operationalisation and coding matrix for *Democratic Governance*.

Democratic Governance substance	
High [2]	An average of transparency, accountability, and participation between 2.0. and 1.4.
Medium [1]	An average of transparency, accountability, and participation between 1.3. and 0.7.
Low [0]	An average of transparency, accountability, and participation below 0.6.

To account for the relative impact of each independent variable on my dependent variables (*Transparency, Accountability, Participation and Democratic Governance*), I have built and interpreted several regression models using the SPSS programme. For the three sub-components of *Democratic Governance (Transparency, Accountability and Participation)*, I have employed ordinal regression analyses, as these are ordinal variables ranked in three categories – Low, Medium, and High (Laerd, 2018). Because the statistical model for the Democratic Governance variable did not confirm the assumption of existence of proportional odds, I employed a multinomial regression analysis to account for the impact of the independent variables on this dependent variable.

CHAPTER 6

Empirical Analysis

A first look at the data from the 222 Twinning projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood between 2004 and 2019 shows that some countries and sectors stand out more than others, as seen in table 10. Implemented projects have a strong focus on the Finance, Internal and Economic sector (21,6%), followed by Transport (14%) and Justice and Homme Affairs (12,2%). On the other hand, Morocco (26,1%), Tunisia (23%) and Algeria (18,5%) stand out as the countries which have invested more in this cooperation mechanism. Palestine (1,4%), Lebanon (3,6%) and Israel (4,1%) show less interest (or capacity) for participating in Twinning projects.

Table 10: Twinning projects implemented between 2004 and 2019, by theme and country.

	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	TN	Total
<i>Agriculture and Fisheries</i>	4	1	0	2	1	2	1	3	14
<i>Finance, Internal Market, and economic criteria</i>	10	6	0	4	5	14	1	8	48
<i>Energy</i>	1	1	1	1	0	4	0	0	8
<i>Environment</i>	3	2	2	1	0	3	0	4	15
<i>Health and consumer protection</i>	3	2	1	1	1	5	0	7	20
<i>Justice and home affairs</i>	6	0	1	9	0	6	0	5	27
<i>Social Affairs and Employment</i>	4	2	1	1	0	5	0	5	18
<i>Standardization and certification, Trade & Industry</i>	1	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	5
<i>Statistics</i>	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	5
<i>Telecommunications</i>	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	2	8
<i>Transport</i>	3	9	0	3	1	7	0	8	31
<i>Other</i>	4	2	0	1	0	8	0	8	23
Total	41	27	9	25	8	58	3	51	222

Note: DZ = Algeria; EG = Egypt; IL = Israel; JO = Jordan; LB = Lebanon; MA = Morocco; PS = Palestine; TN = Tunisia

The content analysis of the Twinning fiches shows a generally low level of *Democratic Governance* being promoted in the Southern Neighbourhood ($\bar{x} = 0,31$). When considering the sub-components of *Democratic Governance*, the same holds true. Concretely, the analysed projects show a very low average level of *Participation* ($\bar{x} = 0,23$) and *Transparency* ($\bar{x} = 0,29$), and a more significant yet low level of *Accountability* ($\bar{x} = 0,65$).

While little over half of the projects under analysis promote a medium level of *Accountability* (51,4%), they tend to invest in internal, rather than external, accountability frameworks for beneficiary institutions. Furthermore, most projects tend to promote a low level of *Transparency* and *Participation* (77% and 82,4%, respectively). Considering this, most projects promote a low level of *Democratic Governance* (69,8%).




Figure 2: Magnitude of *Democratic Governance* of Twinning projects, per policy sector. N = 222

Looking at policy sector dynamics, the data shows some variance, as seen in Figure 2 above. Projects in the Justice and Home Affairs, Energy and Environment sectors tend to show a higher level of *Democratic Governance*, while the lowest averages are seen in Social Affairs and Employment, Standardisation and Certification, Telecommunications and Transport sectors.

The highest substance of *Accountability* is found in the Statistics, Health and Consumer Protection, Justice and Home Affairs, Transport and Finance and Economics sectors. *Participation* tends to be

higher in the Standardisation and Certification, Trade & Industry, Justice and Home Affairs and Environment sectors. The statistics sector stands out with its higher average *Transparency* levels – likely because of the importance of open access to statistical information in this sector – followed by projects in the Environment, Energy and Transport sectors, albeit with in a much lower degree.




Figure 3: Magnitude of *Democratic Governance* of Twinning projects, per country. n = 222

When comparing the different countries included in this study, the data reflects some variance, as shown in Figure 3 above. Algeria stands out as having the highest mean average of *Democratic Governance*, followed by Egypt, Israel, Palestine, and Tunisia. Conversely, Jordan and Morocco show the lowest averages of *Democratic Governance*.

Projects implemented in Lebanon and Palestine show a lack of measures related to *Participation*, which is generally low across all partner countries. Conversely, Palestine shows a higher degree of *Accountability* in implemented projects, followed by Egypt, Algeria, and Israel. Algeria and Lebanon are the countries which invest in a higher degree of *Transparency*.




Figure 4: Average *Democratic Governance* of Twinning projects, per year. n = 222

Furthermore, considering the average *Democratic Governance* of implemented Twinning projects throughout time, the data reflects significant changes in EU external policy in the Southern Neighbourhood. Albeit showing an overall low average between 2004 and 2019, Figure 4 (above) reflects three distinct moments of EU democracy promotion in the Southern Neighbourhood. From 2004 to 2009, one can see a constant increase in the *Democratic Governance* substance of the implemented projects – reflecting the initial period of the ENP, marked by a positivist approach to good governance and institutional development (Cianciara, 2017, pp. 55-56).

After a sudden drop between 2009 and 2011 – likely due to the political instability brought by the Arab uprisings – this was followed by a policy shift in the EU’s approach towards the Mediterranean. For a short period following the Arab Spring (2011-2013), an emphasis was placed on the democratization of the Arab partner countries with support from the EU (Cianciara 2017, pp. 54-56). This can be seen in the sudden peak in the average *Democratic Governance* of implemented Twinning projects in 2012 – when it reached its highest average values. Nevertheless, as reflected in the graph, the fear that the difficult political transition processes in the Southern Neighbourhood would lead to increased instability led to a retracted democratisation strategy after this period, from 2012 to 2014 (Schumacher, 2015, pp. 382-88).

Between 2015 and 2016, the EU sought to reform its approach towards the Neighbourhood with the ENP review (2015) and the new EU Global Strategy (2016). These policy documents reflected a downgrading of expectations and an enforcement of a realist strategy towards the Mediterranean

region, with a lower emphasis on democratisation and value promotion (Furness et al., 2019, p. 449). The sudden decrease in *Democratic Governance* in the analysed projects between 2017 and 2019 is likely a reflection of this policy shift.




Figure 5: Average magnitude of independent variables, per policy sector. n = 222

Finally, considering the independent variables (*Political Adoption Costs, Commercial Interests, Security Interests, Strategic leverage, and Technical Complexity*) the data reflects some variations between sectors, as seen in Figure 5, above.

Projects in the Statistics, Energy and Finance, Economics and Health and Consumer protection sectors show a higher *Technical Complexity*, often requiring advanced technical expertise in econometrics, statistics, phytosanitary standards, and other technically complex subjects. Indeed, most projects across sectors tend to show some technical complexity, as partner countries make use of Technical Assistance programmes to provide advanced training and capacity-building to national policymakers.

Political adoption costs were higher in projects in the Finance and Economics and the Justice and Home Affairs sectors, where corruption risks and political interests are likely to be more present.

Adverse *commercial interests* (albeit generally low), on the other hand, were higher in the Standardisation and Certification and Health and Consumer Protection sectors, due to often conflicting interests regarding regulation and opening of local markets to EU competition. As expected, regional *security interests* were stronger in the Justice and Home Affairs sector.

Finally, the degree of *strategic leverage* between the EU and partner countries tended to be more favourable to the latter in projects in the Finance and Economics, Agriculture and Fisheries, Standardisation and Certification and Consumer protection sectors. This was often due to the impact of the Twinning projects in creating the necessary conditions for partner country access to the Common Market. Conversely, the position of *strategic leverage* tended to be favourable to partner countries in the Justice and Home Affairs sector, often reflecting broader regional security concerns.

The following sections present the main findings of the regression models testing the hypotheses that seek to account for the variance in the *Democratic Governance* levels, as well as the *Transparency*, *Accountability* and *Participation* levels in the Twinning projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood between 2004 and 2019.

Although all regression models showed statistically significant relationships with the dependent variables, only a few independent variables showed a robust and significant impact on the latter. Furthermore, the data often contrasted with the initial hypotheses presented in the literature (see Chapter 3).

Democratic Governance

When considering the *Democratic Governance* substance of the Twinning projects, the results show that the *Public Administration Capacity* of the partner country in the year of implementation, together with the *Political Adoption Costs* of the project, had a statistically significant relationship with the *Democratic Governance* level of the projects. Table 11 shows the results of the multinomial logistical regression, highlighting the variables with a statistically significant result.⁶

Table 11: Multinomial logistic regression results for the dependent variable *Democratic Governance*. n = 222

Democratic Governance Score ^a	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Medium Intercept	-16.561	<.001			

⁶ Because the statistical model for *Democratic Governance* did not confirm the assumption of existence of proportional odds, I employed a multinomial regression analysis to account for the impact of the independent variables on this dependent variable. For the detailed step-by-step multinomial logistic regression for *Democratic Governance*, please see Annex B.

Democratic Governance Score ^a	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)		
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Political Liberalisation	.577	.137	1.780	.833	3.805	
Public Administration Capacity	<u>-1.195</u>	<u>.012</u>	<u>.303</u>	<u>.119</u>	<u>.769</u>	
[Political Adoption Costs=0]	<u>-.725</u>	<u>.034</u>	<u>.484</u>	<u>.248</u>	<u>.947</u>	
[Political Adoption Costs=1] ^{0b}	
[Commercial Interests=0]	-.224	.643	.799	.310	2.060	
[Commercial Interests=1]	0 ^b	
[Security Interests=0]	16.464	.	14132429.834	14132429.834	14132429.834	
[Security Interests=1]	0 ^b	
[Strategic leverage=-1]	.839	1.000	2.314	.000	. ^c	
[Strategic leverage=0]	.247	.582	1.280	.532	3.083	
[Strategic leverage=1]	0 ^b	
[Technical Complexity=0]	-.071	.825	.932	.496	1.749	
[Technical Complexity=1]	0 ^b	
High	Intercept	-34.213	.997			
	Political Liberalisation	229.195	.940	3.451E+99	.000	. ^c
	Public Administration Capacity	-335.816	.942	1.435E-146	.000	. ^c
	[Political Adoption Costs=0]	-13.858	.982	9.588E-7	.000	. ^c
	[Political Adoption Costs=1] ^{0b}
	[Commercial Interests=0]	-76.090	.978	9.009E-34	.000	. ^c
	[Commercial Interests=1]	0 ^b
	[Security Interests=0]	9.420	.999	12327.681	.000	. ^c
	[Security Interests=1]	0 ^b
	[Strategic leverage=-1]	154.310	.991	1.038E+67	.000	. ^c
	[Strategic leverage=0]	3.918	.999	50.317	.000	. ^c
	[Strategic leverage=1]	0 ^b
	[Technical Complexity=0]	1.731	.999	5.647	.000	. ^c
	[Technical Complexity=1]	0 ^b

a. The reference category is: Low.

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

c. Floating point overflow occurred while computing this statistic. Its value is therefore set to system missing.

Projects that took place in a context of weaker *Public Administration Capacity* had higher odds of promoting a medium level of *Democratic Governance*, rather than low. These findings go against the previously proposed hypothesis (H2), according to which “*the greater the public administration’s capacity, the greater the Democratic Governance substance of the project*”, starting from the premise

that more capable public administrations would face lesser political costs and have greater material resources available to adapt to necessary reforms.

Conversely, the data shows that EU-sponsored Twinning projects in the Southern Neighbourhood tended to promote a higher substance of *Democratic Governance* norms in a context of weaker *public administration capacity*. This relationship can imply that the Twinning instrument is employed to create the conditions for transparent, accountable, and participative public institutions when these are weaker, rather than being used to reinforce those which already have a strong institutionalisation and more efficient procedures.

Furthermore, projects with high *political adoption costs* showed higher odds of having a medium *Democratic Governance level*, rather than low. These findings contrast with the proposed explanatory hypothesis for this variable (H3) – “*The greater the political adoption costs within a sector, the lower the Democratic Governance substance of the programme*” – which followed the premise that in sectors where policy reforms would lead to greater political adoption costs a stronger interference and veto actions from domestic elites were to be expected, as these would perceive the attempted transfer of Democratic Governance norms as threatening.

The positive correlation between these variables may suggest that policy sectors prone to having higher *political adoption costs* are more in need of democratizing reforms, an argument also put forward by the conclusions of Panchuk et al. (2017) in their analysis of the Twinning projects implemented in the Eastern Neighbourhood. In this sense, it seems that Twinning’s role in the democratisation of partner countries is stronger in sectors where corruption and political interference are higher. This may signify that the EU utilises this instrument to promote more democratic policy practices with an emphasis on promoting best practices in sectors where these are more costly but also more impactful, rather than promoting Democratic Governance norms in peripheric and depoliticised sectors. Nevertheless, these findings must be approached with caution, as the analysis is limited to the formulation of policy interventions in the Twinning fiches, and does not show the actual outcome of these projects during their implementation phase. While I develop on this further below, this entails that partner countries may knowingly accept the EU’s intention of promoting *Democratic Governance* norms in technical assistance projects while being confident that they will not necessarily have to implement them, thus safeguarding their own interests.

When considering the sub-components of *Democratic Governance*, the data also counters some of the previously proposed explanatory hypotheses. Nevertheless, few of the proposed independent variables account for variations in the *Transparency, Accountability and Participation* substance of the analysed Twinning projects.

Transparency

The regression results indicate that the projects' *technical complexity* and the *public administration capacity* of the beneficiary country in the project year have a statistically significant influence on the project's *Transparency* measures, as seen in Table 12 below.⁷

Table 12: Ordinal logistic regression results for the dependent variable *Transparency*. n = 222

Parameter	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
				Lower	Upper
[Political Adoption Costs=0]	-.212	.575	.809	.385	1.697
[Political Adoption Costs=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Commercial Interests=0]	-.526	.280	.591	.228	1.534
[Commercial Interests=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Security Interests=0]	20.760	.999	1037039352.485	.000	. ^a
[Security Interests=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Strategic leverage=-1]	1.202	1.000	3.328	.000	. ^a
[Strategic leverage=0]	-.076	.862	.927	.393	2.184
[Strategic leverage=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Technical Complexity=0]	-.965	.009	.381	.186	.782
[Technical Complexity=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
Political Liberalisation	.639	.137	1.894	.816	4.398
Public Administration Capacity	-1.363	.012	.256	.088	.739
(Scale)	1 ^b				

a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.

b. Fixed at the displayed value.

Projects with low *technical complexity* showed lower odds of having a higher *transparency* level. In other words, projects with higher *technical complexity* show higher odds of having a higher *transparency* level. These findings thus contradict my initial hypothesis, based on the premise that higher *technical complexity* would deter open access to information, as this would be limited to actors and individuals with high expertise. Contrarily, these results suggest that technically complex projects have higher odds of investing in open access to information (albeit sometimes still limited). This can be explained by the high *transparency* levels in the Statistics sector, as shown in Figure 1, as well as the emphasis on transparency measures in projects that focused on consumer protection and regulatory control. The openness of policymakers to share technically complex information may come from the fact that, despite being open to the public, the shared information is unlikely to be

⁷ For the detailed step-by-step ordinal logistic regression, including verified assumptions, for *Transparency*, please see Annex B.

understood by all, and thus is perceived as non-threatening because technically complex issues are often depoliticized and inaccessible to the general public.

Furthermore, the regression results have shown that Twinning projects taking place in a context of lower *public administration capacity* had higher odds of having more effective *transparency* measures. Following the general conclusions on the relationship between this variable and the substance of *Democratic Governance*, as mentioned above, this suggests that the EU invests more in the implementation of *transparency* measures in projects taking place in a context of weaker *public administration capacity*, making up for the lack of such practices. In this way, by investing in the transparency of policy measures and public institutions, the analysed Twinning projects are contributing to both reinforcing public trust in public administrations, as well as forcing the latter to improve decisions to meet constituents' demands and expectations – thus expectedly contributing to an improvement in good and democratic governance.

Accountability

Concerning *Accountability* measures, the regression results show that the presence of high *political adoption costs* and the degree of *strategic leverage* between the EU and the partner country have a statistically significant influence in this dependent variable, as seen in table 13 below.⁸

Table 13: Ordinal logistic regression results for the dependent variable *Accountability*. n = 222

Parameter	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
				Lower	Upper
[Political Adoption Costs=0]	<u>-1.720</u>	<u><.001</u>	<u>.179</u>	<u>.091</u>	<u>.353</u>
[Political Adoption Costs=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Commercial Interests=0]	-.077	.869	.926	.371	2.315
[Commercial Interests=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Security Interests=0]	1.942	.111	6.976	.639	76.164
[Security Interests=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Strategic leverage=-1]	-.382	.833	.683	.020	23.792
[Strategic leverage=0]	<u>-.948</u>	<u>.014</u>	<u>.388</u>	<u>.182</u>	<u>.827</u>
[Strategic leverage=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Technical Complexity=0]	.030	.919	1.030	.581	1.825
[Technical Complexity=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
Political Liberalisation	.599	.062	1.821	.971	3.413
Public Administration Capacity	-.671	.073	.511	.245	1.066
Scale	1 ^b				

a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. / b. Fixed at the displayed value.

⁸ For the detailed step-by-step ordinal logistic regression, including verified assumptions, for *Accountability*, please see Annex B.

Projects with high *political adoption costs* showed higher odds of having a higher *accountability* level. This suggests – similar to the positive correlation between this variable and the projects’ *Democratic Governance* substance – that the EU supports the development of more efficient accountability frameworks in policy sectors where political interference and corruption risks are higher, thus aiming to reduce malpractices and improve the overall quality of policymaking in Southern Neighbourhood countries. Similarly, this suggests that partner countries may have an interest in investing in stronger (internal) *accountability* measures in sectors where the efficiency of public institutions and public policies is hindered by corruption and strong interference by political actors at various levels of decision-making. Nevertheless, as with the conclusions on *Democratic Governance*, this data must be approached with caution, as it does not show a guaranteed application of proposed *accountability* frameworks in the implementation phase of Twinning projects.

Furthermore, projects which show a degree of *strategic leverage* favourable to the EU show higher odds of having higher *accountability* levels, when compared with projects which show no possibility of *strategic leverage* between the EU and partner countries. This further suggests that the EU makes use of its strategic upper hand – mostly in economic terms, when considering the access of partner countries’ products to the Common Market – to support the reinforcement of *accountability* measures. This not only allows for the proper adoption and implementation of the EU *acquis* and regulatory frameworks, but also ensures that partner countries are more reliable when meeting their responsibilities towards the EU.

Participation

Finally, the regression analysis results showed that *technical complexity* has a marginal statistically significant influence on the *Participation* norms of the analysed Twinning projects, as seen in table 14 below.⁹

Table 14: Ordinal logistic regression results for the dependent variable *Participation*. n = 222

Parameter	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
				Lower	Upper
[Political Adoption Costs=0]	.129	.752	1.137	.513	2.523
[Political Adoption Costs=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Commercial Interests=0]	.115	.847	1.121	.350	3.589
[Commercial Interests=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Security Interests=0]	20.397	.999	721506997.772	.000	. ^c

⁹ For the detailed step-by-step ordinal logistic regression, including verified assumptions, for *Participation*, please see Annex B.

[Security Interests=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Strategic leverage=-1]	.997	1.000	2.709	.000	. ^c
[Strategic leverage=0]	1.366	.076	3.921	.867	17.725
[Strategic leverage=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
[Technical Complexity=0]	<u>.720</u>	<u>.053</u>	<u>2.055</u>	<u>.990</u>	<u>4.267</u>
[Technical Complexity=1]	0 ^a	.	1	.	.
Political Liberalisation	.393	.332	1.481	.670	3.274
Public Administration Capacity	-.457	.348	.633	.243	1.646
(Scale)	1 ^b				

a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.

b. Fixed at the displayed value.

c. Set to system missing due to overflow

These findings suggest that projects with low *technical complexity* have higher odds of having a higher *participation* level. Contrarily to the positive relationship between this independent variable and the *transparency* of Twinning projects, this entails that the projects with lower *technical complexity* are more accessible to broader society and include measures guaranteeing external participation (albeit overall limited) in decision-making. Considering the findings concerning the *Transparency* of analysed Twinning projects, the data thus shows that while policymakers may invest in more transparent policymaking in technically complex sectors, this does not entail a similar focus on external *participation* in decision-making. Rather, as argued also by Panchuk et al. (2017, p. 1058) in their analysis in the East Neighbourhood, “policy sectors requiring advanced scientific [and technical] expertise are not normally open to inputs from the general public”, despite including norms that advocate for sharing information on decision-making. In this sense, a clear gap exists between the availability of information and the power of those who, while gaining access to it, cannot effectively contribute to decision-making.

CHAPTER 7

Discussion and Conclusions

Europeanisation research – as an important branch of EU and policy studies – focuses on understanding “if and how the EU has changed representation, *governance and public policy* in the Member-States and *beyond*” (Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2010, p. 189; emphasis added). Focusing on the beyond, scholars of external Europeanisation have sought to understand the scope conditions that define the Europeanisation of EU partner countries.

Eschewing an understanding of Europeanisation as a means of plain one-sided diffusion of EU norms, values and policies, several scholars have proposed intertwining scope conditions to better understand its differentiated outcomes. As Celata and Coletti summarise (2019, p. 11), “Europeanization is always incomplete and selective insofar as internal and external pressures combine and produce mixed and differential outcomes”.

These pressures – also referred to as scope conditions or mediating factors – are often related to the characteristics of recipient actors, such as regime type or domestic costs of compliance. Nonetheless, analyses often refer to interrelated scope conditions, of both senders and receivers, such as the (a)symmetry of the relationship between the EU and the partner country, the nature of European strategic interests, among others (Catalano and Graziano, 2016, p. 366).

For scholars of external Europeanisation, the European Neighbourhood Policy has proved to be a promising case study for understanding the EU’s limited and partial efforts of external Europeanisation. External Europeanisation in the Neighbourhood is often perceived as generically weak, due to the great institutional misfit between EU forms and partner interests, with high adoption costs and weak domestic reform coalitions (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 22).

Despite this scepticism, some authors have sought to better understand the scope conditions and outcomes of the EU’s Europeanisation efforts in the Neighbourhood, through an analytical focus on the potential of EU technical cooperation efforts. Concretely, scholars of Democratic Governance have set themselves to analyse an alternative level of norm promotion through technical policy-driven cooperation, which capitalises on material support, capacity-building, and socialisation. For them, “the intensifying web of association relations between the EU and associated third countries introduces a new form of democracy [and norms] promotion through sectoral cooperation” (Schimmelfennig, 2015, pp. 21-23).

For students of Democratic Governance promotion, a sectoral approach to Europeanisation and policy cooperation helps to explain the selective and partial transfer of EU norms in the Neighbourhood

through a decentred analysis of sectoral scope conditions, while surpassing the general scepticism in the Neighbourhood Europeanisation literature. Notwithstanding the existence of structural pre-conditions - such as regime type or degree of statehood of a partner country – Democratic Governance scholars argue that most scope conditions have some degree of sectoral differentiation. Existing research has proposed several factors, such as the existence or absence of political, commercial, and strategic adoption costs in each policy sector, as well as the degree of strategic leverage between the EU and partner countries on a particular cooperation topic and, finally, the technical complexity of each policy field to account for the differentiated impact of Europe.

This thesis has sought to contribute to the Democratic Governance and external Europeanisation literatures by analysing the impact of a set of pre-selected scope conditions in the promotion of *Democratic Governance* through a functional cooperation programme – the Twinning instrument – in the Southern Neighbourhood. Considering a set of contextual and sectoral scope conditions – namely, *political liberalisation, public administration capacity, political adoption costs, commercial interests, security interests, strategic leverage* and *technical complexity* – I have implemented a qualitative-quantitative research model to try and answer two research questions: (1) to what extent do norms of *Democratic Governance* appear in EU Twinning projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood?; and (2) what scope conditions account for the differences in the presence of *Democratic Governance* norms across these projects?

This research project comprised a content analysis of 222 Twinning fiches from projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood countries between 2004 and 2019. Through a set of regression models, I have reached a set of conclusions with an important impact for Democratic Governance and Europeanisation research.

First, the content analysis of the implemented Twinning projects shows a generally low level of *Democratic Governance* being promoted in the Southern Neighbourhood. While the analysed projects show a very low presence of *Participation* and *Transparency* norms, *Accountability* shows a more significant, yet reduced, presence. This entails that the EU and neighbouring countries are more open to use this programme to improve the internal management and accountability frameworks in beneficiary institutions, rather than promoting more transparent or participative decision-making. This implies a primacy of depoliticised concerns with public sector efficiency and efficacy, often connected with notions of good governance, rather than democratic governance.

When considering the time variance between projects, the data indicates that *Democratic Governance* promotion efforts have changed between 2004 and 2019, following broader EU policy shifts. Indeed, *Democratic Governance* levels were higher in a short moment after the Arab Spring (2011-2013), reflecting the EU's strong emphasis on democratisation of its Mediterranean partners after these events. More recently, after 2017, *Democratic Governance* levels have reduced

consistently, possibly reflecting a more realist and “geopolitical” EU, which no longer places values promotion at the forefront of its external policy.

Now turning to the explanatory potential of the indicated scope conditions, the regression results have shown that, contrary to the expectations, weak *public administration capacity* and the presence of high *political adoption costs* increase the odds of a Twinning project promoting *Democratic Governance* in the Southern Neighbourhood.

These findings may imply that the EU makes use of the Twinning instrument to promote the conditions for more democratic public institutions in contexts where these are weak and lack efficient, transparent, accountable, and participative frameworks. Furthermore, this further entails that the EU uses this instrument to promote more democratic policy practices in sectors where these are more costly – rather than doing so in more neutral policy areas – against existing political interference and corruption risks.

Projects taking place in weaker *public administrations* were also most prone to having higher *transparency* levels, thus reinforcing the conclusion that the EU aims to make up for the lack of such practices in weaker institutions, rather than promoting these in contexts where they are already present.

The presence of higher *political adoption costs* also entailed higher *accountability* levels, contrary to the general understanding in the literature. This may suggest not only that the EU supports better accountability frameworks in policy sectors with higher political interference and corruption risks, but also that partner countries may support such measures when institutional capacity and efficiency is hindered by these factors. However, as projects showing a degree of *strategic leverage* favourable to the EU had higher odds of investing in *accountability* measures, we can assume that the increase in accountability is more the outcome of the EU’s capitalisation of its strategic upper hand than a form of norm entrepreneurship from partner countries.

Indeed, the motivation of partner countries to implement *Democratic Governance* measures is not evident in the Twinning fiches. These results must thus be approached with caution, as they do not necessarily entail the actual implementation of *Democratic Governance* measures. Rather, they signal that, on the one hand, the EU does not refrain from promoting such norms in sectors where they are more polemic, and, on the other, that partner countries are comfortable with having such norms present in these documents, while not necessarily guaranteeing that they will be implemented afterwards. Drawing on this, future research ought to focus on the implementation of these Twinning projects to analyse the differences between the formulation and implementation phases and better understand to what extent the presence of *Democratic Governance* norms implies a significant effort of democratisation on behalf of the EU and, most importantly, partner country authorities.

Finally, the data has shown that the odds of having higher *transparency* levels are stronger in projects of higher *technical complexity* – this may be explained by the high transparency levels in the statistics sector, as well as the emphasis on transparency in consumer protection and regulatory projects, usually to meet EU market access criteria. Conversely, higher levels of *technical complexity* decreased the odds of external *participation* in Twinning projects and public decision-making. These findings suggest – as also pointed out by Pancuk et al. (2017, p. 1058) in their analysis of Twinning projects implemented in the Eastern Neighbourhood – that a clear gap exists between the availability of information to external actors and the possibility of their active and effective participation in decision-making.

In the process of testing the proposed hypotheses, this research model has shown that most scope conditions proposed in the literature have no statistically significant relationship with the *Democratic Governance* (and its sub-components) of Twinning projects implemented in the Southern Neighbourhood. Hypotheses considering the *political liberalisation* of partner countries, the existence or absence of *commercial and security interests* were rejected by this research model, which has not found a statistically significant relationship between these independent variables and the *Democratic Governance* (and its sub-components) in analysed projects. Nevertheless, the findings on the implications of *public administration capacity* and *political adoption costs*, as well as *strategic leverage* and *technical complexity*, offer several policy-relevant implications.

On the one hand, this research project has shown that EU Technical Assistance projects can have an impact on the democratisation of policy practices, albeit limited, in the Southern Neighbourhood. On the other, my findings indicate that the EU actively seeks to promote a certain degree of democratic policymaking in its Southern partner countries. Particularly, the fact that it does so when political adoption costs are higher and institutions weaker can serve to counter more sceptical analysts of EU democratisation efforts in the Neighbourhood.

Nonetheless, to further study these findings, two main research dimensions deserve a significant investment. First, understanding that this study as focused on the *intended* transfer of *Democratic Governance* norms, future research must focus on the implementation of the selected Twinning projects. An understanding of the actual mid to long-term outcomes of implemented programmes will allow Democratic Governance researchers to understand to what extent these scope conditions influence the *actual* development of democratic governance policy practices in Southern Neighbourhood countries. Second, several mediating factors and scope conditions remain under-researched in the literature and have not received due attention in this research project. These are, for example, the role played by Civil Servants and policy experts – both from the EU and partner country's side – in defining the guidelines and outcomes of Twinning projects.

Finally, by complementing Panchuk et al.'s (2017) study on the Twinning programme in the Eastern Neighbourhood, this research project has opened new paths for comparative analyses between both regions, which can provide more overarching conclusions on the EU's democratisation efforts in the Neighbourhood. While some methodological differences have not permitted a direct comparison between both studies, this remains a possibility to be developed in the near future.

Overall, this thesis has shown that the Twinning instrument, albeit in a limited and timid manner, serves to promote Democratic Governance norms in policymaking in the Southern Neighbourhood. Contrary to the literature, my findings suggest that the EU actively promotes some degree of democratic policymaking in contexts of high political adoption costs and weak institutions. Future research is essential to further tackle the general scepticism in the Neighbourhood Europeanisation literature and improve our understanding of the democratisation potential of functional cooperation. Hopefully, this can have relevant policy implications in the future, by showing that more decentralised and policy-focused democratisation efforts can have a lasting impact in the overall democratisation in the Southern Mediterranean.

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Example of a Twinning fiche analysis

This section presents the qualitative analysis of a Twinning fiche, providing an example of the analytical framework employed in this thesis, following the operationalisation methodology and hypotheses defined in Chapter 5.

To illustrate the application of the coding matrices from tables 2 to 10 (and following the methodological framework first developed by Panchuk et al., 2017), I analyse the Twinning project “Support for the implementation of a quality management system within Vegetal Protection and Technical Controls (*sic*) Services” (European Commission 2018), implemented in the Algerian Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries, between 2018 and 2020. This project’s main objective was to reinforce quality control of vegetables produced in the Algerian market to facilitate their export to the EU.

Through a qualitative analysis of the project’s “fiche”, I conclude that this project has a medium magnitude of democratic governance, with a point average of 0.67, following the coding matrix presented in table 10.

First, this project considers a low level of Transparency (Transparency = 0), with no references being made to instruments or actions for information sharing with actors external to the Algerian public administration.

Second, in terms of Accountability, this project shows a medium level (Accountability = 1). While the project plans the creation of internal structures for the accountability of public servants (in this case, sanitary inspectors), responsible for quality control, it does not consider any form of external accountability from actors external to the Algerian public administration body.

Finally, the presence of Participation norms in this project is medium (Participation = 1). Even though the project invites external actors to participate in activities throughout the implementation of the Twinning project, it does not consider future external participation or input in the day-to-day activities of the institution.

As for the independent variables, and first considering the variable “political liberalisation” (or regime type), this project scored a value of -0.98 in the World Bank’s “Voice and Accountability” Index, referring to Algeria’s values in 2018. As for the “public administration capacity”, for the same year, Algeria shows a value of -0,44.

The objectives set forward in this project – to improve quality control of Algerian produced vegetables to improve their export to European markets – are not considered “politicised” (Political adoption costs = 0, see table 2). On the contrary, the Algerian National Government has incentivised the diversification, liberalisation, and modernisation of this sector, which contributes to 12.3% of the

country's GDP (in 2018) and employs 20% of the population in rural areas (International Trade Administration, 2021).

Furthermore, as Agriculture is a competitive sector for both the EU and Algeria, which seek to export their own products between each other, this project can expose commercial conflicts of interest between both parties, as it facilitates Algerian exports while this partner country has established rigid import limitations to ensure the sector's resilience to external (European) competition (International Trade Administration, 2021). In other words, by facilitating food exports from Algeria while EU exports are limited by import limitations, this project's objectives create a commercial conflict of interest (Commercial adoption costs = 1).

Considering strategic interests, this project does not fit into any strategic or security considerations on behalf of the EU (Security Interests = 0).

Despite the presence of a commercial conflict of interest, when considering the strategic leverage between both partners, the EU has the strategic upper hand, as this project implements a reform that improves Algerian food exports and access to the European market. While this measure is favourable to the Algerian National Government, as part of its competitiveness strategy, market access is dependent on EU rules and interests (In favour of the EU = 1)

Finally, this project has a high technical complexity, as it is necessary to have specialised knowledge to understand food quality control regulations, phytosanitary policies, and instruments (Technical complexity = 1).

ANNEX B

Regression Results

B.1. Collinearity results

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Coefficients			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.372	.066		5.662	<.001		
	Political Liberalisation	.171	.072	.175	2.370	.019	.778	1.285
	Public Administration Capacity	-.244	.083	-.218	-2.946	.004	.776	1.288
	Political Adoption Costs	.166	.073	.154	2.279	.024	.928	1.077
	Commercial Interests	.034	.104	.022	.329	.742	.973	1.028
	Security Interests	-.370	.178	-.143	-2.077	.039	.895	1.117
	Interdependence	-.055	.087	-.046	-.629	.530	.785	1.274
	Technical Complexity	-.012	.066	-.013	-.184	.854	.901	1.109

a. Dependent Variable: Democratic Governance Score

B.2. Ordinal Regression for Variable "Accountability"

Model Fitting Information

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	351.889			
Final	313.448	38.441	8	<.001

Link function: Logit.

Test of Parallel Lines^a

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Null Hypothesis	313.448			
General	302.898	10.550	8	.229

The null hypothesis states that the location parameters (slope coefficients) are the same across response categories.

a. Link function: Logit.

Omnibus Test^a

Likelihood Ratio	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
	38.441	8	<.001

Dependent Variable: Accountability

Model: (Threshold), Political Adoption Costs, Commercial Interests, Security Interests, Interdependence, Technical Complexity, Political Liberalisation, Public Administration Capacity^a

a. Compares the fitted model against the thresholds-only model.

Tests of Model Effects

Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Political Adoption Costs	24.565	1	<u><.001</u>
Commercial Interests	.027	1	.869
Security Interests	2.537	1	.111
Interdependence	6.152	2	<u>.046</u>
Technical Complexity	.010	1	.919
Political Liberalisation	3.495	1	.062
Public Administration Capacity	3.204	1	.073

Dependent Variable: Accountability

Model: (Threshold), Political Adoption Costs, Commercial Interests, Security Interests, Interdependence, Technical Complexity, Political Liberalisation, Public Administration Capacity

Parameter Estimates

Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)			
			Lower	Upper	Wald Square	Chi-df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper	
Threshold	[Accountability=0]	-.896	1.3940	-3.628	1.837	.413	1	.521	.408	.027	6.275
	[Accountability=1]	2.461	1.4052	-.293	5.215	3.068	1	.080	11.719	.746	184.084
[Political Adoption Costs=0]	<u>-1.720</u>	.3471	-2.400	-1.040	24.565	1	<u><.001</u>	<u>.179</u>	<u>.091</u>	<u>.353</u>	
[Political Adoption Costs=1]	0 ^a	1	.	.	
[Commercial Interests=0]	-.077	.4674	-.993	.839	.027	1	.869	.926	.371	2.315	
[Commercial Interests=1]	0 ^a	1	.	.	
[Security Interests=0]	1.942	1.2196	-.448	4.333	2.537	1	.111	6.976	.639	76.164	
[Security Interests=1]	0 ^a	1	.	.	
[Interdependence=-1]	-.382	1.8118	-3.933	3.169	.044	1	.833	.683	.020	23.792	
[Interdependence=0]	<u>-.948</u>	.3866	-1.706	-.190	6.010	1	<u>.014</u>	<u>.388</u>	<u>.182</u>	<u>.827</u>	
[Interdependence=1]	0 ^a	1	.	.	

[Technical Complexity=0]	.030	.2918	-.542	.602	.010	1	.919	1.030	.581	1.825
[Technical Complexity=1]	0 ^a	1	.	.
Political Liberalisation	.599	.3206	-.029	1.228	3.495	1	.062	1.821	.971	3.413
Public Administration Capacity	-.671	.3750	-1.406	.064	3.204	1	.073	.511	.245	1.066
(Scale)	1 ^b									

Dependent Variable: Accountability

Model: (Threshold), Political Adoption Costs, Commercial Interests, Security Interests, Interdependence, Technical Complexity, Political Liberalisation, Public Administration Capacity

a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.

b. Fixed at the displayed value.

B.3. Ordinal Regression for Variable "Participation"

Model Fitting Information

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	226.918			
Final	211.626	15.292	8	.054

Link function: Logit.

Test of Parallel Lines^a

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Null Hypothesis	211.626			
General	196.754	14.872	8	.062

The null hypothesis states that the location parameters (slope coefficients) are the same across response categories.

a. Link function: Logit.

Omnibus Test^a

Likelihood Ratio	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
	15.292	8	.054

Dependent Variable: Participation

Model: (Threshold), Political Adoption Costs, Commercial Interests, Security Interests, Interdependence, Technical Complexity, Political Liberalisation, Public Administration Capacity^a

a. Compares the fitted model against the thresholds-only model.

Parameter Estimates

Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)		
			Lower	Upper	Wald Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper	
Threshold	[Participation=0]	23.479	26478.1425	-51872.727	51919.684	.000	1	.999	15727084539.129	.000	. ^a
	[Participation=1]	24.762	26478.1426	-51871.444	51920.968	.000	1	.999	56745128732.087	.000	. ^a
[Political Adoption Costs=0]	.129	.4066	-.668	.925	.100	1	.752	1.137	.513	2.523	
[Political Adoption Costs=1]	0 ^b	1	.	.	
[Commercial Interests=0]	.115	.5936	-1.049	1.278	.037	1	.847	1.121	.350	3.589	
[Commercial Interests=1]	0 ^b	1	.	.	
[Security Interests=0]	20.397	26478.1425	-51875.809	51916.603	.000	1	.999	721506997.772	.000	. ^a	

[Security Interests=1]	0 ^b	1	.	.
[Interdependence=-1]	.997	38327.2511	-75119.035	75121.028	.000	1	1.000	2.709	.000	. ^a
[Interdependence=0]	1.366	.7697	-.142	2.875	3.152	1	.076	3.921	.867	17.725
[Interdependence=1]	0 ^b	1	.	.
[Technical Complexity=0]	.720	.3727	-.010	1.451	3.735	1	.053	2.055	.990	4.267
[Technical Complexity=1]	0 ^b	1	.	.
Political Liberalisation	.393	.4047	-.400	1.186	.942	1	.332	1.481	.670	3.274
Public Administration Capacity	-.457	.4875	-1.413	.498	.880	1	.348	.633	.243	1.646
(Scale)	1 ^c									

Dependent Variable: Participation

Model: (Threshold), Political Adoption Costs, Commercial Interests, Security Interests, Interdependence, Technical Complexity, Political Liberalisation, Public Administration Capacity

- a. Set to system missing due to overflow
- b. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.
- c. Fixed at the displayed value.

B.4. Ordinal Regression for variable “Transparency”

Model Fitting Information

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	275.540			
Final	253.330	22.210	8	.005

Link function: Logit.

Test of Parallel Lines^a

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Null Hypothesis	253.330			
General	250.819	2.512	8	.961

The null hypothesis states that the location parameters (slope coefficients) are the same across response categories.

a. Link function: Logit.

Omnibus Test^a

Likelihood Ratio	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
	22.210	8	.005

Dependent Variable: Transparency

Model: (Threshold), Political Adoption Costs, Commercial Interests, Security Interests, Interdependence, Technical Complexity, Political Liberalisation, Public Administration Capacity^a

a. Compares the fitted model against the thresholds-only model.

Parameter Estimates

Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)		
			Lower	Upper	Wald Square	Chi-df	Sig.		Lower	Upper	
Threshold	[Transparency=0]	20.697	24490.6682	-47980.131	48021.524	.000	1	.999	973960788.257	.000	^a
	[Transparency=1]	22.277	24490.6682	-47978.550	48023.105	.000	1	.999	4730319092.648	.000	^a
[Political Adoption Costs=0]	-.212	.3783	-.954	.529	.315	1	.575	.809	.385	1.697	
[Political Adoption Costs=1]	0 ^b	1	.	.	
[Commercial Interests=0]	-.526	.4869	-1.481	.428	1.168	1	.280	.591	.228	1.534	
[Commercial Interests=1]	0 ^b	1	.	.	
[Security Interests=0]	20.760	24490.6682	-47980.068	48021.587	.000	1	.999	1037039352.485	.000	^a	
[Security Interests=1]	0 ^b	1	.	.	

[Interdependence=-1]	1.202	34494.1129	-67606.017	67608.421	.000	1	1.000	3.328	.000	. ^a
[Interdependence=0]	-.076	.4375	-.934	.781	.030	1	.862	.927	.393	2.184
[Interdependence=1]	0 ^b	1	.	.
[Technical Complexity=0]	<u>-.965</u>	.3669	-1.685	-.246	6.922	1	<u>.009</u>	<u>.381</u>	<u>.186</u>	<u>.782</u>
[Technical Complexity=1]	0 ^b	1	.	.
Political Liberalisation	.639	.4298	-.204	1.481	2.209	1	.137	1.894	.816	4.398
Public Administration Capacity	-1.363	.5415	-2.425	-.302	6.339	1	.012	.256	.088	.739
(Scale)	1 ^c									

Dependent Variable: Transparency

Model: (Threshold), Political Adoption Costs, Commercial Interests, Security Interests, Interdependence, Technical Complexity, Political Liberalisation, Public Administration Capacity

a. Set to system missing due to overflow

b. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.

c. Fixed at the displayed value.

B.5. Multinomial Regression for “Democratic Governance”

Model Fitting Information

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	253.627			
Final	230.748	22.880	8	.004

Link function: Logit.

Test of Parallel Lines^a

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Null Hypothesis	230.748			
General	.000 ^b	230.748	8	<.001

The null hypothesis states that the location parameters (slope coefficients) are the same across response categories.

- Link function: Logit.
- The log-likelihood value is practically zero. There may be a complete separation in the data. The maximum likelihood estimates do not exist.

Model Fitting Information

Model	Model Fitting Criteria	Likelihood Ratio Tests

	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	253.627			
Final	214.736	38.891	16	.001

Parameter Estimates

Democratic Governance Score ^a		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
								Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Medium	Intercept	-16.561	.735	507.962	1	<.001			
	Political Liberalisation	.577	.388	2.212	1	.137	1.780	.833	3.805
	Public Administration Capacity	<u>-1.195</u>	.476	6.314	1	<u>.012</u>	<u>.303</u>	<u>.119</u>	<u>.769</u>
	[Political Adoption Costs=0]	<u>-.725</u>	.342	4.497	1	<u>.034</u>	<u>.484</u>	<u>.248</u>	<u>.947</u>
	[Political Adoption Costs=1]	0 ^b	.	.	0
	[Commercial Interests=0]	-.224	.483	.215	1	.643	.799	.310	2.060
	[Commercial Interests=1]	0 ^b	.	.	0
	[Security Interests=0]	16.464	.000	.	1	.	14132429.834	14132429.834	14132429.834
	[Security Interests=1]	0 ^b	.	.	0
	[Interdependence=-1]	.839	2273.997	.000	1	1.000	2.314	.000	. ^c
	[Interdependence=0]	.247	.448	.304	1	.582	1.280	.532	3.083
	[Interdependence=1]	0 ^b	.	.	0

	[Technical Complexity=0]	-.071	.321	.049	1	.825	.932	.496	1.749
	[Technical Complexity=1]	0 ^b	.	.	0
High	Intercept	-34.213	9758.710	.000	1	.997			
	Political Liberalisation	229.195	3057.650	.006	1	.940	3.451E+99	.000	. ^c
	Public Administration Capacity	-335.816	4610.443	.005	1	.942	1.435E-146	.000	. ^c
	[Political Adoption Costs=0]	-13.858	614.409	.001	1	.982	9.588E-7	.000	. ^c
	[Political Adoption Costs=1]	0 ^b	.	.	0
	[Commercial Interests=0]	-76.090	2711.793	.001	1	.978	9.009E-34	.000	. ^c
	[Commercial Interests=1]	0 ^b	.	.	0
	[Security Interests=0]	9.420	8935.493	.000	1	.999	12327.681	.000	. ^c
	[Security Interests=1]	0 ^b	.	.	0
	[Interdependence=-1]	154.310	13646.623	.000	1	.991	1.038E+67	.000	. ^c
	[Interdependence=0]	3.918	2441.044	.000	1	.999	50.317	.000	. ^c
	[Interdependence=1]	0 ^b	.	.	0
	[Technical Complexity=0]	1.731	1601.742	.000	1	.999	5.647	.000	. ^c
	[Technical Complexity=1]	0 ^b	.	.	0

a. The reference category is: Low.

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

c. Floating point overflow occurred while computing this statistic. Its value is therefore set to system missing.

Content analysis of Twinning fiches, per country

C.1. Algeria

Project	Transparency	Accountability	Participation	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7
DZ-2009-01 Objectives: Improve effectiveness of taxation system and relationship between taxpayers and public administration.	1 This project encourages free access and sharing of information on taxes, to promote greater confidence among taxpayers and reduce fiscal evasion and fraud. However, it does not encourage sharing of information related to decision-making.	2 Project encourages the creation of more effective channels for complaints on behalf of taxpayers, as well as a more effective structure of internal accountability, to prevent a sense of arbitrariness on behalf of taxpayers.	1 Project provides little space for feedback from external actors. One conference is organized with external actors (such as lawyers and accountants) but with little room for constructive feedback. Questionnaires are to be delivered to taxpayers with some room for constructive feedback.	1 While this project fits with the National Government's objective of promoting economic competitiveness through an effective tax structure (Mahtout and Oukaci, 2020, p. 66), it has high political adoption costs, considering the high corruption risk in the Algerian tax administration, especially between tax officials and taxpayers (GAN 2020a).	0 Project objectives are unlikely to directly expose commercial conflicts of interest between the EU and Algeria.	0 Security-related interests are non-existent in the tax policy sector.	0 There is no relationship of interdependence in this sector, as tax policy is an exclusively national policy area.	1 Understanding tax policy requires an advanced technical and legal knowledge in its daily functioning.

<p>DZ-2009-02</p> <p>Objectives: Ensure Algerian industry products (particularly construction and electric materials) comply with EU regulations to increase their export.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project plans information and sensibilisation seminars with relevant actors from the industry sector (such as trade unions, companies, and patronage associations). However, it does not foresee open access to information of day-to-day activities of the ministry.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>This project considers the development of internal accountability structures to ensure proper adaptation and application of EU industry regulations. However, it does not consider any form of external accountability, for example, from trade unions or patronage associations.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>This project does not encourage any kind of participation from external actors in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose political conflicts of interest, as this project fits with the National Government's strategy of trade liberalisation and export of national goods. According to the literature, economic liberalisation efforts are understood as strategies aimed at keeping the regime in place (see Bustos 2003).</p>	<p>1</p> <p>There is a high chance of adverse economic interests, as national economic actors may oppose strong top-down external regulations, despite the possible positive outcomes with an increase in exports.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Security-related interests are not present in this policy sector.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>As this project increases Algerian access to the European market for exports, the EU has the strategic upper hand.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Industrial and trade regulations require advanced technical and legal knowledge in their daily functioning.</p>
<p>DZ-2009-03</p> <p>Objectives: Improve water safety and quality in Algeria through better monitoring and problem-solving.</p>	<p>2</p> <p>This project foresees open access to information on water quality, including regular</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in stronger internal accountability mechanisms, with internal sharing of information regarding water</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee any kind of participation during project activities or everyday activities of the Algerian Water</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Political adoption costs are non-existent. As of 2009, water resources were managed entirely by the State (Fanack</p>	<p>0</p> <p>As the water sector was (mostly) state-owned in 2009, and this project does not foresee any form of</p>	<p>0</p> <p>While lack of quality access to water can bring about security concerns, this was not a pressing issue at the time in Algeria (Fanack Water 2021a).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>This project does not fit into strategic interdependence considerations between the EU and Algeria.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Water quality management requires advanced technical and scientific knowledge.</p>

	updates on water quality and warning calls in case of emergencies.	quality and proposed solutions to ensure water safety to capitalise on internal experience.	Management Institute.	Water 2021a), which has strong interest in ensuring water quality and public safety, as health crises and lack of access to water can increase public discontent.	sector liberalisation , commercial adversity is non-existent.			
DZ-2010-01 Objectives: Promote Algerian Arts & Crafts sector through a new database and professional training of artisans.	1 Project foresees open access to statistics about the Arts & Crafts sector but does not include information on the functioning of the public bodies responsible for this sector.	0 This project does not foresee any form of internal or external accountability.	0 Relevant actors (artisans) from the sector were not actively involved in decision-making, nor during the project, nor during day-to-day activities.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to trigger political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest, as they do not entail structural changes in the Arts & Crafts sector.	0 This is not a security/stabilisation -related sector.	0 There is no degree of interdependence in this sector.	0 Technical complexity in the Arts & Crafts sector is low.
DZ-2010-02 Objectives: Ensure institutional capacity to apply competition	2 Project considers sharing information with relevant external	1 Project only considers the reinforcement of internal accountability measures,	0 Project does not consider any form of external participation.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to bring about political adoption costs. It focuses on	1 Project exposes commercial conflicts of interest, as the Algerian	0 There are no security-related factors in this project.	0 Project does not directly reflect interdependence relations between Algeria and the EU, since it does not	1 Understanding of competition law requires advanced technical and

laws, through human resource training and application of internal guidelines.	stakeholders on competition laws and decisions taken by the institution.	especially between public institutions. It does not invest, however, in accountability mechanisms for external actors regarding competition rules, for example.		human resources training and fits with the Algerian Government's objectives of (controlled) trade liberalisation (see Bustos, 2003).	government is investing in controlled trade liberalisation, leaving strategic sectors (such as oil and gas) in State hands (see Caruso and Geneve, 2014). As such, reform is expected to be limited by national strategic (economic) interests.		invest directly in opening the Algerian market to European products/investment, or vice-versa,	legal knowledge.
DZ-2011-01 Objectives: Development of an Agriculture Statistics Observatory.	1 Project encourages periodical access to a limited number of statistical information on the Algerian Agricultural Sector.	1 Project invests in some mechanisms for internal accountability and quality-checks on the Statistics Observatory.	0 Project does not foresee any kind of participation from external actors.	0 Project is unlikely to expose political conflicts of interest.	0 Project is unlikely to expose economic conflicts of interest.	0 Project does not relate to security-related interests.	0 Project does not imply any relationship of interdependence between Algeria and the EU.	1 Interpreting agricultural statistical information requires advanced technical knowledge.

<p>DZ-2011-02 Objectives: Capacity-building of Algerian Gas and Electricity Regulator (CREG).</p>	<p>2 Project foresees sharing information on gas and electricity prices, as well as on contracts with distribution companies.</p>	<p>2 Project foresees the creation of an effective system for customer complaints, as well as arbitration between energy operators.</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee any kind of participation from external actors in decision-making.</p>	<p>1 Project objectives and sector are politicized, as gas and electricity production are state-owned in Algeria (ITA 2021a). Furthermore, in 2010 Algeria was enveloped in a corruption scandal involving the national oil production company (MEED 2010), which can explain the strong concern with transparency and accountability-related measures in this project, as to preserve the State's image.</p>	<p>0 Project does not create adverse commercial interests, as the Algerian Government is actively investing in partnerships with energy distribution companies to meet increasing energy demands (ITA 2021a). More effective regulation thus meets these objectives.</p>	<p>0 While related to the energy sector, this project does not entail energy exports to the EU and energy-security related concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not refer to energy exports between Alegria and EU, so it doesn't reflect interdependence.</p>	<p>1 Energy regulation policy has high technical complexity.</p>
<p>DZ-2012-01 Objectives: Improve research</p>	<p>2 Project foresees open access</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee any form of internal</p>	<p>2 Project foresees the creation of a cooperation</p>	<p>1 Project can expose political adoption costs,</p>	<p>0 Project does not relate to any</p>	<p>0 Project does not interfere in security-related interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not entail a relationship of interdependence</p>	<p>1 Legal research is a technically</p>

capacity of national legal research centre (CRJJ), to improve legal capacity and Rule of Law in Algeria.	to research results produced by the beneficiary institution (CRJJ) and annual reports on CRJJ's activities.	or external accountability.	network comprising institutional, economic, and societal actors in defining the CRJJ's research policy.	as the judiciary system in Algeria (in 2012) is highly centralized and directly overseen by the President (which is responsible for assigning, promoting, and transferring judges). The judiciary is thus often subject to political interference (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, p. 13).	economic sector, nor does it expose commercial interests between EU and Algeria.		between EU and Alegria.	complex subject.
DZ-2012-02 Objectives: Improve management and institutional capacity of National Centre for Research on Development of Fishery and Aquaculture (CNRDPA).	0 Project does not foresee any form of open external information sharing.	0 Project does not foresee any structural reform to create internal or external accountability mechanisms.	1 Project foresees limited participation of external actors from Mediterranean fisheries organisations in creating scientific cooperation networks, but only during the Twinning project.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political conflicts of interest, as they do not entail any form of structural reform in public administration and take place in a depoliticised and irrelevant	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project does not entail security-related objectives.	0 Project does not directly contribute to Algerian fisheries exports to the EU, and thus does not have an impact on interdependence relationships. In fact, fisheries exports are rather limited (FAO, 2021).	1 Research on fisheries and aquaculture entail advanced technical knowledge.

				economic sector (fisheries, see FAO, 2021).				
DZ-2013-01 Objectives: Improve institutional capacities of ALGEX (Algerian Export Organization) to gather data on exports and improve exports of (non-hydro-carbonate) Algerian products.	2 Project foresees the creation of an open database and website where Algerian companies can find statistical information on exports, possible export opportunities and limitations.	0 Project does not foresee any form of internal or external accountability.	1 Project foresees some participation from Algerian exporters in pointing out limitations on exportation, which will then be considered when formulating future export-incentivising strategies. However, this is limited to the Twinning project, an not considered in future day-to-day activities of ALGEX.	0 Project does not entail political adoption costs, as it fits with the Algerian Government's strategic objective of reducing dependence on hydro-carbonate exports.	0 Project does not entail commercial adoption costs, as it incentivises economic growth of non-hydro-carbonate companies.	0 Project does not impact on security-related concerns.	0 While this project entails the investment in exports to EU markets, it does not influence EU-Algeria trading regulations. Therefore, there is no room for a strategic advantage on behalf of the EU, and interdependence considerations are thus absent.	1 Project entails the management and interpretation of large quantities of statistical data, thus requiring advanced technical skills in its functioning.
DZ-2013-02 Objectives: Improve data collection and analysis capacity of the Algerian Government for better	1 Project considers limited access to statistical information and reports produced by the	1 Project foresees the improvement of internal organisation of the institution, but with no references to	0 Project does not foresee any form of external participation.	1 Project is implemented directly in the Government's institutions, which can incentivise concerns with	0 Project's objectives are unlikely to create adverse economic interests.	0 Project objectives are unrelated to security concerns.	0 Project objectives are unrelated to interdependence relationship between EU and Algeria.	1 Project entails the development of highly complex statistical mechanisms with

macroeconomic policymaking.	institution. Users with access to the institute's web platform and media outlets which receive information on produced outcomes are decided by the institution.	any form of external accountability.		oversharing of information regarding decision-making.				macroeconomic data.
DZ-2013-03 Objectives: Improve veterinary surveillance regulations through the transposition of EU <i>acquis</i> , creation of an ISO quality system and database. This project aims to facilitate food exports to the EU market.	1 Project foresees discretionary access and sharing of information with a limited number of actors: veterinary (public) institutions in Algeria and international institutions.	2 Project foresees the implementation of internal and external accountability measures. Concretely, it does so through the implementation of the ISO 17020 norm, opening the national authority to international audits and internal accountability mechanisms.	0 Project does not foresee any form of active external participation in policymaking.	0 Project does not create political adoption costs.	1 There is a high chance of adverse economic interests, as national economic actors may oppose strong top-down external regulations, despite the possible positive outcomes with an increase in exports.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 As this project increases Algerian access to the European market for exports, the EU has the strategic upper hand.	1 Phytosanitary regulation is a technically complex matter.

<p>DZ-2013-04</p> <p>Objectives: Adapt the National Institute of Veterinary Medicine to international animal health control and safety standards.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project considers the creation of an internal database where the Institute's analysis outcomes are to be shared with other public institutions and laboratories. However, it does not consider any form of open access and sharing of information with external actors.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in internal accountability structures, in order to fit with international safety standards. However, it does not consider external audits or other forms of accountability.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee any form of external participation.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are not likely to expose political adoption costs. Contrarily, they fit with the Algerian Government's objective of trade liberalisation and diversification.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not influence commercial conflicts of interest, as it focuses on animal and human health safety, and not trade or commercial regulations.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project explicitly mentions the export of Algerian products to the EU market as a desired outcome of this reform. Therefore, interdependence is in favour of the EU.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Veterinary safety standards protocols are technically and scientifically highly complex.</p>
<p>DZ-2014-01</p> <p>Objectives: Supporting the National Centre for Road Safety in increasing road safety in Algeria.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives do not explicitly foresee the creation of an open and free access database where citizens can find</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in internal or external accountability mechanisms.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee any form of participation during Twinning activities or day-to-day activities of the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose political conflicts of interest.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose commercial adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives do not relate to EU security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Road safety measures do not imply technical complexity.</p>

	information on road accidents.							
DZ-2014-02 Objectives: Improve the capacity of the DGPP to predict, formulate and prepare fiscal and budgetary policy.	1 Project objectives foresee an implicit but limited sharing of information regarding medium-term fiscal strategies.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not foresee any form of external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose political adoption costs, as it deals with overall policy planning, rather than tax collection (where corruption risks are higher, as seen in GAN 2020a).	0 Project is unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project objectives are not related to security concerns.	0 Project objectives do not reflect a relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Tax policy is a technically complex subject.
DZ-2014-03 Objectives: Invest in the creation of a road infrastructure database to aid its maintenance and preservation.	0 Project considers the creation of a database with information on road quality, road accidents, etc. but does not consider sharing information with external actors. Rather, the database is	1 Project considers the improvement of internal management practices, with the creation of rules and procedures to improve the infrastructure control system. However, it does not consider the creation of external	0 Project does not foresee any form of external participation.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs, as they deal with a depoliticised and common problem: road safety.	0 Project is unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project domain is technically complex, using engineering and statistical methods.

	for internal use only.	accountability measures.						
DZ-2014-04 Objectives: Improve safety and technical control measures for roads and airports, through institution-building at the National Centre for Technical Control of Public Works (CTTP).	0 Project does not consider any form of open free access to information regarding decision-making.	1 Project incentivises improvement in internal structures of technical control and accountability, regarding, for example, implementation of safety legislation and acquisition of materials.	0 Project does not consider any form of external participation.	0 Project is highly unlikely to expose political conflicts of interest, as it focuses mostly on ensuring road and air safety.	0 Project is unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence relationship between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities imply some degree of technical complexity, mostly regarding engineering methods.
DZ-2014-05 Objectives: Improve effectiveness of General Taxes Directorate (DGI), with a more efficient internal organisation.	0 Project does not consider open and free access to information on policymaking and the institution.	1 Project objectives strongly emphasise measures of internal accountability, investing in a closer and more accountable management of local tax collectors.	0 Project does not consider any form of external participation.	1 While this project fits with the National Government's objective of promoting economic competitiveness through an effective tax structure (Mahtout and Oukaci, 2020, p. 66), it has high political adoption costs,	0 Project objectives are unlikely to directly expose commercial conflicts of interest between the EU and Algeria.	0 Security-related interests are non-existent in the tax policy sector.	0 There is no relationship of interdependence in this sector, as tax policy is an exclusively national policy area.	1 Understanding tax policy requires an advanced technical and legal knowledge in its daily functioning.

				considering the high corruption risk in the Algerian tax administration, especially between tax officials and taxpayers (GAN 2020a).				
DZ-2015-01 Objectives: Improving efficacy of the Algerian Court of Auditors.	1 Project foresees discretionary sharing of information regarding budgetary decisions taken by the Government.	1 Project invests in stronger accountability mechanisms to be used by the Court of Audits towards other Public Administration bodies.	0 Project does not foresee any activities that induce external participation.	1 Project objectives are likely to expose political adoption costs, as they incentivise more effective audits by the Court towards decisions taken by the Public Administration.	0 Project is unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project is not related to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Actions implemented by the Court of Auditors require advanced legal knowledge.
DZ-2015-02 Objectives: Improve prison management and prisoner's wellbeing in Algeria.	0 Project does not encourage any form of open access to information.	1 Project foresees improvement of internal accountability and management procedures to improve prison management.	1 Project foresees limited participation by external actors (psychologists and universities) in defining a strategy against drug dependence in prisons.	0 Despite deplorable conditions in Algerian prisons (see U.S. Department of State, 2015), project objectives are unlikely to directly expose	0 Project objectives are unrelated to commercial interests.	0 Project objectives are unrelated to security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project theme is not technically complex.

				political adoption costs.				
DZ-2015-03 Objectives: Support the Ministry of Industry in the development of Algeria's Industrial Innovation strategy.	1 Project foresees the sharing of data regarding the Innovation Economy with economic and local actors, yet it does not foresee the sharing of information regarding decision-making.	0 Project does not foresee any investment in internal or external accountability measures.	2 Project encourages participation from economic actors, local actors and other agents from the public administration in defining Algeria's Innovation strategy, both during Twinning activities and in future day-to-day activities of the ministry.	0 Project is unlikely to expose political conflicts of interest, as it explicitly first with the National Government's strategy of economic liberalisation and diversification to reduce dependence on oil revenues.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it invests in the innovation of Algeria's industry.	0 Project does not expose security-related interests.	0 Project does not explicitly reflect a relationship of interdependence between the EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities are not dependent on technically complex techniques (such as statistical or econometric analysis). Rather, they focus on increasing the ability of public and private actors to attract foreign investments and grants.
DZ-2015-04 Objectives: Support the Ministry of Communication in implementing a technology-based innovation strategy for economic growth.	0 Project does not consider any form of open access and sharing of information.	1 Project foresees the implementation of internal accountability mechanisms to assess quality of decision-making and management processes. It does not,	2 Project foresees the creation of a network of representatives (government officials, companies, and universities) to influence innovation policy making, which is	0 Project fits with Algeria's objectives of economic diversification and dynamization. Project objectives are unlikely to expose political	0 Project is unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project is unlikely to expose security-related concerns.	0 Project does not expose a relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.

		however, consider any form of external accountability.	expected to function after the Twinning project is implemented.	conflicts of interest.				
DZ-2015-05 Objectives: Capacity-building in the Civil Defence organisation.	0 Project does not foresee open access and sharing of information.	0 Project does not consider investing in forms of internal or external accountability.	0 Project does not foresee any form of internal or external participation in decision making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	1 Project objectives imply security-related concerns regarding natural and human made disasters that can have spill-over effects to the EU space.	0 Project does not reflect a relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities required an advanced degree of technical knowledge regarding Civil Defence, Security and Environmental protection.
DZ-2016-01 Objectives: Improve resource and data management capacities of the Algerian Agency for Integrated Management of Water Resources (AGIRE).	2 Project foresees the creation of open access databases where external and governmental actors can find information on water resources and water-related policies.	1 Project foresees the implementation of a more efficient internal accountability strategy in the target institution.	0 Project does not foresee participation in Twinning or post-project activities of the beneficiary institution.	0 Political adoption costs are non-existent. Water resources are managed almost entirely by the State (Fanack Water 2021a), which has strong interest in ensuring water access for consumers, agricultural and industrial companies.	0 The Algerian water sector is state led, with most water management capacities being carried out by the State (together with some private international companies responsible for water distribution).	0 While lack of quality access to water can bring about security concerns, this was not a pressing issue at the time in Algeria (Fanack Water 2021a).	0 This project does not fit into strategic interdependence considerations between the EU and Algeria.	1 Water quality management requires advanced technical and scientific knowledge.

					Nevertheless , as this project does not incentivise changes in water governance, it is unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.			
DZ-2016-02 Objectives: Capacity-building in the National Institute of Criminology to conform with international standards.	1 Project foresees the creation of a website where information on activities and programmes of the Forensic Centre can be found, yet it does not foresee the sharing of relevant information regarding decision-making or policy results.	1 Project foresees the development of a more efficient internal accountability and management framework. However, it does not consider forms of external accountability.	0 Project does not foresee any form of participation during the Twinning project or in day-to-day functioning of the beneficiary institution.	1 The Criminology Institute is overseen by the Justice Ministry, which is directly overseen by the Algerian president. Furthermore, the criminal and judiciary systems in Algeria are seen to have a high and moderate risk of corruption, respectively (GAN 2020a). Therefore, project objectives are likely to expose	0 Project is unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project does not directly relate to EU security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities require an advanced technical legal and scientific knowledge inherent to criminology and forensic research.

				political adoption costs.				
DZ-2016-03 Objectives: Implementation of a more effective multifunctional cadastre in Algeria to improve tax collection.	1 Project foresees the creation of a database with limited access to specified users. It also encourages the publicity of new legislation.	0 Project does not foresee the implementation of internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not foresee any form of external participation.	1 Project objectives are likely to expose political adoption costs, as it improves the registries system in the Algerian tax administration, where there is a perceived high corruption risk, especially between tax officials and taxpayers (GAN 2020a).	0 Project is unlikely to expose commercial conflicts.	0 Project is not related to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities require a complex technical understanding of geographic and tax methodologies.
DZ-2016-04 Objectives: Support the promotion of Algerian consumers through institution-building activities in the Ministry of Commerce.	0 Project does not foresee open sharing and access of information by the beneficiary institutions.	2 Project foresees the implementation of an external accountability framework through which consumers can file complaints to the beneficiary authority.	1 Project foresees the limited participation of external actors (experts and Civil Society representatives) during Twinning project activities.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	1 Project objectives are likely to expose commercial conflicts of interest, as they are explicitly more likely to have an impact on non-EU	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not explicitly reflect a relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.

					companies exporting their products to Algeria (particularly, Turkey and China).			
DZ-2016-05 Objectives: Improve the ability of the Ministry of Solidarity to invest in socio-professional inclusion of handicap people.	0 Project does not encourage open and free access to information regarding policymaking or the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not foresee the implementation of internal or external accountability measures towards the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not foresee the participation of external actors in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.
DZ-2017-01 Objectives: Support the Ministry of Finance in prospective economic policy-making.	1 Project foresees a limited sharing of information on economic policy with external actors.	1 Project foresees the improvement of internal management and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not foresee any form of external participation in decision-making.	1 Project incentivises a results-based evaluation of economic policy choices taken by the Algerian government, thus implicating a risk of high political adoption costs, as it affects the possibility of arbitrary decision-	0 While indirectly contributing to economic liberalisation policies, this project is unlikely to directly expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project is unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge on macro-economic policy.

				making in government.				
DZ-2017-02 Objectives: Supporting the Customs Authority in risk management.	0 Project does not invest in external access to information.	1 Project foresees an investment in more efficient internal management and accountability within the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not foresee any form of external participation.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as Algerian customs and taxation institutions have high perceived corruption risks, even with recent large-scale corruption scandals (AFP 2021).	1 Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it influences the access of external companies to the Algerian market.	0 Project is unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities require advanced legal and technical expertise.
DZ-2017-03 Objectives: Digital transition and human resources training in the National Agency for Employment.	0 Project does not foresee open access and sharing of information regarding decision-making.	0 Project does not invest in improvement of internal or external accountability frameworks.	0 Project does not consider external participation in policymaking.	0 Project is unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unlikely to reflect security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.
DZ-2018-01 Objectives: Creation of a Risk Management Centre in the	0 Project does not invest in external access to information.	0 Project does not invest in improvement of internal or external	0 Project does not foresee any form of external participation.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as Algerian	1 Project is likely to expose adverse commercial	0 Project is unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities require advanced legal

Directorate of Customs.		accountability frameworks.		customs and taxation institutions have high perceived corruption risks, even with recent large-scale corruption scandals (AFP 2021).	interests, as it influences the access of external companies to the Algerian market.			and technical expertise.
DZ-2018-02 Objectives: Strengthening Scientific and Technical Expertise and implementation of a Quality Management System within the Algerian Forensic Police.	0 Project does not foresee open external access to information.	1 Project invests in improving internal management and accountability frameworks within the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 The Algerian Forensic Police is overseen by the Justice Ministry. Furthermore, the criminal and judiciary systems in Algeria are seen to have a high and moderate risk of corruption, respectively (GAN 2020a). Therefore, project objectives are likely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose EU security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge in forensic sciences.

DZ-2018-03 Objectives: Support to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research for the reinforcement of pedagogical skills of teachers & researchers and the managerial capacities of managers	0 Project does not invest in open access to information on decision-making.	0 Project does not invest in improving internal accountability and management structures in the beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.
DZ-2018-04 Objectives: Support for the implementation of a quality management system within Vegetal Protection and Technical Controls services	0 Project does not consider the creation of an open access database on beneficiary's institutions decisions and policy outcomes.	1 Project considers the investment in internal management and accountability frameworks, in order to meet international standards.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	1 By facilitating Algerian food exports to the EU, this project incentivises commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project does not expose security interests.	1 As this project explicitly invests in the improvement of food safety standards to open the European market to Algerian exports, the EU is expected to have the strategic upper hand, in terms of interdependence.	1 Project activities require advanced scientific and technical knowledge.
DZ-2019-01 Objectives: Support to the Directorate General of Public Accounting for preparing the	0 Project does not foresee open access to information regarding	1 Project foresees the investment in more effective internal management and	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project objectives are likely to expose high political adoption costs, as the project invests in more	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose commercial adversity.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities required advanced mathematical and technical knowledge.

implementation of an accrual accounting system	decision-making.	accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institutions.		accountable and efficient accounting systems, thus presenting high adoption costs for arbitrary public spending decisions fuelled by corruption and other political-economic interests.				
DZ-2019-02 Objectives: Strengthening the institutional capacity of the Authority for the Organisation of Urban Transport (AOTU), Algiers	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decision-making in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external management or accountability frameworks.	0 Project does not consider participation of external actors in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical or scientific knowledge.
DZ-2019-03 Objectives: Support to the strengthening of capacities of the National Meteorological Office (ONM)	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on policymaking.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unlikely to directly expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities require some technical knowledge on meteorological and geographic methodologies.

DZ-2019-04 Objectives: Support to the strengthening of the capacities of the Directorate General of Forests for the implementation of the Forestry Strategy	1 Project considers access to limited information regarding forestry policy in Algeria, carried out by the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in improving internal accountability and management frameworks.	2 Project considers the active involvement of external actors in defining and implementing the beneficiary institution's policy strategy.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unrelated to security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities do not require advanced scientific knowledge.
DZ-2019-05 Objectives: To accompany the modernisation of the organisation of the MICLAT, to strengthen its capacities, to increase the attractiveness of the Local Authorities, and to optimise their resources.	0 Project does not foresee any form of open access to information on decision-making.	0 Project does not consider reforms in internal or external accountability.	0 Project does not incentivise external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unrelated to security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.
DZ-2019-06 Objectives: Support to the modernisation and capacity building of the National	0 Project does not consider open access to information	1 Project invests in more efficient internal accountability and	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse	0 Project is unlikely to directly expose security-related interests.	0 Project does not reflect relation of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	1 Project activities required advanced technical knowledge.

Agency for Hydraulic Resources (ANRH)	for on decision- making.	management frameworks within the beneficiary institution.			commercial interests.			
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C.2. Egypt

Project	Transparency	Accountability	Participation	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7
EG-2005-01 Objectives: Institutional Strengthening of the Egyptian Tourist Authority (ETA)	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decision-making.	1 Project foresees improvement in internal management and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institution but does not consider external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in policymaking.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose commercial conflicts.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect a relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical or scientific knowledge.
EG-2006-01 Objectives: Establishment of a Modern Postal Management for the Egyptian National Postal Authority	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decision-making in the beneficiary organisation.	2 Project foresees the implementation of more efficient internal accountability and management frameworks, as well as the introduction of external customer complaint systems.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making in the beneficiary organisation.	0 The Egyptian postal authorities are perceived as autonomous and effective (Parcel & Post, 2007), and thus this project is expected not to expose political adoption costs.	0 This project explicitly aims at supporting Egypt Post to adapt to market liberalisation, thus reducing the possibility of adverse commercial interests due to economic reform.	0 Project does not expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.

<p>EG-2006-02</p> <p>Objectives: Supporting the Egyptian Authority for Maritime Safety (EAFMS) to produce and deliver maritime services efficiently and to improve its institutional capacities and human resources capabilities.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in open access to information on policy decisions.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project foresees the development of more efficient internal management, accountability, and audit procedures within the beneficiary organisation.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in policymaking.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect security-related concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical and legal knowledge on international maritime law.</p>
<p>EG-2007-01</p> <p>Objectives: Institutional strengthening of the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI) in Egypt</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider open access to information on policymaking.</p>	<p>2</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of internal management and accountability mechanisms, as well as the reinforcement of external complaints and accountability frameworks.</p>	<p>2</p> <p>Project considers external participation and input in economic policymaking by Egyptian and foreign organisations and companies.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>FDI regimes in Egypt are considered transparent and in line with international standards, due to reforms implemented by the national Government, such as this one. Nonetheless, this project can incur in high political adoption costs, as there is a high</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not directly reflect a relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

				corruption risk in public services for businesses, particularly when trying to obtain government approvals and licenses (see GAN, 2020b, U.S. Department of State, 2021).				
EG-2007-02 Objectives: Development of Integrated Hazardous Substances and Waste Management System for the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA)	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decision-making.	0 Project does not invest in improvements in internal or external accountability at the beneficiary institution.	0 Despite foreseeing the creation of an inter-ministerial framework, this project does not consider any form of external participation (i.e. non-state actors) in policymaking.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not reflect security-related concerns.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical or scientific knowledge.
EG-2007-03 Objectives: Institutional Capacity building for the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and developing the	1 Project foresees open access to statistical information but does not consider access to information on decision-	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability frameworks.	0 Project considers the participation of government organisations in the daily functioning of the beneficiary	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.	1 Project activities required advanced technical knowledge of statistics.

legal framework for statistics in Egypt.	making in the beneficiary institution.		institution but does not consider external participation in decision-making.					
EG-2007-04 Objectives: Enhance animal and human health in Egypt and increase the contribution of the livestock sector to the Egyptian economy.	0 Project does not consider open access to information.	1 Project invests in more efficient internal accountability and management structures within the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not explicitly or directly expose EU security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge on animal health and safety.
EG-2007-05 Objectives: Improvement of the Occupational Health and Safety policies, procedures and services, hence reducing the number of work-related accidents and incidents in Egypt.	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decision-making.	1 Project invests in improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project considers input from governmental bodies but does not mention external participation in policymaking.	1 Labour inspections in Egypt are perceived to be lax and uneven (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Adding to the high risk of petty corruption in public services in Egypt (GAN 2020b), this project comprises	1 Project is likely to expose commercial adoption costs, as stronger work regulations impede malpractices by companies in Egypt.	0 Project is unrelated to security concerns.	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.

				high political adoption costs.				
<p>EG-2007-06</p> <p>Objectives: Upgrade the overall capacity of the Egyptian administration in the Railway field by improving the legislative and regulatory framework and strengthening institutional capacity.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider open access to information on rail safety reports or other activities developed by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>2</p> <p>Project considers the investment in the creation of an independent (external) accident investigation body, as well as an (internal) Railway Safety Regulator Unit, in charge of defining, approving and safety rules, and monitoring and auditing their application. Therefore, this project invests in both internal and external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in policymaking.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>The Egyptian railway sector is characterised by frequent accidents with high death rates, which in turn are a focal point for opposition to government and officials' lack of aptitude and improper management (Tarek, 2021). As such, this project (focusing on more accountable safety regulations in this sector) is likely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose EU security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.</p>

<p>EG-2007-07</p> <p>Objectives: Improvement of the Egyptian Accreditation Council's (EGAC) role in the area of conformity assessment.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in policymaking.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect EU security interests.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project reflects a relationship of interdependence in favour of the EU, as it invests in the capacity of Egyptian producers to export their products to the Single Market.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical and legal knowledge.</p>
<p>EG-2008-01</p> <p>Objectives: Assist the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigations' Central Water Quality Management Unit in effectively improving its management of water quality</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project foresees the implementation of warning mechanisms on water pollution accidents to be coordinated by the beneficiary institution, thus improving transparency on water quality in Egypt. Nonetheless, the project does not consider the implementation of transparency measures regarding internal</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee internal accountability measures in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose political adoption costs, as the National Government is keen on improving water quality and access in Egypt (Fanack Water 2018).</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project objectives are likely to expose adverse commercial interests, as stronger control mechanisms hinder non-ecological and hazardous practices from industrial and agricultural economic actors.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not directly reflect security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical knowledge.</p>

	decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.							
EG-2008-02 Objectives: Improve the efficiency of the National Telecommunications Regulatory to ensure fair competition in a deregulated market.	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decision-making by the beneficiary institution.	0 Project foresees the improvement of the beneficiary's internal organisational framework, but without considering the implementation of accountability rules.	1 Project considers consultation and liaison with Consumer/User groups, as well as consumer protection NGOs in defining consumer protection regulations, during Twinning project activities. Nonetheless, it does not consider active participation in post-project day-to-day activities of the beneficiary institution.	0 Reforms proposed by this project are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not reflect security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge.
EG-2008-03 Objectives: Support Egyptian Institutions involved in road safety in reforming the	1 Project considers the creation of an open access database where	1 Project invests in the development of an internal audit and	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse	0 Project does not relate to EU security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.

regulatory framework (through approximation to acquis communautaire) and building their institutional capacity to enhance road safety.	selected stakeholders (e.g. government institutions, police, universities, etc.) can view information on the national road system and road accidents.	accountability system to monitor road safety standards and the implementation of road safety guidelines and policy plans.	in the beneficiary institution.	adoption costs.	commercial interests.		e between EU and Egypt.	
EG-2010-01 Objectives: Support the Egyptian Consumer Protection Agency (CPA) in the development of a consumer protection framework in Egypt.	1 Project foresees the creation of a database on legal consumer protection information (such as laws, regulations, and final litigations). However, this database is only accessible to relevant administrative actors.	2 Project foresees the implementation of a more effective and efficient complaint handling cycle, thus giving consumers a greater possibility in requesting accountable decisions.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project objectives are likely to expose high political adoption costs, as the Consumer Protection Authority is perceived to be closely connected with the Egyptian Government and, thus, not an entirely independent regulatory body (Saleh, 2018).	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as improved consumer protection is perceived as necessary to “improve competitiveness of Egyptian products, contribute to trade promotion and access to the EU and international markets, thus, supporting	0 Project is unlikely to expose security related interests.	1 Project reflects a relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.

					Egypt fulfilling its trade agreements and priorities” (p. 5).			
EG-2010-02 Objectives: Modernisation of the Real Estate Tax Administration in Egypt – Developing Capacities of the Real Estate Taxation Authority	1 Project invests in limited access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution, such as replies to taxpayers’ inquiries, complaint handling and periodic information on taxes.	2 Project invests in the improvement of internal management and accountability frameworks, as well as external accountability mechanisms (such as an Appeals System).	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives reflect the general goals of the Egyptian government, thus having a low risk of exposing adverse political interests.	1 Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it seeks to enforce tax collection.	0 Project does not reflect security-related concerns.	0 Project objectives do not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.	0 Project activities do not explicitly require advanced technical knowledge.
EG-2012-01 Objectives: Strengthening the National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation of Education institutional capacity (NAQAEE) with a view to improving the Accreditation and Quality Assurance Education System	0 Project foresees the development of a transparent accreditation process, yet it does not explicitly mention the measures to achieve it.	0 Project mentions the need for accountable accreditation processes but does not foresee the development of internal or external accountability measures.	2 Project invests in active participation in decision-making from relevant stakeholders and public actors in the long-term functioning of the beneficiary institution.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unrelated to commercial interests.	0 Project objectives are unrelated to security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.

<p>EG-2013-01</p> <p>Objectives: Contributing to legislative reform in the field of metrology and to the strengthening of the institutional and technical capacity of the National Institute for Standards (NIS).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not mention open access to information on decision-making by the beneficiary institutions.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the implementation of internal quality management systems, thus improving internal management and accountability frameworks. However, no form of external accountability is mentioned in reform plan.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project considers active discussion with external actors (academia and sector representatives) in the drafting of primary and secondary legislation.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose high adoption costs and they fit with the Government's policy objectives.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as they help increase Egyptian companies' capacity to export.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project objectives reflect interdependence favourable to the EU, as they seek to improve Egyptian access to the EU market.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>EG-2013-02</p> <p>Objectives: Strengthening the Institutional Capacity of the Egyptian Electric Utility and Consumer Protection Agency to develop market liberalisation</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in improving internal or external accountability measures for the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not mention external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs, as reform in the energy sector fits with national Government's objective of energy stability amid an energy crisis that took</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as the Egyptian energy market was already relatively open to internal and external competition prior to the post-2013 energy reforms</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives do not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced knowledge of energy policy and regulation, comprising advanced technical and legal knowledge.</p>

				place in 2013-2014 (see Fahmy 2020).	(see Fahmy 2020).			
EG-2013-03 Objectives: Supporting the Egyptian Ministry of Transport in the Implementation of the Railway Safety Management System	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken in the beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in the implementation of an internal Accreditation and Certification system that seeks to improve accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 The Egyptian railway sector is characterised by frequent accidents with high death rates, which in turn are a focal point for opposition to government and officials' lack of aptitude and improper management (Tarek, 2021). As such, this project (focusing on more accountable safety regulations in this sector) is likely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose commercial conflicts of interest.	0 Project is unlikely to expose EU security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge on safety and transport regulation.

<p>EG-2013-04</p> <p>Objectives: Assistance to the Egyptian Metro Company (ECM) in Reforming Railway Safety Regulations, Procedures and Practices</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the implementation of an Internal Safety Management System to improve internal accountability in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.</p>
<p>EG-2014-01</p> <p>Objectives: Enhance ECA capacity to foster an effective and non-discriminatory competition system in Egypt within the framework of a free-market economy.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of the internal accountability and management structure of the beneficiary institution but does not consider external accountability measures.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project considers participation from external stakeholders, such as private actors and academia, in the preparation of the reformed competition regulations. However, it does not foresee the development of a permanent external participation framework.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project objectives are likely to expose high political adoption costs, as the beneficiary's political independence and transparency functioning is controversial (see Saleh, 2020).</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is highly likely to create adverse economic interests, as "[m]ost sectors of the Egyptian economy are highly concentrated, dominated by a small number of firms and remain sheltered by protectionist measures that limit entry", according to the Twinning programme itself (page 6).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect security-related concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.</p>

<p>EG-2014-02</p> <p>Objectives: The efficiency and sustainability of the agricultural research system in Egypt is increased by consolidating the legal basis and strengthening the coordination and operational capacity of the Agricultural Research Centre</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management guidelines in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project considers limited participation from external stakeholders (e.g. NGOs and Farmers' Associations) in designing statistical guidelines. However, it does not consider their participation in day-to-day activities of the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical knowledge of Agriculture and Statistics.</p>
<p>EG-2014-03</p> <p>Objectives: Strengthening the Egyptian Organisation for Standardisation and Quality in improving its role in the regulatory framework governing the Egyptian Quality Infrastructure for the domain of technical regulations,</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in limited access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution through seminars and workshops. However, it does not consider the creation of an</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are in line with Government's objective of trade liberalisation and increase of exports, thus having a low chance of exposing high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as both parties saw (at the time) the implementation of the ACAA as mutually beneficial..</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect security-related concerns.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>The project fits with Egypt's goal of finalizing the negotiations of an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance (ACAA) with the EU, thus improving access of Egyptian products to the common market. Project</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced legal-technical expertise.</p>

standards and conformity assessment	open database for permanent and free access to this information.						objectives thus reflect a relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU.	
EG-2014-04 Objectives: Improve the national legal framework, organizational structure and technical capacity of the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA)	2 Project foresees the creation of an open access database with information on procedures implemented by the beneficiary institution.	1 Project foresees the improvement of internal management and accountability frameworks within the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as the Twinning document emphasises the positive outcomes for the Tourism industry in Egypt and its national economy overall.	0 Project increases safety in aviation but does not directly reflect security related concerns on behalf of the EU.	1 As this project seeks to transpose Air Safety Regulations to the Egyptian framework to improve air transport to/from the EU, with outcomes in trade and tourism, project objectives reflect a relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge of air and flight international and national regulations. .
EG-2019-01 Objectives: Upgrade the institutional, technical, and raising awareness capacities of the Egyptian Patent Office (EGYPO) towards accepted international standards thereby	0 Project does not invest in open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability of the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in policy-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unlikely to expose security concerns.	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.

leading to improved operations that attract more patent filings by Egyptian inventors, particularly in the scientific community.								
EG-2019-02 Objectives: Strengthen the administrative and operational capacities of the Egyptian Customs Authority (ECA) to perform more efficiently its core functions, by reducing bureaucracy and responding in an effective way to the needs of the trade community	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project objectives are likely to expose high political adoption costs, as corruption in customs administration in Egypt is perceived as very high (see GAN 2020b).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	1 Project exposes security-related concerns as it attempts to prevent smuggling of weapons and other illegal material to Egypt, where it contributes to increased terrorist activity and, thus, instability in the EU's Southern border.	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.	1 Project activities require advanced technical-legal knowledge of customs regulations and data mining/management.

<p>EG-2019-03</p> <p>Objectives: Enhancing the capacity and the business model of the ETA following the merger of Income Tax and Value Added Tax (VAT) Departments; Developing risk management techniques and performance monitoring program for an increased effectiveness and efficiency of the ETA operations</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider investing in open access to information on decisions taken in/by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project foresees the improvement of internal management and accountability frameworks within the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in policy-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as corruption risk in tax administration in Egypt is perceived as high, especially among tax officials (GAN 2020b).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unrelated to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Egypt.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.</p>
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C.3. Israel

Project	Transparency	Accountability	Participation	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7
IS-2007-01 Objectives: Development of the operational capability and visibility of the Law, Information and Technology Authority (ILITA) as a data protection authority (DPA) ensuring the effective enforcement and implementation of the Israeli legislation on privacy	0 Project does not invest in open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Israel.	0 Project does not require advanced technical expertise.
IS-2010-01 Objectives: Assist the Israeli Telecommunications regulator to establish greater approximation to the European Union regulatory approach, specifically with wholesale markets	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken in the beneficiary institution.	2 Project invests in improvement of consumer protection and dispute resolution frameworks, thus improving external accountability and internal management procedures in	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as the liberalisation of Israel's telecommunications market was already well underway when this project was implemented (p. 3-8; see also ITA 2021a).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse security interests.	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Israel.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge of telecommunications regulation.

		the beneficiary institution.						
IS-2013-01 Objectives: Reinforce the Israeli energy sector by strengthening the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources' capacities to manage the Exploration & Production (E&P) business,	2 Project invests in the development of an on-line open access database with information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management structures in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as the Israeli energy sector is a mature liberalised market (see ITA 2021c).	0 Project is unlikely to expose security concerns.	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Israel.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge of E&P regulations.
IS-2014-01 Objectives: Strengthen the capacities of the Kimron Veterinary Institute (MARD) and supervision of private accredited laboratories to achieve rapid and effective surveillance and control of animal diseases as well as provision of reliable evidence to certify animals and animal-origin products as	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management practices in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Israel.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge of phytosanitary regulations.

safe, especially for human consumption								
IS-2014-02 Objectives: Support the modernization and implementation of the regulatory and management framework of environmental permitting, inspection and compliance especially for SME, the enhancement of the environmental management capacity in Israel, and the infrastructure of resource efficiency.	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures towards the beneficiary institution.	1 Project considers the active participation of external stakeholders (NGOs, industry and business actors) in decision-making activities. However, it does not prepare a structure for active participation in day-to-day activities of the beneficiary institution.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unlikely to expose security interests.	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Israel.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical knowledge.
IS-2015-01 Objectives: Support the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) in aligning official statistics with the	1 Project invests in easier open access to statistical information	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal management and	1 Project considers active participation from stakeholders	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose security-	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Israel.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge in statistics.

<p>EU and other international organizations standards, guidelines, and best practices.</p>	<p>produced by the beneficiary institution. However, it does not actively invest in the access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institution. However, it does not consider external accountability measures.</p>	<p>(researchers) in defining statistical information access policies in the beneficiary institution. However, it does not foresee active external participation in decision-making in the day-to-day functioning of the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>adoption costs.</p>		<p>related concerns.</p>		
<p>IS-2016-01 Objectives: Strengthen the regulatory capacity of the Israeli Ministry of Communications (MoC) to improve mechanisms to develop a better regulatory environment in the field of telecommunications in Israel</p>	<p>0 Project does not invest in open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee improvements in internal and external accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institutions.</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee active external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as the liberalisation of Israel's telecommunications market was already well underway when this project was implemented (p- 10-12; see also ITA 2021b).</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse security interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Israel.</p>	<p>1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge of telecommunications regulation.</p>

<p>IS-2017-01 Objectives: Establishment of a functioning Israeli National Qualification Framework (NQF), and its alignment to the European Qualification Framework (EQF) meta-frame.</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.</p>	<p>1 Project considers participation from external stakeholders (education providers and social partners) in defining the NQF. However, it does not foresee active external participation in decision-making in the day-to-day functioning of the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose security interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Israel.</p>	<p>0 Project does not require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>IS-2019-01 Objectives: Support the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MoEP) in developing a comprehensive framework for sustainable waste management</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1 Project foresees the improvement of internal management and accountability guidelines within the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee active participation from external stakeholders in decision-making.</p>	<p>0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose security interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Israel.</p>	<p>0 Project does not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

		However, it does not consider external accountability rules.							
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C.4. Jordan

Project	Transparency	Accountability	Participation	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7
JO-2004-01 Objectives: Reform of the Jordan Veterinary and Phyto-sanitary Inspection Services	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it's overarching rationale is to improve Jordanian exports.	0 Project does not reflect security related concerns.	1 Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as Jordan is attempting to secure the ability to export agricultural and meat products to the EU.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge of Phyto-sanitary regulations and methodologies.
JO-2004-02 Objectives: Reforming of the Food Inspection Services and Food Chain Laboratories in Jordan	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs, as border control and inspection services are seen as trustworthy in Jordan (GAN 2020c).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it's overarching rationale is to improve Jordanian exports.	0 Project does not reflect security related concerns.	1 Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as Jordan is attempting to secure the ability to export agricultural and meat products to the EU.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge of Phyto-sanitary regulations and methodologies.
JO-2004-03 Objectives: Strengthening of the Jordan Institution for	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal	0 Project does not consider external participation in	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse	0 Project does not reflect security related concerns.	1 Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the	1 Project activities require advanced

Standards and Metrology in Jordan	decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	accountability and management frameworks, following international accreditation standards. However, it does not consider the implementation of external accountability frameworks.	decision-making.	adoption costs.	commercial interests, as its overarching rationale is to improve Jordanian exports.		EU, as Jordan wants to harmonize standards to ensure improved access of Jordanian products to the Common Market.	technical knowledge of Phyto-sanitary regulations and methodologies.
JO-2004-04 Objectives: Strengthen the administrative and operational capacity of the Customs Department in support of the implementation of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks within the beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs, as Customs authorities in Jordan are perceived as having a low corruption risk (GAN 2020c).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unlikely to expose security-related interests.	1 Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as it contributes to the implementation of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and the gradual creation of a Euro-Jordan Free Trade Area (see p.2).	1 Project activities required advanced technical and legal expertise on trade and customs regulations and procedures.
JO-2005-01 Objectives: Institutional strengthening of the Audit Bureau of the	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on	1 Project foresees the improvement of internal	1 Project considers the creation of a Task Force	1 Project is likely to expose high adoption	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse	0 Project is unrelated to security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence	1 Project required advanced technical and

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	accountability and management practices in the beneficiary institution in order to ensure its independence and good governance (see p. 6-10)	comprising relevant stakeholders from the public administration and representatives from Parliament, “among others” (including international actors). However, it does not consider the creation of a framework for active participation in day-to-day activities of the institution.	costs, as the Audit Bureau is responsible for auditing the expenditures of the public budget. Furthermore, there is a medium perception of corruption in tax administration and public services in Jordan (GAN 2020c) and the project explicitly puts forward the goal of “Fraud and Corruption prevention” as its main objective (see p. 3).	commercial interests.		between EU and Jordan.	legal expertise on Audit and public finance practices.
JO-2005-02 Objectives: Enable the trade-related departments of the Ministry of Industry and Trade to fulfil Jordan’s	1 Project considers open access to data regarding the implications of regional and WTO trade	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as	0 Project does not reflect security related concerns.	1 Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as Jordan wants to	1 Project requires advanced technical-legal knowledge of international trade.

commitments related to international trade issues within the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and to its WTO membership	agreements. However, it does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	management procedures in the beneficiary institution. However, it does not open channels for external accountability.			its overarching rationale is to improve Jordanian exports.		harmonize trade regulations to ensure improved access of Jordanian products to the Common Market.	
JO-2007-01 Objectives: Enhance NERC's overall administrative, operational and expert institutional capacity in order to meet the energy challenges facing Jordan in an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable way and to obtain Photovoltaic Systems Laboratory Accreditation.	0 Project does not invest in open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks within the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not reflect security-related concerns.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.	1 Most project activities require advanced technical expertise on energy systems and policies.
JO-2007-02 Objectives: Enhance the functioning of the Jordanian penitentiary system in accordance with EU standards and international human rights instruments,	0 Project does not foresee the improvement of the beneficiary's transparency policy.	1 Project foresees the improvement of internal human resource management and accountability frameworks in	0 Project does not consider active participation from external actors in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as during the project's time-frame human	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not reflect security-related concerns.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical, scientific or legal expertise.

resulting in an improved respect for human rights as regards the treatment of detainees.		the beneficiary institutions.		rights abuses were reported in the Jordanian penitentiary system (see U.S. Department of State, 2011).				
JO-2007-03 Objectives: Strengthen the capacity of the Public Security Directorate - namely the Forensic Laboratories Department and the explosives section in the Preventive Security Department- to counter terrorism and organised crimes	0 Project does not foresee transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not foresee improvements in internal or external accountability of beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project does not reflect commercial conflicts of interest.	1 Project is directly related to security concerns.	-1 Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to Jordan, as the EU is seeking to ensure the country's safety and stability to avoid spill over to the European space.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
JO-2008-01 Objectives: Strengthening and harmonization of environmental legislation and its enforcement in the fields of waste management, environmental liability, and air quality protection	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not consider improvement of internal or external accountability frameworks.	1 Project considers external participation of external stakeholders in "building consensus on environmental liability issues".	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not reflect security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.	1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge on waste management, environmental liability and air quality protection mechanisms.

<p>JO-2009-01 Objectives: Support the Jordanian Gendarmerie to improve its operational capacities to undertake its role in line with international standards and EU best practices, resulting in a fostered public security, order and respect for human rights in the country</p>	<p>0 Project does not encourage open access to information.</p>	<p>1 Project considers improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs. While corruption is not perceived as common in Jordanian police forces (GAN, 2020c), human rights abuses are reported (see U.S. Department of State, 2011).</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect security-related concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>JO-2010-01 Objectives: Support the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission in developing its regulatory framework, and operational capacities to be in line with the international standards and EU best practices.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider open access to information measures.</p>	<p>0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as Jordan has a dynamic and developing ICT market (see ITA 2021d; also p. 3-4 of the fiche).</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise on ICT.</p>

<p>JO-2010-02 Objectives: Enhance the technical and administrative capacities of the Department of Lands and Survey in the field of cadastre and land administration</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs, as Jordanian land and cadastre administration authorities are perceived as having a low risk of corruption, with private property being defined and protected through sound legal processes (GAN, 2020c).</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise in Map and Land register tools.</p>
<p>JO-2010-03 Objectives: Support the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to implement the Anti-Corruption Strategy in line with international and EU best practices.</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee transparency measures.</p>	<p>2 Project invests in improvement of internal accountability frameworks. It also foresees the creation of a whistleblowing mechanism to enhance external accountability.</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee active participation from external actors in policymaking.</p>	<p>1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it explicitly attempts to tackle corruption.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

<p>JO-2010-04</p> <p>Objectives: Assist the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in its trade liberalisation process through developing a Phytosanitary system in compliant with the EU and international standard.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect security concerns.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as it invests in improving phytosanitary standards to ensure access of Jordanian agricultural products to the European Market.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical expertise in phytosanitary systems.</p>
<p>JO-2013-01</p> <p>Objectives: Improve the ability of the Public Security Department -Criminal Investigation Department of the Jordan Police (PSD-CID) in implementing investigations on cybercrime cases</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider measures of internal or external accountability.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project considers participation from external stakeholders (ICT companies and international organisations) in defining the beneficiary's cybersecurity policy framework. However, it does not mention the creation of a permanent day-to-day framework for</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>While relating to (cyber)security, project does not directly reflect security concerns relevant to EU-Jordan relations or EU-Southern Neighbourhood relations.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not directly reflect relationship between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical expertise in cybersecurity and ICT.</p>

			external participation in decision-making.					
<p>JO-2013-02</p> <p>Objectives: Enhance the capabilities of the Jordanian Department of Statistics (DoS)- in the Quality Control of statistical data, the upgrading of sampling capabilities and the implementation of up-to-date national accounts methods.</p>	<p>2</p> <p>Project ensures that statistics published by the DoS are comprehensively documented in terms of methodology, quality and metadata. It thus guarantees open access to transparent methodologies on data gathering and statistics measures taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project foresees the improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks through an organised system for internal auditing in the DoS.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect security-related concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Most project activities require advanced technical expertise on statistics.</p>
<p>JO-2013-03</p> <p>Objectives: Support the evolution of the Regional Special Training Centre (RSTC) within the Jordan Gendarmerie Force (JGF) in providing training services on human rights, peace</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs. While corruption is not perceived as common in Jordanian</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect security-related concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

support operations and internal security in Jordan, to JGF staff				police forces (GAN, 2020c), human rights abuses are reported (see U.S. Department of State, 2013).				
<p>JO-2013-04</p> <p>Objectives: Support to the Audit Bureau (AB) by strengthening the management and technical capacity of the AB to plan and undertake audits in line with EU practices and international standards</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management practices in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project considers participation and input from external stakeholders in improving audit operations. However, it does not consider permanent forms of external participation in the day-to-day functioning of the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high adoption costs, as the Audit Bureau is responsible for auditing the expenditures of the public budget. Furthermore, there is a medium perception of corruption in tax administration and public services in Jordan (GAN 2020c). Finally, this project explicitly aims to tackle corruption</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unrelated to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical and legal expertise on Audit and public finance practices.</p>

				and fraud (see p. 14-15).				
<p>JO-2017-01</p> <p>Objectives: Support JSMO to further fulfil all requirements in preparation for the negotiation and signature of the ACAA Agreement, i.e. the approximation of horizontal legislation relevant to the enhancement of the quality infrastructure components, namely market surveillance, conformity assessment and accreditation</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project considers improvement of internal accountability and management practices in beneficiary institution, considering rules, instructions and procedures on accreditation of inspection and system/product certification.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as its overarching rationale is to improve Jordanian exports.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect security related concerns.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as Jordan wants to harmonize standards to ensure improved access of Jordanian products to the Common Market.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities required advanced technical-legal expertise of trade and regulation.</p>
<p>JO-2017-02</p> <p>Objectives: Strengthening the strategic human resources management capacities of the Borders and Residence Department at the Public Security Directorate</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project relates to security concerns, as the PSD is responsible for maintaining security of Jordan borders against illegal activities (including weapons and</p>	<p>-1</p> <p>Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to Jordan, as the EU is seeking to ensure the country's safety and stability to avoid spill over to the European space.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical, scientific or legal expertise.</p>

						people smuggling; see p. 3).		
<p>JO-2017-03</p> <p>Objectives: Strengthen the national capabilities in assessing, planning and coordinating emergency responders' staffs in dealing with crises and disasters</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project foresees the improvement of internal accountability and management practices within the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project relates to security concerns, as it reflects the EU's Post-Arab Spring "Resilience" discourse and the focus on disaster response and adaptation of neighbourhood countries to avoid spill over to the European space (see, for example, Korosteleva, 2020)</p>	<p>-1</p> <p>Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to Jordan, as the EU is seeking to ensure the country's safety and stability to avoid spill over to the European space.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical, scientific, or legal expertise.</p>
<p>JO-2017-04</p> <p>Objectives: Develop a comprehensive macro-prudential framework covering all aspects of financial stability in accordance with the European Union</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider open access to information measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect security-related concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Most project activities require advanced technical expertise on public finance.</p>

standards and best practices								
<p>JO-2019-01</p> <p>Objectives: Support sustainable reforms of the Work Injury Insurance (WII) and enhance the capacity of the Work Injuries and Occupational Safety Directorate (OSD).</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in increased transparency and access to published data on subsidies and WII contribution rates, as well as other outputs of introduced policy reforms. However, it does not consider open access to general information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it increases the burden on Jordanian business which do not follow safety regulations.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not require advanced technical knowledge.</p>
<p>JO-2019-02</p> <p>Objectives: Develop a comprehensive macro-prudential framework covering all aspects of financial stability in accordance with international and European Union</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider open access to information measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect security-related concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Jordan.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Most project activities require advanced technical expertise on public finance.</p>

standards and best practices								
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C.5. Lebanon

Project	Transparency	Accountability	Participation	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7
LB-2004-01 Objectives: Institutional strengthening and capacity building of the Insurance Control Commission (ICC).	0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not foresee improvement of internal or external accountability.	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs (see World Bank, 2013).	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests (see BankMed, 2017; World Bank, 2013).	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Lebanon.	1 Project activities require advanced technical legal expertise.
LB-2004-02 Objectives: Institutional strengthening and capacity building of the CPD at the MOET to attain a modern consumer protection framework in Lebanon that safeguards consumers' interests.	2 Project invests in public availability of data regarding complaint registration, means of dispute, arbitration, mediation procedures and complaint settlements, among others.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management procedures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	1 Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interest, as it explicitly aims to increase consumer choice while increasing protection against wrong-doings from Lebanese companies.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Lebanon.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.

<p>LB-2005-01</p> <p>Objectives: Enforce an adequate customs legislative and regulatory framework, simplify customs procedures and increase overall customs revenues</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider transparency components.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in improved internal accountability and management framework.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as corruption in Lebanese customs authorities is perceived as high (GAN, 2020d).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Lebanon.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>LB-2005-02</p> <p>Objectives: Update and improve the technical, professional and managerial skills and know-how of VAT employees particularly in the areas of Human Resource Management and Audit.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee improvement of internal or external accountability.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high adoption costs, as the Lebanese tax administration is perceived as posing a high risk of corruption (GAN, 2020d).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Lebanon.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical legal expertise.</p>
<p>LB-2009-01</p> <p>Objectives: Improve tax collection efficiency through better risk management, compliance, and auditing techniques.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider transparency measures.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in improved internal accountability and management frameworks.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high adoption costs, as the Lebanese tax administration is perceived as posing a high risk of corruption (GAN, 2020d).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Lebanon.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical expertise.</p>

<p>LB-2010-01 Objectives: Enable the National Administration of Statistics to deliver, National Accounts, Trade Statistics and Social Statistics using international nomenclature and collection methodologies</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee improvement of internal or external accountability.</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Lebanon.</p>	<p>1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise on statistical tools.</p>
<p>LB-2018-01 Objectives: Strengthening the capacities of the Ministry of Agriculture in the field of veterinary public health in order to protect the health and safety of Lebanese consumers and secure the health and safety of Lebanese animal production and its food industry.</p>	<p>2 Project promotes open access to information on official controls made by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1 Project invests in improved internal accountability and management framework.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>1 Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as it explicitly aims to improve exports of Lebanese agricultural products to the EU market (see p. 2).</p>	<p>1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.</p>

<p>LB-2018-02</p> <p>Objectives: Enhance the safety and security of civil aviation in Lebanon by improving the national legal framework, organizational structure and technical capacity of the Lebanese stakeholders in accordance with ICAO SARPs, EU legislation and other best practices.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in improved internal accountability and management framework.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project objectives are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project reflects EU security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Lebanon.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>
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C.6. Morocco

Project	Transparency	Accountability	Participation	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7
MA-2005-01 Objectives: Improve management of environmental and water policy	1 Project considers the creation of an open access database with free access to legislation, cooperation programmes and policy measures taken by the beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal management and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	1 Project considers participation from external stakeholders in decision-making during the Twinning project. However, it does not explicitly mention day-to-day participation after the project is over.	0 While water and solid waste management in Morocco is deemed inefficient, high political adoption costs are absent in this sector, where corruption risks are not perceived as high (see Fanack Water 2021b).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2005-02 Objectives: Improve legislative administrative framework to incentivise trade between EU and Morocco through an improved External Commercial Policy, focusing on border control	0 Project does not invest in open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in improved internal management, audit and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as corruption risks in Moroccan customs authorities are perceived as relatively high (see GAN 2020e).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security interests.	1 Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as it explicitly aims to improve Moroccan commercial exchanges with the Common Market.	1 Project requires advanced technical expertise in customs methodologies.

and customs policies.								
MA-2005-03 Objectives: Improve maritime safety	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project requires advanced technical knowledge of maritime tools and legal frameworks.
MA-2005-04 Objectives: Improvement of Moroccan authorities' capacity to control borders and prevent illegal migration as well as illegal traffic.	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as corruption risks in Moroccan border authorities are perceived as relatively high (see GAN 2020e).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	1 Project reflects EU security interests.	-1 Project reflects a relationship of interdependence favourable to Morocco, as the project explicitly aims to prevent illegal migration to the Schengen area.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2006-01 Objectives: Support the integration of the Moroccan market into the European market and improve protection of	1 Project invests in the creation of a centralised database where consumers can find information on how to protect their rights and the	0 Project does not invest in improvement of internal or external accountability frameworks.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	1 Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not reflect security interests.	0 While mentioning access to the EU market, this project focuses mostly on Moroccan consumers' protection. As such, it does not	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

Moroccan consumers.	legal framework that defines them. However, it does not invest in transparency of decisions taken by beneficiary institution.						directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.	
MA-2006-02 Objectives: Reinforce Moroccan institutional capacities in the fight against money laundering	0 Project does not invest in open access to information.	0 Project does not invest in the improvement of internal or external accountability in beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	1 Project relates to security interests, as it explicitly aims to fight money laundering connected to international terrorism.	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise in anti-money laundering frameworks and policies.
MA-2006-03 Objectives: Capacity-building of Moroccan authorities to reinforce competition policy.	0 Project does not consider open or limited access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider improvement of internal or external accountability frameworks.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as it seeks to improve Moroccan access to the Common Market.	1 Project activities require advanced technical-legal expertise.
MA-2006-04 Objectives: Improve audit and control capabilities of the Ministry of	1 Project considers limited access to information on decisions taken	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it aims to	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence	1 Project activities require advanced legal-technical expertise.

Interior towards local authorities.	in the beneficiary institution.	and management framework in beneficiary institution.		enforce control of local and national government expenditures.	commercial interests.		between EU and Algeria.	
MA-2006-05 Objectives: Improve phytosanitary control in Morocco.	0 Project does not consider transparency measures.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal management and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it seeks to improve competitiveness of Moroccan products in the Common Market.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2007-01 Objectives: Support the creation of an Agency for Regional Development of the Oudja region.	0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.	1 Project invests in an efficient and accountable internal structure in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as the Centre wishes to be able to apply for and receive EU regional funding.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2007-02 Objectives: Support the Wilaya of the Oudja region to implement regional development policies.	0 Project does not consider transparency-related measures.	2 Project invests in the improvement of internal management and external accountability frameworks.	2 Project considers the active participation of elected officials in the development of a regional policy for the region.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

<p>MA-2007-03</p> <p>Objectives: Improve the functioning of the National Hygiene Institute.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of internal management and accountability frameworks, considering international Quality Management standards.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced scientific-technical expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2007-04</p> <p>Objectives: Support implementation of national market surveillance legislation.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not proactively seek to improve internal or external accountability in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it invests in more efficient market surveillance mechanisms.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it explicitly aims to improve Moroccan access to the EU market through legislative harmonisation.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2009-01</p> <p>Objectives: Support statistical authorities in analysing and collecting statistical data on foreign trade.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in internal or external accountability framework.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical-statistical expertise.</p>

<p>MA-2009-02</p> <p>Objectives: Institutional support to the Direction of Public-Private Partnerships.</p>	<p>2</p> <p>Project invests in dissemination of information on PPPs, their impact and decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of internal management and accountability frameworks, following international best practices.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as public procurement in Morocco is perceived as having a high corruption risk, with contracts being often attributed to actors closely connected with the elite and the royal family (see GAN, 2020e).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2009-03</p> <p>Objectives: Support the Moroccan Research System to integrate the European Research System.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not mention transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of internal management and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2009-04</p> <p>Objectives: Improve the effectiveness of the <i>Office Marocain de la</i></p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in transparency of decision-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of internal management</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project considers some participation in decision-making activities from</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political costs.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose adverse commercial</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

<i>Propriété Industrielle et Commerciale.</i>		and accountability frameworks.	external partners, mostly organisations from other countries with similar roles.		interests, as some Moroccan businesses benefit from a lax system of intellectual property verification and protection.			
MA-2009-05 Objectives: Improve road safety in Morocco.	0 Project does not consider transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not seek to improve internal or external accountability in beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to regional security interests.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2010-01 Objectives: Improve policymaking capacity of the Ministry for Energy.	0 Project does not consider transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not seek to improve internal or external accountability in beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to regional security interests.	0 Project does not reflect a strong relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise in energy data sector.
MA-2010-02 Objectives: Support the Ministry of Energy to manage and ensure safety of oil and gas supply	0 Project does not consider transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not consider internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs, as it fits with the King's and national government's	1 Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests from Algerian oil exporters to Morocco, as	0 While it reflects energy security concerns of Morocco, project does not directly reflect	0 Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise of energy, oil and gas sectors.

				policy objectives (see ITA, 2021e).	the project implicitly aims to reduce dependency on these.	regional EU security concerns.		
MA-2010-03 Objectives: Institutional capacity building for the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Agency	0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not explicitly invest in improvement of internal or external accountability frameworks.	0 Project does not consider active external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs, as it fits with the King's and national government's policy objectives (see ITA, 2021e).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not reflect security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise on energy and energy efficiency.
MA-2011-01 Objectives: Capacity-building of <i>Inspection Générale des Finances</i> .	0 Project does not consider transparency-related measures.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability measures, including (but not limited to) internal audit mechanisms and better oversight over financial inspectors.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as state-led public policies (e.g. in tax administration, public procurement and other relevant public services) are perceived as having a high corruption risk (see GAN 2020e).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is not related to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise in legal and finance regulation/policies.

<p>MA-2011-02</p> <p>Objectives: Improve capacity of magistrates to implement audits and control of public financial expenditures</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider improvement of internal accountability frameworks.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project objectives are likely to expose high political adoption costs, as they entail stronger accountability of public spending, which is perceived as having a high corruption risk (see GAN, 2020e).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is not related to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced legal expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2011-03</p> <p>Objectives: Improve the efficiency and capacity of Moroccan civil aviation authorities.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project seeks to improve internal accountability and management frameworks within the beneficiary institutions.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project reflects relationship of interdependence favourable to the EU, as it aims to improve Moroccan connectivity with the EU air space, with direct positive consequences for mobility and tourism in Morocco.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced legal expertise on air transport regulations.</p>
<p>MA-2013-01</p> <p>Objectives: Reinforce institutional capacities of the</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in transparency-</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project foresees the improvement of internal</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs,</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced</p>

Interministerial Delegation for Human Rights.	related measures.	accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution.		as it took place shortly after the Arab Spring and amidst Human Rights abuses in Morocco (Human Rights Watch, 2013).	commercial interests.		between EU and Morocco.	technical expertise.
MA-2014-01 Objectives: Improve institutional capacities of the National Council for Human Rights	0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.	1 Project foresees the improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it took place shortly after the Arab Spring and amidst Human Rights abuses in Morocco (Human Rights Watch, 2014).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2014-02 Objectives: Improve water management in Morocco	0 Project does not foresee transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	1 Project considers external participation in decision-making through public meetings held within the Twinning project. However, it does not consider creating more permanent frameworks for participation and input.	0 While water and solid waste management in Morocco is deemed inefficient, high political adoption costs are absent in this sector, where corruption risks are not perceived as high (see	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise of water engineering.

				Fanack Water 2021b).				
MA-2014-03 Objectives: Improve phytosanitary control in Morocco.	0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.	1 Project invests in improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it aims to support regulatory convergence with Morocco to improve Moroccan exports to the Common Market.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2014-04 Objectives: Improve Consumer Protection in Morocco	0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not consider internal or external accountability measures.	1 Project considers external participation in decision-making, through roundtables, in the Twinning project. However, it does not consider more permanent forms of participation after the project.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	1 Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it seeks to reinforce consumer protection and penalisation of non-compliant companies.	0 Project does not relate to security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

<p>MA-2014-05</p> <p>Objectives: Support National Agency for Aquaculture.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not explicitly invest in internal or external accountability towards the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical expertise in aquaculture.</p>
<p>MA-2014-06</p> <p>Objectives: Support to development of Moroccan SMEs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not explicitly invest in internal or external accountability towards the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect strong relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2014-07</p> <p>Objectives: Support implementation of international best practices in dangerous goods transport.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in improvement of internal accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institutions.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect strong relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2015-01</p> <p>Objectives: Support institutional and administrative capacities of the Chamber of Deputies.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in limited access to information on decisions in the beneficiary institutions through a database and archive.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in more efficient internal structures with greater accountability and management within the Chamber.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making within the scope of this project or the creation of participation frameworks after</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it aims to reinforce the capacity of the Chamber of Deputies vis-à-vis the central</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

			its implementation.	government controlled by the King, in a time when Morocco was considered partly free (see, for example, Freedom House, 2017b).				
MA-2015-02 Objectives: Support to the Tax Directorate-General to improve its relationship with taxpayers.	0 Project does not foresee implementation of transparency measures.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management framework within the beneficiary institution. However, it does not invest in forms of external accountability.	0 Project does not consider active participation from external actors in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high/medium political adoption costs, as corruption risk in tax administration is perceived as being medium/high (see GAN, 2020e).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require technical expertise in tax collection systems.
MA-2016-01 Objectives: Strengthen Rule of Law through institutional support to the <i>Institut Supérieur de la Magistrature</i> .	1 Project considers limited access to information on decisions and actions taken by the beneficiary institution through an	1 Project reinforces internal management and accountability practices in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project objectives are likely to expose high political adoption costs, as the judiciary's dependence on the monarchy is	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not reflect security interests.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require advanced legal expertise.

	annual report. However, it does not install a permanent system to access information.			high (see Freedom House, 2017b), while corruption risks in the judiciary system are perceived as high (see GAN, 2020e).				
MA-2016-02 Objectives: Support implementation of international best practices in dangerous goods transport.	0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.	1 Project invests in improvement of internal accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security interests.	0 Project does not reflect strong relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2016-03 Objectives: Support to the Tax Directorate-General to improve its relationship with taxpayers.	0 Project does not foresee implementation of transparency measures.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management framework within the beneficiary institution. However, it does not invest in forms of external accountability.	0 Project does not consider active participation from external actors in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high/medium political adoption costs, as corruption risk in tax administration is perceived as being medium/high (see GAN, 2020e).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require technical expertise in tax collection systems.

<p>MA-2016-04</p> <p>Objectives: Reinforce capacities of the Moroccan Court of Auditors.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in limited transparency of decisions taken by the beneficiary institution. Concretely, it considers the sharing of information between the Court and the Parliament. Yet, it does not consider opening access to this information to other external actors.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in improvement of internal audit, accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution and related institutions.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as corruption risks in public spending and the judiciary system are perceived as high (see GAN, 2020). Moreover, the judiciary is perceived as being dependent on the monarchy (see Freedom House, 2017b).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced legal expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2017-01</p> <p>Objectives: Ensure personal data protection in Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project considers limited participation in decision-making during the Twinning project. However, it does not consider the creation of more permanent long-term participation frameworks.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as personal data protection was a polemic subject at the time in Morocco, with persecution of online activities being reported by activists and</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

				organisations (see Freedom House 2017a).				
<p>MA-2017-02</p> <p>Objectives: Improve accessibility to, interactions and efficiency of the <i>Chambre de Conseillers</i> (High Chamber of Parliament).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in open access to information on decision-making processes in beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks (administrative and financial) in the Chamber.</p>	<p>2</p> <p>Project invests in the active participation from citizens in decision-making through petitions and interactions with decision-makers through an on-line platform.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as greater transparency and accountability of the legislative body may expose adverse political interests, since these bodies are not considered overtly democratic (see Freedom House, 2017a).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project outcomes are unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced legal expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2017-03</p> <p>Objectives: Improve governance and capacities of General Administration for Prisons and Reinsertion.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in transparency measures.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in improved internal accountability and management frameworks in the penitentiary system</p>	<p>2</p> <p>Project invests in active long-term participation from relevant stakeholders in decision-making through a “National</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as the Moroccan prison authorities were often</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to regional security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

			Conference for Consensus”.	accused of human rights abuses and arbitrary treatment in the project’s time frame (see U.S. Department of State, 2018b).				
MA-2017-04 Objectives: Support the implementation of a new Law on Finance.	0 Project does not consider transparency-related measures.	1 Project invests in improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks in beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it seeks to increase transparency and efficiency of public finances, where corruption risks are perceived as medium to high (see GAN 2020e).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to regional security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require advanced legal expertise.
MA-2017-05 Objectives: Institutional support to the Ministry of Communications to improve sector development.	0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.	1 Project invest in the improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks in beneficiary ministry.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to regional security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

<p>MA-2017-06</p> <p>Objectives: Capacity-building of the <i>Conseil de la Concurrence</i></p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider transparency related measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in improved accountability or management practices in beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to directly expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it aims to increase free market competition, to the detriment of incumbent companies with strong market and political power.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unrelated to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not directly reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced legal expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2017-07</p> <p>Objectives: Improve governance of basic health services</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in increased transparency in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in improved internal accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project considers participation from Health sector stakeholders in structured dialogues during the Twinning project. However, it does not explicitly mention if these dialogues will continue in the long-term.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

<p>MA-2017-08</p> <p>Objectives: Support reinforcement of energy transition policies.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not seek to improve transparency of beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not directly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Algeria.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical expertise in energy policy.</p>
<p>MA-2017-09</p> <p>Objectives: Improve management of financial resources in Health ministry</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not improve transparency in beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in improved internal audit, oversight, and accountability measures in the beneficiary institution, in order to ensure more efficient and transparent management of financial resources.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it seeks to improve control over budgetary expenses in a public administration body, where corruption risks are perceived as medium to high (see GAN, 2020e).</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require specialised technical expertise.</p>
<p>MA-2017-10</p> <p>Objectives: Improve market surveillance mechanisms</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not improve transparency of beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project seeks to improve internal oversight and accountability measures in the beneficiary institution, particularly tracking actions taken by market surveillance inspectors.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to directly expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it aims to increase free market competition, to the detriment of</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unrelated to security concerns.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it aims to improve regulatory convergence to ease Moroccan exports to the EU market.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced legal expertise.</p>

					incumbent companies with strong market and political power.			
MA-2017-11 Objectives: Support conformity of exports authority for agricultural and fisheries products in the EU market.	0 Project does not improve transparency of beneficiary institution.	1 Projects invests in quality control, audit, and improved management frameworks in beneficiary institution, particularly its laboratories.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it seeks to improve Moroccan exports.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it explicitly invests in improving Moroccan products' conformity and export to the EU market.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2017-12 Objectives: Reinforce gender sensitive approach to budget governance in Ministry of Finance.	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2017-13 Objectives: Support Higher Education reform to approximate Moroccan system to EU Higher Education Space.	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project explicitly aims to improve mobility and opportunities for Moroccan students and researchers in the EU. Therefore, it reflects an	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

							interdependence favourable to the EU.	
MA-2017-14 Objectives: Support the National Centre for Scientific and Technical Research in building stronger cooperation with EU counterparts and access EU funds	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in improvement of internal management and accountability practices in beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project explicitly aims to improve mobility and opportunities for Moroccan researchers in the EU Research Space, as well as access to EU funding in this domain. Therefore, it reflects an interdependence favourable to the EU.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2017-15 Objectives: Support the National Education Evaluation institute in Education public policy evaluation.	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2018-01 Objectives: Support the National Public Health School to improve health	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not directly reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

governance in Morocco.	by beneficiary institution.				commercial interests.			
MA-2018-02 Objectives: Reinforce Rule of Law by supporting the <i>Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire</i> , drawing on EU best practices.	0 Project does not invest in transparency of beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in improvement of internal accountability framework in the beneficiary institution, through the delineation of responsibilities as well as the creation of a deontological code.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as corruption in the judiciary system is perceived as medium to high (see GAN, 2020e).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns,	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	1 Project activities require advanced legal expertise.
MA-2018-03 Objectives: Support Sustainable Environmental Development in Morocco.	0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not directly reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
MA-2019-01 Objectives: Support National Certification Commission (Education Ministry).	1 Project invests in transparency of decisions taken by the beneficiary institution, namely the transparency of	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not directly reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

	certification procedures.							
MA-2019-02 Objectives: Support to the <i>Trésorerie Générale du Royaume</i> in its public finance management capacities.	0 Project does not seek to improve transparency of beneficiary institution.	1 Project invests in improved management and accountability measures in beneficiary institution, namely related to internal transparency and oversight of budgetary expenses.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it seeks to improve control over budgetary expenses in a public administration body, where corruption risks are perceived as medium to high (see GAN, 2020e).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Morocco.	0 Project activities do not require specialised technical expertise.

C.7. Palestine

Project	Transparency	Accountability	Participation	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7
PS-2018-01 Objective: Improve the Palestinian Authority (PA) fiscal position through improving collection of customs revenues and strengthening borders control in order to reduce evasion of customs duties.	0 Project does not consider transparency measures.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal administrative and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 While corruption risks in Palestine are perceived as relatively low (see U.S. Department of State 2018a), this project explicitly aims to track and monitor illegal activities and corruption in Palestine's border (see p. 10-11). However, because corruption is not perceived as endemic, I have decided to qualify this project as "not risky".	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not expose security interests.	0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between the EU and Palestine.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

<p>PS-2019-01 Objective: To support the strengthening of official statistics in order to better answer the needs of the users and building on exchanges and transfers with/from the EU statistical system”</p>	<p>1 Project invests in open access to statistical information made available by the beneficiary institution. However, it does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1 Project invests in the reinforcement of internal quality management and accountability measures in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider active external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect security interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Palestine.</p>	<p>1 Project activities require advanced technical knowledge.</p>
<p>PS-2019-02 Objective: Improve accountability and management of public funds in Palestine through enhanced external audit capacity in line with Palestine's National Policy Agenda and in conformity with recognized international audit standards.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by/in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1 Project aims to improve internal management guidelines and accountability measures within the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0 While corruption risks in Palestine are perceived as relatively low (see U.S. Department of State 2018a), this project explicitly aims to improve audit functions to tackle corruption and misuse of public funds (see p. 3-4). However, because</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not expose security interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect relationship of interdependence between the EU and Palestine.</p>	<p>1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise on audit frameworks.</p>

				corruption is not perceived as endemic, I have decided to qualify this project as “not risky”.				
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C.8. Tunisia

Project	Transparency	Accountability	Participation	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7
TU-2005-01 Objectives: Support phytosanitary control of vegetables.	0 Project does not invest in transparency related measures.	0 Project does not consider improving internal or external accountability in beneficiary institutions.	1 Project considers limited participation in decision-making during Twinning activities, through a discussion seminar on phytosanitary policies in Tunisia. Furthermore, it does not consider creating a permanent venue for external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it explicitly aims to improve Tunisian vegetable exports to the EU market.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2005-02 Objectives: Capacity-building of the Institute for Quantitative Economics in	0 Project does not invest in transparency related measures.	0 Project does not consider improving internal or external	0 Project does not consider external participation	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs. While it studies economic policy impact from a	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	1 Project activities require advanced

analysing economics statistics and the impact of economic policy in the country's development.		accountability in beneficiary institutions.	in decision making.	macroeconomic-statistical perspective, it does not aim to increase accountability or scrutiny of public decisionmakers per se.				technical expertise.
TU-2005-03 Objectives: Improve safety and quality control of animal products in Tunisia.	0 Project does not invest in transparency related measures.	0 Project does not consider improving internal or external accountability in beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it explicitly aims to improve control of animals and animal products to allow their export to the EU market.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2006-01 Objectives: Support the implementation of a Property Information System.	0 Project does not invest in transparency related measures.	0 Project does not consider improving internal or external accountability in beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it aims to ensure better protection of property rights of business owners.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2006-02 Objectives: Support public Regional Development Organisations in their private investment	0 Project does not invest in transparency related measures.	0 Project does not consider improvements in internal or external accountability of RDO.	2 Project considers involving private sector stakeholder in the definition of	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it aims to ensure better protection of property rights of business owners.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project does not require advanced technical expertise.

promotion strategies.			regional development strategies in the long term.					
TU-2006-03 Objectives: Support the Bank for Financing MSMEs.	0 Project does not consider transparency related measures.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management procedures within the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it aims to support private sector development.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project does not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2006-04 Objectives: Support the extension of Social Security and Welfare coverage to non-covered groups.	0 Project does not invest in transparency related measures.	0 Project does not consider improving internal or external accountability in beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project does not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2006-05 Objectives: Support Tunisian authorities in ensuring industrial conformity for future EU-Tunisia agreements.	0 Project does not invest in transparency related measures.	1 Project invests in internal accountability and management frameworks in beneficiary institutions to ensure proper implementation	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it explicitly aims to ensure conformity of Tunisian industrial products to	1 Project activities required advanced technical expertise.

		and conformity with EU rules on industrial conformity.					enter the EU market.	
TU-2006-06 Objectives: Support the National Arts & Crafts Institution in promoting the Arts & Crafts sector.	0 Project does not invest in transparency related measures.	0 Project does not consider improving internal or external accountability in beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project does not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2006-07 Objectives: Improve the relationship between taxpayers and tax administration to improve tax collection.	0 Project does not invest in external transparency related measures.	2 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks within the beneficiary institution, as well as the introduction of external accountability tools, namely allowing taxpayers to provide evaluate and complain on the	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as corruption risks in the Tunisian tax administration are perceived as high (see GAN, 2020f).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.

		institution's actions.						
TU-2007-01 Objectives: Support the National Statistics Institute in collecting and developing statistics on enterprises.	0 Project does not consider transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not invest in improvement of internal or external accountability in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in Twinning activities and decision-making in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2009-01 Objectives: Support the Tunisian Central Bank in implementing a stabilisation monetary policy.	1 Project considers increasing transparency of the beneficiary institution, notably regarding its inflation policy and its outcomes. However, it does not consider increasing the transparency of the institution more broadly.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability of the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.

<p>TU-2010-01 Objectives: Improve budgetary expenditures management in public institutions.</p>	<p>0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>1 Project invests in improvement of internal accountability in beneficiary institution. However, it does not consider external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it seeks to increase accountability of budgetary decisions and public expenditures, where the corruption risk is perceived as being high (see GAN, 2020f)</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.</p>	<p>1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>TU-2010-02 Objectives: Improve the ability of the Court of Auditors in overseeing public expenditures.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>1 Project invests in improvement of internal management, accountability, and audit frameworks in the beneficiary institution. However, it does not consider external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it seeks to increase accountability of budgetary decisions and public expenditures, where the corruption risk is perceived as being high (see GAN, 2020f)</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.</p>	<p>1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>TU-2010-03 Objectives: Support Ministry of Employment in developing job-creation policies.</p>	<p>0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>1 Project seeks to improve internal accountability and management practices within</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.</p>	<p>0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

		the beneficiary institutions.						
TU-2010-04 Objectives: Promote and reinforce metrology system in Tunisia.	1 Project considers increasing the access to information on metrology regulations taken by the beneficiary institutions. However, it only considers sharing outcomes of decisions, rather than increasing transparency of decision-making processes <i>per se</i> .	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability in beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it seeks to improve Tunisian exports to the European market through harmonisation of metrology regulations.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2010-05 Objectives: Support the <i>Direction Générale de la Planification et des Etudes</i> in the development and implementation of a more effective	0 Project does not foresee relevant transparency measures.	1 Project foresees an investment in accountability and good management measures in the beneficiary institution,	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not expose interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

public transport policy.		namely concerning to-be-created Public Enterprises. Nevertheless, it does not consider external accountability measures.						
TU-2010-06 Objectives: Reinforce regulation of telecommunication s market.	0 Project does not consider transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it was implemented amidst high-level corruption scandals involving French and Tunisian telecommunications companies and bribery of state institutions (see Mancourt, 2011 and Silbert, 2011). Furthermore, public contracts/procurements are perceived as portraying a high corruption risk in Tunisia (see GAN, 2020f).	1 Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it seeks to reinforce accountability and oversight of private actors in telecommunications sector, in a moment when high-level corruption scandals were being discussed involving these actors (see Mancourt, 2011 and Silbert, 2011).	0 Project is unrelated to security concerns.	0 Project does not directly reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2011-01 Objectives: Support control of chemical substances in	0 Project does not invest in relevant	0 Project does not consider improvements in internal or	0 Project does not consider external participation	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests, as it	0 Project does not relate to	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it	1 Project activities require advanced

industrial sector through application and conformity with REACH system.	transparency measures.	external accountability measures.	in decision-making.		seeks to improve Tunisian exports.	security concerns.	explicitly seeks to reinforce conformity of Tunisian producers with the REACH system to ensure exports to the EU market.	technical expertise.
TU-2011-02 Objectives: Support public institutions in implementing new environmental protection and sustainability policy framework.	0 Project does not invest in transparency related measures.	0 Project does not consider external or internal accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project does not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2011-03 Objectives: Support eco-building measures in Tunisia	0 Project does not invest in greater transparency of beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not explicitly foresee improvement of internal or external accountability of beneficiary institution.	2 Project considers limited participation in decision-making through the creation of the "Comité Tunisien du Bâtiment Durable", comprising operators from the construction sector.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project does not require advanced technical expertise.

TU-2011-04 Objectives: Support SME development institutions in Tunisia.	0 Project does not include transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not foresee investment in internal or external accountability of beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project does not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2011-05 Objectives: Reinforce institutional system for market surveillance and oversight.	0 Project does not consider transparency measures.	1 Project invests in improving the internal accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution. However, it does not consider external accountability measures.	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to directly expose high political adoption costs.	1 Project may expose adverse commercial interests, as it seeks to enforce market surveillance mechanisms and avoid unlawful market practices.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not explicitly reflect relationship of interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	1 Project activities require advanced technical-legal expertise.
TU-2011-06 Objectives: Support to the National Centre for Animal Sanitary Surveillance.	1 Project invests in limited transparency measures, mostly focused on phytosanitary situation and animal surveillance outcomes.	1 Project invests in improving internal accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution. However, it does not	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not reflect security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it implicitly aims to increase Tunisian access to the EU market.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.

	Nevertheless, it does not consider transparency measures targeting decision-making in the beneficiary institution.	consider external accountability measures.						
TU-2011-07 Objectives: Development of a medical-economic information system, allowing public institutions to calculate costs of hospital activities for specific diseases/health problems	0 Project does not consider external transparency measures.	1 Project considers the implementation of internal accountability and management systems for medical expenses in Tunisian hospitals.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2011-08 Objectives: Support integration of handicap people in Tunisia	0 Project does not consider transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability of beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2011-09 Objectives: Support implementation of better work health	0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability	0 Project does not foresee external participation	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced

and safety measures		of beneficiary institution.	in decision-making.					technical expertise.
TU-2011-10 Objectives: Support the Tunisian Accreditation Council (TUNAC) in implementing conformity-related policy measures following EU and international standards.	1 Project considers limited access to information on conformity to external actors (companies, clients, other accreditation authorities, etc.).	2 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management practices in the beneficiary institution. Furthermore, it considers a role for international accreditation authorities in peer-reviewing the standards and practices implemented in the beneficiary institution, thus guaranteeing a degree of external accountability and oversight.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it explicitly seeks to ensure conformity to guarantee free trade between Tunisia and the Common Market.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2011-11 Objectives: Implement a transparent register for Tunisian SMEs	1 Project considers limited access to information	0 Project does not invest in internal or external	0 Project does not consider external participation	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it	0 Project activities do not require advanced

that ensures conformity with EU standards.	on conformity with international standards and SME registration. However, it does not consider access to information on decision-making activities.	accountability of beneficiary institution.	in decision-making.			security concerns.	explicitly seeks to improve Tunisia's access to the Common Market.	technical expertise.
TU-2013-01 Objectives: Support regulation of telecommunication s market.	0 Project does not invest in greater transparency of beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability of beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	1 Project is likely to expose adverse commercial interests, as incumbent companies in the telecoms market may lose benefits from new and more transparent regulations (see The Washington Post, 2014).	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2014-01 Objectives: Develop and implement a Quality Framework for Tourism sector.	0 Project does not invest in transparency of beneficiary institution.	1 Project defines internal management and accountability frameworks for the beneficiary institution. However, it	1 Project foresees active participation of external stakeholders (Professional organisations and other	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

		does not foresee external accountability modalities.	ministries) in decision-making activities during the Twinning project. However, it does not clearly foresee external participation in day-to-day activities of the beneficiary.					
TU-2014-02 Objectives: Institutional support to maritime authorities to improve maritime governance.	0 Project does not foresee implementation of transparency-related measures.	1 Project seeks to improve internal management and accountability frameworks in beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project objectives are unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to (migration or) security concerns.	0 Project does not explicitly reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	1 Project activities require advanced technical-legal expertise and understanding of International Maritime Law.
TU-2014-03 Objectives: Improve sanitary safety of food packages for agricultural products and their	0 Project does not foresee transparency-related measures.	1 Project seeks to improve internal management and accountability	0 Project does not foresee external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it explicitly aims to improve	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

environmental impact.		frameworks in the beneficiary institution.					Tunisian exports of agricultural products to the Common Market.	
TU-2015-01 Objectives: Improve sanitary and security measures for consumers and the environment.	0 Project does not foresee transparency-related measures.	1 Project foresees an improvement in internal management and accountability frameworks of the beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not foresee explicit participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to regional security concerns.	1 Project reflects interdependence favourable to the EU, as it explicitly aims to improve sanitary and safety standards of Tunisian products to facilitate their access to the Common Market.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2015-02 Objectives: Improve resource allocation in national health services.	0 Project does not consider external transparency measures.	1 Project considers the implementation of internal accountability and management systems for medical expenses in Tunisian hospitals.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.

TU-2015-03 Objectives: Improve personal data protection in Tunisia.	0 Project does not include transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not invest in external or accountability frameworks for the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs, as it took place in a time when data protection and privacy regulations were being actively considered by public authorities (see Freedom House, 2016).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2015-04 Objectives: Support to the National Meteorology Institute.	1 Project considers increased access to information produced by beneficiary institution; however, it does not consider open access to information on decision-making activities.	1 Project invests in improvement of internal accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not explicitly consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not explicitly expose regional security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	1 Project activities require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2015-05 Objectives: Capacity-building for the Tunisian National Parliament to better perform its legislative functions.	0 Project does not include transparency-related measures.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability and management	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs, as it took place in a time when democratic institutions were going through a positive	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

		frameworks for Parliament staff and parliamentary procedures. However, it does not consider measures related to external accountability of parliamentarians and staff.		consolidation process (see Freedom House 2017c).				
TU-2015-06 Objectives: Increase worker safety and protection frameworks.	0 Project does not invest in transparency of beneficiary institutions.	0 Project does not invest in internal or external accountability measures.	2 Project considers active external participation in decision-making during and after Twinning project, in the framework of the tripartite dialogue between the Government, UGTT and UTICA.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs, as it follows the goals of the national political dialogue which begun after the revolution, as explicitly stated in the project fiche.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to regional security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

<p>TU-2015-07 Objectives: Capacity-building of the National Magistrature to ensure an efficient and independent judiciary through quality training for future magistrates.</p>	<p>0 Project does not invest in external transparency measures.</p>	<p>1 Project invests in improved internal accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1 Project considers active participation from external actors in the development of pedagogical materials during the Twinning project. However, it does not consider creating a permanent participation mechanism.</p>	<p>1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as the corruption risk in the judiciary system is perceived as high (see GAN 2020f).</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.</p>	<p>0 Project activities do not require advanced technical-legal expertise.</p>
<p>TU-2015-08 Objectives: Reinforce institutional and operational capacities of penitentiary system.</p>	<p>2 Project explicitly considers creating transparency and communication mechanisms to allow private sector and civil society actors access to information on detainees and</p>	<p>2 Project invests in internal and external accountability of the beneficiary institutions, namely through improved internal management frameworks and a mechanism for external</p>	<p>1 Project considers active participation by external actors (civil society and public stakeholders) in decision-making activities during the Twinning</p>	<p>1 While the penitentiary system has become significantly more transparent and self-critical after the Tunisian revolution (see Avocats Sans Frontières, 2015), the project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it further seeks to tackle the deficiencies of the judiciary and</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not explicitly reflect regional security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not explicitly reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.</p>	<p>0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

	penitentiary conditions.	complaints by detainees on their conditions.	project. However, it does not explicitly consider external participation in day-to-day decision-making activities of the beneficiary institutions.	penitentiary system brought from the Ben Ali regime.				
TU-2015-09 Objectives: Institution-building of the Ministry of Justice.	0 Project does not include transparency-related measures.	1 Project invests in internal management and accountability frameworks, through internal evaluation and oversight mechanisms, in the Ministry of Justice. However, it does not consider external accountability measures.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as corruption risks in the Tunisian judiciary system are perceived as high (see GAN, 2020f).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unlikely to expose regional security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical-legal expertise.

<p>TU-2015-10</p> <p>Objectives: Improve Aviation Authority's capacity for ensuring safety and management of Tunisian civil airspace according to international and EU standards.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in access to limited information on aerial traffic. However, it does not consider open access to information on decisions taken by the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project seeks to improve internal management and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institutions. However, it does not consider external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose regional security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not explicitly reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>TU-2015-11</p> <p>Objectives: Support the Ministry of Agriculture in improving its agricultural policies.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not foresee transparency-related measures.</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in improving internal accountability, management, and evaluation frameworks in the beneficiary institution. However, it does not consider external accountability measures.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not explicitly foresee external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to security concerns.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>TU-2015-12</p> <p>Objectives: Support improvement of</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project seeks to improve access to statistical</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project invests in the improvement of internal</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not consider external participation</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not relate to regional</p>	<p>0</p> <p>Project does not reflect interdependence</p>	<p>1</p> <p>Project activities require advanced</p>

National Statistics in Tunisia.	information produced by beneficiary institution. However, it does not clarify if policy is “open access” and includes access to information on decision-making.	management and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	in decision-making.			security concerns.	e between EU and Tunisia.	technical expertise.
TU-2016-01 Objectives: Improve Tunisian Heritage and Cultural policies.	2 Project invests in open access to information on cultural policies.	1 Project invests in more efficient internal accountability and management frameworks in the beneficiary institutions. However, it does not consider forms of external accountability.	2 Project insists in the inclusion and participation of external stakeholders in future decisions of beneficiary institutions.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unrelated to regional security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2018-01 Objectives: Support the regulation and liberalisation of the communications and audio-visuals sector.	0 Project does not explicitly consider transparency measures.	1 Project invests in the improvement of internal accountability, management and oversight frameworks	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 While this project reflects an effort of enforcing press freedom in Tunisia after the Revolution, security and political concerns are still present in this time	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not explicitly reflect regional security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

		within the beneficiary institution. However, it does not consider external accountability mechanisms.		period, thus creating high political adoption costs that can deter this reform (see, for example: Ben Said, 2015).				
TU-2018-02 Objectives: Support oversight and preservation of water resources.	0 Project does not invest in transparency-related measures.	1 Project considers improving internal management and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs, despite poor functioning of water management institutions (SIWI, 2016).	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project is unlikely to expose regional security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.
TU-2018-03 Objectives: Improve Human Resources management of Tunisian Public Administration.	0 Project does not include transparency-related measures.	0 Project does not explicitly seek to increase internal or external accountability of beneficiary institution.	0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.	1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as it explicitly seeks to impose structural reforms in the Tunisian Public Administration, perceived as having too many workers with little efficiency. This decision is likely to have high electoral and political adoption costs.	0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.	0 Project does not relate to regional security concerns.	0 Project does not reflect interdependence between EU and Tunisia.	0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.

<p>TU-2018-04 Objectives: Institution and capacity-building for the High Administrative Court.</p>	<p>1 Project seeks to improve transparency of beneficiary institution, through access to limited information on decisions taken by the Court. However, full open access is not explicitly considered.</p>	<p>1 Project seeks to improve internal management and accountability frameworks in the beneficiary institution.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>1 Project is likely to expose high political adoption costs, as corruption risks in the Tunisian Public Administration are perceived as being high (see GAN, 2020f).</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not relate to regional security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not relate to interdependence between EU and Tunisia.</p>	<p>0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>
<p>TU-2018-05 Objectives: Improve the Research & Innovation ecosystem in Tunisia.</p>	<p>0 Project does not foresee transparency measures.</p>	<p>0 Project does not explicitly aim to improve internal or external accountability of beneficiary institutions.</p>	<p>0 Project does not consider external participation in decision-making.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose high political adoption costs.</p>	<p>0 Project is unlikely to expose adverse commercial interests.</p>	<p>0 Project does not relate to regional security concerns.</p>	<p>0 Project does not reflect explicit interdependence between EU and Tunisia.</p>	<p>0 Project activities do not require advanced technical expertise.</p>

