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## **In contrast to regime survival: Analysing political institutions under underdemocratic regimes: The case of Guinea-Bissau 1994-2019**

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Mestrado em Ciência Política

Orientadora:  
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ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

Outubro de 2021



SOCIOLOGIA  
E POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS

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Departamento de Ciência Política e Políticas Públicas

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## **DEDICATION**

This dissertation is dedicated to my beloved mother Cecilia Camara. May *N'ghala Ndan* grant *Mama* a safe home in heaven until I meet her again.

## **ABSTRACT**

Classical works on authoritarian politics mostly considered political institutions under nondemocratic regimes as mere window dressing. Yet, contemporary works dispute that idea and argue that political institutions are used to facilitate survival in power. This dissertation explored how political institutions are manipulated by the political class and the potential factors why this has contributed to political instability and lack of survival in power in Guinea-Bissau from 1994-2019, differently from what we observe in other non-democratic societies.

To achieve this goal, qualitative methods and thematic analysis were carried out with three major themes emerging. First, the manipulation of institutions for survival; second, the use of institutions for co-optation and the challenges of power-sharing; third, credible threat in relation to minimization of loss. Findings of this work show the following; first, institutions in Guinea-Bissau; the legislature and political parties are the root causes of instability rather than survival. Second, leaders do co-opt potential opponents but they do not redistribute rent and power sufficiently to ensure that co-optation eliminates the risk of coups. Third, political parties are important but with weak structures, very vertical and unable to distribute rent and to anticipate threats. Fourth, political parties pose credible threats to each other due to their use of military force but access to government and parliamentary or party positions are not a guarantee that opponents will not try to oppressively remove leaders from power. Therefore, the risk of manipulating institutions for survival comes with threats, and these threats have been the driven force for instability since 1994.

**Keywords:** *Political institutions, threats, dictatorship, regime survival, Guinea-Bissau.*

## **RESUMO**

A maioria dos clássicos sobre política autoritária considerava as instituições políticas em regimes não-democráticos como mera fachada. No entanto, as obras contemporâneas tendem a disputar essa ideia e argumentam que as instituições políticas são usadas para facilitar a sobrevivência no poder. Esta dissertação explora a forma como as instituições políticas são manipuladas pela classe política e os possíveis fatores que fazem com que as instituições contribuam para a instabilidade política e a falta de sobrevivência no poder na Guiné-Bissau entre 1994-2019 contrariamente ao que se sucede na maioria dos regimes não democráticos.

A fim de alcançar este objetivo, foram utilizados métodos qualitativos e uma análise de três grandes temas. Primeiro, a manipulação de instituições para a sobrevivência; segundo, a utilização de instituições para a cooptação e os desafios da partilha de poder; terceiro, a ameaça credível em relação à minimização da perda. Os resultados deste trabalho mostram o seguinte: primeiro, as instituições na Guiné-Bissau, o parlamento e os partidos políticos são as causas profundas da instabilidade e não da sobrevivência; segundo, os líderes cooptam potenciais opositores mas não redistribuem suficientemente a renda e o poder para assegurar que a cooptação elimina o risco de golpes de Estado; terceiro, os partidos políticos são importantes mas têm estruturas fracas, muito verticais e incapazes de distribuir a renda e de antecipar ameaças; quarto, os partidos políticos representam ameaças credíveis entre si devido ao uso da força militar mas o acesso ao governo e as posições parlamentares ou partidárias não são garantia de que os opositores não tentem remover opressivamente os líderes do poder. Por conseguinte, o risco de manipulação das instituições para sobreviver no poder vem com ameaças, e estas ameaças têm sido a força motriz da instabilidade desde 1994.

**Palavras-chave:** *Instituições políticas, Ameaças, Ditadura, Sobrevivência do regime, Guiné-Bissau.*

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATION**

APU-PDGB- The Assembly of the people United-Democratic party of Guinea-Bissau.

FDS- Social Democratic Front.

FLING- Liberation Front for the Independence of Guinea.

MADDEM-15-Movement for democratic alternative.

PAIGC-African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

PND- Party for renovation and development.

PRS-Party for Social Renewal.

PS- Socialist party.

PRID- Republican Party for Independence and Development.

PUSD- United social democratic party.

RGB-MB-Resistance of Guinea-Bissau - Bafatá Movement.

UM-Union for change.



## 1 INTRODUCTION

In an attempt to describe the behavior and attitude of African leaders in their struggle for political power and resources<sup>1</sup>, the former Vice-President of Sierra-Leone Solomon E. Berewa stated the following: *“They devoted their energies to enhancing and promoting their personal rule, their own well-being and personal ego and effecting measures aimed only at their own survival in office, with personal rule came bad governance and fragile government. The leader would ignore the rules to bend the rules and make new rules to serve his own interest.”* This judgment portrays a persistent power struggle among a small but powerful group of Guinea-Bissau’s political elites and it is the very foundation of institutional breakdown and undemocratic regimes since the fall of PAIGC<sup>2</sup> single party regime earlier in the 1980s and the opening of multiparty democracy in the mid 1990s.

To better comprehend the complexity of Guinea-Bissau political instability, its enduring stateless and institutional challenges, this dissertation takes a theoretical approach, focused on institutional analysis such as political parties and the legislature, bearing in mind specific manipulative variables used in a nondemocratic regime by the political elites for survival. These variables include; manipulation of political institutions for survival, the use of institutions for co-optation (Gandhi, 2008; Lust-Okar, 2005), and credible threat (Svolik, 2012; Moustafa, 2009), in relation to minimization of loss (Wright and Folch, 2011). The study aims to explain the actions of political actors through the analysis of political institutions. Therefore,

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<sup>1</sup>. This dissertation described resources to be the nation’s natural wealth and state finances. Guinea-Bissau has great biodiversity with host of minerals. These natural resources includes; fish, timber, phosphates, bauxite, clay, granite, limestone, and unexploited deposit of oil and petroleum. The first studies of phosphates in the city of Farim was conducted in 1980. The Farim phosphate project is considered to be a superior quality capable of producing about 2 million t per annum. Bauxity was spotted in the historic city of Boe since 1950’s. <http://legalmca.com/enGB/2020/05/25/guinea-bissau-a-hidden-opportunity/> (Access on the 7/27/2021/, at 7:32PM, Tuesday). Bauxity reserves are estimated at 17 million tons, and it is the 25% of the world known reserve resources of Bauxite.

The fisheries sector account for 3.3% of the GDP with 38 million USD of gross value added in 2013 and on annual state revenue of some 12 to 15 million USD. FAO estimated that, “in 2016, the country exported USD 4.7 million fishery products”. With the recent deposit of oil in the Northern region and shared zone of Cassamance with Senegal, several companies are already settled for prospecting and production. Among them, CNOOC, Swedish Svenska Petroleum exploration, Australian For Limited. Hence, Guinea-Bissau, is the 5<sup>th</sup> world producer of Cashew. <https://www.azominig.com//Article.aspx?ArticleID=207> (Access on the 7/27/2021/ at 7:27PM, Tuesday). These resources and state finances including taxes and foreign aid are at the centre of controversies among those who occupy public offices and political power.

<sup>2</sup>. PAIGC (The African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape-Verde), was founded by Amilcar Lopes Cabral in September 19, 1956. Guinea-Bissau became independent from the Portuguese colonial power in 1973 (Kohnert, 2015). Hence, the nation’s post-colonial era stems from a series of interrelated phenomena rooted in the burdensome and contradictory colonial legacy process of class formation that began with a conflict between native Bissau-Guinean and Cape-Verdeans descendants within PAIGC. Therefore, the weight of culture and history, the struggle for wealth and privilege, and the vicissitudes of scarcity and poverty have all generated despotic forms of undemocratic practices in Guinea-Bissau politics over the decades.

I have translated this into the following research question<sup>3</sup>: *Why do political institutions fail to ensure regime survival in Guinea-Bissau?*

Guinea-Bissau's decades of severe political instability and a shift from ideological politics to an unsubstantiated political elites' power struggle with a highly divided and interventionist military, makes the established institutions incapable of preventing excesses of power. It is, therefore, clearly a politically fragile state in which wealth is unevenly distributed and the country's resources are shared via a network of clientele within the political group in power (Ferreira, 2010). On the contrary, such a collapse of state institutions contributes to a war of all against all, a battlefield where everyone's private interest confronts everyone else's and where chaos, civil strife, and insecurity become a hellish way of life (Fatton, 1990).

From 1974, growing authoritarianism, severe economic problems, and a project intensification of cooperation with Cape Verde led to a successful coup in November 1980. This coup marked the beginning of political instability in Guinea-Bissau, bringing to power João Bernardo Nino Vieira. In order to maintain his power, Vieira managed to play off rivals against each other, thus surviving many alleged coup attempts. Since the mid-1980s, economic structural adjustment and international pressure led to economic liberalization, followed by political liberalization that resulted in the first multiparty election in 1994 (BTI Country Report, 2020).

Vieira's outrageous, authoritarian and brutal rule juxtaposes that, Guinea-Bissau's institutions from the early 1990s were primarily controlled and manipulated (Ostheimer, 1999), with a strong foundation of militarization and single-party authoritarian regime. PAIGC was the exclusive political force with no genuine process of democratization that obstructed the nation's attempted transition to a multiparty democracy of which the effort to preserve and to strengthen democratic institutions is marred by friction disagreement and political uncertainty (Andrea, 2010). PAIGC's introduced a complex power struggle where the most effective means of enhancing one's position in government was to form secret, informal factions. Patron-client ties are usually developed between party leaders and their extended families, personal friends, ethnic group members, and lower-level party men as a means of building trustworthy personal support and to base their power and control over resources or simply to remain in their positions (Forrest, 1992).

With the opening of multiparty democracy in 1994, Guinea-Bissau adopted a semi-presidential political system. Chapter (I), article 59 of the constitution<sup>4</sup>, specifies the independence and separation of

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<sup>3</sup>. Brawnlee (2007), indicated that, to explain why many regimes continue to cling to power requires that we comprehend not just the third wave but also its undercurrents. For this task, structural variables that seemed antiquated may prove surprisingly useful, particularly if they are integrated with the study of political action through institutions (Brownlee, 2007). Thus, one of the objectives of this study is to examine in a new perspective, actions of the political class through the established political institutions.

<sup>4</sup>. It is of essence to mention that, in this section of the constitution, chapter (I), article 59, there are four sovereign institutional bodies namely; The presidency of the republic, the legislature, executive and the judiciary. Guinea-

power among organs of government. Although the separation of power is in place, checks and balances are frequently subjected to interferences (BTI Country Report, 2020), of political elites including the undue influence of the military on politics (Kohnert, 2015). This path of Guinea-Bissau's democratization process shall be analyzed in subsequent sections of this dissertation with a focus on political parties and the legislature in relation to regimes' trajectories from 1994-2019.

However, during the optimistic phase of the third wave<sup>5</sup> (Di Palma, 1990), democratization could essentially be reduced to the business of crafting new institutions to institutionalize uncertainties (Przeworski, 1986). An important body of literature subsequently developed to identify the statecraft that brought formal democratic institutions into being. Attention has been paid to the design of new constitutions, the holding of elections, the establishment of a new party system and executive-legislative relations (Grugel and Bishop, 2012). Yet, institutional decisions made during this transition period of earlier regimes formation particularly in Africa, tend to reflect the balance of power between the incumbent and emerging opposition forces. Such divergences of power balance in the context of Guinea-Bissau have been mostly personalist, factional, and not ideological among the elites composed of civil and military actors (Embaló, 2012), with continuous signs of increasing undemocratic predispositions and political vulnerability.

Various approaches have been adopted in the literature in relation to the functions of institutions in undemocratic regimes. The burgeoning literature on the new institutionalism in the study of authoritarian regimes has expanded the field of research about authoritarianism to encompass its legislative institutions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1995; Wright 2008; Malesky 2009). In contrast to the old institutionalism that centered on the party-state, the armed forces, and the repressive apparatus, new institutionalist studies concentrate on constitutions, legislatures, elections, and parties (Brownlee 2007; Geddes 2008; Gehlbach 2008; Greene 2007; Keefer 2008; Magaloni 2006; Smith 2005) in authoritarian politics. Taking the presence of these institutions in authoritarian regimes seriously, this body of research has hitherto focused on explaining the rationale for the inception of legislatures and the role they fulfill (Bonvecchi and Simison, 2017).

However, although this body of literature has made essential contributions to the study of institutions in undemocratic regimes, yet it mostly focuses on stable authoritarian regimes whereby the ultimate goal of manipulating political institutions is for survival. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, although

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Bissau is a semi-presidential system whereby the president is the head of state with a prime-minister as head of government. Voted political party with highest number of MP's usually form the executive. The chief Justice as head of judiciary is elected by members of the judiciary association with term limits.

<sup>5</sup> “The waves of democracy are major surges of democracy which have occurred in history. The term appears at least as early as 1887 and it was popularized by Samuel P. Huntington, in his article published in the *journal of Democracy*, Harvard University and further expounded in his book the *third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*.

democratic institutions exist, the nation remains an unstable democracy with leaders incapable to survive in power.

This dissertation will clarify the complex interaction between collective action, commitment, and monitoring problems in undemocratic regimes (Boix and Svulik, 2013). This is because Guinea-Bissau had a full dominant one party rule under the leadership of João Bernardo Nino Vieira from the 1980s to 1994. From 1994 Vieira was elected as the first democratic president and overthrown in 1998. From 1994 to 2019, no executive government has ever completed a full four years term in office, the nation was run purely by factions of political, civil and military elites. However, from 2014 to 2019, for the first time in history, the elected president Jose Mario Vaz completed his five years term of office and contentiously handed over power. The 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections brought in another new dynamic of Guinea-Bissau's power struggle of which I shall examine subsequently. This study shall, therefore, broaden our institutional analysis purposely to high-level, deliberative and decision-making bodies in undemocratic and unstable regimes and explain why power-sharing may occur with institutions in more durable ruling coalitions and succeeds under less favorable circumstances than power-sharing without institutions (Boix and Svulik, 2013).

The dissertation is organized, in addition to the introduction and conclusion, into three sections. In the first section, I shall analyse the literature on political institutions under undemocratic regimes, considering a theoretical framework that will help us look into Guinea-Bissau's democratization process from 1994-2019. In the second section, I shall look into specific research objectives, hypotheses and methodology. The third section of this dissertation ends with the analysis of the data and discussions on the functions of institutions in undemocratic regimes in the context of Guinea-Bissau, and assess how political actors' actions through institutions reflect the dynamics of power struggle and instability.

## 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Political Institutions: Conceptual Framework

Studies on political institutions have been especially fruitful in the field of comparative democratization. Consequently, I define political institution as; “relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning” (March and Olsen, 2006:3). This definition helps us to think of political institutions as socially constructed, and the equilibria that emerge from the strategic behavior of political actors (Pepinsky, 2013), whereby the behavioral outcome can be examined.

Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003), point out the crucial link between institutions as contextual constraints and outcomes as consequences of the collective choice of behavior. Therefore, to determine if institutions affect outcomes and how they do so, it is critical that we draw a line between institutions and behavior, and show how these incentives and constraints influence political actions<sup>6</sup>. However, institutionalization implies historicity, which is determined by the routine and reversibility of actions where intergenerational continuity is established. With generational reproduction, institutions gain objectivity and legitimacy, they are transformed into an objective reality that pre-exists one’s birth with solid and rigid, almost unquestionable meaning (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). It makes sense to carefully understand strategic dilemmas that confront political actors and how institutions address or do not address them (Gandhi and Rufino, 2017), for the fact that political institutions govern the interactions of individuals and groups and set out rules of the game (North, 1990).

Essentially, the work of Brownlee (2007), enables us to make sense of how political actors behave and how effective they are at achieving their goals. His analysis demonstrated that, without taking institutions into account, we are left to observe major events without the contextual reference to point what motivates the actors’ involvement and what determines their success which makes institutions vital in the study of regime change and survival, high-stakes conflict as well as a restructuring of the political system.

Geddes (1999) shows that, although political leaders stand at the forefront of politics, some less visible factors, economic resources and ideology constantly shape the choices they face and the outcomes they bring about. Therefore, recognizing such structural influences, the literature on democratization has increasingly sought to integrate them into accounts of human agency and choice (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Remmer 1991; Snyder 1992; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Mahoney and Snyder 1999), which makes political choices for institutional reform and independence as a major problem to Guinea-Bissau democratic consolidation.

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<sup>6</sup>. Considering Pepinsky (2013), perspective; it is misleading to consider institutions as exogenous constraints on individual behavior, for they are by definition endogenous to both the interests of the individuals whose behavior they appear to constrain and the environment in which these individuals interact.

## **2.2 Political institution in a nondemocratic setting: The legislature and political parties**

Unlike previous studies of authoritarian institutions, which contended that institutions ultimately undermined political elites' hold on power, the new literature on authoritarian institutions disputes that elites purposefully create institutions that consolidate their hold on political power to foster durable authoritarian rule (Pepinsky, 2013). As a result, this section reviews the following institutions; the legislature, political parties and looks at elites' actions taken into consideration how institutions play their democratic role when primarily vulnerable to strategic manipulation of political actors.

Considering the single dominant party regimes, Pepinsky (2013), draws attention to the role of political institutions in relation to dominant parties that oversee national legislatures to undergirding authoritarian rule. For example, in a nondemocratic setting, regular interaction in high-level, deliberative, and decision-making bodies within authoritarian parties and legislatures reduces asymmetries of information between the dictator and his allies and thus precludes destabilizing elite conflicts (Boix and Svobik 2013), but the potential of institutions to perform these functions ultimately depends on the allies' capacity to credibly threaten to replace the dictator.

In the case of Guinea-Bissau, for example, the instituted commission of enquiry of 1997 in the case of selling of military arms to the rebel forces of Casamance, Vieira's "attempt to divert attention from his own involvement in arms trafficking by suspending his commander-in-chief, produced the opposite result to what had expected" (Rudebeck, 2001:28), which is the civil conflict of 1998 and Vieira's overthrow. Thus, the balance of power-sharing between Vieira and his allies, as well as his inability to minimize the credibility of threat rendered by the then legislature once controlled by his regime was ineffective. Such supposition determined complex interaction between collective action, commitment, and monitoring problems by institutions in nondemocratic regimes (Boix and Svobik, 2013). Guinea-Bissau's various Coup d'état and political instability have shown that the established deliberative institutional bodies namely; political party and the legislature, represent a mutual credible threat without the appropriate use of redistribution of power and rent.

Literature on the role of legislatures in authoritarian politics, for example, has focused mostly on their ability to commit dictators to respect power-sharing arrangements. Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) claimed that, while authoritarian rulers typically employ consultative councils, juntas, and political bureaus to defuse threats from rivals within the ruling elite, they use legislatures if their survival requires neutralizing threats and soliciting cooperation from other groups in society.

Bovecchi and Simison (2017) show that legislatures are in contrast, the arenas where rulers enhance their bases of support by incorporating political and societal actors to negotiate policy concessions and their demands, thus raise their stakes on the regime's survival. As a result, regimes distributing executive power within a collective body generally intend to share power more extensively, so they would organize

legislatures with comparatively stronger agenda or policymaking powers. In line with this literature, it is important to state that, the demands of political elites in Guinea-Bissau does not only remain within the purpose of holding on to power but it comes with financial benefit<sup>7</sup>. “Politics in authoritarian regimes involves factionalism, competition, and struggle” (Geddes, 1999:121). Therefore, institutions such as the legislature and political party in the context of Guinea-Bissau “are devices that neutralize threats from both elite rivals and societal groups by providing a forum for cooperation and policy concessions and by formally establishing power-sharing arrangements that give allies veto power and stakes in the survival of the government coalition” (Bovecchi and Simison, 2017:522).

For the fact that “leaders want to survive in office to either reap the benefits of being in power or to implement policies” (Gandhi, 2008:77), those leaders skilled in the art of political manipulation may occasionally transform a collective dictatorship into a personal one. Thus, in the context of Guinea-Bissau’s semi-presidential system, chapter (II), article 68, sub-section (g-m) of the constitution, granted an absolute power to the president to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the members of the executive. This constitutional power granted to the president explains series of past and recent political instability. For example, in 2015 former president José Mário Vaz’s dismissal of Domingos Simões Pereira as prime minister led to the closure of parliament which was in the control of PAIGC and serious institutional crises for three years. In 2019, president Umaro Sissoco Embaló dismissed Aristides Gomes and appointed Nuno Gomes Nabiam as prime minister and formed a coalition government between (MADEM-15, PRS and APU), even though PAIGC had the majority in parliament and constitutionally supposed to be in governance.

In relation to political parties, the importance of political institutions, wrote Samuel Huntington “controls the future who organizes its politics” (pg: 461). More permanent than mere factions, parties are organizations that bring together often different interested members to seek influence over government (Duverger 1954, Sartori 1976, Ware 1996). Parties are heterogeneous and may pursue different ends and adopt different means. The party’s agenda may not be idealistic or even programmatic in the sense of a fixed political platform rooted in a particular philosophical stance. Indeed, parties are comprised of self-interested actors who may behave quite capriciously. Sartori reminds us: “party members are not altruists, and the existence of parties by no means eliminates selfish and unscrupulous motivations. The power-seeking drives

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<sup>7</sup>. In Guinea-Bissau, having power, or managing a particular institution or government ministry comes with huge financial benefits. Once political parties support the leading party in parliament and vote their program, they in return are given a particular ministry to run by appointing a minister from their political party as well as members of their political parties into various positions. Therefore, if the ruling party fails to abide by the established power agreement, political parties most often withdraw their support which eventually leads to the collapse of government and instigates political instability.

of politicians remain constant. What varies is the processing and the constraints that are brought to bear on such drives” (pg:25).

Literature on authoritarian regimes clearly demonstrates that, when parties harness elites together, they provide collective security, a sense among power holders that their immediate and long-term interests are best served by remaining within the party organization. This collective security depends on leaders’ binding themselves together in an arrangement that generally precludes certain actions, mainly the permanent exclusion or elimination of fellow party leaders (Ikenberry, 2001). Party members understand that no faction will indefinitely trump the others, and thus the organization’s decisions will, over time, reflect its composition (Schickler, 2001). Therefore, the “binding commitments” of a ruling party’s elite help to ensure the regime’s long-term dominance by reducing the threat of elite defection (Ibid, 2001), and once politicians begin experiencing the collective benefits brought by a party, they are likely to support its continued operations.

This dissertation takes into account the single party regime as part of the analysis. Guinea-Bissau experienced a single dominant rule under PAIGC from 1973 to 1998. Pepinsky (2013), indicated that single-party regimes which are interchangeable with dominant party’ regimes have ‘dominant’ and ‘rival’ factions. Geddes, adopted a nonstandard representation of this factionalism game as he described single-party regimes “as a regime in which the party has some influence over policy, controls most access to political power and government jobs, and has functioning local-level organization” (1999:20).

Nevertheless, it is in the interest of this dissertation to briefly examine what the literature says about the role of corporate elites in a nondemocratic setting. I do so, by considering some of the recently studied forms of authoritarian regimes primarily competitive authoritarianism which is a form of hybrid regimes type. To test these expectations about how legislative institutions and party systems influence survival, Wright and Folch (2012), used a specific model on the effect of legislatures and parties on transitions to both a subsequent dictatorship and a new democracy. Thus, competitive authoritarianism emerged as a major concept in the recent study of political regimes.

Competitive authoritarian regimes, therefore, “are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents (Levitsky and Way, 2010:5). This definition of competitive authoritarianism thus includes what the literature calls hegemonic authoritarian regimes as well as closed autocracies (Bogaards and Elischer 2015).

As indicated by Levitsky and Way (2010), these regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Guinea-Bissau is a clear manifestation of a competitive authoritarianism as well, where state institutions and resources are used by the incumbent to



intimate and oppress the opposition. Furthermore, “Competitive authoritarian regimes are distinguished from full authoritarianism in that constitutional channels exist through which opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power. Elections are held regularly and opposition parties are not legally barred from contesting them” (Ibid, 2010:7). However, the uneven playing field such as access to resources and media for opposition, makes a competitive authoritarian not fully democratic. In Guinea-Bissau, once a regime changes either through elections or coups, the incumbent always used a competitive authoritarian method against the opposition. This method of abuse of power has been used mutually by various governments since 1994.

Kubik (2011), pointed out four types of regime outcomes. In addition to democratization, unstable competitive authoritarianism<sup>8</sup>, and stable competitive authoritarianism there is also full authoritarianism<sup>9</sup>. In all of the present cases, regime formation entailed party formation, although the viability of these organizations varied in critical ways. Those variations mark the first contrast needing explanation: Why did some regimes develop ruling parties, whereas others operated with weak parties and even dissolved those organizations within a short time? Why did some elections become unexpected vehicles for opposition success and the activation of new alliances for regime change?

To answer these questions, Brownlee (2007), stresses on the examination of regimes’ legacies and divergence in institutional development over the preceding years since the political antecedents of the third wave determined the vulnerability of regimes to opposition challenges and continue to structure the distribution of power between rulers and ruled. By large, political institutions under a nondemocratic regime are faced with the issues of “concessions, rents may be distributed through a variety of means. Rents may include bribes to individuals or distribution to a wider swath of society through state employment and public works programs. The distribution of spoils may be organized through the bureaucracy or distributed within institutions” (Gandhi, 2008:77).

With reference to regime parties, Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965), indicated that “party offers individuals willing to collaborate with the regime a vehicle for advancing their careers within a stable system of patronage. In exchange for perks, privileges, and prospects of career advancement, members of a single party mobilize popular support and supervise behaviors of people unwilling to identify themselves with the dictator. In contrast to repression, rents are an alternative means by which dictators can bind parts of the population to them” (77:78). Thus, it is on this background, that I shall examine political instability and the

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<sup>8</sup> . Work of Kubik (2011), mentioned unstable competitive regimes where regime may change at any time due to the fragility of state institutions and elites power struggle.

<sup>9</sup> . The concept of “full authoritarianism” is partially mentioned in Levitsky and Way (2010), but does not become part of the process of analysis. For Huntington (1968), since regime formation provokes a social conflict between different groups in society, it is also a period of institutional building. As leaders seek to gain power, they build organizations through which they may mobilize and channel their supporters.

lack of survival in Guinea-Bissau, beginning with Guinea-Bissau democratization, institutions and unstable regimes from 1994-2019.

### **2.3 Power relation in the context of Guinea-Bissau**

To better understand Guinea-Bissau's consistent political instability, there is a need to examine the phenomenon of power relations as an essential element. As indicated by Lopes (1982), the existing contradictions in Guinea-Bissau power dynamics are mostly logical consequences of some distinctive conceptions of two factors. First is the ethnic relations established during the colonial era, and the second is the post-independence mislaid ideological formation within the state. These two conceptions of ethnicity<sup>10</sup> and state had origin in class struggle, and the history of weak citizen-state relations, dating back to colonial times (Lindell, 2002). Moreover, while political freedom and some fundamental democratic features have improved since the transition to multiparty democratic politics in the early 1990s, the rapid disintegration of the inherited parliamentary model generated the rise of personal rule shaped by the idiosyncrasies of the ruler, the case of Vieira's and his entourage rather than by effective political institutionalization and regulations (Fatton, 1990).

Driven more by self-interest than ideological, the first attempt at democratization under the leadership of João Bernardo Nino Vieira and PAIGC never reached conflicting answers to the question of how the nation should be governed but rather crafted an organized disorder of antidemocratic factions to constrict political power to a small group of close elites, tribes, family members and political party affiliation membership. Therefore, political institutions, become merely an extension of this power relation dynamic. Much literature on power relations range from the work of Emerson (2008), with a simple theory developed to resolve some of the ambiguities surrounding power, authority, legitimacy, and power structures in a coherent scheme. His work focused on the properties of balance and balancing operations in such relations.

Shane (2000), brought in a new status value theory of power, proposed to bridge previous distinct literature. His theory asserts exchangeable objects controlled by high-status actors, perceived to be more valuable when relevant to positive status characteristics. This phenomenon is predicted to confer power to high-status actors who exchange with low-status actors. The theoretical argument represents an important link between exchange theories of power and the research on status hierarchies, two areas that until now have been sharply demarcated. The power relation dynamic in the context of Guinea-Bissau, represent both past and present political instability rooted as well on societal links and cleavages.

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<sup>10</sup>. It is important to indicate that; social cleavages are a major challenge in the consolidation of democracy in Guinea-Bissau. For example, voting preferences and political party affiliations are mostly based on ethnicity, religion and region instead of ideological bases. Ethnicity becomes a major impediment. However, these issues are not the objective of this dissertation even though they are part of the problems. I focus mostly on the behavior of political actors to secure power and resources through established institutions.

## **2.4 Guinea-Bissau democratization, institutions and unstable regimes: 1994-2019**

Like many post-independence African states, Guinea-Bissau adopted the imperialist political system and structures that prior motivated liberation struggle. Moreover, the first generation of leaders did not transform those colonial structures in order to suit national interests. Indeed, the colonial structures were corrupt, oppressive and exploitative. As a result, the extreme weakness of state institutions, enables political actors in power to harass their opponents, often with impunity (Ferreira, 2004, Ostheimer, 2001).

This continuous decline of Guinea-Bissau's state is not merely an incident of history, a stop in the teleological process of state consolidation and democratization. It is rather, perhaps, the symptom of a new style of politics and of the redefinition of the political sphere altogether, (Bordonaro, 2009), that makes it quite impossible to achieve many of the objectives that democracy imposes. Therefore, this section examines Guinea-Bissau's major political trajectory from 1994 to 2019, with a focus on democratization and institutions within the context of survival attempt and instability.

### **2.4.1 PAIGC regime under the leadership of João Bernardo Nino Vieira: 1994-1999**

Guinea-Bissau's democratic path was marked with the first multiparty election in 1994 under the leadership of João Bernardo Nino Vieira. Prior to this election, Vieira led what was later known to be the readjustment movement,<sup>11</sup> and mounted the first successful coup that overthrew Luis Cabral's regime on the 14<sup>th</sup> November, 1980. This coup ended all thoughts of a union between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (Ferreira, 2004). This earlier stage of internal post-independence conflict within PAIGC, allows us to explore the sources of stability of party-based authoritarian regimes especially liberation party. As indicated by Levitsky and Way (2012;2013), the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained violent, and ideologically driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion and durability, in party-based authoritarian regimes. This assertion is evident in the case of PAIGC<sup>12</sup> as a liberation party.

Vieira's first decade of rule only intensified power struggles within PAIGC and personality cult through a concentration of his powers as the head of state. The state structure was authoritarian, a system where the dictator does not create a legislature to share power with strong, organized parties or to constrain

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<sup>11</sup>. The "Readjustment Movement" was founded as a result of internal conflict within members of PAIGC to confront Luis Cabral's regime. The movement was led by Vieira with members of PAIGC mostly from Guinea-Bissau origin who overthrew Luis Cabral's Regime in 1980 on the account of discrimination, injustice and corruption. In order to have total control of the state, Luis Cabral, the then president created factions loyal to him and proposed the amendment of a new constitution to strengthen his power. The constitutional amendment fueled the long internal tensions and factions within PAIGC, and Vieira took a chance and acceded to power in 1980. However, the conflict between Cape-Verde and Guinea-Bissau was also based on two major issues: First, there was a death penalty in the constitution of Guinea-Bissau, but not in the constitution of Cape-Verde. Second, in the constitution of Guinea-Bissau, a Cape-Verdean could be president in Guinea-Bissau, but a Bissau-Guinean cannot be president in Cape-Verde.

<sup>12</sup>. Vieira's ruled from the 1980s to 1998. His era was the continuation and intensification of the vicious circle of the power struggle which shifted the original ideological base of PAIGC. Vieira had no higher education training and was merely a military commander with outstanding manipulative skills. The only way to maintain his power was the use of force and oppression against his opponents within the party and emerging political forces.

himself, but to manage elites who challenged him (Wright and Folch, 2012). For example, in 1985 Vice-President Paulo Correia was among the six leading political figures who were executed for allegedly attempting a coup (Ferreira, 2004). However, under pressure from the international community, Vieira allowed a gradual internal liberalization of the political regime without fully submitting to the uncertainty of democracy (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). These undemocratic incidents were the foundation that opened Guinea-Bissau's democracy in 1994.

The multiparty system was introduced in the early 1990s when new political parties were formed, freedom of the press was established, trade union activity was permitted, and the death penalty was abolished from the constitution (Ferreira, 2004). In 1994, the first multiparty election was conducted without turnover, and Vieira was elected as the first democratic president<sup>13</sup>. However, rather than a proper democratization process, the 1994 multiparty system only strengthened PAIGC as an institution through which elites are co-opted and controlled. Even with the establishment of new institutions, PAIGC took full control of the state apparatus and the constitution strengthened Vieira's powers and deteriorated opposition forces. There was no structural and institutional reform within the state, but rather the intensification of fractions within PAIGC that operated mainly on reliable information<sup>14</sup> (Kamin' ski 1999; Magaloni 2006: 236).

This era of Vieira's tyrannical rule created tension within the armed forces with intensive oppression of military men mostly from the Balanta's<sup>15</sup> tribes which resulted in the 1998 civil uprising led by Ansumane Mané, a former Chief of army and a direct opponent of president Vieira. The uprising gained popular support, but intensified social disorder and increased power vacuum within already dysfunctional state institutions. In 1999, Vieira was deposed and granted political asylum in Portugal. In the meantime, the military junta assumed power and expressed its confidence in the leader of the transitional government, Francisco Fadul (Ferreira, 2004). From 1999, Guinea-Bissau began a new dynamic of power struggle from

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<sup>13</sup>. See Appendix A, Table A.2 on Guinea-Bissau presidents' time in office:1994-2019. This table shows that since 1994 only one president succeeded to complete five years mandate from 2014-2019 without a coup or been assassinated. However, it is important to mention that, elections are normally organized but leaders are incapable of surviving in office due to constant political instability.

<sup>14</sup>. In the literature, "the information argument is based on the premise that the need for information is especially pronounced in authoritarian regimes due to the "dictator dilemma", which Wintrobe (1998) describes as the inability of the dictator to credibly commit to not punishing those who would otherwise bring him news he does not want" (Schuler and Maleskey:681).

<sup>15</sup>. "The Balanta's are a major tribes in Guinea-Bissau, made up 30% of the population with large numbers of military men since colonial period to date. Historically, the Portuguese colonialist found it difficult to govern the Balanta tribes due to their organized hierarchical systems. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Portugal mounted pacification campaigns against the resistant Balanta and subjected them to appointed Fulbe Chiefs. Considering colonial repression, the Balanta's enlisted as soldiers in great numbers and were principal supporters of the PAIGC in the national liberation struggle during the 1960s and 1970s. Their prominence in the military spurred a series of Balanta-led coup attempts in the 1980s. They were major opponents of Vieira's rule". [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balanta\\_people#cite\\_note-balante1-2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balanta_people#cite_note-balante1-2) (Access on 21/04/2021, at 12:05 PM).

PAIGC dominant rule to a direct militarization into politics and factions within newly formed political parties.

#### 2.4.2 PRS regime under the leadership of Kumba Yalá: 1999-2003

In 1999, Kumba Yalá and his Party (PRS) won both presidential and parliamentary elections. This was the first time electoral turnover took place after 18 years of Vieira's and PAIGC authoritarian rule. Hence, in order to maintain power, President Yalá from the Balanta's tribe intensified ethnic divisions within the army and state institutions by promoting his tribe men both within the army and government positions. In effect, the 1998 conflict and the uneasy post-electoral balance of power led to an increase in the importance given to ethnic identity (Ferreira, 2010), and replacement from PAIGC dominant rule to PRS' authoritarian rule. The internal disagreements that were to impede the normalization of Guinea-Bissau political institutions demonstrate that, just as formal peace does not necessarily imply stability, so does the formal holding of elections does not guarantee a successful democratic transition.

The first challenge of Yalá's presidency and PRS government was the contest for legitimacy and redistribution of power between a democratically elected legislative and a military junta<sup>16</sup> which eventually led to the deterioration of an already very fragile political balance (Ferreira, 2004). President Yalá established factions within the army and gained support from his tribe men to oppose general Ansumane Mané, leader of Junta and chief of armed forces. This conflict of legitimacy and power eventually led to the death of general Mané in 2000.

PRS established power-sharing alliance with RGB-MB political party and formed the government. A year later, there was a dissolution of the alliance, after an unexpected ministerial reshuffle ordered by the president, so to have a full control of state institutions. The breaking of the alliance led to the mass resignation of all RGB-MB government members. This aggravated an atmosphere of political instability and exacerbated the tensions between the rival political forces, as no consolidation of a democratic culture had been achieved within the country's public institutions (Ferreira, 2010)<sup>17</sup>. However, president Yalá showed dominance over the executive, legislature and the judiciary and exposed the country's

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<sup>16</sup> . The Military Junta emerged victorious from the 1998 civil uprising. The leader Ansumane Mane was having a status equal to that of the president after the war. Therefore, for president Yalá to legitimize his power, there was the need to silence Mané. As a result, Mané was killed by a cabal of military men.

<sup>17</sup>. Power-sharing arrangements entail distributing cabinet positions (Arriola 2009; Meng 2019), or incorporating opposition or elites into the ruling party. However, literature indicated that "sharing power at the centre does not eliminate the threat posed by rival elites. Instead, it upgrades these elites from outsiders to insiders" (Paime, 2020:510). However, the central argument of classical thoughts on regime survival is that institutions promote survival by facilitating authoritarian power-sharing. Hence, the contrary argument shows that survival depends on the credible commitment and institutions will be ineffective or break down base upon the imbalance of power(Boix and Svobik, 2013). Such imbalance of power-sharing has been a major of the lack of survival and causes of instability in Guinea-Bissau since the inception of democracy in 1994.

institutional fragility. The government collapsed in 2001 and the parliament was closed<sup>18</sup> by the president for two years, and the nation plunged into a situation of total paralysis.

In 2002, the criticism levelled against Yalá's presidency increased, social dissatisfaction manifested itself in constant protests and strikes. In 2003, Yalá was overthrown in a coup, led by chief of army Veríssimo Correia Seabra, accusing Kumba of corruption, arbitrary use of power and conspiracy among ethnic groups. The coup, however, only intensified division in the nation and more factions among the elites with an already increased level of drug trafficking<sup>19</sup> involving top-ranking political and military officials, and the arbitrary detention of opposition voices strengthened.

#### **2.4.3 Political parties, civil society and military factionalism: 2003-2014**

From 2003 to 2014, Guinea-Bissau experienced its most intensive political instability and political militarization<sup>20</sup>. This is the period when the state lost total control of its institutions and the nation was classified as the first narco-state in Africa.

With Yalá's out of power in 2003, a transitional government made up of civil, military and political parties groups was formed. However, in 2005, former president Vieira made a political come back and run for the presidential election as an independent candidate opposing his own political party PAIGC under the leadership of Carlos Gomes Junior and Malam Bacai Sanhá. Vieira's still commanding some level of popularity, yet he gained the support of former president Kumba Yalá during the second round of election against PAIGC's candidate Sanhá. Vieira eventually won the elections.

Vieira's return to power became a threat to his old political competitors. There was a clear confrontation between president Vieira and prime minister Carlos Gomes Junior and top-ranking military men who fought against him in 1998. Few months into power, Vieira dismissed the prime minister and appointed his old friend Aristides Gomes and established factions within PAIGC. Known for his autocratic tendencies, Vieira was trapped in a complex situation where some organized crimes were attributed to him particularly the murder of the chief of the army General Tagme Na Waie, an old opponent of Vieira from the Balanta tribe since post-independence era. President Vieira was accused of his old brutal tactic and

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<sup>18</sup>. The closing of parliament and the judiciary in 2001 by President Yalá was unconstitutional. However, it was an attempt to strengthen his powers.

<sup>19</sup>. The instability of Guinea-Bissau has been associated with the issues of Drug trafficking. In fact, the nation was considered to be the first Narco-state in West Africa. This assertion is misleading to the real issues. Drug trafficking was just one of the effects of state fragility. Geographically, Guinea-Bissau is located within the Atlantic Ocean. With the level of corruption and institutional fragility, it is apparent that the state is unable to control the flow of drugs from other parts of the continent to Latin America and Europe. This dissertation does not examine Drug trafficking per se but acknowledges it as part of political instability.

<sup>20</sup>. See Appendix A. Table A.5 on Guinea-Bissau's most unstable period: 1994-2019. The table explained various political atrocities which include; the assassinations of political actors, coup d'état, arbitrary arrest of political opponents, social and political activists.

eventually murdered in his house by unidentified military men. The president of parliament Raimundo Pereira from PAIGC assumed power as transitional president.

In 2009, Malam Bacai Sanhá of PAIGC was elected president with Carlos Gomes Junior as prime minister. Once again PAIGC was in total control of both the legislature and the presidency. Hence, the dilemma of power struggle, violation of human rights and constitution continued, with series of accusations against prime minister Carlos Gomes Junior for physically eliminating his political rival both within PAIGC and beyond. The death of President Sanhá in 2012 for health reasons in France, only intensified political instability.

#### 2.4.4 José Mário Vaz leadership and PAIGC internal factionalism: 2014-2019

The 2012 election was contested between old circles of political elites mainly between PRS and PAIGC political parties. Both former president Kumba Yalá and Carlos Gomes Junior contested as presidential candidates. However, the election ended with a series of controversies having Carlos Gomes Junior as the winner. Yalá rejected the electoral results on the grounds that elections were not free and fair. His rejection of the 2012 presidential results, led to another direct military intervention and coup against Carlos Gomes Junior government, led by general Antonio Injai. Again, a transitional government was formed with the head of parliament from PAIGC, Serifo Nhamadjo as president and Rui Duarte Barros as prime minister.

Guinea-Bissau's 2014 general elections, held two years after a military coup, marked a significant improvement towards the restoration of democratic governance<sup>21</sup> (Freedom House, 2017). However, the central political dilemma of President Vaz's term was the political turmoil, which included a lengthy power struggle between him and the leader of PAIGC, Domingos Simões Pereira with more than half a dozen different prime ministers appointed in five years<sup>22</sup>, and a parliament unable to function.<sup>23</sup> President Vaz<sup>24</sup>, even though his presidency was marked by various social protests and economic instability, was the only president in Guinea-Bissau's history, since 1994, to complete a five years mandate and controversially handed over power.

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<sup>21</sup>. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/guinea-bissau/freedom-world/2017> (Access on the 22/04/2021/ at 7:24 AM, Friday).

<sup>22</sup>. See Appendix A. table A.4 on the composition of prime ministers, their political party affiliation and time in office from 1994-2019. It also shows why they left office before completing their term. Since 1994 to date, none of the legislatures has completed their four years constitutional term in office. It is a clear manifestation of competitive authoritarianism and a lack of survival.

<sup>23</sup>. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Guinea-Bissau/Independence>, (Access on the 21/04/2021/ at 14:09 PM, Thursday).

<sup>24</sup>. Former President José Mário Vaz was a long standing opponent of Domingos Simões Pereira for five years. Thus, coming from PAIGC, he commanded some secret support within PAIGC. His relation with President Embalo who was the prime minister under his leadership happened to be the best change to prevent Domingos Simões Pereira from becoming a president and to secure his security after leaving the office as president.

Domingos Simões Pereira's dismissal as prime minister created an intensive power dynamic within the legislative with factions within PAIGC in support of President Vaz. As a result, PAIGC's internal division led to the dismissal of 15 high profile members on the account of party indiscipline, and among those was the present Leader of MADEM-G15<sup>25</sup> Braima Camara, the principal rival of Domingos Simões Pereira during the 2014 congressional election for the leadership of PAIGC, and who happened to be a major ally of President Vaz prior to 2019 presidential and parliamentary election. In spite of political uncertainties, this was the first time in the history of Guinea-Bissau politics that, the military refrained from intervening in governance; a positive sign, given Guinea-Bissau's history of coups.

Domingos Simões Pereira, having expelled his main rivals within PAIGC, maintained his close allies and banked on international community appeal and used both national and international media to mount pressure on president Vaz for the return of PAIGC into governance as the winners of the 2014 legislative election. Pereira's determination to eliminate his rival from holding public office, hatred and rejection between political parties and elites solidly based on the strategy of divide and rule created a terrible political environment, impossible at the level of human and institutional relations, becoming a real human obstacle that slowed down the due democratic process of which his main opponent became a credible threat to his accession to power.

President Vaz, instead, established new alliances with the group of 15 MPs expelled from PAIGC to oppose Pereira's leadership. The parliament, under the leadership of Cipriano Cassama, vice president of PAIGC, was closed for complete three years<sup>26 27</sup>. The parliament at this moment had become a mere rubber-stamp legislature and solidly under the control of PAIGC unable to operate as a forum for meaningful bargaining. President Vaz succeeded in destabilizing PAIGC and held on to power until the 2019 presidential and legislative elections in spite of both internal and international criticisms. Therefore, both the 2019 parliamentary and legislative election outcome was a reflection of the power struggle that began in 2015 as a result of internal factionalism within PAIGC. The leader of PAIGC, Domingos Simões

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<sup>25</sup>. (MADEM G-15), Movement for Democratic Alternative was founded less than a year by 15 expelled members of PAIGC. The party became a direct opposition to PAIGC. Their leader Braima Camara is currently a direct opponent of Domingos Simões Pereira whom he contested the leadership of PAIGC in 2014. His presence in PAIGC constitutes a threat to Pereira's leadership. Presently he is a member of parliament and playing a leading role in the current coalition government.

<sup>26</sup>. It is important to mention that, the closing of parliament was unconstitutional and a clear indication of abuse of power. As indicated in the text, PAIGC political party had a majority in parliament and the president of parliament Sipriano Cassama is the Vice-President of PAIGC. In order to pile pressure on president Vaz, Cipriano Cassama in collaboration with his Party simple closed the parliament in order to create more tension and instability in the nation. I considered it to be a rubber-stamp parliament because a single person cannot decide to close the legislative house without due process of the law.

<sup>27</sup>. See Appendix A, table A.1 on the legislature and party representation from 1994-2019. This table shows primarily political parties represented in parliament from 1994-2019.



Pereira was unable to reach out to major political elites and political parties as a presidential candidate. It was a battle between one against many.

#### 2.4.5 2019 coalition government: President Embaló, competent dictator?

In the March 2019 legislative elections, PAIGC remained the largest single party with 47 seats, though it lost its outright majority. MADEM-G15 won 27 seats, the Party of Social Renewal (PRS) won 21 seats, the United People's Assembly-Democratic Party of Guinea-Bissau (APU-PDGB<sup>28</sup>) won 5 seats, and the Union for Change (UM) and the Party for a New Democracy (PND) each secured a single seat<sup>29</sup> (Freedom House, 2020). However, PAIGC needed a majority to form a government which they did not secure. Therefore, it became apparently difficult for PAIGC under the leadership of Domingos Simões Pereira to have the support of major political parties considering the already intensive power struggle prior to the legislative election.

Current president Umaro Sissoco Embaló, appeared to be an outsider politician and former military player who took advantage of recent internal factions within PAIGC and the rest of the political parties' divergences to accede to power. His active participation in national politics began with his support of the 15 members of PAIGC expelled by Domingos Simões Pereira<sup>30</sup> and his appointment as prime minister from 2016 to 2018 by former president Vaz. Notably, Embaló had been an advisor and collaborator to several African leaders, including Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi and former president João Bernardo Nino Vieira.

Umaro Sissoco Embaló's strategic participation in the formation of MADEM-G15 granted him a chance to run as a presidential candidate. Apart from his humor, military background and playing tribal and populist cards, he was able to use his international accreditation especially within sub-Saharan Africa, and co-opted with money, major political elites, forming a strong opposition against Domingos Simões Pereira to win the election. The 2019 presidential election was highly contested; among major contestants were the incumbent President Jose Mario Vaz, Carlos Gomes Junior, Domingos Simões Pereira, Umaro

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<sup>28</sup>. Guinean Party Assembly of United People-Democratic Party of Guinea-Bissau (APU-PDGB), was founded by Nuno Gomes Nabiam. It is a breakaway party from PRS. After losing his own party, Kumba Yalá decided to support Nabiam in opposition to PRS. Nabiam is the current prime minister of Guinea-Bissau.

<sup>29</sup>. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/guinea-bissau/freedom-world/2020>, (Access on the 23/04/2021/ at 2:11 PM, Friday).

<sup>30</sup>. Domingos Simões Pereira, is a leader of PAIGC and former prime minister in 2014. His dismissal by president Vaz in 2015 with an allegation of corruption, made him a major player in recent Guinea-Bissau political history. He was a major threat against all other candidates and was unable to sustain the power-sharing arrangement with Nuno Gomes Nabiam after the 2019 legislative election. His controversial rivalry with Braima Camara led to the dismissal of 15 members of PAIGC and the formation of the MADEM-G15 political party. After president Embaló's inauguration, Pereira was in exile in Portugal for one year. However, he is presently in Guinea-Bissau as a member of parliament and the leading opposition voice. Pereira still questions the legitimacy of President Embaló.

Sissoco Embaló and Nuno Gomes Nabiam. None of the candidates secured a first-round victory, Domingos Simões Pereira had 40,13% of the votes and Umaro Sissoco Embaló had 27,65%<sup>31</sup> votes.

The second round<sup>32</sup> of the presidential election was between Domingos Simões Pereira and Umaro Sissoco Embaló. With the support of major political parties and candidates, Umaro Sissoco Embaló won the second round with 53,55% (CNE, Guinea-Bissau, 2019)<sup>33</sup>. Despite the court appeal by Domingos Simões Pereira, Umaro Sissoco Embaló's inauguration ceremony was held in the absence of the president of Parliament Cipriano Cassama who is the current vice-president of PAIGC and the president of parliament. The inauguration was held under the leadership of Nuno Gomes Nabiam, the vice-president of the parliament with the presence of outgoing President Vaz and the support of the military. Embaló's inauguration raises the question of legitimacy and due process<sup>34</sup>. However, upon his accession to power, he used the military to intimidate the opposition PAIGC, especially former cabinet ministers of PAIGC government. Some were under house arrest and restricted from leaving the country. Those outside the country remain in exile including the leader of PAIGC. Freedom of expression and protest were reduced drastically and oppression against the opposition and political activist increased.

Embaló used all the manipulative strategies to legitimize his power by co-opting and appointing Nuno Gomes Nabiam as prime minister (Gandhi, 2008; Lust-Okar, 2005), guaranteeing the security of former president Vaz and Carlos Gomes Junior (Geddes, 1999), involved the military in the process of transition to minimize his loss (Wright e Escriba-Folch, 2011), removing (ECOWAS) peacekeeping military in Guinea-Bissau and granting the army once again the power to take control of the nation's security and so leaving the opposition without security. He further engaged in power-sharing with other major political parties and succeeded in controlling major institutions including the judiciary.

He gained international accreditation especially from his friends heads of state within West Africa and beyond to legitimize his authority. Recent institutional design of Embaló's presidency shaped legislative performance by way of the same design factors as in democratic regimes. As legislative power was shared, executives had a collective nature, and agenda power in the legislature was decentralized (Bonvecchi and Simison, 2017). However, PAIGC described his presidency as unconstitutional and

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<sup>31</sup>. <http://www.cne.gw/>, (Access on the 23/04/2021/ at 2:55 PM, Friday).

<sup>32</sup>. See Table A.3. On the composition of second-round round presidential result: 1994-2019. This table excluded first-round presidential result data since none of the presidential candidates ever wins presidential elections since 1994-2019 on the first ballots.

<sup>33</sup>. "In January, Domingos Simões Pereira appealed Umaro Sissoco Embaló's victory in the 2019 presidential election, claiming that widespread fraud had taken place. Though the Supreme Court ordered the National Election Commission (CNE) to conduct a full audit of the results, CNE refused and reconfirmed Embaló's victory", (Freedom House, 2021).

<sup>34</sup>. "In March, upon President Embaló's request, military troops occupied the Supreme Court and other public institutions, and public broadcasting outlets, in order to enable the formation of the new cabinet. For multiple days, the state radio was silent, and the state television channel showed a blank screen. The troops left after the new cabinet had been installed". (Freedom House, 2021).

Nabiam's government illegitimate and called him an auto-proclaimed president. Yet, Embaló's era seems to begin with the application of full competitive authoritarianism. His recent move to change the constitution raised serious questions about his dictatorial tendencies. His appointment of the current attorney general who happens to be a fierce opponent of PAIGC raises the question of political witch-hunting. His control over the executive, intolerance against the media and continued use of the military to oppress the opposition is dictatorial with future consequences.

### 3 Research Objectives, Hypothesis and Design

In the general introduction and preceding works of literature, I reviewed major theories on how political institutions function under undemocratic regimes. I as well looked into various authoritarian regime types and the dynamics of regime survival which speak explicitly to the choices and behaviors of political actors. This descriptive approach based on the literature helps us to comprehend the distinctive problem of Guinea-Bissau's political instability in relation to political parties and the legislature, considering the struggle for power and resources as well as institutional inefficiency under various governments from 1994 to 2019.

#### 3.1 Research objectives

Considering the ineptitude of Guinea-Bissau's internal state cohesion, the nation is constantly liable to conflict and unpredictability of elites' manipulative skills to undemocratically assume power. The descriptive analysis shows that, in practice, political institutions are still fragile due to political corruption and intensive manipulation. These political, social and economic factors make it difficult to hold leaders accountable and for the normal functioning of institutions. Therefore, this dissertation is based on four main objectives:

1. To understand how power and natural wealth and state finances are distributed among the political class and how this has contributed to instability over the years.
2. To explore how political actors maximize their interests through political alliances and collective decisions.
3. To identify potential non-interest based motivations in the way actors behave that could explain political instability.
4. To understand how political elites attempts to manipulate political institutions for their benefits can cause instability.

The objectives take into account the concept of power-sharing in a nondemocratic setting and its negative outcome exclusively when the violation of power-sharing agreement (Boix and Svobik, 2013) occurs. This is central since the literature indicated that institutionalized interaction between the dictator and his allies contributes to the stability of authoritarian power-sharing in two ways. First, regular interaction between the dictator and his allies in high-level, deliberative, and decision-making bodies within authoritarian parties and legislatures results in greater transparency among those in power. Second, the literature indicates that, once power-sharing is institutionalized, formal rules concerning membership, jurisdiction, protocol, and decision making embody the power-sharing compromise between the dictator and his allies (Brownlee, 2007).

In the context of Guinea-Bissau, this narrative of power-sharing dynamics involving a single dictator only applies to João Bernardo Nino Vieira's era under the PAIGC single party regime prior to 1994

multi-party election which was contested by its ingrained authoritarianism and fostered discontent among the opposition parties and the military. The literature shows that Vieira's manipulative attempts to modernize the army in the early 1990s and his political interference in the management of the military contributed to the emergence of the 1998 violent civil conflict (Ferreira, 2004). Apart from Vieira's era, the study focused on the causes of constant instability from the opening of multiparty democracy in 1994 to 2019.

Considering the fact that, the state of Guinea-Bissau totally collapsed after the 1998 civil war, every facet of state institutions becomes part of a larger network of power chasers that continue to create constant instability. This complex dynamic of power reflected the depths of the research question: *Why do political institutions fail to ensure regime survival in Guinea-Bissau?*

Apart from the review on power dynamics under the various authoritarian regimes (Pepinsty, 2013; Bonvecchi and Simison 2017; Wright and Folch, 2012; Levitsky and way), the objectives look into few nominally democratic institutions such as political parties and the legislature. For example; in his work, Brownlee (2007), shows clearly that, failure to maintain elite alliances can prompt defections and instability. Consequently, if the regime's core has not splintered, liberalization will not be accompanied by high levels of contestation. An inclusionary gesture such as multiparty elections will simply allow opposition movements one further venue in which to face a cohesive elite. In the context of Guinea-Bissau both Zolberg (1966), and Huntington (1968), would make us believe that, where political parties failed to be the foundation of political stability, much as they were during the initial postcolonial period, they will rather serve as autocratic rulers that draw on the support of a cohesive coalition while suppressing advocates of representative governance<sup>35</sup>. The effects of these durable conflicting coalitions are apparent in some of the longest-lived nondemocratic systems including Guinea-Bissau.

The data will help to understand to what extent can legislatures and political parties affect or not the survival of regimes or transition to a subsequent dictatorship and democratization (Wright and Folch, 2012), considering that both political parties and the legislative are the bedrock of checks and balances. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, these institutions are the main opposing values of democratic principles, administered by political elites involved in corrupt practices. Since 1994 and after enormous crimes, corruption and violation of democratic principles, no single head of state, head of government and ministers have ever been prosecuted and charged by the judiciary within the framework of law.

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<sup>35</sup>. Contrary to this view, Brownlee (2007), highlighted the variations of political parties in the institutions of authoritarian rule that have produced different outcomes during an era of democratization and the assertion that ruling parties enable durable authoritarianism, robust nondemocratic rule in which opportunities for regime collapse are structurally precluded by the maintenance of elite cohesion and incumbent dominance over alternative social movements.

However, since institutions cannot be studied separately from the concrete problems of redistribution of power and policymaking that motivate regime behavior (Pepinsky, 2013), The case of Guinea-Bissau lies in the fact that institutions exhibit causal undemocratic effects since those institutions are constantly manipulated and controlled. Thus, it is the objective of these studies to determine specifically the kind of institutional outcome.

### 3.1.1 **Operationalizing concepts: Political parties, the legislature, survival, co-optation, power-sharing, and credible commitment.**

The operationalization of the above-mentioned concepts is essential for the purpose of analysis. Accordingly, I defined political parties as “institutions that bring together people for the purpose of exercising power within the state” (Ware, 2009:2), and the legislature as “a body with formal, but solely, legislative powers” (Gandhi, 2008:34). Considering the associated threat to the survival of a regime, either from the masses or opposition forces, this dissertation adopts the definition of survival as a strategy used by authoritarian regimes to “prevent regime toppling in a revolution, through a combination of repression, indoctrination and legitimation” (Caramani, 2020:110).

However, the effort to maintain power may occur in various forms, among those is the co-optation strategy. Therefore, co-optation “refers to a regime’s effort to engender loyalty, often by trying strategically relevant actors or groups to the regime elite. By co-opting the opposition and providing them with jobs, payment, and other benefits, this ensures that the opposition has a vested interest in the regime” (Caramani, 2020:110). Furthermore, I look into the concepts of power-sharing in relation to a credible commitment in a non-democratic regime. I employ power-sharing to be the distribution of cabinet positions (Arriola and Meng, 2009), or the incorporation of opposition forces and elites into the ruling party (Paine, 2020).

The concept of power-sharing and credible commitment is related to the literature mainly on the challenges of authoritarian politics. Literature indicated that “all dictatorship faces two problems of governance: how to thwart rebellion and how to obtain cooperation. Leaders want to survive in office either to reap the benefits of being in power or to implement policies. For authoritarian rulers who do not face electoral constraints, the task of maintaining power is considerably more difficult” (Gandhi, 2008:74). However, in the context of Guinea-Bissau, the notion of a single dictator is loose considering the nation’s political system. The analysis focused on features of authoritarian politics, mainly the struggle for political power among the elites and political parties whereby undemocratic principles often prevail<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup>.This dissertation defines regime “as the centre of political authority and its relation with the broader society” (Fishman, 2001:149). Therefore, I consider regimes that do not abide by democratic principles to be undemocratic. I intrinsically relate features of dictatorship lived in the context of Guinea-Bissau such as oppression, overthrow of elected government, assassination of opposition forces etc.... A dictator in this

Furthermore on the concept of co-optation strategies, the analysis focus as well on rent distribution. Lust-Okar (2005), for example, suggests that the regime will distribute patronage through the legislature in order to split the moderate opposition that can be bought rents from the more dangerous, radical element. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), stress that incorporating the opposition into the legislature will moderate their views and make the opposition more willing to cooperate with the dictatorship. Both within the context of the analysis and the literature, “the key theoretical twist of co-optation theory is that dictators, in order to generate productivity, need to induce cooperation from the opposition.

To induce cooperation, the dictators must bait them with policy concessions or resources rents, which are best distributed or negotiated in an assembly” (Schuler and Maleskey,2014:682). It is in this context that the analysis focuses on how political elites use this strategy to minimize their loss and credible threat by co-opting members of the opposition into positions of power with financial gain. This dissertation, therefore, relates the concepts of credible threat within the dynamics of power-sharing arrangements and minimization of loss within the nature of various regimes in Guinea-Bissau from 1994 to 2019.

Consequently, “unlike co-optation theory, the assemblies are not a forum for regime opponents, but instead an arena for hashing out compromises with regime allies” (Schuler and Maleskey 2014:684). It is in the interest of this dissertation that I analyse the application of this phenomenon in the context of Guinea-Bissau since none of the elected legislature has ever completed their four years’ democratic term in office due to changes of government since 1994 to date, and only one elected president, Jose Mario Vaz has completed his five years’ mandate from 2014-2019. The record shows a clear manifestation of intense and continuous threat and counter-threat among the elites and the application of competitive authoritarianism since the opening of the multiparty democracy in 1994.

### **3.2 Research hypotheses**

The hypotheses derive mainly from theories on authoritarian politics focused on the analysis of institutions such as the legislature and political parties. These institutions are crucial for any co-optation strategy that involves policy compromises (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006), and will affirm institutional function in the context of Guinea-Bissau. Taking into account how power-sharing arrangements contributed to political instability and institutional breakdown in Guinea-Bissau since 1994, evaluating institutions such as political parties and legislatures will help us answer questions on how co-optation, credible threats and minimization of loss have been used for attempted survival purposes.

To test these expectations about how legislative institutions influence regime survival or not, Wright and Folch (2012), used a specific model on the effect of legislatures on transitions to both a subsequent dictatorship and a new democracy. The hypothesis, therefore, focused on explaining the rationale

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context becomes either an elected president, appointed prime minister and leader of political parties in collaboration with a particular group of political or military elites.

for the inception of legislatures and political parties and the role they fulfil (Bonvecchi and Simison, 2017). This hypothesis as well derived from a variety of literature where regimes may choose to co-opt dissidents rather than repress them. As indicated by Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), many nondemocratic rulers have co-opted opposition because incorporating opposition forces in the legislature may prolong their hold on power, a complex dynamic of elite's factionalism and struggle for power and resources (Magaloni, 2008). However, in the context of Guinea-Bissau, considering the lack of survival and constant instability it is expected that;

*(H1). "Co-optation through government appointments does not ensure survival due to the lack of commitment to original power-sharing agreement and access to government resources".*

Second hypothesis grows out of the competition theory. Gibney and Dalton (1996), show that, the balance of power between domestic political actors is essential to understanding the prospects for the trade-off between stabilization of authoritarianism, democratic transition and authoritarian replacement as potential outcomes. Therefore, it is expected that:

*(H2). In Guinea-Bissau, political parties are weak and vertical. Therefore, power needs to be attained through other undemocratic and oppressive means".*

In relation to third hypothesis, it is expected that;

*(H3). "The legislature and political parties do not ensure credible commitments because of poor political system and vulnerability of the MPs".*

Conclusively, Guinea-Bissau political system can as well be describe as an unstable hybrid regime type, where a coup and instability occur because frustration builds up among political rivals, which gives an incentive for a coup, but the regime is not as repressive as a full autocracy to thwart coup attempts. As a consequence, the analysis focuses on the ambition of political competitors within the regime and the conditions that facilitate the unconstitutional seizure of power (Svolik, 2009, 2012).



## **4 Research Methodology**

The present dissertation seeks to examine the lack of survival through the analysis of institutions under undemocratic regimes in the context of Guinea-Bissau from 1994-2019, bearing in mind research questions and objectives. To achieve this goal, the study takes a qualitative approach centered on the descriptive and analytical methods.

### **4.1 Research design**

Creswell (2014), identified that qualitative studies begin with questions like “how” and use verbs like ‘explore’, ‘understand’ or ‘discover’, as can be seen in my research questions. Thus, a descriptive approach enabled this study to examine the existing literature on political institutions under undemocratic regimes, regimes type and survival. On another hand, the analytical approach enabled an understanding of how political institutions function in Guinea-Bissau and how they are manipulated by political players. Furthermore, what constitutes qualitative research in this case, involves purposeful use for describing, explaining, and interpreting collected data (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). This is an effective model that enabled me to develop a level of detail from being highly involved in the actual experiences (Creswell, 2003), of the respondents and their perceptions of the event or situation (Williams, 2007), that the research questions try to answer.

### **4.2 Sampling and data collection**

To answer the research question, this study used a purposeful sampling technique and semi-structured interviews with major political leaders and academics<sup>37</sup>. In line with Bryman (2012), he explains that semi-structured interviewing is an inductive approach that enables researchers to be open-minded and flexible about the facts yet to be known and allows data to emerge from participants’ responses. This inductive approach enabled me to identify from the accounts of participants, major issues on Guinea-Bissau political instability, functions of institutions and political actors behavioral choices and decisions since the inception of multiparty democracy in 1994. However, with the spread of the covid-19 pandemic, adjustment were made and all eight interviews were conducted via zoom and skype. Some respondent’s names are anonymized and they are simply referred to as P1, P2 and so forth. . Some respondents also sent their answers through email. The same interview guideline<sup>38</sup> was used for all the respondents with an average duration of

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<sup>37</sup>. See Appendix A. Table A.7 on the composition of the interviewers. The table shows their names and some names were excluded and simply refer to as P-1, P-2 due to ethical reasons. The table as well shows the role each played in the nation’s political history, where the interview takes place and the date of the interview.

<sup>38</sup>. See Appendix B, on the interview Guide. Interview guides are questions sent to respondents prior to the interview. However, some adjustments were made during the interview depending on the role the respondent played in Guinea-Bissau political history.

twenty-five minutes each. Some interviews were recorded and others were not recorded, taking into account respondents' permission for ethical reasons. Also, the informed consent letter<sup>39</sup> was sent to each respondent to before each interview.

### **4.3 Data analysis**

In analyzing data, this dissertation focuses on specific thematic areas as a flexible process that allows us to focus on the data in numerous different ways, analyzing meaning across the entire data set, and examine a particular aspect of a phenomenon in depth. Thematic analysis involves “identifying, analyzing and reporting themes” (Braun and Clarke 2006:79, cited in Obeng, 2020), in line with the research topic.

My choice of thematic analysis enabled me the flexibility of relating data with existing literature and theories. The themes look at the dynamics of power within political parties, the legislatures and elites' involvement considering the manipulation of political institutions for survival, primarily manipulation of political institutions in a nondemocratic setting, the use of institutions for co-optation (Gandhi, 2008; Lust-Okar, 2005), and credible treat (Svolik, 2012; Moustafa, 2009), in relation to minimization of loss (Wright and Folch, 2011).

The themes form the core of primary data that aim at explaining causes of consistent political instability in relation to the functions of institutions in the context of Guinea-Bissau<sup>40</sup>. On the other hand, secondary data derived from other sources such as the Freedom House survey, books, documentaries and research articles were included in the analysis.

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<sup>39</sup>. See Appendix C, on the consent interview letter.

<sup>40</sup>.The qualitative methods advocate the principle that interpretations should arise from the data, it should be clear and explicit and how more abstract constructions and conclusions are directly connected to the context and content of information and collected data from the participants (Stiles 1993: 605; Hill et al. 1997: 558; Morrow 2005: 256).

## 5 Findings and Analysis

This section presents the analysis of the data based essentially on semi-structured interviews conducted by the author and other secondary data. The goal was to find out whether there are evidence of the manipulation of institutions; the use of institutions for co-optation; and the question of credible threats and minimization of loss for survival. I focused in particular on legislatures and political parties. Data were discussed to answer the general research question; *Why do political institutions fail to ensure regime survival in Guinea-Bissau?*

### 5.1 Manipulation of institutions for survival: The legislature and political parties

This section offers an analysis of why two main political institutions; the legislature and political parties have failed to ensure regime survival and even contribute to instability in Guinea-Bissau.

On the question of what undermines the normal functioning of Guinea-Bissau's political institutions; namely the legislature and political parties? Data reveal first and foremost the problems of earlier state formation linked with the controversies of colonial legacy<sup>41</sup> and the phenomenon of the 'order from above'. Mamadu Seide, an academic briefly outlined these issues as follows;

*“Colonial legacies and the issues of ‘order from above’ are some of the challenges<sup>42</sup>. We ended up having strong men instead of strong institutions. That is why those in power can use state institutions to arrest, assassinate or intimidate their opponent without due process. For example, the present government led by Nuno Gomes Nabiam have a list of people mostly from the opposition that are not allowed to travel outside the country including the leader of PAIGC Domingos Simões Pereira, who was once stoped at the airport. When he asked why he should not be allowed to travel since he does not have any court case that may stop him from travelling, he was simply told by the security that the order comes from above. The order does not come from any legitimate institution*

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<sup>41</sup>. In relation to early state formation especially for independent colonial nations, for Huntington (1968), regime formation provokes a social conflict between different groups in society, it is also a period of institution building: As leaders seek to gain power, they build organizations through which they may mobilize and channel their supporters. In the context of Guinea-Bissau, data show the absence of institutional building for the purpose of democracy, but rather the post-independence leaders adopted the oppressive colonial system and institutions for their benefit. This resulted in the absence of the state as the central power, and the total inefficiency of public institutions.

<sup>42</sup>. We cannot ignore the controversies of colonial legacy in relation to the institutional building since political institutions can only be examined by observing the behavior and attitude of those who run those institutions. Therefore, it is important to mention that, most of those who eventually took over power after independence in Guinea-Bissau were mere farmers, carpenters and ordinary citizens with no administrative or technical training. The Portuguese colonial powers were not interested in building schools compare to other imperial powers such as Britain or France. Therefore, after independence in 1973, the struggle for power and resources with factions within PAIGC constituted a major impediment to the normal functioning of political institutions.

*but a single person, who thinks he/she is above state institutions.<sup>43</sup> Again, Guinea-Bissau is the only country where the president can call someone who criticizes him directly with a threat. A day before Marciano Indi an MP was kidnapped and beaten by the security forces from the presidency, president Embaló called him first and threatened him. These acts of violence and abuse of power, show that institutions only exist in structure.”(Mamadou Seide, PhD in Law).*

Post-colonial institutional challenges can as well be associated with unstable factions within political parties which began with PAIGC authoritarian single-party regime. PAIGC introduced an oppressive and violent system whereby those who raised their voices against the regime were either murdered or sent to jail. Bacar Queita, a member of PRS political party put it this way;

*“Prior to 1994, Luis Cabral’s regime, for example, was repressive with countless massacres of opposition voices within the party. The most mentioned case is the execution of hundreds of PAIGC party members in Bissorã in 1980. With the opening of democracy in 1994, João Bernardo Nino Vieira continued with the same oppressive system and he was cruelly murdered in the same way in 2009. Eventually, all other parties that emerged out of PAIGC, have the same despotic philosophy” (Bacar Queita).*

Brownlee (2007), indicated that, whether elites decisively resolve their core conflicts during the period of regime formation, then, determines if a ruling party emerges and binds together a cohesive multi factional coalition. The institutional legacy of the regime formation period subsequently ensured further stability for those leaders with ruling parties or unmediated elite factionalism for those with weak parties. In the case of PAIGC, data show that elites were unable to resolve core conflicts but rather intensified instability with the application of the divide and conquer strategy. Dr. Helder Vaz, former president of RGB-MB political party from 1999 to 2004 and presently an Ambassador of Guinea-Bissau in Portugal stated the following;

*“Due to the webs<sup>44</sup> with which the PAIGC controls Bissau-Guinean society, the permanent internal disputes in that party are reflected, in cascade, in the destabilization*

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<sup>43</sup>. This is a clear example of competitive authoritarianism whereby the incumbent uses state institutions against the opposition. Political intimidation and oppression are legitimizing. State institutions are politicized. After the 2019 presidential and parliamentary election, most of the former cabinet ministers of PAIGC including their leader Domingos Simões Pereira was in exile for one year facing series of political intimidation. Recently, the Government is seeking to take away Pereira’s immunity as a member of parliament. This would be an unconstitutional and undemocratic act. However, once PAIGC comes back to power, the same state institutions will be used to retaliate against what they are facing now. This routine of political oppression and intimidation makes state institutions weak.

<sup>44</sup>. The Webs means, a network of PAIGC elites and power relations with the citizens. For the fact that PAIGC is a liberation political party, it is the only political force with major structures in all regions of Guinea-Bissau. Being a member of PAIGC is a guarantee of job security and other financial privileges.

*of Guinea-Bissau. This is why disputes over the PAIGC leadership have always ended up provoking coups d'état in Guinea-Bissau, as occurred in 1980, in 1998 and in 2012” (Dr. Helder Vaz).*

Leadership dispute in democracies or party politics is a normal phenomenon and should not lead to major national instability. However, the data shows that Guinea-Bissau is an exceptional case where leadership dispute is a major cause of instability prior and since the inception of democracy. This is as a result of the oppressive nature of the state, the weak party system and the struggle for political power.

The struggle to control state institutions for survival became the main status quo. This factionalism among political parties created hatred and rejection between elites which can be considered as a strategy built around state institutions that function as a human obstacle, biased and structural in the corruption apparatus to hinder the evolution of normal functioning of those institutions. Nevertheless, the crises of internal party democracy were captured as one of the challenges as explained by Abdul Mane, lawyer and former member of the central bureau of PAIGC;

*“In Guinea-Bissau, political parties are properties of their leaders. Internal party democracy does not function. For example, when a political party signs coalition agreement with other parties, in most cases these agreements are signed only by their leaders without due process. In 2014, PAIGC won the legislative election and there was an agreement with PRS and I was a member of the central bureau of PAIGC. The president of PAIGC negotiated the terms of agreement alone, contrary to what the bureau demanded. Again, the recent agreement between PRS, MADEM-15 and APU-GDB to form a coalition government was agreed upon only by their leaders, without the consent of their party’s structure. What will happen is that, in the process of executing the agreement, we begin to live the consequences since it was wrongly done right from the beginning. In this case, we may soon see the fall of this present government as a result of non-compliance of the agreement by PRS since they are now demanding to control the ministry of internal administration. Again, the already dispute of power between President Embaló and the leader of MADEM-G15 Braima Camara begin to create tension within MADEM-G15 and the government” (Abdul Mane).*

Data reveal the depths of authoritarianism and non-compliance of democratic principles within various political parties in Guinea-Bissau. The absence of internal party democracy is a clear manifestation of undemocratic practices at the state level. Once elected, leaders of political parties become sole owners of the party. They take major decisions and sideline those who challenge their authorities. In Guinea-Bissau, in order to be granted a ministerial or any government position, members of political parties must abide by their leaders’ will. Leaders of political parties determine who should be appointed and who should not.

Political parties do not function on the basis of their ideology and play the role of watchdogs to government activities. Political parties provide financial security and other privileges for their members, and to survive, a member must play by the rules. This contradiction explained the behavior of MP's at the legislative level. Mauro Wilson Monteiro, lawyer and former legal adviser to the ministry of defense explained this phenomenon as follows:

*“Members of political parties in parliament are not able to separate their party's interest and national interest. They only defend the interest of their political parties. That is why you would hear that members of parliament can be bought in order to support a particular government program. When Carlos Gomes Junior was the president of PAIGC and Prime Minister, PAIGC MP's were paid to vote their own program in parliament<sup>45</sup>. This act cut across all political parties” (Mauro Wilson Monteiro).*

Members of parliament and the executive are confronted with the pressure of defending their parties' interests at the legislative level in order to maintain their position. Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965), indicated that “party offers individuals willing to collaborate with the regime a vehicle for advancing their careers within a stable system of patronage. In exchange for perks, privileges, and prospects of career advancement, members of a single party mobilize popular support and supervise behaviors of people unwilling to identify themselves with the dictator. In contrast to repression, rents are an alternative means by which dictators can bind parts of the population to them” (pg:77-78). On the other hand, Bacar Queita, a member of PRS political party, explained further;

*“The structure of Government in Guinea-Bissau is vertical not horizontal. This vertical power usually shifts because members of government will have 20% obedience to the prime minister and 80% obedience to their party. Even the prime minister is chosen by his own party and must do exactly what his own party thinks and not solidly implementing government policies. This is because you are worried about how to have a sum of money to give back to your political party for appointing you as a minister and to recover the money you spent to buy position. When it is a coalition government, the prime minister has less powers to act appropriately. Therefore, state institutions will be under the guidance of political parties. For example, at the judiciary level, the interpretation that the judges were giving for the 2019 presidential and legislative*

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<sup>45</sup>. In some cases, in order to be nominated as MP's or appointed to a particular government position, members of political parties are required to pay some amount of money to their respective parties as a way of securing their position. Once in parliament or in a government position, what comes first is the recovery of money spent to buy public positions. This behavior is a major impediment to the normal functioning of the institution.

*election petition case, you will know that something dangerous was behind it. Because the party in power (PAIGC) was in control of the justice system. Judges were given money, so they have to judge according to the directives received from PAIGC. This is how our political institutions function” (Bacar Queita).*

Data demonstrate that political institutions are avenues of resource mobilization and income distributions among political parties and the elites. Institutions only serve the needs of political parties. Again, political parties are major institutions that provide jobs for their members. Guinea-Bissau has a weak private sector, and the state has become the main avenue of employment. Therefore, all kinds of manipulative and undemocratic means must be used for political power and financial gain and corruption<sup>46</sup> in all sectors has become a norm guided by impunity. To contextualize this struggle for power and resources, within internal parties’ politics, at the end of April 2021, the vice president of PRS Certorio Biote presented his candidacy for the leadership of the party, arguing that he was deeply concerned about the direction of the party. Following the presentation of his candidacy, Biote was relieved of his post as vice-president by President Alberto Nambaia the following day. However, the former president of PRS and former president of the parliament Mr. Sori Djaló explained the following;

*“At the time when I was leading the party for 9 years, I did not accept corruption within the Party. However, since Alberto knows nothing, he was deceived and they completely destroyed the party<sup>47</sup>, turning it into a nest of thieves to steal state monies” (Mr. Sori Djaló).*

The data capture as well the problem of campaign financing as a major impediment to the normal functioning of state institutions. Guinea-Bissau does not have guiding principles on how political parties raise money for their campaign. The data suggest that political parties gather resources from interest groups both national and international. Once in power, they use state revenue and resources for two purposes. First

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<sup>46</sup>. Corruption and lack of accountability are central characteristics of the Bissau-Guinean economy, business sector and its political system. This is reflected in many international surveys and indices. Guinea-Bissau ranked 165rd out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/gnb> (Access on the 08/25/2021, at 4:12 AM, Wednesday). Guinea-Bissau score lower than the African averages in the 2020 result of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation index of African Governance. In the overall governance category, Guinea-Bissau scores 41 per cent out of 54 per cent. In the accountability and transparency category, Guinea-Bissau scores 40.8 per cent ranking 28 per cent out of 54 <https://iiag.online/about.html> (Access on the 08/25/2021 at 4:40 AM, Wednesday). However, petty and bureaucratic corruption is seen to be common in Guinea-Bissau” (USAID,2009). Weak governance, a weakening economy and rampant poverty have created an environment conducive for corruption in a grand scale (Lindner, 2014). Illicit trafficking, have become increasingly attractive for segments of the Bissau-Guinean military and political elites. Through the drug trade, senior officials have been able to “amass unprecedented wealth and influence, making them less beholden to the constraints of their offices, state institutions, or the political system. Their decisions are opportunistic, based on personal interests, and arbitrary (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2013).

<sup>47</sup>. Since 2003, PRS has never won either presidential or parliamentary elections. However, they have been part of governance by joining other political parties to form a coalition. This is due to continuous internal party conflict.

to pay their debt and facilitate their business and of those who finance their campaign, and second is to save resources for the next election. Mouro Wilson Monteiro explained this phenomenon in this way;

*“Majority of people that finance the campaign, they do it with the hope of having some benefit in return. I will finance your political campaign, when we win, you will give me the ministry of finance to manage, because over there I will be able to get my money back with some profit. I will be able to appoint members of my political party and facilitate my business. This is because our justice system is polarized. Somebody can be a minister just within six months and will build a two million dollars’ house” (Mouro Wilson Monteiro).*

These data reveal how political institutions under a nondemocratic regime face the issues of “concessions, rents may be distributed through a variety of means. Rents may include bribes to individuals or distribution to a wider swath of society through state employment and public works programs. The distribution of spoils may be organized through the bureaucracy or distributed within institutions” (Gandhi, 2008:77). Talking about the challenges of institutions, the current president of PAIGC and former prime minister Domingos Simões Pereira talked about these institutional crises as a purposeful act of ignoring the established roles and democratic principles by those in power.

*“I think what the practice of the institutions in the nation has been is that we lost the sight that, stability can only be attained by respecting laws and the established internal order. It cannot be on conveniences. What do we see? We already have an attorney general who after participating in the judgment of the election petition, was then dismissed to be the judge of the supreme court in order to create a visible majority. We already have cases of ministers dismissed by the president in order to represent their political parties in parliament as MP’s<sup>48</sup> and after voting their program they were re-appointed again as ministers in the next day<sup>49</sup>” (Domingos Simões Pereira).*

However, another major impediment to normal functioning state institutions is related to the lack of accountability by those who holds public offices. P-2, put it this way:

*“Politicians embezzled money from the state without any account. We have seen in this country the missing of over 20 million USD, the famous case of FUNPI involving both*

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<sup>48</sup>. Domingos Simões Pereira, cited a recent case where President Umaro Sissoco Embaló dismissed five cabinet ministers to temporarily return their status as MP’s in order to ensure a majority in parliament to approve the program of Nuno Gomes Nabiam. These ministers include; Sandji Fati, Minister of Defense and Freedom Fighters, Victor Mandinga Minister of Economic Planning and Regional Integration and Abel da Silva Gomes Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development. They were elected MPs by (MADEM-G15). Botché Candé, Minister of the Interior; Jorge Malú, Minister of Natural Resources and Energy, are MPs elected by PRS. They were reinstated on the following day as ministers after the voting government program.

<sup>49</sup>. <https://www.rtp.pt/play/p8172/e518451/grande-entrevista-africa> (Access, 5/31/2021, at 1:00 AM, Monday).



*Braima Camara and Domingos Simões Pereira without any account. Over 36 billion CFA of rescue plan under the government of PAIGC and former minister of finance Geraldo Martins was embezzled in 2014 and nothing happens. In 2015, former president Vaz used 90 viecles donated by King Mohamed VI of Morocco to bribe MP's. This cars worth \$20 thousand dollars each just to gain their support. Every year, government signs fishing agreement with EU over 9.2 million Euro. This money only goes to the pocket of few elites. These and many issues make it impossible for institutions to function well, because the same people running those institutions are the same people involving in these corrupt practices” (P-1).*

In summary, data on the major impediment of the normal functioning of Guinea-Bissau's state institutions namely; the legislature and political parties, are in line with examined literature on authoritarian politics. As observed by Geddes “politics in authoritarian regimes involves factionalism, competition, and struggle” (Geddes, 1999:121). Therefore, institutions such as the legislature and political party in the context of Guinea-Bissau “provide a forum for cooperation and policy concessions and by formally establishing power-sharing arrangements that give allies veto power and stakes in the survival of the government coalition” (Bovecchi and Simison, 2017:522). In the context of political parties, Sartori reminds us: “party members are not altruists, and the existence of parties by no means eliminates selfish and unscrupulous motivations. The power-seeking drives of politicians remain constant. What varies is the processing and the constraints that are brought to bear on such drives” (1976:25). Now, constraints are totally absent in the political system of Guinea-Bissau and its institutions. Therefore, the above data, only confirm the third hypothesis that says: (H3). *“The legislature and political parties do not ensure credible commitments because of poor political system and vulnerability of members of parliament”.*

## **5.2 Co-optation and the challenges of power-sharing**

Co-optation arguments discussed in the literature also contain elements of Guinea-Bissau's undemocratic politics and it is the core strategy used by the elites. Gandhi (2008), emphasizes that the legislature facilitates repeated interactions that will enable elites to signal the credibility of their collective threat to rebel. Thus, “co-opted parliamentarians may rise to levels in government that would lead them to be defined as elites in a power-sharing relationship. Moreover, in either case, the term ‘opposition’ for members of an authoritarian assembly may be a bit of an exaggeration. A true opposition party in a democratic context should fulfil the classic definition of a party, which is a group whose sole purpose is attempting to control government” (Schuler and Maleskey, 2014:685). In the context of Guinea-Bissau politics, co-optation through patronage, political appointment of opposition members to government, distribution of rent and financial privileges are mostly applied. Hence, there are three major layers of co-optation in the context of Guinea-Bissau precisely at national, government and community level. These layers can be characterized as top-down, horizontal

and bottom-up co-optation<sup>50</sup>. A former secretary of state under the PAIGC government who is described as P-2, gives us a clear example of a recent case;

*“This political maneuver is common in Guinea-Bissau. Many times, government after government does co-opt opposition members into governance in order to destabilize the opposition. In return, co-opted elites are given positions. For, example, after the 2019 presidential election, in order to destabilize the then PAIGC government, former secretary of state Suzi Barboza was co-opted and appointed by president-elect Umaro Sissoco Embaló as minister of foreign affairs in the government led by Nuno Gomes Nabiam. Suzi Barbosa was the face of PAIGC government. However, being part of present government became a major loss for PAIGC<sup>51</sup>” (P-2).*

In stable authoritarian politics, co-optation can ensure survival, if leaders can distribute rent and maintain credible commitments. However, data show that co-optation in the context of Guinea-Bissau, does not ensure survival for the fact that leaders are unable to maintain credible commitment due to the fragility of state institutions and the constant threat posed by political parties. The data show that co-optation is primarily used among political parties by sharing ministerial positions or granting access to state finances. Therefore, members of other political parties are mostly co-opted into the governance solidly on the basis of rent. This is because having access to power comes with many financial benefits.

Again, in the context of Guinea-Bissau, co-optation can happen at the personal as well as at political party level which seemingly appears to be a coalition not based on policies but rather financial benefits and sharing of ministerial position. This is one of the reasons why none of the elected executives has ever completed their four years of mandate since 1994. Every political party and their members fights to be in governance by all means. Therefore, elites can easily be co-opted in order to destabilize other political forces. However, this strategy has never been sustainable in a long run. P-1, a leading figure of one of the major political parties who wish to remain unidentified gives us a concrete example of how cooptation work;

*“We can talk about the present minister of interior Botche Candé who was a member of PRS and minister of state and adviser on religious affairs to former president Kumba Yalá from 2002-2003. Botche was co-opted into PAIGC in 2009 as minister of commerce*

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<sup>50</sup>. See Appendix A, table A.6 on the dimension of various layers of co-optation in the context of Guinea-Bissau. The table described co-optation from three different levels namely; at national, government and community levels. However, there are three layers of co-optation from top-down, horizontal and bottom-up.

<sup>51</sup>. The constitutions of Guinea-Bissau chapter (I), article 59, which defines the separation of power among organs of government, does not allow the president to appoint cabinet ministers or people into the position of power. This is the rule of the executive. However, in the context of Guinea-Bissau, various presidents undermined this principle and often appoint people into positions of trust. This has become a norm in the political landscape of Guinea-Bissau. The practice is unconstitutional and a simple abuse of power.

*and tourism due to his influence in Bafatá. Presently, president Embaló co-opted him as minister of internal affairs. The same is the case of António Óscar Barbosa, former spokesperson of PAIGC during the 2019 election and minister of Public Works, Construction and Urbanism in 2009, who is now co-opted to MADEM-15” (P-1).*

In democracy and dispute of power, it is a normal phenomenon for individuals to switch parties. However, this is not the case in Guinea-Bissau. Due to instability and the failed nature of the state, elites seek to be in governance constantly and can easily be co-opted. Bacar Queita explains it as follows;

*“Sometimes elites are co-opted in order to overthrow a ruling government. When Nabiam was co-opted into PAIGC prior to 2019 presidential election, there was no way that former president José Mário Vaz could have not maintained PAIGC in power. However, PAIGC failed to maintain its commitment with Nabiam. This is because co-opted elites come with conditions such as access to state finances or managing a particular ministry. Nabiam was supposed to run the ministry of Public administration, but the brother of Domingos Simões Pereira was in control of strategic management of the ministry where money flows. So, every co-opted elite looks into where they will get more money. When Nabiam joined the coalition of MADEM-15 and PRS after 2019 presidential election, President Embaló dismissed the government of PAIGC and appointed him as prime minister” (Bacar Queita).*

There is a correlation between co-optation and power-sharing in the context of Guinea-Bissau precisely because of prevailing instability among political parties. Data show that co-optation without sticking to power-sharing agreements could create conflict and subsequent instability. In relation to power-sharing, Boix and Svobik, (2013), model of institutions and power-sharing predicts that institutions will collapse and power-sharing will not be possible when changes in the distribution of power favor the dictator at the expense of the allies to the extent that the threat of an allies’ rebellion loses credibility. Abdul Mane, contextualized these issues as follow;

*“For example, the recent agreement between MADEM-G15, APU-GB and PRS is a clear example of how power-sharing agreement can easily collapse. PRS is demanding to appoint all the regional administrators and MADEM-G15 disagrees with this demand. Just like in the finance ministry, MADEM-G15 appointed the minister and PRS appointed the secretary of the treasury. In our context, power-sharing challenges got to do with two phenomena. First, the absence of structure within political parties before the agreement that can follow up the full execution of those agreement. Second, parties usually sign an agreement and then sit down to see how it’s been executed. Their main issue from the beginning is to have power. The same happens with RGB-MB and PRS in*

1999 which ended badly. PRS ended up taken all its ministries originally given to RGB-MB and in return, RGB-MB moved out of the coalition government which eventually led to a subsequent coup and the collapse of Kumba Yalá government in 2003” (Abdul Mane).

The data show that co-optation has been one of the strategic attempt used by various governments to secure power. However, it lacks credible commitment from both sides of political parties. Therefore, the data is a justification of the first hypothesis which stated that: (H1). “Co-optation through government appointment does not ensure survival due to the lack of commitment to original agreement of power and scarcity of resources”.

### **5.3 Credible threat in relation to minimization of loss**

For Boix and Svobik, (2013), the only punishment that the allies can use to deter the ruler from reneging on his promise to compensate them for their support is to stage a rebellion, replacing the ruler with a challenger. The credibility of the threat of a rebellion depends on the balance of power between the ruler and the allies. The balance of power within the ruling coalition thus determines the terms of any power-sharing agreement that the ruler will abide by in the first place. Thus, the data show how this theory has been applied by various leaders and government since 1994.

I begin to examine João Bernardo Nino Vieira approach to power and the strategies he used to minimize his loss. Vieira’s leadership is the foundation of Guinea-Bissau’s authoritarian politics. Data look into factors of key political events that lead to instability of which repression and betrayal is the preferred means of attempted survival. Talking about Vieira’s strategy, Bacar Queita described his manipulative tendencies as follows;

*“Nino Vieira was a military strategist coming from a manipulative political party (PAIGC). Within PAIGC there is a lot of mafia. Vieira was at the center of it. To survive in power, he blocked all those who helped him to attained power after the 1980 coup. He killed many people, took many to a difficult precarious situation and remained the only powerful figure in the country.” (Bacar Queita).*

Furthermore, Mamadu Seide, characterized João Bernardo Nino Vieira in the following words;

*“I define Nino Vieira as an unconscious utilitarian. For him the end justified the means. Nino did not measure his efforts to achieve his objectives, which was to remain in power. No matter the means, as long as they served his ends. From bribery, persecution and silencing of opponents, fraudulent elections, marginalization of intellectuals and promotion of ignorance and other means that proved useful to his project” (Mamadu Seide, PhD in Law).*

Vieira's leadership was marked by many alleged coup attempts and suspicions. In 1984, prime minister Victor Saude Maria, was accused by the regime of coup attempts and was sent to prison. In subsequent years, Paulo Correia the first vice-president and Vriato Pan and former attorney general were both charged of trying to overthrow the regime and condemned to death. Death penalty was constitutional. This situation of threat and attempt to minimize those threats in most cases violently became a political culture in Guinea-Bissau. Carlos Pinto Pereira, a defense attorney of those convicted to death described those accusations as mere political game in order to silence those who challenge the regime:

*"I was unfortunate to participate in this process. It is unfortunate because a process that ends with shootings cannot be pleasant. These cases opened up liberal legal practice in Guinea Bissau, and at the time few people could cover hundreds of cases or people involved outside the ministry of defense, I mean those with legal training who could defend these people. I had Paulo Correia as my constituent. It was painful how things turned out. In my point of view, there were no conditions to affirm that there were coup attempts. For me, it was a setup<sup>52</sup>" (Carlos Pinto Pereira, Lawyer).*

Right from the beginning of Guinea-Bissau institutional building and multiparty system, oppression, persecution and false accusations were used by political leaders to eliminate any threat. However, in an interview, Vieira justified his actions of killing his opponent with a camouflage of a coup attempt on tribal bases. He explained the following;

*"There is still this separatist tendency in Africa, this tribal tendency. Therefore, for Africa to come to form what it wants, the dream of African unity in the future, it is necessary that we eliminate this tendency of grouping, this tendency of tribes, and build the nation. The accusation is of ethnic and power ambition. There was a tribal tendency to mobilize an ethnic group to which they belong but has nothing to do with the Balanta population in the villages<sup>53</sup>" (João Bernardo Nino Vieira, 1986).*

There is a different account in relation to Vieira's approach to power. For Abdul Mane, Vieira's 18 years in power were aided by the political system at the time. These years comprises of both single party regime and multiparty democracy:

*"Nino emerges out of revolution. It is up to us to discuss about its success and failures. He was not a trained politician per se but a warrior, a general of war. His 18 years in power was as a result of Guinea-Bissau's one party system prior to 1994 multiparty election. One party system does not violate international law. It was a political system.*

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<sup>52</sup>. <https://www.rtp.pt/play/p8582/e536693/africa-os-homens-da-presidencia> (Accessed, 5/20/2021/, Thursday, 7:11 PM.

<sup>53</sup>. <https://www.rtp.pt/play/p8582/e536693/africa-os-homens-da-presidencia> (Accessed, 5/20/2021/, Thursday, 7:11 PM.

*Vieira was part of the transition period and participated in the first democratic election in 1994. In all of these processes, from 1994 to 1998 there was the case of 1998 civil war. Nino was unable to end its mandate. For this reason, I cannot have called him a dictator. He survival in power was because of the system. PAIGC was born with the state of Guinea-Bissau” (Abdul Mane).*

Data show that there were a lot of factions within PAIGC under Vieira’s leadership<sup>54</sup>. Thus, he may not have total control of the situation but steady repression, arbitrary detention of opposition, corruption and impunity eventually led to the 1998 rebellion by those he imprisoned. Boix and Svoilik (2013), indicated that authoritarian power-sharing succeeds only when it is backed by a credible threat of a rebellion by the dictator’s allies, institutions will be ineffective or break down when an imbalance of power within the ruling coalition undermines this threat’s credibility. Thus, Vieira finds himself in a complex situation of commitment and monitoring problems with his allies, caused by the secrecy of his authoritarian tendencies.

With the inception of a new era under the leadership of Kumba Yalá from 1999 to 2023, nothing changed. In spite of Yalá being a scholar and victim of Vieira’s undemocratic rule, data show that, Vieira’s era was more stable compared to that of Yalá. This confirms Gandhi and Przeworski’s (2007) findings that single-party regimes were far more stable than non-institutionalized and multiparty regimes. The interaction of parties and assemblies is just as critical to authoritarian dynamics as they are in the democratic system. For Mamadu Seide;

*Kumba Yalá did nothing different from what Nino was doing. He used strictly the same modus operandi as Nino. He has proved to have difficulty in dealing with institutions. A great example of this was the sacking and appointment of more than five Prime Ministers in less than three years of his Presidency, and the assassination of General Ansumane Mané<sup>55</sup> in 2000” (Mamadu Seide, PhD in law).*

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<sup>54</sup>. Data shows as well that, during his era, Vieira established a false elite in order to protect his power in every facet of society. Within armed forces, his own political party, the justice system and even the civil society. One cannot speak bad against him because he has all these false elites who usually defend his regime and gathered the information for him. The very corrupt system which still prevails today in Guinea-Bissau was established by Nino since in the 1980s and PAIGC.

<sup>55</sup>. General Ansumane Mané fought in the war of independence against Portugal alongside President Vieira, and he backed Vieira when they later seized power in the 1980 coup against Luis Cabral. Mané was subsequently dismissed by president Vieira and replaced by General Humberto Gomes on the 6<sup>th</sup> of June 1998. Mané led a military rebellion against president Vieira on the following day, resulting in the 1998 civil war. Mané became temporary head of state (official title: Chairman of the Supreme Command of the Military Junta) until 14 May. Mané backed former president Malan Bacai Sanha in the 1999 presidential election against Kumba Yalá. However, Yalá was victorious. Although the junta was dissolved following Yalá’s victory, Mané remained powerful, acting as an obstacle and threat to president Yalá’s authority.

To minimize his loss, in November 2000, president Yalá promoted a number of Balanta’s senior military officers without the consent of Mané and created a division within the army. Mané objected to the promotions and

Data shows that once in power leaders become stronger than the established institutions. Therefore, changes in leadership and government has not had any positive effect on the nation's structural and institutional challenges. As explained by Bacar Queita, perhaps changes only occurs within class of elites in power and those in opposition:

*“With Kumba Yalá in power, those false urban elites created by Vieira’s fall and those from the rural areas assumed power. These rural elites came in with exaggerated ambition to steal from the state. Yalá’s era was a total disaster with the escalation of tribal politics. He unconstitutionally dissolved parliament in 2002, sacked all the judiciary judges and attempted to manipulate a constitutional amendment. There was a total banalization of state, abuse of power with enormous social and economic catastrophes. All these led to his overthrown in 2023” (Bacar Queita).*

After the fall of president Yalá, the period from 2003-2014 was marked by more intensive struggle for power. During this period, state institutions were totally ignored. Oppression, political intimidation, and assassination of opposition and drug trafficking were more evidence. P-3, a leading political figure in Guinea-Bissau, put it this way;

*“It was a moment when people began to see in a raw form all practices of evil. The coups and assassination of political opponents became the very agenda of the elites. With the emergence of greater number of political parties it was difficult for a single party to have majority in parliament. If you have a coalition government with five political parties, the rest of the parties will begin to plan a coup in order to be part of transition government. All those assassinated politicians were a threat to others. Baciro Dabo for example, was a presidential candidate, Helder Proensa, former minister of defense, Robert Cacheu, an MP and human right activist. Some were arbitrary arrested. Carlos Gomes Junior, the then prime minister was at the centered of all these atrocities. He wanted to be president by all means and he was managing power with much arrogance and repression. These crimes only perpetuated a dangerous political atmosphere until 2014” (P-3).*

From 2003-2014, state institutions were literally nonexistent with political parties fighting to be in power undemocratically. The return of former president João Bernardo Nino Vieira after eleven years of

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declared himself head of the armed forces. He revoked Yalá’s promotions, placed military chief of staff Verissimo Correia Seabra and deputy chief of staff Emilio Costa under house arrest, and appointed General Buota Nan Batcha as the new chief of staff. This incident led to the assassination of Mané by forces loyal to the then-president Yalá and General Batista Tagme Na Waie a week later, on 30 November 2000. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansumane\\_Man%C3%A](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansumane_Man%C3%A) (Accessed on the 7/8/2021, at 5:25 PM, Wednesday).

exile and his election as president in 2009, created more tension within PAIGC and the armed forces. Known for his past authoritarian tendencies with many of his former enemies now in power, the likelihood of eliminating him as it happened was evidence. Carlos Gomes Junior the then prime minister and president of PAIGC perceived Vieira to be a threat to his political ambition. This catastrophic assassination of Vieira is better explained by P-4, a politician and member of parliament;

*“It seems that, after the election of president Vieira, his attempt to dismiss Carlos Gomes Junior government was a miscalculation. Considering Nino’s past history and accusations of countless massacres of opponents, it was clear that those in power both from the government and military were finding ways to assassinate him. General Tagme Nawai who was Vieira’s enemy since post-colonial era, made a statement that if he died in the morning, Vieira would die in the afternoon. Therefore, Carlos Gomes Junior took advantage of this political atmosphere to eliminate Vieira. Considering General Nawai’s statement, he was murdered first by unknown forces and Vieira was immediately accused and brutally murdered in the same day. All these happened because Zamora Induta, the armed chief of staff, was the right hand of Carlos Gomes Junior. Gomes used the military as an attempt to consolidate his powers but he was overthrown by the same military and forced out of the country” (P-4).*

Guinea-Bissau political instability has been associated with the involvement of the military. The data suggest that, the involvement of the military was politically motivated. The military was only used as a means to an end. The period from 2014-2019, was a continuation of power struggle, minimization of threat and undemocratic use of institutions by the elites. “José Mário Vaz was elected president as the nominee of the PAIGC in 2014. Again, Vaz’s 2015 dismissal of Pereira, the party leader, as prime minister touched off a political crisis.<sup>56</sup>” (Freedom House, 2019). Data reveal the following political events that cause instability, explained by Bacar Queita;

*“The internal conflict within PAIGC begin after the 2014 congress of Cacheu that elected Domingos Simões Pereira as president of PAIGC. His major adversary Braima Camara became a threat to his leadership within the party. At a particular moment conflict between these two escalated. Domingos Simões Pereira created a snowballing situation thinking that he has a control over the situation by dismissing 15 members of the party including Braima Camara. Their dismissal from PAIGC resulted to the formation of MADEM-G15<sup>57</sup>” (Bacar Queita).*

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<sup>56</sup>. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/guinea-bissau/freedom-world/2019> (Accessed on the 5/28/2021/ at 9:54 AM, Friday).

<sup>57</sup>. The 15 dismissed members from PAIGC on the account of party indiscipline, founded the MADEM-G15 movement and became a direct opposition to PAIGC during 2019 both presidential and parliamentary election. In order to



For Dr. Helder Vaz, all these crises happened as a result of failure of PAIGC new leadership which he considered to be a new wine in an old bottle:

*“The new leadership of PAIGC in 2014 with an agile and modern discourse to the outside, internally shared the ideas and methods of the old guard, having opted for the exclusion and purging of internal opponents, ruthlessly crushing opponents and dividing the country as never before, through a more populist, fractious and scorched earth discourse. This prelude scenario of a political catastrophe that would plunge the country into chaos led to all opposition forces coming together in December 2019 to support the election of General Umaro Sissoco Embaló to the post of President of the Republic.”*  
(Dr. Helder Vaz).

Considering the magnitude of conflict between President José Mário Vaz, and Domingos Simões Pereira, data justified the challenges of separation of power between the presidency and the executive since 1994. This has been the core of Guinea-Bissau political crises and the challenges of the semi-presidential system. Once the president feels threatened by the prime minister, the option is to dismiss the prime minister, dissolve the parliament and executive and call for re-election. Hence, the dispute of power between former president Vaz and former prime minister Pereira was motivated by access to finance and control of state institutions. Both leaders justified the following;

*“Considering the situation of the people, of the country, the challenges, I felt that cohabitation between the two would not be good either for me, for him or for the country. Politics means serving others, we are here to serve the country, if we are not here to serve the country and we are here for permanent conflicts, it means that it is not worthwhile”* (Former president José Mário Vaz, Interview with RTP).

However, Domingos Simões Pereira stated the following;

*“Jose Mario Vaz is a business man and sees only the profit. He saw the post of the president of republic as a springboard, a platform to access public money and thus solve his problems. President José Mário Vaz understood that the only way to recover the possibility of having access to public funds was to put me aside”* (DSP interview with BissauFlex<sup>58</sup>).

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maintain their influence within the wheels of power, they took advantage of the conflict between president José Mário Vaz and Domingos Simões Pereira and sided with the president in Parliament by refusing to vote government programs presented by PAIGC. This situation led to the collapse of the PAIGC government and the formation of a coalition government of which the group of 15 were mostly in control of major ministerial positions.

<sup>58</sup>. <https://www.facebook.com/bissau.online/posts/1338043543016885> (Accessed on 7/15/2021 at 6:02 PM).

This conflict between the president and the prime minister led to the closure of parliament for three years and social protest throughout the nation. Umaro Sissoco Embaló<sup>59</sup>, former prime minister appointed by President José Mário Vaz and founding member of MADEM-15 took advantage of this situation and gained the support of all the major political elites in divergent with PAIGC leadership.

In late February and into March 2020, a constitutional crisis emerged when elected president Embaló organized his inauguration. The vice-president of Parliament Nuno Gomes Nabiam led the inauguration ceremony with the presence of former president Jose Mario Vaz and the military. President Embalo with the help of the military, forcefully removed PAIGC government and appointed Nuno Gomes Nabiam as prime minister. The PAIGC, who had a slim parliamentary majority but lost the presidential election, ignored Embaló's inauguration, proclaimed the president of parliament Cipriano Cassamá as interim president. However, Cassamá resigned after one day in office, saying he feared for his safety (Freedom House, 2019). The military was used to secure various ministerial buildings and place several PAIGC ministers under house arrest. The coalition of MADEM-15, PRS and APU-PDGB political parties form a majority in parliament and the executive with PAIGC in opposition. In an Interview with RTP Africa, the leader of PAIGC Domingos Simões Pereira who was in exile in Portugal for one year, lamented over the use of military for political gain;

*"I think it is obvious. But I lament this situation, because truly, the military continue to be deceived in Guinea-Bissau. What happen on the 27 of February is that, they were deceived that they are combating a monster which is PAIGC and Domingos Simões Pereira. So they were fed with this lies. The objective is to create an atmosphere of fear, and vulnerability in relation to these threat in order to keep us away or apart in order for them to continue with what they are doing in the nation which is an absolute anarchy" (Domingos Simões Pereira, Grande entrevista RTP Africa<sup>60</sup>).*

President Embaló<sup>61</sup> seems to consolidate his power with the coalition government. However, considering the history of Guinea-Bissau authoritarian politics, this struggle for power will continue until

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<sup>59</sup>. Umaro Sissoco Embaló of the Movement for Democratic Alternation (MADEM- G15) party, supported by former president José Mário Vaz who placed fourth in the first round and a coalition of opposition parties, won the December 2019 presidential election's run-off with 53.6 per cent of the vote, defeating Domingos Simões Pereira of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) who won 46.4 percent of the vote. According to the National Election Commission (CNE), voter turnout was 72.7 percent" (Freedom House, 2019).

<sup>60</sup>. <https://www.rtp.pt/play/p8172/e518451/grande-entrevista-africa> (Accessed on, 5/20/2021/, Thursday, 13:17 PM).

<sup>61</sup>. President Embaló strategically used his international connection to legitimize his authority, having invited many heads of state within Africa and beyond to Guinea-Bissau including the president of Portugal Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa which was seen as a way to legitimize Embaló's authority. The recent return of Domingos Simões Pereira to Guinea-Bissau and his secret meeting with the president of PRS including some military personnel raises serious questions about the role of PRS in the present government. Both PRS and MADEM-15 threaten to abandon the coalition government and call for an anticipated legislative election. PAIGC leadership refused to accept the legitimacy of Embaló's presidency.

one group triumphs. Therefore, this continuous threat and an attempts to minimize these threat justified our third hypothesis which says: (H2) “ *Political parties are weak and vertical. Therefore, power can be attain through other undemocratic and oppressive means*”.

## 6 CONCLUSION

This dissertation presents a new perspective and thought-provoking analysis in relation to enduring political instability in Guinea-Bissau, and examines key historical accounts and the behavior of the political class which triggered instability since the inception of multiparty democracy between 1994-2019. The dissertation is strictly a dialogue with the literature on the features of authoritarian politics and makes use of relevant concepts and theories through the analysis of institutions to explain the lack of regime survival in a country that is neither stable nor purely authoritarian.

In the final analysis, institutions in Guinea-Bissau, precisely political parties and the legislature, are among the root causes of instability. Moreover, there are three important lessons to consider in relation to the causes of instability in Guinea-Bissau. First, leaders do co-opt potential opponents but they do not redistribute rent and power sufficiently to ensure that co-optation eliminates the risk of coups. Second, political parties are important but with weak structures, very vertical and unable to distribute rent and offer leaders information that can be used to anticipate threats. Therefore, political parties in Guinea-Bissau have failed to be the foundation of political stability but rather served as autocratic institutions which draw on the support of a cohesive coalition while suppressing advocates of democracy. The effects of these durable conflicting coalitions are apparent considering the prevailing instability since 1994. Third, political parties pose credible threats to each other due to their use of military force, therefore access to government, parliamentary positions or party positions are not a guarantee that opponents will not try to forcibly remove leaders from power.

However, this dissertation considered institutions in Guinea-Bissau as mere window-dressing in substance as explained in the analysis, but does not necessarily mean they are arbitrarily established. In contrast, institutions in Guinea-Bissau are objectively constructed for good purpose as part of democratization process but has been manipulated to further the ambition of the political class. It is in the light of this logic that instability occurs based upon the strategic behavior of political actors taking into consideration the risks and benefits of manipulating political institutions which was extensively examined in the analysis.

Furthermore, essential arguments from the literature on the need for institutions in a nondemocratic setting raises the problem that, “for autocratic rulers, institutions help in addressing two dilemmas of governance. First, dictators must secure their position in power, neutralizing any threats to their rule. Second, nondemocratic incumbents must solicit the cooperation of outsiders to insure that individuals have incentives to engage in productive activities” (Gandhi, 2008:180). This dissertation argues that, in the context of Guinea-Bissau semi-presidential system, institutions serve the same purpose of facilitating an unscrupulous share of power and resources among the elites only on temporary basis. My assertion is partially in line with the proponents of the co-optation theory of authoritarian legislature where regimes with

greater access to natural resources, dictators are more likely to rely on institutions, which indicate that when regimes need cooperation they will reach out to other groups and incorporate them into the inner circle of the regime (Gandhi 2008; wright 2008). In Guinea-Bissau, the process of incorporating opposing forces becomes temporal due to the lack of commitment to power-sharing agreement and struggle to control state finances and the nation's natural wealth. As a result, institutions exist in principle, but do not serve their ideal purpose apart from serving the interests of the political class. It is therefore not surprising that, upon all the atrocities and crimes committed, violation of human rights, assassination of political opponents and massive corruption since 1994, none of those involved in this act has ever been found guilty by the law. Guinea-Bissau is yet to build a cohesive state and to draw a line between state institutions and political parties and what interests are proper to each. Political parties interest has been place above the national interest. Therefore, for democracy to prevail in Guinea-Bissau, strong institutions are needed to check the excesses of power, a call for structural reform of state institutions.

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## APENDIX

### APENDIX A-Basic information in relation to Guinea-Bissau Major Political events.

**Table A.1. Composition of the legislature and party representation: 1994-2019**

<i>Year</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1999- 2000</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2019</i>
<i>PAIGC</i>	62	24	45	67	57	47
<i>RGB-MB</i>	19	29	-	-	-	-
<i>PRS</i>	12	38	35	28	41	21
<i>UM</i>	6	3	-	-	1	1
<i>FLING</i>	1	-	-	-	-	-
<i>PND</i>	-	-	-	1	1	1
<i>APU- PDGB</i>	-	-	-	-	-	5
<i>MADEM- G15.</i>	-	-	-	-	-	27
<i>FDS</i>	-	1	-	-	-	-
<i>AD (PCD- FD)</i>	-	3	-	1	-	-
<i>PSD</i>	-	3	-	-	2	-
<i>PUSD</i>	-	-	17	-	-	-
<i>PRID</i>	-	-	-	3	-	-
<i>UE</i>	-	-	2	-	-	-
<i>APU</i>	-	-	1	-	-	-
<i>UNDP</i>	-	1	-	-	-	-
<i>Total</i>	100	102	100	100	102	102

*Note:* 102 Members of Parliament are elected according to a proportional representation system. Technical elements: 27 multi-member constituencies with varying size (14 constituencies with three seats, eight with four seats, four with five seats and one with six seats); Closed party lists; Single vote; d'Hondt formula; No legal threshold. Two Members of Parliament are elected by plurality system in two single-member constituencies for emigration circles (Nohlen, Krennerich, Thibaut, 1999:465), which makes the total of 102 members of parliament.

The total number of valid registered voters is 404.521. The two seats for the emigration constituencies were not considered in the 1994 first democratic legislative election. In the legislative elections of 1999-2000, 430,790 out of 523,507 registered voters voted on 28<sup>th</sup> November, which corresponds to 82.29% of the

total number of registered voters. The abstention rate was only 17.71%. This election includes the two diaspora seats. In 2004 election, the total number of valid vote is 460.254 which is 76,25% of valid votes with 23,75% of abstention.

In 2008 election, the total number of registered voters was 593, 739 which correspondent to 82.00% of valid vote and 18.00% abstention. The total number of valid vote in the 2014 legislative election is 586.524. The abstention rate was 11,43% out of 88,57% of total vote. The total number of valid vote in the 2019 election is 602.381, which is amounted to 79.1% of valid vote and 15.3% abstention. **Source:** <http://www.cne.gw/>

**Table A. 2. Presidents' time in office: 1994-2019.**

<b>President</b>	<b>Took office</b>	<b>Left office</b>	<b>Political Party</b>	<b>Motive of termination/overthrow, assassinated and death</b>
<b>João Bernardo Nino Vieira</b>	1994	1999	PAIGC	Elected in 1994 and overthrown in 1999.
<b>Malam Bacai Sanhá</b>	1999	2000	PAIGC	Acting
<b>Kumba Yalá</b>	2000	2003	PRS	Elected in 1999 and overthrown in 2003.
<b>Henrique Pereira Rosa</b>	2003	2005	Independent	Acting
<b>João Bernardo Nino Vieira</b>	2005	2009	Independent	Elected in 2005 and assassinated in 2009 while in office.
<b>Raimundo Pereira</b>	2009	2009	PAIGC	Acting
<b>Malam Bacai Sanhá</b>	2009	2012	PAIGC	Elected in 2009 and died in 2012 for health reason while in office.
<b>Raimundo Pereira</b>	2012	2012	PAIGC	Acting

<b>Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo</b>	2012	2014	PAIGC	Acting
<b>José Mário Vaz</b>	2014	2020	PAIGC	Elected in 2014 and handed over power in 2020.
<b>Umaro Sissoco Embaló</b>	2020	2024	MADDEM G15	Elected in 2019 and still in office.

**Note:** The table is a reflection of those who occupied the office of the presidency from 1994:2019. It shows their time in office either through elections, coups or just acting president as a result of political instability.

**Table A.3. Composition of second round presidential election result: 1994-2019.**

Year	Candidate	Registered voters	Cast cast	Invalid votes	Valid votes	Result
1994	Kumba Yalá and João Bernado Nino Vieira	400417	326615	16868	309747	Viera was elected with 161.083 vote=52.0%
1999-2000	Kumba Yalá and Malan Bacai Sanha	503007	361609	16868	309747	Kumba Yalá was elected with 251.193 vote=72.0%
2005	João Nino Vieira	538472	422978	10053	412926	Viera was elected with 216.167votes=52.35%
2009	Kumba Yalá and Malan	593765	362736	4268	354232	Malan Bacai Sanha was elected with 224, 259 votes=63.31%

	Bacai Sanha					
2014	José Mário Vaz and Nuno Gomes Nabiam	775508	606536	10169	588483	José Mário Vaz was elected with 364.394 votes=61.92%
2019	Domingos Simões Pereira and Umaro Sissoco Embaló	761676	553521	2228	547827	Umaro Sissoco Embaló was elected with 293359 votes=53,55%

**Note:** In two circumstances, the military seized power for a short period of time. In 2003, General Verissimo Correia Seabra in a coup was the chairman of the military committee just for 14 days. In 2012, Major general Mamadu Ture Kuruma, became a chairman of military command for 29 days. However, since 1994 only Former president Jose Mario Vaz completed five years of the mandate as required by the constitution from 2014-2019. Such is a clear manifestation of competitive authoritarianism.

Guinea-Bissau constitution stipulates a regular presidential term of office for five years. “The president cannot be re-elected for a third mandate for the following five years after the second consecutive term. However, the president is directly elected by the absolute majority. If no candidate obtains the absolute majority in the first ballot, a second ballot will be held between the two most voted candidates within 21 days” (Nohlen, Krennerich, Thibaut, 1999:470). Hence, since 1994 none of the presidential candidates ever wins the election on the first ballot. Hence, this table only captures the second-round presidential result. **Source:** <http://www.cne.gw/>

**Table A. 4. Prime Ministers’, party affiliation and time in office:1994-2019**

<b>Prime Minister</b>	<b>Took office</b>	<b>Left office</b>	<b>Political party</b>	<b>Remark</b>
<b>Manuel Saturnino Da Costa</b>	1994	1997	PAIGC	He was in office for two years and 223 days.
<b>Carlos Correia</b>	1997	1998	PAIGC	Was in office for one year and 180 days.
<b>Francisco Fadul</b>	1998	2000	Independent	Was in office for one year and 78 days.

<b>Caitano N'tchama</b>	2000	2001	PRS	Was in office for one year and 28 days.
<b>Faustino Imbali</b>	2001	2001	Independent	Was in office for 263 days.
<b>Alamara Nhasse</b>	2001	2002	PRS	Was in office for 343 days.
<b>Mario Pires</b>	2002	2003	PRS	Was in office for 301 days.
<b>Artur Sanha</b>	2003	2004	PRS	Was in office for 225 days.
<b>Carlos Gomes Junior</b>	2004	2005	PAIGC	Was in office for one year and 176 days.
<b>Aristides Gomes</b>	2005	2007	PAIGC	He was in office for one year 162 days.
<b>Martinho N'dafa Kabi</b>	2007	2008	PAIGC	Was in office for one year and 114 days.
<b>Carlos Correia</b>	2008	2009	PAIGC	Was in office for 150 days.
<b>Carlos Gomes Junior</b>	2009	2012	PAIGC	Was in office for three years and 39 days.
<b>Adiato Djalo Nandigna</b>	2012	2012	PAIGC	Was in office for 62 days.
<b>Rui Duarte De Barros</b>	2012	2014	Independent	He was in office for 2 years and 48 days.

<b>Domingos Simões Pereira</b>	2014	2015	PAIGC	Was in office for one year and 48 days.
<b>Baciro Dja</b>	2015	2015	PAIGC	Was in office for 28 days.
<b>Carlos Correia</b>	2015	2016	PAIGC	In office for 253 days.
<b>Baciro Dja</b>	2016	2016	Independent	He was in office for 175 days.
<b>Umaro Sissoco Embaló</b>	2016	2018	Independent	He was in office for one year and 73 days.
<b>Artur Silva</b>	2018	2018	PAIGC	Was in office for 76 days.
<b>Aristides Gomes</b>	2018	2018	PAIGC	Was in office for 1 year and 198 days.
<b>Faustino Imbali</b>	2019	2019	Independent	Was in office for just 10 days.
<b>Aristides Gomes</b>	2019	2020	PAIGC	Was in office for 112 days.
<b>Nuno Gomes Nabiam</b>	2020	Incumbent	APU-PGDB	Already in office for one year 115 days.

**Note:** It is important to state that, since the inception of multiparty democracy in 1994 to date, none of the legislative elected officials has completed their four years' mandate according to the constitutions. This table explains clearly the struggle for power and the lack of survival.

**Source:** [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_prime\\_ministers\\_of\\_Guinea-Bissau](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_prime_ministers_of_Guinea-Bissau)

**Table A. 5. Guinea-Bissau most unstable period: 1994-2019**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Events</i>	<i>Remark</i>
<b>1994</b>	First democratic election.	The opening of democracy was under the pressure of international community and not a freely political will by the PAIGC single party regime.
<b>1998</b>	Failed coup attempt and civil war.	The failed coup resulted to a civil war where thousands of people killed and overthrown João Nino Vieira after 18 years in power.
<b>2000</b>	The assassination of General Ansumane Mané	General Ansumane Mane was a threat to Kumba presidency and was assassinated by forces loyal to president Kumba.
<b>2002</b>	Unconstitutional Closing of parliament and Judicial house	President Kumba Yala unconstitutionally closed parliament and sacked all the elected judges. This was abuse of power.
<b>2003</b>	Military seized power and forced Kumba Yalá	Total institutional crises as a result of president Yalá incapacity to relate with

	to step down as president.	state institutions and abuse of power.
<i>2009</i>	The assassination of President Vieira	Vieira was accused of involving in the assassination of General Tagme Nawai who was his major opponent since post-colonial era.
<i>2009</i>	Assassination of several senior politicians and arbitrary arrest. These includes: Baciro Dabo, Helder proensa and Robert Cacheu.	Most of them were accused of coup attempt.
<i>2012</i>	Coup and overthrow of Carlos Gomes Junior government by the military.	Prime minister Carlos Gomes Junior was accused of involving in the assassination of several political figure and wanted to control the army with the forces from Angola. He was forcefully removed from power.
<i>2016-2019</i>	Closing of parliament due to internal conflict within PAIGC.	Closing of parliament is as a result of internal conflict within PAIGC between fractions loyal to president Vaz and former prime minister Pereira.

**Note:** It is important to mention that, with the present status quo, instability is prone to happen at any time. This is because of massive oppression, political intimidation, violation of human rights and abuse of power by the



present government of Nuno Gomes Nabiam and President Embaló. Until a serious and structural reform occurs, Guinea-Bissau is yet to consolidate its democracy.

**Source:** <https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea-bissau/timeline-guinea-bissau-history-coups-and-strife>

**Table A. 6. Alignment of three layers of co-optation in Guinea-Bissau.**

	<i>National level</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>Community Level</i>
<i>Top-down co-optation</i>	Political appointment. Distribution of rent and social privileges.	Recruitment and promotion practices on political party base.	Patronage and clientelism.
<i>Horizontal co-optation</i>	Symbolic relationship between political and economic elites.	Collusive behavior in the work place and the use of public institutions to build network	Instrumental construction of network via ethnic, religious, regional and party affiliation.
<i>Bottom-up-co-optation</i>	Expectation of voters about leader's obligation to provide particular benefit to their group.	Favoritism in service provision and abuse of public funds and institutions to favor the group.	Proactive provision of goods and services within the group.

**Note:** This table is adopted from Claudia Baez-Camargo compilation. The table reflects the dynamic of co-optation at various levels. Few adaptations were made by the author in order to reflect the context of Guinea-Bissau.

**Source:** <https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/2646?lang=fr>

**Table A. 7. Composition of the interviewers.**

<b>Name.</b>	<b>Role he/she played.</b>	<b>Place of interview</b>	<b>Date of interview</b>
<b>P-1.</b>	Founding member of Political party since 1994, served as cabinet	Lisbon/Portugal.	4/28/2021

	minister in various government.		
<b>Mouro Wilson Monteiro, Esq.</b>	Lawyer, military and former senior legal adviser to the ministry of security.	Lisbon/Portugal.	5/03/2021
<b>P-3.</b>	Former cabinet minister and member of PRS political party.	Guinea-Bissau.	6/13/2021
<b>P-2</b>	Politician and former secretary of state under PAIGC government.	Guinea-Bissau.	5/21/2021
<b>P-4</b>	Politician, former cabinet minister and member of MADEM-G15.	Guinea-Bissau.	5/17/2021
<b>Dr. Bacar Queita.</b>	Former member of PRS political party, academic and diplomat.	France/embassy of Guinea-Bissau.	4/18/2021
<b>Mamadu Seide.</b>	PhD fellow in legal studies.	Brazil.	7/21/2021
<b>Abdul Mane</b>	Former member of PAIGC political Bureau.	Portugal/Lisbon.	4/26/2021

**Note:** In all, eight interviews were conducted. Due to the spread of the covid-19 pandemic, all interviews were conducted online via Zoom and skype. Some respondent sent their answers through email. The same interview guideline was used for all the respondents with an average duration of twenty-five minutes each with adjustment considering the position of the respondent. Some interviews were recorded and others were not recorded for ethical reasons. However, the informed consent was sent to each respondent. However, secondary data was used, and some already conducted interviews with major political figures were as well used to triangulate data. See footnote and bibliography.

## APPENDIX B: Interview Guide



This interview guide questionnaire is designed to assess the function of political institutions in Guinea-Bissau, considering various regimes since 1994-2019. The guide takes into account the research question, objectives and hypothesis. The interview will be conducted with Guinea-Bissau's major political actors and academics with structural guidelines based upon the identified thematic areas which relate to the existing literature on the studies of political institutions under the undemocratic regime and regime survival.

1. Let us begin our interview by talking about Guinea-Bissau political institutions and various post-independence regimes. In your opinion, what do you think undermines the normal functioning of Guinea-Bissau political institutions namely the legislature and political parties? Can we, therefore, say that political instability in Guinea Bissau is a product of political leaders' perceptions of the risks and benefits of manipulating political institutions? Any practical examples of how political institutions are normally manipulated?
2. From 1994, Guinea-Bissau began a new era of a multiparty democracy under the leadership of president Vieira. How do you describe this political era which ended with the 1998 civil war? President Vieira remains in power for 18 years. How do we explain his main political strategy to maintain his regime?
3. From 1999, a new regime took over the nation with the election of Kumba Yala which was mainly a coalition government between PRS and other political parties. The power-sharing agreement lasted for a short while with the death of Ansumane Mane. What causes Mane's death and how do you label Yala's regime? Why was it difficult for Yala to maintain his Political allies and power compared to Vieira's?
4. From 2003 to 2014, Guinea-Bissau experienced severe political instability with the total collapse of political institutions, an increase of oppression, direct military intervention into politics, the assassination of political figures, violations of democratic principles and human right, conflict between political parties and more... with examples; What can we say are the major causes of all these political conflicts?
5. The election of former president Vaz and Domingos Simões Pereira in 2014 was perceived to be a new era of restoration of democracy. However, the internal conflict within PAIGC culminated into another constitutional crisis with the closing of parliament for over three

years and the establishment of the MADAM-G15 and mass protest all over the nation. How do you describe this period and its effect on the normal functioning of the institution?

6. With the election of Umaro S. Embalo in 2019, we have seen the indirect return of the military into the political scene. The Embalo regime is widely criticized to be dictatorial. Can you briefly talk about his political strategy to be elected and his ability to consolidate power? What were the role of other political parties and political elites in his ascension to power?
7. What will be your opinion in relation to the struggle for political power and resources by the elites as a direct consequence of institutional and various government breakdown?
8. Political parties are major institutions in Guinea-Bissau. In your view, what has been their role in maintaining or not the democratic principles since 1994 to date?
9. Let us presume that you are asked to describe some strategies used by a particular government to survive in power. We take into consideration the following:
  - a) *The use of information.*
  - b) *Co-optation.*
  - c) *Minimization of loss and Credible threat.*

Have any of these variables been used by a particular regime in order to survive in power? Any practical examples?

Thank you very much for your time.

Babiro Duro Djassi.

Masters of Political science, (ISCTE-IUL)

## APPENDIX C: Letter of consent.



Filipa Alves Raimundo

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### Declaração

Declaro que Babiro Djassi frequenta atualmente o 2º ano do Mestrado de Ciência Política no Departamento de Ciência Política e Políticas Públicas do ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, em Portugal, estando atualmente a preparar a sua dissertação sob minha supervisão. A dissertação do Babiro centra-se na história política da Guiné-Bissau desde 1994. Para compreender os avanços e recuos do processo de democratização, o Babiro precisa de realizar entrevistas com individualidades de grande relevo que marcaram certos eventos chave. Como orientadora do Babiro, posso atestar a seriedade do seu trabalho e peço a sua colaboração para que ele possa levar esta dissertação a bom porto beneficiando do importantíssimo contributo de quem conhece e experiencia a vida política guineense por dentro.

Estou inteiramente disponível para qualquer esclarecimento adicional de que possa necessitar.

Sem outro assunto de momento.

Melhores cumprimentos,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Filipa Alves Raimundo".

Professora Auxiliar

[Filipa.alves.raimundo@iscte-iul.pt](mailto:Filipa.alves.raimundo@iscte-iul.pt)

Lisboa, 1 de abril de 2021

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