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Migration of unaccompanied minors from Morocco to Europe: the pursuit of an Amazigh Nation?

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SOCIOLOGIA
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To my family, for being an example of constancy, hard work, and good values.

To João, for his patience, laughs and support.

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This dissertation would not have been possible without the advice and support of Dr. Ricardo Falção. His passion for research and good orientation in sending me papers and books to read, particularly in the nationalism field, has inspired and defined my work.

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Special thanks to Casa Amaziga de Catalunya and, particularly to Mr. Abdul Abdelouahed, president of Casa Amaziga de Catalunya, for introducing me to its members. Thanks to this, I had the opportunity to meet Mr. Abdellah Ihmadi, a member of Casa Amaziga de Catalunya and the Anaruz N Afrika Association. I am very grateful for his warmly welcomed me at his home for the interview despite the COVID-19 situation and his several personal commitments. Without both help, the present dissertation would have missed a closer look into the Amazigh question.

Last but not least, I would like to give a thought to all unaccompanied minors crossing the Strait of Gibraltar in precarious conditions. I hope this dissertation contributes to making visible the collective, its vulnerability, and the need for further research on the topic for protecting their rights as *children on the move*.

Resumo

A presente pesquisa tem como objetivo analisar o fenómeno da chegada de menores não acompanhados provenientes de Marrocos à União Europeia entre 2010 a 2021. Este fenómeno migratório recente supõe um desafio emergente para governos, organizações internacionais e sociedade para garantir a proteção de crianças segundo a Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre os Direitos da Criança (ONU, 1989). A pesquisa centra-se nas crianças em trânsito que vêm sozinhas de Marrocos e chegam à Espanha pelo Estreito de Gibraltar. A chamada Rota Migratória do Mediterrâneo Ocidental tornou-se uma das portas de entrada para a Europa. Por seu lado, a Espanha acolhe hoje uma grande comunidade de menores não acompanhados marroquinos e, em particular, a Catalunha tornou-se a segunda Comunidade Autónoma Espanhola com maior número de menores não acompanhados, apenas superada por Melilla localizada na fronteira de Marrocos. A presente pesquisa dá atenção especial ao estudo da questão Amazigh e às razões pelas quais menores não acompanhados marroquinos que migram para a Europa escolhem particularmente para a Catalunha, considerando esta como um modelo de referência para a busca de uma nação Amazigh.

Palavras-chave: migração, menores não acompanhados, Marrocos, Amazigh, nacionalismo

Abstract

The present research aims to analyse the phenomenon of unaccompanied minors arriving from Morocco to the European Union from 2010 to 2021. This recent migratory phenomenon supposes an emerging challenge for governments, international organisations, and societies, in order to guarantee the protection of children according the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989). The research focuses on the children «on the move», travelling alone from Morocco and arriving in Spain through the Strait of Gibraltar. The so-called Western Mediterranean Migratory Route has become one of the gateways to Europe. Spain hosts nowadays a big community of Moroccan unaccompanied minors and Catalonia has become the second Spanish Autonomous Community with a major number of unaccompanied minors, only surpassed by the enclave of Melilla located on the very border of Morocco. The present research gives special attention to the study of the Amazigh Nationalism question, as something to look at among the reasons why Moroccan unaccompanied minors migrate to Europe, choosing, particularly, Catalonia as a model to pursuit an Amazigh nation.

Keywords: migration, unaccompanied minors, Morocco, Amazigh, nationalism

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

It was a sunny day in June 2019 in Barcelona. It was around midday when we finished moving Claudio's furniture to his new rental apartment located in the heart of Barcelona, close by the Arc de Triomf. After the removal of the furniture, we took a break, standing by a large window overlooking the backyard. That is when I saw one of the most impactful images I have ever seen in my hometown. A young boy, probably, 15 or 16-years-old, sleeping in an old mattress, in a corner, surrounded by trash. Coincidentally, Blanca, one of Claudio's friends, was a lawyer specialized in migration, and she pointed out: *'This is a MENA'.* To my surprise, most of Claudio's friends were familiar with the concept. I was not. At this precise moment, my research began.

MENA (Menor Extranjero no Acompañado) was the first Spanish abbreviation to define an Unaccompanied Minor arriving in Spain. The European Commission Department of Migration and Home Affairs stated the term of Unaccompanied Minor in 2011 through the Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 as '*a person under 18 years old who arrives on the territory of an EU Member unaccompanied by the adult responsible for them by law or by the practice of the EU Member State concerned, and for as long as they are not effectively taken into the care of such a person'.* Since 2019, the term MENA has been substituted by NNAMNA (niños, niñas y adolescentes migrantes no acompañados) but it has remained as a pejorative way to target the group in Spain (Figure 1.1).[1]

Since ancient times, children's migrations have existed around the world. Following family migratory projects, in the vast majority of cases, looking for better living conditions, running away from armed conflicts, famine, environmental disasters or searching for family reunification. However, as defined by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the Report on Migration in the World 2020, a new *'contemporary phenomenon'* has recently been observed of migration of unaccompanied minors following unsafe migratory projects alone. Whereas in the 1990s, the migration of unaccompanied minors appeared as isolated cases in the European Union, from 2010 and, particularly from 2015 onwards, the new migrant phenomenon has achieved major numbers. This new migrant phenomenon of unaccompanied minors supposes an emerging challenge for governments, international organisations, and society, in general, to ensure children's protection following the UN Convention on

[1] Figure 1.1. Shows the xenophobic political campaign launched in April 2021 by VOX (Spanish extreme right party) for the election of the presidency of the Council of Madrid. In the slogan *'Un MENA 4.700 Euros al mes, tu abuela 426 Euros de pensión al mes'* the political group manipulated data to convey the message of public waste when hosting unaccompanied minors instead of investing it in the retirement pensions of the Spanish population. Besides, the image of a young hooded and masked pursues the criminalisation of the target group.

the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989). Whether the migratory projects of unaccompanied minors are due to *'forced'* or *'voluntary'* reasons is difficult to ascertain. Usually, it is due to a combination of both factors. For instance, some minors migrate alone following a family decision, whereas others migrate following their aspirations for better opportunities with or without family support or knowledge. If they succeed in achieving these aspirations at their arrival or not is another question in need of further research. In any case, to protect all migrant under 18 years of age, highlighting their condition as children before their status of migrants, the international community has adopted the holistic definition of *'children on the move'* (IOM, Report on Migration in the World 2020, p. 233). Under this umbrella, the international community, particularly international NGOs such as IOM, UNICEF, Save the Children, and other Inter-Agency Organisations, want to protect and support children affected by migration, regardless of the reasons why they migrate, in a regular or irregular situation, alone or with their caregivers. According to UNICEF, there were 33 million children on the move in the world in 2019. IOM registered 37.9 million child migrants under the age of 20 in the world in 2019 (IOM, World Migration Report 2020, p. 232).

The present research focuses on the *children on the move* coming alone from Morocco and arriving illegally in Spain through the Strait of Gibraltar (Lahlou, M., 2018), and recently also through the Canary Island (Rodriguez, T., November 27, 2020, Radio Televisión Española). From 2018 onwards, the so-called Western Mediterranean Migration Route (Figure 1.2) has become one of the most frequently used migratory routes for North African unaccompanied minors (Fargues, F., 2020, IOM Chapter 4; p. 41-52). Although migratory routes fluctuate rapidly, the proximity of Morocco and Spain, by sea or land, makes Morocco rank as one of the first countries of departure for migration from North Africa to Europe. On the other side, Spain is one of the most important gateways to Europe (Lahlou, M., 2018). The huge number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors arriving in Spain has produced domestic tensions between migratory policies and child protection imperatives (including providing education and training, legal representation and guardianship, healthcare and psychosocial support, leisure and integration, housing, and legal status determination). As a result, the migration of unaccompanied minors is a constant issue of discussion in the Spanish Parliament, courts of Justice, the press, and society in general. This tension resulted in the polarisation of Spaniards. For instance, after VOX launched the pejorative campaign of MENA (Figure 1.1), the NGO Málaga Acoge located in the South of Spain, launched in May 2021 a collaborative campaign with the support of the municipality and private entities like Fundació LaCaixa or El Corte Inglés, to destigmatize the image of the collective through messages like '*78% of MENA like pizza with extra cheese. Same tastes, same rights'* (Figure 1.3.).

Since the first registries of unaccompanied minors in Spain, dating from 1993 (Quiroga, V., 2009: p. 1), it is difficult to quantify the number of unaccompanied minors that have arrived. First of all, due to the lack of coordination between Spanish authorities, but particularly due to the inexistence of statistical calculations (Bravo, A., & Santos-González, I., 2017, p. 3). The difficulty to quantify the group is greatly increased because of the illegality in which they enter, endure while in the country, or

when they, at some point, decide to continue on to other European countries (Bravo, A., & Santos-González, I., 2017, Del-Sol- Flórez, H., 2012, García, BF, 2010, Quiroga, V., 2009). The lack of reliable data collection and statistics on *children on the move* is a pending issue for Spain but also for all EU members. For instance, in December 2020, French public authorities and NGOs estimated that there were between 16,000 and 40,000 unaccompanied minors in France (Today24News, December 2020).

Because of this recent migratory phenomenon and lack of standarised protocols of reliable data collection, authorities from all the EU countries started to cooperate more closely, implementing a European agenda on the protection of children in migration. As a result, on the 12th of April 2017, the European Commission adopted a Communication on the protection of children in migration (COM/2017/0211 final) stating Key Actions to be implemented in all EU countries. It included recommendations for EU members about the reception, protection, data collection, return and family reunification, and integration of children in migration. However, there are no records that allow us to know if these Key Actions have been properly implemented in all EU countries. Furthermore, despite the fact that statistical data on children in migration has been published for the first time in 2019 by the Eurostat, its rigor and transparency it is still questionable.

According to explanatory texts on the Eurostat database, data published comes from official countries statistics (authorities, interior ministries, or related immigration agencies of the EU Member States), following the legal basis of data collection Council Regulation 862/2007. For instance, in Spain, the compiling agency of metadata is the General Commissariat for Aliens and Borders. National Police. Ministry of Interior (Comisaría General de Extranjería y Fronteras. Policia Nacional. Ministerio del Interior). In other countries such as Portugal, the compiling agency is the Immigration and Borders Service (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras). Interestingly, not all EU members are reporting data on children in migration in the eight available statistical data of Eurostat: (1) third-country nationals refused at the border; (2) third-country nationals found to be illegally present; (3) third-nationals who are subject to an obligation to leave; (4) third-country nationals effectively returned by type of return and citizenship; (5) third-country nationals effectively returned to a third-country by type of return and citizenship; (6) third-country nationals effectively returned by type of assistance received and citizenship; (7) third-country nationals returned to a third-country by type of agreement procedure and citizenship; and (8) third-country nationals returned to a third-country by the destination country and citizenship. As an example, whereas the Portuguese compiling agency is reporting data on all these eight statistical source data, the Spanish Ministry of Interior is not reporting data on Third-country nationals returned (6), (7), and (8). The lack of transparency of some EU compiling agencies makes *'invisible'* the vulnerability of the unaccompanied minors in front of the much-feared express deportations, the so-called *'devoluciones en caliente'* in Spanish, with no guarantees of family reunification and security at the home country.

On the other side of the Mediterranean, irregular migration has also been recognized as a particular problem for African countries. King Mohamed VI of Morocco gave a speech at the 29th session of the African Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in July 2017 stating:

'Africa is losing its youths to legal and illegal migration. There is no way such a loss can be justified. Should our young people's fate be at the bottom of the Mediterranean? Should their mobility become a hemorrhage? Certainly not! I think it is up to us to deal with this issue properly to make it an asset. Thousands of young Africans try clandestinely to reach the northern shore of the Mediterranean in search of a better life, with all the risks involved. They are precious men and women and are part of our continent's human resources'. [2]

However, facts do not match King Mohammed VI's words. In 2018, 7.026 unaccompanied minors arrived in Spain. Comparing to the 2.345 unaccompanied minors who arrived in 2017, the number increased 66,6%. And these data reported by the Spanish Ministry of Interior in 2020 (Memoria del Fiscal General del Estado Español Cap. III- 4 .4.7. Menores extranjeros no acomapañados, 220, p. 881-888), only referred to those unaccompanied minors who arrived through small boats, commonly referred to as *'pateras'*. There are no registries of those who crossed the border through Ceuta, Melilla, or by ferry hidden in trucks. In 2019, the number of unaccompanied minors decreased -59,10%, with 2.873 unaccompanied minors. Although there are no official data published in 2020, the COVID-19 crisis has probably reduced the number of arrivals of unaccompanied minors in Spain. Nonetheless, looking at a general picture and according to the available data from the Spanish authorities, from 2015 to 2019, the majority of unaccompanied minors arriving in Spain through the Western Mediterranean Migration Route were from Morocco (60%), followed by Algerians (12,28%), Guineans (9,60%), Ivorians (6,33%) and Malians (5,56%). The recent migratory crisis that occurred in Ceuta on 17th May 2021, with the massive border crossing of 9.000 people, among at least 1.2000 unaccompanied minors (European Parliament Resolution 2021/2747(RSP)), has called into question the migratory policies of the Moroccan State, the dependency and bad praxis of the Spanish border controls and the EU simply look the other way (La Marea, 2021). But what are the reasons why Moroccan children are the more susceptible to migrate alone to Spain?

From a geographical point of view, Morocco is the nearest African country to Europe. Morocco is on the border of two Spanish enclaves in North Africa, Ceuta and Melilla, and only located 14 kilometers from the Iberian Peninsula through the Mediterranean Sea.

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[2] See full text of King Mohammed VI Speech at the 29th AU Heads of State and Government Summit, Addis Ababa, 3 July 2017: http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-speeches/full-text-hm-kings-speech-29th-au-heads-state-and-government-summit

Despite the border's proximity, Morocco has not any known internal political conflicts or economic crisis that explains the phenomenon of unaccompanied minors. Notwithstanding, the economic and religious reforms oriented towards neoliberal policies imposed by King Hassan II (1961 to 1999) and his son King Mohammed VI (1999 - present), have given rise to controversial policies of political control, repression of the population and corruption. Even after the riots of the Arab Spring in Morocco on the 20th of February 2011 and subsequent reforms of the Moroccan Constitution towards a '*democratisation'* and *'liberalisation'* of the political system, expectations of freedom of choice, transparency and accountability inside the Government have not been seen materialized in the daily life of the Moroccan population (Madani, M., Maghraoui, D., & Zerhouni, S., 2012). Its economic development ranks the 5th Strongest Economy in Africa and the 59th Worldwide (World Bank, 2020). Notwithstanding, the country has not improved the quality of life of all its approximately 37 million inhabitants (according to data from the United Nations on July 2021). Morocco's UN Human Development Index (HDI) for 2019 is 0.686 on a scale of 1.0, which puts the country in the medium human development category. Its position is at 121 out of 189 countries and territories. Although Morocco's HDI value has increased from 0.457 to 0.686 between 1990 and 2019 in terms of life expectancy (+11.9 years), education (+3,4 years in men and +7,2 years in women), and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (+98,6%), Morocco's HDI is still behind the values for neighboring countries such as Tunisia or Libya (average of 0.705). Also, statistics based on the World Values Survey (2010-2014) about life satisfaction, considering determinants of health status, income and employment, education level, and freedom of choice, described Moroccans as moderately satisfied with their life (Kasmaoui, K., 2020).

Researching more factors to explain why Moroccan unaccompanied minors were arriving in Spain, at the beginning of the year 2020, I began a search for events on the social media Facebook on the topic of unaccompanied minors. Luckily, before the unprecedented COVID-19 lock-down, I found an event on Facebook organized by Anaruz N Afrika Association in collaboration with Casa Amaziga de Catalunya and the Sabadell Council (a peripherical city of Barcelona). The event took place on 6th February 2020 at the social center Casa Pere Quart (Figure 1.4.). During the event, the documental *'Amazigh: a forced diaspora'* (Casa Amaziga de Catalunya, 2020) was projected, with an aftermath discussion about the marginalization of the Amazigh in Morocco as a reason for young Moroccans to migrate to Europe. The Catalan question was also put in place as a political reference for the Amazigh community. Furthermore, a group of approximately ten unaccompanied minors attended the event, proudly showing several Amazigh flags. The event was closed with an Amazigh band playing traditional music and the group of unaccompanied minors dancing proudly with their flags. As I decided to attend the event without any previous research about the organisers to avoid pre-conception ideas, my surprise about what I saw was enormous. Firstly, because I was not aware of the Amazigh question. Secondly, because the manifestation of an Amazigh nationalism moved me to my mixed Catalan and Spanish identity. And because of this, I decided to focus the present research on the Amazigh question and the

growing Amazigh nationalism as a possible driver for Moroccan unaccompanied minors migrate to Europe.

The Amazigh, also known as *'Berbers'*, are the autochthonous inhabitants of North Africa, from Egypt to the Mediterranean Sea, since the earliest times of recorded history. The Amazigh population represents 40 % of the population in Morocco (Maddy-Weitzman, B., 2012, p. 109) although this number could be higher according to Amazigh associations, around 65 to 70% (IWGIA, 2020). Its territories are concentrated in the mountainous areas of the Rif, the Middle and High Atlas, and the Sous Valley (Figure 1.5.).

After the independence of Morocco in 1956, King Hasan II began a process of Arab nationalisation or systematic Arabisation of the entire territory as a form of achieving territorial and societal unity. It was the time of decolonisation from French and Spanish protectorates. The *'nation-building process' (Cahen, M., 2012; p. 3)* focused the Moroccan political discourse on emphasizing the Arab-Islamic past legitimization under the Alaouite Dynasty to rule the country by the divine and hereditary monarchy as direct descendants of Prophet Mohammed. Arab history accused Berber of *'uncivilized'* (Zakaria Rhani, Khalid Nabalssi & Mariam Benalioua, 2020), and its cultural identity was discredit as a mere colonial invention to fragment the Moroccan nation (Silverstein,P., & Crawford, D., 2004, p. 44; Maddy-Weitzman, B., 2012, p. 110). Despite the support of Amazigh during the decolonisation, the *'invented traditions'* (Hobsbawm, E. J., & Ranger, T. O., 1983) surrounding the modern Moroccan State after independence caused a deep stigmatization of Amazigh population. Today, Amazigh are still suffering from a continuous marginalisation in accessing work, education, goods, and services. Also, the constant divestment in their territories and expropriation of their lands and natural resources either by the State or by private companies of the so-called Arab elite are impoverishing their population (Silverstein, P., & Crawford, D. 2004; Tarik El idrissi, 2017; Bouhmouch, N., 2019; Casa Amaziga de Catalunya, 2020). This situation created a strong rural exodus towards the cities, depopulating rural areas. Consequently, a new housing phenomenon appeared in the late 1960s, the so-called *'urban slums'* or *'shanty towns'* on the outskirts of the country's large cities such as Casablanca, Fez or Marrakech (Bogaert, K., 2011). Also, it forced the Amazigh diaspora worldwide (van Heelsum, A., 2003), particularly after the Rif Revolt 1958-1959 and the repression that the Amazigh population suffered by a young Moroccan army led by prince Hassan II (Tarik El idrissi, 2017). It was the beginning of the *'Years of Lead'* of King Hassan II with the support of the '*Mahkzen'*, supporters of the Alauite Dynasty. From 1961 to 1999, a new state based on politics of oppression and violence was created to silence Moroccans opponents to the Regime, including Amazigh movements. Imprisonments, tortures or forced exiles became daily currency. The Arab-Islamic nationalism shielded by its *'invented traditions'* (Hobsbawm, E. J., & Ranger, T. O., 1983) were used to punish any kind of social demonstration under accusations of unpatriotic and separatism against the ruling Constitutional Monarchy (Rhani, Z., Nabalssi, K., & Benalioua, M., 2020). The consciousness of an Amazigh identity, also referred to as *'Amaziguity'*, was born from this context of oppression with the main objective to protect their autochthonous identity and

accommodate it into the Arab Moroccan State (Lauermann, J., 2009; Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2012; Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2015; Rhani, Z., Nabalssi, K., & Benalioua, M., 2020).

During the process of reconciliation and political transition led by King Mohammed VI after his coronation in 1999, Amazigh movements took the opportunity to demand the recognition of their language and cultural identity in the Moroccan Constitution. This was tried with the publication of a Berber Manifesto in 2000. Despite a certain openness shown by the country in recognising the multiculturality of Morocco and achieve real democracy, there are recent events that contradict this display. The 20 February Movement in 2011 (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2015), the Hirak Rif Movement in 2016 (Rhani, Z., Nabalssi, K., & Benalioua, M., 2020) and the recent imprisonments of Amazigh activists (Aljazeera News, 2019) and journalists (Reporters Without Borders, 2021) are some examples of recent social uprisings and violation of human rights in Morocco.

In the pursuit of an Amazigh nation, as an *'imagined community'* (Anderson, B. 1983), the Catalan process for independence appears as a reference point (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2015; p. 2509-2510). Interestingly, Catalonia is one of the Spanish Autonomous Communities with a bigger Moroccan community. According to the Spanish Statistical Institut (Instituto Nacional de Estadística - IINE) and the Catalan Statistical Institut (Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya - IDESCAT), in 2020 there were 865.945 Moroccans living in Spain, 238.003 of which living in Catalonia. It supposes the 27,48% of the Moroccan community living in Spain. To these numbers, it has to be added those Moroccans already with Spanish nationalisation and its descendants. Besides, as statistics are not disaggregated by ethnicity, it is impossible to know the number of Amazigh population. This has been an important setback in the present dissertation. Notwithstanding, the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya states that there are approximately 125.000 Amazigh speakers in Catalonia, turning the Tamazight (the Amazigh language) the third most spoken language in Catalonia (behind the two co-official languages, Catalan and Spanish). Furthermore, according to data extracted from the Department of Labour, Social Affairs and Families from the Catalan Government, most of the unaccompanied children hosted between 2015 and 2021 by the Child and Adolescent Catalan Protection System (DGAIA) are Moroccan citizens, with a total amount of 9.496 children. It represents a total percentage of 52% of the total amount of unaccompanied minors who arrived in Catalonia. Also, according to the Spanish Children's Observatory, Catalonia was the second Spanish Autonomous Community that hosted more unaccompanied minors in residential shelters in 2019, only surpassed by Melilla located at the border of Morocco.

Data analysed in the present research reflect how Catalonia is a host land for the Moroccan and Amazigh communities. It also highlights the transparency inside the Catalan government in presenting data on unaccompanied minors, particularly if compared with the misinformation surrounding the target group by the Spanish counterparties and EU members in general. However, the way the Catalan government acts do not seem to be disinterested. On the contrary, its support to Amazigh as a minority group appears as an incentive driver of the Catalan aspirations of self-determination. As stated by Maddy-Weitzam (22015; p. 2510), the Catalan government provides funding for Amazigh activities

internationally. A recent example was the organization of the 2019 First Riffian Congress in Catalonia, with the participation of the CUP (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular) and ERC (Esquerre Republicana de Catalunya), Catalan pro-independence parties. Besides, the Catalan Department of Education also provides funding to promote the normalization of Amazigh language and culture throughout Catalonia. Both minority groups, Amazigh and Catalans, appeared to be connected despite their different identity processes. Would it be then possible to co-relate the phenomenon of Moroccan unaccompanied minors arriving in the European Union with the pursuit of an Amazigh nation? Can this factor be a reason for unaccompanied minors settle down in Catalonia?

My hypothesis is that the systematic marginalisation of the Amazigh population by the Moroccan Arab nation-state since its independency in 1956, leads to an increase in the number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors arriving today in the European Union. It also leads to an increase in the Amazigh nationalism sentiment among the new generations of Amazigh youth. In so doing, unaccompanied minors settle down in Catalonia, perceived as a model for the pursuit of self-determination.

The present research aims to address these questions and hypothesis within the field of international studies focusing on nationalism through a mix-method methodology. The methodological approach adopted mainly relies on three sources:

(1) Literature review on Moroccan history, the Amazigh question, the migration of unaccompanied minors, and theoretical concepts on nationalism. The literature review has been enriched by the interpretation and analysis of three documentary films[3] with real memories and experiences to get a perspective of Moroccan history from the Amazigh point of view. The documentaries analysed were filmed by Moroccan directors, decentralizing the hegemony of the European gaze when producing ethnographic documentaries and scientific publications after colonialism. It also reflects another way of telling the Moroccan nation-building state narrative after independence.

(2) Quantitative data analysis on Moroccan population, economy, human development index and children in migration using open data available at United Nations, World Bank, Eurostat, Spanish and Catalan public authorities;

(3) Qualitative analysis through a small incursion on ethnographic methods approach focused on the research of events on unaccompanied minors on social media Facebook, participatory observation of an event on the topic and interview conducted to Mr. Abdellah Ihmadi member of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya and Anaruz N Afrika Association.

[3] Tarik El idrissi (2017). Rif 58-59 Break the silence; Bouhmouch, N. (2019). Amassu: Amazigh Land and Water Rights; Casa Amaziga de Catalunya (2020). Amazic: Una diaspora forçada.

In choosing a mix-method methodology, I wanted to develop my research skills on quantitative and qualitative approaches. I knew that I have a better knowledge of data analysis (because of my previous studies and because I enjoy analysing data), a passion for social anthropology (particularly observation and interpretation) but a lack of experience and a sense of political and social conceptualising and theory building. In the constraints of the present research, the COVID-19 restrictions also hindered further ethnography fieldwork. Notwithstanding, given the several lock-downs that took place between 2020 and 2021, I feel grateful to have been able to undertake an interview with a member of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya, also working as social assistance in a shelter of unaccompanied minors in Sabadell. The choice made to interview a member of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya was to complete the previous fieldwork during my participatory observation of the event on unaccompanied minors that took place before the first COVID-19 lock-down in March 2020. Besides, Casa Amaziga de Catalunya is an entity with the aim to link the Amazigh and Catalan peoples at a linguistic, cultural, and identity level. Created in 2002 with the support of the Catalan Parliament after the Resolution 1197/VI of the Catalan Government, on 6th March 2002, Casa Amaziga de Catalunya is the perfect example of how both minority groups, the Amazigh and the Catalan peoples, join forces in the foundations of *'imagined communities'* (Anderson, B. 1983). The interview was a key element in the research and writing process of the thesis. Conducted in Catalan and translated into English, the full interview is available at Annex B of the present research. I strongly recommend reading it throughout for further in-depth verbal exploration of the research question. I wanted to note that despite unaccompanied minors are the target group of the present research, I did not want to focus on personal information neither personal histories, but rather on the reasons why they undertake such a risky trip alone. In doing so, I wanted to preserve the ethics principles of the present research on *children on the move.*

The research structure is in four main chapters. The first chapter provides a vision of the political and social framework of the dissertation. The second chapter is divided into seven subchapters. It reviews the literature about the origins of the Moroccan state; the construction of modern Morocco after the European decolonisation; the Years of Lead under King Hassan II from 1961 to 1999; the process of liberalisation of the country after the coronation of King Mohammed VI in 1999; the 20 February Movement during the Arab Spring in 2011; the migratory phenomenon of unaccompanied minors after the 20 February Movement; and the analyses of the Amazigh question and its demands taking as a reference text the Berber Manifesto published in 2000. The third chapter is divided into two subchapters. The first one analyses data extracted from Eurostat on unaccompanied minors from North Africa in general. A closer look is done with the data analyses from unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the European Union with Moroccan citizenship between 2010 and 2020. The reason to choose this data source and not others such as, for instance, data on asylum or residence permits statistics on children in migration was to focus on those unaccompanied minors who arrived in the clandestinity and are found for the first time in EU countries. Thus, avoiding express deportations or asylum/residence permits denegation. Besides, statistical data provided by the Department of Labour,

Social Affairs, and Families from the Catalan Government on new arrivals of unaccompanied minors in Catalonia is analysed to get an insight into the target group in this region. Data extracted from the Catalan Government is compared with data reported by the Spanish Ministry of Interior and the Spanish Ministry of Social Affairs and Agenda 2030. The results of data analyse are useful to identify patterns in the profile of Moroccan unaccompanied minors in terms of number, age, and gender compared to North African neighboring countries. It is also useful to denounce the lack of rigor and transparency in reporting statistical data on children in migration. Moreover, the second subchapter analysis the interview with Mr. Abdellah Ihmadi, a member of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya, Anaruz N Afrika Association, and a social worker in a residential shelter of unaccompanied minors. The narrative that emerged from the interview provides a vision at the forefront of the issue. His testimony was crucial for writing the fourth chapter, the conclusions of the present dissertation, with key statements to answer the research questions. Theory building about nationalism will be interspersed throughout the chapters and subchapters to frame facts and events of Moroccan *'invented traditions'* (Hobsbawm, E. J., & Ranger, T. O., 1983) and the Amazigh *'imagined community'* (Anderson, B. 1983) in their respective nation-building processes.

It is my hope that the present research helps in the process of identity building of minority groups such as the Amazigh and gives visibility to all those Moroccan unaccompanied minors that migrate to Europe surrounded by a climate of insecurity and vulnerability.

CHAPTER 2

The Moroccan state, the migration of unaccompanied minors, and the Amazigh question

1.1. The origin of the Moroccan State

To explain the modern Moroccan state, we have to go back to its origins, the Amazigh. The Amazigh or Imazighen (plural of Amazigh) are the autochthonous inhabitants of the region of Al-Maghrib. They were organised in tribes, some nomad tribes, as Tuaregs or Bedouins, to mention some of the best-known Imazighen tribes. However, for Western cultures, Imazighen are better-known contemptuously as *Berbers*. The etymology of the word *Berber* comes from the term *'Barbarus'* or '*Barbarians'*, used by the Greek and the Roman Empires to name all those *'uncivilized'* tribal groups from North Africa (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce 2012; p. 113). Greeks were the first colonizers of North African territories, followed by the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Byzantines, Arab-Muslims and Europeans (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2006; El Aissati, Abderrahman, 2005; Lauermann, J., 2009; Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2012).

Berber dynasties faith in Islam led them to expanded Islamic religion in North Africa and Andalusia during the eleventh and twelfth centuries (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2006). With the arrival of the Alaouite dynasty in 1631 (El Aissati, Abderrahman, 2005), the Arabic language was rooted throughout Amazigh territories. However, Imazighen kept their several oral languages (recently uniformized as Tamazight), their culture, and traditions (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2012).

Under the Treaty of Fez in 1912, Morocco became a French and Spanish protectorate. Although the colonisation of Morocco was not well-seen in the eyes of Arab Moroccans, part of Imazighen Moroccans were closer to European political values. French and Spaniards from its sides saw in *Berbers* an opportunity to take control of the Arab administrations, dividing the more rural Amazigh inhabitants from the urban Arab-speaking population. Europeans also saw the possibility to evangelise part of Moroccan society throughout the Amazigh in their *'civilising mission'* (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2006; p. 72). However, what French and Spaniards missed when trying to divide the Moroccan society was that Berber's real aspirations were to become, as the etymological meaning of Imazighen means, '*free-men'* again.

The first Amazigh uprising took place in the Rif Mountains between 1921 and 1926. Abd el-Krim was the leader of the uprising against the Spanish protectorate in the pursuit of the Republic of the Rif with the main objective of unifying all Amazigh tribes from Morocco to Algeria in a unique Amazigh state. Although the uprising was in the end suppressed by French and Spanish troops, the Rif represented a big defeat for European colonisers and the birth of the Amazigh nationalistic sentiment. It was also the beginning of a generalised Arab-Amazigh disaffection to the French and Spanish protectorates. In 1930, the French decision to issue a *'Dahir'* (a royal decree) to place Amazigh outside the jurisdiction

of the Islamic law, joined Amazigh and Arab Moroccans to expel Europeans from its territories (Maddy-Weitzam, 2012; p.114). In 1943 a group of Moroccan intellectuals from the urban Arab elite founded the Istiqlal Party, the first pro-independence Moroccan party with Arab nationalist ideals imported from Egypt and Lebanon (Maddy-Weitzam, 2012; p.110-111). The Istiqlal party, together with national leaders from the urban and rural areas, drafted the Manifesto of Independence of Morocco in 1944. It called for the independence of Morocco and the installment of a democratic constitutional government under King Mohammed V. In 1953, the French decision to depose King Mohammed V due to his opposition to the colonial administration and replacement with his cousin Mohammed Ben Aarafa, provoked a general uprising against European colonisers. As a result, in 1955 the French administration allowed King Mohammed V to return to Morocco from his exile in Madagascar and led Moroccan independence in 1956. From this moment onwards, in the memories of all Moroccans, the Alaouite Monarchy became a national symbol against European colonisers and the political leader for independence.

Morocco became an independent state where Islam was proclaimed the official religion and Arab the official and national language within its territory. Despite the Amazigh support in the decolonisation, the Istiqlal Party set aside the Amazigh in the nation-building process. In the end, Arabs remained suspicious of the real intentions of the Berbers for two main reasons. Firstly, they considered the Amazigh identity as a mere French invention to divide Morocco (Silverstein, P. & Crawford, D., 2004; p. 44; Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2012, p.116). Secondly, the Arabic language was one fundamental pillar of the Istiqlal political program and all neighboring North African countries, from Egypt to Morocco, for building unity in the new-born Arab-Islamic States (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2012; p. 110). In so doing, the Arabization of the country became a national priority (Maddy-Wetizman, 2012; p. 111). Morocco had to become Arab after independence to guarantee unity against European colonisers. The education system and public administrations began to speak Arab to try to replace French. Arab, the language of Islamic faith, became the symbol of the new nation-state and Tamazight the language of the *'Others'*. Curiously, standard Arab, also referred to as '*Fosha'* by Moroccans, is a dead language, such as Latin. Before the process of independence, it was used only for religious purposes. Moroccans speak dialectical Arabic, referred to as Darija. Darija has born as the confluences of languages passing by Amazigh territories over time, including the Tamazight, Roman, and Arabic languages (see Annex B. Interview with Casa Amaziga de Catalunya). The imposition of the language of Islam as a national language was an '*invented tradition'* (Hobsbawm, E. J., & Ranger, T. O., 1983) product of modern Arab nationalism.

On the other hand, the born of the new Moroccan state struggled to achieve gender equality. The adoption of the Family Code in 1957, the so-called Sharia law, a year after the Moroccan independence was part of the Istiqlal party's political strategies to weaken the role of women in still powerful Moroccan Amazigh tribal areas and strengthen the patriarchal position of men in the new Moroccan State (Maddy-Weitzman, B., 2005, p. 399). Pre-Islamic deserts inhabited by Amazigh tribes were

societies in which females hold primary power positions, leadership, moral authority, and social respect. Maddy-Weitzman, B. (2005, p. 400) cites the words of Mounira M. Charrad in her publication *'State and Gender in the Maghrib'* (1990, p. 19-24), describing how *'The new Moroccan State ratified the societal status quo for the purpose of advancing national goals'.* From this moment onwards, women were prohibited from their independent legal status, unable to study, work or travel without a men's permission. Besides, the Family Code permitted husbands unilateral repudiation of wives, and sexual harassment, to mention some of the most discriminatory laws for women after the approval of the Family Code.

Based on anti-colonial nationalism, Morocco nation-building process followed an ethnolinguistic patriarchal nationalism program in which *'smaller groups asserted their right to separate from large empires and create their states due to its ethnic and or linguistic ties'* (Smith, A. D., Hutchinson, J., & Smith, A. D. (Eds.)., 1994; p. 121). But also, this type of nationalism based on the threat of foreigners and made by nationalists from a dominant elite group on a *'top-down'* basis instead of being constructed *'from below'*, led to the creation of an ethnic and linguistic homogenous state with the consequent exclusion of Amazigh as a minority group (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2006; 73, El idrissi, T., 2017). Islam faith and the figure of the King were the only glue between Arab and Amazigh in the nation-building process.

In the end, Moroccan independence was a victory from Moroccan society against European colonisers. However, part of the Arab society mainly represented by women and the Amazigh population did not fit the new nation-state. The former lost women's positioning in society. The latter saw in the Arab state a re-colonization of their territories and the loss of a more flexible administration under French and Spanish protectorates. The marginalization of rural Amazigh areas ended in one of the darkest periods from modern Morocco, the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt.

1.2. Modern Moroccan State

Two years after the independence of Morocco, the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt surprised both the national and international community for the unproportioned Moroccan military response. The aerial bombardment of the Rif Mountains, where a big Amazigh community were hidden, left thousands of deaths. Besides, the Moroccan army destroyed Amazigh villages, leaving behind rapes, imprisonments, tortures, and the disappearance of civilians. (Maestre Alfonso, J. 2013; 130; El idrissi, T., 2017; Zakaria Rhani, Khalid Nabalssi & Mariam Benalioua, 2020). The repression continued after the defeat, forcing the Amazigh population to live under constant humiliations and fear. As a consequence, lots of Amazigh left behind their homes to live in urban areas inside Morocco or decided to migrate to Europe, North America, and Canada. It was the beginning of the Amazigh diaspora (van Heelsum, A., 2003; Ricci, C. H., 2010;

Maestre Alfonso, J. 2013; Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2016; El idrissi, T., 2017; Harris, J. A., 2019; Drhimeur, L. A., 2020).

Contrary to the first Amazigh uprising that took place in the Rif Mountains between 1921 and 1926 led by Abd el-Krim, the Amazigh population of the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt did not pursue the self-determination of its people. The uprising pursued demands to achieve social justice and the modernisation of Amazigh territories. They were unarmed groups of people led by Mohammed Sellam Amezian, an intellectual teacher from Fez University. He inspired people to start civil disobedience demonstrations as a way to claim for their human rights. It is in the Autumn of 1958 when Amazigh reached the Rif mountains as a protest to the Istiqlal party's way of ruling and its discriminatory treatment of to Amazigh population. The documentary 'Rif 58-59 Break the silence' (El idrissi, T., 2017) interviews several testimonies that lived the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt first hand [4]. The following testimonies are from three Amazigh inhabitants that were hidden in the Rif Mountains at the time:

'We took the mountains to demand our rights. We had tough times, we suffered from torture. We were oppressed in every sense.' Abdelaziz Ould Alhaj

'We were told that a coup was being planned against the King, so people took to the mountains chanting "Long Live the King". We were opposed to this coup.' Mohammadi Mahdia.

'*The whole tribe took to the mountain mobilizing against dethroning the King. (…). There were no arms whatsoever. Absolutely not. The arms appeared only later in the hands of the army'*. Lyachi El Fellah.

The importance of the memories related in the documentary *'Rif 58-59 Break the silence'* and other voices that are beginning to speak out, cannot be ignored without understanding the silenced violence that suffered the Riffians during this period. As denounced by Rhani, Z., Nabalssi, K., & Benalioua, M., (2020; p. 12), behind the *'cruel punishment'* inflicted on Amazigh from the Rif Mountains in 1958 and 1959, there was an aftermath structural silenced violence perpetrated by the Moroccan state, but also by the international community. The study highlights how researchers of the standing of Ernest Gellner (1981) preferred not to relate the violence infringed by the Moroccan state to Amazigh to avoid fieldwork restrictions and or prohibition. Maestre Alfonso, J. (2013; p. 134) also refers to rumors about *'the flights of death to rush into the Mediterranean those who participated in the revolt'* to describe that *'more than an imaginary riot, it was a forgotten, ignored or unknown revolt'*.

[4] The documentary 'Rif 58-59 Break the silence' is a documentary of Tarik El idrissi. Filmed in 2017 in Morocco, the documentary tells the non-written story of the Rif revolution on 1958-1959 based on historical scenes and testimonies. The film won ARACNE Prize at the Tanger film festival, the Jury Prize in the International film festival of Nador, the "Palme d'argent" at the International film festival of Gabes in Tunisia, and an Award for Best Direction at the International film festival of Saidia.

Moreover, from civilians to journalists and historians that appear in the documentary, and the researchers above mentioned, there is consensus that the Amazigh of the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt were not fighting for independence but for their citizen rights from an oppressive Arab administration and the marginalisation of their territories.

Interestingly, the military operation to suffocate the Rif Revolt was the first one operated by a young Royal army led by Prince Hassan II, the future King of Morocco. The testimonials of the documentary open the door to re-think the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt under Prince Hassan II's political aspirations and ambitions. Focused on building a solid monarchical nation-state after independence, Prince Hassan II was obsessed to control all Moroccan administrations, through his allies to the Monarchy: royal nobles, military personnel, landowners, and civil servants of the crown. The so-called '*Makhzen*', an old Moroccan term to refer the dominant Arab elite who controlled the administrative and political institutions. Maestre Alfonso, J. (2013; p. 131) defines the *'Makhzen'* as '*a mixture of a political institution, that is, of power, and a monarchical "court", socially being at the apex of the pyramid of the traditional structure and close to the political and religious authority of the King'*. Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce (2006; p. 73) also refers to the '*Makhzen'* as the *'state authorities' primary obstacle for the Amazigh Culture Movement during the initial post-independence decades'*. Prince Hassan II saw in the Rif Revolt a double opportunity. Firstly, the opportunity to discredit the Istiqlal Party for its bad public administration and take full control of Moroccan institutions. And secondly, it was the moment to mark footprint in the Moroccan society and spread his future authoritarian way of ruling through repression and fear (El idrissi, T., 2017).

With the military operation against the Rif Revolt, prince Hassan II set up an example to all those opponents and possible threats against the centralization of the Monarchy regime. It was the beginning of the so-called *'Years of Lead'* that lasted from the Independence in 1956 to the death of King Hassan II in 1999 (Maestre Alfonso, J. 2013; 130; El idrissi, T., 2017; Zakaria Rhani, Khalid Nabalssi & Mariam Benalioua, 2020; p. 9).

1.3. The Years of Lead

In 1961, Hassan II became King of Morocco upon the death of his father King Mohammed V. A year later, the first Moroccan Constitution claimed by its population after Moroccan independence was approved in 1962 by referendum. Although the 1962 Moroccan Constitution was a manifesto to keep full powers in the hands of the Monarchy (Ketterer, J. P., 2001, 142; Campbell, P. J., 2003, p. 40), it was approved with an absolute majority with 84,2% of participation and 97% votes in favor (Nohlen, D, Krennerich, M & Thibaut, B, 1999, p. 632). Despite the complaints from the Istiqlal Party to the excessive monarchical powers in the Constitution draft and the boycott of the leftist National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) rejecting any kind of participation in a coercive political system (Daadaoui, M., 2010, p. 198), there was high participation in favor of the first Moroccan Constitution. For Moroccan

society, it was the first time they could vote at a national level. However, after the repression of the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt, it is hard to imagine Moroccans voting against the establishment of the 1962 Constitution, or in other words, voting against King Hassan II drafted Constitution.

From this moment onwards, Morocco was constituted as a Constitutional Monarchy, officially proclaiming the King as Head of the State, Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, and Commander of the Faithful as direct descendant of Prophet Mohammed. The King and his descendants had the power to dissolve Political Chambers, control the army, and imposing the Arab and Islam as the official language and religion of Morocco. As Benedict Anderson (1983) explains in his book '*Imagined Communities'*, this highly centralised nation-state in the hands of the King is the product of modern social construction of nationalism. Besides, the proclamation of the King as Commander of the Faith is, as stated by Hobsbawm, E. J., & Ranger, T. O. (1983), an *'invented tradition'* that legitimises the King to rule past and future Moroccan State by divine right. Hence, without opposition.

There was only one missing important official position where the King had, apparently, no power of control: The Court of Justice. Notwithstanding, King Hassan II did not take so long to manipulate the Court of Justice in his favor. It was in the first Moroccan Parliamentary elections in 1963. Parliamentary elections resulted in a victory for the recent pro-monarchy party, the Front for the Defence of Constitutional Institutions (FDIC). This new party was founded inside the *Mahkzen* to counteract the powerful Istiqlal Party. Despite this, the Istiqlal Party and the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) were particularly popular in urban areas and won exactly the same number of seats as the Front for the Defence of Constitutional Institutions (FDIC), impeding the Royal control of the Parliament. King Hassan II saw in peril full control of the state so he used his influence to imprison political opponents (Campbell, P. J., 2003, p. 41). In the end, the Parliamentary ungovernability was solved in the Court of Justice who annulled several seats won by the Front for the Defence of Constitutional Institutions (FDIC)'s opponent parties (Ketterer, J. P., 2001, p. 142). It was a clear message from King Hassan II to Moroccan society: justice was also under his control. The 1962 Constitution Referendum and 1963 Parliamentary Elections were only an illusion for Moroccan society to achieve democracy. King Hassan II political strategy was far from giving up power. It was just a strategy to keep full control of the country and, at the same time, appearing aligned to democratic principles of the Western International community. And this political strategy of the Monarchy has been carried out since the first national elections onwards. As Daadaoui, M. (2010, p. 210) defines *'Moroccan elections are institutionalized "rituals of power", which serve to legitimize the regime and dissimulate the state's democratic competitiveness'.*

The political strategies of the King to keep full power was the beginning of a general discontent against the Monarchy in urban areas of Morocco. The National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) party, led in exile by Mehdi Ben Barka, started a hard opposition to King Hassan II and its messages started to penetrate at university students' associations. Following a controversial educative reform to impede higher education of youngsters older than 18 years-old, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP)

was successful in mobilising a big part of society against this discriminatory law, that affected particularly middle-classes and impoverished population. During the 22nd and 23rd of March 1965, students, parents, and teachers were mobilised in Casablanca, Rabat, and other cities to protest against this educative reform. Also, for the first time, they were protesting against the ruling monarchy. King Hassan II response was again unproportioned. The National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) and international press accounted for a thousand deaths in the streets. Death sentences were handed down to political leaders, including Mehdi Ben Barka, who was kidnapped and disappeared on 29th September 1965 in Paris. In the end, King Hassan II suspended parliament and proclaimed a state of emergency in the country which lasted five years, from 1965 to 1970 (Ketterer, J. P., 2001, 142; Campbell, P. J., 2003, p. 41; Daadaoui, M., 2010, p. 198-199).

Thus, during the first period of political independence, dating from 1961 to 1970, '*Morocco oscillated between authoritarian and the emergence of the 'new left''* (Daadaoui, M., 2010, p. 197), referring to the born of the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) and to the reconversion of the Istiqlal Party. Both parties shared more social-political agendas on improving education, social welfare, and fair distribution of wealth. Notwithstanding, political parties had little space to propose changes due to the dominant position of the King as spiritual leader of the country. In one of the interviews with a Moroccan politician held by Daadaoui, M. (2010, p. 207), the Monarchy's authority was described as *'accountable only to God'*. The status quo accepted by Moroccans anchored the country into unaccountable institutions. This fact has been, the facto, the main setback of the country since its independence to achieving democracy and modernisation of the Moroccan state.

After the 1971 and 1972 defeat coup attempts, Monarchy opponents were either in prison, disappeared, silenced, or exiled. King Hassan II achieved his goal to control the whole country under a system of coercion, fear, and control shielded on his religious legitimization. The opposition had little place in the political sphere of Morocco during the 'Years of Lead'. Not to mention the impossibility to introduce the Amazigh question into Parliament. As an example of the King's power as spiritual leader of Morocco, it is worth mentioning one of the political strategies of King Hassan II. On 6th November 1975, King Hassan II public religious discourse mobilised 350.000 Moroccan volunteers to occupy Western Sahara armed with copies of the Qur'an in the so-called *'Green March'* (Weiner, J.B., 1979, Daadaoui, M., 2010).

A few days after, on 20th November 1975, the Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco died, leaving behind the region before finalising their negotiations with the Sahrawi Polisario Front for the independence of Western Sahara. In the end, the region was occupied by the Moroccan authority and self-proclaimed a Moroccan territory. The Western Sahara conflict is nowadays still unresolved. It is one controversial political issue in the international community and in the regional stability with neighbouring countries, mainly with Algeria.

After the more repressive *'Years of Lead'*, dating from the 1960s to 1990s, King Hassan II began to slowly modernise the country until his death in 1999. However, its way of using political violence,

repression, poverty, illiteracy, and silence as a way to rule the country has left a deep mark in the past and present of Moroccan society (Maestre Alfonso, J., 2013; El idrissi, T., 2017; Daadaoui, M., 2010; Zakaria Rhani, Khalid Nabalssi & Mariam Benalioua, 2020). Amazigh were the first to experience the cruelty of King Hassan II, followed by any political opponents in and outside Morocco. As an example of this, in the documentary, 'Rif 58-59 Break the silence', an old Amazigh woman, after a long silence of the interviewers, asked:

'You weren't sent by The Makzhen (government), were you?' I was afraid to talk to you. I thought you were from the government.' Zuleikha Azerkane.

Suffering as a way to control society is an extended topic of research in anthropology. Social suffering resulted from political, economic, and institutional oppression of people. Forced uprooting, migration, imprisonment, or, in the worst case, deaths resulted from political violence cause deep trauma in families and communities at large. As a result of this trauma, silence appears as a hidden open wound in societies. Expressing suffering through the own language is a fundamental way of individual healing. But also, a tool of political and social reconciliation. Because as stated by Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Margaret Lock in the publication *'Social Suffering'* (1997, Introduction XIII), '*What is not pictured, is not real'*. Zuleikha and other Amazigh inhabitants' testimonies that have recently broken the silence against King Hassan II's ways of political violence are powerful weapons to transform suffering in an open process of social and political mediation and transformation. Notwithstanding, three main subjects are still impenetrable in Morocco's national public discourse: religion, the Monarchy, and territorial integrity including Western Sahara. Campbell, P. J. (2003, p. 39) describes *'God, King, and Country'* as the trinity of the Moroccan State.

1.4. Liberalisation of the Moroccan State

After King Hassan II's death in 1999, his son Mohammed VI ascended to the throne. After 38-years of political repression, a political change was expected by both national and international communities (Campbell, P. J., 2003). King Mohammed VI had a wide support among the population, including support from political opponents, to reign the country. However, political opponents demanded the establishment of a pro-democratic state, as well as breaking the silence concerning the crimes committed against human rights during his father's regime. King Mohammed VI faced one of the biggest dilemmas: conceding power and allow the rise of truly democratic state or remaining the holder of plenipotentiary powers, assuring the continuity of the symbolic figure of the Monarch and protecting the foundations of the regime.

King Mohammed VI's vision seems to be closer to a political change and slowly some of his power has been shifting to civil society. Political prisoners diminished, freedom of speech and press increased,

cultural associations enjoyed institutional support, and political reforms launched for more accountable institutions to citizens (Cavatorta, F., 2006). To demonstrate it, one of his first political actions was to dismiss the Minister of Interior, Driss Basri, due to his participation in the imprisonment and torture of Moroccan opponents and civilians during his father's regime (Campbell, P. J., 2003, p. 42-49). Also, a year after his enthronement, a royal commission was established to compensate the victims and relatives of the crimes committed during the *'Years of Lead'* (Campbell, P. J., 2003, 49; SkRoCH, C., p. 2012, 22).

It looked like King Mohammed VI wanted to break with the legacy of violence and social suffering to control the Moroccan society. However, the commission established to compensate the victims were not revealing the names of the executioners neither judging them. The unaccountability of the Commission was a clear symbol of populism politics of the King and his intention to keep protecting the *Makhzen*. As a response, a demonstration took place in October 2000 in front of the Tazmamart, the prison where the biggest tortures were committed during the *'Years of Lead'*. King Mohammed VI responded with violence against demonstrators (Campbell, P. J., 2003, p. 49). Under pressure from human rights activists, King Mohammed VI decided to create the *'Morocco's Equity and Reconciliation Commission (ERC)'* in 2004 (SkRoCH, C., 2012, p. 19-26). Notwithstanding, the ECR had again no judiciary powers to judge the executors, and compensations to the victims and their families were perceived as insufficient.

Probably the highest achievement in what respects to political reforms in human rights during King Mohammed VI mandate has been the implementation of the Family Code Reform in 2004. Despite the opposition of more traditional and Islamist parties, King Mohammed VI supported women activists demands to implement gender equality as a step-forward to modernise the country (Maddy-Weitzman, B., 2005). Thanks to Family Code Reform, women's guardianship was abolished, early marriage was forbidden until the legal age of 18 years old, equal rights and duties within marriage for men and women were established, women have the right to inheritance, and sexual harassment is persecuted, among other reforms. Furthermore, women's Parliament representation at the House of Representatives (one of the two chambers of the Moroccan Parliament) has 60 out of 395 seats guaranteed for women (15% representation). Despite being far from achieving gender equality, Morocco is nowadays one of the Middle East and North Africa countries with more women's rights.

There is still much to do to achieve gender equality in Morocco. Parliament women's representation is still far from gender equality, and family Code Reform has to be carefully seen as there are a lot of tricks behind it. For instance, polygamy is forbidden by the Family Code Reform but permitted within a positive court sentence. In a doubtful legal system under conservative male judges, this is just an open door to women's discrimination. In any case, the Family Code Reform has positively improved women's emancipation, particularly in urban areas. Socio-demographic changes demonstrate it. For instance, literate and higher educated women have increased, fertility of women has been postponed, family size has diminished, and the number of single women has significantly increased (Desrues, T., & Nieto, J.

M., 2009). Despite all this achievements, one of the highest gaps in gender equality is women's education, with 56% of women's illiteracy in front of the 44% of men aged between 15 and 24 years old (UNESCO, 2018). It particularly worries the situation of women in rural areas, where schooling after primary school rarely occurs. Desrues, T., & Nieto, J. M. (2009) refer to almost the double of illiterate women in rural areas (84,2%) than in urban areas (45.1%). Behind women's illiteracy highlights the forced early marriage, child labor, difficulty arriving in schools in remote locations, teacher absenteeism, and parental economic situations (Lee, Y. J., Mouktaoui, F., & Kim, Y., 2020).

I myself experienced these factors during a volunteering service. In 2009, I traveled to Erfoud, an oasis town in the Sahara, in eastern Morocco. I participated in a summer camp for Moroccan children aged between 6 to 12 years old organised by the *Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroquí - ITRAN*. One morning, three volunteers, including me, visited one of our students' families as *'women ambassadors'*. Fatima was a 6-years-old girl living at *ksar Jrana*, a *kasbah* or fortified village located approximately 5 km from the school. Fatima's mother, recently widowed, was forbidden to go out of her house for a year as a mourning sign to protect her family's reputation. Because of this, Fatima had to give up school the following academic year to support the family's economy. We sat down in Fatima's kitchen to explain the importance of carrying out her education to improve the whole family's future opportunities (communications were simultaneously translated by a local female representative of ITRAN). However, Fatima's mother was more worried about their immediate survival and the future of her family's reputation, so she refused the possibility for her daughter to keep studying. I was in absolute awe, as a mere observer, overwhelmed about the situation. Fatima was standing up in silence too, in the tiny kitchen with no electricity and no water system. Upstairs there were two bedrooms, one for the whole family (Fatima's mother, Fatima, and her older sister) and the other bedroom for two goats. It was difficult for me to see how a mother was denying education to a daughter, although, at the same time, I felt compassion and understood her decision. The only way to survive was either living from neighbor's charity or her daughter's workforce. Behind Fatima mother's decision, there were factors like poverty, generational illiteracy, religion and patriarchy, perpetuating the lack of opportunities for women's future. Hence the importance of activism and political participation to give voice to women, particularly in rural areas of Morocco, where Family Code Reform is not enough to change society. As Habiba Chafai (2017, p. 827) points out:

'Family law reform alone is not sufficient to achieve social change, for what needs be changed are the mentalities of both male and female Moroccans through their socialisation within the family and the school.'

Years and years of patriarchal system and poor educative policies in Morocco have had present consequences in women's integration into the working market today. There are fewer and worst job opportunities for women than men. Rural areas are again more vulnerable than urban areas. Women

living in rural areas depend more on family businesses in the agriculture sector. As a consequence of the informal economy of family businesses, women do not enjoy economic emancipation and working rights. In urban areas, there is another scenario. Women are more educated and they have higher career expectations than in rural areas. However, they hardly ever arrive at management positions and there is a salary gap comparing to their male colleagues. Furthermore, government policies are not boosting entrepreneurship and higher rates of youth unemployment are affecting both youth women and men. (Desrues, T., & Nieto, J. M., 2009, p. 27).

Although King Mohammed VI partially liberalised the country during his first years of mandate, particularly if compared to his father's regime, real stories like Fatima's are still happening in Morocco. Young generations of Moroccans are the ones who have inherited the foundations of the Moroccan state. Religion and tradition challenge the aspirations of modernisation of the country (Daadaoui, M., 2010). King Mohammed VI keeps counterbalancing clashes between traditionalists and modern currents of the country. Notwithstanding, in the last two decades, there were some events that have worsen the popularity of the Monarch in society at large and, particularly, among the young generations of Moroccans. Firstly, the incapacity of the economic system to create quality job opportunities for graduated students achieving high rates of youth unemployment. Secondly, the 2003 Casablanca bombings which killed 45 people increased police repression in Morocco to fight against extremist Islamic terrorists. Finally, the high rates of corruption inside the Monarchy and the Public Administration. Everything together made the perfect scenario for the beginning of a new social uprising, the so-called February 20 Movement. This movement initiated by Moroccan youth was born in the framework of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011.

1.5. The February 20 Movement

The social discontent in North African regimes was exploited in Tunisia in December 2010 and arrived in Morocco in 2011 with the February 20 Movement. Following the social uprisings of their neighboring countries, a group of young Moroccans created a social campaign on Facebook. The so-called *Hirak 20 Febrayer* (February 20 Movement). The first demonstration organised through social media to take the streets on the 20th of February 2011 pursued profound social changes to eradicate the social inequalities and corruption of the Moroccan institutions. Besides, it was a demonstration to show the economic and political exclusion of youth in Moroccan society (Bogaert, K., & Emperador, M., 2011). Among the demands of the February 20 Movement highlighted the dissolution of Parliament, the dismissal of the Government, and trial of corrupted charges in pro of a new Parliamentary Monarchy with an independent justice system and separation of powers. Besides, the February 20 Movement pursued the Amazigh language and identity recognition, the liberation of all political prisoners, and imprisonment of the perpetrators of crimes during the '*Years of Lead'*. Interestingly, and contrary to the majority of

the Arab Spring uprisings, the February 20 Movement did not pursue the overturn of King Mohammed VI.

Since the foundation of the modern Moroccan state, none of the major political parties adopted secular opposition to the state, neither the February 20 Movement during the Arab Spring. This fact reflects the attachment of Moroccan society to the Crown and its role as a national symbol of unity. On the other side, it highlights the social and political taboo in discussing the powers of the King. As pointed by Daadaoui, M., (2010, p. 203): *'Monopoly of the religious space in Morocco sets the monarchy above the political travails of political parties and effectively elevates the king to the status of an arbiter above societal reproach'*.

Although the February 20 Movement did not question the legitimacy of the Moroccan Monarchy, instead it committed to slowly contribute for the country to become more democratic. Because of this, the relevancy of this movement is the fact that it gave birth to a new generation of Moroccan activist. T. Desrues (2012, p. 24) characterises this new generation of Moroccans, born between 1980 and 1995, as the first generation with *'existing awareness of individualization'*, meaning that *'each individual possesses his or her own dignity and vital interests'*. In other words, it is the birth of democratic citizenship, people aware of their rights as citizenship. This represents a breaking point between traditional political structures represented by *the Makhzen* that monopolized the political agenda in Morocco since its independence in 1956. The frustration of a new generation of youth excluded from education, employment, housing, gender equality, and freedom of speech jeopardized the beginning of a new historical stage of modernisation in Morocco. ICT took an absolutely important part in the creation of this new generation of Moroccans. Thanks to the internet and new technologies, citizens were mobilized independently of their ideologies and ethnic belonging. Besides, ICT brought freedom of information and a way of anonymous speech that empowered youth to lose the fear of the authoritarian Moroccan regime in favor of social justice and democracy. After the deposition of president Ben Ali in Tunisia and President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, King Mohammed VI quickly reacted and, on the 9th March 2011, announced the creation of an Advisory Commission to reform the Moroccan Constitution. After the deposition of his counterparty's rulers in neighboring countries, King Mohammed VI was afraid of an increasing people's disaffection to the Crown after the mobilizations of the February 20 Movement.

Notwithstanding, as denounced by the February 20 Movement, the new 2011 Moroccan Constitution was used, again, as a political strategy to silence the social uprising rather than doing profound political and social changes to achieve democracy. The new Constitution did not reduce Royal powers as Head of the State and Commander of the Faithful. As Maddy-Weitzam (2012; p. 125) states: '*The highly publicized constitutional changes (…) were mostly cosmetic, leaving the preponderance of power in the hands of the palace'*.

Despite the boycott of the February 20 Movement to the Referendum of Constitution, including also the boycott from younger generations of Amazigh activists (Maddy-Weitzam, 2015; p. 2503), the

new 2011 Moroccan Constitution was approved by Referendum on 1st July 2010. The 2011 Constitution included institutional reforms such as a more independent Parliament separated from the judiciary system in order to decrease institutional corruption; the consolidation of the rule of law, civil liberties, gender equality, and human rights; and the opening of transparent positions into public bodies for graduated Moroccan youth. Also, the 2011 Moroccan Constitution officially recognised the Amazigh identity and language. This step forward for Amazigh activism was also a milestone in the country's openness to a multi ethnolinguistic national approach, contrary to the foundations of the state. However, the trickery scheme of Article 5 of the new Moroccan Constitution 2011 stated that, in order to implement Tamazight in public administration, media and education as an official language of the state, an Organic Law had to be approved in Parliament:

'Tamazight [Berber/amazighe] constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception. An organic law defines the process of implementation of the official character of this language, as well as the modalities of its integration into teaching and into the priority domains of public life, so that it may be permitted in time to fulfill its function as an official language.' (Article 5. 2011 Moroccan Constitution).

Taking into account that Arab-Islamist and pro-monarchical parties are traditionally majority in Parliament, Article 5 has been denounced as useless by many Amazigh activists. From the interviews conducted with various Moroccan Amazigh in Morocco in September 2011, Maddy-Weitzam (2012; p. 126) highlighted how *'One person termed the organic law requirement a ''sea serpent'' designed to negate in practice the official recognition of Tamazight'.*

Despite the difficulty to implement Article 5, the Amazigh demands embedded in the 2011 Moroccan Constitution were a moral victory for the Amazigh movement widespread. Morocco became the only North African state that recognised a different official language than Arab in the central core of its Constitution. It was a step forward for building a multicultural country in front of a dominant Arab state. It challenged the Monarchy to accommodate Amazigh demands of modernisation in front of Islamist traditionalist parties. In the end, recognising the Amazigh identity at the same level as Arab entitled the loss of a unique national identity based on the Arab language and Islam traditions. Because of this, traditionalists see in Amazigh movements a threat to the national unity and territorial integrity of the country. Linguistic and cultural demands are powerful drivers for minority groups to build a common national identity. Sometimes even deriving to the pursuit of self-determination. It happened with the use of Arab in the process of decolonisation from the Europeans. It is happening now with the Catalan process of self-determination from Spain. Whether the Tamazight will be used as a driver for self-determination of the Amazigh population is soon to decide.

In the end, the Organic Law 26.16/2019 was finally approved in Parliament in 2019. However, the COVID-19 crisis has postponed the implementation of the Organic Law and, still nowadays, there have

been no changes in the implementation of Article 5 of the 2011 Moroccan Constitution (see Annex B. Interview to Casa Amaziga de Catalunya). There are many other examples of the emptiness of the 2011 Moroccan Constitution to achieve real liberalization and establishment of a democratic state (Madani, M., Maghraoui, D., & Zerhouni, S., 2012). King Mohammed VI's political strategy to propose changes without real content has worked out to keep his regime in power after the Arab Spring and maintain good international relations with its democratic allies, mainly the United States and the European Union. The strategic location of Morocco in North Africa and the Arab world has prolonged the good historical relationships with the United States since the Moroccan-American Treaty of Friendship signed in 1786 (Wells, S. B.,1987). Besides, it highlights the Morocco's 1995 association agreement with the European Union for free-trade association and close cooperation in sectors such as fishing grounds, migratory borders, and financial aid (Kahyaoğlu, G. D., Iharchane, O., Bennis, S., & Bakır, Z. G., 2019, p. 214-219). However, the recent migratory phenomenon of unaccompanied minors to Europe is challenging the international community's support to a questionable Constitutional Monarchy.

1.6. Migration of unaccompanied minors

The migration of unaccompanied minors to the European Union appeared to be an affair of a few isolated cases in the 1990s. In Spain, the first registered cases of unaccompanied minors date back to 1993 (Quiroga, V., 2009: p. 1). Nonetheless, it was not until 2010, and more particularly from 2015 onwards, that the new migrant phenomenon achieved relevant (and visible) numbers, becoming an issue in the social and political arenas.

According to the European Commission Department of Migration and Home Affairs, an Unaccompanied Minor is '*a person under 18 years old who arrives on the territory of an EU Member unaccompanied by the adult responsible for them by law or by the practice of the EU Member State concerned, and for as long as they are not effectively taken into the care of such a person'.* Following the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child signed in 1989, an unaccompanied minor is considered a child above being considered a migrant, when in the host country. Consequently, unaccompanied minors entering an EU country must receive assistance and protection as children (not as migrants). They can only be returned to their country of origin if adequate conditions and family reunification are ensured in the home country. Notwithstanding, bad practices in the EU migratory borders and, particularly in Spain, force unaccompanied minors to the much-feared express deportations, contradicting the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. This bad praxis is known in Spain as *'devoluciones en caliente'* (Veas-Peñalver, C., 2015).

The geographical proximity of Morocco to Spain is one key factor in the arrival of unaccompanied minors in the European Union. A huge double fence borders Morocco from the Spanish exclaves in Ceuta and Melilla. Besides, the Strait of Gibraltar, a distance of 14.4 km, is the only geographical border between Africa and Europe. On the other hand, Morocco has an overpopulation of young people of

working age, and promises about economic and political reforms have not improved labor opportunities for youth after the February 20 Movement (Fakoussa, D., & Kabis-Kechrid, L. L., 2020). Lack of opportunities in Morocco and ICTs have helped to spread the hope to achieve economic progress in Europe among the youngest. Moreover, the Moroccan diaspora in Western countries such as Europe, United States, and Canada have contributed to spreading ideals of democratisation and modernisation of the country as a driver of political and social change in front of national traditionalists currents (Maestre Alfonso, J., 2013; Tuccio, M., Wahba, J., & Hamdouch, B., 2019). It is in here where the researchers Etling, A., Backeberg, L., & Tholen, J. (2020) identified a generational migratory change comparing to previous migratory flows from Morocco to European countries.

Based on quantitative survey data from four Arab Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), Etling, A., Backeberg, L., & Tholen, J. (2020) analyses how political discontent, lack of democracy, high levels of corruption, and experiencing violence in daily life are main drivers of youth migration from the Arab Mediterranean region, particularly to Europe. Following Hirschman's concept of activist reactions to discontent with the state (1978), the study associates political discontent with two societal actions: the so-called *'voice'* or *'exit'* action. The former is more common in democratic societies, where freedom of expression, associationism, assembly and the right to strike are permitted. The latter is more often in autocratic regimes, where the voice acting is repressed. Both actions are correlative. The exit action is a consequence of failed protests and repression. Also, the most likely to either undertake one or/and another action are the better-off, well-educated, and secular youth. Among their migratory projects, it highlights the pursue of qualified jobs but also the achievement of democratic rights to make their voice been heard. As Varela Huerta, A. (2015) analyses, it is not only a question of permanence in the host country after a long and difficult journey, but a question of obtaining the rights denied in their country of origin.

Taking into account Etling, A., Backeberg, L., & Tholen, J. (2020) study, it make possible to associate the increase of unaccompanied minors' migration from Morocco to the European Union in the aftermath of the February 20 Movement. Ten years after the uprising, King Mohammed VI continued with full power as Head of the State and the Commander of the Faithful. Religion continues to be dominant in the political and social agenda of the country. The Parliament keeps controlled by traditionalists Arab-Islamist and pro-monarchical parties. There is also a dubious accountability to citizenships and vulnerability to human rights as recent imprisonment of Amazigh activists (Aljazeera News, 2019) and journalists (Reporters Without Borders, 2021) indicate so. Youth unemployment keeps increasing and reforms such as the Amazigh language recognition have been not implemented yet. After ten years of the February 20 Movement, the voice acting has not achieved profound political and social changes in Morocco. Therefore, individual exit actions represented in the migration of unaccompanied minors to Europe are a consequence of denied social justice for this new young generation of Moroccans.

Particularly vulnerable to migration is the Amazigh youth due to the systematic marginalisation that continues existing inside the Moroccan institutions. As a result, the Amazigh young generations

still suffer from continuous stigmatization in accessing education and work. As denounced by the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya in the documental '*Amazigh: a forced diaspora'* (2020), for Amazigh youth is even more difficult than for Arab youth to get access to higher education (where the entrance tests are in Arabic and French) and, lately, getting qualified jobs in the urban Arab elite. Moreover, there has been a constant divestment on Amazigh territories going alongside the expropriation of their lands and natural resources, either by the State or private companies of the so-called Arab elite (Silverstein, P., & Crawford, D. 2004; 5, Bouhmouch, N., 2019). Moreover, the regime's promotion of migration to get rid of economic crisis and political discontent since its independence affected, particularly, the Amazigh population repressed in the Rif region after the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt and during the *'Years of Lead'* (Drhimeur, L. A., 2020). Nowadays, the Amazigh diaspora worldwide increases the possibility for unaccompanied minors having family and friends outside EU countries. As Mohammed Sellam Amezian's son (intellectual leader's son of the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt), exiled in the Netherlands, explains in the documental 'Rif 58-59 Break the silence' (El idrissi, T., 2017):

'I'm not very interested in reconciliation on a personal level (…). What's more important for me is social justice. The Riffian (Amazigh from the Riff Mountains) who wants to immigrate and is more obsessed with Europe than his own country. What's more important to me are the Moroccan educated in France, the US, etc. What am I myself doing here? I am uprooted (…). The crime is not that they took you to prison. This is the greatest crime, that they uprooted you from your land.'

The systematic marginalisation of the Amazigh since the independence of Morocco has profoundly affected to the traumatic alienation of Amazigh (Maddy-Weitzam (2006, 78) from past to present times. Besides, having relatives and acquaintances abroad in the Diaspora helps to make the individual decision of migrating. It improves not only the integration of the youth but also diminishes the fear of the unknown (see Annex B. Interview with Casa Amaziga de Catalunya). Besides, t

It is also important to note that although in smaller numbers, female unaccompanied minors also decide to migrate alone to Europe. This new migratory phenomenon symbolises not only the empowerment of women against a patriarchal political and religious system, but also new patterns of migratory flows in a new generation of Moroccans youth.

1.7. The Amazigh question

To understand the Amazigh question, it is worthy to identify its origins. The autochthonous Amazigh population lived in grouping tribes, span throughout North Africa. It is not until the 1885 Berlin Conference when the European colonisers divided Africa, drawing borders while ignoring the division of ethnic groups such as the Amazigh throughout North Africa. After the division of Africa, the Amazigh tribes were divided into nine different nations: Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Egypt. There are also registers of Amazigh tribes in the Canary Islands in Spain. Nowadays,

the Amazigh population is ranged from 13 million to over 32 million (Lauermann, J., 2009), although this number increases according to other sources, between 22 to 40 million Amazigh (Nationalia, 2020). The highest concentration of Amazigh lives in Morocco and Algeria. Maddy-Weitzman, B. (2012, 109) estimates that 40 percent of a total amount of 20 million Amazigh live in Morocco and 20 percent in Algeria. Amazigh tribal groupings in Morocco are settled into three main geographical areas of Morocco: The Sous Valley in the south, the High and Middle Atlas Mountains in the center, and the Rif Mountains in the north. There are three main Amazigh dialects spoken throughout Morocco: the Tamazight (used in the Middle and High Atlas Mountains), the Tachelhit (used in South Morocco), and the Tarifit (used in the Rif Mountains and Northern Morocco) (Figure 1.3.).

The desert and the mountains, natural borders surrounding Amazigh tribes in Morocco, preserved their oral language and secular traditions from historical colonisation. However, they were in peril of extinction after the French and Spanish colonisation and the aftermath modern Arab state. European colonisers imposed French and pretended to evangelise the Amazigh population, stronger defenders of Islam. After the independence of Morocco, King Hasan II began a process of Arab nationalism or systematic Arabisation of the entire territory as a form to unify the country through a unique national identity based on the Arab language and the Islam traditions. Education and Media in Arabic were used as political channels to convey the ideology of an Arabic state. Furthermore, among other statements, the Moroccan version of history proclaimed that Islam had liberated the Berbers from their primitive origins, diminishing the ethnocultural identity of the Amazigh to mere folklore (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2012; 119). Furthermore, the repression suffered during the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt and the *'Years of Lead'* reverberated in the depopulation of Amazigh rural areas. As a result, many Amazigh decided either to migrate to the cities or to exile. The rural exodus towards the cities, resulted in a new housing phenomenon appeared in the late 1960s, the so-called *'urban slums'* or *'shantytowns'* on the outskirts of the country large's cities such as Casablanca, Fez, or Marrakech (Bogaert, K., 2011). The promotion of migration resulted in the dispersion of the Amazigh population mainly in Algeria, Europe, United States and Canada (Drhimeur, L. A., 2020). As a consequence of this marginalisation of the Amazigh, its oral language and traditions, transmitted only from generation to generation, suffered a strong negative impact. Maddy-Weitzman, B., (2012; 113) states how the percentage of Amazigh speakers in Morocco diminished to probably half after the French colonisation.

The fear to lose their collective identity as a process of national integration into the Arab state spurred the awareness of an '*Amaziguity'* or '*Berberness'* consciousness among cultural associations in the 1970s to preserve their historical, linguistic and cultural legacy. However, it is not until the 1990s when the Amazigh question took major relevance into the national and international community. It coincided with the beginning of liberalisation of the country and, particularly, as a result of globalisation and the so-called *'politics of identity'* (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2012, 114). Thanks to globalisation, the international community began to increasingly support minority ethnic groups all over the world, making pressure on their countries of origin to make their demands been heard. For instance, the

Amazigh movement achieved for the first time international media coverage due to the arrest of seven Amazigh teachers in Errachidia who claimed their labor rights with banners written in Tifinagh (Amazigh alphabet) on the 1s May 1994 (Silverstein, P., & Crawford, D. 2004; 45; El Aissati, Abderrahman, 2005; 67). Various international actors such as the United States or the European Union pressured the Moroccan Government to carry out reforms towards a more transparent and pro-human rights regime that recognized the ethnocultural and political rights of the Amazigh. The international recognition of Amazigh identity helped to the process of renegotiating their accommodation into the Moroccan Arab nation-state (Maddy-Weitzam, Bruce, 2012; 114-116).

Due to the international community pressures and, particularly moved to counteract the growing Islamist movement threatening the Crown both in Parliament and in the daily life of Moroccans, the Amazigh movement achieved domestic relevance after the ascension to the throne of King Mohammed VI in 1999. King Mohammed VI's disposition to recognise the Amazigh identity of Morocco, mobilised the Amazigh movement to collect their demands in the Berber Manifesto, published on 1st March 2000. Signed by more than 200 Amazigh intellectuals, the Berber Manifesto requested: (1) Recognition of the Amazighity of Morocco (2) Recognition of the Tamazight as an official language in the Moroccan Constitution (3) Economic development of the Amazigh-speaking areas to make up the economic and cultural marginalization suffered since 1912 in the fields of education, training, agriculture, industry and infrastructures (4) Enforcement of teaching Tamazight in schools, institutes and universities, as well as creating a scientific institution to codify the Amazigh language and prepare pedagogical instruments for teaching (5) Reconsideration of historical facts to return to Amazigh their historical roots, against the Arab nationalistic history versions (6) Make the use of Tamazight mandatory in public services including mass media, courts, administration, health services, local and regional councils (7) Rehabilitation of original Amazigh art and public support to Amazigh artists (8) Cease to the Arabization of Amazigh names of newborns, places, villages, cities and regions (9) Grant financially Amazigh cultural associations and publications as *'public usefulness'*.[5]

One year after the publication of the Berber Manifesto, King Mohammed VI partially accepted its demands. The '*Amazigh Dahir'* approved in 2001, included the request of teaching Tamazight into schools, the more presence of the Amazigh in the media, and the importance of recognising the Amazigh culture into the Moroccan national identity. It was an important milestone for the openness of the nation to multiculturalism. Silverstein, P., & Crawford, D. (2004; 44) notes how '*instead of posing Berber culture as a challenge for national unity, the King promoted embracing it as a necessary step in his project for a "democratic and modernist society"*. However, despite this reform and, as happened later with the new Moroccan Constitution in 2011, no changes were in the daily life of the Amazigh population. Many complaints against the marginalization of the Amazigh persisted in the following years until recent times.

[5] See Berber Manifesto: http://www.amazighworld.org/human_rights/morocco/manifesto2000.php

Notwithstanding the ambiguity between promises and changes as a political strategy of King Mohammed VI to keep social stability and institutional power, the Amazigh agency continues actively pursuing its demands. The Amazigh language and identity recognition in the 2011 Moroccan Constitution has given strength to the Amazigh movement. Cultural Associations, in and outside Morocco, have contributed to make this real and they are continuously working in the spread of the '*Amazighity'* consciousness, and the spread and normalisation of the Tamazight. Again, far from the first Amazigh uprising in the Rif Mountains riots in 1921, the present Amazigh movement do not pursue the self-determination of their territories today. However, the Amazigh movement exhibits many elements of a nation: a shared history, a common religion, language, culture, and traditions (Lauermann, J., 2009).

I myself experienced the manifestations of Amazigh nationalism during an event organised by the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya on 6th February 2020 with the main topic to discuss the phenomenon of unaccompanied minors (Figure 1.4.). During the event, the documental *'Amazigh: a forced diaspora'* was projected, with an aftermath discussion about the Amazigh marginalisation as a possible driver for unaccompanied minors migrate to Europe. A group of approximately ten unaccompanied minors attended to the event, proudly showing several Amazigh flags (Figure 1.5.) [6]. To end the event, a traditional Amazigh band invited the group of unaccompanied minors to dance in the scenario. It was exciting to see all of them dancing, with their Amazigh flags, following the rhythm of their traditional music. A shared history, language, traditions, music, and a flag representing the borders of Amazigh territories seems the spur not only of an Amazigh consciousness but a manifestation of an Amazigh *'imagined community'* (Anderson, B. 1983). Public manifestations at an international level also demonstrate a growing Amazigh nationalist sentiment with, for instance, the celebration done by the football player Munir El Haddadi with the Amazigh flag in Europa League in August 2020 (Figure. 1.6) or the Amazigh Tuareg musicians Tinariwen Amadjar, awarded with a Grammy to the Best World Music Album in 2012 and nominated again to the Best Global Music Album in 2021 (Figure. 1.7).

These embryonic Amazigh national exhibitions make me remember the spur of the Catalan process for self-determination from Spain. A process often referred to by Amazigh activists as particularly attractive due to the rights peacefully achieved so far (Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, 2015, 2509). The Catalan movement, also referred to *'Catalanism'*, appeared after years of linguistic and cultural repression during Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975). However, it was not until 2006 after the curtail of the new Catalan Statute by the Spanish Constitutional Court's that the idea of self-determination gained more militant supporters and political unity in the Catalan Parliament. Catalonia, economically and politically more powerful than other Spanish Autonomous Communities, was used by the Partido

[6] The Amazigh flag was officialised in 1998 by the World Amazigh Congress, an international non-governmental organisation of Cultural Amazigh Associations, intellectuals, and leaders. It has three horizontal bands in blue, green, and yellow with the Tifinagh letter Z in the middle. The blue represents the sea, the green the mountains, and the yellow the desert. Altogether representing the natural geographical borders of the Amazigh territories. (Figure 1.5. Amazigh Flag)

Popular (PP), right-wing party and, in that time, Spanish Government opposition, as a Trojan Horse to achieve the Presidency of the Spanish Government with an absolute majority in 2011. The PP hazardous ethno nationalistic political campaign awaked Spanish nationalism and patriotism by raising a *'Catalanophobia'* movement in 2006 that ended up with Mariano Rajoy, in that time PP's Secretary-General, entering in the Spanish Congress with 876 boxes with 4.020.000 million Spaniards signatures against the 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy (El País, 2006). The Spanish Presidency of Mariano Rajoy in 2011 started a decentralisation policy reducing Catalan autonomy's competencies, disinvesting in Catalan infrastructures, and, therefore impeding its economic progress. Despite all these controversial policies, the worst insult for Catalans was the public disrespect to the Catalan language and culture expressed by José Ignacio Wert, Spanish Ministry of Education and Culture, and his polemic declaration in the Spanish Parliament wanting to *'Spanify'* the Catalan children (El Mundo, 2012).

Although the Amazigh and Catalan movements are born from different political and historical contexts, both share core demands on ethnolinguistic nationalism encouraged by past and present political repression of their identity by dominant nation-states. Language and culture are powerful drivers for humans to express themselves. Because of this, it is worthy not to underestimate the ethnolinguistic and cultural movements of minority groups in the pursuit of independence when denied by nation-states.

According to these factors, would it be possible to co-relate the phenomenon of Moroccan unaccompanied minors arriving in the European Union with the marginalisation of the Amazigh and the pursuit of an Amazigh nation? Can this factor be a reason for unaccompanied minors settle down in Catalonia?

I hypothesize that the systematic marginalisation of the Amazigh by the Moroccan Arab nation-state leads to an increase in the number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors arriving today in the European Union. It also increments the Amazigh nationalism sentiment among the new generations of Amazigh youth. In so doing, unaccompanied minors settle down in Catalonia as a referent model in the pursuit of self-determination.

The following Chapter 2 tries to reply to these questions and hypothesis by analysing data of arrival of unaccompanied minors from North Africa to the European Union, and more specifically from Morocco to Catalonia, from 2010 to 2021. Besides, an interview with a member of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya provides a better understanding of the Amazigh demands and questions if behind the arrival of unaccompanied minors in Catalonia lies the pursuit of an Amazigh nation.

CHAPTER 3

Analysis of data on unaccompanied minors and interview to Casa Amaziga de Catalunya

The present chapter examines data based on mix-method quantitative and qualitative analysis. The methodological aim is to identify patterns in the unaccompanied minors arriving in the European Union in terms of citizenship, age, and gender, in a specific period, from 2010 to 2021. It has also aimed to quantify the number of unaccompanied minors with Moroccan nationality arriving in the European Union comparing to North African neighboring countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara). Finally, it aims to identify the number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors that arrive in Catalonia compared to other Spanish Autonomous Communities. According to this information, the present research tries to answer the following research questions:

(1) Is it possible to co-relate the phenomenon of unaccompanied minors arriving in the European Union with the marginalisation of the Amazigh by the Moroccan state?

(2) Is the pursuit of an Amazigh nation a reason for Moroccan unaccompanied minors to arrive in Catalonia as a referent model for self-determination?

My hypothesis is that the systematic marginalisation of the Amazigh by the Moroccan Arab nation-state since its independency in 1956 leads to an increase in the number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors arriving today in the European Union. It also increments the Amazigh nationalism sentiment among the new generations of Amazigh youth. In so doing, unaccompanied minors settle down in Catalonia as a referent model in the pursue of self-determination.

The specific methods used in the present dissertation to address these research questions and hypothesis within the field of international studies rely on a methodological approach based on three sources:

(1) Literature review on Moroccan history, the Amazigh question, the migration of unaccompanied minors, and theoretical concepts on nationalism. Among the authors studied highlight Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Silverstein, P. A with several publications about the Moroccan history, Amazigh identity, and its demands; Hirschman, A. O. (1978). Quiroga, V. (2009). García, B. F. (2010), Del-Sol-Flórez, H. (2012), Veas-Peñalver, C. (2015), Bravo, A., & Santos-González, I. (2017) and Tuccio, M., Wahba, J., & Hamdouch, B. (2019) on a literature review about unaccompanied minors and international migration as a political driver for social change; and Hobsbawm, E. J., & Ranger, T. O. with *'The invention of Tradition'* (1983) and Benedict Anderson with *'Imagined communities'* (1983) on a literature review about nationalism. The literature review has been enriched by the interpretation and analysis of three documentary films: 'Rif 58-59 Break the silence' (Tarik El idrissi, 2017), 'Amassu: Amazigh Land and Water Rights' (Bouhmouch, N., 2019) and 'Amazic: una diaspora forçada' (Casa Amaziga de Catalunya, 2020). Real memories and experiences that emerged from the documentaries

have been useful to get a perspective of Moroccan history from the Amazigh point of view. Besides, the three documentaries were filmed by Moroccan directors, decentralizing the hegemony of the European gaze when producing ethnographic documentaries and scientific publications after colonialism (Gill, H. S., 2020). It also helps to contrast the Moroccan nation-building narrative after independence.

(2) Quantitative data analysis on Moroccan population, economy, human development index, and children on the move using open data available at United Nations, World Bank, European Statistical (Eurostat), Spanish Ministry of Interior, General Commissariat for Aliens and Borders. National Police. (Comisaría General de Extranjería y Fronteras. Policia Nacional. Ministerio del Interior), Spanish Children's Observatory. Ministry of Social Rights and Agenda 2030 (Observatorio para la Infancia. Ministerio de Derechos Sociales y Agenda 2030), Spanish Statistical Institut – INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística), Catalan Statistical Institut – IDESCAT (Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya), and the General Directorate for Children's Attention and the Adolescence (Direcció General d'Atenció a la Infància i l'Adolescència) from the Department of Labour, Social Affairs and Families (Departament de Treball, Afers Socials i Famílies) from the Catalan Government (Generalitat de Catalunya), hereinafter referred as DGAIA.

(3) Qualitative analysis through a small incursion on ethnographic methods approach focused on the research of communities on social media Facebook, a participatory observation in the event about unaccompanied minors held on 6th February 2020 (Figure. 1.4.) and an interview with a member of Casa Amaziga de Catalunya. The narrative that emerges from the interview provides a vision at the forefront of the issue. It is a powerful tool to identify if behind the migration of unaccompanied minors from Morocco to the European Union lies its marginalisation from the Arab state and the pursuit of an Amazigh nation.

Quantitative data analysed from Eurostat come from statistical authorities, interior ministries, or related immigration agencies of the EU Member States, following the legal basis of data collection Council Regulation 862/2007 [7]. For instance, in Spain, the compiling agency of metadata is the Ministry of Interior, General Commissariat for Aliens, and Borders, National Police. Interestingly, not all EU members report data on children in migration in the eight available statistical data of Eurostat: (1) third-country nationals refused at the border; (2) third-country nationals found to be illegally present; (3) third-nationals who are subject to an obligation to leave; (4) third-country nationals effectively returned by type of return and citizenship; (5) third-country nationals effectively returned to a third-country by type of return and citizenship; (6) third-country nationals effectively returned by type of assistance received and citizenship; (7) third-country nationals returned to a third-country by type of agreement procedure and citizenship; and (8) third-country nationals returned to a third-country by the destination country and citizenship. As an example, the Spanish Ministry of Interior is not reporting data on Third-country nationals returned (6), (7), and (8). The lack of transparency of some EU compiling agencies,

[7] See Explanatory texts on the Eurostat database: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/migr_eil_esms.htm

like in the case of Spain, questions the reliability of Eurostat data on children in migration. It also highlights the '*invisibility'* of the target group in front of the express deportations, contrary to the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child signed in 1989.

All and with it, the quantitative source from Eurostat selected for the present research corresponds to the database on (2) third-country nationals found to be illegally present in the European Union from Morocco and North African neighboring countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara) in the last decade from 2010 to 2020. The reason to choose this database among the others listed above available on Eurostat is to identify those unaccompanied minors arriving in the European Union and registered by the competent national authorities. This information is compared with data extracted from the DGAIA on new cases of unaccompanied minors arriving in Catalonia and hosted by the Child and Adolescent Catalan Protection System from 2015 to 2021. No data has been recorded before 2015 in the Department of Labour, Social Affairs and Families database provided by the Catalan Government.

This quantitative analyse is useful to identify patterns in the unaccompanied minors arriving in the European Union in regards to their country of citizenship, age, and gender. Nevertheless, data extracted from Eurostat and DGAIA is not desegregated by ethnicity (Arab or Amazigh). This fact is a significant setback for the research since it has been impossible to identify the number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors with an Amazigh identity that has arrived in the European Union and Catalonia so far. Although statistics on ethnicity are infrequent, it is nowadays under debate in the social and political arena the usefulness of ethnic statistics to denounce racial discrimination and empower minority groups. The present research intends to address lack of information in this regard with a qualitative interview with one of the members from Casa Amaziga de Catalunya, Mr. Abdellah Ihmadi. Casa Amaziga de Catalunya states that there are approximately 125.000 Amazigh speakers in Catalonia, turning the Tamazight (the Amazigh language) the third most spoken language in Catalonia (behind the two co-official languages, Catalan and Spanish).

On the other hand, qualitative data analysed come from my approach to search for events on the topic using social media Facebook. Thanks to this, I could find out and attend in person the event on unaccompanied minors organised by Casa Amaziga de Catalunya and Anaruz N Afrika Association with the collaboration of Sabadell Council on 6th February 2020 (Figure 1.4.). Because of this, I got to know for the first time about the Amazigh question and established contact with Casa Amaziga de Catalunya. This approach ended up being useful as it allowed to meet members of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya and probe into their views on the questions that animated this research, namely through an interview with a representative of this organisation. This small incursion in fieldwork and participatory observation proved worthy for the present dissertation because of the engagement with an entity that aims to link the Amazigh and Catalan peoples at a linguistic, cultural, and identity level. Created in 2002 with the support of the Catalan Parliament after the Resolution 1197/VI of the Catalan Government, on 6th March 2002, Casa Amaziga de Catalunya is the perfect example of how both minority groups, the

Amazigh and the Catalan, joint forces at an identity level as *'imagined communities'* (Anderson, B. 1983). Besides, during the event, I had the opportunity to observe a group of unaccompanied minors. Their human agency throughout the event surprised me positively.

In choosing a mix-method methodology, I wanted to develop my research skills on quantitative and qualitative approaches. I knew that I had a better understanding of data analysis (because of my previous studies and because I enjoy analysing data) and a passion for social anthropology (particularly participatory observation and interpretation). However, my lack of experience in political and social conceptualising and theory building on nationalism has been a constraint during my research. The COVID-19 restrictions have also hindered the possibility of doing further multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork, which was in the first design of my dissertation. Notwithstanding, I feel grateful to have been able to engage with a small part of an Amazigh community, observe a group of Amazigh unaccompanied minors and interview a member of Casa Amaziga de Catalunya. Altogether gave me a glimpse of the Amazigh identity in context, despite the pandemic restrictions on mobility and fieldwork.

It is important to highlight that the present research does not focus on personal information either personal histories of unaccompanied minors. On the contrary, it aims to research the reasons why they undertake such a risky trip alone. In doing so, the present research preserves the ethics principles of *children on the move*. It is also noteworthy to consider the data limitations and gaps affecting the present data analysis due to the difficulty to quantitative represent a collective illegally entering the European Union and the inaccuracy of EU compiling authorities. Because of this, observations and conclusions based on these data should be considered indicative rather than conclusive, and should not be understood as the only data to study the migration of unaccompanied minors arriving in the European Union and Catalonia. Because of these limitations, it is relevant to triangulate data extracted from the literature review and data analysis with a qualitative approach.

2.1. Data analysis

The present analysis is based on data extracted from Eurostat (European Statistical), Children in migration (under 18 years old), with North African citizenship (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara), in a specific period (from 2010 and 2020) and focusing on data from Moroccan unaccompanied minors. More precisely, data selected refers to third-country national unaccompanied children found to be illegally present in the European Union. Data are disaggregated by country of citizenship, age, and gender. Furthermore, data extracted from the DGAIA identifies the number of unaccompanied minors who arrived in Catalonia disaggregated by country of citizenship or region, age and sex from 2015 to 2021.

According to the Eurostat data, the majority of unaccompanied children from North Africa found illegally present in the European Union from 2010 to 2020 were originally from Morocco (12.955 children), followed by Algeria (11.210 children) and Sudan (8.840 children) (Table 2.1). Moroccan

children represent the 30% of the total number of unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the EU from 2010 to 2020, followed by 26% of unaccompanied minors from Algeria and 20% of unaccompanied minors from Sudan. Altogether, the three countries sum the 76% of the total amount of unaccompanied minors from North Africa found to be illegally present in the European Union from 2010 – 2020 (Table 2.2). Interestingly, as exposed before, the majority of the Amazigh communities live in Morocco and Algeria (Maddy-Weitzman, B., 2012).

Note that data analysed does not include the number of unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the European Union from 2010 to 2020 with unknown age. Otherwise, the total number of unaccompanied minors with Moroccan citizenship found to be illegally present in the European Union from 2010 to 2020 increases +1.965, with a total amount of 14.920 unaccompanied minors. There is a big debate on the unhumanitarian techniques used by EU countries to check the age of those adolescent migrants coming undocumented and with uncertain minority age.

Analysing data in Table 2.1, Sudan has a peak number of unaccompanied minors to be illegally present in Europe in 2017. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) report '*Migration Crisis Operational Framework in Sudan 2017 – 2019'*, key factors determining the high number of migration of unaccompanied minors from Sudan was due to (1) insecurity (armed confrontations between rebel groups and government forces, and increment of terrorism); (2) social issues (high rate of youth population unemployed and gender inequality); (3) climate change (drought and desertification); and (4) deteriorated economic situation (due to social conflicts and civil war). In the case of Algeria, the poor economic conditions, the lack of employment opportunities in rural regions and the discontent of the young population after the Arab Spring are key factors to explain the phenomenon of migration of unaccompanied children (OIM, 2013). Similarly, data presents a constant migration of unaccompanied minors from Morocco, increasing from 2013 onwards. Notwithstanding, having no known internal conflicts neither an economic crisis in Morocco, the number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors are way higher beyond the rest of North African countries.

Moroccan economic development ranks the 5th Strongest Economy in Africa and the 59th Worldwide (World Bank, 2020). However, the country has not improved the quality of life of all its approximately 37 million inhabitants (according to data from the United Nations on July 2021). Morocco's UN Human Development Index (HDI) for 2019 is 0.686 on a scale of 1.0, which puts the country in the medium human development category. Its position is at 121 out of 189 countries and territories. Although Morocco's HDI value has increased from 0.457 to 0.686 between 1990 and 2019 in terms of life expectancy (+11.9 years), education (+3,4 years in men and +7,2 years in women), and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (+98,6%), Morocco's HDI is still behind the values for neighboring countries in Arab States such as Tunisia or Libya (average of 0.705). Also, statistics based on the World Values Survey (2010-2014) about life satisfaction, considering determinants of health status, income and employment, education level, and freedom of choice, described Moroccans as moderately satisfied with their life (Kasmaoui, K., 2020).

Analysing data from Moroccan children in migration by age (less than 14 years old and between 14 and 17 years old), results show how the 91% of unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the European Union between 2010 and 2020 are aged between 14 and 17 years old. (Table 2.3).

Furthermore, data analysed shows that most of Moroccan unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the European Union from 2010 to 2020 are male, with only 3% of females (Table 2.4). Although the number of Moroccan female unaccompanied minors seem to be not very relevant, when comparing with the neighboring North African countries, data reflects that 19% of the total amount of female unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the European Union from 2010 to 2020 are Moroccans, only surpassed by Libyan females unaccompanied minors (Table 2.5). As we saw previously, Moroccan society is nowadays one of the Middle East and North Africa countries with more women's rights thanks to the Family Code Reform in 2004 and its constant women's activism against political, religious, and cultural patriarchal forces. Technology has also helped women's emancipation all over the world, and Morocco is not an exception. Access to the internet and mobile devices have encouraged freedom of speech and access to open information, encouraging women, particularly younger generations, to pursue their migratory projects.

On the other hand, according to data extracted from the DGAIA, the majority of unaccompanied children arriving in Catalonia and hosted by the Child and Adolescent Catalan Protection System from 2015 to 2021 are Moroccan citizens, with a total amount of 9.496 children (Table 2.6). It represents a total percentage of 52% of the total amount of unaccompanied minors who arrived in Catalonia (Table 2.7). When analysing the number of female unaccompanied minors from the total amount of unaccompanied minors arrived in Catalonia, Moroccan females represented 62% of the total number of female unaccompanied minors hosted by the Catalan government (Table 2.8).

Comparing the results extracted from Eurostat and DGAIA, there are two main points in common: most of the unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the European Union and in Catalonia are (1) males with (2) Moroccan citizenship. Notwithstanding, number of unaccompanied minors varies from one data base to another. Whereas Eurostat counted 12.955 Moroccan unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the EU in a 10-years period of time, only in Catalonia were registered 9.496 Moroccan unaccompanied minors in a 5 to 6-years period.

Consulting further data published in the Children's Observatory of the Spanish Ministry of Health, Consumption and Social Welfare (Boletín de Datos Estadísticos de Medidas de Protección a la Infancia número 22, 2019, pg. 43 - 69), the total number of unaccompanied minor guardianships *'tutelas ex-lege'* in Spain in 2018 were 11.490 children, of whom 93,91% were males and 6,08% females. A total amount of 99,04% were hosted in residential shelters and 0,96% in host families. Interestingly, data from the Spanish Children's Observatory reflects how in 2019 the majority of unaccompanied minors were hosted in residential shelters from (1) Melilla with 3.816 minors (2) Catalonia with 1.905 minors, and (3) The Basque Country with 1.383 minors. Only these 3 out of 19 Spanish regions (17 Spanish Autonomous Communities and 2 Autonomous Cities - Ceuta and Melilla) hosted 61,31% of the total

number of unaccompanied minors registered in Spain in 2019 (Table 2.9). Although it does not match with data extracted from the Catalan Government, numbers are closer than the ones extracted from the Eurostat.

As explained above, the proximity from Morocco to Spain has repercussions on the high number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors arriving in Spain. Melilla, for example, located on the very border from Morocco and Spain, supports high pressure in their residential shelters if compared with other Spanish Autonomous Communities. However, it is remarkable how Catalonia and the Basque Country, both Autonomous Communities pursuing the independence from Spain, host most of the unaccompanied minors in Spain. In 2017 a report issued by the DGAIA and Barcelona Council expressed their concern about the massive arrival of unaccompanied minors to Catalonia and, particularly to Barcelona, comparing to previous years. Hence, their impossibility to assist them in their first reception centers and residential shelters. Among the reasons to arrive in Barcelona, the Catalan authorities reported bad praxis in certain Spanish regions. Mainly Andalucía, Valencia, Madrid but also municipalities such as Bilbao in the Basque Country. They have detected how first reception centers or national police officers from other Autonomous Communities have frequently paid bus tickets to unaccompanied minors for arriving in Barcelona to fleeing their Autonomous Communities before asking their guardianship.

According to the Spanish Organic Law 4/2000, January 11, on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration Articles 35.3 and 35.4, when national state security forces identify an undocumented foreigner, with the physical appearance of a person under the age of eighteen years without being accompanied by an adult responsible for it, they must offer the immediate assistance to protect the rights of the child. They must bring them to the competent services in the Autonomous Community identified. Once in a first reception center, the minor must remain until his identification and age determination is available by the Spanish Prosecutor's Ministry. Health institutions must carry out the necessary tests to identify age as a matter of priority. Once determined that the foreign person is a minor, the Spanish Prosecutor's Ministry must enter data in the Register of Unaccompanied Foreign Minors and warn the competent services for the protection of the minor in the correspondent Autonomous Community. The competent services for the protection of minors must request the guardianship of the minor to the Government of the Autonomous Community.

To take an example, an unaccompanied minor found to be illegally present in Catalonia by the Mossos d'Esquadra (Catalan Autonomous Police) must to be brought to the DGAIA (competent service for the protection of the minor in Catalonia) to offer first assistance in a reception center until the age of the minor is determined by the Spanish Prosecutor's Ministry. Once the tests determine the minority of age, the Spanish Prosecutor's Ministry must enter their identification in the Register of Unaccompanied Foreign Minors and warn the DGAIA. After that, the DGAIA must request the guardianship of the minor to the Catalan Government according to the Statute of Catalonia. Only after this bureaucratic dance, the child is hosted in a residential shelter. Unaccompanied minors should be informed at all times, in a

language comprehensible for them, of the content of the right to international protection and procedure foreseen for their guardianship application. There must be a written record of this action.

This process relies upon so many different public administration services and professionals that, according to the Catalan authorities, it is here that Autonomous Communities and Municipalities try to take advantage and get rid of the minors to send them to Barcelona before having their guardianship assigned. Because of this, one of its demands to the Spanish Government was to ensure the transparency and balance in the quotas upon the arrival of unaccompanied minors to the different Spanish Autonomous Communities and request guardianship. However, despite its demands, in March 2020, the General Secretary of the Department of Labor, Social Affairs and Family from the Catalan Government, Oriol Amorós, declared that: '*What is known is that all regional governments have the same competence to protect minors and it is also known that Catalonia has no direct border with Morocco'* to express its discomfort with the continuous arrival of Moroccan unaccompanied minors passing by other Spanish Autonomous Communities (Diari Ara, 2020).

In any case, what data extracted from different public and official sources reflect is the question of the *'invisibility'* of the target group. As the IOM states in its 2020 World Migration Report, one of the major problems regarding *children on the move* is the lack of complete and reliable data to help to protect minors in the countries of origin and destination. Although the European Union is recently publishing data on children in migration, it highlights its poor transparency in the topic so far. EU-Africa international relations should be a priority on the EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy agenda, guaranteeing data transparency and the protection of minors in and outside the European Union. On the other hand, the Catalan government highlights by providing complete and transparent data on the arrival and reception of unaccompanied minors comparing, above all, to their Spanish counterparties. Data includes information about the date and location of registration per unaccompanied minor. It also includes the date of birth, origin, and sex of each unaccompanied minor. Besides, the information is updated every 15 days. To sum up, among the misinformation surrounding the target group, there is an oasis of transparency inside the Catalan government. And this transparency, as noted by the IOM, is one of the first steps to guarantee the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child.

But why does Catalonia care about unaccompanied minors? Ainhoa Nadia Douhaibi, a social educator specialized in research on institutional racism that has been working on the streets of Barcelona for years with young migrants, analyses the behavior of the Catalan reception system as *'a system that stands as a system of protection, but which is not. It is a system of lack of protection and it is functional to maintain a social, racial, and economic order that is of interest to the Generalitat (Catalan Government) itself, the state institutions, and the DGAIA'* (Directa, 2020). With her declarations, she wanted to reflect her concern about young migrants being treated as simple future cheap workforce to support the Catalan economic development.

More than that, Catalonia has a strong relation with migration in its nation-building project, especially since the twentieth century and the forging of a Catalan *'imagined community'* (Anderson, B. 1983). Sutherland, C. (2014) explains so in its study of migration museums in Barcelona as nation-building sites. Through a vision of the Museum of the History of Catalonia (Museu d'Història de Catalunya - MHC) and the Museum of the History of Immigration of Catalonia (Museu d'història de la immigració de Catalunya - MhiC), the author describes how migrants are in the center of the Catalan past and present identitarian construction. According to the exhibitions at MHC and MhiC, Catalonia has experienced different migrant flows since the twelfth century with the Aragonese crown's expansionism and its mercantile tradition across the Pyrenees, Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, Naples, the Balearic Islands, and south towards Valencia. The expansion of its language and culture throughout the Mediterranean Sea awakened its national identity. Other frequently evoked past events in the forge and spur of the Catalan nationalism are: the 1714 defeat against the Borbon Crown; the loss of Spanish colonies in 1898 coinciding with a potent Catalan industrial infrastructure appeared during the nineteenth century from the willingness to modernise the cultural and economic fabric of Catalonia despite the opposition of the Kingdom of Spain; Franco's regime from 1939 to 1975 and its repression to Catalan language, identity and institutions; the curtail of the 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy by the Spanish Constitutional Court's; and the aftermath 2017 Unilateral Referendum of Independence.

The recognition and tribute to migrants in the forge of the Catalan identity is visible throughout all the above-listed historical events. From the hommage to Spanish civilians opposed to the Borbon Crown that fought during the 1713-1714 Siege of Barcelona to the tribute to the International Brigades during the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War[8]. But also, and in particular, to the migrant flows coming from other parts of Spain in the nineteenth and twentieth century to work in Catalan industries and the recent twenty-first-century migratory flows coming from the Middle East and North Africa. Oriol Jonqueres, ex Vice-President of the Catalan Government, in its speech after the self-proclamation Catalan Republic in 2017, mentioned the *'commitment to being an inclusive country'*, appealing to *'universal values that very diverse people from over the world, who speak different languages, who pray to different Gods, if they pray to any God, can share too and we (Catalans) want to express in this new Republic'.*[9]

The Catalan past and present orientation towards the Mediterranean Sea and recognition of foreigners in building a common Catalan identity, explain the predisposition to welcome unaccompanied minors arriving in Catalonia from North Africa and particularly from Morocco. In the end, migration has contributed to transforming Catalonia and, particularly Barcelona, into a

[8] See Homenage to Catalonia (George Orwell, 1938), an autobiographic book during the author's stay in Catalonia with the International Brigades fighting against totalitarism.

[9] See Oriol Jonqueres speech on 27th october 2017 at the Catalan Parliament: https://www.lasexta.com/noticias/nacional/oriol-junqueras-nos-queremos-dirigir-a-los-pueblos-espanoles-para-reiterar-nuestro-compromiso-por-construir-un-futuro-en-comun_2017102759f34d9b0cf271acab999246.html

'multicultural' community. Far from being reluctant to foreigners, the Catalan migratory approach appears as a fundamental pillar to the pursuit of self-determination. Catalonia offers an alternative vision of a nation-state, accepting migration flows as part of a natural human process, eradicating differences among foreigners and nationals within borders when building a common nation of well-being. This Catalan fluctuant way of nation-building over traditionalist nation-states, such as Spain and its dominant homogenous ethnic, language, tradition, and cultural identity, tries to convey to migrants the sentiment of belonging to a common Catalan *'imagined community'* (Anderson, B. 1983). In so doing, the Catalan language appears as a key element to transmit this common identity while respecting the diversity of cultures. And, contrary to hierarchies inherent in nation-state ideologies, instead of imposing the Catalan language and culture on foreigners, they ease their involvement in it. For instance, after the death of Franco, the demand for teaching Catalan in schools was promoted by a community of Andalusian migrant parents living in Santa Coloma de Gramanet, a municipality located in the peripheries of Barcelona (Directa, 2017). Thanks to this movement, the Catalan Government implemented the normalization of Catalan in schools in 1983. As a personal example, my parents, both migrants that arrived in Barcelona in the 1970s, always explain how difficult was to sign up my older brother in a school teaching in Catalan due to the high demand. The normalization of Catalan in schools but also in daily life is one of the biggest achievements in the Catalan nation-building process[10].

Thus, welcoming unaccompanied minors seems to be a Catalan project for future self-determination processes. Also, in accomplishing the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Catalan Government takes the opportunity to discredit the Spanish authorities to the international community. In any case, what data reflects is that Catalonia hosts a big number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors if compared with other Spanish regions and EU members. If these unaccompanied minors settle down in Catalonia as a referent model for pursuing an Amazigh nation will be analysed in the following subchapter.

2.2. Analysis of the interview to Casa Amaziga de Catalunya

The analysis of the interview with a member of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya seeks to identify if behind the migration of unaccompanied minors lies the systematic marginalization of the Amazigh population in Morocco. Also, it questions the pursuit of an Amazigh nation as a reason for Moroccan unaccompanied minors to settle down in Catalonia as a referent model for self-determination. The interview has been a core part of my dissertation, enriching literature review and data analyses.

The first time I met with Mr. Abdellah Ihmadi, a member of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya and the Anaruz N Afrika Association, was in the event organised by the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya on 6th February 2020 on the topic of the phenomenon of unaccompanied minors. He was the educator in

[10] The Catalan Government offers Catalan classes for free without any previous requirements for migrants since 1983.

charge of the group of unaccompanied minors present at the event. Although he had briefly intervened during the event, I did not have the opportunity, and more importantly the know-how, to speak with him on that occasion. However, during the event, I managed to exchange some words with the president of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya, who kindly put me in contact with Mr. Abdelha Ihmadi to conduct the interview.

The previous communications with Casa Amaziga de Catalunya and Mr. Abdellah Ihmadi through email and WhatsApp were in Catalan, communication language for the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya, and advanced level for the interviewee. The choice of Catalan instead of Spanish as a vehicular language was to bring closer the Amazigh-Catalan identities as minority groups and achieve a better synergy during the interview.

The interview was conducted in Mr. Abdellah Ihmadi's apartment, located in Sabadell in the peripheries of Barcelona. As Harris, J. A. (2019; 51) explains in his study case of the Amazigh diaspora in France, it is common for Amazigh associations to have only social media pages or office space made available in central areas of big cities. In so doing, members lived across the region and only assemble for events and sporadic board meetings. So, after an hour in public transportation to arrive at Mr. Abdellah Ihmadi's apartment, he kindly welcomed me to undertake the interview. Despite his several personal commitments, highlighting his family's immediate relocation to another apartment and taking care of his 3-years-old child, he took time to sit down to undertake the interview that lasted approximately one hour.

Mr. Abdellah Ihmadi was informed about the context of the research as a master studies dissertation in international studies. I always introduced myself as a master's student from ISCTE – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa. Prior free and informed consent was obtained in writing, with the option to voluntarily participate in the research and maintain anonymity and confidentiality if he wished. Nevertheless, he preferred to leave anonymity and agreed to record the interview digitally to have a more fluent interview with no need to take so many notes. His decision to not remain anonymous aligns with Harris, J. A. (2019; 48-49) research and his explanation about how Amazigh activists in France leave anonymity to undertake their mission to promote the Amazigh identity. The informed consent, available in Annex A, was in Portuguese and translated to Catalan. It was interesting to see his curiosity in the similarities between Portuguese and Catalan languages. The conditions under which the interview recording would be stored and the context within which it would be published, in this dissertation, was explained to the interviewee with his consent. When the dissertation is completed, data recorded during the interview will be destroyed following data protection standards. Therefore, core ethical standards were maintained throughout the fieldwork, including respect openness about purpose and respect for the environment, privacy and confidentiality, respect for free and informed consent, maintenance of data protection and respect for vulnerable persons.

The interview analysis has been carried out following a qualitative methodology, divided into two different parts with the main idea to have an insight of the (1) Amazigh demands and (2) the motivations

of unaccompanied minors to migrate from Morocco to the European Union and particularly to Catalonia to answer the research questions. The transcript of the full interview is available in Catalan and English in Annex B.

Mr. Abdelha Ihmadi, better known by his friends and relatives as Ahddawiy Ayt Lhou (Amazigh name and family name), arrived in Catalonia in 2008 coming from Southern Morocco in the Sous Valley. He is a member of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya since 2015 and works as an educator in a residential shelter with a maximum capacity for 30 male unaccompanied minors managed by the DGAIA. He also teaches Amazigh in a Civic Centre in Sabadell with the support of the Catalan Department of Education, aligned to the Catalan support on the normalization of the Tamazight language. Recently the University of Barcelona also offers a course in Tamazight and Amazigh culture[11].

Concerning the question of whether marginalisation of Amazigh people in Morocco can explain the migration of unaccompanied minors, he replied that, although Amazigh people suffer from identity and cultural repression by the Arab state, in what refers to migration, there is no ethnic distinction. For him, migration of unaccompanied minors can be explained by the lack of opportunities in a non-democratic regime. He highlights how even families at no risk of poverty encourage their children to migrate to Europe in search of better education, social benefits, and, in conclusion, better future opportunities. Furthermore, he makes the distinction between minors who arrive with family support and those who come from dysfunctional families:

'If the child has a supportive family behind, we notice it a lot. They have education and values, and they know why they have migrated alone. It is then easy to be integrated here. Otherwise, unaccompanied minors with dysfunctional families are doomed to sleep in the street. They come with a heavy load that needs specialized attention that they will not find here.'

As he points out, there are unaccompanied minors in need of further support, that is the kind of specialized psychological accompaniment not easily available. There is an idealisation of Europe in the imagination of these particular unaccompanied minors. He explains that when unaccompanied minors arrive in Europe, both *'Arab youth'* or *'Amazigh youth'* are considered immigrants. However, he highlights that despite the condition of migrants, the Amazigh migration supposes higher human suffering due to its identity, cultural and language loss:

'As far as migration is concerned, we (Arabs and Amazigh) are equal, but at the identity, cultural and language level, I suffer more than an Arab migrant'.

[11] See University of Barcelona (2021-2022). Introduction to the didactics of Amazig language and culture: https://www.ub.edu/dyn/cms/print/p.jsp?u=/continguts_es/estudis/oferta_formativa/extensions/fitxa/I/202011710/index.html

For instance, he explains how an Amazigh cannot use Tamazight in the Moroccan Consulate. Also, how difficult it is to keep their language, symbols, and values alive and convey them to their children when uprooted. As he notes, Arab language and culture are not in peril due to the support of Governments, Public Administrations, and Media. Instead, Amazigh has no support apart from their native speakers. Therefore, each Amazigh leaving Morocco is a loss.

Because of this loss, the Tamazight language officialization has been a priority for the Amazigh movement in Morocco. Mr. Abdelha relates how thanks to the pressure of the Amazigh movement in the streets during the Arab Spring in 2011, the Moroccan government had no other option than to accept their demand and officialise the Amazigh language in 2011 Constitutional Reform. However, ten years after, there have not been changes in the topic. He holds that:

'It's always like this with all demands and not just the Amazigh ones. The Moroccan State empties the content of the reforms to calm down social uprisings. There's no real change. Reforms are only cosmetics to get the international community support.'

Neither King Mohammed VI nor the Arab-Islamist parties have had the political will to implement the Tamazight as a co-official language in Morocco. To understand the political inactivity in the matter, Mr. Abdellah explains how Islamists and Arabs see in the Amazigh movement an ideological competitor to the spread of a unique national identity based on the Arab language and traditions, and in the legitimization of the Alaouite Dynasty as protectors of the Muslim faithful.

Answering the question of the pursuit of an Amazigh nation as a reason for those unaccompanied minors arriving in Catalonia, his answer is clear in what respects to the Amazigh movement:

'The Amazigh movement does not pursue the creation of an Amazigh nation. We only want the Amazighity of our territory to be recognised.'

When comparing with the Catalan process, he replies that, contrary to the Catalan aspirations, they do not pursue the autonomy of their territories. Amazigh tribes are spread throughout all of North Africa, making it difficult to unify its territories. Besides, their history is based on tribal organisation and not in nations within borders:

'For us, the way to organise politically is not important, if we are in a federal state, or another political frame. What matters to us is that our cultural, identity, and territorial rights are recognised'

Notwithstanding, he points out how Catalonia has been a political referent in the Amazigh movement, particularly in the normalization of its language and the born of the *'Amazighity'* sentiment,

likewise the so-called *'Catalanism'* sentiment. This common sentiment has bridged historical links between Amazigh and Catalan peoples, as Mr. Abdellah relates:

'I don't know why we came directly here (Catalonia), but I remember when we were in the village, we heard about Catalonia: "They're like the Amazigh people here (Morocco), they speak a different language like us".

And he also refers to a big community of Amazigh in the Basque Country:

'Most of the Amazigh that lives in Spain are in Catalonia and the Basque Country. It is because society sympathise with our cause. They (Basques and Catalans) are in different processes, have lived different experiences, but we have a lot in common. It creates a link that eases our integration.'

This shared identity sentiment and mutual understanding among minority groups explain why Catalonia and the Basque Country host the majority of unaccompanied minors who arrived in Spain in 2019, according to data extracted from the Children's Observatory of the Spanish Ministry of Health, Consumption and Social Welfare. Also, as Mr. Abdellah explains, this link was the main reason for founding the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya at the beginning of the 1990s:

'We are aware that we are Amazigh. But if we are here (in Catalonia), we are also Catalans. We must work on this.'

This statement highlights the importance for Amazigh people to be active citizenship in their host country. It is not solely the importance of remaining, but also the importance of being part of a democratic state. It is also remarkable how the Catalan government supports the integration of the Amazigh people and the promotion of the *'Amazighity'* in Catalonia, for instance, with the support of the Catalan Department of Education.

With the recent migratory crisis that occurred in Ceuta on 17th May 2021, with the massive border crossing of 9,000 people, among at least 1,2000 unaccompanied minors, eased by the Moroccan authorities (European Parliament Resolution 2021/2747(RSP), 10th June 2021), Mr. Abdellah states:

'The images seen reflect how people are drowning in Morocco. (...) I believe that the Moroccan Regime has made a mistake. The European Union and Spain, as well. I don't know when they are going to be aware of the kind of neighbour they have. The future lies in supporting democratic movements. Hence, people can live with dignity. Migratory problems will end. (...) I hear the European Union and Spain speaking out for human rights in Russia, and they don't speak about rights in Morocco. (...) They do

not talk about these things, but they give money to this Regime. The money is only to do the dirty work of border control police.'

Interestingly, when asked about the relation of the Amazigh movement with the Saharawi's cause, he explains how they are in disagreements despite having the same political opponent, the Moroccan State. Whereas the Amazigh consider the Saharawi's as Amazigh and not Arabs, the Saharawi's consider the Amazigh movement from Morocco as simply Moroccans. What makes me think about the motto *'Divide and conquer',* used by French colonisers to divide Arab and Amazigh Moroccans.

CHAPTER 4

Conclusion

The migration of unaccompanied minors from North Africa to Europe is a recent contemporary migratory phenomenon underpinning the vulnerability of minors migrating alone and in unsafe conditions in their status of *'children on the move'* (IOM, 2020). Particular attention has been paid to the high number of unaccompanied minors from Morocco arriving in the European Union through the Western Mediterranean Migration Route. As a consequence, Spain is nowadays the EU country receiving more unaccompanied minors. The proximity of borders between Morocco and Spain has eased the migration of Moroccan youth to Europe. However, no known internal conflicts neither economic crisis explain the high number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors arriving in Europe since 2010.

On the grounds of understanding why Moroccan youth decide to take such a risky trip alone, on 6th February 2020 I attended an event about unaccompanied minors organised by the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya and Anaruz N Afrika Association with the collaboration of Sabadell Council. To my surprise, during the event, the Amazigh question was discussed as a reason for unaccompanied minors leaving their home country. One of the attendants even hypothesized that the Catalan process of independence from Spain is possibly a reference to the Amazigh movement. It was the first time I had ever heard about the Amazigh question, and what was worst, it was the first time that I realised that not all Moroccans are Arab, neither do they all speak Darija. Misinformation plays a crucial role in the imagination of Africans about Europe and the same can be said on the other way around. It is usual for Europeans to explain migration due to poverty or armed conflicts. However, there are many other factors behind the migration of unaccompanied minors that are worthy of research. Because as Del-Sol-Flórez, H., (2012) tells us, it is important to *'(re) know and understand migratory projects from the worldview of global phenomenon'.* In doing so, the present research aimed to answer if the migration of Moroccan unaccompanied minors can be explained by linking it to the marginalisation of the Amazigh and the pursuit of an Amazigh nation.

Amazigh, also known as *Berbers*, are the autochthonous inhabitants of North Africa. They lived in tribal systems, with matriarchal governance, and with pagan traditions. Amazigh were defenders of Islam since the eleventh century; however, they kept their several oral languages and traditions alive. After the division of Africa in the 1885 Berlin Conference by the European colonisers, Amazigh tribes were divided into nine different nations: Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, Lybia, Mali, Niger, Egypt, and the Canary Islands in Spain. Under the Treaty of Fez in 1912, Morocco became a French and Spanish protectorate. Between 1921 and 1926, the Amazigh initiated the first Amazigh uprising in the Rif mountains. Although the revolt was suffocated by the colonisers, it was the first time that the Amazigh aspirations were, as its etymological name Amazigh means, *'free-man'* again. The revolt led

by Abd el-Krim pursued an Amazigh nation, unifying Amazigh tribes from Morocco to Algeria. But also, after the uprising, a pro-independence Arab nationalistic movement was born, with the support of Amazigh too, returning full sovereignty to the Alaouite dynasty under King Mohammed V in 1956. King Mohammed V was proclaimed the Commander of the Faithful, as a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, legitimizing the King and his descendants to reign the country without opposition, by divine right, on the basis of an *'invented tradition'* (Hobsbawm, E. J., & Ranger, T. O., 1983). With the main objective of building solid foundations of a new independent Arab State in front of European colonisers, the nation-building process led the creation of an ethnic and linguistic homogenous state, based on Arab language and traditions as central pillars to unify Moroccans in a common *'imagined community'* (Anderson, B. 1983). Minority groups like Amazigh population and women, with the adoption of the '*Sharia* law' in 1957, were relegated to mere second-class Moroccan citizenships. Particularly hard was for the Amazigh of the Rif mountains and rural areas. Its marginalization ended in one of the darkest periods in modern Morocco, the 1958-1959 Rif Revolt and the following *Years of Lead* from the 1960s to 1980s. After the death of King Mohammed V in 1961, his son King Hassan II ruled for three decades with a constant violation of human rights to create a strong centralized post-colonial Arab State. As a consequence, opponents to the regime were imprisoned, tortured, disappeared, or were exiled to different parts of Africa, mainly Algeria, but also to Western countries such as Europe, the United States, or Canada. Amazigh, in particular, suffered from a constant marginalization of its language, identity, and territories. Some of the Amazigh moved to the suburbs of urban areas in Morocco. Others decided to migrate outside the country. It was the birth of the Amazigh diaspora. The marginalisation of Amazigh identity inside Morocco and its consequently dispersation in the Amazigh diaspora put the Amazigh identity in risk of disappearance. Maddy-Weitzman, B., (2012, p.113) notes how the percentage of Amazigh speakers in Morocco diminished to probably half after the French colonisation.

It is in the 1990s, coinciding with a calculated opening of the Moroccan State, that spurred the birth of the modern Amazigh movement to protect its language, identity and traditions. Also, as referred by Maddy-Weitzman, B. (2012), globalisation and the so-called *'politics of identity'* empowered minority groups such as the Amazigh thanks to the support of the Western International Community. The awareness of collective Amazigh ethnic consciousness, also referred to as '*Amazighity'*, was spread in and outside Morocco, particularly by Cultural Associations such as the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya in Spain. After the death of King Hassan II in 1999, there were expectations of reconciliation and democratisation of the country under King Mohammed VI. However, expectations soon disappeared under the unaccountability of human rights violations committed during the *Years of Lead* and the lack of reforms towards the democratisation and liberalisation of the country. King Mohammed VI adopted, as well as his father, a politic of accommodation, with cosmetic reforms facing the international community rather than its citizenships. For instance, after the publication of the Berber Manifesto in 2000, King Mohammed VI approved the '*Amazigh Dahir'* in 2001, including the request of teaching

Tamazight into schools, the more presence of the Tamazight in the media, and the importance of recognising the Amazigh culture into the Moroccan national identity. Despite this reform, no real actions took place. Instead, King Mohammed VI perpetuated control of a centralised authoritarian regime, with Islam as a fundamental pillar of the State, unaccountability of violation of human rights, and, again, a calculated openness towards the international community. Furthermore, the incapacity to create qualified jobs for youth increased the discontent among Moroccan youth. As a result, in 2011 under the Arab Spring uprisings, the February 20 Movement mobilized critical voices against the Moroccan regime. From social media Facebook to the streets. Among their demands, the February 20 Movement pursued profound social changes to eradicate the social inequalities, corruption of the Moroccan institutions, the inclusion of youth into political decisions and employment, and the Amazigh language and identity recognition. Although they did not pursue the overturn of King Mohammed VI, their demands were a clear manifest towards the democratisation of the State and the recognition of the Amazigh identity. As a result of the 20 February Movement, King Mohammed VI amended the Moroccan Constitution. However, again, reforms of the 2011 Moroccan Constitution were just cosmetics.

As an example of this, the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya in its documentary *'Amazigh: A forced diaspora (2020)'* denounces how the Amazigh population continues to suffer systematic discrimination by the Moroccan authorities, prohibiting the teaching of their language in schools, the use and exploitation of their lands (condemning them to poverty or migration), and the lack of opportunities for young Amazigh both in accessing to university studies (where the entrance tests are in Arabic and French) and, lately, getting qualified jobs in front of the urban Arab elite.

Despite the failed attempt of the February 20 Movement to democratise Morocco, the research of Etling, A., Backeberg, L., & Tholen, J. (2020) shows how the movement was based on the birth of a new generation of Moroccans, aware of the power of active citizenship. The fundamental pillars of a democratic state. The research notes how after the Arab Spring uprisings, those youth who felt repressed or not heard by their government, well-educated but with poor job opportunities, with pro-democratic and secular ideals, and experiencing daily life corruption in their home country, tends to voluntary migrate to Western countries, also referred as the *'exit action'*. It is also important to highlight the recent arrival of Moroccan female unaccompanied minors in the EU, symbolising the empowerment of women, but also a new paradigm in the migratory flows.

Taking into account the research of Etling, A., Backeberg, L., & Tholen, J. (2020) and the denounces of Casa Amaziga de Catalunya, it is possible to co-relate the migration of unaccompanied minors from Morocco to Europe with the marginalisation that still suffers Amazigh youth by the Moroccan regime.

Data analysed in the present research from European Statistics – Eurostat, reinforces the idea that most of the unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the EU from 2010 to 2020 are Moroccan citizenships. It supposed 30% of the total amount of unaccompanied minors that arrived in

the EU from 2010 to 2020, number above other neighboring countries with recent armed conflicts, such as Sudan with 20% of unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the EU from 2010 to 2020. When analysing further data on unaccompanied minors, as the one published by the Department of Labour, Social Affairs and Families from the Catalan Government, it reflects how 52% of the total amount of unaccompanied minors who arrived in Catalonia between 2015 and 2021 were Moroccans. However, in both cases, data is not desegregated by ethnicity. Therefore, the present study cannot identify if the majority of Moroccan unaccompanied minors are Amazigh. Ethnic statistics, nowadays under debate in the social and political arena, will be a useful method to confirm if Amazigh youth tend to migrate more than Arab youth from Morocco.

Notwithstanding, data highlights the high number of unaccompanied minors from Morocco arriving in Catalonia. According to the Children's Observatory of the Spanish Ministry of Health, Consumption and Social Welfare, Catalonia was the second Spanish Autonomous Community that hosted more unaccompanied minors in 2019. Only Melilla, located on the very border of Morocco, hosted more unaccompanied minors. Catalonia, from its side, stands out by providing complete and transparent data on the arrival and reception of unaccompanied minors following the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989). Its transparency highlights more if compared with the opaque reception system and bad praxis of their Spanish counterparties.

Catalonia has a strong relation with migration flows in its nation-building project, particularly since the twentieth century and the forging of a Catalan *'imagined community'* (Anderson, B. 1983). Therefore, the Catalan predisposition to welcome unaccompanied minors could contribute to gain more militants for future processes for self-determination. Besides, the Catalan process could be an example for Amazigh youth pursuing an Amazigh nation. As Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (2015, p. 2509) refers, Amazigh often refers to the Catalan aspirations for independence from Spain as a referent model for the Amazigh movement.

To confirm the possible aspirations of an Amazigh nation, an interview was conducted with a member of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya. Mr. Abdelha Ihmadi, better known by his Amazigh name Ahddawiy Ayt Lhou, explained how self-determination is not an official demand of the Amazigh movement. However, he points out how there are sentimental links between Amazigh and Catalans that explain the high rates of unaccompanied minors in Catalonia. He notes how Catalonia is a political referent for the Amazigh movement in terms of language and cultural normalisation. However, the Amazigh movement discards an Amazigh nation due to two main reasons. Firstly, the territoriality. Secondly, religion. Opposite to the Catalan aspirations of independence, Amazigh tribes were dispersed throughout North Africa. They did not limit their territories and they are not interested in doing that. Also, part of the Amazigh population is Muslim, legitimizing the Alaouite Dynasty as direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. On the other hand, the Amazigh movement lacks political structure, forbidden by the Moroccan State in 2001. Cultural Associations such as Casa Amaziga de Catalunya only pursue the protection of its language, culture, and traditions.

When referred to the ethnicity of the unaccompanied minors, he states that all of them, Amazigh or Arab youth, are in the same position as immigrants when entering the EU. However, he highlights that the Amazigh migration supposes higher human suffering than the Arab migration due to its identity, cultural, and language loss. He also explains how behind the migration of unaccompanied minors from Morocco to Europe lies the lack of opportunities in their home country. One of the more touching parts of the interview was when referring to the recent migratory crisis in Ceuta that occurred on 17th May 2021. The eased border crossing by Moroccan authorities, led 9,000 people among at least 1,2000 unaccompanied minors in Spanish territory by swimming or walking. Mr. Abdelha Ihmadi highlighted how *'people are drowning in Morocco'* and added that *'the images seen are the consequence of an autocratic regime supported by democratic allies like Spain or the European Union'.*

The migratory crisis in Ceuta has opened the debate of the use of minors and migration by the Moroccan authorities as a political weapon. This unprecedented crisis has also shown the passivity of the European Union in the protection of the rights of migrant children. To the triple vulnerability of the unaccompanied minors defined by Del-Sol-Flórez, H. (2012, p.12) by three 'in': *'in-security in their countries of origin, in-security in host residential care institutions and in-security when fulfilling the age of majority in the face of the situation of a return to administrative irregularity'*, it is important to add the *'in-visibility'* suffered by the collective.

The present research makes visible the vulnerability of those children who every day migrate alone to the European Union. Because behind the migration of unaccompanied minors, often lie important social phenomenon worthy of being studied in depth. Furthermore, the present research explains how the political situation of Morocco and the systematic marginalisation of the Amazigh affects the high rates of migration of unaccompanied minors who arrived in the EU during the last ten years. However, the present research could not conclude if behind the migration of unaccompanied minors lies the pursue of an Amazigh nation. Notwithstanding, it is possible to point out a growing Amazigh nationalist sentiment to protect its history, language, culture, and traditions. Maybe because of this, they choose to settle down in Catalonia instead of other Spanish Autonomous Communities. Or maybe it is other way around and it is the Catalan Government who is more interested in attracting Amazigh youth for its future self-determination aspirations. In any case, what the present dissertation can conclude is that both minority groups support each other and feel mutual appreciation. They work together in protecting and normalising both language and cultural heritage. As Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory explains, inside culture, we find different codes that approach people due to its common values, rituals and history, including victories, but also defeats. It is then worthy not to underestimate the cultural movements of minority groups when denied by authoritarian regimes. Accordingly, further research should address the co-relation of unaccompanied minors arriving to the European Union and Catalonia with the Amazigh question, considering the processes of maturity of a recent Amazigh movement and the born of a new generation of Amazigh youth.

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CITIZEN/TIME	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Morocco	460	465	755	1.075	1.560	1.500	1.395	1.475	1.330	1.420	1.520	12.955
Algeria	745	635	810	800	860	955	1.220	1.210	1.250	1.305	1.420	11.210
Sudan	720	280	125	150	680	785	500	3.475	1.275	355	495	8.840
Egypt	115	155	165	205	555	590	460	210	285	380	280	3.400
Libya	55	180	175	250	375	290	380	540	425	285	405	3.360
Tunisia	105	235	185	210	310	210	205	250	510	425	330	2.975
South Sudan	0	0	10	30	60	165	110	165	120	40	40	740
Western Sahara	5	0	0	0	0	5	5	5	0	0	0	20
Total	2.205	1.950	2.225	2.720	4.400	4.500	4.275	7.330	5.195	4.210	4.490	43.500

Table 2.1. Number of unaccompanied minors from North Africa found illegally present in the EU (2010 - 2020). Eurostat. Last data update on 11th June 2021.



Table 2.2. Percentage of unaccompanied minors found to be illegally present in the EU (2010 - 2020). Eurostat. Last data update on 11th June 2021.



Table 2.3. Percentage of unaccompanied minors from North Africa found to be illegally present in the EU by age (2010 - 2020). Eurostat. Last data update on 11th June 2021.



Table 2.4. Percentage of unaccompanied minors from Morocco found to be illegally present in the EU by sex (2010 – 2020). Eurostat. Last data update on 11th June 2021.



Table 2.5. Percentage of female unaccompanied minors from North Africa found to be illegally present in the EU (2010 - 2020). Eurostat. Last data update on 11th June 2021.

CITIZEN/TIME	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Morocco	350	639	1.436	3.709	2.219	805	338	9.496
Maghreb (expect Morocco)	220	430	1.084	2.898	1.572	324	122	6.650
Sub-Saharan Africa	39	62	117	149	143	123	44	677
Others	31	63	146	558	369	285	149	1.601

Table 2.6. Number of unaccompanied minors arriving to Catalonia (2015 - 2021). DGAIA. Last data update on 30th April 2021.



Table 2.7. Percentage of unaccompanied minors arriving in Catalonia by citizenship (2015 - 2021). Last data update on 30th April 2021.



Table 2.8. Percentage of female unaccompanied minors arriving in Catalonia (2015 - 2021). Last data update on 30th April 2021.

Tabla 33. Comparativa CCAA - Motivos de los ingresos en centros de menores de edad

	TOTAL		Motivos de los ingresos en centros de menores de edad									
			Tutelas "ex lege"		Guarda voluntaria		Guarda judicial		Guarda provisional		Otras causas	
	Abs.	*Tasa*	Abs.	*Tasa*	Abs.	*Tasa*	Abs.	*Tasa*	Abs.	*Tasa*	Abs.	*Tasa*
Andalucía	3.731	*233,1*	447	*27,9*	4	*0,2*	6	*0,4*	2.412	*150,7*	862	*53,9*
Aragón	758	*337,9*	471	*210,0*	26	*11,6*	2	*0,9*	259	*115,5*	SD	---
Asturias	163	*121,7*	96	*71,7*	11	*8,2*	0	*0,0*	56	*41,8*	0	*0,0*
Baleares	296	*139,0*	53	*24,9*	56	*26,3*	19	*8,9*	74	*34,7*	94	*44,1*
Canarias	165	*46,4*	157	*44,1*	8	*2,2*	0	*0,0*	0	*0,0*	0	*0,0*
Cantabria	170	*184,1*	78	*84,5*	53	*57,4*	0	*0,0*	39	*42,2*	0	*0,0*
Castilla y León	614	*177,5*	498	*143,9*	30	*8,7*	12	*3,5*	38	*11,0*	36	*10,4*
Castilla-La Mancha	430	*116,2*	261	*70,5*	8	*2,2*	3	*0,8*	158	*42,7*	0	*0,0*
Cataluña	5.050	*357,8*	1.905	*135,0*	51	*3,6*	5	*0,4*	SD	---	3.089	*218,9*
C. Valenciana	1.519	*170,1*	929	*104,1*	395	*44,2*	1	*0,1*	194	*21,7*	0	*0,0*
Extremadura	108	*61,7*	89	*50,9*	8	*4,6*	SD	---	11	*6,3*	SD	---
Galicia	139	*36,2*	76	*19,8*	30	*7,8*	1	*0,3*	32	*8,3*	0	*0,0*
Madrid	782	*63,5*	652	*52,9*	123	*10,0*	7	*0,6*	0	*0,0*	0	*0,0*
Murcia	489	*159,4*	231	*75,3*	0	*0,0*	1	*0,3*	257	*83,8*	0	*0,0*
Navarra	322	*264,6*	281	*230,9*	41	*33,7*	0	*0,0*	0	*0,0*	0	*0,0*
País Vasco	2.093	*571,3*	1.383	*377,5*	145	*39,6*	0	*0,0*	472	*128,8*	93	*25,4*
La Rioja	93	*169,5*	44	*80,2*	13	*23,7*	4	*7,3*	32	*58,3*	0	*0,0*
Ceuta	436	*2.173,3*	120	*598,1*	0	*0,0*	0	*0,0*	316	*1.575,1*	0	*0,0*
Melilla	3.829	*16.394,8*	3.816	*16.339,1*	6	*25,7*	7	*30,0*	0	*0,0*	0	*0,0*
Total	**21.187**	***254,5***	**11.587**	***139,2***	***1.008***	***12,1***	***68***	***0,8***	***4.350***	***52,3***	**4.174**	***50,1***

Tasa 1/100.000 personas menores de 18 años

Table 2.9. Number of unaccompanied minors in Residential Shelters in Spain in 2019

Annexes

Annex A. Informed consent

ISCTE IUL
Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

CONSENTIMENTO INFORMADO

O presente estudo surge no âmbito de uma dissertação de Mestrado em Estudos Internacionais a decorrer no **ISCTE – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa**. Este estudo incide sobre a fenómeno migratório de menores não acompanhados de Morrocos para a Europa e pretende identificar se um dos motivos principais da migração destes menores não acompanhados radica na marginalização que o povo Amazigh sofre por parte do Estado Marroquino, assim como identificar se no centro das reivindicações Amazigh está, ou não, a aspiração à formação de uma nação Amazigh independente.

O estudo é realizado por Mireia Rodrigo Fernández (mrfzo@iscte-iul.pt), que poderá contactar caso deseje colocar uma dúvida ou partilhar algum comentário.

A sua participação, que será muito valorizada, consiste em participar numa entrevista presencial em representação da Casa Amaziga de Catalunya e poderá durar cerca de 1 hora. Não existem riscos significativos expectáveis associados à participação no estudo. Ainda que possa não beneficiar diretamente com a participação no estudo, as suas respostas vão contribuir para identificar melhor as causas da migração de menores acompanhados de Marruecos a Europa.

A participação neste estudo é estritamente **voluntária**: pode escolher participar ou não participar. Se escolher participar, pode interromper a participação em qualquer momento sem ter de prestar qualquer justificação. Para além de voluntária, a participação poder ser **anónima** e **confidencial** indicando-o neste documento. As informações dadas na entrevista serão analisadas segundo uma metodologia etnográfica. Em nenhum momento do estudo precisa de se identificar.

Face a estas informações, por favor indique se aceita participar no estudo:

ACEITO ☒

NÃO ACEITO ☐

Se aceita participar, por favor indique se quer que seja de forma anónima e confidencial:

SIM ☒

NÃO ☐

Nome: Abdellah Ilmaadi Data: 23/07/1976

Assinatura: [signature]

O preenchimento do questionário presume que compreendeu e que aceita as condições do presente estudo, consentindo participar.

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Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

DEBRIEFING/EXPLICAÇÃO DA INVESTIGAÇÃO

Muito obrigado por ter participado neste estudo. Conforme adiantado no início da sua participação, o estudo incide sobre a fenómeno migratório de menores não acompanhados de Morrocos a Europa e pretende identificar se um dos motivos principais da migração de menores não acompanhados de Marrocos a Europea radica na marginalização que o povo Amazigh sofre por parte do Estado Marroquí, assim como identificar se dentro das reivindicações dos Amazigh está a formação de uma nação Amazigh independente.

Reforçamos os dados de contacto que pode utilizar caso deseje colocar uma dúvida, partilhar algum comentário, ou assinalar a sua intenção de receber informação sobre os principais resultados e conclusões do estudo: Mireia Rodrigo Fernández / mrfzo@iscte-iul.pt.

Mais uma vez, obrigado pela sua participação.

Annex B. Transcript of Interview to Casa Amaziga de Catalunya

Entrevista al Sr. Abdellah Ihmadi, membre de la Casa Amaziga de Catalunya i l'Associació Anaruz N Afrika.	**Interview with Mr. Abdellah Ihmadi, member of the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya and the Anaruz N Afrika Association.**
Barcelona, 28 de maig de 2021.	Barcelona, 28th May 2021.
Preguntes:	Questions:
INTRODUCCIÓ	**INTRODUCTION**
Pregunta 1: Sr. Abdellah, em pots explicar una mica sobre tu? D'on ets i des de quan vius a Catalunya? Des de quan ets membre de la Casa Amaziga de Catalunya?	**Question 1:** Mr. Abdellah, can you tell me about you? Where are you from and how long have you been in Catalonia? Since when have you been a member of the Casa Amazigh of Catalonia?
Sóc Abdellah Ihmadi, no hi ha registres perquè en realitat al poble i a la família em diuen Ahddawiy ayt lhou. Vaig néixer el 23 del 1976. Vaig arribar a Catalunya al 2008. Sóc membre de la Casa Amaziga des del 2015. També sóc membre de l'Associació Anaruz N Afrika, que està aquí a Sabadell, i també faig classes d'Amazic per als nens d'origen Amazic al centre cívic de Can Rull, que són classes que fem en coordinació amb el Departament d'Educació de la Generalitat (de Catalunya).	*I'm Abdellah Ihmadi, although my real family name is Ahddawiy ayt lhou. I was born in 1976. I arrived in Catalonia in 2008. I have been a member of the Casa Amazigh of Catalonia since 2015. I am also a member of the Anaruz N Afrika Association, based here in Sabadell. I also teach Amazigh for Amazigh children at the Civic Center Can Rull with the support of the Department of Education of the Catalan Government.*
Pregunta 2: Les classes estan obertes a persones que no són Amazic?	**Question 2:** Are Amazigh classes opened to non-Amazigh people?
Sí, però han de ser nens. Però la majoria que s'apunten són, i costa també, els Amazic. No és una llengua de prestigi i costa que s'apunti la gent.	*Yes, but they must be children. However, it is difficult to engage non-Amazigh and Amazigh students. It is not a language of prestige. Therefore, it is difficult to find people interested in learning the language.*
Pregunta 3: Quin és el seu treball en relació amb els menors no acompanyats?	**Question 3:** What is your work on unaccompanied minors?
Sóc educador en un centre de menors, sóc auxiliar educador, i des de 2015 que treballo allà. Aquella xerrada que vam fer (Xerrada sobre els menors estrangers no acompanyats al Casal Pere Quart de Sabadell el 6 de febrer de 2020), vaig convidar al director perquè parli d'això. Al final no es va poder, ell no podia, i al final vam canviar al documental aquest (Amazic: Una diáspora forçada (2020)). Vaig acompanyar aquells nois que	*I'm an educator in a shelter for unaccompanied minors since 2015. To the event (unaccompanied minors at Casal Pere Quart held in Sabadell on 6th February 2020), I invited the director of the shelter to talk about the topic but he couldn't attend. This is why we switched to the documentary (Amazic: una diàspora forçada (2020)) and I accompanied those unaccompanied minors who were there.*

eren allà. Llavors porto des de 2015 que treballo amb menors no acompanyats.	
PART A – PREGUNTES GENERALS SOBRE LES REVINDICACIONS AMAZIC	**PART A – GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT AMAZIGH DEMANDS**
Segons el Manifest berber, publicat al març de 2000, les demandes del poble amazic són les següents:	According to the Berber Manifesto, published in March 2000, the demands of the Amazigh people are as follows:
1. Introduir el debat de la qüestió Amazic en el Parlament marroquí. El manifest també destaca que parlar sobre la qüestió Amazic contribuirà a *«reduir la profunditat dels malentesos que han aparegut en les relacions entre els «joves amazic» i els «joves àrabs»* del Marroc». (Primera petició, Manifest berber, 2000).	1. To introduce the debate on the Amazigh issue into the Moroccan Parliament. The manifesto also highlights that speaking on the Amazigh question will contribute to *"reducing the depth of misunderstandings that have appeared between the "Amazigh Youth" and the "Arab Youth" of Morocco.*" (First petition, Berber Manifesto, 2000).
Pregunta 4: Em podries descriure quins conflictes han aparegut entre els joves Amazic i els joves Àrabs al Marroc?	**Question 4:** Can you explain what conflicts have emerged between *"Amazigh Youth"* and the *"Arab Youth" of Morocco*?
No tinc constància d'això, segurament si ha sorgit està, però té una mica de raó. Per exemple, jo quan estudiava a la universitat a la ciutat, quan vas a la ciutat, molta gent Amaziga tenen vergonya de parlar en Amazic. Quan parlem, si ens sent algú de la ciutat que no és Amazic, es riuen, com si estiguessis parlant una llengua molt rara. Evidentment si la societat marroquí fos bilingüe, és una riquesa per a la integració d'aquests col·lectius, es coneixeran més, cadascú sentirà que l'altre llengua és seva. Però si cadascú aprèn lo seu, lo altre....per a ells, l'Amazic és alguna cosa estranya. Seria al revés, lo autèntic s'ha convertit en alguna cosa estrany. I a més a més, els Amazics també, la majoria no se sent que l'Àrab és llengua seva, sobretot el Darija, que vulguis o no és la nostra llengua també, es un treball, un fruit, una cosa local nostra. Jo no parlo l'àrab estàndard que és una llengua morta. Que és morta. No la parla ningú. I és més relacionada amb la religió. Però el Darija és una barreja. Són Amazics que s'han arabitzat. La gramàtica i l'estructura és Amazic. El vocabulari, la majoria és àrab però hi ha Amazic, hi ha espanyol, llatí.	*I am not aware of that reality, but certainly, it is quite right. For example, when I was studying at university in the city or, when you go to the city, many Amazigh people are ashamed to speak in Amazigh. When we speak, if we are heard by someone from the city who is not Amazigh, they laugh, like you're speaking a very rare language. Obviously, if Moroccan society were bilingual, it would be wealthier for the integration of different groups. They will know more of each other, feeling the other language as theirs. The reality is that for them (Arabs), Amazigh is something weird. In fact, it is the other way around. The real (autochthon) has become something strange. Besides, the Amazigh people, mostly, they don't feel that Arabic is their language, especially Darija, since it owns to us as well. I do not speak Standard Arabic, which is a dead language. It's dead. No one speaks it. Also, Arabic is more related to religion but Darija is the oral language, a mixture of languages. It is from the Amazigh who have been Arabized. The grammar and structure are Amazigh. The vocabulary, mostly Arabic, has also influences from the Amazigh, Spanish, Latin.*
2. Que la llengua Tamazight s'estudi a les escoles. En el documental 'Amazics: una	2. To study Amazigh in schools. In the documentary 'Amazigh: A Forced Diaspora',

diàspora forçada', la Casa Amaziga de Catalunya mostra com, tot i que la llengua Tamazight ha estat reconeguda per la nova Constitució del 2011, no s'ha fet cap inversió per formar professors, fer plans d'estudi o ensenyar Tamazight a les escoles.	the Casa Amazigh of Catalonia shows how, although the Amazigh has been recognized by the new 2011 Constitution, no investment has been made to train teachers, create study plans and, in conclusion, to teach Amazigh in schools.
Si, al 2011 amb la Reforma Constitucional, amb les revoltes aquelles (Primavera Àrab) , el moviment Amazic era molt actiu al carrer, el Govern estava obligat a donar resposta i per això va oficialitzar l'Amazic però crec que sempre fan com el maquillatge. Coses formals, coses buides de contingut. Llavors, si, fem el Amazic llengua oficial, però està pendent de una Llei Orgànica per aplicar-la. Llavors, al Parlament s'ha de votar, s'ha de tramitar aquesta Llei Orgànica i com el govern...el Rei, qui és el que tenia el poder, va obligar a oficialitzar l'Amazic i, després, per no quedar malament, passa això al Parlament i al Govern, que són islamistes, àrab-islamistes, es va quedar allà. Fins ara, encara no s'ha fet aquesta Llei Orgànica. Llavors, han deixat tot això en mans dels directors de les escoles, dels departaments i depèn de si hi ha un director que està conscient de l'Amazic, llavors intenta fer formacions per a professors. Una llengua, encara que la parli una persona Amaziga, no la pot ensenyar, necessites d'una formació per ensenyar-la.	*In 2011, with the Arab Spring uprisings, the Amazigh movement was very active on the streets and the Moroccan government was forced to respond officialising the Amazigh with the Constitutional Reform. But, as always, they did so as make-up. Formal things, empty things. Hence, yes, we achieved to make the Amazigh an official language but it is pending on an Organic Law to implement it. The Parliament has to vote to approve this Organic Law. However, as the Parliament is in hands of the Arab-Islamist party, the Organic Law has not been proceeded yet and the King (Mohammed VI) washes his hands. So, they've left the responsibility of teaching Amazigh to directors of schools and it depends on their commitment and awareness towards the Amazigh cause. A language, even if spoken by an Amazigh person, cannot be taught without training and special education.*
Llavors, és això, com totes les reivindicacions, no només l'Amazic, intenten buidar-les del contingut i quan passi la tempesta, no passa res, no hi ha canvis, i de cara a l'exterior, hi ha reformes però en realitat no hi ha canvis.	*So, it's always like this, all demands, not just the Amazigh claims, they (Moroccan state) try to empty them of the content until weather the storm. There's no change inside, reforms are only cosmetics to get the international community support, but there's no change.*
3. També demaneu invertir en territoris on viuen els Amazic en àmbits relacionats amb l'agricultura, la indústria i la cultura Amazic, incloent la promoció dels seus pensadors, investigadors i artistes.	3. To invest in territories where the Amazigh live in sectors related to agriculture, industry and culture, including the promotion of Amazigh thinkers, researchers and artists.
Si, exacte.	*Yes, that's right.*
4. Permetre l'ús del Tamazigh en entitats públiques (mitjans de comunicació, tribunals, administració pública, centres de salut, etc.).	4. To allow the use of Amazigh in public services (mean of communications, justice courts, public administration, health centres, etc.).
Si, tot és àrab.	*Yes, it's all in Arabic.*
5. Poder registrar els noms en Tamazigh de nou nascuts, així com retornar els noms	5. To register names of newborns in Amazigh, as well as return the original names of streets,

originals de carrers, ciutats i regions en Tamazigh. S'ha produït algun canvi? *Últimament, crec que, de vegades. Abans hi havia una norma del Ministeri de l'Interior que prohibia posar noms que no fossin àrab musulmans. Va haver molta lluita dels Amazics fins que es va anular però, de vegades, depèn dels funcionaris. Vas allà i depèn del funcionari de registre civil, de vegades hi ha gent que reafirma que vol (registrar el nom en Amazic) i al final ho aconsegueix, però hi ha gent que no vol més problemes així que al final li posa un altre nom.*	cities and regions in Amazigh. Have there been any changes so far? *I would say yes, but also, sometimes. For instance, with the registration of newborns' names in Amazigh, there was a previous rule forbidding names other than in Arabic. After a lot of Amazigh fighting, the law was overturned but sometimes it depends on the officials who work in the Civil Registry Office. You go there and, it depends, sometimes people reaffirm that they want to register the name in Amazigh and they achieved it. But some want to avoid troubles in this bureaucratic procedure, and they end up registering their child with another name (in Arabic).*
Pregunta 5: Creus que darrere d'aquesta marginació de l'Estat marroquí hi ha una estratègia política per a forçar la migració Amazic i aconseguir un Estat àrab?	**Question 5:** Do you think that behind this marginalisation of the Moroccan state there is a political strategy to force Amazigh migration and achieve a Pan Arab state?
Això del tema de la marginació, quan un estat no és democràtic, no hi ha un repartiment de la riquesa i llavors hi ha una minoria que es beneficia i la majoria van buscant, buscant i sinó troben res, al final no els hi queda un altre remei que migrar. És una manera indirecta, és una migració forçosa. Això crec que és a tot al Marroc, no només a les zones Amazigues. Però també, a part d'això que pateixen les zones que no són amaziga fones, a part d'això, hi ha una repressió identitària i cultural pel que respecte a l'Amazic. A veure aquí sóc immigrant Amazic, igual que un no Amazic. Pel que fa a la migració som iguals, però a nivell identitari, cultural, de la llengua i tot això, pateixo més que ell. Si va al Consulat (del Marroc) per exemple, ell no té problemes de parlar, perquè parlen només en àrab. Si posa la tele, posa la tele en marroquí i és com si estigués allà. No perilla la seva llengua, tots els seus valors simbòlics no estan en perill, al revés que nosaltres.	*This issue of marginalisation, when a state is not democratic, there is no distribution of wealth, and then there is a minority that benefits, and the majority ends looking for something and, in the end, they have no other choice than migrating. It is a forced migration. However, I think this happens in Morocco in general and not just in the Amazigh areas. What is true is that Amazigh people suffer from identity and cultural repression in regards to their Amazigh origins. For instance, here I'm an immigrant, just like a non-Amazigh immigrant. As far as migration is concerned, we are equal, but at the identity, cultural and language level, I suffer more than an Arab migrant. For instance, if an Arab migrant goes to the Moroccan Consulate, he/she has no trouble talking, because they only speak in Arabic. If they turn on the TV, an Arab migrant feels like being at home. Their language is not in peril, all their symbols and values are not in danger, unlike us.*
Amb els meus fills, per exemple, em costa molt (transmetre la llengua Amazic) perquè és només a casa i un nen no només aprèn una llengua a l'àmbit familiar, sinó també al carrer, a l'escola, amb els amics, a la tele, llavors la influència una mica de la família es va perdent. Això com a exemple de que l'Amazic el que el manté són els seus parlants, l'àrab o el Darija hi ha Estats darrera, Ministeris, finançament, mitjans de	*With my children, for example, it costs me a lot to transmit the Amazigh language because a language is not only learned at home, but also in the streets, school, with friends, on TV. Then, the influence of the family is getting lost. This is an example of how the Amazigh is maintained only by its speakers whereas the Arabic or Darija (Arabic from Morocco) is supported and financed by States, Administrations, Media.*

comunicació, administració. Nosaltres, una persona que surt d'allà (Marroc) és una pèrdua.	*Each Amazigh person leaving Morocco is a loss.*
7. Al Manifest, també es fa referència a la reivindicació de que l'estat del Marroc financi les Associacions Culturals Amazic com a entitats del bé comú.	7. In the Manifesto there is a reference to the need of financing Amazigh Cultural Associations as entities of the common good.
Pregunta 6: La Casa Amaziga de Catalunya rep finançament de l'Estat marroquí?	**Question 6:** Is the Casa Amazigh of Catalonia receiving funds from the Moroccan state?
No. No obstant, crec que els moviments i les Associacions han anat guanyant terreny. Jo crec que des del 2000, segurament hi havia poc finançament i era difícil per les associacions Amazigues, la majoria treballàvem fóra del marc, però crec que ara, si, encara que fa temps que sóc fóra del Marroc, no sé exactament la realitat, però crec que algunes Associacions Amazics si reben finançament de l'Estat marroquí.	*No. However, I believe that associations have gained ground in this topic since 2000. There was certainly little funding and it was difficult for the Amazigh associations before, mostly working outside the framework. I think that now, although it has been a long time since I left Morocco and I don't know exactly what the reality is, I believe that some Amazigh associations are receiving funding from the Moroccan State.*
8. Llegint el manifest, entenc que els Amazic estan a favor de la monarquia constitucional però en contra de les persones que envolten la casa reial, els anomenats «cercles Makzhen» i el seu nacionalisme àrab.	8. Reading the manifesto, I understand that the Amazigh are in favor of the constitutional monarchy but against the people surrounding the royal house, the so-called «Makzhen cercles» and their Arab nationalism.
Pregunta 7: volia aclarir aquest punt perquè no em queda clar si hi ha un afecte o un desafecte per a la corona marroquina per part dels Amazic.	**Question 7:** I wanted to clarify this point because it is not clear to me whether there is an affection or disaffection for the Moroccan crown from part of the Amazigh.
El Makzhen és un concepte que és refereix a l'Estat, a la Monarquia al Marroc. Pel Rei, la Monarquia i els pan àrab islamistes, la seva legitimitat es basa en que, pels islamistes, el Rei és la religió. El Rei és el protector dels fidels musulmans i és descendent de Mahoma. Per a ells, aquesta és la legitimitat que té. Als Amazic no els hi interessa això. Els panarabistes volen la nació àrab. Els Amazics, els que tenim consciència de l'Amazic i tot això, tenen un altre referència de que és ser Amazic. L'Amazic és la terra, és oposada a l'altre (àrabs islamistes). Als Amazic ens veuen com a una invasió. A la religió no els hi interessa això dels Amazic, és com una competència ideològica. Per això, la majoria dels Amazics, el moviment Amazic en general, són contraris a la Monarquia. Això no vol dir que no hi hagi Amazics monàrquics, però el moviment en general, la seva	*The Makzhen is a concept that refers to the State, the Monarchy in Morocco. The King, the Monarchy and the Islamist pan-Arab groups, their legitimacy is based on the fact that, for the Islamists, the King is the religion. The King is the protector of the Muslim faithful and is descended from Muhammad. For them, that is the legitimacy the King has. The Amazigh are not interested in this. Pan Arabs want the Arab nation. The Amazigh, who are aware of the Amazigh identity, have opposite positions than Islamic Arabs. The Amazigh see in the Arabs an invasion and Islamists and Religion are not interested in Amazigh demands as they are ideological competitors. Therefore, the majority of Amazigh is contrary to the Monarchy. This does not mean that there are no monarchist Amazigh, but the movement in general, its reference or legitimacy is based on history, land, and being autochthon. For*

referència o legitimitat es basa en la història, en la terra, el ser autòctons, aquestes coses. Fins i tot això es veu en les festes que celebra el moviment Amazic, la majoria tenen relació amb el calendari agrícola, com el Cap d'Any Amazic. Fins i tot, la gent, a la nostra zona, no li diuen el Cap d'Any Amazic, diuen que és un Any Agrícola, També trobem la Primavera Amaziga que és recent, dels anys 80, nascuda per a reivindicar la repressió que van patir amb la intervenció a Algèria, quan van reprimir als universitaris que reivindicaven l'Amazic. Hi ha moltes festes Amazigues que no tenen arrels amb la religió o amb l'arabisme. En canvi, la majoria de les festes àrabs, la festa del Xai, la festa després del Ramadam, tot té origen religiós o àrab.	*instance, the Amazigh movement celebrates the Amazigh New Year related to the agricultural calendar. We also recently commemorate the Amazigh Spring due to the repressions to the Amazigh movement in Algeria in the 1980s, when the Arab State repressed university students claiming for Amazigh rights. Many Amazigh festivities have no roots in religion or the abyss. Instead, most of Arab celebrities, such as Ramadan or the Festival of the Lamb, have religious origins.*
Pregunta 8: Casa Amaziga de Catalunya va néixer a la dècada de 1960. En el documental 'Amazic: una diàspora forçada', feu referència a una comunitat Amazic a Catalunya de més de 130.000 persones, sent el Tamazigh la tercera llengua més parlada a Catalunya. Quins van ser els motius per fundar la Casa Amaziga de Catalunya?	**Question 8:** Casa Amaziga de Catalunya was born in the 1960s. In the documentary 'Amazic: A Forced diaspora', you refer to an Amazigh community in Catalonia of more than 130,000 people, with its language, the Tamazight, being the third most widely spoken language in Catalonia. What were the reasons for founding the Casa Amaziga de Catalunya?
Una de les raons per fundar la Casa Amaziga és reforçar el vincle amb la identitat de la llengua. Som conscients de que som Amazic però si estem aquí som també catalans i hem de treballar això.	*One of the reasons for founding the Casa Amaziga of Catalonia was to strengthen the link to the identity and the language. We are aware that we are Amazigh, but if we are here (in Catalonia), we are also Catalans, and we must work on this.*
Pregunta 9: Us sentiu identificats amb el poble de Catalunya? Podem comparar la situació política dels Amazic amb la dels catalans? Podria ser aquesta una raó per a triar Catalunya per a viure en comptes d'altres regions d'Espanya?	**Question 9:** Do you feel identified with the people of Catalonia? Can we compare the political situation of the Amazigh with that of the Catalans? Could this be a reason to choose Catalonia to live instead of other regions of Spain?
Crec que si, d'una manera directe o indirecte, crec que si. Fins als anys 2000, la nostra gent, la nostra comunitat, la nostra zona, els Amazics del sud i sud-est, ningú estava aquí, fins els anys de les pàteres, als 2000 que vam començar arribar aquí. No sé perquè vam arribar directament aquí (Catalunya). Però quan estàvem al poble, ja ens parlàvem de Catalunya: 'Són com els Amazic d'aquí, que parlen una llengua diferent i tal'. Si, quan parles amb un català i li expliques la nostra realitat, és ràpid que tingui empatia amb el que li estàs explicant. La majoria	*I think yes, directly or indirectly. Until the 2000s, our people, our community, our area, the Amazigh from the South and South-East, no one was here (in Catalonia). I do not know why we came directly here (Catalonia), but I remember when we were in the village, we listened to histories about Catalonia: "They're like the Amazigh people here, they speak a different language like us". Also, when you talk to a Catalan and explain our reality, it's easy to have empathy with what you're explaining. Most of the Amazigh in Spain are living in Catalonia and the Basque Country and it is*

d'associacions Amazigues estan a Catalunya i al País Basc, i és per això també. Perquè la societat simpatitza, són processos, són experiències diferents però tenim moltes coses en comú i això facilita el vincle, la integració. De vegades, els menors no acompanyats quan parlen entre ells, es refereixen al Català com l'Amazic del Marroc.	*because society sympathise with our cause. They (Basques and Catalans) are in different processes, they have lived different experiences, but we have a lot in common and that creates a link that eases our integration. Sometimes unaccompanied minors refer to Catalan as the Amazigh language from Morocco.*
Pregunta 10: Creus que Catalunya és, pel poble Amazic, un referent polític?	**Question 10:** Do you think Catalonia is, for the Amazigh, a political referent?
Crec que sí, moltes coses les hem après a Catalunya. El procés, l'experiència, la història és molt diferent a la nostra. Perquè la causa Amaziga no és com aquí que està concentrada a un territori. Nosaltres és al revés. Dins de l'estat marroquí, som la majoria i no estem en una zona concreta que volem la independència. És al revés, nosaltres el que volem és reivindicar la 'Amazigitat' del territori del Marroc, no només d'una zona, perquè considerem que el poble Marroquí o del nord de l'Àfrica són Amazic, que alguns s'han arabitzat, llavors han perdut la llengua, només la llengua, perquè la manera de ser, la música, els costums, són Amazics. No tenen res a veure amb els àrabs d'orient i tot això. I hi ha zones que han conservat l'Amazic, sobretot les zones muntanyoses, on hi ha obstacles naturals, la muntanya, el desert, s'ha conservat l'Amazic. Aquí hi ha barreres naturals que han conservat (l'Amazic), al contrari que a les zones de prats, fàcils de conquistar, que s'han arabitzat. Històricament, no va haver una invasió sinó són les tribes que es van arabitzant. Es això, nosaltres el que reivindiquem és la 'Amazigitat' del Nord d'Àfrica i del Marroc. Llavors Catalunya està en un lloc concret, té el seu territori, Catalunya o els Països Catalans, volent independitzar-se d'Espanya. Nosaltres no volem independitzar-nos del nostre territori. Reivindiquem que es torni, que es reconegui la 'Amazigitat' del nostre territori.	*I think we have learned a lot from Catalonia. The process, experience, history is very different from ours. Because the Amazigh cause is not like here (Catalonia) that Catalans are concentrated in a territory. We are the other way around. Within the Moroccan state, we are the majority and we are not in a specific area, we are spread through all the territory. So, we do not pursue independence. Conversely, we claim for the Amazigh identity recognition throughout Morocco's territory, not just in an area, because we consider that the people of Morocco or North Africa are Amazigh, some of whom have been Arabized, losing their language, but only this. The way they are, the music they listen to and their customs are Amazigh. We have nothing in relation to the Arabs from Asia at all. Natural barriers like mountains and the desert have preserved the Amazigh unlike in meadows that were easily conquered and Arabized. Historically, there was not an invasion, but rather, it was the tribes that were being Arabized. In conclusion, what we pursue is the recognition of the so-called 'Amazigity' of North Africa and Morocco. Catalonia pursues the independence of Spain from a particular territory. We do not want to become independent of our territory. We want to be recognised the 'Amazigity' of our territory.*
Pregunta 11: Hi ha algun interès polític, social i cultural per a perseguir una nació Amazic?	**Question 11:** Is there any political, social and cultural interest in pursuing an Amazigh nation?
No, només volem que es reconegui la 'Amazigitat' del nostre territori. Hi ha una altre cosa. Per a mi, jo em sento més Amazic que marroquí. Per a mi, l'estat marroquí és	*No, we just want the 'Amazigity' of our territory to be recognised. There is something else. For me, I feel more Amazigh than Moroccan. I believe that Morocco is something new, the*

una cosa nova, l'estat actual marroquí es va crear a França a 1912 per a la colonització francesa. La nostra zona com a exemple no perteneixia al Marroc fins al 1933 quan França va colonitzar la nostra zona. S'ha creat l'estat actual i s'han posat fronteres amb Algèria. La nostra tribu està dividida, una part està a Algèria i una altra part està al Marroc.	*current Moroccan state was created in France in 1912 for the French colonization. Our territories, as an example, were not Moroccan until 1933 when France colonised our area. The current state has been recently created and borders with Algeria have been established. Our tribe is divided, one part is in Algeria and the other is in Morocco.*
Per nosaltres, la manera d'organitzar-se políticament, ens és igual, si estem en un estat federal, etc. El que ens importa és que reconeguin el nostre dret cultural, identitari i territorial.	*For us, the way to organise our self politically is not important. If we are in a federal state, or in another political frame. What matters to us is that our cultural, identity and territorial rights are recognised.*
Però hi ha moltes coses aquí a Catalunya, tot i que són diferents, però hi ha coses que hem après aquí interessants que són referents. Per exemple, el tema de la llengua, la normalització de la llengua, mitjans de comunicació, el catalanisme, etc.	*But there are a lot of things here in Catalonia, even though they are different, we have learned and have become our referents. For example, the normalization of the language, media communication and the movement of being Catalan, the so-called 'catalanism'.*
PART B – PREGUNTES ESPECÍFIQUES SOBRE MENORS NO ACOMPANYATS	**PART B – SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT UNACCOMPANIED MINORS**
En aquesta part, m'agradaria aprofundir sobre les motivacions dels menors no acompanyats del Marroc per a emigrar a Europa.	In this part, I would like to dwell on the motivations of unaccompanied minors from Morocco to emigrate to Catalonia
Pregunta 12: Quants menors no acompanyats ateneu des de la Casa Amaziga de Catalunya? Heu notat els efectes de la pandèmia en l'arribada de menors no acompanyats a Catalunya? Ha augmentat o disminuït?	**Question 12:** How many unaccompanied minors are you attending from Casa Amazigh of Catalonia? Have you noticed the effects of the pandemic on the arrival of unaccompanied minors in Catalonia? Has it increased or decreased?
Tenim contacte amb nens que estan als centres i recursos de nens tutelats de la Generalitat (de Catalunya). Fem activitats amb ells, col·laboren amb l'Associació quan hi ha alguna activitat, celebracions. Venen i participen.	*We are in contact with children who are in the shelters under the aegis of the Generalitat (Catalan Government). We do activities with them and they collaborate and participate in the Association's activities and celebrations as well.*
Durant la pandèmia, s'ha notat molt que ha baixat el nombre de nens i nenes que arriben aquí. Al centre on treballo, normalment, la capacitat és per a 30 i vam arribar quasi a 15 nois. Ha baixat molt.	*During the pandemic, it has been noted that the number of children arriving here decreased. In the shelter where I work, the capacity is for 30 children and we attend just 15 boys. It has come down a lot.*

Pregunta 13: La majoria són «joves Amazic» o «joves Àrabs»? Nois o noies?	**Question 13:** Are they *"Amazigh Youth"* or *"Arab Youth"*? Males or females?
Hi ha de tot (joves Amazic i joves Àrabs). Al centre on estem és de nens però hi ha centres de noies i mixtes encara que la majoria que arriben són nens.	*Both ("Amazigh youth" and "Arab youth"). The shelter where I work it is only for male children, but there are mixed and only female shelters. In any case, the majority of unaccompanied minors arriving in Catalonia are males.*
Pregunta 14: En la teva opinió i experiència treballant amb menors no acompanyats, quines són les raons per les que els menors decideixen migrar sols malgrat els viatges arriscats, desarrelament familiar i la seva posterior integració en un nou país?	**Question 14:** In your opinion and experience working with unaccompanied minors, what are the reasons why minors decide to migrate alone despite risky journeys, uprooting families and their subsequent integration into a new country?
Jo crec, per resumir-ho tot, és falta de futur. No hi ha, necessitats bàsiques com per exemple, sobretot el tema de l'educació, la sanitat, no n'hi ha. Llavors, al final, els nens, i fins i tot, la família en general, veu que el seu fill no tindrà futur.	*To sum up, I believe it is a lack of future. There are no basic needs, such as, for example, education, public health services, there are no such things. Then, in the end, the children, and even the families in general, see that their child will have no future.*
Falta de perspectives de futur. Perquè a vegades et trobes allà al Marroc famílies que no es que tinguin necessitats econòmiques, no es que tinguin fam, però les famílies veuen que els seus fills no estudiaran res. Les escoles públiques quasi s'han destruït. L'escola privada, els que inverteixen és només per guanyar diners, no és per educar. Llavors, millor que vagi allà (Europa), tindrà millor futur allà (Europa) que aquí (Marroc). Una altre cosa és que sigui cert això o no, perquè de vegades la gent imagina una cosa. De vegades els nens el que necessiten és estar amb els seus pares. També depèn de si són nens amb famílies una mica des estructurades, llavors és molt difícil que tirin endavant. En canvi, si és un nen amb una família darrera, es nota molt. Té educació, té valors, ja sap perquè ha vingut, té recolzament de la família, llavors és molt fàcil que s'adapti aquí, però si té una família una mica des estructurada, (els nens) passen pel carrer. Arriben amb una motxilla molt grossa que necessiten atenció especialitzada que no trobaran aquí.	*There is no future. Sometimes, Moroccan families that are not financially in need, are not hungry, see that their children will not be studying anything. Public schools have almost been destroyed. Private schools, those who invest in are only to make profit, not to educate. Then, it is better to migrate (Europe), to better have a future than to stay here (Morocco). Another thing is if that's true or not, because sometimes this is not the reality and it is only in people's imagination. Sometimes what children need are to be with their parents. It also depends on whether they are children with dysfunctional families. If so, it is very difficult for them to move forward. Instead, if the child has a supportive family behind him, we notice it a lot. They have education and values, and they know why they have migrated alone, their families support them and, then, it is very easy to be integrated here. Otherwise, unaccompanied children with dysfunctional families are doomed to sleep in the street. They come with a very heavy backpack that needs specialized attention that they will not find here.*
Pregunta 15: Recentment, hem vist com milers de persones, inclosos menors no acompanyats, han creuat nadant a Ceuta sense cap control per part de l'Estat marroquí. Què sents veient aquestes imatges i què creus que	**Question 15:** Recently, we have seen thousands of people, including unaccompanied minors, swimming to cross to Ceuta without any control of the Moroccan state. What do you feel about these recent events and what do you think could

es podria fer per part de la comunitat internacional per eradicar la migració de menors no acompanyats del Marroc.	be done by the international community to eradicate the migration of unaccompanied minors from Morocco?
Crec que, amb la informació que arriba aquí, no sé allà com ho percebeixen, però el que ha fet el règim del Marroc, si és degut a una reacció per acollir a una persona malalta, llavors ha perdut el relat. Hi ha convenis internacionals, en temps de guerra i tot això, ja em diràs. Si hi ha algunes informacions o raons que no coneixem, no sé. Jo crec que el règim del Marroc s'ha equivocat i també, l'altre banda, la Unió Europea i Espanya, no sé quan es donaran conta de com és el seu veí. El futur està en recolzar els moviments democràtics i així el poble podrà viure amb dignitat i ja no tindràs problemes de migració. La relació serà millor que quan tinguis un veí que és una dictadura com el Marroc. Mai sabràs on et sortirà i s'ha de diferenciar entre els Estats, el Règim i el Poble. Les fotos i els vídeos, les imatges que s'han vist, es veu com la gent està ofegada al Marroc. Sento a la Unió Europea i a Espanya parlant, per exemple, dels drets humans a Rússia, i no parlen dels drets (humans) al Marroc. Al moviment (Hirak) els van condemnar a 20 anys de presó, només per reivindicacions socials. Hi ha molts altres casos, com ara periodistes encarcerats. No parlen d'aquestes coses però donen diners a aquest règim i els diners només són per fer la feina bruta, aquesta de policia, i els diners se'ls queden ells i les empreses europees que estan allà. Hi ha més matisos. De forma superficial és això però, no sabem exactament que hi ha, perquè de vegades si només és una reacció de rebre el líder del Polisario i fas tot això. O ets tonto o hi ha alguna cosa més?	*I think, with the information that comes here, I do not know how they (Moroccans) perceive it, but what the Moroccan regime has done, if it is due to a reaction to welcome a sick person, then, they have lost their story. There are international conventions, in times of war and all of this. If there is some information or reasons that we do not know, I don't know. I believe that the Moroccan regime has made a mistake and also, on the other hand, the European Union and Spain, I don't know when they are going to be aware of the kind of neighbour they have. The future lies in supporting democratic movements, so people can live with dignity and migratory problems will end. The relationship will be better than when you have a neighbor who is a dictatorship like Morocco. You will never know what will happen (with a dictatorship). It must be distinguished between State, the Regime and the People. The photos and videos, the images that we have seen, reflect how people are drowning in Morocco. I hear the European Union and Spain, speaking out for human rights in Russia, and they don't speak about (human) rights in Morocco. Some demonstrators from the Hirak movement were recently sentenced to 20 years to prison, only for social claims. There are many journalists in jail, as well. They do not talk about these things but they give money to this Regime and the money is just to do the dirty work of border control police. The money goes to certain people and European companies that are making a profit of being there. There are more nuances. We don't know exactly what's in it.*
Pregunta 16: Com es relaciona el poble Amazic amb altres lluites d'identitat al seu voltant, com per exemple, el Sahrauís?	**Question 16:** How does the Amazigh relate to other identity struggles near you, such as the Saharawi?
La veritat que amb el poble Sahrauí tenim poca relació perquè ens consideren com part del Marroc o part del règim del Marroc. Nosaltres també tenim punts de diferència amb ells perquè, per a nosaltres, a veure, ells volen fundar una República àrab-sahrauí i, el moviment Amazic, no tenim problemes amb el marc jurídic o polític, però tenim problemes amb això de 'àrabs' perquè per nosaltres és	*The truth is that we have little relationship with the Sahrawi people because they regard us as part of Morocco or part of the Moroccan regime. We also have different points of view. They pursue an Arab-Saharan Republic. The Amazigh movement has no problems with the legal or political framework, but we struggle with pursuing an Arab State. Because for us, their land is an African land, it is an Amazigh*

una terra africana, és una terra Amaziga. Els àrabs estan a Àsia. Per a nosaltres és la mateixa ideologia que la del Rei, que diu que és àrab, descendent de Mahoma, que els sahrauís del Sàhara Occidental que diuen que són àrabs. Fins i tot la bandera se sembla més a la de Palestina. Si veus la bandera del Polisario amb la bandera Palestina és igual perquè els règims que els van recolzar eren panarabistes (Gadafi, etc). El comunisme, el bloc comunista d'aquell temps quan hi havia la guerra freda. En canvi, el monarca marroquí està al costat dels Estats Units i d'Europa. És d'aquesta època que es van posar el nom de la República Àrab Sahrauí Democràtica. També entre els estudiants, les corrents estudiantils, de tant en tant, hi ha enfrontaments entre el corrent estudiantil Amazic i el corrent estudiantil Sahrauí. Però tenim una cosa en comú: el règim marroquí. És lamentable que no arribem a unir forces en contra del mateix adversari.	*territory. The Arabs are in Asia. For us, the Saharawi ideology is the same than the Kings legitimacy, who says that he is Arab, descended from Mohammed. Even the flag looks more like Palestine. If you see the Polisario's flag compared to the Palestinian flag, it is the same because the regimes that supported them were pan-Arabists (Gadafi, etc). Communism from the time of the Cold War was in both causes. The Moroccan monarchy is on the side of the United States and Europe. It is from this time that the name of the Republic Sahrawi Arab Democratic was given. Among student movements, Amazigh and Sahrawis, there have been also disagreements. The question is that we have one thing in common: the Moroccan Regime. It is regrettable that we cannot be together against the same opponent.*