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Title: Throwing off the dark legacy when going down: Experience of status loss undermines reparation intentions prompted by narratives of the ingroup's past wrongdoings

Short Title: Status loss undermines reparation intention

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Abstract:

Two experiments tested whether group members' reparation intentions towards victims of the ingroup's past wrongdoings depend on their experience of relative status change. We manipulated born-free white South Africans' experience of *accessibility* of memories of past ingroup wrongdoings and their current experiences of status loss. For participants believing in the ingroup's responsibility for past wrongdoing towards Black South Africans during Apartheid, status-loss experiences reduced reparation intentions prompted by the experience of memorizing examples of such wrongdoing as easy (Experiment 1, N = 193), and the ease to remember wrongdoing examples increased reparation intentions only if participants were reminded of status stability, but not if they were reminded of status loss (Experiment, N = 126). We conclude that the implications of narratives referring to past ingroup wrongdoings are contingent upon their relational function in ongoing social change processes.

Keywords:

Ingroup wrongdoing, Accessibility experience, Reparation intentions, Status loss, Social change

Data availability statement:

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in [provided when accepted] at [http://doi.org/\[provided when accepted\]](http://doi.org/[provided when accepted]), reference number [provided when accepted].

Throwing off the dark legacy when going down: Experience of status loss undermines reparation intentions prompted by narratives of the ingroup's past wrongdoings

Abstract

Two experiments tested whether group members' reparation intentions towards victims of the ingroup's past wrongdoings depend on their experience of relative status change. We manipulated born-free white South Africans' experience of *accessibility* of memories of past ingroup wrongdoings and their current experiences of status loss. For participants believing in the ingroup's responsibility for past wrongdoing towards Black South Africans during Apartheid, status-loss experiences reduced reparation intentions prompted by the experience of memorizing examples of such wrongdoing as easy (Experiment 1, N = 193), and the ease to remember wrongdoing examples increased reparation intentions only if participants were reminded of status stability, but not if they were reminded of status loss (Experiment 2, N = 126). We conclude that the implications of narratives referring to past ingroup wrongdoings are contingent upon their relational function in ongoing social change processes.

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Many societies engage in "politics of regret" (Olick, 1999, p. 333) to keep memories about past atrocities committed by one group towards another group alive. Narratives about guilt play a pivotal role in these politics of regret as they are not only assumed to prevent former transgressor groups from committing similar transgressions ever again but also to provide recognition to the victim groups' suffering and to facilitate reconciliation and reparation (Shriver, 1995). Indeed, social psychological research on group-based moral emotions, such as guilt, shame, or anger, has found evidence for reparation tendencies in former transgressor groups' members who were not personally involved in any of the wrongdoings at stake. We contribute to this line of research by examining the conditions under which memories of past wrongdoings increase reparation intentions in former transgressor groups, and when not. We focus on the role of perceived instability of former transgressor groups' relative status, which has been neglected so far as a key contextual factor impacting such reparation intentions.

Most studies on past intergroup transgressions demonstrated a positive relationship between moral group-based emotions such as guilt and shame and reparation intentions in intergroup relations in which status relations between former transgressor and victim groups are unlikely to change substantially in the near future (e.g., European-culture Chileans vs. indigenous Chileans, see Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008; Serbs vs non-Serbian population, see Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011; Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, see Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). Undeniably, real intergroup contexts that undergo radical social change after severe atrocities, where the former transgressor group loses status while the former victim group gains status, are rare. Yet, such contexts of radical social change might be the ones in which awareness of past wrongdoings, accompanying group-based emotions such as guilt, and resulting behavioral intentions such as reparation play a key role as they constitute legal and

political vehicles of social change processes empowering the former victim group. More specifically, such social change contexts are most likely characterized by enduring discourses in which intergroup differences are re-negotiated based on competing narratives on the (in)stability and (il)legitimacy of power and status relations between former transgressor and former victim groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Some narratives might stress moral obligations resulting from the inherited responsibility for past transgressions (e.g., members of the former transgressor group as beneficiaries of an unjust system). Others might emphasize current changes in the relative status relations (e.g., members of the former transgressor group being disadvantaged in some contexts due to affirmative action), or the lack thereof (e.g., economic inequality between the former transgressor group and the former victim group long after an unjust system was formally abolished). Particularly intergroup status-related narratives focusing on the relative status of the former transgressor group have the potential to undermine the readiness for reparation intentions as they might be appraised as an intergroup threat (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006).

The potentially undermining role of the current social change process in the interplay between references to past wrongdoings and reparation intentions was addressed in correlative studies in contemporary South Africa, an intergroup context of severe societal transformation emerging from the abolishment of apartheid. These studies showed that the usually positive link between group-based guilt and reparation intention is significantly weaker for white South African participants perceiving that their group is losing status [ANONYMOUS]. These results imply that the current intergroup context is important to determine when and how groups are ready to make up for their past wrongdoings by reparation. They also correspond with previous findings showing that group-based guilt results in reparation aiming at compensation rather than at promoting equality (Riek et al., 2006; Leach, Iyer & Pedersen, 2006, Study 3; Harth, Kessler & Leach, 2008), and that higher

status groups only support the empowerment of lower status groups as long as it does not threaten their advantaged position (Jackson & Essen, 2000; Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Cunningham & Platow, 2007).

In the present research, we again examine how current concerns about status loss can offset the impact of narratives legitimizing reparation for past wrongdoings, but with a different focus. Instead of focusing on group-based guilt, we explore the role of memories of past wrongdoings as they have the potential to evoke such moral emotions in the first place. The reason for focusing on memories of past wrongdoings rather than on group-based guilt is that people may not necessarily need to strongly feel group-based guilt to respond with readiness for reparation to narratives referring to past wrongdoings. Instead, they can, for instance, hold beliefs of moral responsibility (Zimmermann et al., 2011), have interiorized an if-then rule (Mischel & Shoda, 1995) that past wrongdoings should be answered with actions mitigating the damage as part of their relational self (Andersen & Chen, 2002), or conform to a hegemonic social norm that prescribes reparation of the former victim group (Ekiyor, 2007). To sum up, whatever psychological process produces the plausible positive impact that memories of past ingroup wrongdoings have on readiness for reparation towards the former victim group, we hypothesize that this impact will be undermined if members of the former transgressor group are concerned about their current loss of relative status.

Accordingly, the more general question addressed in the current research is, when do memories of past wrongdoings increase reparation intentions in former transgressor groups in a societal context that emerged from severe atrocities and that undergoes a radical social change?

The experienced ease to remember

In our research, we follow the same idea that most political activists, politicians, and other practitioners buy into when attempting to increase the awareness of past wrongdoings

and atrocities to mobilize for social action or try to legitimize reparation politics. Their efforts rely on the assumption that, while people differ in the degree to which they are chronically aware of such past wrongdoings, it is also possible to make such memories situationally salient by remembering them. Accordingly, previous research has often manipulated the situational salience of memories by plotting a condition in which participants are reminded of past wrongdoings against a control condition, in which they are not. However, different from this research, we also rely on the additional assumption that it is not only important whether the concept of past wrongdoings is accessible in memory (e.g., because of frequent or recent activation), but also *how* the accessibility is subjectively experienced and how the accessible memories are actually *used*. Research on social cognition has shown that meta-cognitions play a pivotal role in that (Higgins, 1996). Sometimes people might experience recalling examples of past wrongdoings as easy while at other times they might experience it as difficult. Moreover, people have metacognitions (i.e., subjective theories) about such accessibility experiences that affect inferences drawn from such recalling experiences (Higgins, 1996). For instance, according to Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, see Higgins, 1996) *availability heuristic*, accessibility experiences influence likelihood estimates as people infer the frequency of a type of an event (e.g., past wrongdoings) depending on how quick and easy they are able to bring to mind examples of the type of event. This metamemory belief (Schwarz, 2004) influences how the activated memories are used (Higgins, 1996). More specifically, experienced ease to recall examples of past wrongdoings implies that past wrongdoings were frequent and typical, which results in responses that are consistent with the recalled content (i.e., reparation intentions). In contrast, experienced difficulty to recall examples implies that past wrongdoings were not very frequent and typical, which results in responses opposite to the implications of the recalled content (i.e., rejection of reparation) (see Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klump, Rittenauer-Schatka & Simons, 1991, p. 196; Schwarz,

2004). Based on the outlined reasoning, we hypothesized that reparation intention as a content-consistent response depends on the accessibility experience to recall examples of past wrongdoings with ease. Moreover, as outlined above, this effect should be moderated by the experience of the current decline of the former transgressor group's relative status.

Accordingly, we tested this hypothesis experimentally in two studies using the effect of *accessibility experience* by manipulating the ease and difficulty of recall of examples of past wrongdoing.

The importance of assumed responsibility

Adopting such an experimental approach requires considering certain meaningful context variables, as the psychological processes at stake do not happen in a social vacuum (Tajfel, 1972; 1981). While the overall macro-context of the two studies was held constant (i.e., contemporary post-apartheid South-Africa and belonging to the group of white South-Africans), we expected a large variety of our participants' positioning in the enduring discourses about past wrongdoings. Particularly, members of a former transgressor group may differ in their belief in the ingroup's responsibility for causing the former wrongdoings at stake. Such causal responsibility has been shown not only to be a necessary condition for group-based moral emotions (e.g., collective guilt; Iyer et al., 2007) but also of moral responsibility for the outcomes of such past wrongdoings (Zimmermann et al., 2011). Accordingly, we expected that the predicted positive effect of memories of past wrongdoings on reparation intentions will not only depend on the absence of status-loss experiences but also requires, as a necessary condition, that the ingroup is believed to be indeed responsible for these wrongdoings. Therefore, we hypothesized that belief in the ingroup's responsibility is an additional moderator affecting the interaction between accessibility experiences with regard to ingroup wrongdoings and status-loss experiences on reparation intentions.

Effects on group-based guilt

We argued above that the experience of group-based moral emotions is not necessary for memories of past wrongdoings to motivate intentions for reparation. Nevertheless, in order to link our research to previous research on the topic, we additionally tested whether those memories do actually evoke group-based guilt, at least for some participants. This test took into account participants' varying identification with the former transgressor group. As previous research has shown, individuals' identification plays a pivotal - though ambivalent - role for the admission of negative group-based emotions (e.g., Doosje et al., 2006). Although highly committed group members are often reluctant to accept negative information about their ingroup (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998), ingroup identification is, according to intergroup emotions theory, a necessary condition for group-based emotions to occur (Smith, Seger & Mackie, 2007). Thus, while ingroup identification might not necessarily be important for accepting that past wrongdoing should be addressed by reparation to the former victim group, if memories of those wrongdoings are experienced as easily accessible, participants should feel group-based guilt only if they are sufficiently identified with the former transgressor group.

Experimental manipulation of accessibility experience

In two experimental studies we tested the hypothesis that reparation intentions as content-consistent response depend on the accessibility experience to recall examples of past ingroup wrongdoings with ease and that this effect should be moderated by the experience of current decline of the former transgressor group's relative status. To manipulate the accessibility experience, we applied the methodology by Schwarz et al. (1991) who demonstrated that participants who were asked to recall 6 compared to 12 examples of their own assertive (unassertive) behavior experienced the former as easy and the latter as difficult, and rated themselves as more assertive (unassertive, respectively) than those who recalled 12 examples. Their explanation of this effect of accessibility experience holds that the easier an

event is recalled, the more frequent and typical it is, which then influences how the recalled information is used. This effect has been replicated in different contexts. For instance, participants reported using their bicycle more often after recalling 3 rather than 8 instances of bicycle use (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999), liking Tony Blair more after being requested to list 2 rather than 5 favorable thoughts about him (Haddock, 2002), and holding a particular attitude with greater confidence after generating 3 rather than 8 arguments in favor of this attitude (Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1999). Consequently, we predicted that participants will report stronger reparation intentions when they are requested to recall few examples of past ingroup wrongdoings (i.e., the experience of high accessibility, as recalling wrongdoings is easy) compared to when they are requested to recall many examples of past ingroup wrongdoings (i.e., the experience of low accessibility, as recalling is difficult).

Moreover, we measured in both experiments perceived responsibility for past wrongdoing to test the hypothesis that the interaction between ease to recall ingroup wrongdoings and status-loss experiences on reparation intentions is conditional upon belief in the ingroup's responsibility. We also measured group-based guilt and ingroup identification to test the hypothesis that the experience of group-based guilt due to ease to recall examples of wrongdoings is conditional upon identification with the former transgressor group.

Both experiments were conducted online using *Qualtrics*. Participants were white South African students registered with the [second author's university] who were eight years old or younger, or not even born when the first democratic post-apartheid elections were held in 1994. In Experiment 1 both ingroup wrongdoing and status-loss experiences were manipulated using the methodology by Schwarz, Bless et al. (1999). We limited, however, the design of Experiment 1 to three conditions by excluding the condition in which both wrongdoing and status-loss would be difficult to recall. As participants would have been required to generate 24 examples, this condition would have overloaded participants and

most probably led to systematic dropout. In Experiment 2 a different manipulation for status-loss was applied to conduct the experiment as a complete 2 x 2 design.

Experiment 1

Sample Size and Participants

The minimal required sample size for Experiment 1 was $N = 159$ assuming an effect size of $f^2 = .05$, a two-tailed alpha level of .05, and a minimal desired statistical power of .80 (G*Power 3, see Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007) for the test of R^2 increase by one predictor (interaction) in a multiple regression with five predictors (three main effects, two interactions). Participants dropping out before filling in the measures of the dependent variable and the moderator were excluded from data analysis. In total, 193 participants completed the experiment of which 55 were male and 132 female (six did not indicate their gender) with an average age of 22.4 years, ranging from 18 to 28.

Procedure

After informed consent was obtained, participants were exposed to the experimental manipulations of the ease to recall white South Africans' wrongdoing during apartheid and white South Africans' status-loss. Then intentions for reparation were measured followed by the measurements of the manipulation checks, belief in the ingroup's responsibility, group-based guilt, identification with white South Africans, and demographic information.

Experimental manipulations

Participants were randomly allocated to one of three experimental conditions (i.e., difficult-to-recall wrongdoing/easy-to-recall status-loss, easy-to-recall wrongdoing/ difficult-to-recall status-loss, and easy-to-recall wrongdoing/ easy-to-recall status-loss).

In the conditions of easy-to-recall wrongdoing participants read the instruction: "Take a minute and think about the apartheid period in South Africa. Think about the various

transgressions White South Africans committed toward Black South Africans during this period. For these transgressions some White South Africans feel guilt. Please briefly describe three (3) examples of these wrongdoings for which White South Africans may feel guilt, even if they were not necessarily individually involved” followed by three blank text boxes labeled *wrongdoing 1*, *wrongdoing 2*, *wrongdoing 3*. In the condition of difficult-to-recall wrongdoing, the instruction was the same except that participants were asked to describe 12 (instead of 3) examples and were provided with 12 blank text boxes labeled *wrongdoing 1*, *wrongdoing 2*, ... *wrongdoing 12*.

Participants in the conditions of easy[difficult]-to-recall status-loss read the following instruction: “Apartheid was demolished 20 years ago when South Africa held its first-ever free and democratic elections. A lot has happened since then. South Africa has developed into a country that won the Rugby World Cup in 1995, that successfully hosted the Soccer World Cup in 2010, and that became a favorite holiday destination for people from all over the world. Most obviously, the relationship between White and Black South Africans changed over the last 20 years. White and Black South Africans use the same public facilities and spaces, they work in the same jobs, and they buy properties in the same suburbs. With all these changes there are areas in which the standing of White South Africans has been declining. We would like you to write down up to three [twelve] examples of this tendency.” Participants were provided with 3 [12] blank text boxes labeled *Example 1*, *Example 2*, etc.

Measures

Manipulation checks

The manipulation of ease to recall wrongdoing was tested by asking the participants: *How difficult was it for you to generate the requested number of wrongdoings for which white South Africans may feel guilt, even if they were not necessarily individually involved?*

The manipulation of ease to recall status-loss was tested by the question: *How difficult was it for you to generate the requested number of examples describing the decline of white South Africans?* In both questions, participants were asked to position a slider on a scale ranging from 1 (*very easy*) to 10 (*very difficult*).

Dependent variables and inter-individual differences

Reparation intention was measured by six items adapted from Brown et al. (2008): “I believe white South Africans should try to repair some of the damage they have caused black South Africans during apartheid”; “I do not think that white South Africans owe something to black South Africans because of the things that were done to them during apartheid” (reversed); “I think that white South Africans should apologize to black South Africans for past harmful actions”; “I think that white South Africans should help black South Africans to reclaim their land”; “I think that black South Africans deserve some form of compensation from white South Africans for what happened to them during the apartheid years”; and “I feel that black South Africans should have economic benefits as reparation for the damage white South Africans caused them” ($\alpha = .82$).

Perceived ingroup responsibility was assessed with three items that were adapted from Čehajić and Brown (2006): “I consider white South Africans to be responsible for the atrocities committed during apartheid”; “I think that white South Africans should feel responsible for the things that happened during apartheid”; and “I do not perceive white South Africans responsible for their transgressions committed during apartheid” (reversed) ($\alpha = .74$).

Group-based guilt was measured by four items adapted from a scale developed by Brown et al. (2008) and Brown and Čehajić (2008): “When I think about things white South Africans have done during apartheid, I sometimes feel guilty”; “I occasionally feel guilty for the human rights violations committed by white South Africans during the apartheid years”;

“When thinking about how white South Africans took away homes from black South Africans, I sometimes feel guilty”; and “I do not feel any guilt for the things white South Africans did to black South Africans during apartheid” (reversed) ($\alpha = .88$).

Ingroup identification was assessed using ten items selected from the 14-item scale proposed by Leach et al. (2008) covering all five sub-dimensions of the multicomponent ingroup identification measure: “I feel strong bonds with white people”; “I feel committed to white people” (*Self-Investment: Solidarity*); “I am glad to be white.”; “I think that white people have a lot to be proud of” (*Self-Investment: Satisfaction*); “I often think about the fact that I am white”; “Being white is an important part of how I see myself” (*Self-Investment: Centrality*); “I have a lot in common with the average white person”; “I am similar to the average white person” (*Self-definition: Individual Self-Stereotyping*); “White people have a lot in common with each other”; and “White people are very similar to each other” (*Self-definition: Ingroup homogeneity*) ($\alpha = .85$).

The order of the items within each measure was randomized for each participant. All measures were assessed on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (*totally disagree*) to 5 (*totally agree*).

Results

The data reported in this article are publicly available as datasets [ANONYMOUS, year; https://osf.io/c9ndu/?view_only=c2ff95483bc34f7b9691f2920ade7e67]. When reported, confidence intervals for effect sizes were calculated using CI-R2-SPSS (Wuensch, 2016) for effects involving only fixed predictors and R2 (Steiger & Fouladi, 1992) if random predictors were involved.

Preliminary Analysis

Participants in the conditions of easy-to-recall wrongdoing reported less difficulties to recall the requested number of wrongdoings ($M = 5.23$, $SD = 2.62$) than in the difficult-to-

recall condition ($M = 5.71, SD = 2.78$). However, the planned contrast (2 -1 -1) using a General Linear Model (GLM) with experimental condition as factor did not reveal statistically significant differences, $F(1, 190) = 1.13, p = .29, \eta_p^2 = .01, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.000, .037]$. The effect of the manipulation of ease to recall status-loss on the respective manipulation check was significant, $F(1, 190) = 21.74, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .10, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.044, .173]$. Participants in the conditions of easy-to-recall status-loss ($M = 4.61, SD = 3.01$) reported less difficulties in recalling the requested number of examples for status loss than participants in the difficult-to-recall condition ($M = 6.88, SD = 2.83$). Because the manipulation of ease to recall wrongdoing was immediately followed by a procedurally identical manipulation of status-loss, participants might have misattributed difficulties experienced in the wrongdoing manipulation to those they experienced in the status manipulation. We, therefore, repeated the analysis for the manipulation check of ease to recall wrongdoing, but this time controlling for the manipulation check for ease to recall status-loss as a covariate. The manipulation check for ease to recall status-loss had a direct statistical effect on the manipulation check for ease to recall wrongdoing, $F(1, 189) = 21.84, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .10, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.044, .175]$. Moreover, the difference between the easy-to-recall wrongdoing conditions and the difficult-to-recall wrongdoing condition reached statistical significance, $F(1, 189) = 4.05, p = .046, \eta_p^2 = .02, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.0002, .066]$. Descriptives and correlations between the measured variables are reported in Table 1.

The manipulations had no effect on belief in the ingroup's responsibility, $F(2, 190) = 0.63, p = .54, \eta_p^2 = .007$, but on ingroup identification, $F(2, 186) = 3.21, p = .04, \eta_p^2 = .03$. Identification in the difficult-to-recall wrongdoing condition ($M = 3.31, SD = 0.66$) was significantly ($p = .02$) and marginally ($p = .07$) stronger than in the easy-to-recall wrongdoing conditions, in combination with difficult-to-recall ($M = 3.00, SD = 0.78$) and easy-to-recall status-loss ($M = 3.10, SD = 0.64$), respectively.

Hypothesis test

As predicted, a GLM with experimental conditions as categorical predictor, mean-centered ingroup responsibility as continuous predictor variable and the interaction between conditions and responsibility as predictor of reparation intentions revealed the latter to be significant, $F(2, 187) = 3.14$, $p = .046$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, $CI\eta_p^2 90\%$ [.0001, .079]. Simple mean comparisons and simple slope analysis of marginal estimated means listed in Table 2 indicate that the main effect of experimental conditions approached significance at mean of responsibility. However, it was even stronger when estimated at high levels of responsibility (1 *SD* above the mean) and vanished at low levels of responsibility (1 *SD* below the mean).

Thus, for participants feeling highly responsible the intention for reparation was stronger in the easy-to-recall wrongdoing / difficult-to-recall status-loss condition than in the easy-to-recall wrongdoing / easy-to-recall status-loss condition. However, the former condition was not significantly different from the difficult-to-recall wrongdoing / easy-to-recall status-loss condition (Table 2).

Additional analysis

To validate the guilt-eliciting character of the recalled memories, we further tested whether experienced accessibility of past wrongdoing predicted group-based guilt and whether this effect was moderated by ingroup identification in a GLM with experimental conditions as a factor and mean-centered identification as a continuous predictor of guilt, as well as the interaction between experimental condition and identification. Unexpectedly, neither experimental condition or identification, nor their interaction had a significant effect, $F_s < 0.6$, $p_s > .57$, $\eta_{ps}^2 < .01$.

Discussion

Experiment 1 provided first evidence that the experience of the former transgressor group's status-loss undermines the potential of narratives about past ingroup wrongdoings to result in reparation intentions: When accessibility of wrongdoing was experienced as high (i.e., examples were easy to recall), reparation intentions were stronger in the condition of low than in the condition of high experienced accessibility of status-loss. Our results support the idea that perceived responsibility of the ingroup is crucial for these effects on reparation intentions, as it did not only have a main effect on reparation intentions but also moderated the accessibility effects. Our results are, however, still ambiguous because a) the manipulation check for ease to recall wrongdoing only indicated a successful manipulation when the manipulation check for status-loss was controlled as a covariate, and b) the manipulation of ease to recall wrongdoing did not increase self-reported collective guilt for highly identified participants. Thus, we cannot be certain of the effectiveness and validity of our accessibility experience manipulation using the ease-of-retrieval paradigm. Experiment 2 circumvents these issues by using this particular paradigm only for wrongdoing and a different technique for the status-loss manipulation.

Moreover, the design of Experiment 1 was incomplete as it did not include the condition combining difficult-to-recall wrongdoing with difficult-to-recall status-loss. When planning the study, we did not consider a complete design necessary for our original hypothesis, which predicted that experience of high accessibility of wrongdoing and simultaneous low accessibility of status-loss are necessary conditions for reparation intention to be raised. However, the unpredicted high reparation intentions for participants strongly believing in the ingroup's responsibility in the condition of difficult-to-recall wrongdoing and easy-to-recall status-loss undermines the underlying logic of such a threshold model. Moreover, the incomplete design did also not allow to rule out that the different effort that was required in one (requiring overall 6 examples) compared to the other two conditions

(each requiring overall 15 examples) can have produced unequal levels of fatigue and thereby contributed to the detected effect. To overcome these limitations of the incomplete design, a complete 2 x 2 design was applied in the second experiment.

Experiment 2

Sample Size and Participants

The sample size of Experiment 2 was $N = 126$, implying a statistical power of .80 for a medium effect size of $f^2 = .064$ (corresponding to an effect size of $\eta_p^2 = .06$) and a two-tailed alpha level of .05 in a multiple regression analysis testing one out of seven predictors (G*Power 3, see Faul et al., 2007). Participants dropping out before filling in the measures of the dependent variable and the moderator were excluded from data analysis. Of the final sample, thirteen participants were males and 108 females (five did not indicate their gender) with an average age of 22 years, ranging from 18 to 26.

Experimental manipulations

In a 2 x 2 design ease to recall wrongdoing was manipulated as in Experiment 1. The manipulation of status-loss differed from Experiment 1 as participants were asked to write down 3 examples (i.e., easy-to-recall condition) either of white South-Africans' status loss (status-loss condition) or of the white South-Africans' status stability (status-stability condition), using the same instruction as in Experiment 1, but replacing the phrase "... has been declining" by "... has remained relatively high" in the status-stability condition.

Measures

Manipulation checks

The manipulation check of ease to recall wrongdoing was the same as in Experiment 1. The manipulation of status-loss was tested by counting how many of the examples generated by each participant described white South-Africans' status-loss. Counts of two independent raters blind to the conditions (intra-class correlation $ICC = .94$) were averaged.

As a second measure, we included the following item: *When you think about the changes of white South Africans' standing in post-apartheid South Africa, do you think their standing has been rising or declining?* Participants were asked to position a slider under the phrase “I think that white peoples' standing has been” from 1 (*strongly declining*) ranging to 10 (*strongly rising*).

Dependent variables and inter-individual differences

Reparation intention ($\alpha = .82$), *belief in ingroup responsibility* ($\alpha = .80$), *group-based guilt* ($\alpha = .91$) and *ingroup identification* ($\alpha = .86$) were measured the same way as in Experiment 1.

Results

Preliminary Analysis

As assumed, in the conditions of easy-to-recall wrongdoing participants reported less difficulties in recalling the requested number of wrongdoings ($M = 4.89$, $SD = 2.75$) than in the difficult-to-recall conditions ($M = 6.41$, $SD = 2.51$), $F(1, 122) = 10.35$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$, $CI\eta_p^2 90\%$ [.018, .162]. Participants generated more examples describing status decline in the status-loss conditions ($M = 1.54$, $SD = 1.21$) than in the status-stability conditions ($M = 0.19$, $SD = 0.48$), $F(1, 122) = 71.39$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .37$, $CI\eta_p^2 90\%$ [.258, .461]. The status manipulation had no effect on the second manipulation check measure, $F(1, 122) = 0.83$, $p = .36$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, $CI\eta_p^2 90\%$ [.000, .050]. There were no other significant effects on the manipulation checks. Descriptives and correlations are summarised in Table 1.

As in Experiment 1, the manipulations had no effects on ingroup's responsibility, $F(1, 122) < 0.74$, $ps > .39$, $\eta_p^2s < .007$, but on identification, which was slightly, yet significantly stronger, $F(1, 118) = 4.02$, $p = .047$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, in the status-loss condition ($M = 3.18$, $SD = 0.71$) than in the status-stability condition ($M = 2.95$, $SD = 0.65$). No other effects on identification were significant.

Hypothesis test

A 2 (ease to recall wrongdoing: easy versus difficult) x 2 (status-loss: loss versus stability) GLM with mean centered ingroup responsibility and its interactions as continuous predictors of reparation intentions showed a significant main effect of ingroup responsibility, $F(1, 118) = 64.46, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .35, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.235, .466]$, a marginal two-way interaction between the two manipulations, $F(1, 118) = 3.50, p = .064, \eta_p^2 = .03, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.000, .098]$, and a marginal two-way interaction between status-loss and responsibility, $F(1, 118) = 3.08, p = .082, \eta_p^2 = .03, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.000, .091]$. Most importantly, the predicted three-way interaction between the two manipulations and responsibility was statistically significant, $F(1, 118) = 4.56, p = .035, \eta_p^2 = .04, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.001, .111]$. The main effect of ease to recall wrongdoing was statistically significant only in the status-stability condition and only at medium, $F(1, 118) = 6.07, p = .015, \eta_p^2 = .05, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.005, .124]$, and high levels (1 *SD* above the mean), $F(1, 118) = 9.32, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .07, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.015, .157]$, of ingroup responsibility, but not at low levels (1 *SD* below the mean), $F(1, 118) = 0.30, p = .58, \eta_p^2 < .01, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.000, .037]$. Ease to recall wrongdoing had no effect when status loss was salient at any level of responsibility, $F_s(1, 118) < 1.39, p_s > .24, \eta_p s^2 < .013$. Reparation intentions were stronger in the easy-to-recall wrongdoing / status-stability condition than in the difficult-to-recall wrongdoing / status-stability condition for participants who believe at least to a certain degree in the ingroup's responsibility for past wrongdoings (Figure 1).

Additional analyses

We tested again whether ease to recall wrongdoing predicted group-based guilt, moderated by ingroup identification in a GLM with the two manipulations, mean-centered identification, and all interactions as predictors of guilt. The only significant effect was the predicted interaction between ease to recall wrongdoing and ingroup identification, $F(1, 114)$

$=7.23, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .06, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.009, .147]$. The effect of ease to recall wrongdoing was significant at high levels of ingroup identification (1 *SD* above the mean), but neither at medium nor at low levels (1 *SD* below the mean). When ingroup identification was high group-based guilt was stronger when recall of wrongdoing was easy than when it was difficult (Table 3).

Discussion

For members of the former transgressor group who believe in the ingroup's responsibility for past wrongdoings, the results support again our hypothesis that memorizing past wrongdoings only increases intentions for reparation towards the former victim group when the relative status of the former transgressor group is experienced as stable. Several problems identified in Experiment 1 did not apply to Experiment 2. The manipulation of experienced accessibility of wrongdoing had a robust effect on the manipulation check and also on self-reported guilt when ingroup identification was high. Moreover, we were able to test the cross-over interaction in this study as it had a complete 2 x 2 design. Interestingly, we replicated the unexpected finding from Experiment 1 of relatively strong reparation intentions for participants strongly believing in the ingroup's responsibility when recall of wrongdoing was experienced as difficult and social change was experienced as status-loss.

General Discussion

The overall aim of the present research was to experimentally test the hypothesis that the effect of narratives facilitating the memory of past ingroup wrongdoing on reparation intentions towards the former victim group is moderated by social change. We conducted two experimental studies using an innovative technique to manipulate the experienced accessibility of memories of past ingroup wrongdoing. The overall results demonstrated that the experience of high accessibility of memories of wrongdoings committed by white South

Africans during apartheid only increases reparation intention towards Black South Africans when the high-status of the white South African ingroup is simultaneously experienced as stable. Moreover, both the effect of experienced accessibility of wrongdoings and its moderation by status-loss experience are contingent on a minimal level of belief in the ingroup's responsibility for past wrongdoings.

The present research adds to the existing knowledge firstly by underlining the importance of considering the *current* intergroup relations between former transgressor and victim groups when studying implications of past atrocities. Results of studies inducing memories of past wrongdoings (e.g., to evoke moral emotions such as group-based guilt) in stable intergroup relations may not be generalizable to intergroup relations undergoing social change. This limited generalizability does by no means undermine the applicability of previous research on a social change context. Even in our studies, there was a positive relationship between ease of recalling wrongdoings and reparation intentions. However, as our studies also show, a social change context entails additional important factors. These contextual factors can be successfully addressed by considering them as moderators, both conceptually and methodologically.

Secondly, we provide first-time evidence that the experienced accessibility of memories of ingroup wrongdoings has a causal impact on the intentions of reparation. This point is crucial because previous research has almost entirely relied on procedures that were guiding people's attention towards past wrongdoings in the experimental condition but not in the control condition (for an exception see Rotella & Richeson, 2013). Such manipulations may face difficulties in contexts in which narratives on past wrongdoings dominate public discourses. As an alternative, our manipulation applied the ease-of-recall-effect (Schwarz et al., 1991). This technique does not require switching between different domains of the intergroup relations at stake, because all participants in the reported experiments were asked

to generate examples from the very same domain, namely of their ingroup's past wrongdoings. To our knowledge, this is the first time that this technique was applied to manipulate the use of wrongdoing memories. Moreover, although not in the central focus of our research, we also tested whether the manipulation of experienced accessibility of ingroup wrongdoing would affect group-based guilt. As predicted, ease to recall examples of ingroup wrongdoing increased group-based guilt for high identifiers. However, that was only found in Experiment 2. One explanation for the absence of this effect in Experiment 1 might be the ambivalent role of ingroup identification in the experience and regulation of group-based guilt. Whereas some level of identification is necessary to experience group-based emotions (Smith et al., 2007), strong identification can also motivate down-regulation of ingroup guilt (e.g., Sharvit et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the technique used in our studies might open a new pathway for future research both on intergroup reconciliation and on group-based emotions.

Thirdly, the present research sheds light on the dynamic interactions between competing narratives on past and current intergroup relations and how they can affect individuals' readiness to make concessions towards former victim groups. The implications of narratives about past wrongdoings may differ depending on the accompanying narratives about current social change. For instance, even if politics of regret tend to present "themselves as the only true and legitimate narratives about the events in question" (Toth, 2015, p. 554) it is also true "that there is never a single, unconditionally accepted historical narrative in any society" (p. 556). The latter is particularly likely when several subgroups hold different positions in a dynamic societal change context and when the former transgressor group is challenged by the fact that the dominating narrative linking wrongdoings with reparation and guilt can be understood as legitimizing its loss of social status.

Unexpectedly, we found that, for participants strongly believing in the ingroup's responsibility, reparation intentions were relatively high when they experienced memories of past wrongdoings as difficult to recall and examples of status-loss as easy to recall. An interpretation for this result could be that reparation intentions are lower when the notions of past wrongdoing and status loss are experienced as either simultaneously accessible or simultaneously not accessible compared to a situation in which only one of them is experienced as accessible. When both are experienced as accessible, white South Africans might be tempted to consider that losing relative social status can be seen as "already paying for the past". On the other hand, when both are simultaneously experienced as not accessible, free-born white South Africans might be tempted to construe the current ingroup's social identity as being distinct from the former higher-status transgressor group profiting from apartheid privilege (see Leach, Zeineddine, & Čehajić-Clancy, 2013). Both strategies are problematic insofar as they disregard the victim groups' needs to restore their sense of power (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), which requires more than the mere recognition of past wrongdoings without making actual concessions to the former victim group [ANONYMOUS]. Another explanation for the unexpectedly high reparation intentions when status-loss was made salient after requiring participants to list 12 examples of ingroup wrongdoing can have to do with demand characteristics. We choose the ease-of-recall paradigm for our study not only because it was conducted in a context in which memories of past ingroup wrongdoings are chronically salient but also because it avoided the problem of social desirability present in previous studies that reminded participants of past wrongdoings in one but not in the other experimental condition. However, a potential trade-off using the ease-of-recall paradigm is that the sequential manipulation of wrongdoing and status-loss might have raised some awareness of the hypothesis in participants (e.g., Wohl et al., 2015). Future research applying the same paradigm might take that possibility into account.

Moreover, it might also be important for future research to use larger sample sizes in order to ensure the necessary statistical power to detect the complex interaction between interindividual differences (e.g., responsibility beliefs) and the experience of social change (e.g., status loss). Another limitation of the present research is that both experiments were conducted within the same intergroup context. It is, therefore, not certain whether the results on the moderating role of status-loss can be generalized to other social change contexts beyond South Africa. Future research is necessary to support such a general conclusion.

Irrespective of these limitations, our research illustrates the importance of social context for the implications of narratives on past collective wrongdoings. More specifically, the results suggest that narratives about the former transgressor group's status-loss lower the likelihood that members of this group respond to memories of past wrongdoings with reparation intention. This might have severe consequences for future intergroup relations between former transgressor and victim groups because the rejection of any amends in response to the admission of wrongdoing contradicts our moral understanding of repairing relationships (Ekiyor, 2007). On the positive side, the results also show that narratives about past wrongdoings combined with the belief in responsibility and narratives about perpetuating advantages of the former transgressor group increase the readiness for reparation.

Social change that comes with relative status' instability is likely to be experienced by members of a former transgressor group as threatening and can, therefore, undermine concessions to the former victim group. Yet, loss of relative status can also be experienced as a win-win situation; namely, if it results from improvements for the former victim group rather than the deterioration of the former transgressor group's conditions. However, such a non-zero-sum perspective, which focuses on restorative rather than retributive justice, might not be achievable in all contexts. For instance, when facing economic decline people might

be reluctant to accept a non-zero-sum perspective because when resources are scarce actual improvements for former victim groups might indeed require transfers. Moreover, former victim groups' needs for recognition of their suffering might sometimes not be fully met by reconciliation that comes with no costs for the former transgressors (Hornsey, Wohl & Philpot, 2015). Our research suggests that, if justice can only be achieved in that former transgressor groups lose status, it might be more appropriate to separate historic moralizing narratives from those of the difficult present. This separation might allow members of former transgressor groups who accept collective responsibility to take on the two burdens of social change: the duty to make up for the ingroup's dirty past and the necessity to accept its current unavoidable sacrifice; one at the time.

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Table 1: Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of the measured variables, Experiment 1 and 2

	1 Reparation Intention	2 Ingroup Responsibility	3 Ingroup Identification	4 Collective Guilt
Experiment 1				
<i>M</i>	2.33	2.55	3.15	2.97
<i>SD</i>	0.80	0.85	0.69	1.04
1		.59***	-.18*	.49***
2			-.08	.53***
3				-.14†
Experiment 2				
<i>M</i>	2.44	2.61	3.05	2.97
<i>SD</i>	0.82	0.88	0.71	1.10
1		.59***	-.07	.46***
2			-.09	.49***
3				-.15

Note: † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table 2: Marginal estimated means of reparation intentions in the experimental conditions in and omnibus tests estimated at low, medium, and high levels of ingroup responsibility,

Experiment 1

Accessibility conditions	<i>M</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% <i>CI</i>	95% <i>CI</i>
Wrongdoing / status-loss			lower	upper
at -1 <i>SD</i> of Ingroup responsibility				
$F(2, 187) = 0.01, p = .99, \eta_p^2 = .00, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [-.000, .004]$				
difficult / easy	1.85 ^a	0.11	1.698	2.026
easy / difficult	1.87 ^a	0.11	1.710	2.071
easy / easy	1.88 ^a	0.11	1.668	2.098
at Mean of Ingroup responsibility				
$F(2, 187) = 3.04, p = .050, \eta_p^2 = .03, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.000, .076]$				
difficult / easy	2.37 ^{a,b}	0.08	2.227	2.527
easy / difficult	2.49 ^a	0.09	2.268	2.698
easy / easy	2.21 ^b	0.07	2.049	2.362
at +1 <i>SD</i> of Ingroup responsibility				
$F(2, 187) = 6.11, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .06, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.013, .118]$				
difficult / easy	2.89 ^a	0.11	2.615	3.121
easy / difficult	3.10 ^a	0.13	2.753	3.452

easy / easy 2.54^b 0.10 2.347 2.728

Note: ^{a, b} At each level of responsibility, values of experimental conditions with different superscripts are significantly different from each other ($p < .05$). 95% Confidence intervals for marginal estimated means are accelerated and bias corrected after bootstrapping with 1000 bootstrap samples

Table 3. Estimated marginal means of group-based guilt in different conditions of the accessibility of wrongdoings manipulation and effects of the accessibility of wrongdoings manipulation estimated at low, medium, and high levels of ingroup identification, Experiment 2

Ease to recall wrongdoings	<i>M</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% <i>CI</i>	95% <i>CI</i>
			lower	upper
at -1 <i>SD</i> of Ingroup identification				
$F(1, 114) = 1.20, p = .28, \eta_p^2 = .01, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.000, .061]$				
difficult	3.31	0.22	2.813	3.794
easy	2.99	0.19	2.596	3.457
at Mean of Ingroup identification				
$F(1, 114) = 1.23, p = .27, \eta_p^2 = .01, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.000, .061]$				
difficult	2.85	0.15	2.549	3.168
easy	3.08	0.13	2.821	3.343
at +1 <i>SD</i> of Ingroup identification				
$F(1, 114) = 7.41, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .06, CI\eta_p^2 90\% [.009, .142]$				
difficult	2.39	0.21	2.025	2.818
easy	3.16	0.19	2.642	3.563

Note: 95% Confidence intervals for marginal estimated means are accelerated and bias corrected after bootstrapping with 1000 bootstrap samples




Figure 1: Marginal estimated means of reparation intentions in the experimental conditions of status-loss (listing 3 examples of status-loss vs. of status-stability) and ease to recall examples of ingroup wrongdoings (easy-to-recall: listing 3 examples vs. difficult-to-recall: listing 12 examples) in Experiment 2, estimated at low (one standard deviation below the mean – 1 SD) medium (at Mean) and high (one standard deviation above the mean + 1 SD) levels of assumed ingroup responsibility for wrongdoings. Error bars are accelerated and bias corrected 95% confidence intervals after bootstrapping with 1000 bootstrap samples.