



INSTITUTO
UNIVERSITÁRIO
DE LISBOA

Representations of Islam in Portuguese Media

Francisco Pita Caravana Santos Silva

Doutoramento em Sociologia

Orientadora:

Professora Joana Fonseca França Azevedo, Professora Auxiliar,
Iscte-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

Dezembro, 2021

Departamento de Sociologia

Representations of Islam in Portuguese Media

Francisco Pita Caravana Santos Silva

Doutoramento em Sociologia

Júri:

Doutora Patrícia Durães Ávila, Professora Associada do Iscte –
Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (Presidente)

Doutora Helena Carlota Ribeiro Vilaça, Professora Associada da
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto

Doutor José Manuel Fraga Mapril Gonçalves, Professor Auxiliar da F
CSH, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa

Doutor Gustavo Alberto Guerreiro Seabra Leitão Cardoso, Professor
Catedrático do Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

Doutora Joana Fonseca França Azevedo, Professora Auxiliar do
Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

Dezembro, 2021

I would like to thank CIES and ISCTE for having taken me in during the time it took to write this thesis, as well as some specific people within the institutions, such as Professor Patrícia Ávila, as well as my supervisor, Professor Joana Azevedo.

I must also thank my family for all the support given throughout the years, particularly my parents. Lastly, but definitely not leastly, I must thank Raquel Gomes, who, being my partner in life, was also the person who had to deal with the bad days and bad moods as well as suffer reading through early drafts and being a sounding board for all my doubts or half-baked ideas. Her help was invaluable.

Resumo

Esta tese procura explorar a representação do Islão e assuntos relacionados com a religião Islâmica nos *media* portugueses, e integrar essa representação no contexto dos *media* e sociedades ocidentais, com um foco particular na Europa. Através de uma série de capítulos inter-relacionados, a tese irá explorar as atitudes Portuguesas em relação ao Islão e aos Muçulmanos e focar-se especialmente em como estas se reflectem nos *media* nacionais de informação. Utilizando os jornais *Público* e *Correio da Manhã* como estudos de caso contrastantes, a tese também mostra como considerações económicas e de classe interagem com a representação do Islão na imprensa. Diferentes capítulos focam-se em artigos de opinião e artigos noticiosos, mas a abordagem é mais larga explorando como os jornais disponibilizam plataformas para comentários interactivos dos leitores, tanto através das suas páginas na internet e através da sua presença nas redes sociais. Através destes comentários a forma como os leitores reagem a notícias específicas pode ser medida. No entanto, porque os *media* portugueses não se resumem aos *media* criados pela maioria branca e culturalmente católica, a tese também olha para a produção de *media* pela comunidade muçulmana em Portugal que discute assuntos relacionados com o Islão. Chegando ao fim da tese será alcançada uma imagem multifacetada de como o Islão é representado nos *media* portugueses e como as atitudes portuguesas em relação ao Islão interseccionam a representação nos *media*, bem como possíveis explicações para a situação corrente.

Palavras-Chave: Islão, *media*, Portugal, religião, sociologia, representação

Abstract

This thesis seeks to explore the representation of Islam and issues related to Islamic religion in Portuguese media and to integrate that representation in the context of western media and society, with a particular focus on Europe. Through a series of interrelated chapters the thesis will explore Portuguese attitudes to Islam and Muslims and focus mainly on how these are reflected on national news media. Using the newspapers *Público* and *Correio da Manhã* as contrasting case studies, the thesis also shows how class and economic considerations play into the representation of Islam in printed media. Different chapters focus on opinion articles and news items but the net is cast wider by exploring how newspapers provide platforms for interactive reader comments, both through their own websites and through their social media presence. Through these comments the way in which readers react to specific news items can be gauged. However, because Portuguese media is not only that created by the majority, white, culturally catholic population, the thesis also looks at the production of media by the Muslim community in Portugal discussing items surrounding Islam. By the end of the thesis a multi-faceted image of how Islam is represented in Portuguese media and how Portuguese attitudes to Islam intersect with media representation is achieved, as well as possible explanations for the current situation.

Keywords: Islam, media, Portugal, religion, sociology, representation.

INTRODUCTION 3	01
The History of Media Coverage of Islam Up Until 9/11	09
CHAPTER 1: Attitudes towards Islam and Muslims in Portugal:	
Drawing Data from the European Social Survey Data	15
1.1 Introduction	15
1.2 What is the ESS, why it can be useful and what are its limitations in the analysis of data about Portugal and Islam	16
1.3 Attitudes towards Race, Ethnicity and Immigration in Portugal	20
1.4 Attitudes towards Muslims when compared to other groups	28
1.5 How does Portugal compare to other European countries in terms of attitudes to Islam and Muslims	34
1.6 Conclusion	44
CHAPTER 2: The Representation of Islam in the Portuguese	
Media's Response to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks	47
2.1 Introduction	47
2.2 Media Coverage of Islam in the Twenty-first Century	49
2.3 Comparison Between Two Daily Newspapers	52
2.4 Content Analysis: The Charlie Hebdo Case	56
2.5 Opinion Articles	58
2.5.1 Público	58
2.5.2 Correio da Manhã	61
2.6 Conclusion	63
CHAPTER 3: The Contrasting Coverage of National and International News About Islam in Portuguese Newspapers	67
3.1 Introduction	67

3.2 Islam in Portugal in the International Context	68
3.3 Characteristics of International Coverage	72
3.4 Characteristics of National Coverage	78
3.5 Contrast between National and International Coverage	81
3.6 Conclusion	84

CHAPTER 4: The Portuguese and Islam in the Internet Age:

Online Reactions to News of the Construction of a New Mosque in Lisbon	87
4.1 Introduction	87
4.2 Internet Comments as a Methodological Problem	88
4.3 Case Study: New Lisbon Mosque	94
4.3.1 The Event	94
4.3.2 The Newspapers	96
4.3.3 The Articles	96
4.3.4 The Comments	98
4.4 What do users say in the comments?	100
4.4.1 First Pair of Articles: Start of the Eviction Process	100
4.4.2 Second Pair of Articles: Updates on the Eviction Process	102
4.4.3 Third Pair of Articles: Articles on the Area of the intervention	104
4.5 Conclusion	106

CHAPTER 5: Muslim Self-Representation in Portugal:

The Audiovisual Production of the Lisbon Sunni Central Mosque	109
5.1 Introduction	109
5.2 Islam in Portugal and the Lisbon Central Mosque	110
5.3 Audiovisual media produced by the Central Lisbon Mosque	114
5.4 Differences in content between televised and online audiovisual productions	117
5.5 Conclusion	120

CONCLUSION	123
BIBLIOGRAPHY	131
APPENDIX A	151
European Social Survey Tables for Chapter 1	151

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to explore, as is made explicit by the title, how Islam is represented in Portuguese media, this kind of exploration of the relationship between media, religion, and minority representation has been studied extensively elsewhere in Europe and the world at large, but there is a noticeable lack of such research in Portuguese sociology of religion. This is due to a number of factors, such as the lack of an established academic field on the Study of Religion in Portugal and also a small number of scholars dedicated to the study of the Sociology of Religion in particular. There are, of course, scholars in this field but the scope of their study has never turned its gaze on this particular intersection. As we will see later in this introduction, when we take on a short literature overview, there is a large bibliography on the subject elsewhere, but Portugal, being a relatively religiously homogeneous country, and with a small number of immigrants of religious beliefs other than Catholicism or Christianity in general has, naturally and historically, concerned itself with studying subjects connected to those overwhelmingly present religious expressions rather than subjects connected to smaller religious groups, even if these are of worldwide significance and represent large global populations, as is the case with Islam and Muslims.

This was, then, the original idea behind this thesis, to fill a gap in the research, not only in Portugal itself but Europe wide, as it will help fill in the puzzle of how Islam is represented across Europe in the media, something for which we already have information in other countries but none about Portugal.

However, the end result is more than that, the thesis explores Portugal's attitudes towards religions which are seen as alien by the majority of population, explores how economic and social conditions directly affect religious and ethnic tolerance, how media outlets contribute to discrimination by providing online forums for the spread of misinformation and prejudice and how they manipulate readers into seeing the "danger of Islam" as something disproportionate to the reality on the ground in Portugal. The thesis also shows how a section of the Muslim population in the country tries to contradict this media narrative through their own means which, even with the help of new technologies, remains an asymmetrical fight against a mainstream media which sees Islam as totally foreign. The thesis presents a multifaceted view of Islam in Portugal, as it is portrayed in the media and how the generality of the

Portuguese public thinks about it, but also how there is an attempt to contradict this narrative.

Unfortunately, this was also a thesis produced under particular conditions, as the COVID-19 pandemic played havoc with the plans to conclude it in the final two years of its development, this left some of the more in person fieldwork planned for the thesis impossible to realise. Fortunately, however, new technologies permit access to much of the data needed for analysing the representation of Islam without leaving the comfort, or in this case, confinement, of home and, therefore, through the use of newspaper websites, social networks, television archives online or freely available surveys like the European Social Survey, it was possible to achieve the end result that was aimed at from the start. As we will see, one is able to draw from human voices across time, commenting directly on the news from such places as comment sections on newspapers or Facebook, draw conclusions about the values and opinions over time of the Portuguese population through the ESS, and chart how opinion makers shape public opinion through looking at opinion articles in newspapers and online, as well as see how the Muslim population in Portugal replies to their situation in the country through their own means of media production.

A note on the unusual format of this thesis should be included here, as an explanation for why it takes this shape. The thesis is composed of five distinct chapters other than the introduction and conclusion, these chapters were designed as distinct articles for publication and can be read either individually or together as a thesis, this was a decision done both for methodological and practical reasons. The distinct characteristic of the chapters allows for the use of distinct methods, such as a more quantitative or qualitative chapter, or one employing mixed methods. Examples of these three cases can be seen in the first chapter, more quantitative in approach, the fifth chapter with a qualitative slant and the second chapter, for example, which uses a mainly qualitative approach while using quantitative tools as an aide. The practical reason for this decision of making distinct chapters was the possibility to use them as articles for publication, this was the case with the second chapter which has been published in issue 3, volume 12, of the peer-reviewed *Journal of Religion in Europe* in 2020. This also means that much of the review of available literature is spread among the five chapters and they should be read as distinct entities each representing a different facet of the subject stated in the thesis title. By the end of the thesis and this will more clearly coalesce in the conclusion after the fifth chapter, the reader should have a multifaceted perspective on the subject of the media representation of Islam in Portugal and be able to construct a distinctive perspective on the subject, its causes and effects.

This is not to say, however that the chapters in this thesis are disconnected from each other, in fact, they work as different facets of one same subject which should by the end of it give the

reader a more complete picture both of how Islam and Muslims are integrated into Portuguese society, how they are portrayed by the media, how media consumers react to Islam and Muslims, how they answer to those portrayals and reactions through their own means and how all of this influences their position in Portuguese society. Therefore, even if each chapter is a distinct entity in itself, much will be gained by the reader if they read them together as one thesis.

The first chapter of this thesis aims to give a general perspective of Portuguese attitudes towards immigrants, non-Christian religions and minority groups, paying particular attention to the data we have on Muslims in Portugal. It aims, then, to set the scene for the rest of the thesis by making heavy use of quantitative data from the European Social Survey to paint a picture of Portugal and its European context. Much as different chapters take on different methodological approaches as these fit better the subject being explored than other methodologies would, the same happens with theoretical approaches. The first chapter, for example, takes a macro approach, making heavy use of quantitative data from the ESS, at the same time showing a positivist tendency in the sense that it relies on quantitative data to try to bring out social facts about the values and concerns of the Portuguese population and how they compare to the rest of Europe, being detached from individual stories and attempts to explain these social facts through the uncovering of laws that govern human behaviour and values. The idea that this chapter points to, that material conditions shape human behaviour and values and that as these material conditions change so do social facts, also clearly draws from Marxist theory and particularly Economic Determinism in its conclusion.

The second chapter focuses on a case study, the reactions in two Portuguese newspapers to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, in January 2015, and particularly the way in which opinion columns in newspapers talked about Islam in the week following the attack. This chapter gives a good overview of a general opinion on Islam by “opinion makers” in the Portuguese media and how these opinions are different depending on the demographic segment to which the newspapers are oriented, exploring the differences between reference and tabloid coverage of Islam. Using mixed methods the chapter explores both the content of the articles themselves as well as tallying up the positive, negative and neutral trends across both newspapers. In contrast to the first chapter’s positivist approach with Marxist undertones, the second chapter is more oriented to an interpretivist perspective, using my own interpretative capabilities to read meaning in the way newspapers and even specific opinion piece writers reacted to the Charlie Hebdo case, the article used qualitative data to measure how people perceive the world and quantitative data as numerical measurements ascribed to those perceptions, being also consistent with a broadly interpretivist approach to the subject. Here an associative model of

analysis is also used, where the author searched for meaning through the interpretation of the opinion articles in the newspapers analysed and looked for associations between those texts and the idea of Islam, attempting to find a contextual understanding of the point of view of the writers and their underlying opinions on Islam. This understanding, then, led to the creation of a simple scale of opinions on Islam with three points (negative, neutral and positive) which, through textual interpretation, allowed for an appreciation of the general outlook of each of the writers and subsequently each of the newspapers examined.

The third chapter continues exploring how different newspapers cover Islam, but this time focusing on the hypothesis that the coverage of national and international news on themes about Islam would have different slants. This chapter then explores how newspapers can sometimes attempt to heighten feelings of fear or paranoia even when there is little to fear and explores how there are indeed marked differences in how national and international news is covered both in reference newspapers and in tabloid ones. Methodologically this, much like chapter two, takes a mainly interpretivist approach using qualitative methods to reach an understanding of whether and why there are any differences between the coverage of the two categories of news items explored in this chapter. The second part of the chapter goes farther in its interpretation of the texts by attempting to propose a sociological hypothesis on why this is the case, through a sort of exercise in Weberian *Verstehen* where I try to put myself in the position of the newspapers and posit reasons for what might lead said newspapers to relate the news in a way rather than another. Lastly, I put myself in the position of the readers of these news items, and attempt to gauge how news items which distort a real image of the world might affect the view of Islam in those who have a contact with this reality mainly through news media. The chapter that follows this goes deeper into this question of reception of the news.

The fourth chapter looks at how media directly shapes popular opinion and how popular opinion is expressed through media platforms. In this case, we look at comments and shares on news items concerning the building of a new mosque in Lisbon, and see what reactions these news items elicited in readers, both in newspaper websites and in their social network presence, namely their Facebook pages. This helps us to see how media contributes to public discourse on the subject, not only through the news items that it produces, but also by giving an audience a platform to discuss and present their opinions on the subject. The qualitative methodology used here worked as a sort of “virtual fieldwork”, particularly useful as a substitution in the way that, during COVID-19 lockdowns, it allowed me to observe behaviour and opinions of a wide range of online participants, in commentary sections and social networking websites, without the need for specifically designed questionnaires or the presence of the sociologist. The

fact that the commentaries and statements explored were made in an environment where the subjects were oblivious of the presence of an observer, years later, interpreting their reactions, also minimises the observer effect that could occur in a more structured situation. The observer effect, through which a subject, if they are aware of being observed by, for example a sociologist, might adapt their behaviour to the situation, to what they might think would be a more socially acceptable position, is absent when, as in this chapter, the subject thinks that they are only making an anonymous statement online to their interlocutor, who is in an equal footing with them. This chapter again makes use of an interpretative approach, using internet comments as the qualitative data through which sociological conclusions can be reached by interpreting the meaning of the commenters who decided to publish their opinions. Of course, this chapter does not aim to present a truly representative cross-section of the Portuguese news media consuming public, but only to show how those who go out of their way to engage with news in which Islam is a central aspect react to those news items. Islam is discussed through comments which benefit from Online Disinhibition Effect, which works as almost an opposite of the Observer Effect described above. This leads those who comment to feel uninhibited, anonymous and protected by their screen, as is discussed in the chapter itself, showing the advantages of digital ethnography, which is particularly important when the ethnographer is limited in his access, as was the case during the pandemic, but which have advantages all of its own irrespective of access to the field.

In the last chapter, we examine the other side of the equation and look at how a specific section of the Muslim population, the one represented by the Sunni Central Lisbon Mosque, puts their own message across in audiovisual channels, both in public television channels but also through their own online channels, such as Facebook and their YouTube channel. This is particularly interesting during the COVID-19 pandemic as much of the activities of the Mosque moved online as a way to limit physical contact between congregants. Looking at this other side of independent media production by the minority, which is the subject of much of the content analysed in previous chapters, we managed to have a better picture of how the community responds to media coverage and how they attempt to show themselves in their own terms, rather than in the terms defined by the majority Portuguese population. Again, use was made of techniques related to digital ethnography, due to the access being limited during the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to an analysis of the media produced and made available online, by both the national TV channel, RTP archive, but also through the Islamic community connected to the Lisbon Central Mosque itself, through the use of their own websites and YouTube channel. This was particularly interesting because even while I

was limited in terms of access to the community in the real world, being pushed to do work on online content which could be looked at remotely, the Lisbon Central Mosque was facing similar problems, with limited access to its own congregants during lockdown, which led them to expand their online content through filmed sermons, for example, which I could then use as data, leading to a fortuitous meeting between researcher and subject as both battled similar contingencies outside their control. The attempt in this last chapter was to turn the tables and see how the community which was seen as the passive object of public interest in the previous four chapters, actively answered and produced their own media content to either add to or counteract prevailing media discourse. As in most of the previous chapters, the approach here was qualitative and interpretivist, searching through the content produced by a single, albeit the largest and most media savvy, Muslim congregation in Portugal, that of the Lisbon Central Mosque, in order to find qualitative data which could allow me to interpret how this minority group tried to project its image both to a general Portuguese audience and an audience of its own congregants. This contrast in target audiences, depending on whether the media production was for broadcast on national television or the Mosque's own YouTube channel, made for a particularly rich set of qualitative data to be interpreted as I tried to discover differences in the way that different messages for different audiences underlined specific aspects of Islam and the experience of Muslims in Portugal.

As we can see, then, the theoretical and methodological approach to each of the chapters in this thesis varied in accordance to what I felt was a more appropriate tool set to be able to draw the intended results from a certain data set. This is partially to do with my own previous academic experience, having a PhD in the Study of Religion, a field that, as opposed to Sociology, is determined by a commonality of subject rather than a commonality of approach, theory and method, using the methods of the social sciences and humanities to study religion as a human phenomenon. This is a field with plenty in common with Sociology, however, sharing common origins and ancestors in texts such as Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* or Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, texts which are foundational for both disciplines. Bringing what I have learned in the academic study of religions to bear on this sociological thesis, led me to an approach where methods and theoretical approaches shift to better fit the subject at hand. The format of having five distinct chapters with their own distinct approaches fits this way of working because it allows the researcher to change theoretical and methodological hats according to what is being tackled in that precise moment, without falling into self-contradiction. It makes sense to approach a chapter, such as the first one in this thesis, which aims to use statistics to give us a picture

of the attitudes and values of the Portuguese public with a positivist, mainly quantitative, approach. When we turn to the fourth chapter, for example, which aims to gauge particular attitudes to Islam by using internet comments as data, using the same approach would make little sense, and therefore there is a shift to a very interpretative and qualitative approach.

Being tied to a particular theoretical and methodological approach might be advantageous for some kinds of sociological work, but in the attempt here to reach a three-dimensional understanding of attitudes to Islam at both a macro and micro level, throughout the chapters in this thesis, a mixing of methods and theoretical approaches seemed to provide the well-rounded picture that it is our intention to be able to grasp by the end of this work. In this way, I tried to bring together in this thesis elements from the area of the Study of Religions and of Sociology, particularly by taking a general theme such as “the representation of Islam” and then applying to it the sociological methodological tools which I felt were most useful to explore each facet of the subject represented in each of the chapters. The research here displayed also asserts that different methodological tools are compatible, even if often not in the same chapter, but are complementary if the aim is to paint a complex image of a particular subject, such as the representation of Islam in Portuguese media, explored in this thesis. Hopefully, this approach comes out as the reader explores one chapter after another and the underlying methodological objectives are made clear through the variety of approaches to the same subject which are displayed here.

Before looking at these five distinct chapters it would be useful to take the remaining space in this introduction to both make a brief overview of the literature available on this general subject and then to give an historical sketch of media coverage of Islam up until the 21st century, which is the period most relevant for this thesis.

Starting with a brief overview of the general literature available for this subject, we will only look in this introduction briefly at the state of the art in the field of studies of religion, sociology of religion and the intersection of media studies and religion. More specific coverage of literature will be present in each distinct chapter as each requires it, therefore rather than do an in-depth literature review in the introduction, the format of this thesis, composed of five distinct chapters allows us to spread that literature review throughout the thesis with the following overview covering what is relevant to all the chapters that will follow.

The geopolitical situation which can be seen as having started in 2001, with the events surrounding September 11 of that year in the United States and the subsequent media coverage of themes related to Islamic fundamentalism and Islam in general, gave rise to the significant growth of the area of sociological studies on religion and its relationship with media. This

thesis, in the context of sociology of religion and media studies, as well as their intersection, the sociological study of religion in media.

Most sociological literature on this subject is concerned with Islam and is produced in Anglo-Saxonic countries and in European countries with large Islamic communities. The production of such academic literature in countries with a relatively small Islamic population, as is the case of Portugal, is much rarer.

Examples of this type of studies which do for their respective universes similar things to what this thesis seeks to do, include *Islam in the Dutch Press* (D'Haenens, L. e Bink, S. 2007), in the case of the Netherlands; *Media influence on the attitudes and knowledge of York adolescents towards Islam, Muslims, the Middle East and Arabs* (Brockett, A. Baird, P. 2008) at a more local level, using the city of York in the United Kingdom as a sociological laboratory seeking to observe the effects of media coverage on Islam on young people in that city.

Other recent and relevant studies for the present thesis cover subjects related to direct conflicts between media and Islam, on the decisions taken by journalists and media companies. Examples of this include *The Media's Role in a Clash of Misconceptions: The Case of the Danish Muhammad Cartoons* (Hussein, A. 2007) which covers the conflict between ideas of “freedom of the press” and “cultural sensitivity”, covering the cartoons published in Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* which were considered offensive by some Muslims. Another example is *To republish or not to republish: The “Je Suis Charlie” Mohammed cartoon and journalistic paradigms in a global context* (Eko, L. e Hellmueller, L. 2017). Lastly there are also more general studies on media attitudes towards Islam, a good example of which is *Symbolically Muslim: Media, hijab, and the West* (Byng, M. 2010) which explores how media relates to the idea of Islamic veiling practices.

There is also a wider literature on religions in media which provide theoretical tools for the study of this area, as for example Daniel A. Stout's *Media and Religion: Foundations of an Emerging Field* from 2012 or *Media, Religion and Culture* by Jeffrey Mahan from 2014.

In a Portuguese context there are no works on Islam in the media specifically that I could find, but there are other useful sources on Islam and Islamic communities in Portugal. These works include those produced by Nina Clara Tiesler such as *Muçulmanos na Margem: A Nova Presença Islâmica em Portugal* (2000) or the work of José Mapril Gonçalves, who has dedicated much of his career to looking at Islam in Portugal, and particularly the Bangladeshi community in the country ever since his doctoral thesis, *A 'Modernidade' do Sacrifício Qurban, lugares e circuitos transnacionais entre bangladeshis em Lisboa* (2008). Mapril Gonçalves has also published more directly relevant works to this thesis, such as *Reconhecer o Islão: Legados*

coloniais, migrações globais e islamofobia em Portugal (2017), or even more recently *Paisagens islâmicas na grande Lisboa: (pós)colonialismo e políticas de reconhecimento* (2021). There are also useful reference works such as *Portugal: Atlas das Migrações Internacionais* (Rui Pena Pires et al. 2010). Each chapter of this thesis has different bibliographical needs and this very preliminary literature overview will be added to chapter by chapter as required.

The History of Media Coverage of Islam Up Until 9/11.

Seeing as this thesis is particularly concerned with the contemporary representation of Islam in media, in a post 9/11 world, the body of the thesis will be particularly concerned with that period. As such, a brief historical sketch of pre-9/11 is useful to help contextualise the reader in the broader context of the thesis.

From the birth of Islam in the seventh century of our era, the geographic proximity of the lands where it originated to Christian Europe created tense relations which are reflected in the way Islam has been represented in the *Western* world and in the creation of the idea of a “Western” world itself. Throughout this thesis I will be using the word “West” or “Western” to represent a socially and historically constructed concept that has in practice been created as a direct opposition to the world where “non-christianity” prevails. The exception to this will be the situations in which the word *Western* is actually describing a cardinal point, rather than a constructed self-conception, such is the case in expressions such as “Western Europe”, meaning the western part of continental Europe where Portugal is situated, or “Western Coast of Africa”, for example. I make this note here so that a reader can take into account that even if for ease of reading the words “West” and “Western” are frequently used, they are never used acritically, but with the specific meaning of a place in the European imagination where Islam does not belong. This world outside the “West” which is seen as essentially alien, included in this “non-Western” world is, of course, Islam, which has, as we will see, helped to determine the borders of Europe. Curiously, the representations and stereotypes of what Islam is have altered progressively throughout history, as a reflexion not only of alterations in Islam but, frequently, alterations in the culture and moral principles of the so called *Western world*. A good example of this can be seen in the way in which women

are represented in the Islamic context in the last few centuries: the *western* representations went from a context in which the Islamic woman is shown as overly sexualized in the context of the harem as can be seen, for example, in Ingres' painting *La Grande Odalisque* (1814) or *L'Odalisque à L'Esclave* (1839), through to the representation of the Muslim woman as a "belly dancer" in such popular works as Disney's *Aladdin* (1992) and all the way up to the most common representation post-9/11 of the oppressed and covered up woman whose sexuality is completely erased by a culture which is seen as being particularly misogynistic. All of these representations, which have in common the promotion of the idea that Islam is associated to a society that objectifies women, whether through an erotic lens or not, end up reflecting *western* morals, just as much, if not more, than Islamic realities. In a more conservative age the veil is seen as an erotic provocation in the context of belly dancing, while now the meaning of the veil is inverted and becomes a symbol of the erasure of the presence of women in public spaces, not being now a piece of cloth which provokes the desire to be removed but one which covers up the presence of women.

Many of the contradictions and mechanisms inherent to this way of looking at non-*western* cultures and Islam in particular, were extensively analysed by Edward Said in his classic *Orientalism* from 1978. Said, focusing mainly on the colonial period, explores precisely the way in which the *western* world creates an image of the "oriental" world, which works as a kind of distorted mirror of the west, against which the west defines itself and in which it projects that which it is not, or does not want to be. Said summarizes the effect that this has in the "eastern" world and in its representation: In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity "the Orient" is in question. [...] European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self. The representation of the "East" is, then, a product not only of that which actually exists in the "East", but also that which helps the "West" to define itself as being its opposite. As we will see further on, this element is important in the media production of news items and opinion pieces on Islam, which is seen as the "other", that which is opposed to Christian and western values and which as a consequence helps the west to define itself through that difference. The construction of the idea of Europe itself and its geographical and identity limits is also partially a result of this process of opposition to the "eastern" world and, particularly, Islamic world. Ballard (1996) reaches this same conclusion:

(...) *there seems little doubt that at least in conceptual terms, if not so emphatically in empirical terms, the variable most closely congruent with Europe's current spatial boundary is a religious one: between popular commitment Christianity on the one hand, and to Islamic political dominance on the other.* (Ballard, 1996: 28)

Ballard explores in this article how geographical, racial, ethnic, linguistic and cultural distinctions are not particularly strong between Europe, Asia and North Africa, especially taking into account the internal diversity of Europe and the fact that geographically the divisions do not correspond to continental masses. He then identifies religion as the determining factor of those who are acceptable as being or not being “European”. Countries with a Christian majority (including the geographically distant Russia) are seen as being part of the European in-group which traditionally Islamic countries are seen as the “other” (as is the case of the geographically close Turkey). This kind of conclusion cannot be far from our thought when we analyse news items such as those related to the entrance of Turkey into the European Union, for example, and the way in which elements related to religion appear in this context.

Both Said and Ballard discuss the *Western* historical perspective on the “Orient” and Islam. In Said's case with a particular focus on the colonial period and in Ballard's in a broader view that ranges from the origins of Islam to the Crusades and the Reconquista all the way to the mid-1990s. However, it is necessary to take into account that the demonizing representation of Islam was not always uniform. There is an interesting period during the second half of the twentieth century in which Islam takes a secondary role in the position of the “other” in relation to the West. During the period of the Cold War (c. 1946-1991) this place is partially taken by communism and communist regimes, also in great part situated to the east of Europe, particularly the Soviet Union and China as well as countries influenced by them (Vietnam, Cuba, etc.). The temporal goalposts of the Cold War are also interesting, starting in 1946 it takes place around the same time in which a large number of countries with Muslim majorities achieve their independence, with the collapse of the British Empire in the period immediately following the Second World War and, later, the independence of French colonies. These events bring several new countries with a Muslim majority into the geopolitical panorama. One of the possible reasons for a relative easing of the confrontational attitude towards Islam would also be related to the division in the international panorama between the two superpowers (USA and USSR), where antagonising new Islamic countries could have the effect of pushing them to join the adversary power. The end of the Cold War in 1991, with the collapse of the USSR, also coincides with the conflict between *Western*

nations headed by the USA and Iraq, in the so-called Operation Desert Storm. The end of the USSR and the end of the geopolitical polarization between the two superpowers takes us also to the end of the preoccupation with avoiding antagonising Islam and Islamic countries as the danger of losing them to the enemy became a non-issue.

Communist regimes, usually portrayed as atheist regimes and, therefore, antithetical both to the “Christian West” and the “Islamic East” leads to a kind of truce concerning the long held tradition of seeing Islam as the “other” par excellence. Strongly Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia or even fundamentalist Islamic groups such as the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan are then seen as anti-communist buffers, allies of convenience of *Western* powers represented by the United States and Europe, particularly the countries related to NATO. The end of the iron curtain and the USSR at the start of the 1990s leads consequently to a relative attenuation of the geostrategic importance of Muslim majority countries, which allows for a rekindling of conflicts which, in one way or another, were already latent.³ However, not every Islamic majority country resisted media attacks during the Cold War period. The largest exception to take into account here is the case of Iran which, in spite of not being the only one (Libya being another example), was without a doubt one of the focus for media attention during the decades following the 1979 revolution. This revolution put a theocratic government in power deeply linked to a minority within the Islamic faith, Shia Islam.

The fact that Shia Islam is a minority within Islam is not unrelated to the media attention given to Iran on the part of the West. Iran was a country which was in a way safe to antagonise in geostrategic terms as it would not endanger alliances with Sunni powers in the region, such as the countries in the Arabian Peninsula, which were also opposed to the Iranian regime, or even alliances with other Shiite majority countries, such as Iraq, being as it was governed by Saddam Hussein, a member of the Sunni minority in that country. This is partially the reason why the *Western World*, including the USSR, felt comfortable with the support given to Iraq during their armed conflict with Iran (1980-88). One of the most reported on cases by the media during this period also involves Iran in the part of the adversary of the West, which was the case of the Fatwa decreed by the Iranian head of state, Ayatollah Khomeini, against the British author Salman Rushdie due to the publication of his work *The Satanic Verses* in 1989. This Fatwa, meaning simply “legal decree”, promoted the assassination of Rushdie for blasphemy against Islam. This controversy surrounding Rushdie’s work was not something promoted solely by Iran, his work having shocked Islamic communities worldwide, including in the West. In Bradford in the UK, for example, there were mass book burnings and in India and Pakistan there were also violent events which

led to the death of 7 people. However, it was Iran and particularly the figure of Khomeini, which became symbolic of this case, representing to Western media an example of the lack of tolerance in the Islamic world.

Moving from the international context to the Portuguese case during the twentieth century, we can see that a large part of media coverage and the narrative promoted about Islam is in everything similar to that which is present in the international context. However, there is a markedly smaller number of news items about these themes. Possible reasons for this difference might have to do with the historical and geopolitical situation of Portugal. During the twentieth century Portugal did not have (and still does not have) an Islamic population with numbers which even approach those of other European countries, particularly those which had colonies in regions with majority Muslim populations. Some of the Portuguese ex-colonies, such as Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and the cities located in the Indian subcontinent had, while they were Portuguese colonies, considerable Islamic communities, but those did not translate into a very visible or numerous population in Portugal after their independence. During the fascist regime in Portugal, before the revolution of the 25th of April 1974, the image of Portugal which is promoted by a press which was not free, reproduced the nationalist directives of the fascist Estado Novo regime, which were those of a uniform and united Catholic country, which means that issues related to other religions have a secondary role in the national panorama. After the fall of the regime, with the independence of the colonies, the question of Islamic communities in the now ex-colonies also ceased to be relevant to national media, which were more concerned with the volatile political moment through which the country was going. The majority of the news in Portugal on Islam consists, then, of reproductions of news from media from the rest of Europe and North America, to which are added some opinion pieces. The distant Islamic past of Portugal and the generally peaceful relations with the Islamic community in Portugal are also factors that contribute to minimise the level of media conflict in the national context. We reach, then, with the end of the Cold War and the rising of tensions between *Western* countries and the Muslim world, in cases like that of The Satanic Verses, or operation Desert Storm in Iraq, nearly to the twenty-first century. We can, however, see that there is a media and historical narrative which contrasts the Western world, often associated with Christianity, to the Eastern world, which in its turn is associated with Islam. The media do not escape this narrative and in fact end up serving as tools for the articulation of these types of narratives which simplify the world, reducing it to two opposing camps of “good” vs. “evil”, “civilised” vs. “barbarian”, without detaining themselves with deep political, social or historical analysis on the origins and reasons for the existence of these narratives. The

media often end up serving the purpose of simplification, codification and articulation of news items, giving simple explanations to complex problems, with the objective of reaching the largest possible number of people (Fulton 2005: 244). With the information explosion at the start of the twenty-first century, particularly through the internet, to which are added tragic events related to Islam, media coverage on the Islamic religion would suffer deep alterations, but which, as we can see, have their origins in a distant past.

CHAPTER 1:

Attitudes towards Islam and Muslims in Portugal: Drawing Data from the European Social Survey Data

1.1. Introduction

In this chapter I will be looking at statistical data about attitudes towards Islam in Portugal, this will help inform the themes explored elsewhere in my work, examining how the general portuguese public looks at immigrants, race and then, more particularly, at Islam and Muslims. It will help give another dimension to the way in which media covers these subjects in print and online. A particularly useful tool for this is the European Social Survey (henceforth: ESS), a biannual Europe-wide survey of attitudes covering all types of subjects. In this chapter I will start, then, by looking at the ESS itself, what is its history, what kind of data it collects and how it can be useful for the examination of attitudes towards Islam and Muslims. In this first section I will also be looking at the definite and possible limitations of the survey, which need to be taken into account so that we may judge what can and cannot be known through its analysis. For example, the low percentage of Muslims in the Portuguese population will definitely limit the data concerning how Muslims themselves feel in a Portuguese context, while it is easier to judge the general population attitude towards Islam.

In a second section of this chapter, rather than focusing down directly on Islam and Muslims, I will first look at general Portuguese attitudes towards race and immigration, some of this ESS data has actually been the target of some media attention due to the surprising results found by the survey. (Henriques, 2020) In this section on race and immigration it will also be relevant to compare the data for Portugal with that of other countries participating in the ESS, allowing us to judge if Portugal is in line with other countries or not, and how the attitudes relate to those other countries. Is it closer to its Western European neighbours or Eastern Europe? Are the results similar to other countries with the same size and percentage

of immigration, for example. The two thematic editions of the ESS on immigration will be useful in creating a diachronic perspective on the subject.

In the third section of the chapter, I will focus on perspectives on Islam and Muslims and, due to the way in which the ESS has been repeated every couple of years since the start of the century, I will be able to chart any changes in attitudes which specifically affect Islam and Muslims when compared to other groups with different religious affiliations in the ESS data. This will allow us to interconnect shifts in attitudes to world events, if there seems to be a strong correlation.

Lastly, I will consider the attitudes of Portuguese people towards Islam and Muslims in comparison to the other countries covered by the ESS, in a way similar to that done in the first section on race and immigration, but now focusing solely on Islam and Muslims. Again, this will allow for both a diachronic analysis covering the years from 2002 to 2018, but also a geographical analysis, searching for similarities and differences to other ESS reporting countries and seeking to find ways to explain these similarities or distinctions. Let us first look at how we can and cannot use the ESS for our ends.

1.2. What is the ESS, why it can be useful and what are its limitations in the analysis of data about Portugal and Islam.

The ESS or, to give it its full name, the European Social Survey is, according to their own website: “*an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001.*” (ESS, 2021) This survey works by interviewing a cross-sectional sample of inhabitants of over 30 countries every two years. By the latest round of the survey in 2018, 38 countries had taken part in at least one round of the survey which has been ongoing since 2002, with a total of 9 rounds at the time of writing. These interviews are done face to face and they seek to measure the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of the populations of those countries involved in the survey. (ESS, 2021a)

This survey allows researchers to chart and gauge many social patterns and attitudes throughout Europe, the more rounds become available the easier it is to chart stability and

change in society, conditions and attitudes and to see how these might be shifting, this can be done by cross-referencing the data of the 9 rounds from 2002 to 2018. Being freely available to all researchers, it is an invaluable tool and time-saver for researchers across Europe attempting to chart changes in attitudes or simply to gauge the opinions of a certain country or make comparisons to its European neighbours. (ESS, 2021) In the particular case of Portugal, which is central to this particular study, it has participated in all the rounds of the ESS, which means that we have data available since 2002, which allows for a diachronic study of the country's attitudes from that year onward. Unfortunately, the ESS only starts in 2002, for the purposes of examining attitudes towards Islam and Muslims it would have been interesting to have some data pre-2001 and the events of 9/11 of that year. However, the data available in the 9 rounds of the ESS, covering 16 years, goes through enough national and international events related to Islam and Muslims that there should be enough information, either directly or indirectly, (indicators such as attitudes on immigration, for example) to be able to have a clearer picture than that which would be possible with either anecdotal evidence or the resources of a single researcher such as the author.

What then is the particular data that is of interest to gauging the relationship between the non-Muslim Portuguese people and the Muslim minority, as well as the attitude to Islam in general? There are two modules of the survey which are of particular interest to our objective in this chapter, one is a constant throughout all editions of the ESS and that is the module entitled "*Subjective well-being, social exclusion, religion, national and ethnic identity*"; the other section is one of the so called "*rotating modules*" of the survey, in this case the one on immigration which was a part of the survey in 2002 and 2014. (ESS, 2021b) The first of these modules covers many of the central themes of interest to us, it allows us to find what religious denomination respondents belong or have belonged to, how religious the respondents consider themselves to be, as well as how often they frequent religious services or pray and if they feel that they are discriminated against in Portugal due to their religious affiliation. In this last question, about discrimination by group we can also compare religious discrimination to other kinds of discrimination, such as due to ethnicity, gender or sexuality.

When it comes to the second module on immigration, a rotating module which was an integral part of the survey twice with a gap of 12 years between 2002 and 2014, we can derive more general attitudes of the population towards immigration and what kinds of discrimination can be observed as well as how they would overlap with being a Muslim in Portugal. For example, there are questions in this module which cover the importance for the respondents that immigrants coming into the country be Christian, a high percentage of

people responding affirmatively to this would be incompatible with welcoming the presence of Muslim immigrants in Portugal, leading us then to deduce information about the attitudes of the Portuguese, or even European audience, if we are comparing countries, to Muslim immigrants or even a general attitude to non-Christians in the country. The same process can be applied to questions about immigrants coming from outside of Europe, belonging to a different ethnic group than that of the respondents, or coming from a poorer country as is the case with the majority of Muslim immigrants in Portugal. The questions asked in this module also cover wider questions about integration, such as if the respondents know or are friendly with any immigrants, or if religious, ethnic or linguistic diversity is a positive thing for the country. This module also covers subjective perceptions about immigration from the respondents, such as if their country has more immigrants than neighbouring countries or estimates of the origin of those immigrants. (ESS, 2021c)

When working with the ESS we have to be aware, however, that there are severe limitations and there are many questions that will remain unanswered, even while using its data. It is not a good resource, for example, for finding out the opinions of minorities, and in particular such a small minority as Muslims in Portugal about the way in which they are integrated or their attitudes. The universe of respondents to the survey in Portugal is not large enough to be able to obtain a representative or even substantial sample of Muslim people in Portugal, in all years of the ESS, the number of respondents who self-identify as Muslim is either in the low single digits or even zero, which is to be expected in a country with such a low estimated percentage of Muslim inhabitants. If the ESS is not useful for gauging detailed information about the attitudes of the Muslim population in Portugal there are also no other resources to do this. There is the Census, the latest of which, in 2020, contained a question about religion, but it is such a vague question that even if it might give us a sense of the number of self-reported Muslims in Portugal, it gives very little information other than that. As João Sedas Nunes points out, the religion question in the national census is a very outdated and biased one, where the top option is “Catholic” and then goes through a number of different Christian denominations. There are five options for Christians: Catholic; Orthodox; Protestant/Evangelical; Jehova’s Witness; Other Christian, which is in itself a bizarre selection of options, but when it comes to Islam there is simply the option “Muslim”, not even giving sub options for such large divisions as Sunni or Shia. (Sedas Nunes, 2021)

Therefore, what this chapter will be looking at is only what can be deduced from the ESS when it comes to the general population’s opinion and attitudes towards Islam and Muslims. Even in this case, and this is another limitation of the ESS, many of the answers

we can find will be found by exclusion, and might apply equally to religions other than Islam. When we look at a question which asks, for example, if the respondents would prefer immigrants to Portugal be Christian, a high percentage of affirmative answers might mean a rejection of any religion including Islam but not restricted to it. The rejection might equally apply to Buddhists or Sikhs, for example. However, as we can see in the other chapters of this thesis, Islam is the religion outside of Christianity with the largest media presence in Portugal, so we can be reasonably sure that those replies will also have Islam high on the list of the non-Christian religions being rejected by the affirmative respondent. Throughout this chapter, then, when data from the ESS is being used we have to always be aware of these possible limitations and I will endeavour to clearly point out in each case what we can safely conclude, what we can assume with some degree of justification, and what we simply cannot know when using this tool.

Methodologically, each of the following sections will focus on a different aspect that can be gleaned from ESS data, first we will look at the data on immigration, race and attitudes towards religion. This will produce a number of data tables from which we will attempt to draw as much relevant information as possible in what concerns the status and attitudes towards Muslims and Islam in Portugal. This will be done through inductive and deductive means. The inductive method can be used when the observable data is specific enough to allow us to draw a straight conclusion from the data, such as when, for example, a question asks how positive respondents feel towards Muslims, allowing us to have a specific reply to what we are directly looking for. While our observations will be deductive when the data gives us a more general idea which we can then deductively apply to Islam and Muslims, as when, for example, a question asks respondents how positive they feel towards non-Christians, this answer will not directly give us information about the perspective on Muslims but we can deductively assume that when “non-Christians” are mentioned, this set of people includes Muslims and can therefore be taken as an answer that also is relevant to the indicators that this chapter is attempting to gauge. If possible, and the data exists across time, in the various years of the survey, we will also be able to have a diachronic image of the data and see in what direction attitudes trend through time and, if possible, be able to associate any particular changes in attitudes over time with media and news events which might help justify them.

In order to obtain the most accurate data possible I will use the ESS’s own design weight, which serves to compensate any occurring design flaws in the survey as well as the post-stratification weight to reduce sampling error by using auxiliary data, in this case taken from Eurostat, and applying it to the results. These two weights will, in fact, be used in all

the data taken from ESS from the start. In a further section of the chapter, when we turn to a comparison between the data available to Portugal and to other countries covered by the ESS, I will also apply the population weight, which is necessary for the comparison of such a diverse group of countries, seeing as while the number of respondents is relatively similar between the different countries covered, the same is not true of the whole population. Without weighing for differences in raw population numbers it is very hard to make an accurate comparison between Portugal and, for example, Germany, which has approximately 8 times the number of people residing there. Firstly, however, we will look more generally at what we can tell from the ESS data about the Portuguese attitudes towards race and immigration and how this might affect the perception of Muslims and Islam.

1.3. Attitudes towards Race, Ethnicity and Immigration in Portugal

Looking through ESS indicators we can find data relative to attitudes of respondents towards factors of race and ethnicity, as well as immigration, this does not directly relate to attitudes towards Muslims, but it does overlap with those attitudes and is therefore of relevance to the present study. The vast majority of Muslims in Portugal are ethnically distinct from the majority catholic population and are often immigrants into the country and therefore are part of the groups covered by questions on race, ethnicity and immigration in the ESS. This will, then, help us have a general overview of Portugal's attitude towards immigrants and people of other ethnic backgrounds. Throughout the next sections there will be a number of graphs in order to visualize the information from ESS which is being discussed. These graphs correspond to tables which will be included as an appendix to this thesis, these tables include the detailed numbers from ESS and are the data used to create the graphs, therefore if a reader requires more detailed information on a particular indicator, I advise consulting the corresponding tables in the appendix.

In this section we will first look at data on ethnicity and racism, most of which is derived from the seventh round of the ESS in 2014, in the immigration rotating module, which

included questions directly inquiring respondents about race and ethnicity in both biological and cultural categories. Following this, we will look at the intersection between race/ethnicity and immigration by looking at respondents' attitudes towards immigrants of non-white ethnic groups. Lastly, we will move fully to the subject of immigration by charting a question which was present in all rounds of the ESS on whether Portugal is made better or worse by immigration. The biannual nature of this last question will allow us to chart how attitudes towards immigration have changed throughout the years. These general questions and answers will prepare us to then look, in the next section, more specifically at the way in which Islam intersects with immigration and how Muslims are seen in comparison to other groups.


The question of racism in Portugal has long been a case for debate, a debate which is particularly active now in Portuguese society. There is a strong denial of the reality of racism in Portugal, partly as a legacy from the fascist, colonial, Estado Novo regime, which partly justified its continued holding of African colonies into the 1970s with the myth of the "good colonizer", with the Portuguese being seen as an exception as a non-racist colonizer. Even after the fall of the fascist regime these kinds of narratives have continued within the educational system, with school books minimizing the role of Portugal in slavery and colonialism. (Araújo, Barrucho, 2017) This kind of rhetoric has been taken up by right and far-right political forces in Portugal to deny the existence of any kind of systemic racism in the country, to the point of having far-right marches with the slogan "Portugal is not racist". (Lusa, 2020)

However, the evidence available shows something different, as Jorge Vala points out, basing himself on the ESS data, for which he was, at a time, the coordinator for Portugal: "Portugal is one of the champions of racism denial" due to the "myth of an exemplary colonization". Alexander Coutts also points out that the theme of racism is not only not debated in Portugal, but also, that when people "try to debate the theme, it tends to get negative reactions". (Vala & Coutts, 2020)

The raw numbers on racism in ESS are revealing. The seventh edition of the ESS in 2014 asked a number of questions on race in the immigration rotating module that was used that year, questions which were not present when the module was previously used in the first edition of the survey, so what we have is a snapshot of Portuguese attitudes to race and ethnicity in 2014. These questions were aimed at evaluating attitudes of respondents both to cultural aspects of racism as well as biological ones. The three questions which directly addressed racism were "if some cultures are much better than others" at the cultural level, and at the level of innate biological racism if "some races or ethnic groups are born less intelligent than others", and if "some races or ethnic groups are born harder working than


others”. Looking at each of the answers to these questions, starting with the biological ones, we can find that almost 4 in every 10 people (37.6%) believe that some races or ethnic groups are born less intelligent (Graph 1) and that almost 7 in 10 people (66.7%) believe that some ethnic groups or races are born harder working than others (Graph 2). (ESS Round 7, 2014) What this shows us is a generalized belief in biological racial differences, expressed more strongly in the belief, which nears 70%, that some races are harder working, while others are lazier. The belief in intellectual superiority of some races does not reach the level of a majority opinion, but is still expressive with over a third of the population believing in it. It is easy to see how, for example, a belief in the inherent laziness of some racial/ethnic groups could have a direct impact on the lives of minority communities, such as when attempting to find jobs or being trusted by their employers, to give an obvious example. When it comes to cultural discrimination the question of whether some cultures are better or worse than others also reveals an ingrained xenophobia in Portuguese society, with over half the population (54.9%) agreeing with the idea that some cultures are much better than others (Graph 3). Overall these opinions on racial/ethnic and cultural differences do not paint a rosy picture when it comes to the acceptance of those who are either of another ethnic group or a different culture as is the case for most Muslims resident in Portugal.

Are Some Races or Ethnic Groups Born Harder Working?
(Portugal, 2014)




Graph 1: Are some races or ethnic groups born harder working?, ESS 7, 2014.
(See Appendix A, Table 1)

Are Some Races or Ethnic Groups Born Less Intelligent?
(Portugal, 2014)




Graph 2: Are some races or ethnic groups born less intelligent?, ESS 7, 2014. (See Appendix A, Table 2)

Are Some Cultures Much Better Than Others, or are All of Them Equal? (Portugal, 2014)




Graph 3: Are some cultures much better than others, or are all of them equal?, ESS 7, 2014. (See Appendix A, Table 3)

The rotating module on immigration which was used in the ESS in its first and seventh editions, in the years of 2002 and 2014 respectively, also asked the question of how important ethnicity was when considering the desirability of immigrants. The question was slightly different in the two editions, but it is measuring similar attitudes. In the 2002 edition of the ESS the question asks how many immigrants of a different racial/ethnic group from that of the majority should be allowed into the country. The options include “Allow many”, “some”, “a few” or “none” to come and live in the country. On the positive side of the answers, the option to “allow many” to come into the country consists of only 5.5% of respondents, while “some” amasses approximately a third of responses (33.1%). On the more negative side of the answers, those who want to limit the entrance of those who do not correspond to the majority Portuguese ethnic group, the option for “few” has 37.5% of the answers, while the extreme “none” consists of almost a quarter of answers (23.9%). In total then, in 2002, 61.4% of respondents wanted few or no racially/ethnically diverse immigrants (Graph 4). (ESS Round 1, 2002)



Graph 4: Should many or few immigrants of different race or ethnic group from the majority be allowed to come and live here? ESS 1, 2002. (See Appendix A, Table 4)

Twelve years later, in 2014, a similar question was asked, this time to rank from 1 to 10 the importance of being white to be admitted into Portugal as an immigrant. The results are surprising as there seems to have been a considerable change in the attitudes towards non-white immigrants, here 51.9% of respondents replied with a 0 or “extremely unimportant” when it came to whiteness as a qualification for immigration. In fact the answers in the lower section of the range, from 0 to 4, account for 73.6% of the answers, with neutral (5) being 11.2% and those considering whiteness to be an important factor and responding in the range of 6 to 10 consisting of only 15.4% of respondents of which 5.1% answered “extremely important” or a value of 10 (Graph 5). (ESS Round 7, 2014) This marks a change of 61.4% of respondents who wanted few or no non-white immigrants in 2002, to only 15.4% who consider whiteness to be an important determinant when it comes to immigration. Part of the discrepancy in these results in the space of only 12 years must be attributed to the way in which the question was changed, however, it does show a positive evolution when it comes to the discrimination of non-white immigrants by the Portuguese.




Graph 5: How important, as a qualification for immigration, is the fact that the immigrant is white? ESS 7, 2014 (See Appendix A, Table 5)

As opposed to the previous questions which were only present in two editions of the ESS as part of rotating modules, all editions of the survey did include a general question about immigration. The fact that we have nine data points in which to chart the evolution of attitudes towards immigration and immigrants is quite useful, and in this case the question asked respondents whether Immigrants make their country a better or worse place to live in. It therefore charts the general opinion on immigration and its general effects on the country as well as the general view on immigrants. The question is the same in all editions of the survey and it asks respondents to give a numeric answer between 0 and 10, with 0 being “worse place to live” and 10 being “a better place to live”, 5 would be the neutral position. In order to look at these numbers I will group them into three groups per survey, an overall negative perspective which includes the numeric values of 0 to 4, a neutral position with the value of 5 and a positive attitude towards immigration including the numbers 6 to 10.

The first set of results, in 2002 shows 56.1% of respondents with a negative view of immigration, 31.3% taking the neutral position, and only 12.6% thinking of immigration as having a positive impact on the country. (ESS Round 1, 2002) The second edition in 2004 shows very similar numbers, with 57.9% negative, 29.3% neutral and 12.8% positive views. (ESS Round 2, 2004) The third edition shows a positive shift towards further acceptance of immigration with 43.8% negative, the first time the negative corresponds to a minority of respondents, 34.8% neutral and 21.3% positive. (ESS Round 3, 2006) Two years later in 2008, the situation is very similar to 2006 with 44.5% negative, 34.1% neutral and 21.5% positive towards immigration. (ESS Round 4, 2008) In 2010, in a situation of deep economic crisis the perspective on immigration turned more negative again, with 49.7% with a negative view, 36.1% neutral and 14.3% with a positive view of immigration. (ESS Round 5, 2010) As the economic crisis and austerity measures are aggravated, with an international bailout, the view of immigration again returns to values similar to 10 years earlier in 2002 with a majority of the population seeing immigrants as having a negative impact on the country, with 55.4% negative, 30.2% neutral and 14.5% positive views of immigrants. (ESS Round 6, 2012) Just two years later as the economic recovery is starting to be felt, opinions on immigration change drastically again with the most positive results since the start of the ESS, with 41.1% negative views, 34.4% neutral and 24.4% positive. (ESS Round 7, 2014) The continuation of an economic recovery with a new government since 2015, gives us radically more positive perspectives on immigration in 2016, for the first time since the start of the survey negative views of immigration are now more than 10 percentage points lower than positive perspectives on immigration, with only 24.9% seeing immigration as a negative,

38.9% being neutral and 36.2% seeing immigration as positive for the country. (ESS Round 8, 2016) By 2018 the overall negative perspective on immigration that had prevailed in the first decade of the millennium has now been completely inverted with anti-immigrant sentiment being the lowest of the three elements we are measuring and pro-immigrant feeling being the highest value, only 19.5% see immigration as making the country worse, while 33.7% are neutral and, nearing a majority of the population, 46.8% see immigration as having a positive effect on the country. (ESS Round 9, 2018) (Graph 6)



Graph 6: Do immigrants make the country better or worse to live in? ESS 1-9, 2002-2018
(See Appendix A, Tables 6-14)

What we can see here is a tendency towards a better acceptance of immigrants and a growth of the view that immigration makes Portugal a better country to live in, but we can also see how volatile that can be, with the economic crisis of 2008-2014 having a deep effect on perspectives on immigration. Immigration is, then, a positive when the respondents feel the country is going well, and there is an overall optimistic view of the future, while in times of crisis and austerity they are seen as undesirable. Curiously, the refugee crisis that affected much of Europe and had its height in 2015, seems to have had little negative effect on the view of refugees with the results the following year, 2016, being overwhelmingly positive in contrast to those of previous years, before the height of the refugee crisis. It is worth noting, however, that Portugal was not a prime destination for those refugees, not being in the mediterranean or sharing borders with affected countries. The news about mistreatment of refugees at European borders, and images like those that were widely circulated with the death of 3 year-old Alan Kurdi in September of 2015, might have in fact have had a “softening” effect on the Portuguese public when it comes to the attitude towards refugees and consequently immigrants in general. It is interesting to note, however, that a positive trend in the attitude towards immigrants has persevered up until the latest numbers that are available, in 2018, which also clearly accompanies and is co-related to the economic recovery.

1.4. Attitudes towards Muslims when compared to other groups

We have already seen the Portuguese attitudes towards race and immigration, two categories which refer to people who include the majority of Muslims in the country, but which are not composed solely or even mainly by Muslims. In fact, of the top 10 countries of origin for immigrants residing in Portugal in 2020, none of them is a country with a majority Muslim population (SEF/GEPF 2021, p. 21), and as we can see in Chapter 3.2, in this thesis, the population is small when compared with other European countries, much of it long established, and particularly those that migrated from Mozambique after the country’s independence in 1975, are holders of Portuguese nationality, which makes them absent from immigration statistics. This does not mean, however, that there is no Muslim


immigration or that it is not visible, particularly in the larger cities, or even that long established Muslims with Portuguese nationality are not wrongly perceived by the white, Catholic Portuguese majority population as being immigrant themselves, which would be reflected in the results of the ESS.

However, this information about immigration and race is indicative of attitudes towards Portuguese and migrant Muslims, but it says little specifically about Muslims. There are other indicators which can be used to gauge Portuguese attitudes towards non-Christians in general and then Muslims in particular. In this section we will look at both those factors. Firstly, I will look at the attitude of the Portuguese towards non-Christians and afterwards the specific attitudes towards Muslims in comparison with other groups. The other groups also gauged by the ESS were Jewish and Romani people.

The first and seventh edition of the ESS, respectively in 2002 and 2014, posed the question to respondents, in the rotating module on immigration, about whether having a Christian background should be a requirement for the immigrants to be let into the country. Notice that the question is posed not about the religion professed by the prospective immigrant, but whether they have a “background” in that religion. This question again points towards racial and ethnic considerations, as many respondents would see “Christian background” as meaning generally European or American as well as their former colonies in Africa, while non-Christian would point towards North Africa and Asia, generally dividing the world in majority Christian countries and majority non-Christian countries. In this question, then, most people would think of an atheist white French person as having a “Christian background” while an atheist Egyptian would not be seen as the same. Still, the fact that the religion is mentioned in the question is enough to give us an indication of what Portuguese attitudes towards non-Christians are like. In this ESS data we have only two snapshots, 12 years apart, and as we saw above those were very different periods in Portuguese social history.

The data on the importance of a Christian background as a qualification for immigration into Portugal, like the above data on how positively immigrants were seen by the respondents, consists of a question that ranks answers from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning “Extremely Unimportant” and 10 being “Extremely Important”. Therefore, the lower the number the more favorably are immigrants with a non-Christian background seen as prospective immigrants. As I did above, I will simplify the results and use the scale of 0 to 4 as a positive view of these immigrants, the middle point of 5 as being neutral, and the values of 6-10 as being a negative view. Looking at the first data point we have available, in ESS1, from 2002, we have 51.8% of respondents who find a Christian background to be unimportant,

classifying its importance on the lower end of the scale, from 0 to 4. The neutral position is taken by 17.1% of respondents and those who see people without a Christian background in a negative light are 31.1%. It is worth noting, however, that there is some nuance within these scales, so the most popular answer among the 0-4 scale is 0, with 23.1% of respondents finding it Extremely Unimportant, while on the opposite end of the scale you get only 3.2% voting at a 9, and in the extreme 10, “Extremely Important”, level there are only 2.8% of respondents. (ESS1, 2002) What can be seen here is a small majority of the population which sees those with a non-Christian background favourably, with almost a quarter choosing 0 in the importance scale, giving no importance to religious background, and at the opposite end of the scale almost a third of the Portuguese have what is mostly a mild dislike for those with a non-Christian background, centred mainly on the values of 6,7 or 8, with the extreme 9 and 10 positions being in the low single digits (Graph 7).



Graph 7: How important is it that immigrants have a Christian background as a qualification to come into the country? ESS 1 and 7, 2002, 2014. (See Appendix A, Tables 15, 16)

The ESS returned to this question in its seventh edition in 2014, as was to be expected from the data we previously analysed on views on immigration the attitudes are more positive towards those seen as foreign, but the difference is less pronounced than what that data showed. In 2014 56.1% see Christian background as being unimportant, 15.9% are neutral and 28.1% find it to be important. The numbers are very similar to 2002, with a slightly more positive slant, but what is more interesting is what can be seen by the distribution of points, which reveals a much more pronounced polarization of opinions than those to be found in 2002, those answering 0 on the scale rise from 23.1% to 29.4%, while those voting 10 on the ranking, with an extreme dislike for those with a non-Christian background rise from 2.8% to 8%, almost tripling in number. (ESS7, 2014) Therefore, even if generally the numbers show a more positive outlook on those immigrants with a non-Christian background, we also have an exponential growth of those with extreme negative attitudes towards those immigrants who have a different background from the majority of respondents (Graph 7).

One of the questions in the ESS addresses specifically the question of Muslims as immigrants, unfortunately it has only been part of the 2014 edition of the survey, which means that we have no way to chart the development of an accepting or rejecting attitude by respondents of Muslim immigrants through time. What we can compare that question to, however, are the questions which were present in the same edition of the ESS about the acceptance of other minority groups, namely Jewish people and Romani people. Both of those groups have a history of discrimination in Portugal, anti-semitic discrimination being, for the most part, a element of past history, with the expulsion of Jews from Portugal in the late 16th century and the actions of the Catholic Inquisition heavily targeting those suspected of Jewish practices, but less present in contemporary culture, while anti-Romani feeling is still widespread and a serious question in Portugal today. Anti-Romani feeling has been, for example, taken advantage of by the Far-Right in Portugal to achieve parliamentary and municipal representation in the country. (Gomes, 2021) Taking this into account, and the fact that there is a lesser visibility of Muslims in Portugal than Romani or Jewish people, and of these only the Romani being particularly frequent targets of racist campaigns, it would be expected to find Muslims somewhere between the two groups when it comes to social acceptance in Portugal, with Jewish people who are popularly seen as “non problematic” having a better reputation, while Romani people having the worst reputation among respondents. Muslims, with the international and national media focus on terrorism and disrespect for human rights, as can be seen in the following chapters of this thesis, would be somewhere in the middle, not exactly approved of, but not as vilified as the Romani people. Taking this as a starting


hypothesis, we can find that it is almost exactly what can be found in the answers to the ESS.

The question posed in ESS7, in 2014, asks if Portugal should allow many or few immigrants of each of the groups in. The answers have four levels of acceptance of immigrants: “Allow many”; “some”; “a few”; or “none”. Taking the first group, Jewish people, we find that 8% want to allow many in, 43.1% some, 24% a few and 24.8% none. There is a slight majority which then approves of Jewish immigrants, 51.1% wanting many or some immigrants, on the other side of the scale there is still impressive anti-semitism with almost a quarter of respondents (24.8%) radically wanting no Jewish immigrants whatsoever. One in four Portuguese people desiring no Jewish immigration to Portugal is a worrying number. However, as we have stated above, of these three groups, Jewish people are the best accepted (Graph 8). (ESS7, 2014)

The groups with the worst level of acceptance of the three groups inquired about are the Romani people, for which the ESS uses the common, but derogatory, term “gypsies”. The use of this term is easy to understand because it is indeed the term in common use, in Portugal the equivalent being *cigano/a* which, while not as derogatory as the English “gypsy”, is still not the correct terminology for the Romani people. It is likely, however, that many of the respondents would not know who the surveyor was referring to if they were to use the word Roma or Romani. Analysing the results of the question on whether many, some, few or none should be allowed into the country, we find a substantially more negative view than that shown towards the Jewish people, with 4% wanting many, 25% some, 29.8% a few and a staggering 41.2% wanting no Romani whatsoever to enter the country. We have, then, less than a third of the population, 29%, wanting many or some to come to the country, contrasted to over half of the respondents (51.1%) who answered the same for Jewish people. On the other end of the spectrum 71% want few or no Romani people whatsoever coming into the country. As has been mentioned before anti-Romani sentiment in Portugal is quite extreme and this was a predictable, if worrying, outcome (Graph 8). (ESS7, 2014)

Before looking at the results of the question covering the three groups of Jewish, Romani and Muslim people I had hypothesised that Muslims would fall somewhere between the other two groups in the level of acceptability. This does indeed prove to be the case, 5.4% of respondents want to allow many Muslim immigrants, 34.1% some, 30.4% few and 30.1% none. As we can see, then, the numbers are closer to those of attitudes towards the Romani people than Jewish people, but significantly more favourable than that group (Graph 8). With 39.5% of the population wanting to allow many or some, and 60.5% few or none. Of the three groups only attitudes towards immigration of Jewish people are in their majority

positive, with both Romani and Muslim people being seen as “undesirable” by the majority of the population, with the Romani people being at the bottom of that particular hierarchy and Muslims being slightly above but still far from the positive attitude shown to prospective Jewish immigrants. As the percentage of Muslims in Portugal is quite small and most people will have only had contact with Muslims through the media and not personally, it is hard to separate media representation of Islam and Muslims from these attitudes towards them. It is unfortunate that we have only one chronological data point for this response as its evolution through time would be of interest not only to this thesis but more generally to chart what effect events, such as the growth of far-right political parties in the country, might have on these attitudes. (ESS7, 2014)




Graph 8: Allow many, some few or none of these minority to come and live in the country?
ESS 7, 2014. (See Appendix A, Tables 17-19)

1.5. How does Portugal compare to other European countries in terms of attitudes to Islam and Muslims

Looking at these numbers, as we have done throughout this chapter, gives us an idea of Portugal's attitude towards immigration and race in general as well as the feeling towards those without a Christian background and specific ethnic and religious minorities. However, if we are trying to look for specificities in the Portuguese case, we will need to look at these numbers in the context of other countries. Seeing as we are using the ESS this will limit us to the countries covered by this survey, as seen above, these include 38 different countries. Comparing all the statistics discussed in this chapter would be beyond the scope of this work, but some elements would be useful to determine if Portugal is particular in its attitude towards Muslims and Islam, or even non-Christians, or if it is part of a wider European pattern. Also interesting would be to see which other European countries it is closer to in its attitudes, neighbouring countries, countries with comparable economic profiles or other reasons that might explain similarities. To do this, then, and to focus down on the topic of Islam, I will look in this section at the question of the importance of having a Christian background as a qualification for immigration and the attitude towards the three minority groups of Jewish and Romani people as well as Muslims. This should help give us both an idea of how important religious homogeneity is to respondents as well as a relative hierarchy of discrimination across countries of the three groups described, here we will achieve a better picture of Portugal's attitude towards non-Christian as well as specifically Muslim immigration and people, in an international context.

Let us look first at the question of Christian background as a qualifying factor in immigration to each European Country, this is the same question that was looked at in the previous section, but what interests us here is the relative position of Portugal in this indicator when it comes to the other countries surveyed. As we have seen, this question was posed in two different ESS rounds, one in 2002 and the other in 2014, those that included the Immigration rotating module. Looking firstly at 2002 (Graph 9 and 10), we can see that the question was posed to 22 countries, all of them in Europe, with the notable exception of Israel, which also participated in the survey. As we saw in the previous section, the question ranks the importance of a Christian Background as a qualification for immigration into each country from 0 to 10, with 0 being "extremely unimportant" and 10 "extremely important".


In 2002, Portugal appears to be slightly above average in giving importance to a Christian background for immigrants, with a middling number of respondents answering “extremely unimportant”, or 0 on the scale, (23.1%), this leaves 8 countries whose respondents replied less frequently that it was extremely unimportant, those being, Poland, Italy, Hungary, Greece, Spain, the Czech Republic, and, surprisingly for a country which is not composed of a Christian majority, Israel. It did, however, leave 13 countries which found a Christian background to be less important than Portugal. The closest countries to Portugal in this answer were the Czech Republic (22.7%) and Spain (22.5%), on the side of the countries who found it more important, while on the other side of Portugal would be Norway (23.9%) and Finland (24%). The countries who were less interested in people with a Christian background would be Luxembourg (59.1%) and Sweden (43.5%), while those who give the highest importance being Poland (18%), Greece (11%) and again, peculiarly for a non-Christian majority country, Israel (7.2%). The average answer, for the value 0, in 2002 across all countries was 27.5%. (ESS1, 2002) (Graph 9)




Graph 9: Christian background as a qualification for immigration is very unimportant, ESS 1, 2002. (See Appendix A, Table 20)

If we look at the opposite end of the scale in 2002, respondents giving a value of 10, who think that it is extremely important that immigrants have a Christian background, we actually find Portugal lower on the table, with only 2.8%, while 14 other countries answered more frequently that it was “extremely important”. This shows that Portuguese respondents might want immigrants with a Christian background and, therefore, do not find it to be “extremely unimportant” but neither do they find it “extremely important”, it seems to be a low priority question in 2002, not creating the polarization or the extreme sentiment that can be seen in other surveyed countries. We can contrast the 2.8% of Portuguese respondents which felt it was extremely important with the 18% of Greeks, 12.3% of Hungarians, or 47.5% of Israelis that found it extremely important. In this indicator, Portugal is closer in 2002 to countries seen as more religiously liberal such as France (2.6%), Finland (2.7%) or Germany (2.9%) (Graph 10). (ESS1, 2002)

Looking at the same question 12 years later, in 2014 (Graph 11), we see the question asked again of a variety of countries, this time 21 of them, mostly being the same as in the 2002 edition, including Israel as the only country not geographically part of the European continent. As we have seen above, there is a polarization of positions in the case of Portugal, with more people replying in the extreme points of 0 and 10 in the scale. This polarization is mainly expressed in the value of 10, where Christian background is an extremely important factor, which goes from 2.8% to 8% of replies, even while the general trend is to be more accepting of immigrants with no Christian background, as the lower points in the scale also rise, it is the middle ground that is comparatively smaller than in 2002. In the European context, Portugal has 29.4% of respondents saying that they give no importance to Christian background, with a value of 0 on the scale, this goes up from 23.1%, further reflecting polarization. This makes Portugal below the European average of 36.1% of people responding 0, but still there are seven countries in the list that rank below Portugal, these are similar to those 12 years earlier, with the notable exception of Spain which has overtaken Portugal, with a value of 22.5% of “extremely unimportant” respondents in 2002, rising to 38.7% in 2014. The countries closest to Portugal in this response are now Ireland (23.9%) and Austria (33.9%) , two strongly Catholic countries. The ones that have the lowest answers in the 0 range being Lithuania (6.8%), Israel (10.1%), Hungary (15.1%) and Poland (16.3%), all more that 10 percentage points distant from Portugal and the countries with the highest percentage of respondents in the same range being Norway (42%), Belgium (42.7%), Germany (47.2%), the Netherlands (48.1%) and Sweden (59.5%). Portugal can then be seen as being in the middle range between these two groups of countries. (ESS 7, 2014)




Graph 10: Christian background as a qualification for immigration is very important, ESS 1, 2002. (See Appendix A, Table 20)



Graph 11: Christian background as a qualification for immigration is very unimportant, ESS 7, 2014. (See Appendix A, Table 21)


Moving to the other end of the scale in 2014, considering the value of 10, we see Portugal with 8% of respondents which think that a Christian background is extremely important to qualify as an immigrant to the country, this is double the European average of 4%, and only four countries have a higher percentage of extreme responses to this question, being Poland (8.3%), Lithuania (9.9%), Hungary (8.5%) and Israel (41.9%). It is worth nothing that Israel’s answer, even not being a country with a majority Christian population, is over 10 times the European average of 4%, revealing a low tolerance for immigrants without a Christian background. In this value the countries nearer to Portugal are the Czech Republic (7.9%), Poland (8.3%) and Hungary (8.5%). In this respect, Portugal is definitely in the group of the countries with the highest percentage of people replying the extreme position of 10 to the question. While in 2002 the value was similar to those of more tolerant countries like France, Finland and Germany, by 2014 the percentage of extreme anti-non Christian sentiment is similar to that of Poland or Hungary, countries which are renowned for being intolerant of asylum seekers and immigrants from outside Europe. (AFP, 2021)



Graph 12: Christian background as a qualification for immigration is very important, ESS 7, 2014. (See Appendix A, Table 21)

This reveals increasing polarization in the case of Portugal which moved its position within Europe, this is not, however, a Europe-wide movement, the average amount of replies giving the extreme value of 10 has in fact gone down if we take all the countries in the survey into account, from an average of 5.1% in 2002 to an average of 4% in 2014. Portugal's change from 2.8% to 8% across the two editions of the ESS reveal a particular growth in extreme anti-immigrant with non-Christian background sentiment. Most countries which were measured at these different points went down in this indicator, even the more extreme ones such as Hungary, Poland and Israel, with only Portugal and the Czech Republic having this kind of growth. One might wish to blame the economic crisis or the spread of social networks for this growth, but this was a phenomenon that was Europe-wide and countries also profoundly affected by the economic crisis of 2008, such as Spain and Ireland, do not show growth in this indicator (Graph 12). (ESS 7, 2014)


Lastly, looking at the comparison between Portugal and the other countries which participated in the ESS in the 2014 edition, when it comes to attitudes to particular ethnic/religious groups, there are interesting elements to be found. Again, this was a question posed only once in the survey, so there is no chronological evolution that we can chart, but as a snapshot of Europe in 2014, it is quite telling. The three groups inquired about were the Jewish and Romani people, as well as Muslims. Starting with the Jewish people (Graph 13), the ESS asked if people across Europe should allow many, some, few or no Jews to come and live in their respective countries. Taking only the extreme positions of "many" and "none" to gauge popular opinion, we find that Portugal has the second smallest amount of "many" (8%) and the second largest "none" (24.8), among all the 21 countries surveyed. Only Hungary demonstrates a deeper aversion to Jewish immigrants than Portugal with responses in the 6.9% for many and 35.5% for none. The countries with the nearest values to Portugal being Hungary, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. (ESS 7, 204) This points to an elevated degree of anti-semitism in Portugal, something which is particularly strange for a country which has not had a substantial Jewish population since the 1400s, and the small population it does have is not renowned for any particular social tensions in the country. The same is not true for the Romani population, however. (ESS 7, 2014)




Graph 13: Should many or few Jewish people be allowed to come and live in the country? (European Context) ESS 7, 2014 (See Appendix A, Table 22)

When it comes to the Romani people, which the survey named as *Gypsies*, being the derogatory but more popularly used word for that ethnic group. As we have seen above, anti-Romani rhetoric is quite present in Portuguese political discourse, being the group most targeted for verbal attacks by the far-right in the country, but the same is true across Europe. Compared with other countries, Portuguese respondents answered “many” to the question of how many to allow into the country, quite rarely, with only 4% of the respondents giving that answer. However, even with such a low percentage, half of those who gave the same answer when applied to Jewish people, there are 5 other countries which answered even less than 4%, being Lithuania (3.9%), Estonia (3.4%), Israel (3.2%), Hungary (2.1%) and the Czech Republic (1.5%) (Graph 14). This goes to show how extreme anti-Romani positions are widespread in Europe, the countries closest to Portugal in this answer were in fact the countries which voted for even less, namely Lithuania, Estonia, Israel and Hungary, the country above Portugal was Ireland, but the difference was wider, with 6.6% of respondents answering that they would like many Roma immigrants. On the opposite end of the scale, when answering that they wish to allow no Romani immigrants whatsoever, Portugal with 41.2% is again overtaken by 5 other countries who chose this option more frequently, the exact same countries which chose the “many” option less frequently, Lithuania (50.8%), Estonia (53%), Israel (60.4%), Hungary (64.8%) and the Czech Republic (63.3%), in this case Portugal also ties with Ireland (41.2%). The fact that 5 countries among those surveyed have more than half the people surveyed wanting no immigration of Romani people whatsoever illustrates just how undesired this ethnic minority is. Portugal (and Ireland) are below the 50% percent mark, but the country just below them in percentage, Belgium, is almost 10 percentage points lower, with 32.7%. Portugal seems then to be consistently, when it comes to discrimination, in the same group of countries, which are not those which are closest to it geographically or culturally, Central and Eastern European and Baltic countries which might have more in common with Portugal economically (Graph 14). (ESS 7, 2014)

Looking at the attitude towards Muslim immigrants in Europe (Graph 15), we again see similar indicators, the Portuguese wanting many immigrants (5.4%) are a small minority of respondents, being less only in 4 countries, Estonia (4.6%), Israel (2.9%), Hungary (2.6%) and the Czech Republic (1.4%). The closest country to Portugal is Lithuania with 5.7% of respondents answering that they would like many Muslim immigrants in their country. On the opposite end of the spectrum 30.1% of Portuguese want no Muslim immigrants, 6 other countries are more excludent in wanting Muslim migrants, Poland (33.7%), Lithuania (39.5%), Estonia (40.4%), the Czech Republic (55.5%), Hungary (56.3%) and Israel (59.5%).



Graph 14: - Should many or few Gypsies [sic] be allowed to come and live in the country? (European Context) ESS 7, 2014. (See Appendix A, Table 23)



Graph 15: Should many or few Muslims be allowed to come and live in the country? (European Context) ESS 7, 2014 (See Appendix A, Table 24)

Below Portugal on this percentage is, again, Ireland, with 22.2% of respondents not wanting any Muslim migrants, but still quite distant from Portugal's percentage (Graph 15). (ESS 7, 2014)

1.6. Conclusion

In conclusion, through the analysis of the available data in the European Social Survey, there are several indicators about Portugal and the attitudes of its population about race, ethnicity, immigration and religious/ethnic groups which are of use if we are to have a general picture of how Muslims are seen in the country. Seeing as the majority of Muslims in the country belong to ethnic groups other than the prevailing one and do not share the religion of the country's majority, this does not paint a rosy picture when it comes to their acceptance as equal members of the society in the country.

We also saw how attitudes towards immigrants have slowly become more positive from 2002 to 2018, but also, and contrastingly, how they have become more polarised. While the general attitude becomes more accepting of immigrants from other cultures and religions, specifically, we also see that the extreme positions of refusal of these groups also become more prevailing. It is not the objective of this section to determine causes for this, but it is easy to find correlations such as the economic crisis of 2008 creating a break in acceptance of immigrants, and the subsequent recovery making people more accepting. If this is compounded with the growth of social networks in the country in the intervening years, and the accompanying growth of far-right parties and rhetoric we start to piece together a puzzle that helps explain these changes.

Looking at Portugal in the wider European context we also see that its attitudes towards race, ethnicities and non-Christian religions are in line not with neighbouring countries, countries that share its Mediterranean culture, a history of empire, colonial atrocities, or countries which share a romance language with it. Portugal's attitudes are more in line with countries in the centre or east of Europe, all of which were behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland or Baltic countries. The most apparent similarities between these countries and Portugal being the per capita gross domestic product and human development index, both indicators that cluster these countries together into a group. (Trading Economics, 2020; Statista, 2019)

It seems then, also taking into account how the survey answers shifted with the ebb and flow of the economic crises in Portugal, that the most determinant factor in being a country accepting of immigrants is not a question of culture or history, but of economic stability and social prosperity. The view of Islam in Portugal and the way it is portrayed in the media needs, then, to be seen in this light: that of a country which is economically deprived and an outlier in Western Europe as well as a particularly racist and intolerant one, which is likely, at least partially, an outcome of those economic factors.

CHAPTER 2: The Representation of Islam in the Portuguese Media's Response to the *Charlie Hebdo* Attacks

2.1. Introduction

When thinking about the relationship between Islam and the media in Portugal, a question that comes to mind is about how homogeneous this coverage is and how much does it diverge from European coverage or not. In order to attempt to answer those questions, in this chapter I seek to contextualize Portuguese media coverage of Islam in the context of the *Western world*. Before we can reach any conclusions about this contextualization, we will have to go through four steps which might help draw out the specificities of the Portuguese case.

It is necessary, before moving on, to determine and limit the universe to be explored in this chapter. I decided to select, both for reasons of variety and investigative ease, two national news sources in the written form. These sources are a tabloid newspaper generally seen as tending towards sensationalism, but which is also the most widely sold newspaper in the country (*Correio da Manhã*), and a newspaper seen as one of the newspapers of reference (*Público*). Within these two publications, for our purposes we will only be examining articles that explicitly refer to religious questions directly related to Islam, meaning those that are related to beliefs or practices associated with Islam or which are explicitly Islamic. It is not, therefore, enough that a news item simply refers to refugees from a country that is coincidentally populated by a Muslim majority or refers to a conflict happening in a region where the predominant religion is Islam. What we are interested in are articles that refer directly to Islam, its beliefs and practices, including both informational articles and opinion pieces. As a way to make this process more automatic, I am only considering articles in which the word 'Islam' (in Portuguese: *Islão*) is specifically used, seeking them out with the help of the newspaper's search engines. Using 'Islam' as a substantive in the body of an article guarantees relevance to this study, a focus that would be lost if we searched for more general terms

that might or might not be related to considerations on Islam itself, such as the words ‘Muslim’ (Pt: *Muçulmano*), ‘Islamic’ (Pt: *Islâmico*), or ‘Islamist’ (Pt: *Islamita*), which might serve simply as adjectives in items that are not directly referring to the Islamic religion but only tangentially related to it, such as news articles on the Islamic State, for example. This is not to say that all uses of the word Islam will result in significant articles which fulfil the needs of this study, but the percentage of articles containing the word ‘Islam’ which directly concern the religion is much higher than those using related words such as the adjectives ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ which are much more often used as simple qualifiers for a person or thing, which can often be used in passing with no particular bearing on the religion or the discussion of it. For example during the time period studied ‘islamic’ can be used as a part of a large number of articles on the ‘Islamic State’ which tell of the ups and downs of the war in the region of Syria and Iraq, rather than discussing the religion itself, the word ‘muslim’ equally is often used to describe a person in an article that goes on to discuss a subject unrelated to the Islamic religion. The collection of articles which will result from this search will allow me to build an analytical grid looking at all articles which use the word Islam, letting me come to conclusions and highlight particularly relevant articles or events for the time period explored.

Towards the end of the chapter, seeking to identify how different sources cover aspects of Islam, I will focus on the week immediately following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks on 7 January 2015. By comparing how the event was covered in both newspapers, I plan to show how different sources present different views on Islam. These different perspectives are even more explicit in the opinion articles published in both sources, which led me to give a more detailed content analysis of opinion articles containing the word ‘Islam’ in order to flesh out differing editorial perspectives. This will help answer questions about how different media sources cover Islam and how these can be divided on lines of intended audience and socio-economic condition of that target audience, which is very much the case that we would expect to see when we compare the newspapers *Público* and *Correio da Manhã* from section 2.3 onwards.

2.2. Media Coverage of Islam in the Twenty-first Century

The passage to the twenty-first century joined two factors that substantially influenced media coverage of Islam. One of these factors is related to the growth of the Internet and the number of people that started not only having access to it but deriving much of their information from it. As it is an open system through which any person can make their voice be heard, this growth resulted in a proliferation of diverse ideas and perspectives on any issue, by any person, expert or non-expert, journalist or non-journalist. This environment created and still creates an increased pressure on traditional press and other media, which quickly also started giving importance to their own online presence, often leaving behind the more traditional formats, such as print and television. The Internet also created the necessity for a faster response on the part of the established media, the previous model of a daily or weekly newspaper stops making sense when news is disseminated in real time over the Internet and also, increasingly, through the proliferation of twenty-four-hour news television channels. These news channels, which started becoming popular with the coverage of the Gulf War at the start of the 1990s, particularly with CNN in the USA, increased in importance and number in the first years of this century as a way to respond to the constantly updated nature of the Internet.

The second factor, which focused news media particularly on Islam as an object of reporting, news, and opinion, was the 9/11 attacks in 2001, when Islamic fundamentalist terrorists coordinated and executed an attack on the USA, which resulted in three-thousand deaths. This was an event accompanied by live coverage, through news channels and the Internet. The shocking nature of the attacks, allied to their almost cinematic quality in the case of the Twin Towers attacks in New York, made the repetition of images exhaustive, as well as the search for an explanation of the reason for the attack and the ideology that underpinned it. Shortly after the attack, reports, opinion articles, and news items about Islam and Islamic fundamentalism multiplied, often with little critical criteria when it comes to the separation between terrorism and Islam, a result of prejudice but also of the sudden nature of the attack and the demand by new media for a more immediate response, which leaves little time for reflection on complex events and cultures that were alien and strange for many of the authors and commentators. (Weaver, 2006: 226)

An important work that gives a broad view of the media coverage of Islam in the UK is the article by Elizabeth Poole “The Effects of September 11 and the War in Iraq on British

Newspaper Coverage,” published in 2006. This article is the continuation of a larger work, the volume *Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims*, which having been published in 2002 had not been able to include an extended analysis of the many changes to the media landscape after 9/11, including this analysis only as the Preface to the work and not as an integral part of the thesis. In this new article, Poole makes a comparison between two British newspapers, *The Times* and *The Guardian* (as well as their Sunday editions, *The Sunday Times* and the *Observer*). These newspapers were chosen because they had distinct political stances, *The Times* being conservative and *The Guardian* centre-left. Poole uses the year 2003 in order to make a quantitative analysis of the language used by the newspapers and consequently compares these results with those obtained in similar works in the 1990s. (Poole, 2006: 89) Poole finds, in her quantitative analysis, twice as many articles related to international questions that mentioned the words ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’ between 1994 and 2003, as well as a more than twice the number of news articles on national issues related to these themes. The clearest increase was in the conservative *The Times*, and the majority of these new news articles had a negative outlook in terms of opinions and representations of Islam. This contrasts with the coverage from *The Guardian*, which was more balanced in what concerns negative, neutral, and positive news items, many of which covered acts of discrimination in which Muslims were the victims, as opposed to the conservative newspaper that almost exclusively portrayed Muslims as criminals and religious fanatics. The change in focus of the news between 1994 and 2003 is particularly noticeable, with conservative newspapers covering, at this point, mainly news on terrorist acts and terrorism, perpetuating the Orientalist discourse that portrays Muslims and Islam in general as antithetical to and as an enemy of the West. (Poole, 2006: 102)

It is also necessary to take into account, from a political perspective, the reason why we have different attitudes in relation to Islam in the media, as well as the different demographics that they aim to reach. Taking Poole’s study as an example, we can see that *The Guardian* was, up until 2008, financed by a non-profit organisation called The Scott Trust, having meanwhile been transformed into a limited company. (Poole, 2006: 89) This institution’s objective was to guarantee the unbiased nature and liberal principles of the newspaper, existing only for that function. In contrast, *The Times* is the property of what was then News International and now News Corp owned by Rupert Murdoch, an Australian media magnate, profoundly conservative and also the owner of other media providers, such as *The Sun* and *News of the World* as well as the TV network Sky News (in the UK) and until recently the company 20th Century Fox, which has now been broken up into several

branches with Murdoch retaining control of their televised media channels, such as the famously ultraconservative information channel in the US, Fox News. There is, therefore, a recognizable pattern in the properties connected to Rupert Murdoch in the propagation of news with a clear anti-Islamic and pro-*Western* slant.

In the USA, we can find further examples of how media outlets attempt to shape an image of Islam and Muslims that suits not only its audience but also the political aims behind the media outlet itself. Most famously we have the example of Fox News, but as this chapter focuses on printed media, we should stick to that medium. A good example of this political agenda behind printed news can be found in *The Weekly Standard*, a relatively small newspaper in terms of circulation, but which is widely influential in propagating a neoconservative view of Islam and Muslims. The newspaper has been studied in depth by George Kassimeris and Leonie Jackson, and they identify in the content of the articles a number of binaries used by neoconservative writers in order to justify political decisions and military actions, in this case the idea of the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ Muslim. (Kassimeris & Jackson, 2011: 19-33) They explain the process through which the media construction of a dividing line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims became instrumental in much of *Western* conservative media:

First, several writers explicitly drew a dividing line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims, with the former being placed in passive roles to illustrate that contemporary Islam is a problem even for Muslims. Second, ‘good’ Muslims were regularly portrayed as begging for help from the West to repel their ‘bad’ co-religionists. Third, Muslims in Western countries were shown as making trouble and abusing the generous freedoms afforded to them, or as a dangerous and ever-increasing minority, lurking in inner cities and ready to rampage at the slightest provocation. Even ‘good’ Muslims are a problem for neoconservatives; their temperaments were presented as strange and inscrutable, ruled as they are by emotion and passion. There is a sense in the texts that all Muslims are in danger of being radicalised and must be treated with suspicion and watched carefully. (Kassimeris & Jackson, 2011: 31)

In this way media helps shape the wider discourse on Islam and Muslims and more specifically helps justify attitudes towards Islam and countries with majority Islamic populations. The case for war, for example, is based on saving the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ Muslim oppressors, or to stop radicalization of the ‘good’ by ‘bad’ Muslims. As the third

point above shows, it also portrays those Muslims living in the West as worthy of constant suspicion and to be subjected to surveillance as particularly dangerous and irrational actors.

The wider point of *Western* media's racism is also explored by Tariq Amin-Khan who also, while re-examining British and US media contexts and examples of anti-Muslim feelings, brings in the case of Canada, exploring the 'Toronto 18,' a group of seventeen youths and one older man who were caught plotting a terrorist attack. (Amin-Khan, 2012: 1595-1610) Amin-Khan explores how much of the coverage of the event and particularly of those news reporters accused of anti-Muslim feelings in the Canadian media were tainted by what he calls "incendiary racism." As an example, he mentions articles published in the magazine *Maclean's* by writers such as Mark Steun and Barbara Amiel, among others, that were not only Orientalizing in their use of stereotypes but that were also "openly venomous, demonising and ridiculing the community as a whole." (Amin-Khan, 2012: 1605)

These are the types of dynamics that we will be looking for when examining the Portuguese case more specifically — examples of xenophobia and racism, Orientalism, and ideas of 'good' and 'bad' Muslims. They are present in the Portuguese case as well, but different political and historical contexts will show that these manifest differently, as a result of what is called the 'domestication' of news or how news is adapted to fit the different interests and concerns of a particular setting.

2.3. Comparison Between Two Daily Newspapers

Moving then to the Portuguese media chosen for this chapter, we will analyse two daily newspapers with a nationwide circulation, but which are seen as having different philosophies. We will consider here news and opinion items published in the week following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in January 2015 that use the word 'Islam' (Pt: *Islão*) in the title or body of those items. Before we move to the analysis of the content, it is useful to start with a brief introduction to both publications, the newspaper *Público* ("Public") and the newspaper *Correio da Manhã* ("Morning Mail"), analysing their origins and editorial orientation as well as the reasons that led to them being chosen for this study.

Público is a daily newspaper founded in 1990 and exists in the context of Portuguese newspapers of reference, which include other than itself another daily newspaper (*Diário de*

Notícias) and two weekly newspapers (*Expresso* and *Sol*), as well as two news magazines (*Visão* and *Sábado*). (Pinto & Sousa, 2004: 183) The newspaper's quality has been distinguished with awards, including the European Newspaper Congress award for best national newspaper in 2014, although we should take into account that this award reflects design and visual concept qualities and is not focused on the journalistic content of the paper. (European Newspaper Congress, 2015) *Público* is owned by Sonae SGPS, S.A., a company that is not dedicated exclusively to media, being also one of the biggest retail operators in the country, one of the largest communications and entertainment companies, and also the largest private sector employer in the country, with 46,000 employees, in addition to it being present in ninety countries. (Sonae, 2017) The large nature of Sonae makes *Público* a drop of water in the context of the company's business, but this also gives it means that go beyond the relatively small dimension of a national newspaper. Between 2014 and 2016, the newspaper's director was Bárbara Reis, a journalist who had previously been the culture editor for the newspaper and who came into the role of director in 2009. (Reis, n.d.) The editorial orientation of the newspaper is the same since the launch of the first issue in 1990, where it was published as "Estatuto Editorial" ("Editorial Statute"), and has been the official orientation since then, still being accessible in the newspaper's website. In this "Estatuto Editorial," *Público* is defined as not having any "dependence of a political, ideological or economic order" and as seeing itself in "a European tradition of demanding and quality journalism, eschewing sensationalism and the market exploitation of informational matters." Beyond this, it presents its mission as being the defence of democratic values:

Público considers that the existence of an informed, active and interventive public opinion is a fundamental condition of democracy and of the dynamics of an open society, which marks no regional, national or cultural boundaries for the movement of communication and opinions. (Público, n.d.)

Público was considered adequate for this study seeing as it is the daily newspaper in its segment of reference press with the greatest circulation. It is overtaken in terms of circulation in its market segment by the weekly *Expresso* and the weekly magazines *Visão* and *Sábado*, however the weekly nature of these media does not make them as good of subjects for our purpose as does *Público*. (APCT, 2018) Also, as the comparison is being made with another daily newspaper with a wide circulation, albeit with a more populist slant, as is the case for *Correio da Manhã*, it made sense to use *Público* as one of the subjects of this study.

The other newspaper to be considered in this article is *Correio da Manhã*, which, similar to *Público*, is also a daily newspaper, but an older one, having been founded in 1979. As opposed to *Público*, it is a part of the market segment not of reference newspapers but that of the popular press, a segment shared with the also daily *Jornal de Notícias*. (Pinto & Sousa, 2004: 183) *Correio da Manhã* is held by the Cofina group, a company dedicated above all to media as opposed to Sonae. The Cofina group also publishes a sports newspaper (*Record*), a free daily newspaper (*Destak*), a university newspaper (*Mundo Universitário*), and a business newspaper (*Jornal de Negócios*). The Cofina group also owns a television channel associated with *Correio da Manhã*, CMTV (*Correio da Manhã TV*), as well as a number of magazines, one about issues of general interest (*Sábado*), a fashion magazine (*Máxima*), and a TV guide magazine (*TV Guia*). *Correio da Manhã* is distinguished by being the Portuguese daily newspaper with the greatest circulation, holding 59.6% of the market share in the segment of daily general interest newspapers, which can be compared to *Público*'s 9.4%. (Real, 2018) The director general of the newspaper, Octávio Ribeiro, is also the director general of CMTV, as well as of the Cofina group as a whole. The populist orientation of the newspaper leads to it being famous, particularly for the attention that it dedicated to stories on crimes of passion and other themes that can attract a general public, which is not particularly interested in politics and other subjects that fill the pages of the so-called reference newspapers. It is also well known for having a very large section of classified adverts and personal adverts, which attract the audience to whom it is aimed. An editorial statute is presented on its website, much like *Público*, and, much like that newspaper, it defends the “independence of the journalistic activity before all forms of power, be they political, economic, religious or other,” stating that it is “made by a newsroom that respects the value of pluralism and does not bend before particular interests that seek to prevail over the interests of the community,” and that it “elects the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic as the fundamental judicial pillars of its journalistic activity.” It affirms its mission as being:

[...] to cultivate investigative journalism, for the necessary scrutiny of public life and as a way of citizen control over eventual abuses of power, authority or dominant position. (Correio da Manhã, 2015)

As opposed to *Público*, there is no mention of a refusal of sensationalism or a statement on the quality of said journalism. It does mention that its mission is one of scrutinising

public life so as to stop abuses and also affirms that it “[...] combats and denounces all forms of social exclusion. It dedicates particular attention to the rights of children, women, minorities and the underprivileged.” (Correio da Manhã, 2015) It presents itself, then, not necessarily as a newspaper centred only on the act of informing the public but also as a justice seeker, appearing as a counter-power and being vigilant in the defence of the public interest against those who might oppress them.

Moving on to the news coverage and opinion articles on Islam between 2014 and 2016, we can see that both newspapers dedicate hundreds of articles to this subject. There is, however, a large discrepancy in the number of articles that each dedicates to the theme. In the period between the 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2016, *Público* published 729 articles containing the word ‘Islam’; in the same period, *Correio da Manhã* published 359 articles containing this word, these results being obtained using the archive search engine on their respective websites. This discrepancy shows that *Público* mentioned the word ‘Islam’ more than twice as often, despite the fact that they are both daily newspapers and that *Correio da Manhã* actually had more news items per issue, which illustrates the difference between the subjects that each newspaper focuses on. *Público*, as a reference newspaper, demonstrates a larger interest in news on international politics in its media coverage, as well as a more extensive coverage of international events, such as terrorist attacks and international conflicts, having in this period of time a large number of items on the attack and the controversy surrounding the *Charlie Hebdo* case, as well as extensive coverage on the conflict in Syria. *Correio da Manhã*, in contrast, having more populist editorial concerns, did not dedicate so much space to international news.

Looking at the news on Islam during this time span, one news item immediately catches the eye as being particularly relevant, generating not only a large amount of news, but also making a bridge between the popular conceptions on Islam by European countries, the fear of Islam in those same countries, and directly the world of media as they refer to an attack on a media outlet in France. This was the *Charlie Hebdo* Case in early 2015 and I therefore opted to look closer at the reactions to this case as a way to further explore the relationship between media and Islam in Portugal.

2.4. Content Analysis: The *Charlie Hebdo* Case

I opted to focus here on the attack on the offices of the French satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, an event which was important for its violence, but also because it can be seen as a direct attack on a *Western* media outlet, which has a particular relevance to the media's reaction to it, due to a professional class empathy and a feeling of an attack on the freedom of the press so valued by the media. The globalised nature of news in the age of the Internet and Twitter means that the reaction to these attacks was almost immediate in Portugal, as it was in other European countries and eventually the world. Discussing the spread of the hashtag #jesuischarlie, which was emblematic of the reaction to the attacks, Johanna Sumiala et al. mention how: "The first few [...] appear in France and in neighbouring Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and then along the east and west coasts of the USA." (Sumiala, et al., 2018: 61) The *Western* media's reaction to the event was then almost immediate and followed a similar pattern of outrage toward the events as an attack on free speech and on the media itself, which made the attacks particularly relevant and newsworthy for that same media that felt attacked. (Sumiala, et al., 2018: 70)

Analyzing the news items that appear in the two Portuguese newspapers between 7 January 2015, the day of the attack, and the same day the following week, the 14th, we can see that both newspapers gave extensive coverage of the event and its relation to Islam. We can again see a discrepancy between both newspapers, with *Público* containing thirty-seven articles that mention Islam in that week, of which six are opinion articles, while *Correio da Manhã* totals ten less articles, twenty-seven, of which ten are opinion articles. Of these articles, almost all of them mention the *Charlie Hebdo* case, with the exception of two in *Público* and one in *Correio da Manhã*.

The emphasis given to the articles in both dailies is, however, quite different. In *Público*, we can see a bigger concern with the possible consequences of an aggravation of Islamophobia in France and Europe, including Portugal, with seven items covering anti-Islamophobia protests in France and Germany, a defacement attack on the Lisbon mosque, a story of a Muslim policeman who was also a victim of the attacks, the French response to the attack to attempt not to create a regime of exception that would unfairly target the Islamic community, and also the fear by the French Islamic community of becoming the victim of reprisals. (Guimarães, 2015; Soares, 2015; Lorena, 2015; Siza, 2015; Lorena 2015a) *Correio da Manhã* has only two articles, one on a protest against Islamophobia in Germany and another one that simply states that the Islamic community is concerned with

Islamophobia. (Faria, 2015; Correio da Manhã, 2015a) Yet, *Correio da Manhã* includes news articles on statements by Nicolas Sarkozy, former French president, under the title “Sarkozy: Immigration ‘Complicates Things,’” and by Pope Francis, entitled “Pope Condemns ‘Deviant Forms of Religion.’” (Correio da Manhã, 2015b; Lusa, 2015) Lastly, it also covers a protest by a far-right German group, *Pegida*, without mentioning the counter-protests discussed by *Público*; there is additionally no mention of the Muslim policeman who was a victim of the attacks. (Lusa, 2015a) *Correio da Manhã* also ignores the defacement of the Lisbon mosque, a search of “Lisbon mosque” in the period when it was defaced presents no results in the newspaper’s archives that even refers to that fact.

Another difference between both newspapers can be seen in the coverage given to the latest book by Michel Houellebecq, which was being promoted at the time, with the promotion having been suspended as a consequence of the Paris attacks. Houellebecq is seen as a controversial writer, particularly in relation to his opinions on Islam, and was featured on the cover of *Charlie Hebdo* on the day of the attacks on their offices. *Público* dedicates four items during that week to the writer, who is mentioned whether by his name or the title of his book in the title of all of these articles, meanwhile *Correio da Manhã* dedicates no articles to the author, although he is mentioned three times in opinion articles authored by former Secretary of State for Culture Francisco José Viegas, but only as a part of the body of more generalist opinion pieces. (De Kerne, 2015; Lopes, 2015; Público, 2015; Canelas, 2015, Viegas, 2015, 2015b and 2015c)

As we have seen above, *Correio da Manhã* focuses almost exclusively on negative news items on Islam, while *Público* has a more balanced coverage. There is, therefore, a clear negative slant to the *Correio da Manhã* coverage, which being a sensationalist newspaper, concerned with negative stories about many other topics, such as extensive coverage of crimes of passion in Portugal, feels like a natural thing to happen in its context. However, it is also interesting to look more in depth at the opinion articles in both newspapers as those will give us a better indication of editorial intent in both cases. Is *Correio da Manhã* simply covering negative news items due to a miserabilist streak or is that in tune with an editorial intent? In the case of *Público*, is the more balanced coverage a sign of a more tolerant and open newspaper?

2.5. Opinion Articles

I have opted to focus on the opinion pieces published during this aforementioned week for a number of reasons: in the Internet age, much of the factual content of news articles reaches the public from a diversity of sources, much of the public will have read about the facts of the matter online, whether in Portuguese or foreign sources, and, therefore, opinion pieces present ways in which columnists attempt to create meaning from those same news and transmit them to a public audience. Opinion pieces are also, usually, unique and exclusive to one single media source, which helps give us a notion of what the columnists associated with that source think about a certain subject and interpret the news; news articles, in contrast, are often repeated almost verbatim in different sources, drawing from news agencies like Reuters or AP. Therefore, in an exercise of comparing and contrasting two different sources, opinion pieces provide us with unique, value-laden texts, exclusive to each source, making the contrast between them clearer. These factors and the fact that most columnists are public figures with dedicated readers and are themselves ‘opinion makers,’ helps us judge the impact that each media source can have on how the audience builds their narrative about Islam, in this case. Lastly, due to the nature of opinion pieces, if we are looking for value judgements on Islam, these are clearly laid out in these pieces.

This analysis will use both qualitative methods with the aide of quantitative tools, looking at the number of occurrences, and at the content of each opinion article, grading its attitude toward Islam on a spectrum from negative to positive as well as giving a short description of the content of each article, laying out its position on Islam. Seeing as the majority of the articles are a reaction to the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, a critical position on Islam is to be expected, but the degree to which each article considers terrorist attacks to be something inherent to Islam or if they make a point of creating distinctions between the attackers and Islam in general can be revealing when attempting to gauge each newspaper’s particular ideological slant.

2.5.1. *Público*

Of the six articles in *Público*, all but one are written by white Portuguese men, none of which are known to be Muslim, with the remaining one being authored by a Portuguese woman journalist, also not Muslim.

The first article came out on the day of the attacks themselves, 7 January 2015, and is the single exception authored by a woman, Teresa de Sousa, entitled “The Return of Fear in a Europe with Fear.” Being so close to the event, the article focuses generally on terrorism in Europe, mentioning that we do not know exactly who was behind the attack except for its “Islamic nature.” (Sousa, 2015) She goes on to lament the attack and to give a synopsis of the latest attacks in Europe since 9/11, finishing the article by lamenting the rise of Islamophobia in Europe, defending the idea that these types of attacks feed new movements, like *Pegida* and other dangerous far-right groups. In spite of some unfortunate turns of phrase, such as characterizing a terrorist attack as having an “Islamic nature,” it shows concern for Islamophobia and sticks mainly to a factual perspective on attacks, as such it can be classified as a neutral opinion article on Islam.

The article by Miguel Esteves Cardoso, a household name in Portugal as a writer and journalist, on the 9th of the same month, looks at the attacks through the perspective of a defence of the French and, by extension, European judicial systems. Entitled “The Righteous Vengeance,” he displays happiness at the fact that the attackers will never spend more than twenty-five years in prison because it shows a superior morality to avoid “eye for an eye” types of vengeance. In terms of Islam, he considers the attackers to be “murdering psychopaths who invoke Islam to make themselves look like religious people” and compares their case to that of Anders Brevik who also did not get any kind of capital punishment. He ends the article by stating “The right vengeance is to be condescending with murderers. To take their reasons away from them.” Again, this opinion article does not put the blame on Islam and affirms that Islam is claimed by murderers for selfish reasons and can also be regarded as neutral in its view of Islam. (Cardoso, 2015)

Another article, by Luís Pedro Nunes, sarcastically entitled “We are Safer Without *Charlie*,” focuses mainly on the importance of the newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* as a satirical paper that made people uncomfortable as an answer to some social media opinions, defending the idea that maybe *Charlie Hebdo* was partially to blame for the attacks. This is a natural subject for Nunes to write about, as he was the director of *Inimigo Público* (“Public Enemy”), a satirical news supplement of *Público* similar to *The Onion* in the US or *Private Eye* in the UK context. His mention of Islam refers to the idea that making fun of Islam and Muhammad is more dangerous than making fun of Christ, for example. He sees *Charlie Hebdo* as defying “Islamic radicals” because it was simply what it did. (Nunes, 2015) It is an article that is mainly neutral if borderline negative towards Islam.

By 11 January, Vítor Belanciano wrote an article about the Je Suis *Charlie* movement,

in which people on social networks changed profile pictures to images allusive to the attacks showing solidarity with the newspaper, entitled “To Be *Charlie* and to Be Muslim.” He mentions how it has been adopted by people from various political quadrants, including those who might be against freedom of speech in other contexts, but who seem to be mobilized by the fact that the attack had a relation to Islam. He goes on to mention how *Charlie*’s right to publish should be an unassailable right, but how there is a need to be careful not to fan the flames under the nascent far-right movements in Europe, who might try to take advantage of the situation for political gain, with a potential as destructive as that of any Islamic extremism. He ends the article by stating that solidarity should be expressed not only with *Charlie* but also with those Muslims who, having no involvement in fundamentalist actions, will nevertheless suffer consequences of these attacks. This can also be considered a neutral or borderline positive article towards Islam. (Belanciano, 2015)

João Carlos Espada, on 12 January, wrote “Paris, 2015: Capital of Freedom,” an article promoting the further integration of Muslim communities in the *Western* societies where they live, asking questions about whether those communities are doing enough to communicate to their members the evils of fundamentalist Islam. Quite paternalistic in tone, the article does not display an openly negative view of Islam but demonstrates a suspicion of Islamic communities and their “insularity,” again warning that this might feed into the rise of the far-right. It is, overall, an article that casts a negative light on Islam and Muslim communities, while attempting to give a veneer of neutrality, by defending the right of those communities to exist in *Western* countries. (Espada, 2015)

The last opinion article of the week in *Público* is by José Vítor Malheiros and is entitled “They Didn’t Get the Joke.” Of all the opinion pieces in *Público*, it is the one that is most clearly negative. It starts off by defending *Charlie Hebdo*, claiming the paper was not criticizing Islam but precisely those forms of Islam that ended up attacking *Charlie Hebdo*, that they were caricatures against “the idiots and misogynist executioners that claim Islam for themselves.” He follows this by describing these fundamentalist Muslims as “cretins with a Kalashnikov dreaming of an eternal erection and 72 virgins waiting for them.” He goes on to say that it is clear that the large majority of Muslims are not supporters of terrorism, and are often themselves victims of terrorism, but he finds that Islam has a particular problem with terrorism that cannot be completely separated from the religion and culture where it originates from and that it is an emergent problem. Although he concedes that “Islam does not defend terrorism,” he says that Islamic terrorism is clearly deriving from a religious base and, therefore, needs to be discussed as such. Even while Malheiros defends a certain idea of Islam

as generally peaceful, he sees Islamic terrorism as being based on Islam as well, a clear use of the ‘good’ versus the ‘bad’ Muslims, as discussed above in this chapter. (Malheiros, 2015)

2.5.2 Correio da Manhã

Of the ten articles in *Correio da Manhã*, all are written by white Portuguese men, none of which are known to be Muslim.

In *Correio da Manhã*, the opinion article by Francisco José Viegas on 7 January came out before the *Hebdo* attacks made it into the newspaper, but it nonetheless mentions Islam, which means it should also be covered here. In it, the author mentions the publication of the latest novel by Kamel Daoud, *Mersault, contre-enquête*, stating that “an imam has condemned him [the author] to death. Well done Islam!”—a clear negative mention of Islam, taking the opinion of one Imam as representative of the whole of the religion and associating Islam with violence and censorship without qualification. (Viegas, 2015a)

The following day, 8 January, Viegas again writes in the newspaper, this time already reflecting on the attacks with an article entitled “An Attack on the Heart of Tolerance and Freedom,” an article again with a negative view of Islam, conflating the attacks with non-related Islamic events, such as the Salman Rushdie affair, and comparing what he calls “howls of ‘Allah Akbar’ [sic] and ‘we have avenged the prophet’” with the “good faith” of Europeans marching against *Pegida* in Germany or the way the Finsbury Park Mosque is allowed to remain open in the UK. Viegas also criticises sociologists for trying to “explain how we have to be patient and ‘understand’ excesses of barbarousness.” (Viegas, 2015b)

A more neutral to positive article, by Fernando Calado Rodrigues, a Catholic priest, came on 9 January, entitled “Fundamentalism.” In this article, Calado takes on the statement by Pope Francis about the attacks and, through a deeply Catholic lens, writes about the love of one’s neighbour, mentioning that Christian fundamentalists also frequently forget that central tenet of the faith. He ends by considering that the *Hebdo* attacks were also a distorted conception of Islam and highlights the fact that many Muslim leaders have condemned the attacks. He laments, however, that few fundamentalists of any religion will pay attention to these condemning voices, as he considers one of the characteristics of religious fundamentalism to be the incapacity to listen to others. (Rodrigues, 2015)

Viegas returns on 9 January with his daily column, with increasing Islamophobic

vitriol. Again, the mentions of Islamic “howls” are repeated, as are comparisons to Rushdie and the murder of Theo van Gogh. He then states that “[...] we have reached a limit. That limit demands that Islam (whatever that is) declare itself gravely outraged, injured and attacked [...] it needs to denounce the falsifiers of Islam if they are indeed falsifiers and not ‘followers of the prophet.’” With apparently no distinction between several forms of Islam, he goes on to quote Shiite leader Ayatollah Khomeini as support for his view of Islam and to gleefully declare that the bottle of wine left at the memorial to the victims at least will not be drunk by Muslims. (Viegas, 2015c)

On the 10th, there is an article by socialist politician Eduardo Cabrita, which presents a more neutral to positive view of Islam. In this article, Cabrita compares Islamic fundamentalism to the Catholic Inquisition, as both being perversions of religious messages, and warns against ideas of creating a “Fortress Europe,” warning that Europe cannot keep being uninterested in tragedies like the one at Lampedusa, the ghettoization of Muslims, and the fermenting of xenophobic hatred. (Cabrita, 2015)

On 11 January, João Pereira Coutinho wrote an article that is also openly negative towards Islam, with the title “Freedoms.” In it, he quotes the Portuguese Catholic priest, António Rego, who claims that there are essential differences in the concepts of freedom in the “West (with Christian roots)” and “radical Islam,” which he claims has to do with their lack of historical movements like the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment, leaving the Islamic world in a medieval mindset. Coutinho ends the article by claiming that Europe’s safety “depends on the capacity of Islam to ‘reform’ in order to leave its own middle ages.” (Coutinho, 2015)

On 12 January, Luciano Amaral wrote another negative article on Islam, “Are We Charlie?”—an article in which he objects to how France left Marie Le Pen out of the discussion about the attacks, saying that her exclusion from the “Republican March” against terrorism gives the impression that she is the only one brave enough to face the problem of Islamic fundamentalism. He mentions the importance of *Charlie Hebdo* and that the attacks prove that the newspaper was right about Islam in France, conflating the attacks with Islam in general. Amaral also says that talking about “attacks on freedom of speech without mentioning the concrete threat is to live in a state of negation.” For the journalist, that concrete threat is Islamic fundamentalism. He claims to find Le Pen’s solutions detestable but that her exclusion is giving her extra power. (Amaral, 2015)

On the same day Rui Hortelão presents an article entitled “To Be Charlie Is Not Enough,” which is neutral on Islam, mentioning that the attacks show that the current social integration model has not worked, that further repression of Muslims is the worst possible option, and

that, more than a religious question, this is a political and social problem. Although the article seems to conflate the attacks with the whole of the Muslim population in France, it is also the only article not to blame some form of religion for the attack. (Hortelão, 2015)

On the 13th, Almeida Henriques puts out a negative article on Islam entitled “The Antivirus” which promotes an idea of the clash of civilizations, stating that the attacks are attacks on *Western* culture: “a culture of fraternity where men and women are equal before the law. A civilization founded on the humanist ideals of Enlightenment where a western democracy was birthed, free from religion, origins, race, gender and ‘owners of the truth.’” It is not clear what is meant by “free from religion, origins, race, [and] gender”—this is probably a mistake and was meant to be “free from discrimination based on [...]” Henriques portrays the civilization from which the attacks arose as being the opposite of these values and proposes a need for education in order to “eradicate the Inquisition from some heads, geographies, and discourses.” (Henriques, 2015)

Finally, a very short piece by João Vaz was published on the same day, a positive/neutral article in relation to Islam, entitled “Recovery.” This article simply mentions a vigil by Muslims in Berlin with the objective to promote the “peaceful coexistence of religions” and includes Chancellor Merkel’s statement that “Islam belongs to Germany” but without making any value judgements on the subject. (Vaz, 2015)

Tallying them up, we have six articles in *Público* of which one is neutral positive (16.7%), two are neutral (33.3%), one is neutral negative (16.7%), and two are negative (33.3%). While of the ten articles in *Correio da Manhã*, we have three neutral positive (30%), one neutral (10%), and six negative (60%) articles on Islam. We can observe that, both in number of articles and relative percentage, there is a clear slant towards negative coverage in *Correio da Manhã* when compared with *Público*, while there is less of a show of neutrality in that newspaper as well as a smaller diversity of opinions.

2.6. Conclusion

There are several conclusions that can be derived from this preliminary analysis of two examples of Portuguese media and the international context in which they are inserted. Firstly, we can see in Portuguese media, as is revealed by the analysis of the week of the

Charlie Hebdo attacks, a preoccupation with events related to Islam outside national borders. In all the news items analysed, only one, in *Público*, refers to a national event as a consequence of the Paris attacks, the criminal defacement of the Lisbon Central Mosque. In general, these articles represent imported news items, many of them through news agencies such as Lusa and Reuters, replicating the same news items in several media, not only in Portugal but also abroad. The exception to the importation of news can be seen in the opinion articles and also in the production of news about national and cultural subjects. Concerning this, I should point out that *Público* presents a larger number of articles signed by authors, while *Correio da Manhã* has a larger number of unsigned items, referring to news agencies in the case being studied. It is also important to note that the more extensive and multifaceted coverage of the attacks in *Público* balances news and opinions, condemning the attacks with considerations on the dangers of Islamophobia, as well as the way in which the attacks themselves damage Islamic communities, with several articles presenting a strong demarcation between terrorists and the rest of the Islamic community. In contrast, *Correio da Manhã*, with a lighter coverage of the event, ends up omitting those news items that moderate feelings of Islamophobia or that portray Muslims themselves as also being victims of the attacks, adding news items absent from other media with inflammatory potential, such as the statements by Sarkozy and Pope Francis, which if the reader does not go beyond their titles can be seen as misleading, giving the feeling that immigration and Islam are blamed for the attacks by these figures, while the bodies of the articles show that the situation is more complex.

What this study starts to reveal is the existence of a clear ideological orientation in the narratives produced by the press. Despite the fact that in Portugal, as opposed to other countries like the UK, there is no clear and affirmed political orientation by the newspapers themselves, the way in which their articles reinforce the predispositions of their readers is similar. *Público* aims for a more educated audience from a higher economic class, as can be seen by the coverage of cultural events ignored by *Correio da Manhã*, such as in the case of the coverage of Houellebecq; it also presents a more complex view of the world through their news, which goes beyond the simplistic discourse of ‘us against them’ and ‘civilization versus barbarians,’ showing the other side of the coin. It is more similar to newspapers like *The Guardian* in the UK.

In contrast, *Correio da Manhã* more clearly represents an adverse position towards Islam, with news coverage and opinion articles, with a few exceptions, that tend to clearly portray the West as the bastion of liberty and others as their antagonists. Additionally, *Correio da Manhã* did not publish news items that might present a more conciliatory vision between the

West and Islam, and, quite to the contrary, ignored news items that presented wrong actions on the part of the West, such as the criminal acts against the Lisbon Central Mosque, or ones that showed a deeper complexity in the relations between Islam and terrorism, such as the story of the Muslim policeman killed in the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks or the counter-protests in opposition to far-right forces in Germany. This simplification of the world reinforces the predisposition of their target audience, creating an ideological echo chamber that concretizes the readers' feelings of being correct in their way of seeing the world; this happens in a similar fashion with *The Times* newspaper, as can be seen in Poole's article.

The particularities of the Portuguese case can be seen in the fact that very little mention is made in any of the articles of Portugal itself or of the Islamic community in Portugal. In fact, from the sixty-four news items and opinion pieces published by both newspapers in the week of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, only one covered an event in Portugal. All other articles covered the Islamic community elsewhere in Europe, particularly France and Germany, mentioning events that took place in the UK or the Netherlands as well (such as the Finsbury Park Mosque, the murder of Theo van Gogh, and the Salman Rushdie affair), but again not connecting them to the Portuguese case. There is even little localization or domestication of the news on Islam, with the exception of a couple of articles that translate the events to a Catholic perspective, which would be attractive to some Portuguese readers. In general, there is no effort to relate the events of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks with a wider Portuguese reality. This helps explain why the more populist newspaper, *Correio da Manhã*, published much less coverage of the event than the more middlebrow *Público*, with ten less news articles on the subject of Islam.

Where the populist tendencies of *Correio da Manhã* are more clearly expressed are in the opinion articles it published on Islam, with 60% of them showing a negative reaction towards the religion, against 33.3% in *Público*. The newspaper's columnists, having a faithful readership, can more easily relate to their readers and transmit certain views of Islam than the news articles that seem removed from the daily reality of most readers. It is also interesting to note the lack of diversity present in the columnists themselves, with an overwhelming presence of white middle-aged Portuguese men (and one single woman columnist in *Público*), none of which are Muslim, lending yet another level of homogeneity to the opinions being presented.

In conclusion, while Portuguese media presents many connections with the wider Western coverage of Islam, with Orientalist portrayals, notions of 'good' and 'bad' Muslims, and the clash of civilizations, it also demonstrates a certain insularity in terms

of the Portuguese relation to Islam. It is presented as something dangerous but far away, reflecting the country's small Muslim population and lack of national events related to Islam, such as terrorist attacks or even a presence in the daily lives of most Portuguese.

CHAPTER 3: The Contrasting Coverage of National and International News About Islam in Portuguese Newspapers

3.1. Introduction

While doing research on the representation of Islam in Portuguese media, a pattern seemed to appear while researching stories published in national newspapers and other media publications. This pattern seemed to show, in the Portuguese case at least, a difference between news items and reportages covering national and international events related to Islam. Anecdotally, it seemed that national news concerning Islam were more often positive and personalized, while international news were more abstract and presented negative connotations of Islam. The purpose of this chapter would then be to find some systematic evidence for this empirical feeling on my part. Was it a result of confirmation bias on the part of the researcher, an artefact of the randomness of articles encountered, or is there some marked difference between these two types of coverage? Does the transfer of Islam from geopolitical events to the personal level of national events or even local events have an influence on the way Islam is covered? Does substituting abstract large events for more humanized and localized coverage alter the way in which media portrays Islam? Also, is this a case that might be explained by the particular geopolitical contingencies of the Portuguese case, with a relatively small Muslim presence and a lack of Islamist inspired violent events?

In order to explore this and reach some conclusion about contrasting coverage of Islam within Portuguese media depending on the scale of the event, this chapter will be divided into four parts. In the first part I will examine, as a way to contextualise the coverage, the situation of Islam in Portugal when compared to other European countries, in terms of geographical distribution of the Islamic population as well as any major events or lack of them since Islam came to the centre of the news agenda in 2001. In the second section, I will explore the characteristics of the coverage of international events related to Islam, what

are the sources for these news items, what kind of news items are covered and what is the general tenor of the coverage. The same will be done in the third section, but now focusing on national news items. In the fourth and last section we can then contrast the two sets of data analysed in the previous two sections and find any particular differences between the way Islam is talked about in international and national news coverage, and what we can deduce from this. The chapter will then end with a brief conclusion summing up the findings and giving any final considerations on the subject.

3.2. Islam in Portugal in the International Context

In chapters 4 and 5 I will discuss the history of Islam in Portugal more in depth, and particularly the history of the Muslim community in Lisbon when I discuss the self-representation of the Muslim community in Portugal in chapter 5. There is, therefore no need to repeat here that same history, suffice it to say that in spite of having had an Islamic presence in the distant past, the Portuguese Muslim community in Portugal comes mainly today from former colonies and is centred particularly in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. According to the 2011 census, the most recent available at the time of writing, there were 20.640 Muslims in Portugal of which 14.202 lived in the Lisbon region, almost two thirds of the total number, the North of Portugal, being the second region with the most Muslim population had 2.263, which gives an idea of the disproportionate concentration of Muslims in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. (Instituto Nacional de Estatística: 2011) These numbers are, of course, outdated, and the total number of Muslims is very likely higher now, even if not remarkably so, however, there is little reason to assume that the relative geographical distribution has changed considerably since 2011. The publication of the 2021 census results by the end of 2022 should help confirm this.

However, for a country of 11 million people, this number of around 20.000 self-described Muslims is a small proportion, particularly in the context of Western Europe, representing 0.4% of the population of the country, which when compared to countries like France (8.8%), the UK (6.3%), Germany (6.1%), or Sweden (8.1%) and makes the Portuguese percentage of Muslims markedly out of step with its geographic region. Even neighbouring Spain has a percentage of 2.8% Muslim population which, even if small, is

still 7 times superior to that of Portugal. Only in Eastern Europe can we find proportions similar to those of Portugal in Hungary and Romania (both with 0.4%) or even smaller, as in the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (all between 0.1 and 0.2%). (Hackett: 2017) The background of the Portuguese Muslim population is also different from those of these countries, it bears some similarities with the Muslim communities in countries such as France and the United Kingdom in the sense that most first generation migrants originated in former colonies, but unlike in the case of those countries where many of the most populous colonies were countries with an overwhelming Muslim population such as the former colonies of Algeria for France or the area of the Indian subcontinent which would later become Pakistan and Bangladesh for the UK, Portugal did not have colonies with a majority Muslim population, although Guinea Bissau came close with a percentage of Muslims approaching half the population of the country and being the single largest religious group. However, Guinea Bissau is a comparatively small country, with a population approaching the 2 million mark, which explains a smaller impact in terms of immigration than that of Pakistan or Algeria, for example.

Another possible explanatory reason for the relatively small number of Muslim inhabitants in Portugal, has to do with the fact that it is not a very attractive country for immigration if the motivation is mainly economic. In this sense, Portugal is closer to the Eastern European countries with comparable rates of immigration than it is with its Western European neighbours. Both Portugal and those countries have lower minimum and average wages than those in France or the UK, or any of the other countries with larger Muslim population, this is a factor in selecting a country for immigration, which leads new Muslim immigrants to avoid Portugal as a final destination for immigration. Looking at a table of minimum wages in European countries we can find a strong correlation between low wages a low Muslim population as well as the reverse when it comes to high wages. (Pordata: 2021) In fact, the countries with minimum wages lower than that of Portugal are the Baltic States (with the exception of Slovenia), Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania, the same countries which we saw above that had lower or similar Muslim populations in percentage of the population. Slovenia appears as an exception of a country with higher wages and lower Muslim population while Bulgaria and Croatia have lower wages and a higher percentage of Muslim population due to their particular geographical and historical situations, with their Muslim population not originating in recent migration but in their proximity to Muslim Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina, respectively, with considerable populations of ethnic Turks and Bosniaks.

The two factors described above, of a relatively low Muslim population in former colonies when compared to the other Western European nations, and the low, unattractive wages for new Muslim migrants are likely the most significant explanations for the low Muslim population in Portugal. However, other factors can also be considered, as the fact that the Portuguese language is not widely studied in the Islamic world as opposed to English or French, although this would also apply to Swedish or German, for example, even if most Swedes and Germans speak English as a second language, as well as the relative geopolitical insignificance of Portugal in the context of Western Europe, being a small and not very powerful country, which does not create the idea of a “dream” destination for a prospective migrant. The fact that countries with larger Islamic communities have established migrant networks ready to welcome new arrivals from the same region of the world as the already established Muslims, is also of great influence when selecting a country of destination. (Geis, Ubelmesser: 2013)

The specific characterisation of the Islamic community in Portugal, and particularly Lisbon, will be dealt with more in-depth when I discuss the community’s self-representation in a later chapter. However, suffice it to say that this is a community that, due to the origin of most of its members in the former colonies, which gained their independence in 1974, is in most cases Portuguese speaking and, in many cases, has been in Portugal since the 1970s and 80s. Those of Indian origin, which were two-thirds of the incoming Muslim migrants during this period, in most cases came from Mozambique in East Africa, where they were well established as affluent merchants, and as such were particularly well suited to immigration and integration into the wider Portuguese society, being middle-class and highly educated. This influx in the second half of the 1970s occurs at the same time that other non-Muslim migrants are also moving from former colonies to Portugal, the socio-economic condition of Mozambican-Indian Muslims is, in fact, superior to that of many Catholic immigrants such as those from Cape Verde, for example and even to that of the majority of the autochthonous population of Portugal. (Mhommed 2007:20)

Another large group of migrants, composing about a third of the influx, came from Guinea Bissau, but being ethnically indistinguishable from other Guineans they did not stick out to the white Portuguese perception, which, unused to large scale immigration, and with its share of prejudice towards black immigrants, just saw all Guineans as being the same people with little consideration to their specific religious affiliations. Therefore, the popular perception of Muslims in Portugal after the first post-colonial migrations was associated with ethnically Indian Mozambicans, many of whom were middle-class and

socioeconomically privileged in comparison to other formerly colonized people coming into the country and, in fact, in comparison to much of Portugal's own native population, many of which were also returning from ex-colonies at this time. This made the perception of Muslims coming into Portugal, by the native Portuguese majority in the 1970s, as being far from "undesirable" immigration, certainly not when compared to other groups coming into the country at the same time, many of which shared the majority religion of catholic christianity. As a result, many of the frictions that can be seen in other European countries with Muslim migrants were either absent or attenuated in the Portuguese context, in part due to the small relative number of migrants, but also due to the socioeconomic condition of the most noticeable among them. (Mhomed 2007:20)

This was the situation of most Muslims in Portugal from the 70s up until the end of the century. A small, low-profile, educated and middle-class community which did not hit any headlines. This changes in 2001 with the attack on the Twin Towers, not so much due to the Muslim community in Portugal, but by importing fears of an "islamic threat" from abroad, initially particularly from the anglophone world and later from the wider world, with terrorist attacks associated with Islamic fundamentalism throughout Europe, such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015. However, Portugal remains, at the time of writing, one of the few European countries which has not been a victim of Islamist terrorism, there have been some arrests of alleged Islamist terrorists, but even in those cases it is not clear that any attack was being planned or if Portugal was simply being used as a place of passage or a place to "lay low". In a report on Jihadism in Portugal Diogo Noivo writes:

As far as is known, there is no sign of internal radicalisation or recruitment or of self-starter cells (...). Such a difference with the rest of European [sic] could have two explanations: (1) the degree of integration and sense of identity of Portugal's traditional Muslim community; or (2) the simple fact that home-grown terrorism has not yet been detected. (Noivo 2010)

Noivo's analysis seems somewhat simplistic as he seems to ignore the fact that class considerations are most likely also relevant here, Muslims in Portugal are, at least in the case of the ethnically Indian Muslims, as we have seen, in a socioeconomically favorable position when compared with those Muslims who migrated to other European countries. This factor translates into less generalised dissatisfaction with their condition and as a result make radical islamist cells less attractive. There have been several Portuguese nationals

identified as being part of Daesh, however, and during the height of that group in 2015, some 12 to 15 nationals were identified as being members. Interestingly, however, most of these were Portuguese with a catholic upbringing who were radicalized as adults and in most cases were also not radicalized in Portugal, but abroad, being migrants themselves, many second generation. (Nunes 2015)

This does not mean that Portugal has no history of terrorism, in the years after the revolution of 1974 which brought down the fascist regime that was then in power, there were frequent terrorist attacks by opposing political groups, with a particular incidence of far-right terrorist attacks leaving several dead. (Carvalho, 2017) By the middle of the 1980s, however, most of this activity had stopped. Since then, terrorism has not been a consideration in the daily life of most Portuguese people, occasionally there are captures of terrorists related to foreign associations such as Basque Nationalists from ETA, for example, but little consideration of attacks happening on Portuguese soil in the public perception.

This is then the particular situation of Portugal in relation to Islam in an international and particularly European context. A small Muslim presence, a well established and in many cases comfortable community, and a lack of large public negative events associated with Islam. There is, however, a negative vision of Islam in the country, as I have explored in the previous chapters, particularly in more populist and right-wing media, a focus on Islam which really became more prominent after the events of the 11th of September of 2001 in New York with the attack on the Twin Towers and Pentagon, and is a constant in the coverage of International events related to Islam. (Santos Silva, 2019)

3.3. Characteristics of International Coverage

The coverage of international events related to Islam in the Portuguese press has its own specific characteristics which might often seem out of step with the country's characteristics, and experience with the Muslim community and Islam in general. However, there are specific reasons which can help explain why there is a certain tenor to the coverage which might have much in common with international, non-islamic and *western* perspectives on Islam but little in common with actual lived experience in the country. In these section we will then look at the characteristics of the coverage on international events connected to Islam in the

Portuguese press. In the next sections we will do the same for news covering national events and then do a compare and contrast exercise between the two modalities of coverage, in order to identify differences and possible reasons for these differences as well as their wider effects.

Methodologically, this will be done following a similar system that I have used before in Chapter 2, comparing the news present in two national newspapers of wide distribution, one being the most sold newspaper in the popular press segment (*Correio da Manhã*) and the other being the most sold newspaper in the reference newspapers segment (*Público*). I will select the same time period for both newspapers, in this case the year 2019, and search for news items containing the word *Islam* (port. *Islão*) covering events occurring outside the national borders of Portugal. The selections of the newspapers aims not to compare the content between them, but simply to have a wider sample from different sources, the selection of the year is determined by the fact that it is recent, which helps with the access to online content of the newspapers, as well as not being a year overly dominated by a single news story about Islam or generally, as was the case with the COVID-19 pandemic. The use of the word “Islam” as the determinant for inclusion, works as a way to cover only news items related to the religion itself rather than wider phenomena which might use Muslim or Islamic as adjectives, but are not particularly related to the religion itself, as would be the case with news items on the Islamic State, for example. In Chapter 2 I focused on Opinion pieces concerning Islam, as I was attempting a comparison between editorial lines of the two newspapers, this time, trying to give a qualitative overview of the content of national versus international news, opinion pieces are not considered as they always give a national perspective on the subject, be it national or international in scope. As such, I will only be focused on news items and longer form reportages, not opinion pieces.

In *Público*, for the year of 2019, 31 items match the search term *Islam* (port. *Islão*). Of these, 6 are opinion or commentary pieces which we can discard, taking into account the methodology described above. We are then left with 24 articles. (*Público*, 2019) Of these 24 articles, 9 cover national subjects and will be covered in the next section. We end up with 15 articles covering international news mentioning the word Islam.

In *Correio da Manhã*, for the year 2019, 39 articles match the search term Islam. Of these, 4 of the articles are false positives which do not mention Islam at all but similar words which trigger the search engine. Also, 12 are opinion pieces that we will discard for the purposes of this research. We are then left with a smaller number of news articles mentioning Islam than in *Público*, with 23 articles matching the search. (*Correio da Manhã*, 2019) Of these 23 articles, only 6 concern national events, which we will explore in the next section. We end

up with 17 articles covering international news containing the word Islam.

From this preliminary analysis of the numbers of articles we can see that in both newspapers we have a preference for international news about Islam. Although this is not very pronounced in *Público* with a difference of 15 articles covering international news to 9 articles concerned with national events, the same can't be said about *Correio da Manhã*. In this newspaper we have a proportion of more than 3 to 1, with 18 articles covering international news to only 6 articles covering national subjects. This discrepancy in *Correio da Manhã* is also seen in the number of opinion pieces about the subject, the double of those in *Público*. The relative disinterest for news about Islam in *Correio da Manhã*, while at the same time promoting a great number of opinion pieces about the subject is also visible in Chapter 2, where I covered a different time-period, but with a similar pattern, there I explore the ideological and narrative implications of this pattern, being outside the scope of this section, there is no need to do this here. (Santos Silva, 2019: 279-280)

An aspect that is immediately apparent from this sample, when looking at the articles covering international events, is the reliance that newspapers have on news agencies. Several of the articles are simple re-prints of news items provided by news agencies rather than original publications by the newspapers themselves. Of the articles in *Público*, one third, five articles, are provided by News Agencies, namely two articles by *Lusa*, a Portuguese news agency, and three by the international agency *Reuters*. One other article has a credit to both *Público* and *Lusa*, meaning that the newspaper added something to the agency's news item ending up with a collaborative article. In the case of *Correio da Manhã* the reliance on news agencies is also pronounced with 7 out of the 18 articles using articles from *Lusa* news agency, this being the only agency used by the newspaper. This is a regular practice by newspapers covering international news as it avoids the expense and logistic problems involved in having either a vast number of international correspondents or researchers in order to produce exclusively original content for a daily newspaper, with the constraints of time deriving from their periodicity and their need to quickly report news. News Agencies, which sell their content to a variety of news outlets, serve as a time and money saving shortcut for newspapers, particularly relevant for international news because of the difficulties involved which are less pronounced in national news.

By their nature and business model, attempting to sell news items to the greatest number of outlets possible, news agencies are usually neutral in the way they present their news. However, curiously, *Lusa* agency, which provided the majority of news derived from agencies on this sample, has recently had problems with discriminatory language in their

news releases. In a press release where several members of the Portuguese parliament were identified, one of those members, Romualda Fernandes, was identified in brackets as “(black)” in front of her name, as a reference to her skin colour. By the time this racist content was noticed the news item had already gone live in a number of national newspapers’ websites. This led to the resignation of the politics editor of the news agency, and put in question the neutrality of the agency. (Correio da Manhã, 2021) We cannot, therefore, always take for granted the idea that a news item, due to their origin in a news agency, presents a neutral value judgement or is exempt from prejudice or xenophobia. Also, a certain news outlet chooses what stories to publish from a news agency, and this choice is also not exempt from moral judgement on the subjects focused on in the news.

What do the newspapers choose to report on internationally, then? There are some patterns to the news that was covered in the year of 2019, with four great categories present in both newspapers, firstly, news about religion, particularly Pope Francis and inter-religious dialogue; secondly, news about islamist terrorism; thirdly, news covering articles about “culture shock” with themes such as poligamy or islamic dress being covered, and lastly news items about islamophobia. There is also a fifth, but smaller category, present only in *Público* which includes articles about culture, such as interviews with writers or musicians where Islam is mentioned.

There is a clear effort to localize the news items in Portuguese newspapers. For example, when Islam is talked about it is often through a catholic view, the most common news item across newspapers being news about statements from Pope Francis or about his visits to Morrocco and the United Arab Emirates in 2019. These visits give material for a fifth of the news items in *Público*, 3 out of 15 articles, and describe the pontiff’s visits and talk of the UAE as the birthplace of Islam and of Morrocco as promoting a tolerant form of Islam to which the Pope is reaching out. (Lusa, 2019; Guimarães, 2019 and Reuters, 2019) The same focus on the Pope is also apparent in *Correio da Manhã* where 5 of the 18 articles mentioning Islam in 2019 are also centred on the Pope, again making up the most frequent subject of the sample. Interestingly, the subjects focused on are different from those in *Público*, only one of the five articles shares the same theme, the visit to the UAE by the Pope, but even there the emphasis is put on the controversy surrounding the visit due to the conflict in Yemen at the time. (Gonçalves, 2019) Three of the other news items focus on the Pope’s visit to Portuguese speaking Mozambique in 2019, all of them are derived from *Lusa* news agency and all of them share exactly the same information on Islam in Mozambique, mentioning that 18% of the population of the country practices Islam as their religion, this comes in the context of the Pope’s message of religious tolerance and coexistence that he

would talk about in his visit to the country. (Lusa, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c) The remaining item, unsigned, focused on Pope Francis, mentions his visit to the UAE but the article is about sexual abuse of nuns by priests and bishops in the catholic church, Islam not being a focus of the article. (Correio da Manhã, 2019a)

The activities of Pope Francis were, then, in 2019, the most common subject in both newspapers where Islam is mentioned, in a context of interfaith dialogue. A second subject which is common to both newspapers is that of islamist violence, but again we see an unbalanced approach by both newspapers, with *Público* presenting only one article that covers the subject while mentioning the word Islam, while *Correio da Manhã* shows 3 articles on the same subject of terrorism. *Público*'s news item discusses French President's Emmanuel Macron's wish for "a vigilant society" against islamist terrorism, in the context of an attack on a Paris police station in October 2019. (Barata, 2019) The three articles in *Correio da Manhã* cover fears of islamist radicalization in the former portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau; (Lusa, 2019d) another has a capsule review of a documentary on islamist terrorism where the reviewer says perpetrators of terrorism associate Islam and terrorism; (Coutinho, 2019) and finally a report on the Shamima Begum case, in the UK, where she was accused of supporting ISIS, and the article focuses on her loss of citizenship. (Lusa, 2019e)

Another category of articles which are also common to both newspapers can be classified as "culture shock" articles, which cover elements happening in Muslim majority countries or activities by Muslims which would seem uncommon, strange or outrageous to the average, non-Muslim, Portuguese reader. In this case, *Público* has the largest number of articles, with five articles covering such subjects, while *Correio da Manhã* only has two. In *Público* these articles include the discussion of the legalization of polygamy in Guinea-Conakry (Lusa, 2019f); the suspension of the sale of a sport oriented hijab in the French sportswear shop Decathlon; (Moura, 2019) an interview with a Moroccan sociologist, Abdessamad Dialmy, on how Moroccan women secretly explore their sexuality and the relation between Islam, sexuality and feminism; (Firaças, 2019) a report on the Indonesian village of Bangun where recycling of garbage is the main industry, the profits of which are used to sponsor the hajj, or peregrination to Mecca; (Reuters, 2019a) and lastly how the Indonesian criminal code was preparing to criminalize extra-conjugal sexual relations. (Fernandes, 2019) The two stories dealing with these kinds of subjects in *Correio da Manhã*, are both about the same story, that of Rahaf Mohammed al-Qunun, a woman, who had renounced Islam and who ran from her family, feeling forced to participate in her own upcoming arranged marriage in Saudi Arabia, asking for asylum in Canada. The first story

announced the situation, (Correio da Manhã, 2019b) while the second, dated four days later, gives an update on the situation and informs the reader that the runaway had arrived safely in Canada and had received asylum. (Correio da Manhã, 2019c)

The fourth category of articles, covering Islamophobia, consists of three articles in *Público* and six in *Correio da Manhã*. In *Público* we get news items covering the banning of far-right group English Defence League's Tommy Robinson from Instagram and Facebook due to racist and Islamophobic content, (Santos Silva, 2019) as well as two articles covering repression against the Uyghur people by the Chinese government, one article about how Chinese television cancelled the broadcast of an Arsenal football game in retaliation for pro-Uyghur statements by one of the players (*Público & Lusa*, 2019) and another which covers the leak of documents by the *New York Times* in which Xi Jinping calls for heavier repression of the Muslim Uyghur. (Reuters, 2019b). *Correio da Manhã* has a wider coverage than *Público* when it comes to Islamophobia, while using the word Islam in the body of the article. The articles cover the subjects of Danish measures for the internment of immigrants, also mentioning other anti-immigrant laws being discussed, including the banning of killing animals for Halal meat or the banning of Hijabs for teachers; (Correio da Manhã, 2019d) two articles cover the Islamophobic New Zealand mosque massacre, one relating the event (F.J.G. 2019) and another covering the request by Muslim countries for concrete anti-Islamophobia measures in the aftermath of the attack. (Lusa, 2019g) Other news items cover the blocking of thousands of social media accounts in Spain due to hate-speech, including Islamophobic speech; (Batista, 2019) the same cancellation of the broadcast of the Arsenal game by Chinese television due to comments by a player in support of the Uyghur people; (Lusa, 2019h) and lastly covering Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders' attempt to create a Mohammed caricature contest as a provocative stunt. (Ramos, 2019)

The last category of articles mentioning Islam are only present in one of the publications, *Público*, and these are articles dealing with cultural events, this can be explained not only because of the different target audience of *Público* as opposed to the tabloid *Correio da Manhã*, but also because *Público* has whole sections and complements dedicated to culture coverage, dedicating substantially more space to those subjects than the other newspaper. *Público* has three articles in this category. One of them is an interview with Jazz musician Abdullah Ibrahim, where Islam is mentioned as being part of his musical inspiration; (Noronha, 2019) another is an interview with religious studies scholar, and celebrity academic, Reza Aslan; (Rios, 2019) and the last one being a travel feature on Israel focusing on the contrasts in cultural expressions in Palestine, covering Islam in that context. (Nadais, 2019)

Some general ideas can be taken from this coverage of international subjects mentioning the word Islam in the Portuguese press. A common feature in most, if not all, the news items, with the possible exception of the cultural items found in *Público*, is a strong localization of the news. A good example of this is the amount of articles dedicated to the Pope's visit to Muslim countries, and to the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique, these are international events which are of particular interest to a Portuguese audience, being both a strongly catholic group and having a special relationship with Mozambique. It is also natural to find more articles about the Pope in *Correio da Manhã* than in *Público*, as it is a more conservatively oriented newspaper with a more religious audience, in a country where conservatism and religiosity are intimately connected, as is the case in Portugal. Another common feature is the selection of articles which are particularly shocking to the audience, with articles on terrorism and "culture shock" being also frequent, these are localized as much of the coverage is of European events or events in former Portuguese colonies. The same is true of the articles on Islamophobia, which are different from the articles on "culture shock" or terrorism by casting Muslims as victims of violence, but which, as we see, also address mainly European events, or events which affect Europe or the highly popular sport of football, in Portugal, as in the news item that appears on both newspapers covering Uyghur repression as having inconveniently led to the cancellation of the transmission of an Arsenal game on Chinese television. (*Público & Lusa*, 2019; Lusa, 2019h) Lastly we also see the frequent use of news agencies as sources for content, rather than original content produced by the newspapers themselves. We now turn to the characteristics of the coverage of national events before we can attempt a contrast of the two.

3.4. Characteristics of National Coverage

The coverage of national events in which the word Islam is mentioned in the newspapers *Público* and *Correio da Manhã* during the year of 2019 presents us with characteristics which are in some ways quite different from those present in the coverage of international events, but also with some similarities. This contrast will be examined in the next section, but first we need to look at what are the actual news items covered by the newspapers during the year, in which the word *Islam* is directly mentioned. The methodology used here is

identical to that described above for the coverage of international news, only shifting the focus to news centred on national events or people within the Portuguese borders.

In the international news we managed to distinguish five different categories of news items, four of which were shared among both newspapers, with one of them being exclusive to *Público*, the national coverage is considerably narrower in scope. The total number of articles across both sources is 15, with *Público* having 9 entries to *Correio da Manhã*'s 6 entries. When we look at the source of the news, we immediately find a smaller presence of articles derived from news agencies, in fact only one of the articles in *Público* has a news agency byline, while none do in *Correio da Manhã*. Instead of the five categories discussed in the previous section we find four categories here, however, only two of the four are shared between both sources, a focus on “Islamist” danger/terrorism, and political reporting. The category of “Islamist” danger or terrorism, accounts for 3 news items in *Público* and 5 articles, all but one, in *Correio da Manhã*. Political coverage accounts for one article in each of the sources. Other than these subjects *Público* also has news in the category of “Muslims in Portugal”, which accounts for 3 articles, and cultural subjects which account for 2 articles.

Looking first at the largest category across both newspapers, we find news on Islamist terrorism or the danger of possible terrorism. In *Público* we get three articles: one being an interview with Francisco Jorge Gonçalves, an expert on Islamist terrorism, focusing on “jihadist self-recruitment” online; (Ribeiro & Costa, 2019) the second article covers how EU funds can help combat radicalization through investment in national and European institutions; (Ribeiro & Flor, 2019) and the third article covers policing efforts for the final of the UEFA Nations League in Portugal with fears of possible Islamist attacks, even if there were no direct threats pointing toward it. (Pimentel, 2019) In *Correio da Manhã*, this category of article makes up all but one of the articles on the website, but the stories are different from those in *Público*. One of the articles covers a Moroccan citizen who was captured in Portugal, accused of belonging to Daesh; (Correio da Manhã, 2019e) another story tells of the capture of a Portuguese citizen who had allegedly belonged to Daesh after being radicalized with his brothers in the UK; (Laranjo, 2019) one tells of six Portuguese “terrorists” who have unknown whereabouts (although then the article states that five of those are presumed dead); (Machado, 2019) another tells of a Portuguese “terrorist” living on welfare in the UK; (Machado & Rodrigues, 2019) and the last story of the year tells of a stolen stamp from a school in Sintra which was then used to fake documents which allowed Portuguese members of Daesh to finance the purchasing of weapons and equipment. (Curado, 2019).

In the category of political reporting we can find one article in each of the newspapers

for that year, in the case of *Público* an article about online disinformation and how it might impact voting in upcoming elections where it is mentioned that Islam is not a central debate theme in Portuguese politics and therefore islamophobic rhetoric online does not particularly impact portuguese voters. (Lusa, 2019i) The news article in *Correio da Manhã* looks back at the first three years of the mandate of Portuguese President of the Republic Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, with some highlights of his presidency including an event in the 16th of March 2018 where he condecorated the Islamic community of Lisbon saying that “Islam is part of the soul of Portugal”. (Correio da Manhã, 2019f)

Lastly we get two categories which can only be found in *Público*, these are articles focusing on the Portuguese Muslim community in a way which is unrelated to terrorism or international events, here we can include an article on how the Islamic community in Portugal is requesting new and improved mosques and prayer locations, mentioning the building of an Islamic centre in Sintra as well as the refurbishment of an improvised mosque in Porto, as well plans to build a new mosque in Porto; (Moreira, 2019) another article focuses on how Ramadan was celebrated in Lisbon through an appreciation of the documentary *Um Ramadão em Lisboa* (A Ramadan in Lisbon) and the experiences of the article’s author, a teacher who writes about how Ramadan is experienced in schools; (Água, 2019) and a final article focuses on how the Muslim community in Tapada das Mercês, Sintra, is making efforts to create a community centre that would be a centre for all people in the area, irrespective of religion or ethnicity. (Moreira, 2019a) The other category only present in *Público* is one that covers cultural events or issues where Islam is mentioned, one article focuses on an exhibition of Islamic Art at the Gulbenkian Museum and explores the geopolitical implications of the exhibition which contained mainly works from countries with a majority Muslim population but which are now held by European and American countries; (Macias, 2019) the other article is an interview with the portuguese Catholic Cardinal and public intellectual Tolentino de Mendonça, appointed in 2019 by Pope Francis where the idea of reinforcing dialogue with Islam is stressed. (Marujo, 2019). The fact that these two categories are only present in *Público* is very interesting when we take into account the different aims and target audiences of the two sources used here (Santos Silva, 2019). In order to be able to take some conclusions out of all this we should now examine both how the newspapers do different coverage of the subject of Islam, and how the national and international coverage contrast with each other.

3.5. Contrast between National and International Coverage

From the previous two sections we can then make some comparisons between national and international coverage, however, it is important to note how this coverage also diverges between the two sources studied and how it highlights and reinforces previous conclusions about those two sources such as those we reached in Chapter 2 of this thesis. However, let us first see the differences that are common to both sources when it comes to the way in which that coverage is made.

One fact that is immediately obvious when looking at the previous analysis is the much higher percentage, across both sources, of reliance on news agencies for international news than for national news. This has several reasons for being the case and varied effects on the coverage. The most immediate reason is simply one of cost, doing international coverage, particularly reporting from across the world would be a heavy expense for most newspapers, even those with wide circulation, as is the case in the sources used, it would require the hiring of reporters, office space, material and so forth, which reliance on a news agency preempts. The case changes when it comes to national news, where the costs are much smaller and, as seen above, only one of the articles covering national subjects examined originated in a news agency, while a third of all articles covering international subjects depended on them. The effect of this dependence on news agencies, which are, by their nature as providing content for many different outlets, skewed towards a neutral approach, is a kind of “flattening” of the news.

News items derived from news agencies have a more anodyne tone, without a strong editorial perspective and reveal little about the news outlet’s views or political agenda. This is true, at least, in terms of the content of the news, the way in which they can be revealing, however, is in the choice of a media outlet to cover a certain news item or not. For example, *Correio da Manhã*, which skews to a more conservative and therefore religious audience, will choose to use more articles about the Pope’s travels, even if they derive from news agencies, than will *Público*, which is aimed at a different section of the population. This leads to a kind of hidden editorializing by the part of the newspaper where the editorial agenda of the media outlet is expressed not openly, but through the inclusion or omission of articles. In this way, an overwhelming selection of news items which include, for example, Islam associated with violence, will give a different image of the religion and its practitioners than one which has a more varied selection of news items.

The effect of this “flattening” of the news, due to the reliance on news agencies, is that there is little difference between the two newspapers used for this study when it comes to international news. They cover, with more or less emphasis, similar stories and have a similar amount of coverage across both sources, even if, as we have seen, in the case of the coverage of the pope’s travels, the individual characteristics of the newspapers and their target audiences lead to specific choices in the articles published. In Chapter 2, I have analysed opinion pieces across both these sources and there it was possible to see that there was more of an overall negative perspective towards Islam in *Correio da Manhã*, but the international coverage does not bring this out, for example. In fact, *Correio da Manhã*, actually presents double the number of articles on islamophobia, six to *Público*’s three, which give a sympathetic view of Islam as a target for discrimination. As we can see from the analysis of the coverage, however, this same phenomenon does not translate to national news.

When it comes to national news, *Correio da Manhã*’s coverage contrasts strongly with their own coverage of international events. In fact, out of all six articles, only one was not concerned with terrorism or violence, even if Portugal was not the stage for any attacks, the newspaper decided to focus on coverage of Portuguese citizens involved in illicit activities outside of Portugal as well as a Moroccan citizen caught in Portugal and allegedly involved in illicit activity. This contrasts not only with the coverage of the other newspaper examined, but it also contrasts with its own coverage of international affairs which appears to be much more balanced. As we saw above, *Correio da Manhã*’s international coverage could be divided into four different groups while the national coverage only had two types of news items and one of those types consisted of a single article where Islam was only mentioned in passing. This national coverage is, unlike the international one, produced by the newspaper without the assistance of news agencies. In fact, none of the six articles, covering national news and mentioning Islam in *Correio da Manhã*, credited any news agencies, all being produced “in house” by the newspaper’s reporters. The fact that the focus narrows so tightly when the newspaper produces its own content is revealing of an editorial perspective in the newspaper which is absent when relying on news agencies. This can also be seen if we are to compare how *Público* covers national news.

In the case of *Público* there is not such a tightening of focus as that which can be seen in *Correio da Manhã*, its articles fall into four categories, also covering Islamist violence and terrorism, but giving an equal amount of articles to news about the Portuguese muslim community which are overall sympathetic in tone, focusing on local activities and the daily life of the communities without making a deliberate connection between those communities

and violence, unlike what happens in *Correio da Manhã*. Another element that sets the coverage between the two newspapers apart is the coverage of cultural news, however this is a difference between the two newspapers, more so than a difference between national and international coverage, *Público* has news items on cultural subjects both nationally and internationally, while *Correio da Manhã* does not cover them at all, even when these are events taking place in Portugal, be they Ramadan celebrations or an exhibition of Islamic art at one of Lisbon's most famous museums. (Macias, 2019)

Overall, then, there is a strong difference between national and international news, but this is intertwined with the differences between the newspapers that make that coverage themselves. This contrast between newspapers is much more visible, however, when we focus down to the national level. Coverage of international news is not substantially different in terms of themes, with the notable exception of the discrepancy in the coverage of cultural news items. However, when we focus on national news the specificities of each of the publications come to the fore. *Público* shows a coverage which balances news about crimes and violence with news about community life and culture, while *Correio da Manhã* focuses almost exclusively on violence and terrorism. Both newspapers are, however, dealing with the same time period and the same country, how are these differences to be explained? I have previously, in chapter 2, explored the different target audiences of both newspapers (Santos Silva, 2019: 264-269), suffice it to say here that *Público* is oriented to a more formally educated and middle class audience, as is typical of a newspaper of reference, while *Correio da Manhã* is oriented to a more conservative, working class audience, often with less formal education, it also has the populist slant typical of a tabloid newspaper. Together with this we have two different political editorial orientations, a more centrist one in *Público* while *Correio da Manhã* has a clear conservative, right-wing bent. This explains the contrasting national coverage of news as the newspapers are actually trying to promote different media narratives about Islam, with *Correio da Manhã* clearly attempting a more alarmist approach to the subject of Islam, even if there is little cause to do so in the Portuguese context where there was no Islamist inspired violence in the period studied, but resorting to Portuguese citizens abroad, some in the UK who had been radicalized in the UK and were arrested there (Machado, Rodrigues, 2019; Machado, 2019), as well as non-Portuguese people arrested in Portugal for suspicion of terrorism (Laranjo, 2019; *Correio da Manhã*, 2019e) and the stealing of a stamp from a school which was used for faking documents (Curado, 2019). The covering of these news items is not problematic by itself, but if taken as a whole, and seeing as no other, more neutral or positive, subjects are

covered, a clear narrative about Islam starts appearing here, where the image of Islam in *Público* is more complex.

3.6. Conclusion

When I started off this chapter, I hypothesized that the national focus on the news would present a different, and possibly more humanized and positive view of Islam and Muslims in the Portuguese press. The research bears out a more complex image which is revealing of several things. It both reveals that and its opposite, the results I expected can indeed be found in the case of *Público*, but *Correio da Manhã* actually presents a more negative coverage than that of international news. This also bears out the limitations of this researcher, who, coming from a background more in tune with the intended audience of *Público*, assumed that his own empirical, anecdotal, evidence would be borne out by the research across different sources as it indeed happened with *Público*. However this demonstrates how class and educational bias can have the effect of creating a sociological blindspot. Fortunately, that is precisely why methodic research is important, and the results shown here permit us to reach firmer conclusions. In the introduction to this section I listed a number of questions that I aimed to answer by the end of the chapter. In conclusion I will attempt to give answers to those questions.

Firstly I asked if the transfer of Islam from geopolitical events to the personal level of national events or even local events have an influence on the way Islam is covered. The research here shows that it definitely does, the question of reliance on news agencies for international events is a good example of this, while national news is more often covered by the news sources themselves. This gives us a significant difference in the way Islam is covered, with international news being more uniform across sources, while national news reflect the different characteristics of each source more explicitly.

Secondly, I asked if substituting abstract large events for more humanized and localized coverage alter the way in which media portrays Islam. Again the answer would be affirmative, but unlike what I expected, this alteration is different from source to source. While *Público* reflects this more localized and humanized reporting in exploring how the Muslim community lives in Portugal and how they interact with the larger community, *Correio da Manhã* almost exclusively focuses on cases of people accused of violence or crime associated with Islam, at

a more personalized level than in the international coverage, but more negative, if anything.

Lastly I asked if this is a case that might be explained by the particular geopolitical contingencies of the Portuguese case, with a relatively small Muslim presence and a lack of Islamist inspired violent events. Here the answer is more ambiguous, in the case of *Público's* stories about local cultural centres or how Ramadan is experienced in Portuguese schools, this is indeed the case, an almost paternalistic and exoticised view of Islam, not seeing it as inherently threatening but as a curiosity more than anything. However, in *Correio da Manhã* this geopolitical situation and the history of the Muslim community in Portugal seems to have little importance, there is an effort to find and report news stories which insert Portugal in the same geopolitical context of countries with a history of Islamist terrorist attacks, using stories of Portuguese citizens, often radicalized elsewhere in Europe, as a sort of imminent danger and reporting on stories that reinforce that idea of an Islamist danger, almost exclusively.

CHAPTER 4:

The Portuguese and Islam in The Internet Age: Online Reactions to News of the Construction of a New Mosque in Lisbon

4.1. Introduction

Having looked at the news and opinion articles reported by the newspapers in the previous two chapters, it is important to note that in today's media landscape this more traditional role of the newspaper, as a propagator of news and selected opinions from hired columnists, is only part of the role it fulfils. Today newspapers are also platforms for the discussion of news by its readers, particularly through their online presence. The question comes up, then, about how this newer facet of newspapers contributes to the propagation of ideas on Islam and how responsible newspapers can be for the content that they provide a platform for. This is what I will attempt to answer in this chapter.

In this chapter I will analyse how Portuguese readers of online media interact with that media through comments and how these reflect popular opinions on Islam as well as stereotypes, prejudices and misconceptions about Islam in the general Portuguese public. Internet comments are special in a number of ways as they do not reflect necessarily the views of the majority of readers or of the country and might even be part of a political agenda as has been recently seen in the case of internet *bots* spreading disinformation through participation in social networks, this raises methodological questions which will also be examined in this article.

The first part of this chapter will focus specifically on these methodological problems and questions raised by Internet comments as well as what, taking these problems into account, we can derive from them which might be useful for an examination of the relationship between media and religion.

The second part of this chapter will take the form of a case study, focusing on the project to build a new Mosque in central Lisbon in Portugal. The discussion surrounding this project which was at its height in 2016-2018, led to the publication of a number of news items and opinion pieces in Portuguese media, with which readers interacted through comments, either in newspaper websites or through social media. In this section we will take on two Portuguese newspapers, *Público* and *Correio da Manhã*, selecting news items covering this subject and the comments which have been published on the newspaper's website as well as in their Facebook page where the article was shared. This will allow us to gauge the attitude of commenters and to look for any differences between the commenters and their attitudes in each of the newspapers as well as differences between the two platforms (website and Facebook).

In the third part of the chapter we will take examples of relevant comments, which show a large degree of popularity among other readers, and look at them in-depth. In this section we will see what the comments tell us about Portuguese attitudes about Islam and Muslims as well as how these attitudes differ from source to source and news article to news article. In conclusion we will see how useful comments can be to gauge the impact of news items and the bias of the commenters in a specific media context, and if media sources need to better moderate their online forums in order to curb misinformation and prejudice.

4.2. Internet Comments as a Methodological Problem

The use of internet comments in sociological research is not without its problems. In the first place there is little demographic information about the commenters, particularly in the case of anonymous contributions, even when there is some information it is often incomplete. Secondly, it is also hard to understand if and to what extent commenters correspond to the average reader of the news item on which they comment (Heinrich & Holmes 2013: 3). Research has shown that only a percentage of readers of a certain news article leave comments on that article. In the case of the USA, for example, over half (50.7%) of the readers of internet news do not leave or read comments by other users. The statistics also

show that those who leave comments skew male, have lower levels of education and lower incomes in comparison with those who only read the comments. (Stroud, Duyn, Peacock 2016: 1) This kind of pattern seems to be replicated in the Portuguese case as well, as we will see further on when we come to the case study. A last, but important factor, which also casts a shadow over the reliability of internet comments is the way in which they can be, and often are, instrumentalized by political agendas, either through people contracted to act as internet *trolls*, doing the bidding of a master with some agenda which is furthered by the spreading of fake news or the stoking of internet arguments in the comments of mainstream news media (Barsotti 2018), or through the use of internet *bots*, automated programs which often help spread misinformation through the propagation of false news or comments. (Shao et al., 2018)

If we assume that comments on news items, both in social networks and in the newspaper's own websites, are not representative of the population in general and the readers in particular, why are they worth studying? One of the reasons why they are worthy of study is the fact that Internet comments, particularly those posted anonymously, often express ideas that people would not be comfortable expressing in other situations. In 2004 Suler famously described the *Online Disinhibition Effect*, in his article of the same name he shows that while online “some people self-disclose or act out more frequently or intensely than they would in person” and he describes six different factors that lead to this extreme behaviour online “dissociative anonymity, invisibility, asynchronicity, solipsistic introjection, dissociative imagination, and minimization of authority”. (Suler 2004: 321) These are all factors that play into the psychology of those leaving comments on online platforms. Suler also mentions that these interactions can be of two kinds, *benign* as for example when people are more willing to talk about their feelings, or to donate money to a cause, or *toxic* when they represent “a blind catharsis, a fruitless repetition compulsion, and an acting out of unsavory needs”. Comments are not, therefore, positive or negative by nature but simply uninhibited. However, Suler warns us to be wary of taking these online interactions as simply people expressing repressed feelings, proposing instead that we see this effect as something that can:

“be understood as the person shifting, while online, to an intrapsychic constellation that may be, in varying degrees, dissociated from the in-person constellation, with inhibiting guilt, anxiety, and related affects as features of the in-person self but not as part of that online self.” (Suler 2004: 325)

It is not, then, a repressed feeling coming out through disinhibition, but a different sort of self, an online self, which is distinct from the 'real world', in-person-self due to the lack of inhibiting constraints such as guilt or anxiety, which anonymity and the relative safety of being behind a screen afford the commenter. Therefore, examining internet comments can give us a glimpse into the thoughts and opinions of a segment of the media consuming public unmediated by social and psychological constraints present in the 'real world', giving us insight that would not be as easy to achieve through in-person interviews or surveys where those social conditionants are still present due to a lack of anonymity.

Another way in which internet comments are relevant for academic study is the fact that after they are posted they become a form of addendum to the original news item, where readers can access them to get further insights into the story being presented by the media source. This makes the comments relevant to the information that users derive from a specific news item and end up being part of the fabric of online news. As such, internet comments are the most immediate way that users have to directly interact with the news items they read, unlike writing a letter to the editor or having an opinion article posted in response to the specific news item, commenting demands no special writing skills and does not go through a process of selection on the part of an editorial team. Internet comments are a direct, unfiltered, often unmoderated and anonymous way for a reader to express his opinion on a certain subject, whether the user has actually read the article's body or just the title, and whether the reaction is thought through or simply knee-jerk. Comments work as an open forum for the exchange of opinions and much as in any other open forum, this can lead either to civil discussion, to heated arguments or anything in between.

It is precisely the freedom of expression granted by commentary spaces online that can sometimes stifle speech in those contexts. It is not uncommon for a comment thread to be overwhelmed by an argument, which, due to the disinhibition effect discussed above, can quickly become abusive and unproductive devolving into little more than name-calling or accusations, often with racist, defamatory and hateful content being expressed in the commentaries. In order to keep this in check traditional media sources, such as the newspapers that will be discussed in this chapter, have attempted to find a way to moderate these interactions, however a completely satisfying system of moderation is far from existing. In an article from 2015, Silva presents an overview of ways in which several content creators have attempted to solve this moderation problem, with some moving comments to other platforms, such as Facebook, where anonymity is less of a problem, leading to more civil discussion, improving the quality of the debate between readers and, as a bonus,

directing more traffic to the to news website. (Silva, 2015: 34) Other news providers are outsourcing comments to third parties, such as Disqus, created precisely as a platform for the management and moderation of comments on blogs and websites or, in some cases, abandoning the commentary function on their website completely. The problem with how to approach comments is, then, not only something to be thought of in the context of this chapter and articles covering this subject, but it is a problem recognized by the news media themselves and also by the common reader of news articles with, as we have seen above, a large percentage of users not participating in comments at all.

Even if some media have dropped the comment function from their websites, the majority retain this function as is the case of the two newspapers to be examined in this chapter. This happens for several reasons: one of the reasons is the idea that keeping people for a longer amount of time in a newspaper website simply has economic advantages, people are more likely to click or see advertising, which helps fund the website, for this same reason the comment section also help build a sense of brand loyalty to the newspaper as people return to read replies to their comment or develop relationships with other commenters, even if only at the level of exchanging barbs or finding people with similar ideas. The comments create a sense of community associated with the news media, which both benefits the news provider in economic and reputation terms. Another good thing about comments, at least from the perspective of the host publication, is the fact that even if the newspaper could moderate comments, most problematic or overly aggressive comments are blamed on the commenter rather than the news media. People like the idea of comments on websites, they just dislike the content. Bergstrom and Wadbring made a statistical study of public opinion on reader comments and came to that same conclusion:

It seems that something of a paradox occurs within the public sample. A majority consider reader comments to be of relatively high value and of making online news more interesting. But a majority also view reader comments as having low-quality content. (...) One likely explanation is the existence of wishful thinking: One likes the idea of reader comments, but the current quality is not good enough. As a consequence, it seems that the criticism is primarily directed towards the people posting comments, rather than towards the news media providing the opportunity to comment. (Bergstrom & Wadbring 2014: 143).

Therefore, as we can see, there is little incentive for news media to suspend comment sections that both benefit them economically and as a brand, while being able to mostly dodge culpability for objectionable content on those discussion forums. There is some incentive to keep those comment sections civil and to moderate them, but in that case there is a cost/benefit trade-off between a need for investment both in having better platforms able to spot problematic comments, as well as the need to hire human moderators or simply leaving the comments section as a more open and free part of the site, which might in fact draw more participation even while allowing for objectionable content.

Now that we have seen the particularities of the content to be found in online comments as well as the reasons why they are an ubiquitous part of the online news landscape we reach the problem of how to approach them from a methodological standpoint. In 2013 Heinrich and Holmes published a research paper specifically concerned with how to use internet comments in social enquiry and this will form the basis to my approach to comments in this chapter. In the paper they recognize the value of internet comments as precious qualitative data which can provide information on how beliefs are formed in society but which also present specific challenges, as we have already seen above. Heinrich and Holmes developed their methodology in the context of the H1N1 pandemic as they used internet comments to try to understand why people were reticent when it came to being vaccinated against the disease. (Heinrich and Holmes 2012: 1) In their paper they concentrate on some of the methodological challenges that the format presented to them. Among these were: demographic depth vs. breadth; uncertainty of demographics; criteria for the inclusion of articles and comments; time limited access to comments and using public consensus data. (Heinrich and Holmes 2012: 3) Not all of these criteria are particularly relevant to the present chapter, but most of them are, as such I will go through each and address how I will approach them.

The question of demographic depth vs. breadth relates to the sources used: whether to use one news source and deal with a large number of comments from that source in order to get an in-depth idea about those specific comments, or to use a wider number of sources in order to get a better picture of the overall opinions of a population, irrespective of source. (Heinrich and Holmes 2012: 3) For my ends, in this chapter, the approach will be a sort of middle path, I am interested only in two sources, *Público* and *Correio da Manhã* in an exercise of comparing and contrasting them, so the idea to go in-depth into these two sources as the goal is to find if there is any difference between the comments in a newspaper of reference (*Público*) and in a tabloid style newspaper (*Correio da Manhã*). The chapter will do an in-depth analysis of these two sources which will then allow us to make

some conclusions as to how these two sources differ, or not, rather than being specifically interested in the full breadth of possible opinions among Portuguese internet commenters.

The question of the uncertainty of demographics when it comes to commenters is not particularly relevant to this chapter. It would be interesting to have more demographic information, but being realistic and taking into account that many of the commenters are anonymous, or have identities that cannot be confirmed with any degree of certainty, it would be hard to obtain any conclusions about the demographic background of the participants. Even when they are identified, as we have discussed above, there is no guarantee that these are not bots, or fake profiles, created with the single purpose of making comments for some political end. As the objective of this chapter is to analyse what comments appear in different news sources and how they propel the conversation, as well as what they reveal about the public conversation on Islam, the specific demographic is less important than the simple fact that these comments are publicly accessible and associated to a specific news source. Whenever it feels relevant to divulge some demographic information about a particular comment or set of comments that will be done, but not in a systematic way.

The criteria for the inclusion of specific articles can be of two kinds as Heinrich and Holmes state, either selecting the articles with the largest number of comments or a section of articles on a single topic as the number of comments alone is not enough to know if an article is more popular than another one. (Heinrich and Holmes 2012: 3) As an example of this an article might have a large number of comments because some kind of fight kicked off between two commenters, leading to a lot of back and forth commenting, rather than because a large number of people felt like they had to comment on it. In this chapter, as what is of interest is not only the number of comments, the approach being mainly qualitative, or the topic, but also a comparison between the two news providers, the selection criteria will take similar news articles from both sources. Therefore I will be specifically looking for 'mirrored' articles, those that tell the same story in the two different sources in the same day or very close in temporal terms if possible, or at least sharing the same subject. If one article in *Público* about the construction of the new Lisbon mosque does not have an equivalent in *Correio da Manhã* it is of little interest to this exercise. Here I will select three mirrored articles from 2016-2020 on both sources, these will have to have at least ten comments in each version, across the website and facebook page, with at least five different commenters to qualify for selection. If a number of articles fit this profile I will select the three with the most comments as a deciding factor.

In terms of deciding which comments to include in the analysis there are also

considerations to make. An active effort has to be made not to overrepresent opinions of a particular commenter who might be overrepresented in the sample, therefore only one comment by user will be examined in this chapter, if that commenter is particularly popular or participative, that will be noted in the context of analysing their comment. An effort will also be made to select only comments that stick to the article topic and particularly those that exemplify views on Islam by the part of the commenter. This means that off-topic comments will not be considered for analysis in this context.

The question of time limited access to comments is not particularly relevant to this chapter, although often comments might be erased from internet pages, this does not appear to be the case with those in either *Público* or *Correio da Manhã* and therefore that is not an immediate problem. However, it is true that some more offensive comments might have been erased by moderators or by platforms if they breached the website's rules (in the case of Facebook comments, for example), we will not be able to know if this was the case as there is no way to recover comments deleted sometimes 4 years in the past. However, it is not easy, even now, to have offensive comments erased, as moderators are often very permissive with what stays online.

Lastly, the question of public consensus data is indeed relevant to this study. What is meant by public consensus data are the indicators of popularity of a certain comment, the most famous example of this would be *likes* on Facebook, as a rule of thumb we may presume that the more positive votes a comment has the more popular it was with the comment reading public. This makes public consensus data also a determinant in the selection of comments for analysis in this article. An ideal comment for analysis in this context would not only stick to the topic of Islam but also be popular which would allow us to make some extrapolation on the general opinion of the news source readers.

4.3. Case Study: New Lisbon Mosque

4.3.1. The Event

On the 25th January 2012, a project was approved by the Lisbon municipality with the objective of requalifying a neighbourhood in central Lisbon through the creation of a

covered city square in the neighbourhood of *Mouraria* (Moorish quarter). This quarter was historically associated with the Islamic population of Lisbon. After the conquest of the city by Christian forces in the 12th century, *Mouraria* was set aside for the so called *Moors*, from which it got its name, by a royal decree dated from 1170, with a right to the free practice of the Islamic religion, the election of their own justice officer, to keep their own law and to internally self-administer under kingly protection (Almeida, 2016: 37). Coincidentally, by 2012, *Mouraria* again had a substantial Muslim population, mainly from Bangladesh but completely unrelated to the original 'moorish' population.

The project for the covered square from 2012 sought to take into account the local Islamic population by including as part of the plan for that square the construction of a new Mosque. A 2015 municipal deliberation for the expropriation of buildings to clear space for the covered square gives us the rationale for the construction of the mosque in four points:

- (...) l) *The project also contemplates a MOSQUE which has as its function the service of the Muslim community, seeing as it already occupied a space in Mouraria with very reduced conditions in what regards its needs, as well as a MULTIPURPOSE ROOM allowing for all kinds of cultural activities;*
- m) *The Muslim Community of Bangladesh has faced several adversities in the use of the Mouraria Mosque, as it is to be found in a residential building, not having, therefore, the necessary conditions to welcome women to prayer;*
- n) *To this can be added the complaints by neighbours of the Mosque about the noise and movement of several people around the worship place on Fridays, which, in spite of their adequate behaviour, and taking into account the circumstances, is not possible to avoid;*
- o) *In spite of many Bangladeshi immigrants having left Lisbon after the economic crisis, the Mosque's attendance has not decreased, still consisting, at the moment, of 600 people;¹ (Salgado, 2015)*

Therefore, the construction of the new Mosque in *Mouraria* was not the creation of a new place of worship, but a new building for an existing, but inadequate, place of worship and would benefit not only the Bangladeshi population, by providing an adequate place of worship, but the neighbourhood's population in general by freeing up a residential building and stopping the attending noise and disruption to the wider community. As we will see, however, this was not an uncontentious decision, particularly after 2016, when the work was to start in earnest through the expropriation of the buildings necessary to be demolished in order to build the square.

1 All translations by Author.

4.3.2. The Newspapers

The two newspapers selected for this analysis, *Público* and *Correio da Manhã* are interesting because they contrast in the way they cover news about Islam and in relation to what public they serve, as well as what kind of newspaper they see themselves as. Briefly, *Público* is considered a newspaper of reference in Portugal, and is the best-selling newspaper in that segment, oriented towards a literate and high/middle-class audience, it covers culture and international events widely, as well as Portuguese politics and events. On the other hand, *Correio da Manhã* is seen as a popular newspaper, somewhat equivalent to the idea of a tabloid in the UK, oriented towards a working-class and low middle-class audience, it is the best-selling newspaper in Portugal, amounting to more than half of all newspapers sold in the country. It is renowned for its coverage of local news, particularly crime news, with limited international coverage and a sensationalist streak to its reporting. (Silva 2019: 265-269) These dynamics have been previously explored in Chapters 2 and 3 focusing on the coverage of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015 and the newspapers coverage of national and international news on Islam by these two newspapers, which reached the conclusion that while *Público* takes an overall neutral, if somewhat negative view of Islam, *Correio da Manhã* takes an almost completely negative view of that religion. (Silva: 2019)

Building on these previous chapters and having established the differences in coverage style of these two media sources, it will now be useful to see if these are at all reflected in the user comments on their websites and social network pages. It would be interesting to see to what degree the difference in journalistic style and general outlook of the media source affects the quality and tenor of the comments, if at all, and to reach conclusions from comparing and contrasting user generated content. In this way, we can gauge how interrelated user participation is with the media source or if user comments exist in a separate realm to the newspaper coverage, which would be the case, if they show themselves to be more similar than the newspaper's disparate approaches to the subject would make one suspect.

4.3.3. The Articles

For the purposes of this chapter then, I have selected six articles, three each from both *Público* and *Correio da Manhã* which revolve around the mosque in *Mouraria* and the Islamic

community in that area of Lisbon. These six articles form three pairs, which will allow us to compare and contrast them between the newspapers and to see the type of comments each elicits from their users. Interestingly, and we will examine the reasons for this further on in the chapter, all of the *Correio da Manhã* articles, unlike those in *Público* present no comments in the newspaper's website, but the official Facebook page of *Correio da Manhã* has hundreds of comments when these same news items were posted by the newspaper on the social media network, there is therefore no lack of data for this analysis.

The first pair of articles concerns the start of the expropriation process of buildings occupied in the area where the future square and mosque were to be built. *Público's* item, from the 18th May 2016 is entitled "New Lisbon Mosque Evicts Inhabitants and Merchants", (Borges, 2016) this article has 26 comments on the website, while the Facebook post of the news item has 275 comments and 182 shares. (Público, 2016) The equivalent article from *Correio da Manhã* from four days later, on the 22nd May 2016 is entitled "City Hall Wants to Expropriate by Force to Build New Mosque" (Rodrigues, 2016), the website has zero comments, while the Facebook share of the item has 143 comments and 131 shares. (Correio da Manhã, 2016)

The second pair of articles discusses the delays in resolving the expropriations and the disputes with the property owners in the area. *Público* has an article and interview from 26th March 2017, nearly a year after the first article, entitled: "Impasse on the *Mouraria* Mosque: 'I Have a Miserable Life'" (Pincha, 2017) with 30 comments on the newspaper's website while it has 277 comments and 215 shares on the Facebook post. (Público, 2017) The equivalent article in *Correio da Manhã* comes over a year later, on the 9th August 2018 and is entitled: "Garage Evicted to Build Mosque in Lisbon", (Esteves, 2018) again with no comments on the website but with 283 comments and 77 shares on the newspaper's Facebook post. (Correio da Manhã, 2018)

The third pair of articles is more divided in terms of time, with a four year gap between the two articles, with the article from *Público* being from 2016 and that from *Correio da Manhã* from 2020, but both sharing a similar theme, covering the Muslim population in the area with a focus on the future mosque. The article from *Público*, from the 5th June 2016 is entitled "A 'more accessible' *Mouraria* and with a Mosque", (Boaventura, 2016) has 66 comments on the website and 236 comments on the Facebook share as well as 36 shares. The article from *Correio da Manhã* is entitled "Lisbon transforms into a 'cultural broth' with odours from the Orient in the streets of *Mouraria*" (Lusa, 2020b) and again has no comments on the website, at the time of writing, but has 168 comments and 105 shares on the newspaper's Facebook page. (Correio da Manhã 2020)

The difference in the way the news is covered in the two news media can be seen from the titles of the articles. While *Público* has a more neutral approach to the news in the language used in the titles, *Correio da Manhã* is more openly inflammatory. In the first pair of articles *Público* uses the word “evict” (Portuguese “desaloja”), while *Correio da Manhã* uses “expropriate by force” (Portuguese “expropriar à força”). However, both articles appear to put the blame on the mosque, *Público* even saying that it was the mosque that evicted residents in its title, while the truth is that it was the city hall, as the mosque is a building that did not even exist at the time and had no way to evict anyone. Looking back at the actual project that led to the evictions, we can see that the Mosque is only a part of the project to build a new covered city square, with a multipurpose room and other spaces being included in the project. This exclusive focus on the mosque, rather than the whole project, is representative of a certain bias on the part of the news sources, and that is true in both cases.

The second pair of articles again shows differences in coverage with *Correio da Manhã* again tying the eviction solely to the Mosque construction and *Público* using the less inflammatory “impasse” to represent the conflict, but adding a quotation from a resident describing his life as “miserable”, as a consequence of the building of the mosque.

The third pair of articles shows another different approach to what are no more than local colour pieces, with *Público* describing the changes to come to the neighbourhood in generally positive terms, while *Correio da Manhã*, a newspaper with a wide readership outside urban centres, exoticizing and orientalisating the neighbourhood, describing the “odours from the orient” in an expression which is dubious in its intention, as the Portuguese word *odor* can have negative connotations as bad smells, even if that association is not as strong as in the English equivalent “odour”.

4.3.4. The Comments

It should be clarified why, in the case of the selected articles, no comments could be found on the website of *Correio da Manhã*. There are several possible reasons for this, the two main ones being that it was either the result of a periodic wipe of comments or a lack of engagement from readers on the website. The available evidence points to the second case, using the Wayback Machine website, a site dedicated to creating images of webpages in past periods, (Wayback Machine, 2020) it is possible to travel back in time on one of the articles published

in the *Correio da Manhã* website, the article in the second pair, and return to the page status on the 10th August 2018 (Wayback Machine, 2018), one day after it was published, where it also displays no comments. If there were comments on the page, it would be expected for the more active time to be the day of publication of the news item, seeing as even on the next day there were no comments, it is safe to presume that there never were comments on the page, and there was no wipe. There is, however, no copy available of the article in the first pair and the article in the third pair, being from February 2020, is too recent to have suffered any kind of wipe, for which reason we can feel safe in assuming that there were never any comments on the webpage. This is not to say that there was a lack of engagement with the stories by the readers and users, as we can see from the participation on the newspaper's Facebook page. It does highlight the importance of *Correio da Manhã* as a printed paper, however, being the paper with the widest distribution and circulation in the country (APCT, 2018). This, together with having a generally older readership, as well as targeting a readership at a lower socio-economic level than *Público*, might explain the relative lack of engagement with the website. *Público*, on the other hand, catering to a more internet-savvy segment of the population, in spite of having a lower circulation, displays more direct engagement with their website. Another indication of this wider internet engagement by *Público*, in spite of lower circulation, can be seen in the amount of times their articles were shared on Facebook (433) versus *Correio da Manhã* (313). Even more objective data can be gleaned from the official data on online paid circulation, meaning the number of paid subscribers to each of the newspapers, in comparison to their physical circulation. Physically, in the first trimester of 2020, *Correio da Manhã* circulated 66.140 copies, versus only 15.633 by *Público*, showing a clear dominance of the more populist newspaper in terms of printed copies. However, online, the positions are inverted, with *Público* having 24.112 subscribers in the first trimester of 2020, versus only 1.690 copies circulated digitally by *Correio da Manhã*. (APCT, 2020) This gap between online subscribers in the two newspapers helps explain the lack of comments on *Correio da Manhã*'s website.

Looking at the comments under each of the article pairs, there are some conclusions to be taken from the go. In all, the six articles have 1,476 comments associated with them, spread through several platforms. This shows a significant engagement with the news items on the part of the users, even if a large number of these comments consist of back and forth conversations and repeated commenters, which means that in no way does this number of comments equal the number of individual commenters, which would be substantially smaller.

Of the three pairs, the one which elicited a larger number of comments and shares on Facebook was the second pair, which portrays, like the first pair, a negative story, but which

complements it with a human interest story about a landlord who was expropriated in the process leading to the building of the *Mouraria* Mosque. On *Público*'s website, however, it was the third article that obtained the largest number of comments, over double those of the more Facebook-popular second article. However, looking into the reasons for this we can see that that comment section in *Público* contains an 19-part comment by the commenter Raúl Lourenço (Lourenço, 2016) which sparks off a discussion which in turn artificially inflates the number of comments in this particular news item. This is something to take into account: a provocative comment, or as in this case a multi-part comment, can distort the actual engagement with a particular news item, becoming more of a case of users engaging with other users, rather than with the material on the website. We will now turn to the content of the comments and what they can tell us about how the news media users relate to the theme of Islam in these instances.

4.4. What do Users Say in Comments

4.4.1. First Pair of Articles: Start of the Eviction Process

Maintaining the classification of the articles into three mirrored pairs, I will start my examination of the comments with the first of those pairs. Starting with *Público*'s article on the evictions to build the *Mouraria* mosque (Borges, 2016), we can see that in the newspaper's website 11 out of the 23 comments directly or indirectly mention Islam, all being critical of it, the main argument being the lack of necessity in the building of a mosque, with arguments referring to the secularity of the Portuguese state in several of those comments. Most other comments not critical of Islam focus their disapproval on the Municipal authorities, none of the comments takes a positive attitude towards, or recognizes a need for, the evictions. Only two of the comments have a writer with a woman's name, leading to the conclusion that commenters are overwhelmingly men in this case. Seven of the comments are by the same author, Henrique Oliveira, who mainly focuses on the Municipality, only questioning on one of the comments the urgency for the building of the Mosque.

On *Público*'s Facebook page we have another factor to add to the comments, which we described above as "public consensus", which can be measured through the number of likes

a certain comment has. By far the most popular comment, with over double the number of *likes* (124) than the next most liked comment, is by António Pereira and states: “Why does the CML [Lisbon City Hall] have to build the mosque? Don’t they have other social [building] works to do, where they have to spend money?” (Pereira, 2016) Again we observe the argument against the use of public money on a Mosque to be the most popular, as it was in the newspaper’s website. In the 274 Facebook comments, they are in their majority Islamophobic at several levels, from simply denying the necessity to build a mosque or to spend public money on doing so, to more pernicious levels of Islamophobia with comments complaining about the Islamization of Europe (Rosa, 2016), of a conspiracy between the government and Islamic interests to build the mosque and reinforce imagined terrorist cells in Lisbon through the recruitment of Portuguese people to join “the jihad” (Pedrosa, 2016). Again, the commenters are composed by a majority of males and an apparently almost exclusively white makeup, judging by profile pictures, with very few dissenting voices, and those few that exist not being able to make their message pass, with few *likes* and being treated aggressively by other commenters.

For the corresponding paired article in *Correio da Manhã*, which has a slightly more forceful title, we need to resort to Facebook comments to get an idea of the public reaction to the news item. Of the 141 comments on the news item, one immediately jumps out as being the most popular with 105 *likes*, as a term of comparison the second most liked comment has only 17 reactions. This popular comment presents a directly anti-Islam position and states: “Really? Since when has Portugal become an Islamic country, go to hell. [literally: “go be broken by lightning”] Why do the people not rise up?”². Presenting over 5 times more positive reactions than the closest other comment, this shows a general attitude of disapproval of Islam, at least in this forum, as well as an appeal for people to “rise up” against Islam, or at least the building of the mosque. This sentiment is replicated almost universally throughout the comment section. This comment elicits 20 replies to it, which include conspiracy theories about the Bilderberg group, criticisms of the Portuguese people only doing anything when it comes to football and an appeal to participate in a far-right rally by PNR (National Renovation Party). Of the 20 comments only one takes issue with the “xenophobia and racism” of the original comment, by an author with a name in the Persian alphabet (ساتيرف يور), managing to receive only 2 *likes* for the author’s lonely resistance to the prevailing discourse. However, the most popular reply to the comment, with 11 *likes* takes up on the xenophobia and amplifies it:

2 All comments translated from the Portuguese by the author.

This only happens until that politico-religious ideology raises its members in numbers... afterwards they will make their positions harder... look at london, paris, brussels, sweden. You never lived in an environment where they are the large majority, have you? they are like kittens when small, cute even cuddly until...when they grow the lion shows his claws and proves he's the king of the jungle...there are no countries with large muslim communities which have freedom of expression, not to speak of all the other rights trod upon. (Mestre, 2016)

There is a noticeable difference between the kind of comments in these two news sources. While both traffic in xenophobia, the tone in *Correio da Manhã* is noticeably more aggressive and conspiratorial, promoting a view of Muslims as foreign invaders, which is not so prevalent in the articles of *Público*. Again, as in *Público*, the commenters present as overwhelmingly male and almost exclusively white. It is possible that this is partly explained by the more inflammatory title in the *Correio da Manhã* article. To see if this pattern is maintained, we should move to the second pair of articles.

4.4.2. Second Pair of Articles: Updates on the Eviction Process

The second pair of articles both concern the evictions which were being attempted by the Lisbon municipality to build the complex which included the mosque. In this case, however, both also include interviews with some of the proprietors being evicted, turning the articles into human interest stories.

The 30 comments in *Público*'s website, are again mainly against the construction of the mosque, with only seven of the comments refraining from condemning the situation. A majority of the comments are not directly critical of Islam, but of the Municipality and the idea of building the mosque, with the objections being based more on a case of claiming that it is unnecessary or that the government should not build religious buildings at all, being secular, dodging judgements of value on Islam itself. However, there are exceptions, with one author suggesting that the Aga Khan (who has a foundation headquartered in Lisbon) pay for the building, showing a clear ignorance of the existence of different strands of Islam, floridly stating that this construction was:

(...)trafficking with the new golden calf of western hypocrisy, Islam, beloved, adorned, adored, by politicians and timorous and subservient officials in a new capitulation realpolitik. And then complain about the seeded lepenism. (Martins, 2017)

Martins is here implying a conspiracy between politicians and Islamic interests to offer a subservience and capitulation of the West, which in his opinion helps explain and justify far-right movements such as the *lepenism* that he mentions, referring to Marine Le Pen's electoral successes in France.

On *Público's* Facebook page we can find 277 comments and 215 shares on this news item, the most liked comment with 160 likes, and one of the few comments by a woman, is a direct attack on the building of the Mosque, calling it "shameful" and that it should have been asked of the inhabitants of Lisbon if they wanted a new mosque, questioning if "can no one do anything to stop this?" (Lopes, 2017). Another comment with 111 likes asks the question of whether any Muslim country would be building a Catholic church. (Cabeça, 2017) These comments are typical of the general attitude in the comments, with an overwhelming majority disapproving of the building of the Mosque with a considerable percentage of those comments seeing a particular problem in the fact that it is a building to serve a Muslim community.

Turning to *Correio da Manhã's* article on the evictions, which gives a 2018 update on the same situation described in the *Público* article from 2017, we again find no comments on the newspaper's website, but we do find 283 comments and 77 shares on Facebook, with even more comments here than in the case of *Público's* Facebook page on their mirror article. The most popular comment on the article, with 66 likes, merits inclusion in full:

True story. An Arab from Saudi Arabia went to Moscow and told Putin that he wanted to buy, in Moscow, a large plot of land to build a large mosque. Putin answered that he agreed just as long as he could build an orthodox church in Riad. The Arab said that that could not be, because their religion is the true religion. Beautiful lesson from Putin. (Henriques, 2018)

The story being referred to here is a mix of truth and fantasy, purposefully altered to make Putin a central figure of the story, which he was not. There was, in fact, a similar news item in 2008, but nowhere is Putin mentioned by name, nor had he a central role in the event. In short, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia manifested interest in building a mosque

in Moscow, to which Orthodox Christian organizations in Russia replied that they wanted to build a church in Saudi Arabia. This is the extent of the news item. (Heneghan, 2008) In truth Vladimir Putin would, in a ceremony with the presence of the president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, inaugurate a new mosque in Moscow in 2015, the largest mosque in the city. (MacFarquhar, 2015) No one takes issue in the comments with this story, while some praise Putin and another accuses the Portuguese prime-minister, who is of Catholic Indian Goan ancestry, and which he simply calls “monhé” (a racist term equivalent to the english “wog”), of being a Muslim himself, presumably due to his skin colour and, therefore, not wanting to refuse the building of the mosque. (Oliveira, 2018)

The large number of comments on this particular article in the *Correio da Manhã*'s Facebook is due in large part to one single comment, which despite having only 17 likes generated 123 replies. In this comment by one Mohamed Ibraimo, the participants in the comment section are accused of xenophobia, unfortunately the 123 replies confirm his accusation for the most part. (Ibraimo, 2018)

4.4.3. Third Pair of Articles: Articles on the Area of the Intervention.

The third pair of articles we are looking at are focused on the area of urban intervention, but not on the evictions. In the case of *Público* we have an article from 2016 focused on the project for the renewal of the area, focusing on the mosque, while in *Correio da Manhã* we have a more recent article from 2020, discussing the cultural diversity of the area where the mosque is to be built.

As discussed above, this is the article with the most comments on the *Público*'s website, totalling 66 comments, mainly due to a 19-part comment by a user identified as Raul Lourenço, a user of some importance as he has, as of 2020, achieved the level of forum moderator, which reflects his continued participation on the website, more so than the quality of his comments. In this 19-part comment, Lourenço writes a long and rambling argument touching on theories of Europe being “invaded” by Islam, the idea that this is a leftist plot, Portuguese political corruption, geopolitics, the destruction of Christian symbols, Brexit and Donald Trump, the rise of the far-right as a consequence of being too lenient on Islam

and other familiar topics which populate commentary boxes on these subjects. (Lourenço, 2016) Other comments on the website repeat many of the typical comments on *Público*'s website, with a majority of comments complaining about the municipality, on the basis of the idea that religious buildings should not be promoted by it, rather than through open Islamophobia, but still opposing the building of the mosque.

On the Facebook page, there are two comments with an equal number of *likes*, 64, disputing the top spot, one questions the use of public funds to build a mosque, suggesting those funds be used to restore the tomb of Portuguese King D. Dinis (1261-1352), (Santos, 2016) while the other comment perpetuates Islamophobic ideas by suggesting that pigs be buried on the plot of land where the mosque is to be built and that Muslims will not build mosques over “pig graveyards”, (Matos, 2016) the commenter also states that this is done in Spain and uses as his support a now dead link from Sputnik News, a Russian controlled media outlet which has been described as “the buzzfeed of propaganda”. (Groll, 2014) This comment did not go undisputed, as several commenters replied with accusations of islamophobia and a misunderstanding of Islam, but none of those replies has a public engagement, in terms of *likes*, similar to the original comment, none of them reaching two digits.

Correio da Manhã, again, presents no comments on its website, but the newspaper's Facebook page shows 168 comments. Of these comments I could find only three that were not openly xenophobic, most other comments remark that people who live in Mouraria are “dirty”, “smell bad” or “do not belong in Portugal”. Two comments make reference to the building of the Mosque, claiming that it is the only thing left to make the area not Portuguese anymore. The highest voted comment, with 22 likes, is an openly xenophobic comment directed to what the commenter sees as Pakistani nationals (the commenter calls them an “ethnicity”). The article itself refers only to a large Bangladeshi and Nepalese community in the area, not to any Pakistanis at all. Nevertheless, the comment states:

I passed this street one of these days, by car, and there was not a woman or a portuguese person to be seen, which would have been easily identifiable. I saw no ethnic or cultural diversification, as the only ethnicity to be seen was pakistani. Tens, if not hundreds of men, on the streets. Fear. (Louro, 2020)

This comment is typical of the tenor of most comments on the news article. Many comments express fear of the area, fear of the people who reside in the area, fear of crime, although this is not a particularly dangerous area of Lisbon and crime in Lisbon has been

coming down year on year for the last 10 years. (INE, 2020) Seeing as the article's title refers to the "exotic odours" of the area, many of the comments take this on to mock those odours, the two most common references are to the smell of curry and of urine, with others commenting on a smell of sweat or garbage. One popular comment with 12 likes states:

What odours? Those that induce nausea, it's how they like to live, to coexist, in the middle of the garbage. It's in these people's DNA, the nauseating garbage can't be outside or far from them. Look at the case of the ambassador. Be they high or low class, they are all the same. (Morais, 2020)

It is not specified who this ambassador is that the commenter refers to, neither is any ambassador written about in the article. Most other comments follow the same trend as these, repeating xenophobic and racist tropes, while mostly ignoring the overall positive content of the original article being commented on.

4.5. Conclusion

There are two main conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis of commentary. One of those conclusions can be drawn across both news sources examined, while the second conclusion concerns the differences between those two sources.

The first of these conclusions is that there is a widespread feeling of Islamophobia in the users commenting in both newspaper's websites. In the case of the majority of comments on all the articles examined there is a feeling of antagonism towards Islam, often at different levels of intensity, depending on the news source being examined, but generalized nonetheless. We could think that this would only mean that commenters were being anti-Islamic in rhetoric, but it can also be noticed that in all cases, some of the more virulent Islamophobic comments are also those who garner the largest number of audience engagement which can, in the case of Facebook, be gauged by the number of likes.

The second conclusion, which leads to the discovery of some differences between the coverage in both newspapers, has to do with the differences in tenor present in the comments. The comments in *Público* often have a larger variety of perspectives, with the presence of at

least some comments with a positive view of Islam. Even those comments which oppose, for example, the building of the Mouraria Mosque, are often couched in criticisms of the Lisbon Municipality, or justify their opposition through appeals to the secularity of the Portuguese Republic. Overtly xenophobic, racist and Islamophobic comments are a minority in the commentary section of *Público*, with commenters, more often than not, being careful to couch their language in ways that might provide plausible deniability for any accusations of hate speech. However, there are still a number of comments promoting Russian propaganda, as in the case of the sharing of Sputnik News content on the “pig burial”, or far-right talking points such as the idea of the invasion of Europe by Muslims.

The situation in *Correio da Manhã* is very different. As we saw above, the majority of comments are openly Islamophobic, often racist and xenophobic and interestingly, as we saw in several cases, propagating false news, far-right talking points and Russian propaganda, as in the case of the comment portraying Putin as a defender of Christendom. These differences between the two sources can be partially explained by the different audience of the newspapers, their different focuses and styles as well as the way in which they differ in the coverage of news items relating to Islamic themes, as I have shown in a previous article (Silva, 2019).

Newspaper comments seem, then, to have often become an unwelcome addition to newspapers’ stated mission to inform the public, becoming a source for the propagation of false news, prejudice, Islamophobia and hatred, with no interference from the part of the news providers in order to mitigate this, at least in the cases examined, and particularly so in the case of the Facebook shares. It seems then, that newspapers need to be serious about moderating, contradicting or informing the public not only through their own articles and publications, but also at the level of what kind of discourse they allow to be attached, unchallenged, to those same publications, otherwise they risk seeing their mission and aims perverted, becoming a source for disinformation.

CHAPTER 5: Muslim Self-Representation in Portugal: The Audiovisual Production of the Lisbon Sunni Central Mosque

5.1. Introduction

Although some studies have been done concerning the representation of Islam in mainstream news media, few have been done in what concerns Portugal, a situation which is explainable due to the peripheral geographic and cultural situation of the country, as well as the comparatively small Islamic community in the country. (Silva, 2019) Even less examined have been the media productions of the Islamic community itself in the country for internal consumption and for a wider audience. In what way then, has the Muslim community replied to Portuguese media representation of Islam through their own media productions and how have these benefited from new technologies, such as internet video services. Has the community used their access to media to come into direct dialogue with mainstream media or have they used their means to present an alternative view of Islam? I will, in this chapter, examine the audiovisual media production arising from the Lisbon Central Mosque, the country's Sunni mosque which covers a large slice of the Muslim population in the country and which also has the highest public profile of any such place of worship in the country.

This chapter will be split into three distinct sections, which should, by the end, give an overall view of how an important subsection of Portuguese Muslims or Muslims living in Portugal represent themselves to the outside world and in their own community. The first section will serve the purpose of contextualizing the Mosque in Portuguese history, quickly tracing the historic Islamic presence in the country and focusing particularly on the second half of the twentieth century, leading up to the building of the mosque itself as well as giving a picture of the mosque's context in Portuguese Islamic and non-Islamic society as well as

the relative importance that it holds today.

The second section of this chapter will look at the audiovisual production of the Lisbon Central Mosque, focusing on two contrasting mediums, on the one hand the productions that were presented on national television (RTP2) during a space dedicated to giving air-time to different religious groups in the country, in a program entitled *The Faith of Men* [sic] (*A Fé dos Homens*); and on the other hand the videos published by the Mosque on YouTube and their own facebook page. It is interesting to see the contrast between the two styles of videos, one with a bigger production budget and directed to a wider audience, the majority of which was not Muslim, and the second more directed to internal consumption by those seeking the Mosque's internet presence.

In the last section of this chapter we will look at how the videos were, or were not, in conversation with wider social discussions on Islam and Muslims outside the Portuguese Muslim community, particularly in mainstream media and how these videos sought to answer questions that the wider Portuguese society might have about Islam. In this section we will be able to look at how the Lisbon Central Mosque sought to represent itself and the Muslim community it served in the context of the wider Portuguese society. It is also in this section that we can analyse some of the content of the videos in the two mediums so as to analyse their different functions.

5.2. Islam in Portugal and the Lisbon Central Mosque

The contact between what would become the geographical location of Portugal and Islam starts at the beginning of the 8th century, with the conquest of the Iberian peninsula by the Umayyad Caliphate. This can be seen as the logical extension of the conquest of North Africa: reaching the western coast of Africa it was an easy and obvious step to jump over the straits of Gibraltar and land on the Peninsula. (Kennedy 1996: 3) Defeating the Visigoth rulers of the peninsula, starting in 711 C.E., it is clear that by 715 most of what is now Portugal had been integrated into the Umayyad Caliphate. It would take over 500 years to restore Christian rule to what is now Portugal, meaning that more than a quarter of the history of Portugal after

the fall of the Roman Empire was spent under Islamic rule. (Disney 2009: 53)

These 500 years of Islamic presence in Portugal left indelible marks up until our times, one of the ways in which this is most obvious to the everyday life of the Portuguese has to do with the amount of vocabulary derived from Arabic present in the language. Recent studies have identified around 19.000 Arabic derived words in Portuguese, which may be contrasted with the only 4.000 found in Spain, for example. (Alves, 2015: 10) Even the name of Portuguese provinces, such as the southernmost province of the *Algarve*, derives from the Arabic term for the region Al-Gharb, or The West. This pattern is repeated throughout the language and the geography with many nouns and place names being of Arabic origin. The composition of the Muslim population of what would be Portugal at that time consisted of a small minority of Yemeni Arabs who were the ruling elite, immigrants from the Maghreb in North Africa and the largest number of Muslims would have been converts from the native Hispano-Roman population. (Disney 2009: 57) In the first years of the conquest the majority of the population would have remained christian with a progressive increase of the Muslim population as time went on, it is during this time that Lisbon became the largest city in Portugal. (Disney 2009: 61)

The Christian reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula started almost immediately after the Islamic establishment in the area with the first victory at Covadonga dating to 722. However, areas of Portugal only started being incorporated into the Christian Kingdom of Asturias in the 850s. The reconquest of the geographical area of Portugal would end in 1249 with Afonso III, King of Portugal taking the last Muslim enclave in what was now the Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves, the borders of the continental part of country have not changed substantially since then. (Disney 2009: 65-66) The Christian conquest of Portugal did not end Muslim presence in the country, although the Arab elites left the country, many of those Muslims who had either immigrated or converted remained in Portugal, only gradually converting to Christianity. In many cities of the country, including Lisbon, *Mourarias* (deriving from the word for Moors) were created, these were areas in the cities set aside for Muslim residents, usually outside the city walls, but with their own specific sets of rights and responsibilities. The Mouraria quarter in Lisbon, for example, was created after the conquest of the city by Christian forces in the 12th century, being set aside for the so called Moors, from which it got its name, by a royal decree dated from 1170, with a right to the free practice of the Islamic religion, the election of their own justice officer, to keep their own law and to internally self-administer under kingly protection (Almeida, 2016: 37). The Muslim population of Lisbon and the country

in general did diminish over the centuries, however, and for much of recent history there was not a significant Muslim population in the country.

This would change in the second half of the 20th century, as Portugal started its process of decolonising its overseas empire in the 1970s. One of these overseas possessions was Mozambique, in the east coast of Africa, which had a substantial population of migrants from the Indian subcontinent, many of which had moved to Mozambique after Portugal gave up its colonies of Goa, Damão and Diu in 1961. The proximity of those Indian cities on the western coast of India to Mozambique, as well as some fear on the part of the Muslim minorities residing there concerning their absorption into India only 14 years after the partition of the subcontinent, led many Muslims to leave those cities and move to Mozambique taking advantage of holding Portuguese citizenship as the colonies were regarded as “Metropolitan Portugal”. The same process took place with the independence of Mozambique in 1975, with those Muslims moving to Portugal as Portuguese citizens. It’s estimated that two-thirds of the Muslim population in Portugal is derived from this group of migrants, with a further 20% being from Guinea-Bissau. (Nielsen and Otterbeck, 2016: 110) Guinea-Bissau won its independence in 1973 and being a country wedged between Senegal and Equatorial Guinea has Islam as its largest religious group. Particularly after the independence and up until today, many Muslims from Guinea-Bissau emigrated to Portugal taking advantage of the shared language as well as the Portuguese citizenship of those born before 1973.

By 2014 the Muslim population of Portugal was estimated as being between 48.000 and 55.000 people, these being only estimates as the Portuguese census data does not include questions on religious affiliation. The majority of these would be Sunni Muslims from the areas described above, but there is also a substantial minority of Isma’ili Xiite Muslims, with a number estimated at 8.000. Over half this population lives either in or around Lisbon in areas where they share their space with large communities of Hindu and African descent, who are also in Portugal as a result of its colonial past. (Nielsen and Otterbeck, 2016: 110) The lack of information on religious affiliation and ethnicity in the Portuguese census makes a good demographic analysis difficult, but it is safe to say that both the Muslims of South Asian origin who immigrated to Portugal in the 60s and 70s, as well as the Isma’ili Muslims are generally a well off minority, well integrated in wider Portuguese society and Middle Class. The same cannot be said of the Muslims of African descent, where problems related to poverty and unemployment persist as a result of systemic racism and their comparatively more economically modest condition when arriving in Portugal. (Nielsen and Otterbeck, 2016: 110) Nielsen and Otterbeck’s volume on *Muslims in Western Europe* does not cover

more recent population movements in the country, but it is worth noting that there have also been substantial Muslim migrants from Bangladesh arriving in Portugal in the recent past. The migrants form a kind of floating population, however, as Portugal often serves as a place to wait out EU residency documentation before moving elsewhere in the EU, where wages are more appealing, as it is generally seen as being a poorer country and more lax in its implementation of immigration laws. (Datta-Ray 2016)

This population is served by over 54 places of worship around the country, according to the listing of places of worship at the Halal Institute of Portugal website, according to 2015 numbers, 33 of which are located in the Lisbon area. (Instituto Halal de Portugal 2015) By 2014, 6 full mosques with minarets had been built, with the other places of worship being smaller affairs. The first of these full mosques was built in 1982 in Laranjeiro, a Lisbon suburb south of the river Tagus, the second, the following year in Odivelas, another suburb of Lisbon to the north, and the third and largest, the Lisbon Central Mosque was built in 1985 inside Lisbon proper. This Lisbon Central Mosque, on which this chapter will focus, is also the seat of the *Comunidade Islâmica de Lisboa* (Islamic Community of Lisbon), the main Islamic organization in the country and recognized as a Registered Religion Community. (Nielsen and Otterbeck, 2016: 111)

The Lisbon Central Mosque is located just off central Lisbon, but is a tall and impressive landmark that can be seen from one of the busiest roundabouts in the city, being located near both the Embassy of Spain and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation building. The off-center location of the mosque can be explained by its sheer size and the need to have a large unbuilt area in Lisbon for the new Mosque building. Due to its location, prominence and size, it is the most well known Mosque in the country. Part of this high-profile can also be laid at the feet of the man who has been its imam since its inception in 1986, Sheikh David Munir. Born in Portuguese Mozambique in 1963, to a Yemeni father and a Mozambican mother of Indian descent, he studied Islamic Theology in Karachi, Pakistan, at the Aleemiyah Institute of Islamic Studies, later also getting a degree in Pedagogy and a baccalaureate in literature. He took over as the Imam of the Lisbon Central Mosque when returning to Portugal at the age of 23. He is not only the Mosque's Imam but has also been a teacher of Arabic at several Portuguese Universities.(Governo de Portugal 2015) Due to his high-profile he has also been the main presence in Portuguese media when it comes to representing Islamic positions, or commenting on themes related to Islam, he is a frequent guest at news programs on television and a frequent interviewee in print media as well. During this article his presence will be by far the most felt, as he is often present in the

media produced by the Central Mosque and the Islamic Community of Lisbon for broadcast on national television, he is also the main presence in the Mosque's youtube channel, which at the time of writing had sermons by Sheikh Munir uploaded weekly. (Mesquita Central de Lisboa, 2017-2020)

5.3. Audiovisual Media Produced by the Lisbon Central Mosque

The Central Lisbon Mosque and the Islamic Community of Lisbon which is headquartered there, are associated with the production of a number of media products, in this chapter we will focus solely on two categories of audiovisual media: those produced for a wider audience to be broadcast on national television and those which are public, but more targeted being spread through the Mosque's social media presence and youtube channel. It is worth noting that the institution is also associated with the production of a magazine, *Al-Furqan*, as well as publishing books under the same imprint name as the magazine, headquartered at the Odivelas mosque, but this will not be covered by the scope of this article.

The audiovisual media produced for a wide national audience of Muslims and non-Muslims, consists of participating in a daily tv programme entitled *A Fé dos Homens* (lit: *The Faith of Men* [sic]) on RTP 2, the second channel of Portuguese public television, the least popular of the four terrestrial channels being associated with cultural and institutional programming, but still one of the four channels that anyone with a television can access freely at home with no need for a cable television contract. According to the program's webpage the program is "a space dedicated to the different religions recognized in Portugal and instituted through their own Church [sic]". Examples of these religions provided on the website include the Portuguese Evangelical Alliance, the Orthodox Church, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the Bahai Community of Portugal, the Vetero-Catholic Church, the Catholic Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Portuguese Hindu Community. (RTP, 2020) This is a long-running show, with episodes coming out every weekday and the RTP2 online archive contains 1441 episodes at the time of writing, with more being added each day. Shared as it is between all different recognized religions in

Portugal, the Islamic community is only featured occasionally, generally, however, there seem to be programs dedicated to the Islamic community once a month, with the last two shows at the time of writing being on the 21st of October and the 23rd of November of 2020, in both of these shows Sheikh Munir is featured, not only in the show but as the thumbnail for that show on the RTP2 website. (RTP Play, 2020)

The other source of audiovisual production can be found online on the youtube channel of the Lisbon Central Mosque, this was a channel that in its current incarnation was created in 2017 and that contains videos produced by the Mosque for a slightly different audience, this time they are not going into the houses of everyone with a television set on RTP2, but they require that the audience goes to the website purposefully to watch the videos. In this way they aim at a public interested in the subject, whether that public is Muslim or not, but not as generalistic as the production for RTP2. The content of the videos is also different, while at the early stages of the channel in 2017 most videos would be of assorted televisual participations, mainly by Sheikh Munir on news broadcasts or television reports on themes such as “Islam in Portugal” during a morning show in one of the terrestrial channels. Sometimes there are other guest speakers, such as Sheikh Zabir Edriss, a younger member of the community who is also a Theologian and Arabic teacher. (Mesquita Central de Lisboa, 2017) Together with these there are also videos on particular events at the mosque, produced by the mosque itself, such as a visit from the President of the Portuguese Republic, members of parliament or the events surrounding Ramadan. The content of the channel has changed, however, since the start of 2020, possibly due to both COVID-19 making services sporadic or non-existent, depending on the degree of containment active in Portugal, and to the Mosque’s website being under construction and this being the preferred channel for communication. Now the videos include weekly sermons by Sheikh Munir, coming out every Thursday filmed in the Mosque itself, clearly directed to a Muslim audience, starting out each video with the traditional Tasmiyah (bi-smi llāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīmi) followed up by a verse or full surah from the Qur’an and addressing the audience as brothers and sister. Throughout the videos he returns to Arabic phrases from the Qur’an to exemplify or illustrate his sermon, this, unlike much of the other content produced by the Mosque is clearly directed towards a Muslim audience, even if it is accessible to all people with an internet connectio on YouTube. (Mesquita Central de Lisboa, 2017-2020)

We can see two very different communication approaches, suited to different audiovisual media, by the Lisbon Central Mosque. A communality that comes across between the two different communication channels is the centrality of Sheikh Munir in the public image not

only of the Lisbon Central Mosque but also of Islam in Portugal in general. As we have seen above the Lisbon Central Mosque is not the only Mosque in Portugal, far from it, and neither is Munir the only Imam, but he has managed to reach a dominating position in the media produced about Islam not only by and for the mainstream media but also by the Islamic community in Portugal. He is a constant presence both in the terrestrial television airtime for the Islamic community and also when there are reports about Islam or Islamic issues in the mainstream media, beyond this he also is front and center in the audiovisual production by the Central Mosque, with most of the videos of the YouTube channel consisting in their totality of Sheikh Munir talking towards the camera. It is, then, easy to see how Munir acts as an unofficial spokesman for Islam in Portugal, even if his authority as an Imam is circumscribed to one Mosque in the capital. This raises questions about how representative Munir is of the community as a whole, seeing as, as we have seen above, he is an established figure of a comparatively old Islamic community in Portugal and also one which can be seen as comparatively privileged, when taking into account the origins of the wider Muslim community in Portugal, not as closely associated with the Central Mosque. There is little doubt that he acts as the public face of Islam in Portugal, and has been so since the 1980s, taking over as Imam of the Mosque, as such Sheikh Munir is a central figure when seeking to examine the self-representation of Muslims in the country.

As can be seen from the changes which have occurred recently in the Mosque's YouTube channel another use for self-produced audiovisual media becomes clear, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, religious congregations adapted to new forms of reaching their members. The Central Mosque's YouTube channel is an example of this exact phenomenon, serving now as a platform not only for institutional promotion but also as a vehicle for religious service and conversation. This is such a new situation, with this being the first truly worldwide and disruptive pandemic, which led to the cancelling or at least downsizing of religious events to occur, since the existence of the Internet, that there is still few research done on this subject. (Fader, 2020) However, it is not hard to consider that religious institutions such as the Lisbon Central Mosque, which are used to producing audiovisual content have a certain advantage and ease when it comes to keeping in contact with their congregations, both in terms of having the material necessary for capturing quality audiovisual content as well as the know-how to make it available to their audience. Therefore the shift of focus on the YouTube channel to weekly sermons shows how the capacity of the mosque to produce their own audiovisual content was an integral part of the adaptation to the pandemic situation.

The same change is not seen in the RTP2 television programs, which continue to cover

generalities more as a public relations exercise than as a way to reach their own congregation. This difference in target audience between televised material and material posted online shows how the Mosque engages in code-switching taking into account the target audience, even if both productions are easily accessible to the public. One distinction that can be made to help explain this code-switch is the idea that television is a somewhat non-interactive and passive medium, something particularly true of older terrestrial channels as is the case of RTP2, where audiences will have the TV on and it will just play what is programmed, while online audiovisual media requires a more active effort on the part of the viewer, who needs to seek out the content that he wants to watch, instead of being automatically fed a set programme. If we take into account recent controversies about Islam in the mainstream media, it is also natural that the Central Mosque would want to take advantage of their airtime on public television to use it as a way to address the whole of Portugal, rather than solely Muslims in Portugal. In the next section we will then take a look at some concrete examples of how each of the audiovisual mediums talks about Islam differently.

5.4. Differences in Content Between Televised and Online Audiovisual Productions

As mentioned above there are considerable differences between the two communication channels which use audiovisual material produced by the Lisbon Central Mosque. In this section we will take videos from each of those channels in order to compare and contrast them, so we can see how the Mosque uses them to different ends and the audiences to which they are directed with concrete examples.

The two examples chosen for this exercise are taken from the same week, one from the 23rd of November of 2020 and another from the 26th of November of the same year, having only three days' distance from each other. The earliest video from the 23rd is from the RTP2 public television show (RTP Play, 2020a) and the later one, from the 26th is taken directly from the Mosque's YouTube channel and is entitled "Sharing" (Port: Partilhar) (Mesquita Central de Lisboa, 2020). The logic underlying the selection of these two videos is the fact that they are some of the most recent ones published before the writing of this chapter as

well as having a particularly short chronological distance between them, which allows us to judge them in a more equal footing. If they were too chronologically distant from each other differences could be attributed to particular world events or situations in the news to which they would be addressing differently, while the time proximity allows us to judge videos arising in a similar context, in this case a context where there were no particular news items focusing on Islam but while the COVID-19 pandemic was in its second wave in Portugal, dominating most of the news cycle, as well as making online communication with the Muslim community a necessity for the Mosque.

Looking first at the television programme, the 23rd of November show presents an interview between Sheikh Munir and Abdul Razac Seco, where Seco asks Munir about the Islamic Calendar. During the short 10 minute program Munir explains several historical and practical facts about the calendar, explaining the idea of the Hejira, Muhammad's move from Mecca to Medina which counts as the start of the calendar. Munir also then goes on to explain the structure of the calendar and how a lunar calendar works. The program is clearly directed to a general audience, but one which also includes a Muslim public, therefore interspread with the general information that most Muslims would already know and which is explained with reference to the Gregorian calendar, to make it easier for non-Muslims to understand, Munir also raises problems which occur within the Muslim community, such as a discrepancy that occurs in counting lunar days. This last point seems more directed to the Muslim community in particular, appealing to a unification of standard according to the scientific knowledge that allows us to know with surety the time of the month without resorting to visual observation. (RTP Play, 2020a)

Looking at the second video, on the YouTube channel of the Central Lisbon Mosque, we find a video directed much more towards the Muslim community rather than a general public. In this video, dated from the 20th of November 2020, Sheikh Munir is filmed sitting in the main hall of the Lisbon Mosque by himself, with the Qur'an in front of him, and resumes an ongoing series of videos on the Surah Al-Baqarah, the second Surah of the Qur'an. In this video he covers the verses 72-74, and the purpose is to recite the verses in Arabic, translate them into Portuguese and give an explanation of their meaning. In fact, when compared to the video broadcast on national television, there are a lot of sentences in Arabic, such as forms of names or ways to address Prophets like Musa (Moses), one of the characters present in the Surah. There are also ritual phrases such as the Shahada which starts the session. Added to this is the Arabic of the Qur'an itself which Munir recites as he goes along in his exploration of the Qur'anic verses. This marked contrast in the use of the Qur'anic language

is explained precisely due to the importance of the original text for the Muslim community, while such stress on the original arabic language would be lost on a more general public as that of the TV show. In the video Munir expounds on the human heart, describing the verses as telling of three types of hearts, hard, soft and a mixed kind and how people should find balance in how severe they are, but also not be gullible. He goes on to explain another verse as condemning those who know the truth of god but misuse it for their own ends, and also sees the Qur'an as condemning those who misrepresent themselves as believers when with a group and not with others. The video ends with a prayer (du'ā) for the sick and those who are in debt or difficulty, as well as for those who have requested it, those who have died, and, topically so that the COVID pandemic is removed. Munir also recommends that people trust in Allah but use our own rationality and, therefore, follow instructions to avoid meetings and take precautions, for their own good and to avoid infection. This is, then, a video much more directed to a more intimate audience, as well as one who shares in the belief of the Imam, there is a section on the interpretation of religious texts, but then, when doing the final prayer, there is a pastoral function for the faithful he serves in the mosque, as can be seen in the references of those who asked him to pray for them, as well as giving advice on how people should keep safe during the pandemic. The video has a modest number of views, 83 at the time of writing, but there is also the possibility that some people view the videos in a family or group context, which would expand that number of people reached considerably. An aspect that makes this video particularly interesting is the way in which the Mosque has used the technological means at their disposal to answer the challenges posed by the unprecedented situation of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Mesquita Central de Lisboa, 2020)

Another kind of video to be found in the Mosque's YouTube page, and which included most videos before the Covid-19 pandemic, are institutional videos or captures of TV appearances by the Mosque's representatives. In fact, before the pandemic the channel had only 9 videos, 5 of which consisted of coverage of visits to the mosque by political personalities such as the President of the Republic or members of parliament, as well as 2 videos on study visits to the Mosque by school students and a group of curious adults. The other videos consist of a music video showing the celebration of Ramadan by the Mosque in 2017, 2 TV appearances by Sheikh Munir as an interviewee and a single video on Qur'anic exegesis, or Tafseer. Curiously, and this shows how COVID-19 changed the relationship between the Mosque and technology, the channel seemed to have been abandoned in May 2017, that being the last of the 9 videos before picking up again in May 2020, already in a pandemic context. From May 2020 until May 2021 (at the time of writing), the channel has uploaded 70 videos, with the

remaining 9 videos dating from 2017. (Mesquita Central de Lisboa, 2017-2021)

There is, then, a clear shift in register depending on the expected audience for each video, the communication of the Mosque, personified in Sheikh Munir, takes care to tailor its content to its intended audience. Even if both types of video are public and accessible to anyone with an internet connection, there is a clear difference in expectation, the open channel video content being clearly meant to instruct a non-Muslim majority country on interesting aspects of Islam, and those which might arise some curiosity in the general public, this happens because of the nature of the medium in which the message is being presented. RTP2 being a terrestrial channel with an open signal, people might watch it inadvertently by the simple fact of having the TV on at home while the program plays. The YouTube content demands from the viewer that he searches out the content purposefully, this simple fact permits the message to be tailored to an audience that is either Muslim or has a deep interest on the subject (or is a Sociologist writing a piece on that same content). This allows the content of these videos to explore more specific Islamic content, including content in Arabic, deep exploration of Qur'anic verses, as well as pastoral activities such as communal prayer for the Muslim community. While remaining public, as the Mosque services themselves are, these videos serve clearly as a sort of substitution for the physical mosque services suspended during the pandemic situation. The way in which different audiovisual media is judiciously calibrated to different audiences shows a savvy understanding of both technology and public relations on the part of the Central Lisbon Mosque.

5.5. Conclusion

In conclusion we can then see how the Lisbon Central Mosque has used audiovisual media production in several ways. As a way to reach out to the wider Portuguese society through national television and as a way to reach the Muslim community in the country through online media. This shows a good understanding of the potentials of different audiovisual mediums with traditional media being less directed to a specific subset of the population and therefore requiring a message tailored to an “outsider” audience, while new media such as YouTube, can be used in a more targeted fashion. This is reflected in the content of the two different mediums, with topics of general cultural interest for the traditional media

and more specific topics, such as Qur'anic exegesis in the more targeted channels. In all of the audiovisual media produced by the Lisbon Central Mosque, Sheikh Munir takes on a central role both as imam, or prayer leader, and interpreter of the Qur'an in the videos targeted to the Islamic community as well as a public figure, showing up in almost all the televised programs for more informal conversations about aspects of Islam of general interest, but also on televised interviews and other TV talk shows where he has been a guest, videos that after having been transmitted on national television, find their way on to the Mosque's YouTube channel.

The COVID-19 pandemic, which mandated the closure of places of worship around the country and prohibited the gatherings that are usual in those contexts, adds another level to the use of new media which became a necessity in order for the Mosque to keep in touch with the Muslim community. This is reflected in a marked increase in the production of online audiovisual content meant to mitigate the restraints caused by the pandemic situation. This content in the context of the pandemic is both very specifically oriented to the community of worshippers, but doing in depth exegesis of the Qur'an but also serves a pastoral function which was not common in previous videos, some of the content includes, for example, communal prayer as well as life advice on how to deal with the pandemic situation.

We can then see that the Central Mosque is not shy in its use of audiovisual content in order to reach a variety of public, in fact it seems to be very aware of the necessity of maintaining a constant presence in several mediums. With time this need has just become more pronounced and when an unexpected event, such as the COVID-19 pandemic takes place, we see how this previous ease with the production of content was used as a way to mitigate the inevitable constraints posed by it.

CONCLUSION

There are a number of conclusions which can be taken from this thesis, one of these, which is a determinant factor which pervades the whole thesis and can be seen all the way at the start in Chapter 1, is the way in which Portugal's economic situation is central to the way in which Islam and Muslims are represented in the media and perceived by the population in general. In the first chapter we saw how the ups and downs of the Portuguese economy influenced responses to the European Social Survey regarding immigration and tolerance for non-Christian and non-white people. We also saw how Portugal's positions in relation to those subjects are similar to those of a group of countries in central and eastern Europe, such as Poland, Hungary and the Baltic countries, and how those countries shared with Portugal economic conditions more so than cultural or geographical commonalities, being as they are separated by most of Western Europe, countries with higher per capita GDPs and Human Development Indexes, such as Spain, France and Germany, which also present substantially more tolerant attitudes towards foreigners. Another thing that Portugal has in common with these central and eastern European countries is a small relative percentage of Muslim immigrants. This is particularly curious as there seems to be a correlation between having a small Muslim community and having islamophobic values. However, this small relative population will also probably be related to the economic condition of the country as we could see in Chapter 3, the fact that it is a country with low wages makes it not a prize destination for Muslim immigrants when coming into Europe, and the consequent lack of Muslim migrant networks helps perpetuate this cycle. Therefore countries with low wages and bad economic conditions when compared with other EU countries, such as Portugal, have both small Muslim migrant communities, while at the same time harbouring large amounts of anti-Muslim prejudice.

As we saw in the diachronic results of the ESS in the first chapter, however, this situation is fluid. As Portugal went through an economic recovery after 2014 attitudes and values became generally more accepting of immigrants which did not conform with the majority religion or ethnic group. The most obvious explanation for this fluid situation is that respondents are more anxious about immigration when they feel that the immigrant might be competing with them for the same jobs or economic resources and less anxious when there is a relative windfall and, therefore, a sense of there "being enough for everyone". This economic effect

on social attitudes and values towards Muslims, and consequently Islam, is quite important when it then comes to the media sources that are consumed by the Portuguese public and how they exploit certain vulnerabilities or concerns of their reading public, this might, in fact, help explain some of the editorial choices in newspapers and other media in Portugal, and the research in this thesis does seem to bear that out, at least in part.

In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 we used two newspapers as a way to contrast how Islam is covered in Portugal and what reactions it elicits from a reading audience. These newspapers were clearly separated by style, with one, *Público* being a reference newspaper directed to a primarily middle-class audience with its coverage of cultural and international events, and the other *Correio da Manhã* being more oriented to a lower-middle and working class audience, focusing mainly on national news and sensational events such as detailed coverage of quotidian crime. In all the three chapters we came to the conclusion that there is a noticeable slant towards negative news about Islam, in the case of *Correio da Manhã*, which matches the preconceptions of its audience, as we have seen above. If, as we saw in the first chapter, a more economically deprived population is more liable to discriminate against foreigners or those of a different religion, then it is natural that a newspaper and its respective social media presence (as seen in Chapter 4), ends up catering to those same preconceptions because it is feeding its audience what it wants to read. As such, newspapers can have the effect of becoming feedback loops, in a vicious cycle where the audience's preconceptions set the newspaper's tone, wanting to please that audience, which in turn ends up reinforcing those preconceptions in the audience, feeding back up again to the newspaper, in an echo chamber of prejudice. This is not a specifically Portuguese problem, famous cases abroad such as the Daily Mail in the UK or Fox News in the USA show the same process happening, a process of "echo chamber" which has been widely studied in the field of media studies. If anything, however, the situation in Portugal has the potential to be even more dangerous because it is a country with a relatively low level of educational attainment, and therefore with a large population which might have difficulty in applying the necessary critical and analytical tools to be able to break from this echo chamber. Portugal's level of tertiary education among adults was 25% in 2019, when compared to an OECD average of 40%. As we saw in Chapter 2, the readership of *Correio da Manhã* skews older and, in this case, the situation is even more dire, seeing as these were people who were educated during the fascist Estado Novo regime, which lasted until 1974, therefore 55-64 years old in 2019 had a percentage of only 14% tertiary schooling. (OECD, 2019: 2) The more populist newspapers, such as *Correio da Manhã*, which despite being directed to a specific demographic are not produced by that same

demographic, as can be seen by the biographies of those producing opinion pieces for it in Chapter 2, have an exploitative relationship with their public, promoting a worldview that fits the newspaper's political outlook by feeding and encouraging their audience's preconceptions, exploiting their lack of economic safety and lower level of schooling to promote their specific agenda. Although this happens, at some level, with all media outlets, it is particularly apparent with those that are directed to this demographic, of older, poorer readers with a low level of schooling, the same audience of the Daily Mail or Fox News, making this far from a Portuguese phenomenon, but an imitation of what happens elsewhere in the world.

It is difficult, however, to pinpoint whether there is a deliberate political agenda to attempt to demonise Islam on the part of Portuguese newspapers and media, or if it is simply a result of giving the readers what they want to read or what they feel comfortable with. This is the case in Portugal particularly because, unlike news media in other countries, there is no declared political preference on the part of the newspaper, always attempting to keep a veneer of apolitical objectivity which is often belied by their content, as is the case in *Correio da Manhã*. However, the lack of an open political allegiance, unlike what happens in countries such as the UK and the US, has the perverse effect of transmitting to the readers a false sense of unbiased objectivity. This same lack of political commitment also raises the question mentioned above about whether there is a hidden political agenda or simply a perpetuation of narratives which are popular with its readers. The most probable and apparent case is that there is a little of both elements going into the representation of Islam in Portuguese media and this can be seen by the way in which different newspapers tailor their message to different audiences and to fit their expectations as seen in chapter 2 and 3.

What chapter 3 shows us particularly, is the fact that even if there is little reason to create fear or sensationalise Islam in Portugal, being a country which has not, to this moment, been directly affected by Islamist violence and which has an overall peaceful coexistence with its very small Muslim minority, there is still that motivation on the part of news media. Again, this is more visible in *Correio da Manhã* but also happens to a lesser extent in *Público*, this is partially a mimicking of foreign news media, but it is also a way to confirm readers in their cultural superiority, something which as we saw in Chapter 1 is a widely held belief in Portugal with over half the population of the country believing in the idea that some cultures are very much superior to others (See Chapter 1, Graph 3). This same belief is very much put forward by the commenters on articles on Islam and Muslims that we saw in Chapter 4. In fact, Chapter 4 illustrates the positions which the statistics of the European Social Survey explored in the first chapter pointed towards, the unguarded comments by people

behind their computer screens reveal a generalised feeling of rejection of Muslims and Islam by the commenters, even when they have little reason to say this, as in the case explored in that chapter these were actions were taken by the city hall of Lisbon and not by the Muslim community itself. This puts the Muslim population of Portugal in a complicated situation, as there seems to be little they can do to change the media narrative. As we saw throughout this thesis the Muslim population in the country is generally, with some exceptions, well integrated, affluent and one of the smallest in percentage of population in Europe, however they still draw outsized antipathy even if their actions do little to justify it.

What compounds this problem, is the asymmetrical relationship between Muslims and the Portuguese mainstream media, in Chapter 2 we saw how out of all the dozens of opinion pieces on the week following the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015 none were by Muslim writers. In fact, this is a problem that is more wide-ranging than simply the underrepresentation of Muslim voices in media. As we saw, out of all opinion articles only a small minority was by women and none of the articles were by people of colour or which belonged to any racial or ethnic minority in the country. The homogeneousness of the Portuguese commentariat is a reality across media platforms, both in print and on screen, the voice of middle-aged white men is overly represented, a problem that Portugal shares with the rest of the so-called western world, but which is very noticeable in the Portuguese context. How is then the Muslim community to make itself heard and to reach out to the general Portuguese public? In Chapter 5 we look at some of the few media outlets that give voice to the Muslim community, using the example of the Central Lisbon Mosque and their audiovisual production, both through an occasional program in public television's second channel and their own YouTube channel. It is interesting to see how new technologies are giving marginalised communities the means to put forward their own voices. Even so, Muslim voices speaking about Islam in Portuguese media are sorely needed, but also a diversity of Muslim voices, as news media seems to almost always resort to the same actors, an example of which being Sheik Munir, as representative of the whole Muslim community, which is in fact more diverse than that in the Portuguese context. However, even with the use of new media technology, the power imbalance in the media between the mainstream communication channels and that produced by the Muslim community is still staggering, not only because of the inequality of financial means and infrastructure to produce media content, but also simply due to a question of numbers: the small Muslim population in the country cannot aim to compete or to effectively put forward a contrasting point of view with such a disadvantage. The fact that the population is small and almost invisible in most of the country, as that chapter shows us, also makes competing narratives from mainstream

media almost non-existent, because they do not see a potential audience for those narratives. It is easier to keep producing content which reinforces stereotypes than to put forward competing narratives when there is little audience for those narratives.

This thesis aimed to create a multifaceted vision of how Islam appears in Portuguese News Media and related forms of communications, and did this through the application of different theoretical and methodological tools to each chapter, as described in the introduction to the thesis. Hopefully, by the end of the thesis the reader will have achieved a well-rounded understanding of how Islam is represented in Portugal, as well as how it is seen in general by the public, how the country reacts in its press to big events such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks, how news about events in Portugal differs from coverage of international events, how the public participates directly in the discussion about this representation through online comments and, finally, how Portuguese Muslims counteract or add to this discourse through their own media production. This three-dimensional image of how Islam is talked about and how that affects dynamics of religious tolerance, integration of minority religions in the country, and the effects that might have politically as some forces, particularly in the far-right, have been known to use stereotypes about Islam as an integral part of their rhetoric, is undoubtedly an important asset to the study of religions and the sociology of religion in Portugal. Similar work could and, in my opinion, should be done in what concerns other religious groups in Portugal, as well as particular denominations within larger religious groups. The difference in how, for example, the Ismaili and the Guinea-Bissau Muslims are represented in the media, has the potential to be a quite revealing study in what it might tell us about racial and economic dynamics in the country. Many other studies of this kind, and not only within Islam, need to be done concerning the Portuguese case where the study of religious minorities has long been neglected.

More generally, there is a need for a wider range of sociological studies of religion in Portugal and the interactions of religious phenomena with Portuguese society and culture. This has long been a neglected feature of Portuguese sociology for a variety of reasons, not the least of which being the relative homogeneity of religion in Portugal, a country which has historically and sociologically been seen as overwhelmingly not only Christian, but specifically Catholic, without any of the tensions that happened in other European countries during the Protestant Reformation and subsequent years of wars and conflict. The years of the fascist dictatorship of Salazar were also not productive for the study of religion, particularly non-Catholic expressions in the country, as the intimate relation between state and church of the time did not promote a disinterested study of religious phenomena in a country that saw itself

and propagandised itself as intensely Catholic. This intimate relationship between state and church, which contrasted with the first republic in the early 20th century, would also contrast with the post-dictatorial democracy which now saw religion and its study as somewhat of a reactionary activity, associated with the old regime. However, although Portugal is still comparatively religiously homogeneous, even if there are great contrasts in church attendance between north and south and the coastal and interior areas, recent decades have changed the religious makeup of the country. As we have seen throughout the thesis, most of the Islamic presence in the country dates from after 1974, and the same happens with other religions which no longer had the repressive regime of the Estado Novo to deal with, with its restrictions on public religious expressions outside Catholicism. Recent years also saw the growth of Evangelical and Pentecostal churches in Portugal, many coming with immigration from places like Brazil, but also converting previously Catholic Portuguese, as well as the appearance of more informal religious expressions, from Afro-Caribbean Candomblé and Umbanda, and other religions from the several diasporas that have made their home in the country, as well as Neopagan, Esotericist and New Age religious expressions. The image of the country is, then, more complex than it might at first look, and there is a rich vein to be mined when it comes to religious expressions, some of which have unique aspects in a European context. Therefore, the study of religion, and in particular the sociology of religion, is both important and urgent. Hopefully, this thesis goes some way to show how and why this is so, using attitudes towards religion to learn not only about the religion, but mainly about the values and biases of Portuguese society and the media that serves that society.

In conclusion, this thesis shed light on the representation of Islam in Portuguese media and shows how it is often misrepresented or represented in ways which reveal a particularly biased view of events relating to Islam, where the religion is often conflated with terrorism, but also that this is more serious in tabloid news media directed to a specific demographic of the Portuguese population, which is poorer, older and has less formal education. We can also see that this maps on to statistics about Portugal and its values which are similar to those of countries in similar socio-economic conditions in Europe. We also see how news media inflates events related to Islam and gives them particularly negative slants even if there is little reason for the creation of a panic in the Portuguese readership about a very small minority which has not been particularly involved in any wrongdoings in the national context. Finally, we can also see how newspapers provide platforms for the dissemination of hateful and prejudiced content about Muslims and Islam, mainly through their online forums, be they comment sections on their own websites or comments on their own social media presence.

We can also see an attempt on the part of the Muslim community to transmit information on Islam through their own means, but this is still a very asymmetrical way of communicating and will remain so while the mainstream media of Portugal has little interest in having a diverse coverage of Islam and Muslims

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Água, A. (2019) “Um Ramadão na Escola” in P3, *Público*, 28 May 2019.
Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/05/28/p3/cronica/ramadao-escola-1873959>
[Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Almeida, A. R. E. (2016) *Mouraria: História e Forma Urbana* (Unpublished Master’s Thesis). Faculdade de Arquitectura da Universidade de Lisboa. Lisbon.
- Alves, A. (2015) *O Árabe no Léxico Português* [Arabic in the Portuguese Lexicon] Lisbon: Academia das Ciências de Lisboa
- Amaral, L. (2015) “Somos Charlie?” *Correio da Manhã*, 12 January 2015.
https://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/luciano-amaral/detalhe/somos_charlie
[Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- AFP, 2021 “Stand-off with Poland, Hungary threatens EU legal order” in *France 24*, 15 July, 2021. Online at: <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210715-stand-off-with-poland-hungary-threatens-eu-legal-order> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Amin-Khan, T. (2012) “New Orientalism, Securitisation and the Western Media’s Incendiary Racism,” *Third World Quarterly* 33/9 (2012), 1595–1610.
- APCT, (2018) “Informação Geral.”. Online at: http://www.apct.pt/Analise_simples.php?idSegmento=2&ano=2018&ordenacao=tiragem5Bi%20DESC
[Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- APCT, (2020) “Análise Simples” <http://www.apct.pt/analise-simples>
Online at: [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Ballard, R. (2016) "Islam and the Construction of Europe," in Wasif Shadid, & Sjoerd van Koningsveld, (eds.), *Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe* Kampen: Kok Pharos
- Barata, C. (2019) “Macron pede “uma sociedade de vigilância” contra o terrorismo islamista” in *Público* 8 October, 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/10/08/mundo/noticia/macron-pede-sociedade-vigilancia-terrorismo-islamista-1889256>
[Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Barrucho, L.; Araújo. M. (2017), “Ensino de História em Portugal perpetua mito do 'bom colonizador' e banaliza escravidão, diz pesquisadora” in *BBC News Brasil* 31 July

2017. Online at <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-40735234>
[Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Barsotti, S. (2018) *Weaponizing Social Media: Heinz Experts on Troll Farms and Fake News*, Carnegie Mellon University, Heinz College. Online at: <https://www.heinz.cmu.edu/media/2018/October/troll-farms-and-fake-news-social-media-weaponization>
[Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Batista, R. F. (2019), “Milhares de contas bloqueadas na internet em vésperas de eleições em Espanha” in *Correio da Manhã* 26 April 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/milhares-de-contas-bloqueadas-na-internet-em-vesperas-de-eleicoes-em-espanha> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Belanciano, V. (2015) “Ser Charlie e Ser Muçulmano,” *Público*, 11 January 2015. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/11/culturaipsilon/opiniao/ser-charlie-e-ser-muculmano-1681864> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Bergstrom, A.; Wadbring, I. (2014) “Beneficial yet crappy: journalists and audiences on obstacles and opportunities in reader comments”, *European Journal of Communication* Vol. 30 (2) pp. 137-151.
- Berr, J. (2018) “Has CNN Discovered ‘the Fountain of Youth’ in Cable News?” *Forbes*, 02/03/2018. Online at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanberr/2018/03/02/has-cnn-discovered-the-fountain-of-youth-in-cable-news/?sh=364963b46a7a>
[Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Boaventura, I. (2016) “Uma Mouraria "mais acessível" e com uma mesquita” *Público*, 5th June. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2016/06/05/sociedade/noticia/primeiro-esta-a-vontade-de-tornar-a-mouraria-permeavel-depois-a-mesquita-1734018>
[Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Borges, L. (2016) “Nova mesquita de Lisboa desaloja moradores e comerciantes” *Público*, 18 May. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2016/05/18/local/noticia/nova-mesquita-de-lisboa-desaloja-moradores-e-comerciantes-1732283>
[Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Brockett, A, Baird, P (2008) “Media influence on the attitudes and knowledge of York adolescents towards Islam, Muslims, the Middle East and Arabs.” *Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research* 1(2): 165–185.
- Bryman, Alan (2016), *Social Research Methods*, 5th edition, Oxford University Press.
- Cabrita, E. (2015) “Charlie e nós,” *Correio da Manhã*, 10 January 2015. https://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/eduardo-cabrita/detalhe/charlie_e_nos

- [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Byng, M (2010) “Symbolically Muslim: Media, hijab, and the West.” *Critical Sociology* 36(1): 109–129.
- Cabeça, J. (2017) “comment” in Público (2017) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10155166099596983> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Canelas, L. (2015) “‘Sim, sou Charlie,’ disse Houellebecq,” *Público*, 13 January 2015. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/13/culturaipsilon/noticia/sim-sou-charlie-disse-houellebecq-1682045> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Cardoso, G. (2005) *Os Media na Sociedade em Rede* Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian
- Cardoso, M. E., (2015) “A Vingança Certa,” *Público*, 9 January 2015. <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/09/mundo/opiniaio/a-vinganca-certa-1681616> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Carvalho, M. (2017) *Quando Portugal Ardeu: Histórias e Segredos da Violência Política no Pós-25 de Abril* Lisboa: Oficina do Livro.
- Ciftci, S (2012) “Islamophobia and threat perceptions: Explaining anti-Muslim sentiment in the West.” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 32(3): 293–309
- Correio da Manhã, (2015) “Estatuto Editorial,” 25 June 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/mais-cm/lei-da-transparencia/detalhe/estatuto_editorial [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Correio da Manhã, (2015a) “Comunidade muçulmana preocupada com ‘islamofobia,’” 8 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/comunidade_muculmana_preocupada_com_islamofobia [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Correio da Manhã, (2015b) “Sarkozy: Imigração ‘complica as coisas,’” 12 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/sarkozy_imigracao_complica_as_coisas [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Correio da Manhã (2016) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/cmjornal/posts/10156946384330475> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Correio da Manhã (2018) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/cmjornal/posts/10160831543620475> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Correio da Manhã, (2019) “Resultados de Pesquisa” online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/pesquisa/?SearchRequest.RangeType=Date&SearchRequest.Filters=&SearchRequest.Sort=Date&SearchRequest.ContentType=All&SearchRequest.Query=Isl%C3%A3o&SearchRequest.FromStr=01%2F01%2F2019&SearchRequest.ToStr=31%2F12%2F2019> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].

- Correio da Manhã, (2019a) “Papa admite que abusos sexuais de padres e bispos a freiras são uma realidade” in *Correio da Manhã*, 5 February 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/papa-admite-que-abusos-sexuais-de-padres-e-bispos-a-freiras-sao-uma-realidade> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Correio da Manhã, (2019b) “Jovem que fugiu da Arábia Saudita pede asilo ao Canadá” in *Correio da Manhã*, 8 January 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/jovem-saudita-que-fugiu-da-arabia-saudita-pede-asilo-ao-canada> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Correio da Manhã, (2019c) “Jovem saudita que fugiu da família já esta no Canadá” in *Correio da Manhã* 12 January 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/jovem-que-fugiu-da-familia-na-arabia-saudita-ja-esta-no-canada> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Correio da Manhã, (2019d) “Dinamarca quer alojar imigrantes numa ilha remota do tamanho de 6 campos de futebol” in *Correio da Manhã*, 10 February 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/dinamarca-quer-alocar-imigrantes-numa-ilha-remota-do-tamanho-de-6-campos-de-futebol> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Correio da Manhã, (2019e) “Cidadão marroquino nega terrorismo e classifica acusação a "filme de Hollywood"” in *Correio da Manhã*, 1 April 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/cidadao-marroquino-nega-terrorismo-e-classifica-acusacao-a-filme-de-hollywood> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Correio da Manhã, (2019f). “Os momentos que marcam os três anos de Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa na Presidência da República” in *Correio da Manhã* 8 March 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/politica/detalhe/os-momentos-que-marcam-os-tres-anos-de-mandato-presidencial-de-marcelo-rebelo-de-sousa> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Correio da Manhã (2020) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/cmjornal/posts/10163305349255475> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Correio da Manhã, (2021) “Demite-se o editor de política da Lusa após ser publicada referência racista em peça” In *Correio da Manhã*, 14 May 2021. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/politica/detalhe/demite-se-o-editor-de-politica-da-lusa-apos-ser-publicada-referencia-racista-em-peca> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Coutinho, J. P., (2015) “Liberdades,” *Correio da Manhã*, 11 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/joao-pereira-coutinho/detalhe/liberdades?ref=Pesquisa_Destaques [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Coutinho, J. P. (2019) “Shakespeare, sempre” in *Correio da Manhã*. 8 September 2019.

- Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mais-cm/domingo/escolhas/detalhe/shakespeare-sempre> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Creswell, J. W. (2009), *Research Design? Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*, London: Sage
- Croucher, Stephen M., Daniel Cronn-Mills (2015), *Understanding Communication Research Methods. A Theoretical and Practical Approach*, Routledge.
- Curado, M. (2019). “Carimbo de escola em Sintra financiou terrorismo” in *Correio da Manhã* 29 December 2019. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/carimbo-de-escola-em-sintra-financiou-terrorismo?ref=Pesquisa_Destaques [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Datta-Ray S. (2016) “Portugal: A backdoor for Bangladeshis into EU” Rediff, July 11 2016. Online at: <https://www.rediff.com/news/special/portugal-the-bangladeshi-connection/20160711.htm> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- D’Haenens, L, Bink, S (2007) “Islam in the Dutch press: With special attention to the *Algemeen Dagblad*.” *Media, Culture and Society* 29(1): 135–149.
- Disney, A.R. (2009) *A History of the Portugal and the Portuguese Empire: From Beginnings to 1807* Vol.1 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Ehrkamp, P (2010) “The limits of multicultural tolerance? Liberal democracy and media portrayals of Muslim migrant women in Germany”. *Space and Polity* 14(1): 13–32.
- Eko, L. e Hellmueller, L. (2017) “To republish or not to republish: The “Je Suis Charlie” Mohammed cartoon and journalistic paradigms in a global context.” *International Communication Gazette* Vol 80, Issue 3, pp. 207 - 229
- El-Aswad, ES (2013) “Images of Muslims in Western scholarship and media after 9/11.” *Digest of Middle East Studies* 22(1): 39–56.
- Espada, J. C., (2015) “Paris 2015: Capital da Liberdade,” *Público*, 12 January 2015. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/12/mundo/opiniao/paris-2015-capital-da-liberdade-1681874> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- ESS Round 1: European Social Survey Round 1 Data (2002). Data file edition 6.6. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS1-2002.
- ESS Round 2: European Social Survey Round 2 Data (2004). Data file edition 3.6. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS2-2004.
- ESS Round 3: European Social Survey Round 3 Data (2006). Data file edition 3.7.

- NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS3-2006.
- ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 Data (2008). Data file edition 4.5.
- NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS4-2008.
- ESS Round 5: European Social Survey Round 5 Data (2010). Data file edition 3.4.
- NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS5-2010.
- ESS Round 6: European Social Survey Round 6 Data (2012). Data file edition 2.4.
- NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS6-2012.
- ESS Round 7: European Social Survey Round 7 Data (2014). Data file edition 2.2.
- NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS7-2014.
- ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data (2016). Data file edition 2.2.
- NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS8-2016.
- ESS Round 9: European Social Survey Round 9 Data (2018). Data file edition 3.1.
- NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS9-2018.
- ESS, (2021) “About Us”, *European Social Survey* Online at:
<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- ESS, (2021a) “Frequently Asked Questions”, *European Social Survey* Online at:
<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/faq.html> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- ESS, (2021b) “ESS Themes”, *European Social Survey* Online at:
<https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/module-index.html> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- ESS, (2021c) “ESS Data”, *European Social Survey* Online at:
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Esteves, B. (2018) “Garagem despejada para construir mesquita em Lisboa”
 Correio da Manhã, 9 August. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/cidades/detalhe/garagem-despejada-para-construir-mesquita-em-lisboa?ref=Pesquisa_Destaques [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- European Newspaper Congress, (2015) “European Newspaper Award 16th Competition.” 22 March 2015. Online at: <https://editorial-design.com/en/16-european->

- newspaper-award/ [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Fader, A. (2020) “Digital media, religious authority, and the Covid-19 pandemic” in *The Immanent Frame*, July 30, 2020. Online at: <https://tif.ssrc.org/2020/07/30/digital-media-religious-authority-and-the-covid-19-pandemic/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Faria, I., (2015) “Milhares nas ruas contra islamofobia,” *Correio da Manhã*, 7 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/2015_01_06_milhares_nas_ruas_contra_islamofobia [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Fernandes, R.C. (2019) “Novo código penal indonésio vai criminalizar relações sexuais extraconjugais” in *Público* 20 September 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/09/20/mundo/noticia/novo-codigo-penal-indonesio-vai-criminalizar-unioes-facto-1887259> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Figueiras, R. (2004) *Os comentadores e os media: os autores das colunas de opinião*. Lisboa: Livros Horizonte
- F.J.G. (2019), “Massacre em mesquitas da Nova Zelândia mata dezenas de muçulmanos” in *Correio da Manhã*, 16 March 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/massacre-em-mesquitas-da-nova-zelandia-mata-dezenas-de-muculmanos> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Friaças, A. (2019) “Com “o reforço do islamismo”, a libertação sexual em Marrocos faz-se às escondidas” in *Público* 12 June 2019 Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/06/12/impar/entrevista/dialmy-1875450> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Fulton, H. E. (2005). Analysing the discourse of news. In H. E. Fulton, R. Huisman, J. Murphet & A. Dunn (Eds.), *Narrative and media* (pp. 245-268). Melbourne: Cambridge University Press
- Geis, W. and Ubelmesser, S. (2013). “How do Migrants Choose Their Destination Country? An Analysis of Institutional Determinants” in *Review of International Economics* Vol. 21, 5. pp. 825-840
- Gomes, H. “Chega continua a crescer onde há mais ciganos” in *Expresso* 18 July 2021. Online at: <https://expresso.pt/politica/2021-07-16-Chega-continua-a-crescer-onde-ha-mais-ciganos-1b4eb72a> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Gonçalves, J.M. (2008) *A ‘Modernidade’ do Sacrifício Qurban, lugares e circuitos transnacionais entre bangladeshis em Lisboa*. Lisboa: Universidade de Lisboa, Instituto de Ciências Sociais
- Gonçalves, J. M. (2017) *Reconhecer o Islão: Legados coloniais, migrações globais e islamofobia em Portugal* Santillana: Barcarena

- Gonçalves, J.M. (2021) “Paisagens islâmicas na grande Lisboa: (pós)colonialismo e políticas de reconhecimento” in *Lusotopie* Vol. 19, 2. pp. 157-180
- Gonçalves, F. J., (2019). “Francisco inicia visita aos Emirados Árabes Unidos envolta em polémica” *Correio da Manhã*, 4 February 2019 online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/francisco-inicia-visita-aos-emirados-arabes-unidos-envolta-em-polemica> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Governo de Portugal, (2015) “Sheik David Munir” in *O Lugar da Cultura*. Online at: <http://olugardacultura.pt/team/sheik-david-munir/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Groll, E. (2014) “Kremlin’s ‘Sputnik’ Newswire Is the BuzzFeed of Propaganda” in *Foreign Policy* November 10, 2014. Online at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/10/kremlins-sputnik-newswire-is-the-buzzfeed-of-propaganda/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Guimarães, M. J., (2015) “Mais de dez mil em Berlim contra islamistas e islamófobos,” *Público*, 13 January 2015. <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/13/mundo/noticia/mais-de-10-mil-em-berlim-contra-islamistas-e-islamofobos-1682131> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Guimarães, M.J., (2019) “Papa não hesita em criticar guerra no Iémen em visita histórica aos Emirados” *Público*, 4 February 2019 online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/02/04/mundo/noticia/papa-nao-hesita-criticar-guerra-iemem-visita-historica-emirados-1860684> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Hackett, C., (2017) . Pew Research Centre, “5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe” Online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Hansen, A., Machin, D. (2013), *Media and Communication Research Methods*, Palgrave.
- Heinrich, N. and Holmes, B. (2013, January). “Web news readers’ comments: Towards developing a methodology for using on-line comments in social inquiry.” in *Journal of Media and Communication Studies* Vol.5(1), pp. 1-4.
- Helder, B. (2011) *Ciberjornalistas em Portugal : práticas, papéis e ética* Lisboa: Livros Horizonte
- Heneghan, T. (2008) “Saudi offer for Moscow mosque, Orthodox call for church in Arabia” in Reuters, November 29, 2008, online at: <http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2008/11/29/saudi-offer-for-moscow-mosque-orthodox-call-for-church-in-arabia/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Henriques, A., (2015) “O Antivírus,” *Correio da Manhã*, 13 January 2015. https://www.cmjornal.pt/opinioao/colunistas/almeida-henriques/detalhe/o_antivirus

- [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Henriques, J. G. (2020) “European Social Survey: 62% dos portugueses manifestam racismo” in *Público* 27 July 2020. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2020/06/27/sociedade/noticia/european-social-survey-62-portugueses-manifesta-racismo-1921713> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Henriques, L. (2018) “comment” in *Correio da Manhã* (2018) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/cmjornal/posts/10160831543620475> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Hortelão, R., (2015) “Ser Charlie Não Chega,” *Correio da Manhã*, 12 January 2015. https://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/rui-hortelao/detalhe/ser_charlie_ao_chega [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Hussain, AJ (2007) “The media’s role in a clash of misconceptions: The case of the Danish Muhammad cartoons.” *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 12(4): 112–130.
- Ibrahim, D (2010) “The framing of Islam on network news following the September 11th attacks.” *International Communication Gazette* 72(1): 111–125.
- Ibraimo, M. (2018) “comment” in *Correio da Manhã* (2018) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/cmjornal/posts/10160831543620475> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Instituto Halal de Portugal (2015) “Locais de Culto” Online at: <http://halal.pt/en/myihp/locais-de-culto/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Instituto Nacional de Estatística, (2011). “População residente com 15 e mais anos de idade (N.º) por Local de residência (à data dos Censos 2011) e Religião; Decenal” Online at: https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_indicadores&indOcorrCod=0006396&contexto=bd&selTab=tab2&xlang=pt [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística), (2020) Portal do INE online at: <http://www.ine.pt> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Jensen, Klaus Bruhn (2002), *A Handbook of Media and Communication Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies*, Routledge.
- Kassimeris, G., & Jackson, L. (2011) “The West, the Rest, and the ‘War on Terror’: Representation of Muslims in Neoconservative Media Discourse,” *Contemporary Politics* 17/1, pp. 19–33.
- Kennedy, H. (1996) *Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of Al-Andalus* London: Routledge

- de Kerne, J. le B., (2015) “Submissão não, antes Demissão,” *Público*, 7 January 2015. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/07/culturaipsilon/analise/submissao-nao-antes-demissao-1681495> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Kumar, D. (2018) “The Right Kind of ‘Islam’: News Media Representations of US-Saudi Relations during the Cold War,” in *Journalism Studies* 19/8.
- Laranjo, T. (2019) “Membro de célula síria apanhado em Lisboa” in *Correio da Manhã* 18 June 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/membro-de-celula-siria-apanhado-em-lisboa> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lopes, H. (2017) “comment” in Público (2017) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10155166099596983> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lopes, M., (2015) “Houellebecq faz capa do Charlie Hebdo no dia em que sai novo romance,” *Público*, 7 January 2015. <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/07/culturaipsilon/noticia/michel-houellebecq-defendese-das-acusacoes-de-islamofobia-no-dia-em-e-publicado-o-seu-novo-romance-1681428> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Lorena, S. (2015) “Família do polícia Ahmed pede para que não se misture islão e extremismo,” *Público*, 11 January 2015. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/11/mundo/noticia/familia-do-policia-ahmed-pede-para-que-nao-se-misture-islao-e-extremismo-1681836> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Lorena, S. (2015a) “Qualquer pessoa que pareça árabe ou muçulmana vai ser olhada como se fosse da família destes assassinos,” *Público*, 10 January 2015. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/10/mundo/entrevista/qualquer-pessoa-que-pareca-arabe-ou-muculmana-vai-ser-olhada-como-se-fosse-da-familia-destes-assassinos-1681751> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Lourenço, R. (2016) Comment section on Boaventura, I. (2016) “Uma Mouraria “mais acessível” e com uma mesquita” *Público*, 5th June. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2016/06/05/sociedade/noticia/primeiro-esta-a-vontade-de-tornar-a-mouraria-permeavel-depois-a-mesquita-1734018> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Louro, D. (2020) “comment” in *Correio da Manhã* (2020) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/cmjornal/posts/10163305349255475> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2015) “Papa condena ‘formas desviantes de religião,’” *Correio da Manhã*, 12 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/parisatentado_papa_condena_formas_desviantes_de_religiao [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Lusa, (2015a) “Protesto em Dresden contra ‘islamização,’” *Correio da Manhã*, 10 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/mais_de_30_mil_

- peessoas_protestam_em_dresden_contra_islamizacao [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Lusa, (2019). “Francisco é o primeiro Papa a pisar o berço do Islão”. *Público*, 3 February 2019 online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/02/03/mundo/noticia/francisco-papa-pisar-berco-islao-1860555> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2019a). “Visita do Papa a Moçambique será uma oportunidade para revitalizar diálogo inter-religioso” *Correio da Manhã*, 2 September 2019 online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/papamocambique-visita-sera-uma-oportunidade-para-revitalizar-dialogo-inter-religioso----analistas> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2019b). “Papa Francisco vai "animar o povo moçambicano" *Correio da Manhã*, 4 September 2019, online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/africa/detalhe/papa-francisco-vai-animar-o-povo-mocambicano> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2019c). “Papa destaca coexistência interreligiosa em Moçambique, Madagáscar e Maurícias” *Correio da Manhã*, 11 September 2019 online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/africa/detalhe/papa-destaca-coexistencia-interreligiosa-em-mocambique-madagascar-e-mauricias> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2019d). “Analistas alertam para "tendência perigosíssima" de radicalização islâmica nas eleições da Guiné-Bissau” *Correio da Manhã* 22 November 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/africa/detalhe/analistas-alertam-para-tendencia-perigosissima-de-radicalizacao-islamica-nas-eleicoes-da-guine-bissau> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2019e). “Londres vai tirar cidadania a britânica que fugiu para se juntar ao Daesh” in *Correio da Manhã*. 19 February 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/londres-vai-tirar-cidadania-a-britanica-que-fugiu-para-se-juntar-ao-daesh> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2019f) “Guiné-Conacri legaliza poligamia por entre inquietações com avanço do Islão” in *Público*. 4 January 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/01/04/mundo/noticia/guineconacri-legaliza-poligamia-inquietacoes-avanco-islao-1856629> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2019g) “Países muçulmanos pedem "medidas concretas" contra a islamofobia” in *Correio da Manhã*, 22 March 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/cm-ao-minuto/detalhe/paises-muculmanos-pedem-medidas-concretas-contra-a-islamofobia> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2019h) “Televisão chinesa cancela emissão de jogo do Arsenal após comentários

- sobre uigures” in *Correio da Manhã* 16 December 2019. Online at: <https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/televisao-chinesa-cancela-emissao-de-jogo-do-arsenal-apos-comentarios-sobre-uigures> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2019i). “Desinformação existe, mas “não tem impacto traduzido no voto”” in *Público* 4 October 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/10/04/politica/noticia/desinformacao-existe-nao-impacto-traduzido-voto-1888877> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lusa, (2020) Chega manifestou-se em Lisboa para dizer que "Portugal não é racista" in *Observador*, 02 August 2020. Online at: <https://observador.pt/2020/08/02/chega-manifestou-se-em-lisboa-para-dizer-que-portugal-nao-e-racista/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Lusa (2020b) “Lisboa transforma-se em "caldo cultural" com odores do Oriente nas ruas da Mouraria” *Correio da Manhã*, 29 February . Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/cm-ao-minuto/detalhe/lisboa-transforma-se-em-caldo-cultural-com-odores-do-oriente-nas-ruas-da-mouraria?fbclid=IwAR0leAu0_LWmkDjm2JII_fydKscV0Jb7Dlcp-Po9ip15PyCnAT3N8wuaD8 [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Lynch, G., Mitchell, J. & Strhan, A. (2011) *Religion, Media and Culture: A Reader*. London: Routledge.
- MacFarquhar, N. (2015) “Putin Opens New Mosque in Moscow Amid Lingering Intolerance” *New York Times*, September 23, 2015, online at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/world/europe/putin-opens-moscows-most-elaborate-mosque.html> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Machado, C. (2019) “Seis terroristas portugueses com "paradeiro incerto”” in *Correio da Manhã* 19 December 2019. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/seis-terroristas-portugueses-com-paradeiro-incerto?ref=Pesquisa_Destaques [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Machado, C. & Rodrigues, J. C. (2019) “Terrorista português vive de subsídios no Reino Unido” in *Correio da Manhã* 23 December 2019. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/terrorista-portugues-vive-de-subsidios-no-reino-unido?ref=Pesquisa_Destaques [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Macias, S. (2019), “Geopolítica da Arte Islâmica” in *Ípsilon, Público*, 1 September 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/09/01/culturaipsilon/critica/geopolitica-arte-islamica-1884678> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].

- Mahan, J. (2014) *Media, Religion and Culture* London/New York: Routledge
- Malheiros, J. V., (2015) “Eles Não Perceberam a Piada,” *Público*, 13 January 2015.
Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/13/opiniaio/opiniaio/eles-nao-perceberam-a-piada-1681996> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Martins, J.M. 2017 “Comment” in Pincha, J. P. (2017) “Impasse na mesquita da Mouraria: ‘Tenho uma vida miserável’” *Público*, 26 March. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2017/03/26/local/noticia/tenho-uma-vida-miseravel-1766418> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Martins, S. (2007) *Muçulmana e mulher: a representação das mulheres muçulmanas na imprensa* Lisboa: Livros Horizonte
- Marujo, A. (2019) “Tolentino Mendonça cardeal: “Ser cristão é um risco, ser humano é um grande risco” in *Público*, 5 October 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/10/05/sociedade/noticia/refugiados-islao-cultura-tolentino-marcas-papa-consistorio-hoje-vaticano-1888944> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Matos, T. N. de (2016) “comment” in *Público* (2016) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10154219975311983> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Mesquita Central de Lisboa (2017) “O Islão em Portugal” online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kjZVRRDEm7A> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Mesquita Central de Lisboa (2017-2020) *Youtube Channel* online at: <https://www.youtube.com/c/MesquitaCentraldeLisboa/videos> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Mestre, F. (2016) comment in *Correio da Manhã* (2016a) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/cmjornal/posts/10156946384330475> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Mhomed, I. (2007) *O Islão Político em Portugal* (Dissertação de Mestrado não editada, Mestrado em Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais) Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Lisboa. Online em: <https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/36139/1/Imran.pdf> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Morais, F.. (2020) “comment” in *Correio da Manhã* (2020) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/cmjornal/posts/10163305349255475> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Moreira, C. F. (2019) “Comunidade islâmica quer rezar em novas mesquitas” in *Público*, 6 May 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/05/06/local/noticia/mesquitas-porto-sintra-1871414> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Moreira, C. F. (2019a) “Quando uma minoria quer ser o cimento que une uma comunidade” in *Público*, 6 June 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/06/06/local/noticia/sintra-1875434> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].

- Moura, C. L., (2019) “Depois de chuva de críticas, a Decathlon não vai vender o hijab em França” in *Público* 27 February 2019, Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/02/27/impar/noticia/decathlon-retira-hijab-lojas-franca-1863610> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Nadais, I. (2019) “Israel é Israel é Israel (e também o seu contrário)” in *Fugas, Público* 2 March 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/03/02/fugas/reportagem/israel-israel-israel-tambem-contrario-1863242> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Nielsen, J. and Otterbeck, J. (2016) *Muslims in Western Europe: Fourth Edition* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
- Noivo, D. (2010) “Jihadism in Portugal: Grasping a Nebulous Reality (ARI)” in Real Instituto Elcano, Area: International Terrorism, online at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari113-2010 [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Noronha, F. (2019) “Abdullah Ibrahim: “As pessoas falam sempre de África como sendo outro lugar, mas África faz parte do mundo”” in *Ipsilon, Público* 4 November 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/11/04/culturaipsilon/entrevista/pessoas-falam-africa-lugar-africa-faz-parte-mundo-1891749> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Nunes, L. P., (2015) “Ficamos Mais Seguros Sem o Charlie,” *Público*, 9 January 2015. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/09/mundo/opiniao/ficamos-mais-seguros-sem-o-charlie-1681555> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Nunes, M. C. (2015) “Quem são os jihadistas portugueses do Estado Islâmico?” in *Observador*, 18/11/2015 online at: <https://observador.pt/2015/11/18/quem-sao-os-jihadistas-portugueses-do-estado-islamico/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- OECD, (2019) *Country Note: Education at a Glance, Portugal* Online at: https://www.oecd.org/education/education-at-a-glance/EAG2019_CN_PRT.pdf [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Oliveira, L. (2018) “comment” in *Correio da Manhã* (2018) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/cmjornal/posts/10160831543620475> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Patinha, D. (2016) comment in *Correio da Manhã* (2016a) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/cmjornal/posts/10156946384330475> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Pedrosa, J. (2016) comment in *Público* (2016a) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10154219975311983> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Pereira, A. (2016) comment in *Público* (2016a) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10154219975311983> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Pimentel, T. (2019) ““Invasão” de adeptos estrangeiros leva 9000 agentes da PSP

- para a rua” in *Público* 5 June 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/06/05/desporto/noticia/invasao-adeptos-estrangeiros-leva-9000-agentes-psp-rua-1875353> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Pincha, J. P. (2017) “Impasse na mesquita da Mouraria: ‘Tenho uma vida miserável’” *Público*, 26 March. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2017/03/26/local/noticia/tenho-uma-vida-miseravel-1766418> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Pinto, M. & Sousa, H. (2004) “Portugal,” in: Kelly, M.; Maszoleny, G. & McQuail, D. (eds.), *The Euromedia Handbook*. London: Sage. pp. 180-190
- Pinto, M. (2011). *Educação para os media em Portugal : experiências, actores e contextos* Braga: Universidade do Minho
- Pires, R. P. (et al.) (2010) *Portugal: Atlas das Migrações Internacionais* Lisboa: Tinta da China
- Poole, E., (2006) “The Effects of September 11 and the War in Iraq on British Newspaper Coverage,” in: Elizabeth Poole & John E. Richardson (eds.), *Muslims and the News Media*. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 89-102
- Pordata, 2021. “Salário mínimo nacional (Euro) Em que países é maior e menor o ordenado mínimo mensal?” Online at: [https://www.pordata.pt/Europa/Sal%C3%A1rio+m%C3%ADnimo+nacional+\(Euro\)-1640](https://www.pordata.pt/Europa/Sal%C3%A1rio+m%C3%ADnimo+nacional+(Euro)-1640) [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Público, (n.d.) “Estatuto Editorial,” Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/nos/estatuto-editorial> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Público, (2015) “Michel Houellebecq suspende a promoção do novo romance que sairá em Portugal na Alfaguara,” 9 January 2015. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/09/culturaipsilon/noticia/michel-houellebecq-suspende-a-promocao-do-novo-livro-apos-o-ataque-ao-charlie-hedbo-1681673> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Público (2016) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10154219975311983> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Público (2016a) [Facebook post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10154263960716983> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Público (2017) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10155166099596983> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Público, (2019) “Resultados de Pesquisa” online at: <https://www.publico.pt/pesquisa?query=Isl%C3%A3o&start=01-01-2019&end=31-12-2019§ion=> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Público & Lusa, (2019) “Televisão chinesa cancela emissão de jogo do Arsenal

- após comentários sobre uígures” in *Público* 16 December 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/12/16/desporto/noticia/televisao-chinesa-cancela-emissao-jogo-arsenal-apos-comentarios-uigures-1897453> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Ramos, R. (2019) “Deputado de extrema-direita holandês provoca muçulmanos” in *Correio da Manhã* 30 December 2019. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/deputado-de-extrema-direita-holandes-provoca-muculmanos?ref=Pesquisa_Destaques [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Rane, H, Abdalla, M (2008) “Mass media Islam: The impact of media imagery on public opinion.” *Australian Journalism Review* 30(1): 39–49.
- Rane, H., Ewart, J., & Martinkus, J. (eds.) (2014) *Media Framing of the Muslim World: Conflicts, Crises and Contexts* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 142-143.
- Real, H., (2015) “CM aumenta quota de mercado em 2018,” 28 April 2018. <https://www.cmjornal.pt/tv-media/detalhe/cm-aumenta-quota-de-mercado-em-2018> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Reis, B., (n.d.) “Bárbara Reis: Redatora Principal,” *Público*, Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/autor/barbara-reis>[Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Reuters, (2019). “Papa visita Marrocos, para falar a favor da tolerância religiosa” *Público* 30 March, 2019 online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/03/30/mundo/noticia/papa-visita-marrocos-falar-muros-favor-tolerancia-1867423> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Reuters, (2019a) “Bangun, a aldeia na Indonésia que sobrevive à base da reciclagem de lixo” in *Público* 16 August 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/08/16/p3/noticia/dinheiro-lixo-aldeia-indonesia-sobrevive-base-reciclagem-lixo-1883562> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Reuters, (2019b) “Documentos do Governo chinês exibem repressão “sem misericórdia” contra os uígures” in *Público* 17 November 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/11/17/mundo/noticia/documentos-governo-chines-exibem-repressao-uigures-misericordia-1894079> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Ribeiro, N. & Costa, J. D. (2019) “Mais de metade dos atentados na Europa desde 2007 foram de auto-recrutamento jihadista” in *Público* 2 February 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/02/02/politica/noticia/metade-atentados-europa-12-anos-auto-recrutamento-jihadista-1859950> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Ribeiro, N. & Flor, A. (2019) “Com fundos comunitários, tempo e guardas prisionais, pode-se prevenir a radicalização” in *Público* 6 February 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/02/06/politica/noticia/europa-conta-francisco-jorge->

- goncalves-1860974 [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Rios, P. (2019) “Entrevista: “Nunca haverá um tempo sem Deus ou religião” in *Público* 9 February 2019 Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/02/09/sociedade/entrevista/havera-tempo-deus-religiao-1861003> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Rodrigues, F.C., (2015) “O Fundamentalismo,” *Correio da Manhã*, 9 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/fernando-calado-rodrigues/detalhe/o_fundamentalismo [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Rodrigues, J. (2016) “Câmara quer expropriar à força para construir nova mesquita” *Correio da Manhã*, 22 May. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/cidades/detalhe/camara_quer_expropriar_a_forca_para_construir_nova_mesquita?ref=Pesquisa_Destaques [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Rosa, J. (2016) comment in *Público* (2016a) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10154219975311983> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- RTP, (2020) “A Fé dos Homens” online at : <https://www.rtp.pt/programa/tv/p1115> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- RTP Play, (2020) “Arquivo” online at: <https://www.rtp.pt/play/p50/a-fe-dos-homens> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- RTP Play, (2020a) “A Fé dos Homens” 23 November 2020, online at: <https://www.rtp.pt/play/p50/e508048/a-fe-dos-homens> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Saeed, A (2007) “Media, racism and Islamophobia: The representation of Islam and Muslims in the media.” *Sociology Compass* 1(2): 443–462
- Said, E. 1978. *Orientalism*. London: Penguin (republished, 2003 and 2005)
- Saha, A (2012) “Beards, scarves, halal meat, terrorists, forced marriage: Television industries and the production of race.” *Media, Culture and Society* 34(4): 424–438
- Said, E (2008) *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*, New York: Random House.
- Salgado, M. (2015) “Proposta 628/CM/2015, parte II - Declaração de utilidade pública de expropriação, com carácter urgente, de três prédios particulares e de todos os direitos a eles inerentes” Online at: <https://www.am-lisboa.pt/301000/1/003964,000278/index.htm> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Santos, J. (2016) “comment” in *Público* (2016) [Facebook Post] Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10154219975311983> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Santos Silva, F. (2019) “The Representation of Islam in the Portuguese Media’s Response to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks”, *Journal of Religion in Europe*

- Vol. 12 (3) pp. 260-284
- SEF/GEPF 2021, *Relatórios de Imigração Fronteiras e Asilo 2020*, Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras: Oeiras. Online: <https://sefstat.sef.pt/Docs/Rifa2020.pdf> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Sedas Nunes, J. cited in Pires, J. M. (2021), “Censos 2021: religião sim, etnia não” in *Jornal i* 09 May 2021. Online at: https://ionline.sapo.pt/artigo/734048/censos-2021-religiao-sim-etnia-nao?seccao=Portugal_i [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Shao, C., Ciampaglia, G.L., Varol, O. et al. (2018) “The spread of low-credibility content by social bots.” *Nature Communications* 9, Online at: <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-06930-7> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Silva, C. C. (2019) “Facebook e Instagram banem ex-líder de extrema-direita inglesa por discurso de ódio” in *Público* 26 February 2019. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2019/02/26/tecnologia/noticia/facebook-instagram-expulsam-exlider-extremadireita-discurso-odio-1863470> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Silva, M. T. (2015) “What do users have to say about online news comments? Readers’ accounts and expectations of public debate and online moderation: a case study” in *Participations: Journal of Audience & Reception Studies* Vol. 12 (2) pp. 32-44
- Siza, R., (2015) “França não vai responder ao terrorismo com medidas de exceção,” *Público*, 12 January 2015. Online at: <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/12/mundo/noticia/franca-nao-vai-responder-ao-terrorismo-com-medidas-de-excepcao-1681998> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Soares, M., (2015) “Mesquita de Lisboa vandalizada,” *Público*, 9 January 2015. <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/09/sociedade/noticia/mesquita-de-lisboa-vandalizada-1681707> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Sonae, (2017) “Sonae Relatório Financeiro ’17: Os Nossos Valores, o ADN de uma Long-Living Company,” Online at: https://www.sonae.pt/fotos/ag/rc17ptsonaesgps_5747185685abd4092b64d7.pdf [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- de Sousa, T., (2015) “O Regresso do Medo numa Europa com Medo,” *Público*, 7 January 2015. <https://www.publico.pt/2015/01/07/mundo/comentario/o-regresso-do-medo-numa-europa-com-medo-1681517> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Statista, 2019 “Human development index (HDI) score of selected European countries in 2019” Online at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/933977/human-development-index-of-european-countries/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Sumiala, J., et al., (2018) *Hybrid Media Events: The Charlie Hebdo Attacks and*

- the Global Circulation of Violence*. Bingley: Emerald.
- Stout, D. A. (2012) *Media and Religion: Foundations of an Emerging Field* Routledge, New York
- Stroud, N.J., Duyn, E., Peacock, C. (2016) *News Commenters and News Comment Readers* The University of Texas at Austin: Center for Media Engagement online at: <https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ENP-News-Commenters-and-Comment-Readers1.pdf> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Suler, J. (2004) “The Online Disinhibition Effect” in *CyberPsychology & Behavior* Vol.7 (3) pp. 321-326
- Tiesler, N. C. (2000) “*Muçulmanos na Margem: A Nova Presença Islâmica em Portugal*” *Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas* 34 pp. 117-144
- Trading Economics, 2020 “GDP per capita PPP | Europe” Online at: <https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp-per-capita-ppp?continent=europe> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Vala, J. & Coutts, A. (2020). Interview: “Portugal é um dos campeões da negação do racismo” in *Sic Online*, 18 December 2020. Online at: <https://sicnoticias.pt/especiais/extremos/2020-12-18-Portugal-e-um-dos-campeoes-da-negacao-do-racismo> [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Van Dijk, T (1991) *Racism and the Press*, London: Routledge
- Vaz, J., (2015) “Retoma,” *Correio da Manhã*, 13 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/almeida-henriques/detalhe/o_antivirus [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Viegas, F. J., (2015) “Blog,” *Correio da Manhã*, 7 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/francisco-jose-viegas/detalhe/2015_01_06_blog [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Viegas, F. J. (2015a) “Não, não era uma ‘chef.’ Não quis, não podia,” *Correio da Manhã*, 7 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/francisco-jose-viegas/detalhe/2015_01_06_blog?ref=Pesquisa_Destaques1681996 [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Viegas, F. J., (2015b) “Um atentado ao coração da tolerância e da Liberdade,” *Correio da Manhã*, 8 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/francisco-jose-viegas/detalhe/um_atentado_ao_coracao_da_tolerancia_e_da_liberdade [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Viegas, F. J., (2015c) “Enfrentar o medo e dar um nome ao terror,” *Correio da Manhã*,

- 9 January 2015. Online at: https://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/francisco-jose-viegas/detalhe/enfrentar_o_medo_e_dar_um_nome_ao_terror [Accessed: 07/12/2021]
- Wayback Machine (2020) Online at <https://archive.org/web/> [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Wayback Machine (2020) 10 August 2018 image of: Esteves, B. (2018) “Garagem despejada para construir mesquita em Lisboa” *Correio da Manhã*, 9 August.” Online at https://web.archive.org/web/20180701000000*/https://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/cidades/detalhe/garagem-despejada-para-construir-mesquita-em-lisboa [Accessed: 07/12/2021].
- Weaver, D. H., et al., (2006) *The American Journalist in the 21st Century: U.S. News People at the Dawn of a New Millennium*. New York: Routledge

APPENDIX A

European Social Survey Tables for CHAPTER 1

Country	Portugal
Some races or ethnic groups: born harder working	
Yes	66.7
No	33.3
Total	100.0
N=	1,238.6

🔄 Weight is on

Table 1: Are some races or ethnic groups born harder working?, ESS 7, 2014.

Country	Portugal
Some races or ethnic groups: born less intelligent	
Yes	37.6
No	62.4
Total	100.0
N=	1,224.5

🔄 Weight is on

Table 2: Are some races or ethnic groups born less intelligent?, ESS 7, 2014.

Country	Portugal
Some cultures: much better or all equal	
Some cultures are much better than others	54.9
All cultures are equal	45.1
Total	100.0
N=	1,242.2

🔄 Weight is on

Table 3: Are some cultures much better than others, or are all of them equal?, ESS 7, 2014.

Country	Portugal
Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	
Allow many to come and live here	5.5
Allow some	33.1
Allow a few	37.5
Allow none	23.9
Total	100.0
N=	1,426.1

Weight is on

Table 4: Should many or few immigrants of different race or ethnic group from the majority be allowed to come and live here? ESS 1, 2002.

Country	Portugal
Qualification for immigration: be white	
Extremely unimportant	51.9
1	5.9
2	6.2
3	5.3
4	4.3
5	11.2
6	3.4
7	3.5
8	1.8
9	1.6
Extremely important	5.1
Total	100.0
N=	1,256.6

Weight is on

Table 5: How important, as a qualification for immigration, is the fact that the immigrant is white? ESS 7, 2014

Country	Portugal
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	
Worse place to live	4.9
1	6.2
2	12.9
3	17.4
4	14.7
5	31.3
6	5.7
7	4.1
8	1.9
9	0.5
Better place to live	0.4
Total	100.0
N=	1,395.5

🔄 Weight is on

Table 6: Do immigrants make the country better or worse to live in? ESS 1, 2002

Country	Portugal
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	
Worse place to live	5.9
1	6.7
2	11.4
3	18.7
4	15.2
5	29.3
6	6.3
7	3.6
8	2.2
9	0.6
Better place to live	0.1
Total	100.0
N=	1,923.0

🔄 Weight is on

Table 7: Do immigrants make the country better or worse to live in? ESS 2, 2004

Country	Portugal
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	
Worse place to live	6.1
1	4.3
2	10.1
3	11.5
4	11.8
5	34.8
6	10.9
7	6.6
8	2.9
9	0.5
Better place to live	0.4
Total	100.0
N=	1,968.5

 Weight is on

Table 8: Do immigrants make the country better or worse to live in? ESS 3, 2006

Country	Portugal
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	
Worse place to live	4.5
1	3.8
2	9.4
3	14.6
4	12.2
5	34.1
6	7.7
7	6.8
8	5.4
9	1.1
Better place to live	0.5
Total	100.0
N=	2,196.4

 Weight is on

Table 9: Do immigrants make the country better or worse to live in? ESS 4, 2008

Country	Portugal
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	
Worse place to live	3.5
1	4.0
2	9.9
3	17.1
4	15.2
5	36.1
6	6.3
7	4.3
8	2.2
9	0.9
Better place to live	0.6
Total	100.0
N=	2,048.4

 Weight is on

Table 10: Do immigrants make the country better or worse to live in? ESS 5, 2010

Country	Portugal
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	
Worse place to live	5.4
1	5.7
2	14.8
3	15.3
4	14.2
5	30.2
6	6.7
7	3.2
8	3.0
9	0.6
Better place to live	1.0
Total	100.0
N=	2,040.0

 Weight is on

Table 11: Do immigrants make the country better or worse to live in? ESS 6, 2012

Country	Portugal
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	
Worse place to live	11.0
1	2.9
2	7.5
3	9.5
4	10.2
5	34.4
6	8.3
7	5.7
8	6.1
9	1.1
Better place to live	3.2
Total	100.0
N=	1,237.8

🔓 Weight is on

Table 12: Do immigrants make the country better or worse to live in? ESS 7, 2014

Country	Portugal
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	
Worse place to live	4.8
1	1.9
2	3.9
3	6.1
4	8.2
5	38.9
6	11.4
7	11.4
8	8.0
9	2.5
Better place to live	2.9
Total	100.0
N=	1,240.6

🔓 Weight is on

Table 13: Do immigrants make the country better or worse to live in? ESS 8, 2016

Country	Portugal
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	
Worse place to live	2.1
1	0.7
2	4.3
3	5.1
4	7.3
5	33.7
6	12.0
7	14.6
8	10.5
9	4.8
Better place to live	4.9
Total	100.0
N=	1,004.2

🔄 Weight is on

Table 14: Do immigrants make the country better or worse to live in? ESS 9, 2018

Country	Portugal
Qualification for immigration: christian background	
Extremely unimportant	23.1
1	6.5
2	7.5
3	7.6
4	7.1
5	17.1
6	10.0
7	8.1
8	7.0
9	3.2
Extremely important	2.8
Total	100.0
N=	1,435.5

🔄 Weight is on

Table 15: How important is it that immigrants have a Christian background as a qualification to come into the country? ESS 1, 2002

Country	Portugal
Qualification for immigration: Christian background	
Extremely unimportant	29.4
1	4.5
2	8.7
3	7.3
4	6.2
5	15.9
6	7.1
7	4.8
8	5.2
9	3.0
Extremely important	8.0
Total	100.0
N=	1,243.9

🔄 Weight is on

Table 16: How important is it that immigrants have a Christian background as a qualification to come into the country? ESS 7, 2014

Country	Portugal
Allow many or few Jewish people to come and live in country	
Allow many to come and live here	8.0
Allow some	43.1
Allow a few	24.0
Allow none	24.8
Total	100.0
N=	1,235.8

🔄 Weight is on

Table 17: Should many or few Jewish people be allowed to come and live in the country? ESS 7, 2014.

Country	Portugal
Allow many or few Gypsies to come and live in country	
Allow many to come and live here	4.0
Allow some	25.0
Allow a few	29.8
Allow none	41.2
Total	100.0
N=	1,244.3

🔄 Weight is on

Table 18: Should many or few Gypsies [sic] be allowed to come and live in the country?
ESS 7, 2014.

Country	Portugal
Allow many or few Muslims to come and live in country	
Allow many to come and live here	5.4
Allow some	34.1
Allow a few	30.4
Allow none	30.1
Total	100.0
N=	1,230.6

🔄 Weight is on

Table 19: Should many or few Muslims be allowed to come and live in the country?
ESS 7, 2014.

Country	Austria	Belgium	Switzerland	Czechia	Germany	Denmark	Spain	Finland	France	United Kingdom	Greece	Hungary	Ireland	Israel	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Sweden	Slovenia	Total
Qualification for immigration: christian background																							
Extremely unimportant	32.6	36.7	32.0	22.7	36.7	29.7	22.5	24.0	29.1	29.5	11.0	18.2	26.2	7.2	20.1	59.1	35.7	23.9	18.0	23.1	43.5	31.8	27.5
1	7.3	8.2	9.7	11.1	8.2	8.2	9.6	7.5	8.3	8.8	6.0	6.1	11.1	1.5	4.7	5.6	10.4	9.5	5.5	6.5	10.3	8.9	7.8
2	9.5	11.1	11.6	10.4	9.9	9.6	9.7	8.4	11.4	11.2	6.0	8.0	10.9	2.7	6.0	6.1	12.1	12.0	6.1	7.5	9.5	7.7	9.3
3	9.5	7.9	10.8	7.4	9.1	8.1	6.7	8.9	9.9	9.3	6.1	8.1	9.5	1.9	6.2	2.9	9.2	10.9	5.8	7.6	9.0	7.6	8.2
4	5.4	5.6	6.2	5.7	6.2	4.5	5.2	5.6	4.2	7.3	5.8	4.5	7.5	2.4	6.2	2.3	5.9	6.2	4.7	7.1	5.0	4.1	5.7
5	12.8	11.3	13.1	18.5	13.8	14.1	16.0	14.5	17.5	14.6	10.7	17.7	12.5	4.6	15.7	9.9	14.0	16.3	14.4	17.1	10.8	14.1	14.8
6	3.9	5.7	3.4	5.1	4.4	4.5	8.0	7.2	5.1	5.4	6.5	5.5	2.9	11.1	2.1	4.7	5.3	7.1	10.0	3.2	4.9	6.2	6.2
7	5.3	4.8	4.7	5.5	3.6	5.8	8.2	8.3	4.3	3.7	7.8	6.4	4.6	5.4	10.0	2.9	3.3	5.9	9.4	8.1	2.7	5.1	5.8
8	5.8	4.5	5.2	6.4	3.9	9.3	6.1	8.6	5.1	4.5	11.1	8.3	5.5	12.1	10.5	1.9	2.1	5.8	10.6	7.0	2.9	5.7	6.3
9	3.0	1.7	1.8	4.0	1.2	3.0	3.8	4.3	2.5	2.0	11.1	4.7	3.1	11.8	4.5	2.2	1.4	1.9	5.9	3.2	1.3	3.6	3.2
Extremely important	5.0	2.5	1.6	3.2	2.9	3.3	4.1	2.7	2.6	3.8	18.0	12.3	3.6	47.5	4.9	5.0	1.3	2.3	12.5	2.8	1.8	6.6	5.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	596.3	826.7	594.6	818.4	7,066.5	419.5	3,313.9	414.6	4,810.2	5,940.7	853.3	804.2	298.6	453.3	4,690.8	35.1	1,304.5	345.5	3,053.2	789.6	743.7	164.2	38,337.4

Weight is on

Table 20: How important is it that immigrants have a Christian background as a qualification to come into the country? (European Context) ESS 1, 2002

Country	Austria	Belgium	Switzerland	Czechia	Germany	Denmark	Spain	Finland	France	United Kingdom	Hungary	Ireland	Israel	Lithuania	Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Sweden	Slovenia	Total		
Qualification for immigration: Christian background																							
Extremely unimportant	33.9	42.7	37.3	37.3	13.1	47.2	39.6	19.2	38.7	38.3	35.8	37.6	15.1	23.9	10.1	6.8	48.1	42.0	16.3	29.4	59.5	43.3	36.1
1	7.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	5.1	6.6	7.8	7.8	5.8	8.7	7.0	7.7	3.8	9.5	2.9	3.4	8.5	9.6	5.1	4.5	8.2	6.6	6.6
2	8.3	9.5	10.1	7.3	10.2	10.2	10.6	8.1	8.2	8.1	12.1	10.7	6.3	13.4	3.8	3.9	11.8	10.6	6.2	8.7	8.5	7.4	9.6
3	9.2	7.3	10.3	9.0	9.4	8.3	7.1	6.2	8.6	8.9	8.3	8.3	6.4	8.3	4.6	6.5	7.2	9.8	6.6	7.3	6.7	6.5	8.0
4	6.1	5.4	5.4	8.8	4.7	4.1	5.8	4.3	6.2	4.0	4.0	5.8	8.2	7.6	2.9	7.6	6.1	5.0	6.7	6.2	3.2	5.8	5.3
5	11.8	13.7	12.3	16.4	11.3	11.3	10.7	18.0	15.0	11.5	15.2	13.1	20.0	14.5	5.9	19.2	9.1	11.0	16.9	15.9	7.0	12.3	13.5
6	5.1	3.6	5.4	8.0	2.7	4.4	6.6	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.0	4.0	8.9	7.5	4.1	11.0	4.0	2.9	8.0	7.1	1.5	3.7	4.6
7	5.0	4.6	4.4	4.5	9.6	2.6	5.1	8.9	4.5	5.0	4.3	4.2	11.9	5.9	5.1	12.6	2.6	4.5	8.6	4.8	2.3	4.4	4.8
8	4.7	4.4	5.2	8.7	3.0	3.0	5.2	8.0	6.6	5.4	4.3	4.1	7.9	5.6	9.5	10.9	1.7	2.2	11.4	5.2	2.0	4.2	5.2
9	3.0	1.3	1.4	6.1	0.8	2.3	3.5	2.7	2.1	1.6	1.8	1.8	3.1	1.7	9.1	8.1	0.3	1.4	5.9	3.0	0.5	1.4	2.3
Extremely important	5.8	1.1	1.9	7.9	1.6	1.9	7.0	3.6	1.6	2.3	2.5	2.5	8.5	2.1	41.9	9.9	0.6	1.0	8.3	8.0	0.5	4.4	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	719.6	926.3	685.6	867.5	6,966.0	459.5	107.8	3,856.7	448.2	5,306.7	5,235.0	818.5	351.5	576.7	239.3	1,391.8	413.5	3,520.5	685.9	789.7	170.9	34,557.0	

Weight is on

Table 21: How important is it that immigrants have a Christian background as a qualification to come into the country? (European Context) ESS 7, 2014

Country	Austria	Belgium	Switzerland	Czechia	Germany	Denmark	Estonia	Spain	Finland	France	United Kingdom	Hungary	Ireland	Israel	Lithuania	Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Sweden	Slovenia	Total	
Allow many or few Jewish people to come and live in country																							
Allow many to come and live here	23.4	13.9	21.0	9.8	43.2	27.8	18.4	19.9	20.5	18.3	22.2	6.9	17.9	75.0	17.8	19.8	27.7	15.0	8.0	47.5	13.3	25.1	
Allow some	40.6	50.5	54.2	36.1	42.9	49.4	47.1	36.6	35.5	57.5	50.0	19.7	40.3	11.3	35.0	50.4	52.1	41.4	43.1	44.3	48.4	45.0	
Allow a few	25.3	24.5	19.4	36.3	10.9	19.7	24.0	31.6	39.1	16.7	21.1	37.9	32.4	8.9	27.1	26.0	18.1	29.7	24.0	7.1	23.0	21.3	
Allow none	10.7	11.2	5.4	17.8	3.0	3.1	10.5	11.9	4.8	7.5	6.7	35.5	9.3	4.8	20.0	3.8	2.1	13.8	24.8	1.1	15.3	8.6	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	693.9	920.4	652.1	854.8	6,867.3	455.4	107.7	3,527.9	442.9	5,191.1	5,171.7	763.3	345.9	585.0	222.2	1,378.9	412.5	3,450.4	681.5	775.0	161.8	33,661.7	

↻ Weight is on

Table 22: Should many or few Jewish people be allowed to come and live in the country? (European Context) ESS 7, 2014.

Country	Austria	Belgium	Switzerland	Czechia	Germany	Denmark	Estonia	Spain	Finland	France	United Kingdom	Hungary	Ireland	Israel	Lithuania	Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Sweden	Slovenia	Total	
Allow many or few Gypsies to come and live in country																							
Allow many to come and live here	14.2	6.9	9.1	1.5	18.0	10.1	3.4	14.1	9.6	10.4	10.4	2.1	6.6	3.2	3.9	11.1	10.6	7.4	4.0	37.3	7.7	11.8	
Allow some	29.0	31.2	35.6	10.2	38.0	25.4	16.1	25.0	20.7	38.8	32.5	6.7	21.8	13.3	17.3	34.2	36.0	27.6	25.0	40.3	32.6	31.4	
Allow a few	31.9	29.2	35.6	25.0	29.8	37.7	27.5	32.8	46.4	29.7	29.1	26.3	30.3	23.2	28.1	38.2	34.0	36.8	29.8	16.9	28.4	30.9	
Allow none	24.9	32.7	19.7	63.3	14.3	26.9	53.0	28.1	23.3	21.1	28.0	64.8	41.2	60.4	50.8	16.5	19.4	28.1	41.2	5.5	31.3	25.9	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	690.5	915.9	661.5	867.6	6,831.4	454.3	108.4	3,575.8	444.2	5,232.7	5,171.8	791.2	342.5	554.8	228.2	1,375.4	412.4	3,426.0	686.1	776.1	167.2	33,713.8	

↻ Weight is on

Table 23: Should many or few Gypsies [sic] be allowed to come and live in the country? (European Context) ESS 7, 2014

Country	Austria	Belgium	Switzerland	Czechia	Germany	Denmark	Estonia	Spain	Finland	France	United Kingdom	Hungary	Ireland	Israel	Lithuania	Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Sweden	Slovenia	Total	
Allow many or few Muslims to come and live in country																							
Allow many to come and live here	13.9	9.7	11.9	1.4	22.6	15.1	4.6	15.3	11.6	12.7	13.9	2.6	12.3	2.9	5.7	12.4	18.8	6.8	5.4	38.5	10.2	14.3	
Allow some	33.0	41.4	45.2	13.5	46.1	36.2	25.1	29.0	26.5	51.7	42.0	8.5	32.4	12.2	24.3	41.6	45.4	25.8	34.1	42.6	45.6	38.5	
Allow a few	33.2	29.2	30.6	29.6	23.7	36.9	29.9	34.7	44.8	21.5	27.5	32.6	33.1	25.3	30.5	33.4	27.4	33.7	30.4	15.1	24.1	28.0	
Allow none	19.9	19.7	12.3	55.5	7.6	11.8	40.4	21.0	17.1	14.1	16.6	56.3	22.2	59.5	39.5	12.6	8.4	33.7	30.1	3.7	20.1	19.3	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	698.3	921.6	665.2	865.2	6,864.4	456.5	108.3	3,578.3	443.0	5,226.7	5,189.2	769.4	344.0	572.1	227.5	1,383.7	414.1	3,461.0	678.6	775.5	166.4	33,809.1	

↻ Weight is on

Table 24: Should many or few Muslims be allowed to come and live in the country? (European Context) ESS 7, 2014

