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“Moria is more dangerous than Afghanistan.”
A critical approach towards Greek asylum and migration policies.

Claire Felix

Master in, International Studies

Supervisor:
PhD, Giulia Daniele, Integrated Researcher and Guest Assistant Professor,
Center for International Studies, Instituto Universitario de Lisboa (CEI.IUL)

September, 2020



SOCIOLOGIA
E POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS

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Abstract

Greece has faced in a first time the consequences of the financial crisis in 2007 which led to several austerity measures, bailout packages from the EU and numerous revolts from its population. Some years later, in 2015, the country was then confronted to the ‘refugee crisis’, bringing hundreds and thousands of individuals seeking international protection. Migration and asylum policies have been implemented, targeting the decrease of irregular migrants’ venue. In this context, the main objective is to identify the influence of migration and asylum policies on the everyday life of asylum seekers and locals.

Two periods of fieldwork in Greece have been conducted. The first one occurred in Eleonas, the refugee camp of Athens, between August 2019 and January 2020. The second one took place on the island of Lesbos during the month of February 2020, where the Hotspot Moria is situated. Thus, participant observation and fieldnotes, semi-structured interviews, surveys and literature analyses were the methods used.

The results indicate that policies are rather exclusionist and perpetuate the imposed categorization of individuals, be it asylum seekers and Greeks. In particular, asylum procedures are driven by humanitarian governance, governmentality, and bio-power, in other words, holding power over the life of asylum seekers and locals. This thesis calls also for more inclusive policies between asylum seekers and locals.

Key words: Asylum seeker, refugee, migration and asylum policies, governmentality and bio-power, humanitarian governance, Greece

Resumo

A Grécia enfrentou pela primeira vez as consequências da crise financeira em 2007 que levaram a várias medidas de austeridade, pacotes de salvamento da UE e numerosas revoltas da sua população. Alguns anos mais tarde, em 2015, o país foi então confrontado com a "crise dos refugiados", trazendo centenas e milhares de indivíduos em busca de protecção internacional. Políticas de migração e asilo foram implementadas, visando a diminuição do número de migrantes em situação irregular. Neste contexto, o principal objectivo é identificar a influência das políticas de migração e asilo na vida quotidiana dos requerentes de asilo e dos habitantes locais.

Foram realizados dois períodos de trabalho de campo na Grécia. O primeiro ocorreu em Eleonas, o campo de refugiados de Atenas, entre Agosto de 2019 e Janeiro de 2020. O segundo teve lugar na ilha de Lesbos durante o mês de Fevereiro de 2020, onde se situa o Hotspot Moria. Assim, a observação participante e as notas de campo, entrevistas semi-estruturadas, inquéritos e análises de literatura foram os métodos utilizados.

Os resultados indicam que as políticas são bastante excludentes e perpetuam a categorização imposta de indivíduos, quer se trate de requerentes de asilo ou de gregos. Em particular, os procedimentos de asilo são impulsionados pela governação humanitária, pela governabilidade e pela bio-potência, por outras palavras, pela posse do poder sobre a vida dos requerentes de asilo e dos locais. Esta tese apela também à elaboração de políticas mais inclusivas entre os requerentes de asilo e os habitantes locais.

Palavras-chave: Requerente de asilo, refugiados, políticas de migração e asilo, governabilidade e bio-potência, governação humanitária, Grécia

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Glossary of abbreviations

- AMIF Asylum, Migration, and Integration fund
- ANEL Anexartitoi Ellines (Independent Greeks)
- CEAS Common European Asylum System
- DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
- EASO European Asylum Support Office
- ECB European Central Bank
- EU European Union
- EURODAC European Dactyloscopy
- EUROPOL European Police Office
- FRONTEX European Border and Coast Guard Agency
- IDP Internally Displaced People
- IMF International Monetary Fund
- IOM International Organization for Migration
- LAOS Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós (Popular Orthodox Rally)
- MAT Unit for Reinstatement of Order
- MOTG Mouvement on the Ground
- MSF Médecins sans Frontières
- NGO Non-governmental organization
- ND New Democracy
- PASOK Panellínio Sosialistikó Kínima (Panhellenic Socialist Movement)
- PM Prime Minister
- RAO Regional Asylum Office
- R4R Refugee4Refugees
- SOLID Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows
- SYRIZA Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás (Coalition of Radical Left)
- UN United Nations

1 Introduction

During my second week in Mytilini, I was invited by the coordinator of Wave of Hope to visit their school situated in the Jungle (unofficial camp next to Moria camp). I decided to take the bus, which is driving every half an hour from Sappho Square, first through Kara Tepe Camp and then to Moria camp. I was at the station with a group of other residents waiting for the next bus. Behind me is Mytilini's port; fisher boats, FRONTEX and Greek border force ships floating on the blue water, the sun is shining. In front of me, the square, some asylum seekers sitting quietly, smoking cigarettes, and the coffee terraces in the back occupied in majority by Greeks.

A bus, rather old, is already parked at the station, its doors are closed although people and the driver are already inside; there is confusion, why does the bus driver not open the doors so that we could enter? The time is passing, and the bus should already have left for some time. Suddenly, the driver opens the doors and, a movement of panic followed where everybody is pushing everyone to enter the bus as fast as possible. The driver blocks the entrance and with an imposing voice, tells people not to enter. He speaks in Greek and sometimes adds some words in English. Eventually, he leaves the bus, closes the doors behind him, and walks away. Men, women, and children are still on the bus; the windows, are closed and it is hot. Meanwhile, about 80 people are waiting for the bus. Minutes later, the driver comes back and locks himself again in the bus. "The bus will go soon," he says.

From the other side of the street that goes alongside the bay, a queue of honking cars and trucks arrives towards the square. Nobody really understands what is happening, but through the flags waving on the cars, I assume that farmers are protesting. Once the 20 cars drove away, the driver opened the doors of the bus, and a new wave of panic started; about 80 people are pushing each other to get into the bus. I cannot enter and miss the first bus. More and more people are now waiting. I decide to cross the street and wait on a bench on the square when a mass of Greeks arrives, protesting the government's new policy. The protesting group screams things in Greek in a megaphone and holding placards. I am wondering what they are protesting about and decide to ask some of the people. The Greek government wants to change retirement insurance from public to private.

As I am sitting there, still hearing the honks of the farmers protest in the background, looking at the protest of Greeks against their government with a large group of asylum seekers waiting for a bus as they are otherwise forced to walk eight kilometers, I ask myself: how is the life of asylum seekers in Greece and how do Greeks face the refugee crisis?

1.1 Thematic background and research question(s)

Over the last five years, the concept of 'crisis' has been central within European discourses, referring first to the financial crisis than to the 'refugee crisis' or 'migrant crisis.' The different use of the concept over the years brought different readings/understandings over the phenomena. The ongoing crisis at Europe's external borders can be described as an 'epistemic crisis' showing general contradictions in the language and labels while discussing human mobility and its governance. 'Crisis' can be used for different situations and therefore confuses more than brings clarity (Campesi 2018:196-197). In that

regard, the notion of ‘crisis’ qualifies a decisive and/or a transformative moment. Commonly, this idea refers to an event that interrupts routine and necessitates an immediate response. The onset of a crisis requires immediate judgment and decision making. However, in situations where the room for maneuver is limited, political leaders must make decisions on the correct approach, which could affect the political order's survival. The term ‘crisis’ can be seen as a synonym for ‘emergency.’ By describing a situation as a ‘crisis,’ one raises the alarm, implying a danger to the ordinary life of the population that must be responded to by exceptional measures (Campesi 2018:196-197).

The financial crisis

The global financial crisis that emerged in 2007 revealed Greece's past financial difficulties¹, making it the most touched within the European Union (EU). The recession undermined Greece's already low tax revenues, leading to a growing deficit, as the country was spending more money than it had. Regarding the political context, the country's transition to democracy after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 has been characterized by a stable political system, structured around two main pillars: the left, Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK – social-democratic party with populist roots) and on the right, New Democracy (ND – liberal-conservative party) (cf. Aslanidis and Kaltwasser 2016:2).

Ten of thousands of Greeks have marched and protested in the streets against austerity measures. As on the 5th May 2010, protests were violent, including a pregnant woman, were killed when protestors threw petrol bombs at a bank in Athens (Papadimas and Maltezou, 2010). The year 2011 was also marked with several events, firstly the Greek *Indignados* (inspired by the Spanish *Indignados*), which started on the 25th May and lasted daily for several weeks. Everywhere in Greece, citizens gathered and protested against strict austerity measures, asking ‘all politicians to go.’ Syntagma Square, located right in front of the Parliament in the center of the capital, saw about 20,000 people, containing in its crowd high-school and university students, self-employed, unemployed, pensioners, and a majority of public sector employees (SIC Journal, 2011). In April 2012, a retired pharmacist took his life on the symbolic Syntagma Square. In a letter left behind, he explained that he could not face the fact of looking through rubbish cans for food and becoming a burden to his children, accusing the government's austerity measures of his decision (Kitsatonis, 2012).

The country has faced between 2010 and 2017 a total of 12 austerity packages, leading to a perpetual cycle of recession, with the unemployment rate reaching its highest pick in 2013, namely 27,47%. Especially young people between 15 and 24 years old were touched the strongest by austerity measures, with its highest rate being 58,2% during the same year (Statista, 2020). Tax revenues have weakened, aggravating the fiscal situation. Austerity packages have left no one and nothing unaffected, leading to a humanitarian crisis where homelessness has increased suicide rates by reaching historical record levels, together with citizens struggling with sickness (such as HIV and tuberculosis). In general

¹ For more information, see: Johnston (2020).

terms, public health deteriorated significantly. Additionally, pensions, salaries, allocations, and public goods were severely cut (Galanopoulos 2014:63).

Greece: Youth unemployment rate from 1999 to 2019




Figure 1.1 Source: Statista, 2020 (Ekathimerini, 2018).

More than one-third of the country's population - 34.8% or 3.7 million people - reported being at risk of poverty or social exclusion. The poverty line was measured at an annual income of 4,560 euros per individual and 9,576 euros per household consisting of two adults and two children under 14²

The beginning of the so-called 'refugee crisis'

In the years 2015 and 2016, the EU faced an unprecedented influx of asylum seekers. During this period, more than one million people came to the EU, the majority of whom fled war and terror in Syria, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, as well as several other countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa which are struggling with weak governance, fragile economies leading to long-standing and/or ongoing civil wars, lack of infrastructures and overall insufficient or inexistent opportunities for their citizens. The enormous influx of migrants has led to significant political divisions within the EU. A few states were building fences and reintroducing border controls within the border-free Schengen area. As the EU has not yet provided a common response to the challenges, it is a patchwork of 28 asylum systems, leading to uneven outcomes.

Lesvos is the island in Greece that currently accommodates about 22,000 asylum seekers and refugees, and Moria represents, therefore, the largest refugee camp in Europe. The camp was built for 3,000 individuals but counted in January 2020 19,000 individuals. Since Spring 2016, the camp has been mainly a deportation center for implementing of the EU-Turkey agreement of the same year on the repatriation of refugees coming from Turkey. (The Guardian, 2020). Illegal immigration to Greece is

² Households at risk of poverty or social exclusion numbered 789,585 out of a total of 4,162,442 households in Greece. Without social benefits, 50.8% of the country's population would be estimated to be at risk of poverty, reflecting the effect that pensions and social benefits - such as the allowance for low pensioners (EKAS) and unemployment benefit - have on individuals' lives (Ekathimerini, 2018).

part of the migration of many refugees to the EU. Due to its location on the EU's external border, its long coastline, and islands.

Previous years	Sea arrivals	Land arrivals	Dead and missing
2019	59,726	14,887	
2018	32,494	18,014	174
2017	29,718	6,592	59
2016	173,450	3,784	441
2015	856,723	4,907	799
2014	41,038	2,280	405

Table 1.1 Source: UNHCR, n.d.

The numbers peaked in 2015, with approximately 857,000 asylum seekers arriving on the Greek islands by sea and approximately 5,000 asylum seekers arriving by land. The number dropped drastically in the following years, also due to the EU-Turkey agreement. Since 2019, the number has been rising again.

74,600 people came in 2019, 50 percent more than the previous year.

On the 2nd September 2015, the picture of the young Alan Kurdi lying drowned on a beach in Turkey was shared more than 20 million times worldwide on social media. A short time after the publication, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Swedish Red Cross or the International Rescue Committee (IRC) saw donations surprisingly rise. “For the established groups already working in Greece, the sudden influx of funds was both welcome and destabilizing” (Howden and Fotiadis, 2017). Although so much attention has been given through this symbolic picture representing the refugee crisis’ costs, some months earlier, on the 30th March 2015, the mayor of the Greek island Lesbos called for immediate emergency assistance from the Greek government. The number of refugees arriving on the island had risen to 600 per day. Only six months later, on the 1st September 2015, the mayor called again for attention, as the number of arrivals on the island has officially surpassed the number of the local population. However, Lesbos is not the only island facing humanitarian issues, but also Samos and Chios have seen severe humanitarian conditions challenged throughout the years. Regrettably, the Greek State and Greek NGOs have taken a long time before their serious involvement on the islands. First, locals from the islands have provided refugees with basic needs such as food, water, and clothes distributions but also healthcare and transportation to registration centers. The humanitarian situation was still affected by the financial crisis. Several national NGOs were mainly active on the mainland, supporting locals. The Greek (not international or European) NGO responsibility increased within the Greek society, regarding the management of migrants and for others characterized as marginal, such as those facing addiction and poverty (cf. Cabot 2018: 18-19). In parallel, independent international volunteer groups started to take place on the islands. Nonetheless, some of them faced several difficulties, including a lot of bureaucratic work for visa regulations and financial controls (Skleparis and Armakolas 2016:72-175).

The Greek PM Mitsotakis strongly urged the EU to accept more refugees in view of Lesbos’s dramatic situation. He called for a change in the Dublin procedure and said on the 15th December 2019: "We need to develop a European asylum and migration pact, as promised by the Commission, and in

dealing with this problem we need more burden sharing.” (Kyriakos Mitsotakis, 2019, in: Tagesschau 2019).

“And humanitarian response — a topic that may once have been considered the purview of a niche aid industry — was quickly becoming of interest to the wider world as crisis and vulnerability came to the doorsteps of even the most privileged” (The New Humanitarian, 2020).

Consequently, policies regarding migration and asylum have been influenced by the transformation of Greece’s economic, social, and political spheres. This study deals with the price paid by Greeks and asylum seekers in Greece and includes humanitarian workers on the field. Hence, the main research questions of the thesis are as follows:

- To what extent do asylum and migration policies influence the everyday life of Greeks and asylum seekers?
- How and why do migrants come to Greece (Greece as transit or destination)?
- What are the major threats and opportunities for asylum seekers and refugees in Greece?
- How do Greeks perceive and live the ‘refugee crisis’?
- How is the cohabitation between asylum seekers and locals in Greece?
- What is the role of humanitarian workers?

1.2 Motivations, relevance, and objectives

When the time came to think about a research subject for this thesis, it was clear and important to me, - to focus on fieldwork and its several advantages and challenges. Once I knew that I would participate in a university exchange in Athens, Greece, I found it pertinent to use this opportunity to focus my research on the refugee crisis. To have the most accurate understanding of refugee’s life in Greece, I decided to volunteer over the full semester for Project Elea in Eleonas camp. There, I was hoping to get insight into asylum seekers’ everyday life, habits, and practices, but also the dynamics of the camp. Alongside this experience, I had the opportunity to understand in a first time how asylum procedures work and, in a second time, the role of NGOs and international volunteers within this context. Additionally, as I lived six months in Athens, I could see and live locals’ positionality towards asylum seekers and their country’s response to it. My second fieldwork in Lesvos provided me with an in-depth comprehension of the country’s political and humanitarian situation. It reinforced my interest in discussing asylum seekers’ situation and the Greeks’ place within the refugee crisis, who have been mostly criticized or mocked by the international community.

Conducting fieldwork in refugee camps and spending time with asylum seekers made me realize the luxury characteristic of nationality, citizenship, and overall human rights. My motivations to conduct this research were lying on my general interest in migration studies and fundamental rights, the relationship between asylum seekers and the host community, and challenging my thoughts on humanitarian work and notions of solidarity, equality, and humanity. To conclude, carrying out

fieldwork in refugee camps in Greece pushed me to first adapt myself to the field's dynamics, which can be challenging, and secondly adapt my methods to the related environment.

The extensive, increasing, and ongoing work on migration indicates that migration and mobility are linked to a global social, economic, political, and technological transformation within societies, referring to the globalization era. Migration flows have been increasing throughout the years, going from about 84,500,000 international migrants in 1970 to about 272 million international migrants in 2019, representing 3,5% of the world's population. Scholars have underestimated the growing numbers, as some have calculated to reach about 230 million international migrants by 2050. Nonetheless, it is difficult to anticipate such numbers, as migration usually occurs after specific political instability, economic crisis, or violent conflicts. Also, long-term phenomena such as demographic change or technology and communication progress can impact migration. Through constant research on mobility and their reasons, scholars have found out that no regular migration forms exist. However, distinct patterns have been developed, such as 'routes.' As time passes, migration forms increasingly shape our daily lives and routines and influence public opinions (IOM, 2020). The societal relevance of studying migration in the 21st century is therefore linked to its interdisciplinary context, including understanding societal development challenges related to citizenship, national identity, governance, and the growing presence of humanitarian aid. This work's scientific relevance involves academic research in Anthropology, Sociology, Psychology, Geography, Demography, History, Economics and Politics. The scientific literature about migration, and especially asylum seekers in Greece, conditions of camps, asylum procedures, and involvement of the EU and the international community includes a high number of books, articles, reports, and documentaries published throughout the years from scholars, activists, or different types of organizations. Therefore, my work will not fill specific literature gaps but rather contribute to the importance of understanding migration in all its aspects to challenge popular assumptions. This work's relevance regards especially the importance of raising awareness of avoiding the categorization of immigrants and the stereotypes linked to host countries, and studying migrants as an important part of a whole population.

Therefore, the main objectives are:

- a) Understanding the effect of the financial crisis in the everyday life in Greece and within what political context the country faced the refugee crisis.
- b) Identifying asylum and migration policies and the reasons of their implementations in Greece but also within the European Union.
- c) Analyzing the daily impact of asylum and migration policies on the life of Greece's population.
- d) Identifying why irregular migrants in Greece flee away from their home country.
- e) By in-depth fieldwork in Athens and Lesbos:
 - identifying the relationship between asylum seekers and Greeks,
 - rising awareness on the perpetuated labeling of individuals regarding asylum seekers and refugees on one side and Greeks on the other side.

f) Studying asylum seekers and refugees as part of the whole Greek population, as they represent an essential part of society.

1.3 Structure

The thesis consists of seven chapters and aims to analyze the impact of Greek asylum and migration policies on the everyday lives of asylum seekers and locals. The first chapter introduces the topic, accompanied by the research questions, my motivations to conduct this work, its relevance, and objectives. The second chapter provides a theoretical framework, in which I present Foucault's theory about power relations within a society and introduce his notions of *governmentality* and *biopower*. In relation to my research question, I also discuss the role of humanitarian governance. The following two chapters adopt an anthropological approach, firstly with the methodological tools I used, then the ethical consideration to be kept in mind and the resulted limitations. Also, it provides two ethnographies based on my fieldwork in Athens and Lesbos between 2019 and 2020. The fifth chapter deals with policies related to asylum and migration. In a first time it gives a brief overview of the EU's approach and, in a second time, a more detailed explanation regarding Greece, its historical background, asylum procedures, and the impact of the EU-Turkey deal. The sixth chapter provides a discussion based on a timeline/trajectory approach. There, to have a clear understanding of the context, I first address the political context in Greece, which represents the milestones of the country's current situation. Following this line, I then discuss asylum seekers' arrival to Greece, namely through the transit routes, the primary role of smugglers, and the conditions of Moria camp. Consequently, the next section has been dedicated to combining theory and fieldwork and discusses different techniques and results of governmentality and biopower through the examples of bureaucracies and detention conditions. Also, the presence of humanitarian governance in refugee camps is addressed, leading to the first concept of this work, namely *categorical fetishism*. Chapter five also includes examples of resistance to power, all argued through my fieldwork. The last section of chapter five analyzes the cohabitation between locals and asylum seekers, leading to the second concept, *humanitarian citizenship*. Finally, the seventh and last chapter presents a conclusion of the thesis's main arguments, including a few suggestions regarding policies and further research.

2 Theoretical framework

The French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault has argued that sovereign power was historically characterized by an asymmetrical relationship between the ruler with the right to kill and the ruled ones. With the start of modern societies, a new form of power mechanisms took place, which he called ‘disciplinary power’ (1975). This new form of power, where discipline is based on knowledge creation, produces norms and behaviors. Discipline enables self-regulation, which is then encouraged and reinforced by institutions such as universities, clinics, hospitals, or prisons. It becomes the norm of modern societies and acts as an instrument for individuals. Discipline is a form of control internalized by every individual implying temporal standards, bodily postures, functions, sublimation of wishes, and instant emotions, which leads to self-discipline. According to Foucault, discipline is a combination of strategies, procedures, and related behaviors with specific institutional frameworks that become part of the general thinking of the subject and its attitude. Such methods aim to bring regularity and generate routine (Balan 2010: 58-60). A year later, Foucault proposed an extension of his work, this time through research on sexuality in France. In *History of Sexuality, Volume I*, the French philosopher presented for the first time his concept of ‘bio-power’ linked to the one of ‘governmentality’. In the late 1970’s, Foucault stated his interest in understanding who can or how should be governed, who is to be governed, and what are methods of governments, or in other words, the shaping-methods of others’ behavior (Balan 2010: 61).

Scholars have applied these concepts to several fields of research, including migration studies and humanitarian aid. Regarding the last decades’ geo-politics events and taking a closer look at the European Refugee crisis of 2015, power relations have taken new forms that can be described best through ‘humanitarian governance’ (Barnett 2005). More and more, we can observe a structured and organized development of international humanitarian assistance. This usually includes emergency relief, defending human rights, providing education along with other activities, medical assistance, distributing food, and non-food items and assisting and empowering individuals, communities, and overall, the most vulnerable ones (Barnett 2005: 380). An extensive range of actors is involved in such dynamic and globalized networks. With this, the anthropologist Agier (2010) argued that the humanitarian world could be defined as a globalized and universal mechanism that involves different organizations (NGOs, governmental organizations, institutions, and states), agents, financial funds which are distributed across different countries and continents (Agier 2010: 32). Humanitarian governance covers concepts such as development, emergency aid, security, peacebuilding, medical assistance, population control, and rights, which can be linked to Foucault’s bio-power concept. Namely, bio-politics cover a range of aspects that can improve a country’s population well-being. This task, which includes organizing, monitoring, controlling, optimizing, and reinforcing, is described as ‘biopower’ or ‘biopolitics’ by Foucault; in other words, taking charge of life (cf. Foucault 1978, cited in, Lilja and Vinthagen 2014: 110). Namely, biopolitics refers to life and death, birth, health and illness (mental and physical), cultural, social, political, environmental, economic and geographic conditions, the family, housing, working conditions,

and standard of life (cf. Dean 2010, cited in, Lilja and Vinthagen 2014:110). Nevertheless, typical to Western liberal societies, governments have become more preoccupied with their populations' health and well-being, reinforcing the exclusion of those who are not entitled to those rights (Baele, 2016).

Humanitarian mechanisms embody totalitarian actions, as humanitarian governance either propose emancipation or intensifies domination. Although such actions are directed to the vulnerable and unprotected ones, governance is about ruling, and ruling is linked to power. Governing a population or a community and how to do this in the most effective way refers to the concept of governmentality mentioned earlier. Who governs the most vulnerable ones? Who holds power over life and power over death, over the society's forgotten and excluded ones?

The West does not operate through any humanitarian governance, yet it maintains a dominant control over it. This can be illustrated by the fact that only a few organizations are widely recognized for their humanitarian work, such as Doctors without Border, CARE, Save the Children, Oxfam, World Vision International. But overall, the political and economic leading position of the UN and its different agencies like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), or the United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF (Barnett 2005: 386). The fact that only a few international NGOs monitor about 90 percent of the total financial support of humanitarian actions can be linked to new forms of neo-colonialism (Agier 2010: 35) and, therefore, power over life (to make live or survive) and power over death (to let die).

With a closer look at this thesis's research question, it is important to understand how asylum seekers are managed and controlled in refugee camps and what political role such camps embody. Foremost, a definition of an asylum seeker and its difference from a refugee is necessary.

So far, there has been no agreement on a universal definition for a migrant, besides its umbrella term covering all forms of movement. Following the United Nations (UN) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a migrant is a person that decided to leave his/her country of origin or residence, whether within the same country or across international borders, for a short, long, or permanent time. The reasons of migration vary and depend on the individual (cf. Key Migration terms, IOM, UN Migration). An asylum seeker is an individual that is seeking international protection. Not every asylum seeker will receive the status of refugee. However, every refugee was initially an asylum seeker (cf. UNHCR, Master Glossary of Terms, 2006 cited in, Key Migration terms, IOM, UN Migration). Therefore, a refugee, as determined by the UN Geneva Convention in 1951, is:

“a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (Adapted from Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954, 189 UNTS 137) Art. 1A (2), cited in, Key Migration terms, IOM, UN Migration).

To understand that power relations change over time, Foucault used archaeology by using texts as monuments to perceive ideas's evolution. He argued that the focus on categorization and definitions made forget about the importance of the time aspect, which is why the world is seen as temporarily static. Therefore, we should recognize that every era has its structure of thoughts and, consequently, its related system of knowledge and reasoning. The same applies to self-empowerment (Nicholas, 1: 20). Following this understanding, every power mechanism has specific techniques and methods of application. In refugee camps, humanitarian governance, and Foucault's theoretical concepts, outcomes of such techniques and methods are mainly to be seen in bureaucracy. Humanitarian aid organizations and workers employ and design administrative systems, standards, knowledge, and indicators to allow more efficient response and management within emergency contexts and optimize refugees' everyday life. Such techniques aim to regulate and normalize refugee camps, which is observable over the last years and are therefore part of global liberal governance, typical of modern and advanced liberal societies (Bulley 2014: 2-3). In this sense, governmentality in refugee camps is performed through security mechanisms and shelter meaning for refugees. Agier (2010) proposed four different types of refugee camps:

1. Camps that are self-organized, established in hostile and dangerous environments without a sense of hospitality.
2. The second type, which represents my ethnographic case studies, namely Eleona and Moria Camp, are retention camps mostly found in Europe. They usually are located close to borders and planned to channel, deport, and relocate individuals. Agier listed similarities which also are to be found in Greece, such as a never-ending present, waiting to be registered and fingerprinted, remoted and isolated spaces which are complicated to reach (as in Lesbos), controlled, managed or ran by authorities and public services and, overall, everyday violence.
3. The third type, which he describes as city-camps, can be best illustrated through the cases of the Palestinian camps.
4. The last type refers to camps to be found in big cities' peripheries, usually hosting internally displaced people, such as Freetown in Sierra Leone or Khartoum in Sudan.

Refugee camps are meant to provide a first-time shelter to asylum seekers and, offer a space of safety and security for the most vulnerable. "The hospitality provided by camps thus aims at something more ephemeral than survival, allowing recovery, providing dignity and the sustenance of 'goods' such as family and community" (Bulley 2014: 2). Nevertheless, communities have turned into new forms of governing individuals without involving the state. In the lectures *Security, Territory and Population* (1976-1977) and in *The Birth of Bio-politics* (1978-1979), Foucault highlighted that a population does not only refer to individuals but also to phenomena and statistics, which form social relations in which political power operates (Sokhi-Bulley, 2014).

Therefore, governmentality can be maintained through community in refugee camps and preserved through two different aspects. In a first time, control, or in other words, optimizing refugees'

life can be done through the spatial control of mobility, namely the camp itself. This part refers to different aspects: firstly, the control of migration flows to allow a better reception within facilities, which is secondly followed by the space itself. The minimum square meters that an individual need is about three and at least 100 square meters for food preparation. Additionally, the site plan or ‘master plan’ designed by the UNCHR provides camp directors or managers with information regarding boundaries, infrastructures, facilities, and social organizations. Camps are usually divided by ethnicities or vulnerabilities of individuals, referring to the categorization of refugees and the continuity of control and restriction over communities (Bulley 2014: 9-12). In a second time, the production and calculation of the individuals in camps as a population through statistics and indicators also allow control and governance over a community. “Rather than concentrate on the individual human body alone, bio-power and governmentality is ‘massifying’, focusing on phenomena that can be measured and calculated based on birth rate, mortality rates, and the fertility of a population” (Foucault 2004, in Adams, 2017). Usually, such phenomena occur before refugees enter the camp to collect information to provide security. To keep spatial control and order, the assessment and interventions permit an efficient administration of camps. Thus regular updates are important. (Bulley 2014:12-15).

Refugee camps include care and control, through the provision of water, food, and health services but also the measurement of refugees. However, to provide security and accordingly the optimization of life, information collection has to be conducted on a fixed population and this has to be done on a temporarily frozen group. Nevertheless, such security mechanisms are not designed to control a community but instead to produce an optimal situation. Over the last years, the UNHCR and smaller NGOs have focused on involving refugees in community programs (see chapter four), through participatory schemes. Community-building approaches are typical of advanced liberal techniques of governance and, consequently, allow efficient control and governance over a population. Community-building should raise awareness among refugees to take part in their security management through personal ethics and obligations.

“Community ‘participation’ and ‘involvement’ becomes a matter of actively changing behavior and habits on issues such as personal hygiene through ‘providing information to the community on life in their new situations, which may be markedly different from their previous experience’ (Corsellis and Vitale 2005:106-107, cited in Bulley 2014: 15).

In contrast to disciplinary power, governmentality and bio-power permit the circulation of goods, services, and ideas and, regarding refugee camps, they allow connections between individuals that were previously unrelated (Bulley 2014: 15). Throughout the years, camps became more organized, complex, and complete in terms of sanitation or public roads, for example. Another focus has been put on camps’ size, which becomes smaller (from 10.000 to 5.000 individuals) to ensure good management of it, better life conditions, and significantly minimize or avoid riots (Agier 2010: 39).

Refugee camps are also spaces of political action; such activities can also disturb humanitarian work, which is due to the perpetuating and imposed categorization and indicators such as ‘vulnerable’

or 'resilience' (see chapter five) (Agier 2010: 39). "The professionalization of the sector might improve the effectiveness of aid, but it represents an exclusionary mechanism, perhaps discriminating against those who have experience but not bureaucratic power" (Barnett 2005: 390). Alongside the use of categories, humanitarian governance also uses violence to settle and balance their identity and role as caring and understanding agents (Barnett 2005: 391). Agier described this use of violence as "striking with one hand, healing with the other" (Agier 2010:29). He argued that states', organizations' and/or individuals' acts are based on humanitarian principles in a political context that lies on the desire for control (Agier 2010: 30). Humanitarian governance relies on terms and limits of intervention through tents being used as medical facilities, clean water provision, basic sanitation or/and food distribution. Therefore, the desire for control is designed around the population's bio-political well-being to be governed (Pallister-Wilkins, 2016).

"This is how 'humanitarian situations' are generated: situations in which the humanitarian element defines and dominates the entire spectrum of experience, including the political space; situations in which the victim and the perpetrator, the refugee and the fake refugee, the vulnerable and the undesirable person monopolize the representation of the human person, as the death knell of the citizen and his unconditional voice. Everything is ready for a governmental humanitarianism to assume its share of the 'government of the world'. [...] And the fact of bringing together all the misery and all the 'disasters' of the world – whether 'natural', epidemiological, social, or political – in a single regime of thought and government that is emergency-driven and exceptionalist inaugurates the time and the spaces of humanitarian government" (Agier 2010: 39).

Alongside Foucault's work, the contemporary author Giorgio Agamben proposed in *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (1998) a reviewed analysis of bio-politics related to crisis environment and how the international law shapes and maintains the nature of violence. Agamben argued about Foucault's work that the sovereign right, "to take life or let live" has converted overtime to "make live and let die." New constructs of systematic neglect have emerged by examining how political power works as geo-politics powers have also changed. Thus, sovereign power always exists and will not disappear, as it operates in situations of emergency.

The notion of 'state of emergency' that has characterized the EU's external borders in the last years mainly relates to the push-back policies or relocation schemes to third countries such as Turkey, aiming to avoid individuals entering. When in 2016, the European Agenda on Migration was discussed, a clear dual but paradoxical focus has been put: saving lives but securing external borders. By adopting this position, asylum seekers have been portrayed as potential security threats regarding possible terrorist attacks and the union's economic security. The presence of institutions like EUROPOL or FRONTEX has been increasing, and hotspots systems for general control created. Agamben has called the situation a 'State of exception.'

In his work, he de-constructed the meaning of *Zoe* in ancient Greek time, which refers to the biological, natural life of an individual and *bios*, meaning the qualified, political life. *Zoe* was excluded

from the *polis* (city-state) and therefore restricted to the domestic sphere without participating in the public sphere. By doing this separation, specific individuals are excluded from certain categories representing the notion of bare life. “By bare life Agamben means a life that is politicized through the fact of its exclusion. [...] Agamben’s bare life is not a natural life but a life exposed to sovereign power and the threat of death...” (Whyte 2013, cited in Davitti, 2019).

There is a junction between the biological, natural life, and politics that have become visible, in which the states control and governs lives. Agamben argues that the politicization of life is becoming increasingly dangerous as it reduces humanity to the biological life that can be kept alive or killed. Additionally, human beings can be killed without impunity because they are already set outside the legal sphere. Moreover, more than being excluded, asylum seekers are abandoned by international law, by normalizing the state of exception. The distinction with Foucault’s understanding is that he includes the natural life in the *polis*, while Agamben argued that it is only included when excluded.

He also argued that states do not intervene to avoid emergencies or catastrophes but rather let them happen to re-establish security and safety in the right way. It could be said that the EU is purposely implementing strict asylum and migration policies, referring to rigid control at external borders, shameful conditions in hotspots and general camps and chaotic applications and procedures to prevent asylum seekers and irregular immigrants from coming. Refugee camps (for example, concentration camps), which Agamben described as “structure in which the state of exception is permanently realized” is a materialization resulting from the state of exception.

Moreover, through his analysis of biopolitics and governmentality, Foucault highlighted that institutions like a government are not only oppressive, permanent, and solid but rather fragile and therefore have potential for change. Power can be characterized by its instability, which for this reason, allows to permanently renew and reaffirm power relations (Balan 2010: 7). Therefore, where there are power relations, there is also resistance, and, paradoxically, resistance reinforces, and creates power relations. In this context, if there are different power relations, there are also different resistance techniques. Lilja and Vinthagen (2014) proposed that to resist bio-power, individuals try to prevent or reject the managing of the population policies by acting differently, eventually through sub-cultures and/or different set of values (Lilja and Vinthagen 2014: 124). Refugee camps also embody the character of a political space, where political subjects act against the attributed identity of a silent victim, which then repoliticize the humanitarian discourse (Agier 2010: 40). This includes protesting bad camp conditions, boycotting food rations, or presenting of wrong information for overage family members to stay together and not be divided into different camps or different countries. Another tactic has been described as ‘intimate-international solidarities’, referring to trans-local movements dedicated to exposing different violence types. Also, activists-academics work in partnership with those who are not entitled to rights and are excluded from societies to change policies, such as border policies in the EU. Working and conducting research with either local staff or irregular immigrants enables better

identification of adequate research method, and interpreting and analysis of cultural practices, codes, and issues.

Finally, refugee camps, driven by humanitarian governance, bio-power, and governmentality, produce and reproduce typical liberal and advanced population management, which gives place to discrimination and exclusion, but also self-empowerment and political engagement as well as resistance. It has become urgent to question the humanitarian aid mechanism as a modern system of government and power, in which control and care are paradoxically linked to each other (Agier 2010: 21).

3 Methodology

“Field research undoubtedly serves as a vehicle to gain better understanding of specific subjects, settings and developments, but the boom in fieldwork in social science (Menzel 2014: 280) certainly also relates to researchers’ ‘curiosity and adventure’ associated with ‘the field’” (Girtler 2001: 16 cited in, Krause 2017: 3).

Due to my decision to discuss my research question by an anthropological approach, several methods have been considered. In particular, two main methods I used for this work are comparative and ethnographic, as on one side, it closely studies two distinct groups in one society and, on the other side, the interpretation and description of symbolic and contextual meanings of these two groups’ everyday practices. In other words, Greeks and asylum seekers and their everyday practices and reactions towards Greek asylum and migration policies (Anthropological Research, Methods and Techniques:14-16), with a focus on understanding and exploring how Greek migration and asylum policies affect locals and asylum seekers’ life. The methods used represent one of the most important aspects of a research, as they give information for the validity of it and its judgment. This section will explain how the research was conducted, discussing the ethical consideration of researching forced migration, and presenting its limitations.

Among the typical methods of ethnographic work, I have included fieldwork, participant observation, and interviews. Yet, before I give a more detailed explanation of these methods, I present my research strategy, namely the so-called “grounded theory” that is a process of identification of categories through collected data in the field and their analysis (coding). In other words, through the methods of identifying and integration of categories, theory(ies) will emerge. This is a dynamic process as each newly added idea, concept, category, or linkage will create new perspectives on the research and therefore either modify or elucidate the original investigations. (cf. Grounded Theory Methodology Chapter 7 Learning Objectives, 2013.)

3.1 Data collection: qualitative and quantitative methods

“Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. Qualitative research consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including fieldnotes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involved an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them” (Denzin & Lincoln 2005: 3).

I conducted fieldwork in Greece between August 2019 and February 2020, divided into two times. In the first period of fieldwork, from August 2019 until January 2020, I volunteered for the local NGO Project Elea, which works inside Eleonas Camp in Athens. There, I also performed participant observation. In the first four months, I volunteered on a full-time basis, meaning five days a week,

followed by three days a week for the last two months. Alongside other international volunteers and residents, I organized different educational, manual, creative and sportive activities. I helped coordinate and distribute food and non-food items to the 400 new arrivals from Moria to Eleonas in September 2019. Additionally, I have often helped residents with informal translation in French or German to English regarding asylum-related documents or ease communication with other camp actors. With some residents of Eleonas, I have built up my relationship as ‘friendship’ as I used to meet some of them outside the camp or volunteering hours. Therefore, it was important not to be there every day of the week, but only three times, as it allowed me to step back from the field and my ‘insider’ position to it, avoid any assumptions or presumed knowledge and readjust my objectivity. Several times in Eleonas and with one of my interview partners in Mytilini, I have been invited into their homes to share tea, food, and hear about their stories.

My second period of fieldwork took place the first three weeks of February 2020 in Lesvos. During this time, I volunteered for Refugee4Refugees my first week. In the last two weeks, I have been mainly conducting interviews in Mytilini and Moria, took notes of the field, and went to the symbolic lifejacket graveyard on the Northshore of the island.

Participant observation with Project Elea allowed me to take notes during weekly meetings, activities, and conversations with residents and volunteers. It also allowed me to understand residents’ daily lives, routines, norms, and community habits but mostly a first insight into asylum procedures. Participant observation with Refugee4Refugees, although its short time, gave me the opportunity to understand how an NGO is working within a humanitarian emergency context, such as coordination with other NGOs and simply how to behave in a hostile environment as a foreign volunteer. Fieldwork and direct observation in Lesvos mainly made me understand locals’ position and reinforced my understanding of the current humanitarian and political context. Field notes fulfill different types of notes such as mental notes that were done later as it felt inappropriate at the moment, full field notes that were written on the computer at the end of the day but mostly jotted notes which were taken on notebooks including small sentences, keywords, important events and strong statements during meetings (Bryman 2016: 443).

Alongside observation, I decided to work with semi-structured interviews, which means that I worked based on a set of questions (see Appendix) or points I was hoping to discuss with my interviewees. At the same time, I gave the conversation the freedom to explore further points or even change its direction. Using this qualitative data collection method gives my interviewee space to explain experiences or stories in a freeway. Additionally, the advantage of face-to-face interviews is the physical proximity and, therefore, the possibility to add body language to the understanding of reactions or answers to specific questions. As already mentioned above, I prepared in advance three different interview guides (asylum seekers, locals, and international volunteers) with each four distinct sections but related to the same themes: cohabitation with locals, humanitarian work and the situation in Moria camp, and the involvement of Greek government and the EU. The central part here is to give people the

opportunity to speak, - and provide time and space for them to raise their standpoints beyond research questions. Crucially, when participants can speak out about issues that are relevant for them, they are not treated as 'data sources' but as persons (Krause 2017: 20)

By the time of my presence on Lesbos (counting 100.000 habitants), Mytilene's population counted around 28.000 habitants (Worldometer, Greece) and about 20.000 asylum seekers in Moria (cf. Hernandez, 2020). The numbers of international volunteers are smaller, but the island counts 40 official NGOs (cf. Peace Corps Community for Refugees). Due to my limited stay in Lesbos, I decided to apply sampling, which allowed me to work with a part of the population to represent the whole. Sampling processes include two ways: probability method – simple, random, and not influenced by the researcher or the researched groups' opinion, and non-probability method – such as convenience, purposeful, and selected by the researcher. The convenience sampling method usually involves a part of this population, which is available to the research. The method is also called 'accidental sampling', 'chain method' or snowball sampling, which is applied when it is complicated to reach a specific community or population, in this case, asylum seekers in general, or asylum seekers who would feel comfortable enough conducting an interview with me (Naderifar et.al. 2017:1-2).

Moreover, during my volunteering time with R4R, I have met different volunteers with who I created friendships, and which helped me find people eligible to participate in this research. Through these people, chosen because of the convenience sampling, I met most of my interview partners. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) argued that this method is rather quick, which indeed, allowed me to conduct in total twelve interviews, including five with asylum seekers and six with international volunteers within ten days.

My interview partners that are seeking international protection were originally from the Middle East and Africa, more specifically from Afghanistan (3), Gambia (1), and Nigeria (1). Regarding my interviews with volunteers, origin countries were Germany (3), France (2), Spain (1), and Chile (1). I decided to record all my interviews, to fully focus on my conversations, and adapt my questions and behavior to my partner so that he/she could feel comfortable. All my interviews are anonymous, as some of the asylum seekers were afraid that if their names were published it would negatively influence their asylum application. On the other hand, some asylum seekers did not have a problem with their published names, as they wanted their stories to be heard. All my interviewees could choose where the interview would take place, which was mainly in coffees/bars, in public spaces like squares or at the canteen of Moria Camp. To ensure a comfortable atmosphere between the interviewees and me, and for personal interest and curiosity, I proposed to send my research once finished. All of them happily accepted; this added proximity and trust between them and me and reinforced my honest intentions. Of twelve interviews, eleven were conducted in English and one in German (the translation was done during the transcription) and lasted between 30 and 60 minutes.

Hence, because of the rather hostile and tense environment, and my limited time in Lesbos, it was difficult to find locals who would agree to interviews. Accordingly, I decided to adapt my methods

to the field and introduced surveys based on a questionnaire to collect data regarding locals' opinion. The questionnaire included ten questions regarding what locals think about asylum seekers fleeing to Greece, the Greek government and the EU's involvement. Participants could either answer yes, no or neutral. I was hoping to distribute 30 of them in the main commercial street of Mytilini called Ermou street. To reach more people as possible, I translated the surveys to Greek. However, only 12 people have agreed to fill them. Of the twelve respondents, seven were females, four males, and one did not answer the question, aged between 35 and 57. Seven are living for between six and 56 years on the island, and five were born there. Regarding their occupation, seven were shop owners, three employees, and one was a lecturer at the University of the Aegean.

Data analysis involves in a first time a close examination to have a better understanding of them and be able to draw a first conclusion. In a second time, by reviewing and studying the data, it is possible to create patterns in line with my research questions. It is important to mention that data analysis requires patience but, foremost critical thinking and problem-solving skills. By analyzing qualitative and quantitative data, I distinguished similarities and differences regarding the opinion of Greeks and their thoughts towards specific situations, without any impact on my position in the field. Both methods abled me to collect reliable data and personal experiences. Regarding my interviews, I tried to transcribe them as soon as possible to have a first-hand idea of the main outputs. After that, I decoded all the transcripts with the help of colors to generate thematic groups. Additionally, I created a table with all personal information of my interview partners such as gender, country of origin, year of birth, marital status, date of entrance in Greece, and destination country for asylum seekers (see table 1.). Regarding volunteers, the table also contains information about volunteering duration, educational level, and the NGO they volunteer for (see Appendix). To analyze the data collected through the surveys, I created a diagram to understand better the results, namely similarities and differences (see Appendix).

In parallel to these primary sources, I have also worked with secondary sources to gain data through scientific articles, reports published by international and Greek organizations and institutions, and movies and documentaries. Linking my research to existing discussions and publications helped me demonstrate its credibility and contribution (Bryman 2016: 3-6).

Overall, my dissertation includes qualitative and quantitative methods, which can be argued as typical for anthropological research, characterized by its interdisciplinary fields of research and subjects and includes “a complex, interconnected family of terms, concepts, and assumptions [...]” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 3).

3.2 Ethical consideration

When researchers want to understand the experiences and practices of displaced people and their political, social, cultural, and economic environment, it is crucial to take the question of ethics into consideration. Institutes or scholars may use a code of conduct as a normative framework where fundamental principles of fieldwork ethics and how to prevent participation harm are described. In 2007

the Oxford Refugee Studies Centre published a code entitled the 'Ethical Guideline for Good Research Practices'. It allows the researcher to discuss and reflect on moral, political, social, cultural, and economic perspectives and issues of representation or power structures. It is important to keep in mind that, although fieldwork is generally motivated by curiosity, it can also bring challenges and risks which must be considered. Therefore, a golden rule within research of displaced people is the principle of do no harm, which entails that "risk reduction is bound to scholars' individual commitment" (Krause 2017: 5). Several scholars have argued through empirical studies that refugees' life conditions are usually characterized by different forms of restrictions and violence (Turner 2016; Crisps et.al. 2012; Krause 2015; Algier 2011 cited in Krause 2017:3), such as social exclusion, discrimination or unemployability. Additionally, "Western" researchers should be careful with the position they adopt once in the field. Attention should be paid to a sensitive approach to avoid top-down power dynamics between the researcher and the researched, the possibility of psychological risks due to explaining traumatic experiences, and not promise better life conditions that cannot be held. Once the fieldwork is concluded, harm can be done through the inappropriate use of data, names, or pictures being published without participants' approval. In the context of my research, hierarchical difference regarding asylum seekers was not an issue due to my young age, which I believe played a role. Nevertheless, I felt some sort of hierarchal difference with locals, especially in Lesbos, as I was clearly labeled as a foreigner who could afford to be a volunteer. This was reinforced through the fact that I do not speak Greek.

Besides harm for the participant, also researchers can also experience physical danger or psychological stress and fieldwork can become emotionally challenging (Thomson et.al 2013 cited in Krause 2017: 4). During my fieldwork in Lesbos, international volunteers have been attacked several times and some injured, which made me not feel especially insecure walking in Mytilini's streets as a foreigner but just remembered me to be more cautious. However, I mainly experienced emotional difficulties. Firstly, in Eleonas camp, when in mid-September about 400 new residents arrived from Moria camp and needed assistance such as clothes and food distribution for several weeks, finding agreements between 'old' and 'new' residents, avoid ethnicity conflicts and overall ensure human dignity. Secondly, during my interviews, I was confronted with the harsh reality of being an asylum seeker. Fundamental principles count as an evident bases such as voluntary participation, information about the research, and the ongoing possibility to withdraw participant's collected data. Several researchers draw a connection between fundamental human rights and participants' rights and argue through a human right-based approach that is central to studies of (post)-conflict and forced migration. "Those who have experienced conflict and forced migration have also often suffered human rights violations, been exposed to marginalization and discrimination, and endured restrictive access to their rights" (Ellis et.al. 2007, Leaning 2001, Pittaway and Bartolomei 2001, cited in Krause 2017:8). To avoid this, informed consent has been widely used over the years, and includes three aspects: provide information about the research, make sure the participants understand what they agree to, and freedom of participation. In the frame of my university and because I decided to research vulnerable

communities, I presented an informed consent, including all these aspects before each interview. In case my interview partner could not read English, I started by explaining my research and ensuring asylum seekers that their participation would not have any impact on their asylum procedures as it would be done under anonymity and that they could stop the conversation at any time without justifications. Nonetheless, the concept of voluntary might be unfamiliar to asylum seekers. Some might experience fear, as those people have been fleeing from authoritarian regimes or experienced violations of human rights.

Besides sensitivity from the researcher, establishing trust is a core aspect of the relationship with participants, especially regarding delicate subjects. To do so, researchers should respect cultural differences, freedom of choice, recognition of participants, and human dignity (Schönhuth et.al 2001, Hugman et.al. 2011b, Lammers 2007, cited in, Krause 2017:13). Consequently, I left the choice to all participants to choose the place of the interview and the time. Before starting the interview, I gave them a summary of the main questions and made sure that they do not have to answer them if they might feel uncomfortable. Once the interview was over, I asked participants if they wanted to talk about something specific that I could have forgotten to voice important aspects to them.

Once the fieldwork is over, scholars' considerable challenge is how to interpret rightly the data collected and place it into the appropriate theoretical debate (Harrell-Bond and Voutira 2007, cited in Krause 2017: 22). In this context, Jacobsen and Landau (2003) have introduced the concept of dual imperative which seeks "to satisfy the demands of academic peers and to ensure that the knowledge and understanding work generates are used to protect refugees and influence institutions like governments and the UN" (Jacobsen and Landau 2003, cited in, Krause 2017:123). Several scholars have debated whether research findings should be used for policies to improve asylum seekers and refugees' conditions.

"I cannot see any justification for conducting research into situations of extreme human suffering if one does not have the alleviation of suffering as an explicit objective of one's research. For the academic, this means attempting to influence the behavior and thinking of policymakers and practitioners so that their interventions are more likely to improve than worsen the situations of those whom they wish to help" (Turton 1996: 96, cited in, Krause 2017: 22).

As I support Landau and Jacobsen for sharing results with policymakers, I also endorse Krause's claim to share findings with participants, which underlines the importance of handing over feedback to the communities (Krause 2017: 24-26). Therefore, I proposed all my interview partners to send my work to them, once it was finished, which they gladly accepted.

3.3 Limitations of the study

Language barriers, specifically with Greeks, had an important impact on my limited involvement in the field. Because I do not speak Greek, it was complicated to reach Greek citizens and conduct interviews with them. While my fieldwork in Lesbos, Greeks refused most of my interview proposals. As I could

only stay in Lesvos for three weeks, I had to adapt the field dynamics, which were changing nearly every day to my research methods (such as the general strike of two days where everything was closed, including no transports at all). Once I realized it would have been extremely challenging to speak with locals and to feel them comfortable enough with me and the English language, I decided to work based on surveys. While I was printing these, I asked the copy shop owner, who is Greek and with whom I had already talked a few times, if, in his opinion, people would be open to a survey. He confirmed with enthusiasm, saying that Greeks want to show their side of the story as well. I, therefore, believe that, overall, my status as a foreigner was limiting my research towards Greeks.

A second limitation, which is linked to the first one, is my short-time presence and, therefore, ability to conduct in-depth fieldwork in Lesvos. In the first place, I believe that to explore in depth an environment with such powerful dynamics, a longer engagement in the field is required. In the second place, my research has been limited to daytime ethnography. Several asylum seekers in Eleonas in Moria have told me that at nighttime, once NGOs and volunteers are gone, the atmosphere in camps are significantly different, involving more violence, aggression, and overall clashes between ethnic communities but also with camp authorities.

The third limitation is concerning the sampling process for interviews and surveys, as participants were chosen on an impersonal basis. Consequently, researchers can unconsciously or unintentionally contribute to silencing some people – and such neglect often occurs along the lines of gender and age. While it is hardly possible to involve all community members in social science projects, sensitivity to inclusion, and exclusion processes is crucial (Krause 2017: 9). Sampling can contribute to inequalities; namely, those with more power will have bigger opportunities than those with less power. Regarding my research, those with more power could represent participants who feel comfortable enough to speak freely, leave the camp to go to the city to have an interview or are comfortable enough or fluent in English. In this case, those who can't speak English or those who maybe feel uncomfortable about leaving their place and be in public spaces with locals didn't have the opportunity to participate in the research.

“The impartial selection of participants is pivotal in data collection to gain insights revealing the complex spectrum and dynamics of a research context and population. Using arbitrary sampling may neglect the voices of people who often remain overlooked, and studies will likely show only one side of a story, or perhaps not even fully this one side” (Krause 2017: 9).

4 Ethnographies

This chapter will provide an ethnographic report about my two fieldwork in Greece and give an in-depth and critical description of Eleonas camp in Athens and Moria Camp in Lesbos. In detail, I will compare the dynamics of both camps using Agier's urban research about refugee camps based on a case study of Dadaab camp in Kenya (2002). However, these ethnographic descriptions are based on daytime fieldwork, which partly represents the everyday life in refugee camps.

4.1 Mainland Greece: Eleonas camp in Athens

Eleonas refugee camp is in Athens, run by the Greek government and under the supervision of the Greek Ministry of Migration. It was the first camp open on the Greek mainland in August 2015. The camp was built for 700 people (Athens Live News, 2017). External access to the camp is restricted, which is why one or two police officers and workers from the municipality are controlling the movements. However, residents can enter and leave as they wish. The camp's proximity to the center of Athens implies access to services, such as the bus station going to Omonia (center of Athens) within a few minutes or two metro stations. Each of them is about 10 minutes walking. The camp's population is currently about 2300 people of about 25 different nationalities, and approximately 500-600 are children. Their basic needs regarding security, shelter, and medical care are covered by the Greek authorities and some major NGOs. Several organizations are working in the camp: some are new, some were there at the beginning (such as the International Rescue Committee) and are no longer in Eleonas since the end of their mission. Examples of NGOs that have been active in the camp during my fieldwork are Elix (Greek language school), El Sistema (music school), Cheer (maternity services and prevention regarding breastfeeding, sexual health, and nutrition), and Project Elea. These NGOs are actively working with IOM, UNHCR, or workers of the municipality of Athens.

Eleonas is organized around three sections: camp 1, camp 2, and camp 3. Camp 1 is situated on the right side of the entrance gate. There, the container of the ministry of migration is located, the IOM office, and the safe zone that welcomes unaccompanied minors together with other residents' containers. Most of the containers stand alone; however, due to new arrivals in the Summer of 2019, some containers were piled on each other. Camp 1 also counts a covered common area with free Wi-Fi access. Camp 2 defines the section at the back of the camp, composed mostly of residents' containers and a small garden created and maintained over the years by refugees and volunteers. It also counts a playground for children and a kindergarten run in the morning by the municipality workers. Camp 3 defines all the left side of the camp. Alongside shelters and a second playground, some of the containers are being used by Elix, and some are used as laundries with washing machines provided by the UNHCR. The most central area of Eleonas is the large road that links the entrance to the football pitch, which is a central point in the camp (geographically and socially). On this road, most of the external actor's containers are placed; IOM, some Elix classrooms, and two storage containers belonging to Project Elea as its office. In the frame of another course, together with a peer student, we investigated the importance of NGOs in Greek Refugee camps based on qualitative data collection in Eleonas. Most of the residents agree that Project

Eleas' office represents the heart of the camp, where one can find volunteers and residents chatting together while listening to music and drinking coffee, but also a larger and covered area with tables and free WIFI which characterizes one of the main meeting points in the camp.

The housing units are metal containers (see figures 4.2 and 4.3), widely believed in providing a better standard of living than comparable camps in Greece and elsewhere. The containers are financed by the EU. Generally, one family lives in one room or between two to four single people. They share a kitchen which is placed on the left side and a bathroom in the middle. Because the kitchen is on one side of the containers, sharing it, depending on resident's cooking and eating hours, can be a source of disagreement amongst ethnicities. The camp counts a total of 216 toilets, which are mixed, and 212 showers. (UNHCR, 2017). Due to important donations over the years, most of the containers have been painted in different colors, and some have positive quotes on them, such as "one love". The camp counts several small kiosks or places where volunteers and residents can buy homemade food such as falafel from a Syrian family or other traditional dishes from other countries for some euros.

Every weekend, only a few meters away from the camp, a big bazaar is organized in old industrial buildings and parking lots, where residents can find cheap affairs such as gas stoves, toys for children, or sheets and blankets. The proximity to the fair allows residents to purchase essential or not, items without having to wait for donation distribution.



Figures 4.2 and 4.3: Streets in the Eleonas Camp in Athens. (November 2019)

4.2 Project Elea

During my stay in Athens, I decided to conduct fieldwork with the NGO Project Elea. The team is composed of volunteers from all over the world who come together with the residents of Eleonas, following the aim of improving the standard of living and well-being of the community. The project was founded by Andreas Ashikalis in June 2016, after he volunteered on the island of Lesbos in the summer 2015. Project Elea has been approved by the Greek Ministry of Migration and operates independently

within the camp. It is a long-term project and consists of a coordination team, a volunteer team, and an education/teacher team. It is based on private donations from companies, volunteers, or foundations and sometimes receives money from international organizations. Besides providing of basic services such as the distribution of food and clothing, great emphasis is placed on creative engagement through a varied program of activities (10-12 per day) focusing on education, sports, culture, environment, and skills training for both children and adults. These activities start at 2 pm until 9 pm, and volunteers must leave at 9:30 pm. The aim is to make the endless time spent at the camp more enjoyable, positive, and productive for the residents (see figures 4.4 and 4.5). Usually, activities are widely appreciated by residents. Yet, on cold or rainy days, and due to the camp's bad irrigation, which quickly becomes overflooded, residents do not participate at activities. Besides children's joy of playing in the water, most of the residents do not own waterproof shoes but instead flip flop, making it unpleasant to be outside.



Figure 4.4: Bench built during the activity Green Street for students to wait before classes start. (November 2019)



Figure 4.5: Ramp built during the activity Green Street, for an habitant in a wheelchair. (November 2019)



Figure 4.6: Garden in Eleonas Camp. (November 2019)

The atmosphere in Eleonas is relatively calm, and family-friendly compared to other camps and conditions are one of the best in Greece. During my first months of volunteering, some families lived in front of the camp, in tents as they wanted to enter Eleonas. Around November 2019, Greek authorities relocated the families, some of them in Eleonas, considering that living directly on a busy street is dangerous. Hence, I have heard several times from residents that the environment as night, once NGOs and workers have left the camp, becomes less sympathetic. It often comes to arguments and physical fights between ethnicities or families, to the point that sometimes police or ambulances must intervene. Additionally, during my fieldwork, it happened sometimes that fires broke out and that firefighters must step in. This

quickly becomes an attractive event for children that find it more exciting than understanding its danger, which may lie because the camp does not have a fire safety plan (UNHCR, 2017).

Overall, the relationship between volunteers, and residents is positive and some are characterized by friendship. For a long time, volunteers and refugees helping in activities use to go out after work, chat and share drinks. However, due to some incidents, and for everyone's safety, more recently, coordinators have decided to put a term at this habit and introduce a contract for residents helping. Only those who have signed it could meet and spend time with volunteers outside the camp.

4.3 Lesvos: Moria camp

Lesvos counts three camps on the island. The smallest one, Pikpa, situated 5,5km on the south of Mytilini and close to the airport (Jauhiainen 2017: 18), is an independent camp established in 2014 by a local group of activists – Lesvos solidarity. (cf. Lesvos solidarity) The camp can welcome between 100 and 120 individuals. Kara Tepe is the second biggest camp, located 2,5 km from Mytilini on the way to Moria Camp. This medium-size camp opened in 2015 cannot exceed 1200 residents, or in other words, 260 families. (cf. Reliefweb, 2019).

Moria camp is located about eight km from Mytilini Centre (south-east of the island). There is a bus (one euro for one ticket) driving every half an hour from Sappho Square, a central meeting place in Mytilini for asylum seekers, to Moria Camp with a single stop at Kara Tepe camp. During the day, men, women, and children sit on the benches, speaking, smoking cigarettes, or just waiting for the day to pass by. Most asylum seekers are coming several times a week to the center. They can go to the

supermarket, take money from the ATM (usually long queues at Western Union) or meet other people outside of the camp because most people hope to come to Mytilini to take a break from life inside the camp, considering that Moria and Kara Tepe are counting around 22.000 people, two busses per hour are not enough. Furthermore, for example, a family of 5 people cannot afford to spend 10 euros per day just to go to the city and come back.

There are two different ways/roads between Moria Camp and Mytilini. One of them (street 1.) crosses Moria village, which is a small, quiet, and authentic town just a few meters from the camp. Volunteers and asylum seekers that feel comfortable enough to be observed by locals take that street. It goes up in the hills of Moria, where the view towards Turkey is even more distinct. Nonetheless, locals have shown their disagreement towards anyone not from the village passing it. Therefore, it is recommended for volunteers' or asylum seekers' safety not to cross it and take the road along the water, which is longer and more dangerous.



Figure 4.7: Street going from Mytilini to Moria camp alongside the Aegean Sea. (February 2020)

Therefore, the single 'safe' road (street 2.) that links the camps to Mytilini has, with time, been transformed into a highway of families with children or babies, groups of friends or older people walking. That street goes along the coast, characterized by a typical Greek landscape where cars and trucks drive faster than they should.

Hundreds and thousands of people walk all day long between Moria, Kara Tepe, and Mytilini, looking at the Aegean Sea within its background, the Turkish coast. While walking on that street, looking at their past on the right and their present in the front, asylum seekers, do not have any other choice than to accept these conditions, walking 16km to keep a social life outside the camp.

Moria camp is run by Greece's central authorities supported by close involvement of the UNHCR regarding its management. Moria camp was initially a military basis before its location was used as a reception site. The camp was built to host 3500 asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2017); however, due to the important rise of venues to Lesbos, it counts today about 19000 people. The official camp is organized by ethnic and linguistic sections. In 2017, most asylum seekers were sleeping in tents, but this was abolished the same year. However, overcrowding makes the site more chaotic rather than organized. The official camp is only accessible to local authorities, UNHCR and EU workers, and Asylum Unit workers. International NGOs are only active outside, in the Olive Grove or also called the "Jungle". The

Jungle, mostly described like this by asylum seekers, represents the unofficial camp, which has been severely growing over the last years all around the high fences and walls of Moria Camp. The camp counts a total of 169 toilets, 118 showers with hot water, and 215 water taps. (UNHCR, 2017).

Part of the population in the Jungle lives in self-made tents, made from long plastic pieces bought in Mytilini and wood that they find on the floor or directly taken from trees. The other part of



Figure 4.8: Tent in Moria camp. February 2020)

people is living in tents provided by the UNHCR or other NGOs, such as Movement on the Ground (MOTG). As already mentioned, the Jungle is situated in the Olive Grove, a large field with hundreds of cut olive trees, which people use to stay warm during winter nights or cook hot meals. Inside and outside, some central streets have transformed into markets or

commonly called ‘bazaar’. There, they can find fruits, vegetables, self-made bread, and any other kind of food or cooked dishes. Some propose their services such as hairdressers or barbers. Although asylum



Figure 4.9: Kiosk selling fruits and vegetables in the Jungle of Moria camp. (February 2020)

seekers need an asylum card to have work and earn money, small businesses are directly visible in the camps. The small shops, backers, and shopping streets are rather crowded during the day. People chat, eat, or listen to music together.

Within two weeks of fieldwork, I have been three times in Moria to conduct interviews and visit an interview partner who kindly invited me for tea and oranges. I have walked every time I have been there, either one way or both. On the way to Moria and in

the self-created streets in the Jungle, people are friendly, wave or greet you, ask where you are from, and children are overall curious.



Figure 4.10: Handmade bridge linking the Jungle to the inside of the Moria camp. (February 2020)

The Jungle is divided into different sections. On the right side of the official camp, MOTG is responsible for the management of the sections. While I was researching where I could conduct participant observation in Lesvos, I came across the website of MOTG. I already heard about this organization when I shared my idea of going to Lesvos with the funder and coordinators of Project Elea. They told me that MOTG is one of the only NGOs still active on the ground, proposing emergency responses. Once I have applied to be a volunteer, coordinators of MOTG told me that every volunteer must pay a minimum of 200euros of donations to join the team. As a student, I could not afford this amount and looked for other organizations, as the island counts about 40 (registered) (cf. Peace Corps

Community for Refugees). However, MOTG counts many volunteers and is the reason why their sections are better organized than those on the left side of the camp. What I mean by better organization is that most of the tents are new ones, bigger and well isolated. Although some areas remain chaotic, those living in the new tents have more space to walk around, and some of them have planted flowers in front. The left side of the Jungle is less crowded but more disorganized. These sections are partly managed by the smaller NGO R4R. They provide clothes donations in their shop close to Moria village and organize two to three times a week cleaning actions, where approximately 300 bags are collected within some hours. Most people living in tents in the Jungle do not have access to electricity or water and must enter the official camp for it (see figures 4.11 and 4.12).

The walls and fences count several holes made by the residents to enter and leave faster instead



of passing by the only main entrance. To cross the old river path that became, a river of irrepressible garbage, asylum seekers build bridges out of wood. These bridges are used hundreds of times a day by children, women, and men and gradually became shaky and impassable. Also here, most of my interview partners highlighted that once the night falls, the atmosphere is much more dangerous. People are being robbed on their way to the bathroom at night, women are being

Figures 4.11 and 4.12: Electric cables in the Jungle of Moria camp. (February 2020)

raped, and families are worried about attacks of groups of single males.

4.4 Urban ethnography³ of refugee camps

Agier, conducted during June and July 2000 fieldwork in Dadaab Camp (southeast of Kenya), where he was ‘inserted’ into the field by the Belgian team of Médecin Sans Frontières (MSF). He links this

³ Also the Greek social anthropologists Katerina Rozakou has proposed in the last years an ethnographic approach to irregular migration, bureaucracy, humanitarianism, volunteerism and solidarity in the Greek refugee crisis. In

fieldwork with extended research since 1998 in Colombia carried out among the desplazada to examine and analyze refugee camps' urban characteristics.

Agier supposed that refugee camps represent, on the one hand, a combination of social conditions created by war and humanitarian actions. In other words, a place characterized by large-scale segregation where life is kept away from the regular political and social landscape. On the other hand, over the last decade, refugee camps have seen a professionalization of humanitarian assistance such as experts, scientific research programs, and interests of academic and popular journals. In this context, camps become organized spaces with social life and power systems, which Agier called city-camps, camps-villas in French (2002: 318-322). A central focus of his research is on the meaning of identity inside camps. Refugees in camps are defined by their exclusive and official status of victims, which makes them nameless in the context of humanitarian assistance, as their identity does not influence the humanitarian support provided (shelter, food, security, healthcare). Therefore, such aid systems have caused political and social non-existence. Following this argument, identity problems arise due to traumas and survival feelings, which also enable opportunities (Agier 2002:322).

Agier explains that the creation of bakeries, shops, kiosks, small restaurants, or markets, educational, craft and trade activities, which are supported by international NGOs, but also the way of giving names to streets, illustrate the everyday life understanding of refugees and the related meaning of space. However, residents of camps in Dadaab, as well as in Eleonas and Moria, show strong feelings of uselessness and powerlessness. Individuals suffer morally from insufficient occupational activities which dominate their everyday life. Several of my interview partners have highlighted being tired of waiting for everything and everywhere. Another aspect I have observed in both camps where I conducted fieldwork is related to the fact that some asylum seekers are also engaged in NGOs and help in all possible ways. In my first week while I was volunteering for R4R, we drove to the Warehouse every morning and we picked up these community helpers in Kara Tepe and Moria camp. Such voluntary community workers are usual/relevant, as also Project Elea's team was composed of refugees and international volunteers. Agier argues that asylum seekers who have the position of 'voluntary community workers can achieve a sort of prestige or power within the camp's internal relations. One of my interview partners used to help his neighbors with translation and received access to electricity through a 200 meters extension cable. On the other side, since he helped others, he got advantages from international volunteers, such as tips or information about the next clothes distribution or good material for his tent.

"The policing of emergency makes the camps spaces of pure waiting without a subject, to which are opposed the sketches of subjectivation that appear in initiatives aimed at recreating work, in movements, meetings, even in the conflicts themselves. Being human, winning back this minimum of

her article published in 2012, she proposed an analysis of the biopolitics of humanitarianism related to the Greek notion of hospitality, *filoxenia*. To do so, she used the theoretical framework proposed by Agamben to illustrate the control and management of irregular immigrants and the danger that such policies embody.

identity, of being in the world, which war and exodus endanger, therefore consists for each refugee in redefining his or her place by taking advantage of the ambivalence of the life of the camps, between emergency and duration, the here and now and the long term, the sentiment of physical or social death and the recommencement of life” (Agier 2002: 337).

Social and economic activities bring social differentiation within the camp, leading to another aspect of refugee camps: the role of nationality and ethnicity linked to hierarchy and power relations. Malkki (1995) has argued that camps are spatial and symbolic as there is an attachment to the place of origin and detachment to the present place. Therefore, refugees give importance to maintaining myths and memories of origin such as holidays, traditional dishes and music, linguistic characteristics, or showing volunteers pictures about their hometown, village, or family members. In this context, Agier pointed out that camps produce identity, ethnic, and non-ethnic (2002: 332-336).

To conclude, on one side, refugee camps represent “closed ethnicizing spaces” as they are places of origin for some and refugee camps for others, and, on the other side, “opened spaces” where identities are fictitious for some and cosmopolitan for others, but overall camps generate “hybrid socialization” (Agier 2002: 336). Refugee camps are naked cities because it consists of:

“an economy that could exist since people show they are willing to work (and, for many of them, to remain where they are), a social division which adapts to the plurality of constraints, an occupation of space which, however precarious, gives meaning to an originally deserts place – everything is potential, but nothing develops [...]” (Agier 2002: 336).

5 European and Greek policies – a review

In this chapter, I will present how my research is linked to migration studies within the humanitarian field and emerged political dynamics. More specifically, I will provide in-depth explanation about refugee protection, related asylum and migration policies and their evolution throughout the years. In this frame, I will first give a brief introduction about the most relevant EU migration policies, followed up by Greece's judicial response to irregular migration. Following this section, I will present the impact of the EU-Turkey agreement as the occurred EU Hotspot and Relocation schemes.

5.1 EU migration and asylum policies – a general analysis

Over the last decades, the EU has been working on developing and adapting policies⁴ related to aspects of asylum and migration. These policies' purposes are to avoid irregular migration, smuggling and foremost ensure EU's external borders. The European Commission has adopted so far six measures to meet migration related matters; however, I will only discuss the most relevant policy for my work, the Common European Asylum System.

Asylum is given to people who are fleeing from persecution or serious harm in their own country and need international protection. Asylum has been recognized as an international fundamental right by the Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees by the UN in 1951. Therefore, the EU - defined by its open borders and freedom of movement including countries sharing the same fundamental rights that ensure a joined approach on the protection for refugees - has promoted a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), firstly adopted in 1999 (cf. European Commission, n.d.). The CEAS can be explained by analyzing its six components. Firstly, the earlier mentioned Identification of Applicant System also called EURODAC Regulation implemented in 2003. Alongside with the second component, the Dublin Regulation EU 604/2013, which determines a single Member State responsible for the examination of the asylum application. These two regulations represent tools of the commonly called 'Dublin System'. The third aspect of the CEAS is its European Asylum Support Office (EASO) established in 2011. EASO is responsible for the cooperation between Member States and asylum related aspects and assists Member States in implementing CEAS laws. Additionally, they provide technical and scientific support to European countries under pressure (such as in Moria camp). The fourth point, adopted in 2013, addresses the Reception Condition Directives. In other words, its purpose is to ensure better and more harmonized reception conditions measures such as access to food, clothing, health care, education, employment, and fundamental rights. It also gives attention to vulnerable cases like minors, people that have suffered from torture or disabled people. The Asylum Procedure Directives were adopted the same year but transposed as national legislations by Member States in 2015. These directives have been implemented to make sure that each application is being treated efficiently and fairly by the means of

⁴ "Public policy can be generally defined as a system of laws, regulatory measures, courses of action, and funding priorities concerning a given topic promulgated by a governmental entity or its representatives." (National Violence Against Women Prevention Research Center, 2000)

access to legal assistance, adequate support, clear rules, or time limits for examination. The last component – Qualification Directives – decides who gets international protection based on a set of criteria to qualify refugee status. (cf. European Commission, n.d.)

All these policies can only be put in practice through funding. The Asylum, Migration, and Integration fund (AMIF) has been established counting 3.1 billion euros from 2014 to 2020. This fund has been used to provide efficient migration flow management and develop and strengthen a common asylum and immigration approach. Between 2007 and 2013, almost 4 billion euros have been provided for the management of external borders through the general program Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows (SOLID). SOLID consists of four funds (cf. European Commission, n.d.).

5.2 Migration and asylum policies in Greece

5.2.1 Access to asylum procedures and First Instance

Asylum demands need to be submitted personally at the Regional Asylum Offices (RAO) or Asylum Units of the Asylum Service, which are under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Citizen Protection. The staff of the Asylum Service and Appeals Authority receives a training from the Minister in partnership with the UNHCR and other competent institutions (cf. Law 3909/2011:8). The applicant is photographed, fingerprinted and a registration form is filled up by the registration officer which is composed of a set of questions. The applicant can be assisted by an interpreter regarding personal details, family links, reasons why the applicant does not want to return to his/her home country, vulnerability. The applicant is informed of his/her rights and obligations. An interview is scheduled depending on the availability of the caseworker and the interpreter. An asylum applicant's card is issued, and the applicant keeps his/her documents.

Asylum procedures have been and are still strongly criticized due to Asylum Services being understaffed, resulting into the number of applicants is higher than the capacity of registration. Two solutions have been adopted: firstly, the 'fast-track procedure' where the registration, interview and decision are happening on the same day and secondly, via Skype (since 2014), in order to decrease very long waiting queues at the Asylum Service (Bolani et.al. 2016: 88-90).

Each adult is interviewed separately, and unaccompanied minors are interviewed alone or with an assistant judging on their maturity. The interviews are recorded, and a full transcript is issued which is not signed by the applicant. The applicant can be assisted by a lawyer but at his/her own costs. Once the interview is concluded, the caseworker must issue the decision as soon as possible within six months or three months in case of an accelerated procedure. There is no difference between a regular and accelerated procedure, only in the second instance. The caseworker can grant refugee or subsidiary protection status or reject an application under regular or accelerated procedure. All decisions must be justified. The average time for the issue of the decision is 88 days. The decision is told in person by a registration officer and interpreter alongside with a copy of the decision. Decision notifications usually occur when the applicant presents him/herself at the RAO for the renewal of the asylum applicant card.

The caseworker can decide to close the examination in case of implicit withdrawal (determined over six reasons, see Bolani et.al. 2016: 92-93). The three possible decisions are the following: agreed, the applicant is informed of his/her rights and the following procedures for the issue of a three-year residence permit; subsidiary protection, the applicant is informed of his/her rights to appeal against this decision of rejection for refugee status; and, rejected, the applicant is informed of his/her right to appeal, informed of required time limit, and must give back the asylum applicant card. (cf. Bolani et.al. 2016:90-93)

5.2.2 EU-Turkey Deal, Greece, and asylum procedures: before and after the agreement

On the 18th March 2016, EU Member States and Turkey signed the so-called 'EU-Turkey Agreement'. The major aims of this bilateral cooperation were to break smuggling networks, replace illegal migration with legal migration and stop the dangerous crossing of the Aegean Sea (Sert and Türkmen 2017: 34). In particular, the original goal was to control migration flows between Turkey and EU Member States, specifically towards Greece. In other words, every individual arriving irregularly to Greek islands without official permission, migrants that are not in need of international protection or their asylum demand being rejected would be returned to Turkey. In exchange, EU Member States would welcome one Syrian refugee from Turkey for every Syrian returned from the islands.

At the time of the deal, Turkey was hosting about three million refugees including: 2,7 million of them from Syria alongside with Iraqis (125,879) Afghans (113,756), Iranians (8,534) and Somalis (3,905) as main nationalities (cf. UNHCR, 2016). The EU committed to provide Turkey with three billion euros for additional resources to improve Syrian refugees' life conditions. Additionally, the EU agreed on Turkey's demand for visa liberalization for all Turkish citizens. However, only a few days before the deal came into force, Erdogan threatened the EU with sending millions of refugees to the EU if no more funds were given to host them. A few days after the agreement, the Turkish government threatened again the EU, that if the visa-free travel was not being implemented by June 2016, Turkey would abandon the agreement and no longer take refugees back (Zagar et.al. 2018: 19-26). In total, Turkey received six billion euros from the EU for 2016-2019, in two tranches of three billion euros. Within the first tranche, 72 projects were organized (cf. European Commission, 2017).

In relation to the situation of asylum seekers in Greece, it is relevant to say that by the end of 2014, SYRIZA - that won the elections in 2015 – promised in its campaign to: accelerate asylum procedures, end systematic and indiscriminate detention, close detention centers and replace them by open hospitality centers, end pushbacks at the borders, stimulate family reunification, remove the 12km long fence at the Greek-Turkish border, accord Greek citizenship to second-generation migrants, assure the protection of human rights, eradicate EU measures on the travel of migrants and the revision of the Dublin Regulation to ensure equal distribution of migrants and asylum seekers throughout the EU. In March 2015, the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition reactivated law 3709/2011. In July of the same year, the alternate Minister for Migration Policy included to the proposed Citizenship Bill the abolishment of anti-smuggling penalties in case of transportation of third-country nationals in need of international

protection or within the context of sea rescue. Legalizing smuggling was then under the coverage of a so-called transportation for humanitarian purpose within Greece (Skleparis 2017: 3-4).

Once the EU-Turkey deal was put in force, it transformed radically conditions within Greek Reception Facilities and temporarily camps which became overnight Detention Centers. The deal generated stricter asylum, detention, deportation, and external border control policies. Moreover, it raised issues of refugee integration in the Greek society. In April 2016, the new law 4375/2016 was issued, to adopt the EU-Turkey Statement. In practice, it expressed that: those who arrived before the 20th March 2016 in Greece were treated as ‘normal’ under the international protection convention and were transferred to accommodation facilities across the mainland, and those who arrived after the 20th March 2016 were treated under an exceptional fast-track procedure of the new asylum law (only vulnerable groups are exempt from these procedures). All applicants for international protection are being divided into ‘admissible’ and ‘inadmissible’ based on their interview with EASO and Greek Asylum Service personnel. Greek authorities decide if Turkey is a safe country for the applicant case-by-case. ‘Admissible’ must stay on the island until their application procedure is completed in Athens. ‘Inadmissible’ have the right to appeal. If this is being rejected, they are deported to Turkey (Skleparis 2017: 4-5).

Additionally, the new law 4368/2016 entitled all applicants to free access to pharmaceuticals, healthcare in medical centers or hospital, social security, and welfare services. Nonetheless, this is only applicable if the applicant has at least 1-year work experience with social security (which is rarely the case). A second new law (1415/2016) was adopted by the Greek government, which allows the organization of reception classes for refugee children (from 6-15 years old) in Greek public schools. This was/is only accessible if they are vaccinated (Skleparis 2017: 4-5).

5.2.3 Hotspot approach and Relocation scheme

In May 2015, the European Commission introduced in the Agenda on Migration for the first time the ‘hotspot approach’ alongside with four other keys: implementing the relocation program, ensuring effective returns of migrants not entitled to international protection, improving border management and creating enough and adequate reception capacity (Orav 2016: 13) in order to react quickly to the rising numbers of asylum seekers’ venue to the EU. This was directed specifically towards Greece and Italy – both frontline States in need of emergency assistance. First Reception Facilities’ aim is to ensure good cooperation between national authorities and EU’s agencies at European external borders. In other words, hotspots are used for initial reception, identification, registration and fingerprinting for migrants and asylum seekers arriving by sea in the EU. The European Regional Task Force is then responsible for coordinating operational support and work closely with important NGOs and other international organizations such as Interpol or UNHCR (Orav 2016: 27).

Hotspots are defined through different migration flows, including asylum seekers and irregular migrants which is the reason why two separate channels of examination are established. Asylum seekers must go to an asylum examination center, where EASO staff prepares the applications files for the

national authorities. Irregular migrants, who are not qualified for international protection or who do not want to apply for asylum are brought to a pre-removal center. Following the Commission’s guideline from the Return Handbook, Member States must ensure the relocation of asylum seekers, which depends on the person’s cooperation, either under assisted voluntary return or forced return. Additionally, the Commission established a list of ‘safe countries of origin’ containing Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, and Turkey. This list enables fast-track examination of applicants from these countries (cf. Orav 2016:3-5).

HOTSPOTS IN GREECE					
	LESVOS	CHIOS	SAMOS	LEROS	KOS
Total Reception Capacity ⁱⁱ	1500	1100	850	1000	1000
EU Presence	European Border and Coast Guard: 110 Officers (fingerprinting and registration, debriefing, screening, interpreting, first line and advanced level document checking, border surveillance (land patrols), security, Frontex Support Officers) 45 Officers under the EU-Turkey Statement EASO: 45 Member State experts, 37 interpreters, 6 EASO staff and 10 interim staff seconded to the Greek Asylum Service	European Border and Coast Guard: 97 Officers (fingerprinting and registration, debriefing, screening, interpreting, first line and advanced level document checking, border surveillance (land patrols), security, Frontex Support Officers) EASO: 30 Member State experts, 22 interpreters, 4 EASO staff and 6 interim staff seconded to the Greek Asylum Service	European Border and Coast Guard: 94 Officers (fingerprinting and registration, debriefing, screening, interpreting, first line and advanced level document checking, border surveillance (land patrols), security, Frontex Support Officers) EASO: 15 Member State experts, 13 interpreters, 3 EASO staff and 4 interim staff seconded to the Greek Asylum Service	European Border and Coast Guard: 47 Officers (fingerprinting and registration, debriefing, screening, interpreting, first line and advanced level document checking, border surveillance (land patrols), security, Frontex Support Officers) EASO: 8 Member State experts, 7 interpreters, 1 EASO staff and 3 members of interim staff seconded to the Greek Asylum Service	European Border and Coast Guard: 55 Officers (fingerprinting and registration, debriefing, screening, interpreting, first line and advanced level document checking, border surveillance (land patrols), security, Frontex Support Officers) EASO: 7 Member State experts, 10 interpreters, 2 EASO staff and 3 interim staff seconded to the Greek Asylum Service

Table 5.2 Source: European Commission, 2017

Independent of the applicant’s origin, the same procedure is followed: medical evaluation, identification/ fingerprinting and registration in EURODAC’s database, debriefing of the migrant’s journey which is forwarded to EUROPOL,

explanation of rights including on asylum, possible detention under the Return Directive and coordination of return of irregular migrants who don’t have the rights to stay in the EU. On the 14th September 2015, the first temporary emergency relocation mechanism was agreed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council, aiming to relocate 40.000 people (from Italy and Greece to other EU Member States) in clear need of international protection. A second implementation package of relocation was adopted on the 22nd September 2015. This scheme was only applicable for applicants that arrived between the 25th September 2015 and the 26th September 2017 as well as to those arrived on the territory of those EU Member States from 24th March 2015 onwards’. Moreover, the relocation scheme can only be applied to asylum seekers which nationality’s recognition rate of international protection is 75% or higher⁵. (cf. Orav 2016:5)

In 2015, through law 4357/2016, Greece established the opening of five hotspots: Lesvos, Samos, Chios, Kos and Leros. In November, a hotspot/relocation pilot program was initiated in Lesvos with the participation of EASO experts and FRONTEX officers. Potential relocation candidates are spotted, if they wish to, they are referred to the RAO of Lesvos to be registered as asylum applicants.

⁵ In 2015, the rage of nationalities accepted were: Central African Republic (85%), Eritrea (87%), Iraq (88%), Yemen (88%), Syria (98%), Bahrain (100%), Swaziland (100%) and Trinidad and Tobago (100%) (Orav 2016: 5).

Applicants under relocation scheme in Lesvos, were referred to PRAKSIS, a Greek NGO working in partnership with the UNHCR for accommodation. Once the registration is concluded, the Head of the Relocation Unit is informed so that the matchmaking procedure can take place and start communication with the relocation Member State. Transfer modalities are carried out by the Relocation Unit and IOM (Bolani *et.al.* 2016: 97).

6 Discussion

6.1 Greece, political environment and beginning of the refugee crisis

As already mentioned, Greece's political environment until the elections in October 2009 was rather constant, shifting mainly between PASOK and ND. Yet, a change is observable during the elections in May 2012, when PASOK lost 30,7% of votes and 160 seats in the parliament. Regarding ND, the party won 17 seats although its popularity amongst citizens fell, from 33,5% vote in 2009 to 18,9% in 2012. As no party resulted with a majority of parliament seats, a new election was held on the 17th May 2012. Following the electoral results, ND won with 29,7% votes and 129 seats, PASOK only with 12,3%. Surprisingly, SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) received 26,9% of votes and was therefore the second most voted party. Also, the newly created party ANEL (Independent Greeks - National Patriotic Alliance) gained in importance within the parliament, with 7,5% votes and 20 seats. (Aslanidis and Kaltwasser 2016: 2-4). Regarding migration policies, the leader of ND, Samaras, campaigned indirectly for the cleaning of Greece from irregular immigrants. He stated in 2012 that "Greece today has become a center for illegal immigrants. We must take back our cities, where the illegal trade in drugs, prostitution, and counterfeit goods is booming. There are many diseases, and I am not only speaking about Athens, but elsewhere too" (Human Right Watch 2012: 35).

In January 2015, anti-austerity SYRIZA won the legislative elections and Tsipras became Prime Minister, ending more than 40 years of two-party system. Tsipras engaged in a promising stand-off with the foreign creditors of Greece promising to end austerity, renew bailout terms and finally achieve debt relief. Regarding a coalition, as SYRIZA did not win parliamentary majority, Tsipras laid his choice on ANEL and although the two parties have different understandings and approaches towards policy prescriptions with specific regard to welfare, other issues of distribution and post-materialist dispositions (like same-sex civil partnership legislation), by joining forces, both parties have managed to reach to a wider pool of voters than alone. However, after a few months of negotiation, a referendum is being called by Tsipras and was voted in favor by the Greeks, rejecting the proposal of the Troika regarding reforms in return for loans. Short time later, the second and third set of bailout measures were announced. During the negotiations, Tsipras used two communication strategies. Domestically, he kept his populist discourse defined by his attacks towards the EU accusing them of hostility against Greeks. While speaking to foreign capitals, foreign media, and European Member States, he defined the context as a political struggle between "conservative forces" favoring austerity and neo-liberal solutions and those against these measures (Aslanidis and Kaltwasser 2016: 5). Yet, in September 2015, Tsipras resigned from his post of prime minister and declared that he had a moral obligation to go to the vote at that moment that a third bailout was secured from European creditors (cf. BBC News, 2015). New elections were organized during the same month and SYRIZA won with 35,5% and, in second place, ND with 28,1% (Aslanidis and Kaltwasser 2016: 4).

Along all austerity measures, bailout packages and political turmoil, the neo-fascist party Golden Dawn (GD), founded in the 1980s, significantly grew over the years. This was mainly observable

during the elections in 2012, when the party respectively won in May 7% (21 seats) and in June with 6,9% (18 seats). Motivated by profound racism and anti-Semitic conspiracy theory, with a strong pro-Hitler rhetoric, the GD combined street violence with torchlight rallies and extreme discourses. Before the elections, the founder and leader Michaloliako explained in a Human Rights Watch interview:

“We want Greece to belong to the Greeks. We are proud to be Greek; we want to save our national identity, our thousands-year history. If that means we are racist, then yes we are. We don’t want to share the same fate of the Native Americans. Right now, the immigrants are the cowboys and we are the Apache”. (Human Rights Watch 2012:37).

Besides anti-austerity and anti-bailout positionalities, the neo-Nazi party called later in 2013 for more attention, when the rapper Fyssas (stage name Killah P), anti-racist defender, was murdered in Piraeus port by GD members. The murder investigation quickly became an investigation into the party’s circle itself, resulting into a massive criminal trial - the largest Nazi trial since Nuremberg, according to lawyers representing some of the victims. After more than six years of trial, a total of 68 people were charged with leading or being part of a criminal organization. The accused, who comprise all GD’s leaders and all former members of parliament, were charged with tens of other charges, including extortion, attempted murder, and weapons possession, but denied all of these charges (cf. The Guardian, 2020). Despite legal problems, the party reached its high point during the European elections in 2014, with 9,39% votes making it to Greece’s third biggest party, which they managed to hold until January and September 2015. Additionally, rumors have been going around that an important number of police officers were GD adherents (Cabot 2018: 216).

Also, during my fieldwork in Lesbos in early 2020, some days before my arrival, luckily, a few GD members flew on purpose to the island to defend their ideology. As I was supposed to volunteer for R4R, I was also supposed to stay at the volunteer house, located in Moria village. However, the week previous my arrival, volunteers have been attacked in the house, with stones being thrown at them and rental cars destroyed. After evacuating the habitants of the house, security measures have been taken by the NGO such as not showing openly the belonging to the NGO or leaving the windows always closed. Coordinators have told me that the attackers were probably GD members and that I should be careful while walking at nights in the street. Earlier in 2019, Mihaloliakos, leader of the party stated after the trial’s defeat: “We are sending a message to our enemies and so-called friends: Golden Dawn is not finished; get over it. The fight for nationalism continues. We return where we became strong: on the streets and squares, in a tough struggle against Bolshevism and the coming savage capitalism” (Al Jazeera, 2019). Not only GD members showed their position towards irregular immigration in Greece but also locals. Long time Greek residents of central, particularly from Athens, have seen their neighborhoods changing with the arrival of immigrants and asylum seekers, which impacted on attitudes towards outsiders. In May 2011, the University of Athens and Panteio University found out through a research that 75,7% of Athen’s population lives in fear (Ekathimerini, 2011). Intolerance comes to increase in times of economic recession as most of the population blames a group of minorities for the

economic problems. Various research have shown that socially and economically vulnerable individuals feel more threatened by the presence of minorities and are more capable of expressing discriminatory and exclusionary attitudes (cf. (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996; Raijman, Semyonov, & Schmidt, 2003; Semyonov, Raijman, Yom-Tov, & Schmidt, 2004, cited in Isaksen 2019: 1-3). Emotions can be intensified in times of crisis, leading to a rise in negative attitudes towards immigrants. Firstly, there may be frustration with weak minority groups, who are then characterized as scapegoats. Secondly, growing competition may intensify the group mentality and the desire to identify with oneself and to distance oneself from external groups (Isaksen 2019: 4-5).

“People that were not racist or fascist became it with the time because of their frustration. I’m not defending their racist thoughts. I’m just explaining why I understand that they are frustrated and tired of the situation. But overall, locals don’t really want refugees to be here. It doesn’t mean that they are racist. Right-wing people don’t want refugees to be here because they want their land backs etc. and left-wing people don’t want them to be here because of the conditions in which people are living” (Interview partner G., 18.02.2020).

The survey I conducted shows that five individuals feel annoyed/bothered by the presence of asylum seekers and volunteers and five individuals do not feel annoyed. One person indicated neutral to the question. This might be due to the fact that, following the mass arrival of refugees since 2015, mass arrivals of volunteers from all around the world followed. Local expressed concerns for it, as they argue that the large income of volunteers was bringing more chaos on the small island than organization and coordination. A hotel owner explained that while the hotel was in desperate need for help, NGOs were bringing their own problems (Nianias, 2016). Only some days after my departure, the 7th March 2020, the offices in the main building of the community center One Happy Family were completely burned down by a voluntary fire. There were water and smoke damages throughout the building, but fortunately, no one was injured (cf. One Happy Family). The day center, that was offering educational and various workshops to some 25,000 asylum seekers, closed its doors days earlier, as violence towards NGOs and volunteers kept on going. In the same weeks, a car belonging to a volunteer was destroyed and out on fire (cf. Keep talking Greece, 2020).

Although many studies try to examine the impact of immigrants on the Greek economy, the lack of reliable statistical information limits their results. Most studies, however, agree that immigrants have positive and negative economic outcomes. Positive effects include increased GDP growth rate, revitalization of the agricultural sector and many small and medium-sized enterprises, at least in the short term, and slowing of inflationary pressures. On the negative side, immigrants might come to have contributed to the development of informal economy, in some cases replacing unskilled and semi-skilled Greek workers, leading to income inequality, unemployment and slow wage growth, especially for the low-skilled, as firms find it more attractive to hire cheap workers than to invest in capital production techniques (Isaksen 2019: 10-11).

Following Foucault's biopower concept in terms of practice of power that emphasizes the management and control of behavior through the control of life, something similar happened in Greece with the establishment of the Memorandum Programs. Internal devaluation, which were the actions proposed by the Troika, concerned the reduction of the standard of living of the entire population, a radical change in lifestyle. The health, food, education, habits, and lifestyle of the citizens all accept violent pressure. Therefore, the crisis is linked to the governance of life and its limits. The effects of these regulations recall the right to let someone die as Foucault developed in his writings. As already mentioned, almost one in three Greeks was at risk of death because of the austerity measures. The measures in the memorandum imposed a rigorous discipline of behavior and widespread control over all aspects of life. The main goal of these measures was to shape people's bodies, movements, and behavior and to make them economically efficient and competitive and socially compliant. The construction of debt and the establishment of the power relationship between creditor and debtor is a typical strategy of neoliberal policies. Debt operates as an apparatus for the production and governance of groups and individuals. (cf. Galanopoulos 2014:69-71).

6.2 "Refugees don't want our tears, they need us to stop make them refugees" (Lustgarten, 2015)

6.2.1 Arriving to Greece: transit routes

Over the last years, different transit routes within Europe have become widespread and well-known among immigrants, forcing these new transit countries to respond quickly to the significant influxes. The two major and busiest routes are: The Eastern Mediterranean Route going from Turkey to Greece, and the Western Balkan Route, passing by Turkey, Greece, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia; both are crossing land and sea. In 2012 and 2014, Greece and Bulgaria built fences along their borders with Turkey, forcing migrants to cross the Aegean Sea (Lilyanova 2016: 2). The Eastern Mediterranean Route has been the most used road in 2015, counting 885,386 individuals and severely dropping in 2016 to 182,277 individuals and to 42,319 in 2017. Between 2014 and 2015, there was an increase of 834,552 immigrants (cf. FRONTEX, n.d.). Regarding the Western Balkan Route, between 2014 and 2015, an increase of 720,676 people has taken the road, making it 764,033 in total. In 2016, also here numbers severely dropped, namely 130,325 individuals (cf. FRONTEX, n.d.).

The 'lifejacket graveyard' is the best example to understand the massive income of immigrants to Europe, and particularly to Lesbos. Situated in the north of the island, a space of about 20,000 cubic meters between hills, is filled with tones of lifejackets from refugees' venue to Europe. Between January 2015 and May 2016, an estimated 1000-1500 tons of waste have been produced with an average of eight kilo per individual (see figures 6.13 and 6.14). The place is mainly characterized by lifejackets, boats, and boat motors. This surrealistic scene is due to the fact, that in 2015 and 2016, when several boats arrived each day, carrying large groups of individuals, no transports were organized to bring the new arrivals to the identification centers. Locals were also not allowed to give rides fearing problems with local authorities. Consequently, asylum seekers, with still several kilometers in front of them, in order

to reach assistance in a time where few or no NGOs or authorities were at the shores, left anything heavy and bulky behind them (cf. Vehkasalo, n.d).



Figures 6.13 and 6.14: Lifejacket Graveyard in the Northern part of Lesbos. (February 2020)

Most asylum seekers, including all my interview partners, have used services of smugglers to cross national borders. Yet, smugglers have taken a paradoxical role within the refugee crisis, its political response and especially refugees' life and fate. Smugglers help in a first-time individual to escape from conflicts, wars, persecutions or more generally danger, and then, in a second time, help them to pass borders, although illegally, to find protection, safety and livelihood. Those smuggling services, albeit its criminal representation by politicians and medias, are usually part of migrant social networks or, as I understood from my own field experience, refugees themselves. Besides migrant networks, smugglers are also to be found in local communities such as through family members or friends (Crawley et.al. 2016: 9). Interview partner 5 told me that once he arrived in Turkey from Iran, he spent seven months looking for a 'good' smuggler. A 'good' smuggler for him is someone that keeps its promises.

“[...] That was my job there, finding the best one which do what they say. I was in contact with one for four months, I think. He said to wait all the time, next week, then next week and so on. He said he needed more passengers, more people to smuggle. After some time I was bored, so I explained to him my situation: that I don't have a home now so that I need to rent it monthly and that I have a family and that it is expensive to stay here. I found another person then, but it was late” (Interview partner 5., 25.02.2020).

Later I also asked him about the prices, assuming that there would be a difference between children and adults. Surprised, he answered: “everyone is the same. Even if you have money or not. So,

an adult pays the same price as a newborn. They say ‘it is breathing? Ok, then it is a person’ (interview partner 5., 25.02.2020). However, refugees have also experienced violence, cases of human trafficking, but in majority traumas related to crossing the Aegean Sea. Alongside these harmful consequences, immigrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea represented in 2016 two third of worldwide migrant deaths, namely 5,098, including 88% of drowning and 148 individuals dying due to bad conditions on the boat, hypothermia, dehydration, or hunger (cf. Halliday, 2015). The same year, 66% of migrants who died in the Mediterranean were registered missing or presumed dead, meaning that their bodies were not found (IOM GMDAC 2017: 2-3).

Interview partner 1 told me that he also came by boat from Turkey to Lesbos; “I came with the boat. It was so difficult. It was cold, and I was in the water for four hours.” (Interview partner 1., 17.02.2020). Interview partner 2’s statement is similar, claiming that the water is ‘too dangerous’ but that people still come (cf. Interview partner 2., 19.02.2020).

6.2.2 Moria camp conditions

Once immigrants have made it to the island, they must go to Moria camp to be registered and receive necessary information about the asylum applications. Despite going through risky situations from the moment they leave their home country, asylum seekers have to face inhumane conditions when arriving in the camp. The EU-Turkey deal deeply reinforced the chaotic escalation of refugee management in the camp, trapping hundreds of men, women, and children in an overcrowded place, resulting into harmful consequences. Daily life in Moria and the Jungle is characterized by ethnic violence between residents, women and girls exposed to sexual violence, stealing, illness, long waiting lines for food and clothes distribution but also access to sanitation leading to palpable frustration, agitation and tenseness. Another issue is the production of garbage, which is not being removed daily, forcing children to grow up and play in a space defined by dirtiness. Within a short time, most of asylum seekers in Moria, including children, have developed hygiene-related diseases due to the environment in which they are forced to live. In front of the camp, MSF has built a sort of office where doctors and nurses are examining patients in tents. The medical coordinator of the organization has stated:

“Moria camp is both unsafe and unsanitary, especially for children. Every day we treat many hygiene-related conditions such as vomiting, diarrhea, skin infections and other infectious diseases, and we must then return these people to the same risky living conditions. It’s an unbearable vicious circle. [...] The mix of unhygienic and dangerous living conditions which increase the rate of childhood illnesses, the obstacles to providing appropriate recovery conditions for sick children, and the inadequate access to healthcare services, represent a perfect storm for the health and well-being of children” (MSF, 2018).

Interview partner 2 told me that if he would have known the conditions in Moria camp, he would never have come to Greece, stating “Moria is more dangerous than Afghanistan!”⁶ (Interview partner

⁶Because of electricity, because of food, because of water. I left my country because of safety. My life and my family’s life are not safe in Afghanistan. So, this is why we come here.” (Interview partner 2., 19.02.2020)

2., 19.02.2020). He described Moria as ‘hell’, and like Interview partner 4, both are comparing their situations to the fact that animals are being better treated than refugees in Greece. Safety is a recurrent issue, as during my fieldwork in Eleonas and Moria I have heard several times from residents about stealing problems in the camps, leading usually to ethnic quarrels. Interview partner 5. told me, that usually robberies happen during the night. Due to the bad electricity disposition, individuals must use their phone lamps to go to the bathroom during the night, where small groups are using this moment of exposure to steal phones, wallets etc. Also Interview partner 3 has been robbed in Moria.

“[...] Nobody can stay here. We are 18 in a box [container] and we close it at night. Because if you don’t close it, Afghanistan people will come and break it. We already caught one. Then, we took him to the police, but the police didn’t do anything. They let him go, I don’t know if they took his papers. [...] They took our stuff and some of my friend they took his phone the time that he was sleeping. [...] Look, also in the container we are 18, you don’t know what people do or have. Someone can be sick, you breath the same air inside because we close everything because it is very cold outside. Someone can be sick, and coughs and you can get sick.” (Interview partner 3., 22.02.2020).

I also asked respondents to the survey, if they think that the situation in Moria would get worse, and eleven out of twelve answered positive. Then, I asked if they think that asylum seekers receive enough help in general (by including NGOs, the Greek State, and the EU). Seven individuals are convinced that they do receive enough help, but ten respondents understand why asylum seekers protest. I also asked international volunteers what would happen in their opinion in the following months. Some have mentioned bigger demonstrations in the previous months and the coming of radical or GD members, calling it a ‘no-way-come-back point’. Interview partner D. thinks that the situation will get worse and worse, referring to more protests and riots and therefore more police operations. “So, I think it is the start of something and this will not go down in my point of view. This can just go up until it will finally explode unless somebody takes a decision and does something about it” (Interview partner D., 24.02.2020).

6.3 Techniques of governmentality and bio-power

“[...] it has been argued that the changes in border controls across Europe during the past century are “both radical and without genuine precedent” (Andreson 2000, cited in Fassin 2011:216), but it underlines the permanence of complex interactions between economic and political logistics, of the ideological manipulation of social fears, and of the obsessive deployment of surveillance technologies.” (Fassin 2011: 216).

Modern and liberal societies of the 21st century have deeply transformed their techniques of governing a population. Fassin (2011) demonstrated that especially in Europe and North America, the global circulation of individuals and its increasing control and limitation (for example through visas) has become a widely recurrent preoccupation, especially related to security and, thus, immigration policies. A large range of scholars, politicians and activists have proved through several reports and

articles that European and Greek asylum and migration are inefficient, exclusionist and resulting into inhumane conditions and partly shameful treatments. This is because states are excessively focused on their own citizens and thereby reinforce the marginalization of their non-citizens within the national population. Consequently, the EU and, as a result, also Greece have over the last years reinforced their security and surveillance techniques at their external borders by implementing “regularity and classificatory technologies” (Rozakou 2017: 39). Such technologies, as Foucault described as characteristics of governmentality, include registration, identification, and documentation alongside institutions to assist and manage a population. Yet, immigrants that cross national borders with the aim to settle in a safe and new society face boundaries with different treatments, usually seen as ‘the Other’ (cf. Fassin 2011:215). Also, in Greece, the humanitarian governance of refugees has reinforced the exclusion of immigrants through methods of governmentality and bio-power. In particular, regarding refugees’ management, the Greek enforcement of repressive immigration and asylum policies associated with monitoring and controlling mechanisms has been mainly made through bureaucracies.

6.3.1 Irregular’ Bureaucracies and asylum applications

Bureaucratic procedures at borders are adopted to produce a “state effect” (Mitchell [1991] 2006, cited in Rozakou 2017: 38), that is representing the state as a solid system. However, bureaucracy ethnographies at borders rather highlight its messy, chaotic, and constantly shifting environment. Authorities have used methods of collecting, calculating, and then dividing individuals into categories to have a better overview and management of them (Bulley 2014: 12). This can be argued through the fact that the West has developed, especially after 9/11, fears of Islam, of the ‘Other’ combined with anti-immigrant feelings, and, consequently, has rather established a governmentality of refugees based on a case-to-case basis, in contrast with displaced population in the global South, defined through confinement. In this case, Schuster described it as “depersonalized masses on the one hand, individualized scrutiny on the other” (Schuster 2000, cited in Fassin 2011: 216) and within the frame of this work, both terms can be applied to the Greek case. On the one side, Eleonas camp in Athens is more organized and asylum procedures are being taken care of individuals, but, on the other side, in the same country, Moria camp is a space defined by detention and restriction, making it an overcrowded and de-humanized space. When refugees arrive in Greece, they are being asked about their names, year of birth, gender, nationality, and passport number, making it the most relevant information about an individual in the state’s eyes. Additionally, authorities also request photographs and biological particularities such as fingerprints (which can be linked to the EU’s database Eurodac, also used for the Dublin Regulation) (Rozakou 2017: 37-39). Interview partner G. told me that the Greek government wants to send 200 asylum seekers per week to the mainland.

“[...] that just proves that they don’t care about the people themselves and there is no sense of human right, all they focus on is numbers. So, you see, the municipality is also against the decision taken by the Government. Locals don’t want refugees to be here and refugees don’t want to stay here. Moria is already a prison and Lesvos overall is a bigger prison.” (interview partner G., 18.02.2020)

Nonetheless, Greek asylum procedures have often faced criticism. Street bureaucrats, precisely coast guards and police officers, have been associated with the practices of irregular bureaucracies such as non-recording, making it ‘irregular’. These procedures have resulted into documents with errors such as names wrongly written, incorrect birth years or mixed-up nationalities. Rozakou explained, through her ethnography about irregular bureaucracy in Lesvos in August 2015, that at that time only eight officers were responsible to carry out asylum procedures, meaning being in charge of registration, surveillance and overall, the management of the camp, with no help of interpreters (Rozakou 2015: 40). Furthermore, local authorities were handling generally conflictual relationships with FRONTEX workers, reinforcing the latter’s role as supranational, well-educated, and elitist bureaucrat while Greek officers were also struggling with wage decline (due to austerity politics in Greece) as all employees of the public sector⁷. Within the framework of rather irregular and chaotic asylum related bureaucracies, asylum authorities have blamed the Greek State and the EU for promoting irregularity and illegality, making it to a ‘bureaucratic limbo’ for asylum seekers (Rozakou 2017: 42).

Out of my five conversations with asylum seekers, only one of them received refugee status, while all the others have to face difficulties due to chaotic and extensive asylum procedures. Interview partner 5 explained me that when he arrived in Lesvos on a boat carrying other 52 individuals, including his wife and two young sons, they were brought directly to Moria camp in order to be identified, registered and informed about the camps’ rules. Some days later he went with his family to the EASO office as they had an appointment there, yet still a mystery, he was told that only him has not been registered. He felt upset and perplex. He explained me:

“when I arrived there, they told me that one person is too much. I was there with all my family, so four people because we obviously arrived on the same day, but the system said something else. The system said that I am single man. But how is this even possible? But they told me it is my problem, not theirs” (Interview partner 5., 25.02.2020).

Because of this error, he had to wait 45 days longer to have a new appointment with EASO workers, that seemingly uninterested blamed him. Later, he told me that his first interview has been scheduled in 15 months, which will make him wait until 2021. “But this really destroyed me because I was with all these other people on the boat, but they forgot me or something” (Interview partner 5., 25.02.2020). Also interview partner 2 was still waiting for his asylum interview. He arrived on the island in February 2019, and by the time of our conversation, namely February 2020, he did not receive any examination date yet (cf. Interview partner 2., 19.02.2020).

⁷ By 2016, the situation on Lesvos saw a professionalization of humanitarian aid, meaning that international NGOs arrived on the island. This period is also characterized the UNHCR putting Greece under emergency. While the UNHCR was mostly working with contract workers assisting the Greek asylum service, the UN team saw its rapid expansion up to 600 people across 12 offices. Unfortunately, international worker earned three times more than their local colleagues which brought tensions within UN teams. A Greek UN staff member, Fotini Rantsiou, argued that the local staff was treated like secretaries by the newly arrived international staff Howden and Fotiadis, (2017). A senior Greek official even argued that he felt a “colonial mentality’ among some aid workers who received hardship pay while working in the relatively comfortable environment of Greece” (Howden and Fotiadis, 2017). Also see: Skleparis and Armakolas (2016).

Overall, most of my interview partners, added to what I heard from my fieldwork, which has then been reinforced by the existent literature, that the asylum procedures are mainly defined as ‘waiting times’ by applicants, making it to period of uncertainty and frustration. “Now, if you come, they will give you a piece of paper that tells you to wait. You wait for a long time, it can take you one year, eight months or six months. They don’t care” (Interview partner 4., 22.02.2020). Although residents of Eleonas camp can enjoy better conditions than in Moria, some are still struggling with their asylum applications. A young single male from Guinée, who I met during my volunteering time in Athens, told me he has been waiting for over three years for his papers, after receiving two rejections.

Table 6.3

Year	Total of asylum application	Asylum rejection	% of rejection
2015	13,205	5,810	43,9%
2016	51,110	6,655	13%
2017	58,650	7,985	13,6%
2018	66,965	6,605	9,8%
2019	77,275	11,070	14,3%

Source: Eurostat, n.d.

6.3.2 Detention conditions in Greece

The Greek law allows the administrative detention regarding deportation of irregular immigrants in case the individual represents a risk or danger to public safety. However, procedural delays are generally so excessive that asylum seekers whose deportation is considered impracticable are often forced to retract their applications in order to speed up their release, while the longest legal maximum duration of detention has increased up to 18 months for those who apply for asylum once detained. This is seen by many as a deterrent to seeking international protection in the first place. Administrative detention in Greece can occur in two types of facilities: one in police and border guard stations, mainly for short-time detention, and the other, the so-called ‘philoxenia centers’, aimed for irregular immigrants waiting for their deportation. During the last twenty years, the numbers of non-Greeks in jail have significantly increased, surpassing Greeks. Conditions in detention have been described by several reports as inhumane and degrading, often accompanied by limited sanitation, poor ventilation, inadequate room temperature and lack of hygiene. Moreover, medical supplies are limited due to the understaff of medical specialists (Cheliotis 2013: 729-732).

Two out of five interviewed asylum seekers have been detained for different reasons. Interview partner 4 decided to leave Moria camp after three years living on the island. Once he arrived in Athens, he got caught by the police while he was looking for a job. As he did not have any documents, he got arrested, brought to the police station where they told him he would have to spend around one month in jail, which eventually turned out in 10 months of detention. After this imprisonment period, he has been deported back to Lesbos, where he in a first time spent three weeks at Mytilini’s prison before coming

back to Moria. Once back on the island, he asked for a second asylum application but “they told me to wait again [...] for four months now” (Interview partner 4., 22.02.2020). Also Interview partner 3 has been detained for three months within the moment he arrived on Lesbos.

“From the time that they rescue us from the boat they put us directly in prison, and they told us that these are the rules. Because we are from West Africa, they said that our country is peaceful. So, I spent three months in jail but in the prison, they don’t have our translator. So, each one of us, we were 28, they gave us a rejection. We didn’t do any interview” (Interview partner 3., 22.02.2020).

The prison is situated inside Moria camp and is divided into seven rooms. Interview partner 3. shared his room with 15 other individuals, mainly from West Africa. There were also some people from Syria and Afghanistan. Most of the detainees are in custody for trying to escape Lesbos in the hope to reach the mainland. The relationship with the guards is defined as ‘terrible’ and the medical assistance is almost absent: “when you are sick, they don’t want to know if you have stomachache or a broken leg. They just give you depon (regular painkiller). It is the only medicine that they have” (Interview partner 3). During our conversation with Interview partner 3, I realized that it was hard for him to explain me his time in detention as he barely looked at me but mostly fixed the floor answering each of my questions with a little voice. Considering his young age (18 years old) and already one asylum rejection, I decided to leave more questions about detention conditions aside. By the time of my fieldwork, both were working with lawyers concerning their asylum application still defined by ‘waiting’. Agier has described this waiting time in camps as ‘never-ending present’, bringing up together unclear present and uncertain fate, making therefore refugee camps as spaces of exception (Agier 2010: 39).

6.4 Humanitarian governance in Eleonas camp and Moria camp

Additionally, state authorities but also humanitarian organizations have especially targeted ‘emergency indicators’ produced by crisis, making mortality rate the most important. The UN has widely developed such ‘calculative practices’ aiming not only to secure refugees but mostly to assure mortality rates falling and child nutrition rising. With the purpose to reach an efficient administration of refugees in camps, regular statistic updates of the population are necessary, which show the paradoxical interest of care and control at the same time. The EU has provided Greece and fieldworking organizations with substantial funds to allow food and water distributions and health services, but in parallel counting refugees to determine rates, making them to a known and calculated mass (Bulley 2014: 13).

In December 2019, as I was preparing an activity in the Eleonas camp, a young lady from the DRC came to Project Elea’s office asking for translation as she wanted to talk with some IOM workers. As in that time I was the only French speaker, I accompanied her to the organization’s office and asked her on the way what was the issue. She told me that she would like to have another gas stove in her container. She was living in one room with her daughter and was currently sharing the kitchen area with another Arabic family. The problem was that the two families have different cooking schedules. She told me: “The Arab family sleeps late and don’t let me cook my lunch.” We arrived in front of the office

and I explained in English to one of the Greek IOM workers what was her issue. One of them did not show much interest and kept showing us her back while smoking a cigarette. She seemed rather annoyed by our presence so I asked if someone else would be there to help us find a solution. Some minutes later someone else came out and explained us that she could not get what she wanted for two reasons: there is only one gas stove per house, and she is cooking on the floor, therefore safety measures have to be respected. He advised her to write a letter to the manager of the camp, but that IOM could not do anything. Surprised by the indifference of both humanitarian workers, I decided to explain the situation to our coordinators. I proposed that we could go all together to their house, with an Arabic translator and find a solution, but my coordinator (who was not surprised by IOM's involvement) told me that she should go to the bazaar this weekend and that maybe there she could find a gas stove for some euros. This scene shows how humanitarian workers decide and impose the limitation of their actions, and in this case, how IOM holds power over the life of this woman. Referring to this situation, Agier has explained that in such spaces, actions, or speeches, like the above discussed, one can disturb the order of things (Agier 2010: 39).

In Moria camp, interview partner 5 told me how much money adults and children receive from the UNHCR. Unexpectedly, men or single adults receive 90euros while married women and children receive 54euros. Additionally, families with more than six members, receive less. "So basically, one kid is kicked off" (Interview partner 5., 25.02.2020). The UNHCR together with the European Commission funded the program ESTIA, aiming at providing asylum seekers in Greece with accommodation or financial support. The Greece Cash Alliance has been implemented in cooperation with the Catholic Relief Services, the International Rescue Committee, Cops, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and the Samaritan's Purse. Payment cards are charged with cash monthly and the amount of money depends on the size of the family and the type of support provided. If a person is in a shelter where food is provided, they can expect to receive about 90 euros per month. Without food, it is about 150 euros per month. Families may receive more, with a maximum of 550 euros per month for families of seven or more people. The purpose of this card is to cover food (if not provided), transport, communication, school materials, medicine, clothing, and hygiene products (Wallis, 2019). As just seen, humanitarian workers hold power over the life of refugees, therefore indirectly over their financial expenses and lifestyle.

Although its southern location, Lesbos can reach bitterly cold temperatures during the winter season occasionally accompanied by snow and freezing wind. The winter period 2019-2020 did not escape such climate conditions. In early February 2020, some NGOs decided to distribute hot water bottles. However, as reported by interview partner 5, it was too late. "Where were you [humanitarian workers] when the people put stones on the fire, warm it up on the floor and wrap it with 2-3 layers of anything to put it under their blankets, because it is cold. I do the same thing! When I didn't have electricity, it was really cold. [...] I did the same because it is better than make a fire in your tent or something like this or you will die" (Interview partner 5., 25.02.2020). These scenes illustrate partly the

politics of humanitarian governance in refugee camps and how humanitarian workers hold power over life of refugees.

To have a better understanding of these practices of holding power over life, the EU has for example organized, along with the UN, the European Population Forum in 2004 in Geneva, entitled “International migration: promoting, management and integration”, aiming at giving a detailed report of migration flows in Greece. The European Parliamentary Research Service has been issuing monthly updates concerning conditions in camps, migration policies implementation and generally global information about the refugee crisis framed in a series of articles called ‘Briefing’ (see European Parliament Think Tank). Also, the UNCHR has been publishing regularly updates, called ‘Factsheet’

Items	Quantity
Blankets	37,000
Raincoats/ponchos	45,000
Plastic Sheets	360
Plastic Rolls	20
Hygiene Kits	1,386
Sleeping mats	3,905
Baby Care kit	840
Solar Lamp	355

Table 6.4 Source: UNHCR, 2015

optimal average (Bulley 2014: 14).

about Greece and specifically the hotspots such as Lesbos, providing information about population trends within specific times, but also the quantity of items distributed. As already mentioned, such biopolitical security mechanisms can only be put in practice on a static population, confined in a close and isolated space, such as Moria camp. Yet, the aim of such politics of management are not to reach complete security but foremost a regulated and

6.5 Categorical fetishism

Yet, in order to be able to go through the asylum procedure, refugees have to accept to be recognized as an individual seeking international protection (Cabot 2018: 12), which is mainly made through the categorization of vulnerabilities “and thus to the extent they are able to attest to this belonging by stating their age, marital status, showing their injury, or telling the story of a traumatic event” (Agier 2010: 39). The UN has introduced a ‘vulnerability screening tool’ aiming at supporting frontline workers and decision-makers to identify and address situations of vulnerability and their factor relevance. This list is divided into five sections, including domains related to the child, sex/ gender/ gender identity/ sexual orientation, health/welfare concerns, protection needs and others (cf. UNHCR and IDC, 2016). This example shows importance to question the dominance of categories and the politicization of the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’ within the European context of the so-called ‘migration crisis’. What is a ‘real refugee’ and to what extent do migration dynamics influence public assumptions? Where is the limit between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migration and what happens ‘in between’? And, finally, are we researcher, academics, policymakers, or humanitarian workers responsible for perpetuating these categories and ultimately reinforce stigmatization?⁸

⁸ Cabot (2016) has introduced the idea of ‘the Anthropology of not Knowing’, in which she discusses the link between ethnographic research and the categorization of refugees as perpetuated dominant power relations.

Scholars working closely with migration have problematized the issue of categories, which lead to two critiques. Some argued that the difference between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ is not reflected by the migratory process because people with different motivations can travel together but also that individuals come to change status or fit into two pre-existing categories (Koser and Martin 2011, Collyer and de Haas 2012, Mainwaring and Brigden 2016, cited in Crawley and Skleparis 2017: 3). These constructed categories (such as the place: home and destination country, the cause and time or duration of migration) usually lead to over-simplify the experiences and realities of people. Also, it is important to keep in mind the dynamic nature of international migration flows which includes rapid and diverse migrants’ profiles. This approach has been criticized partly through scholars introducing and developing new categories and concepts to better understand migration complexities, for example ‘mixed flows’, ‘transit migration’ as well as new categories for international protection regimes of those being trapped in the space between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’. Nonetheless, these categories are still inadequate as they are incapable of explaining people’s stories of crossing the Mediterranean. This is provoked by the increasing fragmented nature of journeys to Europe and “the idea that migration takes place between two fixed points” (Collyer and de Haas, 2012, cited in Crawley and Skleparis 2017: 4).

Other scholars criticized the process by which categories are constructed and therefore the political and social purpose they serve as they help to build the social world. Regimes in general and, for this reason, also migration regimes automatically create hierarchical structures of rights. These systems are not built around a neutral context but rather upon the subjective perception that people fit into specific spaces within the social order. Before the UN Convention in 1951, a ‘refugee’ was understood through specific nationalities, which is no longer physically present or politically protected by his/her country of origin. After 1951, a legal framework was established to differentiate a ‘refugee’ – a person seeking international protection away from persecution - from a ‘migrant’. Although the UN’s frame has widely shaped the legal definition of the term, understanding and agency take place at national level depending on the interest and priorities which also vary over time. The capability to decide who is or not a refugee is powerful and deeply political. Established policy agendas position people as objects in a way and reinforce a simplistic dichotomy which discriminates and divides people on the move (Crawley and Skleparis 2017: 3-5).

“The seemingly neutral and objective category of ‘refugee’ is in fact being constantly formed, transformed and reformed in response to shift in political allegiances or interests on the part of refugee-receiving countries and the evolution of policy and law. [...] The categories of ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ don’t simply exist but are rather made” (Crawley and Skleparis 2017: 4-5).

Namely, during the EU ‘migration crisis’ in 2015-2016 policymakers rather failed to understand the complex realities of ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’. Instead of trying to understand the drivers of the context, politicians and humanitarian workers tended to give a rational explanation to their politics of exclusion and use of over-simplified categories, thus perpetuated categorical fetishism (Crawley and

Skleparis 2017) and politicized vulnerabilities (Agier 2010: 40) making the immigration and asylum environment in Greece to a hierarchy of misery and constant reproduction of irregular immigrants.

6.6 Resistance to power

Unlike discipline, the security mechanisms of governmentality not only regulate, but allow the circulation and distribution of ideas, goods, and services. Asylum seekers can reinvest in the camp space, in terms of business and infrastructure which can add layers of meaning and identity markers. Although the characteristics of confinement, isolation and overpopulation, refugee camps can also develop creative revolution and transformation through the manipulation of control (Bulley 2014: 15-21).

Safe Passage Bags

Over the years, Lesvos Solidarity has developed the workshop ‘Safe Passage Bags’, aiming at recycling massive amount of wasted materials produced by the refugee crisis, such as life jackets, boats, or plastic-glass bottles (see figures 6.15 and 6.16). During my stay in Lesvos, I conducted an interview with the responsible for communication and public relationship of the Mosaik Center, umbrella organization of Lesvos Solidarity. Mosaik is not providing emergency assistance like most of the NGOs on the island but is working on inclusion and integration of refugees within the Greek society. Thus, the workshop is open to locals, refugees, and volunteers. All employees receive the same salary, which represents around 900euros for eight hours of work per day. The salaries are made through donations and what the workshop sells (different types of bags, wallets, and pencil cases of different sizes) (cf. Interview partner G., 18.02.2020).



Figures 6.15 and 6.16: Wallet and pencil case from the Safe Passage workshop proposed in Mosaik Center by Lesvos Solidarity. (February 2020)

Wave of Hope for the Future and Arts Without Borders



Figures 6.17 and 6.18: School Wave of Hope for the Future in the Jungle of Moria Camp. (February 2020)

Another example of resistance initiative is represented by the 'Wave of Hope for the Future' (WHF), a group of asylum seekers and refugees in Moria camp that have started to organize in early 2019 different types of classes⁹ for the camp's population (see images eighteen and nineteen). Although they are working closely with a few international volunteers, classes are mainly being taught by asylum seekers, believing that they can meet better student's needs, as they are also living in Moria. During my fieldwork in Lesbos, WHF worked together with the organization Arts Without Borders and the Afghani artist Shoukran on an art exhibition presented at the Mosaik Center. From this collaboration emerged a range of t-shirts painted by students, paintings and poems discussing the life of refugees on the islands and the difficulties of their journeys to Europe. There, I met the organizer of the exhibition, who told me I could visit the school in the camp if I was interested.

He gave me the number of the school coordinator, who I met some days later in front of the main gate of the camp. Together we walked through the tents to the school's location. There, I met some of the students and teachers and, surprisingly, a friend, who was going to help in the German class for the first time. The coordinator invited me to participate in the class and told me that later I could meet Shoukran and speak with him. Once the class was over, he showed me the other classes where art classes were being taught. The t-shirts and paintings could be bought during the exhibition or online and cost between 25 and 100 euros each. Half of the earnings are being used to buy material like colors and paintbrushes, the other half goes directly to the student and the family.

Protest

Resistance cultures are usually without central coordination and planning. Nevertheless, they have certain logics, forms and orientations that derive from communication and mutual knowledge of, or experience with, similar power conditions. The emergence of a fully-fledged culture of resistance that

⁹ WHF proposes classes of languages, literacy, painting, calligraphy, drawing, sewing, embroidery, knitting, cultural and social classes (such as easing conversations between migrants from different countries).

undermines biopower could be the whole type of biopolitical practices in which people question certain aspects of control over their lives and conduct (Lilja and Vinthagen 2014: 16-17). Regarding the refugee management context, several protests have occurred especially in Moria regarding the conditions of the camp but also in Eleonas, when about 400 new residents arrived in September 2019. On the 3rd February 2020, hundreds of asylum seekers living in Moria camp gathered and marched on the street linking the camp to Mytilini. Demonstrators, accompanied by their families, were protesting inhumane conditions and slow asylum procedures, hoping to call mediatic attention about the general refugee management on the island. Yet, short time after the beginning, the mass faced riot police using tear gas to disperse the groups and hinder them to reach the city. Interview partner 5 told me that day he was part of the protest. Because he has a lot of free time there, he used to walk a lot and knew another way to reach Mytilini. He explained me:

“when I reached there, they were already using tear gas. It is not fair! At that point, I became someone else. [...] Why? Why they have to do this? They [demonstrators] do nothing! They [local authorities] only come here to shut the voices of the people. We don't do anything illegal.” (Interview partner 5., 25.02.2020).

Also, one of the international volunteers I conducted an interview with got trapped in the demonstration. He just arrived that day on the island and was in a taxi on his way to One Happy Family (which is located on the same street where the protest happened) when the driver stopped and asked them to leave, as the street was blocked by riot polices.

“So, because the police closed the street, the refugees decided to go through the mountain and take another way. While this happened, we were stuck in the middle of the police squats and the refugees and got trapped in the tear gas. And the police... They just didn't stop throwing tear gas, all the time. [...] Imagine, the police were throwing tear gas inside the buggies! These images... I never experienced something like this!” (interview partner E., 27.02.2020).

6.7 Cohabitation between Greeks and refugees

During my fieldwork in Lesvos, several events occurred during the month of February. As already mentioned, the situation was tense when I arrived, resulting into numerous clashes between locals, international volunteers, local activists and asylum seekers and refugees. The main reason behind hostilities started when the Greek Minister for Citizen Protection announced in 2019 the construction of ‘controlled’ accommodation centers with ‘entry-exit control systems’. This decision was made regarding the rise of irregular incomes in Greece (cf. Greek Refugee Council, n.d.). At the end of February 2020, Greece hosted more than 104,000 asylum seekers, divided between Aegean islands (62,000 individuals) and the mainland (42,000 individuals). The country already has 30 open accommodation facilities housing about 25,000 individuals. “When we talk about inland structures, we are talking about a few hundred people, while at the same time the design for the islands is for thousands” stated a government official at the meeting hold in January 2020, attended by local politicians whom

regions will be affected by the new projects. (Georgiopoulou, 2020) According to the government's plan, ten new reception and identification centers will be built, aiming at accommodating between 10,000 and 15,000 asylum seekers. The new centers are intended for immediate operation with the setting up of large tents, with heating systems, while simultaneously containers will be installed, for a more permanent and secure solution. (Georgiopoulou, 2020).

6.7.1 Voices of Freedom



Figure 6.19: 22nd February 2020, traditional Greek dancing for carnival on Sappho Square. (February 2020)

On the 22nd February, around 10am, I was waiting for my interview partner on the Sappho Square. On the other side of the square, a typical Greek dancing presentation was performed for carnival (see figure 6.19). Families with children dressed in costumes gathered around as

asylum seekers and some journalists, either documenting the event for the local paper or waiting for the demonstration to start. It felt like a typical Saturday morning. The sun was shining, the water was calm, and the terraces crowded. As I was waiting, I could easily recognize international volunteers and local activists at their clothes and behaviors. The march was organized by Voices of Freedom, an open assembly for individuals with or without papers, fighting against discrimination, racism, and imprisonment. The organizers were already on the square, playing music on a speaker and hanging posters. After my interview, I decided to come back to the square, first to enjoy the Greek traditional dancing and then see how the protest would be. I could tell that the organizers did not know about the local event as they were talking discretely to people that seemed to be interested in participating at the march. Around midday more and more people were joining on the square, with mainly international volunteers. The atmosphere was peculiar, on one side Greeks, dancing, enjoying the music in the sun and eating some feta cheese with bread, and on the other side, human right militants and locals, all this scene under the suspicious observation of some police officers. This day, around 300 individuals peacefully marched around Mytilini, denouncing conditions in Moria, asylum procedures but mainly the opening of the new, closed migrant center. A squat of local authorities was framing the crowd, ensuring no outbreak.

The interesting part of this day was that while I was walking the march, in the crowd, I heard mainly German, English, or Spanish but no Greek. I was wondering where Greeks were. Locals did

not seem to pay attention to the protest or while passing restaurants, locals rather looked amused than involved. It seemed that they are somehow used to the protests as it would have become part of their everyday life.

6.7.2 Mantamados

Earlier this year, the Greek government announced its project to build a closed migrant detention center in Mantamados, located in the northern part of the island. Habitants of the village were blocking access to the new construction site with containers and trash trucks, showing their opposition.¹⁰

On the 25th February, a demonstration was organized by the local workers union, attended by about 300 individuals with a majority of Greeks. Around 9:30am, the first supporters arrived (see figure 6.20) and about one hour later, speeches started followed by a peaceful march. This demonstration marked the beginning of tumultuous upcoming days. However, on the following day, the atmosphere was marked by a bigger involvement of the islanders, as during the night (of the 25th to the 26th February, around 3am), around 200 MAT (Unit for Reinstatement of Order) authorities from the mainland (mainly Athens and Thessaloniki) arrived at the port of Mytilini, aiming at supporting local authorities in Mantamados with bulldozers and heavy machinery. Several locals have heard about it earlier (first information have been published around 11pm), waiting for the riot squads to arrive. Clashes were violent, and so much tear gas was used, that inhabitants living in the houses in front of the port, had to evacuate if they had their windows open. Several videos published in medias show the unrealistic scene of multiple lines of riot polices, fully dressed, disembarking.¹¹



Figure 6.20: “No Hotspot! Neither closed – nor open! Neither at Moria neither at Karavas nor elsewhere, working center of Lesvos”. 25th February 2020, first day of the demonstration organized by the worker’s union of Lesvos and the communist party against the new closed migrant center in Lesvos.

On the 26th February, approximately 1000 individuals have regrouped in Sappho Square before noon (see figure 6.21). All the local shops, supermarkets, restaurants but also NGOs closed, calling for a general strike. More villages of the island joined the

¹⁰ For more information, see: Smith (2020).

¹¹ For the video, see: Greek City Time (2020).

opposition and strike too. Several international and local reporters were taking pictures of this island-wide resistance. At the end of the several speeches of the left-wing party and Lesvos's workers union, I found in the crowd the owner of the copy shop. Some days earlier I chatted with him, while printing my surveys and asking his opinion about it. He recognized me and I joined him and his daughter. As all the speeches were in Greek, I asked them who just talked and where the mayor would be. "The mayor? He ran away!", he answered me laughing. They then added that they would leave after the demonstration and go to Mantamados to support their compatriots. Locals were protesting night and day, reinforcing the notion of resistance between Greeks and their government. Some days later, the deputy mayor of Mytilini said "It's a very bad turn of events when Greeks turn against Greeks". (Smith 2020) Despite that, protests and violent clashes between locals and authorities have also broke out on the island of Chios, where locals have entered hotel rooms where police units were staying, injuring eight of them and stealing their clothes (Smith, 2020).



Figure 6.21: Gathering on the Sappho Square before the march on the 26th February 2020, which marks the first day of general strike. (February 2020)

The march was divided into different political groups, such as the workers union of Lesvos and the communist party. Also, international volunteers were present. The atmosphere was peaceful but the revolt in locals' voice was considerable. As most of the demonstrations in Mytilini, the march started from Sappho Square, passing the busy commercial street of the island's capital, and then coming back

by the port (see figures 6.22 and 6.23). On the way, groups stopped for a longer time in



Figure 6.22: “No Hotspot! Neither closed – nor open! Neither at Moria neither at Karavas nor elsewhere, working center of Lesvos”. (February 2020) Protest on the 26th February 2020 in Mytilini against the new migrant center on the island, with in the background a FRONTEX boat.

front of the General Secretariat of the Aegean and Island Policy. There, speeches were held, a statement paper stuck on the doors of the building but no police officer or politicians to be seen. I was surprised, as this was a big march, mainly composed of locals but rather seemed to be ignored or not taken seriously by the local authorities and political leaders. Later, when I joined some acquaintance, who were the funders and volunteers of Refocus, some were thinking about going to the village to record and report the situation, when a French journalist said it would be too dangerous. The protests seemed very violent as the authorities were using unlimited tear gas, water cannons and stun grenades. Yet, this situation did not stop locals to support the villagers, as the only street linking both places was a single queue of cars and individuals, some of them wearing masks, helmets or balaclavas. The only problem was that both wings of the political sphere were involved, which made it tricky to identify people’s political orientation and possibly Golden Dawn members. At this moment, it was not a clash between locals and asylum seekers but a full island against the capital, an island invaded by their own state.

During these two days of general strike, it was advised to international volunteers not to leave their houses at night and to be careful. It was also advised not to go to Mantamados. Asylum seekers and refugees were stuck in Moria camp and Kara Tepe, as no public transports were functioning and no supermarkets open. As the arrival of the MAT was surprising, the general strike was therefore rather an

instant reaction which made it impossible to warn habitants of the camps and reinforced their exclusion of the political and social life. On the 28th February, life went back to 'normal', coffees were full of Greeks, on Sappho Square some asylum seekers were regrouped, smoking cigarettes, and chatting, and in front of Western Union a long queue. This was mainly during the morning of this day, until the first rumor of Turkey opening its borders for 72 hours was confirmed in international media¹², leading to new panic movements.



Figure 6.23: Protestors marching through Ermou Street, the main commercial street of Mytilini. (February 2020)

In the two following days, I distributed my surveys, so the answers might have been influenced by the previous days of general strike and revolts. Ten out of twelve locals think that the Greek government is not paying enough attention to the inhabitants living

on islands with hotspots, including Lesbos. The same amount of people also think that the government is not taking the right decisions to improve the situation on the island which contributes to the reinforcement of the tense relationship between locals and their government. The survey so far showed that the inhabitants of Lesbos, frontline location of the refugee crisis, rather feel misunderstood and abandoned by those who are supposed to support them.

“To the Greek Government I give bad names for the way they treat us here and how they want us to be here. I follow all the daily news and I see the plans they have for us and it is really bad. I’m happy that Greeks protest for us because either they hate us or not, but the goal is the same. They don’t want us to be here. It is really funny the way the government introduce us to each other. They put us against each other. [...] I said it many times. If this would be in Afghanistan and not Greece and you have the same situation with locals and a lot of refugees in a city probably, they would be there for 1 weeks maybe 2 and one day all of them would be kicked out. So, I’m happy that a lot of people are generous here. Every society has good and bad people. I see many of them that say hello etc. and other

¹² For more information, see Al Jazeera (2020).

that don't. Maybe they hate you or not, but they don't say anything. But the way they look at you, you understand that they are not happy and don't want to welcome us. But most of them are really good and friendly. I'm happy that they are like this! They are not shouting at you. In Iran it is like that. If you are Afghani and a refugee, they shout at you. I was born in Iran so basically I was 19 years a refugee." (Interview partner 5., 25.02.2020).

Also interview partner 4. told me that when he arrived on Lesbos on 2016, locals were nice in general, but not all of them. Regarding the present situation he said, "now the Greek people are shocked. They are angry now, with the situation". (cf. Interview partner 4., 22.02.2020). In his opinion, Greeks are not directly angry with the presence of asylum seekers on the island but rather with their government, that is not taking care of the situation. Also interview partner G. told me that he understands the frustration of the locals. He explained me that the Olive Grove, used to be a big field of olive trees for many years. It happens that asylum seekers cut the trees to make fire in cold nights. But on the other side, these trees belong to locals, who take care of trees from generation to generation (cf. Interview partner G., 18.02.2020).

Bringing the discussion to a global level, a majority of respondents and interview partners consider the EU responsible for the situation in Lesbos. Interview partner 2. thinks that Europe should open its external borders: "I can't say it is Greece's fault because Greece has a lot of refugees and you can't control that much refugees, this is why other countries should open more of its borders" (cf. Interview partner 2., 19.02.2020). Interview partner C. has a similar opinion, when I asked her what she thinks about the actions of the Greek government, she answered, "On the one hand, they are so left alone from the EU. And you know... I don't even have an idea about how to help in the whole picture. I don't even have an idea about how to solve this. [...]" (Interview Partner C., 23.02.2020). Also, during my interviews with international volunteers, I asked them what could be done by the Greek government or by the EU to improve the situation on the island. Interview partner D. told me that in his opinion, the government could do better, especially regarding the European funds provided for it.

"They [Greece] are not using this money to accommodate the people; they are just using the money to stop the people of coming. Some of the actions that the Greek government is taking are not really supported by the EU. They feel like alone. [...] I can understand the frustration because it has been 4-5 years like this, and Greece is collapsed. Collapsed. I will say it out loud; it is very easy to move out 20,000 people from the island to any country in the EU, even in just one country. [...] I really think that the solution is easy, and I really think it is because they don't want to solve it" (Interview partner D., 24.02.2020).

Additionally, interview partner F. stated:

"I don't think that they [Greek government] take good decision. Maybe you heard about the kind of wall that they want to build in the sea. But I understand that some people are angry at them but most of the people, and me too, are angry at the European Union. It is a big crisis and it is going on since a long time, but nobody is doing anything. I'm more angry at the EU" (Interview partner F., 24.02.2020).

It seems that most of the respondents understand the frustration of Greeks, as they have been left alone by their government. Locals of Aegean Sea islands have been the first ones dealing with the refugee crisis, confronted with their government's actions, throughout their daily life. Additionally, respondents also believe that generally Greece, including its citizens and political actors, has been left alone by the EU. Some are arguing through the lack of European solidarity, resulting into the heavy burden that the country must carry. Others are arguing through the radical policies of the Greek government, forgetting the right to basic human rights.

6.7.3 *Humanitarian Citizenship*

Following the events and results, Greece has faced two crises: a financial and a humanitarian crisis, which brought an increasing turmoil regarding boundaries between citizenship and national foreigners as different forms of precarity spread over the population. The economic crisis strongly affected Greek citizens which reinforced 'humanitarian reason'. Those outside the socio-political body became objects of humanitarian projects. In this context, Greek citizenship became 'humanitarianized' "impacting both citizens' survival strategies as well as dominant notions of both deservingness and entitlement" (Cabot 2018: 4). Greek citizenship was then defined between neo-liberalism and humanitarianism as it significantly became codified through humanitarian logics and attitudes (Cabot 2018: 2-5). Arendt (1976) and later Agamben (1998) argued that those who are situated outside the politico-legal frame, and therefore can't enjoy protection offered through national membership, show the real definition of citizenship: a sphere within the socio-political life which is built on the back of the excluded ones. The gray zone of illegality or legal 'non-existence', namely the relationship between insiders and outsiders or citizens and 'aliens' has been researched by scholars to understand the foundations of contemporary citizenship. However, in the Greek case, the combination of neo-liberalism and humanitarian projects have confirmed the uneven relation between Greeks themselves and migrants and, refugees. Greece has experienced a double-precariation of social rights, regarding national citizens and human rights, regarding migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Scholars working on refugees and humanitarian interventions have introduced two different approaches to the concept of precarity. In a right-based approach, refugees are entitled to assistance and protection whose liberty and life is threatened; while in a humanitarian-based approach, refugees must be deserving or vulnerable enough to become protection or assistance.

"While refugees are seen to be the victims of forced displacements entailing violence and migratory trajectories of flight across national borders, citizens are increasingly subject to political-economic modes of dispossession and displacement, through which social roles, obligations, entitlements, and sovereignties are turned upside-down"(Ong 2006b cited by, Cabot 2018: 6).

Within the perspective of upside-down, Greeks, because of austerity, have become 'internal refugees', not through territorial displacement but found themselves dislocated from rights and livelihood and therefore share precarity continuum with refugees. Already in 1995, Malkki argued for the need to engage with the "extraordinary diversity of 'refugee' subjectivities and experiences in order

to de-essentialize the category of ‘refugee’ (Cabot 2018: 7)”. Following Malkki’s and Cabot’s idea, I argue for the ‘demigrantization’ of migration studies. Dahinden argued that scholars should move away from treating migrants as the body of investigation and analysis and instead should conduct researches over a whole population, which then includes migrants (2016). This perspective allows to study the connection between border crossers and a less mobile population, and in particular regarding my work, the connection between asylum seekers and citizens in Greece. During austerity times and refugee crisis, Greeks and asylum seekers came to endure both precarity in terms of access to healthcare, education, shelter, food, childcare and employability. To conclude this argument, I join Cabot’s interest in advocating – through conceptual and analytical approach and methodology, to demigrantize migrants, ‘migrant-ize’ citizens and de-exceptionalize displacement (Cabot 2018: 5-8).

The survey has showed that ten out of thirteen individuals understand the protest of asylum seekers, which supports the argumentation regarding humanitarian citizenship. Greeks have gone through several years of precarity and marginalization, resulting into numerous and violent clashes with the authorities. Asylum seekers and refugees have seen the same scenario happening, namely being excluded from the political and social sphere, depending on humanitarian assistance inevitably leading to protests.¹³

“Nevertheless, the humanitarianization of refugees and citizens alike, and the emergence of overlapping areas of suffering and struggle between these two groups so often assumed to be distinct, attests to a shift in how sovereign citizenship is conceived and practiced on Europe’s margins. Such shifts speak to the limits of citizenship in contexts of neoliberal governance. [...] And yet, as shared forms of precarity have come to the fore, citizens themselves – not just refugees – have also come to expose the limits of rights on Europe’s margins” (Cabot 2018: 18-19).

¹³ The movie *Worlds Apart*, was released in 2015 and shows the everyday life of individuals leaving in Greece. The movie is constructed around the life of three persons, who are facing either the financial crisis or the refugee crisis. For the full movie, see: *Worlds apart* (2017).

7 Conclusion

“The country, the society, reserves to itself the right to host whom it wishes itself to host. This is the semiology of the name [Xenios Zeus]. We do not have the obligation to host whomever judges that they wish to cross the borders clandestinely. [...] We are an organized society, we want to show everyone that we are not a fenceless vineyards, that not everyone who crosses our borders has the right to stay here; it’s not like that, it can no longer be like that” (Cheliotis 2013: 738).

This was the statement of Dendias (ND), Minister for Citizen Protection and Public Order, during an interview at the detention center of Amygdaleza (north of Athens) in 2012. Yet, the country’s main attention was committed to its difficulties in facing the financial crisis in 2007, without knowing what would happen some years later. Greece has been confronted with an economic recession, causing a growing deficit, high unemployment, and significant poverty and social exclusion. Political leaders have tried to save the country by imposing what they thought would be the best; fourteen austerity packages including regular cuts in the public sector salaries, freeze of pensions, a rise of taxes aside further actions. The Troika, composed of the ECB, IMF, and the European Commission, has been called by the then-PM Papandreou (PASOK), introducing the Economic Adjustment Program for Greece, also called bailout of a value of 110 billion euros. In the following years, two more bailout packages have been implemented. Citizens were the first ones paying the price of these strict policies, resulting in several protests, - and ongoing and violent clashes between natives and authorities attracting Europe’s full attention. Greece was then made by media to the epicenter of the financial crisis, mainly through unfavorable titles such as *Greece, a financial Zombie State* published in June 2015 by the New York Time; *From Tsipras to Mitsotakis, Greece is far, far from being out of the woods* (De Tsipras á Mitsotakis, la Grèce est loin, très loin d’être tirée d’affaire) published in September 2017 in Le Figaro; and *Tragedies like the one in Greece do not have to be repeated* (Tragödien wie die in Griechenland müssen sich nicht wiederholen) published in August 2020 in Die Zeit.

The year 2012 was then marked by the elections and the growing presence of SYRIZA, the radical left coalition lead by Tsipras and its anti-austerity promises alongside the rise of the fascist party Golden Dawn with 6,9% of votes and 18 parliamentary seats. Political leaders seemed to fail with their promises and the frustration of Greeks was increasing each time the government passed new austerity packages.

As it would not be enough, two years later, in 2014 but mainly in 2015, massive flows of migrants were making their way towards Europe’s external borders, fleeing from war, persecution, political and economic instability, and overall danger, seeking protection and safety. Throughout the years, different routes to reach the EU and mainly its Northern countries appeared, leading rapidly to the European refugee crisis and the need for rapid responses.

Greece stated its belief not to have an obligation to host all irregular migrants but has eventually seen the opposite happening. Due to its close geographical location with Turkey, where most of the asylum seekers arrived from, the islands Lesbos, Chios, Samos, as others have become frontline scenes.

Over the years, immigrant's arrival to Greece did not end, yet - the country has the highest rate of asylum rejection, as underlined in numerous reports published by the international community denouncing the camps' conditions. Detention conditions have seen so much criticism for their circumstances that it has been argued that it has been left in such ways, on purpose, to dissuade asylum seekers from coming to Europe (Cheliotis 2013: 729). This is partly due to the EU Hotspot approach, which aside from being a migrant identification and reception center, also represents facilities in European territory where individuals are detained the entire time of the registration process or while waiting for execution of a removal order. "This system contributed to the criminalization of asylum seekers, most of who had entered Greece without papers, making them more vulnerable to arrest and also possible deportation" (Cabot 2018: 211).

In the field, I had the opportunity to first meet the courageous inhabitants of both camps that showed me their daily lives, told me about their journeys to Europe, their asylum procedures, and their general opinion about being a refugee in Greece. Secondly, I had the possibility to see and walk in both camps, which abled me to compare their constructions and organizations depending on their location and role. Unfortunately, while my presence on Lesbos, several events or protests happened and made the island's atmosphere rather tense than welcoming. However, this showed me its true day-to-day dynamics. Additionally, as I lived for six months in Athens in the frame of my Erasmus semester, I saw the daily relationships between asylum seekers, locals, and authorities which sometimes seemed to be hanging by a thread.

Through my fieldwork experience, I saw the unequal treatment of asylum seekers and refugees from whom basic human rights were kept away. I also saw locals being blamed on bare accusations, as it should be kept in mind that Greeks were still enduring consequences of the financial crisis and related sentiments. With this perspective in mind, Foucault's theory about governmentality and bio-politics appeared to be the accurate theoretical framework for this research.

To understand to what extent do migration and asylum policies influence in a first time, the everyday life of asylum seekers in Greece, the focus was put on the refugee camps. Bulley has argued that camps represent spaces of security, recovery, and dignity for those who seek international protection and safety. Therefore, camps have become primarily closed spaces where individuals are being managed, directed, controlled, and thus, governed. This refers to the notions of governmentality and bio-politics introduced by Foucault. In other words, the EU, the Greek State and its authorities, by fingerprinting, monitoring, and collecting relevant personal information (such as name, year of birth, entrance in Greece etc.) of individuals when arriving at Europe's doors have taken charge of life. Such techniques of control and security mechanism over a population have become regular in Western-liberal societies that aim to regulate normality within a community. Not only are states occupied with the well-being and regulation of their citizens but also humanitarian agencies with those who are not entitled to citizen rights. For example, the UNHCR has introduced a vulnerability screening tool to categorize vulnerabilities such as unaccompanied children, pregnant girls or women, or LGBTQ members (fifteen

in total) for frontline humanitarian workers. Agier (2010) has argued that asylum seekers, to receive humanitarian assistance, must accept their status as refugee first. “After all, if the right to live is, in the humanitarian fiction, attributed to a generic human just insofar as he is recognized, in doubled form, in the universal victim, then in practice this right is granted on the basis of belonging to assigned groups. [...] all receive their survival kit to the extent they are recognized as belonging to these categories, and thus to the extent they are able to attest to the belonging (by stating their age or marital status, by showing their injury, or telling the story of a traumatic event)” (Agier 2010: 39).

Once such information is being taken and categorized, governmentality and bio-politics follow asylum seekers to the camp, where the location itself has been calculated for them. Namely, how many square meters are needed for this number of individuals, how many toilets, showers, gas stoves, or blankets are required. Furniture are purposely planned, access to specific services only possible when the status of asylum seeker is accepted, and the amount of money they receive is fixed upon groups (single, families, or number of members). Thus, their daily lives are regulated by different categories, which sustain their status as asylum seekers or refugees within the host community. Skleparis and Crawley (2017) have presented the concept of categorical fetishism with the purpose to raise awareness. So far, the construction of policies regarding migration has been built upon binary, linear and stagnant understandings, which creates a gap between conceptual and policy categories and lived experiences of people moving. People cannot simply be put into categories that are constructed around them and neither can it be expected that it makes sense to the world. People indeed move between, and across categories in their country of origin and throughout their journey. However, it cannot be appropriate that policymakers, humanitarian workers, and authorities blame refugees and migrants for failing to put them into categories or resisting them. Instead, the natures of categories and processes of categories building should be problematized. To avoid categories, the authors propose four solutions: raise critical awareness regarding the construction of categories; recognize the danger of categories built and introduced by others; challenge boundaries between categories; and last, bring boundaries into our consciousness to denaturalize the use of categories to avoid discrimination and division (Crawley and Skleparis 2017:12-14).

The strict and exclusionist migration and asylum policies in Greece have resulted in overcrowded camps as waiting and transit zones, thus spaces of exception. Governmentality and biopolitics through constant counting, categorizing, and chaotic bureaucracies, are shaping asylum seekers’ everyday life. It can be argued that States and eventually, humanitarian agencies create and perpetuate illegality and directly sustain a hierarchy of misery. Instead, migration and asylum policies should be produced with asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants, to correctly meet their need, in the short and long term.

Nonetheless, not only do asylum seekers endure the results of these policies but also Greeks. During my fieldwork in Lesbos, within two weeks, three protests have been organized. One was organized by the local activist group Voices of Freedom and was denouncing several issues related to

asylum: camp conditions, asylum procedures and, generally, the unfair treatment of refugees and the ineffective policies. This event was in majority attended by international volunteers. The two other demonstrations were because the Greek government planned to build ten new migrant reception centers, and one of them would be on Lesbos. Locals have blocked access to the construction teams, showing their opposition. Violent clashes erupted on the night from the 25th to the 26th February. About 200 riot police officers made their way to the island to bring order back. Islanders have seen this as an invasion. Eventually it was not a protest against the government's actions regarding refugee management but a protest between citizens and their political leaders based on disappointment.

From the islands as from the mainland, Greeks have, over the years, faced the financial crisis followed by the refugee crisis, leading the country to a humanitarian crisis. Asylum seekers and nationals have faced poverty and marginalization issues but mainly abandon and frustration resulting in violent confrontations, either between them or towards the government. This subject, particularly the fact that Greeks have come to share the same struggles as immigrants, have been described by Cabot (2018) as humanitarian citizenship.

Overall, the survey's results showed that locals of Lesbos understand why asylum seekers come to Greece and why they protest against the circumstances they are forced to live in. However, they have, without exception, indicated that the EU is responsible for the burden that Greece must face. This is not the first time that Greeks blame the EU for a crisis, as it already happened during the financial recession when in 2015, 61% of the population voted for a referendum and therefore against the help of the Troika (Lowen, 2015). The outcomes of the fieldwork, interviews, surveys, and existent literature analyses have also shown a lack of European solidarity. The meaning of citizenship, and in particular European citizenship, has widely been challenged over the years in Greece "and the emergence of new categories of needy subjects aid the entwinement of humanitarian and neoliberal logics under austerity" (Cabot 2018: 18).

"The government tries to keep us on opposite sides. It is really bad. When I see news or go on social media, I translate from Greek to English and I see the people from Lesbos saying bad things. They say that tear gas was used because refugees' protest was aggressive but no! For example, during the protest some weeks ago, a refugee woman was about to fall on the ground and hold herself on a police officer. The media said that she tried to steal the gun of the police officer, but it was not like this at all! They try to brainwash their own people. So, of course people think that we are bad. If a woman does this, what does a man?" (Interview partner 5, 25.02.2020).

To conclude, this thesis has attempted to rethink humanitarianism, the impact of its governance, and the imposed categorization of individuals through their experiences. Additionally, it questions the Dublin Regulation, which should be adapted to the situation in cooperation with asylum seekers and nationals hosting high numbers of irregular migrants. Alongside imposed EU policies for asylum and migration, asylum applications in Greece should be taken seriously as their related effects, including errors in bureaucracies, long waiting times in camps and procedures, violent protests, and mostly

inhumane lifestyle, do not improve the situation either for locals, asylum seekers and governments and their political leaders. Therefore, this thesis 's main goal is to stress out the importance of studying and understanding migration and the significance of further research on this actual and ever-changing subject.

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Table 6.3: Asylum application and asylum rejection in Greece between 2015 and 2019

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Appendix


A. Table interview partners (asylum seekers and international volunteers)

Table interview partners (asylum seekers and international volunteers)

Date of interview	17.02.2020	19.02.2020	22.02.2020	22.02.2020	25.02.2020
Destination country	Switzerland	Anywhere where it is safe	Germany	France	USA/UK
Entrance in Greece	Spring 2017	February 2019	February 2019	December 2016	November 2019
Marital status	Single	Single	Single	Single	Married, 2 children of 4 and 8.
Country of origin	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Gambia	Nigeria	Afghanistan
Age	20	?	18	44	36
Sex	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male
	Interview Partner 1.	Interview Partner 2.	Interview Partner 3.	Interview Partner 4.	Interview Partner 5.

Date of Interview	16.02.2020	18.02.2020	23.02.2020	24.02.2020	27.02.2020	24.02.2020	18.02.2020
What Organisation?	RefugeesRefugees	Low Tech Lab in One Happy Family	Lesvos Solidarity - Pipka, Wave of Hope, Campfire	Better Days	ReFocus in One Happy Family	Low Tech Lab in One Happy Family	Lesvos Solidarity – Mosaik
Education level	MA in Architecture	MA in Ecological Engineering	BA in Sociology and Pedagogy	Diploma in Sports Science	Diploma in Communication Design	MA in Chemistry	MA of Arts
Marital	Single	Single	Single	Single	Single	Single	Single
Volunteer duration	Mid-January to Mid-March 2020	September 2019 to June 2020	December 2019 to June 2020	November 2019 to July 2020	3rd February 2020 to 8th March 2020	Mid-January 2020 to Mid-April 2020	Since 2018
Country of origin	Germany	France	Germany	Spain	Germany	France	Chile
Age	26	25	26	32	26	29	37
Sex	Male	Female	Female	Male	Male	Female	Male
	Interview Partner A.	Interview Partner B.	Interview Partner C.	Interview Partner D.	Interview Partner E.	Interview Partner F.	Interview Partner G.

B. Diagram of the survey results



C. Interview and survey questionnaires templates

Questionnaire for refugees

General information

Country of origin:

Sex:

Year of birth:

Marital status:

Educational level:

Occupation in country of origin:

Occupation in Greece:

Entrance in Greece:

Destination country (at the beginning of the journey and currently):

1. When did you arrive in Greece? How did you arrive?
2. Why Greece? Was it your choice? Do you regret to have come have to Greece? Is it how you expected?
3. Do you get any help in Greece? By whom?
4. Do you have a specific destination country? Why?
5. How did you 'organize' your journey to Greece?
6. What do you think about the volunteers' work?
7. What do you think about the locals' protest? Do you understand? Are you scared?
8. How would you describe your 'cohabitation' with Greek people?
9. How would you describe the camp you are at now?
10. What has to be done, in your opinion to improve the situation on Lesbos?

Questionnaire for volunteers/ humanitarian workers

General information

Country of origin:

Sex:

Year of birth:

Educational level:

Occupation in country of origin:

Occupation in Lesvos/ NGO:

Duration of volunteering time:

1. Why did you decide to be a volunteer? What were your motivations?
2. How did you hear about the NGO/ organization that you are working for?
3. How would you describe the situation of the refugees? Do you understand the protests of the refugees?
4. How would you describe the position of the inhabitants of Lesvos?
5. What do you think about the protests that happened in Lesvos? Do you understand or not?
6. What do you think about the Greek government's actions?
7. How do you understand the contribution of volunteers?
8. What has to be done, in your opinion to improve the situation in general?
9. What do you think about media covering the situation on Lesvos? How would you describe their position?

Questionnaire for locals

	Yes	No	Neutral
1. Do you understand why refugees come to Greece?			
2. Do you think they receive enough help in general?			
3. Do you understand the protest of the refugees?			
4. Do you think that the situation in Moria will get worse?			
5. Is the presence of making you feel uncomfortable/annoyed? - refugees - international volunteers			
6. Do you think that NGOs work are important?			
7. Do you think the Greek Government is paying enough attention to locals of islands with important migration flows?			
8. Do you think that the Greek government is taking the right decisions to improve the situation for: - refugees - locals			
9. Do you think that refugees are getting more help from the Government/ EU than locals?			
10. To what extent is the EU responsible for the situation in Greece/ Lesvos?			

VOICES OF FREEDOM: OPEN ASSEMBLY OF PEOPLE WITH AND WITHOUT PAPERS

More than 21,000 people are trapped in Lesvos. New Greek migration law has been implemented, making it more difficult to leave the island, much easier to issue negative asylum decisions and to increase deportations. The awful conditions affect everyone. The conditions in Moria camp allow violence and discrimination to flourish among migrants, as well as in local society.

Europe and the Greek state's only response is to increase the level of oppression, sending the message that there is no alternative than to obey. Massive police forces have landed on the island and the creation of a closed structure, a prison for migrants, has been announced. There is even a plan to appropriate by force the land of Mantamados for the creation of a prison camp. Locals, migrants and activists all reject the idea but, despite sharing common demands, turn against each other instead of joining common struggles.

In these circumstances, social polarization is rising and extreme-right ideology has found space among a section of local society. Over the years, local people feel increasingly powerless in the face of policies that have transformed the island into a migrant prison and an NGO business field. After 2015, social contact was lost between locals and migrants. NGOs have contributed to this, by assuming the role of the only legitimate managers of the 'crisis' and the only ones responsible for speaking on behalf of migrants. As a result many locals now see a symbol of their abandonment by Athens and Europe in the face of the migrant. This is why a section of local society is ready to blame migrants instead of the EU and the nation states responsible.

For their part, migrants are claiming their right to demonstrate against the awful conditions of their lives, and make themselves heard. Until now, many demonstrations have been hidden from view, blocked by riot police and met with extreme violence and random arrests. However, over the last few months the urge to protest has grown. Compared to previous years, when migrants demanded their right to move on, today they are negotiating their right to exist and have nothing to lose. In the previous weeks hundreds of migrants, despite police blockades, managed to reach the town and raise their voices. The authorities looked for the foreigners in the solidarity movement who they believed orchestrated the protests, unable to believe that migrants have the power to organize themselves.

We, the people of the struggle from any region of this world, with the power of our diversity, are trying to create links between oppressed people. Our weapons are the common struggles, assemblies, demonstrations, active solidarity, our speech and our action.

We support the struggles of the migrants for freedom! We welcome the struggle of our comrades in Athens, Thessaloniki and whole world! We welcome the occupation of the Greek consulate in Venice!

We fight for a world of equality, free of racism and oppression.

We demand:

**FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
SHUT DOWN MORIA
NO NEW (CLOSED) STRUCTURES
STOP DEPORTATIONS**

See our full statement on: facebook.com/VoicesoffreedomOpenAssembly or <https://voicesoffreedom.noblogs.org/>

Plus de 21 000 personnes sont prises au piège à Lesbos. Les conditions horribles affectent tout le monde. L'absence de nourriture et d'abri entraîne une augmentation de la violence et de la discrimination dans le camp. La nouvelle loi grecque sur la migration a été mise en œuvre, ce qui rend plus difficile la sortie de l'île, beaucoup plus facile d'émettre des décisions d'asile négatives et d'augmenter les expulsions. La polarisation sociale augmente. L'idéologie d'extrême droite a trouvé sa place parmi une partie de la société locale. Même si les habitants, les migrants et les militants rejettent les propositions de construction de camps de prisonniers, les gens se sont retournés les uns contre les autres au lieu de construire une lutte commune.

La terrible situation a poussé les migrants à revendiquer leur droit de manifester, à se faire entendre. La population du camp de Moria n'est plus intimidée - si la punition pour protestation est l'arrestation et la déportation, ce n'est pas pire que de vivre dans la peur et d'être expulsé de toute façon. Au cours des années précédentes, les personnes détenues à Lesbos réclamaient leur droit de continuer. Maintenant, les gens exigent le droit d'exister. La police attaque les manifestations de migrants, accuse les étrangers de les organiser et a créé un nouveau bouc émissaire des travailleurs des ONG et du mouvement de solidarité.

L'Europe et l'État grec envoient des forces de police massives, envoyant le message qu'il n'y a pas d'autre alternative que d'obéir. Les politiques de la police, de poursuivre les migrants et les militants solidaires pour avoir participé à des manifestations, alimentent les théories du complot d'extrême droite selon lesquelles les migrants et leurs alliés sont des fauteurs de troubles. Les populations locales ont un sentiment d'abandon d'Athènes et d'Europe. Une partie de la société locale accuse les migrants au lieu d'accuser l'UE et les États-nations responsables.

La seule solution de l'État est la création de camps de prisonniers, que tout le monde - habitants, migrants et militants - rejette. Pour les construire, il est même prêt à s'appropriier par la force des terres à Mantamados.

Après 2015, les contacts sociaux ont été perdus entre les Grecs et les migrants. Certaines ONG y ont contribué en jouant sur l'imagerie de la catastrophe. Avec l'arrivée des ONG, une nouvelle classe est apparue sur l'île. La plupart des ONG ne veulent pas changer cette situation structurellement; ils essaient juste de la gérer. Les gens de la lutte, de n'importe quelle région du monde, tentent de créer des liens entre les peuples opprimés. Nos armes sont des luttes communes, des rassemblements, des manifestations, une solidarité active, notre discours et notre action.

Nous soutenons la lutte de nos camarades à Athènes, en Thessalonique et dans le monde entier. Nous soutenons l'occupation du consulat grec à Venise.

Nous nous battons pour un monde d'égalité, exempt de racisme et d'oppression

Nous battons pour un monde d'égalité, exempt de racisme et d'oppression.

Demandons:

**LIBERTÉ DE MOUVEMENT
ARRÊTEZ MORIA
PAS DE NOUVELLES STRUCTURES (FERMÉES)
ARRÊTER LES EXPULSIONS**

VOICES OF FREEDOM: OPEN ASSEMBLY OF PEOPLE WITH AND WITHOUT PAPERS

Τα όρια του νησιού έχουν γίνει στενότερα για όλες. Περισσότεροι από 21.000 άνθρωποι βρίσκονται παγιδευμένοι στη Λέσβο. Η νέα ελληνική νομοθεσία για το άσυλο τέθηκε σε εφαρμογή, καθιστώντας ακόμη δυσκολότερο τον απεγκλωβισμό από το νησί και πολύ ευκολότερη την έκδοση αρνητικών απαντήσεων στα αιτήματα ασύλου και στην αύξηση των απελάσεων. Οι φριχτές συνθήκες δεν αφήνουν κανέναν ανεπηρέαστο. Το στρατόπεδο της Μόριας είναι ο κατάλληλος τόπος για την άνθιση της βίας και των διακρίσεων, τόσο μεταξύ των μεταναστών, όσο και στην τοπική κοινωνία.

Η μοναδική απόκριση της Ευρώπης και του ελληνικού κράτους είναι η αύξηση του επιπέδου της καταστολής, στέλνοντας το μήνυμα ότι δεν υπάρχει άλλη εναλλακτική πέρα από την υπακοή. Τεράστιες αστυνομικές δυνάμεις έχουν καταφτάσει στο νησί, ενώ έχει προαναγγελθεί η δημιουργία κλειστού κέντρου, μιας φυλακής δηλαδή, μεταναστών. Υπάρχει ακόμη και το σχέδιο της εξαναγκαστικής επίταξης γης στο Μανταμάδο για τη δημιουργία μιας τέτοιας φυλακής, παρότι ντόπιες, μετανάστες και ακτιβίστριες απορρίπτουν την ιδέα των κλειστών κέντρων. Παρόλο όμως που μοιράζονται κοινά αιτήματα, στρέφονται η μία ενάντια στον άλλο, αντί να δώσουν κοινούς αγώνες.

Σε αυτές τις περιστάσεις, η κοινωνική πόλωση έχει αυξηθεί και η ακροδεξιά ιδεολογία έχει βρει γόνιμο έδαφος σε κάποια τμήματα της τοπικής κοινωνίας. Με το πέρασμα των ετών, οι ντόπιοι αισθάνονται αδύναμοι μπροστά στις πολιτικές που έχουν μεταμορφώσει το νησί σε μία φυλακή μεταναστών και σε ένα πεδίο επιχειρήσεων για τις ΜΚΟ. Μετά το 2015, η κοινωνική επαφή μεταξύ ντόπιων και μεταναστών έχει χαθεί και οι ΜΚΟ έχουν συμβάλει σε αυτό, μετετρέπόμενες στους μόνους 'νόμιμους' διαχειριστές της κατάστασης και τους μόνους υπεύθυνους να μιλήσουν εξ ονόματος των μεταναστών. Σαν αποτέλεσμα πολλές ντόπιες βλέπουν τώρα στο πρόσωπο της μετανάστριας το σύμβολο της εγκατάλειψής τους από την Αθήνα και την Ευρώπη. Έτσι, κομμάτι της τοπικής κοινωνίας μοιάζει έτοιμο να κατηγορήσει τους μετανάστες αντί για την *Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και τα εθνικά κράτη, που ευθύνονται.*

Από πλευράς τους, οι μετανάστες διεκδικούν το δικαίωμά τους να διαμαρτυρηθούν για τις άθλιες συνθήκες της ζωής τους. Μέχρι τώρα, πολλές διαμαρτυρίες έχουν κρατηθεί μακριά από τα βλέμματα, έχουν αντιμετωπιστεί με ακραία αστυνομικές δυνάμεις και έχουν αντιμετωπιστεί με ακραία βία και τυφλές συλλήψεις. Παρόλα αυτά τους τελευταίους μήνες η ανάγκη για διαμαρτυρία μεγαλώνει. Σε αντίθεση με τα προηγούμενα χρόνια, όταν οι μετανάστες διεκδικούσαν την ελευθερία τους να μετακινηθούν, σήμερα αισθάνονται ότι δεν έχουν τίποτα να χάσουν, καθώς αυτό που βρίσκεται υπό διαπραγμάτευση, είναι το δικαίωμά τους να υπάρχουν. Τις τελευταίες εβδομάδες και παρά την αστυνομική παρεμπόδιση, εκατοντάδες μετανάστες και μετανάστριες κατόρθωσαν να φτάσουν στην πόλη και να υψώσουν τις φωνές τους. Οι αρχές αναζητούν τώρα τους 'ξένους' που τους υποκίνησαν, σαν να μην μπορούνε να πιστέψουν ότι έχουν τη δύναμη να αυτοοργανωθούν.

Εμείς, οι άνθρωποι του αγώνα, από κάθε περιοχή αυτού του κόσμου, με τη δύναμη της ποικιλομορφίας μας προσπαθούμε να δημιουργήσουμε συνδέσεις μεταξύ των καταπιεσμένων ανθρώπων. Τα όπλα μας είναι οι κοινοί αγώνες, οι συνελύξεις, οι διαδηλώσεις, η έμπρακτη αλληλεγγύη, ο λόγος και η δράση μας. Στηρίζουμε τους αγώνες των μεταναστ(ρι)ών για την ελευθερία. Χαιρετίζουμε τον αγώνα των συντρόφων μας στην Αθήνα, τη Θεσσαλονίκη και σε ολόκληρο τον κόσμο. Χαιρετίζουμε την κατάληψη του ελληνικού προξενείου στη Βενετία. Αγωνιζόμαστε για έναν κόσμο ισότητας, ελεύθερο από ρατσισμό και καταπίεση.

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Περισσότεροι από 21.000 άνθρωποι βρίσκονται παγιδευμένοι στη Λέσβο. Η νέα ελληνική νομοθεσία για το άσυλο τέθηκε σε εφαρμογή, καθιστώντας ακόμη δυσκολότερο τον απεγκλωβισμό από το νησί και πολύ ευκολότερη την έκδοση αρνητικών απαντήσεων στα αιτήματα ασύλου και στην αύξηση των απελάσεων. Οι φριχτές συνθήκες δεν αφήνουν κανέναν ανεπηρέαστο. Το στρατόπεδο της Μόριας είναι ο κατάλληλος τόπος για την άνθιση της βίας και των διακρίσεων, τόσο μεταξύ των μεταναστών, όσο και στην τοπική κοινωνία.

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