Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa

Department of Social and Organizational Psychology

THE NORMATIVITY OF EXPRESSING THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD

A Dissertation presented in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Social and Organizational Psychology
Specialization in Social Psychology

by

Hélder António Vinagreiro Gomes Alves

Supervisor:

Prof. Doutora Isabel Falcão Correia, Professora Auxiliar
Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa

July, 2008

Abstract

Although much research involving the belief in a just world (BJW) has been done in the past decades, most of it has focused on the intra- and inter-individual consequences of holding or threatening such a belief. This work aimed at studying the very expression of the BJW, both personal and general, at the ideological level, specifically whether such an expression is regarded as normative or counternormative. The eight studies included in this thesis provide evidence that the BJW is normative, specifically that individuals use higher degrees of BJW when asked to convey a series of positive images and use lower degrees when asked to convey negative ones. When a target expresses moderate or high BJW for both positive and negative events, he/she is evaluated higher on measures of dimensions of value (social utility and social desirability) than a target expressing low BJW. Furthermore, targets expressing high BJW for either positive (successes) or negative (failures) events are more positively evaluated on at least one dimension of value, than targets expressing low BJW. In fact, the expression of the same positive idea (e.g., self- or other-promotion) is more positively evaluated when it is conveyed through high than through low BJW. Also, the expression of the same negative idea (self- or other derogation) is less negatively evaluated if it is expressed through high than low BJW. Thus, we argue, the expressing BJW per se adds value to individuals engaging in it, even though such an idea may be perceived as not much true. In this regard, we argue that the BJW is a judgment norm.

Keywords: belief in a just world, social norms, social desirability, social utility, judgment norms

Resumo

Ainda que nas últimas décadas a crença no mundo justo (CMJ) tenha sido alvo de muita investigação, a maior parte centrou-se nos níveis intra- e inter-individual. Este trabalho teve como objectivo estudar a própria expressão da CMJ, tanto pessoal como geral, ao nível ideológico, especificamente se a sua expressão é percepcionada como normativa ou contra-normativa. Os oito estudos incluídos nesta tese mostram que a expressão de CMJ é normativa, especificamente que os indivíduos recorrem a graus mais elevados de CMJ para transmitir um conjunto de imagens positivas, e recorrem a graus mais baixos para transmitir imagens negativas. Quando um alvo exprime CMJ moderada ou alta para eventos positivos e negativos, é avaliado mais positivamente em medidas de dimensões de valor (utilidade social e desejabilidade social) do que um alvo que exprime CMJ baixa. Ademais, alvos que exprimem CMJ elevada ou para acontecimentos positivos (sucessos) ou negativos (insucessos) são avaliados mais positivamente em, pelo menos uma dimensão de valor, do que alvos que exprimem CMJ baixa. De facto, a expressão de uma mesma ideia positiva (auto- ou hetero-promoção) é avaliada mais positivamente se o alvo recorrer a CMJ elevada do que baixa. Similarmente, a expressão de uma mesma ideia negativa (auto- ou hetero-derogação) é avaliada menos negativamente se essa ideia for expressa, através de CMJ elevada do que baixa. Argumentamos que a expressão de CMJ, por si, acrescenta valor a quem a profere, mesmo que tal ideia seja percebida como pouco verdadeira. Assim, defendemos que a CMJ é uma norma de julgamento.

Palavras-chave: crença no mundo justo, normas sociais, desejabilidade social, utilidade social, normas de julgamento

TABLE INDEX

FIGURE INDEX

INTRODUCTION

The belief in a just world (BJW), that is the belief that people have what they deserve (e.g., Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978, Lerner & Simmons, 1966), has already entered its fifth decade of research. During this period much research has been published (for reviews, see Correia, 2003; Furnham, 2003; Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978) which has pointed to the paradoxical fact that justice is such a central theme in people's lives that, when facing injustice, they may respond in unjust ways so as to…preserve their perception that justice prevails!

People need to believe in a just world that gives them the feeling of predictability and that their plans will work out (Lerner, 1977), and go to great lengths in order to keep their "fundamental delusion" (Lerner, 1980). This may involve blaming or/and derogating innocent victims (Lerner & Simmons, 1966).

On the whole, research on the BJW has stressed what Doise (1980, 1982) labelled the intra- and the interindividual levels of analysis in Social Psychology. For instance, at the intraindividual level, research has studied the role of the BJW on future planning (e.g., Hafer, 2000b) or as a buffer for negative events (Dalbert, 2001). At the interindividual level, research has mainly focused on how people react to victims when their BJW is threatened (e.g., Hafer, 2000a; Lerner & Simmons, 1966).

Research aiming at addressing the intergroup level of analysis systematically has only recently been published (Braman & Lambert, 2001; Correia, Vala & Aguiar, 2007; Aguiar, Vala, Correia & Pereira, 2008). This research tested the hypothesis proposed by Lerner (1980) that an ingroup victim is more threatening to the individuals' BJW than an outgroup victim. Despite its importance for the advancement of BJW theory, BJW research involving the intergroup level is still scarce, and focuses on its intra- and interindividual effects (threat for the self, and derogation/blaming of victims, respectively).

With this work we intend to introduce the ideological level of analysis in the experimental BJW research on a systematic basis, with our departing question being whether the expression of BJW, as stated in the general BJW (Dalbert, Montada & Schmitt, 1987) and in the personal BJW scales (Dalbert, 1999), is normative or counternormative.

We followed the sociocognitive research tradition (e.g., Dubois, 1994, 2003), which focuses on the normativity of various components of the "individualism syndrome" (Beauvois, 2003), and has found that their normativity may be anchored (i.e., based) on social utility (e.g., perceptions of competence) or on social desirability

3

(e.g., perceptions of likeability). Also, for having based our research on the sociocognitive tradition, we will only focus on the injunctive (counter-)normativity of the BJW, and not on how frequent the expression of BJW is perceived to be. Thus, our focus will be on injunctive rather than on descriptive norms (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991).

From our point of view, addressing this issue has important theoretical consequences, because it may open avenues of research on the BJW (namely, the role of social norms) and give further insights concerning the processes underlying BJW. This might also have important implications for the understanding of the mechanisms underlying victimization of people belonging to dominated social categories (e.g., Aguiar et al., 2008; Correia et al., 2007). In fact, if the expression of BJW is normative, secondary victimization of members belonging to these groups may be more easily accepted. Our goals are, thus, theoretical, because we intend to contribute to a deeper understanding of the more societal processes involving BJW which have been neglected in the experimental BJW literature (but see Dittmar & Dickinson, 1993).

When we started our research we did not know what to expect regarding social norms and the expression of BJW. That is why our departing question was to ascertain the normativity or counter-normativity of the BJW, and our first studies were mainly descriptive (see Rozin, 2001, for the importance of gathering such kind of evidence). We started without specific hypotheses because there were arguments for and against the normativity of the BJW.

As for the arguments against the normativity of the BJW, Lerner (1980) considers that the items that compose the BJW scales (at the time only Rubin & Peplau's (1975) existed) (e.g. "I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice") reflect a naive, childlike vision of the world that adults do not consciously endorse. Although Lerner (1998) later argued that adults may agree with these items in a continuum from rarely to very frequently, the author still maintains his view of the BJW scales items as childlike with which adults would not always agree. In fact, Lerner (1998) seems more convinced that, within that continuum, adults will more often choose "rarely" than "very frequently", because that the scores on various (general) BJW scales tend to be skewed towards their low end (see also Correia, 2003).

Nevertheless, inferring an injunctive norm (which, in this case, would be that people disapprove of the BJW) from a descriptive norm (the mean scores) can be risky. For instance, if we were to infer an injunctive norm from the usual self-serving bias

(Miller & Ross, 1975), we would conclude that people approve of presenting internal reasons for successes and external reasons for failures. Nevertheless, that is not the case, as shown by research on the norm of internality (Dubois, 1994; Jellison & Green, 1981) which has consistently found that the expression of internal reasons for both successes and failures is injunctively normative.

In fact, we could also present arguments for the normativity of BJW. Jost and Hunyady (2005) include the BJW in a list of legitimizing devices in Western, individualistic societies. According to the system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), people are motivated to not only see the system as just and fair, legitimating the social order in the process, but also to defend these views, even if they go against their self-interest (as is the case of members of dominated groups). Thus, it could be that people approve of the expression of BJW (i.e., find it injunctively normative), because it would allow individuals having the perception that the system is fair. Furthermore, the system itself may demand that individuals behave as if they believed that it is just, with one such behaviour being the expression of such an idea, whether or not they believe in it. In a way, the expression of the BJW could be likened to a performance which individuals can use strategically in their daily lives.

We should note that such a connection between the BJW and the justification of the status quo can be traced to Lerner (1980) who, however, having concentrated on the intra- and inter-individual effects of the BJW, did not explore this issue much. Nevertheless, the idea of the BJW as a legitimizing device seems to be built on experimental research that has focused on the intra- and interindividual levels of analysis (such as that by Lerner or Hafer), or on research that includes ideological variables, but is correlational.

Our first goal is then to ascertain the BJW normativity or counter-normativity. We will present the other goals as we present the structure of this thesis.

Structure and Goals

This thesis is divided into two parts, each comprising three chapters.

The first part of the thesis is theoretical. Chapter 1 will review literature on social norms, namely the beginnings of the study of this object, the distinction between injunctive and descriptive social norms and the sociocognitive approach. In Chapter 2 we will present the concept of self-presentation, first from the point of view of the dramaturgical approach (Goffman, 1959/1993), and then from the perspective of Jones

and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy of self-presentational strategies. Chapter 3 will address the literature on the BJW, namely its original conceptualization, the first and subsequent studies showing the effects of the threat to the BJW and the strategies that individuals use to protect it. We will also present the criticisms that have been raised against the use of BJW scales in experimental research, identify its limits and situate our research in the current context.

The second part of the thesis is empirical. Chapter 4 includes three studies based on Jellison and Green (1981) which provided the basis for our argument that the expression of both personal and general BJW is normative (our first goal). Nevertheless, until this chapter, we will always present the problem as ascertaining the normativity our counter-normativity of the BJW, in order that it reflects how our work developed. A fourth study tested whether the normativity of the BJW is recognized when participants are directly asked about it, and whether this normativity derives from perceptions of truth or despite their non-existence (second goal). As it will be seen, the expression of high BJW is perceived as normative (approved of and desirable) but not much believed, that is, its normativity does not derive from perceptions of truth. Thus, it can be considered a judgment norm (see Dubois, 2003). We will argue that this pattern is consistent with the view of the BJW as a pillar of Western, individualistic societies, which demands that individuals engage in a performance, that is to value an idea that they consider relatively untrue.

Having established the normativity of the BJW, we could move on to our third goal, which aimed at ascertaining on which dimensions the BJW normativity is based (social utility or/and social desirability). The two studies included in Chapter 5 addressed the kinds of perceptions that are associated with such an expression and the strategic use of BJW. Specifically, in Study 5 we put forward that the expression of BJW regarding good *and* bad "things" grants social utility and social desirability to targets expressing it, and that participants would show greater willingness to interact with such targets, and evaluate them as more successful, than targets who do not comply with that norm. In Study 6, contrarily to Study 5, participants did not evaluate a target on several dimensions, but instead self-presented on those dimensions with the use of the BJW scales. The aim of this study was to gather further evidence that the expression of higher degrees of BJW is associated with the dimensions measured in Study 5, and to show that the expression of BJW can be used strategically.

Finally, the two studies included in Chapter 6 aimed at identifying instances of moderators to the general pattern (our fourth goal). Specifically, in Study 7 we tested whether or not the expression of higher degrees of BJW could also be associated with a negatively evaluated target. In Study 8 we tested whether a target expressing high BJW could be negatively perceived in social utility or/and on social desirability if he/she only referred good *or* bad aspects (i.e., successes or failures, respectively).

Since these studies were done in Portugal and the BJW is seen as a legitimizing device of individualistic societies (Jost & Hunyady, 2005) we would like to finish this introduction by briefly addressing the "Portugal as an individualistic country" issue.

Although in his studies Hofstede (1991/1997) situated Portugal in the most collectivist cluster, several changes have occurred in Portugal since the collection of data in the late 70s. Possibly the biggest change in recent Portuguese history, along with the 25th of April revolution, occurred in 1986 when this country joined the then European Economic Community, which had a positive impact on its economy.

Discussing Portugal's economic evolution is beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that the country's gross national product knew a significant and positive impact, a variable that is positively correlated with indexes of individualism. In fact, 14 years ago, Marques (1994) expected that the values of individualism would have already increased in Portugal by then, because of the economic growth.

Since the Portuguese gross national product has grown since then, we can expect that individualism has known another increase. That was the view expressed by Hofstede (2008, personal communication, May 15, 2008), who indicated that it is possible that individualism in Portugal may currently be at the level of Spain's or France's (nevertheless, no data supporting this view were presented). Furthermore, since we collected data among university students, and since the most educated layers of the population tend to be more individualistic (or ideocentric) than the average, even in collectivist countries (Triandis, 2001), we may further expect that our samples comprise individualism oriented people.

Nevertheless, from our point of view, the best evidence that, if not Portugal as a whole, at least the university students that participated in our studies have this orientation, lies in one of the results that we have not presented yet. In fact, although both general and personal BJW are injunctively normative, the latter seems to be considered normative to a greater extent than the former. In other words, stating that one has what one deserves seems to be more crucial, for self-presentational reasons, than

stating that others have what they deserve. A reading of this pattern as reflecting individualistic ideology seems to us a more accurate and parsimonious explanation than the one that we would obtain if we took it as revealing collectivism.

PART I:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1: SOCIAL NORMS

Introduction

According to Dubois (1994), social norms may refer to behaviours, judgments, attitudes, opinions, beliefs which are valued and/or put into practice in a certain collective. Therefore, they are socially learned and transmitted. Moreover, according to Dubois (1994), they are not put into practice through legal action but through social sanctions or rewards, as opposed to laws. Cialdini and Trost (1998), however, do not make a distinction between norms, rules and laws. In fact, they compare social norms to rules and emphasize that social norms (of the injunctive kind, as will be developed later) can take on the form of laws.

These conceptual distinctions notwithstanding, there is agreement that social norms may refer to what it is prescribed in a given collective or to what members of the collective actually do or think, following or not the prescriptions (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). As we will see, this distinction between what a society/group values and what its members do, respectively injunctive and descriptive social norms (Cialdini, et al.;, 1991; Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990), has not always been made in the social psychological literature. As a consequence, a conceptual confusion and doubts as to the usefulness of the social norms concept to explain behaviour arose (Cialdini et al., 1991).

There is also agreement that social norms vary considerably across cultures, as shown in anthropological and transcultural social psychology studies (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Studies in transcultural social psychology distinguish between two main groups of societies, individualistic and collectivistic (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 2001), which differ in several factors, such as social norms.

Individualistic societies are characterized by the emphasis placed on the individual, and on his/her goals, autonomy and self-sufficiency (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005; Triandis, 1989). On the contrary, in collectivistic societies the emphasis is placed on the ingroup harmony and the interdependence among its members (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). Whereas in individualistic societies the individual can be expected to abandon an ingroup that prevents him/her from attaining his/her personal goals, in collectivistic societies, faithfulness to the ingroup is expected and individual standing out is discouraged (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). Thus, self-interest (Ratner & Miller, 2001) is normative in individualistic societies, but not in collectivistic ones. As Triandis, Chan, Bhawuk, Iwao, & Sinha (1995, p. 462) put it,

"The central theme of individualism is the conception of individuals as autonomous from groups; the central theme of collectivism is the conception of individuals as aspects of groups or collectives" (see Triandis, 1995, for a theoretical proposal on the factors that contribute for a society to become more individualistic or collectivistic). Obviously, it goes without saying that these are general patterns (or cultural syndromes) and that there are interindividual differences among the members of both individualistic and collectivistic societies (Triandis, 2001; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Lucca, 1988; Triandis, Leung, Villareal & Clack, 1985).

This individualistic ideology impregnates Western Psychology, such that putting it into practice in one's life is a criterion that humanist and phenomenologist theorists use to consider someone as mentally healthy (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992). For instance, among the criteria that characterize a "fully functioning person", Rogers (1980, cited in Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992) included *organismic trusting* (i.e., individuals make decisions according to their experiences and to what "feels right" to them, and not according to social norms imposed by groups or institutions) and *experiential freedom* (i.e., the person's feeling that he/she is able to choose). Furthermore, at least in Western Psychology and Social Psychology, much work includes concepts around the "self": self-schema (Markus, 1977), self-verification (Swann, 1990), self-affirmation (Steele, 1988), self-complexity (Linville, 1985), self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), among many others. In fact, the predominant paradigm of Social Psychology in the USA, social cognition, has the individual as its main level of analysis (Augoustinos & Walker, 1998; Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue, 2006).

In sum, attaining one's goals, instead of being primarily concerned with the accomplishment of the group's, is more normative in individualistic societies than in collectivistic ones, and in the latter it may even be counternormative, and this cultural assumption reflects on the very practice of a social science, such as Social Psychology.

Nevertheless, different approaches focusing more on the social and on the interplay between the individual and the social have emerged, especially in Europe. Those are the cases of the Social Representations theory (Moscovici, 1976) or the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For the past 25 years, research begun in the USA (e.g., Jellison & Green, 1981), and subsequently developed in (especially) France, has stressed the role of the norm of internality on such societies (Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; Dubois, 1988, 1994; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005).

The norm of internality is a judgment norm, that is judgments the expression of which is positively valued (Dubois, 1994, 2003), which "states" that presenting internal reasons for one's behaviours and outcomes in individualistic societies is more valued than presenting external ones. The more important reason for this valuation seems the role they have in facilitating the evaluation practices that are crucial in these societies (Dubois, 1994). More recently this research has expanded on other judgement norms which comprise individualism (or the "individualism syndrome", Beauvois, 2003): the preference for individual anchoring (i.e., defining oneself as an individual) over other-anchoring (i.e., defining oneself primarily in relation to one's group memberships), or the preference for self-sufficiency (i.e., the idea that individuals are expected to solve their problems) over other-dependency (i.e., expecting that others solve one's problems).

Although social norms differ transculturally, normative diversity can also be found intraculturally. In fact, even in the USA, a country that is usually regarded as one of the best illustrations of individualism (Hofstede, 1991), there can be found regions where collectivism prevails (Vandello & Cohen, 1999). Also, on the whole, in a given society there are more general and more context or group-specific norms (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Michener & DeLamater, 1999; Miller & Prentice, 1996). For instance, the norm of not killing others is general and consacrated in both religious and legal texts. Nevertheless, in some groups (e.g., the Hammerskins) killing specific others is valued and a necessary condition to enter the group (Racist Skinhead Project, n.d.). In fact, norms are a distinctive feature of groups, and members who do not conform to them are seen as deviant, are derogated (see the black sheep effect, Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001; Marques, Yzerbit & Leyens, 1988) and ostracized, especially when the norm is relevant to the ingroup's identity (Marques et al., 1988), and/or when members are high-identifiers with the group and the group is cohesive (see the groupthink phenomenon, Janis, 1972).

In this chapter, we intend to present a theoretical overview on social norms and relevant studies in this research area. We will begin by presenting how social norms began to be studied in social psychology (Asch, 1952; Sherif, 1936). Afterwards, we will distinguish between descriptive and injunctive social norms, and present one condition for norms to influence the behaviour of individuals in a given setting, specifically the role of normative focus (i.e., salience and activation of a given norm) (Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991). We will see that this theoretical approach was able to show

that the concept of social norms, contrarily to the circularity and uselessness that critics acused it of, is a valuable one in explaining behaviour. We will move on to the presentation of the sociocognitive perspective (e.g., Dubois, 1994, 2003), also known as socionormative (Testé, 2001), and its emphasis on studying injunctive rather than descriptive social norms. The cases of two phenomena, pluralistic ignorance (e.g., Miller & McFarland, 1987; Prentice & Miller, 1993) and perverse norms (e.g., Fernández-Dols, 1993; Oceja & Fernández-Dols, 1992), and the distinction between the norm of internality (Beauvois & Dubois, 1988) and the self-serving bias (Miller & Ross, 1975) will illustrate some reasons for the preference, in certain cases, of studying injunctive over descriptive social norms. In presenting the sociocognitive approach, we will focus on a judgment norm – the norm of internality - because it has guided much of our research on the expression of the BJW. Then, we will present the sociocognitive view on the dimensions that give an object social value: social utility (i.e., the characteristics that make an object be regarded as having what it takes to achieve society's goals) and social desirability (i.e., the characteristics that make an object be socially liked). Finally, we will present the experimental paradigms used in the sociocognitive approach, on which we have based our studies.

1. The Beginnings of the Study of Social Norms

1.1. Sherif's (1936) Studies on the Formation and Transmission of Norms

The study of social norms has a long history in Social Psycology. In fact, the first attempts to study social norms in an experimental way seem to have coincided with the period in which Social Psychology began to strive to be seen as a legitimate and autonomous science. In this respect the classic works by Sherif (1936) on the formation and transmission of norms are quite representative.

In Sherif's studies, participants were presented with an unusual situation to which they had no previous experience. Sitting in a dark room, they were asked, either alone or in groups, to give various estimations of the distance that a certain point of light would move. Unbeknownst to them, however, that point of light did not actually move. There was only such an illusion - the autokinetic effect.

The results of Sherif's studies were quite clear. When participants began their estimations alone, facing a novel experience and without any source of information, they were quick in forming a reference point, interpreted as a personal norm, around which the successive estimations were made. Despite the interpersonal variation of their estimations, intrapersonally they were quite consistent and were apparently used to make sense of that novel situation. Thus, one definition of norm may be of a device that guides individuals' judgments (and as we will see, behaviours), making situations meaningful.

In this specific case, the personal norm was formed through the interpretation of a novel and ambiguous situation by isolated individuals. Nevertheless, more often than not, a personal norm derives from the internalization of social norms which are shared and transmitted in the settings where the individual lives. When internalized, those social norms are believed to be the correct framework to interpret reality (Kelman, 1958), and may be automatically activated (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003). The studies by Sherif also show how norms may be transmitted and internalized.

When once isolated participants were put together and made estimations in groups, they converged toward a group mean. In other words, participants had other sources of information (the other participants) and negotiated their estimations. As a result, a group norm was formed. This group norm mainly resulted from a process that Deutsch and Gerard (1955) coined informational influence, underlying which is the motivation to be right. Since participants were not sure about their estimations, due to

the ambiguous nature of the situation, they accepted that the estimations of others had some validity. What is more, when participants first made estimations in groups, these influenced their later estimations made in isolation. Jacobs and Campbell (1961), also using the autokinetic effect, showed that social norms could be perpetuated by several "generations" of participants, even when the original norm was arbitrarily formed and those who created it (confederates that gave higher than usual estimations) were no longer present. This study demonstrates at an experimental level that the views of past generations shape the thinking of later generations.

Thus, with this set of studies, Sherif (1936) and Jacobs and Campbell (1961) experimentally showed how norms could be formed and transmitted. Although the situation used could be criticized for being artificial, the psychosocial mechanisms captured (need of making sense of reality, interaction, negotiation, transmission and perpetuation of norms) seem ubiquitous in social life (see, for instance, Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, for the case of the transmission and perpetuation of norms in cultures of honour, even when the conditions that originated them no longer exist).

Nevertheless, social norms may not only serve as information to guide individuals towards what is believed to be the correct answers (i.e., informational influence, Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Social norms also serve as guidelines for individuals to be accepted in a group, by indicating them how to behave in the way it is expected or approved of in a given group or setting. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) coined this process as normative influence, underlying which is the motivation to be accepted. In the classic works by Asch (1952) on conformism it was shown how strong normative influence can be even in objective situations.

1.2. Asch's (1952) Studies on Conformism

In the most basic situation, Asch (1952) had participants say which of three lines (the comparison lines) was the same size as another one (the standard line). When the participants answered alone (the control condition), there were virtually no errors. However, in the basic experimental condition, in which each participant answered in front of confederates trained to unanimously give wrong answers in 12 out of 18 trials, 75% of participants gave at least one wrong answer and 33% gave six or more wrong answers.

In post-experimental interviews, one of the most presented reasons for having followed the majority (i.e., the confederates) was to avoid standing out and being

laughed at. In other words, the relatively high percentage of conformist answers partly derived from fear of ridicule. Their fears were not unfounded. In fact, in another experimental condition, in which there was only one confederate, who was instructed to give wrong answers, the majority, composed of naïve participants, ridiculed and ostracized him. Given that recent research showed that ostracism is unpleasant, even when it comes from strangers (Smith & Williams, 2004) or disliked people (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007), it is not strange that the participants in the basic experimental condition showed relatively high levels of conformism[1].

Although in post-experimental interviews participants also referred that they thought the consistent others were right (thus, if we take these reasons at face value, their wrong answers had also derived from informational influence), those who referred the wish to avoid ridicule showed normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). If the former derives from the motivation to be right, the latter derives from the motivation to be accepted and to belong which, according to Baumeister and Leary (1995), is universal. There are sanctions to deviant members, that is, members who somehow breach social/group norms (Cialdini et al., 1991; Goode, 2002; Marques et al., 1998, 2001) and, depending on the kind of norm violated, different sanctions are used (from simple admonitions to downright ostracism, or in more formal situations, firing or imprisonment).

2. The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct

Despite the auspicious beginning in the study and theorizing of social norms and their influences (see also Crutchfield, 1955; Lewin, 1943; Milgram, Bickman & Berkowitz, 1969), the sheer number of definitions of social norms existing in the sociological and in the social psychological literature led to a situation of conceptual confusion. Cialdini and Trost (1998, pp. 151 - 152), for instance, referred to the definitions by Sumner (1906: norms as "folkways"), Sherif (1936: norms as "jointly

---

[1] Nevertheless, we should note that the main pattern was that of independence. The reason for Asch's works to be so frequently cited as demonstrations of conformism, derives from the fact that the so called conformist answers were much more frequent in the expermental condition than in the control condition. However, some authors (e.g., Friend, Rafferty & Bramel, 1990) argue that the emphasis placed on conformism from Asch's data is a misinterpretation of the results obtained, and one that goes counter Asch's interpretation. A possible reason for the emphasis on the "results showing conformism" interpretation may be due to the negative connotation that such a process has in individualistic societies (although being individualistic in such societies is, paradoxically, being conformist). A meta-analysis comprising studies using Asch's paradigm in several cultures show that conformist answers are higher in collectivistic than in individualistic societies, such as the USA (Bond & Smith, 1996) Furthermore, Crutchfield (1955) showed that when participants are asked about esthetic judgments conformism tends to be relatively rare, and the same seems to apply when attitudes with a moral component are involved (Hornsey, Majkut, Terry & McKimmie, 2003).

negotiated rules for social behaviour", such as customs and traditions) and Pepitone (1976: norms as "social behaviour [that] is more characteristic of some sociocultural collective unit"). These definitions hint at what is done in a social group. On the other hand, Homans (1950) conceptualized norms as judgments shared by group members about what should be done.

The various definitions of norms (qualified or not by terms such as "social", "cultural" and "group") and the number of concepts to which norms were likened or made equivalent (e.g. customs, traditions, rules) led some authors (e.g., Darley & Latané, 1970; Krebs & Miller, 1985) to question the relevance of norms to understand social behaviour. According to these authors, since there are often contradictory norms (e.g., to get involved vs. to mind one's own business), social norms were criticized for providing circular (and, therefore, useless) explanations: a certain behaviour could be explained by one norm or by its opposite.

Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991) proposed a conceptualization of social norms which comprised the various aforementioned definitions, by distinguishing between injunctive (what the members of a social group believe to be the proper or improper behaviours, values, beliefs) and descriptive social norms (what the members of a social group actually do, value and believe). Therefore, this conceptualization not only comprises the various definitions presented above, but also makes central distinctions among them. According to Cialdini and Trost (1998), social norms can include either standards that are developed by observing others or societal expectations by valued others for individuals' behaviour. In Cialdini et al.'s (1990, 1991) terms, they correspond, respectively, to descriptive and injunctive social norms.

In order to further disentangle the presumed circularity that social norms were criticized for, Cialdini et al. (1990, 1991) developed their focus theory of normative conduct, according to which a norm only has influence on behaviour when it is salient and activated (i.e., when individuals are focused on it). Thus, although contradictory social norms coexist, only that which is focal in a given situation is likely to exert influence (Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). In fact, even personal norms (i.e., those social norms which have been internalized) also seem to affect behaviours when individuals are focused on them, so that "(. . .) the mere possession of a personal norm does not lead routinely to norm-based action. Rather, internal or

external focus of attention importantly moderates the degree to which the personal norm is likely to guide such action" (Kallgren, Reno & Cialdini, 2000, p. 1010).

Thus, in order that social norms could be considered a useful concept to describe, explain and predict social behaviour, it was needed, on the one hand, a conceptual clarification (i.e., distinguishing between injunctive and descriptive social norms) and, on the other hand, the identification of which norm is focal in a given situation.

2.1. Descriptive Social Norms

Descriptive norms provide information about what people usually do in a certain context. This information is especially important for perceivers who enter a novel or ambiguous situation. As Festinger (1954) stated, when in doubt about what to do in a situation, people try to find the answer by watching what similar others do. In these situations, the higher the number of people that behave in a certain fashion, the more correct that behaviour is perceived to be, because it has consensus information (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).

When individuals are in novel or/and ambiguous situations and feel uncertainty about what actions to take, they are likely to turn to other individuals' behaviours, when available, as sources of information for appropriate action. Thus, other individuals' behaviours may serve as a heuristic of "social proof" (Cialdini & Trost, 1998), and can be a powerful means of shaping people's behaviours through informational influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).

In a series of studies involving littering behaviour, Cialdini et al. (1990, Study 2) found that the descriptive norm in a certain situation (operationalized as littered vs. clean environment) influenced the participants' decision to throw or not to throw the provided handbill onto the ground. Specifically, the more littered the environment (0, 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16 pieces of paper on the ground), the higher the percentage of individuals littering tended to be. Also, the more littered the environment, the faster individuals tended to litter as well. Furthermore, Cialdini et al. (1990, Study 1) found not only that littering behaviour was more frequent in a littered than in a non-littered environment, but also that focusing participants on that descriptive norm (by having a confederate throw a paper onto the ground) influenced their behaviour. In fact, participants who were focused on the clean environment littered even less than those who were not, whereas participants who were focused on the littered environment littered even more

than those who were not. Thus, there was an interaction effect between the descriptive norm and the normative focus on littering behaviour.

In sum, descriptive social norms do exert influence in individuals' behaviours (see also Cialdini, 2007). Furthermore, a meta-analysis of studies of nonexperimental research using the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) found that the inclusion of the variable "descriptive norm" (i.e., the perception of what others do) explained a further 5% of variance to the original model in predicting behavioural intention in a series of mainly health-related behaviours (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003).

Besides showing that descriptive social norms influence behaviour, Cialdini and colleagues also identified their limitations. For instance, Reno, Cialdini and Kallgren (1993) showed that the influence of descriptive norms is circumscribed to the specific situations in which they occur. Furthermore, they also showed that their influence was dependent on how others behave in that situation, and not on the value (desirability) ascribed to that behaviour. Specifically, individuals are more likely to litter in a littered environment and more likely not litter in a clean one. Consequently, the beneficial influence of a descriptive norm is more likely felt in situations in which it is not so needed, because it is already the current practice (Cialdini et al., 1991). On the contrary, injunctive norms exert their influence transsituationally (Reno et al., 1993) and independently of the descriptive norm (Cialdini et al., 1990), as will be seen in more detail.

2.2. Injunctive Social Norms

Injunctive norms provide information about what people approve or disapprove of in a given situation, that is they specify what is expected to be done or not to be done (Cialdini et al., 1991), and "motivate behaviour by promising social rewards or punishments for it" (Cialdini & Trost, 1998, p. 157). Whereas the power of descriptive norms lies in them clarifying what is done in a context, injunctive norms exert their influence by clarifying which behaviours are expected (and not expected) from individuals in a given situation through normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). As Cialdini et al. (1991) put it, injunctive norms "orient individuals away from a concern with how others have behaved in a particular setting and toward a concern with what others approve/disapprove" (p. 225). As such, injunctive norms contribute for the "scripted" aspect of situations (Abelson, 1981), in such a way that people know that they are supposed to behave in certain ways and not in others. This aspect allows for the

coordination of individuals' behaviours and the avoidance of violating the situational injunctive norms.

Although the terms "injunctive" and "prescriptive" are often used interchangeably, Cialdini et al. (1991, footnote 1) emphasized that the former is a more comprehensive concept that the latter. According to these authors, the concept of prescriptive norm only includes the prescriptions for behaviour and thoughts (i.e., the expectations). On the contrary, the concept of "injunctive norms" goes beyond it by also including proscriptions, that is, the promised social rewards or punishments for the respected or disrespected prescriptions, respectively. Instances of injunctive norms are the social responsibility norm (Berkowitz, 1972), the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), the norm of consistency (Channouf & Mangard, 1997) and the norm of internality (Dubois, 1994; Jellinson & Green, 1981). We will focus on the norm of internality, later in this chapter, because of its relevance to our work.

The influence of injunctive social norms on behaviour was experimentally demonstrated in a series of studies also involving littering behaviour. Cialdini et al. (1990, Study 4) manipulated the injunctive anti-littering norm while keeping the descriptive norm constant (littered environment). The authors reasoned that if the litter was swept into piles (vs. not swept), it would provide information that not littering was the appropriate behaviour (the injunctive social norm), even though many people may have littered (the descriptive social norm). As a consequence, individuals would litter less when it was swept into piles than when it was not. Furthermore, the normative focus was also manipulated. In the low focus conditions, a confederate merely walked by each participant, whereas in the high focus conditions a confederate dropped a handbill, thus focusing the participants on the injunctive norm. It was expected that when participants were focused on the unswept environment, they would litter more than when they were not. On the contrary, when participants were focused on the swept environment (i.e., on the anti-littering norm), they would litter less than when they were not.

Results supported these hypotheses, thus showing that an injunctive norm exerts its influence, even when contradicted by the descriptive norm (littered environment) as long as individuals are focused on it[2] (see also Kallgren et al., 2000, for further

---

[2] Nevertheless, when both kinds of norms are in the same direction their influence on people's behaviours is increased (see Cialdini, 2003, for a discussion and an experimental demonstration that persuasive messages that contain contradictions between the injunctive and the descriptive norms are less effective than those who do not).

experimental demonstrations of the importance of being normatively focused, in order that injunctive norms, even personal ones (Study 3), can exert influence on behaviour).

Other studies further showed that injunctive social norms exert a stronger influence on individuals' behaviour than descriptive norms in the sense of influencing them transsituationally vs. only contextually.

Reno et al. (1993, Study 2) had a confederate walk by the participants on their way from a library building to the library parking lot. In the experimental conditions, the confederate either disposed of the litter which he carried by throwing it into a litter-container (focus on the descriptive norm, by recalling what is usually done in that environment), or by picking it up from the ground (focus on the injunctive norm - by picking up other people's litter, the confederate was communicating his disapproval towards littering). In the control conditions the confederate simply walked by the participants. The confederate could walk by the participants either on a grassy path belonging to the library (different environment condition) or on parking lot (same environment condition). Both environments were cleaned of visible litter (except for that in the injunctive norm conditions). The dependent measure was the percentage of participants who would throw a handbill attached to their car's windshield onto the ground.

Compared to the participants in the control conditions, those who had been focused on the injunctive norm littered significantly less, regardless of the place where they had seen the confederate pick up the litter. On the contrary, compared to the participants in the control conditions, participants who had been focused on the descriptive norm only littered less when they saw the confederate throw the litter into the litter-container in the parking lot (i.e., in the same environment as where they had to decide what to do with the handbill), but not when they saw the confederate do it along the grassy path. Thus, the influence of injunctive social norms is more likely felt transsituationally than descriptive social norms. According to Cialdini et al. (1991), this pattern derives from the perception that what people do in a certain setting is more context-specific than what people approve or disapprove of in society.

We would like to point out that studies based either on the model of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) or on the model of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), the injunctive norm is included in the subjective norm, which is defined as the perception of what relevant others think it is right to do, and the individual's motivation to comply. In sum, in the definition of subjective norm it is included the perception of

the injunctive norm, although restricted to people who are important to the individual (whereas injunctive norms may be more general).

Explaining these models and presenting their results is beyond the scope of our work. Nevertheless, we would like to stress that the subjective norm has been found to be a consistent, albeit weak, predictor of behavioural intention, as shown in one meta-analysis regarding studies based on the model of reasoned action (Shepperd, Hartwick & Warshaw, 1988). This weakness of the subjective norms as a predictor runs counter Cialdini and colleagues' theoretical framework which stresses the role of injunctive norms. However, in another meta-analysis (this time of studies based on the model of planned behaviour), Armitage and Conner (2001) found that the strength of the subjective norm, as a predictor of behavioural intention, was moderated by the quality of its measurement (operationalized as the number of items used to measure the subjective norm), being weak when measured by only one item. Thus, the relatively weak effects found before were mainly due to the low quality of measurement, and not due to the concept of subjective norm per se. Thus, the construct of subjective norm, when properly measured, can be a strong predictor of behavioural intention, which is more consonant with Cialdini and colleagues' proposal[3].

In sum, social norms guide behaviour because they indicate what is expected and inform about the rewards and punishments for following or not following the prescriptions (injunctive norms). Furthermore, social norms inform what other people do (descriptive norms). When internalized, there is a personal feeling of what is right and proper (personal norms). These various kinds of norms exert influence on individuals' behaviour, as long as individuals are focused on the social and/or personal norms (Kallgren et al., 2000).

3. Beyond Littering

Further studies applied the focal norm theory to other issues related to environment, such as environmental theft in natural parks (Cialdini, Demaine, Sagarin, Barrett, Rhoads & Winter, 2006). Nevertheless, the distinction between injunctive and descriptive social norms can also be applied to other domains, such as the expression of

---

[3] We should point out, however, the correlational nature of these studies (vs. the experimental nature of studies by Cialdini and colleagues) and that the subjective norm is a predictor of the behavioural intention, whereas in Cialdini and colleagues' studies, they measured the impact of the injunctive norm on behaviours. Nevertheless, our point is to stress a certain overlap between the concepts of subjective and injunctive norms (Armitage & Conner, 2001).

emotions (Eid & Diener, 2001), their effect on undesirable behaviours, such as gambling (Larimer & Neighbors, 2003), binge drinking (Sher, Bartholow & Nanda, 2001), casual sex (Lambert, Kahn & Apple, 2003), reckless driving (Leary, 1995), the expression of opinions against gays (Masser & Philips, 2003) or the expression of sexism and racism (Swim, Aikin, Hall & Hunter, 1995). We will briefly present some of the findings involving the relationship between the expression of racism and social norms.

Whereas in the past the expression of overt racist ideas was common (i.e., descriptively normative), valued and legally sanctioned (i.e., injunctively normative), nowadays this kind of expression of racism is considered old-fashioned (McConahay, 1986). The past 50 years have witnessed a change in laws and in explicit attitudes towards black people which have made the overt expression of racism unacceptable (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), that is, injunctively counternormative. In other words, social norms towards the expression of overt racism have dramatically changed in the general population (in several minority groups, such as neonazis or the KKK, however, the expression of overt prejudice and the accompanying diverse kinds of discrimination are injunctively normative and at the very basis of these groups' identities).

Nevertheless, this change has not ended racism. Instead, it has replaced the way racism is expressed, that is, its descriptively normative component. Nowadays, racism is expressed more subtly than in the past, although it coexists with more blatant forms of racism (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; see also Vala, Brito & Lopes, 1999), and the reasons individuals present for discrimination are not seen as racist ones but as logic and valid. For instance, individuals may express the idea that they do not have anything against a racialized group, such as blacks, but that the group occupies and should occupy an inferior status because its members do not conform to the values that would make the group successful, such as hard-work ("symbolic racism", Kinder & Sears, 1981; see Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1996, for the similarities between old-fashioned and modern forms of racism and sexism). Recently, Pereira (2007) demonstrated that individuals openly discriminate against blacks, even when the anti-prejudice norm is salient, if an excuse that may justify their discrimination is available. Research involving children has shown that this norm is learnt early in life, and that the nonracist performance is put into practice when children have gained the cognitive capacity to normatively adapt the expression of their racial attitudes to contexts (around the age of

eight) (França & Monteiro, 2004; see also Rutland, Cameron, Milne & McGeorge, 2005).

Thus, currently open prejudice and discrimination against blacks are injunctively and descriptively counternormative, and individuals generally only turn to them when they may have an excuse that prevents them from being categorized as racists. In fact, nowadays the expression of overt prejudice and discrimination in general terms are usually perceived as undesirable. Thus, besides the aforementioned situations of groups whose identity is based on prejudice, and the existence of contexts that allow its overt expression, blatant prejudice and discrimination are usually directed to groups, that is descriptive normative, towards which it is injunctively normative to engage in those processes (Crandall, Eshleman & O'Brien, 2002).

4. The Sociocognitive Approach to Social norms

The sociocognitive approach studies the social injunctive norms of the Western democratic and economically liberal societies (Dubois & Beauvois, 2003). Seeing that this approach focuses on social norms, Peeters (2004) wondered whether the term "socionormative" would be a more accurate label to identify it. In fact, it is sometimes referred to as the "socionormative" approach (e.g., Testé, 2001), even by those who defend the label "sociocognitive approach" (Dubois & Beauvois, 2003).

Whereas the term "socionormative" may more readily identify the main object of this approach, it nevertheless lacks one of its features, specifically that social knowledge influences cognitions: "(. . .) it is assumed that current social functioning (even if its roots go back in time) and its fundamental features and priorities (. . .) are the source of today's ways of thinking and of the content of our cognitions (. . .) (Dubois & Beauvois, 2003, pp. 233-234; see also Le Floch & Somat, 2003). The more encompassing label "sociocognitive approach" is more usual and it is the one we will use in this thesis, even though we will not directly test the influence of norms on cognitions.

The sociocognitive approach, which has been mainly developed in France, has focused on the study of injunctive norms, namely judgment norms (see Dubois, 1994, 2003), that is statements, the expression of which is positively valued in contrast to others that are less positively or even negatively valued. The value attributable to an object or person can be of two kinds: social utility and social desirability (Beauvois, 1995; Dubois & Beauvois, 2003) (see the later section "the dimensions of value"). The

emphasis on the social aspect of knowledge indicates another assumption of this approach: that "[social] objects cannot be understood independently of the social relationship that links us to them (. . .)" (Dubois & Beauvois, 2003, p. 234).

The sociocognitive approach emphasizes the study of injunctive social norms because these are the ones that serve as reference for societal functioning (Dubois, 2003; Dubois & Beauvois, 2003). Dubois (2003) argues that a descriptive norm has an implicit prescriptive facet because someone who does not follow the actions of the majority is likely to be viewed somewhere between being original and a misfit. Nevertheless, even if individuals do not follow a given social prescription (i.e., if the descriptive norm contradicts a certain injunctive norm), it is the latter which guide individuals' evaluations and contain the options of a society's functioning (see, for instance, the emphasis on the individual in individualistic societies, or on the group in collectivistic societies).

Besides the already mentioned higher transsituational influence of injunctive over descriptive social norms, three other phenomena may illustrate reasons why the sociocognitive approach focuses on the study of injunctive social norms. We will now turn to a brief presentation of those phenomena: pluralistic ignorance, perverse norms and the difference between the norm of internality and the self-serving bias.

In the case of the pluralistic ignorance phenomenon (e.g., Prentice & Miller, 1996 for a review), certain behaviours (e.g., binge drinking, Prentice & Miller, 1993; hooking up, Lamber et al., 2003) are enacted because group members watch other members behave in a certain fashion - that is, the behaviours are descriptively normative. However, the strength of the phenomenon rests on the misperception that, underlying those behaviours, there is individual comfort and the belief that those are the ways most members of the group think that one is supposed to behave (that is the injunctive norm). Pluralistic ignorance may underlie not only the adoption of undesirable behaviours but also prevent desirable ones. In fact, the concept of pluralistic ignorance has been used to explain the bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968, 1970) - the inaction of others (descriptive norm) is interpreted as lack of emergency, and as a consequence, the belief that alerting of possible danger, or coming into help of someone is not considered adequate (injunctive norm).

Thus, in the case of pluralistic ignorance, a descriptive norm is interpreted as reflecting an injunctive norm and it is in this interpretation that lies its strength. However, there are instances in which descriptive norms not only do *not* reflect

injunctive ones but also contradict them. In other words, in various situations most people do what they are not expected to or, conversely, fail to do what they are supposed to. In fact, Codol's (1975) distinction between desirable and factual norms also seems to convey this idea.

Whereas desirable norms are related to a system of social expectations (the prescriptive aspect), factual norms refer to behaviours that actually happen (that is, the behaviours that occur in fact, the descriptive component)[4]. This distinction resembles the later differentiation between descriptive and injunctive social norms (Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991). In Codol's (1975) words "factual norms tend to relate to an actual and concrete behavioural experience [whereas] desirable norms (. . .) pertain more to the realm of the imaginary than to the realm of reality" (p.460). In sum, the author recognizes that although what is socially done may coincide with what is socially expected, it is possible for this match not to exist.

More specifically reflecting upon the discrepancy between the injunctive and the descriptive norms, Fernández-Dols (1992) identified "perverse norms". This phenomenon derives from the existence of explicit norms that are only exceptionally possible to accomplish, and sanctions (negative or positive) that are arbitrarily administered. This phenomenon is recognisable by people as a common situation and shares certain characteristics with an unjust situation, namely demoralization and mistrust towards authority (Oceja & Fernández-Dols, 1992). Furthermore, the trangression of norms that are usually perverted tends to be more tolerated than other transgressions (e.g., to tolerate drivers who exceed speed limits vs. those who drive drunk: Fernández-Dols & Oceja, 1994) which seems to perpetuate the phenomenon. Also, the individuals who are able to put this transgression into practice get a negatively connoted image of power (Fernández-Dols, 1992, 1993). Nevertheless, despite the descriptive transgression of these injunctive norms, and despite their being difficult to follow (hence, their perversity), they are still the background against which individuals are evaluated and sanctioned (e.g., fines for individuals who are caught speeding). In sum, injunctive norms (e.g., not exceeding 120km/h in highways), even if descriptively they may not be followed, are still a sign of what society considers to be proper behaviour (e.g., driving within a certain speed limit).

---

[4] Nevertheless, as far as we were able to find, Cialdini and colleagues do not cite Codol's (1975) work, either to acknowledge the similarities or to state the differences betwen the concepts.

A third example, more closely related to Dubois's research, relates to following the norm of internality vs. engaging in the self-serving bias (Miller & Ross, 1975) Although giving internal accounts for one's behaviours and results (both negative and positive) is highly valued (i.e., injunctive) in individualistic, economically liberal societies (Dubois, 1994), which reflects the norm of internality, very often individuals give internal reasons for positive aspects (e.g., successes) and external reasons for external ones (e.g., failures), that is, the self-serving bias. Nevertheless, as we will see in more detail, this kind of society continues to value the expression of internality for both positive and negative behaviours and outcomes. Even though most individuals may not follow it descriptively, they are still judged against this injunctive norm. Those who follow the norm of internality are evaluated more positively, namely by individuals who symbolize formal evaluations, such as teachers (e.g., Dubois & Le Poultier, 1991) and supervisors (e.g., Pansu & Gilibert, 2002). As a consequence, and as we will see in more detail, individuals who follow the norm of internality have greater chances of being successful than those who do not (Pansu, Bressoux & Louche, 2003). It is by taking into account the existence of this injunctive norm, and not focusing on the more descriptively normative self-serving bias, that we may understand how individualistic, economically liberal societies are organized and on what elements their functioning is based[5].

Following this reasoning, we focused on the injunctive (counter-)normativity of the expression of the BJW.

4.1. The Norm of Internality

In the 1980s several French researchers (Jean-Léon Beauvois, Nicole Dubois, François Le Poultier) began the study of social norms of judgment, among which the norm of internality received special attention. Inspired by the works by Stern and Manifold (1977) and, especially, Jellison and Green (1981)[6], the norm of internality

---

[5] It goes without saying that what what we have just presented does not mean that the study of descriptive norms is a secondary issue or lacks interest. For instance, if one is interested in changing behaviours, we must take into account the descriptive norm (see, for instance, Schroeder & Prentice, 1998, for an intervention on pluralistic ignorance about alcohol use). Thus, research goals should guide whether the researcher should focus on injunctive, descriptive or both kinds of social norms. In our case, following the sociocognitive approach as our main theoretical framework, we focus on the injunctive (counter-)normativity of the expression of BJW.

[6] These authors used the Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966). Therefore, their results do not directly show that individuals positively value internal explanations for behaviours, but only the expression of controllability of outcomes (Dubois, 1994). That is why we do not present their results in this section but only in a later one. However, they hypothesized the existence of a norm of internality which was the starting point for much

(Beauvois & Dubois, 1988) received special attention and much of the theorizing underlying Beauvois's (1995) model was based on results involving this judgment norm. In fact, the most studied judgment norm has been the norm of internality. Nevertheless, other judgment norms have recently been studied, namely other components of individualism such as "self-sufficiency" (people are expected to find solutions to their own problems) or "individual anchoring" (people are expected to define themselves without referring to group memberships). We will focus on the norm of internality because research on this judgment norm has highly influenced ours.

The norm of internality derives from learning in socio-educational settings (e.g., school, companies) that the accentuation of the actor's role as a causal factor of behaviours and outcomes is more socially valued than the accentuation of the role of external factors (Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; Dubois, 1994; Dubois, Loose, Matteucci & Selleri, 2003). For instance, explaining one's failure to achieve one's job requirements by stating that one did not put enough effort in the task is more socially valued than stating that one had too much work.

Although not all internal explanations are systematically more valued than external ones, with this pattern being more pronounced for explanations based on efforts than traits (Dompnier & Pansu, 2007; Pansu & Gilibert, 2002)[7], the general pattern is the valuation of internal over external explanations.

This phenomenon is not connected to internal explanations being truer or, at least, being perceived as truer, than external ones (Beauvois, 2003; Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; Dubois, 1994; Dubois et al., 2003). In fact, as Beauvois and Dubois (1988) note, internal explanations may even be objectively wrong since individuals tend to discard the influence of external factors in situations in which they are indeed the factors that determine a certain outcome or behaviour (e.g., the illusion of control, Langer, 1975).

If truth is not the criterium for such a wide use and valuation of internal explanations, Dubois (1994) and Pansu et al. (2003) situated their importance in the role they play in economically liberal societies. In this kind of society, evaluations are central in order to admit, promote or dismiss individuals, and these evaluations are facilitated if, for instance, individuals are held responsible for their actions and outcomes. It is among individuals who have more experience with evaluations (i.e., the

---

research by Beauvois and Dubois (for a criticism about using Locus of Control Scales in the study of the norm of internality, see Dubois, 1994, and Jouffre, 2003).
[7] However, as Pansu and Gilibert (2002) discuss, perceivers may interpret the fact that a target who shows effort as a sign of an underlying trait – "effortful".

more educated ones and the ones occupying higher positions) that internal explanations are more valued. Nevertheless, it is a norm that is learnt early in life, in such a way that research on the norm of internality shows a clear valuation of internal over external explanations in both minors and adults (Dubois, 1994; Dubois et al., 2003).

In the case of minors, Dubois (1988) observed that both children and teenagers gave more internal answers when asked to give a positive than a negative image of themselves, and that in the case of positive image, scores were higher when they had to self-present to a teacher (a symbol of formal evaluation) than to parents. Dubois, Bonmarchand and Scheurer (1992, cited in Dubois, 1994) observed that 8-16 year-old pupils also judged a fictitious peer who self-presented internally as more successful at school and in friendships than another fictitious external peer.

Adults also judge internal children more positively than external ones. For instance, both teachers and parents predicted that a fictitious internal child would be more successful and integrated in school than an external child (Dubois, 1988b, cited in Dubois, 1994). Also, Dubois and Le Poultier (1991) showed that teachers predicted that a fictitious internal pupil would more likely pass to the next grade than an external pupil, independently of his/her current academic standing or social class. Bressoux and Pansu (1998, Study 1) found that the same pattern holds when teachers are asked to rate the academic potential of their own pupils (3rd graders) (see also, Dompnier, Pansu & Bressoux, 2006).

Regarding adults as targets, managers, who are supposedly more acquainted with evaluative practices than subordinates, give more internal explanations for work-related outcomes and behaviours than their subordinates (Pansu, 1997). Also, managers consider internal applicants as more "employable" than external ones, and judge internal employees with average performance as positively as external employees with superior performance (Pansu & Gilibert, 2002). This latter result led Pansu et al. (2003, p. 209) to state that "The fact of producing internal explanations seems to act somewhat like a "criterion of excellence", a sort of guarantee at the heart of evaluators' implicit personality theories". Thus, the expression of internality is associated with success (both at school and in companies) and higher status, either symbolic ("the good student") or real (managers vs. subordinates).

In sum, the expression of internality for behaviours and outcomes carries value to individuals expressing it. They are described in more favourable terms and are

expected a brighter future than a target who does not express internality. The next question is: what is social value based on?

4.2. The Dimensions of Value

Beauvois (1995) distinguished among three components that are activated in a psychological description: affective, descriptive and evaluative. The *affective* component is related to the fact that the target being described or the word being used is liked or not liked. The *descriptive* component concerns what the person is supposed to be like and the behaviours that may be expected. Finally, the *evaluative* component refers to the social value attached to the target by a trait.

The most frequently used dimension in implicit personality theories, that is general beliefs about how certain traits are or are not related to others (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954), is a general evaluative dimension which is subdivided into different types of evaluative contents (Kim & Rosenberg, 1980; Rosenberg et al., 1968). These are broad dimensions of social value that can be generalized to different contexts (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). For instance, if someone is described as honest, he/she may also be expected to be described as generous, but not as mean (the implicit personality theory), and this pattern is expected to hold in various settings.

According to Cambon (2006b), numerous works have tried to ascertain the dimensions that would give structure to personality descriptions, and the most common solutions have been bidimensional models which have been reproduced both intra- and interculturally. One should note that these dichotomies show up either when participants are asked to rate targets by using adjectives (traits) presented by the experimenters or when they are asked to describe targets on their own (Cambon, 2006b). This fact shows the structuring nature of these two dimensions in interpersonal perception (for the case of intergroup perception, see Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy & Glick, 1999).

There are several such dichotomic models in the Social Psychology literature: value and dynamism (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957), intellectual positivity/negativity and social positivity/negativity (Rosenberg & Sedlack, 1972), status and affiliation (Wiggins, 1979), self-profitability and other-profitability (Peeters, 2001), or competency and morality (Wojciszke, 1997) (all cited in Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). To these we may add agency and communion (Rosenberg, Nelson & Vivekanathan, 1968), competence and warmth (Fiske et al., 1999, 2002), and social

utility and social desirability (Beauvois, 1995). In terms of meaning, there is empirical equivalence among the labels of the first terms and among the labels of the second terms of the dichotomies (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). Whereas the former opposes positively and negatively valenced traits regarding people's competences or/and abilities (e.g., intelligent, hard-working vs. dumb, lazy) and also people's status or power (dominating, strong vs. dominated, weak), the latter opposes positively and negatively valenced traits regarding sociability (e.g., warm, kind, vs. aloof, unkind).

To Beauvois (1995) the aforementioned dichotomies correspond to two dimensions underlying the value attributed to objects and persons (Le Barbenchon, Cambon & Lavigne, 2005). According to Cambon (2006a), Beauvois's (1995) model is among the most discussed and validated models of the components of social value for individual targets, and presents a social framework for interpreting results.[8]

4.3. Beauvois's Model: Social Utility and Social Desirability

Beauvois's model emphasizes the social aspect of value carried by traits and focuses on individuals as entities immersed in social structures. According to Beauvois (1995), it is this social inclusion that determines individuals' knowledge of the value of objects. Therefore, to Beauvois (1995, 2003), the value of a person or an object only has meaning when social relationships are taken into account.

Beauvois (1995) distinguished between two kinds of values that people and other social objects can take: "social utility" and "social desirability". The term "social" in each component aims to emphasize the social aspect attached to the knowledge of someone's (or something's) value (for the sake of simplicity, we will only refer to people from now onwards).

On the one hand, *social desirability* is connected to affective value (Beauvois, 2003) and includes the characteristics that make someone be felt as pleasant vs. unpleasant, or be approached vs. avoided on a social level. Social desirability should not be equated with individual desirability. Social desirability refers to what is liked or disliked in a certain society or group. Whether or not a specific individual also likes or

---

[8] Other validated models for individual targets focus, according to Cambon (2006a), on an intraindividual level of analysis (Cambon, 2006a). Fiske and colleagues' model (1999, 2002, 2004), the stereotype content model, is another very used model but it is aimed at group perception and aims to capture the several kinds of stereotypes, how dependent they are of the relationship between ingroup and target outgroup and the emotions elicited. Although we based our dependent measures on this model for Studies 5 and 8, we think that it is beyond the scope of this work to present it. The reasons for using such dependent measures will be presented in Study 5.

dislikes that person is a matter of individual desirability. Even though Beauvois (2003) argued that social desirability refers to social attraction and not to interpersonal attraction, the author did not argue that individuals who are socially desirable cannot be desirable at an interpersonal level.

On the other hand, *social utility* is related to the fit of the person to the fundamental options of social functioning and has a quasi-economic meaning (Beauvois, 1995). The social utility of a person is defined by the rules of the social system functioning, which aim at assuring its continuity and, in the case of Western, democratic societies that option it seems to be economic liberalism (Beauvois, 1995; Dubois, 1994; Pansu et al., 2003). Thus, the label "social utility", as Beauvois uses it, does not have functional but economic connotations. In other words, "social utility" refers to the person's market value and not to the specific services that he/she can do to someone else or a group. As Cambon (2006a, p.131) states, "money is the ultimate sign of objects and people's social utility" (our translation).

To sum up, and as Beauvois (2003) put it, desirability has affective value and utility has social value. A social desirable person is someone who is perceived to have what it takes to be liked, and a social useful person is someone who is perceived to have what it takes to be successful (Cambon, Djouari & Beauvois, 2006). The empirical distinction of these two dimensions was first addressed in an unpublished study by Gallay (1992, cited in Dubois, 2005) and replicated in Cambon (2006a).

In Gallay's study, participants had to write down the names of two people they knew on each cell of a 2 X 2 table. One variable contrasted "people they liked/ vs. didn't like" and the other contrasted "people who had all the qualities vs. few qualities to succeed in social life". Afterwards, they had to choose, from a list of 60 traits, the six traits they thought best described each of the eight people they had recalled. A correspondence analysis showed that the two dimensions theorized by Beauvois (1995) were reproduced. One factor, *social desirability*, contrasted traits such as "pleasant", "open" and "attractive" with traits such as "pretentious", "irritating" and "petty". The other factor, *social utility*, contrasted traits, such as "ambitious", "dynamic" or "intelligent" with traits such as "naïve", "shy", "unstable".

In further studies, Cambon (2006a) confirmed the theoretical meaning of this distinction. More specifically, participants attributed more social utility traits to neutral target faces that were associated with more indicia of social success (banknotes) than to faces that were associated with fewer such indicia. This result gave further evidence to

the quasi-economic perspective in the definition of social utility. On the other hand, participants evaluated the same neutral target faces with more social desirability traits the more frequently they were exposed to them (without the social success indicia), showing a simple exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968).

Another point that shows the aforementioned connection between, on the one hand, social utility and market value and, on the other hand, between social desirability and affect, is how different jobs are perceived. Classically, professional activities which produce capital have been distinguished from those which are aimed at the welfare and entertainment of producers (education, health, cultural "industries"). This distinction goes back to authors such as Adam Smith, Malthus or James Stuart Mill who respectively distinguished between productive and nonproductive activities (Cambon, 2004).

Cambon (2002) showed that social utility was associated with professional activities connected to production or activity areas whereas social desirability was associated with services or professional activities related to entertainment. When the participants were presented with all possible pairs of 12 jobs and asked to select, for each pair, either the one which gets more money to society or the one which lets people feel good, they selected jobs related to production (e.g., manager of a mine site; miner) or jobs related to services (e.g., manager of a hospital; janitor), respectively. In another study, when the participants were asked to describe targets associated with either activity domain, they chose more social utility traits for targets associated with production jobs and more social desirable traits for targets associated with jobs related to entertainment (Cambon, 2004, Study 1). The participants also made this distinction concerning the status of jobs by attributing more social utility traits for targets supposedly having high status jobs, and social desirability traits for targets supposedly having low status jobs.

The latter results remind us of what has been found in other research in other domains, for instance the modern forms of sexism and racism. This research has noted that these two dimensions (even if given other labels) are differently used according to status of the group and reflected on these divergent uses. For instance, the positive competence/social utility dimension is more used to describe dominant groups (e.g., Whites, men, rich people) whereas the positive warmth/social desirability dimension is more used to describe targets from dominated groups (Blacks, women, poor people), (Amâncio, 1994; Eagly & Mladinic, 1993; Fiske et al., 1999, 2002, 2004; Jost, Burgess

& Mosso, 2001). These attributions occur among both high and low status members (Jost & Banaji, 1994) which function as a mechanism that perpetuates the system. In other words, this attributional imbalance serves as a device to perpetuate and legitimize inequalities by creating and maintaining legitimizing myths (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), supported by both low and high status members, such as that people with different characteristics should occupy different positions in society. We will come back to this issue in chapter 3.

In sum, social desirability traits are aimed at dominated groups and social utility ones to dominating groups, and these diverging attributions have legitimizing effects.

4.4. What is Normativity Based on: Social Utility, Social Desirability or Both?

4.4.1. The Social Utility View

Research on the norm of internality has shown that it is judged more socially useful than desirable. For instance, internal targets are described, both by others and themselves, with more social utility traits than with social desirable traits (Dubois, 1994). In other words, these individuals are perceived and perceive themselves as more socially useful (e.g., industrious, ambitious) than socially desirable (e.g., likable, good-natured).

Having based his model primarily (although not solely) on results concerning the norm of internality, and concluded that the norm of internality was anchored on social utility, Beauvois (1995) proposed that the normativity of social judgments (and of targets expressing it) anchored on social utility and not on social desirability[9]. This would not mean that a social useful judgment (or person) would necessarily be disliked. In fact, a normative judgment could also be liked through a process of internalization of social utilities. In other words, by being exposed to a norm people could end up getting used to it and find it desirable (a kind of mere exposure effect, Zajonc, 1968). What Beauvois (1995) meant was that the mere fact that individuals like an object, a person or

---

[9] We should note that "anchor", as used in the sociocognitive approach, does not relate to Moscovici (1976) proposed mechanism through which individuals link the new to the old, in order that the former can be understood. In fact, the social representations theory is not usually cited in the sociocognitive approach, even though both share the assumption that the social level strongly influences the cognitive level. In the sociocognitive approach, stating that a judgment norm "anchors" on social utility or on social desirability means that one of these kinds of social knowledge is more strongly associated to a given judgment norm and constitutes its main social value.

a judgment, does not make it/him/her normative. Instead, it would be its/his/her social utility dimension the defining feature of it/his normativity.

To sum up, a judgment (and consequently a target expressing it) would be normative if it were in accordance with the fundamental options of our society, that is the ones which allow it to reach its goals, whether or not it is liked (Beauvois, 1995). In this way, in individualistic and economically liberal societies, such as Western democracies, where actors are motivated for success and reaching specific goals, being industrious (a social utility trait) would be more important than being likable (a social desirability trait). What is more, by making the actor responsible for outcomes, internal explanations facilitate evaluation practices (e.g., performance appraisals, decisions to fire, admit or promote personnel, pass or fail students), which are basic in the organization(s) of such societies. Ultimately, it would be the evaluative practices in school and companies that would establish such a norm (Dubois, 1994; Pansu et al., 2003). This fact would explain consistent results showing the positive valuation of internal explanations by both school children and adults, especially by those occupying positions where evaluative practices are central.

4.4.2. Can Normative Judgments Really Lack a Desirable Component?

So far, we have seen that judgment norms were theorized to anchor on social utility. However, results obtained from 2001 onwards led to two reconceptualizations. The first concerned the view that for a judgment to be normative it did not have to be desirable as well; the second, to be developed in the next section, concerned the assumption that judgment norms anchor above all on social utility.

The research that produced these theoretical changes was published by Dubois and Beauvois (2005) although it was already discussed by Beauvois (2003). In it, Dubois and Beauvois (2005) present a series of experiments testing the normativity of individualism as a whole and the normativity of each of its components, among which "internality", "self-sufficiency" (the idea that people are expected to find solutions to their own problems; opposite: other-dependent), "individual anchoring" (to define oneself without referring to group memberships; opposite: other-anchoring) and "individualism in a narrow sense" (primacy of individual goals over group goals; opposite: collectivism in a narrow sense). Results of Study 1 showed that, when taken as a whole, the expression of individualism and collectivism was rated as equally desirable, but individualism was seen as more socially useful than desirable (with the

expression of collectivism showing the reverse pattern). In sum, the expression of individualism as a whole was normative and its normativity rested above all on social utility without denying some degree of desirability. These results are in accordance with Beauvois's (1995) theoretical proposals. However, when each component was analyzed separately, the resulting patterns were not so homogeneous.

Let us focus here on the first theoretical change: from the view that a judgment was normative independently of its social desirability to a view that prescribed a certain degree of desirability in order to be normative.

In Dubois & Beauvois (2005, Study 4), the participants were presented with a target who was described differently across experimental conditions, and then they had to choose a number of statements that they thought would describe such a target. When a target was described as "very useful" (e.g., active, ambitious) the participants thought that he/she would choose more "individualism in a narrow sense", and "self-sufficiency" sentences than a target described as "very desirable" (e.g., pleasant, nice). On the contrary, when a target was described as "not very useful" (e.g., shy, vulnerable), participants thought that the target would choose fewer "individualism in a narrow sense", and "self-sufficiency" sentences than a target described as "not very desirable" (e.g., irritating, boastful). These results suggest that both components are normative, according to Beauvois's (1995) original proposal, which put forward that judgment norms are normative because of their social utility, irrespectively of being perceived as desirable or undesirable. However, when discussing results, Dubois and Beauvois (2005) only considered self-sufficiency normative. On the contrary, the authors considered individualism in a narrow sense as not normative (or even counternormative, at least in France), possibly due to results in Study 2a (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005) which showed that when the participants were asked to give a positive image of themselves, they opted for self-sufficiency but not for individualism in a narrow sense.

Thus, there was reconsideration from the view that normativity may not always be desirable to a view in which desirability is a necessary, but not sufficient, feature of normativity. For instance, Beauvois (1995) questioned "for what reason are internal explanations always useful [thus, normative] even when they are not desirable any longer", p. 378, our translation). Nevertheless, Beauvois (2003) later stated that "undesirable events cannot become normative" (p. 141) although the author still

followed the original principle that "normativity rests above all on social utility" (Beauvois, 2003, p. 141).

This view, according to which the normativity of social judgments anchors above all on social utility, persisted until 2001/2003 when results concerning individual anchoring began to show incongruence with this model, that is, scores on social desirability were higher than those of social utility. This encompassed the second theoretical change, which we present next.

4.4.3. The Transition from a Social Utility View to a Social Desirability View (The Case of "Individual Anchoring")

An aspect that can be drawn from certain results in Dubois and Beauvois (2005) is the idea that there may be at least two kinds of norms: those anchored in social utility and those anchored in social desirability. In fact, a target described with social desirability traits was attributed more individual anchoring than a target described with social utility traits (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005, Study 4).

Aiming to directly test the hypothesis that there are judgment norms which anchor on social desirability, Dubois (2005, Study 2) had participants read the responses of a "target" to questionnaires (actually, the responses of the experimenter), and then judge the target. The responses were presented as choices between several pairs of sentences, one of which being normative (e.g., expressing internality) and the other counternormative (e.g., expressing externality). Three questionnaires were used, but the participants only read the responses to two. In all cases, however, they always read the responses to a questionnaire, the normative responses to which anchor on social utility (i.e., either the norm of internality or self-sufficiency) and to another, the normative responses to which supposedly anchor on social utility (individual anchoring).

The target's responses were presented in one of four ways, which corresponded to the four experimental conditions: 1) chosen all normative sentences of the questionnaires (i.e., all sentences of either internality or self-sufficiency, and all sentences of individual anchoring); 2) chosen all counternormative sentences of the questionnaires (i.e., all sentences of either externality or other-dependency, and all sentences of categorical anchoring); 3) chosen all normative sentences of judgments anchoring on social utility (i.e., self-sufficiency or internality) and all counternormative sentences of the judgment anchoring presumably on social desirability (i.e., categorical anchoring); 4) chosen all counternormative sentences of the judgment norms anchoring

on social utility (i.e., other-dependency/ externality) and all normative sentences of the judgment norm presumably anchoring on social desirability (i.e., individual anchoring).

Afterwards, the participants had to choose the three adjectives from a set of 12 (six of social desirability and six of social utility, both negatively and positively valenced) that they thought best described the target. Focusing on the condition of interest here (condition 4), the results showed that the participants attributed the target who expressed individual anchoring and either externality or other-dependency with more positive social desirability than social utility traits. Furthermore, it was the target to whom the participants attributed the highest number of positive social desirability adjectives, and the lowest number of negative ones (equivalent to the target of condition 1, who also "expressed" individual anchoring). Thus, Dubois (2005) concluded that the normativity of individual anchoring relied (i.e., anchored), above all, on social desirability.

Thus, from 1995 to 2005 there was a change in the view that social judgment norms were only anchored in social utility to a view which acknowledges that some judgment norms anchor on social desirability. In other words, a judgment norm may either anchor on social utility or social desirability. Whether or not a judgment norm can anchor simultaneously on both dimensions has not been established yet, and we will address that issue in Study 5. In fact, this possibility was raised by Le Barbenchon and Milhabet (2005) in their studies on the normativity of expressing optimism. However, their results showed that the expression of optimism only anchored on social utility because scores on this dimension were higher than on social desirability when the target expressing high optimism was evaluated.

4.5. The Three Experimental Paradigms of the Sociocognitive Approach

The sociocognitive approach to social norms, specifically judgment norms, has much of its research based on the seminal article by Jellison and Green (1981), in which the Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966) was used as the basis for the three studies. In the studies, participants (undergraduate students) were asked to: a) (Study 1) judge targets who had presumably filled the Locus of Control Scale in the direction of low, moderate, high or very high perception of controllability (which Jellison & Green, 1981, interpreted as internality); b) (Study 2) fill it in according to their opinion and that of the "average student"; c) (Study 3) fill it in twice - in order to convey a positive and a negative image.

The experimental paradigms used in Jellison and Green's (1981) article were coined by Dubois (1994) as the judge paradigm, the identification paradigm and the self-presentation paradigm, respectively. As we present the paradigms, we indicate the results obtained by Jellison and Green (1981). The presentation order follows that used in Jellison and Green (1981).

4.5.1. The Judge Paradigm

Weiner (1993, 1995) likened humans to gods and social life to a courtroom. With these metaphors Weiner meant that individuals see themselves as legitimate judges or powerful gods who have the right to state, for instance, that others are good or bad, innocent or guilty. Others, on the other hand, are granted the right to defend themselves from accusations by offering excuses or justifications, or to confess what they are accused of. The use of the judge paradigm carries with it this view, even if it may not be mentioned explicitly.

In this paradigm, participants typically read at least one target's answers on a questionnaire (in some versions they read about or watch his/her actions on film), and then evaluate (i.e., judge) the target(s) according to certain criteria. Gilibert and Cambon (2003) identified three such criteria which constitute versions of the paradigm.

First, judgments may be made using several adjectives which are then averaged to form a global evaluative index. Jellison and Green (1981, Study 1) found that the more a target gave controllability/internal responses on the Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966), the more positively was he/she evaluated on a global index comprising the average of, for instance, friendly, admirable, likable, have for a friend. A similar pattern was obtained by Channouf and Mangard (1997) regarding consistency. The more consistent the target's responses, the more positive the global evaluation was (serious, good, pleasant, nice). This is the version that we used in Study 3.

Second, participants may be asked to make judgments of social desirability (e.g., how likable, how generous) or/and social utility (e.g., how competent, how ambitious). For instance, Dubois and Beauvois (2005, Study 1) found that individualistic targets were judged more socially useful than desirable, whereas collectivist targets were judged as more socially desirable than useful. This is the version that we used in Studies 5 and 7.

A third version, not used in this thesis, relates to judgments of academic or professional value. For instance, participants have to decide which target is to be hired, promoted or fired (see Pansu et al., 2003).

4.5.2. The Identification Paradigm

According to Gilibert and Cambon (2003), the identification paradigm can be traced to Wallach and Wing (1968). Originally, participants were asked to answer the Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966), according to their opinion and according to the way they thought a general/average target would answer (e.g., Jellison & Green, 1981: "average student"). Results are analysed by calculating the difference of scores between the two instructions. If an object (e.g., a judgment) is normative, scores are expected to be higher when participants answer according to their own opinion than according to the target's. That was the case of controllability/internality answers (Jellison & Green, 1981, Study 2): participants (undergraduate students) gave more internal responses when answering on their behalf than on that of the average student. This is the version that we used in Study 1 (target: "your classmates in general").

Other versions have been used, in which a specific value is attached to the targets (e.g., Dubois & Beauvois, 1996: "good vs. bad pupil"; Beauvois, Gilibert, Pansu & Abdelaoui, 1998: "executives vs. staff"). In these cases, results are analysed by calculating the difference between the scores of the two targets (the difference between own opinion answers and the targets' may also be analysed but is not the crucial one). If an object is perceived as normative, scores will be higher in the positive target condition than in the negative target condition. That is also the case of internality: more internal answers when participants respond on behalf of a good than of a bad pupil (Dubois & Beauvois, 1996). This is the version that we used in Study 7 (targets: bad/ good/ apple-polisher student).

4.5.3. The Self-Presentation Paradigm

According to Dubois (1994), this paradigm was first used by Jellison and Green (1981, Study 3). In that study, participants were asked to fill in the Rotter's (1966) Locus of Control Scale twice: in order to give a positive (normative instruction) and a negative image (counternormative instruction) of themselves. Results clearly showed that participants were sensitive to this manipulation: they chose more

controllability/internal statements in the positive image condition than in the negative image. This is the version used in Studies 2 and 6.

According to Gilibert and Cambon (2003), this paradigm highlights" (. . .) the beliefs which allow one to be liked, which allow one to obtain the highest degree of social approval" (p.44). This paradigm is especially suitable to identify the social desirability of an object, that is, the characteristics that make an object likable (Dubois, 1994; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).

The self-presentation paradigm has been amply used and constitutes, along with the judge paradigm, the main paradigm in the sociocognitive tradition (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005).

Gilibert and Cambon (2003) identified four variants to this paradigm.

Firstly, standard instructions (i.e., asking participants to answer according to their own opinion) have been added (e.g., Dubois, 1988). However, differences between standard and normative instructions are not systematic because, for instance, participants may feel pressured to convey a positive image of and for themselves even in standard instructions (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).

Secondly, the order of the instructions and the within- or between-subjects designs have been manipulated. Some authors opt to present participants with the standard instruction first and then either the normative or the counternormative instruction (Dubois, 1988) or both (e.g., Dubois & Beauvois, 2005, Study 2a); other authors present the various instructions in random order (e.g., Somat & Vazel, 1999). Also, although in the majority of studies the normative and the counternormative instructions are between-subjects (see Gilibert & Cambon, 2003), in some they are within-subjects (e.g., Jouffre, Py & Somat, 2001). According to Gilibert and Cambon (2003), neither the manipulation of the instructions nor the kind of design has any significant effects on the participants' answers.

Thirdly, the specific reference to the potential evaluator was added (in Jellison and Green, 1981, it was imprecise). For instance, participants may be asked to gain approval or disapproval from a teacher (e.g., Jouffre et al., 2001) or, in working populations, from a boss, a manager (Masson-Marret, 1997) or a potential employer (e.g., Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). Studies with this version of the self-presentation paradigm have shown, for instance, that expressing internality is more desirable than expressing externality, especially when the target of the self-presentation represents a

symbol of formal evaluation, such as a teacher, vs. a figure of informal evaluation, such as a parent (e.g., Dubois, 1988).

Conclusion

In this chapter we began by distinguishing two broad kinds of societies, collectivist (where individuals' goals are expected to be subordinated to the ingroups') and individualistic ones (where the individuals' self-interest is normative) (e.g., Triandis, 2001), in order to contextualize normative diversity.

Next, we focused on individualistic societies and reviewed how social norms began to be studied in Western Social Psychology, namely the works on formation and transmission of norms (Sherif, 1936), and on conformism (Asch, 1952). In reviewing these studies, we indicated that these results could be understood under the light of two kinds of social influence identified by Deutsch and Gerard (1955): normative and informational. Whereas underlying the former is the motivation for individuals to be accepted, underlying the latter is the motivation for individuals to be right.

Then, we presented the focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991; Kallgren et al., 2000), which identifies two kinds of social norms, injunctive and descriptive, the strength of which lies in their influence through normative or informational influence, respectively. This distinction was crucial to address criticisms of circularity and uselessness surrounding the concept of "social norms". To this theory, both kinds of social norms exert influence on individuals' behaviour, but the influence of injunctive social norms is more likely to be felt transsituationally than that of descriptive norms. Importantly, social (and personal) norms are more likely to have influence on behaviour if individuals are focused on them.

We then turned to the presentation of the sociocognitive approach, which restricts its study to injunctive social norms in individualistic societies (namely, France), and illustrated the reasons for this emphasis with the phenomena of pluralistic ignorance (Prentice & Miller, 1996), perverse norms (Oceja & Fernández-Dols, 1992) and the difference between the self-serving bias (Miller & Ross, 1975) and the norm of internality (Beauvois & Dubois, 1988). We focused on the norm of internality, that is, the valuation of expressing the idea that one's behaviours and outcomes are due to the social actor's internal reasons, because it has received the most research in this approach and because we have based our own research on it. Research on this judgment norm illustrated the two components of value proposed by Beauvois (1995): social utility and social desirability. Whereas social desirability refers to affective valence, social utility refers to how well an object or person meets the requirements of a given society. This distinction will be crucial in our work, specifically in Studies 5, 6 and 8.

We reviewed research on social judgments and pointed out the theoretical shift from asserting that a norm anchored above all on social utility (e.g., the norm of internality), irrespectively of its social desirability (Beauvois 1995), to a view which considered that a norm had to have a certain degree of social desirability (Beauvois, 2003), to a final view which acknowledged that there are judgment norms which anchor on social desirability (the norm of individual anchoring, Dubois, 2005). In this thesis (Study 5), we will put forward that the expression of BJW may anchor on both dimensions simultaneously.

Finally, we presented the three experimental paradigms used in the sociocognitive research (the judge, the identification and the self-presentation paradigms) which we used in the studies comprised in this thesis.

In the next chapter we will address the phenomenon of self-presentation not only because we used the self-presentation paradigm, but also because this phenomenon runs through our work.

CHAPTER 2: SELF-PRESENTATION

Introduction

Imagine the following scene: a wealthy woman, in her expensively decorated dressing-room, preparing to start another day of *dolce fare niente*. She has just woken up and must firstly get ready to face her world. Her maids dress and make her up. Confident of herself, she may even be thinking "surely, no one will ever see me without being smartly dressed. I control my world… and the worlds of those who surround me". And in so doing, she rehearses the superior glance that she will display during that day.

Now, imagine another scene involving the same wealthy woman, at her home. This time, however, instead of her confident look, there are tears rolling from her eyes. Her uncontrollable screams hint at her despair. She has just known that her (never assumed) loved one had died in a fight. After all, she was not able to control the worlds around her and, at that moment, she seems to be unable to control even her own. During the time that separates these two scenes, both she and her loved one had engaged in a series of games through which she displayed virtue, where none was to be found, while destroying the reputation of real virtuous others. In the process, they gained power over those that surrounded them… or so they thought.

Sometime after the death of her loved one, she goes to the theatre where she is booed by the audience who knew of her schemes. That night, alone in her dressing-room, she removes her make-up and silently cries. She cannot help it. She seems to have a moment of introspection. She is most probably thinking that she was caught in the web of her own games and that, in the end, she has lost what really was important in life.

If the reader finds these scenes familiar, you may know that we did not invent them. They correspond to key moments in Stephan Frears's much acclaimed film "Dangerous Liaisons", and the wealthy woman is Marquise de Merteuil, the character interpreted by Glenn Close. If we chose to begin this chapter with such a reference it is because it illustrates much of what has been theorized about self-presentation.

In this short description, several concepts come to mind: self-presentation, front (e.g., the superior glance), front creation (being dressed and made up, rehearsing the superior glance), the putting down of fronts (removing make-up, crying), backstage and frontstage behaviours (the preparation of schemes and the display of false virtue, respectively), frontstage and backstage places (the theatre and the dressing-room,

respectively) and props (expensive decoration). In sum, the scenes presented are a good illustration of Goffman's (1959/1993) "life as a theatre" metaphor used to describe the process of "self-presentation in everyday life".

In the description of the scenes, it was stated that those (dangerous) games were a way of gaining (and we add now, displaying) power over others. As we will see, one goal of self-presentation can be the attempt to control others and to be promoted, i.e., to gain power (Jones, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982). In fact, and contrarily to what could be concluded from the simple viewing of the film, self-presentation is not just an issue of the powerful and wealthy. Although interpersonal differences exist in the extent to which individuals are motivated to strategically self-present to others (e.g., self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974, 1979), or public self-consciousness (Feningstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975), in daily interaction people try to influence how others think of, feel and behave towards them.

The pervasiveness and importance of self-presentation in daily life among the commonest citizens can be shown by a click of a button. For instance, in February 2008, if we asked for a list of books by Cialdini at www.amazon.fr, the site would add a number of other supposedly related books in the field "customers who bought this book [Influence: The psychology of persuasion] have also bought". These publications, which supposedly teach people to be successful by conveying different images, have self-revealing titles: "The art of seduction"; "The 48 laws of power"; "Presenting to win: The art of telling your story"; The mystery method: The foolproof way to get any woman you want in bed"; How to win friends and influence people". Although this kind of publication is not new (Jones, 1990), the money involved has reached amounts unimaginable in the past. According to research firm Marketdata (as stated in Wikipedia) the "self-improvement" market was worth 8.5 billion dollars in 2003 and it is predicted that it will grow to over 11 billion dollars by 2008 (Anonymous, n.d.).

Self-presentation is so important in individuals' lives (and, as Goffman, 1959/1993, would add, in social functioning) that they may engage in risky behaviours, such as reckless driving, binge drinking or excessive suntan, in order to impress others and/or feel a member of a group (for a review, see Leary, Tchividjian & Kraxberger, 1994).

As we will see in more detail, the impressions or images that individuals try to convey may be either positive (e.g., to be perceived as likable or/and competent) or negative (e.g., to be perceived as intimidating). The valence of the same image,

however, may vary situationally. For instance, although for most people being perceived as law-abiding is positive, in criminal circles individuals may try to convey an image of being disrespectful of the law (Hogan & Jones, 1983, cited in Leary, 1995). Thus, just as norms vary across groups (see Chapter 1), so does the evaluation of the images that their members are supposed to convey.

We begin by briefly presenting the symbolic interactionist origins of the concept of self-presentation (Mead, 1934/1962), and move on to illustrate the pervasiveness of the self-presentation process. Then, we present Goffman's (1959/1993) dramaturgical approach to social life and briefly refer some interpersonal differences (self-monitoring and public self-consciousness) that moderate the extent to which individuals engage in strategic self-presentation. Next, we will discuss whether or not self-presentation represent deception, will give instances that support both perspectives, and how individuals can create fronts.

After indicating the individual motives underlying self-presentation, we turn to the Jones and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy of self-presentation strategies. We will present the five strategies identified (exemplification, intimidation, ingratiation, self-promotion and supplication), their goals and limitations. We will focus on the latter three strategies, because they are more directly related to our work. When referring to ingratiation, we will stress a specific kind, more commonly known as "apple-polishing", the role that it plays in individual's climbing up the hierarchical ladder and the mechanisms that contribute to its success. In the case of self-promotion, we will present the various ways through which it may be accomplished, stressing the verbal claims of competence. Then, we will focus on one of the main pitfalls of verbal self-promotion (e.g., being perceived as boastful), and will indicate a way of going round the issue, specifically the use of balanced modesty. As far as supplication is concerned we will stress the negative images that may be conveyed if it is overused, and will draw parallel a between excessive modesty and self-derogation.

Finally, we will focus on one phenomenon related to self-presenting to oneself, the *Primus Inter Pares* effect (Codol, 1975), through which the individual sees him- or herself as more conforming to the group norms than most other members as, paradoxically, a means of individual distinctiveness. We will frame this phenomenon in the context of other better-than-average phenomena in individualistic societies.

1. Self-Presentation as a Pervasive Phenomenon

According to the well-known looking-glass self metaphor (Cooley, 1902), people imagine how others evaluate them and this representation determines how people feel about themselves. In other words, others function as mirrors on which individuals see representations of their value. Extending these ideas, Mead (1934/1962) believed that the very origin of self lies in perspective taking (the individuals' capacity to imagine how others see them), and in the capacity of imagining themselves as objects of knowledge. Furthermore, according to Mead (1934/1962), individuals are socialized beings when they are able to modify their behaviours according to what they think the expectations of other people are. In other words, individuals are socialized when they learn to self-present; and people do self-present differently according to whom they are interacting. As James (1890) argued, the individual has so many social selves as people he knows.

Deriving from symbolic interactionism and from the work by Goffman (1959/1993), the concept of self-presentation comprises a set of more or less conscious strategies that individuals use to expressively control the images that they convey to others (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Leary, 1995; Schlenker & Weigold, 1992). A concept akin to self-presentation is that of impression management. However, the two have often been used interchangeably, in that when people self-present they are trying to convey a certain impression (image) (Leary & Kowalski, 1990; but see Schlenker, 2003, for a distinction between self-presentation and impression management). In this work, we will use the expression "self-presentation" and, when necessary, we will distinguish between self-presentation for others and self-presentation for the self[10].

According to Goffman (1959/1993), self-presentation is not only a pervasive phenomenon but also a crucial one for smooth social functioning. For Goffman, social interaction would be difficult if people did not construct public identities, because this kind of information serves as a guide on what kind of interaction is to be expected. In fact, as Leary (1995) notes, it is often awkward to interact with someone before knowing something about him/her.

---

[10] This option is due to two factors. First, because the use of the label "self-presentation" is generalized, and the one that Goffman (1959/1993) used. Second, and as we will see at the end of this chapter, one of the experimental paradigms has been coined as "self-presentation" (Dubois, 1994), "not impression management" paradigm. Thus, to avoid using two expressions to designate the same phenomenon, which would be conducive to confusion, we opted for "self-presentation", adding the expressions "to others", or "to the self" when necessary. By default, the simple use of "self-presentation" means "self-presentation to others" because it is the one most used in our work.

Although individuals may not always recognize that they are engaging in self-presentation, they are concerned about other people's opinions (Jones, 1990). In fact, individuals partly behave in order to influence the impressions others have of them, and this phenomenon does not only occur among the so called "normal people". For instance, Braginsky and Braginsky (1967, cited in Leary, 1995) found that long-term schizophrenics in a mental hospital self-presented differently (showing more or less adjusted behaviours) according to what they were told the interview goals were: to ascertain whether they could be moved to a more pleasant ward, a desirable outcome, or to be released from the mental hospital, which is considered an undesirable outcome for such long-term inmates (see also Begeer et al., 2008, for the case of self-presentation in autistic children).

Due to the pervasiveness of self-presentation, it is not strange that Goffman (1959/1963) likened social life to a theatrical performance. According to the dramaturgical metaphor, individuals resemble actors on stage when they interact with other individuals (the audience). In the process, individuals play specific social roles in specific situations and behave differently according to their current role. For instance, a man may show aggressive behaviours as a football-player but show tenderness at home with his family. As such, individuals have situated identities (Goffman, 1959/1993) which change according to his/her goals and the audience for whom the individual has to perform. In other words, individuals situationally negotiate their own identities and place others in their situated identities in order to achieve certain goals.

Since identities are situated, a given identity may be desirable or undesirable in different situations. For instance, as a football-player, the man's goal is to win the match, and a way of accomplishing that goal may be through attempts of intimidating the adversary (this is even more visible in New Zealand's rugby national team who perform Maori warrior-like dances in front of the rival team before the beginning of each match); however, when in family, the man's goal may be to be loved and seen as a caring husband and father; hence, his tenderness displays. Thus, both aggressiveness and tenderness displays may be positively evaluated, according to the individuals' situated identities and the goals they wish to attain.

Although self-presentation is a ubiquitous phenomenon, there are inter-personal differences in the extent to which individuals are concerned with their public images and with the kinds of impressions that they try to convey (Brown, 1998). One such difference is self-monitoring (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1974, 1987) which

refers to the degree people are motivated to and do control their behaviour in public situations. Another interpersonal difference is public self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975), which refers to the degree to which people focus on public, observable aspects of themselves. Although self-monitoring and public self-consciousness tend to be positively correlated (Tomarelli & Shaffer, 1985), they are different constructs. The former is a motivational orientation – high self-monitors are more motivated than low self-monitors to engage in strategic self-presentation. The latter is not a motivation – individuals high in public self-awareness are simply more aware of themselves in public situations than individuals low in public self-consciousness.

So far it seems that self-presentation and deception are equivalent. The very short list of publications, included in the introduction to this chapter, which "teach" their buyers how to "adequately" self-present, seems to support this idea. Furthermore, there are cases in which people lie, by omission or commission, about their identity(ies). In extreme cases, individuals may self-present with multiple fake identities, such as Frank Abagnale, a con-artist whose "adventures" were filmed in Spielberg's "Catch me if you can" (spies, covert agents, are other instances). Therefore, the question arises: does self-presentation equal deception?

2. Self-presentation and deception

Goffman (1959/1993) argued that self-presentation does not necessarily imply deception. In fact, most of the time it does not (Leary, 1995), and individuals even tend to believe their self-presentations. For instance, Tice (1992) showed that the individuals' own self-concepts may shift in the direction of how they present to others. If anything, it seems that self-deception is, at least, as usual as other-deception.

Through repetition in multiple settings, self-presentation often becomes an automatic process with no or little attention being devoted to it (Jones, 1990). Moreover, Jones (1990) argues that, in most cases, individuals recognize that self-presentation occurs in interactions but only from others, not themselves. Although this kind of attribution may derive from associations between self-presentation and deception, it also seems to stem from individuals' difficulty in perceiving themselves as social actors. As a consequence of self-presentation being so common, effortless and even unconscious, individuals tend to think that they are just doing things, not self-presenting (Brown, 1998; Leary, 1995). In other words, individuals tend to perceive themselves as genuine human beings.

Another argument against the idea that self-presentation necessarily implies deception is that, on occasions, it is only through self-presentation that others come to validate the individuals' true attributes (or, at least, the ones that the individual thinks he/she has). Without this dramatic realization, as Goffman (1959/1993) coined this process, these perceived attributes of the self may likely be left unnoticed in various situations.

It goes without saying that individuals do not always self-present in the way as they perceive themselves, and do engage in strategic self-presentation, which we emphasize in our work. For instance, the above mentioned perceived true attributes of the self are often displayed only when the individual is alone (like Marquise de Merteuil, Glenn Close's character, at the end of the film), while publicly showing other attributes. In other words, individuals usually put on a front required by their social roles, and show their perceived true selves in specific situations to which only a limited few (sometimes, only the individual) have access. To these different patterns correspond, respectively, frontstage and backstage behaviours (Goffman, 1959/1993). For instance, the football-player may perceive himself as much more tender than aggressive but having to put on a front of aggressiveness when he is playing the role of football-player. Furthermore, he may only allow himself to display tenderness when his situated identities are those of a father and husband at home. According to Goffman (1959/1993), it is in places away from the public eye (metaphorically coined "backstage areas"), that individuals may put down their fronts (and, in the process, relax from the effort of strategic self-presentation), or where they prepare their fronts for their public performance (remember Marquise de Merteuil being dressed and rehearsing glances in her dressing-room).

3. How Individuals Create Fronts

Goffman (1959/1963) distinguishes among three key types of expressive resources which give cues about the kind of interaction to be expected: the actors' appearance (e.g., clothing, hairstyle, facial expressions, way of talk, titles), the actors' manner (e.g., mood, disposition or style of behaviour) and the interaction setting (e.g., offices, classrooms, churches, kind of housing) in which props (e.g., furniture) may be used to convey specific impressions.

Leary (1995) adds other tactics which are more related to our work: attitude expressions and attributional statements.

Traditionally, the study of attitudes has stressed their intrapersonal nature, and has neglected their interpersonal and intergroup relationships (Leary, 1995; but see the concept of "prejudice" as the intergroup equivalent to "attitude", e.g., Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue, 2006). The expression of attitudes, however, influences the impressions that the audience has of the social actor. For instance, if someone wants to impress others for his/her refined musical taste he/she may drop how much he/she loves classical music. If, on the other hand, the individual wants to be perceived as rebellious, it is unlikely that he/she will mention that kind of music.

As for attributional statements, they may be more than simple explanations or causal inferences for events. Again, the study of attributions on an intraindividual level does not capture their interindividual or intergroup functions (Leary, 1995; but see the "ultimate attribution error", Pettigrew, 1979). For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the study of the norm of internality has shown that, irrespective of the true cause of an event, internal explanations (attributions), and targets expressing it, are more valued than external ones (Dubois, 1994). Also, individuals give more internal explanations when asked to convey a positive image of themselves, and give more external explanations when asked to convey a negative image of themselves (Beauvois & Le Poultier, 1986; Dubois, 1988; Jellison & Green, 1981).

Just as the expression of attitudes and attributions has self-presentational consequences, so the same may hold for the expression of beliefs. In fact, one goal of this thesis is to ascertain whether the expression of BJW is normative or counternormative. In either case, there will be self-presentational issues involved. If it is perceived as normative, individuals are likely to express it as a form of self-valuation. If, on the contrary, it is perceived as counternormative, individuals are likely to avoid expressing it, in order to avoid a negative image, or express its opposite in order to gain a positive one.

4. Personal Motives to Self-Present

Although self-presentation may be automatic, very often it is the product of a strategy that individuals use to achieve their goals, some of which we have already mentioned. We now turn to a more structured presentation of them.

Self-presentation may regulate emotions by promoting positive ones and reducing negative ones. In the case of the promotion of positive emotions, conveying images that others will favour is likely that people feel better because they are accepted

and approved (Baumgardner, Kaufman & Levy, 1989). Also, since people like to perceive themselves as likable and competent, by convincing others that they are competent and likable, they may also convince themselves that they have those desirable qualities. As Brown (1998, p.163) states, "(. . .) people seek to create impressions in the minds of others because it makes them feel good about themselves to do so". Furthermore, merely telling other people about themselves can reduce negative feelings (Leary, 1995).

Individuals also construct (Baumeister, 1982) or confirm (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982) particular identities for themselves through self-presentation. The construction of new identities may also have a motivation function, in that when individuals publicly claim to have a certain identity, they feel pressure to confirm it (Goffman, 1959/1963). In the case of confirming particular identities, Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1982) refer to the process as "self-symbolizing". For instance, in the case of a new teacher, conveying images and using symbols that are consistent with his/her representations of being a teacher will help him/her internalize the new role. Furthermore, displaying socially defined, identity-relevant symbols of what makes a teacher, will help the social validation of his/her new identity.

Finally, people self-present to gain material and social rewards, or conversely to avoid material and social punishments (Brown, 1998; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker, 1980). In the process, individuals try to control how others see them so as to be in a better position to influence the nature of social interaction. For instance, an employee who is able to convince his/her superiors that he/she is competent will more likely influence the superior's decision of a promotion than an employee who is not. For this reason, Jones and Pittman (1982) suggested that self-presentation serves to maintain or increase the actor's power in his/her relationships, in the sense of intentionally conveying specific images (e.g., an image of being someone intimidating, competent or likable).

<div align="center">5. Strategic Self-Presentation</div>

In order to maximize the likelihood that their goals are achieved, individuals select expressive behaviours that they regard as appropriate for the situation. In a word, individuals engage in strategic self-presentation. In so doing, individuals may opt to self-present as having certain characteristics or identities or to hide them, according to their current situation and goal(s). Leary (1995) referred to these two different approaches as attributive and repudiative self-presentation, respectively.

Taking into account that individuals react not to other people (or other stimuli) but to the representations they have of other people (Leary, 1995), if individuals are successful in making others represent them as they wish, they have a powerful means of controlling interactions and outcomes. In other words, strategic self-presentation aims at creating in others specific representations about the self in order to attain power. As Jones and Pittman (1982) stated, "Formally we define strategic self-presentation as *those features of behavior affected by power augmentation motives designed to elicit or shape others' attributions of the actors' dispositions*" (p. 233, italics in the original).

According to Leary and Kowalski (1990), the motivation to engage in self-presentation varies according to the goal-relevance of impressions (social and material outcomes, self-esteem maintenance, identity development, amount of contact with the audience, dependency on the audience), the value of desired goals (for instance, motivation to self-present is higher when the desired outcomes have intrinsically more value or when they are scarce) and the discrepancy between desired and current images (the higher the perceived discrepancy the higher the motivation tends to be).

However, as Brown (1998) argued, impressions are only effective as long as the audience accepts them. Schlenker and Weigold (1992) have proposed that in order that self-presentation is successful, individuals must always make a trade-off between beneficiality (presenting the most advantageous image possible) and believability (self-presenting in a realistic way). As we will see, each self-presentation strategy has specific dangers for the self-presenter, and may even backfire against him/her. This occurs if the audience sees through the social actor's intentions, or somehow the self-presenter loses control of the image conveyed (see the case of supplication later in this chapter).

5.1 Jones and Pittman's (1982) Taxonomy of Self-Presentation

Jones and Pittman (1982; see also Jones, 1990) created a taxonomy of five self-presentational strategies: exemplification, intimidation, ingratiation, self-promotion and supplication. Jones (1990) admitted that this taxonomy is not exhaustive, as far as self-presentation on the whole is concerned, but that their original goal was to cover the most power-related strategies.

We will present the five strategies, but our focus will be on ingratiation, self-promotion and supplication. Firstly, self-promotion and ingratiation are the most common strategies (Brown, 1998), and the ones which have received the most research (especially, ingratiation) (Leary, 1995); and secondly, these three strategies have

revealed themselves the most central to our arguments as we conducted our studies and analysed the results.

5.1.1. Exemplification

Through exemplification individuals try to convey the impression that they are morally superior, virtuous, or righteous (Jones, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982). These individuals run the risk of being perceived as hypocritical unless they show consistent honesty across a variety of situations. As a result, the rewards gathered through exemplification may be lost if something that goes against the public image and discourse of virtuosity is found. As shown in the recent sex scandal case involving ex-Governor Eliot Spitzer, who fought against prostitution but who was discovered to have had the services of a prostitute (Powell & McIntire, March 11, 2008), exemplification can be a fragile performance which may suddenly fall apart.

5.1.2 Intimidation

This strategy is mainly used when individuals wish that others do something coercively, or when they want to build a reputation of someone who is not to be messed with (Jones, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982). Although it is often used by people with greater power in an interaction, such as bosses towards employees, or officials towards soldiers, it may also be used by individuals with lesser power, such as children threatening to "make a scene" (Jones & Pittman, 1982). The goal of conveying an intimidating image explains why seemingly irrational aggression (in the sense of unprovoked) occurs in various settings, such as prisons (Toch, 1992, cited in Leary, 1995). In these settings, displaying aggressive behaviours is a way that individuals have to communicate that it is not a good idea to have them as enemies. Thus, what superficially seems to be irrational behaviour (unprovoked aggression), a more thorough analysis reveals it to be a rational strategy for living in a hostile setting. Thus, individuals who use this strategy do not aim to be liked, but respected or feared (Jones, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982).

5.1.3. Ingratiation

If the individuals are motivated to be liked and to get along, they opt for ingratiation, possibly the most ubiquitous and basic of all self-presentation strategies (Jones, 1990). Usually the advantages of being liked outweigh those of being disliked.

For instance, people who are liked tend to be more rewarded with friendship, romance, status, social support or help than those people who are disliked (Leary, 1995).

Godfrey, Jones and Lord (1986) showed that there is a wide culturally shared knowledge of the tactics that make one be liked, among which showing interest in the other person, using approach gestures, such as eye contact and smiles, or indicating agreement with other people's beliefs and opinions. Pandey (1986, cited in Leary, 1995) put forward that the latter (opinion conformity) is the most used tactic transculturally when people want others to like them. Gordon (1996), however, found that flattery is a more efficacious tactic than opinion conformity.

Among the nonverbal behaviours, we emphasize subtle mimicry of someone's behaviour (the "chamaleon effect", Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), showing interest in the other person, using approach gestures, such as eye contact and smiles, or doing favours, (Jones, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1990; Wayne & Ferris, 1990). The last tactic, however, may be a too transparent way of ingratiation and, as such, it is mainly used when status differences are not very accentuated (Gordon, 1996). Finally, looking physically attractive is a very common way of making oneself likable (Leary, 1995). Thus, it is not strange that individuals spend so much money in improving their physical appearance, even risking their health (Jones & Leary, 1994; Leary & Jones, 1993; Leary et al., 1994).

Ingratiating behaviours may result from either automatic or controlled processing (Jones & Pittman, 1982). In the former case, social cues that stress one's dependency on a target (e.g., status differences in an organization) may automatically trigger ingratiating behaviour, as a result of overlearned responses (Jones & Wortman, 1973, cited in Jones, 1990). Nevertheless, ingratiation is often the result of deliberately attempting to have the targets do what the actor wants. In other words, ingratiation can be strategically used, and it is in this sense that we will focus here and in our studies (for instance, one of the experimental conditions of Study 6 asked participants to fill in the BJW scales in such a way as to be liked). In this respect, ingratiation can be seen as a strategy for gaining power over someone else, such as in the case of intimidation (Jones, 1990). Thus, the main goal of ingratiation may not be to be liked *per se* but to achieve ulterior motives (one's hidden agenda) by being liked. Contrarily to intimidation, however, the power obtained through ingratiation is achieved in a concealed way. This lack of strategic openness, which involves other-deception, led Jones (1990) to qualify

ingratiation as an illicit way of gaining power (see Ralston & Esass, 1989, for a review of and predictions concerning ingratiation as a political device in organizations).

According to Jones (1990), there is not only other-deception involved in the ingratiation process, but also self-deception. In fact, Jones (1990) pointed out that one of the reasons that ingratiation works out so often is due to an "autistic conspiracy", in which both the ingratiator and the target tend to participate. On the one hand, it seems aversive to the ingratiator to perceive him- or herself as deceptive. On the other hand, the target wants to believe that the ingratiator is being sincere (Jones & Pittman, 1982).

Despite the participation of the target in the "autistic conspiracy", Jones (1990) stressed that the ingratiator often faces a dilemma. This "ingratiator's dilemma" consists in the fact that the need to ingratiate (i.e., to be liked) is usually higher in contexts in which the target (e.g., a boss, a teacher) may be more sensitized that the individual (e.g., an employee, a student) is ingratiating. According to Jones (1990), this dilemma is less likely to show up either when the ingratiator has a higher status than the target, because there are no reasons to doubt of the sincerity of the process (e.g., a supervisor paying one of his/her subordinates a compliment; a teacher praising one of his/her student's work), or when ingratiation is made laterally (both the ingratiator and the target have the same status). It is in the case in which the ingratiator has a lower status than the target that ingratiation must be disguised and that the "ingratiator's dilemma" shows up more often[11]. Thus, the more the need to ingratiate, the more the need to disguise it, so that the target does not suspect of the ingratiator's ulterior motives.

Nevertheless, if the ingratiator disguises ingratiation too much, it is unlikely that ingratiation has an effect on the target. Gordon (1996) purposed that a "mid-of-the-road ingratiation" is the best way to be successful. Among the tactics at his/her disposal, Jones (1990) suggested disagreeing on trivial issues while agreeing on relevant ones, being humorously self-mocking, or having others ingratiate on the individual's behalf.

As already mentioned, ingratiation must not be blatant; otherwise its effects may backfire. In this case, instead of being perceived as likable, the ingratiator gets a discredited identity (Goffman, 1963/1990). Disparaging terms such as "apple-polisher" or the more graphic ones, such as "bootlicker", "asslicker" or "brownnoser", are self-

---

[11] Vonk (1998, Study 2), however, showed that the state of dependence is more crucial in ratings of ingratiators than their formal hierarchical relationship. Thus, in cases in which someone who has a hierarchically higher position but momentarily needs a favour from a subordinate (i.e., is momentarily dependent on the subordinate), the latter may also become suspicious of ingratiation and the former may feel the need to disguise his/her ingratiation attempts.

revealing as to its negativity. Associated to the representation of an "apple-polisher" are the ideas of deceit and manipulation (Ralston & Esass, 1989), that is, illegitimate ways of achieving one's goals.

Individuals seem to have highly accessible schemas of apple-polishers which can be easily retrieved from memory by few cues, such as knowing of a target's few behaviours towards people they depend on (Vonk, 1998). Individuals who are friendly towards their superiors but unfriendly to their subordinates, namely derogating them (the "licking upward, kicking downward" situation) are especially disliked, as shown by the coinage of this phenomenon, the "slime effect" (Vonk, 1998).

Despite the perils involved in ingratiation if it is found out, a meta-analysis of studies about this self-presentational strategy showed that targets are generally affected by it in the way ingratiators intend to and, in return, reward them (Gordon, 1996). In fact, even in situations in which the target of ingratiation is likely to be suspicious of the ingratiator's purposes, such as when the ingratiator has a lower status than the target, ingratiation seems to pay off (Leary, 1995). Apparently, individuals like to be flattered and reward those who do it. Thus, ingratiation may be a crucial strategy in the advancement of the ingratiator's career because, when it is successful, judgments of likeability may spread to other domains, as a halo effect (Jones, 1990). As Jones (1990) states, "a pinch or two of ingratiation helps to leaven the other self-presentation strategies as well" (p. 185), such as being judged competent. In fact, research has found that ingratiation pays off in terms of raises and promotions (e.g., Westphal & Stern, 2006), or job performance ratings (e.g., Wayne, Liden, Graf & Ferris, 1997).

On the contrary, observers of ingratiation are more likely to question the ingratiator's real motives, and more readily and accurately see through his/her hidden agenda than the targets of ingratiation (Gordon, 1996). In four experiments, Vonk (2002) showed that this target-observer difference was a robust effect that could be explained by neither several situational nor personality variables. Instead, it seemed to derive from the target's self-enhancement motive.

Apple-polishing and other-derogation (as in the "slime effect" situation) are relevant to our work. In one experimental condition of Study 7 we asked participants to fill in the BJW scales the way an apple-polisher would, and in several conditions of Study 8 participants were asked to evaluate a target who engages in other-derogation through the expression of BJW. Also, ingratiation, as a whole, is relevant because we

asked participants to self-present through the expression of the BJW in order to be liked (Studies 2 and 6).

5.1.4. Self-Promotion

This is a strategy that aims at convincing the target that one is competent, intelligent or talented (Jones, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982). Individuals use diverse ways of showing their competence, both verbally and nonverbally.

Verbal claims of competence may be direct, by saying that one is good at a certain task, or indirect, by downplaying the effort that one exerted in completing a task (Leary, 1995). Nonverbal displays of competence comprise completing tasks and directly showing that one is competent. Just as in the case of exemplification, in which showing exemplar behaviours is the best way to convince others of one's morality, so is doing things the most convincing tactic of self-promotion.

5.1.4.1. Nonverbal tactics of self-promotion.

Since, on the one hand, there are people who exaggerate their claims of competence and, on the other hand, it is believed that people who really are competent do not need to talk about it, the individual sees himself/herself in the "self-promoter's paradox" (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Thus, the best tactic to convince the target of one's competence is not claiming for it but to show how competent one is. That is why Baumeister (1982) put forward that task performance may be a tool for self-presentational purposes. In fact, one of the reasons people are motivated to succeed and achieve is to be perceived as successful, competent or effective (Leary, 1995).

In fact, when individuals know or suspect that their desirable performances may be left unnoticed (e.g., the case of a supervisor who has too many subordinates to control) they turn to stage performance (Goffman, 1959/1993; Jones, 1990). In other words, individuals arrange the setting in such a way that the targets of their self-promotion notice their performance, in order to accomplish a dramatic realization (Goffman, 1959/1993), in this case the social validation of his/her competence.

Another way of self-promotion is through association with successful ones and dissociation with unsuccessful ones or people of disrepute, which correspond, respectively, to the "basking in reflected glory" or BIRG (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman & Sloan, 1976) and "cutting off reflected failure", or CORF effects (Snyder, Lassegard & Ford, 1986), respectively. Similarly, individuals try to both

increase the value (burnishing) and minimize the negative characteristics (boosting) of people, places, and institutions to which they belong or are somehow associated with (Cialdini, 1989, cited in Leary, 1995). The latter phenomenon occurs even in situations in which the association is extremely weak, such as sharing one's birthday with an undesirable person (Finch & Cialdini, 1989).

One potent way of self-promoting involves a mixture of succeeding and verbal claims of obstacles. Following the augmenting principle (Kelley, 1973), if an individual succeeds despite obstacles, his/her competence will be seen as superior. If, on the contrary, he/she does not succeed, the failure may be attributed to the obstacle, and following the discount principle (Kelley, 1973), perceptions of his/her competence may remain untouched. These obstacles, however, may not only be claimed but also created by the individual in a self-handicapping strategy (Jones & Berglas, 1978). These created obstacles, which objectively decreases chances of success (e.g., to drink heavily on the eve of an exam), has similar self-presentation effects to those of claimed obstacles. In other words, the self-handicap may enhance one's performance in case of success, but serve as an excuse in case of failure. Nevertheless, excuse making, which violates the norm of internality, involves risks. Schlenker, Pontari and Christopher (2001) argued that excuses make one be perceived as unreliable, uncommitted, untrustworthy (if others perceive the excuse as such and not as a valid reason for failure), or self-centred (if excusing involves blaming others).

5.1.4.2. Verbal tactics of self-promotion.

As for verbal tactics, although individuals usually self-promote in this way, their claims may hurt their likeability, except in settings in which these claims are expected, such as job interviews (e.g., Stevens & Kristof, 1995). In other settings, individuals who verbally self-promote may be perceived as competent at the expense of not being liked. For instance, Holtgraves and Srull (1989) showed that the context in which self-promotion occurs is crucial in how others evaluate the self-promoter. In this study participants had to evaluate people who made positive remarks about their intellectual ability (having good grades). The ratings of the targets who mentioned their good marks after being specifically asked about them were more positive (more likeable, considerate and less egotistical) than the targets who mentioned their grades without being asked. In such cases, people are disliked because they are perceived as immodest for trumpeting their achievements.

Furthermore, a study by Godfrey et al. (1986) showed that self-promoters may not only be disliked but also be seen as incompetent. In other words, verbal claims of competence may backfire. Godfrey at al. (1986) had pairs of undergraduates to interact verbally. Whereas in the experimental conditions, one of the members of the dyad was instructed to either self-promote or to ingratiate the other member, in the control condition there was no specific instruction. Results showed that participants who ingratiated and those in the control condition were liked more than those who self-promoted. What is more, the self-promoters were judged less competent than the other participants. This study shows several aspects: first, that people seem to be more successful in ingratiating than in self-promoting; second, that verbal claims of self-promotion may backfire, in that individuals who engage in that kind of interaction may be perceived as neither competent nor likable, possibly being given another, unexpected type of discredited identity, that of a bragger (but see Holtgraves & Dulin, 1994); third, that modest self-presentations are more conducive to balanced perceptions of competence and likeability.

In sum, there is usually a trade-off between perceptions of competence and likeability when individuals self-promote verbally (Jones, 1990; Leary, 1995).

Nevertheless, despite this trade-off, individuals prefer being perceived as incompetent only on specific occasions, for instance to avoid unpleasant tasks or, in the case of competitive situations, to convince the adversary that one is less capable than one really is so that chances of winning increase (Leary, 1995). On the whole, however, people are more motivated to self-promote than to self-deprecate, at least in individualistic societies. A way of resolving the trade-off between perceptions of competence and likeability is to have someone else promote the self (Leary, 1995). Another way, and the one we will emphasize here is to self-present modestly, that is neither too positively nor too negatively.

Self-promotion is relevant to this thesis because we will ascertain whether or not the expression of BJW can be used as a way of verbal self-promotion. Specifically, in two experimental conditions of Study 6 we asked participants to fill in the BJW scales in such a way as to convey an image of competence or success. Furthermore, in several conditions of Study 8 we asked participants to judge targets who engaged in self-promotion (conditions of other-promotion were also included).

5.1.4.3. The case of modesty.

The valuation of self-presenting modestly, and the consequent repudiation of immodesty (i.e., "showing-off"), is already recognized among children as young as eight years-old (e.g., Bennett & Yeeles, 1990; Watling & Banerjee, 2007). In fact, expressing modesty seems to be a common norm which can explain why sometimes individuals prefer to underestimate their own performance and overestimate that of their group (Codol, 1975).

Modesty can be cultivated by either reducing self-effacement, when the self-views are too negative, or by reducing self-enhancement when the self-views are too positive (Sedikides, Gregg & Hart, 2007). For instance, individuals may publicly acknowledge the aiding role of others in one's successes (that is the case of artists receiving academy awards, or PhD candidates at the beginning of their dissertations), or by pointing out weaknesses in less important areas (Baumeister & Ilko, 1995). According to Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbit and Kashima (2005) modest self-presenters not only gain in likeability but they do not usually lose in perceived competence.

By default, modest self-presentations are directed at acquaintances (e.g., family, friends) and self-promotion to strangers (Sedikides, et al., 2007; Tice, Butler, Muraven & Stillwell, 1995, Studies 1 and 2). Violating this automatic default requires cognitive effort from individuals, as shown in worse performances in recall tasks when compared to individuals who do follow the default (Tice et al., 1995, Studies 3 and 4).

According to Tice et al. (1995; see also Sedikides et al., 2007) the different patterns of self-presentation to acquaintances and strangers may be due to differing amounts of information that each one has of the self-presenter. Acquaintances know about both one's achievements and abilities, and therefore it is not necessary to inform them. Furthermore, they are also likely to know about one's weaknesses and failures, which prevent the individual from boasting, even if he/she would like to. Strangers, however, do not know much, if anything at all, about either the individual's successes or failures. In order that strangers know about their strengths, individuals have to self-promote (that is what occurs in job interviews), and may hide their less desirable characteristics.

Despite the normativity and the advantages of modesty, Leary (1995) points out that too much modesty is likely to me damaging to one's image, as we will see next. A study by Robinson, Johnson and Shields (1995) compared the ratings of likeability, self-knowledge, honesty and authenticity attributed to three targets: a self-promoter (or self-

enhancer), a modest (or balanced self-presenter) and a too modest (or self-deprecator), as we will see whwn we address supplication (next section). For now, we will only refer to the the self-promoter and the modest targets and leave the self-deprecator to when we present the supplication strategy. Results showed that the modest target was rated as the most likeable, authentic and honest, and as the one with the highest self-knowledge (the latter case equivalent to the self-promoter).

To sum up, a balanced modest self-presentation is usually a good strategy, in that it does not curtail perceptions of competence, but adds likeability (unless it is perceived as false modesty, Leary, 1995). In other words, individuals who self-present in a balanced modest way are perceived as having social utility and social desirability (see Beauvois, 1995). On the contrary, self-promoters are usually seen as competent but not likable, that is as having social utility (as long as they are not perceived as deceivers) but lacking in social desirability, as shown in expressions such as "bragger", or "show-off" (see also Powers & Zuroff, 1988).

5.1.5. Supplication

On some occasions people turn to supplication, through which individuals self-present as weak, helpless or incompetent. This is a last resort strategy, seeing that competence and success are so valued (Jones, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982). Through supplication individuals try that others regard them as weak and dependant (Jones & Pittman, 1982) so that they, following the norm of social responsibility, or the obligations superiors are expected to have toward inferiors (the *noblesse oblige* ideology) come to their help. As a result, targets of supplication feel obligated to come in the supplicator's assistance, whether or not they feel like helping him/her (Leary, 1995). In extreme cases, supplication may underlie depression or other psychological difficulties, but it is often used strategically (Leary, 1995). For instance, someone may exaggerate his/her incompetence so as to not be chosen for a task he/she does not like (Gove, Hughes & Geerken, 1980).

Supplication, however, comprises risks for the person who uses this strategy, one of which is to be avoided if he/she shows depressive symptoms (Segrin & Dillard, 1992). Also, even if the supplicator receives help, he/she is perceived as incompetent, weak, lazy or insecure. For instance, Powers and Zuroff (1988) showed that participants who interacted with a confederate who self-derogated (a too modest way of self-presentation) gave her more support, but privately they thought that she was a poorly

functioning individual. Also, Robinson et al. (1995) found that the self-derogator (when compared to the self-enhancer and the balanced modest targets) was rated as relatively honest (more than the self-enhancer but less than the balanced modest) but the least likeable, and the one with the least self-knowledge of the three. To sum up, self-derogation (a too modest self-presentation) can even be more undesirable and make the individual more disliked than self-promotion. Strangers may take these (often exaggerated) modest claims at face value and come to believe that the actor is not competent.

Thus, besides knowing to whom to self-present in a modest fashion, the social actor must know the amount of modesty to convey. As Sedikides et al. (2007) state "(. . .) being modest is hard work" (p.163). When individuals self-present too modestly, they are negatively viewed, for instance as insecure (Schlenker, 1980). If that self-presentation is believed, they are likely to be viewed as self-derogators (on the contrary, if it is not believed, they are likely to be seen as arrogant, Leary, 1995). As Robinson et al. (1995) discussed, it may be that self-derogators can bring very little to personal relationships and, we add, they may lack social utility.

This strategy is important to our work because one experimental condition of Study 7 we asked participants to fill in the BJW scales in such a way that people who read their answers would feel pity. Furthermore, in Study 8 we asked participants to judge some targets who self-derogated through the expression of BJW.

The aforementioned strategies involve individuals self-presenting to others by trying to convey specific images. Nevertheless, individuals may self-present to themselves in an attempt to convince themselves that they possess certain characteristics, are a certain kind of person (see, for instance, the self-symbolizing process, Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), or occupy a specific position in a given group.

Next, we will present a set of findings that hint at the issue of self-presentation to the self, specifically seeing oneself as better than average. We will develop in more detail the *Primus Inter Pares effect* (PIP) (Codol, 1975), a self-perceptual framing through which individuals tend to see themselves as more normative than others in general on relevant comparative dimensions.

6. The "better-than-average phenomena" in individualistic societies and the PIP effect

In reviewing past research, Epley and Dunning (2000) identified several instances of a general pattern in Western societies: that individuals tend to see themselves as superior than others on desirable dimensions and inferior to others on undesirable dimensions. In the instances quoted by Epley and Dunning (2000), individuals tended to perceive themselves as more charitable, cooperative, considerate, fair, kind, loyal and sincere, and to think of themselves as less belligerent, deceitful, gullible, lazy, impolite, mean and unethical than the average person (see also Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; see also Kruger, 1999; Moore, 2007, for the limits to this phenomenon).

In their own studies, Epley and Dunning (2000) found a "moral superiority effect", whereby individuals assert that they would behave more cooperatively and ethically than their peers, and that their behaviours would be only driven by moral sentiments, whereas their peers' would also involve self-interest issues. This pattern, however, does not only show up among "the men in the street", but also among those who study them, namely social psychologists. In fact, Van Lange, Taris and Vonk (1997) found that social psychologists themselves believe that they are more likely to engage in academically desirable actions (and less likely to engage in academically undesirable actions) than their peers.

This "better than average" trend on desirable dimensions is more likely to show up when individuals compare themselves with people in general or average others than with known individuals (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak & Vredenburg, 1995). This trend is also stronger in private than in public, which suggests that people do believe in their superiority but put up a front of modesty in public (Brown, 1998).

These results seem to derive from the need to be different in Western individualistic societies where the differentiation of the self from others is highly valued (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989) and praised in popular culture (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). For instance, being assertive is a requirement in advertisements for high status positions, and in numerous films the hero is a lonely individual who overcomes all obstacles. Also, "My way" is one of the most popular songs ever written, the English lyrics of which state that "I ate it up and spit it out/I faced it all and I stood tall and did it my way". The fact that it has been sung by such diverse artists as Frank Sinatra or The Sex Pistols seems to attest the centrality of perceiving oneself unique in individualistic societies, even by those whose discourse is

centred around the replacement of the existing society by a new (dis)order, such as stated by the Punk movement.

Although in individualistic societies self-interest is normative (Ratner & Miller, 2001), and individuals are expected to leave groups that make the achievement of their personals goals difficult, which contrasts with more collectivist societies (e.g., Kim & Markus, 1999)[12], even in individualistic societies individuals need to belong (see, Baumeister & Leary, 1995, for a review). In fact, the need to belong seems to be universal and to have survival value (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and according to Maslow (1968), creating bonds with other people is the second most basic need in individuals. The fact that this need comes in second is especially significant is highly significant as to its importance, being Maslow's theory impregnated with individualistic ideals, such as self-actualization (Dubois, 1994).

Research has found that being ostracized is unpleasant, to say the least (Williams, 2001). This unpleasantness is felt when one is ostracized either by ingroup or outgroup members, even in cyberspace settings (e.g., Smith & Williams, 2004), and even when the outgroup is despised (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). Also, loneliness is associated with several negative states, such as depression, pessimism, alienation or low self-esteem (Ernst & Caccioppo, 1999). Furthermore, individuals in debilitating physical states, such as cancer patients, who have social support, show more improvements in their condition than individuals who do not have such support (Baron, Cutrona, Hickling Russell & Lubaroff, 1990).

So far, we have seen that two apparently conflicting motives dominate people's lives, at least in individualistic societies. How are they able to cope with such a seemingly paradox?

In a review, Hornsey and Jetten (2004) identified eight strategies that individuals use in order to balance the need to belong and the need to differentiate by crossing two variables: mechanisms for achieving distinctiveness (structural reality or perceptual framing) and level of distinctiveness (group or individual). The strategy that interests us, the superior conformity of the self, or the *Primus Inter Pares* (PIP) effect (Codol, 1975), involves a perceptual framing and individual distinctiveness.

---

[12] This does not mean that individuals in collectivist cultures do not feel the need to differentiate themselves from others, even from ingroup members, from whom they are expected not to stand out, only that the manifestation of distinctiveness is different cross-culturally (for an overview, see Hornsey & Jetten, 2004).

The PIP effect consists of the tendency for individuals in Western societies to present themselves as more normative than *most* others. For instance, in a context where cooperation is normative, each individual tends to state that he/she is more cooperative than most others. If, on the contrary, being competitive is the norm, each individual tends to state that he/she is more competitive than most others (Codol, 1975)[13]. According to Codol (1975), the PIP effect results from a conflict between the desire to please and the desire to preserve the uniqueness of the self. Whereas the former leads to conformity, the latter leads to differentiation. The only way to present oneself simultaneously as conforming and being unique is paradoxically to state one's superior conformity. Judging oneself as more normative than most others, however, does not deny the acknowledgment that they are normative too; only that they are less normative than the self.

The PIP effect is not a question of mere self-enhancement, in the sense of individuals simply attributing desirable features to them. In fact, as with other "better-than-average" phenomena, self-enhancement is a component of the PIP effect and it is achieved through the comparison with other individuals. Thus, it is not a mere attribution of certain characteristics to the self. Nevertheless, contrarily to other "better-than-average" phenomena, such as the "moral superiority effect", the PIP effect can show up even in features that are commonly undesirable, but valued in a certain context.

This effect, however, is not expected to show up in all comparisons between the self and the other members of a group. The identification issue seems central to the emergence of the PIP effect. As Hornsey and Jetten (2004) state (quoting a reviewer), "a low identifier probably would not bother going through the mental gymnastics needed to balance the need to belong and the need to be different" (p. 261). Actually, Codol (1975) had argued that asserting one's superior conformity to the norms, in order to convey a positive image of oneself, is more likely in reference groups. If the referent is too vague (e.g., people in general) or identification is low, individuals may give random answers although that is not necessarily the case (Codol, 1975).

In the definition of the PIP effect we stressed that the judged superiority of the self related to most others. The qualification "most others" is important because,

---

[13] Although this phenomenon has been studied in individualistic societies, where the need for individual differentiation is "intuitively" assumed, Hornsey and Jetten (2004) discuss that it likely occurs in collectivistic societis too. However, the dimensions on which it shows up are possibly different. For instance, whereas in individualistic societies people are more likely to see themselves as more autonomous than most others, in collectivistic societies individuals may perceive themselves more conformist than most others.

although *"primus inter pares"* literally means "first among equals", Codol (1975) cautioned that this tendency does not necessarily imply presenting oneself as being the first (i.e., the most normative) of all others. This may occur when individuals are in small groups or when this kind of self-presentation does not differ much from objective reality (e.g., having the second best performance in a small group). However, the PIP effect is unlikely to show up in large groups (where it is difficult to claim being the first on a given dimension), or when self-presenting as the best/most normative individual clashes with objective reality (e.g., when objectively the individual has one of the worst performances). As Codol (1975) emphasizes, the PIP effect is more a comparative than a superlative phenomenon.

The importance of this phenomenon to our work is clearly seen in Study 1, in which we asked participants to fill in the BJW scales, according to their opinion and according to their classmates' in general.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to be an overview of self-presentation, a pervasiveness phenomenon in social life which is extremely important in our research. We emphasized self-presentation for others over self-presentation for the self, because the former is more explicitly focused in this thesis.

In this overview we emphasized two aspects: Goffman's (1959/1993) dramaturgical metaphor on social presentation and Jones and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy of self-presentation strategies. Nevertheless, we also addressed the latter in the last section of the chapter when we reviewed literature on the "better than average" phenomena, specifically the PIP effect.

As for Goffman (1959/1993), besides presenting his crucial notion that individuals, as social actors, do try to convey specific images to other social actors (the "audience"), we also presented a series of notions put forward by Goffman which complete his metaphor and are powerful aids to our understanding of the self-presentation phenomenon. In this sense, we reviewed concepts, such as the creation of fronts, frontstage and backstage behaviours (those that are accessible vs. not accessible to the audience, respectively), frontstage and backstage places (respectively, places shared with the audience vs. places to which only the social actor or a limited few have access, and where fronts are created). We also emphasized the notion that identities are situated and linked it to differing kinds of self-presentation.

Although self-presentation does not necessarily equal to deception, and most of the time individuals do seem to believe in their own self-presentations, we stressed its strategic use. For that purpose, we based ourselves on Jones and Pittman's (1982) now classic taxonomy of self-presentation strategies which we used for the most part in our studies.

We focused on three self-presentation strategies: ingratiation, self-promotion and supplication. When individuals ingratiate, their goal is to be liked. Although there is the danger of being perceived as an apple-polisher, research shows that when ingratiation is well conducted it pays off (Gordon, 1996). With self-promotion individuals want to be regarded as competent. If verbal self-promotion is used, there is the danger of individuals being perceived as braggers and being disliked. A way of going round this is to self-present modestly. However, if individuals exaggerate in their modesty, they are likely to be perceived negatively, such as self-defeating. This danger also permeates the continuous use of the third self-presentation strategy, that is, supplication. Individuals

who use it intend to be perceived as incompetent or helpless, for instance in situations in which they wish to escape from doing undesirable tasks.

Finally, we focused on one phenomenon that comprises self-presentation to the self, the PIP effect (Codol, 1975), through which individuals perceive themselves more normative than most others in reference groups. If, when comparing to others on a given dimension, individuals assert their relative superiority, it is likely that the dimension in question is normative. This reasoning is helpful in the study of the (counter-)normativity of phenomena, as is our case.

The concept of self-presentation is very important to our work, because most of it is based on answers to two scales, specifically the Personal BJW Scale (Dalbert, 1999) and the General BJW Scale (Dalbert, et al., 1987). It is well-known that individuals taking personality tests often give social desirable answers by portraying themselves healthier or better adjusted than they really are (Leary, 1995). Baumeister, Tice and Hutton (1989) see the scores on standard measures of trait self-esteem as self-presentation acts: scores labelled "low self-esteem" are, in fact, usually in the middle range of scores. In other words, people with lower self-esteem self-present as having "average" self-esteem, not low, which could convey an undesirable/aversive image of dependence. According to Becker (1976, cited in Leary, 1995), even answers on scales aiming at identifying social desirable responding can be faked.

Thus, although we cannot ascertain whether or not the answers to the scales really reflect the individuals' stand (which was not our goal anyway)[14], it very likely is an act of self-presentation (Leary, 1995), either for others (social desirability effects) or for the self (wishing to believe that one is the "correct", i.e., normative, person, or has the "correct" characteristics, or believes in the "correct" ideas). Although in personality research self-presentation issues are a matter of much concern, it turns out to be a major strength in research about normativity, as is our case.

In the next chapter we will review the literature on BJW the (counter)normativity of which is the object of this thesis.

---

[14] As we will see in Chapter 3, individuals may not even be aware of their standpoint as far as BJW is concerned (Lerner, 2003).

CHAPTER 3: THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD THEORY

Introduction

Again we ask the reader to imagine a situation. This time the setting is a psychiatric ward where individuals suffering from schizophrenia have been hospitalised for a long time. You watch the come and go of inmates and staff in the corridors. Some psychiatrists are getting ready to see their patients. Nevertheless, you cannot help noticing that, before leaving, they let escape to their colleagues a "going to see those cuckoos" remark. And you wonder how these highly trained individuals can utter such remarks. And the way they walk, "for crying out loud" you think angrily, shows unwillingness, even reluctance, to meet their patients. "How unprofessional can they be?", you wonder. However, would they behave like this if a new drug had just arrived and there would be hope of change in schizophrenics' lives?

The situation portrayed in the above paragraph was loosely based on the opening pages of Lerner's (1980) classic book "The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion" where the author presented his observations prior to developing his belief in a just world (BJW) theory. Furthermore, Lerner observed other instances of seemingly irrational behaviour among educated young people who showed no extreme scores on psychological or ideological measures. This behaviour involved the fact that related to the fact that the average medicine student tended to blame the poor for their plight, disregarding the social aspects that contribute to poverty.

In fact, derogation and blaming innocent victims, that is victims who do not contribute to their situation, are very usual phenomena and central ones in Lerner's theory. As put forward by Lerner and colleagues (e.g., Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) these "nonrational" reactions derive from the need that individuals have of perceiving the world as a just place, where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get (for the specific case of psychiatrists and their reactions to dangerous patients, see Rumgay & Munro, 2001).

We will begin by presenting how the BJW hypothesis was conceived (observation) and the two first studies that tested it (Lerner, 1965; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). We will indicate the distinction that has been made between the BJW and the need to believe in a just world. We will then stress the role of the so called "personal contract" (Lerner, 1977) between the individuals and society, and the centrality of

deservingness in the process. The personal contract and the strategies individuals use to protect their BJW will be two leitmotifs in this chapter.

We will present two studies (Braband & Lerner, 1975; Long & Lerner, 1974), with children as participants, which show the importance of deservingness and reactions to others from an early age. In studies with adults, we will see the relationship between believing in a just world and making long-term plans and achieving one's goals through just means (e.g., Hafer, 2000b, Study 3). We will then present studies that show that innocent victims threaten people's BJW, the strategies they use to protect it from this evidence and the reasons that lead them to engage in such strategies. Afterwards, we will present the distinction between the personal and the general BJW, as operationalized by scales, and the phenomena that correlational research has shown to be best predicted by each of this spheres of BJW best predicts. Then, we will present the criticisms that some authors have offered against the use of scales in experimental BJW research (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 1980). Since our research is experimental and we used scales, we wondered whether the validity of our studies is compromised.

In order to answer this question, after stressing that previous experimental BJW research has focused on the intra- and inter-individual levels of analysis (Doise, 1982), we present recent research situated at the intergroup level and stress the lack of experimental BJW research at the ideological level of analysis, at which we situate ours. The system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), by viewing the BJW as a legitimizing device of the *status quo*, shows the importance of studying it at this level; however, the evidence presented is either situated at the intra- or inter-individual levels, or is correlational in nature. Based on the only experimental BJW study situated at the ideological level of analysis that we were able to find (Dittmar & Dickinson, 1993), we will argue that shows that the use of BJW scales can be useful in gaining theoretical insights at this level of analysis.

1. The First Experimental Studies: Lerner (1965) and Lerner and Simmons (1966)

The BJW hypothesis (e.g., Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978) states that people need to believe that the world is a place where people get what they deserve and, conversely, deserve what they get because of either their behaviour or their character.

Lerner formulated the just world hypothesis based on his observations and the findings from studies that reported counter-intuitive results. We briefly describe two such studies: Lerner (1965) and Lerner and Simmons (1966).

According to Correia (2003), it is in Lerner (1965) that the principle of deservingness (i.e., "people have what they deserve") is stated for the first time. Lerner (1965) based his study on the findings by Yaryan and Festinger (1961) and Aronson and Mills (1959), and introduced two differences. Yaryan and Festinger (1961) found that that the more effort participants had put into a task, the more they thought that the outcome would be the one they wanted, and Aronson and Mills (1959) found that the more effort participants had put into a task, the more attractive the outcome seemed to them.

In Lerner (1965), contrarily to the previous studies, participants did not do any tasks or were rewarded. Instead, they listened to "Tom" and "Bill", two confederates who had been taped, but who participants thought were performing a series of tasks (solving anagrams) at that moment. Participants were informed, prior to listening to "Tom" or "Bill's" performance, which one would be rewarded and which one would not. They were further informed that the choice of the person to be rewarded had resulted from chance. A second difference, compared to the previous studies, was that participants did not have to evaluate either "Tom" or "Bill's" outcome but their contribution to the task.

As expected, participants evaluated either "Tom" or "Bill" more positively (in terms of degree of contribution, effort and creativity), depending on which one was said that would be rewarded. Since the only factor that changed between-subjects was this information, results could be interpreted as resulting from a bias through which participants had made sense of the situation. The reasoning underlying the participants' evaluations was very likely that people reward those who deserve it. Thus, the one who got the reward must have deserved it. This somewhat circular reasoning, which is perfectly reasonable in a just world, could not objectively hold in that situation. After all, participants had been informed that either "Tom" or "Bill" only received the reward by chance. Nevertheless, participants distorted the objective situation, and evaluated the

person who had been rewarded more positively. This pattern showed up despite "Tom's" higher ratings in attractiveness than "Bill's".

This was the first experimental demonstration of the BJW effect, through which individuals perceive that people get what they deserve, when other factors, such as mere luck, are involved.

In Lerner and Simmons (1966), the situation was not one in which injustice derived from the absence of positive consequences (as was the case in Lerner, 1965), but from the existence of negative consequences, specifically suffering.

In this study, participants were led to believe that they were watching a confederate supposedly getting electrical shocks, in what was presented as a study on emotional reactions. Thus, in the eyes of participants, the confederate was a victim. Six experimental conditions presented the "victim's" situation differently: 1) the "reward" condition, in which participants could vote for or against the ending of suffering, were informed that it had been decided to end it and that the victim would be paid; 2) the "suffering as a past event" condition, the only one in which participants were informed that the scene had been filmed, and that at that moment she was well; 3) the "endpoint" condition, in which the participants were informed that the victim would not have to suffer more because the experiment had finished; 4) the "midpoint" condition, in which participants were informed that the victim suffering would continue after a break; 5) the "reward decision" condition, in which participants were asked to vote for or against the ending of suffering but were not informed about the decision; 6) the "martyr" condition, in which the confederate ended up accepting being shocked in order not to compromise the experiment, and in order that the participants received credit for taking part in the study. In other words, she was sacrificing herself for others, that is being a martyr.

In the end, participants had to rate the "victim" on 15 bipolar scales which comprised the attractiveness measure. Results showed that, on the whole, the victim was rated more attractive in the conditions, in which the participants were informed that the suffering had ended ("past event" and "endpoint"), and in the "reward" condition (which tended to be higher than in the two former conditions, but nonsignificantly). In the conditions, in which the participants thought that the suffering would continue ("midpoint"), or did not know what would happen to the victim ("reward decision"), the victim was rated less attractive than in the former conditions. A BJW reading of these results is that when people can stop the suffering (in a sense, they help the victim) or when they know that the suffering will stop, they do not need to find fault in the

victims' character in order to rationalize his/her suffering. If the victim is rewarded, this tendency is somewhat, but nonsignificantly, more pronounced.

However, when participants thought that the suffering would continue or when there was the possibility that it would, and they were unable to do anything to prevent it, they engaged in derogation. Facing an emotionally arousing experience which shattered the participants' sense of justice, and not being able to change the situation, the solution that they found to reestablish their emotional balance was to try to convince themselves that the victim was the kind of person who deserved to suffer. In this way, their "fundamental delusion" ("fundamental" in the sense that it is central and basic) that the world is just would be left untouched. Nevertheless, it was in the "martyr" condition that this need to reestablish the perception of justice was more highly felt. In fact, it was in this condition that participants derogated the victim the most, which seems to point that having others suffer for us can be an especially aversive experience.

In sum, in Lerner and Simmons's (1966) study, when no help or compensation was possible, or when the participants were left uncertain as to the victim's fate, they reinterpreted the situation by judging the innocent victim as the kind of person who deserves to suffer. Thus, their BJW was restored through derogation.

The results of these two studies led to the conclusion that when people witness injustices that they cannot change, they cognitively distort the situation in order to make sense of it and to perceive justice where it is not to be found objectively. This perception was achieved by attributing a better performance to the rewarded member (Lerner, 1965), or by evaluating an innocent victim whose suffering persists more negatively (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). The latter study also shows that in situations in which individuals can compensate or come in aid for victims they do it (to decide to stop the suffering and reward the victim in the "reward condition"). However, if that course of action is not possible (or, as we will se later, it is too costly), they cognitively restore justice by perceiving the victim under a negative light (derogation) or by blaming him/her for his/her situation (see also Lincoln & Levinger, 1972). In other words, in the latter situation individuals resort to secondary victimization (Brickman et al., 1982), that is reactions that increase the negative consequences of being a victim in the first place (with other forms of secondary victimization being avoidance and minimization).

Later publications (Lerner, 1977, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Lerner, Miller & Holmes, 1976) expanded on the aforementioned findings and theorized about the

origins of the need to believe in a just world, the mechanisms of the BJW maintenance and the development of a more general justice motive (Hafer & Bègue, 2005). According to the BJW theory, the aforementioned perceptive distortions are assumed to be functional for individuals, because they allow them to keep faith in their personal contracts.

2. The Development of the Personal Contract and The Threats to the Belief in a Just World

The BJW theory puts forward that individuals develop a justice motive (Lerner, 1977, 1980; Lerner et al., 1976), which Montada (2002) regarded as an "anthropological constant" (i.e., omnipresent). According to this perspective, individuals need to believe in a just world, that is they need to believe that the world they inhabit is one where " (…) people get what they deserve or, conversely, deserve what they get" (. . .) (Lerner Simmons, 1966, p.204), which transcends mere self-interest issues (Lerner, 2003; Montada, 2002). According to Lerner (1980), this need will give rise to a BJW, the form and degree of which will vary interindividually.

We should note, however, that in Lerner's conceptualization (e.g., Lerner, 1980, 1998, 2002, 2003), the crucial point is the individuals' motivation to behave and perceive the world as if it were a just place. In fact, Lerner (1980, 1997) insists that the expression "BJW" should not be interpreted literally, but regarded as a metaphor, according to which people behave as if they believed that the world was just. We will develop this matter more fully when we address the use of BJW scales in this research domain.

According to Lerner (1977), individuals need to believe in a just world in order to be able to maintain their "personal contract" (another metaphor), which is thought to develop in childhood, between the individual and society. With the personal contract, children learn to give up immediate gratification and to strive to reach long-term and, presumably, better goals; in exchange, society is expected to reward their efforts (Lerner, 1977). In other words, it is implicitly stated in this contract that if people postpone immediate gratifications and work hard, society, as a just place, will ultimately give individuals bigger compensations. This contract becomes an organizing principle of most people's lives (Lerner, 2002). Nevertheless, individuals can only believe in the validity of this personal contract if they also believe that the world is just, that is, a place where effort and the postponement of gratification will eventually pay off.

In sum, underlying the perception that the world is a just place is the view of merit and deservingness: whoever strives to reach something is entitled to it and deserves it. Since it is deserved, the just world logic adds, the individual will get it. In order to have such a perception, people need to believe in a "fundamental delusion" (Lerner, 1980) that allows individuals to perceive the world as a stable and predictable place where long-term plans can be made with the subjective certainty that, as long as individuals put effort to it, their goals will be achieved (Lerner, 1977; Lerner & Miller, 1978). On the other hand, if the world is not perceived as just, there is no point in investing in long-term outcomes. A violation to the personal contract is felt as an injustice that threatens individuals' BJW, especially when the events are closer to the individuals' environment (Lerner & Miller, 1978) and there are strong emotional reactions on the perceivers' side, such as anger (Lerner, 1971, 1980) and anxiety (Wyer, Bodenhausen & Gorman, 1985). Such is the case of knowing of or witnessing the suffering of an innocent victim.

Two of the next three studies that we will present show the connection between the children's developing delay of immediate gratification and an increasing concern with deservingness (Braband & Lerner, 1975; Long & Lerner, 1974). The third study (Hafer, 2000b, Study 3) shows the connection, in adults, between believing that the world is just and the investment in long-term plans as well as intentions to achieve goals through honest means.

In Braband and Lerner (1975), children first wrote an essay, received an amount of money for it and were made to believe that their reward was either "properly paid" or "overly paid" (manipulation of the variable "own deservingness"). These children were divided into high or low tolerance to delayed gratification, according to their scores on a measure by Mischel (1961), which were taken as an index of the extent to which the children were affected by considerations of deservingness. Then, they were presented with the situation of a child who had to copy out arithmetic problems by hand, and were asked to help that child. This child was presented as either deserving of that annoying task (his/her carelessness caused the copying machine to break) or as undeserving of it (the copying machine had broken down accidentally), which corresponded to the manipulation of the "other's responsibility" variable.

Results showed that, on the whole, children scoring high on the delay for gratification measure helped the child more (i.e., copied out more arithmetic problems) than those scoring low. More importantly, however, "own deservingness" and "other's

responsibility" only had effect among the children scoring higher on the measure. Specifically, children scoring higher who were also told that they had been overly, thus unjustly paid, helped the child more when he/she was presented as nonresponsible than responsible for his/her situation. However, when they were told that they had been justly paid, they seem relatively unconcerned with the nonresponsible child's situation, and even tended to help the other child to a higher extent.

These results suggest that children who are more concerned with justice do help those in need in order to reestablish a sense of justice (that is, when they were supposedly overly paid) but not when their own justice is guaranteed.

Long and Lerner (1974) had 4th-grade children supposedly test a toy to a company. As in Braband and Lerner (1975), they were divided into high and low tolerance to delay gratification, and were told that they were either properly or overly paid for the test (manipulation of "own deservingness"). Then, they were asked to donate some money to a poor orphan, either anonymously or believing that the experimenter, the teacher or the other participants would know their donations.

Results showed that, on the whole, the children who believed to have been overpaid donated more money to the orphan than the children who believed to have been justly paid. More importantly, however, in the just payment condition, the children who were high in tolerance to delay gratification donated less money than the children who were low. On the contrary, in the overpayment condition, children who were high in tolerance to delay gratification donated more money than children who were low. The former children, that is, those who were most concerned with justice issues, donated more or less money according to the "own deservingness" condition, whereas the other children's donations remained equivalent in the two conditions. Other results further illustrate this point: in the anonymous condition, children who were low in tolerance to delay of gratification gave relatively little either when they had been led to believe that their payment was just or excessive. On the contrary, the children high in tolerance to delay of gratification, in the same condition of anonymity, changed their donations according to their perceptions of "own deservingness".

Thus, these two studies give evidence that, already in childhood, individuals more concerned with justice (in this case, deservingness issues) react to someone else's situation accordingly to the other's responsibility or/and their own justice (i.e., "own deservingness") to a higher extent than individuals less concerned with justice issues.

In adults, Hafer (2000b, Study 3) showed the relationship between the individuals' endorsement to the BJW, measured through Lipkus's (1991) Global Belief in a Just World Scale, and their long-term investment orientation (two scales: The University Investment Orientation Scale and the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale by Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger & Edwards, 1994). Results showed that the participants' BJW was positively correlated with both long-term investment scales. In the same study, Hafer (2000b) also measured the participants' tendency to pursue their goals through just or unjust means which was measured through three scales: the Self-report Delinquency Scale (Rushton & Chrisjohn, 1981), Mach IV measure of Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) and the honesty-dishonesty morality subscale of the revised Morally Debatable Behaviors Scale (Katz, Santman & Lonero, 1994) (all measures cited in Hafer, 2000b). Results showed that the participants' BJW was negatively correlated with each of these three measures. Thus, adult individuals higher on BJW are not only more focused on long-term planning, but they also intend to reach their goals through more "fair and square" means than their lower BJW counterparts.

In sum, these studies provide evidence for the assumed connection between the BJW, the personal contract and the role played by deservingness (Lerner, 1977).

3. Innocent Victims as a Threat to the Belief in a Just World and The Strategies to Protect the Confidence in the Personal Contract

What happens to others surrounding the individual provide him/her with cues as to the validity of the personal contract (Lerner, 1977; Lerner et al., 1976). Thus, perceptions that injustices occur are a threat to the individual's perception of the validity of his/her personal contract. Just as injustices occur to others, so they can happen to him/her. Thus, seeing that individuals are motivated to keep on believing in the validity of their personal contract and on investing in long-term outcomes, when they face evidence of injustices, such as innocent suffering, the individuals' confidence in their personal contract lowers. Because of the importance of believing in the personal contract for long-term planning, individuals must somehow restore confidence in it. A way of restoring confidence in their personal contracts is by contributing to the change of injustices and the objective restoration of justice. If, however, that is not possible or it is too costly for individuals, they may restore justice cognitively.

If the individual perceives the victims responsible for their plight or as being the kind of person who deserves to suffer, then no injustice occurs. In other words,

individuals recognize that suffering exists, but perceive it as deserved. Also, if undeserved suffering is perceived as minimal or nonexistent, or if the individual has no contact with it, cognitively the undeserved suffering is nonexistent. As such, by cognitively distorting the situations, the individual is able to cope with emotional distress that the injustice situations evoke and keep on believing in the validity of his/her personal contract. A series of studies (Correia & Vala, 2003; Correia, Vala & Aguiar, 2001; Hafer, 2000a,b) shows, on the one hand, that innocent victims are indeed threatening to the individuals' BJW and, on the other hand, some of the nonrational strategies (blaming and derogation) that individuals use in order to restore their perceptions of justice.

Hafer (2000a, Study 2) showed participants a television news clip which portrayed a victim of robbery and physical assault (an innocent victim). Half of the participants were informed that the assailants had been caught and sent to prison ("retribution condition") and the other half that the assailants had fled the country and would very likely never been tried ("no retribution condition"). Thus, in the retribution condition, justice was somehow restored whereas in the no retribution condition it was not (see also Goldberg, J. S. Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). After viewing the video, participants engaged in a modified Stroop task which was presented as a distractor task. In it, participants were subliminally presented with words of five categories: justice related, physical harm related, social harm related, words related to the story but not related to harm, and neutral words. After the presentation of each word, a mask comprised of as many asterisks as the number of letters of the word showed up on screen. The participants' task was to identify the colour of the mask as quickly as possible. In the end, they were asked to indicate the extent to which they dissociated themselves from the victim (e.g., how different their and the victim's attitudes and personal characteristics were; the likelihood that they would be in such a situation) and the extent to which they derogated him.

Results showed that there was interference of the justice-related words in the identification of colours, such that participants were slower in identifying the colours when previously presented with a justice-related than with the other kinds of words. Furthermore, this interference existed only when the situation was that of unrestored justice, that is when there was a threat to the individuals' BJW.

The connection between the personal contract and the derogation and blame of innocent victims was more directly studied in Hafer (2000b, Studies 1 and 2).

Hafer (2000b, Study 1) was done in two sessions. In the first, participants completed Lipkus's (1991) BJW scale, and three weeks later, in the second session, the independent variables were manipulated and the dependent measures completed. Half of the participants were focused on long-term investments by being asked to write about their plans after graduation, whereas the other half was not focused on long term investments, and wrote about their university courses and extracurricular activities. Participants were then presented with Sarah's situation, a student who had contracted a sexually transmitted disease. Half of the participants were told that she had contracted the disease despite not having had sex with strangers, but because the used condom broke during intercourse (innocent victim), and the other half was told that she had contracted the disease for not having used a condom (noninnocent condition). This manipulation corresponded to the manipulation of the threat to the BJW, being higher when the victim was presented as innocent rather than noninnocent. The dependent measures were ratings on 10 bipolar personality dimensions (to test whether or not the victim was derogated), on attribution of blame and on dissociation from the victim.

Results showed that participants who had been focused on their long-term investments derogated, blamed and dissociated themselves more from the innocent victim than participants who had not been focused. Furthermore, there were no differences between the long-term focused and not focused participants regarding the noninnocent victim.

In Hafer (2000b, Study 2), participants completed Lipkus's (1991) BJW scale, a long-term investment orientation scale (as a measure of the strength of focusing on long-term planning) and a measure of delinquency/antisocial behaviour. The latter measure aimed at assessing the extent to which participants attempted to reach their goals through unjust means. Three weeks later they were presented with the case of Sarah who suffered from depression due to having contracted a sexually transmitted disease with no fault on her behalf (only an innocent victim was presented). Half of participants were informed that, by the time of the study, her mental condition had improved ("past suffering" condition) and the other half that her depression continued ("persistent suffering" condition). Then, participants completed measures of victim blame and derogation, and personal and situational disassociation from the victim.

Results showed that when the suffering was presented as persistent, participants who tended to more strongly focus on long-term planning engaged in higher victim blame and situational disassociation than participants who tended to focus on long-term

planning less strongly. No such differences showed up in the past suffering condition. Similarly, regarding the delinquency/anti-social behaviour measure, there were only significant differences when the suffering was presented as persistent. In this case, however, the relationship was inverted. In other words, participants who scored higher on this measure engaged less in victim blame and in situational disassociation than participants who scored lower.

On the whole, these results show that, as put forward by Lerner and Simmons (1966), it is in cases that suffering persists that there is a higher threat to people's BJW. Furthermore, this threat is not equally felt by all individuals, being especially felt by those who tend to focus on long-term goals and to pursue them through just means. In short, the threats are more strongly felt by those individuals who are more involved in complying with the personal contract (see also Hafer, Bègue, Choma & Dempsey, 2005). Nevertheless, the measure of BJW was only marginally correlated with victim blame and situational disassociation, when it could be expected that it would also significantly interact with the victim suffering. After all, individuals who score higher on a BJW measure are presumably those who have more at stake when they know of injustices, in the sense that these should be especially threatening to their view that the world is a relatively just place. We will address this matter later when we present the BJW scales and the controversy around them.

Before finishing the section on the threats to the BJW and the strategies that individuals use to restore it, we would like to present one study, which was the first one to simultaneously manipulate the victim innocence, the suffering persistence and a threat to the individuals' BJW (Correia & Vala, 2003, Study 2). Although this study was not intended to directly test the influence of being or not being committed to the personal contract on reactions to victims, the findings give further insights regarding this process, because of the joint manipulations of the three variables.

In this study, participants read a text which manipulated a threat to the participants' BJW by stating that their investments as students would pay off (low threat) vs. would not pay off (high threat). Then, they read the case of an AIDS-infected victim. The manipulation of victim innocence was similar to that in Hafer (2000b, Study 1). Half of participants read that the victim was infected despite wearing a condom, which broke ("innocent victim" condition), whereas the other half read that the victim did not wear a condom ("noninnocent victim" condition). Also, the persistence of suffering was manipulated by the statement that the victim would survive the disease

("low persistence" condition) or that the victim would not survive it ("high persistence" condition). Among the several measures included there was a measure of victim derogation.

The results showed a three-way effect, such that the impact of both the victim innocence and the suffering persistence on derogation was moderated by the threat to the BJW. In other words, when the observers were confronted with an innocent victim who suffered permanently, participants whose BJW had been threatened (who, thus, presumably had a higher need to reestablish their BJW) derogated the victims to a higher extent than the participants who had not been threatened (see also Correia, Alves, Santos & Vala, 2005, for the same finding with measured BJW).

In sum, in order to preserve the perception of validity of their personal contract, individuals engage in a series of cognitive distortions, such as perceiving an innocent victim as blameworthy for his/her situation, which allow them to perceive the world as a just place (see also Lerner & Goldberg, 1999, for a connection between cognitive biases, such as the correspondence and hindsight biases, and secondary victimization). In this way, their confidence in the personal contract remains (Lerner, 1977).

The studies included in this section show a series of aspects. First, that knowing of an unjust situation (an innocent victim), can be threatening to the individuals' BJW, especially when justice is not reestablished, and Correia et al. (2003, Study 2) showed that an innocent victim who suffers permanently poses the highest threat to the individuals' BJW. Second, that it is the injustice of a situation and not the suffering per se that is threatening to individuals, as had already been hinted by Lerner and Simmons (1966). These aspects were shown in Hafer (2000a, Study 2). Third, they give empirical evidence as to one of the functions of the BJW, specifically that it is crucial for long-term planning, and as a consequence, to the personal contract. Fourth, they show some strategies that individuals may use when their BJW is threaten, that is they may blame, derogate and dissociate from the source of that threat (the innocent victim). The innocent victim is especially threatening to the individuals' BJW when they are focused on their long-term plans (Hafer, 2000b, Study 1), or when they tend to be chronically concerned about them (Hafer, 2000b, Study 2; Hafer & Bègue, 2005) because such a victim is evidence that injustices exist. Thus, there is the possibility that their plans may not work out. In order to keep on believing in their personal contract, and without being able to objectively change the victim's situation, individuals turn to a cognitive reconstruction of the situation.

In conclusion, the more individuals are focused on their long-term plans, and/or it is important to them to perceive the world as a just place, the higher the threat to their BJW posed by injustices. These seem to be taken as evidence that the personal contract may not hold, and a way of keeping faith in it is by resorting to blame and derogation of innocent victims. If these victims are perceived as responsible for their plight or/and as the kind of people who deserve to suffer, no injustices occurred, and no threats to the personal contract are present. Thus, the more individuals are concerned about justice, the more likely they are to paradoxically behave in unjust ways (Lerner, 2002), that is to secondarily victimize innocent victims, for the sake of maintaining confidence in their personal contract.

We would like to point out that blame and derogation of innocent victims have been the most studied strategies that individuals have at their disposal to keep on believing in their personal contract (Hafer & Bègue, 2005). They are, however, by no means, the only ones. In fact, Lerner (1980) identified several other strategies that individuals may use to keep on believing in justice. Lerner (1980) distinguished among rational, irrational/nonrational and protective strategies. Blame and derogation of innocent victims are included in the irrational/nonrational strategies.

4. The Various Strategies to Protect the Belief in a Just World

As for the *rational strategies*, which have been object of relatively little research (Hafer & Bègue, 2005), Lerner (1980) identified prevention and restitution. These strategies were labelled "rational" for a series of reasons. First, they not only involve the acknowledgment that injustices occur or, at least, that they may potentially occur; second, they involve actions that may help prevent injustices from happening, or in case they do, these actions objectively diminish injustices; third, they are perceived as the reasonable or sensible responses by both actors and observers (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; see also Lerner, 1980).

In order that individuals engage in these rational strategies, it is necessary for them to believe that their actions are likely to be successful in compensating or helping the victim, and that these actions are not very costly to them (Reichle, Schneider & Montada, 1998); otherwise, individuals are more likely to engage in nonrational strategies. Whether or not this sequence holds is yet to be tested (Hafer & Bègue, 2005). Nevertheless, Mohiyeddini and Montada's (1998) found that high believers in a just world who are also high in self-efficacy to promote justice in the world show more

willingness to help victims (and blame them less) than those low in self-efficacy. This result indicates that scoring high in BJW does not necessarily mean engaging in secondary victimization (see also Bierhoff, Klein & Kramp, 1991). As long as high believers think that they are able to change the victim's situation, they are the most willing to help.

As far as the *nonrational strategies* are concerned, which have received the most research (Hafer & Bègue, 2005), they involve refusing the existence of injustice (hence, the label ("nonrational"). This refusal can be accomplished in various ways. Firstly, individuals may engage in denial-withdrawal, which comprises the selection of information. Individuals may turn to the minimization of the victim suffering, sometimes to the extent of denying it, or to avoid contacting with undeserved suffering both psychologically and physically.

Whereas denial involves information distortion, withdrawal does not (Hafer & Bègue, 2005). Secondly, individuals may reinterpret the event, which can be accomplished in four ways: by reinterpreting the outcome, in such a way as to perceive the suffering as desirable, for instance as character builder (Hafer & Bègue, 2005), by reinterpreting the objective cause of the suffering and assigning responsibility/blame to the victim, by reinterpreting the character of the victim (victim derogation), or by upgrading the character of those who benefit from injustices (Hafer & Bègue, 2005).

It should be stressed, however, that the need to believe in a just world is not the only motivation to engage in secondary victimization, with other factors being the need for control or plain prejudice (Montada, 1998). Regarding prejudice, Apfelbaum (2002) found that liked groups in need living in Germany were judged more deserving of aid than less liked ones.

Lerner (1980) also identified a strategy that Hafer and Bègue (2005, p. 145) qualified as "false cynicism", through which individuals deny believing that the world is just (which may be true at a conscious level, as we will develop later) while behaving in ways consistent with the BJW (see Holmes, Miller & Lerner, 2002).

Lerner (1980) put forward two further strategies, labelled protective. In common, these strategies allow individuals to recognize that injustices do occur, but they differ in how individuals deal with them. One of the strategies is to believe that although injustice exists there will be justice in the long run (ultimate justice), which is a central tenet in Judeo-Christian religions (see also Maes, 1998; Maes & Schmitt, 1999). Another strategy is to cognitively separate the world in which the individuals

live from the one inhabited by victims. In this way, individuals recognize that injustices do occur but feel somehow protected by dissociating their world from the victims'. In fact, victims who share similar characteristics to the self (Lerner, 1980; Novak & Lerner, 1968), such as ingroup members (Correia, Vala & Aguiar, 2007), are more threatening than dissimilar victims, such as outgroup members, as will be developed later.

This last strategy, that is, the cognitive separation between one's world and the world of others, where victims exist, directly leads us to two major distinctions in the BJW: the personal BJW (Dalbert, 1999; see also BJW for self, Lipkus, Dalbert & Siegler, 1996) and the general BJW (Dalbert et al., 1987; see also BJW for others, Lipkus et al, 1996). This conceptual distinction refers, respectively, to the degree to which individuals believe that they have what they deserve, and to the degree to which they believe that people in general get what they deserve. These two different "kinds" of BJW have been termed as spheres of BJW and have been shown to predict different phenomena (e.g., Bègue & Bastounis, 2003).

Research on this distinction has relied much (but not exclusively) on participants' responses to various scales and, on the whole, it is correlational. In the next sections, we will address what research on the distinction between the two spheres of BJW has found, and the criticisms involving the use of BJW scales in experimental research (e.g., Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 1980, 1998).

5. The Distinction between the Personal and the General Belief in a Just World

Lerner (1980) argues that witnessing or knowing of injustices that happen to others disturb observers emotionally, because those events are signs that injustices may also happen to them. As a result, their fundamental confidence in the personal contract is threatened.

As stated in the previous section, a strategy to minimize this perceived threat is to dissociate one's world, where justice prevails, or at least will prevail in the long-run, from the world of victims who suffer permanently.

On the whole, results show that scores on personal BJW are more positively related with measures of psychological well-being than those of general BJW[15]. Thus,

---

[15] Actually, we use the labels "personal BJW", which comprise items about beliefs concerning the respondent, and "general BJW", which comprise items about beliefs concerning people in general, for the sake of simplicity, and because these are the labels that we use in the thesis. However, in this section there are several scales that are put under the same label because they can be grouped in terms of meaning and because they

Dalbert (1999, 2001), for instance, put forward that another function of the BJW, namely personal BJW, is to preserve individuals' well-being. In fact, Lipkus et al. (1996) likened the BJW to a positive illusion (see Taylor & Brown, 1988).

Next, we will only present results from studies that simultaneously compare personal with general BJW. This strategy was used because only in this way are we able to identify what the specific and the shared effects of general and personal BJW are.

Personal and general BJW scales are positively correlated (e.g., between .33 - .48, Dalbert, 1999), and the patterns of correlations with other variables are somewhat similar, and are also positively correlated. This pattern suggests a certain overlap between general and personal BJW (Bègue & Bastounis, 2003). Nevertheless, even in these cases, the intensity of correlations is different.

Lipkus et al. (1996) found that the personal BJW is negatively correlated with neuroticism, depression and perceived stress, and positively correlated with life satisfaction. The latter result still held when personality variables were entered in a regression, which led the authors to suggest that the personal BJW "(. . .) apparently contributes to psychological well-being, especially greater life satisfaction, independent of personality." (Lipkus et al., 1996, p. 674). Although the various measures of general BJW also correlated negatively with perceived stress and positively with life satisfaction, on the whole they were weaker and less consistent (i.e., present only in one of the studies). Nevertheless, Tomaka and Blascovich (1994) found that the BJW, as measured through Rubin and Peplau's (1975) scale, moderated stress-related responses and behaviours. In this study, participants scoring higher in BJW, compared to those scoring lower, not only reported less stress during the task that they were asked to perform (solving arithmetic problems) but also felt less stress, as indicated by a series of physiological measures (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance). Dalbert (1999, Studies 2 and 3) found that personal BJW could significantly predict mood level, life satisfaction and self-esteem in addition to the amount already predicted by general BJW. Furthermore, when personal BJW was controlled for, general BJW no longer predicted any of the mentioned variables.

Bègue (2005) found that, in a threatening situation (an upward comparison), the personal BJW, but not the general BJW, when coupled with high-efficacy, could

---

show equivalent patterns of results. As such, in this section we use "personal BJW" when referring to the personal BJW scale (Dalbert, 1999) and the BJW for self scale (Lipkus et al., 1996). We use "general BJW" when referring to the general BJW scale (Dalbert et al., 1987), the global BJW Scale (Lipkus, 1991) and the just world scale for others (Lipkus, et al., 1996) (see Furnham, 2003, for a review of the various BJW scales).

contribute to the maintenance of self-esteem. Dzuka and Dalbert (2002) indicated that personal BJW can be an especially important coping resource (see also Dalbert, 1998) that stimulates coping reactions to situations that may be felt as unfair, such as being unemployed (at least, as far as short-term unemployment is concerned). For instance, personal BJW may be a resource that prevents individuals from the self-focused rumination "Why me?". Finally, Bègue and Bastounis (2003) found that personal, but not general, BJW was positively correlated with perceptions of life as purposeful.

On the contrary, Bègue (2002) indicated that, although both personal and general BJW are positively correlated with interpersonal trust, the former is not a significant predictor when entered in a regression with general BJW, religious attendance and measures of immanent and ultimate justice. In fact, only general BJW and religious attendance significantly predict interpersonal trust, with the former being the strongest predictor (see also Lipkus & Bissonnette, 1996; Rubin & Peplau, 1975; Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977).

Bègue and Bastounis (2003) found that general BJW, but not personal BJW, positively predicted rejection of the elderly (Study 3), the belief that public welfare discourages the development of individual autonomy, the perception that people have equal chances in life, and negatively predicted social commitment toward the poor and valorisation of egalitarianism (Study 4). Finally, Bègue and Bastounis (2003, Study 5) found that general BJW, but again not personal BJW, positively predicted punitive attitudes towards offenders. In a later study, Sutton and Douglas (2005) showed that the connection between general BJW and attitudes toward the poor (as well as that between personal BJW and life satisfaction) could not be attributable to the influence of other variables, such as socially desirable response or locus of control.

These distinguishing patterns between the personal BJW (or BJW for self) and the general BJW (or BJW for others) led Bègue and Bastounis (2003) to propose that that they could be considered distinct spheres of BJW, in spite of somewhat correlated ones. Whereas personal BJW contributes to the individuals' psychological well-being, general BJW seems more associated with victim derogation, unwillingness to change the status quo and agreement with punitive measures against deviants (in this case, offenders).

To sum up, the function of the general BJW seems to primarily involve the maintenance of confidence in the personal contract, by allowing individuals to perceive justice around them, whereas the personal BJW seems to primarily involve the

maintenance of psychological balance. Although both functions seem connected, they seem better accomplished by one or the other sphere of BJW.

Another pattern worth stressing is that individuals' scores are systematically higher for personal than for general BJW (Bègue, 2002; Bègue & Bastounis, 2003; Dalbert, 1999; Dzuka & Dalbert, 2002; Lipkus et al., 1996). Bègue and Bastounis (2003) present two possibilities for this pattern. First, that it may be more important for individuals to endorse a view, according to which they themselves have what they deserve to a higher extent than others (even though what happens to others is also relevant because, as already mentioned, it is taken as evidence about the validity of the personal contract). A second explanation is related to sampling procedures. In fact, in most studies, researchers use convenience samples comprising undergraduates from Western urban contexts, that is relatively privileged individuals who very likely have not been targets of major injustices. According to this explanation, the score differences between personal and general BJW most probably reflect reality: when comparing themselves with "others", a label that includes both their colleagues and other less privileged individuals, participants state that their world is more just than that of other people. This is the view defended by Sutton et al. (2008).

Sutton et al. (2008, Study 1) asked their participants to fill in Lipkus at al.'s (1996) scales, according to their own stand, the stand that they thought characterized their peers (a specific one or as a collective) at university, and other people. Results showed that there were no differences in scores between the participants' scores and the perception of their peers'. Furthermore, these scores were higher than those obtained when they filled in the scales according to what they thought was other people's stand in BJW. In our work, without denying this possibility, we will put forward that this difference also derives from self-presentational and normative factors.

With the exception of Sutton et al. (2008), the studies presented in this section are correlational. Nevertheless, BJW scales, especially general BJW ones, have also been amply used in experimental research, such as the aforementioned studies by Correia et al. (2001) and Correia and Vala (2003). It is beyond the scope of our work to exhaustively review the experimental literature involving the use of BJW scales, which for the most part has concentrated on their effects on secondary victimization (for reviews, see Correia, 2000; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Nevertheless, since we used two BJW scales in our studies, we will indicate the main criticisms involving the use of scales in experimental BJW research.

6. Criticisms To The Use Of Scales In Experimental Belief In A Just World Research

The use of BJW scales has been ample since the publication of Rubin and Peplau's (1975). According to Hafer and Bègue (2005), this has been the most used BJW scale in the literature despite its psychometric shortcomings. In fact, Furnham (2003) reports factorial analyses which have shown that it comprises two factors: a belief in a just world and a belief in an unjust world (the latter including the items that are reverse coded). Dalbert, Lipkus, Sallay and Goch (2001) showed that these are distinct constructs, and that some populations (prisoners) endorse the belief in an unjust world, but not the BJW, to a greater extent than others (prison warders). However, the scales we use in our work (personal BJW scale, Dalbert, 1999; general BJW scale, Dalbert et al., 1987) are not only shorter but also unifactorial (Dalbert, 1999; Furnham, 2003).

Hafer and Bègue (2005) indicated that the results involving measured BJW in experimental studies have met mixed success. In other words, Hafer and Bègue (2005) identified studies which find the expected BJW effect(s), that is higher secondary victimization from participants scoring higher in BJW measures, and studies in which these effects are not found. This mixed pattern clashes with that of correlational studies which generally find the expected results. How can this be accounted for?

The answer to this question may lie in a misunderstanding between the label of the theory, "BJW theory" and what it is meant by it. Due to this confusion, Hafer and Bègue (2005) suggest that the labels "just-world theory" or "justice motive theory" (p. 143) should be used instead.

Although Lerner (1980) argued that the need to believe in a just world will almost inevitably lead to BJW, the degree and kind of which will differ interindividually, the author is highly critical of BJW scales (see also Hafer & Bègue, 2005).

First, the expression "BJW" was meant as a metaphor but it has been interpreted literally. Originally "BJW" was used to indicate that, because people need to believe that the world is just, they behave as if they believed that it were just. Thus, according to this argument, if there is a belief in a just world, it is implicit and unlikely to be subject to introspection; therefore, Lerner (1980, 1998) argued, it cannot be captured through paper and pencil measures (see also Hafer & Bègue, 2005). In other words, the participants' answers on these measures, which Lerner (1980) labelled as "peek-a-

scopes" and their items as childlike, do not reflect the implicit, introspectively opaque BJW (Lerner, 2003).

Another criticism is that the scales do not capture the motivational aspect that is behind the processes described and predicted in the theory. According to Lerner (1998, 2002, 2003) the best way to capture these processes is through the use of carefully designed experiments, in which the participants are exposed to unjust, emotionally arousing situations, followed by the observation of the strategies used to restore their perceptions of justice. In such situations, participants will very likely be using their experiential system (Epstein, Lipson, Hostein & Hub, 1992), which is dominated by relatively simple and emotionally-driven scripts and associations that do not require much time or effort. Hafer and Bègue (2005) argued that scales systematically work in correlational studies, because participants in this kind of study are in relatively emotionally neutral situations. Consequently, they are able to use their rational system (Epstein et al., 1992), which is a more effortful, time-consuming and conscious information processing that shapes behaviour in ways that are conventionally rational and normatively appropriate (see also Lerner, 2003; Lerner & Goldberg, 1999). Thus, in this kind of study, participants are able to answer the different measures according to their explicit opinions, which is unlikely to reflect the need to believe in a just world as operationalized originally (Hafer & Bègue, 2005).

As far as the use of BJW scales in experimental studies is concerned, Hafer and Bègue (2005) argued that its mixed success derives from the kind of situation the participants are in. If the situation has low emotional impact, it is more likely that significant effects of measured BJW in the expected direction show up than when the situation has high emotional impact. However, this should be viewed in terms of likelihood and not in terms of either or. For instance, a replication of Lerner and Simmons's (1966) study, therefore an emotionally arousing situation, which included the measurement of BJW, showed that participants with higher scores on BJW tended to derogate the victim more than those with lower scores (Zuckerman, Gerbasi, Kravitz & Wheeler, 1974). In other words, it is possible that even in high impact situations, measured BJW shows effects in the expected direction. Nevertheless, they seem less likely.

Seeing that we used two BJW scales in our studies, and the aforementioned criticisms against the use of such scales in experimental research, it is legitimate to raise the following question: does it compromise the validity of our work?

In order to answer this question we turn to a global review of the research done so far, in terms of the levels of analysis it has approached. Then, having this framework into account, we situate the goals or our research and present the aspects in which it is different from previous and current BJW research.

7. The Various Levels of Analysis in the Belief in a Just World Research

The research reviewed so far has focused on the intra- and interindividual levels of analysis (Doise, 1980, 1982). Specifically, it has focused on the benefits for the individual holding a BJW (well-being, subjective certainty of his/her personal contract), and on the interpersonal consequences of attempts to protect it from external threats (helping or compensating behaviour when it is possible or not too costly or, as more often studied, secondary victimization).

The emphasis on these levels of analysis can be astonishing, on first sight, if we take into account that Lerner (1980) identified several social mechanisms through which the BJW is constructed, such as cultural wisdom and morality tales. Furthermore, Lerner (1980) put forward the idea that victims and nonvictims could be regarded as two categories (see also Lerner & Goldberg, 1999), and that a similar victim to the observer is likely to pose a bigger threat to the individuals' BJW than a dissimilar victim (Lerner & Agar, 1972; Novak & Lerner, 1968). The latter idea, in order to be fully addressed, would require an intergroup level of analysis. Nevertheless, most of Lerner's (1980) theorizing concerns the intra- and the interindividual levels (Correia et al., 2007). As a consequence of the emphasis on these levels of analysis, only sporadically has experimental research on the BJW ventured into others, such as the intergroup or the ideological.

As far as the intergroup level is concerned, Correia et al. (2007) indicated several studies which could be thought of as instances of research on this level of analysis (e.g., reactions of men and women to a female rape victim, Kleinke & Meyer, 1990), but the goals of which were not explicitly to focus on it (but see Anderson, 1992). Only recently has this level of analysis received systematic research (Aguiar et al., 2008; Correia et al., 2007).

In Correia et al. (2007, Study 2), participants watched an approximately 5-minute video based on a true event. The video was about a male minor who had lost his arms as a result of an accident (a massive electrical shock). The boy was presented as either responsible (noninnocent victim) or nonresponsible (innocent victim) for the

situation, and as either belonging to a Portuguese family (ingroup victim) or to a Gypsy victim (outgroup victim). Then, participants took part in a modified Stroop task, similar to that in Hafer (2000a), in which they were subliminally exposed to justice-related and neutral words before asterisks appeared on the screen. Their task was to identify the colour of the asterisks and the dependent measure was the time it took participants to perform such a task. Although no significant effects involving the victim innocence were found, the latency for justice-related words was significantly higher than the latency for neutral words when the victim was presented as a member of the ingroup, but not when he was presented as a member of the outgroup. This result experimentally showed that an ingroup victim is more threatening to the individuals' BJW than an outgroup victim.

In Aguiar et al. (2008, Study 1), participants watched the same video as that in Correia et al. (2007, Study 2), but the victim was always presented as innocent, and as an ingroup or an outgroup member (a noncategorized condition was added). Next, the participants engaged in a modified Stroop task and, finally, completed an explicit measure of victim blame and derogation. The pattern of time latencies replicated the one found in Correia et al. (2007, Study 2), being significantly higher when the victim was presented as an ingroup than an outgroup member (with no significant differences for the noncategorized victim when compared to either the ingroup or the outgroup). Thus, the ingroup victim posed a greater threat to the participants' BJW than an outgroup victim. However, in the explicit measure of derogation, there were significantly higher scores towards the outgroup than the ingroup victim which were interpreted as reflecting prejudice towards the outgroup, not a threat to the BJW (no significant differences in attribution of blame).

This interpretation received support in Aguiar et al. (2008, Study 2), in which an implicit measure of derogation/depersonalization was introduced (the time participants took to form an impression of a target). Based on the literature on impression formation (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), Aguiar et al. (2008) reasoned that the longer the participants took to form an impression of the target, the less they would be incurring in depersonalization. In this study, the target was presented as either a victim or a nonvictim, and belonging to either an ingroup or an outgroup. Results showed that when the target was presented as an outgroup member, there were no differences in the amount of time taken to form an impression. This pattern gives evidence that the results concerning the explicit measure of derogation towards the outgroup victim in the

previous study derived from prejudice. However, when the target was presented as an ingroup member, participants took significantly less time to form an impression when he was a victim than a nonvictim. This pattern gives further evidence as to the higher threat that a victim from the ingroup poses to the individuals' BJW.

As far as the ideological level of analysis is concerned, which is the level that we privilege in our work, most research has been correlational and, on the whole, has found that it tends to be positively associated with religiousness and political conservatism (sociodemographic variables have known little research and shown mixed results – Correia, 2003; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Rubin & Peplau, 1975).

Regarding religiousness, Rubin and Peplau (1973, cited in Rubin & Peplau, 1975) reported that frequency of church or synagogue attendance, and the belief in an active God were positively correlated with scores of BJW. Similarly Sorrentino and Hardy (1974) also found that people who indicated higher levels of religiousness also indicated higher BJW. Nevertheless, Zweigenhaft, Philips, Adams, Morse and Horan (1985) indicated a surprising negative correlation between religious belief and BJW. When separate analyses for religious affiliation were performed, they indicated that only Catholics showed a positive correlation. This result hints at the need to distinguish among religious denominations. In fact, a study by Hunt (2000), which comprised interviews with 2628 Southern Californians from the three largest ethnic groups living in that part of the country (Whites, Latinos and Blacks), showed that the the endorsement of BJW for members of each of these ethnic groups was differently related according to religious affiliation. For instance, among Whites it was Protestantism the key affiliation to positively predict BJW scores, whereas in the case of Latinos it was Catholicism.

As far as political conservatism is concerned, Connors and Heaven (1987) found a positive correlation between BJW and preference for right-wing parties. In fact, four studies in the USA, reported in Dittmar and Dickinson (1993), indicate that conservative/republican voters scored higher in BJW than liberal/democratic voters. Peplau and Tyler (1975, cited in Rubin & Peplau, 1975) showed that support for powerful and political institutions (e.g., the Congress, the Supreme Court, military) was positively associated with BJW. Also, Rubin and Peplau (1973, cited in Rubin & Peplau, 1975) found that BJW scores were positively correlated with 10 items of authoritarian submission of the F-Scale. Rim (1983) showed that the BJW is positively

associated with opposing socialism, libertarianism, and believing in a non-interventionist economy.

In a study involving a representative sample of the Portuguese population (Correia, 2003), the pattern of correlations between the general BJW and measures of religiousness and sociopolitical attitudes showed a similar pattern: the general BJW correlates positively, albeit weakly, with religiousness and a right-wing orientation, and negatively with political participation and perception of injustices.

In sum, higher scores of BJW are associated with support of the status quo. This pattern received further evidence by the positive correlations reported between BJW and protestant work ethic scales (see Furnham & Procter, 1989; Rubin & Peplau, 1975), that is the belief that people have a moral responsibility to work hard, and that hard work is a virtue (Jost & Hunyady, 2002, 2005; see Weber (1920/2005), for the original conceptualization of the Protestant work ethic and the association between hard work and success as signs of heavenly salvation).

This link between the BJW and the support of the status quo in the form of justification was already present in Lerner (1980, p. 155):

> The deserving component, however, in the Belief in a Just World implies that people can, and should, control their own fate. Obviously, this can lead to a justification of the status quo – those who are highly privileged must have deserved it, and those who are deprived had it coming as a result of their own failures (. . .) the irony inherent in the "justice" aspect of the belief in a just world is that it often takes the form of *justification* (italics in the original).

Nevertheless, Lerner (1980) did not explore this line of thought much further. John Jost, in his system justification theory (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; Jost & Hunyady, 2002), however, clearly develops the idea of the BJW as a legitimizing device of the status quo. The system justification theory seeks to explain the "process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of personal and group interest" (Jost & Banaji, 1994, p. 2). According to this theoretical view, there is a motive, both in dominant and dominated groups, to perceive the system under a positive light, for instance, as fair (Jost et al., 2004). In fact, this motive to rationalize and defend the status quo can be even stronger among members of dominated groups. Hunt's (2000) finding that Latinos, not Whites, had the highest BJW scores, and that there was a negative correlation between social economic status and

BJW scores provided evidence that low status groups may be the ones who more strongly hold legitimizing beliefs. Nevertheless, the fact that in the same study Blacks held the lowest BJW scores also shows that it is not necessarily so, and that other factors, such as group identity and identification may play an important role (Hunt, 2000).

Through a series of ideological devices, inequalities are perceived as legitimate and the members of most dominated groups are placated most of the time (Kay et al., 2007), which led Jost and Hunyady (2002) to identify a palliative function in ideology. Jost and Hunyady (2005) identified several such legitimizing devices, also known as "stratification beliefs" (Kluegel & Smith, 1981), or "legitimizing myths", which are more "hierarchy enhancing" than "hierarchy attenuating" (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Among these devices, Jost and Hunyady (2005) identified the Protestant work ethic, the meritocratic ideology and the belief in a just world.

The three "myths" are closely associated and seem to be basic for the functioning of Western, individualistic societies (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). As we see it, the Protestant work ethic conceives work a central feature in people's lives who regard it as rewarding in itself (see Ramos, 2000; Vala, 2000, for this issue in several European countries, such as Portugal); the meritocratic ideology asserts that the system rewards individual ability and motivation, such that individual success indicates personal deservingness (cf. the original protestant work ethic, according to which success was an indicator of salvation, that is of individual deservingness of heaven); the belief in a just world indicates that people can trust in this arrangement (cf. trust in the personal contract, its associations with perceptions of deservingness and the BJW).

Kay and Jost (2003) found significant positive correlations between BJW and diffuse system justification, and also between protestant work ethic and the same diffuse system justification measure. Biernat, Vescio and Theno (1996) found that individuals scoring higher in protestant work ethic are more likely to engage in victim blaming and to believe that lack of success derives from laziness and poor self-control than individuals scoring lower, which is a pattern similar to high and low believers in a just world (or to manipulations of high vs. low threat to the BJW), respectively. Also, Hafer and Olson (1989) found that high believers in a just world were less likely than low believers to rate personal deprivation as unfair. The fact that high believers reacted calmly to their situation was interpreted as a motivation to accept the status quo. Furthermore, Hafer and Olson (1993) found that female high believers in a just world

were less likely than their low believers counterparts to report discontent and to engage in improvement or in protest behaviours against their disadvantaged situation.

Nevertheless, the evidence used to conceptualize the BJW as a social legitimizing device suffers from two limitations. Firstly, the experimental evidence that Jost and colleagues have present is situated at the intra- and inter-individual levels, such as the studies by Hafer (2000a,b), or those presented in Lerner (1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Secondly, when they report evidence situated at the ideological level, it is correlational in nature.

We are only aware of one study which experimentally addressed the BJW from an ideological perspective. Dittmar and Dickinson (1993) asked their participants to complete Rubin and Peplau's (1975) BJW scale twice, once according to their own perspective and once from the perspective of either an "extremely right-wing" or "extremely left-wing" person. In-between they filled in a measure to assess their political stand. Based on the scores on this measure, the participants were divided into three groups: right-wing, moderate/liberal and left-wing. Results showed that when asked to fill in the scale according to their perspective, right-wingers' scores were the highest, and those of left-wingers were the lowest, with moderates' scores being in the middle. This pattern gives further support for the association between the endorsement of BJW and right-wing political views. What is more, when participants filled in the scale according to either political perspective, they were consensual in attributing lower scores to the left-wing perspective and higher scores to the right-wing perspective, regardless of their own political stand. This result points to the BJW as "(. . .) a social construction, which derives from sociopolitical socialization" (Dittmar & Dickinson, 1993, p. 269)[16].

8. Our Research: Does the Use of Scales Compromise its Validity?

As in our work, Dittmar and Dickinson's (1993) goal was not to gather evidence of the threat to the BJW, and its intra- and inter-individual consequences, and their study shows that the use of BJW scales can give important theoretical insights regarding more societal aspects of the BJW.

---

[16] However, we can raise the question of whether the same results would be obtained if the labels "left-wingers" and "right-wingers" (thus, without the qualifier "extremely") had been used. A further issue relates to the scale used, which is not unifactorial (Furnham & Procter, 1989).

Thus, from our point of view, the use of scales in our work does not compromise our goals, simply because we are interested neither in the issue of the need to believe in a just world nor in the threats to the BJW. As such, whether or not the scales capture the motivational aspect posited by Lerner (1980, 2002, 2003; Lerner & Goldberg, 1999; Lerner & Miller, 1978) is beyond our theoretical concerns.

With our work we intend to systematically address the expression of BJW, both personal and general, from the perspective of social norms, which belongs to the ideological level of analysis (Doise, 1980, 1982). More specifically, our goals are to ascertain the (counter-)normativity of the expression of both spheres of the BJW, the differing (counter-)normativity and the social value (utility or/and desirability) associated with them, and the inter-individual consequences of such perceptions, namely willingness to interact. Thus, we do not aim to capture a phenomenon, the emotionally laden aspect of which may be disguised by the use of low impact situations, such as answering a questionnaire about a vignette that presents a victim situation (Lerner, 1998, 2002, 2003) and, unintentionally, get normative responses in the process. In other words, our goals do not include situations that, in order to be properly studied should encourage the use of the participants' experiential systems (Epstein, et al., 1992). On the contrary, because at the core of our research lies the perception of normative expression, we are interested that participants use their rational system (Epstein et al., 1992).

Thus, instead of compromising our work, the use of scales is, from our point of view, a clear advantage, because they provide a uniform means of representing the expression of BJW across our various studies (see also the use, by Channouf & Mangard (1997), of Cialdini, Trost and Newson's (1993) scale of preference for consistency, to show that the consistency is normative, or the use, by Jellison & Green (1981), of Rotter's (1966) Locus of Control Scale, to identify the existence of the norm of internality). Furthermore, these scales have face-validity (see Hafer & Bègue, 2005), which means that the ideas conveyed by the BJW items are very likely interpreted as intended. Even though the items may sound childlike and be nothing more than "peek-a-scopes" regarding the need to believe in a just world (Lerner, 1980), it is in the expression of such ideas that we intend to ascertain their (counter-)normativity in a given sociopolitical context, specifically an individualistic one, and not how people react when their BJW is threatened.

PART II:
EMPIRICAL STUDIES

CHAPTER 4: ASCERTAINING THE (COUNTER-) NORMATIVITY OF THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD EXPRESSION: THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD AS A JUDGMENT NORM?

Introduction

In this chapter we will address the question of whether or not the expression of personal and general BJW is normative. We began without specific hypotheses because these were the first studies to address this issue. We followed Rozin's (2001) proposal of gathering descriptive data of a phenomenon prior to explaining it. Thus, this chapter will be mainly descriptive, although we put forward explanations for our results, some of which will be tested in later studies.

Studies 1, 2 and 3 in this chapter[17] were based on Jellison and Green (1981) who were the first to do experimental research that identified the existence of a norm of internality (see also Dubois, 1994). We added a fourth study in order to ascertain whether the results obtained in the previous three were due to perceptions of truth. In our studies we used two BJW scales (Studies 1, 2 and 3) or adapted them in conversation format (Study 4). The scales used were the personal BJW (Dalbert, 1999) and the general BJW (Dalbert et al., 1987) scales. The option for these measures is due to their being widely used, having good psychometrical properties, being unifactorial and, besides, they are short, which simplifies their application.

When we began collecting data, we did not have specific hypotheses as to the normativity or counter-normativity of BJW or whether there would be differences in the (counter-)normativity between the two spheres of BJW. In fact, we could find arguments for or against the normativity of the expression of the BJW.

The expression of BJW may be seen as counternormative because individuals face injustices on a daily basis in the media. Furthermore, they themselves have certainly felt injustices in their lives or witnessed close ones being targets of injustice. The view that the expression of BJW is counternormative seems to be Lerner's (1998) view, even though he cautioned that the expression of a certain (although vaguely stated) degree of BJW may be normative:

Most people, if asked, would more readily agree that they live in a "tough world" (. . .) rather than a "just" one where people get what they deserve.(. . .) At

---

the same time, most people would not claim that people would never get what they deserve , and if pressed would be willing to place their beliefs on a dimension from rarely to very frequently (Lerner, 1998, pp. 248-249).

Even though the items in these scales may not reflect the motivational aspect of the BJW/need to believe in a just world (Lerner, 2003), as had been conceptualized originally, the responses to these scales may indicate the degree of agreement to a view of the world as a place where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get.

On the whole, it seems that people do not follow the view that the world is just, if we take into account their responses on BJW scales. Correia (2003) indicated that the individuals' responses on general BJW scales (that is, the belief that people in general get what they deserve) are skewed towards their low end. Although responses on personal BJW (that is, the belief that the respondents themselves get what they deserve) tend to be higher than those of general BJW, they are just slightly above their midpoints (see Dalbert, 1999; Lipkus et al., 1996). These results indicate that the explicit agreement with both spheres of BJW is moderate at best. Thus, these data seem to go in the direction of Lerner's (1998) view.

Nevertheless, there are scabrous processes in social life (see, Fernández-Dols, 1992, 1993, for the case of perverse norms). Possibly there may be also a perverse mechanism underlying the expression of BJW. Specifically, even though people may not believe that the world is just, they may feel obliged to express it or have even internalized such an expression because of the role that such performance has on the functioning of society (see, for instance, the case of the norm of internality, Dubois, 1994). From this perspective, the expression of BJW would be injunctively normative. This could derive from the fact that the BJW is a pillar of Western societies (Jost & Hunyady, 2002, 2005) and so would have a status of social truth. Thus, individuals may feel that expressing the idea that what each one gets is what one deserves is the correct thing to say, even if privately they do not agree with that idea (see the case of normative influence, Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).

1. Study 1

In the current study, we used the identification paradigm (Dubois, 1994; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). We asked participants to fill in both the general (Dalbert et al., 1987) and the personal BJW scales (Dalbert, 1999) twice: according to their opinion and the way they thought their classmates would.

We expected a main effect of the referent, which would reflect the PIP effect (Codol, 1975), according to which, at least in Western, individualistic societies, people rate themselves as more normative than the other members of the group, as a strategy to perceive themselves as different. Since this was the first attempt to address this issue, and that we could expect the expression of BJW to be either normative or counternormative, we were unable to present a one-tailed hypothesis concerning this effect. We reasoned that in case that at least one sphere of BJW was perceived as normative, participants´ scores would be higher in the "own opinion" condition than in the "classmates" condition. On the contrary, if at least one sphere of BJW was perceived as counternormative, participants´ scores would be higher in the "classmates" condition than in the "own opinion" condition.

We consider that "classmates in general" is a referent that is optimal for the PIP effect to show up. It is neither too specific nor vague (and one that has been used in the literature- see Gilibert & Cambon, 2003) and one that very likely constitutes with whom our participants, undergraduate students, usually compare and identify.

We also expected a main effect of the sphere of BJW which would reflect the fact that personal BJW scores tend to be higher than those of general BJW.

1.1. Method

1.1.1. Participants

Twenty-five university students (11 males, 14 females), from various degrees (geography, human resources, sociology) took part in this study. Their ages varied between 18 and 41 ($M = 23.77$, $SD = 5.78$).

1.1.2. Experimental Design and Procedure

This study consisted of a 2 (sphere of BJW: personal/general) X 2 (referent: to fill in according to own opinion/ according to the classmates' opinion) within-subject design.

Participants were asked to fill in both the Personal BJW (Dalbert, 1999, seven items - e.g., "I believe that, by and large, I deserve what happens to me") and the General BJW scales (Dalbert et al., 1987, six items- e.g., "I think basically the world is a just place"), according to two referents: their own opinion and the way their classmates would (see Appendix A).

The responses were on six-points Likert-type scales (1 = totally disagree; 6 = totally agree). The order of the referents was counterbalanced and randomly assigned to participants. In the end participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed and thanked.

1.1.3. Dependent Measures

The dependent measures were the average scores obtained for each scale in each condition resulting in four indices.

1.2. Results

Firstly, we averaged the ratings of items of both scales, according to the experimental conditions in order to get four BJW indices: personal BJW/ own opinion condition (Cronbach's α = .67), general BJW/own opinion condition (Cronbach's α = .70), personal BJW/classmates condition (Cronbach's α = .80) and general BJW/classmates condition (Cronbach's α = .75)[18].

Secondly, we performed a 2 (sphere of BJW) X 2 (referent) repeated-measures ANOVA on the participants' scores of the general and personal BJW scales, which showed a main effect of the sphere of BJW, $F(1, 24) = 72.80$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .75$, and an interaction effect between the sphere of BJW and the referent, $F(1, 24) = 6.76$, $p = .016$, $\eta_p^2 = .22$

The main effect showed, as expected, that the participants perceived their personal BJW and that of their classmates (M = 3.93) to be higher than their general BJW (M = 3.13). The interaction effect shows that participants did not differentiate between their own opinion (M = 3.17) and that of their classmates (M = 3.07), as far as general BJW is concerned. However, they considered their personal BJW (M = 4.10) to

---

[18] These Cronbach's alpha values compare well with those reported in the literature, which typically vary from satisfactory to good values, being higher in the case of personal than general BJW. For instance, in three samples Dalbert (1999) reported that Cronbach's alpha values varied between .68 and .78 for general BJW scale (.69 -.70, reported in Lipkus et al., 1996), and between .82 and .87 for personal BJW. Equivalent values were found for the similar BJW for self scale, .84 (Lipkus et al., 1996) or .86 (Bègue, 2002) and between .66-.90 (Bègue & Bastounis, 2003).

be stronger than that of their classmates ($M = 3.70$), which was revealing of a PIP effect (both comparisons with Scheffé post-hoc tests).

1.3. Discussion

With this study we aimed at gathering evidence regarding perceptions of the normativity or counter-normativity of expressing BJW. Results in this study suggest that the expression of BJW is normative.

In the case of personal BJW, participants distinguished between their opinion and that of their classmates, lowering scores when asked to fill in the scale on their behalf. This result represents a PIP Effect (Codol, 1975). In fact, when asked to think of their colleagues on average, participants opted to distinguish their opinions from theirs. by stating that they believed to a subtle more extent (the difference of scores was just .40) than their colleagues that their world is just. Although the difference is small it is highly significant (see Prentice & Miller, 1992, about the importance of small size effects as long as they are meaningful theoretically and practically). In sum, these results suggest that the personal BJW is normative.

Regarding general BJW, however, no such distinction was made. The reason(s) for this phenomenon cannot be ascertained but we put forward a few possibilities.

Firstly, it may be more difficult to "know" what others think about people in general and participants decided to "play it safe" by projecting their own opinions on others.

A second possibility is that the expression of general BJW may be counternormative. This possibility, however, seems unlikely. If general BJW was counternormative, scores of own opinion should be lower than those attributed to their classmates, as a way of distinguishing themselves in the opposite way from the case of personal BJW. Nevertheless, this is not the case.

We consider a third possibility: that the normativity of general BJW is perceived to be not so strong as that of personal BJW. In fact, Codol (1979, cited in Channouf & Mangard, 1997) stated that the PIP effect is expected to show up when the normativity of an object is strong. If the normativity of general BJW is indeed weaker, then participants may not have the motivation to distinguish themselves from their colleagues. What is more, they may not even be aware of its normativity (i.e., lack of clearsightedness, Py & Somat, 1991).

Nevertheless, taking into account that individuals tend to see themselves as normative people who "think and do the right thing", and that they did not distinguish their scores from those of their classmates, it seems to us that a more clear and parsimonious explanation is that both spheres of BJW are normative; the expression of personal BJW, however, is perceived to be more strongly normative than that of general BJW.

Channouf and Mangard (1997) put forward that the comparison with an average other may not be strong enough in order to highlight the normativity of a judgment. Furthermore, they also suggested that there may be norms that can only be activated when participants are in situations resembling evaluation. Thus, with other experimental paradigms it may be possible to more clearly highlight the normativity of the general BJW (if it is indeed normative), and to receive further support as to the normativity of personal BJW.

In the next two studies we used the other two paradigms in Jellison & Green (1981) which Dubois (1994) named the self-presentation (Study 2) and the judge paradigms (Study 3). In the former, participants were asked to give a certain image (positive or negative) of themselves. In the latter, the task resembled an evaluation process. Both paradigms seem more apt to highlight instances of weaker normativity than the identification paradigm, and are the most used ones in the sociocognitive research tradition (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005).

2. Study 2

In Study 2, we used the self-presentation paradigm (Dubois, 1994; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003), in which participants filled in one of the BJW scales according to one of two instructions: to either convey a positive or a negative image of themselves. In order that a "positive" and "negative" images could be clear, we added that they should complete the scales in order that other people would approve vs. disapprove of them and like vs. dislike them, respectively.

In this study we used the most basic version of the self-presentation paradigm, close to Jellison and Green's (1981). The only difference with Jellison and Green's (1981) study lied in the fact that we asked participants to either give a positive *or* a negative image of themselves (between-subjects design) whereas they asked their participants to give a positive *and* a negative image of themselves (within-subjects design).

We think that having different participants respond to different conditions will provide a stronger argument for our case. If the design was within-subjects, each subject could probably distinguish the positive and the negative image conditions simply by reversing the scores. However, if we have this "reversal" in a between-subjects design we may be more sure that it is not just an epiphenomenon resulting from answering in a lazy fashion[19].

As stressed in Chapters 3, the answers to the BJW scales may not reflect the individuals' stand. According to Lerner (2003), who stresses the motivational aspect of the construct, individuals may not even be aware that they hold a BJW (or more accurately the need to believe in a just world) because it is "introspectively opaque" (Lerner, 2003). Nevertheless, we do not address the motivational aspect of the need to believe in a just world, but the (counter-)normativity of expressing the idea that the world is just. Thus, although we cannot ascertain whether or not the answers on the BJW scales represent the individuals' true stand, as with other scales, completing them is a self-presentational act (Leary, 1995). Since our goal is to ascertain the (counter-)normativity of the expression of the BJW, this aspect turns out to be a major strength.

---

[19] Although, as aforementioned, Gilibert & Cambon (2003) argued that the different designs have no significant effects on participants' answers, they are mainly referring to studies on the norm of internality, which has been studied for almost thirty years. Thus, it is possible to state with confidence the lack of kind of design effects on results. On the contrary, these are the first studies to address the normativity of the BJW and, as such, we have opted to play it safe.

Results in Study 1 suggested that both spheres of BJW are normative, but personal BJW seems to be more strongly so than general BJW. Taking into account these results, and the fact that the self-presentation paradigm identifies the social desirability of a norm (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003), we expect a main effect of the image valence, which will reflect the perceived desirability of the expression of BJW: scores in the positive image condition will be higher than in the negative image condition. Furthermore, we expect an interaction effect that will show that the difference between the positive and the negative image conditions will be higher for personal than for general BJW.

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants

Eighty-one Portuguese university students took part in this study (34 males, 49 females) whose ages varied between 18 and 39 ($M = 21.63$; $SD = 2.94$).

2.1.2. Experimental Design and Procedure

This experimental study has a 2 (sphere of BJW: personal/general) X 2 (image valence: positive; negative) between-subjects design.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions and were asked to fill in one of the BJW scales in such a way as to either convey a positive or a negative image of themselves (see Appendix B). They were told that their answers would remain anonymous. In the end, they were probed for suspicion, debriefed and thanked.

2.1.3. Dependent Measures

The dependent measures are the average scores of the scales in each condition.

2.2. Results

A 2 (sphere of BJW: personal/general) X 2 (image valence: positive/negative) ANOVA revealed, as expected, a significant main effect of the image valence, $F(1, 78) = 47.80$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .38$, and a significant interaction effect between the sphere of BJW and image valence, $F(1, 78) = 17.60$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .18$.

The main effect of the image valence shows that the participants differently filled in the scales when asked to give a positive ($M = 4.40$) or a negative image ($M = 2.74$). This main effect was qualified by the interaction effect (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1

Means and standard deviations of scores for personal and general BJW in the positive and negative image conditions

	Positive image	Negative image
Personal BJW	4.75 (.75)	2.07 (.98)
General BJW	4.06 (.98)	3.40 (1.49)

Note. Scores could vary from 1 to 6. The four scores are all significantly different among them as showed by contrasts (p's $< .05$ or better).

Whereas scores in the positive image conditions were significantly higher than those in the negative conditions for both spheres of BJW, testing for simple main effects showed that, as expected, this difference was higher for personal BJW, $F(1, 78) = 10.57$, $p = .002$, than for general BJW, $F(1, 78) = 4.39$, $p = .04$. This difference resulted from the fact that, in the positive image condition, the scores of personal BJW were significantly higher than those of general BJW, $F(1, 78) = 4.41$, $p = .04$, and in the negative image condition they were significantly lower, $F(1, 78) = 14.23$, $p < .001$.

One-sample t-tests show that three scores were significantly different from the mid-point of the scale (3.50): 4.75, $t(21) = 7.78$, $p < .001$; 2.07, $t(16) = -6.02$, $p < .001$; 4.06, $t(21) = 2.69$, $p = .014$; 3.40, $t(20) = -.29$, $p = .77$. In other words, whereas both "positive image" scores were above the mid-point, the personal BJW/negative image score was below it and the general BJW/negative image was equivalent to it.

2.3. Discussion

This study gives further evidence that the expression of a higher degree of BJW (both personal and general) is more desirable than the expression of a lower one. Furthermore, this is observed in both spheres of BJW. In other words, participants' scores are higher when asked to convey a positive than a negative image of themselves.

Although this pattern is observed for both spheres of BJW, it is nevertheless stronger for personal than for general BJW. This difference is especially due to the "general BJW/negative image" score. In fact, whereas scores in the positive image are above the mid-point of the scale in both the personal and the general BJW, there is a different pattern in the negative image conditions. Whereas in the case of personal BJW the score is well below the mid-point, in the general BJW it is equivalent to it. In the general discussion of this chapter we will put forward reasons for these results.

This study shows that the expression of a higher degree of BJW is perceived as more desirable than that of a lower degree. In other words, people think that conveying higher degrees of BJW will make them look good in the eyes of others. Nevertheless, we may ask the question: do observers judge likewise?

In Study 3 we addressed this question by using the judge paradigm, which compels participants to respond according to the eyes of society (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).

3. Study 3

In Study 3, participants read the answers to one of the BJW scales presumably filled in by a university student in the direction of low, moderate or high BJW. Afterwards, they evaluated the person on twelve adjectives which were averaged on a global evaluative index. Thus, in this study we used the judge paradigm (Dubois, 1994; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). Whereas the identification and the self-presentation paradigms show that individuals may be aware of the normativity of an object, the judge paradigm is the one that confirms its actual value because it implies participants as evaluators (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).

According to Gilibert and Cambon (2003), the judge paradigm reduces the effect of participants' motivation to be liked in their answers, when compared to the other two paradigms, by "[compelling] the subjects to look at things from the outside, from the point of view of the social collective" (p. 55). As such, this paradigm involves the self to a lesser extent than both the identification and the self-presentation paradigms. For this reason, Gilibert and Cambon (2003) defend that this paradigm may be the most suitable to reveal the existence of a social norm. On the contrary, both the identification and the self-presentation paradigms seem to be more suitable to reveal how individuals interpret a social norm and what they do with it. For instance, in the self-presentation paradigm participants sometimes respond in a self-serving way (e.g., give internal responses for positive outcomes and external responses for negative outcomes). However, when playing the role of judges, they systematically attribute greater value to a target who responds internally for both negative and positive outcomes (Dubois, 2000).

The goals of Study 3 were, firstly, to confirm the positive image associated to the expression of higher degrees of BJW and the negative image associated to lower ones. Secondly, we intended to explore whether or not the expression of a moderate BJW is perceived as the most normative one, namely because most scores in the previous studies were around the mid point of the scales. Although we cannot unequivocally state that these scores correspond to a moderate BJW, the possibility that the expression of such a degree of BJW is considered normative is, from our point of view, relevant to explore. Firstly, it would indicate that only the expression of low BJW is not normative. Secondly, until now we have stated that higher degrees of BJW are more normative than low BJW. By simultaneously manipulating moderate and high

BJW we may ascertain whether the expression "higher degrees" is accurate or if it should be reviewed to only "high degree" of BJW.

Due to evidence in the previous two studies that the expression of higher degrees of BJW is more normative than the expression of low BJW, we predict a main effect of the degree of expressed BJW in such a way that the participants who read the high BJW answers, compared to those who read the low BJW answers, will rate the person more positively (both in the attractiveness and in the global impression measure), and will indicate more willingness to meet the person and to be his/her friend. As far as comparisons between the expression of moderate and high BJW are concerned, we do not present any specific hypotheses.

We also predict an interaction effect in such a way that ratings of the high personal BJW target will be more positive than those of the high general BJW target, and that ratings of the low personal BJW target will be less positive than those of the low general BJW target.

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participants

Seventy-two Portuguese university students (35 males, 37 females) took part in this study. Their ages varied between 18 and 33 ($M = 22.54$; $SD = 2.63$).

3.1.2. Experimental Design and Procedure

This experimental study has a 2 (sphere of expressed BJW: personal/general) X 3 (degree of expressed BJW: low/moderate/high) between-subjects design.

Participants were randomly given a stapled block which contained the sphere and degree of expressed BJW manipulations and the dependent measures.

The study was introduced as an impression formation task. Each participant received one already filled in scale (either the personal or the general BJW scale), presumably by another student, the answers to which manipulated the degree of expressed BJW: low (points 1 and 2), moderate (points 3 and 4) or high (points 5 and 6) BJW (see Appendix C). They were told that those were the answers by a university student in a previous study, and that we were interested in knowing what their impression about that person was. The scale was preceded by a comment which aimed at emphasizing the meaning of the presumed student's answers (pre-testers complained that just reading the answers was too "abstract").

We transcribe the comment to the personal BJW conditions. The only difference between them and those for general BJW was the target of the belief: the person's own life or the lives of people in general.

Low BJW:

"The following answers show that this person has a low belief in a just world. That means that this person tends to think that he/she rarely deserves what happens to him/her in life (be it good or bad). In sum, this person does not believe that the world is a just place for himself/herself."

Moderate BJW:

"The following answers show that this person has a moderate belief in a just world. That means that this person tends to think that sometimes he/she deserves what happens to him/her in life but not other times (be it good or bad). In sum, this person believes that the world is a place that can be either just or unjust for himself/ herself."

High BJW:

"The following answers show that this person has a high belief in a just world. That means that this person tends to think that he/she generally deserves what happens to him/her in life (be it good or bad). In sum, this person believes that the world is a just place for himself/ herself."

Then all participants were invited to try to imagine what that person was like while they read his/her answers. After responding to the dependent measures, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed and thanked.

3.1.3. Dependent Measures

Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they thought each of 12 adjectives described the presumed student on 7-point Likert type scales (1 = not characteristic; 7 = very characteristic). The adjectives used in the study were part of a list that included 37 adjectives generated by 26 pre-testers and of our own[20]. The pre-testers read the same answers on the scales (one scale per pre-tester) and were asked to describe the person with characteristics (see Appendix D). Thirty-nine other individuals rated the 37 adjectives on a five-point scale raging from "very negative" to "very positive" (see Appendix E). The 12 adjectives included in the study were those which

---

[20] We had to add adjectives of our own due to the small number of characteristics that pre-testers came up with ($M = 2.38$, $SD = 1,42$) and with some of the indicated characteristics not being adjectives. This result likely derived from difficulty of the task, as reported by some of the pret-esters. Nevertheless, the adjectives that made the final list included adjectives generated by the pre-testers and by us.

got the six most positive (intelligent, responsible, honest, just, sensible, good-natured, which rated 4 or above) and the six most negative scores (liar, boastful, envious, depressed, inflexible, selfish, which rated 2, or below). This was our measure of judgment.

Afterwards, participants answered a few more items designed to measure their: *global impression of the person* ("Globally, what kind of image did you get from this person?": 1 = extremely negative; 7 = extremely positive), *their willingness to meet* ("Would you like to meet this person?": 1 = not at all; 7 = yes, certainly) and *to be a friend of the person's* ("Would you like to be a friend of this person's?" 1 = not at all; 7 = yes, certainly).

Results

We constructed two indices: one by averaging the scores of the adjectives after reversing the negative ones ("judgment of the person": Cronbach's α = .85). The second index was obtained by averaging the scores of willingness to meet and to be a friend of the person's ("willingness to interact with the person": Cronbach's α = .66). The scores of these items were correlated, $r(72) = .50$, $p < .001$, and previous separate analyses showed the same pattern of results for each item.

A 2 (sphere of expressed BJW) X 3 (degree of expressed BJW) MANOVA revealed a main effect of the BJW degree, $F(6, 130) = 5.63$, $p < .001$ $\eta_p^2 = .21$, which was observed on all three variables: judgment of the person, $F(2, 66) = 14.33$, $p < .001$, willingness to interact with the person, $F(2, 66) = 5.00$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$, and global impression, $F(2, 66) = 12,78$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .28$ (see Table 4.2 for means and standard deviations). No further effects were significant (p's > .25).

Planned contrasts comparing high and low BJW show that the former, relatively to the latter, was judged more positively, $F(1, 66) = 16.88$, $p < .001$, participants showed more willingness to interact with him/her, $F(1, 66) = 9.87$, $p = .001$, and had a more positively global impression, $F(1, 66) = 23.45$, $p < .001$. Duncan post-hoc tests comparing moderate BJW with low and high BJW showed that participants did not differentiate between moderate and high BJW in the three cases (all p's > .10). Regarding moderate and low BJW, the former was judged more positively and had a more positive global impression than the latter (both p's < .001). However, participants were only marginally more willing to interact with the moderate than the low BJW target ($p = .09$).

Table 4.2

Means and standard deviations concerning attractiveness, global impression and willingness to interact with the person

Degree of BJW	Judgment	Global impression	Willingness to interact
low	4.17 (.79)	2.65 (1.36)	3.16 (1.32)
moderate	5.03 (.60)	4.05 (.95)	3.82 (.99)
high	4.65 (.91)	4.57 (1.73)	4.34 (1.54)

Note: Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating higher ratings of attractiveness and willingness to interact and a more positive global impression.

3.3. Discussion

This study gives further evidence that the expression of higher degrees of BJW is more valued than the expression of a low degree. In this study, however, there is no evidence that the differentiation between degrees of personal BJW is higher than that between degrees of general BJW (no interaction effect). This may be due to the kind of paradigm used, which puts participants in the role of society - that is, as judges– whereas in Study 2 participants answered according to what they thought would convey a positive or a negative image. In fact, this change of perspective has been showed to be important, in order to get a clearer picture of what is involved in normativity. For instance, in research about the norm of internality, it is sometimes found that participants give self-serving responses (i.e., give internal reasons for positive outcomes, but external reasons for positive outcomes) when responding in the self-presentation paradigm. Nevertheless, the same participants prefer the consistently internal targets when they are judging (Dubois 1995, cited in Beauvois, 1995).

In our case, the change seems to be less dramatic, though. In fact, results in this study suggest that when participants respond according to society's perspective, a kind of court where people are judged (Weiner, 1993, 1995), the crucial variable seems to be the degree of expressed BJW and not as much its sphere. Nevertheless, the direction of the degree of expressed BJW and the target's judgment go in the direction predicted by results of Study 2. in other words, the target who expressed high BJW is more positively judged that the target who expressed low BJW.

Results in Study 3 also suggest that those in the previous studies may stem from the fact that the expression of moderate to high BJW is not only valued in relative terms (that is when compared to low BJW) but also that the expression of low BJW may be devalued per se. In fact, the target who expresses low BJW is the least positively judged and evaluated of the three, and the one with whom the participants were least willing to interact.

The inclusion of moderate BJW seems relevant, in order to ascertain the normativity of the expression of BJW, because it allows the conclusion that it is not necessary to express high BJW in order to be positively judged. In fact, both the targets who expressed moderate and high BJW were equally positively evaluated and more so than the target who expressed low BJW. Granted, it could also be the case that the participants in the moderate BJW conditions interpreted it as high BJW, hence the similarity of results.

Nevertheless, there is one result that goes against this alternative explanation. In fact, the result concerning willingness to interact with the target do not exactly fit the previous ones. If we assume that people are more willing to interact with more normative than less normative individuals, we would expect, firstly, equal willingness to interact with the target who expressed moderate or high BJW (as is the case), and secondly, that participants would clearly show more willingness to interact with either of them relatively to the target who expressed low BJW. Nevertheless, results suggest that only the first expectation is confirmed, because participants showed only marginally more willingness to interact with the target who expressed moderate BJW than low BJW. Although this fact turns out to be a strength regarding our manipulation (i.e., it reinforces the idea that participants did not interpret moderate BJW as high BJW), it is also a surprising result taking into account those of the judgment and the global impression of the target. How can we account for this result?

Possibly, although people tend to consider the target who expressed moderate BJW as normative as the one who expressed high BJW, they may be less willing to interact with individuals who shatter their "fundamental delusion" (Lerner, 1980), even if they do not do it completely. Probably, the obtained results mean, not that people explicitly believe that the world is a just place, but that they dislike having around them people who explicitly do not endorse that view, reminding them of something they do not want to be reminded of, even if only slightly (after all, moderate BJW, as operationalized here, states that justices do occur). Although such individuals may be

perceived as realistic, they may lose in perceived optimism which may be a factor that makes the target who expressed high BJW clearly more attractive to be in the company of when compared to the target who expressed low BJW. This raises the possibility that high BJW, contrarily to moderate BJW, may not be much believed, with its normativity not being based on a perception of truth. In Study 4 we tested whether or not our reasoning had validity.

4. Study 4

In the previous studies we showed that the expression of higher degrees of BJW is normative whereas the expression of low BJW is not. More specifically, participants in Study 1 considered their personal BJW higher than that of their classmates, in Study 2 participants expressed higher degrees of both personal and general BJW when asked to convey a positive than a negative image of themselves, and participants in Study 3 evaluated a target who expressed either moderate or high BJW more positively than a target who expressed low BJW.

Nevertheless, these studies do not allow us to ascertain whether the normativity derives from their opinions being perceived truer than low BJW or whether they are perceived normative *despite* being perceived as not true. If it turns out to be the latter case, the expression of (high) BJW would be a clear instance of a judgment norm.

Judgment norms refer to statements that are preferred over others irrespectively of their being objectively true or false in explaining behaviours or outcomes (Dubois, 2003). In these cases truth is not the criterion for normativity; that is, individuals do not state to prefer a specific explanation because they believe that it is a more faithful representation of reality, but because it has social value.

As indicated in Chapter 1, for the past 25 years research has shown that individuals give more value to the expression of internal than to external reasons for outcomes and behaviours (Dubois, 1994, 2003; Jellison & Green, 1981), not because this kind of explanation is truer (often it is not - Beauvois, 2003; Beauvois & Dubois, 1988), but because individuals learn in certain settings (especially, evaluation settings) to show preference for this kind of explanation, and that these explanations are crucial for economically liberal societies (Dubois, 1994). Although internal reasons may not be the ones that are spontaneously produced in everyday life, they are the ones that individuals choose in self-presentation situations or in situations that evoke social evaluation (Dubois, 1994).

Likewise the preference for expressing higher degrees of BJW may not derive from them being perceived as reality but instead from the perception that it is socially valued. Thus, the BJW would not only be a case of a "fundamental delusion" for the individual (Lerner, 1980), which we do not deny, but also of a normative delusion for the functioning of society. Just as the norm of internality plays a crucial role in the functioning of Western, individualistic societies, so does the BJW seem to play such a role (see Jost & Hunyady, 2002, 2005). Furthermore, similarly to the expression of

internality, the BJW may not be the most frequently expressed in daily interactions, except for those involving explicit self-presentation and evaluation situations, which is also characteristic of judgment norms (Dubois, 2003). This could explain the relatively low scores that are typical in BJW scales.

In Study 4 we directly asked participants the extent to which they approved of and found desirable the expression of the different degrees and spheres of BJW (i.e., their perception of normativity) and the extent to which they believed in them and found them realistic. Therefore, as far as the perception of normativity is concerned, we reversed the situation in Study 2. In other words, instead of asking participants to present themselves either favourably or unfavourably, we asked them to judge how favourable or unfavourable certain expressions of BJW were. Also, instead of judging someone, as in Study 3, they directly judged what the target said. In our reasoning, converging results would provide us with additional evidence about the normative character of the BJW. Furthermore, by directly asking participants the extent to which they agree with and find each expression of BJW as realistic (i.e., their perception of truth), we may ascertain the nature of BJW's normativity.

Concerning judgments of *perceived normativity*, based on the global results of Study 2 (higher scores when asked to give a positive image than a negative image of themselves) and Study 3 (more positive evaluations of the targets who expressed moderate or high BJW than the target who expressed low BJW), we expected that the ideas expressed by the moderate and high BJW targets will be evaluated as equally normative, and more so than those expressed by the low BJW target. Based on Studies 1 and 2, we also expected an interaction effect which will show that the differences of perceived normativity for personal BJW will be higher than those of general BJW. More specifically, low personal BJW will be perceived as less normative than low general BJW but high personal BJW will be perceived as more normative than high general BJW.

As for *perceived truth*, we explored whether or not higher degrees of BJW are perceived as truer than low BJW and whether or not they follow the perceived normativity patterns.

In this study we changed the operationalization of the BJWs and their degrees, in an attempt to make them easier to understand, because some participants in Study 3 complained that they thought it too difficult to form an impression of someone from a few answers and told us that they had based their ratings on the comment that preceded

them. Therefore, we transformed the items of the personal BJW into "interview excerpts" and manipulated the sphere and degree of expressed BJW based on those items (for a similar strategy concerning the norm of internality, see Regalia, 2001, cited in Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).

We think that this transformation was the best strategy because, firstly, all participants received more standardized information and read the same amount of information (whereas the personal BJW has seven items, the general BJW scale has only six). Secondly, the way moderate BJW was operationalized in Study 3, involved crossing the mid points of the scales, which could have given an image of cautiousness and that image being the one that led to favourable opinions, not the expression of moderate BJW.

Nevertheless, there were some doubts (unfortunately only after data of Studies 4 and 5 were collected) that the operationalization of moderate BJW could be interpreted as a belief in a random world, due to the use of expressions, such as "sometimes other people deserve, other times they don't deserve what happens to them" (this doubt could also apply to the comment on the target's answers on the scale in Study 3). For that reason, we tested how moderate personal and general BJW were perceived.

4.1. Pilot Study

Forty-seven participants read the excerpt of either general or personal moderate BJW (see Appendix F). Then, they were asked to choose the expression that best summarized the idea of the excerpt (we only transcribe the personal BJW options; as for general BJW instead of "he/she", participants read "people"): "The person thinks that: 1) he/she almost always has what he/she deserves; 2) he/she has what he/she deserves to a certain extent; 3) he/she almost never has what he/she deserves; 4) what he/she has does not relate to what he/she deserves, but it is due to other factors. These phrases intended to respectively mean, high, moderate, low BJW and belief in a random world.

Thirty-five participants indicated, as intended, the moderate BJW option, eight participants indicated the high BJW option, one participant the low BJW option and 4 participants chose the belief in a random world. Thus, 75% of participants interpreted our operationalization of moderate BJW the way we had in mind. Nevertheless, 25% did not. Surprisingly, most of the participants who did not respond the expected way, did not opt for the belief in a random world, which was what had led us make this test, but for a high BJW. This surprising result may be interpreted in two ways. On the one

hand, it may mean that either our operationalizaton of moderate BJW is flawed, or on the other hand that expressing moderate BJW is interpreted by a number of participants as having the same value as high BJW. We follow the latter explanation.

First, two thirds of participants matched the operationalization the way we intended to. Secondly, in Study 3 willingness to interact with the target who expressed moderate BJW only marginally differed from the target who expressed low BJW, contrarily to the target who expressed high BJW. This result shows that moderate BJW was not confounded with high BJW. Granted, the operationalization of the degrees of BJW was not based on "interview excerpts", but there was also a comment which was similar to that in Study 4, and various participants told us that they had mainly based their answers on the comment, not on the targets' "answers". Finally, since in Study 4 (and also 5) we included a manipulation check, we were be able to ascertain who had "correctly" checked the options given. In this way, we were able to ascertain whether results varied by including or excluding those participants who chose "high BJW" in the "moderate BJW" conditions[21].

4.2. Main Study

4.2.1. Method

4.2.1.1. Participants.

Sixty-four Portuguese university students (21 males and 43 females) took part in this study. Their ages varied between 18 and 54 ($M = 22.28$, $SD = 5.00$).

4.2.1.2. Experimental design and procedure.

This experimental study has a 2 (sphere of expressed BJW: personal/general) X 3 (degree of expressed BJW: low/moderate/low) between-subjects design.

The participants were randomly given a stapled block which contained the manipulations and the dependent measures.

On the front page they read that the excerpts had been taken from an approximately 50-minute interview with a university student performed in a previous study by our research team. Participants were further informed that the team was now

---

[21] In both Studies 4 and 5 those analyses were performed and there were no significant differences between participants in the "moderate BJW" conditions who had or who had not checked the condition as intended (nevertheless, we only present results with those participants who identified the degree of BJW as intended). We will come to this issue in the discussions of those studies.

interested in knowing what other people thought about some of the ideas conveyed in that interview.

Each "excerpt" was preceded by three time references (minutes 10, 26 and 43) in order to give the idea that the sentences had not been said in a row. Although the "excerpts" were just the items of the personal BJW scale, we added a few expressions that tried to emulate oral speech ("that's it"; "for instance"; "it's like I said before") in order to increase believability (see Appendix G for a full transcription). Each "excerpt" was followed by a comment which basically repeated what the "interviewee" had said and added that it reflected a low/moderate/high BJW (for the self or for people in general). The only difference between the personal and the general BJW sentences was the referent (i.e. the "interviewee" vs. "people in general", respectively). Then, participants answered the dependent measures and the manipulation check.

The manipulation check consisted of asking participants to choose the statement that best summarized what they had read in the "interview excerpt" (they were asked not to reread it): "The interviewee thinks that [general BJW conditions]: 1) individuals generally deserve what happens in their lives; 2) sometimes individuals deserve what they have in life; 3) individuals almost never deserve what happens in their lives"

4.2.1.3. Dependent measures.

Participants gave their opinions by answering, on 7-point Likert type scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), about their *perceived normativity* of the expression of different degrees of BJW (two items: "How desirable do you think the idea expressed is?"; "To what extent do you approve of this view?") and the degree of *perceived truth* (two items: "To what extent do you agree with the opinion expressed? How realistic do you find this opinion?").

4.3.1. Results

We constructed two indexes, one of *perceived normativity* (Cronbach's α = .79), and the other of perceived truth (Cronbach's α = .88) by averaging the respective two items. Then, we performed a 2 (sphere of BJW: personal/ general) X 3 (degree of expressed BJW: low/moderate/high) MANOVA, which showed a degree of expressed BJW significant main effect, $F(4, 116) = 12.53$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .30$, Pillai's Trace = .60, and a two-way interaction between the sphere of BJW and degree of expressed BJW,

$F(4, 116) = 4.00$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$, Pillai's Trace $= .24$. No further effects were significant (all other p's $> .10$).

As far as the two-way interaction is concerned, univariate ANOVAs showed that that it had significant effect only on perceived normativity, $F(2, 58) = 7.87$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .21$ (see Figure 4.1). Planned contrasts showed that, as expected, participants rated the expression of low personal BJW ($M = 1.45$) as less normative than that of low general BJW ($M = 2.87$), $F(1, 58) = 6.20$, $p = .016$. Also, as expected, they rated the expression of high personal BJW ($M = 4.50$) as more normative than that of high general BJW ($M = 3.39$), $F(1, 58) = 4.75$, $p = .03$. In sum, this interaction effect seems to point to a higher extremity of ratings of the expression of personal than general BJW. Testing for simple main effects shows that the difference between ratings of expressed low and high personal BJW, $F(1, 60) = 11.23$, $p = .001$, is actually higher than that of low and high general BJW, $F(1, 60) = 5.86$, $p = .02$.

Figure 4.1 Perceived normativity by the sphere and the degree of BJW (interaction effect)

Regarding the degree of BJW effect, univariate ANOVAs showed that it had effect on both perceived normativity, $F(2, 58) = 22.01$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .44$, and perceived truth: $F(2, 58) = 10.69$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .27$.

Planned contrasts tested our hypotheses that low BJW would be perceived as the least normative and that moderate and high BJW would be perceived as equally

normative (see Figure 4.2) As expected, the expression of low BJW was perceived to be less normative ($M = 2.21$) than that of both moderate ($M = 4.61$), $F(1, 58) = 40.59$, $p < .001$, and high BJW ($M = 4.06$), $F(1, 58) = 27.50$, $p < .001$. Also as expected, moderate and high BJW were perceived as equally normative, $F(1, 58) = 2.39$, $p = .13$.

Figure 4.2 Perceived normativity and perceived truth by degree of expressed BJW

Regarding *perceived truth,*, we did not have hypotheses. We performed Duncan post-hoc tests which show that participants rated the expression of moderate BJW ($M = 4.81$) truer than the expression of both low ($M = 2.75$, $p <.001$) and high BJW ($M = 3.38$, $p < .001$). Finally, participants rated the expression of high and low BJW as equally less true ($p = .13$) .

Further analyses, comparing perceived normativity and perceived truth for each degree of BJW by means of Duncan post-hoc tests showed that the expression of low BJW was perceived truer than normative ($p = .003$), that of moderate BJW was perceived as true as normative ($p = .84$) and, finally, that of high BJW was perceived more normative than true ($p = .01$).

4.4.1. Discussion

In the previous studies, the normativity of the BJW expression was mainly inferred from the participants' answers to scales and how they judged targets that expressed various degrees of BJW. Although in Study 2 the participants were asked to

to complete the scales in such a way as to be approved or disapproved, this was a complement to the main instructions to convey a positive or a negative image. Also in that study, we could not ascertain whether or not moderate and high BJW were equally approved. With this study, we aimed at ascertaining the perceived normativity and truth of expressed BJW by directly asking participants about them.

Our hypotheses received strong support. As far as perceived normativity is concerned, results showed that the expression of low BJW was rated as the least normative and the expressions of moderate and high BJW were rated as equally normative. These results go in the direction of our reasoning, that is, the expressions of both moderate and high BJW are injunctively normative but that of low BJW is not, and may be even counternormative. Furthermore, and also as expected, there was a differentiation between the perceived normativity of personal and general BJW, with the former seeming to be stronger than the latter. In fact, judgments of (counter-)normativity of the expression of low and high personal BJW were more differentiated than those of low and high general BJW, as seen in the interaction effect. These results go in the direction of those of Studies 1 and 2. We will come back to this issue in the general discussion section.

Nevertheless, the normativity of high BJW does not seem to be anchored on judgments of truth, contrarily to moderate BJW. In fact, for both personal and general BJW, the expression of moderate BJW is perceived not only as relatively injunctively normative but also as relatively true. In fact, participants rated the expression of moderate BJW as truer than both the expression of low and high BJW. Thus, the expression of high BJW is normative and desirable but not much believed, which has the characteristics of an ideal. This ideal may be interpreted as something that is wished but not attainable (a kind of "It would be so good that justice prevailed"), or as an ideal that individualistic societies fabricated in order to function, much as in the case of the norm of internality. Thus, it may be that individuals have internalized this pattern and find the expression of high BJW normative, for instance through a process of mere exposure (Zajonc, 1968). Nevertheless, this possible internalization seems to include only the social value attached to its expression, not going to the extent of believing it much.

Since the expression of BJW (moderate and high) is preferred over that of low BJW, independently of perceptions of truth, we consider it a judgment norm. Nevertheless, this judgment norm does not involve explanations of behaviours or

outcomes, as it is stated in Dubois's (2003) definition, which was centred on research about the norm of internality, that is, the preference for a certain kind of attributions. With our research the definition of a judgment norm should be more encompassing, and include the BJW.

The expression of high BJW seems not only to be a fundamental delusion for the individual (Lerner, 1980) but also a social normative delusion, fundamental for society's functioning. On the contrary, individuals perceive the expression of low BJW both as counternormative (neither approved of nor desirable) and relatively untrue. These results suggest why it was devalued in the previous studies.

A last point to be taken into account is that results did not differ when we included or excluded participants who checked the manipulation the way we intended, with the majority of errors being from participants who read the moderate BJW texts and checked high BJW. This fact is relevant here because it could be argued, due to the results in the pilot study, that the similarity of results between moderate and high BJW could derive from the former being perceived as high BJW (as it will be seen in Study 5, there are no differences between the two degrees on all dependent measures). The fact that the difference in perceived agreement between moderate and high BJW remains, shows that they were indeed perceived differently. By obtaining equivalent results with or without the participants who chose the intended option in our manipulation check measure, we consider it safe to see the manipulation of moderate BJW as successful.

A possible explanation for the fact that a number of individuals checked moderate BJW as high BJW may derive from the words "justice" or "just" being used more often than the words "injustice" or "unjust" (only twice, one in the "interview excerpt" and the other in the comment). This imbalance derives from the process of constructing the "interview excerpts", which are based on Dalbert's (1999) scale. In this scale the words referring to justice are more often used than those referring to injustice. This is due to a double problem with the creation of BJW scales. On the one hand, if items of injustice are included, in order to get round acquiescence, factor analyses reveal the existence of two factors, one being BJW and the other a belief in a unjust world. In order to overcome this problem, items are written in the direction of BJW (see, Hafer & Bègue, 2005, for a discussion of this problem). As a result, there are more words related to justice than to injustice.

Since we wanted to be faithful to the spirit of the scales, so that the results of the studies using the "interview excerpts" could be comparable to those of Studies 1-3, we started by quoting the items as they are written in the scales (but changing their order when it seemed to sound more "natural" speech), and used these quotations as our high BJW conditions. Then we changed the adverbs, for instance, from generally to rarely, to have the low BJW conditions. "Sometimes" seemed the solution to operationalize moderate BJW in this context. However, since there are more words connected to justice than to injustice it is possible that this is the reason why various participants failed the manipulation check (similarly, had more words connected to injustice than to justice be present, and participants would have probably checked it as low BJW world).

In practice, however, and as already stated, participants processed the moderate BJW texts as intended, even if some have failed the identification (see Sigall & Mills, 1998, for a discussion on this matter).

5. General Discussion

With the studies included in this chapter we intended to ascertain whether or not the expression of BJW was injunctively normative. In other words, our main goal was to answer the question whether people approve or disapprove of expressing the idea that the world is a just place. We also intended to ascertain whether the perceived normativity differed according to two spheres of BJW: personal or general.

The goals in this chapter were mainly descriptive because no past research had addressed these issues. Thus, we began this research without one-tailed hypotheses. On the one hand, we could think that expressing BJW is counternormative because witnessing injustices on a daily basis (e.g., on the mass media) or having been a target of injustice would refrain people from approving such an idea. This seems the idea defended by Lerner (1998), although this author cautioned that the counter-normativity would most probably address the expression that the world is always just or unjust. On the other hand, because we are not concerned about what people do believe but about the expression of such an idea, we could think that the expression of BJW would be normative because the it is a pillar of individualistic societies (Jost & Hunyady, 2002, 2005) in which meritocracy plays a central role. Thus, the expression of BJW could be thought of as normative either because individuals had presumably internalized the idea that the world is just, or at least, the performance of acting as if they believed that the world was just (even if they may not think likewise). In this regard, the expression of BJW would essentially have a character of social truth and be a judgment norm.

In Study 1, we used the identification paradigm and asked participants to fill in the general and the personal BJW scales according to their opinion and how they thought their classmates would. Results suggested that both spheres of BJW are normative, even though the expression of personal BJW seems to be more so. In fact, participants only distinguished their scores from those of their colleagues, thus revealing a PIP effect (Codol, 1975), in the case of personal BJW. More specifically, their personal BJW scores were higher when they answered on their own behalf than on their classmates'. Regarding the general BJW, the own opinion scores were equivalent to those attributed to their classmates. Seeing that individuals usually perceive themselves as normative (e.g., Epley & Dunning, 2000; Moore, 2007; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008) this result suggests that the expression of general BJW is normative. However, it also suggests that its normativity is less strong than that of personal BJW, because it seems not to motivate individuals to distinguish themselves from their peers

through its expression. The results in Study 2 seem to go in the direction of this reasoning.

In Study 2, we opted for the self-presentation paradigm and asked participants to fill in either the personal or the general BJW scale, in such a way as to convey either a positive or a negative image of themselves. Results showed that higher scores were used to convey a positive image and lower scores were used to convey a negative image. Although this pattern was similar for both spheres of BJW, it was nevertheless more pronounced for personal than for general BJW. Then, the next question is to ask the reason(s) for these patterns. Although we do not have a definitive answer, we would like to put forward some ideas that require experimental testing.

We believe that it may be relatively easy for individuals to know how to convey a positive image of themselves in both the personal and general domains, even in minimal situations such as in our experimental contexts. In the case of personal BJW, it may convey an image of success and in the case of general BJW it may be seen as a means of portraying oneself as fitting in society. This reasoning derives from the fact that the BJW is seen as a legitimating device of the status quo, at least in Western societies (Jost et al., 2004; Jost & Hunyady, 2002, 2005). When asked to convey a negative image, it may also be relatively easier to know how to avoid a negative image (such as that of a "loser"), through the expression of personal BJW than through general BJW, because the latter involves other individuals. In other words, people's normative clearsightedness, that is the "knowledge of the normative or counternormative character of a type of social behaviour or a type of judgment" (Py & Somat, 1991, p. 172), may be higher in the personal than in the general BJW in the case of conveying a negative image. We believe that, in the latter condition, it is likely that participants focused on different contexts or referents, resulting in individual scores cancelling out each other. For instance, some participants may have evoked contexts in which displaying high BJW is counternormative, such as in the case of an innocent victim, whereas others may have evoked exactly the opposite. An alternative explanation could be that in individualistic societies or contexts it is more crucial for people to distinguish between the two images in the personal than in the general sphere of BJW.

Would these results replicate if participants were not asked to self-present, but instead to evaluate someone who self-presents?

In Study 3, we addressed this issue, and whether or not individuals would distinguish between the expression of moderate and high BJW. We used the judge

paradigm whereby participants read the presumable answers of a target to one of the BJW scales and had to evaluate him/her afterwards on several personality traits (the judge paradigm part), and further on a global impression measure and on willingness to interact.

Results showed that the targets who expressed either moderate or high BJW were more positively evaluated than the target who expressed low BJW, both in the judgment part and in the global impression measure. This pattern was equivalent for the expression of both personal and general BJW. Nevertheless, participants did not show significantly more willingness to interact with the target who expressed moderate that low BJW. We put forward that this last pattern could derive from a resistance to interact with people who do not completely follow fundamental assumptions and/ or delusions (Lerner, 1980). We now add a further possible explanation which will be addressed in Study 5: the relative lack of psychometric quality in our willingness to interact measure, which comprised only two items. In Study 5 we will use a richer measure comprising items of professional and nonprofessional interaction.

Confronting the results of the three studies, it seems that for society, as a court where people are judged (Study 3), the crucial aspect is the degree of BJW and not so much its sphere, contrarily to what individuals think when they have to self-present (Study 2) or compare with their peers (Study 1). This conclusion derives from the fact that only the degree of expressed BJW was significant.

In sum, these three studies suggest that the expression of higher degrees of BJW is more normative than the expression of low BJW. In Study 4, we addressed the question of whether or not these perceptions derived from the fact that they were seen as truer than low BJW.

Results of Study 4 showed that the expression of moderate and high BJW were equivalently perceived in normativity, and to a higher extent than the expression of low BJW. However, the normativity rating of high BJW was not followed by an equivalent rating of perceived truth. In other words, although participants valued the expression of high BJW, they did not agree much with that view, finding it somewhat untrue. What is more, the perceived truth of high BJW was as low as that of low BJW. On the contrary, they perceived the expression of moderate BJW as true as normative.

If the expression of high BJW is normative and grants value to people expressing it, even if it is perceived as relatively untrue, it is likely that its expression

may comprise strong strategic component. We will address this issue in the next chapter.

Also in the next chapter, we will directly address the kinds of social value (social utility or social desirability) that a target expressing BJW is granted with. In other words, we will address on which dimensions the expression of BJW anchors. The previous studies allow us to draw the conclusion that the BJW is socially valued. However, although from results in Studies 1-3, we may infer that it anchors on at least social desirability, we cannot infer much about social utility.

CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL UTILITY AND SOCIAL DESIRABILITY OF MODERATE AND HIGH BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD AND THE STRATEGIC USE OF THIS JUDGMENT NORM

Introduction

In the studies presented in the previous chapter, we found that the expression of higher degrees of BJW was more positively evaluated than the expression of low BJW. In other words, the expression of higher degrees of BJW is perceived as more normative than that of low BJW. The first goal of this chapter was to replicate this pattern.

Although the results of the studies included in the previous chapter indicate that the expression of higher degrees of BJW is normative, we cannot say much on which this normativity is based on (i.e., anchored). The second goal of this chapter was to ascertain on which dimension(s) the normativity of BJW anchors: on social utility (a quasi-economic dimension), on social desirability (an affective dimension) or on both. This third possibility, that of a double anchorage, seems possible although it has never been reported in the literature about judgment norms. In fact, the literature on norm judgments has identified ones which anchor either on social utility (e.g., the norm of internality, Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; the norm of self-sufficiency, Beauvois & Dubois, 2001; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005) or on social desirability (the norm of individual anchoring, Dubois, 2005).

Nevertheless, an aspect that was not discussed in Dubois and Beauvois (2005) was the possibility that some norms could simultaneously be anchored in social utility and social desirability. However, certain results in Dubois and Beauvois (2005, Study 2b) regarding individual anchoring could be interpreted as a clue for this third path for normativity, namely the registered close mean values of social utility and social desirability. Nevertheless, Dubois and Beauvois (2005) neither compared these values nor discussed this possibility. Also, although in the same year Dubois showed that individual anchoring rested only on social desirability, in the introduction Dubois (2005) did not even raise the hypothesis that it could anchor on both dimensions. As far as the expression of BJW is concerned, it may simultaneously anchor on social desirability and on social utility. We should stress again that the possibility of a double anchorage was first raised by Le Barbenchon and Milhabet (2005) in their studies on the normativity of expressing optimism. Nevertheless, their results showed that the expression of optimism only anchored on social utility.

As far as social desirability is concerned, it seems very likely that the BJW anchors at least on this dimension. Firstly, the self-presentation paradigm is the best suited to identify instances of social desirability (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003), and in Study 2, in which this paradigm was used, scores of BJW were higher when participants were asked to convey a positive than when they were asked to convey a negative image. Furthermore, the target who expressed high BJW in Study 3 was rated relatively high in the global impression measure (equivalent to the target who expressed moderate BJW) and participants indicated the highest willingness to interact with him/her.

Regarding social utility, there is indirect evidence that the normativity of higher degrees of BJW may also anchor on this dimension. The judge paradigm is the best suited to identify the social utility of a judgment or a target (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003), and in Study 3 the targets expressing either moderate or high BJW were rated higher on the judgment measure than the target who expressed low BJW. Nevertheless, a closer inspection of the list of adjectives used shows that it comprised personality traits pertaining to both social utility and social utility (remember that at the time we were only interested in the positive-negative dimension). Thus, both dimensions were confounded. Unreported analyses separating the adjectives of the two dimensions, however, pointed to the fact that the targets expressing moderate or high BJW were more positively evaluated, in both social utility and social desirability, than the target expressing low BJW. Thus, this result indicates that the BJW may anchor simultaneously on both dimensions.

Nevertheless, we need to be cautious about drawing conclusions from these data. In fact, these analyses were based on adjectives that were not primarily used to test these dimensions, and there was an imbalance in the number of adjectives to each dimension. For instance, there was one negative (depressed) and three positive social utility adjectives (sensible, responsible, intelligent), which means that most adjectives (eight out of 12) belonged to the social desirability dimension (e.g., envious, good-natured). Furthermore, some of the most used adjectives to assess social utility (e.g., hard-working, competent) were not included. Thus, a second goal in this chapter was to disentangle the confound between social utility and social desirability in Study 3, and to ascertain whether or not the expression of higher degrees of BJW anchor on both dimensions simultaneously.

In the general discussion of the previous chapter, we suggested that the only marginally higher willingness to interact with the target expressing moderate compared

with the target expressing low BJW could derive from a relative lack of psychometric qualities of our "willingness to interact" measure, which comprised only two items. Thus, our third goal was to address the measurement issue by adding several items from professional and nonprofessional dimensions.

The aforementioned goals will be addressed in Study 5. A final goal, is related to the strategic use of the expression of BJW. In fact, results in Study 2 hinted at the fact that the expression of BJW could be strategically used in order to convey different global images (a positive or a negative image). In Study 6, we intended to more fully address the issue of strategic use of BJW expression by asking participants to convey specific images (competent, successful, likeable, and pitiful) which are mostly based on Jones and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy of self-presentation strategies.

In sum, in the studies included in this chapter we had different goals: 1) to confirm the normativity associated with higher degrees of BJW; 2) to disentangle the confound between social utility and social desirability measures; 3) to ascertain on which dimension(s) the expression of BJW is anchored; and 4) to address the strategic use of the expression of BJW.

1. Study 5

In this study we have several goals: to replicate the result that suggests that the expression of moderate and high BJW is more socially valued than that of low BJW, to ascertain whether the expression of high BJW is anchored on both social utility and social desirability, as could be inferred from Study 3, or just on one dimension. If the double anchorage is true, it will be the first time, to our knowledge, that such a pattern would be captured, at least in research based on the sociocognitive tradition. We also intend to ascertain the perception of status attached to the targets expressing different degrees of BJW, and the participants' willingness to interact with them, with the use of a richer measure.

Social utility and social desirability were measured with personality traits and, as such, part of this study follows the judge paradigm as it has been traditionally defined (Dubois, 1994; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). We also asked participants about the perceived status of targets expressing each degree and sphere of BJW. This information was collected through answers on sentences/questions, some of which were based on Fiske, et al. (1999, 2002). Although it is also a judgmental activity, it has not been considered as part of the judge paradigm in a strict sense.

We predict that the target who expresses low BJW will be judged the lowest in social utility and social desirability. Besides, participants will show the least willingness to interact with that target (even if only marginally when compared with the moderate target) and will rate him/her as the having the lowest status and professional success.

Regarding the targets who express moderate or high BJW, based on results in Study 3, in which both targets were equivalently rated in the judgment measure, in the overall image and in willingness to interact, we predict that they will be rated equivalently in social utility, social desirability, social and professional status and willingness to interact.

We will explore whether the moderate and high BJW anchor on social utility and social desirability or just on one dimension.

1.1. Method
1.1.1. Participants

Eighty-seven university students (32 males and 55 females) whose ages varied between 17 and 27 ($M = 21.91$, $SD = 2.21$) took part in this study[22].

---

[22] As in Study 4, this number corresponds to participants who correctly identified the degree of BJW in the manipulation check. Also, as in Study 4, results did not change when participants who failed the manipulation check were included.

1.1.2. Experimental Design and Procedure

This experimental study has a 2 (sphere of expressed BJW: personal/general) X 3 (degree of expressed BJW: low/moderate/low) between-subjects design.

Participants were asked to take part in this study during class time and each session lasted 20-25 minutes on average.

The manipulations and procedure in this study follow those of Study 4. After reading the interview excerpt and comment, each participant answered the dependent measures, provided some personal information (their sex and age) and filled in the manipulation check (the same as in Study 4). Finally, they were probed for suspicion, debriefed and thanked.

1.1.3. Dependent Measures

There were two blocks of dependent measures, the order of which was counterbalanced (see Appendix H).

On one of the blocks, participants answered on 7-point Likert type scales (1= nothing at all; 7 = very much so) the extent they thought each of 26 adjectives, of positive and negative valence, characterized the target. These adjectives concerned two dimensions: *social utility* (e.g., hard-working, passive, competent) and *social desirability* (e.g., good-natured, sincere, hostile). The adjectives used were translated from Fiske et al. (1999) which is the seminal article for their stereotype content model[23]. (see also Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007; Cuddy Norton & Fiske, 2005; Fiske et al., 2002), and the only one using this model than includes negatively valenced adjectives.

---

[23] It is beyond the scope of our work to present this model in detail. In a few words, this model identifies three kinds of stereotypes for outgroups (contemptuous, pitiful or envious) which have three kinds of prejudices associated (contempt, pity or envy). A fourth kind of (positive) stereotype, reserved for successful ingroups and their allies, is associated with pride and admiration. The content of each kind of stereotype results from negative or/and positive perceptions of two dimensions (competence and warmth, equivalent to Beauvois's (1995) dimensions of social utility and social desirability, respectively) which are associated with the kind of structural relationships between groups (cooperation vs. competition) and their relative status. Nevertheless, some words explaining this process are due in order to clarify why we based our dependent measures on Fiske et al. (1999) and not on references from the sociocognitive approach. When Cambon's works, which directly tested Beauvois's model, were published (2005/2006) we had already collected data for this study (2004). We have always based our theoretical framework on Beauvois's model and knew about the similarity of Cambon's measures to Fiske at al.'s by reading Beauvois (2003) which briefly reviewed the main results of Cambon's PhD. However we did not have direct access to the measures Cambon used in each of his studies until 2006. An exception was a table in Beauvois (2003) which comprised the English translation of several adjectives used in Cambon's PhD, which we did not know whether they had been used in several studies or just in one. Furthermore, by using the adjectives in that table, we would be translating from a translation (French-English-Portuguese), which seemed problematic. Since Cambon and Fiske et al.'s (1999) measures seemed very similar (with various adjectives in common, at least if we base our conclusions on the English translation by Beauvois, 2003) we opted for the latter because we had first-hand contact with them.

On the other block, participants responded to some sentences/questions on 7-point Likert-type scales with different anchors on points 1 (no way/ not successful at all/ not pleasant at all/I don't agree) and 7 (yes, certainly/very much successful/ very much pleasant/I very much agree). These items concerned the participants' perceptions of the target's *success and professional status* (four items: "Someone who thinks in this way is very likely to achieve a well-paid position"; "How economically successful is this person?"; "How successful will this person be in achieving a position of power?"; "Having this opinion is halfway to achieve a prestigious position."), *willingness to interact with the target professionally (five items:* "Would you like to have this person as your superior?; "Would you like to cooperate with this person in a project, an assignment…?"; The idea of working with this person is:"; The idea of working to this person is:"; "How much would you like to be a colleague of this person's?"), and *willingness to interact with the target nonprofessionally* (two items: "Would you like to engage in an entertaining activity – sports, cinema, theatre, outings- with this person?"; "How much would you like to have this person as a friend?").

Some of these items were directly based on Fiske et al. (1999), but adapted to an individual target, while others were of our own.

1.2. Results

Since the measures involving the adjectives have been amply used, we created two indices (one of social utility and another of social desirability) by averaging scores of social utility and social utility adjectives. However, we had to exclude the negatively valenced adjectives, because they did not show satisfactory internal validity. On the one hand, when we averaged only the negative valenced adjectives, the Cronbach's alpha values did not reach .50. On the other hand, when we included them together with the positively valenced adjectives, the Cronbach's alpha values considerably dropped, when compared to the average of the positive ones[24].

Thus, we created two indices with only the positively valenced adjectives: *social utility* (competent, confident, competitive, independent, hard-working, intelligent,

---

[24] To note that Fiske et al. (1999) also had to drop the negative valenced adjectives from their analyses and that in further studies (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002) they only used positively valenced ones. We still presented our participants with the negative ones because our study concerned individual targets.

determined, responsible; Cronbach's α = .86) and *social desirability* (likable[25], helpful, sincere, warm, polite, good-natured, tolerant; Cronbach's α = .78).

As far as the statements/questions are concerned (the other block of measures), since we have created a few items besides those included in Fiske et al. (1999), and dropped some because we felt that they were not appropriate to individual targets, we performed a factorial analysis, with "Maximum Likelihood" method and Oblimin rotation. The option for an oblique rotation was due to results in literature about impression formation of either single or multiple targets. The aforementioned dimensions have shown up as orthogonal (e.g., Devos-Comby & Devos, 2001) or correlated (Beauvois, 1995). According to Cambon (2006a), these dimensions are orthogonal when participants make judgments comparing several targets and are correlated when they judge single targets, as is our case.

As can be seen on Table 5.1, we found two interpretable factors, *willingness to interact* and *success and professional status*, instead of the three we had in mind, which accounted for 72.16% of the variance. This structure was due to the items of professional and nonprofessional relations which loaded on a single factor, meaning that the participants' attitudes concerning professional and nonprofessional relations did not differ for the targets presented.

Also, as can be seen on Table 5.1, all items loaded at least reasonably high on both factors, which is due to the fact that the factors are correlated, as expected, r(92) = .53, $p < .001$.

A few words are due concerning the item "Having this opinion is halfway to achieve a prestigious position" because it is the one the loadings of which are closest. We decided to keep it because exploratory analyses revealed identical results when this item was either dropped or included. Also, it makes empirical sense to keep it in the second factor, which is where it has the highest loading. Thus, we created further two indices: *success and professional status* (Cronbach's α = .88) and *willingness to interact* (Cronbach's α = .95).

---

[25] In this case an expression was used ("de quem se gosta", i.e., "whom one likes") because there is no equivalent in Portuguese for "likable".

Table 5.1

Results of factorial analysis on the questions/statements

	Factor 1 (willingness to interact)	Factor 2 (success and professional status)
To work to	**.93**	.45
To have as a colleague	**.91**	.43
To work with	**.91**	.41
To cooperate on an project	**.91**	.49
Being a friend of	**.82**	.46
To have as a superior	**.85**	.45
Entertaining activities with	**.72**	.40
Economically successful	.45	**.91**
To obtain a powerful position	.42	**.82**
To have a well-paid position	.35	**.74**
To have a prestigious position	.58	**.77**
Eigenvalue	6.38	1.56
% of variance explained	57.96	14.20

Note. "Maximum Likelihood" method with Direct Oblimin rotation used. The values in bold correspond to the items that comprise each index.

We performed two 2 (sphere of expressed BJW) X 3 (degree of expressed BJW) MANOVAs, one on *social utility/social desirability* and the other on *professional status/ willingness to interarct*[26]. Degrees of freedom may vary between the two MANOVAs due to missing responses or scores which were dropped from analyses due to their being 2.5 or more standard deviations above or below the mean.

Regarding the MANOVA on social utility and social desirability, there was a main effect of the degree of expressed BJW, $F(4, 162) = 5.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$, Pillai's Trace = .23, and an interaction effect, $F(4, 162) = 3.93$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$, Pillai's Trace = .18. The effect of the sphere of the BJW was nonsignificant.

---

[26] Our decision to perform two MANOVAs and not just one including the four dependent variables is related to the fact that, although the four share the same 7-point Likert-type scale, social utility and social desirability were measured differently (adjectives/ personality traits) from professional status and willingness to interact (sentences and questions).

As far as the interaction effect is concerned, subsequent ANOVAs showed that it was only observed on social desirability, $F(1, 81) = 7.73$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .16$. Planned contrasts showed that there were no significant differences between high and low general BJW, $F(1, 81) = 0.27$, $p = .60$, but the target who expressed high personal BJW ($M = 4.74$) was perceived higher in social desirability than the target who expresses low personal BJW ($M = 3.18$), $F(1, 81) = 24.58$, $p < .001$.

Table 5.2

Means and standard deviations by degree of BJW on social utility, social desirability, professional status and willingness to interact

Degree of BJW	Social utility	Social Desirability	Professional status	Willingness to interact
low	3.42 (1.00) a	3.57 (.83) a	2.32 (.87) a	2.73 (.84) a
moderate	4.12 (1.05) b	4.21 (1.02) b	3.63 (1.07) b	3.78 (1.52) b
high	4.48 (.87) b	4.29 (.92) b	3.79 (1.22) b	3.75 (1.20) b

Note: Values in each column with different subscripts are different at p < .01 or better.

Concerning the main effect, subsequent ANOVAs showed that it was observed on both social utility, $F(2, 81) = 9.09$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .18$, and social desirability, $F(2, 81) = 5.78$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$ (see Table 5.2). Planned contrasts showed that, as expected, the target who expressed low BJW ($M = 3.42$) was perceived lower in social utility than the targets expressing moderate ($M = 4.12$), $F(1, 81) = 6.17$, $p = .01$, and high BJW ($M = 4.48$), $F(1, 81) = 18.10$, $p < .001$. Also as expected, the same pattern held for social desirability ($Ms = 3.57$ vs. 4.21), $F(1, 81) = 7.06$, $p = .005$, and ($Ms = 3.57$ vs. 4.29), $F(1, 81) = 10.23$, $p = .001$, respectively. Further planned contrasts also showed that the targets who expressed moderate and high BJW were perceived equivalent in social utility ($Ms = 4.12$ vs. 4.48), $F(1, 81) = 2.37$, $p = .13$, and in social desirability ($Ms = 4.21$ vs. 4.29), $F(1, 81) = .10$, $p = .75$.

Testing for differences in social utility and social desirability within each degree of BJW, Duncan post-hoc tests showed that there were none statistically significant (all p's > .10). In other words, moderate and high BJW targets were seen equivalent in social utility and social desirability and the low BJW target as equally low social utility and social desirability.

Regarding the second MANOVA, performed on success and professional status and willingness to interact, there was only a main effect of the degree of the expressed BJW, $F(4, 168) = 5.22$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$, Pillai's Trace = .22. Subsequent ANOVAs showed that this effect was observed on both professional status, $F(2, 84) = 11.57$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .22$, and willingness to interact, $F(1, 84) = 5.09$, $p = .008$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$ (see also Table 5.2). No other effects were significant (p's > . 10).

Planned contrasts indicated, as expected, that the target who expressed low BJW ($M = 2.35$) was perceived having lower professional status than both the targets who expressed moderate BJW ($M = 3.67$), $F(1, 84) = 13.88$, $p < .001$, and high BJW ($M = 3.79$), $F(1, 84) = 20.77$, $p < .001$, but no significant differences were found between moderate and high BJW ($Ms = 3.67$ vs. 3.79), $F(1, 84) = .36$, $p = .26$. The same pattern was obtained regarding willingness to interact. In fact, planned contrasts indicated that participants showed less willingness to interact with the target who expressed low BJW ($M = 2.73$) than with both the targets who expressed moderate ($M = 3.78$), $F(1, 84) = 6.03$, $p = .008$, and high BJW ($M = 3.75$), $F(1, 84) = 9.18$, $p = .002$. However, no significant differences were found between the targets expressing moderate or high BJW, $F(1, 84) = 0.08$, $p = .93$.

1.3. Discussion

This study is an extension of Study 3 with a different operationalization of the degrees and spheres of the expressed BJW (the same as in Study 4) and with a greater number of dependent measures. With this study we had several goals.

First, we intended to replicate the finding that the expression of higher degrees of BJW was more normative than the expression of low BJW, as suggested in previous studies. Results supported this idea: targets who express moderate or high BJW are more positively evaluated than the target who expresses low BJW. In this respect, a few participants in the low personal BJW condition spontaneously wrote some lines about this target. For instance, "I can't stand these dramas!" or "If he continues to think like that he won't go far in life". From our point of view, the tone of these excerpts reflects the devaluation of the expression of such an opinion about justice. Furthermore, the fact that only participants in this condition wrote these comments (despite the low number of those who did) seems to illustrate how aversive the expression of this idea is. These results and reactions are consistent with previous findings that people derogate those who complain about discrimination and injustice (Kaiser, Dyrenforth & Hagiwara,

2006). As Kay et al. (2007) argue: "it appears that there are social norms that serve to uphold system-justifying responses and punish system-challenging responses." (p.308).

Secondly, we intended to ascertain on which dimension(s) the expression of various degrees of BJW was normatively differentiated. In Study 3, social utility and social desirability were confounded and, although separate analyses were performed, showing that the pattern held for both dimensions, these analyses could be considered, at best, exploratory. In the current study, we were able to show that the targets who expressed moderate and high BJW were perceived more socially useful and desirable than the target who expresses low BJW.

The latter results are connected to our aim to ascertain on which dimension(s) the expression of BJW anchors. According to our results, it seems that it anchors on both social utility and social desirability. This result is a new finding, in that judgment norms have been conceptualized as either anchoring on social utility (e.g., the norm of internality, Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; Dubois, 1988) or, more recently, on social desirability (the norm of individual anchoring, Dubois, 2005). Thus, moderate to high BJW seems to grant both kinds of social value to those who express them. In other words, individuals who express any of these two degrees of BJW are perceived as having both "what it takes to succeed in life" (i.e., social utility) and "what it takes to be liked" (i.e., social desirability) (Cambon, 2006a).

We should note that, regarding social desirability, there was again an accentuation of differences of the personal BJW when compared with the general BJW. Whereas judgments of social desirability did not significantly change according to the degree of general BJW expressed, the target who expresses high personal BJW is perceived as more socially desirable than the target who expresses low personal BJW.

Our third goal was to test the perceptions of status and willingness to interact with the targets, the latter with a richer measure than that used in Study 3. As predicted, the targets who either expressed moderate or high BJW were perceived as having equal status and professional success. However, as predicted, these targets were perceived to have higher status and professional success than the target who expressed low BJW. Furthermore, the same pattern held to willingness to interact. In this respect, the pattern obtained in Study 3 concerning willingness to interact (i.e., only marginally higher for moderate than for low BJW) derived, from our point of view, from a relatively poor measure in that study.

In sum, the results in this study provide evidence that individuals who intend to be perceived as socially useful, socially desirable and being relatively professionally and interpersonally successful, it is enough for them to express moderate BJW. It seems that the expression of such an idea grants people with the same value as the expression of high BJW. Why this pattern shows up cannot be ascertained from this study. However, the results of pre-tests and the errors in our manipulation check measure may shed light on the issue.

The highest number of errors in the manipulation check measure was among participants who read the moderate BJW texts and rated it as being high BJW. Although we only included participants who had the manipulation check correct, it could be that those who read the moderate BJW texts gave more emphasis on the justice than on the injustice part, that is, they processed moderate BJW as comprising more justice than injustice. If we had not omitted the participants who had failed the manipulation check, it could always be argued that the current results derived from them having misread the moderate BJW texts (which, however, would be a difficult argument to accept due to the repetitions in the "interview excerpts" and in the comment that followed them). By excluding them, we may not only definitely put that interpretation apart, but also accept that participants consider moderate BJW to have similar characteristics to high BJW, possibly because the number of justice-related words is higher than that of injustice-related ones, as discussed previously. In fact, when comparing the answers of those who failed and those who did not fail the manipulation check, there were no significant differences. Thus, in a situation that could be perceived as a glass half empty or half full, results suggest that both the participants who failed and those who did not fail the manipulation check processed the information given in the same vein, by perceiving the glass as half full.

2. Study 6

This study represents a kind of reversal of Study 5. Instead of presenting the opinions of a target and asking participants to rate the target on several dimensions, we asked them to self-present in order to convey specific images: a pitiful one, a competent one, a likable one or a successful one. In a control condition we asked for the participants' own opinion.

Thus, in this study we returned to the self-presentation paradigm, but used more specific instructions than in Study 2 (for a similar procedure on the expression of emotions, see Olson, Hafer & Taylor, 2001). We believed that this procedure would allow us to more clearly show the strategic dimension of expressing BJW than in Study 2, in which we used two very broad instructions (to convey either a negative or a positive image).

Most of the self-presentation strategies used were based on Jones and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy: self-promotion, supplication and ingratiation. Self-promotion and ingratiation were used because they represent strategies aiming at conveying images of competence (i.e., social utility) and likeability (i.e., social desirability), which are associated to moderate and high BJW[27]. Supplication represents an attempt to convey an image of helplessness or incompetence, which is associated with the expression of low BJW. Although depression may underlie supplication, the latter can be also strategically used when individuals wish to avoid a task (Jones, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982).

Jones (1990) stated that other self-presentation strategies were possible but that those proposed by Jones and Pittman (1982) should be the most frequent. We added a new one, to convey an image of success, which we consider another type of self-promotion strategy, so that we could capture a further dimension measured in Study 5.

Based on results of Studies 1 and 2 (and the literature on BJW), we predict that in the "own opinion" condition scores of personal BJW will be higher than scores of

---

[27] To be accurate, we did not ask participants to directly ingratiate someone but to self-present in order to achieve the goal of ingratiation, that is, to be liked. In our study, the participants are ingratiating only indirectly, that is to an imaginary audience. Since agreement with the other is a tactic of ingratiation, the participants' responses will reflect the representation of that imagined audience (which may be society at large) thinks. Our point is that, although participants are not trying to ingratiate someone specific, they are trying to be liked through what they think the imagined audience would approve of being expressed. One can also question whether or not this instruction is equivalent to conveying a positive image in Study 2 (and pitiful equivalent to the negative image). It most probably is but we do not think it is problematic. On the one hand, it is a replication of that study with somewhat more specific instructions (positive/negative image seem very broad, although necessary for a first approach). On the other hand, we will be able to compare those strategies with others which allows us to go beyond the mere positivity-negativity dimension.

general BJW. We will explore whether or not this difference is consistent across conditions.

We also predict that scores in the "competent", "successful" and "likable" conditions will be equal or higher than those of the control condition. This hypothesis derives from the fact that around the mid-point-scale scores were used, in Study 1, to express own opinion (which may be interpreted, although cautiously, as moderate BJW), that higher scores were used to convey a positive image (Study 2), and that scores of perceived likeability, success, social utility and social desirability were associated with the expression of both moderate and high BJW (Studies 3 and 5).

Finally, we predict that scores in the "pitiful" condition will be lower than those of "own opinion", because lower scores were used to convey a negative image (Study 2), and the expression of low BJW is associated with lower likeability, success, social utility and social desirability (Studies 3 and 5).

The aforementioned effects are expected to hold for both spheres of BJW.

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants

One hundred and eighteen university students (76 males and 42 females) took part in this study. Their ages varied between 17 and 36 ($M = 21.37$, $SD = 2.96$).

2.1.2. Experimental Design and Procedure

This experimental study has a 2 (sphere of BJW: personal/general) X 5 (self-presentation strategy: competent/ successful/ likable/ pitiful/ own opinion – control condition) mixed-subjects design, with the former variable as within-subjects and the latter variable as between-subjects.

Participants were approached at ISCTE library (when working in small groups) or during class time, and were asked whether they were willing to participate in a small study. After agreeing, participants were given two stapled sheets of paper (see Appendix 9). On the first one, all participants read that previous research had shown that people were able to convey specific images of themselves according to situations. Then, they read that they were supposed to imagine themselves as someone who wanted to convey one of four images, and that they should convey that image by answering the sentences on the next page (the two BJW scales). The images were "to be seen as": competent, successful, likable or pitiful. Participants in the control condition read that although

people are able to convey specific images of themselves, we were interested in their own opinions and that they should be honest about them. The scales were printed on the following page and were preceded by the specific instruction about how to fill them in, so that it would always be available to participants (see Appendix I). In the end, participants were debriefed and thanked.

2.1.3. Dependent Measures

The dependent measures were the mean scores of responses to both BJW scales by condition. Thus, each participant had two scores.

2.2. Results

Preliminary analysis showed no significant effects of the place where data were collected (library or classrooms- all p's > .20). Therefore, all data were collapsed and we performed a 2 (sphere of BJW: personal/general) X 5 (self-presentation strategies: competent/ successful/ likable/ pitiful/ control-own opinion) mixed-subjects ANOVA, with the former factor as within-subjects and the latter as between-subjects.

Results showed sphere of BJW and self-presentation strategies main effects, $F(4, 113) = 97.47$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .46$, and $F(4, 113) = 14.31$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .34$, respectively, and an interaction effect between the sphere of BJW and the self-presentation strategies, $F(4, 113) = 3.80$, $p = .006$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$.

As far as the main effect of sphere of BJW is concerned, on the whole scores of personal BJW ($M = 3.98$) were higher than those of general BJW ($M = 3.30$).

Regarding the main effect of self-presentation, Duncan post-hoc tests showed that participants in the "pitiful" ($M = 2.81$) strategy condition chose significantly lower scores than participants in the other conditions (all p's < .001). Also, participants in the "successful" strategy ($M = 4.12$) chose higher scores than those in the "own opinion" ($M = 3.59$; $p = .008$) and "competent" strategy ($M = 3.75$; $p = .06$). Finally, participants in the "successful" strategy ($M = 3.92$) chose marginally higher scores than those in the "competent" strategy ($p = .06$).

The two-way interaction allows us to verify whether or not the aforementioned effect holds within each sphere of BJW (see Table 5.3). On the whole it does, but there are some specificities worth noting.

Table 5.3

Means and standard deviations of the interaction between the sphere of BJW and the self-presentation strategy

Self-presentation	Personal BJW	General BJW
Own opinion	3.98 (.59)	3.19 (.62)
competent	4.17 (.72)	3.34 (.69)
successful	4.54 (.63)	3.71 (.58)
likeable	4.34 (.70)	3.51 (.66)
pitiful	2.89 (1.12)	2.74 (.87)

Comparing each sphere of BJW within each self-presentation strategy, participants chose higher scores for personal BJW than for general BJW in own opinion, self-promotion, ingratiation and success (all p's < .001). There was an exception, "pitiful" which was not statistically different in both spheres of BJW ($p = .34$).

We performed planned contrasts to test our hypothesis that within each sphere of BJW, participants would choose at least equal scores in the competent, successful, and likable strategies when compared to the control condition, and would choose lower scores in the pitiful strategy. Our hypothesis received full support. In both spheres of BJW when compared to own opinion, two strategies were given equivalent scores: *competent* (personal BJW: $F(1, 113) = .75$, $p = .19$; general BJW: $F(1, 113) = .50$, $p = .24$) and *likable* (personal BJW: $F(1, 113) = 2.40$, $p = .13$; general BJW: $F(1, 113) = 2.35$, $p = .13$). One strategy was given higher scores: *successful* (personal BJW: $F(1, 113) = 6.27$, $p = .005$; general BJW: $F(1, 113) = 5.94$, $p = .01$). Finally, one strategy was given lower scores: *pitiful* (personal BJW: $F(1, 113) = 24.65$, $p < .001$; general BJW: $F(1, 113) = 4.84$, $p = .03$). All values were higher than those in the pitiful strategy (all p's < .001).

2.3. Discussion

With this study we intended to provide further evidence for the results in Study 5 in a somewhat reversed experimental paradigm. Whereas in Study 5 participants rated a target on social utility, social desirability, professional status and willingness to interact, in this study each participant filled in the two BJW scales according to their own

opinion or according to one self-presentation strategy, based on Jones and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy. Moreover, we included a control group in which participants expressed their own views. We also intended to show that the expression of BJW has a strategic component, in that individuals are able to use its expression in order to achieve specific goals (in this case, conveying images).

Results showed that individuals are able to strategically use the expression of BJW. As predicted, when participants were asked to convey a positive self-presentation (self-promotion/competence, self-promotion/success and ingratiation/likeability) their scores were higher than in the negative self-presentation condition (supplication/pity). Furthermore, this pattern was obtained for both general and personal BJW. Also, as expected, when participants self-presented positively, they either used equivalent (likeability and competent) or higher scores (success) than in the control condition (own opinion). Another way of looking at these results is that they reflect the fact that the expression of higher degrees of BJW anchor simultaneously on social desirability and social utility, as had been shown in Study 5. Higher scores were used to convey diverse positive impressions of themselves on both dimensions, whereas participants significantly lowered their scores in order to convey a specific negatively valenced impression – being pitied.

We should note that, in all impressions, scores for personal BJW were always higher than those for general BJW, except those in the pity condition. In this case, there were no differences between personal and general BJW. That being the case, this study also replicates another feature already identified in previous studies, that is, the accentuation of differences in the personal BJW in comparison to the general BJW. Indeed, if scores of personal BJW in the positive images conditions were always higher than those in general BJW, but no such difference was obtained in the negative condition, it means that the difference between the positive impressions and the negative one was higher in the personal BJW than in general BJW. Again, participants seem to have distinguished the self-presentation strategies of the personal BJW to a higher extent than those of the general BJW.

We would like to draw the attention to two limitations of this study which are connected to the fact that we followed Jones and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy for the most part. First, the number of positive self-presentation strategies is higher than that of negative ones (in fact, only supplication). A suggestion for future studies is to add other self-denigrating instructions such as self-presenting as incompetent or unsuccessful.

Second, we intended to reverse Study 5 completely. However, we did not include an instruction equivalent to "in order that others have willingness to interact with you". The omission of this instruction has two reasons: first, we did do not want to add a further instruction to Jones and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy (we had already added "being successful"), so that the connection with that theoretical framework would not be too loose. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it would be difficult to operationalize that interaction. We either would opt for a vague operationalization, such as "fill in the scales in order that others have willingness to interact with you", or in order to be more specific we would, first, to include professional and nonprofessional interaction (which are included in one factor in Study 5), when most of our subjects do not have professional experience. Furthermore, in the case of nonprofessional interaction, the instructions would sound strange, at least as far as BJW is concerned (e.g., "fill in the scales in order that those who read your answers want to be your friends/want to take part in entertaining activities with you").

To sum up, and despite the aforementioned limitations, this study replicates the finding in previous studies that both spheres of BJW are judgment norms, the expression of which grants individuals characteristics associated to both social utility and desirability. Furthermore, it shows that different degrees of BJW can be strategically used.

3. General Discussion

With the two studies included in this chapter we had several goals.

Firstly, we intended to confirm the idea that the expression of higher degrees of BJW is perceived as more normative than the expression of low BJW. The results in Study 5 support this idea. The targets who expressed moderate or high BJW are perceived as having higher social utility, social desirability, professional status and participants show more willingness to interact with them than with the target who expresses low BJW. There were no significant differences between the target who expressed moderate and the target who expressed high BJW. As such, the expression of at least moderate BJW grants the target with the same characteristics as the one who expresses high BJW. This may explain the reason why several participants identified moderate BJW as high BJW: as long as someone expresses the idea that the world is somewhat just, it is more likely to be interpreted as thinking that the world is just than unjust. However, stating that the world is more unjust than just is enough to remove these positive characteristics from a target.

On the whole, there were no differences regarding the spheres of BJW. Nevertheless, as far as social desirability is concerned, there was a greater differentiation of the expression of low and high personal BJW, when compared with the same degrees of general BJW. In fact, the target who expressed low personal BJW was perceived as less social desirable than the target who expressed high personal BJW. This difference is reminiscent of results obtained in Study 2, in which the self-presentation paradigm (the most adequate to identify the social desirability of an object) was used. In that study, the difference between the positive and negative image scores in the personal BJW was higher than in the general BJW.

Secondly, we intended to distinguish between the kinds of social value (social utility or social desirability) attributed to the expression of BJW, which were confounded in Study 3, and to ascertain whether the expression of BJW anchored on either or on both. Whereas research in other domains suggested that judgment norms anchored either on social utility (e.g., norm of internality, Dubois, 1994) or on social desirability (norm of individual anchoring, Dubois, 2005), the results in our previous studies suggested that the expression of BJW could anchor on both simultaneously. The results in Study 5 seem to go in the direction of this double anchorage. In fact, the targets who expressed at least moderate BJW were rated as socially useful as socially desirable., and more so than the target who expressed low BJW.

Finally, we aimed at more specifically ascertaining the strategic use of the expression of BJW. In Studies 1 and 2 this strategic component could be inferred, especially regarding personal BJW. In fact, participants used the expression of this sphere of BJW in order to distinguish themselves from their colleagues, and used higher degrees of BJW in order to convey a positive image and lower degrees in order to convey a negative image of themselves (with this pattern being more pronounced in the case of personal BJW). Nevertheless, these studies were not specifically done to ascertain the strategic use of BJW, but to ascertain whether or not the expression of BJW was normative in the first place. Thus, the conclusions about the strategic use of BJW were limited.

In Study 6 we specifically addressed this issue. Participants were asked to self-present according to one of Jones and Pittman's (1982) strategies, with a control condition being added. The results were in consonance with our predictions. When participants were asked to give a specific positive image (self-promotion/competence, self-promotion/success or ingratiation/likeability) scores were higher than when they were asked to convey a negative image (supplication/being pitied). Furthermore, the highest scores were obtained among those who had to self-present as successful. Thus, a way of being seen as "having what it takes to succeed in life" is to express BJW. If, on the contrary, people want others to do things in their place or being taken care of (as is the case of supplicators), a strategy may be to express low BJW. This, of course, is obtained at the expense of being seen as incompetent or not being liked (Jones, 1990; Leary, 1995).

Again, there was an accentuation in the case of personal BJW. All scores in this sphere of BJW were higher than in general BJW, except when participants were asked to supplicate, in which there were no significant differences. Thus, the difference between any of the positive self-presentations and the negative one is higher in the case of personal than general BJW. These repeated accentuations of differences as far as personal BJW is concerned seem to indicate that it is more crucial to express personal BJW than general BJW. If one wants to impress others positively one must use higher degrees of personal than general BJW. In order to convey a negative image one really needs to lower the expression of BJW (to the same extent as general BJW as in this study or even lower, as in the case of Study 2).

To sum up, we have seen that the expression of higher degrees of BJW is associated with positive targets and self-presentational strategies. Nevertheless, we may

ask whether this pattern holds in all situations or whether or not it is possible to identify situations in which the expression of BJW may be negatively evaluated or associated with negatively evaluated targets. We will address this issue in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 6: IDENTIFYING MODERATORS TO THE PATTERN: CAN THE EXPRESSION OF THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD BE COUNTERNORMATIVE?

Introduction

In the studies presented in the previous chapters, we found that the expression of higher degrees of personal and general BJW were more normative than the expression of a lower one. Specifically, we found that the expression of higher degrees of BJW was associated with conveying a global (Study 2) and other specific positive images (Study 6), whereas the reverse held for the expression of a lower degree. Furthermore, we found in Study 3, and more convincingly in Study 5, that the expression of moderate and high BJW anchored on two dimensions, social utility and social desirability. The main goal of the two studies included in this chapter was to find cases of moderation of these general patterns.

Based on research on the "slime effect" (Vonk, 1998, 2000) and ingratiation in general (Jones, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982), in Study 7 we put forward that, because the expression of higher degrees of BJW is positively valued, it could be strategically used by individuals who who wish to take advantage of the system. In other words, the expression of the BJW may not only be associated with positively valenced targets, known for their social utility or/and social desirability. The expression of the BJW may be also used by targets who expressively conform to norms in order to strategically benefit from the social arragements, which is likely to lower the target's likability. In sum, we tested whether the expression of higher degrees of BJW could not only be associated with a positively valenced target (a good student) but also with a negatively valenced target (an apple-polisher student).

Until now, when presenting a target's views on BJW, we have not manipulated the valence of outcomes. In fact, in Study 5 participants read that the targets' views about the justness of the world concerned both good and bad things. Thus, we are unable to state whether this double anchorage pattern holds when participants read the same views regarding specifically positive or negative outcomes. In Study 8 we explored the hypothesis that when targets express high or low BJW, for either good or bad things (successes and failures, respectively), the pattern of anchorages changes. In fact, we propose that, in certain conditions, the expression of high BJW may even be counternormative.

We will also discuss whether these changes compromise the "double anchorage" view defended so far.

1. Study 7

In the previous studies we found that the expression of higher degrees of BJW was associated with positive self-presentation strategies and positively evaluated targets. In this study we aimed at ascertaining whether or not it could also be associated with a negatively associated target.

Seeing that our participants were university students, we used targets that could have some relevance to them and that they would be familiar with. Thus, we used three subcategories of students, a positively valued one ("good student"), which would presumably elicit relatively high degrees of BJW and two negatively valued ones ("bad student" and "apple-polisher"), and asked the participants to complete the BJW scales according to how they thought each subcategory of student would (plus according to their opinion). Thus, we returned to the identification paradigm (Dubois, 1994; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).

The choice of these two negative valued subcategories of students (bad and apple-polishers) was due to our perception that the contents associated with each one are different. On the one hand, the bad students, who supposedly do not care much about the academic norms of success, or in cultivating privileged relationships with the system or their representatives (in this case, the teachers), may express low BJW in an attempt to excuse for their low achievements (self-serving attribution). On the other hand, the apple-polishers, in their attempts to have privileged relationships with the system or their representatives, would be perceived to show higher BJW than the bad student, even equivalent to a good student, but for different reasons from the latter.

Nevertheless, in order to ascertain the contents associated with each subcategory of student, and in order not to base this study solely on our perceptions as social actors), we did a pilot study.

1.1. Pilot Study

We felt the need to construct this pilot test because we did not find any reference specifically comparing the representation of good, bad and apple-polisher students.

As for references concerning the good vs. bad student dichotomy, they tend to be somewhat vague as to what these labels refer to, and seem to be based on common sense, at least as far as we were able to find. By and large, however, the emphasis seems to be on contrasting high vs. low academic achievement, high effort vs. low effort, or high potential vs. low potential, respectively (see Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). These

dimensions are connected to social utility, and some of our items reflect it (e.g., "good marks"; "fail course"; "professional competence") as well as perceived status (e.g., "will go far in life").

The literature involving apple-polishers emphasizes the various tactics of ingratiation that they use (e.g., flattery, opinion conformity). Ingratiation may be a somewhat automatic kind of self-presentation, under little or no volitional control due to its pervasiveness in social interaction (Gordon, 1996). Jones (1990), however, emphasizes that this strategy often is deliberately used by those of lower status towards their superiors in an attempt to achieve their goals, such as to gain power over someone or a group of people.

Some authors emphasize that ingratiators are disliked by observers of ingratiation but not by its target (Gordon, 1996; Jones, 1990; Vonk 2002), who usually prefers to believe that the flattery and the conformism to his/her opinions are genuine. The dislike towards ingratiators is especially felt towards those who "lick upwards and kick downwards" (Vonk, 1998; "the slime effect"), that is, people who ingratiate their superiors but treat those of lower status badly.

Thus, the main goal of this pilot test was to ascertain which distinguishing contents are associated with each subcategory of student (good, bad and apple-polishers) and which ones are shared. Concerning the shared contents, we may instinctively expect, for instance, that both the apple-polisher and the good students are perceived to have equivalent marks, but through different means: merit vs. ingratiation, respectively.

1.1.1. Method

1.1.1.1. Participants.

Fifty-three university students took part in this pilot test (28 males, 24 females, one unreported), whose ages varied between 17 and 52 ($M = 22.94$, $SD = 5.77$).

1.1.1.2. Procedure.

The experimenter approached the participants at the ISCTE library and asked them to fill in a small questionnaire about the characteristics that they associated with students.

The so called questionnaire consisted of a front and an answer page (see Appendix J). On the front page, participants were thanked for participating and were to

answer a few statements concerning their idea of a bad, a good or an apple-polisher student (one subcategory of student for each participant). On the other page, they were reminded of the purpose of the study and informed how they should answer. For that purpose, a seven-point Likert type scale was used, with each point having a label below it (e.g., 1- do not agree at all; 2- agree very little (. . .) 7- very much agree). Participants read that they should write the number of the scale which they thought to best represent their stand on the space in front of each statement.

There were two orders of presentation of items, such that half of participants' first item was the other half's last one.

1.1.1.3. Dependent Measures.

Participants rated their agreement to 18 statements using a seven-point Likert-type scale (1= do not agree at all; 7= very much agree). The items were aimed to capture several aspects found in the literature reviewed.

Eight items intended to measure the *different styles* that may be typical of each subcategory of student in their relationship with the academic world. Four of these items were used expecting higher scores for "good students" ("They are responsible"; "They are essentially motivated to learn"; "They have solid study habits"; "They show great potential as far as everything connected to studying is concerned"); two items for "bad students" ("They don't care ("baldas")"; "They use to party"); and two items for the "apple-polisher students" ("Their main goal is to please their teachers"; "they may humiliate[28] their colleagues in order to achieve their goals").

Two items concerned the perception of the targets' *academic success* ("They use to have good marks"; "They usually fail courses" (reverse scored).

Two items concerned the perception of use of *fair means of achieving academic goals* ("Their marks are achieved honestly"; "Their marks essentially reflect their performance").

Two items concerned the perception of the targets' socio-professional future. One item tested how professionally competent they would be ("In their professional life they will be competent professionals") and another item tested how successful they would be ("They are people who will go far in life (e.g., good salaries, social status)").

---

[28] The Portuguese word used was "espezinhar", to which we did not find an English equivalent. Metaphorically "espezinhar" someone means to treat him/her as if the actor is treading on him/her as a person. It is used for extremely unethical behaviour, involving the attempt to diminish the other's value, such as in humiliation.

Four items evaluated the targets. Two items concerned how participants viewed the targets in terms of their *character* ("they are sincere"; "they are trustworthy"), and two items concerned their (positive) *relationship with each kind of target* ("They are the kind of people I like to have as colleagues"; "They are the kind of people I like to hang around with").

1.2. Results and Discussion

Firstly, we averaged the items following our reasoning presented in the dependent variables section. However, when preliminary analyses showed that the pattern of results of isolated items was different (even if the Cronbach's alpha values were good), we decided not to aggregate them. That was the case of the items concerning professional competence and status, on the one hand, and humiliate and please teachers, on the other hand[29]. Each index showed at least reasonable internal consistency (see Table 6.1).

Next, as preliminary analyses, in order to test for order and sex of participant effects, we performed separate 3 (subcategory of student) X 2 (sex of participant) X 2 (order of items) ANOVAs for each dependent variable (we did not have enough participants to include the four variables simultaneously). Neither the sex of the participant nor the order of items showed any significant effects (all p's > .20). Thus, these variables were dropped from further analyses.

---

[29] If we had averaged humiliate and to please teachers (Cronbach's α = .77), we would conclude that the good student was perceived as humiliating their colleagues and please their teachers to a higher extent than the bad student (there was a significant difference between the two subcategories of students in the index). The separate analyses of these items, however, showed that they only differed in pleasing teachers. Thus, if we had used the index, we would have lost this information. Since we were interested in ascertaining the shared and distinguished contents associated with the various subcategories of students, we would be interpreting as shared what in fact is not.

We are aware that the most suitable way for deciding which items should be averaged would be by performing a factorial analysis. However, we did not have enough participants to perform a reliable one. In our case, we think that this is not a serious matter because in this pilot test our purpose was, again, to ascertain the contents associated with each subcategory of student and not how these contents are structured. Future research could approach this subject because it seems an interesting issue.

Table 6.1

Means, standard deviations and effects of the ANOVAs on the evaluations of the subcategories of students

Variable	Subcategory of student	M (SD)	F(2, 50)
"good students' academic style" (α = .93)	Good students Bad students Apple-polishers	5.44 (.89) a 2.36 (1.03) b 3.62 (.84) c	49.79, *p* < .001, η_p^2 =.67
"bad students' academic style" (α = .66)	Good students Bad students Apple-polishers	3.12 (1.21) a 4.84 (.88) b 3.56 (.98) a	13.85, *p* < .001, η_p^2 =.36
"apple-polisher students' academic style" (to please teachers)	Good students Bad students Apple-polishers	4.88 (1.03) a 3.11 (1.53) b 6.12 (.85) c	19.31, *p* < .001, η_p^2 = .44
"humiliate colleagues"	Good students Bad students Apple-polishers	3.70 (1.21) a 3.22 (1.67) a 5.35 (.78) b	13.14, *p* < .001, η_p^2 = .35
"academic success" (α = .85)	Good students Bad students Apple-polishers	5.71 (.73) a 2.63 (1.10) b 4.41 (.85) c	51.13, *p* < .001, η_p^2 = .67
"fair means of achieving academic goals" (α = .77)	Good students Bad students Apple-polishers	5.15 (.90) a 3.61 (1.04) b,c 2.79 (1.15) c	22.88, *p* < .001, η_p^2 =.48
"competent professionals"	Good students Bad students Apple-polishers	4.47 (1.18) a 3.16 (1.07) b 3.25 (1.18) b	7.13, *p* = .002, η_p^2 =.23
"status"	Good students Bad students Apple-polishers	4.41 (1.17) a 3.32 (1.06) b 4.35 (1.41) a	4.69, *p* = .01, η_p^2 =.16
"targets' character" (α = .86)	Good studenst Bad students Apple-polishers	4.35 (.98) a 3.47 (1.14) b 2.41 (.96) c	15.07, *p* < .001, η_p^2 = .38
"positive relationship with targets" (α = .91)	Good students Bad students Apple-polishers	4.65 (.88) a 3.58 (.96) b 2.53 (.82) c	24.11, *p* < .001, η_p^2 = .35

Note. Higher means indicate higher agreement. Means with different subscripts are different at *p* < .05 or better (Bonferroni post-hoc tests)

We performed further univariate ANOVAs on each dependent variable with the subcategory of student as the independent variable. As can be seen on Table 6.1, all ANOVAs showed significant results. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that each academic style could be associated more strongly with each kind of student.

"Good students" were perceived as having the "good student academic style" to the largest extent (being responsible, being motivated to study, having solid study habits and potential to study); "bad students" were perceived to have the "bad student academic style" to the largest extent (not caring about studies and going to parties) and the apple-polisher students as having the "apple-polisher student academic style" to the largest extent ("to please the teachers). To note that in the case of the "bad students'" style, both the good students and the apple-polishers were equivalently perceived to cultivate this kind of style to a lesser extent than the bad students (with the other two styles there was a differentiation among the three subcategories of students).

As for academic success (having good marks and not failing subjects), good students were perceived as the most successful and bad students as the least successful. Although the apple-polisher students were perceived as more successful academically than the bad student, they were somewhat perceived as using less fair means to achieve their goals than the bad student. In this respect, the good students were the ones perceived to use the fairest means. Therefore, they not only were perceived as the most academically successful, but also as the most deserving of it. As we see it, the fact that the bad students are perceived as using less fair means to achieve their goals than the good student, while at same time being the ones who use the apple-polisher tactics to the least extent, may indicate the use of other less honest tactics, such as cheating. This, however, remains a tentative explanation because we did not ask participants about this tactic. However, if we are right, it may mean that cheating is perceived as a somewhat less serious dishonest tactic than apple-polishing. Thus, the apple-polisher students are seen as the least deserving of their marks.

As for evaluation of the students' character, the most positive one (trustworthy and sincere) was attributed to the good students and the least positive to the apple-polisher students. The same pattern was observed regarding having positive relationships with each subcategory of student.

As far as future professional competence is concerned, the good students were perceived to be the most competent and both the bad and the apple-polisher students were perceived the least competent to an equivalent extent. In terms of status, however,

the apple-polishers were perceived to attain the same relatively high status as the good students, and the bad students the lowest. This pattern goes in the direction of results that individuals who ingratiate their superiors are able to attain high positions (Gordon, 1996). Participants seem to share the perception that ingratiating pays off in the end. Also, they seem to associate the "slime effect" (Vonk, 1998) to the apple-polisher students. In fact, this subcategory of student was perceived to be able to humiliate their colleagues to reach their goals to the largest extent, whereas both the good and the bad student were perceived equivalently to the least extent.

To sum up, *good students* are perceived as being the most academically motivated and successful and to achieve their successes through the fairest means. Although these students are perceived to also want to please their teachers, it does not seem their main motive (contrarily to apple-polishers). Possibly they are perceived as cultivating good relationships with their teachers without having in mind the intention of improving marks. This conclusion seems plausible because, personally, they are perceived to have the most desirable character and to be the ones with whom participants enjoy the most to hang around. Professionally they are perceived as being the most competent and having the highest status (the latter shared with the apple-polishers).

Bad students are perceived to be the least academically motivated and successful. Their accomplishments are perceived as resulting from less fair means than the good student (probably cheating) but somewhat fairer than the apple-polisher. In other words, they are perceived as the ones with the lowest marks and the ones who fail more subjects. When they are successful, however, it seems that it is through neither the most desirable nor the least desirable means. Personally, they are perceived as having a more desirable character than the apple-polisher, but less desirable than the good student (the same pattern for enjoyment to hang around with). Professionally, they are perceived as the least competent, along with the apple-polishers but, unlike the latter, their status is perceived to reflect their lack of competence. This may derive from them being perceived neither ingratiate their superiors nor kick their colleagues downwards, which seems typical of apple-polishers.

Finally, *apple-polisher students* are perceived to be less academically motivated and successful than the good students but more so than the bad students. However, their relative success is perceived to be obtained through the least fair means. Personally, they are perceived the most negatively (rather untrustworthy) and the ones participants

enjoy the least to hang around with. Professionally, they are perceived to be somewhat incompetent (as the bad students) but able to achieve a status as high as the more competent good students. It is likely that apple-polishers are perceived to overcome their relative lack of competence and achieve the same status as the good students through ingratiation and humiliation (the "slime effect").

After ascertaining the distinguishing and shared contents associated with the subcategories of "good-students", "bad students" and "apple-polisher students", we conducted Study 7, in which participants were asked to fill in both BJW scales according to their opinion and according to how they thought one of the subcategories of students would.

1.3. Main Study

1.3.1. Hypotheses

According to our main hypotheses we expect a three-way interaction effect which will show the following patterns (for both personal and general BJW).

Firstly, scores of BJW in the apple-polishers condition will be higher than those in the bad students condition. Although both will be equally negatively judged (and more negatively than the good students) the sources of negativity are different. On the one hand, the negative image of apple-polishers derives from them being perceived as phoney, whereas the negative image of bad students derives from them being perceived as incompetent, lazy.

Secondly, we expect that scores of the apple-polisher students will be equivalent to those of good students. The scores attributed to the apple-polisher students condition will derive from their efforts to ingratiate, and one of the strategies will be to express agreement with the system and their representatives. On the contrary, the scores of the good students will derive from self-enhancement motivations, that is, that their good marks are just (hence, relatively high scores in personal BJW) and that they belong to a just system where people get what they deserve (hence, relatively high scores in general BJW). Finally, the scores in the good students condition will be higher than those in the bad student condition.

Another set of hypotheses concerns the differentiation between the participants' own opinions and the subcategories of students. We predict that the scores of own opinion will be lower than those of the apple-polisher students (a negative referent who tends to express high agreement with the norms), will be equivalent to those of the good

students (a positive/normative referent), and will be higher than those of the bad students (a negative referent due to his/her incompetence and/ or laziness, two very negatively valenced characteristics in individualistic societies).

Finally, we predict that the "good students" will be more positively evaluated than both the "apple-polishers" and the "bad students", and that no significant differences will be obtained between the latter ones.

1.3.2. Method

1.3.2.1. Participants.

Sixty university students of geography and marketing took part in this study. Their ages varied between 18 and 47 ($M = 22.95$, $SD = 7.04$).

1.3.2.2. Experimental design and procedure.

This experimental study has a 2 (sphere of BJW: personal/general) X 2 (perspective: own opinion/subcategory of student) X 3 (subcategory of student: apple-polisher students/good students/bad students) mixed-design with the two former factors within-subjects and the latter factor between-subjects.

Participants were given a three-page stapled block. On the front page all participants read that the goal of the study was to know the position of university students about a number of statements used by several teams of social scientists. Participants were assured about the anonymity of their answers and that they would not be evaluated. Finally, they were asked to follow the order of the questions.

Participants filled in the two BJW scales according to both their own opinion and the way a specific subcategory of student would (apple-polisher students, good students or bad students). These conditions were randomly distributed among participants and the answering order was counter-balanced across participants. A final item asked participants to evaluate the subcategory of student according to whom they had filled in the scales. In the end, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed and thanked.

1.3.2.3. Dependent measures.

The dependent measures of this study were the average scores of each participant on each sphere of BJW for both their own opinion and according to the

specific category of student's. An item ("In general, what image do you have of apple-polisher/ good/ bad students?") assessed on a Likert-type scale (1= very negative; 7 = very positive) how participants evaluated the subcategory of student according to whose perspective they had filled in the BJW scales.

1.3.3. Results

Firstly we tested whether the scores of general and personal BJW were equivalent among participants who had to answer according to each subcategory of students. We performed two separate ANOVAs (one for each sphere of BJW), with the subcategory of students as the factor on the participants' scores in the "own opinion" condition (see Table 6.2, for mean values and standard deviations). There were no significant effects in either ANOVA (both p's > .10). Thus, the differences of scores in the subcategory of student conditions, to be presented next, resulted from the representation associated with each one, and not from original differences in the participants' own stand on both spheres of BJW.

Then, in order to test for possible order effects, we performed a 2 (sphere of BJW) X 2 (perspective) X 3 (subcategory of student) X 2 (answering order) ANOVA with the former two factors within-subjects and the latter two between-subjects. There were no significant effects involving the answering order (all p's > .10).

After these preliminary analyses we tested our hypotheses.

A 2 (sphere of BJW) X 2 (perspective) X 3 (subcategory of student) mixed-subjects ANOVA was performed, with the two former factors as within-subjects and the latter factor as between-subjects. There were several main and two-way interaction effects and the expected three-way interaction effect, $F(2, 54) = 5.92$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .18$ (see Table 6.2 for means and standard deviations; see also Figure 6.1 for the patterns).We will only focus on the three-way effect because our hypotheses are based on it.[30]

---

[30] The other significant effects were: *sphere of BJW*: $F(1, 54) = 41.66$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .44$; *subcategory of student*: $F(2, 54) = 3.85$, $p = .027$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$; *sphere of BJW X subcategory of student:* $F(2, 54) = 6.25$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .19$; *sphere of BJW X perspective*: $F(1, 54) = 15.48$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .22$; *perspective X subcategory of student*: $F(2, 54) = 19.30$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .42$.

Table 6.2

Means and standard deviations of responses to the personal and the general BJW, according to the participants' own stand and the perceived stand of three referents

	Perspective							
	Own opinion		Apple-polisher students		Good students		Bad students	
Condition	Personal BJW	General BJW	Personal BJW	General BJW	Personal BJW	General BJW	Personal BJW	General BJW
Apple-polisher	3.74 (.50)	2.70 (.74)	4.35 (.66)	3.74 (1.08)				
Good students	3.67 (.71)	2.97 (.78)			3.78 (.69)	3.06 (.78)		
Bad students	3.64 (.92)	3.11 (.86)					2.60 (.91)	2.86 (.98)

Figure 6.1 Means of responses to the personal and the general BJW, according to the participants' own stand and the perceived stand of three referents

171

The first set of hypotheses stated that for both spheres of BJW, scores in the "apple-polisher students" condition would be higher than in the "bad students" condition. This hypothesis received support, $F(1, 54) = 7.98$, $p = .006$ (personal BJW: Ms = 4.35 vs. 2.60), $F(1, 54) = 46.45$, $p < .001$ (general BJW: Ms = 3.74 vs. 2.86). Secondly, we expected that scores in the "apple-polisher students" condition would be equal to those in the "good students" condition. This hypothesis did not receive support because in both spheres of BJW scores of the "apple-polisher students" were higher than those of "the good students": $F(1, 54) = 4.89$, $p = .03$ (personal BJW: Ms = 4.35 vs. 3.78), $F(1, 54) = 4.72$, $p = .03$ (general BJW: Ms = 3.74 vs. 3.06). Thirdly, we expected that scores in the "good students" condition would be higher than those in the "bad students" condition. This hypothesis received support in the personal BJW sphere, $F(1, 54) = 23.67$, $p < .001$ (Ms = 3.78 vs. 2.60), but not in the general BJW sphere, $F(1, 54) = .45$, $p = .51$ (Ms = 3.06 vs. 2.86).

Another set of hypotheses compared the scores in the "own opinion" condition to the scores in the three "referent" conditions. Firstly, we expected that scores of "own opinion" would be lower than those in the "apple-polisher students" condition. This hypothesis received support for both spheres of BJW: $F(1, 54) = 8.61$, $p = .005$ (personal BJW: Ms = 3.74 vs. 4.35), $F(1, 54) = 27.71$, $p < .001$ (general BJW: Ms = 2.70 vs. 3.74). Secondly, we expected that scores in the "own opinion" would be equal to those in the "good student" condition, which received support for both spheres of BJW: $F(1, 54) = .34$, $p = .56$ (personal BJW: Ms = 3.67 vs. 3.78), $F(1, 54) = .22$, $p = .64$ (general BJW: Ms = 2.97 vs. 3.06). Finally, we expected that scores in the "own opinion" condition would be higher than those in the "bad students" condition. This hypothesis received support in the case of the personal BJW sphere (Ms = 3.64 vs. 2.60), $F(1, 54) = 32.95$, $p < .001$, but not in the case of the general BJW sphere in which there were no significant differences (Ms = 3.11 vs. 3.86), $F(1, 54) = 2.20$, $p = .14$.

Given that there were two unexpected equivalent scores of general BJW (between own opinion and the bad students, and between the good and the bad students) we felt the need to probe for what may underlie this pattern. Thus, we compared scores of personal and general BJW in the bad and the good student conditions. We reasoned that these equalities could derive from the fact that general BJW scores of the bad student were "too high". By "too high", we mean being at least equal to personal BJW scores of the bad students (remember that scores in general BJW tend to be lower than those of personal BJW). If we found that pattern, then the above mentioned equalities

were more likely due to an "inflated" general BJW of the bad students, than due to lower than usual scores in the "own opinion" and the "good student" conditions.

Duncan-post-hoc tests showed that scores in the good students condition were higher in personal BJW ($M = 3.77$) than in general BJW ($M = 3.06$, $p < .001$), which follows the expected pattern. On the contrary, scores in the bad students condition were marginally higher in the general BJW ($M = 2.86$) than in the personal BJW ($M = 2.60$, $p = .06$).

In order to ascertain whether the overall results were obtained due to differences/similarities in evaluations of the referents, or despite these differences/similarities, we tested how the different referents were evaluated. For that purpose, we performed a one-way ANOVA, with the evaluation as the dependent variable and the referent as the independent variable, which resulted in a highly significant effect, $F(1, 54) = 57.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .68$. As expected, the "good students" was evaluated more positively ($M = 5.74$) than both the "bad students" ($M = 2.76$), $F(1, 54) = 73.05$, $p < .001$, and the "apple-polishers" ($M = 2.12$), $F(1, 54) = 97.25$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, the "apple-polishers" was rated marginally more negatively ($M = 2.12$) than the "bad students" ($M = 2.76$), $F(1, 54) = 3.23$, $p = .08$.

1.3.4. Discussion

With this study we aimed to show that the expression of higher degrees of BJW was associated with a specific positive target (good students) and that the expression of lower degrees of BJW was associated with a specific negative target (bad students). In our reasoning, these results would replicate those in Study 2 (to convey a positive or a negative image of oneself) but with the use of specific targets. Furthermore, we intended to show that the expression of higher degrees of BJW could also be associated with a negative target, namely a target who tries to be liked by explicitly expressing agreement with the system and their representatives (apple-polisher students). We reasoned that if that were the case, we would be showing that the normativity of the expression of BJW is a matter with more subtleties than shown in Studies 1 to 6 (that the expression of high BJW is more valued than that of low BJW). In other words, expressing BJW is not necessarily associated with normativity, namely normative social actors.

We found both similarities and differences regarding the patterns of results of general and personal BJW.

A first similarity, in both spheres of BJW, was that scores were, as expected, higher when participants filled in the scales according to the apple-polisher students than according to the bad students. This result likely reflects the different representation of each subcategory of student: the apple-polishers are perceived as people who try to be liked by those in power (or, in this case, by those who can decide their marks) by agreeing with them (or their decisions), whereas the bad students are perceived as people who do not care about studies, being lazy and having inferior marks. In other words, the apple-polisher students try to be successful (although, at least partially, through illegitimate means), and the bad students do not. As a result, the apple-polishers are motivated to express normative statements whereas the bad students are not. In the latter case, stating that the world is not just, both for them and for people in general, may even serve as an excuse for their lack of effort and results.

From our point of view, the difference between the apple-polisher students and the bad students cannot be accounted for by a difference in evaluation but by the contents associated with each subcategory of student. In fact, when asked to evaluate the students, there was a marginal difference between the apple-polisher and the bad students. In the cases of marginal differences, we may opt to either stress the difference or the equivalence. In either case, however, we come up with the conclusion that the differences of scores were not dependent on the evaluation of each subcategory of student. If we see the evaluation of the apple-polisher and that of the bad students as equivalent, and expect the scores of BJW to reflect those evaluations, then the scores should be equivalent, too. Nevertheless, that is not the case. If, on the contrary, we opt to see the evaluation of each subcategory of student as different, and expect scores of BJW to reflect that difference, then scores of the bad students would have to be higher than those of the apple-polishers, because the evaluation of the former was marginally higher than that of the latter. Nevertheless, that is not the case, either. From our point of view, the difference can only be accounted for if we take the associated contents of the representation of each subcategory of student into account.

A second (this time, unexpected) similarity between both spheres of BJW was the fact that scores of the apple-polisher students were higher than those of the good student. Why were the scores not equivalent as we had expected?

Although a definitive answer cannot be given, we believe that the apple-polisher students, in order to be liked and profit from it, may exaggerate the extent to which they agree with the status quo defined by the "people in charge" (in this case, the teachers,

although in our study that is implicit); hence, the expression of superior degrees of BJW. On the contrary, good students are people perceived as competent and who have good marks. Although they recognize that the world is somewhat just (otherwise, their marks would not reflect their competence), they do not need to exaggerate their agreement with the status quo. As Jones (1990) argues, the best way of self-presenting as competent is by showing competence not by claiming competence. Nevertheless, since the expression of high BJW is associated with perceptions of competence (see Study 5), claiming that the world is just may be perceived as a means of claiming that one is competent[31]. As such, the expression of higher BJW degrees by the apple-polishers may be a means to be perceived as likable and competent. As for the latter aspect, it may be an attempt to make up for their relative incompetence (see the results of the pilot test) even though people who claim competence may end up being perceived as incompetent (Godfrey et al., 1986). Furthermore, despite being perceived as less competent than the good students, the apple-polishers are perceived to be able to attain an equivalent status.

Thus, joining the results of our pilot test and those of the current study, it seems that this subcategory of student has several reasons to overjustify the status quo (in the sense of having the highest scores): to be seen as competent, to be liked by those in higher positions and, a consequence of the latter case, to legitimate their future high positions which are perceived to be attained through ingratiation of their superiors (see Gordon, 1996; Vonk, 1998, 2002).

In a final similarity, scores in the "own opinion" condition were, as expected, lower than those in the "the apple-polisher student" condition, and equal to those in the "good student" condition for both spheres of the BJW. These patterns reflect the tendency of individuals to perceive themselves as normative (Codol, 1975). As such, they express equivalent degrees of BJW to those of a positive referent (good student) and lower degrees than a negative referent who tends to express conformity to norms (apple-polishers).

As for differences of patterns between general and personal BJW, whereas the personal BJW scores in the good students condition were, as expected, higher than those in the bad student condition, scores in both conditions were equivalent in the general

---

[31] The same applies to the expression of moderate BJW (see also Study 5). Although we cannot state that the scores of the apple-polisher, especially those of the personal BJW, represent a high BJW, and those of the good student represent a moderate BJW, this is an hypothesis that could be tested in future studies.

BJW. The latter result was not expected. Comparisons between the two spheres of BJW in the good and bad students conditions shed light on possible reasons for these unexpected results. As we see it, the main reason for these equalities is mainly due to the unexpectedly higher score of general than personal BJW in the bad students condition. What may explain this unexpected result?

From our point of view, it derives from a strategic use of BJW that participants attribute to bad students. In order to justify their poor results, bad students allegedly state that the world in general is not just, and what is more, it is especially unjust for them than to others in general. This kind of victimization strategy may serve as excuse making (it is not their fault) and/or self-esteem maintenance, much as members of devalued social groups do when justifying some failures (see Crocker & Quinn, 2003, for a review). In sum, this negatively evaluated subcategory of student is very likely perceived as engaging in excuse making, which can be associated with perceptions of incompetence, and not accepting personal responsibility for their results (Schlenker et al., 2001). In the process, these students are perceived to violate the norm of internality (Dubois, 1994) and the expression of BJW.

2. Study 8

In Studies 1-6 we consistently found a general pattern, according to which the expression of lower degrees of BJW was counternormative (or associated with a counternormative self-presentational strategy) and that the expression of moderate or high BJW was normative (or associated with more normative self-presentational strategies). Furthermore, in Study 7, relatively high degrees of BJW were associated with a positively valued target (a good student), and relatively low degrees of BJW were associated with a negatively valued target (a bad student). Nevertheless, also in Study 7, we found that another (somewhat more) negatively valued target (an apple-polisher student) was associated to even higher degrees of BJW (both personal and general) than the positively valued one (a good student).

With the current study we aim to show other instances in which the expression of BJW may be counternormative, by identifying another moderator to the general pattern. For that purpose we extended Study 5 by introducing a new variable that seemed likely to moderate those general patterns - the valence of the event that the interviewee refers to (successes or failures).

In Study 5, participants read that the "interviewee" held a low, moderate or high BJW for both good and bad things. This latter information was given in an attempt to avoid that participants focused on either positive or negative events or outcomes. It is likely that the results obtained (namely, higher ratings on social utility and social desirability to the targets who expressed high and moderate BJW than the targets who expressed low BJW) were due to this information, even though participants read it only once. We wondered whether or not the patterns would change, and other effects which were absent in Study 5 would be found, namely significant effects involving the sphere of BJW, if we had participants focus on either positive or negative events.

Nevertheless, instead of just presenting those events as good or bad, as in Study 5, we were more specific about the kinds of events the "interviewee" was referring to: successes or failures. With this choice we intended to present events that are either desirable (successes) or undesirable (failures), and are more likely to derive from the individuals' actions and less likely to derive from external factors, such as luck (e.g., winning the lottery, be a victim of a natural disaster). Although there is still room for participants' elaboration on what they interpret as a success or a failure, we did not want to be too specific in the event portrayed to avoid the interpretation that the results derived from that situation in particular and not to a more general process.

In this study, participants read an "excerpt interview" in which the "interviewee" expressed his/her low or high personal or general BJW about either successes or failures. Then, participants rated the targets on dimensions also considered in Study 5: social utility and social desirability. In the current study we did not include "moderate BJW" conditions because intuitively we thought that it would always be perceived as normative (e.g., saying that one thinks that people/the self sometimes deserve(s) successes/failures and sometimes they/the self do(es) not, seems to be the "reasonable" thing to say). Since our main goal was to show instances of change (i.e., moderation) in the general patterns (i.e., the relative normativity of high BJW and the relative counter-normativity of low BJW), and none was expected with the expression of moderate BJW, by including this degree of BJW we would be unnecessarily complexifying the experimental design (which would have 16 cells, instead of the current eight).

As we see it, several targets are more likely to be considered normative and others counternormative, at least on one dimension, when they refer to successes or failures through high or low BJW, and that the sphere of BJW used will also have impact on their judgments. As such we expect a three-way interaction effect, the patterns of which can be consulted on Table 6.3.

Table 6.3

Hypotheses of the three-way effect on social utility and social desirability

	General BJW				Personal BJW			
	low		high		low		high	
	Successes	Failures	Successes	Failures	Successes	Failures	Successes	Failures
	(1)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(3)	(4)	(4)	(3)
Social utility	++	++	+++	+++	---	+	+++	--
Social desirability	---	++	+++	--	---	-	+	--

Note: The more minus signals, the lower the rating, and the more plus signals, the higher the rating.

The numbers represent conditions in which the targets are, from our point of view: (1) other-derogation; (2) other-enhancement; (3) self-derogation; (4) other-enhancement

In our reasoning, because the expression of high BJW is normative and anchors on social utility and social desirability, we expect that its expression will increase scores of both dimensions. Thus, the negativity associated with derogation will not be so strong when high (vs. low) BJW is expressed, and the positivity associated with enhancement will be increased when high (vs. low) BJW is expressed.

In the case of *general BJW*, we believe that two targets will be considered counternormative and two others normative.

The targets who express high general BJW for failures ("I think that people generally deserve their failures") or low general BJW for successes ("I think that people rarely deserve their successes") seem to be engaging in other-derogation or, at least, in other-effacing, namely denying others their competence or utility. In this case, they may be perceived as people who show the slime effect, that is, people who "lick upward but kick downward" (at least, in our case, the kick downward" part), which is an extremely aversive identity (Vonk, 1998, 2002).

Although other-derogation may be usual and a way of gaining power over others (see, for instance, the case of gossip, Kurland & Pelled, 2000), it is negatively evaluated (Horowitz et al., 1991). In other words, it may be descriptively normative but injunctively counternormative. For instance, derogation of victims, even those who are responsible for their plight, is a counternormative phenomenon, and its counter-normativity is stronger at the injunctive than at the descriptive level (Alves & Correia, 2007). Furthermore, research has found that other-derogation is typical of (but not exclusive of) narcissists when they are criticized or fail in a task (e.g., Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides & Elliot, 2000; Kernis & Sun, 1994). By engaging in other-derogation, people are seen as undesirable (Horowitz et al., 1991), and possibly get spoilt identities, such as being a gossiper or self-centred. Nevertheless, despite being perceived low in desirability, individuals who engage in other-derogation are likely to be perceived hostile and competitive (Horowitz et al., 1991), the latter being connected to social utility.

Since both the target who expresses high general BJW for failures and the target who expresses low general BJW for successes seem to engage in other-derogation, they are likely to be perceived relatively high in social utility (at least, in its competitive component). Nevertheless, the target who does it through high BJW (a normative expression connected to social utility) will be perceived even higher in this dimension than the target who expresses low BJW (a counternormative expression).

On the contrary, the targets who express high general BJW for successes ("I think that people generally deserve their successes") or low general BJW for failures ("I think that people rarely deserve their failures") are engaging, from our point of view, in other-enhancement. However, this other-enhancement involves a third-party (people in general) and not someone the target would be talking directly to. As such, the "interviewee" is not an apple-polisher, which would be a highly negative identity (Gordon, 1996; Vonk, 1998, 2002). Instead, by engaging in third-party enhancement, the interviewee is likely to be seen under a positive light (e.g., good-natured). In fact, sometimes individuals self-promote by having someone else doing it on their behalf. It is unlikely that individuals engaged in this mediating role if it would give them an undesired identity.

The fact that one target is engaging in other-enhancement (third-party) through normative means (i.e., high BJW), and the other target is doing it through counternormative means (i.e., low BJW) will differentiate these targets in perceived social utility and in social desirability, although both will be rated high on both dimensions (in fact, as we will see later, we expect the target who expresses high general BJW for successes to be rated the highest on both dimensions).

In the case of *personal BJW*, there seem to be two cases of self-derogation (or, at least self-effacing) and two cases of self-enhancement (or self-promotion). Their (counter-)normativity, however, is hypothetically not so linear as in the case of general BJW.

The targets who, from our point of view, are engaging in self-derogation are the ones expressing low personal BJW for successes ("I think that I rarely deserve my successes") or high BJW for failures ("I generally deserve my failures").

The target who expresses low BJW for successes is, in our opinion, the one who more explicitly engages in self-derogation. Since people do not enjoy having around them people who self-derogate (see Leary, 1995), judge them as relatively submissive and passive (Horowitz et al., 1991), and seeing that this self-derogation is conveyed through low BJW (a counternormative expression), this target should be perceived especially low in social utility and desirability. In the case of the target who expresses high personal BJW for failures ("I generally deserve my failures"), it is likely that he/she is interpreted slightly more positively than the previous target because he/she uses high BJW.

Turning to the targets who express high personal BJW for successes ("I think that I generally deserve my successes") and low personal BJW for failures ("I think that I rarely deserve my failures"), both may be seen as engaging in self-enhancement.

As reviewed in Chapter 2, individuals may self-promote either nonverbally or verbally (Jones, 1990). In the latter case, the one which matters here, self-promotion may be achieved in various ways, namely by directly referring to one's qualities, competences and achievements or by refusing responsibilities for failures (excuse-making) (see Leary, 1995). Overt self-enhancement is normative both descriptively (see the commonness of the better-than-average phenomena, e.g., Hornsey & Jetten, 2004) and injunctively in specific domains, such as in job interviews (e.g., Stevens & Kristof, 1995). Nevertheless, too much self-enhancement (e.g., when claiming the best performance explicitly clashes with reality, Codol, 1975) or when self-enhancement is performed in an inappropriate context, or still when others do not require it, it is likely to be injunctively counternormative (Holtgraves & Srull, 1989).

Although overt self-enhancement in an improper context (as it seems to be the case in the situation presented in our study) is likely to be perceived negatively, it does not usually lower perceptions of social utility (although that peril exists, as shown by Godfrey et al., 1986). The diminishing effect is more usually felt in judgments of social desirability (e.g., being perceived as a bragger; but see Holtgraves & Dulin, 1994). On the other hand, someone who self-promotes by not recognizing his/her responsibilities[32] when failing may be seen as unreliable, uncommitted, untrustworthy or self-centred (Schlenker et al., 2001). Thus, this kind of person may be perceived not very high in social utility. In both cases, however, social desirability should not be very high.

Since the target who expresses high personal BJW for successes self-promotes by using high BJW (a normative expression by itself) we expect him/her to be more positively evaluated in both dimensions than the target who expresses low personal BJW for failures.

Next, we present our hypotheses more systematically.

---

[32] We should note, however, that the BJW is conceptually distinct from an attributional process, namely locus of control (Maes, 1994). In fact, by expressing the BJW the individuals are not identifying a cause for outcomes, but "merely" stating whether or not they consider outcomes as just. In fact, correlations between BJW and locus of control are typically low or nonsignificant (Correia, 2003).As we will see, in the "interviews" used in this study, the "interviewees" do not present reasons for their successes or failures, but only evaluate them as just or unjust. What we argue is that the image conveyed by expressing low personal BJW for failures may be likened to that conveyed when individuals are perceived not to acknowledge their responsibilities in failures (such as making excuses).

2.1. Hypotheses

We expect a main effect of the degree of expressed BJW, such that targets who express high BJW will be judged higher in social utility and social desirability than the targets who express low BJW which replicates the findings in previous studies.

As far as *social utility* is concerned, we expect that the targets who express high general BJW for failures (other-derogation), high general BJW for successes (other-enhancement) and high personal BJW for successes (self-promotion) are expected to score the highest. The reasons for these expectations are as follow.

As for the target who expresses high general BJW for failures, his/her high ratings derive from the fact that he/she is engaging in other-derogation, which seems to have a component of social utility, and because it is expressed through a normative way (high BJW).

Although the literature suggests the social utility of other derogation, as far as we know it does not indicate that other-enhancement lacks it. Therefore, we expect that the targets who engage in other-enhancement will also be rated high in social utility, especially when it is expressed through high BJW, as is the case of the high general BJW for successes. Since both other-derogation and other-enhancement are likely to grant social utility, especially when expressed through high BJW, we expect that the targets who express high general BJW for successes and for failures will be distinguished in social desirability, not social utility.

As for the target who expresses high BJW for successes, he/she is self-enhancing through high BJW, that is, asserting his/her market value through a normative way (contrarily to the target who expresses low BJW for failures who is self-enhancing through low BJW). Thus, it is also expected to be among the highest ratings in social utility.

Finally, we expect that the target who expresses low personal BJW will be rated the lowest in social utility, because he/she is not only self-derogating, but he/she is also doing it through a counternormative way (low BJW), contrarily to the other target whom we assume to be self-derogating (high personal BJW for failures).

Regarding *social desirability*, we expect that the target who expresses high general BJW for successes will be the one being rated the highest (other-enhancement through a normative way), followed by low general BJW for failures which is also other-enhancement but through low BJW.

On the contrary, the targets who express low general BJW for successes (other-derogation) and low personal BJW for successes (self-derogation) will be rated the lowest in social desirability, because they convey counternormative ideas in a counternormative way (low BJW).

In order to address the anchorage issue, we have to compare each target on both dimensions and will consider an anchorage when the ratings on the dimension are among the highest. Thus, according to this criterion, we expect that only the target who expresses high general BJW for successes will show a double anchorage, because it will be the only one to show the equivalent highest ratings on social utility and social desirability. The case of the target who expresses high personal BJW for successes is the case which also resembles more closely a double anchorage; however, our (strict) criterion for considering a score as an anchorage excludes this target's social desirability as such (although not negative, it will not be among the highest). Also, the ratings of the target who expresses low BJW will not be considered a double anchorage (in fact, no anchorage is expected), because neither the ratings of social utility nor the ratings of social desirability are among the highest (although they are relatively high).

We should note that the case of the target who expresses low personal BJW for successes (and, to a lesser extent, the target who expresses high personal BJW for failures) is expected to be rated the lowest on both dimensions, which hints at its special counternormativity.

2.2. Method

2.2.1. Participants

One hundred and twenty-five university students of both sexes (40 males and 85 females) and several degrees (e.g., geography, architecture, design, sociology) took part in this experimental study. Their ages varied between 17 and 48 ($M = 21.82$; $SD = 4.51$).

2.2.2. Experimental design and procedure

This experimental study has a 2 (sphere of expressed BJW: personal/general) X 2 (degree of expressed BJW: low/high) X 2 (valence of event: successes/failures) between-subjects design.

The procedure of this study closely resembles that of Study 5. The only differences are the nonexistence of expression of moderate BJW and the inclusion of a new variable: valence of event.

Participants were asked to take part in this study during class time and each session lasted 20-25 minutes on average.

The participants were randomly given a stapled block which contained the manipulations and the dependent measures (see Appendix L). On the front page they read that the excerpts had been taken from an approximately 50-minute interview with a university student which our research team had performed for a previous study. The participants were further informed that the team was now interested in knowing what other people thought about some of the ideas conveyed in that interview. Each "excerpt" was preceded by three time references (minutes 10, 26 and 43) in order to give the idea that the sentences had not been said in a row. Although the "excerpts" were just the items of the personal BJW scale, we added a few expressions that tried to emulate oral speech ("that's it"; "for instance"; "it's like I said before") in order to increase believability. Each "excerpt" was followed by a comment which basically repeated what the "interviewee" had said and added that it reflected a low or a high BJW (for the self or for people in general). The only difference between the personal and the general BJW sentences was the referent (i.e. the "interviewee" vs. "people in general", respectively). Half of the participants read that the target's judgments concerned their own or people in general successes and the other half read that their judgments concerned their own or people in general failures.

After reading the "interview excerpt" and the comment, each participant answered the dependent measures and provided some personal information (their sex and age). Finally, they were probed for suspicion, debriefed and thanked.

2.2.3. Dependent measures

The participants answered, on 7-point Likert type scales (1= nothing at all; 7 = very much so), the extent to which they thought each of 15 adjectives characterized the target. These adjectives concerned two dimensions: *social utility* (competent, confident, competitive, independent, hard-working, intelligent, determined, responsible) and *social desirability* (e.g., likable, helpful, sincere, warm, polite, good-natured, tolerant). These adjectives correspond to the ones that were used in the analyses of Study 5.

2.3. Results

Firstly, we created two indexes corresponding to the average of the items included in each measure, as in Study 5: social utility (Cronbach's α = .90) and social desirability (Cronbach's α = .85).

Then, as preliminary analyses, we tested for order and participants' sex effects. Because we did not have enough participants to perform MANOVAs with five simultaneous factors (our independent variables, plus the participants' sex and the answering order), we decided to perform separate MANOVAs with four factors: one 2 (sphere of expressed BJW) X (degree of expressed BJW) X 2 (valence of event) X 2 (sex of participant), and the other 2 (sphere of BJW) X (degree of expressed BJW) X 2 (valence of event) X 2 (answering order). There were neither main nor interaction effects involving the participants' sex or the answering order (all p's > .10).

Then we performed a 2 (sphere of expressed BJW) X 2 (degree of expressed BJW) X 2 (valence of event) MANOVA on social utility and social desirability.

Results showed, as expected, a main effect of the degree of expressed BJW, $F(2, 108) = 23.37$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .30$[33]. Univariate ANOVAs showed that the degree of expressed BJW had effect on both measures: $F(1, 109) = 43.65$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .29$ (social utility), $F(1, 109) = 15.51$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$ (social desirability). As expected, participants perceived the target who expressed high BJW, compared to the target who expressed low BJW, higher in social utility (Ms = 4.62 vs. 3.51) and in social desirability (Ms = 4.07 vs. 3.51).

Also as expected, there was a three-way effect, $F(2, 108) = 23.78$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .31$[34]. Univariate ANOVAs showed that this three-way interaction had effect on both measures: $F(1, 109) = 16.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$ (social utility) and $F(1, 109) = 15.95$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$ (social desirability) (see Table 6.4 for means and standard deviations; and see Figure 6.2 for the patterns).

---

[33] The differences of degrees of freedom stated and those expected are due to the fact that several participants did not respond to all items.
[34] There were other main and interaction effects which we only present here because they were not expected and are not as informative as the ones we predicted: a main effect of sphere of BJW, $F(2, 108) = 5.10$ $p = .008$ $\eta_p^2 = .09$, and two two-way interaction effects: sphere of BJW X degree of BJW, $F(2, 108) = 3.91$ $p = .023$ $\eta_p^2 = .07$; sphere of BJW X valence of event, $F(2, 108) = 3.25$ $p = .04$ $\eta_p^2 = .06$.

Table 6.4.

Means and standard deviations of social utility and social desirability, according to the sphere of expressed BJW, degree of expressed BJW and valence of the event

| | General BJW | | | | Personal BJW | | | |
| | low | | high | | low | | high | |
	successes	failures	successes	failures	successes	failures	successes	failures
Social utility	4.05a,b1 (.92)	3.54b1 (.86)	4.68a1 (.92)	5.03a1 (.52)	2.87c1 (.91)	3.57b1 (1.12)	4.96a1 (.62)	3.81b1 (1.27)
Social desirability	3.53a,b1 (.77)	4.05b,c2 (.81)	4.50c1 (1.07)	3.60a,b2 (.70)	3.23a1 (.54)	3.19a1 (.74)	3.73a,b2 (.61)	4.54c2 (.61)

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Mean values in line not sharing the same letter differ at $p < .05$, or better. Pairs of means in column not sharing the same number differ at $p < .05$, or better.

Figure 6.2. Mean values of social utility and social desirability according to the joint effect of sphere of expressed BJW, degree of expressed BJW and valence of the event

We predicted that several targets would be perceived as the most/the least socially useful or/and socially desirable. In this section we will test those predictions and explore whether other targets were seen as useful or/and as desirable as the ones we predicted.

In the process, we began with the highest or lowest mean on each dimension and then compared it with the second, third, etc. highest or lowest mean. We considered as equivalent high (or low), those targets whose ratings did not statistically differed from the highest (or lowest) mean, and differed from the first mean to be statistically different from the highest (or lowest). Comparisons were done using Duncan post-hoc tests[35].

As far as social utility is concerned, we predicted that the targets who expressed high general BJW for failures, high general BJW for successes and high personal BJW for successes would be judged the highest, and the target who expressed low personal BJW for successes the lowest on this dimension. These hypotheses received full support. In fact, the targets who expressed high general BJW for failures ($M = 5.03$), high general BJW for successes ($M = 4.68$) and high personal BJW for successes ($M = 4.96$) were the highest ratings according to our criteria, the other two being the targets who expressed (all p's $> .30$, among the three values). Also as expected, the target who expressed low personal BJW for successes ($M = 2.87$) was rated the lowest. Most of the remaining values were statistically different from these. The exception was the target who expressed low general BJW for successes ($M = 4.05$) which was equivalent to the highest ratings. Nevertheless, since it was also equivalent to other lower ratings, it contradicted one of our criteria to be included among the highest.

Regarding social desirability, we predicted that the target who expressed high general BJW for successes would be judged the highest and the targets who expressed low general BJW for successes or low personal BJW for successes would be judged the lowest. Most of these predictions received support.

In fact, the target who expressed high general BJW for successes ($M = 4.50$) was one of the two targets with the highest ratings on this dimension. Nevertheless the target who expressed high personal BJW for failures ($M = 4.54$) was judged as desirable as the previous one ($p = .76$), which was not expected. On the contrary, the targets who expressed low personal BJW for successes ($M = 3.23$), as expected, and for failures ($M = 3.19$), not expected, were judged the lowest in social desirability ($p = .89$). As for the target expressing low general BJW for successes, included in our hypothesis, although the ratings in social desirability were statistically equivalent to the previous two targets,

---

[35] Although we had hypotheses and the use of planned contrasts would be more appropriate, we also explored, as stated, whether other conditions were equivalent to those we had predictions (hence, the use of post-hocs). In order that in this part of the results section we did not mix both kinds of testing, which would result in a more difficult text, and since the results are equivalent, we opted to present the results of the post-hoc tests which only require the indication of the p-value.

they were also equivalent to the ratings of targets who differ from them (e.g., low general BJW for failures). Thus, the ratings of the target who expressed low general BJW for successes violates our criteria for inclusion among the lowest.

As for the anchorage issue, we predicted that only the target who expressed high general BJW for successes would be rated equally high on both dimensions, thus representing the only instance of double anchorage. Planned contrasts confirmed our hypothesis. The target who expressed high general BJW for successes was rated equivalent in social utility and in social desirability, $F(1, 109) = 0.86$, $p = .36$. The comparisons between ratings of social utility and social desirability of the targets who expressed high general BJW for failures and high personal BJW for successes (the ones who had also received the highest ratings in social utility) showed that they were perceived higher in social utility than in social desirability, $F(1, 109) = 34.13$, $p < .001$, and $F(1, 109) = 24.38$, $p < .001$, respectively.

The unexpected result that showed that the target who expressed high personal BJW for failures was perceived among the highest in social desirability, led us to test whether he/she would also be perceived as high in social utility (although its ratings on this dimension were not among the highest). The contrast showed that this target was, however, perceived higher in social desirability than in social utility, $F(1, 109) = 9.30$, $p = .003$.

Finally, we tested whether the target who expressed low personal BJW for failures would be rated equally low on both dimensions. A planned contrast showed that social desirability was only marginally higher than social utility, $F(1, 109) = 3.10$, $p = .08$.

In sum, these patterns showed that, as expected, the ratings of the target who expressed high general BJW for successes were the only ones to simultaneously anchor on social utility and social desirability.

2.4. Discussion

With this study we intended to identify a moderator to the general pattern obtained in the Studies 1-6, namely that the expression of low BJW is counternormative and the expression of high BJW is normative. In this study, participants read similar "interview excerpts" similar to those of Studies 4 and 5, except that no "interviewee" expressed moderate BJW, and there were explicit references to either failures or

successes (our moderator). Then, participants rated the targets (the "interviewees") on social utility and social desirability.

As expected, the valence of the event to which the targets referred proved to be a strong moderator to the general pattern obtained in Study 5. As already stated, in that study, in which no particular event was referred to, we found that the expression of high BJW was consistently more normative than the expression of low BJW. In the current study we also found that, on the whole, the targets expressing high BJW were more positively rated on both dimensions than the targets expressing low BJW. Furthermore, the only targets that can be said to have at least one anchorage (being rated highest on at least social utility or desirability) are precisely those who expressed high BJW.

Nevertheless, and as predicted, there were other, more complex patterns of normativity judgments, involving the joint effect of the sphere of BJW, the degree of expressed BJW and the valence of the event. This resulted in another difference from results in Study 5. Whereas in that study there was a consistent double anchorage of high BJW on social utility and social desirability, in the current study most high BJW conditions were rated higher on one dimension than on the other. With the exception of high general BJW for successes, which rated equally high on both, there was a difference between the social utility and social desirability ratings in the other conditions: high general BJW for failures high and personal BJW for successes were rated higher on social utility than on social desirability, and high personal BJW for failures was rated higher on social desirability than on social utility.

The target who expressed low personal BJW for successes, which we interpret as engaging in self-derogation, was judged especially harshly, because he/she received the lowest ratings in both social utility and social desirability. In other words, this target was judged to have little of "what it takes" to succeed and to be liked (to note that the target who expressed low personal BJW for failures was rated equally low in social desirability, which points to the fact that expressing low personal BJW is especially aversive). From our point of view, this pattern derives from the fact that the target who expresses low personal BJW for successes does not conform to individualistic ideals in which achievements and self-promotion are highly regarded, within certain limits. In fact, this target was rated even lower in social desirability than the target who expressed high general BJW for failures, that is the one who is likely to show the "kickdownward part" of the "slime effect"(Vonk, 1998, 2002). The fact that the target who expressed low personal BJW for successes is perceived even lower in social desirability than the

target who expressed high general BJW for failures is especially clear as to how aversive the former target is. It seems that failing to self-promote is a more serious social "defect" than engaging in other-derogation.

On the contrary, the target who expressed high general BJW for failures was perceived as the one with the highest social utility (along with the targets who expressed high general BJW for successes and high personal BJW for successes), that is as someone with the potential (social utility) to "climb up the hierarchical ladder". Since this target is rated among the highest in social utility and is rated as having a certain degree of social desirability (i.e., his/her ratings are neither among the lowest nor the highest) he/she should be considered, contrarily to our expectations, a normative target, according to the model proposed by Beauvois (1995, 2003).

Other targets who were rated high in social utility were the ones expressing high personal BJW for successes and high general BJW for successes. The former target hints at the normativity of self-enhancement in individualistic societies, in contrast with the counternormativity of self-derogation (or, at least, self-effacing), such as the aforementioned case of the target who expresses low personal BJW for successes. The normativity of the target who expressed high personal BJW for successes is anchored on social utility, at the expense of some social desirability (possibly, being perceived as conceited). As for the target who expressed high general BJW for successes, he/she is perceived as high in social utility as in social desirability, being among the highest ratings on both dimensions. This double anchorage seems to show that individuals perceive that people do not have to show the slime effect in order to be potentially successful.

We would like to draw the reader's attention to the target who expressed high personal BJW for failures, who was assumed to be perceived as engaging in self-derogation. Nevertheless, the results obtained are not consonant to our assumption. In fact, our results are more supportive of the idea that this target is perceived as assuming his/her responsibilities, which would be similar to the norm of internality, although in our case there would not be an attributional process. However, contrarily to what happens to internal targets, this target's ratings in social utility are lower than those of social desirability. How can we account for this pattern?

One reason may be the kind of manipulation we used. Although, in this specific case, nothing was said about what the target thought about the justness of his/her successes, we think (in fact, that was our goal) that by focusing on failures participants

would assume that the target would think the opposite about successes (this reasoning applies to all experimental conditions). If we are right in our assumption, participants very likely thought that the target was the kind of person who assumes his/her responsibilities for failures, but when it comes to successes, he may be too modest to accept them. On the one hand, modesty is desirable (Sedikides et al., 2006), and when it is balanced it does not lower perceptions of competence (utility) (Judd et al., 2005). Nevertheless, when someone expresses too much modesty, he/she tends to be judged as relatively incompetent (low social utility) (Leary, 1995), which may have been the case of this target; hence lower social utility than social desirability. Possibly, this target was not rated among the least on social utility because he/she expresses high BJW which partly compensates for the perceived excessive modesty.

Finally, we would like to indicate that the ratings of the remaining experimental conditions, either those which show equivalence in social utility and social desirability or significant differences between those dimensions, are somewhere in the middle of the aforementioned experimental conditions. Thus, at least in the experimental conditions that we created, the expression of low BJW is never normative.

In sum, the patterns obtained result in the following picture. On the one hand, the existence of several conditions which are higher on one dimension than on the other, whether or not they represent anchorages on either dimension (in order for them to anchor on one dimension, the ratings had to be among the highest ones: social desirability - high personal BJW for failures; social utility - high personal BJW for successes and high general BJW for failures). On the other hand, only the condition of high general BJW for successes can be said to anchor simultaneously on both dimensions because they are not only equivalent but are also among the highest values. In the general discussion we will address this issue and discuss its possible theoretical consequences.

General Discussion

The two studies included in this chapter aimed at finding instances of moderation to the general pattern obtained in Studies 1-6. In general, we had found that the expression of higher degrees of BJW was more positively valued than the expression of lower ones. Specifically, participants used higher degrees of BJW in order to convey positive impressions and lower degrees to convey negative impressions. Furthermore, targets expressing high (and moderate) BJW were more positively valued than targets expressing low BJW, being rated higher on social utility and social desirability.

In Study 7 our main goal was to ascertain whether or not the expression of higher degrees of BJW could be also associated with a negatively valued target (apple-polisher students). Furthermore, we intended to replicate the findings that higher degrees of BJW were associated with a positively valued target (good students) and lower ones with another negatively valued target (bad students). On the whole these expectations received support.

Firstly, the expression of higher degrees of BJW (both personal and general) can be associated with a specific negatively valued target (apple-polishers) but not with the other (bad students). How can we account for this difference?

From our point of view, this difference derives from the distinguishing contents associated with each subcategory of student, as shown in our pilot test, and not to a general negative evaluation. Whereas the apple-polisher students are perceived to be motivated to succeed, the bad students are not. In order to be successful, the apple-polishers engage in illegitimate behaviour: both humiliating their colleagues and ingratiating the representatives of the system (thus, showing "the slime effect", Vonk, 1998, 2002). As students, they ingratiate their teachers, as professionals, they ingratiate their superiors. One way of ingratiating these representatives of the system, which values BJW, is by expressing BJW. In the process, they also legitimate the positions that they achieve, presented as deserved, when most probably they are due to ingratiation. As such, participants perceive the existence of a strategic use of higher degrees of BJW.

On the contrary, the bad students, who are not so attuned to the norms in individualistic societies to be successful as the other subcategories of students, or at least to exert effort in order to achieve success, are perceived to express lower degrees of BJW, which are associated with low competence (utility) and status. As we see it, underlying the attribution of lower degrees of BJW to this subcategory of student may

also be the idea that it may serve as an excuse that they use for the poor performance and as a device to maintain their self-esteem (see Crocker & Quinn, 2003). As such, it seems likely that participants perceive the existence of a strategic use of lower degrees of BJW.

An unexpected finding was that of higher degrees of BJW associated with the apple-polisher than with the good students. In fact, we had expected equivalent scores between these subcategories of students, although for different reasons. How can we account for this difference?

Again, we think that the contents associated with each subcategory of student explain it, among which the academic style, academic success (such as having good marks), future professional competence and status. Despite being perceived as having better marks than the bad students (possibly, through ingratiation), neither the apple-polishers' marks nor their competence is as high as those of the good students. Nevertheless, they are motivated to succeed and, in fact, they are perceived to achieve the same status as the good students. As we see it, expressing BJW, in order to please the representatives of the system is a means that participants perceive that apple-polishers use to compensate for *a priori* disadvantages when compared to the good students. Good students, however, do not need to engage in such ingratiation. In the just world that university students, our participants, seem to inhabit (Fiske et al., 2002), this subcategory of student will succeed for own merit. Good students may still express BJW for strategic reasons (to assert the justness of their achievements) but it is more likely used as reflecting their perceptions. They do not need to brag about their competence (and since expressing BJW is associated with competence, they do not need to express very high agreement) because their achievements speak for themselves. In fact, the best way of self-promoting is by showing ability not claiming ability (Jones, 1990).

In Study 8, we extended the procedure used in Study 5 by including a new variable: the valence of event that the target refers to (successes or failures). Our aim was to ascertain whether by focusing participants on one kind of event it would moderate the patterns obtained in Study 5 (higher social utility and social desirability). The valence of the event did moderate the aforementioned general pattern.

On the whole, targets who expressed high BJW were rated higher on both dimensions than targets who expressed low BJW. In fact, only targets who expressed high BJW were rated as having at least one anchorage, which seems to reflect the

devaluation of the expression of low BJW. In this respect, the expression of low personal BJW seems to be especially devalued, as we will discuss later. Nevertheless, only the target who expressed high general BJW for successes was rated equally high on social utility and social desirability. Thus, it was the only target to show the double anchorage on social utility and social desirability that was constant across all targets expressing high BJW in Study 5. Does the existence of only one such condition contradict our conclusion in Study 5 that high BJW anchors simultaneously on both dimensions? From our point of view, it does not, and the reason is the kind of manipulation used.

In Study 5 participants read that the targets referred to both good and bad things. On the contrary, in the current study, targets only referred to either good (successes) or bad things (failures). As a consequence, participants were focused on one but not on the other. Thus, participants may have thought that the target did not hold the same view about the non referred event. For instance, participants may have thought, that the target who expressed high personal BJW for successes had necessarily low personal BJW for failures, although nothing was said about it, and it does not necessarily have to be that way.

We would like to stress the fact that the target who expressed low personal BJW for successes was the most devalued of all targets because he/she was rated the lowest in social utility and social desirability. From our point of view, this pattern is observed because the target is engaging in self-derogation (or at least, in self-effacing) through low BJW; hence, an instance of double counter-normativity. Nevertheless, another instance of double counter-normativity (low general BJW for successes, i.e., other-derogation through low BJW) is not so harshly evaluated. In fact, this target is rated relatively high in social utility (visibly higher than the target who expresses low personal BJW for successes), and according to our criteria, he/she is not among the lowest in social desirability (although equivalent to the lowest, this target is also equivalent to targets who rate higher on this dimension). Furthermore, when someone engages in other-derogation through high BJW (the target expressing high general BJW for failures), the ratings in social utiliy even increase whereas those of social desirability remain equivalent.

The aforementioned differences lead us to conclude that, all things being equal, self-derogation is perceived as a more serious breach in normativty than other-derogation. Possibly, this is the case because self-derogation violates the norm in

Western, individualistic societies of being successful and self-promoting (see Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Leary, 1995). In fact, they may be perceived as depressive and weak. On the contrary, other-derogation seems to be perceived as part of the game. In this regard, it seems to parallel the expression of "individualism in a narrow sense" (giving priority to one's goals) to a certain extent (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005, Study 4): higher association with (positive) social utility than with (positive) social desirability.

Another way of looking at the targets who either self-derogate or other-derogate is by perceiving the target who expresses low personal BJW for successes as having the status of a victim, and the targets who engage in other-derogation as perpetrators of harm. With this analogy we may find points of contact with the BJW literature, namely the consistent finding that victims tend to be derogated, especially when innocent (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978). What our results suggest is that people who are victims are less positively rated than people who perpetrate harm to others. We stress that we are making an analogy, and that in cases of extreme physical harm, perpetrators are highly devaluated, even demonized (Ellard, Miller, Baumle & Olson, 2002). Nevertheless, this analogy permits us to read the results that we have obtained in the various studies of this thesis in a way that we could not otherwise.

The valuation of high BJW may result, at least in part, from its association with nonvictims (such as, successful people), whereas the devaluation of low BJW may result from its association with victims. Thus, expressing relatively high degrees of BJW is refusing an identity of victim and expressing relatively low degrees of BJW is acknowledging it. As a consequence, if individuals do not want to be perceived as victims, which is an aversive identity, they have to engage in a performance by stating that the world, and especially their world, is just, even if they do not agree with it. The most direct evidence that expressing BJW can be a performance is, besides the results in Study 4, the scores attributed to the apple-polisher student in Study 7.

To sum up, these studies give further evidence that the expression of BJW can be strategically used. Furthermore, it shows that the expression of higher degrees of BJW may not always be associated with valued targets. Nevertheless, it did not show that the expression of low BJW could be normative. Obviously, we do not mean that there are no instances in which such an expression is normative. In the final discussion of this thesis we will put forward a situation in which it probably is.

FINAL DISCUSSION

This thesis intended to be a contribution to a deeper understanding of the BJW at a more societal level than has been the traditional focus of research in this domain. More specifically, our concern was to study the (counter-) normativity of the very expression of the BJW.

Thus, with the studies included in this thesis, we aimed at addressing a theoretical issue which, on the whole, has been neglected in the literature. In fact, to our knowledge, only Dittmar and Dickinson (1993) focused on the expression of (general) BJW. Yet, their concern was not its (counter-)normativity but the socially shared association of the BJW with right-wing ideology.

Our research did not aim at denying the validity of previous one, which has mainly focused on the levels of analysis that Doise (1980, 1982) labelled intra- and inter-individual, but to complement it and to address, as well as to ask, new questions.

We focused on the expression of two spheres of BJW which have been shown to be important distinguishing predictors of attitudes and behaviours (Bègue & Bastounis, 2003): the general BJW (the idea that people on the whole get what they deserve), and the personal BJW (the idea that the self gets what he/she deserves). The expression of the two spheres of BJW was operationalized through the personal BJW scale (Dalbert, 1999) and the general BJW scale (Dalbert et al., 1987).

We started our research without specific hypotheses because we could find arguments for and against the normativity of the BJW. Based on the responses to the BJW scales reported in the literature, the expression of the BJW could be seen as counternormative. In fact, scores of general BJW scales tend to be below the midpoint and those of personal BJW just slightly above it (Dalbert, 1999; Lipkus et al., 1996). Thus, in terms of descriptive norms (Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991; Cialdini & Trost, 1998), the BJW may be perceived as counternormative. Also, Lerner (1980, 1998) considered the items comprising BJW scales as childlike and that adults in general would not agree with them on a regular basis. In this respect, the expression of BJW would be injunctively counternormative.

Nevertheless, the BJW has also been conceptualized as a legitimizing mechanism in Western, individualistic societies which serves as a justification of the status quo (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Jost et al., 2004; also Lerner, 1980). Thus, it could be that the BJW was approved of and found desirable, even if people did not agree much with it. In short, the BJW could be perceived as injunctively normative (Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991). In this respect the BJW would be a

judgment norm which could be strategically used by social actors and would grant social value to those expressing it. Thus, the expression of the BJW would be associated with positively evaluated targets. The perspective of the BJW as a judgment norm was the one which received support in our studies.

We followed the sociocognitive approach (Dubois, 2003; Dubois & Beauvois, 2003, 2005), because it has focused for the past three decades on the systematic study of judgment norms, especially the norm of internality, and their functions in Western, individualistic and economically liberal societies. Following the theoretical proposal of this approach that sees the injunctive, not descriptive, social norms as the backbone of normativity issues, our focus was exclusively on the perceived injunctive (counter-)normativity of the expression of the BJW.

We will review the main results that we obtained and discuss their theoretical implications. We divided our final discussion into five sections. The first section comprises Studies 1 to 4, that is the ones in which we ascertained that the BJW was a judgment norm. The second section comprises Studies 5 and 6 which confirmed the BJW as a judgment norm, revealed its double anchorage on social utility and social desirability and showed that it can be used strategically. The third section refers to Studies 7 and 8 in which we showed that the general pattern could be moderated, namely that the expression of higher degrees of BJW could be associated with a negatively evaluated target, and identified a situation in which the expression of the BJW could be counternormative. Although our concerns were exclusively theoretical, our results led us to reflect on its practical consequences, and in the fourth section we present some of the resulting ideas and some ethical issues involved, namely those about transmitting this knowledge to other people. Finally, we indicate future research problems in the fifth section.

1. The Expression of the Belief in a Just World as a Judgment Norm and its Anchorage Dimensions

In the first three studies (Chapter 4) our main goal was to ascertain the BJW normativity or counter-normativity.

In Study 1 we asked participants to fill in the personal and the general BJW scales according to their opinion and the way that they thought a classmate would. Results pointed to the first evidence that both spheres of BJW were normative despite seemingly differing in strength. In fact, as far as the general BJW is concerned,

participants did not significantly differ their opinion scores from those that they thought would reflect their classmates'. Nevertheless, in the case of personal BJW, participants superiorly distinguished themselves from their classmates by attributing higher scores of personal BJW to themselves than to their classmates, an instance of the PIP effect (Codol, 1975). This study also replicated the results that the literature has repeatedly found (e.g., Dalbert, 1999; Lipkus et al., 1996) that scores of personal BJW tend to be higher than those of general BJW.

Similarly, in Study 2 the participants also made a clearer distinction between personal than general BJW scores. In this study, participants were asked to complete one of the BJW scales in order to convey a positive image or a negative image of themselves. Results showed that higher scores were used when asked to convey a positive than a negative image. Nevertheless, scores of personal BJW were more differentiated than those of general BJW.

We have interpreted this pattern as reflecting a higher normative strength of the personal BJW, so that distinguishing the images conveyed by the expression of the personal BJW than by the expression of the general BJW seems to be a more fundamental issue when social actors engage in self-presentation (when they take on the role of judges/evaluators, this differentiation between the spheres of BJW does not seem so crucial, as we will see next). The fact that in Study 1 scores of personal BJW, in the own opinion condition, were higher than those of the general BJW seems to give this interpretation some basis.

In Study 3 participants were asked to evaluate a target who expressed one of three degrees of either general or personal BJW: low, moderate and high. In a situation in which participants took the role of judges, only the degree of the expressed BJW was relevant in distinguishing the targets. In fact, whereas the targets who expressed high and moderate BJW were equally positively judged, the targets who expressed low BJW were less positively judged. This result gave further evidence that the expression of BJW is normative and shows that the expression of moderate is normative too, without having to infer it from midpoint scores. The reason for the absence of sphere of BJW effects is likely to be attributable to the kind of paradigm used, an issue that we will address in the next section

Thus far, the evidence pointed to higher degrees of BJW being perceived as normative and a low BJW being perceived as counternormative. Would this pattern be

replicated if we asked participants directly? In the case it would, would it have to do with perceptions of truth?

Study 4 aimed at answering these questions. Results clearly showed that the expression of both high and moderate BJW were perceived as more normative than the expression of low BJW and, again, judgments of normativity of personal BJW were more extreme that those of general BJW. This result gives further evidence that the expression of personal BJW can be more crucial than that of general BJW. The fact that there was an effect of the sphere of BJW in this study, where none was found in Study 3, even though in both studies participants played the role of judges, may derive from the fact that in Study 3 they judged someone, whereas in Study 4 they judged the beliefs themselves.

Furthermore, this study showed that the normativity of high BJW is not connected, contrarily to moderate BJW, to perceived truth. In fact, high BJW was judged as (un)true as low BJW, a counternormative degree. Thus, it seems that the normativity of moderate and high BJW have different basis, and that the system grants value to both because of different reasons. On the one hand, moderate BJW is perceived as the truest judgment. Although it acknowledges that injustices may sometimes occur, its truth/realism characteristic may be a too important component for moderate BJW to be disqualified as counternormative. The system also needs realism to survive, especially when it seems to stress that people also get what they deserve (as noted in Chapter 4, the operationalizaton of moderate BJW contains more justice than injustice related words). In the case of high BJW, its normativity exists despite it not being much believed. Nevertheless, it conveys the idea required by the system to perpetuate itself, that is that people generally have what they deserve, thus legitimizing social differences and promoting the meritocratic myth (Kay et al., 2007).

This pattern (high BJW more normative than true) however, seems paradoxical, even perverse. How can something that people do not believe in be approved of? The answer, we think, lies again in the fact that it may be a mechanism that perpetuates a certain social functioning. It may not stand the test of objective reality but its existence may be beyond it – it may serve a purpose, the creation of a normative reality which people do not personal agree with but have learnt to find the right thing to say. In this respect, the expression of high BJW is a judgment norm.

Our results go in the direction of Jost & Hunyady's (2002, 2005; see also Kay & Jost, 2003) recent assumption of the BJW as crucial in Western, individualistic

societies, along with other factors, such as the Protestant work ethic or the fair market ideology (see Jost & Hunyady, 2005). On the whole it is the logic of meritocracy, that is the belief that society rewards individual ability and motivation, that seems to be at play and that differences in statuses are deserved, thus legitimate. The BJW very likely has crucial functions in individualistic societies, such as the distribution of rewards or regulating intergroup relationships, such as placating low status ones (see Jost & Hunyady's, 2002, perspective of ideology as a palliative). Expressing BJW, especially personal, seems to be in accord with a social myth in individualistic societies - that of meritocracy: each individual has what he/she deserves. Performing accordance with this myth, a kind of "meritocratic illusion", seems to give credit to individuals.

Taken the results of moderate and high BJW as a whole, it seems that the system feeds itself on a balance of perceived realism and on illusion and that both are equally valued. Furthermore, the expression of high BJW is the one more similar to a performance, in that individuals who express it do not believe it much. The pattern involving the expression of high BJW may reflect the fact that such an idea is perceived as childlike (Lerner, 1998). Yet, individuals approve of it. Thus, a technologically advanced society such as ours has a simplistic view as one of its pillars. Ironically, individuals recognize its unrealistic simplicity but find it normative. In sum, individuals not only do not abandon a view of immanent justice on an implicit level, as proposed by Lerner (1980; see Callan, Ellard and Nicol, 2006, for a demonstration); they also approve of it on an explicit level.

Thus, the expression of BJW seems fundamental not only for individual functioning, as Lerner (1980, 2002, 2003) and Dalbert (1999, 2001) argue, but also for social functioning. Even though individuals may not truly believe that the world is a just place, it seems to be part of the social drama to play as if it were the ultimate truth.

It is possible that, as put forward by Dubois (1994) regarding internality, at the core of the BJW normativity are evaluation practices in liberal societies. Specifically, just as evaluation practices are made easier, from the point of view of the evaluator, if outcomes are directly linked to the evaluated person's characteristics or behaviours, so they may become even easier if this link is perceived, or at least performed, as just. In other words, if a candidate to a job or to a promotion accepts, as part of the social game, that decisions regarding his/her hiring or promotion are only or, at least, mainly dependent on the qualities he/she has to offer or has offered the company (the internality part), the final decision is more easily accepted, if not privately, at least publicly. If, this

evaluative process is perceived, or at least publicly performed as just, it receives further support because it is legitimized.

This link between evaluation practices in companies and the valuation of the expression of the BJW was not directly tested in our studies. Neither was the relationship between the expression of BJW and the expression of internality. Nevertheless, there is indirect evidence that expressing BJW may be a "criterion of excellence" in companies, as internality is (Pansu et al., 2003), if we take into account the participants' responses in Study 5 (higher ratings in social utility directed to the targets expressing moderate or high BJW), in Study 6 (the highest BJW scores obtained when the participants were asked to be perceived as successful people) and those in Study 7. In fact, in this study, a target lacking social utility was perceived to use the highest degrees of BJW, presumably in order to be positively viewed by the system or its evaluative representative s (in this case, teachers) and be given advantages for just expressing that idea. In other words, expressing BJW seems to be perceived as a factor that compensates for a lack of social utility. Its limits, however, cannot be ascertained from our studies.

2. The Double Anchorage of the Belief in a Just World and Its Strategic Use

The kinds of value granted to targets expressing the BJW and its strategic use were directly addressed in Studies 5 and 6, respectively.

In Study 5, participants read an "interview excerpt" of a target who expressed low, moderate or high personal or general BJW for "good and bad things". Then, they rated the target on four dimensions: social utility, social desirability, perceived status and willingness to interact. Thus, we measured one interpersonal consequence (willingness to interact) for expressing ideas that are consonant or counter to the individualistic ideology (respectively, moderate or high BJW on the one hand, and low BJW, on the other hand).

The results in the study were quite clear. The targets who expressed high and moderate BJW received higher ratings on all four measures than the targets who expressed low BJW. This pattern represents further evidence regarding the normativity of those two BJW degrees. Again, using the judge paradigm, the crucial variable was the degree of BJW expressed and not so much the sphere.

The biggest contribution of this study, in comparison to the previous ones, was that we were able to ascertain on which dimensions the expression of the BJW anchors.

Research in the sociocognitive tradition has identified judgment norms which anchor either on social utility (e.g., the norm of internality or the norm of self-sufficiency) or on social desirability (the norm of individual anchoring). Although Le Barbenchon and Milhabet (2005) hypothesized the existence of a double anchorage in the expression of optimism, they found that it only anchored on social utility. Thus, as far as we know, we were the first to identify a judgment norm that shows a double anchorage. This finding requires that the conceptualization of judgment norms be more inclusive, in that it not only should comprise the BJW as a new instance but it should also consider the possibility of a double anchorage in its definition.

The next question is: why does the expression of BJW (moderate and high) grant individuals both kinds of social value, and not only one?

We do not have a definitive answer, but it may be due to the fact that, because they convey the idea that that justice occurs (even in the case of moderate BJW, as operationalized here), it may be a more general judgment norm than internality, self-sufficiency or individual anchoring. The BJW, although an element of the individualistic ideology, may be situated on a higher level of abstraction than the other judgment norms, because it is the element that "certifies" their justness. For instance, expressing internality is expected and approved of, granting social utility; individual anchoring is also expected and approved of, granting social desirability. The BJW may envelope these and other judgment norms, legitimizing them for being just and, as a consequence, incorporating both dimensions. This, of course, is a tentative explanation which requires testing, namely confronting the various judgment norms simultaneously, including the BJW.

This study gives further evidence of the social drama involved in the expression of the BJW. Those individuals who act accordingly are given positive value and contact; those who do not are devalued and ostracized. As such, there seems to be a strategic component in the expression of the BJW: individuals may not believe in what it is said, as shown in Study 4, but in order to achieve certain goals they have to act as if they do. Thus, for the system it seems that what is important is to support it, both through personal and general BJW. In other words, the system seems to require that individuals express the idea that the world is just for people in general and for each individual. In short, that individuals have the chance of getting what they deserve.

In sum, the expression of high BJW seems to be a strategic and fundamental performance, both for individuals who are granted value, and for the system which is accepted by individuals.

Study 2 had already provided evidence of the strategic use of BJW but the strategies used, to convey a positive or a negative image of oneself, were the most general we could think of. In Study 6 we directly addressed the strategic use of BJW based on Jones and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy. The results gave further evidence that the expression of higher degrees of BJW is positively valued, both for personal and general BJW. It also showed that when participants complete BJW scales, instead of judging a target, they tend to consistently distinguish between both spheres of BJW and finding higher differences within different strategies in the personal than in the general BJW.

This consistent result seems to indicate that when individuals self-present, they mistakenly consider the expression of personal BJW more central than general BJW. We state "mistakenly" because when individuals are put in the situation of evaluators (i.e., being a kind of representatives of the system), this distinction between spheres is not consistent. In other words, individuals as social actors seem to consider that the personal BJW is more crucial than the general BJW, but the system itself considers that the general BJW is, on the whole, as central as the personal. Whereas the identification and self-presentation paradigms implicate the self to an important extent, the judge paradigm, makes the participants look at the material presented through the eyes of society (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). Thus, there seems to be a difference between what the individuals, as social actors, perceive to be central to normativity and individuals as a judging audience do. For participants, as social actors, the degree and the sphere of BJW seem equally relevant. For participants as an audience (judges) the degree of expressed BJW seems to be more relevant.

These differentiated patterns may derive from the fact that for the system it is important to be perceived as legitimate on the whole. Yet, it also stresses that each individual has the duty to express that he/she has what he/she deserves, as indicated by a few effects of the sphere of BJW in Studies 4 and 5. Nevertheless, on the whole, the emphasis of the system is on the degree, and not so much on the sphere of BJW expressed.

On the whole, Studies 1-6 indicate that the expression of personal and general BJW is normative. Although we do not know how frequent individuals engage in

expressing this idea (i.e., how descriptively normative it is), our results indicate that it is a central idea in individualistic societies. After all, participants were not focused on any norm, and yet they consistently indicated that the BJW is normative. Besides, these consistent findings were obtained with Likert-type scales, not with forced-choice tasks. This fact is a conservative test of the normativity of the BJW because, according to Dubois (1994), the normativity of a phenomenon, namely judgment norms, is more easily identified when participants have to decide between two or more statements, as is the case of most research on internality, than when Likert-type scales are used.

The next question was then to try to find instances in which the expression of BJW was counternormative, that is a moderator to this general pattern.

3. Moderators to the General Pattern

The main goal of Study 7 was to show that the expression of higher degrees of personal and general BJW could be associated with a specific negatively evaluated target (apple-polisher students) to the same extent as a positively evaluated one (good students), but not to another specific negative target (bad students).

The results showed that, as expected, the bad students are perceived to express the lowest BJW. More importantly to our argument, the apple-polishers are perceived to express even higher degrees of BJW than the good student, which was an unexpected finding. This result indicates, on the one hand, that the expression of BJW is perceived to be crucial to the system, at least in evaluation settings. In fact, its expression may be somehow "exaggerated" by those who, lacking social utility (as the bad students), make up for it by presenting themselves highly conformist or/and supporters of the system, as an ingratiation tactic (unlike the bad students). On the other hand, this result also leads us to question how high can the expression of BJW be without being perceived counternormatively.

Although individuals who ingratiate tend to be successful in their attempts because the target of ingratiation tends to take it at face value (Gordon, 1996), thus participating in the "autistic conspiracy" (Jones, 1990), the observers tend to dislike the ingratiator (Gordon, 1996). Thus, if there is an association between the expression of a very high degree of BJW and a negatively evaluated target, it is possible that there is a limit to the degree of BJW expressed, above which it becomes counternormative. This study seems to show instances that being too normative (for instance, as the case of the apple-polisher student) may not be normative (see Beauvois & Dubois, 2001). It also

implies the question of whether or not the expression of total BJW is counternormative, as put forward by Lerner (1998). We will come back to this issue in the last section.

With Study 8, we aimed at ascertaining whether the expression of low and high BJW, as operationalized here, could be perceived as normative or counternormative, respectively. For that purpose, we extended the situation presented in Study 5, in which the targets expressed BJW for both good and bad things, by putting the "interviewee" refer to either successes and failures. In our reasoning, this could provide a test to the limits of expressing high BJW, for instance indicating that when people refer to just one kind of event, high BJW could be counternormative and low BJW normative. Also, it could indicate whether the normativity would still anchor on social utility and social desirability or just on one of these dimensions. Finally, we could ascertain whether it would show different patterns for each sphere of BJW.

Results suggested that the "social game" is mainly played in the expression of high BJW. In fact, even though only the expression of high general BJW for successes showed a double anchorage, the expression of high personal BJW for failures (anchoring on social desirability), of high personal BJW for successes and even of high general BJW for failures (both anchoring on social utility) were rated normative. The fact that in all cases the expression of high BJW is normative, even when it implies derogating others (high general BJW for failures), seems to provide further evidence for the view that the expression of high BJW per se may represent a "criterion of excellence" (Pansu et al., 2003).

On the contrary, the expression of low BJW is never considered normative. In most of the cases its ratings on social utility and social desirability are between the lowest and the highest. Furthermore, the expression of low personal BJW for successes is clearly counternormative, because this target was rated equally low on both dimensions. Thus, self-derogation is perceived as a more serious "defect" than other-derogation. Whereas the former grants individuals with little of what it takes to succeed (i.e., social utility), the latter grants individuals with such potential.

In short, in individualistic societies, showing the "kick downward" part of the slime effect (Vonk, 1998, 2002) seems to be less serious than failing to self-enhance. Thus, individuals are advised to avoid expressing low BJW on a whole, and especially low personal BJW for successes. This "piece of advice" may be one of the practical consequences of the theoretical knowledge gathered in this thesis.

4. How Practical Can These Theoretical Insights Be?

Although, as already assumed in the introduction to this thesis, our goals were strictly theoretical, we could not help thinking about the practical implications of our studies.

The idea that came to mind in the first place and most strongly was "spreading the news" and teach people, the "men in the street" about our findings. Nevertheless, does it mean that we would be promoting a view of the world as a just place?

This question raises some practical and ethical questions. As far as practice is concerned, we doubt that we could change adults' minds on the topic, unless much effort would be put into it. But then, why the effort, and how reasonable would it be having individuals be more likely to conform to the system? If anything, as Milgram's (1974) studies on obedience to authority seem to show, people may possibly need to be taught to raise their voices when the situations demand it, not being more conformist. If we turn to the case of children, does the situation change? On the one hand, teaching children to believe that the world is just can have its intrapersonal benefits, as reviewed in Chapter 3. On the other hand, in the same chapter we indicated the negative effects that believing in a just world may have (although not necessarily) when reacting to third parties, namely victims. These doubts are not original. Kristjánsson (2004) has already raised them and found no definitive answer. Neither have we. We should note that, in all likelihood, school is already one of the strongest settings in which the BJW is spread, by conveying the idea that if students work, they will get good marks and pass, but if they do not, they will not. Thus, even in children, the impact of our training would be limited at best.

Nevertheless, teaching others to believe in a just world, presuming that it is a feasible task, is beside our point. In fact, what our results showed was that the *expression* of moderate and high BJW was valued, even if the latter could not be much believed. This valuation is not just a matter of making the person who expresses it more attractive (i.e., socially desirable) in the eyes of others but also, and that is the point we emphasize here, it grants that person higher market value (i.e., social utility). Thus, we could think of training sessions directed at adults in order that they can increase their market value. In other words to give them training in normative clearsightedness (Py & Somat, 1991) on the BJW, that is to make them aware that such a judgment norm exists and the implications it has on people's evaluations, so that they can self-present accordingly in formal settings (e.g., job interviews, performance appraisals). This is not

a weird idea. Beauvois and Dubois (2001) did it with the internality, self-sufficiency and individual anchoring judgment norms.

Thus, we would not be concerned in changing people's own opinions but only in providing them with tools that would more likely enable them to meet success. This can be especially relevant for the long-term unemployed who may not be using the most suited self-presentation strategies in job interviews for lacking of normative clearsightedness (see Beauvois and Dubois, 2001). As a consequence, their status is likely to linger on.

We are clearly in the domain of the performance, and not in the transmission of "true values". Thus, ethical issues may also arise. How ethical, after all, can it be to teach people to self-present to someone who has important decisions to make, in ways that may not be consistent with their views? This question, however, equals to asking how ethical is social life? After all, has it not been likened to theatre (Goffman, 1959/1963)? Furthermore, and more importantly, if we possess this knowledge and do not share it, how ethical are we? Is it not more ethical to provide people who are lower in normative clearsightedness with this knowledge so that they may stand an equal chance as those who are higher in normative clearsightedness? As Beauvois and Dubois (2001) indicate these questions are not raised when it comes to train people on writing a good resumé. Yet, it is also a question of self-presentation that is at its core.

We can also reflect on the political consequences of the normativity of the BJW, namely on the policies aiming at the disadvantaged. Although secondary victimization is counternormative, especially when directed towards innocent victims (Alves, 2005; Alves & Correia, 2007), can the fact that the BJW is normative be a way of legitimizing taking away support to the disadvantaged in neoliberal political contexts? In this case we could be facing a cynic situation in which "we must not victimize the poor, but as everyone knows, people have what they deserve, and don't you dare say otherwise" (see Jost, Blount, Pfeffer & Hunyady, 2003, for the fair market ideology).

5. Future Research

In the introduction to our thesis we emphasized that one of the relevant aspects of our studies would be the opening of new avenues in research on the BJW. In fact, the number of answers we have obtained is tiny compared to the number of questions that these answers have encouraged, four of which we will present here (with others having been presented during this discussion).

Firstly, our operationalizations of the various degrees of the BJW were restrained to the continuum that according to Lerner (1998) adults would normally be willing to situate their BJW, that is from rarely to very frequently (or generally as we used). Thus, in our studies we excluded the complete disbelief ("never") and the complete belief ("always") in a just world.

Our results allow the inference that the statement that justice never occurs is very likely perceived as counternormative. Yet, what about someone stating that he/she believes that justice always prevails? Intuitively, we may expect that the person would be perceived as naïve, hence lacking in social utility, even if he/she could be perceived high in social desirability (probably "cute"). Two questions, however, arise: first, would that person really lose in social utility, or is the system so eager to be perceived as legitimate that allows such apparently childish (or, is it optimistic) remarks? On the contrary, however, if the former question meets a negative answer, would the person lose, not only in social utility, but also in social desirability, making him/her socially equivalent to someone expressing low BJW? It could be that such target could be perceived as being the kind of person who wants to have privileged relationships with the system (such as apple-polishers, or "slimes", Vonk, 1998, 2000); hence, their low ratings in social desirability. These questions are relevant not only in theoretical but also in practical terms. For instance, it would allow us to more accurately advise trainees on the degrees of BJW that they should emphasize and those that they should avoid.

Secondly, although we based our studies on the sociocognitive approach, the "cognitive" part was not addressed. According to this approach the social learnings do exert influence on the individuals' cognitive functioning. One way to test this assumption, as far as the BJW is concerned, would be to show that it may serve as a heuristic. For instance, we could compare the scores of participants who complete the scales under the normative system (Epstein et al., 1992), as was our case, with those who complete them under the experiential system (Epstein et al., 1992), such as giving them limited time. If the BJW is a heuristic scores should be higher in the experiential than in the normative condition.

Thirdly, in Study 8 we showed that the expression of high BJW could be counternormative, specifically high general BJW for failures. Nevertheless, we were unable to find that the expression of low BJW could be normative. As in science we can never find evidence that a phenomenon does not exist, the only way is to keep on searching for situations in which the expression of low BJW may be normative. For

instance, by priming participants with an unjust situation it is likely that when asked to convey a positive or a negative image their scores will show the reverse pattern than the one in Study 2. Specifically, scores should be higher in the negative image than in the positive image condition.

Also in Study 8, although leading participants to focus on one kind of event and disregard the possibility of both events was our goal with this manipulation, participants were not given the chance of reading what the target had to say about the other event. As a result, participants rated several targets higher in social utility than in social desirability or vice-versa. In future studies it would be fruitful to have targets simultaneously conveying different degrees of BJW for failures and successes (e.g., high BJW for failures but low BJW for successes), which we believe will replicate the results of Study 8, and targets who would convey the same degree of BJW for both failures and successes. In the latter case we expect a replication of the double anchorage of high BJW found in Study 5. Furthermore, we did not include targets expressing moderate BJW because we took for granted that those targets would always (i.e., for both successes and failures) anchor simultaneously on both dimensions. Nevertheless, this expectation needs to be empirically tested.

Finally, in Studies 3, 5 and 8, in which participants were asked to judge a target, we only used noncategorized ones (hence, the frequent use of "he/she" in the thesis). The introduction of categorized targets seems another promising avenue of research on the expression of BJW as it has been on secondary victimization (Aguiar et al., 2008; Correia et al., 2007). For instance, does high BJW lose its social utility when it is expressed by members of dominated than by members of dominating groups? Also, just as in Study 1 participants distinguished themselves from their classmates in personal BJW, would we get a similar result if we used the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971) and asked them to complete the BJW scales according to their opinion, that of an ingroup member and finally an outgroup member? Would these patterns be even more pronounced when real groups are used, especially among high identifiers?

The amount of questions that are still to be made seems colossal. For our part, we regard that one the most important contributes of this thesis was, besides the small number of questions addressed and answers obtained, the avenue of new questions regarding the BJW that it has opened.

REFERENCES

Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2003). The silence of the library: Environment, situational norm, and social behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84*(1), 18-28.

Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. *American Psychologist, 36*(715-729).

Aguiar, P., Vala, J., Correia, I., & Pereira, C. (2008). Justice in our world and in that of others: Belief in a just world and reactions to victims. *Social Justice Research, 21*, 50-68.

Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*(50), 179-211.

Alicke, M. D., Klotz, M. L., Breitenbecher, D. L., Yurak, T. J., & Vredenburg, D. S. (1995). Personal contact, individuation and the better than average effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68*, 804-825.

Alves, H. (2005). *To secondarily victimize or not to secondarily victimize? Perceptions of the descriptive and prescriptive normativity of these reactions towards innocent and noninnocent victims.* Unpublished Master Thesis, Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa, Lisboa.

Alves, H., & Correia, I. (2007). A first approach to perceptions of social norms regarding reactions towards innocent and noninnocent victims. Manuscript submitted for publication.
.

Amâncio, L. (1994). *Masculino e feminino: A construção social da diferença*. Porto: Edições Afrontamento.

Anderson, V. N. (1992). For whom is this world just? Sexual orientation and AIDS. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22*, 248-259.

Anonymous. (n.d.). Self-help. Retrieved April 19, 2008, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-help

Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A meta-analytic review. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 40*, 471-499.

Aronson, E., & Mills, J. (1959). The effects of severity of initiation on liking for a group. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59*, 157-181.

Asch, S. E. (1952/1987). *Social Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Augoustinos, M., & Walker, I. (1998). The construction of stereotypes in social psychology: From social cognition to ideology. *Theory & Psychology, 8*, 629-652.

Augoustinos, M., Walker, I., & Donaghue, N. (2006). *Social cognition: An integrated introduction*. London: Sage Publications.

Baron, R. S., E., C. C., Hicklin, D., Russell, D. W., & Lubaroff, D. M. (1990). Social support and immune function among spouses of cancer patients. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59*(2), 344-352.

Baumeister, R. F. (1982). A self-presentational view of social phenomena. *Psychological Bulletin, 91*, 3-26.

Baumeister, R. F., & Ilko, S. A. (1995). Shallow gratitude: Public and private acknowledgement of external help in accounts of success. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 16*(1 & 2), 191-209.

Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin, 117*, 497-529.

Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M., & Hutton, D. G. (1989). Self- presentational motivations and personality differences in self-esteem. *Journal of Personality, 57*, 547-579.

Baumgardner, A. H., Kaufman, C. M., & Levy, P. E. (1989). Regulating affect interpersonally: When low esteem leads to greater enhancement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56*, 907-921.

Beauvois, J.-L. (1995). La connaissance des utilités sociales. *Psychologie Française, 40*(4), 375-387.

Beauvois, J.-L. (2003). Judgment norms, social utility, and individualism. In N. Dubois (Ed.), *A sociocognitive approach to social norms*. London: Routledge.

Beauvois, J.-L., & Dubois, N. (1988). The norm of internality in the explanation of psychological events. *European Journal of Psychology of Education, 18*, 299-316.

Beauvois, J.-L., & Dubois, N. (2001). Normativity and self-presentation: Theoretical bases of self-presentation training for evaluation situations. *Journal of Managerial Psychology, 16*(7), 490-508.

Beauvois, J.-L., Gilibert, D., Pansu, P., & Abdelaoui, S. (1998). Internality atrribution and intergroup relations. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 28*, 123-140.

Begeer, S., Banerjee, R., Lunenburg, P., Meerum, T. M., Stegge, H., & Rieffe, C. (2008). Self-presentation of children with autism spectrum disorders. *Journal of Autism & Developmental Disorders, 38*(6), 1187-1191.

Bègue, L. (2002). Beliefs in justice and faith in people: Just world, religiosity and interpersonal trust. *Personality and Individual Differences, 32*, 375-382.

Bègue, L. (2005). Self-esteem regulation in threatening social comparison: The roles of belief in a just world and self-efficacy. *Social Behavior and Personality, 33*(1), 69-76.

Bègue, L., & Bastounis, M. (2003). Two spheres of belief in a just world: Extensive support for the dimensional model of belief in a just world. *Journal of Personality, 71*(3), 435-463.

Bennett, M., & Yeeles, C. (1990). Children's understanding of showing off. *The Journal of Social Psychology, 130*, 591-596.

Berkowitz, L. (1972). Social norms, feelings, and other factors afecting helping and altruism. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 6, pp. 63-108). New York: Academic Press.

Bierhoff, H. W., Klein, R., & Kramp, P. (1991). Evidence for the altruistic personality from data on accident research. *Journal of Personality, 59*(2), 263-280.

Biernat, M., Vescio, T. K., & Theno, S. A. (1996). Violating American values: A "value congruence" approach to understand outgroup attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32*, 387-410.

Bond, R., & Smith, P. B. (1996). Culture and conformity: A meta-Analysis of studies using Asch's (1952b, 1956) line judgment ask. *Psychological Bulletin, 119*(1), 111-137.

Braband, J. E., & Lerner, M. J. (1975). A little time and effort: Who deserves what from whom? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1*, 177-181.

Bressoux, P., & Pansu, P. (1998). Norme d'internalité et activités évaluatives en milieu scolaire : Recherches en psychologie de l'éducation *Revue Française de Pédagogie, 122*, 19-29.

Brickman, P., Rabinowitz, V. C., Karuza Jr., J., Coates, D., Cohn, E., & Kidder, L. (1982). Models of helping and coping. *American Psychologist, 37*(4), 368-384.

Brown, J. D. (1998). *The self*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Bruner, J. S., & Tagiuri, R. (1954). The perception of people. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (Vol. 2). Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Callan, M. J., Ellard, J. H., & Nicol, J. E. (2006). The belief in a just world and immanent justice reasoning in adults. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32*(12), 1646-1658.

Cambon, L. (2002). Désirabilité et utilité sociale, deux composantes de la valeur. Une exemplification dans l'analyse des activités professionnelles. *L' Orientation Scolaire et Professionnelle, 31*(1), 75-96.

Cambon, L. (2004). La désirabilité sociale et l'utilité sociale des professions et des professionels. In J.-L. Beauvois, R.-V. Joule & J. M. Monteil (Eds.), *Perspectives cognitives et conduites sociales* (Vol. 9, pp. 187-212). Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Cambon, L. (2006a). Désirabilité sociale et utilité sociale, deux dimensions de la valeur communiquée par les adjectifs de personnalité. *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, 19*, 125 - 151.

Cambon, L. (2006b). La fonction évaluative de la personnologie, vers la mise en évidence de deux dimensions de la valeur: La désirabilité sociale et l'utilité sociale. *Psychologie Française, 51*, 285-305.

Cambon, L., Djouari, A., & Beauvois, J.-L. (2006). Social judgment norms and social utility: When it is more valuable to be useful than desirable. *Swiss Journal of Psychology, 65*(3), 167-180.

Campbell, K. W., Reeder, G., Sedikides, C., & Elliot, A. J. (2000). Narcissism and comparative self-enhancement strategies. *Journal of Research in Personality, 34*, 329-347.

Channouf, A., & Mangard, C. (1997). Les aspects socionormatifs de la consistence cognitive. *Les Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale, 36*, 28-45.

Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The chameleon effect: The perception-behavior link and social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76*(6), 893-910.

Cialdini, R. B. (2003). Crafting normative messages to protect the environment. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12*(4), 105-109.

Cialdini, R. B. (2007). Descriptive social norms as underappreciated sources of social control. *Psychometrika, 72*(2), 263-268.

Cialdini, R. B., Borden, R. J., Thorne, A., Walker, M., Freeman, S., & Sloan, L. (1976). Basking in reflected glory: Three (football) field studies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34*, 366-375.

Cialdini, R. B., Demaine, L. J., Sagarin, B. J., Barrett, D. W., Rhoads, K., & Winter, P. L. (2006). Managing social norms for persuasive impact. *Social Influence, 1*(1), 3-15.

Cialdini, R. B., Kallgren, C. A., & Reno, R. R. (1991). A focus theory of normative conduct: A theoretical refinement and reevaluation of the role of norms in human behavior. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 24*, 201-234.

Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58*, 1015-1026.

Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity and compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 151-192): The McGraw-Hill.

Cialdini, R. B., Trost, M. R., & Newson, J. T. (1995). Preference for consistency: The development of a valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral implications. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69*(2), 318-328.

Codol, J.-P. (1975). On the so called "superior conformity of the self" behavior: Twenty experimental investigations. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 5*(4), 457-501.

Connors, J., & Heaven, P. C. (1987). Authoritarianism and just world belief. *Journal of Social Psychology, 127*, 345-346.

Cooley, C. H. (1902). *Human nature and social order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Correia, I. (2003). *Concertos e desconcertos na procura de um mundo concertado: Crença no mundo justo, inocência da vítima e vitimização secundária*. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian.

Correia, I., Alves, H., Santos, H., & Vala, J. (2005). Are high strivers for justice more unjust when they react to a victim? Further evidence on the effects of the belief in a just world, of the innocence of the victim and of the persistence of suffering on secondary victimization [Electronic Version]. *Iberpsicologia*, 10. Retrieved June 11, 2008 from http://www.fedap.es/IberPsicologia/iberpsi10/congreso_lisboa/correia/correia.htm.

Correia, I., & Vala, J. (2003). When will a victim be secondarily victimized? The effect of the observer's belief in a just world, victim's innocence and persistence of suffering. *Social Justice Research, 16*, 379-400.

Correia, I., Vala, J., & Aguiar, P. (2001). The effects of belief in a just world and victim's innocence on secondary victimization, judgments of justice and deservingness. *Social Justice Research, 14*, 327-341.

Correia, I., Vala, J., & Aguiar, P. (2007). Victim's innocence, social categorization, and the threat to the belief in a just world. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43*, 31-38.

Crandall, C. S., Eshleman, A., & O'Brien, L. (2002). Social norms and the expression and suppression of prejudice: The struggle for internalization. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*(3), 359-378

Crocker, J., & Quinn, D. M. (2003). Social stigma and the self: Meanings, situations, and self-esteem. In T. F. Heatherton, R. E. Kleck, M. R. Hebl & J. G. Hull (Eds.), *The Social Psychology of stigma*. New York: The Guilford Press.

Crutchfield, R. (1955). Conformity and character. *American Psychologist, 10*, 191-198.

Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2004). When professionals become mothers, warmth doesn't cut the ice. *Journal of Social Issues, 60*(4), 701-717.

Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007). The BIAS map: Behaviors from intergroup affects and stereotypes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92*(4), 575-584.

Cuddy, A. J. C., Norton, M. I., & Fiske, S. T. (2005). This old stereotype: The pervasiveness and persistence of the elderly stereotype. *Journal of Social Issues, 61*(2), 267-285.

Dalbert, C. (1998). Belief in a just world, well-being, and coping with an unjust fate. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), *Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world*. New York: Plenum Press.

Dalbert, C. (1999). The world is more just for me than generally: About the personal belief in a just world scale's validity. *Social Justice Research, 12*(2), 79-98.

Dalbert, C. (2001a). *Beliefs in a just world as a buffer against anger*. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.

Dalbert, C. (2001b). *The justice motive as a personal resource. Dealing with challenges and critical life events*. New York: Plenum Publishers.

Dalbert, C., Lipkus, I. M., Sallay, H., & Goch, I. (2001). A just and an unjust world: Structure and validity of different world beliefs. *Personality and Individual Differences, 30*, 561-577.

Dalbert, C., Montada, L., & Schmitt, M. (1987). Glaube an die gerechte Welt als Motiv: Validierung zweier Skalen [The belief in a just world as a motive: Validation of two scales]. *Psychologische Beitrage, 29*, 596-615.

Darley, D. M., & Latané, B. (1970). Norm and normative behavior: Field studies of social interdependence. In J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), *Altruism and helping behavior* (pp. 83-101). New York: Academic Press.

Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. (1955). A study of normative and information social influences upon individual judgement. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51*, 629-636.

Devos-Comby, L., & Devos, T. (2001). Social norms, social value and judgments of responsibility. *Swiss Journal of Psychology, 60*, 35-46.

Dittmar, H., & Dickinson, J. (1993). The perceived relationship between the belief in a just world and sociopolitical ideology
Social Justice Research, 6(3), 257-272.

Doise, W. (1980). Levels of explanation in the European Journal of Social Psychology. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 10*, 213-231.

Doise, W. (1982). *L'explication en Psychologie Sociale*. Paris: PUF.

Dompnier, B., & Pansu, P. (2007). L'intervention des explications causales internes en termes d'effort dans les stratégies d'autoprésentation et le jugement social : perspectives sociocognitives [The role of internal-effort explanations in self-presentation strategies and social judgments: sociocognitive perspectives]. *Psychologie Française, 52*(4), 459-478.

Dompnier, B., Pansu, P., & Bressoux, P. (2006). An integrative model of scholastic judgements: Pupils' characteristics, class context, halo effect and internal attributions. *European Journal of Psychology of Education, 21*(2), 119-133.

Dubois, N. (1988). The norm of internality: Social valorization of internal explanations of behavior and reinforcements in young people. *The Journal of Social Psychology, 128*(4), 431-439.

Dubois, N. (1994). *La norme d'internalité et le libéralisme*. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.

Dubois, N. (2005). Normes sociales de jugement et valeur: Ancrage sur l'utilité et ancrage sur la désirabilité. *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, 18*(3), 43-79.

Dubois, N., & Beauvois, J.-L. (1996). Internality, academic status, and intergroup attributions. *European Journal of Psychology of Education, 11*(3), 329-341.

Dubois, N., & Beauvois, J.-L. (2003). Some bases for a sociocognitive approach to judgement norms. In N. Dubois (Ed.), *A sociocognitive approach to social norms*. London: Routledge.

Dubois, N., & Beauvois, J.-L. (2005). Normativeness and individualism. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 35*, 123-146.

Dubois, N., & Le Poultier, F. (1991). Internalité et évaluation scolaire. In J.-L. Beauvois, R. V. Joule & J.-M. Monteil (Eds.), *Perspectives cognitives et conduites sociales* (Vol. 3, pp. 153-166). Cousset: Delval.

Dubois, N., Loose, F., Matteucci, M. C., & Selleri, P. (2003). Sociocognitive development: Acquisition of the normativeness of internality. In N. Dubois

(Ed.), *A sociocognitive approach to social norms* (pp. 94-122). London: Routledge.

Dzuka, J., & Dalbert, C. (2002). Mental health and personality of Slovak unemployed adolescents: The impact of belief in a just world. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32*(4), 732-757.

Eagly, A. H., & Mladinic, A. (1993). Are people prejudiced against women? Some answers from research on attitudes, gender stereotypes, and judgments of competence. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *European review of social psychology* (Vol. 5, pp. 1–35). New york: Wiley.

Eid, M., & Diener, E. (2001). Norms for experiencing emotions in different cultures: Inter- and intranational differences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81*(5), 869-885.

Ellard, J. H., Miller, C. D., Baumle, T., & Olson, J. M. (2002). Just world processes in demonizing. In M. Ross & D. T. Miller (Eds.), *The justice motive in everyday life* (pp. 350-362). New York: Cambridge University press.

Epley, N., & Dunning, D. (2000). Feeling "holier than thou": Are self-serving assessments produced by errors in self- or social prediction? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79*(6), 861-875.

Epstein, S., Lipson, A., Holstein, C., & Huh, E. (1992). Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: Evidence for two conecptual systems. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67*(2), 328-339.

Ernst, J. M., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1999). Lonely hearts: Psychological perspectives on loneliness. *Applied and Preventive Psychology 8*(1), 1-22.

Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness:. Assessment and theory. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43*, 522-527.

Fernández-Dols, J.-M. (1992). Procesos escabrosos em Psicología Social: El concepto de norma perversa. *Revista de Psicologia Social, 7*(2), 243-255.

Fernández-Dols, J.-M. (1993). Norma perversa: Hipotesis teoricas *Psicothema, 5*, 91-101.

Fernández-Dols, J.-M., & Fernández, L. V. O. (1994). Efectos cotidianos de las normas perversas en la tolerancia a la corrupcion. *Revista de Psicologia Social, 9*(1), 3-12.

Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations, 7*, 117-140.

Finch, J. F., & Cialdini, R. B. (1989). Another indirect tactic of (self-)image management: Boosting. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15*, 222-232.

Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). *Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to theory and research*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.

Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*(6), 878-902.

Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum model of impression formation: From category based to individuating processes as a function of information, motivation, and attention. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 23, pp. 1-74). San Diego: Academic.

Fiske, S. T., Xu, J., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Glick, P. (1999). (Dis)respecting versus (dis)liking: Status and interdependence predict ambivalent stereotypes of competence and warmth. *Journal of Social Issues, 55*(3), 473-489.

França, D. X. d., & Monteiro, M. B. (2004). A expressão das formas indirectas de racismo na infância. *Análise Psicológica, 4*(XXII), 705-720.

Frears, S. (Writer) (1988). Dangerous Liaisons [Motion Picture]. United States: Warner Bros.

Friend, R., Rafferty, Y., & Bramel, d. (1990). A puzzling misinterpretation of the Asch "conformity" study. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 20*, 29-44.

Furnham, A. (2003). Belief in a just world: Research over the past decade. *Personality and Individual Differences, 34*, 795-817.

Furnham, A., & Procter, E. (1989). Belief in a just world: Review and critique of the individual difference literature. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 28*, 365-384.

Gangestad, S. W., & Snyder, M. (2000). Self-monitoring: Appraisal and reappraisal. *Psychological Bulletin, 126*(4), 530-555.

Gilibert, D., & Cambon, L. (2003). Paradigms of the sociocognitive approach. In N. Dubois (Ed.), *A sociocognitve approach to social norms* (pp. 38-69). London: Routledge.

Godfrey, K., Jones, E. E., & Lord, C. G. (1986). Self-promotion is not ingratiating. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50*(1), 106-115.

Goffman, E. (1959/1993). *A apresentação do Eu na vida de todos os dias* (M. S. Pereira, Trans.). Lisboa: Relógio d'Água.

Goffman, E. (1963/1990). *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity*. London: Penguin Books.

Goldberg, J. H., Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Rage and reason: The psychology of the intuitive prosecutor. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 29*, 781-795.

Gonsalkorale, K., & Williams, K. D. (2007). The KKK won't let me play: Ostracism even by a despised outgroup hurts. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 37*(6), 1176 - 1186.

Goode, E. (2002). *Deviance in everyday life: Personal accounts of unconventional lives*. Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc.

Gordon, R. A. (1996). Impact of ingratiation on judgments and evaluations: A meta-analytic investigation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*(1), 54-70.

Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. *American Sociological review, 25*, 161-178.

Gove, W. R., Hughes, M., & Geerken, M. R. (1980). Playing dumb: A form of impression management with undesirable side effects. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 43*, 89-102.

Hafer, C. L. (2000a). Do innocent victims threaten the belief in a just world? Evidence from a modified Stroop task. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79*(2), 165-173.

Hafer, C. L. (2000b). Investment in long-term goals and commitment to just means drive the need to believe in a just world. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26*(9), 1059-1073.

Hafer, C. L., & Bègue, L. (2005). Experimental research on just-world theory: Problems, developments, and future challenges. *Psychological Bulletin, 131*(1), 128-167.

Hafer, C. L., Bègue, L., Choma, B. L., & Dempsey, J. L. (2005). Belief in a just world and commitment to long-term deserved outcomes. *Social Justice Research, 18*(4), 429-444.

Hafer, C. L., & Olson, J. M. (1989). Beliefs in a just world, and reactions to personal deprivation. *Journal of Personality, 57*, 799-823.

Hafer, C. L., & Olson, J. M. (1993). Beliefs in a just world, discontent, and assertive actions by working women. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19*(1), 30-38.

Hjelle, L. A., & Ziegler, D. J. (1992). *Personality theories: Basic assumptions, research, and applied applications* (3 ed.). New york: McGraw-Hill International Editions.

Hofstede, G. (1991/1997). *Culturas e Organizações: Compreender a nossa programação mental* (A. Fidalgo, Trans.). Lisboa: Edições Sílabo.

Holmes, J. G., Miller, D. T., & Lerner, M. J. (2002). Commiting altruism under the cloak of self-interest: The exchange fiction. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38*, 144-151.

Holtgraves, T., & Srull, T. K. (1989). The effects of positive self-descriptions on impressions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15*(3), 452-462.

Holtgraves, T. M., & Dulin, J. (1994). The Muhammad Ali effect: Differences between African Americans and European Americans in their perceptions of a truthful bragger. *Language and Communication, 14*, 275-285.

Homans, G. C. (1950). *The human group*. New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich.

Hornsey, M. J., & Jetten, J. (2004). The individual within the group: Balancing the need to belong with the need to be different. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8*(3), 248-264.

Hornsey, M. J., Majkut, L., Terry, D. J., & McKimmie, B. M. (2003). On being loud and proud: Non-conformity and counter-conformity to group norms. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 42*, 319-335.

Horowitz, L. M., Locke, K. D., Morse, M. B., Waikar, S. V., Dryer, D. C., Tarnow, E., et al. (1991). Self-derogations and the interpersonal theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61*(1), 68-79.

Hunt, M. O. (2000). Status, religion, and the "Belief in a Just World": Comparing African American, Latinos, and Whites. *Social Science Quarterly, 81*(1), 325-343.

Jacobs, R., & Campbell, D. (1961). The perpetuation of an arbitrary norm tradition through several generations of laboratory microculture. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 62*, 649-658.

James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology* (Vol. 1). London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd.

Janis, I. L. (1982). *Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes* (2 ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Jellison, J. M., & Green, J. (1981). A self-presentation approach to the fundamental attribution error: The norm of internality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40*(4), 643-649.

Jones, E. E. (1990). *Interpersonal perception*. New York: W. H. Freeman and Company.

Jones, E. E., & Berglas, S. (1978). Control of attributions about the self through self-handicapping strategies: The appeal of alcohol and the role of underachievement. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4*, 200-206.

Jones, E. E., & Pittman, T. S. (1982). Toward a general theory of strategic self-presentation. In J. Suls (Ed.), (Vol. 1, pp. 231-262). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false-consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 33*, 1-27.

Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. *Political Psychology, 25*(6), 881-919.

Jost, J. T., Burgess, D., & Mosso, C. (2001). Conflicts of legitimation among self, group, and system: The integrative potential of system justification theory. In J. T. Jost & B. Major (Eds.), *The psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, and intergroup relations* (pp. 363-388). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2002). The psychology of system justification and the palliative function of ideology. *European Review of Social Psychology, 13*, 111-153.

Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2005). Antecendents and consequences of system-justifying ideologies. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14*(5), 260-265.

Jouffre, S. (2003). The procedures of measure: Questionnaires and scales. In N. Dubois (Ed.), *A sociocognitive approach to social norms* (pp. 70-93). London: Routledge.

Jouffre, S., Py, J., & Somat, A. (2001). Norme d'internalité, norme de consistance et clairvoyance normative *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, 14* (2), 121-164.

Judd, C. M., James-Hawkins, L., Yzerbyt, V., & Kashima, Y. (2005). Fundamental dimensions of social judgment: Understanding the relations between judgments of competence and warmth. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89*, 899-913.

Kaiser, C. R., Dyrenforth, P. S., & Hagiwara, N. (2006). Why are attributions to discrimination interpersonally costly? A test of system- and group-justifying motivations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32*, 1523-1536.

Kallgren, C. A., Reno, R. R., & Cialdini, R. B. (2000). A focus theory of normative conduct: When norms do and do not affect behavior. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26*(8), 1002-1012.

Kay, A. C., & Jost, J. T. (2003). Complementary justice: Effects of "poor but happy" and "poor but honest" stereotype exemplars on system justification and implicit activation of the justice motive. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85*(5), 823-837.

Kay, A. C., Jost, J. T., Mandisodza, A. N., Sherman, S. J., Petrocelli, J. V., & Johnson, A. L. (2007). Panglossian ideology in the service of system justification: How complementary stereotypes hel us to rationalize inequality. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 39, pp. 305-358). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Kelley, H. H. (1973). The process of causal attribution. *American Psychologist, 28*, 107-128.

Kelman, H. C. (1958). Compliance, identification and internalization: Three processes of attitude change. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2*, 51-60.

Kernis, M. H., & Sun, C.-R. (1994). Narcissism and reactions to interpersonal feedback. *Journal of Research in Personality, 28*(1), 4-13.

Kim, H., & Markus, H. R. (1999). Deviance or uniqueness, harmony or conformity? A cultural analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77*(4), 785-800.

Kim, M. P., & Rosenberg, S. (1980). Comparison of two structural models of implicit personality theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38*, 375-389.

Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40*, 414-431.

Kleinke, C. L., & Meyer, C. (1990). Evaluation of rape victim by men and women with high and low belief in a just world. *Psychology of Women Quarterly, 14*, 343-353.

Kluegel, J. R., & Smith, E. (1981). Beliefs about stratification. *Annual Review of Sociology, 7*, 29-56.

Krebs, D. L., & Miller, D. T. (1985). Altruism and aggression. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The handbook of Social Psychology* (3 ed.). New York: Random House.

Kruger, J. (1999). Lake Wobegon be gone! the "below-average" effect and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77*(2), 221-232.

Kurland, N. B., & Pelled, L. H. (2000). Passing the word: Toward a model of gossip and power in the workplace. *Academy of Management Review, 25*(2), 428-438.

Lambert, T. A., Kahn, A. S., & Apple, K. J. (2003). Pluralistic ignorance and hooking up. *Journal of Sex Research, 40*(2), 129-133.

Larimer, M. E., & Neighbors, C. (2003). Normative misperception and the impact of descriptive and injunctive norms on college student gambling. *Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 17*(3), 235-243.

Le Barbenchon, E., Cambon, L., & Lavigne, F. (2005). Désirabilité et utilité sociale de 308 adjectifs de personnalité et 297 professions. *Année Psychologique, 105*(2), 307 - 322

Le Barbenchon, E., & Isabelle, M. (2005). L'optimisme: Réponse désirable et/ou socialement utile? *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, 18*(3), 153-181.

Le Floch, V., & Somat, A. (2003). Norm of internality, social utility of internal explanations, and cognitive function. In N. Dubois (Ed.), *A sociocognitive approach to social norms* (pp. 148-169). London: Routledge Publishers.

Leary, M. R. (1995). *Self-presentation: Impression management and interpersonal behavior*. Madison, Wisconsin: Brown & Benchmark.

Leary, M. R., & Jones, E. E. (1993). The social psychology of tanning and sunscreen use: Self-presentational variables as a predictor of health risk. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23*, 1390-1406.

Leary, M. R., & Kowalski, R. M. (1990). Impression management: A literature review and two-component model. *Psychological Bulletin, 107*(1), 34-47.

Leary, M. R., Tchividjian, L. R., & Kraxberger, B. E. (1994). Self-presentation can be hazardous to your health: Impression management and health risk *Health Psychology 13*, 461-470.

Lerner, M. J. (1965). Evaluation of performance as a function of performer's reward and attractiveness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1*(4), 355-360.

Lerner, M. J. (1971). Observers' evaluation of a victim: Justice, guilt and veridical perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 20*, 127-135.

Lerner, M. J. (1977). The justice motive: Some hypotheses as to its origins and forms. *Journal of Personality, 45*(1), 1-52.

Lerner, M. J. (1980). *The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion*. New York: Plenum press.

Lerner, M. J. (1997). What does the belief in a just world protect us from: The dread of death or the fear of undeserved suffering? *Psychological Inquiry, 8*, 29-32.

Lerner, M. J. (1998). Two forms of belief in a just world: Some thoughts on why and how people care about justice. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), *Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world*. New York: Plenum Press.

Lerner, M. J. (2002). Pursuing the justice motive. In M. Ross & D. Miller (Eds.), *The justice motive in everyday life* (pp. 10-37). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lerner, M. J. (2003). The justice motive: Where social psychologists found it, how they lost it, and why they may not find it again. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7*(4), 388-399.

Lerner, M. J., & Agar, E. (1972). The consequences of perceived similarity: Attraction and rejection, approach and avoidance. *Journal of Experimental Research in Personality, 6*, 69-75.

Lerner, M. J., & Goldberg, J. H. (1999). When do decent people blame victims? In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), *Dual process theories in Social psychology* (pp. 627-640). New York: The Guilford press.

Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution process: Looking back and ahead. *Psychological Bulletin, 85*(5), 1030-1051.

Lerner, M. j., Miller, D. T., & Holmes, J. G. (1976). Deserving and the emergence of forms of justice. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 133-162.

Lerner, M. J., & Simmons, C. H. (1966). The observer's reaction to the "innocent victim": Compassion or rejection? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4*, 203-210.

Lewin, K. (1943). Forces behind food habits and methods of change. *Bulletin of National Research Council, 108*, 35-65.

Lincoln, A., & Levinger, G. (1972). Observers' evaluations of the victim and the attacker in an aggressive incident. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22*(2), 202-210.

Lipkus, I. M. (1991). The construction and preliminary validation of a global belief in a just world scale and the exploratory analysis of the multidimensional belief in a just world scale. *Personality and Individual differences, 12*, 1171-1178.

Lipkus, I. M., & Bissonette, V. L. (1996). Relationships among belief in a just world, willingness to accomodate, and marital well-being. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22*(10), 1043-1056.

Lipkus, I. M., Dalbert, C., & Siegler, I. C. (1996). The importance of distinguishing the belief in a just world for self versus for others: Implications for psychological well-being. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22*(7), 666-677.

Long, G. T., & Lerner, M. J. (1974). Deserving the "personal contract", and altruistic behavior by children. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29*, 551-556.

Maes, J. (1998). Immanent justice and ultimate justice: Two ways of believing in justice. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), *Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world* (pp. 9-40). New York: Plenum Press.

Maes, J., & Schmitt, M. (1999). More on ultimate and immanent justice: results from the research project "Justice as a problem within reunified germany". *social Justice Research, 12*(2), 65-78.

Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35*, 63-78.

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review, 98*(2), 224-253.

Marques, C. A. (1994). O individualismo: Do senso comum à dimensão cultural. *Análise Psicológica, 1*(XII), 5-13.

Marques, J. M., Abrams, D., & Serôdio, R. G. (2001). Being better by being right: Subjective group dynamics and derogation of in-group deviants when generic norms are undermined. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81*(3), 436-447.

Marques, J. M., & Yzerbit, V. Y. (1988). The black sheep effect: Judgemental extremity towards ingroup members in inter- and intra-group situations. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 18*, 287-292.

Maslow, A. H. (1968). *Toward a psychology of being* (2 ed.). New York: Van Nostrand.

Masser, B., & Philips, L. (2003). "What do other people think?": The role of prejudice and social norms in the expression of opinions against gay men. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 184-190.

Masson-Maret, H. (1997). Évaluation sociale et différence des sexes: Une étude socionormative au sein d'une organisation administrative. *Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale, 45*, 29-47.

McConahay, J. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the modern racism scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 91-125). New York: Academic Press.

Mead, G. H. (1934/1962). *Mind, self and society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist*. Chicago: The University of Chicago press.

Michener, H. A., & DeLamater, J. D. (1999). *Social Psychology* (4 ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.

Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to authority*. New York: Harper and Row.

Milgram, S., Bickman, L., & Berkowitz, L. (1969). Note on the drawing power of crowds of different size. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13*(2), 79-82.

Miller, D., & McFarland, C. (1987). Pluralistic ignorance: When similarity is interpreted as dissimilarity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53*(2), 298-305.

Miller, D., & Prentice, D. A. (1996). The construction of social norms and standards. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (pp. 799-829). New York: Guilford.

Miller, D., & Ross, M. (1975). Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or fiction? *Psychological Bulletin*(82), 213-225.

Mohiyeddini, C., & Montada, L. (1998). BJW and self-efficacy in coping with observed victimization: Results from a study about unemployment. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), *Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world*. New York: Plenum press.

Montada, L. (1998). Belief in a Just World: A hybrid of justice motive and self-interest? . In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), *Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world* (pp. 217-246). New York: Plenum Press.

Montada, L. (2002). Doing justice to the justice motive. In M. Ross & D. Miller (Eds.), *The justice motive in everyday life* (pp. 41-62). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Moore, D. A. (2007). Not so above average after all: When people believe they are worse than average and its implications for theories of bias in social comparison. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 102*, 42–58.

Moscovici, S. (1976). *La psychanalyse, son image et son public* (2 ed.). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Novak, D. W., & Lerner, M. J. (1968). Rejection as a consequence of perceived similarity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9*, 147-152.

Oceja, L. V., & Fernández-Dols, J.-M. (1992). El reconocimiento de la norma perversa y sus consecuencia en los juicios de las personas. *Revista de Psicologia Social, 7*(2), 227-240.

Olson, J. M., Hafer, C. L., & Taylor, L. (2001). I'm mad as hell and I'm not going to take it anymore: Reports of negative emotions as a self-presentation tactic. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31*(5), 981-999.

Pansu, P. (1997). Norm of internality in an organizational context. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 6*, 37 - 58.

Pansu, P., Bressoux, P., & Louche, C. (2003). Theory of the social norm of internality applied to education and organizations. In N. Dubois (Ed.), *A sociocognitive approach to social norms* (pp. 196-230). London: Routledge Publishers.

Pansu, P., & Gilibert, D. (2002). Effect of causal explanations on work-related judgments *Applied Psychology, 51*(4), 505–526.

Peeters, G. (2004). [Review of: N. Dubois (Ed.) (2003). A sociocognitive approach to social norms. London: Routledge]. *European Bulletin of Social Psychology, 16*, 40 - 44.

Pereira, C. (2007). *Preconceito, normas sociais e justificações da discriminação: O modelo da discriminação justificada [Prejudice, social norms and justifications of discrimination: the model of justified discrimination].* Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa, Lisboa.

Pettigrew, T. F., & Meertens, R. W. (1995). Subtle and blatant prejudice in Western Europe. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 25*, 57-75.

Powell, M., & McIntire, M. (March 11, 2008). A fall from White Knight to client 9. *New York Times [online version]* Retrieved April 20, 2008, from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/nyregion/11fall.html

Powers, T. A., & Zuroff, D. C. (1988). Interpersonal consequences of overt self-criticism: A comparison with neutral and self-enhancing presentations of self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54*(6), 1054-1062.

Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. (1993). Pluralistic ignorance and alcohol use on campus: Some consequences of misperceiving the social norm. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64*(2), 243-256.

Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. (1996). Pluralistic ignorance and the perpetuation of social norms by unwitting actors. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 28, pp. 161-209). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Py, J., & Somat, A. (1991). Normativité, conformité et clairvoyance: Leurs effets sur le jugement évaluatif dans un contxte scolaire. In J.-L. Beauvois, R. V. Joule & J.-M. Monteil (Eds.), *perspectives cognitives et conduites sociales* (Vol. 3). Cousset: DelVal.

Racist_Skinhead_Project. (n.d.). American Thule Society (ATS) Retrieved April 22, 2008from http://www.adl.org/racist_skinheads/states/pennsylvania.asp

Ralston, D. A., & Esass, P. M. (1989). Ingratiation and impression management in the organization. In R. A. Giacalone & P. Rosenfeld (Eds.), *Impression management in the organization* (pp. 235-249). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Ramos, A. (2000). Centralidade do trabalho. In M. V. Cabral, J. Vala & J. Freire (Eds.), *Atitudes sociais dos portugueses 1 - Trabalho e cidadania* (pp. 47-69). Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.

Ratner, R. K., & Miller, D. (2001). The norm of self-interest and its effects on social action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81*(1), 5-16.

Reichle, B., & Schmitt, M. (2002). Helping and rationalization as alternative strategies for restoring the belief in a just world: Evidence from longitudinal change analyses. In M. Ross & D. Miller (Eds.), *The justice motive in everyday life* (pp. 127- 148). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Reno, R. R., Cialdini, R. B., & Kallgren, C. A. (1993). The transsituational influence of social norms. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64*(1), 104–112.

Rim, Y. (1983). Belief in a just world, personality, and social attitudes. *Personality and Individual differences, 4*, 707-708.

Rivis, A., & Sheeran, P. (2003). Descriptive norms as an additional predictor in the theory of planned behaviour: A meta-analysis. *Current Psychology: Development, Learning, Personality, Social, 22*(3), 218-233.

Robinson, M. D., Johnson, J. T., & Shields, S. A. (1995). On the advantages of modesty: The benefits of a balanced self-presentation. *Communication Research, 22*(5), 575-591.

Rosenberg, S., Nelson, C., & Vivekanathan, P. S. (1968). A multidimensional approach to the structure of personality impressions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9*, 283-294.

Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. *Psychological Monographs, 80*(1).

Rozin, P. (2001). Social psychology and science: Some lessons from Solomon Asch. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5*, 2-14.

Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. A. (1975). Who believes in a just world? *Journal of Social Issues, 31*(3), 65-89.

Rumgay, J., & Munro, E. (2001). The lion's den: Professional defences in the treatment of dangerous patients. *The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 12*(2), 357-378.

Rutland, A., Cameron, L., Milne, A., & McGeorge, P. (2005). Social norms and self-presentation: Children's implicit and explicit intergroup attitudes. *Child Development, 76*(2), 451-466.

Schlenker, B. R. (2003). Self-presentation. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), *Handbook of self and identity* (pp. 492-518). New York The Guilford Press.

Schlenker, B. R., Pontari, B. A., & Christopher, A. N. (2001). Excuses and character: Personal and social implications of excuses. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5*(1), 15-32.

Schlenker, B. R., & Weigold, M. F. (1992). Interpersonal processes involving impression regulation and management. *Annual Review of Psychology, 43*, 133-168.

Schroeder, C. M., & Prentice, D. A. (1998). Exposing pluralistic ignorance to reduce alcohol use among college students. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28*, 2150-2180.

Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2008). Self-Enhancement: Food for Thought *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3*(2), 102-116.

Sedikides, C., Gregg, A. P., & Hart, C. M. (2007). The importance of being modest. In C. Sedikides & S. Spencer (Eds.), *The self: Frontiers in social psychology* (pp. 163-184). New York: Psychology Press.

Segrin, C., & Dillard, J. P. (1992). The interactional theory of depression: A meta-analysis of the research literature. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 11*, 43-70.

Shepperd, J. A., & Socherman, R. E. (1997). On the manipulative behavior of low Machiavellians: Feigning incompetence to "sandbag" an opponent. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72*(6), 1448-1459.

Sher, K. J., Bartholow, B. D., & Nanda, S. (2001). Short- and long-term effects of fraternity and sorority membership on heavy drinking: A social norms perspective. *Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 15*(1), 42-51.

Sherif, M. (1936). *The psychology of social norms*. New York Harper.

Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance: An Intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sigall, H., & Mills, J. (1998). Measures of independent variables and mediators are useful in social psychology experiments: But are they necessary?. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2*, 218-226.

Smith, A., & Williams, K. D. (2004). R U there? Effects of ostracism by cell phone. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, & Practice, 8*, 291–301.

Snyder, C. R., Lassegard, M., & Ford, C. E. (1986). Distancing after group success and failure: Basking in reflected glory and cutting off reflected failure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51*, 382–388.

Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30*(4), 526-537.

Snyder, M. (1987). *Public appearances, private realities: The psychology of self-monitoring*. New York: W. H. Freeman.

Somat, A., & Vazel, M.-A. (1999). Normative clearsightedness: A general knowledge of social valuation. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 29*, 691-705.

Sorrentino, R. M., & Boutilier, R. G. (1974). Evaluation of a victim as a function of fate similarity/dissimilarity. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 10*, 84-93.

Spielberg, S. (2002). Catch me if you can [Motion Picture]. United States: Paramount Pictures.

Stern, G. S., & Manifold, B. (1977). Internal locus of control as a value. *Journal of Research in Personality, 11*(2), 237-242.

Stevens, C. K., & Kristof, A. L. (1995). Making the right impression: A field study of applicant impression management during job interviews. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 80*, 587–606.

Sutton, R. M., & Douglas, K. M. (2005). Justice for all, or just for me? More evidence of the importance of the self-other distinction in just-world beliefs. *Personality and Individual Differences, 39*, 637-645.

Sutton, R. M., Douglas, K. M., Wilkin, K., Elder, T. J., Cole, J. M., & Stathi, S. (2008). Justice for whom, exactly? Beliefs in justice for the self and various others. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34*, 528-541.

Swim, J. K., AIKIN, K. J., Hall, W. S., & Hunter, B. A. (1995). Sexism and racism: Old-fashioned and modern prejudices. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68*(2), 199-214.

Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 1*, 149-177.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson.

Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. *Psychological Bulletin, 103*, 193-210.

Testé, B. (2001). Perspective socionormative sur la polarisation de groupe: Effets du consensus dans le cadre d'une activité de détection d'utilité sociale. *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, 14*(1), 91-129.

Tice, D. M. (1992). Self-concept and self-presentation: The looking glass self is also a magnifying glass. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63*(3), 435-451.

Tice, D. M., Butler, J. L., Muraven, M., & Stillwell, A. M. (1995). When modesty prevails: Differential favorability of self-presentation to friends and strangers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69*, 1120-1138.

Tomaka, J., & Blascovich, J. (1994). Effects of justice beliefs on cognitive appraisals of and subjective, physiological, and behavioral responses to potential stress. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67*(4), 732-740.

Tomarelli, M. M., & Schaffer, D. R. (1985). What aspects of self do self-monitors monitor? *Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 23*(2), 135-138.

Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. *Psychological Review, 96*(3), 506-520.

Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism and collectivism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Triandis, H. C. (2001). Individualism-Collectivism and personality. *Journal of Personality, 69*(6), 907-924.

Triandis, H. C., Chan, D. K., Bhawuk, P. S., Iwao, S., & Sinha, J. B. (1995). Multimethod probes of allocentrism and idiocentrism. *International Journal of Psychology, 30*, 461-480.

Triandis, H. C., Leung, K., Villareal, M., & Clack, F. L. (1985). Allocentric vs. ideocentric tendencies: Convergent and discriminant validation. *Journal of Research in Personality, 19*, 395-415.

Vala, J. (2000). Mudanças nos valores associados ao trabalho e satisfação com o trabalho. In M. V. Cabral, J. Vala & J. Freire (Eds.), *Atitudes sociais dos portugueses 1 - Trabalho e cidadania* (pp. 71-95). Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.

Vala, J., Brito, R., & Lopes, D. (1999). O racismo flagrante e o racismo subtil am Portugal. In J. Vala (Ed.), *Novos racismos: Perspectivas comparativas*. Lisboa: Celta Editora.

Vandello, J. A., & Cohen, D. (1999). Patterns of individualism and collectivism across the United States. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77*, 279-292.

Vonk, R. (1998). The slime effect: Suspicion and dislike of likeable behavior toward superiors. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*(4), 849-864.

Vonk, R. (2002). Self-serving interpretations of flattery: Why ingratiation works. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*(4), 515-526.

Wallach, M. A., & Wing, C. (1968). Is risk a value? . *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9*, 101-106.

Watling, D., & Banerjee, R. (2007). Children's differentiation between ingratiation and self-promotion *Social Development, 16*(4), 758–776.

Wayne, S. J., Liden, R. C., Graf, I. K., & Ferris, G. R. (1997). The role of upward influence tactics in human resource decisions. *Personnel Psychology, 50*, 979-1006.

Weber, M. (1920/2005). *A ética protestante e o espírito do capitalismo* (A. F. Bastos & L. Leitão, Trans. 6 ed.). Lisboa: Presença.

Weiner, B. (1993). On sin versus sickness. *American Psychologist, 48*(9), 957-965.

Weiner, B. (1995). *Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct*. New York: The Guilford Press.

Westphal, J. D., & Stern, I. (2006). The other pathway to the boardroom: Interpersonal influence behavior as a substitute for elite credentials and majority status in obtaining board appointments. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 51*, 169-204.

Williams, K. D. (2001). *Ostracism: The power of silence*. New York: The Guilford Press.

Wyer, R. S., Bodenhausen, G. V., & Gorman, T. F. (1985). Cognitive mediators of reactions to rape. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48*, 324-338.

Yaryan, R. B., & Festinger, L. (1961). Preparatory action and belief in the probable occurrence of future events. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 93*, 603-607.

Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9*(2, Pt.2), 1-27.

Zuckerman, M., & Gerbasi, K. C. (1977). Dimensions of the I-E Scale and their relationship to other personality measures. *Educational and Psychological Measurement, 37*, 159-175.

Zuckerman, M., Gerbasi, K. C., Kravitz, R. I., & Wheeler, L. (1974). The belief in a just world and reactions to innocent victims. *JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 5*, 326.

Zweigenhaft, R. L., Philips, B. K. G., Adams, K. A., Morse, C. K., & Horan, A. E. (1985). Religious preference and belief in a just world. *Genetic, Social & General Psychology Monographs, 3*, 333-348.

APPENDIX A:
Study 1

O presente estudo tem como objectivo perceber o posicionamento de estudantes do ensino superior face a um conjunto de afirmações a que várias equipas de ciências sociais recorrem nos seus estudos.

Quando responder a este estudo, tenha em conta que as suas respostas são **<u>anónimas</u>** e, porque não há respostas certas ou erradas, **<u>não serão alvo de avaliação.</u>**

Por favor, responda na escala que lhe apresentamos, indicando a opção que considera mais adequada.

<u>Responda às questões pela ordem por que surgem</u>.

Muito obrigado.

Por favor, responda ao seguinte questionário, segundo a sua **POSIÇÃO PESSOAL** relativamente a cada frase que lhe apresentamos**.**

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

Por favor, pense **NOS(AS) COLEGAS EM GERAL DA SUA TURMA**. Tendo em conta essa imagem, responda ao seguinte questionário da forma como considera mais provável que eles(as) o fariam.

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

Para efeitos estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade:_____ anos

Tem comentários a fazer ao estudo em que acabou de participar? Em caso afirmativo, utilize o espaço nesta folha.

Muito obrigado pela sua participação.

APPENDIX B
Study 2

Este estudo tem como objectivo verificar como as pessoas criam e transmitem imagens sobre si aos outros a partir das respostas que dão em questionários usados por equipas de ciências sociais.

Pedimos-lhe que responda às questões, de acordo com as instruções dadas.

Tenha em conta que as suas respostas são **anónimas** e, porque não há respostas certas ou erradas, **não serão alvo de avaliação**, mas somente de tratamento estatístico.
Responda às questões pela ordem por que surgem.

Muito obrigado.

Por favor, indique, para efeitos estatísticos:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade _____anos
Curso_____

Por favor, responda ao seguinte questionário de modo a que as suas respostas transmitam uma **imagem negativa** de si. Portanto, **NÃO** deverá preenchê-lo segundo a sua posição pessoal, mas sim que responda de forma a que quem lesse as suas respostas **as desaprovasse e ficasse a não gostar de si.**

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1

[general BJW negative image condition]

Muito obrigado pela sua participação!

Remaining experimental conditions of Study 2

Por favor, preencha o seguinte questionário de modo a que as suas respostas transmitam uma **imagem positiva** de si. Portanto, **NÃO** deverá preenchê-lo segundo a sua posição pessoal, mas sim que responda de forma a que quem lesse as suas respostas **as aprovasse e ficasse a gostar de si.**

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1

[general BJW positive image condition]

Por favor, responda ao seguinte questionário de modo a que as suas respostas transmitam uma **imagem negativa** de si. Portanto, **NÃO** deverá preenchê-lo segundo a sua posição pessoal, mas sim que responda de forma a que quem lesse as suas respostas **as desaprovasse e ficasse a não gostar de si. (**

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

[personal BJW negative image condition]

Por favor, preencha o seguinte questionário de modo a que as suas respostas transmitam uma **imagem positiva** de si. Portanto, **NÃO** deverá preenchê-lo segundo a sua posição pessoal, mas sim que responda de forma a que quem lesse as suas respostas **as aprovasse e ficasse a gostar de si.**

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

[personal BJW positive image condition]

APPENDIX C
Study 3

Estudos anteriores têm revelado que as pessoas em geral conseguem formar opiniões sobre outros em diversas situações a partir de pouca informação disponível.

Este estudo tem como objectivo verificar que impressões podem ser formadas através das respostas que os indivíduos dão em questionários.

Vamos apresentar-lhe parte das respostas de alguém (estudante do ensino superior) que aceitou participar num estudo em Psicologia Social. A sua tarefa é formar uma impressão sobre essa pessoa a partir dessas respostas, indicando as características que julga que essa pessoa possui, indicando a sua posição em relação a cada uma.

Tenha em conta que as suas respostas são **anónimas** e, porque não há respostas certas ou erradas, **não serão alvo de avaliação**, mas somente de tratamento estatístico.

Responda às questões pela ordem por que surgem.

Muito obrigado.

Para efeitos estatísticos, por favor, indique:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade _____anos
Curso_____

De seguida pedimos que leia atentamente as respostas de uma pessoa (estudante do ensino secundário) a um questionário sobre a crença no mundo justo em geral.

As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com um crença no mundo justo elevada. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que os indivíduos merecem aquilo que lhes acontece na vida (de bom e mau). Em suma, esta pessoa acredita que o mundo é um lugar justo.

Enquanto lê as respostas da pessoa às afirmações apresentadas, tente imaginar como será esta pessoa.

	Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	X					
De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.		X				
As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.		X				
Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	X					
As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	X					
A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.		X				

[high general BJW condition]

Por favor, indique com que impressão ficou desta pessoa. Para tal, indique em que medida os seguintes traços são característicos de uma pessoa que tenha respondido ao inquérito da forma que acabou de ler.

	nada característico						Muitíssimo característico
deprimido(a)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
justo(a)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
sensato(a)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
mentiroso(a)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
gabarola	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
inteligente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
egoísta	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
responsável	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
invejoso(a)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
inflexível	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
honesto(a)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
boa pessoa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Por favor, releia as respostas dadas pela pessoa que participou no estudo anterior e indique:

. Gostaria de conhecer esta pessoa?

Sim, certamente   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Certamente que não

. Em que medida gostaria de ter esta pessoa como amigo(a)

Nada   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Muitíssimo

. Com que tipo de impressão ficou desta pessoa?

Extremamente negativa   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Extremamente positiva

Finalmente, pedíamos-lhe que fizesse alguns comentários relativamente ao estudo em que acabou de participar.

Sentiu dificuldades na resposta às questões? Em caso afirmativo, indique em que consistiram.

Muito obrigado pela sua participação.

Remaining experimental conditions of Study 3

	Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.			X			
De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.				X		
As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.				X		
Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.			X			
As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.			X			
A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.				X		

[moderate general BJW condition]

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.						X
2	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.					X	
3	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.					X	
4	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.						X
5	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.						X
6	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.					X	

[low general BJW condition]

251

#		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	X					
2	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.		X				
3	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.		X				
4	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	X					
5	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	X					
6	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	X					
7	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.		X				

[high personal BJW condition]

#		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.			X			
2	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.				X		
3	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.				X		
4	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.			X			
5	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.			X			
6	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.			X			
7	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.				X		

[moderate personal BJW condition]

#		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.						X
2	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.					X	
3	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.					X	
4	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.						X
5	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.						X
6	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.						X
7	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.					X	

[low personal BJW condition]

252

APPENDIX D
Material used to elicit adjectives from pretesters

Estudos anteriores têm revelado que as pessoas em geral conseguem formar opiniões sobre outros em diversas situações a partir de pouca informação disponível.

Este estudo tem como objectivo verificar que impressões podem ser formadas através das respostas que os indivíduos dão em questionários.

Vamos apresentar-lhe parte das respostas de alguém (estudante do ensino superior) que aceitou participar num estudo em Psicologia Social. A sua tarefa é formar uma impressão sobre essa pessoa a partir dessas respostas, indicando as características que julga que essa pessoa possui, indicando a sua posição em relação a cada uma.

Tenha em conta que as suas respostas são **anónimas** e, porque não há respostas certas ou erradas, **não serão alvo de avaliação**, mas somente de tratamento estatístico.

Responda às questões pela ordem por que surgem.

Muito obrigado.

Para efeitos estatísticos, por favor, indique:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade _____anos

Curso_____

Leia com atenção as seguintes afirmações e as respostas dadas por alguém que participou num estudo anterior e que deu o seu consentimento para que as pudessemos usar neste. Tente imaginar como será esta pessoa.

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	X					
2	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.		X				
3	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.		X				
4	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	X					
5	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	X					
6	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.		X				

[high general BJW]

Por favor, indique com que impressão ficou desta pessoa. Para tal, enumere as características que considere ser próprias de alguém que respondeu desta forma ao questionário (uma palavra por linha).

1._____
2._____
3._____
4._____
5._____
6._____
7._____
8._____
9._____
10._____
11._____
12._____

(The remaining conditions are the same as those presented in Appendix C)

APPENDIX E:
Material used to assess the negativity/positivity of the adjectives collected

APPENDIX F
Material used as a pilot study of the moderate belief in a just world operationalization

Imagine que as frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Neste momento, estamos a verificar que sentido as pessoas atribuem a estas palavras. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases teriam sido proferidas. Pedimos-lhe que leia este excerto e o comentário e que indique, no final, que ideia a pessoa transmitiu.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que por vezes as pessoas obtêm o que merecem: por vezes os acontecimentos na vida das pessoas são justos… É isso: acho que parte do que acontece às pessoas é justo, que por vezes merecem o que lhes acontece, mas nem sempre."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Há vezes em que as pessoas tratam os outros de uma maneira justa, por exemplo, certas decisões tomadas em relação aos outros são justas, embora não todas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na vida das pessoas tanto a justiça como a injustiça são a regra. As pessoas têm tanto duma como doutra."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo moderada. Tal significa que esta pessoa pensa que os indivíduos certas vezes merecem e outras não merecem o que lhes acontece na vida (de bom e de mau). Em suma, esta pessoa acredita que o mundo é um lugar que tanto pode ser justo como injusto para os indivíduos.

Gostaríamos que nos indicasse qual das seguintes afirmações reflecte de forma mais precisa a ideia veiculada por esta pessoa. Não há qualquer "truque" neste exercício. Por isso, pedimos-lhe que indique a sua verdadeira opinião para que saibamos verdadeiramente o significado que as pessoas atribuem a estas palavras.

A pessoa considera que:

☐ As pessoas têm quase sempre o que merecem

☐ As pessoas têm o que merecem até certo ponto

☐ As pessoas quase nunca têm o que merecem

☐ O que as pessoas têm não está relacionado com o que merecem

[moderate general BJW]

Imagine que as frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Neste momento, estamos a verificar que sentido as pessoas atribuem a estas palavras. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases teriam sido proferidas. Pedimos-lhe que leia este excerto e o comentário e que indique, no final, que ideia a pessoa transmitiu.

> **(Minuto 10)** *"Acho que por vezes obtenho o que mereço: por vezes os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos… É isso: acho que parte do que me acontece é justo, que por vezes eu mereço o que me acontece, mas nem sempre."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Há vezes em que os outros me tratam de uma maneira justa, por exemplo, certas decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas, embora não todas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na minha vida tanto a justiça como a injustiça são a regra. Tenho tido tanto duma como doutra."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo moderada. Tal significa que esta pessoa pensa que certas vezes merece e outras não merece o que lhe acontece na vida (de bom e de mau). Em suma, esta pessoa acredita que o mundo é um lugar que tanto pode ser justo como injusto para si.

Gostaríamos que nos indicasse qual das seguintes afirmações reflecte de forma mais precisa a ideia veiculada por esta pessoa. Não há qualquer "truque" neste exercício. Por isso, pedimos-lhe que indique a sua verdadeira opinião para que saibamos verdadeiramente o significado que as pessoas atribuem a estas palavras.

A pessoa considera que:

☐ tem quase sempre o que merece

☐ tem o que merece até certo ponto

☐ quase nunca tem o que merece

☐ o que tem não se relaciona com o que merece

[moderate personal BJW]

APPENDIX G
Study 4

Em primeiro lugar, gostaríamos de lhe agradecer ter acedido a participar neste estudo.

Irá ler excertos de uma entrevista realizada a uma pessoa (estudante do ensino superior) num estudo conduzido pela nossa equipa.
Porventura, já terá tido a experiência de ter ouvido alguém que não conhece dizer algo (ex. nos transportes públicos, salas de espera, etc.) e ter formado automaticamente uma impressão sobre essa pessoa. Provavelmente terá ainda imaginado até que ponto é que concordava ou discordava com o que a pessoa disse e quanto outras pessoas o fariam.
Neste estudo, estamos apenas a pedir que faça este exercício e que partilhe as suas opiniões connosco, ou seja, gostaríamos que nos desse a sua opinião sobre os excertos que vamos apresentar. Sendo opiniões, não há respostas certas ou erradas.

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos, a não ser que, relembramos, se trata de um(a) estudante do ensino superior.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço: de um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos… É isso: acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo, que em geral eu mereço o que me acontece."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa, por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo elevada. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que geralmente merece aquilo que lhe acontece na vida (de bom e de mau). Em suma, esta pessoa acredita que o mundo é um lugar justo para si.

[high personal BJW condition]

Por favor, responda às seguintes questões, usando para tal a escala apresentada de 1 a 7. Se achar necessário, releia os excertos e/ou o comentário aos mesmos.

Quão realista é acreditar nesta opinião?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada						Muitíssimo

Em que grau você aprova que se tenha esta opinião?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada						Muitíssimo

Quanto acha desejável ter esta opinião?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada						Muitíssimo

Quanto concorda você com esta opinião?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada						Muitíssimo

Sem reler os excertos da entrevista nem o respectivo comentário, gostaríamos que nos indicasse qual das seguintes afirmações reflecte de forma mais precisa a ideia veiculada pelo(a) entrevistado(a).

O(A) entrevistado(a) considera que:
. geralmente merece o que lhe sucede na vida   □
. de vez em quando merece o que lhe sucede na vida   □
. quase nunca merece o que lhe sucede na vida   □

Por razões estatísticas, por favor indique os seguintes dados pessoais:

Sexo: masculino □   feminino □
Idade: _____ anos

Muito obrigado pela sua participação

Em primeiro lugar, gostaríamos de lhe agradecer ter acedido a participar neste estudo.

Irá ler excertos de uma entrevista realizada a uma pessoa (estudante do ensino superior) num estudo conduzido pela nossa equipa.
Porventura, já terá tido a experiência de ter ouvido alguém que não conhece dizer algo (ex. nos transportes públicos, salas de espera, etc.) e ter formado automaticamente uma impressão sobre essa pessoa. Provavelmente terá ainda imaginado até que ponto é que concordava ou discordava com o que a pessoa disse e quanto outras pessoas o fariam.
Neste estudo, estamos apenas a pedir que faça este exercício e que partilhe as suas opiniões connosco, ou seja, gostaríamos que nos desse a sua opinião sobre os excertos que vamos apresentar. Sendo opiniões, não há respostas certas ou erradas.

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos, a não ser que, relembramos, se trata de um(a) estudante do ensino superior.

> **(Minuto 10)** *"Acho que por vezes obtenho o que mereço: por vezes os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos… É isso: acho que parte do que me acontece é justo, que por vezes eu mereço o que me acontece, mas nem sempre."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Há vezes em que os outros me tratam de uma maneira justa, por exemplo, certas decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas, embora não todas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na minha vida tanto a justiça como a injustiça são a regra. Tenho tido tanto duma como doutra."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo moderada. Tal significa que esta pessoa pensa que, certas vezes, merece e outras não merece o que lhe acontece na vida (de bom e de mau). Em suma, esta pessoa acredita que o mundo é um lugar que tanto pode ser justo como injusto para si.

[moderate personal BJW]

Em primeiro lugar, gostaríamos de lhe agradecer ter acedido a participar neste estudo.

Irá ler excertos de uma entrevista realizada a uma pessoa (estudante do ensino superior) num estudo conduzido pela nossa equipa.

Porventura, já terá tido a experiência de ter ouvido alguém que não conhece dizer algo (ex. nos transportes públicos, salas de espera, etc.) e ter formado automaticamente uma impressão sobre essa pessoa. Provavelmente terá ainda imaginado até que ponto é que concordava ou discordava com o que a pessoa disse e quanto outras pessoas o fariam.

Neste estudo, estamos apenas a pedir que faça este exercício e que partilhe as suas opiniões connosco, ou seja, gostaríamos que nos desse a sua opinião sobre os excertos que vamos apresentar. Sendo opiniões, <u>não há respostas certas ou erradas</u>.

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos, a não ser que, relembramos, se trata de um(a) estudante do ensino superior.

> **(Minuto 10)** *"Acho que de um modo geral não obtenho o que mereço: de um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida não são justos… É isso: acho que a maior parte do que me acontece não é justo, que em geral eu não mereço o que me acontece."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Geralmente os outros não me tratam de uma maneira justa, por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim não são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na minha vida a justiça é a excepção e não a regra."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo baixa. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que raramente merece aquilo que lhe acontece na vida (de bom e de mau). Em suma, esta pessoa não acredita que o mundo seja um lugar justo para si.

[low personal BJW]

Em primeiro lugar, gostaríamos de lhe agradecer ter acedido a participar neste estudo.

Irá ler excertos de uma entrevista realizada a uma pessoa (estudante do ensino superior) num estudo conduzido pela nossa equipa.

Porventura, já terá tido a experiência de ter ouvido alguém que não conhece dizer algo (ex. nos transportes públicos, salas de espera, etc.) e ter formado automaticamente uma impressão sobre essa pessoa. Provavelmente terá ainda imaginado até que ponto é que concordava ou discordava com o que a pessoa disse e quanto outras pessoas o fariam.

Neste estudo, estamos apenas a pedir que faça este exercício e que partilhe as suas opiniões connosco, ou seja, gostaríamos que nos desse a sua opinião sobre os excertos que vamos apresentar. Sendo opiniões, <u>não há respostas certas ou erradas</u>.

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos, a não ser que, relembramos, se trata de um(a) estudante do ensino superior.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que geralmente as pessoas obtêm o que merecem: de um modo geral os acontecimentos na vida das pessoas são justos… É isso: acho que a maior parte do que acontece às pessoas é justo, que em geral merecem o que lhes acontece."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Geralmente as pessoas tratam os outros de uma maneira justa, por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que se tomam em relação aos outros são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra."*

<u>Comentário</u>: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo elevada. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que os indivíduos geralmente merecem aquilo que lhes acontece na vida (de bom e de mau). Em suma, esta pessoa acredita que o mundo é um lugar justo para os indivíduos.

[high general BJW]

Em primeiro lugar, gostaríamos de lhe agradecer ter acedido a participar neste estudo.

Irá ler excertos de uma entrevista realizada a uma pessoa (estudante do ensino superior) num estudo conduzido pela nossa equipa.

Porventura, já terá tido a experiência de ter ouvido alguém que não conhece dizer algo (ex. nos transportes públicos, salas de espera, etc.) e ter formado automaticamente uma impressão sobre essa pessoa. Provavelmente terá ainda imaginado até que ponto é que concordava ou discordava com o que a pessoa disse e quanto outras pessoas o fariam.

Neste estudo, estamos apenas a pedir que faça este exercício e que partilhe as suas opiniões connosco, ou seja, gostaríamos que nos desse a sua opinião sobre os excertos que vamos apresentar. Sendo opiniões, <u>não há respostas certas ou erradas</u>.

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos, a não ser que, relembramos, se trata de um(a) estudante do ensino superior.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que por vezes as pessoas obtêm o que merecem: por vezes os acontecimentos na vida das pessoas são justos... É isso: acho que parte do que acontece às pessoas é justo, que por vezes merecem o que lhes acontece, mas nem sempre."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Há vezes em que as pessoas tratam os outros de uma maneira justa, por exemplo, certas decisões tomadas em relação aos outros são justas, embora não todas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na vida das pessoas tanto a justiça como a injustiça são a regra. As pessoas têm tanto duma como doutra."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo moderada. Tal significa que esta pessoa pensa que os indivíduos certas vezes merecem e outras não merecem o que lhes acontece na vida (de bom e de mau). Em suma, esta pessoa acredita que o mundo é um lugar que tanto pode ser justo como injusto para os indivíduos.

[moderate general BJW]

Em primeiro lugar, gostaríamos de lhe agradecer ter acedido a participar neste estudo.

Neste estudo, irá ler excertos de uma entrevista proferidos por uma pessoa (estudante do ensino superior) que participou num estudo realizado pela nossa equipa. Porventura, já terá tido a experiência de ter ouvido alguém que não conhece dizer algo (ex. nos transportes públicos, salas de espera, etc.) e formado automaticamente uma impressão sobre essa pessoa. Provavelmente terá ainda imaginado até que ponto é que concordava ou discordava com o que a pessoa disse e quanto outras pessoas o fariam.
Neste estudo, estamos apenas a pedir que faça este exercício e que partilhe as suas opiniões connosco, ou seja, gostaríamos que nos desse a sua opinião sobre as frases. Sendo opiniões, <u>não há respostas certas ou erradas</u>.

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos, a não ser que, relembramos, se trata de um(a) estudante do ensino superior.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que de um modo geral as pessoas não obtêm o que merecem: de um modo geral os acontecimentos na vida das pessoas não são justos… É isso: acho que a maior parte do que acontece às pessoas não é justo, que em geral não merecem o que lhes acontece."* (. . .)
(Minuto 26) *"Geralmente as pessoas não tratam os outros de uma maneira justa, por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que se tomam em relação aos outros não são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na vida das pessoas a justiça é a excepção e não a regra."*

<u>Comentário:</u> As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo baixa. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que os indivíduos raramente merecem aquilo que lhes acontece na vida (de bom e de mau). Em suma, esta pessoa não acredita que o mundo seja um lugar justo para os indivíduos.

[low general BJW]

APPENDIX H
Study 5

Em primeiro lugar, gostaríamos de lhe agradecer ter acedido a participar neste estudo. Irá ler excertos de uma entrevista realizada a uma pessoa (estudante do ensino superior) num estudo conduzido pela nossa equipa.

Gostaríamos que nos desse a sua opinião sobre as frases e que nos dissesse como imagina essa pessoa.
Embora possa parecer difícil ter uma impressão sobre alguém apenas a partir de algumas frases, vários estudos têm mostrado que os indivíduos formam impressões e tiram conclusões acerca de estranhos simplesmente por ouvirem uma frase sua (ex. nos transportes públicos, salas de espera, etc.). Porventura, já terá tido a experiência de ter ouvido alguém que não conhece dizer algo e formado automaticamente uma impressão sobre essa pessoa.

Neste estudo, estamos apenas a pedir que faça este exercício e que partilhe as suas opiniões connosco. Sendo opiniões, não há respostas certas ou erradas.

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos, a não ser que, relembramos, se trata de um(a) estudante do ensino superior.

> **(Minuto 10)** *"Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço: de um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos… É isso: acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo, que em geral eu mereço o que me acontece."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa, por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo elevada. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que geralmente merece aquilo que lhe acontece na vida (de bom e de mau). Em suma, esta pessoa acredita que o mundo é um lugar justo para si.

[high personal BJW condition

(The remaining conditions were, like this one, the same as in Study 4, see Appendix G)

Sabendo que podemos muito facilmente construir imagens de outras pessoas a partir de muito pouca informação, gostávamos que nos dissesse em que grau imagina que os seguintes adjectivos caracterizam esta pessoa. Se achar necessário, releia os excertos e/ou o comentário aos mesmos.

competente	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
de quem se gosta	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
prestável	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
sem personalidade	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
sincero(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
frio(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
hostil	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
caloroso(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
ingénuo(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
confiante	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
autoritário(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
competitivo(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
independente	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
queixinhas	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
arrogante	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
trabalhador(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
bem-educado(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
inteligente	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
boa pessoa	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo

ganancioso(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
determinado(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
tolerante	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
lamuriento(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
irritável	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
egoísta	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
passivo(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo

Por favor, responda às seguintes questões usando para tal a escala apresentada de 1 a 7. Se achar necessário, releia os excertos e/ou o comentário aos mesmos.

Quem pensa desta forma tem muitas probabilidades de vir a ter uma posição bem remunerada.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Não concordo nada						Concordo muitíssimo

Gostaria de fazer alguma actividade lúdica (desporto, cinema, teatro, passeios, etc.) com esta pessoa?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Não de maneira alguma						Sim, certamente

Gostaria de ter esta pessoa como chefe?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
De maneira nenhuma						Certamente que sim

Quão bem sucedida economicamente será esta pessoa?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada bem sucedida						Muitíssimo bem sucedida

Gostaria de cooperar (num projecto, num trabalho) com esta pessoa?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Não de maneira alguma						Sim, certamente

A ideia de vir a trabalhar com esta pessoa é-lhe:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
nada agradável						muitíssimo agradável

Quão bem sucedida será esta pessoa em obter uma posição de poder? -

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada bem sucedida						Muitíssimo bem sucedida

Quanto gostaria de ter esta pessoa como amigo(a)?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada						Muitíssimo

A ideia de vir a trabalhar para esta pessoa é-lhe:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
nada agradável						muitíssimo agradável

Ter esta opinião é meio caminho andado para vir a ter uma posição de prestígio.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Não concordo nada						Concordo muitíssimo

Quanto gostaria de ter esta pessoa como colega?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada						Muitíssimo

Sem reler os excertos da entrevista nem o respectivo comentário, gostaríamos que nos indicasse qual das seguintes afirmações reflecte de forma mais precisa a ideia veiculada pelo(a) entrevistado(a).

O(A) entrevistado(a) considera que:
. geralmente merece o que lhe sucede na vida ☐
. de vez em quando merece o que lhe sucede na vida ☐
. quase nunca merece o que lhe sucede na vida ☐

Tem comentários a fazer ao estudo em que acabou de participar? Em caso afirmativo, utilize o espaço nesta folha.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Por razões estatísticas, por favor indique os seguintes dados pessoais:

Sexo: masculino ☐   feminino ☐
Idade _____ anos

Muito obrigado pela sua participação.

APPENDIX I
Study 6

A investigação tem demonstrado que os indivíduos recorrem a diversas estratégias para projectarem diferentes imagens de si, consoante a situação.

Neste estudo, pedimos-lhe que se imagine como um indivíduo que tem como objectivo principal que os outros **simpatizem/gostem dele(a)**. Para tal, recorra às frases constantes na página seguinte, indicando a forma como julga que alguém com esse objectivo o faria.

As suas respostas são anónimas e não serão alvo de avaliação, pois estamos interessados na sua opinião

Para efeitos estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade:_____ anos

Curso_____ ANO:_____

Por favor, preencha a seguinte escala com o objectivo de levar os outros a <u>SIMPATIZAR/ GOSTAR</u> da pessoa que responde.

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

["to be liked condition"]

Muito obrigado pela sua participação!

A investigação tem demonstrado que os indivíduos recorrem a diversas estratégias para projectarem diferentes imagens de si, consoante a situação.

Neste estudo, pedimos-lhe que se imagine como um indivíduo que tem como objectivo principal que os outros **o(a) vejam como alguém competente**. Para tal, recorra às frases constantes na página seguinte, indicando a forma como julga que alguém com esse objectivo o faria.

As suas respostas são anónimas e não serão alvo de avaliação, pois estamos interessados na sua opinião

Para efeitos estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade:_____ anos

Curso_____ ANO:_____

Por favor, preencha a seguinte escala com o objectivo de levar os outros a ver a pessoa que responde como <u>ALGUÉM COMPETENTE.</u>

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

["to be seen as competent" condition]

Muito obrigado pela sua participação!

A investigação tem demonstrado que os indivíduos recorrem a diversas estratégias para projectarem diferentes imagens de si, consoante a situação.

Neste estudo, pedimos-lhe que se imagine como um indivíduo que tem como objectivo principal que os outros **o(a) vejam como alguém bem sucedido(a) na vida.** Para tal, recorra às frases constantes na página seguinte, indicando a forma como julga que alguém com esse objectivo o faria.

As suas respostas são anónimas e não serão alvo de avaliação, pois estamos interessados na sua opinião

Para efeitos estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade:_____ anos

Curso_____ ANO:_____

Por favor, preencha a seguinte escala com o objectivo de levar os outros a ver a pessoa que responde como <u>ALGUÉM BEM SUCEDIDO(A) NA VIDA</u>.

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

["to be seen as successful" condition]

Muito obrigado pela sua participação!

A investigação tem demonstrado que os indivíduos recorrem a diversas estratégias para projectarem diferentes imagens de si, consoante a situação.

Neste estudo, pedimos-lhe que se imagine como um indivíduo que tem como objectivo principal que os outros **o(a) vejam como alguém por quem se tem pena.** Para tal, recorra às frases constantes na página seguinte, indicando a forma como julga que alguém com esse objectivo o faria.

As suas respostas são anónimas e não serão alvo de avaliação, pois estamos interessados na sua opinião

Para efeitos estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade:_____ anos

Curso_____ ANO:_____

Por favor, preencha a seguinte escala com o objectivo de levar os outros a ver a pessoa que responde como <u>ALGUÉM POR QUEM SE TEM PENA.</u>

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

["to be seen as pitiful" condition]

Muito obrigado pela sua participação!

A investigação tem demonstrado que os indivíduos recorrem a diversas estratégias para projectarem diferentes imagens de si, consoante a situação.

Neste estudo, no entanto, pedimos-lhe que indique **a sua posição pessoal** e que seja honesto(a) em relação às mesmas. Para tal, recorra às frases constantes na página seguinte, indicando a sua posição pessoal relativamente a cada uma.

As suas respostas são anónimas e não serão alvo de avaliação, pois estamos interessados na sua opinião.

Para efeitos estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade:_____ anos

Curso_____ ANO:_____

Por favor, preencha a seguinte escala segundo a <u>SUA POSIÇÃO PESSOAL.</u>

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

["own opinion" condition]

Muito obrigado pela sua participação!

APPENDIX J
Pre-test of the subcategories of students

Muito obrigado por ter acedido a participar neste estudo. O nosso objectivo é verificar quais as ideias que estudantes do ensino superior associam quando pensam num(a) **mau/má estudante**.

Assim, pedimos-lhe que indique em que grau as afirmações constantes na folha seguinte se aplicam à sua ideia de **mau/má estudante**.

Para fins estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino ☐   feminino ☐

Idade:＿＿＿＿＿ anos.

["bad student" condition]

Por favor, tendo em conta a sua ideia de **um(a) mau/má estudante**, indique quanto julga que as seguintes afirmações o(a) caracterizam. Indique no espaço à frente de cada afirmação o número da escala que considera caracterizar um(a) mau/má estudante.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Não concordo	Concordo mto pouco	Concordo pouco	Concordo mais ou menos	Concordo bastante	Concordo muito	Concordo muitíssimo

são responsáveis_____

pretendem sobretudo agradar aos professores_____

estão essencialmente motivados para aprender_____

costumam andar em festas_____

têm hábitos de estudo consolidados_____

as notas que obtêm são atingidas de forma honesta_____

são baldas_____

têm um bom potencial em tudo o que diz respeito ao estudo _____

são pessoas com quem gosto de conviver_____

são pessoas de quem gosto de ser colega_____

costumam ter boas notas_____

na sua vida profissional serão profissionais competentes_____

são capazes de espezinhar os colegas para atingirem os objectivos_____

são colegas de confiança_____

são sinceros_____

as notas que obtêm correspondem ao essencialmente seu desempenho_____

são pessoas que irão longe na vida (ex., bons ordenados, estatuto social) _____

costumam ter de repetir cadeiras_____

Muito obrigado por ter acedido a participar neste estudo. O nosso objectivo é verificar quais as ideias que estudantes do ensino superior associam quando pensam num(a) **bom/boa estudante**.
Assim, pedimos-lhe que indique em que grau as afirmações constantes na folha seguinte se aplicam à sua ideia de **bom/boa estudante**.

Para fins estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino ☐   feminino ☐

Idade:_____ anos.

["good student" condition]

Por favor, tendo em conta a sua ideia de **um(a) bom/boa estudante**, indique quanto julga que as seguintes afirmações o(a) caracterizam. Indique no espaço à frente de cada afirmação o número da escala que considera caracterizar um(a) bom/boa estudante.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Não concordo	Concordo mto pouco	Concordo pouco	Concordo mais ou menos	Concordo bastante	Concordo muito	Concordo muitíssimo

são responsáveis_____

pretendem sobretudo agradar aos professores_____

estão essencialmente motivados para aprender_____

costumam andar em festas_____

têm hábitos de estudo consolidados_____

as notas que obtêm são atingidas de forma honesta_____

são baldas_____

têm um bom potencial em tudo o que diz respeito ao estudo _____

são pessoas com quem gosto de conviver_____

são pessoas de quem gosto de ser colega_____

costumam ter boas notas_____

na sua vida profissional serão profissionais competentes_____

são capazes de espezinhar os colegas para atingirem os objectivos_____

são colegas de confiança_____

são sinceros_____

as notas que obtêm correspondem ao essencialmente seu desempenho_____

são pessoas que irão longe na vida (ex., bons ordenados, estatuto social) _____

costumam ter de repetir cadeiras_____

Muito obrigado por ter acedido a participar neste estudo. O nosso objectivo é verificar quais as ideias que estudantes do ensino superior associam quando pensam num(a) **estudante graxista**.

Assim, pedimos-lhe que indique em que grau as afirmações constantes na folha seguinte se aplicam à sua ideia de **estudante graxista**.

Para fins estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino ☐   feminino ☐

Idade:_____ anos.

["apple-polisher student" condition]

Por favor, tendo em conta a sua ideia de **um(a) estudante graxista**, indique quanto julga que as seguintes afirmações o(a) caracterizam. Indique no espaço à frente de cada afirmação o número da escala que considera caracterizar um(a) estudante graxista.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Não concordo	Concordo mto pouco	Concordo pouco	Concordo mais ou menos	Concordo bastante	Concordo muito	Concordo muitíssimo

são responsáveis_____

pretendem sobretudo agradar aos professores_____

estão essencialmente motivados para aprender_____

costumam andar em festas_____

têm hábitos de estudo consolidados_____

as notas que obtêm são atingidas de forma honesta_____

são baldas_____

têm um bom potencial em tudo o que diz respeito ao estudo _____

são pessoas com quem gosto de conviver_____

são pessoas de quem gosto de ser colega_____

costumam ter boas notas_____

na sua vida profissional serão profissionais competentes_____

são capazes de espezinhar os colegas para atingirem os objectivos_____

são colegas de confiança_____

são sinceros_____

as notas que obtêm correspondem ao essencialmente seu desempenho_____

são pessoas que irão longe na vida (ex., bons ordenados, estatuto social) _____

costumam ter de repetir cadeiras_____

APPENDIX K
Study 7

O presente estudo tem como objectivo perceber o posicionamento de estudantes do ensino superior face a um conjunto de afirmações a que várias equipas de ciências sociais recorrem nos seus estudos.

Quando responder a este estudo, tenha em conta que as suas respostas são **anónimas** e, porque não há respostas certas ou erradas, **não serão alvo de avaliação**.

Por favor, responda na escala que lhe apresentamos, indicando a opção que considera mais adequada.
Responda às questões pela ordem por que surgem.

Muito obrigado.

Para efeitos estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade:_____ anos

Curso_____

Por favor, responda ao seguinte questionário, segundo a sua **POSIÇÃO PESSOAL**, relativamente a cada frase que lhe apresentamos.

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

Por favor, pense **NOS BONS ESTUDANTES**. Tendo em conta essa imagem, responda ao seguinte questionário da forma que considera mais provável que um(a) desses (as) estudantes o faria.

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

["good student" condition]

Muito obrigado pela sua participação.

Remaining experimental conditions

Por favor, pense **NOS MAUS ESTUDANTES**. Tendo em conta essa imagem, responda ao seguinte questionário da forma que considera mais provável que um(a) desses (as) estudantes o faria.

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

["bad students" condition]

Por favor, pense **NOS ESTUDANTES GRAXISTAS**. Tendo em conta essa imagem, responda ao seguinte questionário da forma que considera mais provável que um(a) desses (as) estudantes o faria.

		Concordo completamente	Concordo	Concordo ligeiramente	Discordo ligeiramente	Discordo	Discordo completamente
1	Basicamente, o mundo em que vivemos é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	Acho que geralmente obtenho o que mereço.	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	De uma maneira geral, as pessoas merecem aquilo que lhes acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
4	Geralmente os outros tratam-me de uma maneira justa.	6	5	4	3	2	1
5	Em geral eu mereço o que me acontece.	6	5	4	3	2	1
6	As injustiças em todas as áreas da vida (por exemplo, profissão, família, política) constituem uma excepção à regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
7	De um modo geral os acontecimentos da minha vida são justos.	6	5	4	3	2	1
8	Ao longo da vida as pessoas acabam por ser compensadas pelas injustiças sofridas.	6	5	4	3	2	1
9	As pessoas tentam ser justas quando tomam decisões importantes.	6	5	4	3	2	1
10	Na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra.	6	5	4	3	2	1
11	A justiça vence sempre a injustiça.	6	5	4	3	2	1
12	Acho que a maior parte do que me acontece é justo.	6	5	4	3	2	1
13	As decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim são justas.	6	5	4	3	2	1

["apple-polisher student" condition]

APPENDIX L
Study 8

Em primeiro lugar, gostaríamos de lhe agradecer ter acedido a participar neste estudo.
Irá ler excertos de uma entrevista realizada a uma pessoa num estudo conduzido pela nossa equipa.

Gostaríamos que nos desse a sua opinião sobre as frases e que nos dissesse como imagina essa pessoa.
Embora possa parecer difícil ter uma impressão sobre alguém apenas a partir de algumas frases, vários estudos têm mostrado que os indivíduos formam impressões e tiram conclusões acerca de estranhos simplesmente por ouvirem uma frase sua (ex. nos transportes públicos, salas de espera, etc.). Porventura, já terá tido a experiência de ter ouvido alguém que não conhece dizer algo e formado automaticamente uma impressão sobre essa pessoa.

Neste estudo, estamos apenas a pedir que faça este exercício e que partilhe as suas opiniões connosco. Sendo opiniões, <u>não há respostas certas ou erradas</u>. As suas respostas são anónimas.

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que geralmente mereço os meus sucessos. De um modo geral os sucessos da minha vida são justos… É isso: acho que a maior parte do que me acontece nesse campo é justo, que em geral eu mereço quando sou bem sucedido(a)."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Quando se trata dos meus sucessos, os outros geralmente tratam-me de uma maneira justa. Por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim nesse campo são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra quando se trata dos meus sucessos. Geralmente tenho tido justiça neste*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo elevada para os seus sucessos. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que geralmente merece aquilo que lhe acontece neste aspecto da sua vida.

[high personal BJW for successes]

Tendo em conta o excerto que leu e o respectivo comentário, em que grau considera que os seguintes adjectivos caracterizam a pessoa entrevistada?

competente	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
de quem se gosta	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
prestável	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
sincero(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
caloroso(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
confiante	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
competitivo(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
independente	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
trabalhador(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
bem-educado(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
inteligente	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
boa pessoa	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
determinado(a)	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
tolerante	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo
responsável	1 nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 muitíssimo

Para efeitos estatísticos, por favor indique:

Sexo: masculino   feminino

Idade:_____ anos

Muito obrigado pela sua participação!

The remaining experimental conditions

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que geralmente não mereço os meus sucessos. De um modo geral os sucessos da minha vida não são justos… É isso: acho que a maior parte do que me acontece nesse campo não é justo, que em geral eu não mereço quando sou bem sucedido(a)."* (. . .) (Minuto 26) *"Quando se trata dos meus sucessos, os outros geralmente não me tratam de uma maneira justa. Por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim nesse campo não são justas."* (. . .) (Minuto 43) *"É como já disse, na minha vida a justiça é a excepção e não a regra quando se trata dos meus sucessos. Raramente tenho tido justiça neste campo."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo baixa para os seus sucessos. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que raramente merece aquilo que lhe acontece neste aspecto da sua vida.

[low personal BJW for successes]

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos, acerca do percurso de vida. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que geralmente mereço os meus insucessos. De um modo geral, os insucessos da minha vida são justos… É isso: acho que a maior parte do que me acontece neste campo é justo, que em geral eu mereço quando sou mal sucedido(a)."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Quando se trata dos meus insucessos, os outros geralmente tratam-me de uma maneira justa. Por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim nesse campo são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na minha vida a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra quando se trata dos meus insucessos. Geralmente tenho tido justiça neste campo."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo elevada para os seus insucessos. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que geralmente merece aquilo que lhe acontece neste aspecto da sua vida.

[high personal BJW for failures]

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que geralmente não mereço os meus insucessos. De um modo geral, os insucessos da minha vida não são justos... É isso: acho que a maior parte do que me acontece neste campo não é justo, que em geral eu não mereço quando sou mal sucedido(a)* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Quando se trata dos meus insucessos, os outros geralmente não me tratam de uma maneira justa. Por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que os outros tomam em relação a mim nesse campo não são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na minha vida a justiça é a excepção e não a regra quando se trata dos meus insucessos. Raramente tenho tido justiça neste campo.*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo baixa para os seus insucessos. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que raramente merece aquilo que lhe acontece neste aspecto da sua vida.

[low personal BJW for failures]

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que geralmente as pessoas merecem os seus sucessos. De um modo geral os sucessos na vida das pessoas são justos… É isso: acho que a maior parte do que acontece às pessoas nesse campo é justo, que em geral merecem o que lhes acontece quando são bem sucedidas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Quando se trata dos sucessos, as pessoas geralmente tratam os outros de uma maneira justa. Por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que se tomam em relação aos outros nesse campo são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na vida das pessoas a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra quando se trata dos seus sucessos. As pessoas geralmente têm justiça neste campo."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo elevada para os sucessos das pessoas em geral. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que os indivíduos geralmente merecem aquilo que lhes acontece neste aspecto das suas vidas.

[high general BJW for successes]

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos.

> **(Minuto 10)** *"Acho que geralmente as pessoas não merecem os seus sucessos. De um modo geral os sucessos na vida das pessoas não são justos… É isso: acho que a maior parte do que acontece às pessoas neste campo não é justo, que em geral não merecem o que lhes acontece quando são bem sucedidas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Quando se trata dos sucessos, as pessoas geralmente não tratam os outros de uma maneira justa. Por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que se tomam em relação aos outros nesse campo não são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na vida das pessoas a justiça é a excepção e não a regra quando se trata dos seus sucessos. As pessoas raramente têm justiça neste campo."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo baixa para os sucessos das pessoas em geral. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que os indivíduos raramente merecem aquilo que lhes acontece neste aspecto das suas vidas.

[low general BJW for successes]

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos.

> **(Minuto 10)** *"Acho que geralmente as pessoas merecem os seus insucessos. De um modo geral os insucessos na vida das pessoas são justos... É isso: acho que a maior parte do que acontece às pessoas nesse campo é justo, que em geral merecem o que lhes acontece quando são mal sucedidas."* (. . .)
> **(Minuto 26)** *"Quando se trata dos insucessos, as pessoas geralmente tratam os outros de uma maneira justa. Por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que se tomam em relação aos outros nesse campo são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na vida das pessoas a injustiça é a excepção e não a regra quando se trata dos seus insucessos. As pessoas geralmente têm justiça neste campo."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo elevada para os insucessos das pessoas em geral. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que os indivíduos geralmente merecem aquilo que lhes acontece neste aspecto das suas vidas.

[high general BJW for failures]

As frases que transcrevemos e comentamos de seguida foram retiradas de uma entrevista com a duração aproximada de 50 minutos. Indicamos-lhe (entre parêntesis) em que ponto da entrevista as frases foram proferidas. Por razões de anonimato, não daremos quaisquer indicações sobre a pessoa que entrevistámos.

(Minuto 10) *"Acho que geralmente as pessoas não merecem os seus insucessos. De um modo geral os insucessos na vida das pessoas não são justos... É isso: acho que a maior parte do que acontece às pessoas neste campo não é justo, que em geral não merecem o que lhes acontece quando são mal sucedidas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 26)** *"Quando se trata dos insucessos, geralmente as pessoas não tratam os outros de uma maneira justa. Por exemplo, a maior parte das decisões que se tomam em relação aos outros nesse campo não são justas."* (. . .) **(Minuto 43)** *"É como já disse, na vida das pessoas a justiça é a excepção e não a regra quando se trata dos seus insucessos. As pessoas raramente têm justiça neste campo."*

Comentário: As respostas dadas por esta pessoa revelam que se trata de alguém com uma crença num mundo justo baixa para os insucessos das pessoas em geral. Tal significa que esta pessoa tende a pensar que os indivíduos raramente merecem aquilo que lhes acontece neste aspecto das suas vidas.

[low personal BJW for failures]