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Explaining Normative and Non-normative Collective Action Tendencies based on the SIMCA, and perceived oppression as a mediator, in the Context of the Pro-democracy Movement in Thailand

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September, 2021

Acknowledgments

I would like to express an endless gratitude for my supervisor, Dr. Miriam Rosa. The way she guided me not only allowed me to grow intellectually as a researcher but also, with kindness and great patience, she (and Cookie) saved my life from the darkest days. Along this journey where making it through another day is already a victory, finishing a thesis dissertation did not seem to be possible or to matter. But because she always believed in me in times when I did not have enough strength to believe in myself, I postponed the day to give up to the next day, over and over. Thanks to her here I am, anxiously alive with a bit more self-esteem and positivity, also with another ridiculously cool thesis in my hand.

To my family and friends in Thailand, I am forever thankful for your existences and laughter.

To Rafael and Inês, thank you for being my loving home in Portugal while I was writing this dissertation, for always finding a way to put a smile on my face, and for all the encouragement and positivity.

To Sara, thank you for being that one classmate who gave me a random sense of comfort and peace every time I looked across a room and saw you.

To Hilal and Yagmur, you two are the reasons that I still have faith in humanity and was able to keep writing about collective action.

To other GM people, thank you for showing me that our ideal world has not yet been created.

Resumo

O presente estudo pretendeu analisar preditores de tendência para envolvimento em três formas de ação coletiva - 1) normativa, 2) não violenta não-normativa, e 3) violenta não-normativa - no contexto dos movimentos pró-democracia na Tailândia. Analisou-se também o papel da perceção de opressão na tendência para ação coletiva violenta não-normativa via sentimentos de desprezo. Esses preditores não tinham sido analisados conjuntamente, e não num contexto não democrático. Aos participantes tailandeses maiores de 17 anos (N = 353) foi pedido que respondessem a um questionário online. Corroborando investigações anteriores, os resultados de uma *path analysis* do modelo proposto indicaram que 1) a identidade do movimento pró-democracia predisse avaliações de injustiça e eficácia do grupo, 2) a eficácia do grupo predisse apenas ação normativa, 3) avaliações de injustiça predisseram sentimentos de raiva e desprezo, 4) a raiva predisse mais fortemente ação normativa, e menos fortemente ação não violenta não-normativa, 5) o desprezo apenas previu ação violenta não-normativa, 6) a identidade do movimento pró-democracia predisse opressão percebida que, por sua vez, predisse desprezo e ação coletiva violenta não-normativa respetivamente; finalmente 7) a opressão percebida teve um efeito indireto na tendência da ação coletiva violenta não-normativa através do desprezo. Em suma, a ação coletiva normativa e não-normativa (não violenta vs. violenta) foi impulsionada por diferentes fatores psicológicos. Foram discutidas limitações, implicações e orientações na investigação futura, tais como a necessidade de investigação que aborde a eficácia específica para ação coletiva, e como as formas não-normativas de ação coletiva podem ser dependentes do contexto.

Palavras-chave: Social Identity Model of Collective Action, Ação Coletiva, Opressão Percebida

Classificação nas categorias pela American Psychology Association

2900 Social Processes & Social Issues
2960 Political Processes & Political Issues
3000 Social Psychology
4270 Crime Prevention

Abstract

The present study aimed to analyze, based on the *Social Identity Model of Collective Action*, predictors of willingness to engage in *three* forms of collective action - 1) normative, 2) non-violent non-normative, and 3) violent non-normative - in the context of the pro-democracy movements in Thailand. It additionally analyzed the role of perceived oppression in predicting violent non-normative collective action tendency through feelings of contempt. To our knowledge, those predictors have not been analyzed in a common framework, and not in a non-democratic context. Thai participants over 17 years old ($N = 353$) were asked to answer an online questionnaire. After preliminary analyses, a path analysis of the proposed model was conducted. In line with previous research, the findings indicate that 1) *the pro-democracy movement identity* predicted *injustice appraisals* and *group efficacy*, 2) group efficacy predicted only normative action tendency, 3) injustice appraisals predicted the *feelings of anger* and *contempt*, 4) Anger predicted most strongly normative, and less strongly non-violent non-normative, 5) Contempt only predicted violent non-normative, 6) the pro-democracy movement identity predicted perceived oppression, in turn, predicted contempt and violent non-normative collective action respectively, finally 7) perceived oppression had an indirect effect on violent non-normative collective action tendency through contempt. In sum, normative and non-normative (non-violent vs. violent) collective action were driven by different psychological factors. Limitations, implications and directions in future research were discussed, such as the need for future research that addresses specific action efficacy, and how non-normative forms of collective action can be context dependent.

Keywords: Social Identity Model of Collective Action, Collective Action, Perceived Oppression

PsychINFO classification categories and codes

2900 Social Processes & Social Issues
2960 Political Processes & Political Issues
3000 Social Psychology
4270 Crime Prevention

Contents

Table Index

Glossary of abbreviations

CI – confidence interval

IET **-** Intergroup Emotion Theory

RDT - Relative Deprivation Theory

SCT - Self-Categorization Theory

SIMCA - Social Identity Model of Collective Action

SIT - Social Identity Theory

SMO – social movement organization

YTG - Youth Through Gas

WHRD – Women human rights defender

Chapter I – Introduction

Throughout the history of humanity, collective action has been used to attempt social changes across the globe. Contemporary incidents include the 2020 United States presidential election, the global strikes in 2019 calling for greater actions from governments in solving the climate crisis (Taylor et al., 2019), police brutality protesters throwing objects to attack the police in Tunisia (*Violent protests over police abuse*, 2021), or the Karen National Union attacks on Myanmar army positions due to the rising of tensions and mistrust towards the military after the 2021 military coup (*Explainer: Karen rebels step up,* 2021), which all display behaviors engaged by ingroup members aiming to achieve a goal for their groups. According to Wright et al. (1990), "a group member engages in collective action any time that she or he is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group" (p. 995). It could also be seen that such collective actions can be carried out in various ways, from normative (like voting, strikes, etc.) to more radical forms (like attacking with objects or weapons, or terrorism).

Scholars from different fields of social science have studied the factors that motivate people to participate in collective action. Important psychological theories that are used to explain such phenomenon are, for instance, Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT; e.g., Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Later on, several integrative theories have been proposed by social psychologists to explain collective action in a more systematic and holistic manner (e.g., Politicized Collective Identity; Simon & Klanderman, 2001; Dual pathway model; Sturmer & Simon, 2004). One of them is the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008), which has been used in numerous empirical studies to examine collective action in different social contexts.

However, there are still gaps in collective action literature that need to be addressed. The majority of research has focused mainly on relatively normative forms of group-based actions while more extreme forms have not yet been systematically analyzed enough (except for Tausch et al., 2011; Becker & Tausch, 2015), although Wright (2009) suggested that gaining more insights regarding different strategies of collective action is vital for advancing theoretical developments. Schwarzmantel (2010) further stated that such understandings could be essential for preventing an escalation from non-violent to violent forms of collective action. Moreover,

most research tends to be conducted in Western, liberal, and democratic societies where collective action is generally encouraged (e.g., Studies 1 and 2, Tausch et al., 2011). While new studies attempt to expand to more diverse contexts (e.g., in Hong Kong (Chan, 2017); in Iran (Keshavarzi et al., 2021); in Japan and the Philippines (Ochoa et al., 2019); and in Indonesia; (Setiawan et al., 2019)), to our current knowledge, there is none that studies collective action - from the perspective of Social Psychology - in the context of pro-democracy movements in Thailand. To address these gaps, this current research aims to examine how the SIMCA could systematically explain the willingness to engage in different types of collective action in the context of those Thai political movements.

According to Wright et al. (1990 as cited in Tausch et al., 2011), types of collective action are distinguished between *normative* and *non-normative*. Normative collective action is a behavior that conforms to the norms of a mainstream social system, such as the laws. In contrast, non-normative collective action is a behavior that violates those norms (or social rules). Tausch et al. (Study 1; 2011) and Sabucedo and Arce (1991) further differentiated collective behaviors outside of the political system between *violent* and *non-violent*. All in all, the present research studies willingness to engage in different forms of collective action (collective action tendencies) as dependent variables by measuring the tendencies of three types of collective action: 1) normative collective action such as voting and signing petitions, 2) non-violent non-normative collective action such as blocking highways or buildings, and 3) violent non-normative collective action such as arson attacks and terrorism. It is also referred to as radicalism in this study.

Becker and Tausch (2015) suggested that one of the ways to better understand violent non-normative collective action tendency is to investigate the emergence of political contempt, since it has been consistently proved to distinguish between normative and non-normative action tendencies and to uniquely predict radical actions (see Becker et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011). Nevertheless, there still is relatively little understanding of the feeling of contempt and the unique factors that determine it.

On the other hand, violent non-normative collective action has also been studied in terrorism literature. According to Victoroff (2005), *oppression theory* was preliminarily proposed, among others, to be one of the possible causes of terrorist participation. However, the impact of oppression might be felt differently depending on individuals; thus, the cognitive-emotional

aspect of the variable - namely, *perceived* oppression - is more appropriate to be used in psychology studies.

The present study, hence, aims to also investigate the role of perceived oppression in violent non-normative collective action via contempt and foresees that the findings could potentially benefit future interventions to mitigate violence in political collective action.

The Context of pro-democracy movements in Thailand

Van Zomeren et al. (2008) stated that "the psychology of collective action cannot be understood in a social vacuum" (p. 525). This emphasizes the importance of the social contexts surrounding the studied topic. Thus, it is worth giving an overview of the political situation in Thailand, especially the ongoing pro-democracy movements that were the focus of this study.

Thailand has a long history of repressive governments, which in recent decades were always met with popular pro-democratic movements trying to reform or overthrow governments seen as non-democratic (Wongcha-Um & Johnson, 2020). The last few years have seen pro-democracy protests frequently flooding the streets of Thai cities calling for the resignation of Prayuth Chan-ocha (Tonsakulrungruang, 2021), the current prime minister, a former army chief who carried out a coup in 2014 and then went on to win a controversial election in 2019. As reported by the BBC News in an article titled "*Thai protest: How pro-democracy movement gained momentum*" (2020), the three main purposes of the current pro-democracy protests are changes in the post-coup constitution, gains in freedom of speech, and the reform of the power of the monarchy, which includes the reconsidering of the *lése majestè* law that forbids any criticism of the royal family. A common point of criticism of the current constitution is the fact that it was engineered for the preservation of the junta's political power (see also *Thailand Parliament Delays Vote*, 2020), since the entire Senate is appointed by the junta, and more than a third of the 250 senators have a police or military background (*A Third of Thailand's Appointed Senators*, 2019). Regarding freedom of speech, the topic seems to be on edge in the context of Thai politics, as the forced disappearance in 2020 of Wanchalearm Satsaksit, who was a Thai pro-democracy and LGBTIQA+ activist (Wrigth & Praithongyaem, 2020; *No justice: A year on*, 2021), exemplifies. Furthermore, several means have been used by the government to discourage demonstrations, such as enforcing laws to repress freedom of expression (Maida, 2019) and ordering harsh measures by riot police to control pro-democracy rallies (Ratcliffe, 2020; Tanakasempipat &

Wongcha-um, 2020). Despite the fact that "pro-democracy" in Thailand entails several goals, it is noticeable that every point comes from criticisms toward the work of the government. Thus, the present research defines and studies the Thai pro-democracy movements as those popular movements focusing specifically on the anti-government aspect, which self-identify as "pro-democracy".

The circumstances of the repression from the Thai government on the pro-democracy movements raise the question of how the oppression from the people in positions of political power influences collective action tendencies among the pro-democracy movements participators (Lobato, 2017). This study, hence, measures a subjective variable of oppression - that is, the perception of oppression by the government among the participants. In summary, the present study aims to examine the role of perceived oppression on the willingness to participate, specifically, in violent non-normative collective action through the established integrative model that explains collective action tendencies, namely, the SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2008)

Furthermore, it is vital to note that a complexity of identities and hierarchies persists among pro-democracy activists, especially in the realm of gender equality. A rapport published by The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders - under the title "THAILAND, STANDING TALL: Women human rights defenders at the forefront of Thailand's pro-democracy protest" (The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, 2021) - found that women human rights defenders (WHRDs; including people from the LGBTQIA+ community) in the Thai pro-democracy movement have faced doubled repression and discrimination, both from the authorities and from fellow democracy supporters. Findings from interviewing 22 WHRDs showed that they had been subjected to similar human rights violations as male activists. However, WHRDs are also frequently exposed to sexual harassment and sexual or discriminatory acts by law enforcement officials. This negatively affects their emotional and psychological health. Additionally, despite women and LGBTQIA+ being prominent participants in the pro-democracy movements, the interviewees have experienced exclusion, prejudice, and discrimination within those movements.

The imbalance of power status within the movement should not be ignored since it is clear that not everyone who identifies themselves as pro-democracy experiences the same oppression. Moreover, in this case, not everyone in the pro-democracy movement might actively support the

goals of the gender equality movement (also known as the feminist movement), while it can be assumed that WHRDs or Thai feminists - who participate in the call for democracy – would identify themselves with the goal of the pro-democracy movement. However, facing doubled oppressions due to the intersectionality not only from the outgroup but also from the ingroup (i.e., the pro-democracy group) could be an interesting variable that deserves more attention. Thus, the present study also preliminary explores the relationships of feminist movement identity with pro-democracy collective action tendencies, hoping to encourage more investigations in future studies.

This dissertation is composed of four chapters. Firstly, the introduction in Chapter I was outlined. Then, the literature review and main theoretical concepts will be presented in Chapter II. After Chapter III - which consists of methodology and results – findings, limitations, and future directions will be discussed in Chapter IV.

Chapter II - Theories and literature review

Social Identity Model of Collective Action

The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008) is an integrative model including three socio-psychological components that explain when people would tend to engage in collective action. The three subjective predictors - which are identity, group efficacy, and injustice appraisal – are derived from previous empirical studies. A meta-analysis showed that social identity bridged the injustice and efficacy together in explaining collective action (see Figure 2.1). Each variable, along with its extended factors and hypotheses, will be outlined in the next paragraphs.


Figure 2.1 The Social Identity Model of Collective Action

Identity

Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978) proposed that people would identify themselves as members of a group and would typically aspire to earn benefits from positive social identities. However, there are circumstances when members of negative social groups, like disadvantaged or lower status groups, would have no option to disidentify. Instead, they have to make the best of the situation by all means, including by engaging in social competition identity management strategies, for instance, through collective action. SIT further suggested that identification with a disadvantaged group could proximally predict engagement in collective action (Ellemers, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Mummendey et al., 1999; Tajfel, 1978 as cited in van Zomeren et al., 2008). Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) further proposed that individuals who identify strongly with an ingroup are more likely to internalize the values and norms of the group as their own. Thus, there are higher chances that they will act to serve the goals and interests of the group.

Stürmer and Simon (2004) proposed that identification with a *social movement organization* (SMO) can predict collective action more strongly than it predicts identification with a disadvantaged group. This is because an SMO identity is considered a *politicized* identity, which allows people to develop more sense of agency or particular activist identities. It also helps to connect members to the structural disadvantages in a lower-status group. According to Stürmer (2000 as cited in van Zomeren et al., 2008) and Stürmer and Simon (2004), this creates an "inner obligation" to engage in social movement activities. Hence, politicized identity can directly and indirectly, through group injustice and efficacy, predict a tendency of collective action.

The present study measures two politicized identities, the *pro-democracy movement* and the *feminist movement*, to examine their effects on collective action tendencies among the pro-democracy movements in Thailand. However, the dynamics of pro-democracy movement identification is a primary focus in this study, while feminist movement identity was measured only to explore the relationships with the dependent variables.

Pro-democracy movement identity. Klandermans (2002) suggested that the stronger a person identifies with a group, the more likely they will engage in collective action. This finding is robustly showed in studies across time (a longitudinal study e.g., Thomas et al., 2019) and contexts (e.g., Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Greene, 2004). van Zomeren et al. (2008) later on

constructed the SIMCA, which proposed that identity has not only a direct but also an indirect effect on collective action through injustice and group efficacy. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H1: Pro-democracy movement identity predicts injustice appraisals and group efficacy.

Group Efficacy

Social injustice and discrimination widely persist in almost every society; therefore, this factor alone is too broad to predict collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Another perspective that has been developed to explain collective action was built on Resource Mobilization Theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) which proposed that collective action is a strategic and rational, rather than solely emotional, behavior aiming to achieve the group's goals. Later on, Klandermans (1984) proposed that an individual's motivation to engage in collective action could be measured by subjective expectancy of the outcome. In line with that thought, Mummendey et al. (1999) proposed that, in a social group context, *group efficacy* - defined as a common belief that one's group can solve its plight by collective action – can proximally predict collective action, since it provides a sense of collective power that helps members believe that they can change their fate (Drury & Reicher, 2005).

In a systematic examination of different types of collective action, Tausch et al. (2011) suggested, in line with previous assumptions, that group-efficacy is positively associated with normative action tendencies (van Zomeren, 2012). They further proposed that group efficacy is unrelated with non-violent non-normative, but is negatively associated with violent non-normative action tendencies. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H2: Group efficacy positively predicts normative, is unrelated to non-violent non-normative, and is negatively related to violent non-normative collective action.

Injustice appraisals

According to Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT; Runciman, 1966; Walker & Pettigrew,1984), the feeling of deprivation is developed from the social comparison with other groups (Festinger, 1954). RDT proposed that collective action is likely to take place only when social comparison leads to a perception of group-based injustice. However, it was later confirmed in a meta-analytic study that the 'feeling' of injustice can predict collective action more powerfully, compared to

perceptions of group-based deprivation (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). The feeling that was originally proposed in the SIMCA was *anger*, with Tausch et al. (2011) later proposing that injustice also predicts *contempt*. The following hypothesis is proposed:

H3: Injustice appraisals predict anger and contempt

Anger. The SIMCA proposed that anger is a key emotion that drives collective action, since it motivates the likelihood of engaging in specific actions to challenge those responsible for the unjust deprivation. This suggestion is also based on Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET; Mackie & Smith, 2002) which - building upon the self-categorization theory - holds that, when individuals self-categorize as members of a group, the group's fates become individually relevant and evoke emotions and action tendencies (Smith, 1993); and also on appraisal theories of emotion that suggest that group-based anger is a state of action readiness (Frijda, 1986).

However, the latest studies found that anger might not be able to predict non-normative collective action. Tausch et al. (2011) studied collective action willingness and attitude towards different forms of action based on the Dual Pathway Model (van Zomeren et al., 2004), which proposed that collective action could be explained by the efficacy pathway and the emotion pathway. Their studies were conducted in three different contexts: Study 1 was carried out among student protests against tuition fees in Germany ($N = 332$) to examine the role of injustice appraisal, among other variables, on students' willingness to participate in normative or non-normative collective action; Study 2 was conducted on Indian Muslim's support for actions related to ingroup disadvantage ($N = 156$); and Study 3 examined British Muslim's reactions to British foreign policy towards Muslim countries ($N = 466$). Overall, the findings showed that, while anger was strongly related to normative action, it was generally found to be unrelated or less related to non-normative action. In particular, the results from Study 1 showed that anger was associated with normative but not with violent non-normative action. Tests that compared relative strength of paths additionally suggested that the more extreme the action, the less predictive the anger becomes. According to Fischer and Roseman (2007), this was because anger tends to occur among more intimate relationships, which allows certain levels of control over the other person while reconciliation is still an ultimate goal. Thus, anger is a constructive emotion that tends to motivate change through short-term attacks while aiming to maintain the relationships (Averill, 1983; Weber, 2004). Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H4: Anger strongly predicts normative collective action, less strongly non-violent non-normative collective action, and does not predict violent non-normative collective action.

Contempt. According to Fischer and Roseman (2007), contempt often takes place in less intimate relationships. Thus, a sense of control is less likely to be perceived, and reconciliation is not desired. They further proposed that contempt can be developed from anger when the prior source of anger with the same person has not been resolved. It also relates to negative dispositional attributions (assigning a cause of a behavior to internal factors) and permanently changes beliefs about another person. Moreover, contempt in the context of intergroup relations also appeared to associate with outgroup dehumanization (Esses et al., 2008), disdain, worsening social relationships, and social exclusion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007), which all promote the psychological and physical distancing from the source of contempt.

Tausch et al. (2011) also examined the role of contempt - as an alternative emotion that resulted from injustice appraisal – on collective action tendencies. The results in all three studies showed that contempt significantly and positively predicted violent non-normative action, but it was not related to normative nor non-violent non-normative collective action in Study 1. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H5: Contempt predicts violent non-normative collective action but does not predict normative nor non-violent non-normative collective action

Perceived Oppression.

Becker & Tausch (2015) suggested future research to examine how the repression of current protests impact motivations to engage in normative and non-normative future protests, since it was found that reactions from the outgroup play an important role in forming identities and action tendencies among activists (Drury & Reicher, 1999; 2000). This includes immediate actions like arrests or violent measures by the riot police. For example, perceived likelihood of repression of protests in Egypt increased commitment to further action by fueling emotions and expected change through consolidation (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016). Also, repression could take place not only when protest is occurring but also, for instance, by arresting or punishing demonstrators after a protest.

Lobato et al. (2020) studied *identity fusion*'s relations to *intentions of radicalism* through perceived oppression ($N = 214$) in the context of Catalonia in Spain. Identity fusion, according to

Lobato et al. (2020), is a sense of oneness with a group which is a form of identification. The results showed that, in both majority and minority groups, identity fusion predicted intention of activism through perceived oppression, whereas intention of radicalism was predicted by identity fusion through perceived oppression only among the minority group. Moreover, the results also indicated that identity fusion significantly predicted perceived oppression in both groups. The following hypothesis, hence, is proposed:

H6: Pro-democracy movement identity predicts perceived oppression

Becker & Tausch (2015) suggested that repression as outgroup behaviors could evoke feelings of contempt towards the government and the overall social system, resulting in disidentification with the system. Thus, it could potentially motivate non-normative collective action in the future. In line with Fischer and Roseman (2007), contempt can be formed from anger when the previous issues went unresolved. Perceiving more oppression from the government could possibly fuel emotions to the point where anger is transformed into contempt. Moreover, Lobato et al. (2018) conducted two studies (Study 1; 133 Muslim and 126 non-Muslim, Study 2; 98 Muslim and 167 non-Muslim) to examine how perceived oppression affects violent disinhibition through radical intentions. The results indicated that perceived oppression had an indirect effect on violent disinhibition through radical intentions in the Muslim participants, while in the non-Muslim sample the influence of perceived oppression on violent disinhibition was not mediated by radical intentions. Since the previous hypothesis (H4) does not anticipate the prediction of anger on violent non-normative collective action, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H7: Perceived oppression predicts violent non-normative collective action through the feeling of contempt

Chapter III - Methodology and Results

Participants and procedure

Participants included 353 adults aged from 18 to 64 years old ($M = 28.97$, $SD = 10.65$). The majority were women (65.2%). The rest of the respondents were men (29.7%), and non-binary (5.1%). Ethical approval was obtained from the university.

Data were collected among Thai nationals aged 18 years old and above who did not participate in the pre-test that was conducted earlier. Data collection was made through the Qualtrics platform (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) using the Snowball sampling method. The questionnaire was publicly distributed as an anonymous link and QR code on social media and the Line application.

A total of 517 accesses to the link were recorded, but the considered sample consisted of 356 participants: other respondents were excluded on the basis of not giving consent to participate, not reporting their nationality as Thai, and/or not reporting their age and/or gender. After analyzing patterns of missing values, the results showed that there were three responses (0.84%) that contained missing data, which were handled by listwise deletion. Thus, there were ultimately 353 participants in the analyses.

The main survey (Annex A) was conducted within a correlational cross-sectional framework design by asking the respondents to fill their answers in a questionnaire. In the beginning, general information was presented about the questionnaire, along with informed consent. Then, the respondents could select either to consent and begin the survey or to select not to participate, in which case they would be automatically directed to the end of the survey. All measures were presented in the following order: 1) perceived oppression, 2a) pro-democracy identity and 2b) feminist identity in randomized order between both 3) group efficacy, 4) injustice appraisal followed by 4.1) anger and 4.2) contempt in randomized order between both – the order of group efficacy and injustice appraisal was randomized as well – 5) collective narcissism, 6) collective action tendencies, 7) self-perception of the Thai pro-democracy movement group affiliation, 8) general information including 8.1) nationality, 8.2) year of birth, and 8.3) gender. Before submission, the respondents were informed about more details of the study and provided with the contact of the researcher, a debriefing text, and literature related to the studied topic.

All the measures were translated into Thai using the committee approach (Pan & de la Puente, 2005), which included the researcher (who is a native Thai) and a native Thai freelance translator with a Bachelors's degree in Psychology from Chulalongkorn University.

Measures

Collective action tendencies

To assess collective action tendencies, items from Tausch et al. (Study 1; 2011) were adapted for the present study. Subjects reported the likelihood that they would participate in 17 activities against the Thai government on a 7 point Likert scale from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 7 (*very likely*). There were three categories of actions, namely, normative ($\alpha = .86$), non-violent non-normative ($\alpha = .85$), and violent non-normative ($\alpha = .91$).

As cited in Tausch et al. (Study 1; 2011), Sabucedo and Arce (1991) also identified the components by differentiating political participation within the political system (normative) from non-violent and violent collective action that takes place outside of the system (non-normative).

Prior to the main survey, a pre-test (Annex B) was conducted to examine the categorization of different types of collective action among the same population.The questionnaire first presented definitions of normative, non-violent non-normative, and violent non-normative collective action. Then, the participants were asked to categorize 19 examples of collective actions adjusted from Tausch et al. (2011) that were used to measure action tendencies among students who opposed tuition fees in Germany. Additional behaviors that have already taken place within the contemporary pro-democracy movement in Thailand were also included (e.g., the use of social media to raise awareness about the Thai pro-democracy movement, the burning of symbolic objects such as flags and pictures). The instruction was "Collective action is divided in three categories. For each example, chose the one category that you think applies".

The pre-test was answered by Thai respondents aged 18 to 74 years old ($N = 25$). It included 16 women, seven men, and there were two participants who self-reported as non-binary. In the end, 17 examples from all three categories were finalized as displayed in Table 2.1 shown below.

Table 2.1

Finalized Collective Action Examples by Categories

Normative	Non-violent non-normative	Violent non-normative
Participate in discussion meetings about democracy in Thailand	Demonstration*	Throw stones or bottles
Participate in plenary meetings about democracy in Thailand	Block government buildings	Arson attacks on government buildings
Write flyers	Block streets or highways	Arson attacks on private property of political officials in the government
Sign a petition to impeach members of the government	Boycotting political officials in the government*	Attacks on military personnel
Use social media to raise awareness about the Thai pro-democracy movement	Go on strikes*	Attacks on police
		Attacks on political officials
		Burn symbolic objects in public e.g., flags, pictures*

*Note: *actions that were reported in the pre-test to be perceived differently from their theoretical definitions*

As shown in Table 2.1, four samples of collective action were not consistently perceived by participants in the pre-test with their theoretical definitions. Those actions were the following: 1) demonstration, which was perceived as a normative collective action, but defined as a non-violent non-normative collective action in the present study, since protests and public assemblies have been banned by the national emergency decrees imposing pandemic restrictions - with human rights groups denouncing said bans as legislative abuse by the government to restrict the people's freedom of peaceful assembly for political purposes (Sasipornkarn, 2021; Thailand: Emergency Decree, 2020) - and non-normative collective action is defined as actions that violate the law; 2) burn symbolic objects was categorized as non-violent non-normative collective action as a result from the pre-test, but according to Sabucedo & Arcem (1991), actions that involve damaging properties are considered as violent; 3) boycotting political officials in the government was mostly perceived as a normative action, while it was reported to have cross loadings between normative and non-violent non-normative in a previous study (Tausch et al., 2011; Study 1) - even so, it was suggested to be non-violent non-normative according to Sabucedo & Arcem (1991); 4) strikes were perceived to be equally normative and non-violent non-normative by participants of the pre-test, while they had cross loadings between normative and non-violent non-normative in a previous study (Tausch et al., 2011; Study 1). Nonetheless, according to Sabucedo & Arcem (1991), non-authorized strikes were categorized as non-violent non-normative collective action. Also, political strikes are currently illegal in Thailand as determined by pandemic restrictions (Kri-aksorn, 2020), so they were seen as non-violent non-normative collective action in the present study.

In sum, this study classified collective action according to the theoretical definitions (Sabucedo & Arcem, 1991) and the rules of the dominant society (i.e., the laws of Thailand). As shown in Table 2.1, 1) there were five items in the normative collective action category, 2) there were five items in the non-violent non-normative collective action category, and 3) there were seven items in the violent non-normative collective action category.

Identities

The present research adapted a movement identity measurement from Chan et al. (2017), which was adjusted from previous studies of social movement organizations (Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Participants answered in 7-point Likert scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Pro-democracy movement identity. The questions were composed with two items: a) "The pro-democracy movement in Thailand broadly represents how I feel and think" and b) "I identify with the pro-democracy movement." Both then were integrated into a single scale (r (351) = .77, $p < .001$).

Feminist movement identity. The questions were composed of two items: "The feminist movement in Thailand broadly represents how I feel and think" and b) "I identify with the feminist movement." Both then were integrated into a single scale (r (351) = .81, $p < .001$).

Group Efficacy

The measurement for group efficacy was adapted from Tausch et al. (Study 1; 2011). There were four items ($\alpha = .81$): 1) "I think that members of the Thai pro-democracy movement can pressure the prime minister to resign and cause other reforms in the Thai government." 2) "I think that members of the Thai pro-democracy movement can successfully defend their rights." 3) "The Thai pro-democracy movement is strong as a group and can move a lot." and 4) "I think members of the Thai pro-democracy movement have already lost the fight." (reverse coded). Participants self-reported their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Injustice appraisals

The assessment of injustice appraisals was adapted from Tausch et al. (Study 1; 2011). There were four items ($\alpha = .86$): 1) "The work of the government is unfair." 2) "The work of the government is socially unjust." 3) "The work of the government is not legitimate." and 4) "The work of the government is justified." (reverse coded). Subjects self-reported their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Anger. The questions to assess anger were adapted from Tausch et al. (Study 1; 2011). There were two items (r (351) = .90, $p < .001$): a) "I'm furious at the government." And b) "The government angers me." Respondents indicated their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Contempt. To assess contempt, the measure was adapted from Tausch et al. (Study 1; 2011). There were two items (r (351) = .74, $p < .001$): a) "I disdain people who advocate the

16

government." and b) "I detest people who advocate the government." Respondents indicated their agreement on a 7- point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Perceived oppression

To assess this variable, the Reduced Oppression Questionnaire (R-OQ; Lobato, 2017) that was adapted from the Oppression Questionnaire (OQ; Victoroff, 2005) was used in this study. Participants indicated their agreement on 10 items (α = .94): 1) "The government considers members of the Thai pro-democracy movement to be inferior." 2) "Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement are often looked down upon." 3) "The government treats members of the Thai pro-democracy movement unjustly." 4) "The government wants to humiliate members of the Thai pro-democracy movement." 5) "Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement are denied their rights." 6) "Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement feel humiliated." 7) "The government keeps members of the Thai pro-democracy movement from living the way they want." 8) "Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement get controlled too much." 9) "The government wants to physically hurt members of the Thai pro-democracy movement." and 10) "Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement are often verbally abused." Participants indicated their agreement on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 4 (*a great deal*).

Collective Narcissism

The present study further assessed collective narcissism for exploratory purposes, using the Collective Narcissism Scale (de Zavala et al., 2009) as was used in Golec de Zavala et al. (2013). The five items (α = .80) referred to the Thai pro-democracy movement group, including 1) "Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement deserve special treatment." 2) "Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of the Thai pro-democracy group." 3) "It really makes me angry when others criticize the Thai pro-democracy movement." 4) "If the Thai pro-democracy movement had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place." and 5) "I will never be satisfied until the Thai pro-democracy movement gets the recognition it deserves." Participants indicated their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Participants were asked to provide the following demographics information: nationality (1 = Thai; 2 = non-Thai; 3 = both Thai and others), gender (1 = woman; 2 = man; 3 = neither), and year of birth which was then computed as age by subtracting by year of data collection.

Results

Preliminary analyses of the data were carried out using SPSS, with the results shown in Table 3.1 where means, standard deviations, and correlations among variables are presented. Furthermore, the Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that the data were significantly deviating from normality. To handle problems of non-normality in the regression analysis, the bootstrap method (West et al., 1995) was used to randomly draw 5000 re-samples from the original data in order to calculate bootstrap standard errors and bias-corrected confidence intervals at 95%.

Table 3.1

Means, Standard deviation and Correlations (Pearson, except involving gender (Spearmen)) matrix for variables (N = 353)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	*M*	*SD*
1. Gender	-													-	-
2. Age	.23**	-												28.97	10.65
3. Democracy	-.07	-.52**	-											5.61	1.45
4. Efficacy	-.15**	-.45**	.61**	-										4.40	1.26
5. Injustice	-.13*	-.58**	.75**	.53**	-									6.24	1.23
6. Anger	-.15**	-.64**	.76**	.51**	.81**	-								6.05	1.50
7. Contempt	-.19**	-.35**	.53**	.42**	.51**	.62**	-							4.45	1.86
8. Oppression	-.13*	-.64**	.80**	.55**	.75**	.81**	.60**	-						3.26	0.79
9. Feminist	-.17**	-.42**	.62**	.46**	.56**	.60**	.43**	.57**	-					5.17	1.33
10. Narcissism	-.14**	-.35**	.66**	.55**	.55**	.57**	.58**	.63**	.44**	-				4.52	1.27
11. Normative	-.03	-.47**	.64**	.46**	.62**	.66**	.49**	.63**	.51**	.50**	-			5.42	1.35
12. Non-violent	-.03	-.41**	.49**	.37**	.49**	.52**	.43**	.52**	.39**	.36**	.75**	-		4.23	1.58
13. Violent	-.05	-.20**	.16**	.18**	.17**	.20**	.33**	.24**	.20**	.23**	.37**	.54**	-	2.01	1.19
Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	*M*	*SD*

In order to perform regression and path analysis, the IBM SPSS Amos 28 Graphics program was used, with the results first outlining significant outcomes of linear regression analysis. Then a model was created for path analysis, a technique of the Structural Equation Modelling (Kline, 2016). Path analysis, compared to multiple regression, holds advantages in a graphical and more flexible examination of relationships among variables (MacCallum & Austin, 2000). It has also been an approach used in previous studies on this topic (e.g., Nguyen et al., 2021). The full model, as seen in Figure 3.1, consisted of collective action tendencies as criterion variables, pro-democracy movement identity as a predictor, and group efficacy and injustice perceptions - as well as anger and contempt – as mediators. Paths were drawn according to the SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2008) and also included the findings from Tausch et al. (2011) that injustice appraisals led not only to anger but also contempt. However, for both anger and contempt, along with group efficacy, relationships were drawn to all the three types of collective action tendency to examine their predictions to the dependent variables. Additionally, perceived oppression was added to the model according to the hypotheses of the present study by being a mediator between identity and contempt (Lobato et al., 2018; 2020; Tuasch et al., 2011). Gender and age were included in the model as control variables.

Figure 3.1 *Conceptual model and specified paths from previous studies with gender and age as control variables*

Preliminary linear regressions were performed to initially examine predictions of age, gender, perceived oppression, pro-democracy movement identity, group efficacy, injustice appraisals, anger, and contempt on each type of collective action tendencies separately (normative vs. non-violent non-normative vs. violent non-normative). The results showed that willingness to engage in normative forms of action was predicted by pro-democracy movement identity (β = .20, SE = 0.08, p = .009; $CI_{95\%}$: [.051, .352]) and anger (β = .22, SE = 0.09, p = .019; $CI_{95\%}$: [.037, .384]). Non-violent non-normative was predicted by contempt (β = .16, SE = 0.06, p = .008; $CI_{95\%}$: [.046, .273]) and age (β = -.11, SE = 0.06, p = .042; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.226, -.004]), which means that the older an individual is, the less likely they would report the willingness to take violent actions, while violent non-normative collective action was significantly predicted by contempt (β = .34, SE = 0.07, p < .001; $CI_{95\%}$: [.189, .457]) but was negatively related with age (β = -.14, SE = 0.06, p = .012; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.257, -.028]). Group efficacy was not related to any of the action tendencies.

Path analysis of the model 1, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, demonstrated overall poor fitness to the data according to the criterion proposed by Kline (2016) as shown in Table 3.2. Apart from outcomes on each path as shown in the first model, age and gender as control variables showed

significant influences on several variables, but the model was simplified by showing only significant relationships between the control variables and the endogenous factors except for the exogenous variable which is identity. The full model 1 from AMOS is presented in Annex C. Age had a significant negative effect on injustice ($\beta = -.27$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < .001$; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.367, -.174]), perceived oppression ($\beta = -.31$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < .001$; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.412, -.222]), efficacy ($\beta = -.17$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .002$; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.277, -.062]), anger ($\beta = -.25$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < .001$; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.343, -.159]), contempt ($\beta = .11$, $SE = 0.04$, $p = .016$; $CI_{95\%}$: [.020, .191]), non-violent non-normative action tendency ($\beta = -.15$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .006$; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.261, -.042]), and violent non-normative action tendency ($\beta = -.16$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .007$; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.268, -.048]). Gender had significant effect on contempt ($\beta = -.12$, $SE = 0.05$, $p = .009$; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.209, -.033]) and normative action tendency ($\beta = .09$, $SE = 0.04$, $p = .040$; $CI_{95\%}$: [.004, .172]). Since this study assumed more than two genders - woman ($N = 230$, $M = 5.47$, $SD = 1.32$), man ($N = 105$, $M = 5.27$, $SD = 1.38$), and non-binary ($N = 18$, $M = 5.62$, $SD = 1.63$) - a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of gender on contempt and normative collective action tendency. Although the sample size might be too small to draw a firm conclusion, the results indicated that there was a significant effect of genders on contempt when other predictors were included as covariates, $F(2,344) = 3.92$, $p = .021$. Pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni adjustment suggested that women were more likely to experience the feeling of contempt compared to men ($p = .023$; $CI_{95\%}$: [.048, .874]). There was also a significant effect of genders on normative collective action tendency when other predictors were included as covariates, $F(2,343) = 3.09$, $p = .047$. Pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni adjustment suggested that men were more likely to engage in normative collective action than women ($p = .042$; $CI_{95\%}$: [.008, .584]).

Figure 3.2 *Model 1 with path estimated 95% C.I. including age and gender as control variables*

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Model 2 (Figure 3.3) was subsequently computed according to the suggestions from *Modification Indices* in AMOS to specify covariations between errors of variables. Figure 3.3 illustrated the relationships between the main variables including relationships between the control variables, namely age and gender, with the endogenous variables. However, only paths with significant relationships with the control variables are shown in Figure 3.3. The complete diagram of model 2 from AMOS involving covariations between residuals (double-headed arrows) are presented in Annex D. The covariations between residuals of endogenous variables that were additionally specified were the following: injustice appraisals and perceived oppression, anger and perceived oppression, injustice appraisals and anger, anger and contempt, efficacy and contempt, non-violent and violent non-normative collective action tendency, anger

and normative collective action tendency, normative and violent non-normative collective action tendency, and normative and non-violent non-normative collective action tendency. The goodness fit of model 2 improved notably as shown in Table 3.2, and was overall considered very good (Kline, 2016). Nevertheless, it is vital to note that outcomes as shown in model 2 should be read with caution since adding covariation between residuals of latent variables could contribute meaningful changes in theoretical standpoint (The Division of Statistics+, 2012). This limitation will be further addressed in the next chapter.


Figure 3.3 Model 2 with path estimated 95% C.I. as modified from model 1 to improve model fitness, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table 3.2

Fit Indices for the Tested Model

The goodness of fit indices	Model 1	Model 2
x^2	448.753	22.788
x^2/df	21.369	1.899
AIC	538.753	130.788
RMSEA	.241	.051
GFI	.832	.989
AGFI	.470	.938
TLI	.545	.980
CFI	.826	.996

Note: Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), absolute fit: root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), goodness-of-fit index (GFI), adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the comparative fit index (CFI)

Figure 3.3 showed that pro-democracy movement identity significantly predicted injustice appraisals ($\beta = .61$, $SE = 0.04$, $p < .001$; $CI_{95\%}$: [.522, .689]) and group efficacy ($\beta = .51$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < .001$; $CI_{95\%}$: [.411, .605]). These findings supported Hypothesis 1.

Group efficacy predicted normative action tendency ($\beta = .12$, $SE = 0.05$, $p = .012$; $CI_{95\%}$: [.025, .212]), but could not predict neither non-violent non-normative ($\beta = .10$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .067$; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.009, .210]), nor violent non-normative action tendency ($\beta = .04$, $SE = 0.07$, $p = .511$; $CI_{95\%}$: [-.087, .170]). Thus, the findings partially supported Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, injustice perceptions predicted both anger ($\beta = .96$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < .001$; $CI_{95\%}$: [.839,

1.095]) and contempt ($\beta = .14$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .031$; CI$_{95\%}$: [.013, .259]) which supported Hypothesis 3.

Anger was found to be most significantly related to normative action tendency ($\beta = .66$, $SE = 0.10$, $p = .001$; CI$_{95\%}$: [.465, .841]), and less strongly related to non-violent non-normative action tendency ($\beta = .28$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < .001$; CI$_{95\%}$: [.136, .404]). But it was also found to be unrelated to violent action tendency ($\beta = -.12$, $SE = 0.07$, $p = .088$; CI$_{95\%}$: [-.256, .022]). The findings supported Hypothesis 4 - in other words, anger tended to predict best to worst in the following order: normative, non-violent non-normative, and violent action tendencies.

Contempt, however, was most positively related to violent action tendency ($\beta = .35$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .001$; CI$_{95\%}$: [.199, .459]), and then less strongly, but significantly, predicted non-violent non-normative action tendency ($\beta = .18$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .002$; CI$_{95\%}$: [.070, .291]). It could not, however, predict normative action tendency ($\beta = .05$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .393$; CI$_{95\%}$: [-.072, .162]). The results partially supported Hypothesis 5 because it turned out that, in this study, contempt could significantly predict not only violent non-normative but also non-violent non-normative action tendency. Nonetheless, the results still showed the same predictive trend as proposed in Hypothesis 5. The trend noticeably showed that contempt could predict consecutively, from best to worst, violent, non-violent non-normative, and normative action tendency. Interestingly, this trend was opposite with the predictive trend of anger.

Consistent with Hypothesis 6, identity significantly predicted perceived oppression ($\beta = .64$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < .001$; CI$_{95\%}$: [.546, .722]). Perceived oppression significantly predicted contempt ($\beta = .55$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < .001$; CI$_{95\%}$: [.424, .675]). Indirect effects were also examined. The results indicated that perceived oppression had an indirect effect on violent non-normative action tendency through contempt ($\beta = .19$, $SE = 0.04$, $p < .001$; CI$_{95\%}$: [.109, .277]), which supported Hypothesis 7. However, there was no indirect effect of injustice appraisals on violent normative action tendency via contempt ($\beta = -.07$, $SE = 0.07$, $p = .281$; CI$_{95\%}$: [-.206, .060]).

Chapter IV – Discussion

The study examined psychological factors that contributed to tendencies to participate in different types of collective action in the context of the pro-democracy movement in Thailand. Based on the SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2008), the research studied the role of contempt (Tausch et al., 2011) on collective action tendency and further investigated the role of perceived oppression on violent non-normative collective action likelihood through feelings of contempt. Seven hypotheses were proposed: (H1) pro-democracy movement identity predicts injustice appraisals and group efficacy; (H2) group efficacy positively predicts normative, is unrelated to non-violent non-normative, and is negatively related to violent non-normative collective action; (H3) injustice appraisals predict anger and contempt; (H4) anger strongly predicts normative collective action, less strongly non-violent non-normative collective action, and does not predict violent non-normative collective action; (H5) contempt predicts violent non-normative collective action but does not predict normative nor non-violent non-normative collective action; (H6) pro-democracy movement identity predicts perceived oppression; and (H7) perceived oppression predicts violent non-normative collective action through the feelings of contempt.

The findings of the present study are in accordance with the SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2008), that is, that group efficacy and injustice appraisals are bridged by identity (supporting H1) and, in turn, predict collective action tendencies. Moreover, the results were overall consistent with findings from Tausch et al. (2011), which attempted to extend the understanding of what might contribute to different forms of collective action, based on the predictions of group efficacy and injustice appraisals. H2 was partially supported since efficacy could predict only normative action and, whilst H3 and H4 were fully supported, H5 was only partially in line with the findings for contempt, predicting not only violent but also non-violent non-normative action tendency. Finally, H6 and H7 were fully supported. In essence, the findings of the study showed that 1) normative collective action tendency was predicted by anger and group efficacy, 2) non-violent non-normative collective action tendency was predicted by the feelings of both anger and contempt, but not group efficacy, 3) violent non-normative collective action tendency was predicted only by contempt but not group efficacy, and 4) perceived oppression mediated the relationship between identity and contempt. It also had an indirect effect on violent collective action through contempt, while injustice appraisals did not.

Normative collective action - such as signing a petition to impeach members of the government and participating in discussions or plenary meetings about democracy in Thailand – was predicted by both anger and efficacy. This finding was in line with the *dynamic dual pathway model* (van Zomeren et al., 2004), which proposed that collective action is driven by two different processes: an emotion-focused (anger) and a problem-focused (efficacy) approach as a way to cope with shared disadvantages instead of other alternatives (such as avoidance or disidentification with the disadvantaged group). Efficacy was seen as a result of instrumental assessments of coping potential for social change. It is a cost-benefit calculation for an individual who is deciding whether to put in their own effort (cost) in order to achieve common rewards (Olson, 1968). Anger, as a group-based emotion, was viewed as a result of external appraisals to blame others (e.g., the government or the system) for unfair treatments and subsequently activates the tendencies to confront the offender (Mackie et al., 2000). Van Zomeren et al. (2012) suggested that an individual's decision to act for a cause through collective action – like any decision to act – is a result of both cost-benefit weighting and emotions, as they conceptualized the individual as a "passionate economist".

However, group-based anger and group efficacy as proposed in a dual pathway model (van Zomeren et al., 2004) and the SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2008) are inadequate to explain the distinctions between different types of collective action, as they approach collective action in general without looking into its different forms. Becker and Tausch (2015) provided an integrative review of how normative and non-normative collective action engagement among members of disadvantaged groups can be predicted by different psychological factors. They addressed that there was some evidence indicating that a high sense of group efficacy was linked to normative action, while (violent and non-violent) non-normative collective action can be a result of a sense of *low* efficacy. The feeling of powerlessness could come from a sense of inability to eliminate an injustice the group is facing due to surrounding conditions, like the lack of access to conventional channels of political influence, being marginalized from the mainstream political system, or being too discouraged and disorganized from the cause. However, the results of the present study did not show significant negative effects of efficacy on either type of non-normative collective action. This could be explained by the insight, provided by Becker and Tausch (2015), that non-normative action is, in fact, highly strategic to serve specific purposes, such as gaining public attention or eliciting countermeasures that would destabilize the current

political situation and assist a long-term goal. This means that, while general group efficacy – which was measured in this study - might be highly linked with efficacy of normative action, it could be irrelevant to efficacy of non-normative action. Instead, specific action efficacy (Saab et al., 2015) of non-normative action might be a positive predictor of non-normative action. Thus, this should be further investigated in future research. Other suggestions for future research will be discussed later on in this chapter.

According to Becker and Tausch (2015), anger, within the political domain, is accounted as a constructive emotion that would motivate disadvantaged group members to express dissatisfaction and call for changes without breaking social norms (non-hostile responses) in order to maintain long-term reconciliation. They further included explanations of non-normative collective action in the aspect of emotion. Unlike anger, which tends to be an action-focused emotion, contempt is a globalist emotion (Bell, 2013) that occurs when members of a group perceive that injustice cannot be changed and it's out of their control. Thus, contempt drives psychological disengagement from, and moral exclusion of, the object of contempt (for example, an offending group, the government, or the police). It could be summarized that feelings of contempt are not as constructive as feelings of anger, for they can lead to particularly hostile reactions when an injustice is present. These roles of emotions could explain the findings of the present study, given how anger was found to predict normative collective action and contempt was a predictor of violent non-normative collective action.

Non-violent non-normative collective action, in this study, appeared to be predicted by both anger and contempt. This could come from the characteristics of such actions that contain moderate levels of hostility when compared to normative and violent non-normative forms of action. To be clear, it is more hostile than normative actions but less aggressive compared to violent non-normative behaviors, making it a 'middle category' (Tausch et al., 2011). So, it was possible that there were nuances in non-violent non-normative actions that were responsible for both group-based emotions. However, the results might also come from an issue in the action categorization for the main analysis. The classification was made according to the definitions in the literature that highlights the differences between normative and non-normative action when referred to norms of the dominant social system, like laws and regulations, and not norms of the (sub-)group (Becker & Tausch, 2015). This study, then, decided which action was normative or non-normative according to the laws currently in effect in Thailand. But the pre-test – where

participants were asked to classify examples of collective action into the three subtypes after reading their definitions – showed that there were four actions that were perceived differently from what they were categorized in the main analysis. That was the case for three out of five actions listed in the non-violent non-normative category, which were perceived as normative: demonstration, boycotting, and going on strikes. Burning objects was perceived as non-violent non-normative, but it was categorized as a violent form for this study. This point will be discussed along with other limitations later in this chapter.

Furthermore, this study found a significant effect of pro-democracy movement identity on perceived oppression (from the government). This was likely because, in the literature, social identity (Tajfel, 1981) has been recognized as the foundation of the radicalization process (Kruglanski, 2018; Lobato et al., 2020). According to Lobato et al. (2020), identity fusion, which is a form of social identification, predicted perceived oppression and led to intentions of radicalism in minority groups. Those who identified more strongly with the Thai pro-democracy group tended to perceive higher oppression. In other words, they felt more sensitive to the group's problems, and more affected by them (Talaifar & Swann, 2018).

Additionally, the present study found that the feelings of contempt moderated the relationship between perceived oppression and violent non-normative collective action. When further investigated, it was shown that perceived oppression had a significant indirect effect on violent non-normative action through contempt, but injustice appraisals did not. The outcomes also showed that oppression could predict contempt more strongly than injustice did. On the contrary, injustice showed a much stronger link with anger than with contempt. This could be because of the different characteristics between injustice appraisals (and anger) vs. oppression (and contempt). According to the SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2008), injustice appraisals, based on RDT, are a process where social comparisons occur and result in a subjective sense of group-based injustice or disadvantage. They tend to have a stronger link to the feelings of anger since they are likely to motivate confrontations in order to correct the wrongdoings.

Despite being similar when it comes to both the sense of disadvantage and the sense of unfairness, perceived oppression, unlike injustice appraisals, involves a unique element of difference in power status between ingroup (pro-democracy movement group) and outgroup (the government). Lobato et al. (2018) provided the definition of perceived oppression as the

"…perception of subjugation of one group by another, imposed by an asymmetric power and often reinforced by hostile conditions such as threats or actual violence." (p. 2). This difference was manifested in the questionnaire used to measure these two constructs. While questions such as "The work of the government is unfair" generally assessed perceived injustice, perceived oppression items measured more specifically the presence of power difference between the two groups as, for example, "The government considers members of the Thai pro-democracy movement to be inferior." or "The government keeps members of the Thai pro-democracy movement from living the way they want." Interestingly, this is a potential justification of why perceived oppression was found to predict the feelings of contempt in the present study. The emphasis on power differences implies that mistreatments are constant and take place unidirectionally towards the inferior group. It possibly elicits the realization that the unfair circumstance is likely to be stable due to the pattern of power dynamics. Such components are in line with the characteristics of contempt, which was proposed to occur when causes of anger stayed unresolved and were seen as out of one's control (Becker & Tausch, 2015).

All in all, this study is additionally proposing that perceived oppression - which involves humiliation and marginality and has been seen as a contributor of radicalization (Victoroff, 2005) - was a better predictor of contempt (when compared to injustice appraisals) and indirectly predicted the willingness to engage in violent non-normative collective action via contempt. However, future research should further explore predictions of anger from perceived oppression, as well as compare the effects of injustice appraisals and perceived oppression on both group-based emotions.

General implications

The result of the present study proposed that perceived oppression, compared to injustice appraisals, was a more proximal predictor of violent non-normative collective action via contempt. This finding complemented the limited existing knowledge about contempt within the framework of collective action by highlighting the unique quality regarding unequal distribution of power in perceived oppression. As proposed by Young (2011), social inequality should rather be considered as a notion of oppression and not as an imbalanced distribution of resources (injustice appraisals). Thus, not only did it offer an alternative predictor of contempt, the finding

related to perceived oppression could be potentially developed to explain collective action in other contexts of social inequality.

Besides the theoretical contributions, the outcomes of the study provided important implications. Consistent with the previous research (Tausch et al., 2011), normative collective action is associated with anger and group efficacy. It suggests that when people feel represented by democratic channels in the existing system, engagements in non-normative action become unnecessary. Hence, demanding social changes through normative collective action should be seen as a manifestation of the wellness of the social system and not as a threat (Briggs, 2010). The divergence between normative and non-normative collective action often depends on how the state reacts to both forms of action (Tausch et al., 2011).

First of all, as found in the present study, violent non-normative forms of action tend to happen among those who feel contempt which, as already discussed, is an emotion that usually develops when causes of anger stay unresolved. It suggests that - to prevent the feelings of anger from transforming into contempt - injustice, which is a cause of anger, should be addressed early on when expressed by normative means.

Secondly, movements of minority groups that engage in non-normative means under a system of majority rule are often faced with violent countermeasures. This is also the case in Thailand. A briefing paper named "the Implementation of the Emergency Decree in Response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Thailand" (2021) published by the International Commission of Jurists criticized multiple aspects of the decrees, including the ban on public and peaceful assemblies, by denouncing that "The ban has been used by the Thai authorities with the inevitable and predictable effect of suppressing participation in public protest mostly aimed at the government" (p. 10). Besides, human rights organizations - under a joint statement named "Thailand: End the use of disproportionate and unnecessary force against protesters" (2021) - denounced the frequent unjustified use of excessive violence against the demonstrators by the riot police, as well as the increasingly common arrests of pro-democracy protesters (including minors) without warrants, leaving prisoners with unequal access to lawyers and fair trials according to the Criminal Procedure Code. These actions might impose a stronger sense of oppression by the government among the pro-democracy movement group, as Lobato et al. (2018) claimed that perceived oppression frequently increased under adverse circumstances,

including the use of violence and threats. Hence, these responses from the state may subsequently fuel discontent and psychological distancing towards the social system in the form of contempt, which could result in higher tendencies to engage in non-normative collective action among the pro-democracy movement group.

Ultimately, to prevent violent non-normative collective action, promoting efficacy and preventing contempt is crucial. To be specific, policy makers are those in positions playing a vital role in designing inclusive political institutions that foster said psychological variables by allowing the equal representation of minority groups in society (McCanless, 2019)

Limitations and Future Research

One of the most important limitations of the study is the modification carried out in model 2 to improve goodness of fit. According to Division of Statistic of the University of Texas at Austin (2012), such re-specification, in some cases, might lead to insignificant changes in the meaning of the model, whereas in other occasions, the additional paths could possibly lead to fundamental changes of theoretical assumption. Moreover, to perform such modifications is basically an attempt to improve the structure on empirical data to a better fitness, rather than testing the model which path specifications are based on theories. This could potentially lead to a smaller probability for the model to be replicated in different samples. Hence, future research should pay attention to the modification indices and allow the adjustments only when it is supported by theoretical or methodological justifications.

As mentioned earlier, the discrepancies between theoretical definitions and participants' perceptions could contribute to generalizability issues. Since this study was conducted in the context of Thailand during 2020 – 2021 when the country was under a volatile political climate, and a complex of restrictive – but supposedly temporary - emergency decrees were implemented to tackle both the pandemic (Tonsakulrungruang, 2021) and political unrest (Yuda, 2020), it could reflect particular social conditions that might have led to unique dynamics of collective action. Thus, future research conducted in different time periods and countries should keep in mind that the findings of the study might not be generalizable to all circumstances.

Another important limitation of the study is the fact that the data were collected by an online survey distributed through several social network services (e.g., Twitter, Facebook). Thus, it is assumed that the majority of the participants have access to such platforms and even the internet

in general. This selection effect could influence the overall trend of the data since social media use - apart from news consumption from television vs. alternative media – was found to directly and indirectly predict pro-democracy protest intention among participants in Hong Kong (Chan, 2017). So, it is possible that the data from the present study were overrepresented by Thai individuals who identified with the pro-democracy movement group. Future research could try to eliminate this issue by also collecting data using a pen-and-paper approach.

In addition, political groups often use both normative and non-normative actions in their movements to achieve their goals (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). The Thai pro-democracy movement group is composed of individuals with different backgrounds and aspirations. It is, then, likely that there are sub-identities within the big umbrella of pro-democracy movement identity, including radical subgroups. Future studies could shed more light on the emergence of subgroups and their effects on participation in different types of collective action. This study proposed two sub-identities of the Thai pro-democracy movement, namely, Youth Through Gas (YTG) and Thai feminists. It preliminary explored feminist identification but not YTG since the group emerged after the data collection process.

Youth Through Gas is a pro-democracy movement subgroup that was formed by Thai youths to fight against dictatorship and call for the resignation of prime minister Prayuth Chan-ocha. The group was established and became known in August 2021, diverging from the existing pro-democracy youth organizations. The name was inspired by the situation of peaceful assemblies calling for democracy being often met with tear gas, among other countermeasures used by riot police. According to their statement of position – which was published on their Twitter platform followed by more than 8,000 accounts (as of September 2021) – YTG are not opposed to peaceful protests, but, unlike other political youth organizations, they are willing to adopt harsh tactics in response to the use of violence by the government. It is possible that individuals who identify with this subgroup are more likely to participate in violent and non-violent non-normative collective action since, from their point of view, such actions are justified as legitimate reactions to the violence imposed by the government and the authorities. Future research could focus on investigating the effects of YTG identification, as well their specific action efficacy, on the willingness to engage in non-normative collective action.

As explained in Chapter I, the complexity of identities potentially contributes to oppressions within the Thai pro-democracy group. This phenomenon is clearly seen in the aspect of gender equality among the pro-democracy movement since women and LGBTQIA+ activists are sexually assaulted and discriminated against by both Thai authorities and other pro-democracy protesters (The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, 2021). This study measured the identification of the feminist movement group; although it did not conceptualize it in the model, it preliminary explored its associations with other factors. Future research should continue studying the feminist movement identification and its predictions on different types of collective action within the Thai pro-democracy movements. Further discussion regarding pro-democracy movement identity vs. feminist movement identity will be addressed below.

Facing a series of incidents where the political freedom of the people is put at risk by the government has led some Thai people to create a movement to take a stance against such circumstances. The formation of the pro-democracy identity allows its members to connect with a shared goal they aim to promote and will not tolerate. In this case, the pro-democracy identification is a result of an *incidental* disadvantage. According to van Zomeren et al. (2008), *incidental* disadvantage is an issue-based or situation-based disadvantage - for instance, a newly imposed law or a rise in tuition fees. In order to respond to such disadvantages, members need to form a shared social identity around their common fate, that is, using the basis of an objective (fight for democracy) to create their group's social identity (pro-democracy group).

Unlike the identification of pro-democracy, feminist identification is formed because of a *structural disadvantage.* According to van Zomeren et al. (2008): "Structural disadvantage includes structural low group status or discrimination based on membership of a social group or category" (p. 509). Different from *incidental* disadvantage, social identity under structural disadvantage already exists, but it needs to be *transformed* into something else. In this case, people of certain genders are systematically discriminated against. While the nature of their genders is already established in a society, the transformation to become feminists is required to express the shared goal (i.e., gender equality).

The SIMCA proposed that the two distinctive types of disadvantages contribute to differences in predicting collective action. For instance, anger and efficacy can predict collective action more accurately in case of incidental disadvantage. This could be because a) structural

disadvantage tends to be more psychologically harmful to the self and leads to other coping strategies (e.g., social creativity strategies; see Derks et al., 2007) other than confrontations through collective action, or b) structural disadvantage is generally harder to change than incidental disadvantage since those with higher status normally try to maintain social hierarchies. Moreover, the means and resources that are needed to fight against structural disadvantage tend to be fewer. Therefore, this could result in lower efficacy in structural disadvantage (Klandermans, 1997). However, social identity should still be a vital predictor of collective action in both incidental and structural disadvantages.

Given the differences between types of disadvantages of pro-democracy movements (incidental) and feminist movements (structural), those in the pro-democracy movement subgroup who also see the importance of combating gender inequality by identifying themselves as feminists could perceive both types of disadvantages. While the feminists participate in the pro-democracy movement, the rest of the movement isn't equally eager for gender equality, or worse, is against it. This might create a scenario where feminists see that "We fight with you for our goal, but you don't fight for our right (and still oppress us)." Therefore, the nuance of experiences and identities could potentially impact the quantity of identification with the pro-democracy movement group, which is a bigger group, and might also affect collective action tendencies by different dynamics (oppression from Thai authorities vs. oppression from the pro-democracy protesters), which requires future investigation.

In addition to feminist movement identity, *collective narcissism* was also measured. Because of the time constraints it was not conceptualized into the model of the study, but its correlations with other variables were analyzed. According to de Zavala et al. (2009), collective narcissism is "…an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about the in-group's greatness…" (p. 2). They proposed that the relationship between collective narcissism and aggressiveness towards outgroups was mediated by perceptions of threats from outgroups and insults to the ingroups. The five studies in the research found that collective narcissism predicted perceived threats from outgroups, unwillingness to forgive outgroups, right-wing authoritarianism, preference for military aggression, and blind patriotism. Interestingly, collective narcissism in the present study was found to have positive associations with all the main variables, including the three forms of collective action. Despite its positive correlations with pro-democracy movement identification, perceived oppression, anger, and contempt, collective narcissism did not mostly associate with

violent non-normative collective action. A close look shows that its strongest link was with normative, then with non-violent non-normative, and least strongly with violent non-normative collective action. It was possible that the quality content of the identified group played a role in the radicalization process (e.g., Muslim vs. non-Muslim group; see Lobato et al., 2018). Plus, the pro-democracy movement group in this study reflected rather a left-wing belief that supports social equality. Thus, collective narcissism might not be a strong indicator of violent non-normative collective action engagement among pro-democracy movement groups. Nevertheless, more thorough studies will be needed in the future to understand the role of collective narcissism in collective action tendencies.

It is believed that the present research is the first to investigate – from the point of view of social psychology - collective action in the context of the Thai pro-democracy movement. Moreover, the study's design was correlational, so although causal relations were predicted and tested, directionality was not possible to determine in such design. For these reasons, future studies varying in methodology and design are crucial to complement the existing knowledge. This may include qualitative research conducted by interviewing activist leaders, experimental research design to address casual effects of perceived oppression on variables in the SIMCA and further examine its prediction on political efficacy - which is the trust in the government and the belief that as citizens, their voice can influence political decision makings (Becker & Tasuch, 2015) –, or longitudinal studies on how witnessing violent countermeasures by the riot police, including the arrests of other protesters, would predict willingness to participate in different forms of collective action in the future. Finally, cross-cultural studies involving cultural-level variables could give a broader view of collective action in terms of similarities and differences across societies. For example, future research could apply Hofstede's cultural dimensions - especially power distance, which is the acceptance of unequally distribution of power among those who are inferior (Hofstede, 2011) - to examine its role on perceived oppression and the effects on collective action tendencies.

Conclusion

In summary, the study proposed that collective action tendencies in the context of the pro-democracy in Thailand were driven by different variables. Anger and a high sense of efficacy predicted normative collective action tendency; anger and contempt predicted non-violent non-

normative collective action tendency; and contempt predicted violent non-normative collective action tendency. The study also offered contributions regarding the role of perceived oppression, which was found to predict violent non-normative collective action through contempt. And it pointed out that perceived oppression, compared to injustice appraisals as was originally proposed by Tausch et al. (2011), might have a closer relationship with contempt in predicting violent non-normative collective action tendency. These findings might be interpreted to imply that steering the Thai activists away from engaging in violent tactics is possible with potential interventions aiming to create a sense of political inclusivity and reducing imposed oppression to promote group efficacy and prevent the escalation from anger to contempt. Nonetheless, more studies with different focuses and methodologies are still necessary to expand and support the existing findings.

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Annex A – Questionnaire, informed consent, and debriefing text (English)

Name: Survey of Thai people's attitudes toward the current political situation in Thailand

General information about the survey:

This survey is a data collection process which is a part of a thesis within a master's program named Psychology of Global Mobility, Inclusion and Diversity in Society. The program takes place at ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon, Portugal. The responsible researcher is Pichayapohn Ritkampee. The primary supervisor is Dr. Miriam Rosa (ISCTE-IUL). And the co-supervisor is Dr. Anca Minescu (University of Limerick).

The purpose of this survey is to study Thai people's attitudes toward the current political situation in Thailand. The survey is based on social psychological theories and collection of statistical data.

We do not intend the survey to be utilized as a political tool to harm or oppressed any entity. We only propose to study social phenomena using scientific research methods.

Conditions and safety of the participant:

The participant of this survey must be a Thai who is at least 18 years old and never participated in the previous survey of this study.

The participant can take part of this survey only with voluntary nature and able to stop the participation at any point without giving a justification.

This survey does not require the respondent's identity, so you are able to answer this survey anonymously.

Your answers will be kept secretly and only the researchers of this project will have access to the data from this survey.

We anticipate that there will be no physical or psychological risks from answering this survey.

If you have any further questions, please contact Pichayapohn Ritkampee, email: preni@iscte-iul.pt

Would you like to participate in this survey?

1. Yes, I do. And I consent to the conditions. (start the survey)

2. No, I don't. (the end of the survey)

Thank you for your participation

There is no right or wrong answer to the question. Please answer with your honest opinions.

(Perceived Oppression; 10 items)

<u>Instruction</u>: Please read the presented statements and indicate to what extent do you **<u>agree</u>** from 1 (*Not at all*) to 4 (*A great deal*).

The following statements aim to ask your opinions about <u>the Thai government in 2021 which led by P.M. Prayuth Chan-ocha</u> and <u>the present Thai pro-democracy movement.</u>

This survey cannot identify the respondent and there is no right or wrong answer. Please, answer with your honest opinions.

1. The government considers members of the Thai pro-democracy movement to be inferior

2. Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement are often looked down upon

3. The government treats members of the Thai pro-democracy movement unjustly

4. The government wants to humiliate members of the Thai pro-democracy movement

5. Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement are denied their rights

6. Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement feel humiliated

7. The government keeps members of the Thai pro-democracy movement from living the way they want

8. Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement get controlled too much

9. The government wants to physically hurt members of the Thai pro-democracy movement

10. Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement are often verbally abused

<u>Instruction</u>: Please read the presented statements and indicate to what extent do you **<u>agree</u>** from 1 (*Strongly disagree*) to 7 (*Strong agree*).

The following statements aim to ask your opinions about <u>the Thai government in 2021 which led by P.M. Prayuth Chan-ocha</u> and <u>the present Thai pro-democracy movement.</u>

This survey cannot identify the respondent and there is no right or wrong answer. Please, answer with your honest opinions.

(Pro-democracy identity; 2 items)

 1. The pro-democracy movement in Thailand broadly represent how I feel and think

 2. I identify with the pro-democracy movement

(Feminist identity; 2 items)

Instruction: Please read the presented statements and indicate to what extent do you **agree.**

 1. The feminist movement in Thailand broadly represents how I feel and think

 2. I identify with the feminist movement

(Group-efficacy; 4 items)

Instruction: Please read the presented statements and indicate to what extent do you **agree.**

 1. I think that members of the Thai pro-democracy movement can pressure the prime minister to resign and cause other reforms in the Thai government.

 2. I think that members of the Thai pro-democracy movement can successfully defend their rights

 3. The Thai pro-democracy movement is strong as a group and can move a lot

 4. I think members of the Thai pro-democracy movement have already lost the fight*

(Injustice appraisal; 4 items)

Instruction: Please read the presented statements and indicate to what extent do you **agree.**

 1. The work of the government is unfair

 2. The work of the government is socially unjust

 3. The work of the government is not legitimate

 4. The work of the government is justified*

(Anger; 2 items)

Instruction: Please read the presented statements and indicate to what extent do you **agree.**

1. I'm furious at the government

2. The government angers me

(Contempt; 2 items)

Instruction: Please read the presented statements and indicate to what extent do you **agree.**

1. I disdain people who advocate the government

2. I detest people who advocate the government

(Collective narcissism; 5 items)

Instruction: Please read the presented statements and indicate to what extent do you **agree.**

1. Members of the Thai pro-democracy movement deserve special treatment

2. Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of the Thai pro-democracy movement

3. It really makes me angry when others criticize the Thai pro-democracy movement

4. If the Thai pro-democracy movement had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place

5. I will never be satisfied until the Thai pro-democracy movement gets the recognition it deserves

Instruction: Please read the presented statements and indicate the likelihood that you will engage from each action from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 7 (*very likely*).

The following statements aim to ask your opinions about the Thai government in 2021 which led by P.M. Prayuth Chan-ocha and the present Thai pro-democracy movement.

This survey cannot identify the respondent and there is no right or wrong answer. Please, answer with your honest opinions.

1. Participate in discussion meetings about democracy in Thailand

2. Participate in plenary meetings about democracy in Thailand

3. Write flyers

4. Sign a petition to impeach members of the government

5. Demonstrations

6. Use social media to raise awareness about the Thai pro-democracy movement

7. Block government buildings

8. Block streets or highways

9. Throw stones or bottles

10. Arson attack on government buildings

11. Arson attacks on private property of political officials in the government

12. Attacks on military personnel

13. Attacks on police

14. Attacks on political officials

15. Burn symbolic objects in public e.g., flags, pictures

16. Boycotting political officials in the government

17. Go on strikes

(The Thai pro-democracy movement affiliation)

Do you consider yourself to be a member of the Thai-prodemocracy movement?

1. Yes, I do.

2. No, I do not.

(General information)

Instruction: Please, provide your general information below.

- Nationality
- Year of birth
- Gender
- Browser information (not presented to the respondent)

(Debriefing)

Explanation the survey:

Thank you for having participated in this study. As indicated at the onset of your participation, the study is about attitudes towards political situation in Thailand and aims to examine the

association between perceived oppression and the willingness to engage in different types of collective action in the Thai pro-democracy movement.

In this questionnaire, we asked about potential ways of acting, just for scientific purposes. We would like to stress that in no way we endorse or promote specific forms of action asked in there. Specifically, we do not encourage any form of violence as an acceptable option.

In the context of your participation, there are not any anticipated physical or psychological risks as a result of answering this questionnaire. However, if you experience psychological distress because of this participation, or you have any question, comments that you wish to share, or to indicate your interest in receiving information about the main outcomes and conclusions of the study: aimhung52@gmail.com (Pichayapohn Ritkampee)

If you wish to access further information about the study topic, the following sources can also be consulted: Becker, J. C., & Tausch, N. (2015b). A dynamic model of engagement in normative and non-normative collective action: Psychological antecedents, consequences, and barriers. European Review of Social Psychology, 26(1), 43–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2015.1094265

Once again, thank you for your participation.

End of the survey

Annex B – Collective action categorization for the pre-test (English)

Instruction: The following actions are examples of collective action; that is, actions that may be done by a member of a group on behalf of that group, with the intention to improve the conditions of the group as a whole.

Collective action is divided in three categories. For each example, chose the one category that you think applies:
- **Normative Collective Action**: is a collective action that conforms to the norms of the existing social system (i.e., laws and regulations)
- **Non-Violent Non-Normative Collective Action**: is a collective action that violates norms of the existing social system (i.e., laws and regulations) without use of violence
- **Violent Non-Normative Collective Action**: a collective action that violates norms of the existing social system (i.e., laws and regulations) with use of violence

Participate in discussion meetings about democracy in Thailand

Participate in plenary meetings about democracy in Thailand

Write flyers

Sign a petition to impeach members of the government

Protest art e.g., street catwalk, street theatre Demonstrations

Use social media to raise awareness about the Thai pro-democracy movement

Disturb events where advocates of the government appear

Block government buildings

Block streets or highways

Throw stones or bottles

Arson attack on government buildings

Arson attacks on private property of political officials in the government

Attacks on military personnel

Attacks on police

Attacks on political officials

Burn symbolic objects in public e.g., flags, pictures

Boycotting political officials in the government

Go on strikes

Annex C – Model 1 from AMOS with specified paths between control variables and the main factors