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## **Home Sweet Home?**

Returning Refugees and The Challenges of Sustainable (Re)integration into  
Kismayo, Somalia

Isabelle Datz (86068)

*Master of Science* in International Studies

Supervisor:

PhD, Pedro Figueiredo Neto, Researcher  
ICS- ULisboa – Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa

November 2020



SOCIOLOGIA  
E POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS

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## Resumo

Actualmente, no sul da Somália observa-se um afluxo maciço de refugiados que regressam ao país, particularmente desde os campos de Dadaab, no Norte do Quénia. A grande maioria estabelece-se na cidade de Kismayo, devastada pela guerra, aumentando significativamente a procura de bens e o acesso a serviços básicos. Com base em investigação realizada no Quénia entre Fevereiro e Março de 2020 em cooperação com a GIZ, este estudo analisa os processos de (re)integração social e económica dos retornados em Kismayo, procurando identificar também os principais desafios. Embora o repatriamento voluntário de refugiados seja tido pela UNHCR e países de acolhimento como a solução duradoura mais desejável, são escassos os estudos que abordam os processos de regresso e (re)integração. O repatriamento é associado ao "regresso a casa", o que suspostamente recriaria um conjunto de vínculos naturais, entre os regressados e os seus antigos territórios, posições sociais e económicas. Estes pressupostos simplistas são enganadores e não reflectem adequadamente os processos subjectivos de decisão dos refugiados e a complexidade dos processos de (re)integração. Para compreender se a falta de segurança humana em Kismayo impede uma (re)integração sustentável dos retornados, foi realizado um inquérito e entrevistas semi-estruturadas tendo como interlocutores refugiados/regressados e staff humanitário. Os inquiridos incluíam representantes governamentais, a comunidade internacional e os próprios repatriados. Foram examinados cinco aspectos da segurança humana (educação, economia, ambiente, alimentação e água, e segurança comunitária), bem como as motivações individuais dos regressados. Este documento analisa os desafios da (re)integração a partir de um quadro teórico mais amplo, constatando que as condições em Kismayo não são actualmente as mais propícias ao retorno em grande escala.

Palavras- chave: Dadaab, Soluções Duradouras, Quénia, Crise de Refugiados, Repatriamento, UNHCR

## **Abstract**

Southern Somalia is currently facing a massive influx of returning refugees, particularly from the Dadaab refugee complex in Northern Kenya. The majority settle in the war-torn city of Kismayo, which significantly increases the demand for goods and access to basic services. Based on research conducted in Kenya between February and March 2020 in cooperation with GIZ, this study examines the status of social and economic (re)integration of returnees in Kismayo while identifying key challenges. Although voluntary repatriation of refugees to their country of origin is proclaimed by UNHCR and host countries as the preferred durable solution to the “refugee crisis” questions of return and (re)integration remain an area of scarce research. Return is associated with “homecoming”, a supposedly uncomplicated event that re-creates a shattered natural bond between returnees and their former social and economic roles and territories. Such simplistic assumptions are misleading and do not adequately reflect the subjective decision-making processes of refugees and the complexity of (re)integration processes. To test the hypothesis that a lack of human security in Kismayo prevents a sustainable (re-)integration of returnees, a survey and semi-structured interviews were conducted. The respondents included governmental representatives, the international community, and returnees themselves. Not only five aspects of human security (education, economy, environment, food and water, and community security) but also individual motivations of returnees were examined. This paper places the challenges of (re)integration into a larger theoretical framework, concluding that despite the efforts and best intentions, Kismayo does not yet offer the necessary conditions for large-scale return.

Keywords: Dadaab, Durable Solutions, Kenya, Refugee Crisis, Refugee Return, Somalia

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## List of Abbreviations

AI	<i>Amnesty International</i>
BMZ	<i>German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</i>
DRC	<i>Democratic Republic of Congo</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
GIZ	<i>German Corporation for International Cooperation</i>
IC	<i>International Community</i>
ICU	<i>Islamic Courts Union</i>
IDP	<i>Internally Displaced Person</i>
IO	<i>International Organization</i>
NGO	<i>Non- Governmental Organization</i>
QIP	<i>Quick Impact Project</i>
SNM	<i>National Movement of Somalia</i>
SRP	<i>Somali Reintegration Programme</i>
UN	<i>United Nations</i>
UNHCR	<i>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</i>
USC	<i>United Somali Congress</i>
VR	<i>Voluntary Repatriation</i>

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## **Glossary of Key Concepts and Definitions<sup>1</sup>**

**Displaced Persons** refers to individuals or groups of individuals, including asylum-seekers, refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs), who are outside their homes or places of residence due to fear of persecution, conflict, or other circumstances that disturb public order (DRC et al., 2017).

**Durable Solutions** are a central element of the global refugee response and human rights-based governance, promoted by UNHCR (DRC, et al., 2017). They can be achieved „when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement” (IASC, 2010, p. 1). The three durable solutions are voluntary repatriation to the country of origin, local integration into the country of asylum, or resettlement in a third country (IASC, 2010).

**Economic Resources** constitute the factors that are used in the production of goods or the provision of services. They are, in other words, the inputs that are used to create things or help to provide services. Economic resources can be classified into human resources like labor and management, and non-human resources like land, capital goods, financial resources, and technology (Grimsley & Chapel, n.d.).

**Fragile States** are regimes that „lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home or abroad“ (CIFP, 2006). The Fragile States Index is an annual ranking that has been published since 2005 by the US Fund for Peace in the American journal Foreign Policy.

**Host Community** is the municipality in which displaced persons settle (Blay & Crozet, 2017, p. I).

**Internally Displaced Persons** (IDPs) are „persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an international border” (Blay & Crozet, 2017, p. I).

**Livelihood** „comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social) and activities required for a means of living. [...]. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks (drought, flood, war, etc.), maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base” (Carney, 1998, p. 5).

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<sup>1</sup> These key concepts and definitions are drawn from the official definitions of terms used in several recognized sources (including UNHCR, World Bank, UNDP, and other legal documents and international frameworks)

**Non-refoulement** is a key element of refugee protection. Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention states „no contracting State shall expel or return, in any manner whatsoever, a refugee to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion” (UN General Assembly, 1951). **1951 Convention** refers to the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

**Peace** is understood according to Galtung (1969), distinguishing between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace. ‘Positive’ peace refers to the simultaneous existence of desirable mindsets and social conditions such as harmony, justice, equality, etc. ‘Negative’ peace signifies the ‘absence of war’ (p. 183).

**Refugee** is defined as a person who,

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his (or her) nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself (or herself) of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his (or her) former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UN General Assembly, 1951, Article 1A(2)).

**Returnees** are former refugees who return to their countries of origin, either spontaneously or in an organized form (UNHCR, 2005).

**State** refers to a political entity that has a recognized territory, a population that considers itself belonging to the state, and government institutions that are sovereign within that state (Goodson, 2001).

**Stayees** refers to the host community, to the people who remained in the region during conflict.

**Sustainable (Re)Integration** - There is no universal definition of the term “(re)integration”. It is the act or process of the re-inclusion of someone back into society. UNHCR defines (re)integration as

the ability of returning refugees to secure the political, economic, (legal) and social conditions needed to maintain life, livelihood and dignity, (and) a process that should result in the disappearance of differences in legal rights and duties and the equal access of returnees to services, assets and opportunities (2004a).

**Voluntary Repatriation** is the return of refugees to their country of origin based on their genuinely free decision. The main condition for voluntary repatriation is the counterpart to the principle of non-refoulement. Facilitating voluntary repatriation is a basic mission of the UNHCR (DRC et al., 2019).



Figure 0.1 Map of Somalia  
Source: United Nations, 2011



## 1. Introduction

Waris<sup>2</sup> fled Somalia in 1991 when the civil war broke out. The state collapsed and the war raged in her hometown Kismayo. The then 16-year-old moved with her family to the refugee complex Dadaab in Northern Kenya, where she remained for 24 years. „You know, we got used to life in the refugee camp. In Dadaab we have built a new life for ourselves. I met my husband and I gave birth to my 16 children” (Interviewee A). Since 2015 Waris and her family live again in Kismayo.

I do feel happy to be back. [...]. However, I imagined coming home differently. I always thought that I would return when things developed positively. But there are still many problems here. Nevertheless, we have to do what we have to do, as this is our country (Interviewee A).

Waris is one of over 90.000 Somalian<sup>3</sup> refugees who have returned to their country of origin between 2014 and 2019 (UNHCR, 2019a), making it the third-largest repatriation process worldwide<sup>4</sup> (Amnesty International, 2017). Civil Wars such as those in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria are triggers for massive refugee movements, where millions of refugees find themselves in protracted situations, i.e. their displacement lasts five consecutive years or more. At the end of 2018, almost 70.8 million people worldwide were on the move, with 78% in protracted situations (UNHCR, 2018). This piece explores the challenges of sustainable (re)integration<sup>5</sup> of returning refugees in Southern Somalia. It was conducted with the support of the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), which operates on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

Currently, the favored “durable solution” advocated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and governments to counteract forced displacement is Voluntary Repatriation (VR) or, in other words, ‘going home’. From the late 1980s onwards, priority was given to the return and (re)-integration of refugees and IDPs over local integration and resettlement measures in the host countries. However, the growing emphasis on repatriation as a policy has not been accompanied by an increase in voluntary, safe, and dignified returns. Scholars, practitioners and human rights organizations have noted how the return of refugees is often carried out in unstable and war-like situations (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018) or „in a trajectory of overall post-conflict recovery” (Harild, Christensen & Zetter, 2015, p. ix) and does not always preserve the voluntary nature. Peace is often fragile, security is vulnerable, and the economy and infrastructure of the country to which the refugees return are devastated (Stein & Cuny, 1994). Although the hostilities may have ended, society is often left in chaos and wounds still need to be healed (Ogata, 1997).

Repatriation is often understood as the solution and endpoint of the refugee crisis (Schwartz, 2019). However, as the repatriation of displaced persons to Somalia reveals, the return cannot simply be

---

<sup>2</sup> Name changed

<sup>3</sup> This paper uses the term “Somalian” instead of “Somali” as “Somali” only recognizes the ethnic Somalis and thus excludes minorities such as Arabs or Bantu born in Somalia.

<sup>4</sup> After the repatriation of Afghans and Sudanese

<sup>5</sup> Here the word “(re)integration” is applied in place of “reintegration” to stress that when individuals come back to their country of origin, they may settle in a region they are not familiar with.

understood as “homecoming”, nor as „an event with an end-state” (Harild et al., 2015, p. 29). Instead, it is a complex and long-lasting process that raises many challenges. Once the physical return movement is completed, the challenge for the receiving community and local authorities is to ensure a sustainable (re)integration of the newcomers. While the return of refugees is often seen as an indicator of post-war stability, the lack of integration of returnees combined with the challenges of the post-war period can also contribute to the resurgence of old conflicts, social tensions, or the emergence of new violence outbreaks<sup>6</sup> (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). And yet, there is little monitoring after most exercises of repatriation, a gap that this research tries to shed light on. The prevailing reality of protracted conflicts and persistent refugee situations in sub-Saharan Africa sets a particular environment for return. Violence and displacement processes in this region tend to remain part of people's lives even after they have returned “home” (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). One example of how return can hardly be seen as an „end of the refugee cycle” (Black & Koser, 1999). Recognizing the complex reality of repatriation, this paper focuses on the challenges, but also the possibilities of a sustainable (re)integration of returning refugees into fragile environments, on a case study of Kismayo in South Somalia.

### **1.1 A Glimpse into Somalia’s Clan Politics, History, and Migration Movements**

The Federal Republic of Somalia has been portrayed in ancient Egyptian texts as “the land of the punt”, i.e. “the land of the gods”, a region rich in resources and a source of wealth and luxury (Mark, 2011). Today the country is described as the world’s longest failed state (Hammond, 2013) marked by years of total state collapse, lawlessness, chronic insecurity, massive displacement, and recurring humanitarian crises (Menkhaus, 2009). Somalia has a long history of migration and the interaction of conflict and displacement has experienced different phases, and developments (Hammond, 2014). To better grasp this research, a digression is first given on the history of the country, it’s clan politics, relevant migration movements, the Kismayo region, and Kenya as the main receiving country for Somalian refugees.

#### *Historical Background and Clan Politics*

Although the history of Somalia does not fall within the scope of this work, it is an essential part of understanding the country's experiences of war, displacement, and (re)integration. As the majority of the displaced left Somalia when the civil war broke out in 1988<sup>7</sup> (Moret, 2006), this chapter will, after a brief description of the colonization and the post-colonial period, mainly focus on the years after 1988.

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<sup>6</sup> Examples of hostilities and conflicts after return migration can be found in Iraq and South Sudan. The government of Iraq pressured refugees and IDPs to return to their homes after years of displacement. Those returning families often faced a violent backlash from those left behind (Schwartz, 2019). The UNHCR describes this return movement as “unsuccessful circular repatriation” in which 24 % of the people had to flee again after their return to Iraq (Riiskjaer & Nielsson, 2008). In Southern Sudan, when tens of thousands of refugees and IDPs returned in anticipation of independence in 2011, tensions arose between those who had lived as IDPs in Khartoum, those who had been refugees in East Africa, and those who had stayed in South Sudan in the course of the war (Schwartz, 2019).

<sup>7</sup> starting at the end of 1988 in the North (Somaliland) and from 1991 in the rest of the country

During the second half of the 19th century, French groups conquered the territory of today's Djibouti and declared it as "French Somaliland", Great Britain colonized the northern coastal area of today's Somalia (British Somaliland) and the Italians the Southern part of the coast at the Indian Ocean (Italian Somaliland) (Sosinski, 2014). After British Somaliland achieved independence on June 26, 1960, and Italian Somaliland on July 1, 1960, the two independent territories united to establish the state of Somalia (Gundel, 2002). After nine years of independence and democracy, a bloodless coup d'état by the military took place in the 1969 parliamentary elections. A dictatorship was established, and General Mohammed Siad Barre became the head of state. He ended the pro-Western attitude of his predecessor and took a socialist course with close ties to the Soviet Union (USSR) and the Arab states. The democratic constitution was repealed, and a revolutionary council was formed. With the support of the USSR, Barre promised to preserve democracy and eliminate corruption and clannism (Gundel, 2002).

The clan system plays an important role in the culture and politics of Somalia and the surrounding Somalian areas as an organizational form of society. Due to their patrilineal lineage, every Somali belongs to a clan. Clan families<sup>8</sup> share common origins and are linked by complex networks of social relationships that span clan territories with fluid borders inside the national territory (Ssereo, 2003). Typically, these clans are divided into sub-clans, sub-clans are divided into even smaller sub-clans, and so on, down to the core family (Lewis, 1999). Nomadic clans consider themselves superior to the settled agricultural clans and to various ethnic minorities in Southern Somalia. However, members of all majority clans can be considered as minorities if they live in an area inhabited mainly by other majority clans (UKHO, 2017). As in many multi-ethnic societies in Africa, each clan had its leaders, the land is shared property, and its administration is connected with the concept of power, religion, and clan (Ssereo, 2003). As we will see, clan politics can have implications for the (re)integration experiences of returning Somalian refugees into the host societies.

In 1977 Barre led the Ogaden<sup>9</sup> war against Ethiopia, which Somalia lost. As the Soviet Union supported Ethiopia, Barre switched from the side of the USSR to the side of the USA. This conflict sparked a massive movement of Ogaden refugees from Ethiopia to Somalia (Gundel, 2002), where Somalia itself became an important receiving country for refugees. With an estimated 650,000 displaced (Hammond, 2014) settling there, every sixth person in Somalia was registered as a refugee (Gundel, 2002). In the 1980s, discontent increased, and Barre's government became more corrupt and repressive. This led to armed unrest between individual clans such as the Islamic "National Movement of Somalia" (SNM), which represents the Isaaq clan, the "Somalia Patriotic Movement", from the Darod clan, and the "United Somali Congress" (USC) of the Hawiye clan as well as the Barre regime. In 1991, the Barre regime was overthrown, while the SNM launched an offensive in the northwest that led to the self-

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<sup>8</sup> There is a total of four majority clans in Somalia - the Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq, and Dir - which are mainly and most characteristically pastoral nomads (Lewis, 1999). Two other clans, the Digil and Rahanwiin, are positioned between the majority clans and the minority groups. The minority groups are composed of ethnic and religious minorities as well as professional/outside caste groups (UKHO, 2017).

<sup>9</sup> i.e the region between both countries

proclaimed independent Republic of Somaliland<sup>10</sup>. Due to the differences between the individual groups, the formation of a common central government failed, the state collapsed, and the civil war continued (Ssereo, 2003). Renewed peace negotiations were held in May 2000 on the initiative of the President of Djibouti and the United Nations (UN). The involved parties of the civil war agreed on the establishment of a transitional government and the formation of a parliament. In August 2000, Prime minister Abdulkassim Salad Hassan was elected as President of Somalia. In his inaugural speech, he announced to combine Islam, a market economy, and democracy (Jalata, 2004).

Ssereo (2003) argues that „the post-independence processes of modernization greatly changed the traditional concept of land and power” (p. 26). He claims that in modern Somalia the clan system and modern forms of political and social governance coexist. While maintaining the cultural and social status of clan elders, the traditional clan structures that served as frameworks for identity, dispute and conflict resolution, and community security have been replaced by a national judicial and constitutional system (Ssereo, 2003). In 2000, the Transitional Government introduced the so-called “4.5 formula”<sup>11</sup> to ensure that each of the four main clans is equally represented in the government (Jama, 2018).

The “Islamic Courts Union” (ICU), conquered the capital Mogadishu in 2006 and other parts of the country and enforced a system based on the Sharia. After declaring jihad against neighboring Ethiopia, Ethiopia declared war on the ICU and invaded Somalia, with the result that parts of Mogadishu soon fell back into the hands of the transitional government. The follow-up organization of the ICU, Al-Shabaab, took large parts of Southern and Central Somalia under its control. Kismayo was captured in 2008 and reconquered after four years following a three-day battle between the Kenyan armed forces and Somali groups against the terrorist militia (Dagne, 2010). After more than 20 years without a central government, a new national government led by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmud was formed in September 2012. Five years later, in 2017, a new president was democratically elected- the Somali-American Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo (Onyulo, 2017).

Yet, to this day the Somali government does not have control over the entire country. While they are in charge of the major urban centers of Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa, large parts of Southern and Central Somalia are still in the hands of Al-Shabaab. Although there has been some progress in security and development in recent years, the lack of state control over large parts of Somali territory has allowed persistent violations of international human rights and humanitarian law to go unpunished. In 2016 and 2017, the ongoing conflicts between AMISOM-supported government troops, clan militias, and Al-Shabaab continued in large parts of the country. This violence included serious human rights violations, e.g. conflict-related sexual violence, abduction, and execution of children, as well as threats to freedom of expression (UN Security Council, 2017). It thus becomes clear that on the one hand,

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<sup>10</sup> Until today, this republic has not been internationally recognized.

<sup>11</sup> The “0.5” is intended to include all groups that are not part of the main clans, i.e. minorities, women, civil society, and other groups (Gundel, 2009). This formula, however, is highly controversial as the allocation of 0.5 to the “small clans” reflects the general treatment given to the members of these clans in all areas of life. Members of 0.5 are often discriminated against, disadvantaged, and marginalized (Jama, 2018).

Somalia has a complicated internal balance of power, which is partially due to the clan system that is deeply rooted in the culture, and often leads to fights between the different groups. On the other hand, the country is geostrategically very important, and so in and around Somalia are regional players, but also major powers such as the USA, China, and Turkey (Bröckelmann- Simon, 2020). These aspects indicate that peacebuilding operations are a challenge from both a domestic and a foreign policy perspective.

### *Migration, Flight and Displacement*

With the beginning of the uprisings against the dictatorship of Siad Barre, the number of Somalians who were internally displaced or fled the country increased dramatically (Stone, 2020). The proportion of people born in Somalia but living outside the country doubled between 1990 and 2015, with an increase of 136 % (Connor & Krogstad, 2016). Today, Somali refugees and asylum seekers are among the largest refugee populations in the world, and the Somali diaspora is widely dispersed (Moret, 2006). Appendix L shows the fluctuations in the total number of displaced persons from the mid-1980s until 2012. The graph illustrates a peak in both IDP and refugee flows in the early 1990s with an estimated 800,000 refugees and two million IDPs, whereby the collapse of the state, the beginning of the civil war, and the outbreak of a famine can be seen as causes. A second peak can be identified between 2007 and 2012, when the rise of Al Shabaab, escalated fighting and drought contributed to another plight and famine. The number of Somali refugees reached the one million mark for the first time in 2012 (Mahecic, 2012). The graph also shows periods of relative calm in which migration slowed down and return to some areas became possible (Hammond, 2014).

Somalia is considered „a truly globalized nation” (Sheikh & Healy 2009, p. 6), with over 1 million Somalians living outside the country. Of these, 764,000 Somalians were refugees in 2019 (UNHCR, 2020), a decline since 2012. While some of the displaced spent most of the decades of civil war in neighboring countries such as Kenya, settling either with local communities or in the Dadaab or Kakuma refugee camps, others even left the African continent. The majority, however, stayed close to their homes and experienced waves of internal displacement and violence.

Kenya is the largest receiving country for Somali refugees and currently accommodates about 256,000 people. Before March 1991 Kenya hosted about 30,000 Somali refugees. Within a year after the outbreak of the civil war, the number rose to almost 300,000 (UNHCR, 2020). The figure further increased and reached its peak in 2013 with 492,000 Somali refugees in Kenya (ICMC, 2013). Yemen is the second-largest receiving country with about 254,000 Somali refugees, followed by Ethiopia with about 199,000 (UNHCR, 2020). Also, there were an estimated 2.6 million Somali IDPs in 2018, most of whom live in the capital Mogadishu (United Nations Humanitarian Country Team, 2018). Moreover, many Somalians moved to states with which they maintained colonial relations or to regions where they have traditional and historical employment opportunities (Gulf States) (Moret, 2006).

### *Somalian Refugees in Kenya*

Kenya signed the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol as well as the 1969 African Union Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. It acknowledges two types of refugees: *prima facie*<sup>12</sup> and statutory refugees. Somalians were considered *prima facie* refugees until April 2016 (Amnesty International, 2017). The prospects for the local integration of Somalian refugees in Kenya are limited. Kenya restricts refugees' access to employment as they do not receive work permits (ICMC, 2013). Also, the refugees are officially confined in camps, with no freedom of movement. The largest refugee camps in Kenya are Kakuma in the north of the country, on the border with South Sudan and Uganda, and the Dadaab complex about 100 km from the border with Somalia (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Dadaab was established in 1991 following the outbreak of the Somalian civil war. It consisted of five different camps – IFO, Dagahaley, Hagadera, Kambioos, and IFO 2. However, the latter two were closed in May 2018 (UNHCR, 2019b). Dadaab housed in 2012 almost half a million refugees, although it was originally intended to accommodate no more than 160,000 people. This number made it the largest refugee camp in the world, with an estimated 96 % of all refugees there being Somalians (ICMC, 2013) and 58 % being children (UNHCR, 2019b).

Montclos and Kagwanja (2000) argue that refugee camps can have the characteristics of a virtual city, given its population and demographic density. „Their layout, their concentration of infrastructures, their socio-occupational profile and the trading activities they have developed give them urban features” (p. 205). Through the years, Dadaab has developed into a virtual city and an important commercial center in northeastern Kenya. Many refugees find employment in large informal economies of the camp (Menkhaus, 2017) and the areas around Dadaab attract the surrounding population. An obvious factor of urbanization is the infrastructure built in the camps, which compared to the rest of the region offers better health facilities and a higher percentage of children in full-time education. Kenyans account for as much as one-third of the school population in the camps. Moreover, Dadaab offers permanent and free access to running water and electricity (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000).

In November 2013, the foreign ministries of Kenya and Somalia together with the UNHCR concluded a tripartite agreement governing the VR of Somalian refugees living in Kenya (UNHCR, 2013). This agreement was signed two months after an attack by Al-Shabaab on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, largely based on the assumption that Somalian Al-Shabaab fighters would use Dadaab as a basis for planning attacks in Kenya. In April 2015, another attack by the terrorist militia on the Garissa University College in Kenya took place, killing 147 Kenyans. Somalian refugees were made the scapegoat for the attacks (Amnesty International, 2017). It was argued that Dadaab posed a security risk as it was a haven and source of recruits for Al-Shabaab while conditions in Somalia no longer justify

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<sup>12</sup> A *prima facie* status covers groups and is generally determined by the circumstances in the country of origin.

That means that people are often granted refugee status based on their nationality and their entitlement is not determined individually (Amnesty International, 2017).

claims to Somalian refugee status<sup>13</sup> (Rift Valley Institute, 2015). In the aftermath of the attack, Kenya's Deputy President Ruto announced that Dadaab would be closed within three months, which at that time sheltered about 330,000 Somalians. The decision was strongly criticized internationally with references to Kenya's obligations as signatories to conventions for the protection of refugees. UNHCR outlined a range of approaches in Kenya and Somalia to enhance the process of *voluntary* return (UNHCR, 2015). As a result, the return rate has increased significantly, with more than 90,000 returnees between 2014 and 2019, as shown in Appendix M. And yet, those are the official figures for returnees supported by UNHCR, but the majority of returnees came to Somalia "spontaneously" and without the support of an aid agency (Interviewee 7). Accordingly, the population of Dadaab has been reduced by more than half since 2013, so that in July 2020 219,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers were living in Dadaab, with repatriation movements having a major impact. However, the camps in Dadaab are still open today, and the deadline for closing has been constantly extended (UNHCR, n.d.).

## 1.2 Case Study Kismayo: Problem Statement and Thematic Relevance

Kismayo is the capital of the autonomous region of Jubbaland in Southern Somalia. It is located about 200 km from the Kenyan border and 300 km from Dadaab<sup>14</sup> (GOS, IOM, & UN Habitat, 2017). Like most cities in the region, Kismayo has been devastated by years of civil war, recurring droughts, floods, severe famine, and the absence of a central government. Before the war, Kismayo was the economic center of South Somalia. Its international seaport has boosted exports in the region and economic development has attracted many people in search of employment. However, due to the war, the city has suffered considerable damage. Since 2012, the situation in Somalia has stabilized. Following the creation of the current state of Jubbaland, Kismayo has enjoyed relative stability. Combined with the city's economic potential, and strategic importance, since it is located halfway between the capital Mogadishu and near the Dadaab refugee camp, Kismayo is attractive to returning refugees (GOS et al., 2017). In fact, about 80% of returnees from Kenya settle there. The city's population has doubled in recent years, and returnees and IDPs now account for one-third of the population (Reichelt, 2019). Kismayo transformed from a city previously associated with destruction and displacement into a city associated with reconstruction and emplacement. However, peace initiatives do not necessarily lead to reconstruction, and neither does return necessarily lead to (re)integration (Kaun, 2008). In such challenging (post)- conflict environments, what does the concept of "(re)integration" mean and how can national and international actors support it best? Despite the awareness on part of donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governments that (re)integration can be „a powerful symbol for the end of conflicts" (Black & Gent, 2006, p. 31) and that it is a process that profoundly influences and changes entire societies in (post)- conflict environments (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018), there is

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<sup>13</sup> In fact, refugee camps are used in several cases as recruitment sites for terrorists. Examples include the recruitment of child soldiers from Syrian refugee camps in Jordan (Sommerfelt & Taylor, 2015) or Sudanese in the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya (Jansen, 2018).

<sup>14</sup> Maps can be found in Figure 0.1 and in Appendix H.

still a limited understanding of it. Until today there is a lack of knowledge about „the lived experiences of those who returned and/or stayed behind, the longer-term dynamics of return, and about the position of returnees in (re)constituting societies” (Kaun, 2008, p. 36). Several scholars agreed with this reality, such as Bascom arguing that „what is being promoted as the most desirable solution to the refugee crisis is a poorly understood social and spatial phenomenon” (1994, cited in Chimni, 2004, p. 59). Accordingly, an in-depth analysis of the issues is crucial, since return and (re)integration is not just a simple “homecoming” but involves various challenges that need to be addressed correspondingly. In (post)-war society, the (re)integration of returnees can be difficult both due to the lack of basic infrastructure and the lack of livelihoods (Maniraguha, 2011). Case studies reveal that the challenges of the post-war period combined with the influx of many returnees can contribute to the resurgence of violence and conflict. Arowolo (2000) explains „failure to achieve reintegration soon after return may lead again to internal strife, political agitation and civil war, with its predictable negative consequences on the economy and society” (p. 65-66). At the same time, refugee return is widely portrayed as crucial for peacebuilding and national reconciliation, for the promotion of state stability and legitimacy as well as for (post)-conflict economic development (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). To reduce the potential threat to stability posed by poor (re)integration of returnees, it is important to understand the challenges that: (1) returnees face upon arrival and (re)integrating into the fragile environment and, (2) the challenges that the HC and state authorities face when receiving a large number of people (Maniraguha, 2011). While it is generally acknowledged that the return of refugees can be beneficial to the development of the countries of origin (Kaun 2008), it is likely to be so under certain circumstances. Return itself is not enough to promote peace or the economy, rather (re)integration has to be “successful”, sustainable, and take place under certain conditions (Black & Gent, 2006). Kismayo’s years of civil war mean that resources are scarce, the infrastructure is weak and so are basic services. The influx of large numbers of people combined with the city’s limited resources may lead to tensions between the HC of Kismayo and returnees and IDPs. On the other hand, rapid population growth could boost the region’s economy and thus contribute to the reconstruction and development of Kismayo. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, there is little research on this return practice available, and there is no significant assessment of the “success” or the problems it has created. Thus, there is an urgent demand for studies that address (re)integration through links of specific challenges in particular historical and contemporary conflict contexts (Maniraguha, 2011). A gap, which my research intends to address.

### **1.3 Research Questions, Hypothesis, and Objectives**

The large-scale return of Somalians to Kismayo has put the new government and the state administration of Jubbaland under considerable pressure, combined with difficulties in managing the distribution of goods to the citizens. To respond to the potential threat to stability posed by the arrival of the many returnees in Kismayo, but also to adequately address the possibilities that a sustainable (re)integration of returnees could offer, it is important to identify the key challenges returnees have to face while

(re)integrating into the city. The aim is therefore to determine the current conditions for (re)integrating returnees in Kismayo and to identify which aspects need improvement. Therefore, a contextualized and evidence-based analysis of the various factors that shape displacement, return, and (re)integration in Kismayo will be carried out (Sturridge, Bakewell Hammond, 2018). The research objectives are:

1. To investigate the status quo of social and economic (re)integration practice in Kismayo.
2. To identify the main challenges that returnees face when (re)integrating into Kismayo.
3. To study how (re)integration is implemented by UNHCR, GIZ, and national actors and to what extent these challenges are addressed by them.
4. To analyze individual perceptions about the current state of (re)integration of returnees, the IC, and Kismayo administrations.
5. To investigate to what extent the challenges of (re)integration differed between the returnees who received support and those who returned without support.
6. To examine whether and why the return of refugees to Kismayo was influenced by pressure from the Kenyan government and/or UNHCR.
7. To assess whether the conditions and circumstances faced by returnees in Kismayo are in line with international refugee and human rights laws and standards.

In the following overview the research questions and hypotheses are presented.

<b>Research Phenomenom</b>	The challenges of a sustainable (re)integration of returning Somalian refugees into Kismayo.	
<b>Gap</b>	Research and literature gaps in monitoring, methodology and trend analysis mechanisms that undermine the understanding and awareness regarding the fate of returnees and what kind of support might be most beneficial for their (re)integration in Kismayo.	
<b>Research Questions</b>	<b>Qi<sub>1</sub></b>	What are the main challenges returnees have to face while (re)integrating into Kismayo?
	<b>Qi<sub>2</sub></b>	What is the state of social and economic (re)integration into Kismayo?
<b>Explanatory Hypotheses</b>	<b>Hypotheses A</b>	The authorities in Kismayo are dependent on the help of the IC in facilitating (re)integration.
	<b>Hypotheses B</b>	The lack of human security in Kismayo prevents a sustainable (re)integration of the returnees.

This piece provides a basis for further research, e.g. for a doctoral thesis. By identifying and investigating the various challenges of (re)integration in Kismayo, approaches are provided to specifically address these challenges. While the results of this study and the application of the (re)integration framework will need to be further tested and adapted in future research (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015), this study may assist in developing an approach to implement sustainable return and (re)integration in Somalia.

## **1.4 Methodology**

Migration research must conform to academic standards, with (1) clear and relevant concepts, (2) data collected in a transparent, careful, and ethical manner, using (3) methods that reflect the complex reality of migrants (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). This subchapter aims to explain the methodology applied in this research, including the limitations and ethical considerations that were considered.

### **1.4.1 Data Collection and Research Design**

This research was realized with the support of GIZ, which supports the (re)integration of returnees and IDPs with various projects in Southern Somalia. The projects are coordinated by GIZ in Kismayo and supported by GIZ in Nairobi. Ms. Reichelt, the head of the GIZ projects, allowed me to conduct research in Nairobi between February and March 2020, thereby providing me with relevant data and contacts. I was mainly involved in the “Somali Reintegration Programme” (SRP), that focuses primarily on strengthening the voluntary return of refugees through a community-based approach for (re)integrating into Kismayo. Yet, this research was conducted by me and not influenced by GIZ in any way.

In investigating the (re)integration practices of returnees in Kismayo, an in-depth case study research was adopted. Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that case study research is „a necessary and sufficient method for certain important research tasks in the social sciences“ (p. 241). The strength of large samples is in breadth, while their weakness is in depth. In case studies, the situation is the opposite, however, either approach is crucial for a solid development of social sciences. In this context, Kuhn (1987) states that „a discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and that a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one“ (cited in Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 242). To do justice to the complex and multidimensional nature of current (re)integration practices in Somalia, a “triangulation of methods” was employed. Since the application of mixed methods provides broader and deeper information on the topic (Vargas- Silva, 2012), I have used both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect data through in-depth interviews, a survey and the review of policy documents as well as secondary literature such as academic journals and books. The target group consists of full-aged Somalians who have been forced to live in exile for at least two years and are now living in Kismayo since at least two years. The study included informants from the regional state of south Somalia, namely the Refugee Commission as well as the Governor and Planning

Minister of Jubbaland. Also, informants from the IC were interviewed, i. e. UNHCR and GIZ employees involved in the repatriation of Somalian refugees.<sup>15</sup>

I have adopted a comparative analysis, which refers to „the method of comparing different societies, groups or social institutions within the same society or between societies to show whether and why they are similar or different in certain aspects” (Scert Kerala, 2015, p. 14). Therefore, I divided the returnees into two groups: on the one hand returnees who came to Kismayo with the support of UNHCR, and on the other hand returnees who arrived in Kismayo “spontaneously” without any assistance. This division allowed me to investigate the influence of the IC on the (re)integration experiences of the returnees. The study is guided by two main approaches: a narrow approach, based on the individual experience of the returnee, examining the ‘status quo’ of the return and on the other hand, a broad approach, which linked the (re)integration of returnees with broader issues (Maniraguha, 2011). The latter includes questions on the possibilities of (re)integrating returnees with the economic reconstruction of Kismayo, peacebuilding in Jubbaland, compliance with international refugee and human rights law, as well as the management of socio-economic problems in Somalia as a failed state. The challenge of finding a suitable theoretical framework to collect and analyze data on (re)integration practices in Kismayo in a consolidated and coherent way was found in Kaun's (Re)integration theory (2008). Thereby, this study sets the challenges of (re)integrating returning refugees into a broader theoretical framework, proposing that the process depends on both institutional and individual factors (Kaun, 2008)<sup>16</sup>.

### *Interviews*

The selection of the right interview technique depends on the type of information required, corresponding to the research plan and objectives. This consideration is especially relevant when dealing with a population in sensitive circumstances. In-depth interviews are sensitive and person-oriented and enable the interviewees to construct their experience accounts by describing and explaining their lives in their own words. Due to the lack of knowledge about the experiences of returnees from Kenya to Kismayo, semi- structured in-depth interviews were employed, allowing to set a general direction while ensuring flexibility. Open-ended questions were chosen to enable respondents to fully share their experiences, while taking into account both the specific circumstances and the spatial situation of the respondent (Vargas- Silva, 2012). To compile the key questions of the interviews<sup>17</sup>, I have drawn on other studies with similar topics (e.g. Kaun 2008). Accordingly, I made sure to cover the institutional aspects of human security on the one hand, as well as the individual motivations of the returnees on the other. Another significant reference was the key variables that influence the sustainability of return, which were researched by the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance and published by IOM 2015<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> An overview of all participants of the study can be found in Appendix A

<sup>16</sup> A more detailed explanation of the theory is provided in Chapter 3.

<sup>17</sup> The questionnaires can be found in the Appendices C, D, E, F.

<sup>18</sup> These variables are listed in the Appendix I.

I used a non-probability method when recruiting participants, where I purposively sampled returnees depending on their legal age, length of exile, and length of time they lived in Kismayo. The informants of the IC, Somalian authorities, and Government were selected according to their field of work and experience with the (re)integration of returnees into Kismayo. Since I did not have the necessary information to locate the members of my target population, I used the snowball sampling method to recruit participants, a widely used technique in qualitative sociological research (Vargas- Silva, 2012). My first contact was Ms. Reichelt and accordingly the GIZ project in Nairobi. With their help I got in touch with UNHCR, the Governor and the Planning Minister of Jubbaland, the Refugee Commission as well as with returnees, who went back to Somalia with the assistance of the UNHCR. The Refugee Commission provided me with contacts of “spontaneous” returnees. Besides, I obtained several phone numbers of returnees in Kismayo from UNHCR. I conducted a total of 17 in-depth, semi-structured interviews. These included four informational interviews with relevant members of the IC (GIZ and UNHCR), three interviews with Somali authorities and government officials as well as 10 interviews with returnees in Kismayo<sup>19</sup>.

As a trip to Kismayo was not possible for me, all interviews with the returnees were conducted via telephone. To ensure linguistic equivalence, the interviews with the returnees were performed with the help of Mrs. Warsame, a GIZ staff member who is a native speaker of English and Somali and assisted as a translator. Mrs. Warsame mainly conducted the interviews with the help of a prior briefing from me and the interview guide I developed. They lasted between 15 and 30 minutes. The remaining interviews with the informants were either conducted one-on-one via telephone, Skype or face to face and lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. All interviews with the informants were held by me in English, except the interview with Ms. Reichelt, which was conducted in German. After approval, each interview was recorded with a recording device.

### *Survey*

Surveys are an „effective method for studies of the complex processes that underlie spatial mobility” (Fawcett & Arnold, 1987, p. 1523) and are often employed as a principal method of data collection in contemporary international migration studies. A survey can be tailored specifically to a certain research objective and offers flexibility in adapting the research process to the research objectives (Fawcett & Arnold, 1987). Based on the results of the interviews already conducted, I customized the questions of the survey to further pursue my research goal. The survey was distributed to 16 further Somalian returnees in Kismayo between April and May 2020 and contained 39 carefully selected open qualitative and closed quantitative questions<sup>20</sup>. The questionnaire was designed similarly to the interview questions and covered variables that may affect the sustainability of return such as age, gender, profession, marital status, and the number of children. It included the experiences before, during,

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<sup>19</sup> For more detailed Information, see list of participants in Appendix A.

<sup>20</sup> The questionnaire can be found in the Appendix B.

and after the migration process. The main focus, however, according to the research objectives, remained on the experiences after the return and the current state of life in Kismayo.

The questionnaire starts with 17 quantitative yes and no questions. I decided to use this questioning technique as I intended to determine quantities, frequencies, and statistical correlations between the answers of the different returnees. After that, the process continued with partly quantitative closed and partly qualitative open questions. The qualitative, open questions are less structured and were used to obtain in-depth information on the mindsets and motivations of the returnees. Accordingly, the open questions gave me a more comprehensive understanding of the problems from an individual perspective. At the end of the survey is a table, which was created based on the results of the interviews. I have listed 15 challenges that were mentioned to me by returnees and informants with which the returnees might be confronted during (re)integrating into Kismayo. I invited the respondents to select the three challenges that most affected them personally from the list and to sort them according to their urgency. This allowed me to determine which challenges were most frequently cited as the most significant by the returnees. The questionnaire was initially composed in English and then translated into the Somali language with the help of the translator. To avoid a possible incorrect translation, I had it translated back into English by native speakers who had not been involved in the project before. The translator was requested to inform me about any differences between the translations and correct them. Since I could not travel to Somalia personally, I sent the survey to the Refugee Commission in Kismayo, which in turn distributed the survey randomly to local returnees in the IDP and returnee camps of the city. Accordingly, all respondents were selected by the Jubbaland Refugee commission, which is a big limitation. As in the interviews, I divided the returnees into two groups. I had eight questionnaires distributed to returnees who received support from UNHCR and eight to self-settled returnees.

#### **1.4.2 Data Analysis**

##### *Interviews*

Qualitative information must be evaluated by building up thematic groups to answer the research questions. Therefore, I used tape recordings of the interviews to extract relevant details and salient topics that are of significant importance for the analysis. First, I transcribed the interviews and evaluated the information they contained to develop a content analysis of the perceptions of the individual respondents. Second, I coded the transcribed texts from the interviews and classified this information. This enabled me to put the raw data obtained from the interviews into a standardized format that facilitates their understanding and analysis. The categories in which I have classified the obtained data are adopted from Kaun's (re)integration theory, namely the five aspects of human security<sup>21</sup> I have

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<sup>21</sup> I have not, like Kaun, addressed each of the eight aspects of human security, but only the five mentioned.

It was decided not to cover health-, personal- and political security aspects, not only due to data protection but also because this information is highly sensitive, and the interviews and surveys were often arranged by third parties such as the GIZ of the Refugee Commission in Kismayo.

selected: education-, economy-, community-, environment-, food security as well as the individual motivations. Finally, I have identified several patterns among the codes to delineate the most important issues. This has allowed me to gain a broad and clear understanding of the respondents' narratives and hence of the problem under investigation (Vargas- Silva, 2012).

### *Survey*

Although the survey contains both closed quantitative and open qualitative questions, I analyzed the answers qualitatively. The procedure of the survey analysis was similar to that of the interviews. I classified the different questions and answers of the individual respondents into the already defined categories (human security, individual motivations) and identified patterns between the different answers and aspects. I investigated the quantitative answers of the returnees according to quantities, frequencies and statistical correlations and then interpreted them qualitatively. I used secondary sources in addition to available primary literature for the analysis, which provided a basis for comparison.

### **1.4.3 Ethical Considerations and Limitations of the Study**

#### *Ethical Considerations*

Some several ethical principles and guidelines should be respected when researching with participants that may be traumatized and vulnerable. In theory, these principles emphasize the need to (1) do good (beneficence) as well as (2) do no harm. In practice, this means that the researcher is obliged to comply with these guidelines during data collection, data analysis, and subsequent data storage after the research. Before data collection, I provided the research participants with a detailed description of the information, outlining the objectives and methods of the research and disclosing possible risks (Mackenzie, McDowell, & Pittaway, 2007). Therefore, the participants of the surveys received a written explanation of the information, while the participants of the interviews obtained it either in written or oral form, depending on whether the interview was conducted in person or by telephone. The participants were advised of their basic right to voluntarily, protection and anonymity of their data. I clarified that the collected data will be treated strictly confidential and will only be used for research purposes (Krause, 2017). To avoid communication problems due to a language barrier, the returnees who did not speak English were instructed in the Somali language by Mrs. Warsame.

Frequently, the interests of the researchers are given priority over the well-being of “the researched”. Such power asymmetries reveal the dominance of scholars and contribute to an objectification of the participants, which is ethically questionable. A strict top-down power dynamic of researchers vis-à-vis “the researched” implies a risk of imposing and objectifying decisions and thus affecting the quality of research. To avoid a top-down performance dynamic between researcher and researched, I adopted a human rights-based perspective, regarding the interviewees as active subjects with rights and agency rather than research objects (Krause, 2017).

When dealing with a population of migrant minorities, the researcher should find the best way to approach potential respondents and formulate questions. This is crucial to the success of the overall study, as an inappropriate first approach could be perceived as interference or even as an insult, and thus jeopardize the interview process. Vargas Silva (2012) refers to the current social power arrangements based on the conditions of membership. In most places, some groups are denied full participation, which means inclusion and exclusion from society for the individual. That this is especially critical in the case of migrant minorities since they are particularly aware of this. Consequently, feelings of exclusion can be converted into mistrust, blocking the relationship between the researcher and the researched. Any intention to interview a migrant should be sensitive to this issue, as otherwise, it could harm the final results of the research (Vargas Silva, 2012). To avoid the risk, I have dealt with the issue in- depth beforehand. Through the GIZ and the Refugee Commission in Kismayo, I have received significant information about the circumstances regarding the returnee's daily life, which simplified the selection and formulation of appropriate questions.

Another important point when conducting research is the caution in collecting data with the help of third parties. Dependence on e.g. translators can be ethically problematic. Krause (2017) points out that all translations include a certain degree of interpretation of what is said, „and content can - (un)consciously or (un)intentionally - be lost” (p. 17). In the worst case, translators can violate confidentiality or be hostile to the views and interests of research participants (Mackenzie et al., 2007). Mrs. Warsame was carefully selected by Ms. Reichelt and me as a translator and had to adhere to the guidelines and principles of GIZ, rendering a breach of confidentiality less likely.

Ethical considerations are important throughout the entire research project, including the time afterwards, which is particularly evident in the possible consequences of non-anonymized data use. Since the participants may have provided sensitive information, the disclosure of their identity may put them in a vulnerable position (Hugman, Pittaway, & Bartolomei, 2011). Thus, I have not published any data and pictures without permission, as well as anonymized data to ensure the safety of the participants. I have stored the data securely and encrypted them with passwords. Besides, I have invited all participants of my study to receive my work and to provide them with feedback of my research results. It should be noted that there is no single, “best” way to guarantee that refugee-centered research is ethically and scientifically based and policy-oriented. A range of concerns was outlined here, but each academic discipline requires that knowledge production follows certain procedures and meets certain standards. There are strengths and weaknesses in each approach, depending on the research questions and the conditions under which they are to be studied (Jacobsen, 2003).

### *Limitations*

A limitation of a research design or instrument „is the systematic bias that the researcher did not or could not control and which could inappropriately affect the results” (Price & Murnan, 2004, p. 66). The first limitation, that occurred here is the lack of previous research studies on this topic. While there are considerable literature and studies on refugee return, there is a lack of studies on the sustainable

(re)integration of returnees in fragile states, including Somalia. Given that, to the best of my knowledge, there are hardly any published and well-established (re)integration theories of returnees, I was limited in the choice of suitable theories that I can use to investigate my research questions.

The second problem was my limited access to data and contacts, as I was not allowed to travel either to the Dadaab refugee camp or to Kismayo. The only direct contact I had with the returnees was over the phone, which has its limitations compared to personal interviews. Respondents who do not have a telephone or cannot be reached by telephone are excluded (Colombotos, 1969). Furthermore, telephone interviews tend to be shorter than personal interviews, which reduces in-depth conversations (Irvine, 2011). I was not able to observe the behavior and body language of the interviewees to gain insight into their thoughts during the interview process. It is also more difficult to develop personal rapport as there is no face-to-face interaction. The latter is particularly problematic when dealing with vulnerable people, as sensitive issues could be addressed, and it is more difficult to build a basis of trust over the phone.

The third limitation was the choice of the snowball technique as my sampling method. While snowball sampling has many advantages, there are also some known disadvantages associated with this method. If not handled very carefully, a snowball selection approach has a high risk of producing a biased sample. In contrast to a random sample, where everyone in the target population has the same chances of being chosen, in a snowball sample people are drawn from a particular segment of the community and are likely to be similar in some respects - e.g. share a social network or belong to the same religious group (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). In my study, the GIZ and the Refugee Commission in Kismayo were my first contacts, which accordingly had a great influence on the selection of participants for this study. This means that returnees who are not related to the GIZ or are not registered as returnees in the Refugee Commission in Kismayo were excluded. Thus, this research represents only a fraction of the local reality, as many returnees are informal. Since it is a nonprobability sampling method, all people who did not fit into my target group were excluded, i.e. there is no control group. Those are minors or returnees who have lived in Kismayo for less than two years or have been in exile for less than two years.

The outbreak of COVID-19 is the fourth important point to mention here. Due to the worldwide pandemic that also affected Somalia, I was not able to consult as many returnees in Kismayo as I intended. I planned to distribute 30 surveys via the Refugee Commission to the returnees on site. The Refugee Commission, however, urged me to reduce the number of respondents, as access to participants was limited due to the pandemic. Thus, the Refugee Commission only distributed seven surveys in Kismayo and gave me a list of phone numbers to conduct the remaining surveys via phone. With the help of my translator I did that with nine further returnees.

The fifth limitation was that the data collection was carried out with the help of Ms. Warsame as a translator. Since Ms. Warsame conducted the interviews in my presence, but only gave me the translations after the interviews were finished, I was not able to direct the conversation during the interview. Therefore, I was not in a position during the interview where I could ask the returnees about

certain answers in more detail or to steer the interview in a different direction. Also, Ms. Warsame gave me the translations often in summary form and not word for word.

Besides the translation problems during the interviews, there were also translation problems during the survey. Initially, I composed the questionnaire in English. The table of quantitative, closed questions contained five choices (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree), but these expressions do not exist in the Somali language, so I had to reduce the choices to yes and no.

Besides, several questions were not answered by respondents, which could be due to problems of comprehension. Also, the distribution of the survey in Kismayo meant that all returnees who are unable to read and write were excluded from participating in the study. To sum up this chapter, it can be said that some difficulties could have been mitigated or could have been predicted by a more elaborate preparation, while others were unpredicted, such as COVID- 19. Therefore, the results might be imperfect, but they are valuable, offer a good insight into the problem, and provide a useful basis for further research.

## **1.5 Thesis Outline**

After the introduction just given, chapter two presents relevant literature and research on refugee return and (re)integration in fragile states. This chapter is divided into four main topics, which correspond to the main research objectives of this work. The first section begins with an introduction to place the main debates within their historical context and within a developing international policy framework on return and the pursuit of “durable solutions”. Starting with the second section, the main topics that have emerged from the literature are discussed critically. An analysis of the academic literature on refugee return in (post-)conflict societies is made, including a discussion of the categorization of people as refugees together with the ideas of home for people on the move. The third section analyses how the links between return, (re)integration, and development are understood in the existing literature. It is discussed what sustainable (re)integration in fragile states means and how (re)integration can be made sustainable. In the fourth section, the role and approaches of the IC in the return and (re-)integration process of returnees to the HC are addressed. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the identified research gaps. Starting from chapter three the results of the study are presented. Based on five aspects of human security (educational-, economic-, environmental-, food and water-, as well as community security), the results are evaluated, followed by an analysis of the individual motivations of the returnees. Chapter four summarizes the results presented in chapter three. It discusses the research question by setting out what the main challenges for (re)integration in Kismayo are from different perspectives, and what the Somali authorities and IC are undertaking to address them. In the last chapter a discussion of the results follows, conclusions are drawn and areas for further research are suggested.

## 2. Going Home? Refugee Return and (Re)integration into Fragile Environments

This chapter is a literature review that serves to provide a critical overview and debate of academic and policy-oriented literature on return and (re)integration processes of refugees in fragile environments. It serves to inform and debate on the current state of the art on the topic and to identify knowledge and research gaps that will guide the overall research (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018).

### 2.1 Situating the Debates

#### *The refugee problem and the durable solutions*

The three solutions to the so-called “refugee crisis” proclaimed by the UN are (1) local integration of the refugee in the country of asylum, (2) resettlement in a third country, and (3) VR to the country of origin. The emphasis on the ideal solutions has changed several times throughout history, depending on the practicalities of each situation and the prevailing geopolitical circumstances (Takahashi, 1997). Until the 1990s, few researchers studied what happened when refugees decided to return to their country of origin. This general disinterest was mainly attributed to the international understanding of return in the context of the Cold War and as an uncomplicated process of “homecoming” (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). Yet, what exactly is the nature of the “refugee problem”, for which VR seems to be the ideal solution? Malkii (1995) explains, refugees constitute a “problem” as scholars consider the study of

diaspora, movement and displacement as a lens through which to examine the supposedly normal condition of being attached to a territorialized polity and an identifiable people. [...]. It is therefore useful to explicitly contextualize the study of refugees in this national order of things, instead of taking this order as a given (p. 516).

Bakewell (2002) shares this view by arguing that „the presence of refugees constitutes an aberration in the modern world, which is neatly partitioned into nation states where each individual must belong to one of these states” (p. 43). Moving from one country to another is regulated by immigration procedures that allow either temporary residence or the possibility of changing nationality, but only with the consent of the state to which the person is relocating. Refugees constitute an exception, as states that are party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention are obliged either to receive them or to negotiate their reception in a third country; they cannot send them back to their country of origin if they are subject of persecution. As a further aspect of the “refugee problem” Bakewell addresses the assumption that each person emotionally and administratively belongs to a particular place called home. He argues that when the conflict is over and the refugees have been able to settle under difficult conditions either temporarily in local communities or settlements, it is still believed that there is chronic suffering caused by exile from one's nation. Accordingly, there is an implicit notion that refugees have fled a home that is in a fixed geographical location to which they will remain drawn as refugees (Bakewell, 2002). Malkii (1992) argues that this perception leads to a peculiar sedentarism that is reflected in everyday language, in nationalist discourses and in scientific studies of nations, nationalism and refugees. „The sedentarist metaphysic embedded in the national order of things is at its most visible [in displacement]” (p. 31). She

further explains that the contrast between two terms: *transplantation* and *uprooting*, illustrates that displacement is governed by botanical thinking. The concept of transplantation generally evokes viable roots, embedded in an orderly manner in the “motherland”, the original culture- bed and their “acclimatization” in the “foreign environment”. Uprooting is the moral axis that has lasted longest in the problematization of refugees (Malkii, 1992). According to Clifford (1997) work on “traveling and dwelling”, living has to be re-conceived as long as travel as a cultural practice is predominant. “Dwelling” is no longer the soil from which travel begins and to which it returns, but rather involves intricate imaginations and practices. It is a localized practice in everyday, domestic life, while “traveling” creates a minimal yet continuous state (Clifford, 1997). As another aspect to the “refugee problem”, Bakewell (2002) addresses that refugees are often perceived as a threat to the local and national security of the societies in which they settle. Referring to Europe, he points out that the main concerns both then and now are increasing crime, and the impact of many unsettled people with nowhere to go. Besides the issues raised by Bakewell, other scholars such as Crisp (2004) and Chimni (2004) discuss the reluctance of host countries to receive large numbers of refugees, due to a perception that the wealthier members of the IC have not made sufficient commitments to burden-sharing. The unwillingness of the North to share the burden of the poor receiving states at the level of resources has led to refugees either having to be repatriate or falling under the sole responsibility of the receiving state. In fact, most of the host countries, which receive many refugees, are among the poorest in the world, e.g. Tanzania, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Bangladesh and Uganda (Chimni, 2004).

These observations remain up to date, if not worsen. A number of the problems just mentioned are also evident in the “European refugee crisis” of 2015/2016. Since the influx of more than one million asylum seekers and refugees, the 27 states of the European Union (EU) have been divided on how to handle the situation. There are considerable challenges in burden-sharing within the EU, with Italy and Greece overstretched and blaming the richer countries of the North for not acting adequately, and a number of Central and Eastern European countries openly opposing the idea of accepting a quota of refugees. The failure of a common EU migration policy is exemplified by the EU- Turkey agreement, which was concluded in 2016 to prevent or at least reduce the refugee movement to the EU. Another prime example is the refugee camp Moria on the Greek island of Lesbos, where at times more than 20,000 people are stranded in the overcrowded camp (BBC News, 2020b). As a matter of fact, it becomes clear that these refugees are seen as “uprooted” from their “motherland”, who now have to dwell in overcrowded camps to wait for asylum from a country willing to take on this “burden”. The high influx of refugees in Europe led to a split in society due to e.g. security concerns, the fear of being left behind and of foreign cultures. In Germany, e.g. the Islamophobic and xenophobic, right-wing populist organization PEGIDA was founded in 2014, organizing weekly demonstrations against the “Islamization” of Germany and Europe allegedly caused by the influx of Muslim refugees.

As a consequence of the factors mentioned, countries around the world have become reluctant to receive large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers. Scholars argue that countries are generally more

hesitant to take measures - such as promoting local integration or local settlement - that might imply a permanent or long-term presence of the displaced within their territory<sup>22</sup>. Consequently, VR is „seen as the ideal solution to the refugee problem as it brings the refugees back under the protection of the state of origin, it restores them to their homes and it relieves the burden on the host society” (Bakewell, 2002, p. 44). Thus, refugee problems - and the problems of refugees - are often solved by repatriation alone, although in the view of several scholars this may in reality not be enough (Crisp, 2004).

### *The evolution of voluntary repatriation as ‘the’ durable solution*

From the late 1980s onwards, scholarly interest in return processes grew steadily, firstly due to the increasing prioritization of VR rather than resettlement as the most preferred refugee solution by the IC, and secondly because a number of large-scale repatriation movements took place. Although VR has „not been examined in any depth by experts and scholars” (Coles, 1985), UNHCR declared the decade of the 1990s to be the decade of VR. In response to the change of policy by the IC and the subsequent large-scale refugee returns, it was argued that „it was not the sudden availability of scholarly studies which emboldened the organization to make such an announcement” (Chimni, 2004, p. 59). Harrell-Bond warned of this danger already several years earlier „there are no published research data which could be used to test the assumptions which govern current policies and practices of governments and international agencies” (1989, cited in Chimni, 2004). Advocates of VR simply assumed that all refugees wanted to return to their homes. It was believed that the simple return of people to their home countries and their social communities would solve all problems on its own and be sufficient to restore political stability and legitimacy, peace and thus an end to displacement (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018, p. 6). Yet, these assumptions were not treated as a “hypothesis to be tested”, but as a matter of fact. Chimni (2004) noted that those who faced the more difficult task of testing the hypothesis, however, concluded that there were numerous situations in which refugees did not want to return home. As an example, he cites time. Second generation refugees may not want to return to a home they have never been to and may know little about. He also addresses the meaning of home and the fact that exile has a profound effect on individuals and groups, so that the meaning of home often changes. Zieck (1997) argued that although it is „assumed that everyone wants to return to the country of origin, i.e. ‘home’, no attempt will be made to assess the validity of the assumption since it appears, in the absence of other options, to be largely irrelevant” (cited in Chimni, 2004).

In 1985, the UNHCR Executive Committee adopted Conclusion No. 40 on VR expanding the mandate to include returnees. In subsequent years, the share of repatriation operations in UNHCR's total budget expenditure rose accordingly, from 2 percent before 1984 to approximately 14 percent in the period 1990-1997. The extension of the mandate was necessary because, in addition to the growing role

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<sup>22</sup> However, other scholars, such as Hein de Haas and Fokkema (2011), actually suggest how counterintuitive and counterproductive current approaches towards socio- cultural integration on return migration intention can be. For more information see e.g. De Haas, H., & Fokkema, T. (2011). The effects of integration and transnational ties on international return migration intentions. *Demographic research*, 25, 755-782.

of VR, more and more people were returning to regions affected by conflict. In response to growing criticism of this alarming trend, UNHCR gradually increased its commitment to support and protect returnees (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). In the decade of VR, major return movement took place and around seven million refugees returned to their country of origin (Stein & Cuny, 1994).

Opinions on VR as a permanent solution differ widely. While Crisp (2004), criticizes the preference of VR over local integration and resettlement and Stein (1994) concludes that „repatriation is not a panacea” (p. 68), other scholars contradict the understanding of the ‘impossibility’ of return. Markowitz and Stefansson (2004), e.g., argue that „the blessings of homecoming can make it well worth the struggle” (p. 12) and Kibreab (2003) explains that the propensity of refugees to return depends on the relationship between access to or lack of access to civil rights in countries of asylum. The political environment and structural factors for refugees who find shelter in less developed countries form the counterpart of refugees in developed countries. As a result, millions of refugees in the South have ‘voted with their feet’ to regain their civil rights, which they lost in the context of displacement and could not achieve in exile (Kibreab, 2003). Whether the repatriation of refugees to Somalia can be considered a durable solution will be discussed in the ongoing process of this dissertation.

## **2.2 The Concept of Return**

Among the liveliest debates in the literature identified and selected is the concept of return itself. Two main themes dominate this debate: the first seeks to gain a better understanding of how return processes have been and are being practiced, lived, and given meaning by returnees, scholars, and policymakers. The second area focuses on paths that can be taken by rethinking policy and research frameworks following experienced return processes. Researchers that concentrate on experiences and practices of return have investigated the law and practice of the ‘right of return’, examined the notion of voluntariness, questioned the idea of return as a process of ‘homecoming’ and ‘(re)integration’, as well as debated whether or not return can be seen as ‘the end of the refugee cycle’ (Vlassenroot & Tegenbos, 2018). These debates will be presented and discussed subsequently.

### *The notion of voluntariness and the return in safety and dignity*

UNHCR's repatriation standards set out four conditions for the organization's involvement in VR: (1) A fundamental change in circumstances in the country of origin - elimination of the causes of refugee movements; (2) A voluntary decision to return; (3) Tripartite arrangements between the origin and host country and UNHCR; and (4) A return in safety and dignity. The right to leave and return to one's country of origin is a fundamental right expressed in Article 13(2) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When violent conflicts occur, peace and tripartite agreements often specifically mention the ‘right of return’ for displaced persons (Cuny & Stein, 1994). However, the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention does not require the application of the standard of ‘voluntariness’ in return procedures (Chimni, 2004). It does not demand refugees to be granted asylum in the sense of permanent admission

to a new political entity. Instead, refugees are entitled to dignity and protection rights *until and insofar* as the conditions in the country of origin allow repatriation without risk of persecution (Hathaway, 1997). Thus, enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention on Refugees is the principle of non-refoulement, that prohibits the repatriation of persons to states where they are threatened with torture or other serious human rights violations (UNHCR, 1977). However, as refugee status is explicitly linked to the condition that the refugees are exposed to risk in the country of origin, it can be revoked if there has been a significant change in circumstances in that country that diminishes the need for protection (Hathaway, 1997). According to Hathaway (1997), it is wishful thinking to propose „that a voluntariness requirement can be superimposed on the text of the Refugee Convention. [...]. [O]nce a receiving State determines that protection in the country of origin is viable, it is entitled to withdraw refugee status (p. 551). Zieck (1997) explains that „refugees are by definition ‘unrepatriable’ ... as long as a person satisfies the definition of a refugee in the contemporary instruments, he remains ... ‘unrepatriable’ and consequently benefits from the prohibition of forced return” (p.101- 102). VR presupposes that the conditions which led them to flee have changed substantially so that the refugees can return under the protection of the state, that their idea of home remains tied to a particular place for a generation or more after they have left, and that their presence continues to be a burden on the host society (Bakewell, 2002). However, Bakewell (2002) is critical and notes that „all these assumptions are open to question” (p. 44). Cuny and Stein (1994) pointed out that in most cases peace is fragile, security weak and the economy and infrastructure of the home country destructed. „Above all, we need to recognize that most repatriation is refugee induced and occurs under insecure conditions” (p. 176). Although it is acknowledged that most refugees return of their own accord (Bakewell, 2002), most of the scholarly attention belongs to those who receive support from the UNHCR. In the year 2000, e.g. only 23 percent of returns from the countries of the EU were facilitated by assisted VR programs, i.e. 87,628 persons, compared to 367,552 persons deported during the same period (European Commission, 2002). Similarly, Crisp (2000) argues that despite a firmly established legal principle that the return of refugees should be on a completely voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity, at least 12 major repatriation movements were forced in 1998, affecting seven different countries of asylum: Angola, Guinea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire/DRC. Black and Gent (2006) agree with Crisp and argue that one reason for this is the practical difficulty of establishing the voluntary nature of the return. They provide an example and explain that it is often „difficult to disentangle the voluntary return of refugees to promote post-conflict reconstruction, and the usually less-than-voluntary return of failed asylum seekers and irregular migrants by Western governments under political pressure to demonstrate the “integrity” of their migration systems” (p. 19). Furthermore, different degrees of ‘voluntarism’ can be found within voluntary programs: Return can be a clear and open decision by the refugee to either return or remain permanently in the host country „but it can also be a choice between returning voluntarily when asked to do so, perhaps gaining financial or other incentives as a result, or staying and risking forcible return at some time in the future” (Black & Gent, 2006, p. 19). In some

cases ‘voluntary’ may simply mean that no force is used during deportation, but that the refugee is given no choice at all (Black & Gent, 2006). In such difficult contexts, the voluntary return of refugees must be reconsidered. What is the inner freedom of choice defined by external pressure?

However, these views dismiss the life strategies of refugees, which are not exclusively tied to peace or the conditions, but to several other aspects (family closeness, new social and economic networks, future opportunities for children... etc.). Monsutti (2008) argues that the durable solutions promoted by UNHCR are based on the idea that solutions are found when the movements stop. Yet, Migration and exile are not usually followed by integration into a host country or return, the movement is continuous and eventually leads to the formation of a truly transnational community. Mobility can be seen as a crucial strategy for securing livelihoods. Therefore, a more comprehensive solution is needed that takes into account the whole range of strategies and responses developed by the population concerned.

The Governments of Somalia and Kenya and the UNHCR have committed themselves to adhere to the principles of VR in safety and dignity. Between April and September 2017, Amnesty International (AI) conducted a study in Kenya and Somalia, which concluded, however, that the conditions to which refugees return are not compatible with international refugee and human rights laws and norms, leading AI to the assessment that „Somalia is not ready for large-scale returns” (Amnesty International, 2018, p. 12). Human Rights Watch (2016) reached a similar conclusion, reporting that:

Kenyan authorities are not giving Somali refugees a real choice between staying and leaving, and the UN refugee agency isn’t giving people accurate information about security conditions in Somalia. [...]. There is no way these returns can be considered voluntary (HRW, 2016).

#### *Repatriation to restore order – Is return homecoming?*

Return is associated with homecoming. The separation of people from their homes is one aspect of the refugee problem (Bakewell, 2002), and the repatriation of people to their places represents a positive return ‘home’ and thus the normalization and restoration of daily life (Sturridge et al., 2018). The assumption is that people belong to a certain place called ‘home’ and that the ‘end of the refugee cycle’ can be reached abruptly and artificially with the moment of return (Hammond, 1999). One reason for this belief can be traced back to the categorization of people as refugees. Zetter (2007) argues that the process of categorizing and differentiating refugees is based on highly instrumental practices that serve the interests of governments to control migration movements

In the past the political discourse on refugees focused on rights and entitlements. Now, the analysis of labeling [...] is preoccupied by notions of identity and belonging embedded in debates about citizenship and the ‘other’ in an era of global migration (p. 189- 190).

In this context, Malkki (1995) explains that the reductionist process of labeling and categorizing implies that the refugee experience has a beginning (flight), a middle (exile/temporary asylum), and an end (ideally return). However, scholars such as Black and Koser (1999) argue that return does not necessarily mean the ‘end of the refugee cycle’ but is often a very problematic and complex process that leads returnees into new socio-economic and political realities. While displacement can be a painful

rupture, there is also the potential for positive outcomes and return can mark the beginning of a new and affirmative cycle (Sturridge et al. 2018). Along with concepts such as '(re)integration' and '(re)construction', the homecoming model increasingly came under criticism in the early 1990s. Returning population groups often settle in a place other than their former homes, struggle with social '(re)integration' into their home communities being considered as 'stayee communities' (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). There is a risk that dreams of returning home may „be based on nostalgia for a past that cannot be recreated” (Bakewell, 2002, p. 45). The homeland is perhaps no longer as it was when the refugees left because the country of origin will have changed socially, politically, and developmentally (Harild et al., 2015). Hence, they rarely come home or return to a context they are familiar with from the period before the outbreak of violent conflict (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018).

The understanding and the concepts of home vary greatly. While some scholars maintain that home is rooted in a particular place, others have a more fluid interpretation (Kaun, 2008). Kibreab (1999) is an advocate of the territorialized view of home. Even though many refugees and IDPs manage to create a new life in places of exile, he argues that they retain the desire to one day return to their region of origin. Not only does he emphasize the strong social and economic links that people have with their regions of origin, but he also draws attention to the associations that refugees have with a particular place (Kibreab, 1999). In contrast, others argue that this territorialized view of (re)integration is both obsolete and unrealistic in such a globalized world (Kaun, 2008). Coles (1985), points out that the concept of home usually encompasses more than just a physical place, but also the community associated with that location. The connection between home and land promotes the idea of repatriation as a means of recovering a 'home', a past that cannot be restored and may never have existed. This flowing concept of 'home' is also supported by Malkki (1992) who questions the assumption that culture and identity are grounded in a particular place. In her study, displaced Hutus from Burundi to Tanzania, she examined „how the lived experiences of exile shape the construction of national identity and historicity among two groups of Hutu refugees inhabiting two very different settings in Tanzania” (p. 35). One group settled in organized and isolated refugee camps, the other lived in a more fluid environment in a small town. The result was that the refugees who stayed in the camps waited for their return home, while the 'town refugees', who were integrated into Tanzanian society, even denied their Burundian origins. Moreover, a study by Zetter (1994) on Greek Cypriot refugees shows how refugees, despite resisting acceptance into the host society and maintaining a strong desire to return, can pragmatically adapt to exile and take new roots (Bakewell, 2002). Hammond (2004) concludes from her work with Ethiopian returnees that 'home' is associated with the community, identity, and political and cultural affiliation rather than with a fixed geographical area. She emphasizes how „home is a variable term, one that can be transformed, newly invented, and developed in relation to the circumstances in which people find themselves or choose to place themselves.” (p. 10). Hansen (1994) described in his study of Angolan refugees in Zambia that the degree of integration was so high that there was no reason to reliably distinguish a refugee from a Zambian on the basis of verifiable information. As a result, the

refugees who remained in the border villages and were fully integrated had a considerable disinterest in returning. Hansen implicitly suggests that once people have really found a solution (integration), they will not have the desire to move again (cited in Bakewell, 2002). Ghanem (2005) stresses that the refugees' decision to return and (re)integrate is determined by more than just their relationship to a real or perceived 'home'. Crucial is also their experiences in exile. These factors include the number of years spent in exile, the conditions experienced there, the extent to which they are integrated into the local population, the host government's policy towards refugees, and their own individual profile. Hence, scholars have concluded that return does not necessarily mean the end of the refugee cycle. It is not an event with an end state in which the returnees simply 'go home', but rather a complex and long-term process of integrating returnees into new socio-economic and political realities (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018).

### **2.3 The Last Step? How (Re)integration can be Made Sustainable**

In research on return, the later phases of repatriation in which returnees attempt to establish themselves socially and economically have been practically neglected (Hammond, 1999). Until today there is little research on the (re)integration of returnees into their communities. This chapter presents a selection of literature on sustainable (re)integration of returnees in receiving (post)-conflict environments.

When analyzing the (re)integration of returnees, scholars are debating the "sustainability" of return. This research interest is reflected in the increasing attention of the IC to longer-term perspectives for (re)integration programming (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). Official UNHCR (2004b) positions state that „if the issue of sustainability of (re)integration of refugee and displaced populations is not addressed properly, the countries concerned will almost inevitable slide back into conflict" (p. 267). The question of how to define the term "sustainability" raises a problem, as it is used in many different contexts. Gibson (2005) argues that „of all the buzzwords and catchphrases circulating in the academic and political worlds, sustainability may be the most slippery" (p. 39). Despite its relevance, there is no comprehensive definition of sustainable return, with studies on return migration using various indicators and determinants to define and measure sustainability (Hall, 2015). A review of the literature has identified five broad (and overlapping) approaches (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015). Early attempts to understand sustainability for measurement focused mainly on the protection of the returnee, i.e. the extent to which returnees can live free from protection concerns (Hall, 2015). Black et al. (2004) developed an approach distinguishing between the 'individual' and 'community' levels of sustainable return. „Return migration is sustainable for individuals if returnees' socio-economic status and fear of violence or persecution is no worse, relative to the population in place of origin, one year after their return" (p. 39). Furthermore, it is often considered that durability implies no subsequent return migration (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). However, as Hall (2015) argues, without a thorough assessment of the reasons for re-migration, it can be problematic to assess the sustainability of a return based on this indicator alone. The reasons for re-migration can be related to many factors and may not

be attributed solely to the inability to (re)integrate. A different approach focuses on individual rights and the socio-economic situation of returnees. This implies, e.g., that a returnee can find employment and have access to housing and basic services. Yet, a benchmark is needed, either concerning the status of the returnee before the initial migration (comparing the socio-economic situation after return with that before migration) or to the situation of the local population (who never emigrated). This view is shared by UNHCR (2004b), which argues that „reintegration is a process that should result in the disappearance of differences in legal rights and duties between returnees and their compatriots and the equal access of returnees to services, productive assets and opportunities“ (p. 6). The definition implies that the rights of returnees shall be equivalent to those of the local population (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015). Others understand sustainable (re)integration more as a (re)integration of returnees into the community and focus less on access to basic needs. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2011) describes (re)integration as „re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a person into a group or a process, e.g. of a migrant into the society of his country of origin“ (cited in Harild et al., 2015, p. 10). A comparable view has Cassarino (2008), defining a sustainable (re)integration as „the process through which a return migrant participates in the social, cultural, economic, and political life in the country of origin“ (p. 127). Another approach to defining sustainability is that the perception of (re)integration could be as important - if not more important - than the reality on the ground. If a returnee believes that his or her standard of living has declined compared to others it might be an incentive to migrate again. A related issue arising is that the terms ‘(re)integration’ and ‘sustainable return’ tend to be used interchangeably. It can be assumed that these terms are related - integration is usually a key condition for sustainable return - yet, there may be instances where the concepts do not overlap. People could return to their country of origin to live there long enough to be regarded as sustainable, but without actually (re)integrating. Thus, they may prefer to leave the country but encounter obstacles to re-migrating. Similarly, some people may have fully (re)integrated after returning but are still considering re-migrating as some opportunities arise elsewhere. It is important to separate these concepts and understand how they can be connected (Koser, & Kuschminder, 2015).

Now the question arises whether it is possible to measure a process like (re)integration and at the same time recognize its complexity (Kaun, 2008)? Since refugee return is a neglected area in migration research, the development of a framework for addressing the complex issue of (re)integration is still in its infancy (Arowolo, 2000). The various theoretical approaches reveal the divergence and the difficulties in conceptualizing the return and (re)integration of refugees. The concepts developed so far neither are uniformly defined nor measured with the same indicators, which complicates a reliable evaluation and comparable measurement of the effectiveness of return (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015).

Koser and Kuschminder (2015) categorized key factors potentially affecting the sustainability of return, combining individual and structural factors, which can be seen in Appendix I. As the table shows, there are different factors, both individual and structural, which play a role in the (re)integration of

returning refugees. From personal character traits to the conditions in the country of exile, the experiences in the host country, the willingness to return, or the circumstances in the country of origin.

However, there are other and less positive aspects of the repatriation coin (Crisp, 2000). Returning could be more challenging than the experience of exile itself. „In place of the semblance of stability and physical security established in camps, where the major problems of survival were adequately met, a host of problems, uncertainties and dangers awaited the refugees on their return to their home country” (Watson 1996, p. 105). Cuny and Stein (1994), identified and explained possible obstacles to sustainable (re)integration. They mention, e.g., fragile peace, the protection of the voluntary nature of return, and the problematic of return assistance in connection with the danger of creating dependency. Crisp (2000) discusses further uncertainties and dangers which returnees may face. He addresses psychosocial insecurity, which is characterized by the fact that war-torn societies often have a high level of social tension and psychosocial insecurity. Also, material insecurity can be an uncertainty. Refugees and IDPs rarely possess many resources when they return home. A large number of returnees today find themselves in situations where their material living conditions are no better (and perhaps even worse) than before their return (Crisp, 2000).

#### **2.4 The Role of the International Community in the (Re)integration Process**

Not only are the displaced categorized, but also the processes they are likely to go through. The terms ‘return’, ‘(re)integration’ and ‘reconstruction’, implies a return to pre-war normality and are seen as part of the wider continuum of assistance and development (Kaun, 2008). This continuum theoretically consists of three phases: „pure humanitarian assistance, the introduction of development activities and eventually the end to humanitarian assistance, accompanied by a transition into development” (UNHCR, 2004a, p. 17). The process ideally involves actors like the government, humanitarian/development agencies, multilateral institutions as well as the private sector (Kaun, 2008). Some scholars, such as Helton (2002), go so far by describing state-building as „efforts by the international community to construct or fortify societies riven by crisis to ... encourage the repatriation and reintegration of refugees” (p. 30). Today it is common practice to link reconstruction with the physical reconstruction of basic infrastructure - roads, bridges, clinics, and schools - or with procedures such as support for good governance, civil society, and capacity building. Although, as Kaun (2008) argues, reconstruction is carried out in parallel with (re)integration, the latter concentrates more on how the civilian population copes with the reconstruction of society, both in the economic and social spheres. She explains that experience has shown, however, the importance of providing longer-term protection and assistance to returnees. Concern about the sustainability of return is also reflected in UNHCR's Return Assistance and Development Strategy, which aims at a long-term perspective of (re)integration of returnees. Several programs fall under the ‘4R’ approach and the ‘Quick Impact Projects’ (QIPs). The QIPs should be small-scale, based on gender equality and community involvement as well as combine successful (re)integration with sustainable development (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018).

They were first implemented in Nicaragua in 1991 and have been widely used in other return operations, becoming „a standard in UNHCR (re)integration practice in the middle of the 1990s” (Crisp, 2001, p. 180). Scholars have generally recognized the value of QIPs for (re)integration, despite its shortcomings in terms of inadequate planning, data- collection, and project identification (Crisp, 2001). Launched in 2002 by the UNHCR, UNDP, and the World Bank, the 4R approach incorporates repatriation, (re)integration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction and aims to „bring together humanitarian and development actors, create a conducive environment in countries of origin to prevent the recurrence of mass outflows and facilitate sustainable repatriation and reintegration” (UNHCR, 2004b). UNHCR's step to institutionalize a post-conflict framework reformulated the thinking on (re)integration by placing it in a larger cycle of migration and development. Yet, several scholars criticize the desire to „bridge the gap between basic reintegration assistance and longer-term development” (Cuny & Stein, 1994, p. 183). Cuny and Stein (1994) argue that international post-return assistance should focus on the rehabilitation of returnees rather than on long-term development. Rehabilitation is the direct and immediate need of the refugees, and it is a field in which international resources, experience, and intervention are of proven value. The current conditions of return are unfavorable to development efforts on a broad front.

## **2.5 Conclusion and Gaps**

As this chapter has shown, most of the debates identified can be traced, in one way or another, to UNHCR and, more broadly, the IC and how the organizations interpreted repatriation in terms of peacebuilding and economic recovery. Scholarly attention on return has been largely influenced by these policy priorities and concerns. It also became clear that the understanding of return has changed considerably, both conceptually and in practice over time. The literature on (re)integration and return strategies is generally considered based on the benefits (or failures) they bring in terms of aid and financing for development. However, the greater, political role, impact, or consequences are largely neglected, and therefore more research on how organizations enter, integrate, and move within the national space would be beneficial. Many studies take an aid-centered approach by primarily defining gaps in humanitarian aid to improve (re)integration programming. Often the involvement of political state actors in economic (re)integration and development is missing. A gap this piece sheds light on. Other gaps in research are the mere focus on returnees and the neglect of people in communities that have never left the region. The ‘stayee’ community plays an important and decisive role in the (re)integration of returnees into the community and should not be excluded. Furthermore, it is recognized that spontaneous return movements are greater than the return programs offered by the IC. However, the focus is usually on the return programs and the returnees who received assistance (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). Despite hosting the third largest repatriation movement in the world, no research on the (re)integration of Somalian returnees seems to be available. There are no published (re)integration theories on Somalia, let alone on Kismayo.

### 3. (Re)integration of Returning Refugees into Kismayo

Here, the results of the interviews and surveys<sup>23</sup> conducted will be presented and reviewed. Chapter 3.1 introduces (1) the times and reasons for the escape from Somalia, (2) the time spent in exile, and the years of return, as well as (3) the reasons for returning of the participants. Starting from Chapter 3.2 the current (re)integration practices into Kismayo are analyzed, using Kaun's (2008) (re)integration theory.

#### 3.1 Flight, Exile, and Return to Somalia

Of the 26 returnees questioned through surveys and interviews, 24 (92%) fled in the years between 1990 and 2012. Two were born in the Dadaab refugee camp. The following bar chart in figure 3.1.1 provides an overview of the years in which the participants fled Somalia. Thereby, the years are shown on the lower x-axis and the number of respondents who left Somalia in that year is listed on the y-axis.




Figure 3.1.1 Years in which the Respondents fled Somalia

Source: Own Source

The majority of the respondents named the following periods as the peak of displacement: 2004 and 2009 with four persons and 1991, 1998, 2005 with three persons respectively. All concerned returnees stated that lack of security as a reason for their flight to Kenya. 13 out of 16 returnees (81,25%) in the survey cited education as one reason for their escape. Here are some quotes from interviews: „The reason I left Somalia was to seek education and better teaching because Somalia was broken from the civil war at that time” (Interviewee C). „I left Somalia 1991 because of security reasons ... because of the war [...]. Before the war we lived in Kismayo, we had land and also a farm “(Interviewee A). “I left Somalia 2009 with my family for education purposes. [...]. There is just barely an education in Somalia. And school was free in Kenya” (Interview Partner H). „I left Somalia in 2009 with my grandfather. I left my family behind. [...]. The reason why I left was to get education” (Interviewee E).

<sup>23</sup> The answers in the survey of participants are to be found in Appendix G.

All participants spent their time in exile in Dadaab in Kenya. Of the 25 returnees who reported their length of stay in exile, the average time spent outside Somalia was 15 years. 27 years was the longest and 4 years the shortest stay. In figure 3.2.1, the y-axis indicates the number of respondents and the x-axis the time spent in Dadaab at 5-year intervals. The majority of the returnees with 7 out of 25 (28%), spent between 10 and 14 years in Dadaab, 6 returnees (24%) spent between 5 and 9 years and 5 returnees (20%) between 20 and 24 years in Dadaab. This protracted refugee situation is consistent with an analysis by the World Bank from 2016, which concluded the average length of exile since the end of the 1990s has fluctuated between 10 and 15 years (Devictor & Do, 2016).




Figure 3.1.2 Returnees Length of Stay in Dadaab  
 Source: Own Source

Of the 26 returnees, 25 returned to Somalia between 2014 and 2017. One person did not indicate the year of return. Figure 3.1.3 provides an overview of the years in which the participants returned, whereby the y-axis presents the number of respondents and the x-axis the year of return. The principal year of return was 2016 with 10 people, followed by 2017 with 8 people. No one returned before 2014. It can be seen that flight and return were not constant phenomena but varied according to the political climate and the refugees' confidence in a return (Kaun, 2008).




Figure 3.1.3 Years of Return to Kismayo  
 Source: Own Source

An important prerequisite for a sustainable (re)integration of returnees is the voluntary nature of the return as it significantly influences the willingness to integrate into the HC. When asked whether it was their free decision to return to Somalia, 15 of 16 participants in the survey (93.75%) and 6 of 10 returnees in the interviews (60%) gave a positive answer. Yet, it is interesting to note that the majority with 50 % of the 26 returnees expressed that they had returned to Somalia due to external pressure from the Kenyan government, 38% gave no explanation on that matter and 12% rejected that statement. The rapid increase in returns from 2015 to 2016 (see Figure 3.1.3), whereby in 2015, 4 participants had returned to Somalia and in 2016 more than twice as many with 10, can thus be attributed to the announcement to close Dadaab at the end of 2015. Some selected quotes from the interviews: „We didn't want to come back, however, Kenya said they were closing down the camp and we were scared. [...]. We would have never come back because my children were in school [in Dadaab] and they had good education” (Interviewee A). „The main reason for our return in 2016 was because of the closure of the camp. All the Somalis were told that the camp is closing, that's why we returned” (Interviewee D). „The reason for our return to Somalia was the announcement to close the camp. I was concerned for my future and that of my children” (Interviewee I).

A staff member of the GIZ Somali Reintegration Programme (SRP) in Kismayo explained:

Most of the returnees were worried when the Kenyan government announced the closure of the refugee camps. [...]. If you discuss it with the returnees, they will say they had no option, that they had to look for a place to go. It's somehow voluntary, but based on .. external pressure? [...]. The major factor remains if the government of Kenya says we no longer host people from Somalia, Somalis have to consider and think about what they will do next (Interviewee 2).

The technical advisor of SRP in Nairobi further argued:

I suppose that within that time [2014/2015] there was the pressure to sort of move people. There were a lot of incentives to move and maybe not a very clear picture of what is on the other side. I feel like this pressure has now reduced, there is probably a lot more information available now than it used to be. And also, the returns are reduced. Between 2014 and 2017 the border was very fluid. People would come to Kismayo and see how it is but then return back, because it was just better to stay in the camps (Interviewee 5).

The manager of GIZs SRP stated: “Well, there was both [voluntary and involuntary returns]. This was also monitored by UNHCR, the Somalian, and the Kenyan side. And it was already apparent that the clarification was not always satisfactory” (Interviewee 4). Access to information is crucial for assessing the strength of return decision processes. In the survey carried out, returnees were asked whether they had accurate and up-to-date information on conditions in Somalia, including the security situation prior to return, which all 16 returnees answered positively. This was confirmed in an interview with the UNHCR's Chief Protection Assistant, who is responsible for VR from Kenya to Somalia. A further reason for the return cited by the returnees was seeking employment. As noted in chapter 1.1, the government of Kenya does not issue work permits to asylum seekers or refugees, except in a few individual cases. As a result, the displaced are forced to seek employment in the informal sector or to resettle in another country. Here are two quotes from the interviews with the returnees: „After I

graduated, I wanted to find a job but there were no jobs in the refugee camp and my grandfather died. So, I had to come back” (Interviewee E). „After I got an education, I returned to my prior country which is Somalia. I came back on my free will after I finished my education because I wanted to come back to my homeland and live and work there” (Interviewee C). To sum up, as the study suggests, the repatriation of Somalian refugees from Dadaab was not always based on a voluntary decision by the returnees themselves. The combination of the following reasons may have played an important role:

1. The refugees limited opportunities to integrate in Kenya due to restrictions such as lack of work permits or no freedom of movement in the camps.
2. The withdrawal of the *prima facie* status for Somalian refugees by Kenya on the grounds that conditions in Somalia no longer justify claims for asylum. Yet, large parts of Somalia are still in the hands of Al-Shabaab and there are severe attacks and human rights violations. A return in *safety* can therefore not be presumed. I would like to come back to a quote from Hathaway (1997): „once a receiving State determines that protection in the country of origin is viable, it is entitled to withdraw refugee status” (p. 551). This is exactly what happened in Kenya.
3. Due to constant threats to close Dadaab, many Somalian refugees were uncertain about their future and saw no other option but to return to their country of origin.
4. In this desperate situation of the refugees, UNHCR offered them financial incentives that encouraged a return. I would like to refer again to Black and Gent (2006): „it can also be a choice between returning voluntarily when asked to do so, perhaps gaining financial or other incentives as a result, or staying and risking forcible return at some time in the future” (p. 19). The refugees saw themselves in a position either to return ‘voluntarily’ now, with the support of UNHCR or to be forced to do so in the near future due to threats of closing Dadaab.

The Tripartite Agreement of 2013 was intended to create a framework for organizing returns in accordance with international law, which requires the cooperation of the governments of Kenya and Somalia and the UNHCR. Yet, the Governor of Jubbaland explained that there was almost no cooperation between Kenya and Somalia in the return of refugees. „When Kenya announced the closure of Dadaab Camp, we were given about six months. There was no planning phase, nothing. Jubbaland was overwhelmed” (Interviewee 1). Furthermore, as the majority of returnees as well as members of the IC have acknowledged, both Kenya and the UNHCR support the involuntary return of refugees to a place where their lives and freedoms are still endangered. This is illegal under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Also, other international refugees and human rights laws and standards are violated such as the principle of non-refoulment. As the return of Somalian refugees to Kismayo cannot be regarded as voluntary, dignified, or safe, an important prerequisite for sustainable (re)integration is missing.

### **3.2 State of Human Security**

Starting with this chapter, the data obtained in the study are analyzed using Kaun's (re-)Integration strategy (2008), which was developed based on fieldwork conducted in Eastern Angola in 2006. The

objective of Kaun’s analysis is to shed light on how governments, aid donors, International Organizations (IOs) and, the people affected by displacement themselves can improve (post)-war (re)integration not only in Angola, but also in other countries emerging from protracted conflicts. The theory places the challenges of (re)integration in a larger theoretical framework, arguing that the process depends on both institutional and individual factors. Kaun defines (re)integration as „a process that displacement- affected persons undergo which is characterized by human security and individual perceptions of inclusion and belonging to a place” (2008, p. 2). The institutional factors are discussed based on the framework for human security, which can be divided into the following categories illustrated in Figure 3.2.1:




Figure 3.2.1 Framework of Human Security  
Source: Kaun, 2008

As already mentioned in chapter 1.4.2, I did not, like Kaun, examine each of the eight aspects of human security due to reasons of data protection. I focused on the following five: educational, economic, environmental, food and water, and community security. These aspects will be presented subsequently.

### 3.2.1 Educational Security

Kaun (2008) explains that educational security refers to access to schools, teachers, and non-formal education services for children, as well as the recognition of relevant educational qualifications for employment purposes for the returnees.

The population of Somalia is extremely young with 45.9% younger than 15 years and 75% younger than 30 years (GOS et al., 2017). The average age is 16,7 years, which makes Somalia one of the youngest countries in the world. Given the high fertility rates, Somalia’s young population is likely to continue to grow, with 6.1 births per woman in 2018 (Worldbank, 2020). These figures highlight the need for educational services in the country. The majority of the population was born after the fall of the Barre regime in 1991 and grew up in a country that lacked education, plagued by conflict and violence (UNDP, 2013b). The civil war led to the complete collapse of the formal education system. Most school buildings were destroyed, teaching materials and facilities were looted, and many teachers

and students were displaced. Apart from madrasas<sup>24</sup>, no formal education took place for years (RBERN, 2012). Ms. Reichelt explains: „The biggest challenge [in Kismayo] remains education. Somalia needs well-educated people. [...]. An entire generation grew up without education. For ten or twelve years, people had no educational opportunities. It is, so to speak, a lost generation” (Interviewee 4).

Although the situation has improved as the number of functioning primary and secondary schools has increased significantly, statistics give clear indications of poor access to and quality of education. Most children, especially in rural areas, are still not able to complete formal education (UNDP, 2013a). Somalia has one of the lowest enrollment rates for school-aged children in the world, with 30% of children in elementary school and 26% in secondary school. Less than half are girls (UNCF, 2016). Accordingly, the literacy rate is very low. Among school children in the age group of 6-13 years, the literacy rate was 42% in 2006. For the adult population in the sample 15 years and older, the literacy rate was estimated at 31%, 26% for women compared to 36 % for men. A 2006 study by the Somalia Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey cited as the main reasons for not attending school the inability to afford school (36%), housework (22%), and lack of relevance to job search (17%) (UNDP, 2013a).

Kismayo has a significant lack of resources for education, both physical and personal. The city provides several educational institutions, including public and private primary, secondary, tertiary, and Koranic schools. On average there are about 40 students in a public primary and secondary school class (Interviewee 2). The principal tertiary institution is the University of Kismayo, which is the first university in Jubbaland and thus attracts students from all over Southern Somalia. Yet, the education system suffers primarily from a lack of uniformity in curricula, a severe shortage of qualified teachers as well as a general scarcity of schools. On one side there are the traditional madrasa schools and on the other side is the formal school system (Interviewee 2). A UNHCR employee comments:

The education system is not structured. We have many returnees opting for the traditional systems of education, however, that is not formal. They go to madrasas, and they only learn about the Koran. No arithmetic, no English. [...]. The teachers we're not, shall we say, exposed to mathematics. They didn't learn that in school, and they can't teach the kids (Interviewee 3).

Access to education in all areas depends on one's own ability to pay, which limits certain minority groups, including IDPs and returnees (GOS et al., 2017). School fees for primary and secondary education average US\$13 per month. Besides, there are indirect costs such as school uniforms, materials, transport, and canteen food (Interviewee 2). One particular advantage returnees have over IDPs or stayees was their access to educational opportunities in the refugee camps (Kaun, 2008). In Kenya, education is free. Dadaab offers 35 preschool centers, 35 elementary schools, and 6 secondary schools run by NGOs or privately, as well as Koran schools. That is significantly more than there are in Kismayo (Duale et al, 2019). Relevant education documents, which the returnees received in Kenya, are fully recognized in Kismayo (Interviewee 1, 2, 7). The schools in Dadaab also have to struggle with problems such as constantly changing teachers and overcrowded classrooms, but due to the funds provided by IC

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<sup>24</sup> Koranic schools in which Islamic studies are taught.

in the refugee camps, education there is generally better than in Somalia. This was confirmed by several respondents, such as Interviewee 3:

Some [returnees] end up as teachers as their English is much better, and they have gone through the Kenyan education system and graduated from high school. They can read and write in English. It's a challenge for those who are living in [Kismayo] for a long time (Interview Partner 3).

Some schools in the IDP and returnee camps of Kismayo are supported by the IC. The Governor of Jubbaland criticizes assistance, which only targets returnees and IDP's and neglects the HC:

Returnees and IDPs receive funding from the IC and the HC does not. As a result, families from the HC move to the IDP camps and returnee camps to benefit as well from the funding. Children from the HC suddenly went and still go to the schools of the camps that were originally intended for IDPs and returnees. Since these schools receive financial support and are therefore in quite good condition. Possibly even in a better condition than the schools in Kismayo (Interviewee 1).

Besides, the returnees receive a "return package" offered by UNHCR which includes a so-called school attendance card - a conditional education allowance of up to USD\$25 per month for each school-age child for one year (UNHCR, 2019a). In the survey, 7 of 13 returnees (54%) answered the question of whether they believe that there are enough educational opportunities in Kismayo with yes and 6 (46%) with no. In response to the question "If you have children, does every one of school-age attend school?" 13 of 16 returnees (81,25%) responded positively. The reasons were given by the 3 returnees, whereby not all children go to school, where lack of access to education and school fees. „Schools need money, and I have no money to pay for education. [...]. Even for me alone, life is already hard" (Returnee O15). In question 6 of the survey "Please select three of the various issues that returning refugees may face in Kismayo" 10 out of 16 returnees (62,5%) named lack of education opportunities. In question 8 "What do you think must be done by state administrations to meet the challenges?", one person expressed that the school fees should be reduced, and 6 returnees recommended hiring more qualified teachers. Among the 10 interviews with returnees, 9 specifically commented on the lack of education in Kismayo. Here are a few examples:

[In Dadaab] my children were in school and they had a good education. We haven't fully (re)integrated [in Kismayo]. I returned some of my kids to Dadaab to go back to school. Some of my kids I sent them to Nairobi to relatives so that they can go to school in summer. And some of my children are with me. We are not fully comfortable (Returnee A).

As for the services, they all lack. Like education. The school was free in Kenya and now we have to pay in Somalia. And that is difficult for each group. [...]. I'm happy to be back in my country [...], however, if I would be able to speak to the Somali government and the IC, I'd let them know to put a stronghold and pressure on education in Somalia" (Returnee H).

I've been going to school through the American Refugee Committee in Kismayo, but they don't have funding for this year. When I came here, I continued [to study] until the funding stopped. [...]. I don't see myself staying in Kismayo in a long run, because there are a lot of issues like a lack of education. It's not the same as in Kenya (Returnee G).

When my wife died, we came to Kismayo without any support. [...]. I don't have a job and take care of my children. [...] Three of my older children support me in the household. The other three don't go to school in Kismayo yet. [...]. Kismayo urgently needs more [...] educational and

employment opportunities. We hope the situation will soon improve so that we can live here longer. Otherwise, we have to go back to Dadaab (Returnee E).

Altogether it can be observed that it was frequently mentioned that education in Dadaab was better and free of charge. A service that is not offered in Kismayo. Also, 6 of 10 interviewed returnees said that if they could reach out to the Somali government or the IC, they would report that the most challenging issue to be addressed „is education, because at the bottom- line that is what matters” (Interviewee D). Taking the results of the survey and the interviews together, it can be seen that the majority of the returnees are not satisfied with the educational system in Kismayo. 22 returnees expressed their opinion on the situation, while 15 (68%) of them directly criticized the school system.

The education system in Kismayo has been one of the many victims of the various conflicts and frequent administrative shifts in the region. In summary, the study suggests that the education sector in Kismayo is affected by three central challenges: (1) lack of qualified teachers as a result of the civil war and the consequent poor quality of education, (2) no unified education system, and (3) school fees that impede access to education for vulnerable and poor groups. To the extent that they can pay school fees, all those returning to Kismayo have the same access to education as the IDPs and the city's HC. A major difference is that the returnees are usually better educated than those who stayed in Somalia due to a better school system in Kenya. Besides, returnees receive support from the IC in the form of funded schools in the IDP and returnee camps or the UNHCR return package. Existing schools in Kismayo require rehabilitation, and there is a great need for qualified teachers and to build new schools due to the city's enormous population growth. 83% of teachers in Somalia have never received any teacher training (Africa Educational Trust, n.d.). Thus qualified teachers should be recruited from abroad if necessary, or, as interviewee 3 mentioned, some returnees can be instructed to teach in Kismayo. Failure in education can lead to frustration and demoralization among youths. They risk being tempted by crime and endangering not only themselves but also their communities (UNDP, 2013a).

### **3.2.2 Economic Security**

Economic security refers to having access to formal or informal means of subsistence and freedom of movement to take advantage of economic opportunities (Kaun, 2008).

After the civil war and ongoing conflicts fragmented the country, Somalia is today one of the poorest and most underdeveloped countries in the world. Poverty is widespread and in 2016 every second Somali was living below the international poverty line of US\$1.90 (Pape, 2017). Most of those affected are young people, women, and children (Webersik, Hansen & Egal, 2018). Somalia's unemployment rate was 13.96% in 2018 (Worldbank, 2019b), with high youth unemployment being one of the biggest problems in Somalia. In 2012, 67% of the 14 to 29-year-olds were unemployed, one of the highest figures in the world (UNDP, 2013b). Beyond this, Somalia has been ranked for 13 years as one of the three most fragile states in the world (Fund for Peace, 2019) and, according to the Corruption Perception Index 2019 (Transparency International, 2020), the most corrupt state on earth.

In Kismayo, the urban economy is currently undergoing rapid development. Given the increased stability, considerable amounts of money are flowing into investments in the city from international companies, humanitarian organizations, and the diaspora, with some of them returning to invest. The main sectors of the urban economy are the construction sector, as people are rebuilding houses and business premises; the retail sector through imports/exports, telecommunications as well as the hospitality sector (hotels and restaurants). This availability of livelihood activities renders Kismayo an attractive destination for those in search of employment (GOS et al., 2017). Although Kismayo's economy has historically been based on agriculture (arable farming, livestock) with secondary activities in the fishing industry, private sector actors reported in a survey conducted by IOM in February 2016 that these sectors are currently the least dynamic, given the lack of skills, technology, and access. The fishing industry needs investment in processing mechanisms and conservation measures. Agricultural areas surrounding Kismayo are controlled by Al-Shabaab and the cattle breeding industry was destroyed during the war and has not been revived since (IOM, 2016, cited in GOS et al., 2017).

In the survey, 10 out of 16 returned refugees (62,5%) stated that they are unemployed. Among them, 7 are female and 3 are male, aged between 30 and 61. Of the 6 returnees who have a job, 4 are women and 2 are men. The jobs indicated were twice “construction work” and twice “casual work”, such as returnee D4 who sells ice cream. The occupation indicated by both women was “housewife”, although it is not clear whether they are employed and receive a salary. On question 2 of the survey “Have you been employed before leaving Somalia“ 14 of the 16 returnees (87.5%) answered negatively and 2 positively. However, as reported in question 2.1, these 2 people were not able yet to work in the same field again. In question 6, where the returnees were asked to select 3 aspects that they see as the biggest challenge for their (re)integration in Kismayo, 13 out of 16 people (81,25%) cited “lack of employment opportunities” as one of the main challenges for them. However, this result is not due to the fact that returnees in Kismayo do not have the same access to basic services as everyone else living there. The majority of the returnees surveyed, 12 out of 16 people (75%), feel they have equal opportunities to access basic services. Their prospects may even be better than those of the HC, as returnees often have a better education. The Gouverneur of Jubbaland explained: „Everyone has the same chances. [...]. Everyone has equal access to health care, education or employment. [...] There is no separation” (Interviewee 1). Ms. Reichelt commented: „The people who came from Dadaab [...] received a more solid professional training and therefore find jobs faster. Long-term employment opportunities” (Interviewee 4). The head of the refugee commission in Kismayo declared:

We need their minds; we need their skills. The economic background of the HC is poor and often they are not educated. [...]. [The returnees] have a high-quality education. Those people who are getting the highest job opportunities in Kismayo are either independent [returnees] or the ones who are supported by UNHCR. [...]. They even get the jobs from the government (Interviewee 7).

In other words, the fundamental problem stems not from the fact that returnees do not have the same access to basic services, as they often have even better prospects than the HC. Instead, the main difficulties lie in the economic capacities of Somalia and the city of Kismayo. Accordingly, 12 of the

16 returnees (75%) surveyed stated that they do not consider the resources in Kismayo to be sufficient for everyone. In question 6 of the survey, 11 out of 16 people (68,75%) stated that a lack of resources in Kismayo was one of the 3 biggest challenges they faced in their (re)integration in Kismayo. Besides, 14 out of 15 returnees (93,3%) indicated that there are not enough employment opportunities for everyone living there. One reason is that the country's economy has suffered greatly from years of civil war, while the population of Kismayo has doubled in the last 5 years due to the influx of many new people. This can lead to conflicts over the scarce resources. Following are some quotes from interviews with returnees about their perception of the economy in Kismayo and their access to basic services. „At first, I didn't have a job, but I had a few trainings that helped me out. When it comes to basic services, I have the same opportunities [...]. We [the returnees] are usually the ones that get the services” (Returnee C). „I'm not working at the moment. [...] I don't see myself staying in Kismayo in a long run because there are a lot of issues like lack of education and lack of jobs. It's not the same as in Kenya” (Returnee G). „We all have equal opportunities. [...] Before the biggest challenge [for me] was unemployment, however that is not an issue anymore as I'm now working with GIZ [...]. I'm comfortable [...] and there so many opportunities in Kismayo” (Returnee D). „The HC gets the first opportunities when it comes to education or jobs” (Returnee E). 3 further returnees explained:

A lot of the people that migrated back have different skill sets like business, and farming and such but it's competitive and there are not enough resources available at the moment. There were much more resources in Dadaab, enough food, water, health care and free education. We don't have any of those things available anymore (Returnee B).

We came back in 2016 with our four children and no support. Today my husband works in a restaurant and I'm a housewife. [...]. We are living in an IDP camp and we feel integrated. We have the same access to basic services; however, some get more support than others (Returnee J).

When it comes to basic services, the IDPs receive more of the services and have more access to them than us. If I could leave Kismayo, I would leave, however, I do not have the resources so I will probably be here long- term (Returnee F).

As the quotations made clear, the perceptions differ considerably. Most returnees say that they have the same access to basic services as everyone else, yet returnee E and F feel that they are disadvantaged in this respect. Furthermore, returnees like B or G say that the economic resources are not sufficient, whereas returnee D claims that there are many opportunities available in the city.

Moving on to the perspectives of the Somali authorities and the IC, everyone agrees that the capacity of Kismayo's local economy is not sufficient to absorb such a large influx of people.

The area of return itself is need. [...] They struggle for resources in terms of livelihood. As Kismayo is the main area for returnees we also have congestion. [...]. One big challenge is that the employment possibilities are not enough for all of them (Interviewee 2).

No matter whether you are there as someone originally, whether you live within the HC or whether you have been internally displaced, the level of poverty in Kismayo is high, regardless of the group category you belong to.[...]. However, the private sector in Kismayo is strong at the moment. There is a lot of investments in the region. So at least that is progressing. It is not yet where it should be, but I think there is development (Interviewee 5).

Also, Interviewee 5, staff of the SRP in Nairobi, criticizes the temporary nature of the scarcely available jobs and the connections (mainly concerning clan families) one must have to get them. Even the jobs from the government are temporary and mainly paid by aid agencies.

In summary, despite its recent investments, Kismayo's economic situation is poor and poses a challenge not only for the many new people who want to integrate but also for the HC. The demand for employment is high, however, the resources are not sufficient. This became clear in the surveys and the interviews with the returnees, as well as the IC and the authorities of Kismayo. The UNHCR employee explained: „We have a big Somali community outside of Somalia. They are experts in different fields. If these persons would be willing to return home, they would build the capacity of the local economy” (Interviewee 3). It was recognized that the high unemployment rate among returnees is not resulting from unequal opportunities in the labor market or other basic services. Returnees often have even better prerequisites due to a better educational background. It is a consequence of scarce resources and economic capacity. Youth unemployment is particularly high in Somalia, which is dangerous since Al-Shabaab has already successfully recruited unemployed youth (GOS et al., 2017).

### **3.2.3 Environmental Security**

In the (re)integration strategy developed by Kaun, the aspect of environmental security is characterized as access to clean drinking water in residential areas and access to land and property rights (Kaun, 2008). Unlike Kaun, access to potable water is not discussed here, but in the following chapter 3.2.4. Instead, the overall safety in Kismayo is included in this section.

Traditionally, half of the Somalian population lives in rural areas and is dependent on livestock and agriculture. Many Somalians are nomadic pastoralists who move with their animals in search of grazing grounds and watering places for their livestock. Other Somalians practice agropastoralism, i.e. they are settled farmers who live from both agriculture and cattle breeding (Worldbank, 2019a). Thus, Somalians are highly dependent on their land, yet, less than 2 percent of the country is suitable for the cultivation of crops (Duyvesteyn, 2004). Rainfall is relatively low and irregular, which is why the country has been repeatedly hit by severe droughts and floods in the last three decades (Ogallo, Ajuang, Ouma, & Omondi, 2017) resulting in an extreme increase in the rate of urbanization. The number of Somalians living in cities rose from 17.3% in 1960 to 46.8% in 2020 (cf. Worldometer 2020). Also, the population of Kismayo has grown enormously. Between 2014 and 2017, more than 44,000 people were repatriated to Kismayo from the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps in Kenya. In addition, some have returned spontaneously. In the first four months of 2017 alone, 10,000 returnees arrived in the city, and similar numbers have been displaced in the districts directly affected by the drought (UNHCR, 2017, cited in Gos et al. 2017). The rapid population growth in Kismayo underlines the urgency of expanding the city, providing more land, and building houses for the new residents. However, several regions in central and Southern Somalia are still in the hands of Al-Shabaab. In Jubbaland, control can be considered as divided between the Jubbaland administration and the terrorist militia. While Al-Shabaab dominates the

rural areas and has a hidden presence in most urban centers, the Jubbaland administration, with the support of AMISOM and bilateral Ethiopian troops, has control over most urban centers (GOS et al., 2017). Another reason why the rate of urbanization in Somalia rose sharply. Due to the city's high population growth on the one hand and the dominance of Al-Shabaab over many areas on the other, two major problems are evident: security concerns and limited land area. While all returnees, both in the interviews and survey, stated that they feel safe in Kismayo and had no particular safety concerns, 6 out of 7 respondents from the IC and Kismayo authorities expressed serious security doubts. The head of the refugee commission argues that if security could be improved, returnees could migrate to agricultural areas or actually return to their original location (Interviewee 7). The SRP project's technical advisor confirms this reality by saying:

It is safe within a 50 km radio around Kismayo. There are areas within Al-Shabaab's control, leading to competition for the available space. [...]. Security is the biggest [challenge]. If there is stability, the other issues can be addressed. In terms of space and land, it means that Kismayo could expand. People could be able to resettle in the farming areas and go back to their farms. Farm production and export for food products could be restarted again (Interviewee 5).

When asked what future developments would be desirable, Ms. Reichelt replied:

That depends on whether areas are being freed that offer future prospects in the agricultural sector. Because South Somalia was once the granary of all of East Africa. There is a lot of potentials, which can already be seen in the many rivers of the region (Interviewee 4).

On the question of general security in Kismayo, opinions differ. Several members of the IC and the Somalian authorities expressed concerns, such as Ms. Reichelt who said:

Compared to Mogadishu, it is stable in Kismayo [...]. However, the overall political situation has deteriorated. [...]. The elected president of Jubbaland was not recognized by the federal government. This power vacuum is slowly filled by Al- Shabaab. They are taking advantage of it. The danger exists that it could develop into a civil war again (Interviewee 4).

Another employee of the SRP project of GIZ commented:

One of the biggest obstacles is security. It's not within anybody's control. There are security threats coming from the armed militia, it is insecurity coming from internal civil ramping for power, there is a struggle between the federal and the regional government. The security has to be a bit stronger so that people get that feeling of protection. In terms of everything. If I'm able to make a small amount of money- am I protected enough to do investments in this area? (Interviewee 5)

The planning minister said: „Security is always challenging in Somalia, but as far as the returnees and IDPs are concerned it is manageable. They are within the facility of the secure areas” (Interviewee 6). Interviewee 3, responsible for the repatriation of refugees from Kenya to Somalia, explained that the work of the UNHCR in Kenya is tied to security in Somalia. In the case of security incidents, any movement from Kenya to Somalia is stopped. As the interviews with the IC and the authorities of Kismayo indicate, the presence of Al-Shabaab in Jubbaland presents a major problem. First, there are serious security concerns, and second, it harms the situation in both residential and agricultural areas. On the one hand, there is high population growth, on the other hand, the city can only expand to a limited extent due to the occupation of the surrounding areas by the Islamic movement. To accommodate the

new inhabitants, two new settlements were built in Kismayo, called Midnimo and Marina (Interviewee 7). In November 2019, the settlements consisted of 1,990 houses with room for 13,000 people. By the end of 2020, 30,000 people are expected to find a new home there (Reichelt, 2019). In Appendix J, the urban growth of Kismayo between 2006 and 2016 can be seen. It can be observed that the city has expanded by 648 hectares in the years between 2006 and 2016. However, the houses built are not sufficient, and many returnees had to settle in the city's IDP camps. In other words, returnees who had lived in a refugee camp for an average of 15 years had to move to another camp after their return to Somalia. Not an ideal solution.

Forced evictions and land grabbing are the most frequent types of land conflicts in Kismayo that have occurred regularly over the past two decades. The insecurity of land ownership and the inaccessibility of formal land registration systems, especially for IDPs, contribute to this situation. The problem of land disputes continues to be a challenge, owing to the complex nature of the city: mass migration, clan mixing, and weak legal frameworks. IDP settlements belong to the most affected ones since they often belong to one or more private landowners, which easily leads to forced evictions and the violation of other residential, land, and property rights of the people affected by displacement (GOS et al., 2017). This results in the dilemma that Al Shabaab actually has a reputation for enforcing fairer land ownership and rights than other local authorities. Some returnees may decide to go directly to their farms in the hope that Al Shabaab will settle any land disputes in their favor (Menkhaus, 2017).

As of June 2017, there were more than 100 IDP sites in Kismayo. The sites are organized into four geographical clusters spread across the city, each with its own leader. The development of the constructed IDP sites between 2014 and 2017 can be seen in Appendix K. The settlements are divided into three different groups according to their physical organization and land ownership. Older sites are generally small to medium-sized unplanned settlements built on private land. New sites are small, spontaneous settlements on private land, and new large planned sites are built by humanitarian organizations on government-allocated land. However, there is a lack of infrastructure, inadequate waste management, inadequate shelter, fire hazard, and sanitary problems. The state of Jubbaland tries to relocate people within Kismayo and resettle them in the suburbs by offering underdeveloped land outside the city (GOS et al., 2017). Yet, this land faces challenges such as distance from the city and main markets, vulnerability to flooding, and lack of water and electricity (GOS et al., 2017).

The UNHCR supported some returnees by providing them with houses, yet not all benefit. Consequently, many returnees are dissatisfied with their housing situation. In the survey, 15 out of 16 returnees (93,75%) stated that their current housing situation is not adequate. Dissatisfaction with the accommodation conditions was also expressed in the interviews, not only by the returnees but also by the IC and the Somali authorities.

Only few houses were built, with much delay and in far too small numbers. And very shabby housing units, initially intended for three to four months. In one room there were sometimes six to eight people living. [...]. I have heard that they want to resettle the IDPs and build more houses,

with two rooms. [...]. But the problem remains, where do you get the land and where do you get the funding? (Interviewee 4)

The planning minister declared that Kismayo urgently needs more help from the IC:

The people are living in shanty houses. They are living in the merge of housing, in a pathetic situation. We cannot say it is sufficient. [...]. The most advantaged are the ones that benefited from the international interventions. They secured two rooms. The rest is living in shanty villages and share little space (Interviewee 6).

Some selected returnees said the following about their housing situation:

Unfortunately, I was not entitled to get a house and had to build one for myself and my six children out of wood. It's hard. [...]. Kismayo urgently needs more houses for returnees [...]. We feel safe here and hope the situation will soon improve (Returnee I).

I lived in Kismayo before the war. We had land and we also had a house. After being 24 years in Dadaab [...] I came before I brought my kids to double-check on my house. When I came back, the fence was broken, so I had to rebuild that. I knew the safety wasn't all the way there, but I felt comfortable, so I went back and got my kids after I fixed my house (Returnee A).

I didn't have land before fleeing. [...]. UNHCR provided me and my family with a home but it's difficult as there are a lot of people to help. [...]. Kismayo is pretty safe and has potential due to all the organizations there. GIZ helped us a lot during our transition. They offered us kitchen supplies and training, but we need more support (Returnee B).

When asked whether the returnees in Kismayo had claims to land or property that belonged to them before they fled, the Governor explained that they do so if they have a certificate that proves this (Interviewee 1). In question 6, 7 out of 16 people identified housing as one of the three biggest challenges they face since coming to Kismayo. To sum up, the two biggest issues in the environmental aspect are security and limited access to land and correspondingly reduced farmland and settlement areas. This leads to overpopulation in the city and the corresponding exploitation of housing and land resources. Although the Governor says that new households are built according to demand (Interviewee 1), many returnees find themselves in IDP camps in very small, crowded rooms or in self-built houses made out of wood. The fact that, on the one hand, 1,990 houses with space for 13,000 people were built in two settlements and, on the other hand, 44,000 people were repatriated to Kismayo from the Kenyan refugee camps between 2014 and 2017 alone illustrates the problem. It is recognized that housing in Kismayo is a major challenge, both for the returning refugees and for the authorities of the city in providing them with sufficient new housing units.

### **3.2.4 Food and Water Security**

Kaun (2008) associate food security with access to markets, land and agricultural equipment, and access to food aid. The focus here is on securing food and water supplies for returnees in Kismayo.

The civil war and recurring droughts caused a sharp decline in food production in Somalia. According to the UN's Environment Programme the grain harvest, measured against the average value of the past five years, has fallen by 45 percent, bringing it down to the level of 1988. Agriculture and

livestock breeding are the basis of life for many people. As a result, nomadic cattle breeders have few alternatives to secure their livelihood if their herd dies due to lack of feed (Duyvesteyn, 2004). Somalia is struggling with recurrent famines. In 1992, following the outbreak of civil war and drought, the country suffered a terrible famine that affected millions of people. Between 240,000 and 280,000 people starved to death. In 2011, Southern Somalia experienced another devastating famine as a result of drought and piracy, in which 258,000 people lost their lives and hundreds of thousands fled the country (Seal & Bailey, 2013). Between 2000 and 2011, piracy off the Somalian coast threatened important international shipping routes and the delivery of food aid to millions of Somalians. Around 2000 pirates operated in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. A serious consequence for the local population was food insecurity, as piracy caused food prices to rise dramatically as only a few cargo ships were still willing to dock in a Somalian port. It was also becoming increasingly difficult for the IC to provide food aid. The number of pirate raids fell sharply after 2011, as they had been fought with military means (Mejia, Quibranza, Kojima, & Sawyer, 2013). Since spring 2017, Somalia has again been suffering from a drought that has affected millions of people through food shortages. In addition, there has been little or no precipitation in large parts of the country. In 2019 Somalia had the „worst harvest since 2011” (UN News, 2019). In spring 2020, Somalia declared a national emergency as large swarms of locusts spread over East Africa. The country's Ministry of Agriculture reported that the insects, which consume huge amounts of vegetation, posed „a major threat to Somalia's fragile food security situation” (BBC News, 2020a). Despite improvements, malnutrition rates throughout Somalia remain among the worst in the world. There are still great humanitarian needs, „particularly among IDP populations, due to residual impacts of drought, ongoing displacement, conflict and marginalization” (UNICEF, 2018). According to UNICEF (2018), more than half of the IDP settlements assessed in Somalia have an acute malnutrition rate. In addition, only about 52 percent of the population have access to a fundamental water supply (WHO, 2019, cited in UNICEF, n.d.). The situation is often even worse in the IDPs and returnee camps as the infrastructure is broken, and the pipes are in poor condition. People often live in overcrowded camps without access to clean water, while diseases and malnutrition spread even faster (UNICEF, n.d.).

Kismayo drew most of its water from the Juba River through the Kismayo Water Treatment Plant. However, as a consequence of the civil war, the plant is now out of operation and its pipes are looted. The city depends on poorly designed, shallowly dug wells for its water supply. Due to the high rate of urbanization and the growing population, the river and the wells have suffered from both human waste pollution and solid waste dumping. Therefore, water is a danger to humans and the cause of several outbreaks of cholera and acute watery diarrhea within the city. The majority of settlements are dependent on pit latrines and underground waste tanks for waste disposal, causing further groundwater contamination. The poor drainage system in Kismayo also undersupplies the city, as many rainfalls cause flooding and water stagnation. These cause an interruption of normal livelihoods, health risks, the pollution of open shallow wells, property destruction, and the loss of human lives. Another source of water is the private company CAAFI, drilling boreholes about 4 km outside the city center. The water

costs are high, as 1,000 liters of water is sold for US\$5 and are hence unreachable and unreliable for the majority of households. Yet, studies on groundwater and water supply in Somalia date back up to 20 years ago, and updates are urgently needed. GIZ is currently conducting a hydrological study in the northern part of the city, where new IDP settlements are being built (GOS et al., 2017). Food and water security are some of the most pressing concerns of the respondents. 14 out of 16 returnees (87,5%) in the survey stated that they do not have sufficient access to food and water. Yet, nobody named the drought as a challenge. 4 people (20%), identified “Access to clean water” in question 6 as one of the main challenges they face in (re)integrating into Kismayo. The planning minister explained:

Water is scarce and very expensive. [...]. Even the HC cannot afford to buy water. As for food, there is not enough at all. That is why there is sometimes food aid from the partners. But it's very scarce. The reason is not the drought, but the general circumstances. [...]. The people cannot farm. They don't produce anything. Because where they have produced, they have been displaced. The breadbasket is occupied by Al- Shabaab areas (Interviewee 6).

The Refugee Commission expressed that the greatest challenge in Kismayo is access to water. A 61-year-old returnee with six children said: „The environment is good, but the main challenge faced by us is access to clean water and the resources are not enough for the community” (Returnee I9). Returnee J, a widower with six children explained: „I don't have access to clean drinking water, and I don't know how to feed my children tomorrow. [...]. It's very hard for us”. Overall, it can be said that food and water security in Kismayo is a significant challenge, as the majority do not have sufficient access to it. Besides weather conditions and low fertility, one of the main reasons is the occupation of the agricultural areas of Al-Shabaab. Other factors are groundwater pollution, unsatisfactory wells, inadequate drainage systems, and private companies selling expensive water to a poor population.

### **3.2.5 Community Security**

Kaun explains the security of the community with access to community support and development without interference from state or non-state actors (Kaun, 2008). The focus here is on the sense of community among returnees in Kismayo.

The population of Somalia grew from 2.76 million to 15.01 million between 1960 and 2018. Currently, Somalia has 15.8<sup>25</sup> million inhabitants, based on projections of the latest UN data, representing a population growth of 2.92% (Worldometer, 2020). The vast majority of Somalian society is ethnically homogenous which distinguishes Somalia from other multi-ethnic African countries south of the Sahara, except for Burundi and Rwanda (Ssereo, 2003). 85% of the population are ethnic Somalis, living mainly in the northern regions of the country. The remaining 15% are members of ethnic minorities, with the Bantu people being the largest minority group residing primarily in the South (Gundel, 2009). The Somalis share a common language, culture, traditions, and Islam as religion (RBE-RN, 2012). Almost 100% of Somalis are Sunni Muslims, with most of the doctrines governing

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<sup>25</sup> as of 05. May 2020

the lives of those who profess Islam agreed. The ethnic composition of the Jubbaland region today includes more than 30 sub-clans (GOS et al., 2017). The questioned returnees did not express any problems of discrimination based on clan affiliation in both the survey and the interviews. In the survey, the majority with 14 out of 16 respondents (87,5%) rejected the statement “I have experienced discrimination in Kismayo because of my clan membership”. Also, when asked if they have already experienced tensions between the HC, the IDPs, and the returnees in Kismayo, the majority of the respondents with 15 out of 16 (93,75%) answered no. In questions 6 and 7 of the survey, none of the returnees indicated “tensions between the HC, IDPs, and returnees”, “discrimination/exclusion by different clans” or “cultural differences” as a major challenge for them. Also, in the interviews with the returnees, nobody pointed out particular problems between the three groups. Following are a few quotes from returnees: „We don’t have any feelings towards the IDPs and the HC. We are all the same. Some of these people I’ve known for years” (Returnee A). „I’m well-adjusted now and I feel that the HC, IDPs, and refugees all get along very well. We are all Somalis, and this is our land” (Returnee B). „We are all a community, However, we do not live in the same areas as the IDPs and HC” (Returnee C). „I’m fully (re)integrated back into Kismayo. We are one community. There are no issues between the three identities. We all have equal opportunities” (Returnee D). „I’m fully (re)integrated into Kismayo. Somalia is my country. I do feel as we are a community” (Returnee H).

Although the majority of the returnees surveyed did not feel any tension in Kismayo, nor did they experience any discrimination based on clan affiliation, the majority with 10 out of 15 respondents (66,66%) stated that they do not perceive that the IDPs, the HC, and the returnees form a community. In contrast, the majority of the returnees interviewed said that they feel that the IDPs, HC, and returnees built a community. Yet, 3 out of 10 respondents believe that resources and aid are unequally distributed. „There are no issues between the IDPs, returnees, and HC. We are all a community. However, when people are being helped, the people that are helped first is the HC” (Returnee E). „I do feel that the IDPs, the returnees, and the HC are a community. However, the IDPs receive more services and have more access to the services” (Returnee F). „We are a community, however, the people that get the most help is the HC. They get all the funding and housing” (Returnee G).

Unlike returnees, who do not see tension or discrimination as a problem, the Governor of Jubbaland has identified this as the greatest challenge:

First, the HC [...] thought that the returnees wanted to take their land. Due to the rush of the many new people, the fear of their land was increasing. Second, Kismayo is the most important commercial center of Jubbaland [...]. The HC thought that they only want to profit from the economic situation of Kismayo, that the IDPs and returnees only came to get what they desired. There was a separation rather than the creation of a community (Interviewee 1).

The head of the refugee commission shares the view of the Governor:

There was confusion between returnees, IDPs, and the HC. [...]. The returnees were foreigners since the other two groups stayed in the country, but the returnees were in another country for 30 years. When they come, they are perceived as foreigners. This mentality exists and is still there. The relations are not good. But it is no longer the way it was before (Interviewee 7).

The planning minister has a different view: „What I hear is that the relationship [between HC, IDPs, and returnees] is not an issue. [...] There is no actual concern with that” (Interviewee 6). Recapitulating, one can see that the opinions differ significantly. While several state officials describe tensions between IDPs, returnees, and the HC as a major challenge, the vast majority of returnees questioned, do not consider it a serious concern. A few returnees expressed unequal treatment in the distribution of aid.

### **3.3 Personal Motivation of the Returnees**

Following the examination of the aspects of human security, this chapter focuses on the (re)integration processes into Kismayo on an individual level. Kaun emphasizes that while institutional factors influence the ability to (re)integrate, individual factors impact upon the motivation to (re)integrate. Although they are more difficult to quantify, individual motivations need to be recognized and taken into account in policy planning initiatives. A variety of factors influence human behavior, but three factors can be identified that significantly influence the motivation for (re)integration. These are related to place, relationships with people, and confidence in human security (Kaun, 2008).

#### *Relationship with place*

In the interviews with the returnees in Kismayo, it became clear how complex the relationships are that the individuals have with their physical “home”. While settling in Kismayo meant homecoming for some respondents, for others, especially the younger ones, it meant settling in an environment that was completely unknown. Returnees may have returned to Kismayo because they lived there before the expulsion, or they may have decided to settle in Kismayo even though they lived in another region before fleeing. Other interviewees were born in Dadaab in Kenya and have, therefore “returned” to a country that is foreign to them. Of the 10 interviewed returnees, 7 persons (70%) did not know Kismayo before their return to Somalia. 3 people (30%) lived there before. Since the repatriation of refugees to their country of origin is often associated with “homecoming”, it is necessary to deal with the problem of what home means to someone who was born and raised in a refugee camp. For those who have lived in Dadaab for an average of 15 years, what does home entail? The perceptions are very individual. Following are a few impressions from the interviews. „We had the opportunity to go anywhere in Somalia, but we chose Kismayo. I wouldn’t leave Kismayo. I’m comfortable here. I feel safe” (Returnee D). „We didn’t want to come back, but however, [...] we are happy to be back in the lower Jubba area, [...] because that is my home. (Returnee A). „I left Somalia in 2009 when I was 9 years old and I’m back in Kismayo since 2017. It’s a new home and a foreign place I’ve never been to” (Returnee H).

My biggest challenge about coming to Kismayo was that it was a foreign place for me since I only knew Kenya my whole life. I didn’t know the city or the people, or the customs. That was hard at first but now I feel comfortable and completely integrated into the Somali culture and the city. However, if I could leave Kismayo I would leave if I had the choice (Returnee F).

I was born in a refugee camp, but I do not have Kenyan citizenship. I never knew the state of Kismayo nor what was going on as I’ve never been to Somalia. I came with my mother because I

was a child. [...]. I don't see myself staying in Kismayo in the long run as there are a lot of issues. It's not the same as in Kenya. And I'm not happy to be back (Returnee G).

I'm really happy to be back home in my motherland. Kismayo is very different from the time that I left. Safety-wise it depends on how you look at it, but a lot of things have changed. If I could speak to the IC or the Kismayo government [...] I would say, please make the people feel welcome and let them know that they are back home (Returnee C).

These quotations illustrate how the returnees' experiences and perceptions of Kismayo as their home differ. The study emphasizes that a person's relationship to the place depends on socioeconomic factors. E.g, when a place was associated with livelihood opportunities, returnees shared nostalgia for the life in the refugee camps (Kaun, 2008). „There were much more resources available in Dadaab, there were enough water, food being provided, and health care and free education. We don't have any of those things available to us anymore” (Returnee B). However, when it came to the feeling of belonging, several returnees expressed their attachment to Somalia as their home country. „We are all Somali. This is our land” (Returnee A). Also, some returnees who lived in Dadaab for many years still described Somalia as their home. Such as Returnee H, who lived almost half of her life in Kenya „I'm happy to be back in my home country”. In question 6 of the survey, only one respondent cited “Kismayo was a foreign place for me” as a challenge. The study didn't reveal that cultural or religious associations related to the region played a major role in determining the places where returnees (re)settled (Kaun, 2008).

### *Relationship with people*

Like the relationship to a place, the relationship of one person to other people has a strong influence on the ability to (re)integrate. The place where family or friends are located can greatly influence the decision to relocate and the ease to do so. Alongside these more intimate connections, culture, and language play an important role (Kaun, 2008). As already noted, the majority of those questioned did not know the city of Kismayo before returning to Somalia. Accordingly, the inhabitants were new to them and they had to make new contacts and friendships. All respondents in this study either returned to Kismayo from Dadaab with family or already had family in Kismayo, which was one of their main reasons for settling in the city. Not one of the respondents expressed complaints about the lack of or poor relations with the fellow inhabitants of Kismayo. Also, no complaints about language barriers were expressed. Although the official languages differ between Kenya (with Swahili and English) and Somalia (with Somali and Arabic), this does not seem to pose a problem for the (re)integration of returnees. That is likely to be because 96% of the inhabitants of Dadaab are from Somalia and therefore speak Somali (ICMC, 2013). Moreover, the Somali language has been formally taught in Dadaab schools for over 20 years (Rich, 2018).

Common cultural characteristics and differences with others can impair (re)integration. The majority of the respondents did not express any problems regarding cultural differences. In question 6 of the survey, not one returnee cited “cultural differences” as a challenge for him or her during

(re)integration in Somalia. In the interviews a few individuals commented on the issue: „I did know the state of Kismayo before I came back. However, it was hard for us to (re)integrate into Kismayo. The biggest challenge we had for the first 2 years was understanding the culture. Even though we all have the same culture, we dealt with things differently” (Returnee A). „The biggest challenge for me was being accustomed to Somali culture. Even though I did have the culture, it was just very different. It’s a new home and a foreign place I’ve never been to” (Returnee H). Returnee C was already familiar with the culture in Somalia and had in comparison to Returnee A and H no problems to adapt: „I am happy that people unify our culture and the old culture I saw before I left. This makes me really happy”.

#### *Level of confidence in human security*

It is reasonable to assume that the majority of respondents returned because they had a certain amount of confidence in Somalia's future. As already been analyzed, although the majority stated that it was their free decision to return, this choice was influenced by external pressure from the Kenyan government. To recall, 13 from 16 returnees (81, 25%) confirmed that external pressure from the Kenyan government was a reason for their return. Even if those who returned with the help of UNHCR were informed about the current status and security situation of Somalia before their return, it cannot be concluded that the majority of those returned for reasons of confidence in the human security situation in Somalia. But what about the respondents' trust in human security after their return? To answer this, question 5 of the survey addressed whether the respondents could imagine living in Kismayo in the long term. Although more than half of the respondents stated that Kismayo is not their area of origin, the majority with 10 out of 16 respondents (62,5%) indicated that they plan to remain permanently in their current location. Explanations were e.g. „Kismayo is my hometown and I would like to stay as long as I’m safe” (Returnee M13) or „Kismayo is my home and I will never leave it for the rest of my life” (Returnee P16). However, six people (37,5%) cannot imagine living in the city over a longer period. Explanations for this were e.g. limited livelihood opportunities or poor access to basic services. „Because of the hardships of life, I don’t think I can survive in Somalia” (Returnee O15); „We will not live in a city where the working conditions are bad. Or remain homeless, inshallah” (Returnee N14).

Trust in the future influences the happiness of people. In the survey, it was asked whether the returnees are happy to be back in Kismayo. The vast majority, with 15 out of 16 people (93,75%), indicated that they were overall satisfied with their decision to return and happy to be back. Also, in the interviews, the majority said that they were happy that they had returned to Somalia. The one who was not satisfied with the decision to return cited as a reason the limited livelihood possibility. When asked if they feel that the Somalian state supports them in their (re)integration process, the majority with 10 out of 16 (62,5%) responded with yes. In short, although returnees face several problems in (re)integrating into a country like Somalia, the majority of returnees are happy to be in Kismayo, can imagine living in the city for the long term, and feel supported by the Somalian state in their (re)integration.

## 4. Addressing the Main Challenges

Four years after the peak of the repatriation of Somalian refugees to Kismayo, enormous challenges remain. This chapter summarizes and discusses the main challenges for (re)integration on the part of returnees, IC and Jubbaland authorities. It also provides an overview of the IC and local government's interventions to counteract these challenges.

### 4.1 The Difficulties of (Re)integrating Returnees from Different Perspectives

#### *Returnees*

The returnees perceived that there are many unresolved issues in Kismayo, as returnee F said:

If I could speak to the Somali government or the IC about certain challenges they can improve, I wouldn't pick a pinpoint specifically about what they can change. There are a lot of issues and a lot of problems that need to be upgraded and changed (Returnee F).

The study concluded that from the perspective of the returnees the 3 most pressing challenges to (re)integrate into Kismayo are: (1) **lack of employment** and (2) **lack of education opportunities**, as well as (3) **lack of resources**. 13 out of 16 returnees (81,25%) indicated that they believe that there are not enough employment opportunities. 10 returnees (62,5%) stated that there are not enough education opportunities and 11 (68,75%) expressed complaints about inadequate resources in the city. In question 7 of the survey, where respondents were requested to rank the challenges by urgency, both lacks of education and employment opportunities were ranked as the most urgent challenge with 6 votes each. This was followed by a lack of resources with 3 votes. A similar result was obtained in the interviews.

#### *International Community*

There was a widespread overlap between the statements made by GIZ and UNHCR staff members and the perceptions of returnees. For Interviewee 2 and 3 the biggest challenges are the resources needed for livelihood and a lack of basic services in Kismayo. On the one hand there is a huge influx of people, but on the other hand, the region itself is poor and simply cannot provide enough resources yet. „The town cannot feed everyone, all returnees from Kenya and Yemen” (Interviewee 2). In particular, she mentions the problems concerning the lack of employment opportunities and poor and inconsistent school education. She argues, that the local government of Kismayo is highly dependent on the help of the IC. Ms. Reichelt shares a similar view. „I think the biggest challenges are the possibility to earn money and also further school education as well as access to health facilities. So, actually the provision of basic services” (Interviewee 4). She highlights the presence of Al-Shabaab as a major problem due to security concerns and resulting limited living and cultivation areas. She argues that future development strongly depends on when and to what extent areas around Kismayo will be liberated to resettle IDPs and returnees as well as to increase agriculture. Interviewee 5 sees the situation in Kismayo more critically. When asked what challenges she sees, she replied: „Lack of resources, lack of land, weak or nonexistent legal systems. [...]. Weak government systems or the provision of basic services

like health, water, or education”. When asked which of the obstacles she mentioned she considered to be the greatest, Interviewee 5 answered security.

To sum up, the IC’s views coincide with the perceptions of the returnees. Yet, the IC considers security a significant challenge, whereas hardly any of the returnees expressed any serious concerns. The three main challenges from the perspective of the IC are accordingly: (1) **lack of resources**, (2) **lack of basic services** as well as (3) **security concerns**.

#### *The Regional Government of Jubbaland / Authorities in Kismayo*

As already explained in chapter 3.2.5, the Governor of Jubbaland describes that the biggest challenges occur between the returnees and the HC. In particular, he referred to the dispute over land and labor. Furthermore, he explained:

Another challenge was and is that the returnees and IDPs received funding from the IC, and the HC did not. As a result, families from the HC moved to the IDP and returnee camps to benefit as well from the funding. So, e.g. children from the HC of Kismayo suddenly went and still go to the schools of the camps that were originally intended for IDPs and returnees. Since these schools receive financial support and are therefore in quite good condition, possibly even in a better condition than the schools of Kismayo (Interviewee 1).

The issue of unequal distribution of aid was also raised by the Refugee Commission. Thus, Interviewee 7 explained that originally, when IDPs and returnees came to Kismayo, they were very welcome, but over time, the unfair distribution of aid and the prioritization of returnees changed that. A further difficulty raised by the Refugee Commission is the “fixed mentality as refugees”.

A problem is, that returnees still believe that they are refugees. That they are vulnerable with no access in life. [...]. Even when they come into our office, they say ‘I am a refugee’. And I say, ‘how can you be a refugee in your own country? They have to understand that they are no longer returnees, nor are they refugees. They are now part of the Somali citizens (Interviewee 7).

Interviewee 7 further explained that this mentality leads to what they call the “dependency syndrome”.

When they were in Dadaab, they got free food, water, and education. And today they still have adapted to this “dependency syndrome”. They think everything is free. [...]. Our biggest challenge is to try to fight with that so that they can sustain their own lives (Interviewee 7).

Interviewee 7 further stated security problems, the poor economic and uneducated background of the HC, and a general lack of resources. In the view of the Planning Minister, the biggest obstacle is the underfunding of the city. He pleads for more financial help from the IC, e.g. to expand the infrastructure. It was found that perspectives and perceptions differ concerning the main challenges for (re)integration. While the perceptions of GIZ and UNHCR informants largely overlap with the experiences of returnees, it is interesting to notice that the views of government officials widely diverge. Thus, from the perspective of the respondents from the Somali authorities and the regional government of Jubbaland, the greatest challenges in (re)integrating the returnees in Kismayo are (1) Envy and competition over resources between returnees and the HC, (2) “Dependency Syndrome”, (3) No holistic distribution of aid – exclusion of the HC, as well as (4) Underfunding.

## 4.2 Responding to the Challenges of (Re)integration and the Role of UNHCR and GIZ

The (re)-integration does not depend solely on the personal characteristics of the returnees, but also to a great extent on the facilitation by state and non-governmental institutions. „[W]ithout national and international political will, reintegration cannot occur” (Kaun, 2008). Certain fundamental building blocks are required to be provided by the state for human growth and development to take place. Such needs are an integral part of the framework for human security – including livelihood opportunities, basic services, infrastructure, and security. Kaun (2008) clarifies that the current paradigm of (post)-conflict aid places state institutions above IO’s and NGOs (Kaun, 2008). After years of civil war, however, Somalia is not in a position to set up these mechanisms for its citizens. As this study suggests, the country is highly dependent on IC interventions to facilitate the (re)integration of returnees due to a lack of capacities and technical expertise. This section examines the role of UNHCR and GIZ in the (re)integration process and the impact of their interventions on the overall situation.

### *UNHCR*

The UNHCR return aid comprises unconditional sets of basic supplies, a one-time unconditional resettlement grant of US\$200 per person, a six-month unconditional monthly grant of US\$200 per household, a six-month unconditional monthly food ration grant as well as a conditional education grant of up to US\$25 per month for each school-age child for one year. After arrival, UNHCR uses post-return monitoring (UNHCR, 2019a). „Our mandate includes advocacy work with the government to ensure that it takes its responsibilities. They should be welcoming its people back home and assist them to (re)integrate. But since we’re here it’s us. They need to improve their involvement” (Interviewee 3). On the question of whether Interviewee 3 considers the authorities dependent on the help of the IC, he argued: „A lot. Not only from UNHCR and GIZ, [...], also from UNDP or other development actors. There is a lot of money from the EU and the World Bank that is being channeled to the government”.

### *GIZ*

GIZ supports Kismayo primarily with three different interventions: The “Somali Reintegration Programme” (SRP), the “Fish for Nutrition”, and the “Urban Food Security” (UFSP) initiatives. Fish for nutrition targets food security, with GIZ promoting the consumption of fish to improve the daily food supply. This is done through media campaigns informing people about the benefits of eating fish and through practical knowledge transfer in cooking courses. Fishermen and fish sellers take part in training courses and learn about the hygienic processing and storage of fish (Reichelt, n.d.). UFSP is a response to the recurring drought and lack of access to water in the new settlements of Midnimo and Madina. By drilling two boreholes, salt/brack water is provided to the residents. To meet the need for drinking water GIZ developed the Midnimo and Madina Water Sub Service Agency together with the Ministry of Minerals, Energy, and Water in Jubbaland. The agency sells affordable and safe water through a prepaid water distribution system. Each inhabitant receives a coin that is used to draw water.

With this approach, GIZ focuses on institutional strengthening, including personnel support, technical assistance, coordination meetings, and equipment (Reichelt, 2019). GIZ follows a community-oriented, holistic approach, meaning they target not only returnees and IDPs, but also include the HC. „Nobody has to feel excluded. [...]. We give each group of people a certain percentage. 50% to the returnees, 30% to the IDPs, and 20% of our interventions to the HC” (Interviewee 2). The technical advisor of SRP reports:

When we started in 2015, our idea was to create pool factors to encourage people to return. But when we saw what the situation was like in Kismayo, we changed that. We are not creating pool factors, but we are creating conditions that are conducive to (re)integration (Interviewee 5).

Thus, SRP supports setting up businesses and income generation, organizing infrastructure reconstruction, and courses to impart knowledge. People learn professions such as carpentry and tailoring or are prepared for modern service sectors. Furthermore, there are psychosocial services offered by GIZ to help people with war experiences and trauma (Reichelt, 2020). When asked what challenges of (re)integration have already been addressed or even solved, Interviewee 5 explained:

Other aid organizations than GIZ have contributed to shelter rebuilding. The government itself has provided empty land for the relocation of IDPs and returnees [...]. There are a lot of humanitarian organizations [...] providing basic services like health and water. [...]. And we are working with the government to ensure at least some improvement with service deliveries [...].

Ms. Reichelt added:

In the education sector certain issues were addressed, but by other actors and not by GIZ. I know that UNHCR had money and they commissioned international NGOs to build schools. We [GIZ] built a hospital in the new settlement. The second largest one is in the city. Then we built a school for midwives because maternal mortality and infant mortality are high. [...]. Then, the entire professional sector and also start-ups for small businesses. A bakery was built, where cakes are offered. Then the whole milk area was built up, yogurt was produced (Interviewee 4).

Interviewee 2 further explained:

We also do a community dialogue, where all groups are invited to discuss issues. [...]. When we carry out interventions to secure livelihoods, institutional strengthening, psychosocial support, etc. GIZ not only takes care of training and support, but we also act as mentors for the people. And we measure it. We keep the data, do a follow-up, and monitor every three months.

To the question of whether Kismayo is dependent on the help of the IC, all three interviewed GIZ employees agreed. „The government has not the capacity to support the people. Basically, with anything. The things which are supposed to be provided by the government is provided by the IO’s here” (Interviewee 2). Ms. Reichelt argued: „I would make a distinction between humanitarian aid, which was quite dominant until 2015/2016, and long-term development cooperation. GIZ was actually the first organization to focus on long-term development” (Interviewee 4). She further explained:

[D]evelopment cooperation at eye level is not always the right step. [...]. Somalia itself does not yet have many resources to give. But the willingness is there and there should be more actors with the same development goal. Being on the ground for three to five years and not just short term.

The presentation of both UNHCR and GIZ operations in Kismayo illustrates that the main difference between the interventions lies in the fact that UNHCR is directly involved in the process of

refugee return from Kenya to Somalia, while GIZ focuses on (re)integration measures on the ground. While UNHCR primarily offers short-term assistance to meet the immediate needs of returnees, GIZ shifted its focus from immediate humanitarian aid to a long-term, holistic approach by promoting wider activities to create an environment conducive to the return and a sustainable (re)integration. Not only do members of the IC declare that the government of Jubbaland is dependent on aid and funding, but also the majority of returnees expressed in the survey the feeling of receiving more support from the IC than from their government. 8 respondents (50%) of the survey received support from UNHCR and GIZ. Of those eight, six (75%) stated that the IC was more helpful in the (re)integration process than the authorities of Kismayo. The same outcome was observed in the interviews with the returnees. Here are some quotes: „I received [from UNHCR] about US\$200 per month for 6 months. When I look into the bigger picture, I'd hope Somalia would start helping and get on their feet. But for now, the IC is the one helping us” (Returnee C). „UNHCR did help us, they gave us support before we were leaving. They really helped us; they build us homes. But now we expect our government to step in” (Returnee H). „I feel like the IO's are more active in supporting the (re)integration in Kismayo than the Somali state. I would have wished for more help“ (Returnee J).

In the interviews with the 3 government representatives, it was noted that they repeatedly pleaded for support from the IC in taking responsibility. Interviewee 7 explained: „The government is weak, and so is the economy. Even I as a government employee don't receive any salary. Jubbaland and the national government are really working. [...]. However, we need the IC to increase efforts”. The Planning Minister agreed with this matter. The representatives were also asked what the government has done to date to meet the challenges of (re)integrating returnees. Interviewee 6 explained that the challenges are being tackled jointly by the federal government, the state government, donors, and international partners. The refugee commission added: „Two villages were built where 50% returnees, 30% IDPs and 20% HC live. The system by which they settle in the village promotes (re)integration. They play together, they live together. There is no barrier anymore (Interviewee 7). The Governor further explained: „When GIZ came to Kismayo, they helped to involve the HC in the activities. They started an awareness campaign about the erasure of titles like IDP or returnee. They were all called Somali People because that is what they are” (Interviewee 1).

This study found no significant differences in the challenges of (re)integration between those who returned with UNHCR support and those who returned without support. Both groups provided similar answers to the difficulties they have to overcome during (re)integration. The reasons for this are primarily seen in two aspects: (1) (re)integration is a long-term process and UNHCR only offers short-term support. Providing six months of aid eases the arrival in Kismayo for the returnees, however, for the (re) integration as a long-term process it does not make a significant difference; (2) The conditions in Kismayo are too poor and the state's resources too scarce for six months of support to compensate. This is e.g. reflected in the unemployment rate of 70% for people under 30 years of age. Thus, the lack of employment opportunities limits the returnees' access to paid labor, despite UNHCR assistance. To

conclude this subchapter, the study recognizes that the authorities of Kismayo are heavily dependent on the help and funding from the IC for the facilitation of the (re)integration of returnees. This was confirmed by the statements of the interviewed government officials, GIZ and UNHCR, as well as the returnees themselves. Therefore, hypothesis A was validated. The IC and the Somalian authorities have acknowledged the challenges of returnees' (re)integration and taken measures to combat them. GIZ addresses, e.g., the aspects of food- and water security, as well as community- and employment security. They are further active in the health sector. It was noted that other aid organizations are currently building and renovating schools in Kismayo on behalf of the UNHCR. Moreover, new settlements with housing units for the new arrivals are built. However, as the study revealed, more remains to be done as tremendous challenges remain. It was found that long-term, holistic approaches as GIZ implements are more effective in facilitating (re)integration as a long-term process. Interviews with the returnees, IC employees, and government officials confirmed this. It needs to be kept in mind that dependence on external support is dangerous, as donors can stop their funding at any time if, e.g., they see no development. The burden of national development cannot be shifted solely to humanitarian organizations or development NGOs. Instead, the Somali government and international actors must work together and coordinate their activities to guarantee a (re)integration process consistently and comprehensively. As Interviewee 7 explained: „(re)integration is a joint task. A joint responsibility”.

## **5. Moving Backwards or Forwards? A Final Discussion and Concluding Remarks**

Twenty years after the “decade of VR”, questions of return and (re)integration remain significantly under-researched (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). Half a decade has passed since Somalian refugees began repatriating from Kenya, yet major challenges remain. This research investigated the current state of social and economic (re)integration practices in Kismayo, using Kaun’s (re)integration strategy (2008). By placing institutional and individual dimensions at the center of this process, the dissertation highlights the lack of human security in Kismayo and thus prevents a sustainable (re-)integration from occurring. Hypothesis B is confirmed.

Since 2012 the situation in Kismayo has stabilized and life has returned to the port city. Families are reunited, neighbors have gotten to know each other again, and new faces have appeared as people from other regions searched for new places to settle. The urban economy of Kismayo is currently undergoing rapid development. However, for the majority of the population, progress has not been accompanied by improvements in daily food security, access to clean water, sanitation, and adequate housing. In all analyzed aspects of human security, except community security, major shortcomings have been identified. The study concluded that the main challenges are the lack of resources and funding, insufficient provision of basic services (particularly in terms of employment and education opportunities), security concerns, and the unequal/partial distribution of aid. One of the biggest problems in Somalia is youth unemployment, which puts particular pressure on young returnees to find a sustainable livelihood in Kismayo. It is accordingly important that basic social services are expanded to minimize the danger of competition and conflict between returnees, IDPs, and HC (Menkaus, 2017).

Most IDPs and refugees used to live in camps in which they had at least access to a basic level of health care, education, food security, and potable water. Returning to Kismayo, where safety nets are limited, makes sustainable (re)integration a long and difficult task (Lippman & Rogge, 2004). This brings us back to the approach of Watson (1996) who argues that return can pose a greater challenge than the experience of exile itself. Instead of the stability that the returnees had in the refugee camps, they face a multitude of problems, uncertainties, and dangers after their return to Kismayo. The situation is compounded by the fact that the local authorities have only limited capacity to implement effective and efficient return and (re)integration programs, creating dependency on assistance from the IC. The governor of Jubbaland was the only one who stated that the greatest challenges lie between the HC, IDPs, and returnees. Yet, not a single returnee complained about problems, tensions, or clan fights within the community. Only a few concerns expressed included the feeling of envy or the fear of being left behind. The findings suggest that the challenges of (re)integration do not relate to peaceful coexistence within the community but lie more in the area of providing basic services and livelihoods.

What is the perception of (re)integration of those affected themselves? When asked in the survey whether the returnees feel (re)integrated into Kismayo, 8 of 15 respondents (53.33%) answered yes and the remaining 7 (46.66%) no. In the interviews, 8 of the 10 returnees (80%) reported that they feel

(re)integrated. Following are some selected quotes: „I’m well-adjusted now. Kismayo is pretty safe and has a lot of potential due to all the organizations here, like GIZ” (Returnee B). „I’m fully (re)integrated back into Kismayo. I’m happy in my country and I do feel safe“ (Returnee H). „We haven’t fully (re)integrated. I do feel safe and I’m happy to be home. But the services here are bad” (Returnee A). „I’m adjusted in Kismayo now because I have to because I live here now” (Returnee G). „As a result of the many challenges we have to face, I do not feel (re)integrated into Kismayo and I hope for support from the IC or the Somali state” (Returnee I).

Overall, of the 25 returnees, the majority with 16 (64%) feel (re)integrated into Kismayo despite various difficulties encountered. Thus, for some, factors such as family, sense of belonging, and the feeling of “home” can carry more weight than practical considerations. For others, the lack of human security has been a cause for not feeling (re)integrated into the region. This reveals that the individual motivation to (re)integrate depends on several factors and cannot be generalized owing to the personal character (Kaun, 2018). It is also important to bear in mind the dimension of the returnees' lifestyle, strategies, and expectations. In case of a voluntary return, what are the reasons behind people moving to the war-torn areas? What are their expectations before returning, what is the reality on- site, and how do they deal with the likely discrepancies?<sup>26</sup>

And how do government officials and employees of GIZ and UNHCR assess the (re)integration processes up to now? The answers differ. According to the Governor, the Planning Minister, and the Refugee Commission officials on- site, the (re)integration process is not yet complete. „Some of the returnees are fully (re)integrated and joined the HC. Some have businesses, they have jobs. They are like any other citizen. However, some had to (re)integrate into the IDP camp. Thus, the (re-)integration is currently 50:50 completed” (Interviewee 7). The Minister of Planning explains:

The (re)integration is not as successful as the amenities are not yet complete. [...]. We have to connect more with aid and talk to donors. [...] Once the money is here, we can set up everything and locate people to where the development has been done (Interviewee 6).

Ms. Reichelt, on the other hand, believes that (re)integration has so far been ‘successful’. Her explanation, however, is rather based on the results of the GIZ interventions in Kismayo: „I would describe the (re)integration as successful. I cannot prove it quantitatively. We have figures from our target group [from GIZ], but of course, there are many more people who came back who do not benefit from our activities” (Interview Partner 4). Similarly, interviewee 3 describes (re)integration as generally successful, though he draws mainly on the work of the UNHCR in that process:

I would say that it is perhaps between 70-90% successful. And the reason is the coordination we have with the UNHCR in Somalia. Before the refugees leave Kenya, we inform them that we have a family that will come, that this number of people will come and that these are their special needs. And thus, they are preparing in Somalia to receive this family (Interviewee 3).

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<sup>26</sup> For more information on migratory life strategies see Monsutti (2011), Agier (2011), or Neto (2018).

In contrast, two GIZ employees (Interviewee 2 and 5) have a different view and assess the (re)integration of the returnees into Kismayo as unsuccessful. Both cite a lack of resources as a main reason. It becomes clear that the majority of the informants express that the (re)integration practices are either not successful or not yet complete. This underlines the fact that returning cannot simply be seen as „an event with an end state” (Harild et al., 2015, p. 29), but rather as a complex and long-term process.

The study revealed that there is an apparent gap in the targeting of humanitarian aid, whereby returnees generally are given priority over IDPs and ‘stayees’. However, the mere focus on returnees reveals an ignorance of the realities faced by other population groups affected by war, such as the HC. Kaun argues that embedding the HC in (post)-war contexts implies stability, security, and a sustainable livelihood for both donors and humanitarian organizations. But one cannot assume that a ‘stayee’ has experienced less suffering than a former refugee in a conflict and therefore deserves less humanitarian aid. To be rooted in a certain place in the course of a conflict does not signify a lack of hardship or suffering. Stayees are often trapped in a vicious circle of conflict that inhibits social and economic growth at the family or community level. Besides, they are often significantly worse off than those of their returned compatriots once peace is achieved (Kaun, 2008). This reality was observed in the case of Kismayo, where returnees have in some respects more favorable conditions and opportunities than the HC. Returnees from Dadaab generally obtained a better education and are therefore those who have a better chance of getting decent employment. Besides, the returnees receive support from various aid organizations, such as the UNHCR, in providing schooling for the children, health care, housing, and an unconditional income for a limited period. The HC on the other hand lives in the same environment and rarely receives support. Due to the years without general education in Somalia, ‘stayees’ have greater difficulty finding employment than the returnees. Feelings of disadvantage may arise as the scarcity of resources, security, employment, and educational opportunities affect not only returnees or IDPs but *all* inhabitants of the region. The extent to which the (re)integration will be sustainable is strongly interwoven within the larger community. Focusing solely on IDPs and returnees in an environment such as Somalia is not conducive, as the vast majority of the population - regardless of their classification - need assistance. One-sided support of isolated groups can lead to tensions over available resources and make the (re)integration of returnees more difficult. A community-based initiative should involve all people living in the community - stayees, IDPs, and returnees - and aim to promote dialogue, social cohesion, and empowerment (IOM, 2017).

As discussed in chapter 2.4 scholars criticize the relationship between basic post-return assistance and longer-term development measures. To recall, Cuny and Stein (1994) argued that comprehensive international post-return assistance should focus on the rehabilitation of returnees rather than long-term development assistance. Short-term interventions to meet e.g. food security are certainly effective in facilitating returnees' entry into (re)integration, but they are not a permanent solution. Afterward, returnees are still confronted with the hardships of limited services and resources. The provision of educational and employment opportunities, e.g., can only be achieved through long-term approaches.

And the state of Somalia does not have sufficient resources for this, as the study confirmed. I would like to add a quote from Returnee A, who is struggling with a severe lack of education for her 13 children as well as housing and medical care. It illustrates that the actual assistance lies in long-term approaches, as GIZ adapts: „When we were coming to Kismayo [in 2015], UNHCR gave us US\$700. However, they haven't helped me since. The cooperation that really helps me is GIZ” (Returnee A).

All respondents of the study agree that Somalia is dependent on external support. Furthermore, Somalia is described by Western countries as the most fragile state on earth. This raises several questions: (1) If Somalia is not a country in the sense of Western states (i.e. “failed state”), why is the return of refugees to such a country considered the most “durable solution” to this refugee crisis? (2) What is the actual interest of IOs, NGOs, and governments in supporting the repatriation of refugees in such a fragile environment? (3) Under these circumstances, how should short-term support and the sole satisfaction of immediate needs, as offered by UNHCR, be a sufficiently sustainable solution to facilitate (re)integration? If UNHCR views the return of refugees to Somalia as *the* durable solution, it should also support the main receiving regions to such an extent that they are conducive to mass returns.

This dissertation also recognized that there is much debate among scholars about the voluntary nature of the return of refugees. In chapter 2.3, studies by HRW and AI were presented, which demonstrated and strongly criticized that the return of refugees from Dadaab to Somalia is often anything but voluntary. This has been confirmed in this research. While the majority of the returnees said that it was their own decision to return, most of them also stated that they returned as a result of pressure from the Kenyan state. UNHCR states in a published report from 2015: „At the moment, however, conditions in Somalia are not yet conducive for safe, dignified and sustainable mass refugee returns to Central/South Somalia” (p. 6). If they acknowledge this reality, why do they support since 2014 the return of refugees to these very regions? The country is still in a state of civil war and the central government has no control over all regions of the country, sharing the administration with Al-Shabaab. As discussed above, this violates international refugee and human rights laws. For one possible answer, I want to come back to the propositions of Bakewell (2002) and Crisp (2004), which were discussed in chapter 2.1. According to them, refugees are often perceived as a threat to the societies in which they settle. This is what happened in Kenya. After increased attacks by Al-Shabaab in the country, the Somali asylum-seeker and refugee population were seen as the scapegoat for the attacks. Fearing for the safety of the Kenyan population, the refugees were held responsible, and accordingly, threats were made to close the camps. The Kenyan state revoked refugee status *prima facie* and exerted pressure on the IC and the Somali population to repatriate the refugees.

Another debate that arose in the literature on refugee return was the concept of home and the feeling of belonging for a refugee. It is understood that (post)-war return enables refugees to (re)integrate into realities and structures they are familiar with. But as the findings demonstrate, returning to Kismayo is not simply a reversal of displacement and a return to normality. This rationale might apply to durations of short-term displacement, e.g. less than five years. But in the case of Somalia, where many refugees

have lived in camps for decades and where children and youths are often born abroad without ever setting foot in their country of origin, a return “home” cannot be the universal assumption. For those affected, a repatriation is a form of resettlement rather than a return to normality (Kaun, 2008). As the study found out, only a few of the returnees are original inhabitants of Kismayo. Most of them are from rural agricultural and agropastoral communities in Southern Somalia. Alongside the fear of Al-Shabaab's presence in these regions, the reluctance of returnees to return directly to their original “homes” can be attributed to the lack of basic education and health services in these remote rural areas. Moreover, after years in the quasi-urban environment of Dadaab, there may be resistance to returning to agriculture as a livelihood (Menkhaus, 2007).

It is often assumed that refugees want to return to their homeland. However, Chimni (2004) noted that there are indeed many situations in which returnees do not wish to return “home”. As an example, he cited the time and meaning of home. Second generation refugees often do not have the desire to move to a country they have never been to before, nor do people whose understanding of home has been transformed by a longer stay in exile. This fact was confirmed here. Two of the Somalian interviewees were born in Dadaab and did not want to go to Somalia, but only moved to Kismayo at the request of their family. Returnee A lived in Dadaab for 24 years and stated that she did not want to return to Somalia after her prolonged stay in the camp. The “home” one is familiar with can change over some time. Somalia had no central government for over 20 years, and Kismayo was occupied by Al-Shabaab between 2008 and 2012. The Kismayo that the returnees knew before they fled may no longer exist as such today. Thus, e.g. returnee C explained: „Kismayo is very different from the time that I left”.

The sustainability of repatriation itself and its relationship to development and state-building is yet another dominant debate in the reviewed literature. „Gradually, return migration came to be considered as both a movement back to normal, which restores the pre-conflict natural and social order, and a movement forward to change, in which returnees contribute to development and peace-building” (Koser & Black, 1999, cited in van Houte, 2014, p. 13). Donors, NGOs, and governments agree that (re)integration is essential to secure future peace and development in (post)- war societies. Kaun (2008) argues that circumstances whereby returnees experience marginalization, insecurity, or a lack of economic opportunities may result in new conflicts and/or further displacement waves. As the study confirms (particularly in terms of community security), in the short term the returnees will not affect the security of Kismayo and the region of Jubbaland nor will they trigger a serious conflict. The lack of human security living difficult for everyone, regardless of their previous ties to a place or community. Given the increasing urbanization trend and the fact that people are settling in places unknown to them, governments and donors need to reconsider not only the concept of “return” but also the circumstances required for former refugees and IDPs to live in a particular place. The (re)integration of returnees into Kismayo can, due to the lack of security in the examined aspects of human security, currently not be assessed sustainable. The sustainability is influenced by the following factors: (1) presence and insecurity of Al-Shabaab in the surrounding regions; (2) limited capacity of government institutions in

many areas; (3) reduced livelihood opportunities; (4) shortage of basic services such as education; (5) weak infrastructure, especially in housing, schools and health care facilities (UNHCR, 2017). However, a benchmark is needed for a proper evaluation of the matter. This can be found either concerning the status of the returnee before the initial migration (comparison of the socio-economic situation after the return with that before the migration) or in relation to the situation of the local population. In this area future research is necessary.

It was found that views on the major challenges of (re)integration differed. While the statements of GIZ and UNHCR informants coincided with the experiences of the returnees, the government officials had a quite different perception of it. It is important that the Jubbaland administration recognizes the views and experiences of the returnees and addresses them accordingly. Donors and aid organizations like GIZ have already taken several initiatives to respond to the key challenges identified, such as food insecurity, water scarcity, and lack of employment opportunities. Yet, they also have limited resources and cannot fill every gap in assistance (Kaun, 2008). This study suggests that it is possible to achieve sustainable (re)integration in Kismayo if (1) security is provided by liberating surrounding areas from Al-Shabaab and (2) if this is done in a way that takes into account both the institutional and the individual dimension of the process (3) facilitation is jointly addressed by the Federal Government of Somalia, the regional government of Jubbaland and national and international donors

As the results show, the return to Kismayo cannot be considered a movement back to normality, neither is it easily a movement forward to transformation and state-building. It was confirmed in the interviews with the informants, that such an enormous influx of new inhabitants contributes to the economic development and strengthening of the region. Yet, it was also noted that the state of Jubbaland and the region of Kismayo have hardly any resources available to supply all inhabitants satisfactorily. To what extent the return of refugees in Kismayo will have an impact on the economic development and peacebuilding of the region remains to be seen and should be investigated in future research.

To sum up, the findings of this research suggest, that the conditions in Kismayo are not yet conducive for a sustainable (re)integration to happen. Major shortcomings were identified in four out of five aspects of human security examined, namely in the fields of the education system, the economy, food, and water security as well as environmental security. A lack of infrastructure and adequate livelihoods, as well as insufficient basic services, currently prevent *all* inhabitants of Kismayo from living in economic stability. This leads to the conclusion that the repatriation of refugees to Kismayo may signify “the end of the refugee cycle”. However, with the (re)integration into such a fragile environment, a new cycle begins. A cycle of a new life in a country that is described as the most fragile and one of the most corrupt states on earth. A cycle of life in insecurity as a terrorist organization governs less than 50km away from you. A cycle of living in an environment where fundamental aspects of human security are not guaranteed and a cycle and of dwelling in camps where you had to move from Dadaab to IDP camps in Kismayo. But with adequate support, an economic upswing, and state-building measures, it can also mean a start into a new, more stable life in one’s home country.

### *Suggested Areas for Further Research*

This study offers an essential insight into the (re)integration experiences of returnees into Kismayo. It represents a small part of a much wider discourse on the repatriation of refugees to fragile environments. Various domains remain insufficiently researched. Following is a selection of ideas.

Research could be conducted on the influence of clan politics on the (re)integration processes of returning refugees in Somalia. Furthermore, a comparison could be made between the hardships that the HC of Kismayo faces in daily life and those of the returnees. Do they have the same obstacles or different ones? A further study could examine whether the knowledge and skills acquired in the camps really benefit returnees in Somalia, e.g. in finding work. Do such skills transfer to employment opportunities and, accordingly, to economic (re)integration? In this study, informants often confirmed that returnees are preferred in job search due to better education, however, more in-depth analysis is needed. A further study could address the influence of the experiences, location and duration of the exile stay on the (re)integration process. Even though returnees from Yemen or other countries generally reside in the same regions, there could be differences in the answers regarding their experiences. Besides, further research could shed light into whether involuntary repatriation, as occurred in some cases from Dadaab to Kismayo, has an impact on the motivation to (re)integrate into a new community. It could be investigated how many of the returnees actually return to their former homes and thus how much the repatriation truly equals a return “home”. Research should also be carried out on indicators and determinants for the case of Kismayo to define and measure a sustainable return. Last but not least, long-term studies are lacking. E.g., the long-term effects of humanitarian aid or a longer-term observation of the application and success of a (re)integration strategy is needed.

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## Appendix A: List of Participants

### Interviews

	Sex	Year of Birth	Marital Status	Number of Children	Year of Escape	Time spent in Kenya in Years	In Kismayo since	Code	Interview Method
<b>Returnee with support</b>	F	1975	Married	16	1991	24	2015	A	Phone
<b>Returnee with support</b>	F	1975	Married	6	2010	6	2016	B	Phone
<b>Returnee with support</b>	M	1989	Single	0	2005	11	2016	C	Phone
<b>Returnee with support</b>	M	1991	Married	0	1993	23	2016	D	Phone
<b>Returnee with support</b>	M	1995	Married	0	2009	8	2017	E	Phone
<b>Returnee with support</b>	F	1996	-	-	Born in Dadaab	20	2016	F	Phone
<b>Returnee with Support</b>	M	1998	Single	0	Born in Dadaab	18	2016	G	Phone
<b>Returnee with Support</b>	F	2000	Single	0	2009	8	2017	H	Phone
<b>Self- settled Returnee</b>	M	1977	Widower	6	2009	8	2017	I	Phone
<b>Self-Settled Returnee</b>	F	1985	Married	4	1991	25	2016	J	Phone

## Interviews with Informants

Position	Sex	Nationality	Working Location	Code	Interview Method and Location
<b>Gouverneur of Jubbaland</b>	M	Somalian	Kismayo	1	Face to Face on the terrace of the GIZ office in Nairobi
<b>GIZ staff of monitoring and evaluation of the Somali reintegration programme</b>	F	Somalian	Kismayo	2	Phone
<b>Senior Protection Assistant UNHCR for the voluntary repatriation</b>	M	Kenyan	Nairobi	3	Face to Face in the UNHCR office in Nairobi
<b>Project manager of the GIZ Somali Reintegration programme</b>	F	German	Nairobi	4	Face to Face on the terrace of the GIZ office in Nairobi
<b>Technical Advisor of the GIZ Somali Reintegration programme</b>	F	Kenyan	Nairobi	5	Face to face in GIZ office Nairobi
<b>Planning Minister Jubbaland</b>	M	Somalian	Kismayo	6	Skype
<b>Head of the Jubbaland Refugee Commission and Assistant</b>	M and M	Somalian	Kismayo	7	Face to face in Nairobi GIZ office

## Survey

	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Number of Children	Year of Escape	Time spent in Kenya in Years	In Kismayo since	Code	Data Gathering Method
<b>Returnee with Support</b>	F	48	Married	7	1992	24	2016	A1	Refugee Commission
<b>Returnee with Support</b>	M	50	Married	10	1998	16	2014	B2	Phone
<b>Returnee with Support</b>	F	46	Married	8	2009	7	2016	C3	Phone
<b>Returnee with Support</b>	F	32	Married	7	2006	9	2015	D4	Phone
<b>Returnee with Support</b>	F	52	Married	12	2004	13	2017	E5	Refugee Commission
<b>Returnee with Support</b>	M	45	Married	8	1990	27	2017	F6	Refugee Commission
<b>Returnee with Support</b>	F	35	Divorced	5	2004	13	2017	G7	Refugee Commission
<b>Returnee with Support</b>	F	48	Married	7	1992	24	2016	H8	Refugee Commission
<b>Self- settled Returnee</b>	F	61	Married	6	1991	26	2017	I9	Phone
<b>Self- settled Returnee</b>	M	42	Married	10	1998	16	2014	J10	Phone
<b>Self- settled Returnee</b>	M	48	Married	8	1998			K11	Phone
<b>Self- settled Returnee</b>	F	36	Married	5	2005	10	2015	L12	Phone

<b>Self- settled Returnee</b>	F	30	Married	7	2012	4	2016	M13	Phone
<b>Self- settled Returnee</b>	F	42	Married	9	2005	12	2017	N14	Refugee Commission
<b>Self- settled Returnee</b>	M		Married	4	2004	10	2014	O15	Refugee Commission
<b>Self- settled Returnee</b>	F		Single	2	2004	11	2015	P16	Refugee Commission

## Appendix B: Questionnaire Survey

<b>Gender</b>	Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Age</b>	
<b>Profession</b>	
<b>Marital Status</b>	Single <input type="checkbox"/> Married <input type="checkbox"/> Divorced <input type="checkbox"/> Widow/Widower <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Number of children</b>	
<b>In which year did you leave Somalia?</b>	
<b>Where did you live after your escape from Somalia?</b>	
<b>Since how long are you back in Kismayo?</b>	

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>I left Somalia because of security reasons.</b>		
<b>I left Somalia to experience a better education in Kenya.</b>		
<b>I left Kenya because I felt external pressure from the Kenyan government.</b>		
<b>Before returning, I had accurate and up-to-date information on the conditions in Somalia, including the security situation.</b>		
<b>It was my genuine free decision to return to Somalia.</b>		
<b>I feel completely reintegrated in Kismayo.</b>		

<b>I have the feeling that IDP's, returnees and the host community of Kismayo form a community.</b>		
<b>I have already noticed tensions between the host community of Kismayo, IDP's and returnees.</b>		
<b>I have the feeling that the resources in Kismayo are not sufficient for everyone.</b>		
<b>I experienced discrimination in Kismayo because of my clan affiliation.</b>		
<b>I have the feeling that I have the same access to basic services like everyone else living there.</b>		
<b>There are enough education opportunities in Kismayo.</b>		
<b>There are enough employment opportunities in Kismayo.</b>		
<b>My current housing situation in Kismayo is sufficient.</b>		
<b>I have enough access to food and water.</b>		
<b>I'm happy to be back in Kismayo.</b>		
<b>I have the feeling that the state administration in Kismayo helps me with my reintegration.</b>		

1. Did you own property before leaving Somalia? **Yes**  **No**

1.1 If yes, have you been entitled to regain the land you previously owned? **Yes**  **No**

2. Have you been employed before leaving Somalia? **Yes**  **No**

2.1 If yes, have you been able to work in that field again? **Yes**  **No**

3. If you have children, does everyone of school age attend school?

3.1 If no, what are the reasons?

4. Did you get support from the international community (e.g. UNHCR) for your return? **Yes**  **No**

4.1 If yes, do you have the feeling that they have helped a lot? **Yes**  **No**

4.2 Do you have the feeling that they help you more than the Somali administrations?  
**Yes**  **No**

5. Can you imagine living in Kismayo on the long term? **Yes**  **No**

5.1 Please explain briefly.

6. In the following table you can see various issues that returning refugees may face in Kismayo.

Please select 3 of these aspects that affect you personally the most.

Lack of education opportunities	Lack of employment opportunities	Not enough resources	Tension between host-community, IDP's and returnees	Daily food security
Access to clean water	Lack of housing or land supply	Insecurity	Discrimination/exclusion by different clans	Not equal access to basic services
Kismayo was a foreign place for me	Not enough support from the international community	Unfair distribution of resources.	Cultural differences	Not enough support from the Somali Authorities

7. Now please sort the 3 challenges you have selected according to their urgency.

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

8. In your opinion, what has to be done by the state administrates in order to face the challenge you picked as number 1?

## Appendix C: Questionnaire Interviews with Independent Returnees

<b>Background Information: Circumstances before return and in exile</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. When, why and how did you leave Somalia?</li><li>2. How long have you lived in Exile? Where?</li><li>3. How and where were you and your family accommodated in Somalia before you fled? Did you own any land/property?</li><li>4. What was your profession in Somalia?</li><li>5. Since how long are you back in Somalia?</li></ol>
<b>Return to Somalia</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. In exile: How did you obtain the information about a possible return? (From the Kenyan government, from UNHCR/GIZ, from radio, etc.)<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1.1 Have you received accurate and up-to-date information on conditions in Somalia, including the security conditions?</li><li>1.2 Have you been presented with alternatives besides the return to Somalia?</li></ol></li><li>2. Was it your genuine free decision to return to Somalia?<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>2.1 Did you feel pressured by external factors (such as the closure of refugee camps, lack of information, etc.)? Please Explain.</li></ol></li><li>3. What were your main reasons for returning to Somalia?</li></ol>
<b>Challenges of return</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Do you feel completely reintegrated in Kismayo? Explain.</li><li>2. Do you have the feeling that IDPs, returnees, and the host community of Kismayo form a community?</li><li>3. Are you feeling that you have the same access to basic services as everyone else living there?<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>3.1 Health care: Do you think that you have good access to health care?</li><li>3.2 Education: Do you consider that there are enough education opportunities in Kismayo?<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>3.2.1 Do all children in your household attend school? Girls and boys?</li></ol></li><li>3.3 Housing: How is your housing situation at the moment? Were you entitled to land you previously owned?</li><li>3.4 Employment: Do you think there are enough employment opportunities in Kismayo?<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>3.4.1 Are you employed? If yes - what is your profession? If not - why?</li></ol></li></ol></li><li>4. What were or are the major challenges for you on your return to Somalia?</li><li>5. Can you imagine staying in Kismayo for the long term? Explain.</li><li>6. Do you feel safe in Kismayo?</li><li>7. Are you happy with your return so far?</li><li>8. What do you think, how can the challenges of reintegration be better addressed? What is missing in terms of support from the Somali authorities?</li></ol>

## Appendix D: Questionnaire Interviews with Supported Returnees

General Information
<p>Here I'll invite the participant to introduce himself briefly:</p> <p>Country of origin Sex Year of birth Marital status Children</p>
Circumstances before return and in exile
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>6. When, why and how did you leave Somalia?</li><li>7. How long have you lived in Exile? Where?</li><li>8. How and where were you and your family accommodated in Somalia before you fled? Did you own any land/property?</li><li>9. What was your profession in Somalia?</li><li>10. Since how long are you back in Somalia?</li></ol>
Return to Somalia
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>4. In exile: How did you obtain the information about a possible return? From the Kenyan government, from UNHCR/GIZ, from radio, etc. ?<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>4.1 Have you received accurate and up-to-date information on conditions in Somalia, including the security conditions?</li><li>4.2 Have you been presented with alternatives besides the return to Somalia?</li></ol></li><li>5. Was it your genuine free decision to return to Somalia?<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>5.1 Did you feel pressured by external factors (such as the closure of refugee camps, lack of information, etc.)? Please Explain.</li><li>5.2 To what extent had the assistance provided by the GIZ and UNHCR influenced your decision to return?</li></ol></li><li>6. What were your main reasons for returning to Somalia? What factors have influenced your decision to return?</li><li>7. Can you briefly explain the process of your return and what role the UN/GIZ played in it?</li></ol>
Challenges of return
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>9. Do you feel completely reintegrated in Kismayo?</li><li>10. Do you have the feeling that IDPs, returnees, and the host community of Kismayo form a community?</li></ol>

11. Do you have the feeling that you have the same access to basic services as everyone else living there?
  - 11.1 What about health care: How do you get access to health services?
  - 11.2 Education: Do you think there are enough education opportunities in Kismayo?
    - 11.2.1 Do all children in your household attend school? Girls and boys?
  - 11.3 Housing: How is your housing situation at the moment? Were you entitled to land you previously owned?
  - 11.4 Employment: Do you think there are enough employment opportunities in Kismayo?
    - 11.4.1 Are you employed? If yes - what is your profession? If not - why?
12. What were the biggest challenges for you when returning to Somalia?
13. Do you still have to fight with challenges? If so, which ones?
14. Do you want to stay in Kismayo for the long term? Explain.
15. Do you feel safe in Kismayo?
16. Were the expectations you had for your return fulfilled?
17. Are you happy with your return so far?
18. Do you have the feeling that the decision makers are aware of your problems?
19. How do you perceive the treatment of returnees by the authorities in Kismayo?
20. Are you satisfied with the support provided by the aid organizations during the reintegration process?
21. How can the challenges of reintegration be better addressed?

## Appendix E: Questionnaire Interviews with the International Community

<b>Background Information</b>
Here I'll invite the participant to introduce himself briefly: General information about background, educational level, professional experience
<b>Assessment of the main challenges for the return and reintegration of refugees to Kismayo.</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>11. Would you assess the reintegration of the refugees in Kismayo who have returned so far as successful? Explain your answer.</li><li>12. What conditions should a region generally fulfil in order to ensure a sustainable reintegration of returnees? (name maximum 5)<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>2.1 Do you think Kismayo meets these conditions? Explain.</li></ol></li><li>13. In your opinion, what are the major challenges for a sustainable reintegration of returnees in Kismayo? (maximum 3)<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>13.1 Have some of these challenges already been solved? If so, how and to what extent was the GIZ/UN involved in solving the problem?</li><li>13.2 How are the remaining challenges currently being addressed? By whom?</li><li>13.3 Which of the challenges you mentioned do you see as the biggest obstacle?</li></ol></li></ol>
<b>International help in the reintegration process (UNHCR/GIZ and other actors)</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>8. Do you consider the capacities of the local economy of Kismayo sufficient in relation to, for example, the increasing demand for labor through the returning refugees?</li><li>9. How about capacities regarding land and housing?</li><li>10. What is the contribution of GIZ in supporting the reintegration of returnees?</li><li>11. How long are the returnees approximately assisted in the reintegration process?</li><li>12. Do you consider Kismayo to be dependent on help from the international community (like GIZ or the UN) in order to face the challenges? Explain.</li><li>13. How do you assess the voluntary nature of the refugees' return? Are they fully informed in Kenya about the security situation in Somalia and further possibilities?</li></ol>
<b>Concluding questions</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. In your opinion, what is the security situation in Kismayo at the moment? Is the region secure?</li><li>2. What future developments would be desirable regarding the readmission of returnees in Kismayo?</li></ol>

## Appendix F: Questionnaire Interviews with Somali Authorities

<b>Background Information</b>
Here I'll invite the participant to introduce himself briefly: General information about background, educational level, professional experience
<b>Assessment of the main challenges for the return and reintegration of refugees to Kismayo.</b>
<p>14. Would you assess the reintegration of the refugees in Kismayo who have returned so far as successful? Explain your answer.</p> <p>15. What conditions should a region generally fulfill in order to ensure a sustainable reintegration of returnees? (name maximum 5)</p> <p>2.1 Do you think Kismayo meets these conditions? Explain.</p> <p>16. In your opinion, what are the major challenges for a sustainable reintegration of returnees in Kismayo? (maximum 3)</p> <p>16.1 Have some of these challenges already been solved? If so, how and by whom?</p> <p>16.2 How are the remaining challenges currently being addressed? By whom?</p> <p>16.3 Which of the challenges you mentioned do you see as the biggest obstacle?</p>
<b>Sustainable reintegration, access to basic services, capacities of Kismayo etc.</b>
<p>14. Do you consider the capacities of the local economy of Kismayo sufficient in relation to, for example, the increasing demand for labor through the returning refugees?</p> <p>15. How about capacities regarding land and housing?</p> <p>16. Do the returnees in Kismayo have equal access to basic services such as education, employment opportunities or health care as the host community or IDPs?</p> <p>17. How do you assess the relationship between the host community, IDPs and returnees in Kismayo? Is there a dispute about resources due to the increasing demand for basic consumer goods (e.g. food, water etc.)?</p> <p>18. Do you consider Kismayo to be dependent on help from the international community to face the challenges?</p>
<b>Concluding questions</b>
<p>3. How do you assess the security situation in Kismayo at the moment? Is the region secure?</p> <p>4. Do you believe that a successful reintegration of returning Somalis can contribute to peace building and peacekeeping in Jubaland? Or that a wrong approach can trigger new conflicts or a re-emergence of already existing conflicts?</p> <p>5. What future developments would be desirable?</p>

## Appendix G: Table with the Results of the Survey

	<b>Number of respondents</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>I left Somalia because of security reasons.</b>	16	16	0
<b>I left Somalia to experience a better education in Kenya.</b>	16	13	3
<b>I left Kenya because I felt external pressure from the Kenyan government.</b>	12	9	3
<b>Before returning, I had accurate and up- to date information on the conditions in Somalia, including the security situation.</b>	16	16	0
<b>It was my genuine free decision to return to Somalia.</b>	16	15	1
<b>I feel completely reintegrated in Kismayo.</b>	15	8	7
<b>I have the feeling that IDP's, returnees and the host community of Kismayo form a community.</b>	15	5	10
<b>I have already noticed tensions between the host community of Kismayo, IDP's and returnees.</b>	16	1	15
<b>I have the feeling that the resources in Kismayo are not sufficient for everyone.</b>	16	4	12
	16	2	14

<b>I experienced discrimination in Kismayo because of my clan affiliation.</b>			
<b>I have the feeling that I have the same access to basic services like everyone else living there.</b>	16	12	4
<b>There are enough education opportunities in Kismayo.</b>	13	7	6
<b>There are enough employment opportunities in Kismayo.</b>	15	1	14
<b>My current housing situation in Kismayo is sufficient.</b>	16	1	15
<b>I have enough access to food and water.</b>	16	2	14
<b>I'm happy to be back in Kismayo.</b>	16	15	1
<b>I have the feeling that the state administration in Kismayo helps me with my reintegration.</b>	16	10	6

**Appendix H: Map of Kenya and Somalia**




*Source: Yarnell, 2016, p. 4*

## Appendix I: Variables that Influence the Sustainability of Return.

	<b>Key Variables that may influence the sustainability of return</b>
<b>Returnees' Characteristics</b>	Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Religion, Rural/Urban, Sexual orientation
<b>Experiences before Exile</b>	Pre-migration accommodation; Pre-migration education; Pre-migration employment status; Pre-migration job; Previous migration history; Remittances received pre-migration
<b>Decision Making Factors in Migration</b>	Migrated via smuggler or not; Individual or Collective Decision; Reason for Migration; Cost of Migration; Goals of Migration; Voluntary or rather forced migration
<b>Experiences in the Country of Destination</b>	Migrated alone or with family; Children educated; Income; Employment; Language learned; Discrimination; Maintained ties to country of origin; Send remittances; Freedom of movement; Education; Extent of social integration/friendships
<b>Public Policy on Asylum</b>	Legal status in in country of destination; Accomondation status in country of destination
<b>Conditions of Return</b>	Return to pre-migration community; Return alone or with family; Ability to bring possessions; Receipt of return assistance; Receipt of reconstruction assistance; Assets regained, Acceptance within community, Employment, Household Vulnerability; Safety and Security
<b>The decision to return</b>	Willingness to return; Reasons for return; Sources of information about return; Influences in the return decision; Threat of forced returns


Source: I Koser et al., 2015, p. 83

## Appendix J: Kismayo Urban Growth Map 2006 - 2016




Source: GOS et al., 2017, p. 9

## Appendix K: Development of Constructed IDP Sites in Kismayo



Source: GOS et al., 2017, p. 16

## Appendix L: Total Number of Displaced Persons from Somalia between 1986 and 2012



Source: Lindley & Hammond, 2014

**Appendix M: Return Trends per Year**



Source: UNHCR, 2019a, p. 5