



School of Sociology and Public Policy  
Department of History

# Rebooting American Defense: U.S. Strategy for its European Presence

Richelle Larice Clark

Thesis specially presented for the fulfillment of the degree of  
Doctor in History, Security Studies and Defense

Supervisor:  
Dr. Antonio Telo, Professor  
Portuguese Military Academy

December 2020



IUL School of Sociology and Public Policy

Department of History

# Rebooting American Defense: U.S. Strategy for its European Presence

Richelle Larice Clark

Thesis specially presented for the fulfillment of the degree of  
Doctor in History, Security Studies and Defense

Jury:

Dr. Luis Nuno Rodrigues, Professor, ISCTE-IUL

Dr. Monica Dias, Assistant Professor, Catholic University of Portugal

Dr. Carlos Pacheco Amaral, Associate Professor, University of the Azores

Dr. Raquel Vaz Pinto, Assistant Professor, NOVA University of Lisbon

Dr. Antonio Duarte, Assistant Professor, NOVA University of Lisbon

Dr. Antonio Telo, Professor, Portuguese Military Academy

December 2020



## *Acknowledgements*

I would like to thank Dr. Antonio Telo for guiding me through the dissertation process. I appreciate your wisdom and commitment to education.

I would like to thank Dr. Luis Nuno Rodrigues for his assistance during my time as a student at ISCTE-IUL and for all of his help during my doctoral research.

I would like to thank my husband and daughter. I would not have been able to pursue this dream of studying history, security studies and defense without your support. I also would like to thank my mother for her love and sacrifice — and for cheering me on when I doubted my abilities and dreams.

## Table of Contents

Abstract	Page i.
Key Words	Page i.
Chapter 1 — Introduction	Page 1
Chapter 2— Literature Review	Page 14
Chapter 3 — Method of Investigation	Page 30
Chapter 4 — A Short History of U.S. Bases	Page 43
Chapter 5 — Foreign Policy of President Barack Obama	Page 70
Chapter 6 — Foreign Policy of President Donald Trump	Page 126
Chapter 6A — Scenarios on NATO funding and a Polish Base	Page 163
Chapter 6B — Scenario graphics (It is a separate document)	
Chapter 7 — Case Studies of Poland and Portugal	Page 187
Chapter 8 — Findings/Conclusions	Page 209
Further study	Page 220
Bibliography	Page 222

## **Abstract/Summary**

Scholar David Vine says the United States has about 800 overseas military bases — making it the world’s largest military.<sup>1</sup> It has installations in Asia, Africa, Europe and other places around the globe. Because of America’s growing “base empire,” some wonder if the United States has too many foreign bases and or too many troops in bases around the world. Critics have said American bases make it ‘less safe’ while supporters say that America’s foreign bases “project power” and keep allies safe. America spends more on defense than any other country, but even it has limits. The United States, under the Trump Administration, is now weighing the cost of foreign bases, not just for the cost, but whether these bases are crucial to American strategy in Europe for the 21st century.

**Key Words:** U.S. military, Russia, NATO, Lajes Field, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, military bases, U.S. strategy and U.S. presence in Europe

---

<sup>1</sup> Vine, David, *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World*, (2015: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, New York

## **Abstrato/Sumário**

O acadêmico David Vine diz que os Estados Unidos da América têm cerca de 800 bases fora do seu território – tornando as forças armadas americanas as maiores do mundo. Os Estados Unidos têm instalações militares na Ásia, África, Europa e outros continentes do mundo. Por causa do crescimento do “império de bases” americano, muitos questionam-se se os Estados Unidos terão demasiadas bases ou demasiadas tropas espalhadas pelo mundo. Os críticos já disseram que as bases americanas tornam tudo ‘menos seguro’, enquanto os defensores dizem que as bases americanas no estrangeiro “projetam poder” e mantêm os aliados seguros. A América investe mais em Defesa do que qualquer outro país, mas tem limites. Os Estados Unidos, sob a Administração Trump, têm estado a avaliar os custos das bases no estrangeiro, não apenas pelo custo financeiro em si, mas para determinar se essas bases são cruciais para a estratégia americana na Europa no Século XXI.

**Palavras-chave:** militares dos EUA, Rússia, OTAN, Lajes Base, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, bases militares, estratégia dos EUA e presença dos EUA na Europa





## Chapter 1 – Introduction: U.S. Military Presence in Europe – a perspective

The United States of America has become a military superpower, with 1.3 million active-duty troops and thousands of military bases in the United States and around the world. This nation has a formidable nexus of ‘forward operating bases’, aircraft carriers and spy planes based around the globe, along with high tech weapons systems, a nuclear arsenal and partnerships with European allies through NATO. It is said that America has more troops and military might than the former Roman Empire<sup>2</sup> and it has more troops than it needs to police its borders, thwart home-grown terrorism and assist allies when needed.

The United States sought to gain influence and power by expanding its military base empire across the world. In 1938 the United States had a mere 14 foreign military bases but by 1945, it had 30,000 military installations in 100 countries.<sup>3</sup> Following World War II, America set up permanent bases in Western Europe to prevent another world war and deter Soviet aggression and the spread of communism. This began a new political and military era known as the Cold War and by the height of this war, the U.S. had stationed 400,000 forces in Europe.<sup>4</sup>

The Cold War ended when the former Soviet Union’s empire crumpled. When this happened, the United States began shuttering many of its European bases and redeployed hundreds of thousands of troops, family members and civilian employees back to the United States. But America changed its military basing and troop strategy at the beginning of this millennium. On September 11, 2001 terrorists hijacked American planes and flew them into the World Trade Center and Pentagon. A fourth plane, which was supposed to attack the U.S. Congress, crashed. This terrorist event resulted in an upswing in American basing

---

<sup>2</sup> The Roman Army had about 500,000 troops, according to “What was life like inter Roman Army?” BBC, accessed <https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/topics/zwmpfg8/articles/zqbnfg8>

<sup>3</sup> Lutz, Catherine, editor, *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts* (New York: New York University Press, 2009), page 10.

<sup>4</sup> Europe Command, *“EUCOM Factsheet in Europe,”* U.S. Department of Defense, 26 May 2016, accessed on the internet on 28 June 2016 at [www.eucom.mil](http://www.eucom.mil).

policy and the start of the Global War on Terror, with the United States adding more troops to its bases around the world to fight terror in the Middle East. Specifically, the United States used its European based troops to fight the war by tasking them to train soldiers heading to war and also deploying themselves. When President Barack Obama took office, he ended the Global War on Terror and attempted to end the conflicts in Iraq by using a surge strategy. While the American troop count in the Middle East is lower, the war in Afghanistan continues.

Today, the United States has more than 800 military bases outside of the United States and those bases house hundreds of thousands of troops.<sup>5</sup> As of March 2019, the United States has 68,000 troops in Europe (active duty, reserve, permanently based out of Europe and temporarily based out of Europe), according to the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). Half of those troops are located in Germany, the headquarters of the United States' Cold War against the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union (and Russia) is no longer a threat to Germany — at least militarily, the United States still has half of its Europe-based troops in Germany, as well as major training centers of Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels. During the Global War on Terror, some troops in Europe rotated into the training centers before they were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq.

This dissertation seeks to examine America's strategy for its European presence by examining its plans for its European bases and asking the question: ***What is the role of American foreign bases in Europe as part of America's strategy for the 21st century?*** This work seeks to answer that question by focusing on America's foreign bases in Western Europe and Poland.

While this work agrees that American forces are in Europe because they serve as a deterrent to Russia and violent extremist groups, this work also proposes that U.S. forces are in Europe because it is The United States of America's strategic interest to do so; and that American strategy includes sending troops to Europe to serve as a deterrent but also for

---

<sup>5</sup> Vine, David, *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015) page 3.

other reasons, such as: serving as ‘cultural ambassadors,’ protecting ‘American interests’ and ‘training with host nation countries’ to increase reaction times to conflicts and ‘increase troop readiness.’ Many scholars argue that America did serve as an initial deterrent in Europe but that there is no quantifiable way to discover if the current 68,000 troops are a true deterrent and if their presence has really stopped enemies from invading Europe or attacking individual European bases since September 11, 2001. (One can argue, looking at Spain, that American troop presence did not prevent the terrorist attack there in 2004). This work will show that America sought to spread its influence through the world by literally placing military boots on the ground. This work argues that American presence in Europe also equals influence. It further argues that if presence does not add to American influence, then why would China, the United States and France have bases in Djibouti when Djibouti has no credible threat of invasion or enemies seeking to destroy the country?; or why is the United States again sending troops to Saudi Arabia when it has one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the Middle East and there is no credible threat from its neighbors to be invaded; however, there might be issues within the country from extremists who are unhappy with the royal reign. American influence is power.

This work hopes to add to scholarship by showing American presence does not just assist host nations, but it assists regional partners and neighbors. For example, U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan makes it easier to assist regional neighbors in countries such as Syria, Israel, Libya or other countries that may require assistance. The U.S. does not have a permanent base in Poland, but it rotates troops into the country as part of a measure to deter Russia and “assure” allies who fear Russia’s growing aggression in the region. Troop rotations to Poland and some of its neighboring Eastern European neighbors has had a positive affect, in that troops are training with these countries — even though the United States does not have permanent bases in those countries — and therefore improving European defense as well as projecting American strength and deterring Russia.

And lastly, this work hopes to add to scholarship by examining Russian aggression and explores if increased troops are needed to deter Russia in what could be seen as a 'New Cold War.'

This work is important now, as American President Donald Trump decides what kind of relationship and partnership he wants with European allies. Mr. Trump has been critical of many NATO partners, such as Germany and France, for not spending at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Mr. Trump has argued that NATO is not paying its 'fair share' and threatened to walk away from the strategic alliance. Mr. Trump is considering if the United States should move some troops out of Germany and possibly open a permanent base in Poland — which would cause some concern and possibly damage relations with Poland's neighbor, Russia.

This work will show how American bases and its locations are part of a strategic campaign of influence. This work is also important because it could be a foreshadowing of problems between the United States, NATO and the EU if the United States decided to reduce its troops strength in Europe and or leave NATO.

This research will examine literature on U.S. basing policy abroad, America's foreign military presence in Europe and how these two impact America's future plans for its bases, troops and policies in Europe. It will compare U.S. foreign policy and foreign bases under the eight years of the Obama Administration and examine the first three years of the Trump Administration. The examination of Mr. Trump's policies ends December 31, 2019. Because Mr. Trump's tenure was ongoing at the time of this thesis, this work also examines two probable scenarios that could happen under Mr. Trump's administration. The first scenario presupposes that America will authorize a new foreign base in Poland and that America will decide to draw down some of its 30,000 troops in Germany and move 20,000 of those troops to a new permanent base in Poland. The new base, if approved by the U.S. Congress, could be called Fort Trump. The second scenario examines whether America

should diminish its role in NATO by reducing funding, participation and troops. The scenario also addresses the possibility of the United States leaving the historic alliance.

In addition to seeking to answer the first question on how America's foreign bases in Europe is part of its future grand strategy, this work addresses three sub-questions: The first sub-question asks, if America has too many bases in Western Europe? This work seeks to answer this question by examining American base policy, funding, conducting interviews with scholars and government officials and military service members; the second sub-question asks, if America has too many or too few troops in Europe? This work seeks to answer this question by examining American troop level histories, funding, examining scholarly works on important troops levels for America and its bases abroad, examining writings from military journalists, politicians and military associations. The third sub-question asks, if America needs a permanent base in Eastern Europe (Poland)? Currently, the United States has an agreement with Poland to rotate troops into Polish military bases to train its troops. The bases do not belong to the United States and there are no guarantees that America will continue to permanently rotate in its troops or that the American public or politicians will continue to support such a mission. This work seeks to answer this sub-question through scholarly literature, news articles, interviews and a case study later in the thesis which will examine a possible permanent base in Poland. This work will take into account the tensions between the United States and Russia, and tensions between Poland and Russia and how these tensions could impact a possible American base on the border with Russia and former Russian republics, many of which are NATO member nations (Belarus and Russia are not NATO members.).

In addition, this work will examine if the United States has enough troops in Europe and what would be an ideal number of troops if U.S. officials determine that U.S. presence in Europe is crucial to American and European security. This work will also address the importance of America's presence in Europe through its troops and bases. This work aims to show that while an American base is a way for America to show its military might and spread

its influence, often times host nations benefit from bases in areas of security, finance, employment of local nationals and additional training for its troops.

This work uses case studies on Poland and Lajes Field Air Base in the Azores to examine U.S. troop presence in Europe.

The dissertation will be viewed through the lens of Realist International Relations Theory as defined by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi in their book, *International Relations Theory*, (2009). In their work, the authors define realism as a theory based on four assumptions: anarchy rules the world politic; only states can act, that governments speak for the people; the state is the rational actor for the people; and lastly that society is of the most importance to the state and that military and and related political issues dominate world politics.<sup>6</sup>

Realists focus on conflict or potential conflict between actors and the use of force, examining how international stability is attained or maintained, how it breaks down the utility of force as a means to resolve disputes, and the prevention of any violation of its territorial integrity.<sup>7</sup> Because Realists view security and the military as a top priority, it is fitting to examine this work through this lens. The well-respected Political Scientist, John Mearsheimer, has written the United States has acted in accordance to the dictates of offensive realism for most of its history.<sup>8</sup>

Also, many of the United States' recent leaders have been Republican and political realists or neocons. And even those who were Democratic or more liberal, such as former President Barack Obama, took a more realist view when it came to the military and defense because of world events. (\*Editor's note: in his first term, Mr. Obama made what this author considers realist decisions, such as continuing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, using special forces to track down and eliminate terrorists, increasing troops strength in Afghanistan and keeping the Guantanamo Bay military prison base open). Mr. Trump also

---

<sup>6</sup> Viotti, Paul, R. and Kaupi, Mark V., *International Relations Theory, Fourth Edition*, page 42-43, (2010: Pearson Education Inc., New York).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, page 43.

<sup>8</sup> Mearsheimer, John, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, page 421 of 701 on Amazon Kindle electronic book (2001: W.W. Norton and Company), New York.

follows a realist view, calling his recent plan to increase troop numbers in Afghanistan “Principled Realism.”

When examining a work it is important to note the levels of analysis. And while all levels are important and should be explored, this work will primarily look at the issue of American strategy and its foreign bases through the State-Society Level and the International-World Level. The state level of analysis focuses on government structures, policymaking practices<sup>9</sup> – such as how did the U.S. government come to the conclusion that it needed thousands of troops in Germany and a base in Portugal? It also takes into account things such as public opinion and political culture.<sup>10</sup> (editor’s note: these definitions of state and societal level come from Viotti and Kauppi’s book *International Relations Theory*). Regarding the International level, this work will focus on patterns of military alliances such as the United States’ relationship with Western European host nations and NATO, the number of major powers and the ‘distribution of power’ (as defined by Viotti and Kauppi)<sup>11</sup>; These two levels of analysis were selected so that the readers could better understand the behaviors of the main actors and the importance of national security, protecting alliances and borders in Western Europe.

This work will also use some elements of game theory to explain the United States’ actions on basing and troop presence. Game theory, in short, views decisions made by the players as a game in which one side wins and the other loses. Each actor tries to maximize gains or minimize losses often under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information which requires each actor to rank order preferences, estimate probabilities, and try to discern what the other actor is going to do.<sup>12</sup>

Assumptions, Limitations, Delimitations:

---

<sup>9</sup> Viotti, Paul, R. and Kauppi, Mark V., *International Relations Theory*, page 458.

<sup>10</sup> Viotti, Paul, R. and Kauppi, Mark, V., *International Relations Theory*, page 458.

<sup>11</sup> Viotti, Paul, R. and Kauppi, Mark, V., *International Relations Theory*, page 458.

<sup>12</sup> Viotti, Paul R. and Kauppi, Mark V., *International Relations Theory*, page 458.

While this work could examine a large amount of data and theories about U.S. military presence in Europe, it will narrow its scope to focus on U.S. troops in Western Europe and Poland. This work will not focus on the cost of building bases; nor will it focus on status of forces agreements — the ‘secretive,’ and or ‘classified’ agreements arranged between the United States and nations hosting U.S. troops that establish rules on matters such as funding, housing and law enforcement. Much scholarship has already been written on the topic and it is too broad an issue to address in a work about U.S. military presence in Europe and basing policy. This work will not specifically address the composition of military bases, but will focus on how bases are specifically part of America’s strategy for maintaining its military power and influence.

This work will not focus on the strength of NATO, or how NATO could work to increase its funding and troop strengths in a way that is acceptable to its members. Such topics are too broad and could not be adequately addressed in this thesis on U.S. presence in Europe. This work will not be a critical examination of the U.S. military’s commitment to fighting terror groups in the Middle East and around the globe, however, it will address this issue in brevity as it relates to how America used troops based in Europe deploy to Afghanistan to fight terrorism.

While this work addresses U.S. strategy for the 21st century by focusing on America’s foreign military bases, it will only focus on the strategic field. This dissertation is not a critical examination of the U.S. military’s funding; nor will this work focus on the U.S. economy or how American culture impacts its military strategy. This work will focus primarily on the military/defense strategic field as a way to assess America’s strategy in Europe — in part because America locates military bases in regions that it considers the most important for its political, military/security aims. America has most of its foreign bases in Europe and Asia. According to Scholar David Vine, America has 174 bases in Germany, 50 in Italy, 113 in Japan, 83 in South Korea, 21 in Portugal and 47 in Guam.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> Vine, *Ibid*, page 6.



## Definitions and Terms —

This dissertation will use many terms in its effort to describe U.S. strategy for its foreign bases. In order to successfully complete this work, the terms and how they will be used, must be defined. While no definition of political and military terms is alone perfect, this work will seek to use the best definition for the scope of this work. The terms that will be defined include military base, lily pads, U.S. strategy, empire and U.S. foreign policy

While the term foreign policy can be summarized by how a country interacts with other countries (allies and adversaries), a more precise term is needed for this scholarship. Scholars Viotti and Kauppi define foreign policy as “external affairs, particularly to decisions and actions taken by states in their dealings with other states or such external actions such as international organizations, multinational corporations and other transnational or non-state actors.”<sup>14</sup> This definition is important because the United States does not just deal with European allies, such as Portugal and Germany, but international organizations such as the European Union, NATO and the United Nations.

Scholar David Vine describes a military base as “any place, facility or installation regularly used for military purposes of any kind.”<sup>15</sup> Scholar Catherine Lutz, defines bases as installations routinely used by military forces that includes a convergence of military, paramilitary workers and civilians employees and that the base includes land, facilities, supplies and equipment.<sup>16</sup> The Pentagon defines a military base as “any physical location owned, leased or otherwise processed by the armed services or a component of the U.S. Department of Defense.”<sup>17</sup> And the official Department of Defense Dictionary of Military terms defines a base as, “a locality from which operations are projected or supported; An area or locality containing installations which provide logistics or other support; and a home

---

<sup>14</sup> Viotti, Paul R., and Kauppi, Mark V., *International Relations Theory*, Ibid, page 458.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. page number

<sup>16</sup> Lutz, Catherine “The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts,” (New York: New York University Press, 2009). page 4.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. page number

airfield or home carrier.<sup>18</sup> This work will use a hybrid of all four definitions to describe America's bases in the 21st century: \* A military base is land, a facility, or installation owned, operated or used by the military; A base can have troops, paramilitary and or civilian employees and the base can include buildings, supplies, weapons and weapons systems and other equipment. The base can be used to stage troops, launch wars, support military operations or any other reason the military chooses. (Vine, Lutz, DOD, hybrid definition).<sup>19</sup>

This work seeks to understand U.S. presence in Europe, which for this work will be defined as any U.S. military bases and troops located within Europe.

This work seeks to understand America's role for its European bases as part of its strategy for the 21st century. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Doctrine Note on Strategy, defines strategy as "*how nations use the power available to them to exercise control over people, places, things, and events to achieve objectives in accordance with their national interests and policies. The challenge for the strategist is to coordinate the various levers of national power in a coherent or smart way.*"<sup>20</sup> The U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary defines strategy as "A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national and/or multinational objectives."<sup>21</sup> The United States also uses its National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategies to define specific strategies to specific threats or events around the globe. This dissertation addresses both strategic reports in chapters on foreign policies of President Donald Trump and former President Barack Obama.

**In Chapter 2**, the literature review highlights the scholarly work written about the U.S. military as it pertains to foreign bases as part of America's grand strategy. This research

---

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, July 2019, page 24, accessed on the internet on 26 Sept. 2019 at <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> hybrid definition of a military base using definitions provided by Vine, Lutz, the U.S. government.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, Strategy, 25 April 2018, page v, accessed on the internet on 26 September 2019, at [https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jdn1\\_18.pdf](https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jdn1_18.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, page 206.

highlights books that examine U.S. foreign base policy and if such a strategy is good for America, its military and international order. This dissertation analyzes the popular book on foreign bases by David Vine, *Base Nation*. In the book, Vine's major premise is that foreign bases make America unsafe at home and abroad. The literature review also includes scholarly papers written by academics and military officials, and some who disagree with Vine's premise about foreign bases making America unsafe. Some scholars have argued that America's foreign bases act as a deterrent to hostile acts from known and unknown enemies and that foreign bases help keep the peace and spread American influence abroad.

**In Chapter 3**, includes the methodology of this research project, beginning with its qualitative research methods and explaining the frameworks for the scenarios and case studies, and including how interviews and surveys were conducted.

**In Chapter 4**, examines the history of U.S. military bases. The work limits its scope to the three important periods for military bases in American history, beginning with World War II, where scholars report the number of foreign bases grew from a few base camps to thousands of bases. The second period chronicles the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union — and how America built up its European troop levels to prevent the spread of communism in Europe and to deter the Soviet Union. The third major period follows September 11, 2001, when America launched a war in Afghanistan in retaliation of the World Trade Center bombing; and later launched what former President George Bush termed a 'Global War On Terror'. This chapter analyzes the importance of foreign bases in America's strategies to fight foreign wars, assist allies and train its troops.

**In Chapter 5**, this work examines the foreign policy of former President Barack Obama. It specifically examines how Mr. Obama handled European base closures. It also shows how defense officials used bases in Europe, as a training and launching pad to fight wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and examines if America needed European bases to successfully fight conflicts and care for its troops. This work also shows that during his tenure, Mr. Obama

tilted toward an Asian-Pacific foreign policy and sought to address China's rise in power on the world stage.

**In Chapter 6**, this work examines the foreign policy of President Donald Trump. This work focuses only on the first two years of his presidency, from 2017 to 2019 because he has not served a full term in office. It examined Mr. Trump's National Security Strategy, his defense strategy and a plan associated with his administration that would charge allies "Cost Plus 50 percent," to host U.S. forces in its country. The work discusses Mr. Trump's growing animosity toward NATO members who are not fully funding defense in a manner he approves. It also briefly discusses Mr. Trump's recent impeachment before the U.S. House of Representatives and his approval to target an Iranian general.

In a subchapter, of Chapter 6, this work offers two scenarios that could happen under a possible Trump Administration and how those scenarios could impact base policy and American foreign policy. The first scenario examines if the United States places a permanent base in Poland, should U.S. forces currently in Germany be moved to Poland; the second scenario examines whether the United States should decrease its participation in NATO.

**In Chapter 7**, this work examines two case studies: Portugal's Lajes Field; and Poland. The first case study on Poland examines whether America should have a permanent base in Poland and how such a move would impact NATO and Russia. The second case study examines whether Lajes Field, the U.S. Air Base in the Azores, should remain open and if it closes, whether Chinese companies should use the base and nearby port for commercial purposes.

**In Chapter 8**, this work discusses research findings, conclusions and discussion/suggestions for future research. This is an open dissertation in that the findings will depend on several variables that could happen in the future, such as whether Mr. Trump is re-elected or another leader is elected that does not have the same views of U.S. military presence in Europe. Other variables that could impact research results include if the United States goes to war with Iran; whether Russia continues its aggressive behavior in the

Ukraine and other parts of Europe and sparks an armed conflict; to whether or not a re-elected Mr. Trump decides to leave NATO or reduce America's participation in the historical alliance.

This dissertation will also include a bibliography of the sources used to produce this work. It will include a table of interviews conducted in person or on the telephone, and use graphics and charts to help illustrate the research and findings. It will also show results of a survey conducted for this work on U.S. military presence in Europe.

## Chapter 2 — Literature Review

The United States military, with its vast base empire, has been the subject of scholarly papers, books and news articles. However, much of the work focuses on the U.S. military as a whole, American militarism and or the cost of military basing around the globe. Few works specifically address America's military bases in Western Europe and how those bases work as an important part of U.S. strategy.

This literature review focuses on works that discuss America's foreign bases in Europe and America's basing strategy, and it is ordered by publications, starting with books and then scholarly works. The scope of this literature review is works published during the Obama and Trump administrations, however, some literature was written during or focused on the tenure of former U.S. President George W. Bush, who began America's Global War On Terror in response to September 11, 2001 terror attacks in America. This review only addresses foreign policy as it relates to U.S. basing strategy in Europe.

Perhaps there is no greater critic of America's foreign military bases than Dr. David Vine, a professor at American University in Washington, D.C. In his work, *"Base Nation,"* Vine said America has too many foreign military bases and those bases make the United States "unsafe." Vine's book examines the history of America's foreign bases from the 1700s, until the end of the Obama Administration and he reaches his conclusion after conducting interviews, examining government documents and new articles and talking with people who live near America's foreign bases. He also visited bases around the globe. Vine's book also discusses America's modern military and its bases located around the world; His book examines the work involved in building military bases, maintaining those large structures and housing those troops overseas (Vine 2015). Although few U.S. citizens realize it, the United States probably has more bases in other people's lands than any other people, nation or empire in world history, said Vine.<sup>22</sup> Citizens know America has foreign

---

<sup>22</sup> Vine, David, "Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and The World," (2015: New York), page 3.

bases, but may not understand the country has hundreds of bases scattered on every continent. Americans may also not be aware it takes thousands of support staff and billions of dollars to manage foreign bases, according to Vine.

Vine said overseas military bases hurt American security because U.S. service members abroad are under increased security threats. However, Vine's assertion may not be necessarily true. It is doubtful that troops serving in places such as Okinawa Japan, the Solomon Islands or Portugal feel they are under increased security threat compared to troops serving in some parts of the Middle East or Asia. U.S. Troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria understand they are in immense danger and could be targets of violent extremist organizations. In fact, troops in war zones fully expect to draw the attack of enemies, and hope their efforts will decrease the likelihood that terrorists will attack the United States.

According to Vine, foreign bases keep America focused on enemies, battles and supremacy and bases "give a false impression that we are safe in America and we are not."<sup>23</sup> However, many see foreign bases as a source of security. America's foreign bases overseas have thousands of troops, military equipment, planes, war-fighting helicopters, munitions and advanced weapons systems. While Vine says this may make Americans unsafe, military strategists could disagree because a highly trained force would be able to fight back if a base or its host country was attacked.

Vine also asserts Americans are used to its military forces using overseas bases and that America's presence in foreign lands is not considered out of the ordinary. According to Vine, the presence of overseas bases have long been accepted unquestioningly and treated as an obvious good, essential to national security and global peace.<sup>24</sup> But Vine said Americans would not feel the same about foreign troops stationed in the United States — he asserts: "While there are no freestanding bases on U.S. soil, today there are around 800

---

<sup>23</sup> Vine Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Vine, Ibid, page 2.

U.S. bases in foreign countries, occupied by hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops.”<sup>25</sup> Although the United States has long had some bases in foreign lands, this massive global deployment of military force was unknown in the U.S. history before World War II.<sup>26</sup>

This work disagrees with Vine. Americans are aware that U.S. troops are in Europe to deter Russian aggression and as part of a NATO agreement to fight for NATO member countries if they are attacked by a foreign adversary. If NATO did not exist, it is quite possible that there would be a smaller U.S. presence in Europe because there would be no agreement or bond to keep U.S. troops on the continent.

Vine is critical of America’s worldwide military bases and overseas troops, and he said America has more foreign bases than China, Russia, Britain and France. “In total, all the non-U.S. countries in the world combined have about 30 foreign bases among them — as compared to the United States and its 800 or so.”<sup>27</sup> If we add up all the troops and the family members living with them, plus the civilian base employees and their family members, the bases are responsible for over half a million Americans abroad.”<sup>28</sup>

According to Vine, people across the political spectrum believe as a matter of faith that overseas bases and troops are essential to protecting the country.<sup>29</sup> Vine said former president George Bush believed foreign bases “maintained peace,” and was a symbol of commitment to allies and friends.<sup>30</sup>

In the last chapter of the book, entitled, True Security, Vine presents his findings on what he believes will ultimately keep America safe: fewer American bases at home and abroad (Vine 2015). According to Vine, America does not need so many bases because its military already has the capability — even without any bases abroad — to deploy more

---

<sup>25</sup> Vine, Ibid, page 3.

<sup>26</sup> Vine, Ibid, page 3.

<sup>27</sup> Vine Ibid, page 5.

<sup>28</sup> Vine, Ibid, page 5.

<sup>29</sup> Vine, Ibid, page 6.

<sup>30</sup> Vine, Ibid, page 5



military power faster and over longer distances than any other military on earth, by far and that the nation's current basing network and its broader military strategy are not the only option."<sup>31</sup>

Vine is not the only scholar critical of America's basing empire. Catherine Lutz, in the book she edited, "*Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against Military Posts*," offers readers a history of U.S. bases as part of its defense strategy and how America projects power through its bases. Lutz is critical of America's growing foreign base infrastructure and the way those bases impact local communities, such as using farm land to construct bases and infrastructure, environmental damage caused by bases in foreign communities, the training of foreign militaries that may not embrace democratic principals, to America's support of leaders who stay in power because of American assistance.<sup>32</sup> Lutz said 38 percent of the counties with U.S. bases were cited in 2002 for poor human rights records.<sup>33</sup>

A decade ago, Lutz said the United States trained 100,000 soldiers annually in 180 countries under the guise of the saving American money and that training would encourage those foreign militaries to pursue American interests.<sup>34</sup> That training includes urban, desert, jungle, maritime and polar training and those training missions have been seen as provocative to other nations or become a pretext for positioning of American troops in those countries.<sup>35</sup> While Lutz may be critical of American forces training foreign militaries that do not embrace democracy or may have violated human rights, it is important to note the United States trains with NATO allies and partnership countries so those militaries can protect their own citizens and borders — not American interests.

---

<sup>31</sup> Vine, *Ibid*, page 324.

<sup>32</sup> Lutz, Catherine, editor, "*The Bases of Empire: the Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts*," (2009: New York University Press, New York) page 4.

<sup>33</sup>Lutz, Catherine, editor, *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts*, *Ibid*, page 5.

<sup>34</sup>Lutz, *Ibid*, page 5.

<sup>35</sup> Lutz, *Ibid*, page 5.

Lutz also links bases with America's desire for world power: "After consolidation of its continental dominance, there were three periods of global ambition in U.S. History beginning in 1898, 1945 and 2001, and each is associated with the acquisition of significant numbers of new overseas military bases."<sup>36</sup>

There is growing anti-U.S. base movements across the globe, Lutz said, because some foreign nation citizens' feel the U.S. military causes environmental damage, noise pollution from aircraft and that some service members commit crimes; These anti-base movements believe the cost of America's bases are more than they could afford.<sup>37</sup>

Lutz is not alone in her criticism of America's growing base empire. The book, *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire*, by Mark L. Gillem, examines America through the lens of a military empire.

His work examines the success and failures of previous European empires and also discusses how America has successfully exported its culture and life to parts of Europe. He writes: "...empires have required outposts beyond their homeland, places from which they could project their awesome, and frequently gruesome power. These outposts have existed to support the implementation of power."<sup>38</sup> His work also examines empires across centuries and he gives evidence on why he considers the United States to be an empire.

Not everyone would agree that America is an empire, in the sense that it controls a host nation or its lands or its peoples, but the United States has 1.3 million active duty troops and bases around the globe. While American bases can be a show of force, it does not mean that America wants to completely dominate the world through its bases.

The Book, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*, by Andrew J. Bacevich, also touches on American militarism by examining the popularity of the U.S. military, how it fights wars and seeks the best defense/weapons. This work is important

---

<sup>36</sup> Lutz, *Ibid*, page 11.

<sup>37</sup> Lutz, *Ibid*, page 11.

<sup>38</sup> Gillem, Mark, L., *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire*, (2007: University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN), page 3.

because it sheds insight into why Americans continue to support American troops in Europe, extended wars in the Middle East and Asia (Iraq and Afghanistan) and offers insight on how Americans view military power, might and its destiny/title as world's lone super power.<sup>39</sup> Bacevich's book does not blame a certain American leader or policy that lead to what he calls "American militarism," but rather an event — September 11, 2001, which gave added impetus to already existing tendencies rather than as a turning point.<sup>40</sup> He said America's embrace of war and militarism began during the Vietnam War and continued to grow until September 11, 2001.

While Bacevich saw a steady growth of American militarism until 9/11, America has fewer troops and fewer European bases than in 2003. And previous presidents such as Mr. Obama, worked to rebalance troops and encourage other countries to provide for their own defense so the United States could focus on domestic matters. But, there is no doubt that even with America's downsizing that it still possesses one of the world's most powerful militaries and it shows no signs it would cut its military or capabilities in the immediate future.

Other scholars also address America's growing base empire.

John Glaser, in his essay, *The Case Against U.S. Overseas Military Bases*, examines why he believes foreign bases 'cause America harm.' He narrows his argument to a few key points: The first is that the world is more technologically advanced, and "targeting and surveillance technology" means that America's foreign bases are more vulnerable to governments and terror groups who want to harm the troops and the base where they reside; He believes technologies, such as long-range aircraft and improved communications and weapons systems, lessen the need to have foreign troops abroad.<sup>41</sup> Quoting a RAND report, Glaser said, An armored brigade combat team can get from Germany to Kuwait in

---

<sup>39</sup> Bacevich, Andrew, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*, (2013:Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK), summary.

<sup>40</sup> Bacevich, Andrew, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*, (2013:Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK), page 5.

<sup>41</sup> Glaser, John, *The Case Against, U.S. Overseas Military Bases: Why they are no longer a strategic asset*, *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, 25, July 2017, accessed online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-07-25/case-against-us-overseas-military-bases>.

approximately 18 days, only about four days faster than if it deployed from the East Coast of the United States.<sup>42</sup> However, he also pointed out that deploying heavy forces by air in bulk is not plausible for contingencies requiring massive ground troops.<sup>43</sup>

While technological advancements allow American military units to arrive in war zones quicker — no technology replaces being in the area when a war breaks out. Some of the first troops deployed to Afghanistan in 2001 were on a nearby training mission in Asia when they were called to fight terrorists. Also, U.S. troops can also serve as a deterrent through the use of local intelligence and could possibly stop attacks before they occur or could be rapidly deployed to conflict areas.

Glaser's second point is the presence of foreign troops can "militarize disputes," that might have ended peacefully had the military not been there and that sometimes America will enter into conflicts to aid allies or to keep its credibility.<sup>44</sup> To support his claims, Glaser used the example of Korea. Military leaders had urged that United States to leave Korea at the end of World War II and it did not, he said. Just five years later, North and South Korea were at war and America got involved to help the south, in part, because there were U.S. troops in the country, according to Glaser. While Glaser makes an interesting point about the United States being closer and therefore more likely to engage an adversary, this work questions what would have happened to South Korea had American not been there to help with war. North Korea is a repressive dictatorship. Its citizens do not have true freedom to leave the country, criticize the government or live as they please. North Korea is technically still at war with South Korea.

Glaser's third point is that bases are "seductive" — they entice America to fight or join conflicts because of geographical proximity<sup>45</sup>. To make his point, Glaser used the example of the 2011 Libyan conflict, when the United States got involved in the NATO bombing mission

---

<sup>42</sup>Glaser, John, *The Case Against, U.S. Overseas Military Bases,* Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Glaser, John, *The Case Against, U.S. Overseas Military Bases*" Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Glaser, John, *The Case Against U.S. Overseas Military Bases,*" Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Glaser, John, *The Case Against U.S. Overseas Military Bases,*" Ibid.

in the country. When the United States agreed to assist NATO in Libya, it used troops already stationed in Europe to run bombing missions from Italy, Spain and Germany<sup>46</sup>. At the time, the U.S. was still engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Glaser wrote, “The weak arguments in favor of U.S. involvement, which included conjectural claims about impending humanitarian disaster and pressure from NATO allies, might have been harder to sell politically if U.S. forces had not already been deployed in the area.”<sup>47</sup>

And lastly, Glaser said foreign bases do not serve as a deterrent against enemies. Glaser gives many reasons why deterrence does not work, but perhaps his most compelling reason is that deterrence can have the opposite effect. Using Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the Ukraine, Glaser said the invasion was more about Russia’s insecurity about the expansion of U.S.-led Western economic and military institutions into former Soviet Republics and even up to the Russian border.<sup>48</sup> While Glaser makes an interesting point, deterrence is important in law enforcement as well as in the military. Sometimes an adversary may change their mind about committing a crime or taking an action because the possible outcomes may not give them an advantage or the thing they seek. U.S. peacekeeping soldiers served as deterrents to violence in places such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, by preventing and stopping many cases of ethnic violence and theft. Troops, in a large enough number, could also serve as a deterrent to Russia, particularly if they were strategically located in places such as Poland, Romania and or Estonia.

According to Glaser, The three main strategic justifications for overseas bases — to deter adversaries, reassure allies, and enable rapid contingency response by the U.S.

---

<sup>46</sup> Glaser, John, *The Case Against U.S. Overseas Military Bases*,” Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Glaser, Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Glaser, Ibid.

military—are no longer sufficient to justify a permanent peacetime military presence abroad.<sup>49</sup>

Again, Glaser makes an interesting case, but he cannot prove that deterrence does not work. NATO and the United States are in Poland and Eastern Europe because those nations feel justifiably threatened by Russian aggression and American lawmakers were sufficiently convinced enough to fund the European Deterrence Initiative, which has given billions of dollars to European security.

Glaser closes his essay by warning Americans about its current defense strategy: “*Rather than defending the security of other states and attempting to stabilize regions of conflict around the world, the United States should encourage allies to carry the burden of their own defense and extricate itself from regional disputes, lest it get drawn into conflicts in which its vital interests are not at stake.*”<sup>50</sup>

Glaser’s assertion is correct that other countries should share the burden of their own security and Mr. Obama and Mr. Trump have encouraged European allies to fund more toward their own defense. NATO members are working toward spending 2 percent of the GDP on defense by 2024.

While some scholars may disagree with America’s foreign bases, others see these structures have played an important role in history and security.

*Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges*, edited by Dr. Luis Rodrigues and Sergiy Glebov, offers a historical view of U.S. military bases since the Cold War and addresses future concerns and possibilities for U.S. basing overseas. In the Chapter, “Underpaid, Undersexed and on the Way Out,” scholar Simon Duke offers the pros and cons of having American bases in Europe and examines the critical role of bases in America and Europe’s future. Regarding America’s base empire across Europe, he writes:

---

<sup>49</sup> Glaser, John, *The Case Against, U.S. Overseas Military Bases: Why they are no longer a strategic asset*, *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, 25, July 2019, accessed online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-07-25/case-against-us-overseas-military-bases>.

<sup>50</sup> Glaser, *Ibid.*

“For host governments, the presence of U.S. military bases could provide valuable political and economic support; but it could also lead to disputes, disagreements and strategic difference.”<sup>51</sup>

Having an American base in a European city may not help government popularity — particularly in cases where anti-war, anti-American and anti-militarism sentiment is on the rise. However, Duke said in the past, American bases in Europe had two important missions: they were strategically located to be a show of force against any enemy and were political tools<sup>52</sup>. Military bases, particularly those in Southern Europe, were often tied to extensive economic assistance what would not only help the host nation, but also ensure the tolerance of activities in and around the basing areas.<sup>53</sup>

While foreign bases help local economies and project power, the attitudes about having a base in a community has changed. Duke said: *“NATO can no longer count on the glue of NATO to pull the allies together and build a permissive environment for military basing. If bases overseas are no longer perceived to be serving the interest of a collective alliance, but instead are platforms to project military force in defense of national interests, the political tolerance amongst the European allies for extensive American military presence in their midst may wane.”*<sup>54</sup>

While the United States, the European Union and NATO may be pulled in different areas, there are things they have in common — a need for European security. Duke said the three entities have similar security goals, some of which include fighting terrorism and eradicating weapons of mass destruction.

---

<sup>51</sup> Duke, Simon, “Underpaid, Undersexed and On the Way Out? The Past, Present and Future of U.S. Basing in Europe,” in *Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges*, eds Rodrigues, Luis and Gebov, Sergiy (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009).

<sup>52</sup> Duke, Simon, “Underpaid, Undersexed and On the Way Out? Past, Present and Future of U.S. Basing in Europe, page 8.

<sup>53</sup> Duke, Simon, “Underpaid, Undersexed and On the Way Out? Past, Present and Future of U.S. Basing in Europe, page 8.

<sup>54</sup>Duke, Simon, “Underpaid, Undersexed and On the Way Out? Past, Present and Future of U.S. Basing in Europe, page 8.

Duke cautions American military planners who continually downsize American bases and troops in Europe: “The drastically lower force levels in Europe run the risk that European allies may see this as a lack of serious interest in NATO and that role of the U.S. military in Europe is force projection for national interest.”<sup>55</sup> Duke pointed out that while there are plenty of U.S. troops in Europe, many of them are trained and then deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan to fight in those conflicts and only a few remain to participate in NATO training exercises.

While there is concern that it might appear that America is less interested in Europe and participating in NATO, Duke offers hope for the American-European partnership and the future of U.S. troops in Europe. Although there were disputes with European allies over the Iraq war, those disputes have not negatively impacted the number of American bases in Europe. Duke writes: “ The United States will continue to look to its European allies to host main and forward bases and sites since — in spite of any differences — they remain the most politically stable allies and are of key interest in terms of their proximity to the Middle East, the Caspian Sea and even North Africa.”<sup>56</sup>

Duke makes important points about the benefits of having a base in a European community and also about the importance of American bases in Europe being linked to NATO. Some might see an American base as a commitment not only to European security, but to the alliance.

Another important work to be discussed in this literature review is *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*, by Alexander Cooley. In this work, Cooley said America’s foreign bases: project power, are “force multipliers and enable U.S. planners to rapidly project power both within and across regions.”<sup>57</sup> Cooley also discusses the importance of bases. Beyond their military role, and strategic functions, bases also

---

<sup>55</sup> Duke, Simon, “Underpaid, Undersexed and On the Way Out? Past, Present and Future of U.S. Basing in Europe, page 12.

<sup>56</sup> Duke, Simon, “Underpaid, Undersexed and On the Way Out? Past, Present and Future of U.S. Basing in Europe, page 15.

<sup>57</sup> Cooley, Alexander, “Base Nation, Ibid, page 4.



provide service and repair facilities, storage, training facilities, and logistical staging posts.<sup>58</sup> Bases can also be used to conduct surveillance, coordinate tasks, collect intelligence, and facilitate command, control and communications.”<sup>59</sup> He adds: *“For host governments and citizens, U.S. bases are also concrete institutions and embodiments of U.S. power, identity and power. The physical presence of overseas U.S. troops and installations — from large garrison towns in Germany that look like imported American countries to the small but restricted sites in Central Asia — serves as a daily reminder of the scope of U.S. global influence and signifies that the host country has sacrificed some of its domestic sovereignty.”*<sup>60</sup>

Bases can be an economic boon for host nations, who will often spend less on security because they host American troops, and in some cases they might also receive additional foreign aid/economic assistance because of hosting foreign troops, according to Cooley. “Basing agreements can also provide intangible benefits such as prestige, legitimacy, and association with the United States and the West. Such connections may be invaluable to host-country elites who seek international legitimacy and support for their regime.”<sup>61</sup>

Cooley is correct that hosting a military base could lead a host nation to spend less on defense. Germany can be used as an example, Mr. Trump has repeatedly criticized Germany for not spending 2 percent of its GDP on defense. Germany said it would only spend 1.5 percent of its GDP on defense by 2024.<sup>62</sup> Many other NATO countries with U.S. military bases have failed to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense, which troubles many American politicians.

---

<sup>58</sup> Cooley, Alexander, “Base Nation, Ibid, page 5.

<sup>59</sup> Cooley, Alexander, Ibid, page 5.

<sup>60</sup> Cooley, Alexander, Ibid, page 7.

<sup>61</sup> Cooley, Alexander, Ibid, page 12.

<sup>62</sup> Reuters, “Merkel: Germany will meet the pledge to spend 1.5 percent of GDP on defense by 2024,” accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-politics-merkel-nato/merkel-germany-will-meet-pledge-to-spend-1-5-percent-of-gdp-on-defense-by-2024-idUSKCN1R20SQ>.

In addition to how bases impact defense spending of NATO countries, some scholarly works examine America's commitment to helping its European partners with their security.

Lt. Col. Michael A. Nelson, Jr., in a research paper entitled, "Promise without Presence: A New Approach to U.S. Global Commitments," for the U.S. Air War College, addresses how allies rely on America to help it with its security through bases instead of taking care of it themselves. He said America's "global approach," to defense will cause it difficulty because of federal funding cuts and fewer available resources. He also warned of dilemmas that could impact the United States military. He said the current systems *"encourages allies to rely on U.S. presence for their own security. U.S. basing often produces resentment among citizens across the globe. It places the U.S. military at undue risk when one considers the capabilities that other nations possess the ability to regionally threaten U.S. forces. Current global U.S. basing fails to outweigh these risks,"*<sup>63</sup>

Nelson said America should "phase out its reliance" on permanent overseas bases. By phasing out bases, Nelson said the military could put money into its military to "rebuild and re-arm," its troops. He said by moving troops to America, there would be fewer complaints about American hegemony and it eliminates the seduction of getting involved in international disputes because troops are located near by.<sup>64</sup> "Ultimately, by reducing U.S. permanent overseas basing, the U.S. will retain proven military capabilities, sustain regional security and maintain its global dominance without the fruitless benefits of global permanent presence," he said.<sup>65</sup> This new approach, Nelson argues, would force "the United States into difficult, but necessary strategic decisions regarding its global commitments, its willingness to use force and the statement of a clear grand strategy for global affairs."<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>63</sup> Nelson, Michael, A. Lt. Col., 2016, "Promise Without Presence: A New Approach to U.S. Global Commitments," U.S. Air War College paper, Air University, accessed via the internet on 22 Sept. 2019, at <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1036917.pdf>.

<sup>64</sup> Nelson, Michael, A., Lt. Col., "Promise Without Presence, Ibid, page 2.

<sup>65</sup> Nelson, Michael, A., Lt. Col., "Promise Without Presence," Ibid, page 2.

<sup>66</sup> Nelson, Michael, A. Lt. Col., "Promise Without Presence," Ibid, page 2.

Nelson argues the United States is over-extending its military and overseas bases and can contribute to negative reactions to U.S. military actions abroad. He said forward deployed bases put troops at risk from enemies and there is the possibility that foreign based troops may not survive an attack. Nelson said the military has old equipment and often times does not have the troops to participate in missions and the military has to enact a “stop-Loss” policy which prevents troops from leaving military service until critical positions can be filled with new people.<sup>67</sup>

Nelson is highly critical of the U.S. overseas basing system, which he says was based on World War II. He writes: *“The U.S. continues to live with the commitments, alliances and constructs without an adjustment for the fiscal, strategic, economic and political realities that face it. Current global issues do not remember the bi-polar ideological battles of the 20th century. If the U.S. approach and structure does not change, it will increasingly fail to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.”*<sup>68</sup>

Nelson said he does not believe all allies want foreign bases as a way of ensuring America’s military assistance if they ever need it. He said that temporary deployments, such as those to the Baltics, and the Partnership for Peace initiative can have the same kind of impact. He also said American military presence in Iraq did not deter ISIS and American presence in Europe did not stop Russia from invading and annexing Crimea in the Ukraine.

Nelson said the solution is not just giving the military additional funding, nor is it to convert the U.S. military to an expeditionary force, rapidly dispatched to fight in foreign conflicts. So what is a possible solution? According to Nelson, the answer is simple, but not easy — a reduced U.S. global presence. He said America reduced its presence at the end of World War II. He has a partial plan for how America could go about reducing its footprint around the globe. His plan would require the United States to negotiate its base closures

---

<sup>67</sup> Nelson, Michael, A., Lt. Col., “Promise Without Presence, Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Nelson, Michael, A., Lt. Col., “Promise Without Presence, Ibid, page 5.

with each foreign country, as opposed to an announcement of closure.<sup>69</sup> His plan would pay special attention to the combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan. After all, Nelson says, if the United States can establish withdrawal dates for combat zones without catastrophe, then a similar concept for non-combat and allied nations should occur with more ease and with a smooth coordination.<sup>70</sup> Nelson adds that America has closed many bases around the world in the past.

In his paper, Nelson said the United States would not lose credibility with its allies if it closes its foreign bases. He counters by saying that America lost some has credibility for its invasion of Iraq and for not getting involved int Syria. He writes: “The current U.S. grand strategy lacks depth, specificity, forcefulness and the predictability needed to ensure that allies and opponents alike understand U.S. resolve in security matters.”<sup>71</sup>

While Nelson makes important points, this work disagrees that America would not lose credibility if its closes its foreign bases. Closing bases in Europe could make Eastern European nations feel unsafe — even if American troops are rotated into the country for military training exercises. There is an old American saying that goes like this, “out of sight is out of mind,” and that is what could happen if America retreats from Europe. Not only could it make Europe unsafe from an aggressive Russia, but it could also decrease American power around the globe.

The works examined in this literature, were selected to shed light on America’s foreign bases and American strategy in Europe. While this work does not agree with all of the assertions of the authors, this work sees the importance in a diversity of voices to address how America uses its bases as part of its strategy for the 21st century.

---

<sup>69</sup> Nelson, Michael, A. Lt. Col., “Promise Without Presence, Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Nelson, “Promise Without Presence,” page 10.

<sup>71</sup> Nelson, “Promise Without Presence,” page 13.



### Chapter 3: Method of Investigation

This dissertation examines America's strategy for its European presence by asking the question: ***What is the role of American foreign bases in Europe as part of America's strategy for the 21st century?*** This work will seek to answer the question by using qualitative research methods — using primary and secondary sources to examine the role of U.S. foreign bases in Europe and if those bases remain a critical part of America's future strategy. The sources for this work includes books, scholarly journals, interviews with scholars, government officials, a former ambassador and European government officials. This work uses books, government reports, readouts from state department meetings between American and foreign government officials and speeches from President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump. It examines government historical documents, military reports and news releases and videos of speeches and events that pertain to U.S. military presence in Europe.

This work uses the hypothesis that foreign bases are an important part of American strategy for the 21st Century. This work hopes to show the importance of foreign bases by examining America's history of foreign bases and comparing the foreign policies (especially base policies) of Mr. Obama and Mr. Trump. It also takes into account that some critics see U.S. foreign bases as a form of military colonialism. The Oxford Dictionary defines colonialism as, *“the policy or practice of acquiring full or partial political control of another country, occupying it with settlers and exploiting it economically.”*<sup>72</sup> This dissertation does not agree that America controls or occupies any European nation, but agrees that America and host nations work together to keep the peace. The goal of this work is to add to scholarship on the significance of foreign bases to American strategy. It does not seek to give a definitive answer on whether America should have foreign bases around the globe, rather, it offers an examination of U.S. basing policies in Europe and collects data, which yields results.

---

<sup>72</sup> Oxford Dictionaries, accessed 12 July 2016 on the internet at <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/colonialism>

This work will seek to answer sub-questions, the first is: *Should America still have forces in Europe?* And second: How many troops would be necessary to *deter an aggressive Russia and or provide for European security?* And as part of the second question, it will answer whether the United States should locate a permanent military base in Poland. This work will address dependent variables such as the political benefits of having an American base in a European country and how base closures impact foreign policy and the local relations. This work will also touch on American foreign bases as soft power and an extension of U.S. foreign policy, diplomacy and power.

This proposal will be viewed through the lens of Realist International Relations Theory as defined by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi in their book, *International Relations Theory*, (2009). In their work, the authors define realism as a theory based on four assumptions: anarchy rules the world politic; only states can act, that governments speak for the people; the state is the rational actor for the people; and lastly that society is of the most importance to the state and that military and and related political issues dominate world politics.<sup>73</sup>

Realists focus on conflict or potential conflict between actors and the use of force, examining how international stability is attained or maintained, how it breaks down the utility of force as a means to resolve disputes, and the prevention of any violation of its territorial integrity.<sup>74</sup> Because Realists view security and the military as a top priority, it is fitting to examine this work through this lens.

Many of the United States' leaders have been Republican — and some have identified as political Realists or neocons. And even those who were Democratic or more liberal, such as Mr. Obama, took a more Realist view when it came to the military and defense because of world events. (\*Editor's note: in his first term, Obama, made what this author considers Realist decisions, such as continuing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,

---

<sup>73</sup> Viotti, Paul, R. and Kaupi, Mark V., *International Relations Theory, Fourth Edition*, page 42-43, (2010: Pearson Education Inc., New York).

<sup>74</sup> Viotti, Paul, R. and Kaupi, Mark V., *International Relations Theory*, Ibid, page 43.

using special forces to track down and eliminate terrorists, increasing troops strength in Afghanistan and keeping the Guantanamo Bay military base open). Trump also follows a realist view — “Principled Realism.”

In examining Mr. Obama and Mr. Trump’s foreign policies, this work also expands the definition of realism to include the definition used by Stanford University’s International Affairs program, which states that realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests and struggle for power.<sup>75</sup> Realist also tend to be skeptical of globalization and see the world as anarchical; Realists may also believe that conflicts between nations are ‘inevitable.’<sup>76</sup>

In addition, this work will also use some parts of Game Theory to examine foreign policies. Game Theory, as defined by Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubenstein in their book, *A Course in Game Theory*, is a bag of analytical tools designed to help people understand the phenomenon they observe when decision makers interact.<sup>77</sup> The base assumptions that underlie the theory are that decision makers pursue well-defined exogenous objectives and take it into account their knowledge or expectations of the decision maker’s behavior.<sup>78</sup> Game theory is an important to use because it makes strategy easy to comprehend. In its simplest form, game theory shows international relations as a game and the players (actors) make a series of moves on the game board to win or to get an advantage. Viotti and Kauppi explain it this way: each actor tries to maximize gains or minimize losses often under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information, which requires each actor to rank order preferences, estimate probabilities and try to discern what the other actor is going to do.<sup>79</sup>

---

<sup>75</sup> Stanford University, “Political Realism in International Relations,” Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Stanford University, “Political Realism in International Relations,” Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Osborne, Martin, J., and Rubenstein, Ariel, *A Course in Game Theory*, (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1994) e-book, updated 24 September 2012, accessed on 4 December 2019 at <http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il>.

<sup>78</sup> Osborne, Martin, J., and Rubenstein, Ariel, *A Course in Game Theory*, Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Viotti, Paul, R. and Kaupi, Mark V., *International Relations Theory*, Ibid, page 43.



Game theory was also used because President Trump, a businessman, is renowned for deal making and using game-theory like tactics in his business negotiations and uses some aspects of it in his foreign policy.

When examining a work it is also important to note the levels of analysis. And while all levels are important and should be explored, this work will primarily look at the issue of American strategy and its foreign bases through the state-society level and the international-world Level. Regarding the International level, this work will focus on patterns of military alliances such as the United States' relationship with Western European host nations and NATO, and the number of major powers and the distribution of power<sup>80</sup>; These two levels of analysis were selected so that the readers could better understand the behaviors of the main actors and the importance of national security, protecting alliances and borders in Western Europe.

While this work addresses U.S. strategy for the 21st century by focusing on America's foreign military bases, it will only focus on the strategic field. This proposed dissertation is not a critical examination of U.S. economic matters or how American culture impacts strategy abroad. This work focuses on the military/defense strategic field as a way to assess America's grand strategy in Europe — in part because America locates military bases in regions that it considers the most important for its political, military and security aims. America has most of its foreign bases in Europe and Asia.

In the next few paragraphs, this work addresses personal interviews conducted in the United States, seminars attended, internships worked that all provided assistance for this work:

In June 2018, I flew to the United States to interview three people for my dissertation project:

- In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, I interviewed Dr. Alex Weisiger: professor at the University of Pennsylvania. His specialty includes the causes of war and peace, conflict;

---

<sup>80</sup> Viotti and Kaupi, *International Relations Theory*, Ibid.

peace building after conflict, how reputation impacts a country in the international community and game theory. He is the author of *Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts* (2013).

- Afterward, I drove to Washington D.C. to interview with Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield: Mr. Bloomfield was a Special Envoy for man-portable air defense systems reduction (2008-2009). He previously worked as deputy assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, deputy Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs; Bloomfield also founded Palmer Coates LLC, a firm that specializes in strategic planning.

- I conducted an interview with Dr. Jorge Benitez, professor at the Marine Staff and Command College in Quantico, Virginia. His specialty areas are NATO, European Politics, Russia, cyber security and the national security decision making process in the United States. I interviewed Mr. Benitez in the Washington D.C. area about my thesis. Benitez was the former director of NATO affairs for the U.S. Secretary of Defense for the Obama Administration and he also worked as a security specialist for the State Department.

These three interviews in the United States were crucial because the subjects were asked specific questions about case studies that are used in this research project. The case studies, and its methodology will be discussed later in this chapter. They also offered their insights on American foreign policy and military strategy.

In addition, I conducted conversations and sent emails with former service members, scholars and government officials for this work. For example, I talked with service members about deployments to war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan and asked their views on foreign policy matters.

In addition to interviews, I worked as an intern for the U.S. Department of State in Washington D.C. I worked in the Public Affairs front office. The internship gave me an intimate view of U.S. foreign policy and how the department crafts the Trump Administration's message to the general public and foreign governments. While I interned at

the State Department, it hosted a NATO ministerial. In addition, I had informal, off-the record conversations with military and political advisors which helped me to further focus my work.

While in Washington D.C., I attended a Brookings Institution Seminar: “Is the Army ready for great power competition?” on April 30, 2019. The guest speaker was Mark Esper, who at the time was the U.S. Army Secretary. Mr. Esper is now Secretary of Defense for Mr. Trump.

In addition to gathering data through interviews, internships email correspondence and seminars, I used traditional methods of books and scholarly work. In the following paragraphs, I outline the methodology used for chapters of this work:

This work also used an alternative method for this research — social media: Since Mr. Trump is a prolific social media user, his social media accounts were monitored and data gathered to get his view on current and past foreign policy issues such as NATO and defense spending. While social media is not scholarship, one can argue it is important because Mr. Trump uses his social media accounts to say exactly what he feels and he also uses it to instruct his staff. (He has on more than on occasion fired staff members and given instructions to others on social media. )

In addition, I conducted a survey on U.S. military presence in Europe from 3 December 2018 to 1 January 2019, asking respondents questions about U.S. military presence, troop levels and basing strategy in Europe. I used Survey Monkey to conduct the survey. However, what makes this survey unusual is that I used connections from my personal social media accounts (Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn) to find survey respondents. I chose this method to guarantee that respondents had at least a rudimentary understanding of the military and U.S. military presence abroad. (As a disclaimer, I am a former journalist who wrote about the military and I am married to a retired military officer. We are able to keep in touch with friends, associates and former work mates through social media and most of our contacts have some connection with the military). Since this survey was conducted by an independent company often used by university students, I do not know

how specific contacts answered the questions but I do have a compilation of the results but with no names or identifiable markers.

In this survey, 43 respondents were asked 10 basic questions. Here is a brief book at three of the questions that were asked in the survey: Question No. 4, Does America have too many or too few foreign military bases?; Question No. 3, Does America have enough troops in Europe to sufficiently serve as a deterrent to Russia?; and Question No. 6, Should American keep Lajes Field in the Azores Open?; The survey took two minutes to complete and it had a completion rate of 89 percent.

The survey results are located after Chapter 6.

In Chapter 2, the literature review examines books and scholarly works on U.S. military basing abroad. This section uses the most recent books on U.S. basing strategy, American foreign policy through the use of its military and scholarly papers on U.S. presence in Europe. This literature review only focuses on books that deal with U.S. basing policies as I have elected not to include works that examine the foreign policies' of former President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump. This dissertation includes a chapter on each president's foreign policy aims as it relates to U.S. presence in Europe and it also includes books and scholarly articles and reports to help answer the research question.

In Chapter 4, this work examines the history of U.S. bases focusing on three critical periods: World War II, the Cold War, and September 11, 2001 and after. This section is a historical review of U.S. basing in Europe as well as an examination of how the bases were used and how those bases impacted the European and American security environment. This work uses interviews by former government and military officials, books, government documents and scholarly papers to examine how America used European bases in the past and how those bases are being used today and asks if European bases are vital to American strategy.

Chapter 5 examines Mr. Obama's evolving foreign policy during his two terms in office, focusing on how he handled foreign bases, overseas troops, national security,

defense and the safety of the United States and its Western European allies. The work begins by examining and defining the Obama Doctrine and how it might lead Mr. Obama to make certain policy decisions. This work discusses Mr. Obama's Pacific Pivot toward Asia, then chronologically analyzes the two National Security Strategies issued by Mr. Obama, in 2010 and 2015 respectively, as well as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, The National Intelligence Strategy of 2014 and the National Defense Strategy of 2015.

This work also examines military budget initiatives that specifically addressed European allies, known as the European Reassurance Initiative. This research also examines government documents such as the Base Realignment Commission report, European Infrastructure Consolidation report, government think tank reports on bases and foreign policy — such as the Rand Corporation, the Brookings Institution and scholarly journals. This work analyzes books written about Obama's foreign policy and tenure to glean insight on America's European foreign policy and base policy and examined news articles about Mr. Obama's tenure and European legacy. This chapter also includes interviews from former state department and defense department officials. This work focuses only on Obama's goals and policies which impacted America's European bases and his Asian-Pacific-tilt to compete with a growing China. This chapter does not analyze plans for non-European bases, nor will it expound upon domestic strategy within the United States, unless it impacted America's European bases. This work also used some aspects of game theory to gauge why Mr. Obama made certain decisions and if those decisions were a win for Mr. Obama or a loss for Europe.

Chapter 6 examines Mr. Trump's foreign policy during his first three years in office, ending in December 31, 2019. This date was selected because this dissertation is due December 31, 2019. The chapter begins by examining the Trump Doctrine, defining it and attempting to show how this doctrine might lead to certain policy decisions. Next, the work examined Mr. Trump's National Defense Strategy of 2018 and analyzed his National

Security Strategy of 2017. This work also examined the European Deterrence Initiatives (Formerly called the European Reassurance Initiative) from fiscal years 2018, 2019 and 2020 to see Mr. Trump's priorities for European security and troop presence.

Because Mr. Trump has only served three years, this work cannot examine the entirety of his term. Nor is there any guarantee that Mr. Trump will be re-elected in 2020. And there is a movement in Congress to impeach Mr. Trump because he is alleged to have asked Ukraine's president to investigate the son of his political rival, former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, who is currently running for president against Mr. Trump. (This work does not know if Mr. Trump will be impeached by the U.S. Senate in the future and forced to resign. And if Mr. Trump is impeached by both houses or resigns before impeachment, hypothetically, he could still run for president and be re-elected by the American public in November 2020.) Because of the shortness and uncertainties of Mr. Trump's term, this work has elected to also use two exploratory scenarios of what could happen in the near future. Here is a look at the scenarios:

1. The United States decides to move most of its troops out of Germany (20,000 of an estimated 30,000) and send them to a new base in Poland that would be called Fort Trump. The remaining Germany-based American troops would be assigned to support bases and training centers scattered throughout Germany. Dozens of American bases in Germany would close as a result of the troop realignment.

2. The United States decides to decrease its participation/funding in NATO or withdraw from the alliance after Trump complained that many NATO nations did not meet the 2 percent threshold and had no immediate plans to do so. While America is still a member of NATO, it may cut its monetary and military contribution.

The framework for these scenarios will be a mixture between exploratory framework methodology and some aspects of military scenario methodology. Exploratory scenarios are descriptive, begin in the present and are used to provide insight on things that could happen in the future, according to the European Environmental Agency, which used these kinds of

scenarios for explaining potential disasters, finances and BREXIT stress tests.<sup>81</sup> This work will use a specific exploratory model used by IMCORE (Innovative Management for Europe's Changing Coastal Resource) that is typically used for 'socio-economic exploratory scenarios.'<sup>82</sup> Because these scenarios impact the U.S. military, this work will use the explanatory scenario frameworks used by IMCORE in combinations with military scenario framework outlined by Marius Potirniche, from the National Defense University of Romania. The framework, therefore would look like this:

1. The work would list the research questions;
2. The research would list the stakeholders in this issue;
3. The research would identify those who are driving this particular changes — such as another country's aggression or economic trends;
4. Next, the research would select the scenario's axes and logics;
5. A scenario narrative will be developed in four to five paragraphs;
6. The work, would also include the long term vision. So, if the scenario addresses moving troops, the long term vision could be eventually adding even more troops to a certain region. it would present scientific research, scholarly papers and news reports on the scenario and it would also list contrary policies.<sup>83</sup>
7. In addition, the framework will include some aspects of military scenarios because the scenarios will impact the U.S. military and potentially Russia, NATO and its partners. Potirniche, in his paper, "Military Scenario Development," for the National Defence University of Romania, had a lengthy list of tangibles that should be included in the scenario, but for the sake of brevity and usefulness, this work will only incorporate

---

<sup>81</sup> European Environmental Agency, "scenarios," can be accessed at <https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/scenarios>

<sup>82</sup> Willekens, Marian, et al, "Developing socio-economic scenarios — Exploratory Scenario Approach," IMCORE, 2014, accessed on the internet on July 2019, at <https://imcore.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/establishing-future-visions-becn-exploratory-scenario-approach.pdf>

<sup>83</sup> Willekens, Marian, et al, "Developing socio-economic scenarios — Exploratory Scenario Approach," IMCORE, 2014, accessed on the internet on July 2019, at <https://imcore.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/establishing-future-visions-becn-exploratory-scenario-approach.pdf>

some of those recommendations. To that end, the exploratory scenarios may include descriptions of the crisis area, the historical background of the situation and information on the history, people, government, economy, geography, political situation, presence and activities of the international community.<sup>84</sup>

In addition, this work will use a graphic map template from Renaissance Planning, to map the scenarios. Renaissance is a city planning company in the United States that created mapping templates for several types of scenarios, which lets readers to look at the main question, immediate facts, view the process and possible outcomes.<sup>85</sup> The scenario questions of what could happen in the future, were created by the author and approved by her PhD supervisor. This work also uses a template and method of placing the axis and logics from the MIT's Sloan School of Management.

Chapter 7 uses two case studies to examine the role of U.S. troop presence in Europe to gauge American commitment to European security. The work will examine research questions on the impact of U.S. military presence in Portugal and Poland. Here are the case study questions:

1. Why should Lajes Base in the Azores, Portugal stay open?
2. Why should the United States consider placing a permanent military base in Poland?

The methodology for this case study will come from scholar Robert K. Yin, who describes case studies as way to investigate contemporary phenomenon in its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context may not be

---

<sup>84</sup> Potirniche, Marius, "Military Scenario Development," October 2017, National Defence University, Romania, accessed on 11 December 2019 at [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320588106\\_Military\\_Scenario\\_Development](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320588106_Military_Scenario_Development).

<sup>85</sup> Scenario graphic template can be accessed at <http://www.citiesthatwork.com/blog-renaissance/2014/02/towards-a-typology-of-scenario-planning>



clearly evident.<sup>86</sup> Yin said that case studies contribute to knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political and related phenomena.<sup>87</sup> Case studies were selected because the subject matter focuses on current events, which is when Yin says a case study should be selected as a research tool.

Each case study will have five parts. As recommended by Yin, those five parts are: a research question that is framed with a “Why,” or “How,” question; a proposition; a unit of analysis; a determination of how the data is linked to the proposition; and criteria to interpret the findings.<sup>88</sup> <sup>89</sup>

To conduct this case study, I flew to the United States to interview former government officials and scholars and asked them specific questions about U.S. basing strategy in general and then questions about specific bases in Poland and the Azores. I asked about presidential foreign policy, troop levels and if they had alternative plans or comments to make about the case studies. In addition, I began researching these specific base locations and examined U.S. plans to either open, close or expand bases in those countries. I searched through news reports, government reports, wrote government officials, and read scholarly work that examined these basing issues.

Next, I conducted a survey through social media, asking respondents their views on U.S. basing strategy in Europe and also asked about the U.S. bases in the Azores and a possible base in Poland.

---

<sup>86</sup> Yin, Robert, K., “Case Study Research: Design and Methods,” Chapter 1: Getting Started, accessed on 11 December 2019 at [https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/1742025/mod\\_resource/content/1/How%20to%20know%20whether%20and%20when%20to%20use%20the%20case%20study%20as%20a%20reaserach%20method.pdf](https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/1742025/mod_resource/content/1/How%20to%20know%20whether%20and%20when%20to%20use%20the%20case%20study%20as%20a%20reaserach%20method.pdf), page 2.

<sup>87</sup> Yin, Robert, K., “Case Study Research: Design and Methods,” Ibid, page 4.

<sup>88</sup> Yin, Robert, K., quoted in course notes for Case Studies for Software Engineering, at the University of Texas, 2004, accessed on 11 December 2019 at <http://users.ece.utexas.edu/~perry/education/382c/L06.pdf>

<sup>89</sup> Editor’s note: I experienced a technical problem with the footnotes in the chapter that I cannot fix. The notes are placed lower than normal on the page after attribution.

The case studies have strengths and weaknesses. The strength is that it has comments from former government officials who helped shape government policy, national security strategy and relations with NATO. It is also timely — at the time of the dissertation’s due date — government officials were still seeking a final solution to these issues. And the topics are exciting, in that the United States might increase its presence in Europe or at least restructure that presence to deal with the growing threat of Russia and China (this issue is discussed in full in the case study chapters.). The case studies have limitations it cannot provide an answer, only a possible solutions based on the available data that was collected.

In Chapter 8, this work presents conclusions and findings. In this section all the data, interviews, reports, scenarios, case studies, and foreign policy analyses will be summarized and findings will be based on several variables in this “open” thesis. U.S. presence in Europe and America’s strategy for the 21st century is based on several variables, which will be discussed in full detail, in the last chapter.

This work also includes a lengthy bibliography.

## Chapter 4 - A Short History of U.S. Bases and U.S. Presence in Europe

America's first foreign military base was established December 1903 in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and served as little more than a coal refueling station for its Naval ships.<sup>90</sup> Since that time, America's military basing empire has spread around the world and Scholar David Vine reports that the United States has more than 800 foreign bases.<sup>91</sup> The Pentagon reports it has a much smaller number of bases around the world.

However, America's foreign bases are not just places for planes to refuel and troops to train — they sometimes resemble cities with houses, apartments, schools and Starbucks cafes strategically located in its shopping centers. Military bases can be world class facilities that train troops before they enter the battlefields of Iraq, Afghanistan or some other clandestine location. Military bases can be technological wonders, where unmanned vehicles are deployed, or busy airports that welcome families to their first overseas tour. In many cases, military families live on bases with their military spouse on two to three year assignments throughout the United States, Asia and Europe and they serve as America's cultural ambassadors as well as symbols of America's military power, protection and potential. The reach of America's military presence is growing, even in light of past budget cuts and troop reductions. It is important to note: *The United States military is now operating in 40 percent of the world's countries.*<sup>92</sup>

This chapter briefly examines the history of America's foreign bases, concentrating on European bases. It will focus on three critical phases when American bases grew in size and stature around the world: World War II, the Cold War and post September 11, 2001. (Much scholarship has already been written about U.S. basing during this period and the work does not wish to advance any new theories about basing during those periods.)

---

<sup>90</sup> National Geographic, "Guantanamo Bay Naval Base History," 26 March 2011, accessed on 30 December 2019 at <https://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/people/guantanamo-bay-naval-base-history.aspx>

<sup>91</sup> Vine, Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Savell, Stephanie and 5W Infographics, "This Map Shows Where in the World the U.S. Military is Fighting Terrorism," Smithsonian Magazine, January 2019, accessed on 30 December 2019 at <https://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/people/guantanamo-bay-naval-base-history.aspx>.

Instead, most of the analysis will focus on three sub-questions to this work: Why does America need bases in Europe?; Should the United States still have troops in Europe?; and if U.S. troops are necessary, then what would be a good number of troops to have in the European theater? This work also examines how troop fighting has changed over the last 30 years to meet old threats in new ways and what the U.S. Army is doing to address those issues.

### **World War II basing and troops.**

Three years before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 — the act that brought the United States of America into World War II — the United States had “14 military bases outside of its continental borders and by 1945, the United States had 30,000 bases in 100 countries.”<sup>93</sup> The United States created a massive basing system to better fight its adversaries, stage troops and equipment, treat the injured, fly aircraft, analyze intelligence, and provide other kinds of support for the war effort. When the United States entered the war, it built or occupied bases in Mexico, Brazil, Panama, Northern Ireland, Iceland, Danish Greenland, Australia, Haiti, Cuba, Kenya, Senegal, Dutch Suriname, British and French Guiana, the Azores, the Galapagos Islands, Britains Ascension Island and Palmyra Island close to Hawaii.<sup>94</sup> In five years, the United States had built the largest collection of bases in world history.<sup>95</sup>

At the same time the United States was building bases, it was also rotating in millions of troops to fight in the war. In 1945 there were 3 million U.S. troops in Europe, according to the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). And when the treaty was signed in 1949 establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, U.S. troops levels in Europe had

---

<sup>93</sup> Lutz, Catherine, *Ibid*, page 10.

<sup>94</sup> Vine David, *Ibid*, page 27, taken from Desch, Michael, C. “When the World Matters: Latin American and the United States Grand Strategy, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993) pages 66-69.

<sup>95</sup> Vine David, *Ibid*, pages 27.

decreased to about 150,000.<sup>96</sup> At that time, the United States had 2,000 base sites around the globe.<sup>97</sup>

The United States wanted foreign bases because it hoped to achieve military and economic dominance, according to Vine. Before World War II ended, President Harry Truman, in a meeting in Potsdam, Germany, addressed his strategy for having foreign bases after the war to protect American interests and to preserve world peace.<sup>98</sup> By American interests, Truman was referring to American businesses and investments.

From 1947 until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the United States created a system of overseas military bases as a means to contain aggression by the Soviet Union, and to perpetuate its foreign policy goals worldwide according to Lt. Col. Alfred Viana, in a research paper for the U.S. Army War College.<sup>99</sup> During this period, U.S. defense strategy and overseas presence policies were primarily guided by “the objectives of containment, deterrence, and escalation control, he said.”<sup>100</sup>

While the United States began closing up most of its foreign bases at the end of World War II, the Cold War created another military build-up in troops and bases in Europe.

Vine said city-sized bases that began growing in Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain and beyond in the late 1940s and early 1950s also helped improve relations, legitimizing and normalizing what might have otherwise have been permanent occupation.<sup>101</sup> Vine said that the relationship had a positive impact in that there were not many protests from local

---

<sup>96</sup> U.S. European Command, “U.S. Military Presence in Europe 1945 to 2016,” 26 May 2016, pdf download accessed 30 December 2019 at eucom.mil.

<sup>97</sup> Vine, David, “The United States probably has more foreign bases than any other people, nation or empire in history,” *The Nation*, 14 September 2014, accessed 30 December 2019 at <https://www.thenation.com/article/the-united-states-probably-has-more-foreign-military-bases-than-any-other-people-nation-or-empire-in-history/>.

<sup>98</sup> Vine, David, *Ibid*, page 28.

<sup>99</sup> Viana, Alfred, Lt. Col., “Overseas Military Presence: U.S. Land Forces in Europe,” July 2003, research project for the U.S. Army War College, accessed October 2019 at <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=446108>, page 3.

<sup>100</sup> Viana, Alfred, Lt. Col. “Overseas Military Presence: U.S. Land Forces in Europe,” taken from Kugler, Richard, “U.S. Military Strategy and Forces Posture for the 21st Century, Capabilities and Requirements, (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corp, 1994) page 62.

<sup>101</sup> Vine, *Ibid*, page 51.

communities about military bases in their towns. By 1950, when Truman created his containment policy, there were a little more than 100,000 U.S. forces in Europe, according to EUCOM; and by 1955 when West Germany joined NATO, there were about 400,000 troops in Europe.<sup>102</sup>

The military and base build up remained steady throughout Europe until the Soviet Union fell in 1991. In 1986 there were about 350,000 U.S. forces in Europe, according to EUCOM. But from 1990-1991, the United States began working to reduce troop numbers in Europe to 100,000.<sup>103</sup> The U.S. Army in Europe was to be reduced from 235,000 to 62,000 active duty soldiers, 3,000 reserve forces, 11,000 civilians and 16,000 local national employees.<sup>104</sup>

By 1991, the United States had 1,600 foreign bases.<sup>105</sup> It was during the 1990s that the United States closed about 60 percent of its foreign bases.<sup>106</sup>

#### **Basing after September 11, 2001 to present:**

The United States went to war in Afghanistan in October 2001 when its Taliban regime refused to expel Al Qaeda terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, who planned the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Al Qaeda followers hijacked four U.S. commercial planes and crashed two of them into the World Trade Center in New York City and crashed one plane into the Pentagon, it was reported. A fourth plane crashed in a Pennsylvania field before reaching its target, according to news reports.

---

<sup>102</sup> EUCOM, "U.S. Military Presence in Europe," Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Viana, Alfred, Lt. Col., "Overseas Military Presence," Ibid, page

<sup>104</sup> Viana, Alfred, Lt. Col., "Overseas Military Presence: U.S. Land Forces in Europe," noted this section from Meigs, Montgomery C., "U.S. Army Europe: Ready for Deployment on a Moment's Notice," Army 2002-2003 Green Book, page 75.

<sup>105</sup> Vine, David, "The United States probably has more foreign bases than another people, nation or empire in history," The Nation, 14 September 2015, accessed 30 December 2019 at <https://www.thenation.com/article/the-united-states-probably-has-more-foreign-military-bases-than-any-other-people-nation-or-empire-in-history/>

<sup>106</sup> Vine, David, "The United States probably has more foreign bases than any other people, nations or empire," Ibid.

Two years later, the United States went to war with Iraq to destroy reported weapons of mass destruction and to end the dictatorial rule of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.<sup>107</sup> These conflicts caused the United States to increase its foreign bases and troop levels. Most of the new bases were in the Middle East.

Scholar David Vine said at the height of the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, the total number of bases, combat outposts and checkpoints in those two countries alone topped one thousand.<sup>108</sup> In 2003, there were 100,000 U.S. forces in Europe and some of those troops were sent from Europe to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And regarding the main argument often used that U.S. troops provide deterrence in places such as Europe, Vine said there has been little investigation of the effectiveness of long term deterrence of the kind supposedly provided by bases overseas.”<sup>109</sup>

Vine is not alone in his criticism of overseas bases.

Scholar Catherine Lutz said the strategic language used to justify bases in the wake of September 11 has become increasingly emphatic in portraying foreign military access a key to the projection of power and portraying the bases as requiring no more than rationale that uncertainty and contingency in the world.<sup>110</sup>

Lutz, in her book, *The Bases of Empire*, lists many of the arguments that are used by defense officials in justifying bases and she countered those argument. She writes, “Asked why the United States has a vast network of military bases around the world, Pentagon officials argue first, via utilitarianism and realism, that the bases project power, and so get things done for the United States and, second, on humanitarian grounds, that the bases

---

<sup>107</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, “The Iraq War: 2003 to 2011,” accessed on 30 December 2019 at <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war>.

<sup>108</sup> Vine, Ibid, page 3.

<sup>109</sup> Vine, David, “Base Nation,” Ibid, page 325, quoting Huth, Paul, K., “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 2, (1999), page 27.

<sup>110</sup> Lutz, Catherine, editor, “The Bases of Empire: The global struggle against U.S. military posts,” Ibid, page 22.

project care, and provide things for other countries.”<sup>111</sup> Secondly, Lutz said the second set of arguments often used about bases are that they express American character and offer humanitarian assistance.<sup>112</sup>

Some of the arguments include bases serve America’s economic interests; bases are symbols of American power and credibility and bases protect free trade that benefit other nations.<sup>113</sup> But Lutz said these two reason do not address an important part about America’s bases. “Many of America’s bases were taken during war time and kept or ‘given’ to the United States by another of the war’s victors.”<sup>114</sup>

While Vine and Lutz might be critical of America’s European bases, America’s overseas facilities have played an important role in training European troops, projecting American power and culture and fighting wars in the Middle East and other conflicts. Thus showing the presence of troops already stationed in Europe is important and necessary. Not only were troops protecting Europe, but they could be sent quickly to fight in wars when needed. The Rand Corporation, in its study on bases, found that in-place forces provide the immediate capabilities needed to counter major acts of aggression.<sup>115</sup> The Rand study was highly critical of foreign bases but it did find that those bases provide “deterrence and assurance.” Some of Rand’s other criticisms of overseas bases included that they are expensive; some bases could be at risk of closure because of agreements with politicians who could change their minds; long-range precision weapons could be used to attack foreign bases; and those bases could also be he victim of violent extremism.<sup>116</sup>

---

<sup>111</sup> Lutz, Catherine, editor, “The Bases of Empire,” Ibid, page 21

<sup>112</sup> Lutz, Catherine, editor, “The Bases of Empire, Ibid, page 24

<sup>113</sup> Lutz, Catherine, “The Bases of Empire,” Ibid, pages 20-25.

<sup>114</sup> Lutz, Catherine, “The Bases of Empire,” Ibid, pages 26.

<sup>115</sup> Lostumbo, Michael, et al, “Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An assessment of relative costs and strategic benefits,” 2013, Rand Corporation, accessed 30 December 2019 at [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR200/RR201/RAND\\_RR201.sum.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR201/RAND_RR201.sum.pdf).

<sup>116</sup> Lostumbo, Michael, et al, “Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces,” Ibid, executive summary page xxi to xxiv.



While the Rand study was not totally complimentary of overseas bases, it did address the importance of America's overseas bases providing deterrence. The report states, "While the U.S. overseas posture does contribute to deterring potential adversaries and assuring friends and allies it does not mean that all overseas facilities and forward capabilities and be justified on this basis; they are not all equally important in this regard. Deterrence relies on perceptions of the will of a nation and its abilities relevant to a particular conflicts. The overseas posture contributes to both these aspects."<sup>117</sup>

The United States — and its European Deterrence Initiative funding, troop rotations and other training opportunities between the United States and European troops — helps create the belief the United States would defend those nations if they were attacked by Russia or violent extremist groups. A Pew Research poll conducted in 2015 backs up those claims. Respondents from NATO member countries were asked if they thought the United States would defend them if attacked by Russia and most respondents said the United States would.<sup>118</sup> In another poll, many NATO countries said they would not support their country using force to defend a NATO member attacked by Russia.<sup>119</sup> It could be inferred therefore that some NATO countries have more faith in the United States to defend them than their own European neighbors. And while some might dismiss polls as not being important, a few American politicians and policy officials have cited this poll when addressing their concerns over the future of NATO and European defense spending.

In addition to the United States providing deterrence and assurance to their neighbors, this work asserts that European bases serve as an effective method to deploy troops to the Middle East and Africa because of its geographical location. It is quicker to send troops to the Middle East from Europe than from the United States. For example, the

---

<sup>117</sup> Lostumbo, Michael, et al, "Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces," Ibid page xxi.

<sup>118</sup> Pew Global, "NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid," 10 June 2015, accessed 30 December 2019 at <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/>

<sup>119</sup> Pew Global, "NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid," Ibid.

Stars and Stripes newspapers reported that Europe based troops deployed to the Middle East. A 2009 article, reported Vilseck, Germany based U.S. soldiers assigned to the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment would deploy to Afghanistan the following summer.<sup>120</sup> And in 2015 it reported how soldiers from the Hohenfels training center were not only training troops in preparation for the Afghanistan deployments, but troops based in Hohenfels also deployed to Afghanistan.<sup>121</sup>

In addition, bases are also part of America's foreign policy. When the world makes demands that a nation stop deplorable behavior, that country might be more prone to listen if the threat is made by a country with a large, powerful military already in the region. As an example, one can look at the Kosovo War. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic began a campaign of persecuting, then expelling ethnic Albanians from the country. After international talks to solve the crisis failed, the United States, through NATO began targeted bombing in the country that lasted 78 days.<sup>122</sup> Both U.S. and Europe-based American forces were used in this conflict. (As an editor's note, during some of the bombing, I was a journalist covering the Kosovo War and I was based in neighboring Albania and was an embedded journalist with 'ground troops,' who had assembled on an old sheep-grazing field. The troops were to be used if the bombing campaign did not work; and in June 1999, I entered Kosovo to interview NATO troops who were restoring peace to the region.) In June 1999 Milosevic and his troops left Kosovo and NATO created a mission that worked to restore peace to the region so that Albanian Kosovars could return to their homes, according to news reports.

In addition to using bases as part of foreign policy, bases are being used to face a new potential enemy — Climate Change. In January 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense

---

<sup>120</sup> Robson, Seth, "2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment Prepping for Afghanistan Rotation," 23 October 2009, The Stars and Stripes, accessed 30 December 2019 at <https://www.stripes.com/news/2nd-stryker-cavalry-regiment-prepping-for-afghan-rotation-1.95832>.

<sup>121</sup> Stars and Stripes, "Fallen Hohenfels Troops Honored With New Memorial," 23 May 2015, accessed on 30 December 2019 at <https://www.stripes.com/news/fallen-hohenfels-troops-honored-with-new-memorial-1.348126>.

<sup>122</sup> BBC, "Kosovo profile — timeline," 29 July 2019, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18331273>.

issued a report on how Climate Change was impacting the military and its missions. The defense department said the effects of a changing climate are a national security issue with potential impacts to department missions, operational plans and installations.<sup>123</sup> The Defense Department said it must adapt current and future operations to address the impact of threats and conditions — including those from weather and natural events; and the department factors in the effects of the environment into its mission planning and execution to build resilience.<sup>124</sup> According to the report, 79 American military bases have experienced recurrent coastal and river flooding, drought that negatively impacts the water supply, desertification, wildfires and thawing permafrost.<sup>125</sup>

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, said in November 2018 that climate change is one of the sources of conflict around the world and it's an issue the U.S. military has to respond to and that response may require humanitarian assistance such as disaster relief.<sup>126</sup> In addition to being a source of conflict, Climate Change hurts military logistics and support in places such as the Mediterranean, according to the U.S. military. Weather conditions over the Mediterranean Sea currently impact intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, personnel recovery/casualty evacuation and logistics flights from Europe to the African continent — potentially increasing no-go flight days.<sup>127</sup>

While Climate Change negatively impacts military missions in Europe and Africa, the issue might be worse if the United States did not have bases in Europe. Without strategically

---

<sup>123</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense," January 2019, accessed on 31 December 2019 at <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/29/2002084200/-1/-1/1/CLIMATE-CHANGE-REPORT-2019.PDF>, page 2.

<sup>124</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense," January 2019, *Ibid*, page 2.

<sup>125</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense," page 4.

<sup>126</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense," *Ibid*, page 8.

<sup>127</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense," *Ibid*, page 8.

located bases, such as Lajes Field, it might be more difficult for the military to deliver disaster relief, conduct some intelligence and surveillance missions as well as logistics. The military is treating Climate Change just as it would any other adversary.

Climate Change is not just a problem for the United States military, but every military on the planet. Dr. Nuno Lemos Pires, a Portuguese military scholar, said there is a link between Climate Change and War, as more people with less water and less food can provoke conflicts.<sup>128</sup> Lemos Pires, said Climate Change can fuel a crisis, aggravate a resolution of the problem and slow down peace and stability and that from now on, one cannot just study conflicts from one dimension.<sup>129</sup>

But there are still people who doubt Climate Change, which could prove tricky for the U.S. military and its bases around the world. In a recent survey conducted by Pew Research Center, only 36 percent of Americans said they were ‘personally concerned’ about climate issues; and when that number is examined through the two main political parties in the United States (Democrats and Republicans), 72 percent of Democrats ‘care a great deal about climate issues’ and only 24 percent of Republicans ‘care a great deal about climate issues.’<sup>130</sup> U.S. President Donald Trump, A Republican, does not seem to believe in Climate Change. Mr. Trump has been quoted in newspapers saying that Climate Change is a “hoax.”<sup>131</sup>

While some American politicians might dismiss Climate Change, the U.S. military has addressed the issue by creating the “*Planning Handbook on Climate Change Installations Adaptation and Resilience.*” The defense department has also: asked the U.S. Army Corps

---

<sup>128</sup> Lemos Pires, Nuno Col., “Is There Anybody Out There? The Link Between Climate Change and War,” 3 November 2016, ISCTE-IUL Center for International Studies, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://blog.cei.iscte-iul.pt/is-there-anybody-out-there-the-link-between-climate-change-and-war/>

<sup>129</sup> Lemos Pires, Nuno Col., “Is There Anybody Out There? The Link Between Climate Change and War,” Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Pew Research Center, “The Politics of Climate,” 4 October 2016, results of surveys on climate issues based on political party affiliation, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-climate/>

<sup>131</sup> Worland, Justin, “Donald Trump Called Climate Change a Hoax. Now He’s Awkwardly Boasting About Fighting It,” 9 July, 2019, Time Magazine, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://time.com/5622374/donald-trump-climate-change-hoax-event/>

of engineers to create a set of assessments tools that would show potential changing weather patterns that could impact projects; and ordered the military to include climate issues into infrastructure and operations planning so that risks can be assessed.<sup>132</sup> (As a side note, a recent U.S. report found the Pentagon emits more greenhouse gases than the entire country of Portugal<sup>133</sup> This is important because it shows military actions actually could worsen the impact of climate change. However, the U.S. military is taking steps to address Climate Change.)

In addition, U.S. troops strategically located in Europe can help America and its European allies address issues such as cyber crime, international crime and illegal immigration. When it comes to cybercrime, the enemy could be a state actor, terrorist group or it a single person with a gripe against a person, government policy, conflict or single event. It may be hard to determine the true location of the cyber adversary and their goal. But the military, through its bases and troops around the world, can play an important role in defeating this kind of crime.

During the U.S. midterm elections in 2018, the U.S. Army Cyber Command deployed three teams to Europe to work with partner countries to hunt and track adversaries who wanted to interfere in the election.<sup>134</sup> It is unclear from the news reports if U.S. forces deployed to America's European bases or to bases of NATO members or partners. However this report shows that the United States and European nations are recognizing the importance of cybersecurity when it comes to protecting national security and the security to allies.

---

<sup>132</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense," Ibid, pages 2-3.

<sup>133</sup> Reuters News Service, "The Pentagon emits more greenhouse gases than Portugal, study finds," 13 June 2019, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jun/12/pentagon-greenhouse-gas-emissions-portugal>

<sup>134</sup> Sheftick, Gary, "Cyber teams deploying to safeguard national security," U.S. Army News Service/ U.S. Army Cyber Command, 17 September 2019, accessed 31 December 2019 at [https://www.army.mil/article/227274/cyber\\_teams\\_deploying\\_to\\_safeguard\\_national\\_security](https://www.army.mil/article/227274/cyber_teams_deploying_to_safeguard_national_security).

U.S. Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, who was quoted in that same news article, said those troops forward deployed to Europe were able to ‘fall back’ on the larger capabilities in the United States, who were able to use the internet to ‘provide effects’ in support of the defense of midterm elections.<sup>135</sup> Previous news reports have investigated whether Russia had “meddled” in the 2016 U.S. elections and an U.S. government report concluded that Russia used “cyber espionage” in connection with the election (This is discussed in a later chapter).

Nakasone also said cyber teams are being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. He said, “Every single day as we take a look at operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and other places within Central Command, and they are leveraging the capabilities of Army Cyber.”<sup>136</sup> The United States began its cyber command a little more than five years ago.

NATO also created its own cyber center in Belgium in 2018, and Portugal will be the site of increased cyber awareness as well. The NATO Communications and Information Systems School in Italy is relocating to Oeiras, Portugal and will provide greater emphasis on cyber defense training and education.<sup>137</sup>

The need for cyber commands and focus on internet safety are more important. Portuguese Scholar Paulo Fernando Viegas Nunes said the number of cyber attacks and their disruptive impact have been experiencing a sharp growth over the past few years.<sup>138</sup> Nunes writes: *“In a networked and hyper-connected world, this new global space has been transformed into a privileged vector for conducting attacks against individuals, enterprises, public or private networks, critical infrastructures or even against the very processed that*

---

<sup>135</sup> Sheftick, Gary, “Cyber teams deploying to safeguard national security,” Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Sheftick, Gary, “Cyber teams deploying to safeguard national security,” Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> NATO, “Cyber defence,” 6 September 2019, accessed 31 December 2019 at [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_78170.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm)

<sup>138</sup> Nunes, Paulo Fernando Viegas, “Ciberameaças E Quando Legal dos Conflictos no Ciberspaço,” January 2016, *Ameaças E Riscos Transnacionais No Novo Mundo Global*, abstract, page viii, accessed 31 December 2019 at [https://www.fd.unl.pt/docentes\\_docs/ma/FPG\\_MA\\_27511.pdf](https://www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/FPG_MA_27511.pdf)

*control the information systems of states' electronic governance. In this context, new social risks arise that have to be properly analyzed and managed.*"<sup>139</sup>

Cyber issues also create a good opportunity for countries to work together. While not every country in Europe agreed with America's *Global War on Terror*, or the fact that it waged war against Iraq, nearly all can agree that cyber warfare has a damaging impact not just on a country's electricity, water and infrastructure systems, but also on quality of life when a person's identity is stolen or government computers are hacked to disable defense systems. U.S. troops in Europe can work with European partners to target those parties responsible for waging such attacks and once located, their electricity can be turned off, equipment destroyed and the adversaries arrested.

The United States, with its Europe-based troops, can also use a similar tactic to assist European partners when it comes to helping to eradicate international crime and illegal immigration.

#### **Bases in Europe and their function:**

While Vine maintains the United States has about 800 foreign bases, the U.S. military, in its base reports, shows that it has "686 base sites outside the 50 states and Washington, D.C."<sup>140</sup> The U.S. Department of Defense also reports it has just 64 overseas bases or small installations valued at less than \$915 million each.<sup>141</sup>

But irregardless on how bases are defined or their value, there are many who support U.S. presence in Europe.

Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield, when asked about the importance of bases in Europe, offered this view: "Well a base in some ways is like a historical marker because it was put there sometime for some reason. So right away people say, look, there are Americans here. What's the story behind Americans being here. So that reminds the next

---

<sup>139</sup> Nunes, Paulo Fernando Viegas, "Ciberameaças E Quando Legal dos Conflictos no Ciberespaço," January 2016, Ameaças E Riscos Transnacionais No Novo Mundo Global, Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> Vine, Ibid, page 4 quoting U.S. Department of Defense Base Structure Report, 2014.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

generation that there was danger, that responsible governments banded together that there was solidarity and good will so that American across the Atlantic made common cause and commitments with European countries and then then the question is, is this still relevant for today?"<sup>142</sup>

Bloomfield recalls being in a meeting in the White House where Secretary of State Colin Powell was listening to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld discuss some European bases he thought didn't perform high value tasks. In a previous position, Powell commanded the 7th Army Division in Europe and he cited a few ancient facilities that were not updated and it was his way of saying that Rumsfeld was right, Bloomfield said. There really are some bases that outgrow their time and should be modernized," Bloomfield said.

But even without the modernizations, bases are important markers of American presence and are used by troops to train, conduct exercises and defend the United States and allies — if needed.

Dr. Jorge Benitez sees U.S. forces in Europe as a deterrent to Russia. Benitez calls European-based U.S. forces a tripwire whose presence lets Russia or another aggressor know that if they invade a country like Latvia and engage its military, it might kill German, French or Canadian soldiers and that could be seen as a cause for war, he said. To make his point, Benitez tells a story set in World War I: "*A journalist asked the French Prime Minister how many British soldiers did he need to stop a German Invasion. The Prime Minister said he only needed one British soldier because France and Britain have an alliance. Countries are never quite sure about their allies, but if they have one of their soldiers there and that soldier is shot and killed by the evading force, then Britain would defend its soldier.*"<sup>143</sup> In the same respect Benitez said it's not the 68,000 troops that would stop a war any more than one British soldier could, but if the aggressor country killed a

---

<sup>142</sup> Bloomfield, Lincoln, Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Benitez, Jorge, Dr., Ibid.



British (NATO) soldier, the rest of the British military would come and fight. And it is for this reason that readiness is important, Benitez said.

Benitez also said the 4,000 troops that rotate into Poland/Eastern Europe are also a tripwire force. They are not big enough to stop Russia but they are big enough to slow them down, he said. But the important point is that more than 20 NATO countries sent troops to participate in that Eastern European rotation. “It sends the political message of if you attack here, you are not just attacking these smaller countries, you are attacking the United States as well,” he said.<sup>144</sup>

### **American troop strength in Europe:**

In addition to addressing U.S. troop presence in Europe serving as a deterrent, this work interviewed scholars and searched through scholarly works to determine how many U.S. forces should be based out of Europe. However, none of the people interviewed seemed willing to put an exact number to the question. While they may not agree on a number, most all agreed that American troop presence in Europe was crucial not only as a deterrence mechanism, but as a way to form lasting bonds between the countries, train NATO troops and project American power.

Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield, who was appointed under the George W. Bush Administration, believes there may not be a “magic number,” for how many troops should be in Europe. He said: “I remember the time we had magic numbers for Asia and magic numbers for Europe. I was part of the global force posture defense review that was done after the turn of the century when Rumsfeld was the secretary of defense and I handled it for the state department and briefed around the world including Germany, Spain Russia and Asia. My view is that there are several advantages to having U.S. forces stationed in welcoming countries.”<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>144</sup> Benitez, Jorge, Dr., Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Bloomfield, Lincoln, Ambassador, interview in June 2018 in Washington D.C.

U.S. troop presence in Europe provides reassurance to allies and it shows commitment that if they are attacked, the United States will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with them, he said. American troop presence also is a signal that the United States is committed to the pledges it made to be a faithful ally, he said, adding it is much more than that: “Some people believed that if we moved the bulk of U.S. forces (back) to the United States the advantaged would be greater. First of all the transition costs to leave are very expensive and secondly, what happens after you have left was not carefully examined. In Europe there are all sorts of important places to go people to see conversations to participate in that our military at all levels ... benefit from attending and so do our allies benefit from having Americans participate. If you are stationed in Washington state or Kansas or Georgia, you are just not going to be (attending those meetings),” he said.<sup>146</sup>

When asked if the United States had enough troops in Germany, Benitez began telling a story about how former U.S. Army Europe Commander Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges used to always say he was making 30,000 troops seem like 300,000 troops. Hodges comments in 2015 were a joke of sorts, but were also true — there was an understanding that troop reductions in Europe meant there would be no troop increase. Soldiers were being called to do more than in previous years because of budget cuts.

At the time Hodges made his remarks, there were about 30,000 U.S. Army troops in Europe and most of them were based out of Germany. Benitez said the United States needs more troops in Europe. Benitez said sending more troops to Europe is not a question about a specific number but a focus on the threat. Benitez added: “The reason we have have 60,000 coming down from the hundreds of thousands that we had during the Cold War is because at the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union going away. With the Warsaw Pact, we believed, many believed, that there was no longer going to be hegemonic rivalry. Frances Fukiyama, in his book *End of History* (wrote) about how the wave of liberal democracy would be triumphant. As a historian, I was like, that might be true, but 5 years, 10

---

<sup>146</sup> Bloomfield, Lincoln, Ibid

years is too far an amount of time and there are large forces and threats within Europe that tell us that war is part of human history. It's not going to go away."<sup>147</sup>

And if war is not going away, Benitez said America must be vigilant and make war as difficult and undesirable as possible so that others will not seek it. And Benitez believes that NATO serves as that kind of deterrent for Europe. But he reiterated that 68,000 troops is not enough to serve as a true deterrent and that number does not reflect the changes that are happening in European security. In the last 10 years, Russia has invaded its two neighbors and has intervened militarily in the Middle East and projected its power in the region in ways that it never has before directly in the face of U.S. operations, Benitez said. In addition, there are threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin to Europe and other NATO states. Benitez added: "He has made it very clear he is nostalgic for the Soviet Union, he wants that kind of power. His definition of peace in Europe is a Russia that is dominant over all of its neighbors. That is not fair; that is not good. (Russia's neighbors) are independent and sovereign, they do not want to be vassals of Moscow."<sup>148</sup>

Benitez is concerned that Eastern European nations that disagree with Putin and do not manage their policies in a way Putin approves could be invaded or harassed like Georgia and Ukraine. Benitez said Russia is more willing to take this approach with non-NATO countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, which is why they want to join NATO. Benitez said Russia has threatened non-NATO countries such as Sweden and Finland, "saying if they get close to NATO, Russia will have to take military responses and he has also threatened and I would say attacked NATO members. He violated NATO airspace. He is building up the most heavily militarized part of Europe between Poland and the Baltic Republics."<sup>149</sup>

---

<sup>147</sup> Benitez, Jorge, Dr., Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> Benitez, Jorge, Dr., Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Benitez, Jorge, Dr., Ibid.

In addition, Benitez pointed out there were reports Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. election and in elections in Great Britain, France and Germany. The United States appointed a special counsel to investigate if Russian interfered in its elections. The report found that Russia purchased \$100,000 worth of Facebook ads and sent information to Twitter accounts that supported Mr. Trump and opposed former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.<sup>150</sup> In addition, the report found that Russia used cyber espionage — it stole emails and then released the information in a manner that embarrassed the Democratic Party.<sup>151</sup> In light of the election espionage, the United States placed sanctions on those Russian individuals it believes were involved, according to news reports. Benitez said Putin is waging political warfare — but not yet kinetic.

“We can’t keep wishing that we can go back to 1992. And I would argue the best way we can go back to 1992 is to do what we did in the Cold War and that is increase our strength so that he sees no reason to challenge us — no reason to attack these countries because he sees that we are united, strong and can defend ourselves. That’s the easiest, the best way, the cheapest way to preserve peace and to defend U.S. national security,” Benitez said.<sup>152</sup>

**How has war fighting changed over the last 30 years?:** Secretary of the Defense, Mark Esper recently appeared at a Brookings Institution symposium entitled, *Is the U.S. Army ready for the Great Power Competition?* During his talk Esper, who is Desert Storm veteran, addressed how war fighting has changed over the last 30 years. He also addressed his push to modernize specific military equipment because of potential technological and tactical advancements.

---

<sup>150</sup> Vanden Brook, Tom and Collins, Michael, “Mueller Report: 5 things to know about Russian interference in U.S. elections,” 22 April 2019, accessed 30 December 2019 at <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/04/22/mueller-report-what-know-russian-election-interference/3538877002/>

<sup>151</sup> Vanden Brook, Tom and Collins, Michael, “Mueller Report: 5 things to know about Russian interference in U.S. elections,” Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> Benitez, Jorge, Dr. Ibid.

While the Army is still using some of the same equipment as it did 30 years ago, it also must deal with new threats and new challenges. He said: “If you go to the National Training Center today, stand on an overlook and watch a fight, you would see Abrams Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Blackhawk Helicopters, Apache Helicopters and Chinooks and the whole rigamarole, which tells you about how old our systems are. It just means that we need to get to the next generation and some systems are in better shape than others. But to an untrained eye, 1986 would look similar to 2019. It is just that simple.”<sup>153</sup>

And while the Army has some of the same equipment, its soldiers are not fighting under the same conditions or facing the same kind of mechanical threats. Today, if someone observes troop training, they would see soldiers not just shooting at enemy forces, but drones. “What I didn’t see 30 years ago was soldiers defending against drones or employing our own drones to do anything from surveillance to direct enemy fire,” Esper said in the talk<sup>154</sup>

How soldiers move on the battlefield has also changed in the last three decades: “We also challenge them to move much more frequently so this concept of staying in a fixed spot for four, five or six days is gone. They jump their operational centers every 12 hours or so and even that is not quick enough,” Esper said, adding that to survive, soldiers need to move more quickly on the battlefield. In addition, troops need to be ready for electronic warfare. Esper said troops must ‘mask or obscure’ the electronic signals they transmit on the battlefield and at the same time they must use electronic warfare to find the enemy or jam his electronic equipment.

So how does Esper hope to prepare America’s troops for these new challenges, especially in light of past troop cuts and a smaller European presence? Through training and modernization. Esper said the military needs an attack reconnaissance plane that has high speed and survivability. This plane must also have the ability to call for fire, help other

---

<sup>153</sup> Esper, Mark, “Is the Army ready for great power competition?,” 30 April 2019, Brookings Institution, vide of talk can be viewed at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2UGKGIvhLMU>.

<sup>154</sup> Esper, Mark, “Is the Army ready for great power competition?” Ibid.

aircraft and clear airspace to protect ground troops. He said the Army is working to create FARA — the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft. It also is working with the defense industry to create FLRAA the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft that would replace the Blackhawk helicopter on the battlefield. Esper said the FLRAA must be faster than the Blackhawk and be able to fly a greater range and carry a greater payload. In addition, the Army seeks to modernize its systems by finding a replacement for the Chinook Helicopter that would provide a ‘heavy vertical lift.’ Esper said the weapons the Army seeks must offer, “greater survivability in a fight against Russia or China that has speed, the range and maybe a greater payload to do those things.”<sup>155</sup> The military’s goal is to modernize was driven by the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the Army wants to begin using these new aircraft by 2028, he said. The National Defense Strategy is discussed at length in Chapters 5 and 6 as part of an examination of the foreign policies of former President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump.

Esper said that for nearly 20 years the United States has focused on the Middle East — while China and Russia have not had that concern. He also told the audience that China and Russia are rapidly modernizing their military forces. “To counter all of this, we must modernize and we must do this now,” he said.<sup>156</sup>

In addition to modernizing systems, the Army is changing the way it trains its troops. Esper said in March 2019 there was a non-notice deployment of 1,500 troops from the 1st Armored Division to conduct three weeks of training in Poland. (\*A non-notice deployment means that when soldiers arrived at work that morning, they were told to pack their gear for an immediate deployment. In deployments such as Iraq or Afghanistan, most units know months in advance when they are leaving, what they must take and how long they will be there. They often are given extra time to train for the deployment. But in the case Esper talked about, soldiers had no notice and immediately deployed. Esper said they drew their

---

<sup>155</sup> Esper, Mark, “Is the Army ready for great power competition?,” Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Esper, Mark, “Is the Army ready for great power competition?,” Ibid.

equipment from prepositioned stocks already in theater). This deployment serves as an example of how the Army is using ‘dynamic forcing strategy,’ outlined in the most recent National Security Strategy, Esper said.

U.S. forces are being asked ‘to do more with less, according to Lt. Gen. Hodges, who has since retired. He often said U.S. Army Europe was making 30,000 soldiers seem like 300,000 — and that move was a direct result of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine changing the security environment, with all 28 NATO nations aligned in opposition to the annexation of Crimea and other moves.<sup>157</sup> Hodges, who gave a July 2015 talk at the Association of the United States Army, told the group that while he did not think Russia would invade the rest of Ukraine, basing and deployment decisions could make it difficult for the U.S. and allies to respond to further aggressive action because Russia has shown it has the ability to rapidly move large numbers of troops and equipment.<sup>158</sup>

However, Hodges was doubtful the Army would send new troops to Europe, so he found ways to make do with current troop levels but to have soldiers do more. In his talk, he described what the U.S. Army in Europe was doing to make current troop levels seem like they were more. Hodges said Army Europe would:

- \* Increase military exercises. Hodges remarked that the new normal for soldiers would be to have 50 training exercises in a year;
- \* U.S. Army Europe would increase the responsibility given to officers and sergeants, including those who rotate into Eastern Europe for exercises and training missions;
- \* The U.S. National Guard and reserve units were going to be asked to leave behind some of their equipment so that it could be pre-positioned in Europe so that it could help decrease upcoming deployments;

---

<sup>157</sup> Hodges, Ben, Lt. Gen., “Army Europe: Making 30,000 Troops Looks Like 300,000,” 14 July 2014, Association of the United States Army, speech, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.USA.org/news/army-europe-making-30000-troops-look-300000>

<sup>158</sup> Hodges, Ben, Lt. Gen., “Army Europe: Making 30,000 Troops Look Like 300,000,” Ibid.

\* U.S. Army Europe would have to use equipment from its European allies, and as an example Hodges said it did not have bridging equipment in Europe and would have to use the equipment of allies.<sup>159</sup>

This work takes into account that service members have to do more with less. And while there is no “magic number,” for troop levels in Europe, as espoused by some of the people interviewed for this chapter, this work takes the position, taking into account the interviews and data, that the United States should increase its troop levels in Europe to provide security for its European allies, continue to train its troops and allied troops and to deter Russia. America is clearly stretched thin in Europe, and if it does not have enough troops to provide a safe environment, then additional troops would help.

**The work proposes the United States should increase its troop levels in Europe to 100,000.** Currently, there are 68,000 troops in Europe, which includes forces that continually rotate into Eastern Europe on nine-month deployments. An increase in troops would allow the United States to permanently station troops in Eastern Europe so that those troops could serve as a ‘tripwire’ to possible Russian aggression. This work also asserts the United States currently has the infrastructure at its European bases to support a troop increase. This work also asserts the United States has the money to pay for such a troop increase. The U.S. has given billions of dollars to the European Deterrence Initiative (discussed in later chapters) and part of those funds could be diverted or used completely to pay for U.S. troop increases in Europe; and since the war in Afghanistan may be coming to an end, money previously used in that campaign could fund a European troop increase. The United States may also decrease troops in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2021 and those troops could also be moved to Europe.

So how did this work come up with that 100,000 troop number? By examining history and data and past effectiveness of troop levels and taking into account technological

---

<sup>159</sup> Hodges, Ben, Lt. Gen., “Army Europe: Making 30,000 Troops Look Like 300,000,” Ibid, all four points came from Hodges talk at the Association of the United States Army speech.



advances that allow one soldier on the battlefield appear as if he is two or three — not 10, as Hodges refers to in his remarks that he was making ‘30,000 troops seem like 300,000.’

When the United States began using Truman’s containment policy for the Soviet Union back in 1950, there were 100,000 forces stationed in Europe, according to EUCOM. Those troops were in Western and Central Europe because the Soviet Union was in control of East Berlin and its republics in Eastern Europe. U.S. troops could go no further than West Berlin to project their strength and power to the Soviet Union. The immediate threat was that the USSR would attempt to invade Germany which was now divided into two countries. The only thing preventing a possible invasion were the allies stationed in Western Germany.

This work argues that Russia has begun what some scholars characterize as a new type of systematic rivalry or Cold War, and instead of creating a new containment policy, former U.S. President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump have and are using the European Deterrence Initiative as a way to deter Russian aggression. This new rivalry is different in that it is not about nuclear weapons and the spread of communism, but is about Russia (and China) attempting to assert its authority in their regions. These countries also want to be major influencers in the world. If Russia forms a partnership with China, then the world could be stuck between two major powers instead of just American hegemony. In this new era of power, Russia and China would be on one side and the United States and the rest of Europe would be on the other side. If such a thing would happen, Russia would want as much influence and power as it could get from Europe. Mr. Putin has shown in the past that he is not averse to using means such as cutting off gas to neighboring countries and using electronic espionage when he wants to get a country’s attention.

Katrina Vanden Heuvel, in a column for the Washington Post newspaper, said the United States and Russia are locked in a new Cold War that represents a grave danger to humanity.<sup>160</sup> Vanden Heuvel’s concern is based on the United States and Russia possessing

---

<sup>160</sup> vanden Heuvel, Katrina, “From the hope of 1989 to a new Cold War,” 12 November 2019, The Washington Post, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/12/hope-new-cold-war/>

14,000 nuclear weapons, and that the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.<sup>161</sup> She is additionally concerned because of what is happening in Europe — increased U.S. troop presence and growing instability in the Ukraine.<sup>162</sup>

Vanden Heuvel, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a journalist, is correct in stating the United States and Russia are in a new Cold War; and since that is the case, the United States and its European allies should further increase troop presence and military training. European allies, particularly NATO members, should consider increasing defense spending because the United States — although the mightiest military in the world for now — cannot do it alone.

In addition, scholarly works have also addressed the advent of a new Cold War. Robert Legvold, in an article for *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, said this new Cold War will not be like the first one. He writes, *“Although this new Cold War will be fundamentally different from the original, it will still be immensely damaging. Unlike the original, the new one won’t encompass the entire global system. The world is no longer bipolar, and significant regions and key players, such as China and India, will avoid being drawn in. In addition, the new conflict will not pit one “ism” against another, nor will it likely unfold under the permanent threat of nuclear Armageddon. Yet the new Cold War will affect nearly every important dimension of the international system, and Putin’s emphasis on Russia’s alienation from contemporary Western cultural values will add to the estrangement. Finally, were a security crisis in the center of Europe to escalate, the danger of nuclear war could quickly return.”*<sup>163</sup>

Both the mainstream media, scholars and even political pundits see a “New Cold War,” with Russia. While this work will not discuss possible outcomes if the United States and Russia went to war, this work does argue, that like in the past, a physical, bloody war could be avoided through deterrence. And as in the past, Russia moved more carefully when

---

<sup>161</sup> vanden Heuvel, Katrina, “From the hope of 1989 to a new Cold War,” *Ibid.*

<sup>162</sup> vanden Heuvel, Katrina, “From the hope of 1989 to a new Cold War,” *Ibid.*

<sup>163</sup> Legvold, Robert, “Managing the New Cold War: What Moscow and Washington Can Learn From the Last One,” July/August 2014, *Foreign Affairs*, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-06-16/managing-new-cold-war>

there were thousands of allied troops near its border. There are an estimated 30,000 troops in Germany, yet there is little chance that Russia would invade Europe's strongest economy. Yet there are only a few thousand rotational forces from the United States in Eastern Europe near its borders. (This work discusses possible troop movements from Germany to Poland in exploratory scenarios in Chapter 6.)

This work also takes the position that U.S. troops in Europe are a necessary deterrent to Russia and violent extremist groups. This work believes it has shown throughout this body of this dissertation that U.S. troop presence is necessary in Europe, not just as a deterrent, but as a means to show American strength to adversaries and to calm the fears of partners who hope that America would defend them if they were ever attacked by Russia. This work asserts that U.S. forces also serve as cultural ambassadors, sharing American culture and ideals and that bases have a positive impact the local economies.

In an article in *Foreign Affairs*, dated in 1975, the author seeks to answer the question, *Why do we still need troops in Europe 30 years after World War II?* Unfortunately and fortunately, the same answer applies today as it did 45 years ago. Author Alain C. Enthoven, in answering the question of why we need U.S. troops in Europe said: *"Because it is in our best interest to keep them there. A free and independent Western Europe, aligned with the United States, is vital for our national security and well-being. The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies have large and effective land and air forces in Eastern Europe. If our allies are to be able to preserve their independence, NATO must have in-place forces of equal size and effectiveness, and be able to match the Pact in a mobilization."*<sup>164</sup>

There were a little more than 300,000 troops in Europe when Enthoven made those comments, according to troop presence data provided from the U.S. European Command.<sup>165</sup>

---

<sup>164</sup> Enthoven, Alain, C., "U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?," April 1975, *Foreign Affairs*, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1975-04-01/us-forces-europe-how-many-doing-what>.

<sup>165</sup> U.S. European Command, "U.S. Military Presence in Europe, 1946-2016," *Ibid*, graphic shows the United States had more than 300,000 troops in Europe in 1973 and about 350,000 troops in Europe by 1982.

And at the time, generals did not have to make 30,000 look like 300,000 — they had 300,000 troops in Europe to deter the Soviet Union. Sixteen years after Enthoven's comments, the USSR broke apart and Russia emerged as a state. Some of Russia's Warsaw Pact allies are now fearful of Russia's aggressive acts in Europe. Some of those former allies, including Poland, have asked the United States to locate a permanent base in its country. The question of whether the United States should put a permanent base in Poland is addressed in a Chapter 7 case study.

In conclusion, when the Soviet Union fell, the United States felt comfortable enough about European security that it began reducing its European troop presence. The reduced troop numbers remained steady until the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks caused the United States to refocus on its foreign bases as a way to fight terrorism. By 2003 there were about 100,000 U.S. forces in Europe, but that number began decreasing under the tenure of former President Obama, who instituted cuts to U.S. troops in Europe and closed some bases. Instead of focusing on Europe, he made a pivot toward Asia to deal with China's rise in the region. By doing so, he neglected European security. When he began the European Reassurance Initiative in 2014 to reassure allies that the United States believed in its security in light of Russian aggression against the Ukraine and Georgia, he also ushered in what could be considered a new 'Cold War.' And in order to fight this new kind of battle, the United States will have to increase its presence in Europe, not only through troop increases, but better strategic placement of those troops throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

American service members have operated under the philosophy of 'doing more with less,' because there are simply not enough troops currently in Europe to deter Russia. These service members are committed to their mission, which includes: being representatives of America abroad as cultural ambassadors; rapidly deploying around the world in times of conflict or war; protecting American citizens and business interests; training and participating in exercises with NATO member troops and partnership troops. And they also serve as a tripwire — a hypothetical way to slow down Russian aggression. This is a

big role for any one entity to take on, but US. troops have been doing this for decades in Europe and supporters hope they can continue their role as a deterrence not only to Russian aggression, but against other forces that threaten the United States, NATO and or European security.

## Chapter 5

**U.S. President Barack Obama's foreign policy, as it relates to U.S. base strategy in Europe from January 2009 to January 2017:**



**FORMER PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, ADDRESSES TROOPS IN IRAQ, 2009** PHOTO COURTESY OF REBECCA CLARK

When Barack Obama became the 44th President of the United States of America a decade ago, he inherited two wars, an infamous military prison in Guantanamo Bay Cuba, a Global War on Terror and a national financial crisis. During the initial phase of his tenure, Mr. Obama followed a similar foreign and domestic policy as his predecessor, President George W. Bush. However, by the end of his first term, Mr. Obama began crafting his own foreign policy, which tilted away from Europe and tilted toward the Asian Pacific. He opted to shutter some foreign military bases, use drones to fight terror and reduce troop levels at home and abroad, end America's Global War on Terror and focus more on domestic issues such as health care.

This chapter examines Mr. Obama's evolving foreign policy during his two terms in office, focusing on how he handled foreign bases, overseas troops, national security, defense and

the safety of the United States and its Western European allies. The work begins by examining and defining the 'Obama Doctrine' and reviewing budget decisions, national strategies, speeches, news reports and scholarly papers. The purpose is to show how it might lead Mr. Obama to make certain policy decisions on U.S. troop strength and European security.

At the beginning of his tenure, Mr. Obama seemed to follow a “fairly conventional, at times, hawkish,”<sup>166</sup> foreign policy, according to journalist Kedor Pavgi, who writes for Foreign Affairs Magazine. Pavgi describes Mr. Obama’s foreign policy in terms of his accomplishments and attempted accomplishments such as working to: defeat Al Qaeda; review military spending; address immigration reform; and creating a framework for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.<sup>167</sup> However, Mr. Obama’s policies were more than hawkish strategies — Mr. Obama had little choice but to follow the same path as his predecessor until he could end the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The war in Afghanistan is ongoing and President Donald Trump is seeking to negotiate with the Taliban to officially end the 18-year war. The Iraq War “technically” ended in 2011, however there was a U.S. troop surge in 2014 to fight violent extremists. There are currently about 5,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, according to media reports. U.S. forces had been involved in the Libyan conflict since 2011, mainly through bombing missions. And in December 2019, military officials said they would leave 600 troops in Syria to ensure that ISIS does not return, according to a report in the Washington Post newspaper.

While trying to end wars in Iraq and Afghanistan during his first years in office, Mr. Obama showed hints of his own distinct foreign policy — separate from political party expectations. Mr. Obama’s foreign policy could be described as a mixture of old school political realism, with hints of progressive liberal stances on domestic issues, but it was also

---

<sup>166</sup> Pavgi, Kedor, “Barak Obama’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Magazine, 17 November, 2011, accessed on 13 November 2019 at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/17/barack-obamas-foreign-policy/>

<sup>167</sup> Pavgi, Kedor, “Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy,” Ibid.

an emerging, fluid plan for addressing a changing political and military landscape. Political scientists and historians often talk about the ‘Obama Doctrine,’ but not everyone agrees it was an actual doctrine, or just several neat strategies linked together to meet changing times. Still, it is clear that his doctrine evolved from his time as U.S. Senator until he finished his two presidential terms.

In 2007, U.S. Sen. Obama spoke before the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and discussed the five important foreign policy goals he would enact if elected president. The speech was the beginning of his foreign policy framework, which was then remolded into the Obama Doctrine. The goals were:

First, Mr. Obama said he wanted to end the Iraq War and address issues in the Middle East; second, he wanted to build a more advanced military and for America to *“show wisdom in how it deploys”* the military; third, he wanted the military to *“secure, destroy and stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction,”* and that included chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; and fourth, he wanted America to *“rebuild and construct the alliances and partnerships necessary to meet common challenges and confront common threats.”*<sup>168</sup> By alliances, Obama was speaking of NATO and international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations, which he said were in need of reform; And lastly, Mr. Obama called for *“helping world neighbors to be free from fear.”* In this last part, Mr. Obama said he wanted to end terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. Mr. Obama said, *“the true desire of all mankind is not only to live free lives, but lives marked by dignity and opportunity; by security and simple justice.”*<sup>169</sup>

These audacious goals would be difficult to accomplish in two terms. But to some voters, Mr. Obama was a symbol of hope and change and some believed he could do it. When Mr. Obama was elected president, defeating U.S. Sen. John McCain (A Republican from

---

<sup>168</sup> Obama, Barack, speech at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 23 April, 2007, accessed on 14 November 2019 at [https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/remarks\\_of\\_senator\\_barack\\_obam.html](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam.html).

<sup>169</sup> Obama, Barack, speech at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 23 April, 2007, accessed on 14 November 2019, Ibid.



Arizona) to lead America, Mr. Obama began the task of addressing America's continuing wars in the Middle East/Asia and the country's sagging economy.

Mr. Obama, almost immediately, surprised Europe and confused some leaders by not attending an important policy meeting. European leaders felt as if Mr. Obama had "snubbed," them by not attending the May 2010 United States-European Union Summit, according to news reports. This could be seen as the foreshadowing of what would become of U.S.-European relations; It was also a precursor that Mr. Obama, as America's representative, still valued Europe — but felt America had more pressing matters address around the world. In a *New York Times* report, Charles Grant, the director of the Center for European Reform, said Mr. Obama's decision was a useful wake up call for the European Union because it had to realize that Mr. Obama would not court the group or have summits just because "Europe is a nice idea."<sup>170</sup> Grant, whose comments were echoed by others who said Mr. Obama had a 'coolness' toward Europe, also addressed how Mr. Obama was different from previous administrations. While Mr. Obama considers Europe an ally of great importance, Grant told the *New York Times* that Mr. Obama had no emotional ties to the country. Grant said of Mr. Obama not attending the conference in 2010: "(Mr. Obama) has a cool, analytical view of allies and partners, but when Europeans can't provide much to help America solve global security problems, he doesn't want to spend too much time on it."<sup>171</sup>

Following what was perceived as a snub to some European leaders by sending lower level staff members to the EU summit, Mr. Obama pivoted away from Europe. Through his strategies and speeches, he focused attention on domestic issues, defense spending (war-related), military readiness and China's rise and possible aggression toward neighbors. One could argue that Mr. Obama's pivot away from Europe impacted how his administration viewed the importance of placing permanent U.S. forces in Europe. If Mr. Obama did not see

---

<sup>170</sup> Erlanger, Steven, "Europe Feels Snubbed by Obama," *New York Times*, 2 February 2010, accessed on 4 December 2019 at <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/world/europe/03europe.html?auth=login-email>

<sup>171</sup> Erlanger, Steven, "Europe Feels Snubbed by Obama," *Ibid.*

Europe as a critical partner in helping in its own or America's defense, then it can be argued, that perhaps the theory also trickled down to the American bases in Western Europe. And if bases were no longer as important, one could argue that to the Obama Administration, Europe was not in any immediate security dangers that reduced U.S. forces and the European military could not handle. Mr. Obama also wanted European partners to give more money and troops to their own defense. America's focus for nearly a decade was not deterring Russia — it was beating Al Qaeda, ISIS and the Taliban.

Ivo Daalder, U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013 was interviewed by the Atlantic Magazine on Mr. Obama's tenure and briefly spoke about the administration's pivot from Europe. Daalder said Mr. Obama will be remembered for two things: "First, he continued to pursue a foreign policy in which Europe was a major, but no longer the main focus of American foreign policy. Second, he reaffirmed America's strong commitment to the defense of all NATO partners, most notably, newer members in Eastern Europe."<sup>172</sup> America's foreign policy shifted from a Cold War mentality where Europe was the main focus to looking at the entire world and the Middle East and Asia are also part of America's focus, According to Daalder. "Europe is still important to America — but Europeans need to accept that they no longer have pride of place in the White House, no matter who occupies the Oval Office," Daalder told the political news magazine.<sup>173</sup> While Europe may not be the pride of place, events later in Obama's term underscored the importance of the continent as a guarantor of peace. However, during this time, Obama was still focused on Asia and domestic issues.

Author Jeffrey Bader in the book *Obama and China's Rise, An Insider's Account*, details Obama's Asia-Pacific Tilt. Bader said Obama was concerned with a rising China and the

---

<sup>172</sup> Politico Magazine, "What's Obama's European Legacy," comments from Ivo Daalder, 21 April 2016, accessed on the internet on 13 November 2019 at <https://www.politico.eu/article/what-will-define-barack-obamas-european-legacy-eu-us/>.

<sup>173</sup><sup>173</sup> Politico Magazine, "What's Obama's European Legacy," 21 April 2016, accessed on the internet on 13 November 2019, *Ibid*.

instability of North Korea. It was during this tilt that relations between Europe seemed to suffer.

While Bader chronicled Mr. Obama's tenure and his work to strengthen U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific, Mr. Obama's strategy was not without its critics. In his book *Dangerous Doctrine: How Obama's Strategy Weakened America*, Robert G. Kaufman, said Mr. Obama's policy to "reset" relations with Russia was the main part of his strategy transforming European relations. Kaufman infers that Obama did not completely understand Russian President Vladimir Putin. Mr. Putin aims for no less than a Russian military commensurate with his ambitions of ending American unipolarity, presenting the authoritarian bases of his regime, restoring Russian preeminence in East Central Europe and making Russia a Global Power, Kaufman writes.<sup>174</sup>

Kaufman also quoted government reports such as the National Defense Panel where it cautioned Mr. Obama that defense planners should pay more attention to Europe and ask planners to address key areas such as: a reduction of U.S. forces permanently stationed or rapidly deployed in Europe; to address the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance infrastructure in Eastern Europe that is insufficient to provide strategic and operational warnings.<sup>175</sup> Other critical areas the panel discussed were Russia's using special forces in Europe and NATO funding. Kaufman said a RAND report also challenged the "two basic assumptions" on America's policy in Europe were founded upon: The first assumption is that Europe is stable, and secure and America is free to focus its attention on other areas, particularly Asia and the Middle East; and the second assumption is that Russia is a potential partner rather than an enemy.<sup>176</sup>

---

<sup>174</sup> Kaufman, Robert G. *Dangerous Doctrine: How Obama's Strategy Weakened America*, (2016: University Press of Kentucky, Lexington), accessed in the internet on 31 August 2017 at [https://books.google.pt/books?id=rZP4CwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs\\_ge\\_summary\\_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.pt/books?id=rZP4CwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false)

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

This author asserts that perhaps the Obama Administration's focus on Asia could have led to missteps in dealing with Russia and probably gave the false impression that Russia would face little opposition in seeking to become a stronger power in Europe. This issue came to haunt Mr. Obama's legacy and was poised to become a bigger threat to European security than China's rise.

But not everyone opposed Mr. Obama's pivot away from Europe. Dr. Daniel Drezner, an international law professor from Tufts University in the United States, authored an article in *Foreign Affairs Magazine* where he said Mr. Obama had two separate grand strategies to carry out his foreign policy — retrenchment and counterpunching: “Multilateral entrenchment was designed to curtail the United States overseas commitments, restore its standing in the world and shift burdens onto global partners.<sup>177</sup> The strategy was clearly articulated, but it delivered underwhelming policy results.<sup>178</sup> The second strategy had to do with America maintaining its unipolarity whilst helping its allies. The counterpunch strategy allowed the Obama Administration to “assert its influence and ideals across the globe when challenges by other countries, reassuring allies and signaling resolve to allies.”<sup>179</sup> Drezner said that Mr. Obama's second strategy was not “articulated well,” however it seemed to work better.

While retrenchment helped Mr. Obama score points at home, it caused confusion and alarm among some European allies. The strategy sent a confusing message to allies that America wanted to “lead from behind.” A large policy shift, that focuses on Asia and then on America, could send allies the wrong message, particularly if they rely on the United States for security assistance. Mr. Obama was interviewed by other magazines and media outlets about his foreign policy and strategies. Perhaps his most popular interview was with *The Atlantic Magazine* in 2016, where Mr. Obama discussed his foreign policy decisions. This

---

<sup>177</sup> Drezner, Daniel, W., “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?: Why we need doctrines in uncertain times,” *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, July/August 2011, digital accessed on 13 November 2019 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-06-17/does-obama-have-grand-strategy>.

<sup>178</sup> Drezner, Daniel, W., “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?: Why we need doctrines in uncertain times,” *Ibid.*

<sup>179</sup> Drezner, Daniel, W., *Ibid.*

article also describes Mr. Obama as a “retrenchment, president,” who decided to step back from some world events, to focus on America.

Regarding his political views, Mr Obama told The Atlantic: *“I suppose that you could call me a realist in believing we can’t at any given moment, relieve all the world’s misery. We have to chose where we can make a real impact.”*<sup>180</sup> Mr. Obama also told the journalist that he was an internationalist, who was devoted to “strengthening multilateral organizations and international norms.”<sup>181</sup>

In addition to describing himself as a realist and internationalist — two terms not necessarily assigned to liberal or progressive Democratic political leaders — Mr. Obama discussed his commitment to international organizations such as NATO, but also said members needed to do more financially. Obama once warned Great Britain that it could no longer claim a special relationship with the United States if it did spend at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense.<sup>182</sup> Mr. Obama told the magazine that Great Britain had to “pay its fair share.” Great Britain spent about 2.13 percent on defense expenditures as a share of its GDP in 2014 and 2019 — However, more than half of NATO expenditures from 2012 to the present came from the United States.<sup>183</sup> (Few of NATO’s members meet the 2 percent threshold in 2019. NATO members who meet defense spending thresholds include the United States, Greece, Estonia, United Kingdom, Romania, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania (Lithuania spends 1.98 percent of its GDP), according to NATO documents. The United States spends 3.42 percent of its GDP on Defense spending — less than it did in 2014.)<sup>184</sup>

While Mr. Obama’s critics have characterized the 2 percent as an unfair and unrealistic bar to measure NATO participation, Dr. Jorge, Benitez, a former assistant for alliance issues

---

<sup>180</sup> Goldberg, Jeffrey, “The Obama Doctrine: The U.S. President talks through his hardest decisions about America’s role in the world,” April 2016, accessed on 13 November 2019 at <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>

<sup>181</sup> Goldberg, Jeffrey, “The Obamam Doctrine,” Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Goldberg, Jeffrey, “The Obamam Doctrine,” Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> NATO, “Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries,” 25 June 2019, accessed on Nov. 20, 2019 at [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2019\\_06/20190625\\_PR2019-069-EN.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_PR2019-069-EN.pdf)

<sup>184</sup> NATO, “Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries,” Ibid.

to the director of NATO affairs in the office of the Secretary of Defense under Mr. Obama's Administration, said many U.S. presidents were critical of countries not meeting the 2 percent level. Benitez said throughout history, some presidents have been more successful than others in getting NATO members to fund the 2 percent level. And more often than not, what tends to be more successful than 'how' the American president asks NATO members to fund to the 2 percent level, is 'what' is going on with Russia; and that is often the decisive factor, Benitez said.<sup>185</sup> NATO members are now having discussions amongst themselves about exactly how much money they should put into their own defense, particularly in light of Russian aggression, Benitez said an Interview in Washington D.C. in June 2018. "The Russians will do something bad and remind everyone that even though we are democracies, we try to get along, we have disagreements, there is a wolf at the door, it is a violent wolf, and if we don't do something you will see things like the Russians crushing the Hungarian uprising, the Russian tanks marching into Prague and crushing the Czech Spring," Benitez cautioned.<sup>186</sup>

Asking European neighbors to give more money to defense was part of Mr. Obama's strategy of retrenchment. In this context, retrenchment is defined as pulling back, spending less, cutting risk and shifting burdens to allies.<sup>187</sup> Mr. Obama asked allies to do more and America, under his presidency, was doing less to help its allies in Europe. However, less funding and troop presence did not mean that the United States was not committed to European security or deterrence an aggressive Russia.

Scholar Adreas Krieg said Mr. Obama was focused on "multi-lateral retrenchment that would curtail the United States overseas commitments, shore its standing in the world and shift burdens onto global partners."<sup>188</sup> Mr. Obama's Administration wanted to keep its foreign

---

<sup>185</sup> Benitez, Jorge, interview in Washington D.C. in June 2018 for this research.

<sup>186</sup> Benitez, Jorge, interview, Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> Goldberg, Jeffrey, "The Obama Doctrine," quoting scholar Stephen Sestanovich, Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> Krieg, Andrea, "Externalizing the Burdens of War: The Obama Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East," 8 January, 2016, accessed in 14 November 2019 at [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/INTA92\\_1\\_05\\_Krieg.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/INTA92_1_05_Krieg.pdf), page 103.

posture by not being reliant on military power or presence alone, he wrote. Krieg, in his paper *The Obama Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, said Mr. Obama was adamant that in a context of austerity and globalization, that military action had to be first limited to the defense of vital U.S. interests; and second, carried out by leaner, more flexible military force acting not unilaterally but multilaterally in cooperation with local allies.<sup>189</sup>

Mr. Obama's approach to using the military and military basing, seemed to be more measured and frugal, especially since he was trying to balance America's budget and meet domestic commitments for things such as health care reform. Defense spending ballooned under former President George Bush because of his Global War on Terror and Mr. Obama wanted to restore balance to America's finances, particularly its military budget. And that balance and measuredness also meant cuts were needed at America's bases in Europe.

By now, Mr. Obama was well into his first term and public attitudes about war and spending had changed. In 2006, 69 percent of Americans said it was right to use force in Afghanistan, however, by 2010 only about half of Americans agreed to the use of force, according to study conducted by Pew Research Center.<sup>190</sup> And in 2011, three separate surveys found that more than half of Americans now opposed the Afghanistan War.<sup>191</sup> In an article in the Atlantic Magazine, journalist Chris Good found that Americans were increasingly unhappy about the length of the war, the growing number of American casualties, the Taliban's resurgence in parts of Afghanistan and that Americans had little confidence in the Afghan government.<sup>192</sup> In addition of being tired of war, the American public seemed to be questioning its continued role as the world's police and superpower. So,

---

<sup>189</sup> Krieg, Andrea, "Externalizing the Burdens of War: The Obama Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East," 8 January, 2016, accessed in 14 November 2019 at [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/INTA92\\_1\\_05\\_Krieg.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/INTA92_1_05_Krieg.pdf), page 103.

<sup>190</sup> Pew Research Center, "After 17 years of war in Afghanistan, more say U.S. has failed than succeeded in achieving its goals," 5 October 2018, accessed 6 December 2019 at <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/05/after-17-years-of-war-in-afghanistan-more-say-u-s-has-failed-than-succeeded-in-achieving-its-goals/>

<sup>191</sup> Good, Chris, "When and Why Did Americans Turn Against the War in Afghanistan?" The Atlantic, 22 June 2011, accessed on 6 December 2019 at <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/06/when-and-why-did-americans-turn-against-the-war-in-afghanistan/240880/>

<sup>192</sup> Good, Chris, "When and Why Did Americans Turn Against the War in Afghanistan?" Ibid.

if America was tired of war, one could also argue it might be reluctant to provide millions for European security, through European troop presence and basing.

Mr. Obama's Doctrine confirmed that America could no longer be the world's policemen when it came to keeping the peace and fighting wars, Krieg said. He also outlined the core parts of the Obama Doctrine as it related to this new administration shift: *"The core principal of the Obama Doctrine is burden-sharing, both strategically and operationally. On the strategic level it emphasizes the need for collective action through coalition warfare and for capacity building of local partners and allies. On the operational level it prioritizes covert warfare, relying increasingly on technological platforms, special forces and CIA operatives to achieve strategic operational objectives out of the public eye. Essentially, Obama's foreign policy is one that lays the doctrinal foundation for surrogate warfare: externalize the burden of warfare to human and technological surrogates."*<sup>193</sup>

Kreig said Mr. Obama used non-state actors and technology as surrogates to help fight wars. An example for non-state actors could include Kurdish fighters in Northern Iraq and Syria and the use of drones to track and kill terrorists. Krieg said America also used surrogates for diplomacy, using the example of asking Japan to reach out to China on America's behalf. Mr. Obama's rationale was to lead from behind and regional partners questioned U.S. superpower status now that it seems unable to act as a global hegemony to influence outcomes in the region, Krieg wrote.<sup>194</sup>

Instead of guaranteeing other nations' security, the United States has shifted to become a partner, assisting local surrogates to take over responsibility to provide security in their own backyard.<sup>195</sup> Krieg writes: "U.S. power is diminishing as austerity requires budgets to be lighter, the American people call for commitments closer to home and operational environments become more complex. All these factors have prompted the United States to

---

<sup>193</sup> Krieg, Andreas, "Externalizing the Burdens of War: The Obama Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East," 8 January, 2016, accessed in 14 November 2019 at [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/INTA92\\_1\\_05\\_Krieg.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/INTA92_1_05_Krieg.pdf), page 104.

<sup>194</sup> Krieg, Andreas, "Externalizing the Burdens of War," *Ibid*, page 113.

<sup>195</sup> Krieg, Andreas, "Externalizing the Burdens of War," *Ibid*, page 113.



explore new means of achieving strategic or operational objectives in conflicts overseas while minimizing the burdens for American taxpayers, policy makers and the military.”<sup>196</sup>

Kreig, said a lone super power is, “archaic,” idea in today’s times. However, Mr. Kreig seems to posit that American power is solely based on its money and how much money it is willing to spend on the military, security and assisting its allies. While money has allowed the United States to build an impressive arsenal of weapons and trained troops, money alone does not win wars or help partners keep their peace — strategies and working in partnership with allies is key.

Kreig’s take on Mr. Obama’s foreign policy is important when it comes to European basing. If America is indeed asking more of its allies to keep the peace, it may include using the bases of host nations more than usual or some bases less than usual. The United States, under Mr. Obama, also used drones as part of its surrogate warfare program and therefore, operating drones on known and secret bases in Europe, Africa and Asia have become all the more important. In the first three years of office, Mr. Obama’s Administration built an extensive apparatus for using drones to carry out targeted killings of suspected terrorists and stealth surveillance of other adversaries.<sup>197</sup> The administration has “dozens,” of secret facilities, including two operational hubs on the Eastern Coast of the United States and virtual U.S. Air Force cockpits in the Southwestern part of the United States and clandestine bases in six countries.<sup>198</sup> But the problem with drones, as far as American basing is concerned, it that America does not need a huge base in Western Europe to operate a drone. Such machines can be operated from small, simple bases, instead of large, military bases.

---

<sup>196</sup> Kreig, Andreas, “Externalizing the Burdens of War,” page 112.

<sup>197</sup> Miller, Greg, “Under Obama,an emerging global apparatus for drone killing,” The Washington Post, 27 December, 2011, accessed on 21 November 2019 at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/under-obama-an-emerging-global-apparatus-for-drone-killing/2011/12/13/gIQANPdILP\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/under-obama-an-emerging-global-apparatus-for-drone-killing/2011/12/13/gIQANPdILP_story.html)

<sup>198</sup> Miller, Greg, “Under Obama, an emerging global apparatus for drone killing,” Ibid.

America has a growing number of “lily pad,” bases around the globe, that are cooperative security locations that have few troops, may rely on private contractors and frequently house drones, surveillance aircraft or pre-positioned weaponry for the use of troops deploying from elsewhere, according to scholar Dr. David Vine.<sup>199</sup> These bases can be located anywhere in the world. While there is a growing peace movement across the globe calling for U.S. foreign base closures and the United States is seeking to focus more on domestic matters as it rebuilds its military, the Pentagon has built about 15 lily pads and other small bases in the last 15 years and may build up to a dozen more, according to Vine.<sup>200</sup> The Pentagon’s movement may show that U.S. foreign bases are very important to America’s strategic and military goals, but that European bases may be less important because of how they are built and where they are located. One cannot have too many clandestine operations running out of bases in Germany, Turkey or Poland without adversaries noticing, but such operations could be run in secret and possibly at a lower cost in Africa and Asia.

### **A Perspective**

Mr. Obama, when he snubbed Europe by not attending an important EU meeting made an error. But he probably attempted to show Europe that it was not as important to the United States as it was in the past. To compound matters, Mr. Obama pivoted toward Asia and in retrospect, one can see this move hurt U.S.-European relations. The pivot wasn’t just about countering China’s rise, it was about showing Europe it was not as important as in the past and it would not or could not be that important to the United States while he was president. While Mr. Obama tried to mend fences through European Reassurance Initiative funding, (it was about \$1 billion the first year) Mr. Obama could have given more if the United States was as troubled by European security as he said. The ERI (now EDI) has

---

<sup>199</sup> Vine, David, “Base Nation (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015), page 45.

<sup>200</sup> Vine, David, “Base Nation,” page 57.

ballooned under the Trump Administration, giving \$5.9 billion toward Russian deterrence in fiscal year 2020.

Critics of Mr. Obama, such as Kaufman, said that the president misjudged Russian President Vladimir Putin and that may be correct. In the beginning of his term, Mr. Obama thought of Mr. Putin as a possible ally in part, because both countries were dealing with violent extremist groups. Russia grappled with ISIS and Chechnyan rebels, while the United States had ISIS and Al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan. However Russia was not a partner. Mr. Putin, through waging aggression with Georgia and the Ukraine, was acting like the former Soviet Union and perhaps Mr. Putin wanted his country to recapture its former power and lands. He has since made many other Eastern European nations nervous — so nervous that Poland has asked the United States to locate a permanent base in its country.

In addition to not seeing Mr Putin as an important adversary, Mr. Obama chose to be a retrenchment president — to move away from being a world leader and to lead from behind. This retrenchment policy further confused European partners and could have emboldened Russia's Mr. Putin, who knew the United States was in the midst of a financial crisis and still fighting two wars. Mr. Obama's Doctrine, may have appeared just as confusing to some European partners, because he pivoted to Asia and focused more attention to China's rise than what was happening in Europe. It could be seen as a mistake, because Europe was essential to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. European partners were sending troops to aid in the fight. And while not all countries sent combat troops, some countries' sent support troops that also aided in the fight against Al Qaeda and Iraq. In addition, U.S. forces stationed in Europe rotated into war zones to fight terrorists. It could have proven much more difficult for the United States if it did not have troops already in Europe that could more easily arrive in Afghanistan and Iraq for troop deployments that lasted up to 18 months in the early stages of the war.

Mr. Obama also stressed burden-sharing when it came to European partners. He wanted NATO members to pay more for defense. However, his retrenchment strategy looked like he

was abandoning Europe for Asia — where Mr. Obama spent some of his formative years a child in Hawaii and Indonesia.

In addition, Mr Obama's policies, also allowed him to cut troops to Europe as well as cut defense spending, as America struggled to balance its budget. The issue of defense cuts will be discussed later in this chapter.

While Mr. Obama's strategy had positive aspects such as asking European neighbors to spend more on defense and recognizing the rise of China, it also had unfortunate aspects, such as his administration turning away from Europe and possibly emboldening Russia to reclaim land and act aggressively toward European neighbors. Some European partners began to quietly question if the United States was still as committed to European security. But, Mr. Obama created a special funding initiative. While he redeployed thousands of troops back to the United States, the troop rotations in the initiative allowed for troops to rotate in and train with European partners, particularly those from Eastern Europe.

If we view Mr. Obama's foreign policy doctrine and his plans for European bases through the lens of realism in international relations theory and use some aspects of Game Theory, there might be a better understanding of why Mr. Obama's approach to America's European presence could be considered a zero-sum game where America wins at the expense of its partners and allies. Mr. Obama describes himself as a realist. For this work, realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests and struggle for power.<sup>201</sup> Realists also tend to be skeptical of globalization and see the world as anarchical. Realists may also believe that conflicts between nations are inevitable. Another way to possibly understand Mr. Obama's action is by using some aspects of Game Theory, often used by International Relations scholars to explain difficult decisions that leaders make. Realism is also defined as

---

<sup>201</sup> Stanford University, "Political Realism in International Relations," Ibid.

that branch of international politics that stresses the competitive and conflictual side.<sup>202</sup> Game Theory, as defined by Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubenstein in their book, *A Course in Game Theory*, is a bag of analytical tools designed to help people understand the phenomenon they observe when decision makers interact.<sup>203</sup> The base assumptions that underlie the theory are that decision makers pursue well-defined exogenous objectives and take it into account their knowledge or expectations of the decision maker's behavior.<sup>204</sup>

From a realist perspective, Mr Obama was in a competition, not just with adversaries in the Middle East, or partners in Europe, but with his predecessor former President George Bush. Mr. Obama was elected to bring 'Hope' and 'Change' to America and because he took a different domestic and foreign policy stance than his predecessor. During his campaign, Mr. Obama became a vocal critic of both wars (He served in the U.S. Senate from 2005 to 2008, well after both wars began.). He was also tasked to help America with its fiscal crisis. America, at the time, was somewhat secure, with most terrorist attacks and violent extremist groups saving their attacks for American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Mr. Obama created his own doctrine and wanted to pursue his own interests and the best interests for the nation. He also wanted to look after his own legacy as the first African American elected as President of the United States. It is plausible that his ethnicity and position factored into his decision-making process. Realists see the world in terms of a struggle for power. In Mr. Obama's case, America already had power, but he wanted to keep that power in a way that cost America less on the battlefield and the purse.

Mr Obama, in managing the wars and domestic financial woes, was faced with at least four dilemmas on how he could proceed:

---

<sup>202</sup> Stanford University, "Political Realism in International Relations," 24 May 2019, accessed on 4 December 2019 at [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/?utm\\_source=AOL&utm\\_medium=readMore&utm\\_campaign=partner#KennWaltInteSyst](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/?utm_source=AOL&utm_medium=readMore&utm_campaign=partner#KennWaltInteSyst)

<sup>203</sup> Osborne, Martin, J., and Rubenstein, Ariel, *A Course in Game Theory*, (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1994) e-book, updated 24 September 2012, accessed on 4 December 2019 at <http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il>.

<sup>204</sup> Osborne, Martin, J., and Rubenstein, Ariel, *A Course in Game Theory*, *Ibid.*

1. He could do nothing and let defense spending continue as normal — which would almost guarantee the American economy would implode under the weight of defense spending and necessary public spending;
2. His could reduce defense spending and troop levels and presence in Europe and also by that move reduce the number of troops not only in Europe but the number and importance of military bases in Europe;
3. Mr. Obama could increase non-war defense spending — knowing that the American economy could not support it. Mr. Obama could increase defense spending as a support to allies in Europe and across the globe. That show of support could have been displayed by increasing the number of troops in Europe and not shuttering European bases. Mr. Obama also could have strategically located troops close to Russia's border so that NATO nations and partners would feel secure in their alliance with the United States;
4. And lastly, Mr. Obama could more drastically reduce defense spending, and redeploy at least half of the troops stationed Europe to America and decrease participation in European and NATO training and exercises. This would have had a negative impact on U.S.- European nations and could have emboldened Russia to continue its aggression toward its former republics.

If these options were examined like zero-sum game where one person wins, while the other impacted parties lose (but are not totally defeated), it is clear that Mr. Obama chose the move that represented his world view and doctrine — No. 2 — which decreased defense spending in a way that still allowed the United States to keep its power and seem supportive of European safety and security. While Mr. Obama restructured the military and redeployed some foreign based troops to America, he also created the European Reassurance Initiative, which is discussed later in this chapter. While he wanted to decrease defense spending, this move had some negative implications because he did not allow for funds to rebuild the military or modernize weapons used during the conflict. He also ignored European allies in

a way that made them doubt the United States was concerned for their safety and the importance of the NATO alliance. At the time he made this move, NATO was seen as a weaker institution than it had been during the wars in Kosovo or Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For a more in-depth look at Mr. Obama's foreign policy and defense strategies, as it relates to U.S. military bases in Europe, and why Mr. Obama may have made these decisions about European bases, this work analyzes his administration's specific national security strategies, defense strategies, Base Realignment and Closure Commission reports and budgets. This work begins by examining Mr. Obama's first National Security Strategy:

### **I. 2010 National Security Strategy**

Mr. Obama outlined the key points of his foreign affairs policy with this strategy. It focuses is on eliminating weapons of mass destruction and reducing the world's nuclear arsenal. America's interests were outlined as: U.S. security; a vibrant economy; respect for oneself and others; and American leadership taking the lead to help other nations gain "peace, security and opportunity." However, security and America's role and responsibilities as a superpower was the central theme linking together his national strategy.

Mr. Obama wrote in the opening pages of the strategy: "Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security — through our commitments to allies, partners and institutions; our focus on defeating Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan and around the globe; and our determination to deter aggression and prevent the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons. As we do, we must recognize that no one nation — no matter how powerful — can meet global challenges alone. As we did after World War II, America must prepare for the future while forging cooperative approaches among nations that can yield results."<sup>205</sup>

---

<sup>205</sup> Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy of the United States, 2010, page 1, accessed 4 November 2019 at [http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/4/.](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/4/),

It also appears as if Mr. Obama was given a gentle nudge to organizations such as NATO and EU and their individual nation-members to do more in terms of their own security and continental security.

The national security strategy discusses the importance of strengthening ties with old allies such as Europe and reaching out to emerging powers such as BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

At the time of his report on his national security goals, America was still at war in Iraq and Afghanistan and he remarked that Americans had become hardened by wars, yet he was inspired by the nation's commitment to end terrorism and dismantle Al Qaeda and its affiliate terror groups. He outlined his priorities for the strategy, which included renewing American leadership, which could be a euphemism for changing America's foreign policy gears away from his neoconservative predecessor Mr. Bush, to a more progressive philosophy espoused by Mr. Obama. Safety and security were next, followed by the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, defeating and eliminating Al Qaeda and overseeing the transition of Iraq from an occupied land filled with thousands of American troops to an independent state.

Obama referred to America as the "sole global superpower," and gave his assessment of the dangers America faces through terrorism. Those dangers included space and cyber capabilities that would be vulnerable to attack by terrorist groups, America's continued dependence on fossil fuels from the Middle East, Climate Change and failed states (failing governments) and global criminal security. The latter part, cyber security was becoming more important to America and its allies, as advancements in technology improved the lives of the world's citizens, but also made them more vulnerable to computer and technology attacks in a more technologically advanced, global world.

While Obama focused on the challenges America faces if it does not take its security seriously, he also remarked that America's closest ally — Europe — had continued to improve its security: "Europe is now more united, free and at peace than ever before. The



European Union has deepened its integration. Russia has re-emerged in the international arena as a strong voice.”<sup>206</sup>

While Mr. Obama’s security address stressed that American security begins “at home,” he also talked about the importance of working with allies in order for America’s military to remain strong. The report states, “... we must update, balance and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same. Our military must maintain its conventional superiority and as long as nuclear weapons exist, our nuclear deterrent capability, while continuing to enhance its capability to defeat asymmetrical threats, preserve access to the global commons and strengthen partners.”<sup>207</sup>

Regarding the military, Mr. Obama’s initiative called for restructuring the U.S. military so troops on the ground could exceed expectations on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations and any security threats that may arise. This includes, preparing for increasingly sophisticated adversaries, deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environment, and defending the United States and supporting civil authorities at home.<sup>208</sup>

In his strategy, Obama also reached out to European nations, saying America could not meet the world’s challenges alone. While Mr. Trump garners attention for addressing shortfalls in NATO funding, Mr. Obama and presidents before him addressed the issue — but perhaps more delicately. Obama states in his report: “International institutions, most prominently NATO and the UN have been at the center of our international order since the 20th century. Yet an international architecture that was forged in the wake of World War II is bucking under the weight of new threats, making us less able to seize new opportunities. Even though many defining trends of the 21st century affect all nations. ... too often, the mutual interests of nations and people are ignored in favor of suspicion and self-defeating

---

<sup>206</sup> Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy of the United States, 2010, page 8, accessed 4 November 2019 at <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/4/>.

<sup>207</sup> Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy of the United States, 2010, page 14, *Ibid.*

<sup>208</sup> Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy of the United States, 2010, page 14, *Ibid.*

competition.”<sup>209</sup> Mr. Obama then called for a “realignment” of national actions and international institutions that have the same interests. He also cautioned those countries that do not follow society norms or do not care for their people and nation.

His strategy wanted to create stronger relationships with allies: *“These relationships must be constantly cultivated not just because they are indispensable for U.S. interests and national security objectives, but because they are fundamental to our collective security. Alliances are force multipliers through multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of our actions is always greater than if we act alone. We will continue to maintain the capacity to defend our allies against old and new threats. We will also continue to consult with our allies as well as newly emerging partners and organizations so that we revitalize and expand our cooperation to achieve common objectives. And we will continue to mutually benefit from the collective security provided by strong alliances.”*<sup>210</sup>

Mr. Obama addressed America’s relationship with Europe and NATO in his strategy.

“Our relationship with our European allies remains the cornerstone for the U.S. engagement in the world and a catalyst for international action. With our 27 NATO allies and the many partners with which NATO cooperates, we will strengthen our collective ability to promote security, deter vital threats and defend our people. NATO’s new strategic concept will provide an opportunity to revitalize and reform the alliance. We are committed to ensuring that NATO is able to address the full range of 21st century challenges, while serving as a foundation for European security.”<sup>211</sup>

Mr. Obama also said his administration was committed to strengthening ties with Russia. At this point in his administration, Mr. Obama seemed hopeful that Russia would be a partner in some areas, instead of an adversary. In 2009, Mr. Obama released his National Intelligence Strategy and there were a few lines about Russia. First, it saw Russia as a

---

<sup>209</sup> Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy of the United States, 2010, page 40, Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy of the United States, 2010, page 41, Ibid.

<sup>211</sup> Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy of the United States, 2010, page 41, Ibid.

potential partner to defeat terrorism and nuclear weapons getting into enemy hands, but also saw Russia could pose problems to American strategy: “Russia may continue to seek avenues for reasserting power and influence with ways to complicate U.S. interests,” it reported.<sup>212</sup> Even so, Mr. Obama did not feel it prudent to provide additional troop presence in Western or Eastern Europe to deter Russia. Neither report discussed the possibility of adding additional military bases in Europe.

Mr. Obama was correct to focus his first security strategy on fighting the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. During this time, the United States had been fighting two wars in the Middle East for nearly a decade and the wars cost American lives, hurt America’s reputation and helped drain the country’s coffers. While Mr. Obama said the United States would continue to ‘underwrite global security,’ it was impossible to do so while fighting two wars, hunting for terrorists and maintaining military bases around the globe.

In addition to focusing on the war, Mr. Obama asked NATO members to do more. At the time, NATO members were sending troops to fight in Afghanistan and providing support troops and assistance in the two wars. While it is true many countries did not fund NATO to 2 percent of the GDP, they did support America’s effort in Afghanistan. In 2011, European NATO members including Canada, collectively spent an average of 1.52 percent of their GDP on Defense, while the United States spent 4.77 percent.<sup>213</sup> (European support for the war in Iraq was not widespread, as the intelligence to wage the war was discredited, U.S. forces did not find weapons of mass destruction, and forces did not leave after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was captured and killed in 2006).

At the time Mr. Obama was asking its alliance to do more, the military was focused on preventing terrorist attacks in the United States and on troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, Europe and other locations around the globe. The public was also concerned about terrorism and its

---

<sup>212</sup> National Intelligence Strategy of the United States, August 2009, accessed on 6 December 2019 at <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=33833>

<sup>213</sup> NATO, “Graph 8: Defense Spending as a Share of GDP,” 14 March 2019, accessed 28 December 2019 at [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2019\\_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.pdf), page 5.

impact. The CATO Institute, in a paper on public opinion and counterterrorism, shared the results of surveys on America's attitudes on terrorism. In a survey conducted in 2011, 60 percent of respondents said that they feared another terror attack right around the same time Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011; In 2009, terror attack fears were close to 70 percent.<sup>214</sup>

In addition to focusing on terrorism threats and violent extremist groups, Mr. Obama's strategy focused on restructuring the military, just as combat operations in Iraq were coming to an end. However, his troop withdrawal proved to be premature as troops dealt with violent extremist groups attacking bases and soldiers on patrol. Perhaps he should not have announced the withdrawal, but started to slowly remove U.S. forces and change the time and scope of deployments to the region.

When examining the foreign policy of Mr. Obama, it also appears he made a big misstep in how the United States viewed Russia. While the administration saw Russia was an aggressor, it also saw Russia as a potential partner to defeat terrorism — however Russia was never really a partner in the sense of the word. Russia was just as threatened by the United States, NATO and its place in the world and began aggressively maneuvering toward its neighbors in Eastern Europe. In addition to conflict in Georgia, Russia began targeting the Ukraine. In 2008-2009 it cut off gas supplies because of price disputes and it led to gas shortages in other parts of Eastern Europe which hurt many citizens in those countries.<sup>215</sup> It was clear that Russia was already trying to reassert itself in the region and while Mr. Obama saw this, he did little to confront Russian aggression or help Eastern Europe at this time. If he had acted sooner, perhaps Russia would have been less emboldened to annex Crimea in 2014.

---

<sup>214</sup> Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark, G., "Public Opinion and Counterterrorism Policy," 20 February 2018, Cato Institute, accessed 27 December 2019 at <https://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/public-opinion-counterterrorism-policy>.

<sup>215</sup> Kirby, Paul, "Russia's Gas Fight with Ukraine," 31 October 2014, BBC, accessed on 28 December 2019 at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29521564>.

## II. Quadrennial Defense Review of 2010

In his first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Mr. Obama's focused on fighting and winning the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. For the sake of brevity, this thesis will not discuss those aspects of the QDR as it relates to the Middle East, but it will address sections of the report that discuss military alliances, Europe, basing and Russia. Only a small portion of the QDR addressed Europe or NATO, possibly showing the beginning of Mr. Obama's focus to other areas of the world such as the Asia-Pacific. The QDR set out four defense strategies: win the wars; prevent further conflict; defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve and protect America's volunteer military force.<sup>216</sup>

The QDR executive summary said that "*years of war have significantly stressed our military personnel and their families. Given the controlling need for sustained deployments in conflict zones, the department must do all it can to take care of our people — physically and psychologically.*"<sup>217</sup> The report goes on to say that ground forces were the most stressed of U.S. troops, but the military must remain prepared for such campaigns. During this period, the U.S. military had 400,000 troops forward deployed around the world, including Iraq and Afghanistan, according to U.S. defense figures.

At the time of this report, U.S. forces were in Afghanistan for nine years and in Iraq for seven years. Public opinion was beginning to turn against the administration regarding the war and its impact on the American psyche. In a Gallup Poll conducted in February 2010, 73 percent of the public viewed Iraq as unfavorable or mostly unfavorably; and another poll found that 58 percent of the public thought the war in Iraq was a mistake; By 2011, 75 percent of the public said they agreed with Mr. Obama to pull most of the troops out of Iraq.<sup>218</sup> In contrast, the Afghan War had more support, with only 36 percent of Americans

---

<sup>216</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2010, accessed 4 December 2019 at <https://archive.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf>, page 5.

<sup>217</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2010, *Ibid*, executive summary page vi.

<sup>218</sup> Gallup Organization, "Iraq," various public opinion polls, accessed on 9 December 2019 at <https://news.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx>

viewing it as a mistake.<sup>219</sup> America's war weariness was showing and most likely contributed to Mr. Obama's plan to pull troops out of Iraq by 2011 and to reduce troop levels and defense spending by 2012.

Regarding NATO or Europe, the report featured a section called Strengthening Relationships that discusses the importance of the transatlantic partnership and alliances. The QDR said the United States is committed to NATO and the Article 5 security agreement, that underlines that a threat against one NATO member is a threat against all of NATO and its members, including the United States, would respond to the threat with defensive measures. The QDR also sees Russia as a potential partner: it said the United States and Russia were working on a nuclear proliferation treaty and working to combat terrorism; working together in the Arctic region; and working to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. (The National Intelligence Strategy of 2009 also saw Russia as a partner with a caveat: Russia "may continue to seek avenues for reasserting power and influence in ways to complicate U.S. interests."<sup>220</sup> If Russia is a threat, then America would leave enough troops in the nearby region to deter or dissuade, but if Russia is seen as a potential ally or a nation in which America needs to extend a branch of peace, then America would act in a non-threatening manner, such as reduce troops, because it feels that Russia would not cause harm to its neighbors. Unfortunately, Russia had already gone to war with Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimean region of the Ukraine by 2014.)

Regarding troops, the QDR unveiled three parts of its defense posture: 1. forward stationed and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities and equipment; 2. a supporting overseas network of infrastructure and facilities; 3. a series of treaty, access, transit and status protection agreements and arrangement with allies and key partners.<sup>221</sup> The report

---

<sup>219</sup> Newport, Frank, "More Americans Now View Afghanistan War as a Mistake," Gallup Organization, 19 February 2019, accessed 9 December 2019, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/167471/americans-view-afghanistan-war-mistake.aspx>

<sup>220</sup> National Intelligence Strategy 2009 accessed 5 December 2019 at <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=33833>, page 3.

<sup>221</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, *Ibid*, page 62.

appears to acknowledge the importance of overseas bases in being able to wage and fight wars. Also, forward deployed troops in places such as Europe and Asia can more quickly arrive at combat zones than troops stationed in the United States. The report goes on to address why these troops are important:

*“First, forward-stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces continued to be relevant and required. The long-term presence of U.S. abroad reassures allies and partners of our commitment to mutual security relationships, generates enduring trust and goodwill with host nations, and increases regional and cultural expertise in the force. We cannot simply ‘surge’ trust and relationships on demand. Second, our defense posture will balance the need for permanent overseas presence that assures allies and partners of our commitments with the need for flexible ability to respond to contingencies, emerging threats and global security needs in distant theaters.”<sup>222</sup>*

This section is critical because it states that America is still committed to international security and it recognizes that U.S. troop presence in host nations as an important symbol for host nations. Troops in host nations are housed, trained and work on complicated basing networks provided by the host nations and or built by the United States. The report also said that American troop presence in host nations are also a symbol of deterrence. The QDR also recognized the security changes in Europe after the Cold War.

Specifically addressing Europe, the report reinforces American commitment to the continent’s safety while also acknowledging changes in the security landscape, as forces and bases transformed into “lighter, more flexible, and more deployable,” positions. *“Maintaining a robust U.S. military presence in Europe serves to deter the political intimidation of allies and partners; promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea regions; demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies, builds trust and goodwill*

---

<sup>222</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, Ibid, pages 63-64.

*among host nations; and facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests both inside and outside the continent,”* according to the report.<sup>223</sup>

Regarding NATO, the QDR said America would support alliances and partnerships and it would build relationships in key regions. The United States said it would retain four brigade company teams and an Army Corps headquarters (V Corps) stationed in Europe and begin the deployment of a revised U.S. missile defense architecture in Europe and an enhanced forward-deployed naval presence in the region to support missile defense and increase maritime security cooperation.<sup>224</sup>

The U.S. Congress created a panel to independently review the president’s QDR strategy and the panel makes recommendations to Congress on what priorities should be, rather than what a president recommends for the nation. The panel’s recommendations are non-binding and the president can ignore those he does not think relevant or incorporate those things he supports. The panel outlined priorities for the armed forces, including troop levels and defense spending.

In a hearing with the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, in July 2010, the independent panel’s co-chairs William Perry and Stephen Hadley testified about their findings/conclusions, which called for an increase in the size of America’s Navy and Air Force. This recommendation is important because a larger Air Force and Navy could also mean an increase in troop presence abroad in Europe.

Members of the House Armed Services Committee were critical of the report for many reasons. Some lawmakers wanted the panel to recommend additional ground troops to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Others felt that more troops would be necessary to keep current alliances and security across the globe. U.S. Rep. Howard P. Buck McKeon said the panel’s report was “provocative” and “substantive” and the military could have problems maintaining troops levels with its volunteer military force and that there could be problems

---

<sup>223</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, Ibid, page 65.

<sup>224</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, Ibid, page 65.



with force structure and acquisition (replacing old, worn out equipment). He also cautioned the report showed potential allied security issues: “the report offers a realistic review of the global security environment: that maintaining and growing our alliances will place an increased demand on American hard power and require an increase in our military’s force structure,” he said.<sup>225</sup>

The panel also recommended an increase of forces in the Asia-Pacific region to counter China. The report said the United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region to protect American lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability and defend our allies in the region.”<sup>226</sup> The call for more troops and resources in Asia is important to U.S. presence in Europe because one year later, Mr. Obama’s Administration began pivoting to Asia. Within two years, he was removing some troops from Europe.

One of the most interesting things about the National Defense Strategy was not its recommendations, but the recommendations of the panel formed to oversee it. The panel calls for more troops to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq — the U.S. administration seemed to be rationing out troops under the belief it did not need a lot of personnel to subdue Iraqi and Afghan extremists. The panel also called for an increase in Navy forces. An increase in Navy forces could translate as an increased presence in Europe because those troops would have to be located some place and Europe — Italy and Spain — would make ideal locations in part because those servicemen and women would be closer to the Middle East and possibly more cost effective to deploy into war zones.

In addition, the panel said the United States should focus more on Asia — and America did at the expense of Europe. Following this commission report, Mr. Obama started to make

---

<sup>225</sup> U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, “The Final report of the Independent Panel’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 29 July 2010 accessed on 5 December 2019 at <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hrg62163/html/CHRG-111hrg62163.htm>

<sup>226</sup> The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, the final report of the Independent Panel’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010, accessed 9 December 2019 at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/QDR-IntroCompilation.pdf>, Chapter 3, section ii.

what is now known as a Pacific Pivot, in which he turned away from Europe and turned toward Asia to confront a rising China.

Perhaps Mr. Obama rightfully thought the United States had been distracted by the wars and had ignored Asia, but his pivot ignored Europe to the advance of Asia and this could be viewed as a policy mistake because not too long afterwards, Russia began to rise in aggression and projected power.

### **III. Pacific Pivot—**

By 2011, Mr. Obama, through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, had embarked upon a Pacific Pivot — putting emphasis on China’s rise in Asia and working to counteract it by turning toward Asia. Obama, in speeches and texts, had pointed out that America had always been a Pacific nation (Hawaii, a Pacific island, became America’s 50th state in 1959; however, it was annexed in 1898 and became a U.S. territory in 1900, according to the U.S. Department of State.). However, when America was looking toward the Asian Pacific, it was feared that it forgot about its European commitments and the fear of Russian aggression.

### **IV. Defense Strategy Guidance**

In January 2012, Mr. Obama released a defense guidance, entitled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense,” that called for defense spending cuts, reduced troops, a smaller European presence and increased engagements from special operations. Mr. Obama’s plan, which was the first strategy that did not focus on Afghanistan and Iraq, was unveiled at the Pentagon. Mr. Obama said his plan called for eliminating “Cold War era systems,” so that the military could use those means and tools needed for the future battles. Mr. Obama said that while the U.S. military will be leaner, the world would know the United States would maintain its military superiority with armed forces that are agile, flexible and ready for the full range of contingencies and threats.<sup>227</sup>

---

<sup>227</sup> Obama, Barack, “Remarks by the President on the Defense Strategic Review,” 5 January 2012, accessed on 9 December 2019 at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/05/remarks-president-defense-strategic-review>.

Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, U.S. Army Europe Commander, told the Stars and Stripes newspaper in February 2012, that troop reductions would place some limits on the Army's ability to train with allies, but that American troops would continue to maintain relationships.<sup>228</sup> While the plan may hurt Europe based troops' ability to train with allies, it did include a battalion rotating from the United States to participate in European training exercises. In addition, the plan eliminated about 11,000 of the 80,000 troops based in Europe, according to the Stars and Stripes, an independent, daily newspaper owned by the U.S. Department of Defense. The troops cuts would save the United States about \$500 billion over a decade, it reported.<sup>229</sup>

The plan called for severe cuts, including:

- Inactivating the 170th Infantry Brigade in Baumholder, Germany with its 3,800 troops;
- Inactivating the 172nd Infantry Brigade in Grafenwöhr, Germany with its 3,800 troops;
- Elimination of U.S. Army's V Corps in Wiesbaden, Germany;
- Closing bases in Schweinfurt and Bamberg, Germany;
- Inactivating the 81st Fighter Squadron in Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany;
- Inactivating the 603rd Air Control Squadron at Aviano Air Base, Italy;
- Eliminating another 2,500 troops from other units over five years.<sup>230</sup>

Mr. Obama said the goal of this new strategy was to direct defense spending and new priorities. The guidance sets Mr. Obama's new priorities, including the Asia-Pacific pivot to counter China's rise and influence in the region. In a letter attached to the initiative, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, addressed China and Europe in the guidance:

*"It will have global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe and strengthen*

---

<sup>228</sup> Vandiver, John, "Pentagon lays out significant cuts to U.S. forces in Europe," 16 February 2012, accessed on the internet on 5 Dec. 2019 <https://www.stripes.com/news/pentagon-lays-out-significant-cuts-to-u-s-forces-in-europe-1.168861>.

<sup>229</sup> BBC, "U.S. to withdraw two Europe combat brigades," 12 January 2012, accessed on 9 December 2019, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/16543456>.

<sup>230</sup> Vandiver, John, "Pentagon lays out significant cuts to U.S. forces in Europe," Ibid.

*alliances and partnership across all regions. It will preserve our ability to conduct the missions we judge most important to protecting core national interests: defeating Al Qaeda and its affiliates and succeeding in current conflicts; deterring and defeating aggression by adversaries, including those seeking to deny our power projection; countering weapons of mass destruction; effectively operating in cyberspace and across all domains; maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent; and protecting the homeland.*<sup>231</sup>

In this guidance, Mr. Obama outlined his commitment to Europe, but one can see a tilt in American grand strategy to counter a growing China. He sees China's unrivaled growth and prominence a threat to the U.S. security. In the strategy Mr. Obama stated: *"Over the long term, China's emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China's military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law."*<sup>232</sup>

The defense guidance also emphasizes commitment to European allies, NATO's Smart Defense Program and the challenges of asymmetrical warfare. Europe is described as America's main partner that would continue to be an important partner in the future. The guidance said it's important for America to promote European integration and security, in part, because there are still some conflicts in Europe. (For example, in 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia and hundreds died in the conflict; there is still ethnic unrest in Kosovo, as

---

<sup>231</sup> Panetta, Leon U.S. Secretary of Defense and Obama, Barack, U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.," January 2012, introduction page, accessed 12 November 2019 at [https://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense\\_Strategic\\_Guidance.pdf](https://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf)

<sup>232</sup> Obama, Barack, U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," Ibid, page 2.

well as tensions between Russia and the Ukraine.). However, the document underscores American commitment to peace in Europe and a strong NATO. It states: *“Most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities. In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve.”*<sup>233</sup>

While the relationship between Europe and the United States will change, Obama’s strategy said America would continue its commitment to Article 5 of the NATO charter. The strategy also commits to the United States helping NATO create a “Smart Defense,” approach. Smart defense is a concept that encourages allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities to meet current security problems in according with the NATO strategic concept.<sup>234</sup>The concept calls for pooling and sharing capabilities and setting priorities and coordinating efforts better.<sup>235</sup>

Mr. Obama knew his plan would have critics. He seemed to respond to them well in advance by saying: *“Some will no doubt say that the spending reductions are too big; others will say that they’re too small. It will be easy to take issue with a particular change in a particular program. But I’d encourage all of us to remember what President Eisenhower once said -- that “each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.” After a decade of war, and as we rebuild the source of our strength -- at home and abroad -- it’s time to restore that balance.”*<sup>236</sup>

---

<sup>233</sup> Obama, Barack, U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Ibid, page 3.

<sup>234</sup> NATO Review Magazine, accessed on 12 November 2019 at <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/Topics/EN/Smart-Defence.htm>

<sup>235</sup> NATO Review Magazine, Ibid.

<sup>236</sup> Obama, Barack, “Remarks by the President on the Defense Strategic Review,” Ibid.

While Mr. Obama was correct to take a pause and be concerned about the money and personnel used in fighting two wars, he perhaps acted a bit hastily by restructuring troops to Asia at the expense of Europe. American troops should remain in Europe. U.S. forces are much more than guards and people who train with European militaries, they serve as a personal link between the United States and Europe and the relationships and training they receive in Europe would not just help military careers but form bonds between nations. These troops are also how America can project its power to its allies and its adversaries and hopefully serve as a deterrence to Russia, China and violent extremist organizations. America should have also maintained a strong presence in Europe because it would have been a sign that NATO is important and America is committed to its Article 5.

While it was prudent for the United States to shut down some bases and reduce capacity at others, not every base in Europe is helpful, useful and should be part of America's basing empire. But the drastic closures and restructuring appeared as if America was retreating not just from Europe, but from the world. About 25 percent of troops were cut from Europe under Mr. Obama's plan. The bases were much more to local citizens — the soldiers there, who interacted with the local communities, served as community liaisons, introducing them to American culture and those troops had strong economic impact in places because they purchased food, supplies and entertainment. Europe is also an ideal location when it comes to fighting and waging wars. Look at how a U.S. Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling described U.S. presence in Europe in a Washington Post newspaper article about a base closure in Baumholder, Germany: "Europe is the hallway to all the rooms in the world. Europe serves as the hallway to Africa, to Russia, to Turkey. And the presence of American troops in Europe reminds countries that are reining in defense budgets of the importance of maintaining adequate forces."<sup>237</sup> He goes on to say, "Being part of the club means more than standing up an army. It means building alliances and working together before there's a

---

<sup>237</sup> Birnbaum, Michael, "German town fears loss of U.S. Army base," 27 March 2012, The Washington Post, accessed 28 December 2019, at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/german-town-fears-loss-of-us-army-base/2012/03/23/gIQAoNzzeS\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/german-town-fears-loss-of-us-army-base/2012/03/23/gIQAoNzzeS_story.html).

threat.”<sup>238</sup> The base in Baumholder was scheduled to have troop reductions. (Some European leaders may take offense at being called a ‘hallway’ to the world, however, the general probably meant to say that Europe is an important continent that has helped America obtain access to the rest of the world.)

Mr. Obama impacted America’s access to the world when he cut the troops in Europe. America now had fewer strategically located Europe-based troops to get to hot spots around the globe and to Europe during times of crisis.

## **V. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)**

The QDR released by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel focused on rebalancing America’s military and overseas commitments. The QDR pivots the military toward the Asia Pacific, calls for overall budget cuts and troop reductions — and specifically calls for reducing European bases and troops. The QDR’s goals for America’s defense were: to protect America; to help protect global security; to project American power; and win wars against violent extremist groups.<sup>239</sup> This QDR is different from the previous document because it informs partners and allies that America will reduce its’ role in the world stage and shows hints that Mr. Obama is embracing a retrenchment foreign policy.

The QDR addresses America’s desire to keep presence in Europe, however NATO and Europe are asked to do more for their own defense. The QDR reports that “NATO provides vital collective security guarantees and is strategically important for deterring conflict, particularly in light of recent Russian aggression on its periphery.”<sup>240</sup> The QDR urges NATO members to increase their “inoperability,” so that they can handle their own defense. The QDR acknowledges America’s continuing support of Article 5 of the NATO treaty by stating: *In the event of an attack against the United States or one of its allies, the U.S. along with allies and partners will project power across multiple domains to decisively defeat the*

---

<sup>238</sup> Birnbaum, Michael, “German town fears loss of U.S. army base,” Ibid.

<sup>239</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 accessed October 2018 at [https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_Quadrennial\\_Defense\\_Review.pdf](https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf), page 5.

<sup>240</sup>Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, Ibid, page 9.

*adversary by compelling it to cease hostilities or render its military incapable of further aggression.*<sup>241</sup> But at the same time, the report calls for the “restructuring,” or removal of an unknown number of troops from Europe.

The United States sees itself as a stabilizing force for the world and the QDR reports the location of U.S. forces in Europe “underpins the security of our allies and partners, provides stability to enhance economic growth and regional integration and positions the Joint Force to execute emergency actions in response to a crisis.”<sup>242</sup> The QDR said the result of this rebalancing would be troops that are flexible, creative and integrated across its combat commands and to allow the military to rest, modernize and replace important equipment.<sup>243</sup>

But if Europe’s safety was a priority, then why did the Obama Administration close down bases in Europe? In January 2015, The Pentagon announced the closure of 15 military bases. The United States closed RAF Mildenhall and RAF Alconbury and RAF Molesworth in the United Kingdom. In Germany, the military closed Mainz Kastel, Barton Barracks, Weilimdorf Warehouse Site among other bases.<sup>244</sup> The military also announced it would reduce operations, troops and civilian workers at Lajes Field in the Azores. And by July 2015, the U.S. Army announced it would cut troops and civilian workers. The Army plan called for cutting 40,000 soldiers and 17,000 civilian employees from 30 installations over the next few years.<sup>245</sup> In 2013, the U.S. Army had 532,043 troops but that number shrunk to 465,2017 by December 2017, according to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). American total troops levels also decreased from 1.4 million in 2012 to 1.3 million in 2017, according to DMDC. If European security was still an important priority, then perhaps Mr. Obama would not have closed down so many bases or removed so many troops from the

---

<sup>241</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, Ibid, page 10.

<sup>242</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, Ibid, page 11.

<sup>243</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, Ibid, page 15.

<sup>244</sup> The full list of U.S. military base closures can be found on the Atlantic Council website at <https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/us-announces-it-will-close-15-military-bases-in-europe/>.

<sup>245</sup> Lopez, Todd, “Army to Realign Brigade, Cut 40,000 Soldiers, 17,000 Civilians,” U.S. Army 9 July 2015, accessed on 10 December 2019 at [https://www.army.mil/article/151992/army\\_to\\_realign\\_brigades\\_cut\\_40000\\_soldiers\\_17000\\_civilians](https://www.army.mil/article/151992/army_to_realign_brigades_cut_40000_soldiers_17000_civilians).



region. As America moved away from a Cold War model to fight wars, it believed it needed less troops to serve as a deterrent and fight because of technological advances of things such as smart bombs that cut down on collateral damage and more precise missiles and weapons.

By examining the QDR, one can understand that European security is important to overall world security. In the past, America located its bases in places of strategic, military, security and economic importance and if America chose to close a base then one could assume it was no longer a vital part of American strategy. (For example, one can look at the base closures in the Philippines in the 1990s or the American withdrawal from Saudi Arabia in 2003.) One could infer that Europe may not be as strategically important to the United States as it had been in the past or that there were no existential threats to Europe. While the QDR saw Russia as a threat, it was not seen as a big enough threat to continue with current troop levels in Europe or to keep all bases in Europe open. There were 64,000 active duty American troops in Europe during the 2014 QDR.

In addition to troop restructuring, the QDR placed a high priority on U.S. forces deploying and redeploying from any location in the world. The United States currently has troops on every continent in the world and according to a recent report from Smithsonian Magazine, U.S. troops have presence in 40 percent of the world's countries. The United States has assembled a military base and lily pad empire to help deploy its troops. The QDR reported the United States is *“striving to increase our agility by improving campaign planning, sustaining a resilient global posture and implementing dynamic force management processes that adjust presence in anticipation of event to better seize opportunities, deter adversaries and assure allies and partners. We also are more fully sharing forces among combatant commands to address trans regional threats. We are positioning forces where they are most needed, exemplified by our rebalance to the Asia Pacific region as well as our evolving presence in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.”*<sup>246</sup>

---

<sup>246</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, Ibid, page 15.

The QDR was not more specific regarding its' evolving presence in Europe. However, in 2014 the U.S. Army started rotating troops for 9-month deployments to Poland as part of Atlantic Resolve. According to U.S. Army Europe 6,000 troops participated in this deployment in 17 countries. Most of the troops from this deployment were based in Poland.

While most support the troop rotations to Eastern Europe, not everyone agreed with the QDR. Some critics said the report left out Europe, a valued partner and other claimed the proposal lacked money and perhaps insight. A Congressionally mandated panel, created to review QDR recommendations, also took issue with some of its plans. The panel, co-chaired by former CENTCOM Commander, Gen. John P. Abizaid and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, issued a report entitled, "Ensuring A Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, in July 2014.

Some of the defense panel's important recommendations/concerns included budget cuts, reduction of forces in Europe, lack of funding for the force structure planned and administration plans to fight wars on two fronts (such as Iraq and Afghanistan), when America might have to fight several conflicts at a time while engaging in a large war. The defense panel also discussed the growing threat of Russia and how its aggression could impact Europe.

The panel was critical of the U.S. Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), which called for mandatory budget cuts, caps on defense spending and "across-the-board cuts," called sequestration, if an agreement could not be made on what items to cut from the budget. The panel found the BCA provisions, "constitute a serious strategic misstep on the part of the United States. Not only have they cost significant investment shortfalls in the U.S. military readiness and both present and future capabilities, they have prompted our current and potential allies and adversaries to question our commitment and resolve."<sup>247</sup>

---

<sup>247</sup> Ensuring A Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, accessed 2 December 2019, at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring-a-Strong-U.S.-Defense-for-the-Future-NDP-Review-of-the-QDR.pdf>

The Budget Control Act was approved in 2011, but some aspects of the law did not go into effect until 2013. Arguably, defense took the biggest hit under the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). War spending was exempt from budget cuts, but military equipment and training were not. The defense panel said the cuts were “self-defeating.”

In addition to being critical of budget cuts, the defense panel also called for increased defense spending. The defense panel said the “capabilities and capacities,” of the QDR needed additional funding as there was a gap between what the administration wanted and what it was able to pay for. The panel wrote: “This gap is disturbing if not dangerous in light of the fact that global threats and challenges are rising, including a troubling pattern of territorial assertiveness and regional intimidation on China’s part and recent aggression of Russia in the Ukraine...”<sup>248</sup>

In addition to calling for increased funding, the defense panel said the United States should put more attention toward Europe. While the panel supported the Obama Administration’s Pacific-Pivot, it did not want to ignore Europe or decrease troops to the region. The defense panel said recent events should prompt America to pay closer attention to Europe. “*Indeed, the rapidly evolving nature of security threats to America and its allies as witnessed in the recent turbulence in the Ukraine and in the extraordinary deterioration in Iraq, during the writing of this report alone, causes us to recommend revising the force size constraint of the 2014 QDR,*” it reported.<sup>249</sup>

Troop presence in Europe is important because the more troops America has based in a country, the more bases it will likely have to house, train and care for those troops. Likewise, those troops would have access to munitions and weapons which would be stored nearby and could be used in the event of a conflict or peacekeeping mission. Troop presence can be used as a gauge of political military and security importance for the United States. If America sees itself as the arbiter of world security and a hegemon, then it might have troops

---

<sup>248</sup> Ensuring A Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, *Ibid*, introduction page viii.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid*, page viii.

in important locations across the globe. Likewise, Saying that America needs more troops in Europe could be a signal that America could focus more on Europe because it is still an important strategic partner that should not be neglected. It could also show that America could find it important to increase its power projection in Europe.

The defense panel also made recommendations regarding NATO and eastern Poland. This is important because the U.S. Congress is currently reviewing plans on whether to establish a permanent military base or bases in Poland. The panel said that, “...*Europe is a net producer of security. If that is to remain the case, NATO must bolster the security of its own frontline states, especially in the Baltics, and across Southern Europe but also in Poland, lest they be subject to intimidation and subversion. America must lead the alliance in this regard.*”<sup>250</sup> This section is also important because at the time, the United States was considering closing Lajes Air Base in Portugal.

The defense panel wrote America must continue its alliances and partnerships — most likely a reference to NATO and Partnership for Peace members which were formerly members of the former Soviet Union. NATO, on its website, characterizes the program as a way for partnership members to build a relationship with NATO. In some cases, partnership nations became NATO members (such as Estonia and Poland). The defense panel said the United States should maintain the military forces and associated capabilities required to provide credible security assurances to those allies and partners and to protect and sustain the liberal international order.”<sup>251</sup> Keeping military forces at a higher strength in Europe would mean more bases and more support staff to help this troops in their security operations.

In addition to asking America to show its commitment to NATO and partnerships by keeping troops in Europe, the defense panel also warned of the Russian threat and its

---

<sup>250</sup> Ensuring A Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Ibid, introduction page xiii.

<sup>251</sup> Ensuring A Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Ibid, introduction page 6.

implications on European and American security. The group warned that *“Russia’s recent military intervention in Crimea and its continued attempts to destabilize Ukraine, signal that Moscow is prepared to use force and coercion to pursue its interests, including in ways that violate well-established international norms. While Russia’s recent aggression actually reflects both its strengths and weaknesses as a European power, it is none-the-less clear that Russia present a more serious security threat than was the case a decade ago.”*<sup>252</sup> To support their claims, the defense panel pointed to challenges in the military and political landscape: some NATO members not fully funding defense and military modernization efforts; and some Eastern European nations were unable to provide the critical intelligence and infrastructure needed to give “strategic operation warning,” in case of an attack. The defense panel said another challenge included a reduced number of U.S. forces permanently stationed or rotationally deployed in Europe and available for rapid response to crises as well as regular training and exercises with allies.<sup>253</sup>

The defense panel report also cautioned against America’s long-standing tradition of training its troops to fight two simultaneous wars on two fronts — by arguing that America might be called to do more than fight two simultaneous wars.

If we look at this issues discussed in defense reviews through the lens of Game Theory, where there are opponents and each one wants to win, we can see that Mr. Obama created a strategy that he thought was important for his foreign policy, legacy and the future of America. Concerned with climbing budgets, defense spending and neglected American infrastructure and economic woes, Mr. Obama took the focus off of the Middle East and Europe and tried to focus on America. The military, which was responsible for a large chunk of defense spending, was the biggest target of his new stance. Mr. Obama, also wanted Europe to put more effort and money into its own defense, however, America still supported

---

<sup>252</sup>Ensuring A Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Ibid, introduction page 15.

<sup>253</sup> Ensuring A Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Ibid, introduction page 15.

Article 5 of the NATO treaty to defend allies. Mr. Obama did not stop any European bases from closing, and he also called some European-based American troops back to the United States to save funds and to encourage European partners to do more for their defense. Mr. Obama, who likened himself as the retrenchment president, wanted to focus on America, lead from the back, while America kept its place of power.

However, if this issue is examined through the lens of realism, one could argue that Mr. Obama's retrenchment could also mean a retrenchment from power. Critics, who want to win in security, win in war and win in power, could possibly see Mr. Obama's retrenchment as weakness or him giving up on chances of peace in the Middle East or peace with Russia. This mind of thought might also see America on the losing end if it cuts defense spending and removes troops from Europe.

This QDR was focused on a pivot to Asia and dealing with budget cuts. It is troubling for a nation to cut defense and troop levels while it is still at war, yet the United States, through the BCA made those deep cuts. Five years later, the United States increased spending to make up for the negative impact budget cuts had on troop readiness. The BCA has not been used by lawmakers and it is essentially dead because Congress approved a new budget measure. Defense Secretary Mark Esper, in a talk at the Brookings Institute in April 2019, said that the Army has had a 55 percent increase in brigade-level readiness since 2016.<sup>254</sup> So while Mr. Obama wanted to reduce spending and use the military in a more focused way, the military cuts ultimately impacted troop readiness.

---

<sup>254</sup> Esper, Mark, "Is the Army ready for great power competition," 30 April 2019, Brookings Institute. I attended the conference, which can be accessed at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?time\\_continue=47&v=2UGKGlvhLMU&feature=emb\\_logo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=47&v=2UGKGlvhLMU&feature=emb_logo).

## **VI. European Reassurance Initiatives (ERI) in Fiscal Years 2015, 2016 and 2017 (For**

the sake of brevity, this work will examine the first and last initiative issued by Mr. Obama.)

Mr. Obama unveiled his European Reassurance Initiative in June 2014 while on a trip to Warsaw, Poland. The initiative's purpose was to reassure Europe and NATO of America's commitment to its safety and security and to put nearly \$985 million toward that aim. The initiative was announced three months after Russia annexed Crimea. The European Union, the United States and other Democratic countries considered the annexation a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty. In response to the annexation, the EU slapped Russia with economic sanctions — freezing the assets of 170 people and 44 entities; The EU also placed sanctions on the import of products from Crimea or Sevastopol, investment in Crimea or Sevastopol, tourism and the prohibition of certain goods and technologies from the area.<sup>255</sup> In the summer of 2019, the EU extended the sanctions against Russia for another year — ending in June 2020. The United States responded to Crimean annexation by rebuking Russia and giving money, training and commitment to European allies. The United States also placed sanctions against Russia.

The ERI was used to train troops, to create and hold multi-national military exercises, to develop military equipment and capabilities; the activities all took place under Operation Atlantic Resolve, whose core mission is to enhance deterrence.<sup>256</sup> The U.S. European Command (EUCOM), oversees the initiative and Operation Resolve.

Mr. Obama's initiative gave specific assistance and training to European partners. The plan bolstered the security of NATO allies by pre-positioning more equipment in Europe and expanding military exercises and training in the European theater to increase troop

---

<sup>255</sup> European Union, "Illegal Annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol: EU extends sanctions by one year," 20 June 2019, accessed on 25 November, 2019 at [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/64430/illegal-annexation-crimea-and-sevastopol-eu-extends-sanctions-one-year\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/64430/illegal-annexation-crimea-and-sevastopol-eu-extends-sanctions-one-year_en)

<sup>256</sup> European Union Parliament Think Tank, 9 July 2018, accessed 25 November 2019 at [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)625117](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)625117).

readiness.<sup>257</sup> It also included Operation Atlantic Resolve, a measure to create a “unified response,” against Russia — if it did attack a NATO member. Here is a brief look at some of the initiative’s proposals (The Initiative has been included in the defense budget each year since 2015 and additional funding was proposed by Mr. Trump for fiscal year 2020, which will be addressed in the next chapter examining Trump’s foreign policy.).

The initiative called for sending thousands of U.S. troops to Europe or using troops already stationed in Europe to participate in training exercises with NATO member or European partners from Eastern Europe. It sent 600 U.S. troops to Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Lithuania for training exercises in 2014. The USS Donald Cook, the USS Taylor and USS Vella Gulf were sent to the Black Sea. The reason for the missions, according to the White House, was to increase troop readiness, and to develop relationships with its allies.<sup>258</sup>

In addition, the program deployed planes to Eastern Europe as part of readiness exercises in Poland and Romania. American forces also patrolled the skies over the Ukraine. The United States augmented some training missions that were previously planned and flew spy planes over Poland and Romania to “reassure allies.”

At first glance, an initiative to strengthen international cooperation, strengthen NATO and increase military funding to deter Russia would seem like a great benefit to world peace. However, there was opposition to this initiative as some thought it could backfire by provoking Russia. If Mr. Obama’s actions were viewed through a realist lens, then this program is a way to maintain American power by showing its allies that even though America is in a fiscal crisis, it still cares about European security. It recognizes that conflict is possible in the region and training with European allies could increase troop readiness. The ERI is

---

<sup>257</sup> Obama, Barack, “Remarks by President Obama and President Komorowski of Poland in a Joint Press Conference,” 3 June 2014, Warsaw, Poland, accessed on 25 November 2019 at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/remarks-president-obama-and-president-komorowski-poland-joint-press-conf>.

<sup>258</sup> The White House, “Factsheet: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of Allies and Partners,” 3 June 2014m accessed on 25 November 2019 at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-and-other-us-efforts-support->.



also a way for the United States, Europe and NATO to project power against an increasingly aggressive Russia.

The ERI was the good move by Mr Obama's administration to correct the withdrawal of so many troops from Europe — but it fell short of what was needed. It is important that Eastern European nations experience U.S. troop presence so new NATO members understand that they are also worthy of protection, if attacked. As NATO membership grows to include former Russian republics, then so should NATO and U.S. troop presence. The ERI would have been more effective if it had a permanent deployment of troops, rather than rotational troops. The troop deployments, which are usually less than a year, are not a permanent way to form relationships with Eastern European nations. The ERI also would have been more effective if Mr. Obama gave more funding to the initiative. More funding would allow for more complex training and exercise scenarios and could include additional troops sent to more regions of Europe.

#### **VII. 2015 BRAC/European Infrastructure Consolidation**

The European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC), was created by the Fiscal Year 2014 Defense bill to examine European basing, examine the need for certain European bases and offer recommendations to close or consolidate some U.S. bases in Europe.

Among its many findings, the EIC report recommended the Pentagon shutter 15 foreign bases in a measure to save \$500 million a year (This was discussed in an earlier section). The report recommended the closure of many bases in Germany, where America has the bulk of its Europe-based troops (about 30,000) and it called for "streamlining," operations and property at Lajes Field, Azores, Portugal. The streamlining recommendation was like a death bell for the Azorean base, which was operating with a small crew of airmen and had several empty buildings. The report called for reducing active duty, civilian personnel and contract workers at Lajes by two-thirds and to return several buildings to the Portuguese

government.<sup>259</sup> The Air Force originally chose to streamline the operations at Lajes because the current troop and civilian presence exceeded the requirements to support transitioning aircraft.<sup>260</sup> (This work takes a critical look at America's initial call to shutter Lajes Field or to use it in intelligence operations in an upcoming chapter.) While Obama was closing bases in Europe he was pivoting to Asia and opening bases there and in the Middle East.

The EIC is a crucial part of Obama's strategy for America's defense and foreign policy, as he talked about restructuring the military in past national security strategies and defense strategies. This report was released as America was working to end the war in Afghanistan. European bases were critical to America's Global War on Terror and fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, in part, because many of the troops stationed in Europe would train in Germany at places such as Grafenwöhr or Höhenfels before deploying to the war zones in Afghanistan.

It is interesting to note, the Obama Administration received the EIC report to close many European bases at the same time he unveiled the European Reassurance Initiative, which assisted mostly Eastern European partners. The Initiative was to let those partners know that America was concerned with their security, but it was also a shrewd move by Mr. Obama to try to keep and expand American power in the region. (Many U.S. base buildings are located in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, according to the U.S. Base Structure Report of 2018. America actually owns very few bases in Eastern Europe — with just 25 buildings in Romania and a training center in Bulgaria, the structure report concludes. The United States has several other bases and facilities that it uses in Eastern Europe, however America does not own these sites but leases or uses as part of host-nation agreements.)

In addition to base closures and consolidation, the administration announced that it would move its F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom. The

---

<sup>259</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD Announces European Infrastructure Consolidation Actions and F-35 Basing in Europe," 8 January 2015, accessed November 2018 at <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/605338/dod-announces-european-infrastructure-consolidation-actions-and-f-35-basing-in/>

<sup>260</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD Announces European Infrastructure Consolidation Actions and F-35 Basing in Europe," Ibid.

United States chose the United Kingdom because of their special relationship and the first planes will arrive in 2020, the defense department reported. Moving the F-35 to the UK was a trade off because the defense department said it was closing RAF Mildenhall — so 3,200 troops leave the UK as part of the closure and an additional 2,000 arrive to be part of the F-35 base at Lakenheath (This was also addressed earlier in the chapter).

Some of the other closings include:

- \* Closing RAF Alconbury/RAF Molesworth in the UK;
- \* Closing lots of sites in Germany, including once grand military bases in Bavaria and central Germany; As a result of some of these closures, the military also had to move some military headquarters, such as the moving of DISA-Europe from Stuttgart to Kaiserslautern, Germany;
- \* Divesting of two bases in Belgium and consolidating facilities at other locations;
- \* Closing part of bases in Italy and changing a hospital into an out-patient clinic.<sup>261</sup>

America does not just close bases to save money. As noted earlier, the United States also closes bases that are no longer deemed critical to the mission. During this time, the United States also closed bases in Afghanistan that it no longer needed. America also closed bases it no longer needed in Iraq when the war operations came to an end. If the emphasis of Mr. Obama's foreign policy is in Asia, then an argument can be made that more bases, buildings and better equipment might also be shut in location where they are no longer needed and opened in places such as Asia where those bases are mission critical. The closures could also show a decrease of influence those countries have with administration leaders and on American foreign policy. While there is a threat that Russia could invade the rest of Ukraine, there is little threat that Mr. Putin will invade Italy, Belgium, Germany or the Netherlands. These closures could also show a decreasing status of NATO,

---

<sup>261</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD Announces European Infrastructure Consolidation Actions and F-35 Basing in Europe," Ibid.

whose light seemed to darken after the successful war in Kosovo. It could also show America's displeasure in the level of defense spending from these countries.

To critics of European base closures, America was abandoning Europe and the alliance that kept the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. Perhaps Mr. Obama's plan to shutter European bases would have been more effective if it shutdown one or two more bases in Western Europe and opened a small forward operating base in Poland, Estonia or Lithuania — so that it reassured Eastern European allies. The base could have been used as part of NATO and American training exercises. In addition, the plan to shut down Lajes Field did not seem well thought out, particularly since China has expressed interest in acquiring the base and or its nearby port. Lajes Field will be discussed in depth in Chapter 7.

## **VI. 2015 National Security Strategy**

Following base closures and military restructuring, Mr. Obama released a new National Security Strategy in February 2015 which showed his emergent foreign policy goals for the nation. Just two years left in his term, Mr. Obama seemed poised to move away from a strategy that America acts alone to stop terror and aggression, to one where America asks its allies for help. The strategy is no longer focused on fighting extremist groups, and it now focuses more on Russia. Addressing Russia is an important turn of events because in the past, America addressed Russia through troop presence in Western Europe. The United States, during the Cold War, had strategically placed bases and troops so they could react to Soviet aggression. However, in the last few years, the United States had closed bases in Europe and reduced troops and retreated from the world stage — and perhaps emboldened Russia to fill a void and or act more aggressively in the region.

The top threats identified by the strategy were: cyber threats to American technologies; growing aggression from Russia in Eastern Europe; Climate Change; and infectious diseases. Violent extremist organizations, such as Al Qaeda and ISIL and keeping

Americans safe around the world were also listed as threats.<sup>262</sup> Mr. Obama wrote in the strategy's introduction letter: *"Any successful strategy to ensure the safety of the American people and advance our national security interests must begin with an undeniable truth — America must lead. Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is, never whether America should lead, but how we lead."*<sup>263</sup>

But how would America lead, when Mr. Obama was quickly becoming known for his European retrenchment? He did not send troops to help Ukraine keep the peace when Russia annexed Crimea and his European Reassurance Initiative only sent a few thousand additional troops to Europe through troop rotations. He also did not send troops to Syria after it was discovered that Syrian military forces used Sarin gas in combat, killing scores of civilians. In 2013, Mr. Obama had said if Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad's regime used chemical weapons, that America would take action, but he did not commit to out right war, according to news reports. After chemical weapons were used in Syria, Mr. Obama did not send American troops to Syria or bomb targets as it had been feared, but asked the U.S. Congress for authorization to go to war, according to news reports. The United States, at the time of the Syrian conflict, was trying to loose itself from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as looking at ways to downsize the military while not negatively impacting troop readiness. When Mr. Obama did not send troops to Syria, he lost respect in the eyes of some and his inaction possibly negatively impacted his legacy. However, Russia and Turkey did involve itself with Syrian conflict.

In his 2015 strategy, Mr. Obama said his administration is aware of lessons learned in the Cold War draw down that took place in Europe in the 1990s and said he was committed

---

<sup>262</sup> Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy, February 2015, accessed November 2018 at [https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015\\_national\\_security\\_strategy\\_2.pdf](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf)

<sup>263</sup> Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy, February 2015, accessed November 2018 at [https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015\\_national\\_security\\_strategy\\_2.pdf](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf), *ibid.*

to a “dominant,” fighting force. However, some would argue there are not enough American fighters left in Europe to be a true deterrent to an aggressive Russia or to violent extremist groups that might try to harm Europe. Europol, the European Law Enforcement Agency, reported in 2014 the overall threat to EU security is likely to increase and that Al Qaeda and ISIS have retained their capability to recruit and train jihadists from Europe.<sup>264</sup> Europol said it was concerned religious fighters who travel to Europe from conflict zones could possibly attack an EU country; it also reported a total of 201 failed, foiled or completed terrorist attacks were reported by EU member states, with more than half coming from the United Kingdom.<sup>265</sup> And while Russia is seen as a great threat to Europe, the national strategy does not mention possible terror attacks in Europe by violent extremist groups.

While Mr. Obama did not specifically discuss non-Russian threats to Europe, he addressed America’s ongoing commitment to Europe and NATO. He said: *“The United States maintains a profound commitment to an Europe that is free, whole and at peace. A strong Europe is our indispensable partner, including for tackling global security challenges, promoting prosperity and upholding international norms. Our work with Europe leverages out strong and historic bilateral relationships throughout the continent.”*<sup>266</sup>

In a section on security, the strategy addressed the need to strengthen defense through modernizations and restructuring. It also discussed the European Base Closure report, which was already discussed in this chapter.

The NSS finally recognizes Russia as a major threat, but unfortunately it is after it annexed part of the Ukraine. In addition to annexing part of its territory, Russia shut down its pipeline giving natural gas to the country when the two had a disagreement about debt and price increases according to an article by the BBC. Ukraine receives 50 percent of its natural gas from Russia, it was reported. Russia’s gas pipe supply line runs through the Ukraine and

---

<sup>264</sup> EUROPOL, “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015,” accessed on 10 December 2019 at [www.europol.europa.eu](http://www.europol.europa.eu), page 6.

<sup>265</sup> EUROPOL, “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015, Ibid, pages 6 and 8.

<sup>266</sup> Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy, February 2015, Ibid, page 24.

then to several EU countries and about 70 percent of its gas to the EU is sent through those gas pipes.<sup>267</sup>

In addition to the Ukraine, Europe is growing increasingly concerned about rising terror attacks and American retrenchment. It may have been more prudent if Mr. Obama created a strategy with NATO that would increase European security while also working to deal with Russian and Chinese aggression.

---

<sup>267</sup> Kirby, Paul, "Russia gas fight with Ukraine," 31 October 2014, BBC, *Ibid.*

## VII. 2015 National Defense Strategy

The National Defense Strategy, issued in June 2015, had a slightly different focus than the 2011 document, probably because the Iraq War had been considered concluded in 2011 – American troops were now in Iraq to train local forces, serve as advisors and assist American embassy staff with security. While one war was over, the United States was still fighting threats from violent extremist organizations such as Al Qaeda, and ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also called ISIS). In the opening pages of the military strategy, U.S. Army General Martin E. Dempsey, said that America’s priorities were, “... the security of the United States, its citizens and U.S. allies and partners; a strong innovative and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for universal values at home and around the world; and a rules based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.”<sup>268</sup>

While some in the defense and political community took issue with a military strategy that used “respect for universal values,” as an American goal, the strategy seemed to be on point with Mr. Obama’s goal of countering Russia, restructuring the military and keeping America and its allies safe. The military strategy does not discuss European bases, but does address America’s commitment to Europe and its allies. The report also served as a reminder to allies that America would be involved in the formation of a world “security environment” and would maintain its long standing alliances.

Regarding Russia, the report said Russia does not respect its neighbor’s sovereignty and has used its military to hurt regional security. The strategy called on American forces to create plans for dealing with “revisionist states,” such as Russia and extremist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIL. While no nation was named, the report goes on to say that such countries have, *“the capability to contest regional freedom of movement and threaten our*

---

<sup>268</sup> Dempsey, Martin, E., U.S. Army General, “National Military Strategy of the United States of America, June 2015, accessed November 2018, at [https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015\\_National\\_Military\\_Strategy.pdf?source=GovDelivery](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf?source=GovDelivery) .



*homeland. Of particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles, precision strike technologies, unmanned systems, space and cyber capabilities and weapons of mass destruction.*<sup>269</sup>

While the United States recognized the Russian threat, the report should have addressed more specific ways the United States would deter Russia. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appeared on France 24 TV in June 2015 to address Russia's increased aggression. Russia was threatened by the United States pre-positioning its vehicles and equipment in Europe as part of its ERI, according to the news report. Stoltenberg was quoted as saying: "We will not be dragged into an arms race but we must keep our countries safe. ... What Russia has done in Ukraine is not defensive; to annex Crimea ... that is an act of aggression."<sup>270</sup>

The article also said Russia was modernizing its armed forces and would add 40 new nuclear ballistic missiles in 2015.<sup>271</sup>

This is a clear indication that Russia feels threatened and wants to threaten its neighbors in response. Mr. Obama could have taken a more forceful posture such as sending more troops back to Europe to reassure allies. However, the 2017 European Reassurance Initiative did provide additional funding for training and allowed for a temporary increase in troops.

### **VIII. European Reassurance Initiative of 2017**

Mr. Obama released his last ERI in January 2017, his last month in office. In November 2016, Real Estate Tycoon Donald Trump was elected president of the United States and was able to craft his own funding program for U.S. forces training in Europe. However, Mr. Obama's plan gave \$3.4 billion toward European security.

---

<sup>269</sup> Dempsey, Martin, E., U.S. Army General, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America, June 2015, Ibid, page .

<sup>270</sup> France 24, "NATO: Russian 'aggression' in Ukraine must be countered," 24 June 2015, accessed 28 December 2019 at <https://www.france24.com/en/20150624-nato-russian-aggression-ukraine-must-be-counterred>.

<sup>271</sup> France 24, "NATO: Russian 'aggression' in Ukraine must be countered," Ibid.

The plan used \$1.8 billion to preposition military equipment and weapons in Europe; \$163.1 million for exercises and training and \$189 million to improve Infrastructure.<sup>272</sup> A 4,000 member Army brigade combat team rotated to Europe under the initiative — which consisted of seven battalions, 90 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles and 112 support vehicles, according to a news release from the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado rotated to Poland, while the equipment and gear were repositioned to seven Eastern European countries.<sup>273</sup>

In addition to sending troops and gear to Eastern Europe, the initiative provided funding so 18,000 U.S. forces could train with 24,000 NATO and partnership troops, according to EUCOM. Through the ERI, EUCOM said it has been able to increase America's rotational presence in Europe, increase America's participation in training exercises with European partners and improved infrastructure so that U.S. forces can have greater responsiveness in Europe.<sup>274</sup>

Many U.S. lawmakers and NATO partners saw the ERI as a positive step in ensuring the safety of Europe and deterring Russian aggression. However, some thought the plan did not go far enough. Frederico Bartels and Daniel Kochis, in a scholarly paper for conservative American think tank, The Heritage Foundation, said the ERI needs “enduring support,” and permanent funding. They said for military planning and geopolitical signaling, the United States would be better served if ERI funding were merged into the Defense Department's base budget,<sup>275</sup> thus guaranteeing permanent funding for European security. Bartels and

---

<sup>272</sup> Bartels, Frederico and Kochis, Daniel, “Congress Should Transform the European Deterrence Initiative into an Enduring Commitment,” *Backgrounder Magazine*, The Heritage Foundation, Issue No. 3319, 29 May 2018, accessed 10 December 2019 at [https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/BG3319\\_2.pdf](https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/BG3319_2.pdf)

<sup>273</sup> EUCOM, “European Initiative Fact Sheet,” 5 January 2017, accessed on 10 December 2019 at <https://www.eucom.mil/media-library/document/35544/eri-fact-sheet>.

<sup>274</sup> EUCOM, “European Reassurance Initiative Fact Sheet 2017,” *Ibid.*

<sup>275</sup> Bartels, Frederico and Kochis, Daniel, “Congress Should Transform the European Deterrence Initiative into an Enduring Commitment,” *Ibid.*, page 1.

Kochis believe the initiative could help America rebuild European presence, after it reduced troops in Europe because of budget constraints. Now that the rebuilding continues, the initiative's funding is crucial to these efforts, they said.<sup>276</sup>

They said deterring further Russian aggression through a strong U.S. security presence in Europe and a robust leadership role in NATO is in America's national interest, and that capabilities, interoperability, and presence are vital to and deserve continued support."<sup>277</sup>

While some scholars call for permanent funding for the ERI, perhaps a better solution would be to end the program and permanently deploy additional troops back to Europe. In addition, the defense department could mandate that those 'new' troops train with NATO allies and conduct exercises so as to improve troop readiness and reaction times in case of a crisis. ERI is a patch for the problem Mr. Obama created when he reduced troop numbers in Europe. A more permanent cure would be to send more troops to Europe on a permanent (non-rotational) basis.

## **IX. Conclusion**

When Mr. Obama was elected to lead the United States, he was faced with budget woes and climbing defense costs. America was involved in two wars, and troop surges and counterinsurgencies were necessary to help end the war in Iraq, but not Afghanistan. At the time of this report, the Afghanistan war continues, but Mr. Trump is negotiating a peace deal with the Taliban. Mr. Obama made it clear when elected that his focus would be on Asia — and countering China's rise in the region. During his tenure he refocused defense spending, troops and programs to Asia in an attempt to not only counter China but to increase America's stature as it had neglected the Asia Pacific.

And while Mr. Obama was focused on Asia, some in Europe felt slighted, particularly when Mr. Obama cut defense spending which had the disastrous effect of closing 15 military

---

<sup>276</sup> Bartels, Frederico and Kochis, Daniel, "Congress Should Transform the European Deterrence Initiative into an Enduring Commitment," *Ibid*, page 2.

<sup>277</sup> Bartels, Frederico and Kochis, Daniel, "Congress Should Transform the European Deterrence Initiative into an Enduring Commitment," *Ibid*, page 2.

bases in Europe, deactivating V Corp and moving troops from Europe to America. In the process, the U.S. military had to cut thousands of troops and refocus on the American home front. In addition to cutting defense spending, Mr. Obama had to find ways to convince European partners that America was still concerned with its security even though America faced budget constraints. Mr. Obama's European Reassurance Initiative helped keep American presence in Europe — but on a smaller scale and in a way that Europe had to be more involved with its own security. Mr. Obama had committed himself to European safety, but he felt America could no longer fund as many troops and bases in Europe. His actions showed that Europe was important to America, but less important than the Asian Pacific and Middle East.

Mr. Obama had critics — both from within and outside his political party. While not everyone agreed with his choices, his decisions were colored by America's economic picture of spending money on wars and conflicts. To opponents, Mr. Obama had no ties to Europe and didn't value the special relationship. To supporters, he was doing the best he could to ensure everyone's security under tight budget constraints. While both sides may have valid points in terms of military funding and European presence, the ultimate winner in this issue will be whether peace holds in Europe, if Russia continues to emerge as an aggressor in the future and if NATO members spend more on their own defense.

By the end of his tenure, Mr. Obama was trying to explain his foreign policy choices and frame his legacy. Following the November 2016 election of Mr. Trump, Mr. Obama toured Europe confirming America's commitment to NATO and European defense. In what was termed as a "legacy speech," Mr. Obama talked about NATO and U.S. presence in Europe.

"In recent years, we've made historic investments in NATO, increased America's presence in Europe, and today's NATO — the world's greatest alliance — is as strong and as ready as its' ever been. And I am confident that just as America's commitment to the transatlantic alliance has endured for seven decades — whether it's been under a

Democratic or Republican administration — that commitment will continue, including our pledge and our treaty obligation to defend every ally.”<sup>278</sup>

In the next chapter, this work examines the foreign policy of Mr. Trump, including his strategy for NATO and U.S. troop presence in Europe.

---

<sup>278</sup> Obama, Barack, “Remarks by President Obama at Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center in Athens,” The White House, 16 November 2016, accessed 10 December 2019 at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/11/16/remarks-president-obama-stavros-niarchos-foundation-cultural-center>.

## Chapter 6 —

### An examination of U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy, as it relates to U.S. base strategy in Europe from January 2017 to December 2019



President Donald Trump talking with servicemembers at the Pentagon, by Sgt. Amber I Smith. Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense. (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense visual information does not imply or constitute DOD endorsement.)

Real Estate Mogul and TV personality Donald Trump campaigned for the presidency by promising to “Make America Great Again,” and to put “America First.” His catchy slogans caught the attention of a public tired of foreign wars and foreign affairs taking up the budget and the government’s attention. When he was elected as the 45th president of the United States of America, Mr. Trump set about undoing what he saw as past wrongs to the military, the American public, and to the American economy.

Mr. Trump has been called a ‘bully,’ ‘unpredictable’ and a bit ‘crude’ — and has appeared to shake world leaders who are not used to such presidential behavior. On December 18, 2019, President Trump was impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives. However, he remained America’s leader and served out his term, but the impeachment vote meant some lawmakers did not think he should be president. While some critics may not agree with Mr. Trump’s views or the way he governs, many will agree he created a different methodology to deal with world than his predecessor Mr. Obama. He

campaigned to put America first and when it comes to foreign affairs, the Trump Doctrine is lead by what he calls 'Principled Realism.' While it is appropriate to put one's country first, some of Mr. Trump's rhetoric seemed to imply that America was the most important country in the world and for that reason it should be 'first.' He also seemed to encourage the growth of nationalism among some of his supporters; And Mr. Trump's self-avowed nationalistic tendencies did not always sit well with political adversaries or allies.<sup>279</sup>

This chapter examines Mr. Trump's foreign policy during his three years in office, ending December 27, 2019. It focuses on how he handled foreign bases, overseas troops, national security, defense and the safety of the United States and its Western European allies. It will not focus on his U.S. House impeachment, Mr. Trumps' bid for reelection or domestic issues — unless it is related to U.S. bases in Europe. The work begins by examining and defining the Trump Doctrine, and next, analyzing budget decisions, national strategies, speeches, news reports and scholarly papers. The purpose is show how it might lead Mr. Trump to make certain policy decisions. The previous chapter discussed Mr. Obama's foreign policy and this chapter focuses on Mr. Trump's foreign policy, but will compare and contrast the two leaders because they have such divergent policies. Because Mr. Trump has not yet completed a full term in office, this work will use two exploratory scenarios to address issues that could happen in the future of Mr. Trump's term in office.

Mr. Trump, a staunch critic of his predecessor, Mr. Obama, seemed to set about undoing much of what Mr. Obama had accomplished during his two terms of office. Mr Trump: ended the North American Free Trade Agreement; ended U.S. participation in the Iran Nuclear Deal; removed the United States from the Trans Pacific Partnership; told the world America would not sign on to the Paris Climate Accord; publicly lambasted NATO members for not "paying their fair share," regarding defense and European security; and

---

<sup>279</sup> In an news article in USA Today newspaper, Trump said he was a nationalist: Cummings, William, "I am a nationalist: Trump's embrace of controversial label sparks uproar," 24 October 2018, USA Today, accessed on 28 December 2020 at <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/10/24/trump-says-hes-nationalist-what-means-why-its-controversial/1748521002/>

tried to make nice with North Korea dictator Kim Jung-un in a summit and then halted a large training exercise with South Korean forces and U.S. troops. Instead of an Asian pivot (like Mr. Obama) and sending troops to Asia, Mr. Trump pivoted toward America and domestic issues. Trump didn't want to be a retrenchment president like Mr. Obama — he still wanted to use and keep American power. He also wanted to remind the world that America was once powerful and remains powerful.

Mr. Trump used the military to remind people of America's power. He pledged to increase military funding to modernize a military that fought two simultaneous wars and assisted allies in Syrian and Libya. Mr. Trump also increased funding to help bolster European security through the European Deterrence Initiative and the annual defense budget. Mr. Trump at first wanted to work with Russia, but began criticizing the country for its aggression. Mr. Trump talked tough about American adversaries, but he did want to send troops to Syria, Iran or Venezuela. While Mr. Obama was hawkish, Mr. Trump seemed reluctant to involve America in any more conflict.

Mr. Trump unveiled his doctrine — “Principled Realism, ” in a May 2017 speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This was one of the first indications of how he wanted to govern and engage with global partners. Mr. Trump outlined his vision in the speech: *“Our friends will never question our support, and our enemies will never doubt our determination. Our partnerships will advance security through stability, not through radical disruption. We will make decisions based on real-world outcomes — not inflexible ideology. We will be guided by the lessons of experience, not the confines of rigid thinking. And, whenever possible, we will seek gradual reforms — not sudden intervention.”*<sup>280</sup>

---

<sup>280</sup> Trump, Donald, “President Tump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit,” 21 May 2017, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, accessed 12 December 2019 at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit/>.



At first glance, Mr. Trump's "Principled Realism," seems simple, not unfamiliar and a bit nationalistic, yet it has supporters and critics on all sides of the political spectrum. It is not an Obama-era retrenchment policy, but a reintroduction of an America that no longer faces the Asia-Pacific. While some welcomed America taking a step back from being the world's police force, others opposed a doctrine they felt focused too much on American power.

Ishaan Tharoor, a journalist for the Washington Post, wrote an analysis article that said Mr. Trump's doctrine was "an incoherent mess." He added, that the irony is that Trump's international agenda is neither principled, not pragmatic and has always been guided by ideology.<sup>281</sup>

Tharoor was not alone in his harsh criticism of Mr. Trump's doctrine. Eliot Cohen, in an article for Foreign Affairs Magazine, said Mr. Trump's foreign policy was "curious," and "disturbing." He writes: "The president has outlined a deeply misguided foreign policy vision that is distrustful of our allies, scornful of international institutions and indifferent if not downright hostile to the liberal international order that the United States has sustained for nearly 80 decades." <sup>282</sup>

Trump's principled realism has its critics, even within his own administration and has caused consternation in staff meetings, according to media reports. Former Secretary of Defense, Gen. Jim Mattis, in an article in Politico, was quoted in a new book as being critical of Trump's national security policies. *"Asked in a private meeting in June 2018 whether he thought the commander and chief was strengthening America, Mattis responded: 'No, I don't. I do not think Trump's policies will make America stronger.' The conversation occurred*

---

<sup>281</sup> Tharoor, Ishaan, "Trump's Principled Realism is an Incoherent Mess," 20 September 2019, Washington Post, accessed on 12 December 2019 at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/20/trumps-principled-realism-is-an-incoherent-mess/>.

<sup>282</sup> Cohen, Eliot, A., "America's Long Goodbye: The real crisis of the Trump era," January/February 2019, Foreign Affairs Magazine, accessed 12 December 2019 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/long-term-disaster-trump-foreign-policy>.

*after the president's first summit meeting with North Korea dictator Kim Jong Un and Trump's subsequent decision to cancel war games with South Korea.*"<sup>283</sup>

Mattis resigned from his post in February 2019 and did not talk negatively about the Trump Administration or its policies. However, according to the article in Politico, Mattis thought the president's foreign policies could potentially weaken America. Mattis is one of several Trump high-ranking staffers to have left their posts, without serving a full-term or even most of the initial term, which is usually customary in Washington.

In the book, "Holding the Line: Inside Trump's Pentagon with Secretary Mattis," author Guy Snodgrass, a retired U.S. Navy Commander, said Mattis's public solidarity crumbled in private as his frustration grew at Trump's dismissal of allies and shoot-from-the-hip pronouncements."<sup>284</sup>

But not everyone agreed with Mattis, Tharoor and Cohen. In fact, some thought this new pivot and doctrine was just what America needed.

Michael Anton, a former National Security Council member who served under Trump, said in a Foreign Policy Magazine article that Mr. Trump is trying to "correct the course," not destroy the United States. Anton describes the Trump Doctrine in this manner: *"Let's put our own countries first, and be candid about it and recognize that it's nothing to be ashamed of. Putting our interests first will make us all safer and more prosperous. If there is a Trump Doctrine, that's it."*<sup>285</sup>

And the Hoover, Institution, a conservative think tank, has written a bevy of articles about Mr. Trump's doctrine.

---

<sup>283</sup> Bender, Bryan, "The White House is not to be Trusted Right Now," Politico magazine, 22 October 2019, accessed 5 November, 2019 at <https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/22/trump-jim-mattis-policies-book-054967>.

<sup>284</sup> Bender, Bryan, "The White House is not to be Trusted Right Now," Ibid.

<sup>285</sup> Anton, Michael, "The Trump Doctrine," 20 April, 2019, Foreign Policy Magazine, accessed 12 December 2019 at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/20/the-trump-doctrine-big-think-america-first-nationalism/>.

Robert G. Kaufman, a conservative scholar and Mr. Obama critic, seemed cautiously optimistic about the Trump Doctrine, saying it is rooted in “shared values.” Kaufman was critical of Mr. Obama for not truly understanding Russian President Vladimir Putin as an adversary and for not paying enough attention to Europe. He is also critical of Mr. Trump, but offers a more hopeful prognosis of his doctrine. Kaufman writes: “... The Trump Administration has bolstered deterrence against Russian imperialism, reaffirming the importance of NATO, rebuilding the American military, increasing American presence in Eastern Europe, resisting rather than enabling Russia’s subversion of Ukraine’s independence, arming Ukraine’s freedom fighters and accelerating the development and deployment of missile defense, including Eastern Europe.”<sup>286</sup> Kaufman is also supportive of the Trump Doctrine because it does not put a time line on troop withdrawals in places such as Afghanistan. Instead it focuses on winning conflicts.

While Kaufman said that principled realism corrects the Obama Doctrine, he is also critical of Mr. Trump, saying that he has a “transactional view of politics.” Regarding Mr. Trump’s doctrine, Kaufman said unharnessed to principle, the art of the deal can dangerously descend into unsteadiness, unpredictability, and expedience inimical to vindicating the national interest, rightly understood.”<sup>287</sup>

Mr. Kaufman is correct that Mr. Trump has a transactional view of politics. Mr. Trump was a successful businessman known for constructing casinos, towering buildings and golf resorts. This work does not agree that ‘principled realism,’ is a mess or disturbing — it is just Mr. Trump’s political view of the world. It also takes into account his focus on power and strength and re-establishing the United States as a more powerful nation after eight years under Mr. Obama. Mr. Trump’s principled realism appears a bit selfish, in that it puts America

---

<sup>286</sup> Kaufman, Robert, G., “Two First Quarter Cheers for Trump’s Principled Realism,” *Strategika Magazine*, Issue No. 45, September 2017, accessed 15 December 2019 at [https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika\\_45\\_web.pdf](https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika_45_web.pdf), page 5.

<sup>287</sup> Kaufman, Robert, G. “Two First Quarter Cheers for Trump’s Principled Realism,” *Ibid*, page 6.

first and other countries last. And it is a big nationalistic, which pre-World War II Germany demonstrated that nationalism can become dangerous when pushed too far.

But principled realism has positive aspects, such as Mr. Trump's commitment to rebuild the military through modernization and increasing troop strength in the United States and in Europe. However, because he takes the position that America is first and above all others, it has somewhat hurt the United States' relations with European allies, especially since Mr. Trump has publicly attacked leaders Angela Merkel of Germany and Emmanuel Macron of France for not spending enough on defense spending; He also publicly considered withdrawing the United States from NATO.

While Mr. Trump has been quite outspoken about what he thinks about European leaders and decisions, some find his brand of leadership refreshing, in that there is no doubt how he feels, in part because he has used social media to criticize partners and even to fire his own staff. He has maintained a mainly favorable approval rating — until the controversy swirled about the Ukraine matter and subsequent impeachment. In a recent Gallup Poll survey, Mr. Trump received a 45 percent job approval rating.<sup>288</sup> Mr. Obama had a lower job approval rating during his third year in office, at 43 percent.<sup>289</sup>

Mr. Trump has been in office for just three years and has drastically changed American foreign policy from the previous administration and caused some allies to wonder in what direction is America going and what does it mean for European security?

If Mr. Trump is viewed through the lens of realism, specifically principled realism, then one can see he is focused on what he thinks is best for the United States and how he could "Make America Great Again." This work will give a scholarly definition of "principled realism," to help with the analysis and will use the work of scholar Mark R. Amstutz, who said principled realism integrates political morality with the responsible use of power and it

---

<sup>288</sup> Gallup, "President Approval Ratings — Donald Trump," the survey was taken Dec. 2-5, 2019 and the results were accessed on 26 December 2019 at <https://news.gallup.com/poll/203198/presidential-approval-ratings-donald-trump.aspx>

<sup>289</sup> Gallup, "president Approval Ratings — Donald Trump," Ibid.

sees an anarchic community where power is necessary to protect and secure interests.<sup>290</sup> Moreover, Amstutz argues, principled realists are skeptical of the role of global institutions in maintaining global order, promoting human rights and protecting the global commons.<sup>291</sup>

When we view Mr. Trump and his actions through this lens, then perhaps a better understanding of his decisions could be made. Mr. Trump appears to be obsessed with American power — keeping it, projecting it and he seems to act as if American power could be used in a ‘transactional’ way. He wants America to be ‘great;’ he wants to leave treaties and pacts that are not good for the country and complains about NATO members not paying their fair share. And in response for that payment, he seems to infer that allies can enjoy in American power and its military strength. Mr. Trump probably sees himself as ‘courageous’ for addressing NATO funding because previous administrations have only hinted at the issue. Mr. Trump, however, has seized on it and even personally attacked foreign leaders for low defense spending.

When Mr. Trump talks of ‘Making America Great Again,’ he is talking about specific moral values he associates with the United States. When he cancels American participating in climate accords, treaties or deals, it could be based on him wanting the best deal that he can for America — a powerful country. When he decides to increase military funding and put a halt to military cuts, it could also be an issue of power — of wanting America to project power and keep power in the world.

When Mr. Trump was elected president, he faced a dilemma on how to best proceed for the nation, its foreign policy and his own legacy. This work will examine four of the dilemmas Mr. Trump faced in his foreign policy:

1. Mr. Trump could have followed Mr. Obama’s policy and continued the budget cuts, retrenchment and Asian pivot. Mr. Obama had decided that a rising China and its economic growth was a threat to the United States. He also determined America was

---

<sup>290</sup> Amstutz, Mark, R., *International Ethics: Concepts, Theories and Cases in Global Politics*, (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Press, 2005) page 60.

<sup>291</sup> Amstutz, Mark, R., *International Ethics*, Ibid, page 60.

spending too much on defense and he closed European bases and cut troops. Mr. Trump could have done the same and even replaced China with North Korea as an important adversary. But he did not.

2. Mr. Trump could have turned inward to the United States and focused on domestic policies, putting world affairs at the bottom of his agenda, while at the same time, finding a balance with foreign nations so that America maintained its power projection.

3. Mr. Trump could have focused on the Middle East, trying to end conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria and attempt to bring more stability to Iraq. While Mr. Trump is currently negotiating with the Taliban to end the nearly 20 year war, the war has not been a priority for him. He still wants to win, but seems reticent to send any more troops to Afghanistan or expand the war to stop the Taliban resurgence.

4. Mr. Trump could have focused on domestic issues first, then focused on Asia (North Korea), the Middle East and Europe. Mr. Trump appeared to take this road in the early parts of his administration, focusing on domestic issues, ending programs, pacts and treaties he felt were unfair for the United States. He held summits in North Korea and started a trade war with China. He is trying to win the Afghanistan war and increased troops there and also reduced the number of troops in Syria. He continues to be critical of NATO and European leaders for not spending enough on defense and floated plans to ask foreign countries to pay more to host U.S. troops in their countries. Nearly all of his actions seemed to echo principled realism because it deals with American power and projection of power. Principled realism also offers a better understanding of Mr. Trump's seemingly distrust of NATO and international treaties and pacts.

Mr. Trump clearly changed the trajectory of American foreign policy, by turning America inward without hiding from the global stage. China's rise is not a priority, but considered important. Likewise, it is important to him that America ends its war in Afghanistan while also modernizing the military and maintaining its troop strength. In the

following pages, this work will examine Mr. Trump's National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, speeches and social media to gain clearer insight on his commitment to European Security and U.S. military presence in Europe and therefore U.S. military bases on the continent. This chapter will also conclude with two exploratory scenarios on what could happen in the Trump Administration.

### **I. The National Security Strategy of 2017**

Mr. Trump released his National Security Strategy in December 2017 and it focused on domestic issues, such as rebuilding America's economy and its military. While Mr. Obama's strategies focused outward on wars in the Middle East and China's rise, Mr. Trump's strategy focuses inward, onto how he can make the country more prosperous, while maintaining its military advantage and power in the global arena. He outlines his strategies in four pillars that focus on improving national and border security, promoting economic prosperity, rebuilding the military and spreading America's influence around the globe. The most interesting pillar, in terms of the research, is Pillar III, which aims to "preserve peace through strength."

In his opening statements, Mr. Trump vowed to rebuild America's military and its economy. Mr. Trump wrote: "It is a strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology. It is based upon the view that peace, security and prosperity depend on strong, sovereign nations that respect their citizens at home and cooperate to advance peace abroad. And it is grounded in the realization that American principles are a lasting force for good in the world."<sup>292</sup>

While three of the four pillars focus on domestic issues, Pillar III focuses on military strength and threats such as Russia and China. Unlike Mr. Obama's strategies that focused on war, Mr. Trump focuses on threats such as Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and violent extremists groups such as ISIS. Regarding Russia and China, the strategy said the

---

<sup>292</sup> Trump, Donald, "The National Security Strategy," December 2017, accessed 6 February 2018 at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>, page 1.

adversaries want to form the world in a way that is “antithetical to U.S. values and interests.” Russia, according to the report, seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders and weaken American influence, while dividing America from its allies and partners.<sup>293</sup> The strategy said Russia sees NATO and the European Union as a threat and to that aim, is modernizing its military. Russia is investing in new military capabilities such as nuclear systems that remain the most significant existential threat to the United States and is also investing in destabilizing cyber capabilities, according to the report.<sup>294</sup> The report was critical of Russian influence and interference on a global scale. It writes: “... Russia interference in the domestic and political affairs of countries around the world. The combination of Russian ambition and growing military capabilities create an unstable frontier in Eurasia, where the risk of conflict due to Russia miscalculation is growing.”<sup>295</sup>

Because the strategy focuses on Russia, it highlights the importance of U.S. military presence in Europe. Russia has a nuclear arsenal and is again seen as an ‘existential threat’ to the safety and security in Europe. In the past, when the Soviet Union was seen as a threat during the Cold War, the United States responded by increasing troops in Europe and also by expanding its military basing system in Europe, particularly in places such as Germany. But under the Obama and Trump administrations, the focus has been shifted to Eastern European nations who complain of Russia’s aggression. The United States responded by creating the European Reassurance Initiative, which was renamed the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) under the Trump administration. The United States has spent \$17 billion since the program began to beef up European security and reassure Eastern European nations that America is committed to their safety, according to media reports. The United States also began rotating troops into the region, primarily Poland. In October 2019, the

---

<sup>293</sup> Trump, Donald, “The National Security Strategy,” December 2017, Ibid, pages 25 and 26.

<sup>294</sup> Trump, Donald, “The National Security Strategy,” December 2017, Ibid, page 26.

<sup>295</sup> Trump, Donald, “National Security Strategy,” December 2017, Ibid, page 26.



United States began the rotation of its latest troops and equipment (1st Cavalry Division from Fort Hood, Texas) that would temporarily train in the region, according to media reports. The United States is also considering building a permanent base in Poland — which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Mr. Trump appears to see European safety as a higher priority than Mr. Obama, even though Mr. Trump is publicly critical of NATO countries for not spending enough on defense. His strategy discusses the Russian threat and U.S. generals have also addressed Russian aggression before panels and commissions. If Russia is considered a threat worthy of pages in a security strategy — not just paragraphs, then it can be a good indication that America might be willing to make countermeasures to meet that threat. Mr. Trump also said he wanted to stop the depletion of the military, to ensure there are enough troops and modern equipment to protect American interests. The strategy reports: “To prevail, we must integrate all elements of America’s national power — political, economic and military. Our allies and partners must also contribute the capabilities and demonstrate the will to confront shared threats. Experience suggests that the willingness of rivals to abandon or forge aggression depends on their perception of U.S. strength and the vitality of our alliances.”<sup>296</sup>

Following mentions of Russia and China, the strategy addresses military troop strength and modernization. Defense spending was critically impacted under the Obama Administration, with mandated defense cuts called sequestration. Mr. Trump was critical of those cuts saying it was a major contributor to the “erosion of America’s military dominance.”<sup>297</sup> The military, the strategy states, did not keep step with technological advances or threats. The United States believed incorrectly that technology could compensate for reduced capacity — for the ability to field enough forces to prevail militarily, consolidate gains and achieve the desired political goals, it reported.<sup>298</sup> The strategy said

---

<sup>296</sup> Trump, Donald, “National Security Strategy,” December 2017, Ibid, page 26.

<sup>297</sup> Trump, Donald, “National Security Strategy,” December 2017, Ibid, page 26.

<sup>298</sup> Trump, Donald, “National Security Strategy,” December 2017, Ibid, page 27.

that United States mistakenly believed it could fight wars and win quickly without many casualties.<sup>299</sup> But when the United States made defense cuts, China and Russia began to rise.

The strategy pointed out that Russia and China are fielding military capabilities designed to deny American access in times of crisis and to contest its ability to operate in critical commercial zones during peace time.<sup>300</sup> The strategy categorized Russia and China are contesting the geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.<sup>301</sup> If Russia and China want to change the international order, then as a principled realist, Mr. Trump could want to keep an order where America is the sole super power or perhaps the dominant power. His strategy also stated that deterrence is more challenging today than during the Cold War, but that the United States must use deterrence not just in traditional warfare, but in other platforms such as the cyber domain. The strategy reports that in order for the United States to compete against Russia and China and non state actors, it must “recognize that the U.S. often views the world in binary terms with states being at peace or war, when actually it is an area of continuous battle. Our adversaries will not fight us on our terms.”<sup>302</sup>

So how does the United States envision fighting against these enemies who may use cyber attacks, instead of missile attacks and who may be at peace with America but also make moves that may seem like a type of conflict? The strategy calls for the United States to improve its military capabilities, which will also impact its European presence.

First, the strategy calls for “overmatch,” capabilities, so the U.S. military will be able to overmatch adversaries not only on the battlefield, but in other scenarios as well; Secondly,

---

<sup>299</sup> Trump, Donald, “National Security Strategy, December 2017, Ibid, page 27.

<sup>300</sup> Trump, Donald, “National Security Strategy,” December 2017, Ibid, page 27.

<sup>301</sup> Trump, Donald, “National Security Strategy,” December 2017, Ibid, page 27

<sup>302</sup> Trump, Donald, “National Security Strategy,” December 2017, Ibid, page 27.

it also calls for U.S. allies to modernize, spend more on defense and expand the size of their armed forces.<sup>303</sup>

The plan further sets a list of priorities that includes modernizing the equipment and tools of U.S. forces, removing the bureaucracy that prohibits the timely purchases of equipment and weapons and to halt Obama era plans to reduce troops.<sup>304</sup> Instead, Mr. Trump wants to increase troop levels and wants the armed forces to conduct more training and exercises.

In addition, Pillar IV discusses regional concerns for the United States and also addressed Russia and China and NATO. The strategy is critical of Russia directing its influence with the use of its natural gas projects in Europe and China's "targeted investments," with its Belt and Road initiative that funds billions of dollars in infrastructure for its partners.<sup>305</sup> The strategy also asked European allies to spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense by 2024.

Trump's strategy had critics and supporters and some who thought everyone could find something to support in this document.

Peter Feaver, a political science professor at Duke University, wrote an analysis of Trump's security strategy for Foreign Policy Magazine. Feaver said Trump's strategy could find support among both Democrats and Republicans but that the report was "bleaker" and "less optimistic," than previous strategies. He said, "While the National Security Strategy does have some boilerplate language about what we have achieved with our allies, I suspect that our allies will also note that they are just as often referred to as rivals as they are partners — and just as often called out for not doing enough as they are acknowledged for what they have done."<sup>306</sup>

---

<sup>303</sup> Trump, Donald, "National Security Strategy," Ibid.

<sup>304</sup> Trump, Donald, National Security Strategy," Ibid.

<sup>305</sup> Trump, Donald, "National Security Strategy," Ibid.

<sup>306</sup> Feaver, Peter, "Five Takeaways from Trump's National Security Strategy," 18 December 2017, Foreign Policy Magazine, accessed 23 December 2019 at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/18/five-takeaways-from-trumps-national-security-strategy/>.

While Mr. Trump was vocal in asking partners to spend more for their defense, he also talked about how America would do more for its own defense. Feaver said Mr. Trump was correct to focus on rebuilding America's military, but said the budget does not spend enough in that area.

Elliott Abrams, in a post for the Council on Foreign Relations, offered his support of the strategy, dismissing critics who have problems with the document as having a problem with the president — not his policies.<sup>307</sup> He said the strategy was a first rate effort, filled with ideas that need to be taken seriously.<sup>308</sup> Among the things he thinks should be taken seriously include the Russia and China threat. He agrees that Russia and China are “competitors,” against the United States.

While Trump's strategy had supporters, there were also critics.

A Foreign Affairs Magazine article referred to the strategy as “delusional.” Writer Melvin P. Leffler said that Mr. Trump's strategy seemed to paint a picture of a “Hobbesian” world that was “grim,” and unaware of growing threats. He writes: “According to Mr. Trump and his advisers, the country has been asleep since the end of the Cold War, while threats have been mounting around the globe.”<sup>309</sup> Leffler was also critical of what he saw as Mr. Trump's contradictory response to Russia. In the beginning part of the strategy it states America is willing to share intelligence with Russia, but it also identified Russia as a threat, according to Leffler.

Leffler writes that Mr Trump's strategy, “stresses again and again that Russia is not only a revisionist power but also a nation that seeks to interfere in the domestic political affairs of countries around the world. Yet in his comments introducing the document, Trump

---

<sup>307</sup>Abrams, Elliott, “The Trump National Security Strategy,” 26 December 2019, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 23 December 2019 at <https://www.cfr.org/blog/trump-national-security-strategy>.

<sup>308</sup> Abrams, Elliott, “The Trump National Security Strategy,” Ibid.

<sup>309</sup> Leffler, Melvin, “Trump's Delusional National Security Strategy: How the administration Ignores what makes America great.” 21 December 2017, Foreign Affairs Magazine, accessed 23 December 2019 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-12-21/trumps-delusional-national-security-strategy>.

went out of his way to elude such Russian behavior and to stress the efficacy of sharing intelligence information with the Kremlin.”<sup>310</sup>

While Leffler is correct in stating the document does say America will share intelligence with Russia, it is clear throughout its many pages that Russia is a serious threat not just to the United States, but to Europe. The document also understands that Russia and the United States may have common enemies such as violent extremist groups, for example, ISIS. At no point in the document does Mr. Trump say he sees Russia as a partner. However, Mr. Obama did initially see Russia as a partner.

Mr. Trump was correct to re-pivot back to the United States to focus on domestic concerns, as the United States had been so focused on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that it began to neglect the American public, its infrastructure and social matters. But Mr. Trump did something equally important, he also focused toward Europe. Although he brashly criticized Europe for not spending enough on defense, in his constant criticisms, he let European partners know they were important to the United States and the first line of defense against a growing aggressive Russia. While Mr. Obama removed troops and attention from Europe, Mr. Trump would give Europe lots of attention — although not the kind some would like — and began focusing on the safety of Eastern European nations.

Mr. Trump was also correct in seeing China and Russia as growing threats — threats strong enough that they were addressed in the National Security Strategy. Russia is seeking to emerge again as a major power not only in Europe, but the world and Russia and China could possibly reset the world balance of power with the United States and Europe on one side and China and Russia on the other. While the world is undoubtedly unipolar, there are indications that the world power structure will change to include Russia and China.

And because China and Russia are seen as growing threats, Mr. Trump wants European partners to pay more for defense. However, his method for delivering that message, has probably caused him more harm than good. He has used social media to

---

<sup>310</sup> Lefflor, Melvin, “Trump’s Delusional National Security Strategy,” Ibid.

strike out at European leaders, criticized leaders in press conferences, and made bombastic threats about the United States' role in NATO and other treaties. While these issues will be addressed later in the chapter, it is important to note that some leaders have taken offense at Mr. Trump's tough talk. While Mr. Obama also criticized European partners on defense spending, he did it decidedly gentler.

It is also important to note that Mr. Trump's principled realism does not come cheap. Later on in this chapter, questions will be raised as to how the United States will pay for its military modernizations at a time the country's budget deficit is climbing. America will have to make some tough choices on what is more important - securing American domestic concerns or focusing on European and Indo-Pacific Security so that it can deter Russia and China.

## **II. The National Defense Strategy of 2018**

Defense Secretary, Jim Mattis released the defense strategy that focused on military threats from three principle regions: Indo-Pacific, Middle East and Europe. The defense strategy calls for a three-prong attack to improve American defense: modernize; strengthen alliances; and reform the way the government buys equipment and weapons/tools. This strategy is not focused on war, but on how American forces can stay competitive so that they can win wars and conflicts.

Mattis writes, *"Today we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage is eroding. We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order — creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security."*<sup>311</sup>

---

<sup>311</sup> Mattis, Jim, Gen., "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge," accessed 22 December 2019 at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

Regarding national security, the report focuses on the places where threats are greatest and how America should respond to those threats. One way America hopes to deter threats is through modernizing its military force and its equipment. The strategy recommends taking five years to restore military readiness in several areas. It also, like the previous strategy, let go of long-used methods of U.S. forces fighting two separate wars on two different fronts. Instead it says U.S. forces would be able to defeat aggression by a major power and at the same time deter opportunistic aggression in another location, while disrupting terrorists attacks or weapons of mass destruction threats.<sup>312</sup>

This newer fighting scheme is important because to do it effectively, the United States will need bases and troops strategically located around the world. So, if the United States is in a major war with a Middle Eastern nation, such as Iran, and is attacked through war or cyber capabilities by a country such as Russia, U.S. troops in Afghanistan have to deal with the Taliban threat or other violent extremist groups, then the United States could be able to dominate all in battle with this plan. This plan may also require additional defense spending for training opportunities for U.S. troops around the globe so that the plans work effectively.

The defense strategy also called for modernizing the force through investing additional funds in equipment and modernization, which is backlogged because of government bureaucracy. Some of the areas that need modernization include the nuclear arsenal, space and cyberspace war fighting domains, forward force maneuver and posture resilience and C4SIR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.)<sup>313</sup>

In addition to modernization, the strategy recommends America's volunteer armed forces recruit, cultivate and maintain its troops. The strategy states, "Cultivating a lethal, agile force requires more than just new technologies and posture changes; it depends on the

---

<sup>312</sup> Mattis, Jim, Gen. "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy," Ibid, page 6.

<sup>313</sup> Mattis, Jim, Gen. "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy," Ibid, page 6.

ability of our warfighters and the department workforce to integrate new capabilities, adopt war fighting approaches and change business practices to achieve mission success.”<sup>314</sup>

Recruiting additional troops could mean that some of them could be assigned to Europe. It could also mean that European bases would house those increased troops. During Obama’s tenure, the United States cut troops to Europe. In 2012, the Obama Administration announced it would cut 11,000 of the 80,000 U.S. forces in Europe; In 2014, troops were cut to 64,000. As of July 2019, there are about 68,000 U.S. forces in Europe, according to the U.S. European Command. There has been a slight increase in troops, since Trump took office, possibly because of U.S. troop rotations into Poland and Eastern Europe.

In addition to modernization, the strategy aims to strengthen America partnerships and alliances, which is a reference to NATO and other partnerships. The strategy “expects partners and allies to contribute an equitable share to our mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities.”<sup>315</sup> Again, this statement relates to NATO. As stated earlier, Mr. Trump has been an outstanding critic of NATO members who do not spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense. This report more bluntly states that allies need to spend and do more on their own defense.

The defense strategy also seeks to deepen interoperability between the United States and its partners, it reported. The report said the Department of Defense would prioritize requests from allied countries that seek to buy American equipment so they can modernize their forces and so their equipment will work with American forces.<sup>316</sup> The 11-page summary report also stated that America’s goal was to help fortify NATO. The report said NATO will “*deter Russian adventurism, defeat terrorists who seek to murder innocents and address the arc of instability building on NATO’s periphery. At the same time, NATO must adapt to remain relevant and fit for our time — in purpose, capability and responsive*

---

<sup>314</sup> Mattis, Jim, Gen. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” Ibid, page 7.

<sup>315</sup> Mattis, Jim, Gen., “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” Ibid, page 8.

<sup>316</sup> Mattis, Jim, Gen. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, Ibid.



*decision-making. We expect our European allies to fulfill their commitments to increase defense and modernization spending to bolster the alliance in the face of our shared security concerns.”*<sup>317</sup>

The Strategy also calls for reforming the U.S. government in ways to decrease bureaucracy.

A congressionally mandated panel is charged to analyze the National Defense Strategy and to make its separate recommendation that could be adopted or rejected by elective officials. The panel agreed with much of America’s strategy focusing mainly on threats from China and Russia, along with North Korea, Iran and violent extremist groups. However, the panel found a major fault with the defense strategy — there should be more government funding to increase troop readiness and modernization, and the military should find more innovative ways to fight current and future threats. The panel wrote that readiness has suffered because of wars and budget cuts but that U.S. Department of Defense plans to increase readiness will require additional resources to train troops to a higher level of proficiency and that it must focus on missions to deter advanced military threats from China and Russia.<sup>318</sup>

The panel was blunt in its criticism on the direction of the American military — not supporting its newly unveiled plan for fighting on one big front and then fighting other enemies on smaller fronts in different locations. It wrote, “The United States is particularly at risk of being overwhelmed should its military be forced to fight on two or more fronts simultaneously. Additionally, it would be unwise and irresponsible not to expect adversaries to attempt debilitating kinetic, cyber or other types of attacks against Americans at home

---

<sup>317</sup> Mattis, Jim, Gen., “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, Ibid, page 9.

<sup>318</sup> National Defense Strategy Commission, “Providing for the common defense: The assessment and recommendation of the National Defense Strategy Commission, 2018” accessed 24 December 2019 at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf>, page xi.

while they seek to defeat our military abroad. U.S. military superiority is no longer assured and the implications for American interests and American security are severe.”<sup>319</sup>

The panel was blunt about the outcome of such a war with China or Russia. ‘If the United States had to fight Russia in a Baltic contingency or China in a war over Taiwan, Americans could face a decisive military defeat. These two nations possess precision — strike capabilities, integrated air defenses, cruise and anti-satellite capacities heretofore possessed only by the United States. The U.S. military would face daunting challenges in establishing air superiority or sea control and retaking territory lost early in a conflict.’<sup>320</sup>

So how does the panel recommend America remedy this situation? With money. The panel recommends the United States increase defense spending from 3 to 5 percent above inflation over the next several years. It wants the United States to come up with more innovative plans to deter and then defeat Russia and China if there is ever a war. It also wants the United States to improve its procurement and acquisition programs so that equipment and weapons can be more speedily ordered, received and used by soldiers in theater. The report ends with a caution that if America does not make tough choices to improve in these areas, it could be a “tragedy.”

The defense strategy and commission report are important and relevant because in late 2017 Mr. Trump released his Afghan war strategy, based on “principled realism,” that called for sending an additional 4,000 more troops. Unlike Mr. Obama’s previous plans, this plan did not set a date on when U.S. troops needed to leave the country. In a news article in *The Atlantic* about the troop surge, Mr. Trump said he had reached three conclusions about the conflict: the first was that the United States seeks an honorable ending that would be worth the sacrifices made; second, that the consequences of a quick withdrawal of troops in

---

<sup>319</sup> National Defense Strategy Commission, “Providing for the common defense,” *Ibid*, page vi.

<sup>320</sup> National Defense Strategy Commission, “Providing for the common defense,” *Ibid*. page 14.

the region have been predictable and unacceptable; and thirdly, that Afghanistan and the Taliban still post a security threat to the United States.<sup>321</sup>

The Afghan troop plan is pertinent to Europe and U.S. basing strategy in Europe because the United States has troops serving deployments to Europe and some of those units deploy to Afghanistan. And this issue is also important to Europe because for more than a decade, the war in Afghanistan took precedence over America providing European security — and when America was in a financial crisis, the war fighting budget was not cut, however, defense budget cuts did target European bases and troops. If American finds a successful strategy to leave Afghanistan, it could lead to substantial cost savings and money that could then be redistributed to increase American troop presence in Europe or even the possible construction of new bases in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Trump's National Defense Strategy rightly focuses on the Indo-Pacific instead of Mr. Obama's Asian-Pacific. The latter implies that all of Asia is an adversary of America, when in reality, the main focus of Mr. Obama's pivot was dealing with China's rise and its use of aggression toward its neighbors.

In addition to geographic changes to the defense strategy's focus, it also proposes to change the way America prepares for war. In the past, the U.S. military trained so that it could simultaneously fight two wars on two different fronts, however, the National Defense Strategy wants to abandon that plan to one that focuses primarily on American facing one large opponent, and then also have forces for "opportunistic aggression," terrorist attacks and possible weapons of mass destruction. Such a move would be short-sighted because the United States cannot dictate which countries might declare war against it and how the war might be fought. I agree with the panel recommendation to return to the two-war front strategy and include the possibility of many other attacks from opportunists or terrorists. And that front should definitely include training to deter Russia. The United States, for more than

---

<sup>321</sup>Calamur, Krishnadev, "Trump's Plan for Afghanistan: No Timeline for Exit," 21 August, 2017, The Atlantic Magazine, accessed on 22 December 2019 at <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/trump-afghanistan/537474/>.

a decade, was at war with Iraq and Afghanistan and also helped with wars in Syria and Libya. At the same time, it also engaged terrorists in places such as Africa. It would be imprudent to think that this would not happen again or that a future war would only include one major opponent.

The National Defense Strategy wants to modernize the military and keep highly trained troops and recruit more troops. The defense panel correctly states that America will need more money to do that — that current defense allocations are not enough. I agree that the U.S. military will need more money to modernize but I am unsure the American public has the will to spend more money on defense — particularly since American infrastructure is crumbling. Civil engineers have warned that American bridges are structurally deficient and that antiquated drinking water and waste water systems pose a public health risk.<sup>322</sup> The U.S. Department of Transportation estimated that it needs \$800 billion just to shore up America's roads and bridges.<sup>323</sup> With the cost of such work, Mr. Trump will have to decide what is the biggest priority and convince a war-weary public to agree.

In addition, more money does not always equal better or winning. The United States military will have to create more innovative ways to train and fight if it wants to win its next war, as opponents such as China have sophisticated weapons systems and may deploy them in a manner the United States may not expect.

Besides addressing funding, the president's National Defense Strategy said it wanted to strengthen partnerships and alliances. However, this could be doubtful. If Mr. Trump truly wants to strengthen relations with NATO members — especially those not meeting funding goals — then he must communicate with those countries and their parliaments in a more civil manner. He should not use social media to attack leaders for not spending more on defense. And he must find ways to improve relations and the reputation of NATO whether all

---

<sup>322</sup> McBride, James, "The State of U.S. Infrastructure," 12 January 2019, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed on 26 December 2019 at <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/state-us-infrastructure>

<sup>323</sup> McBride, James, "The State of U.S. Infrastructure," Ibid.

or none of its members spends 2 percent of their GDP on defense. While some pundits like to refer to Europe as wealthy and able to take care of their own defense, parliaments and citizens ultimately decide if defense spending will be increased. It may take some European nations many years to convince their public of the need to increase defense spending — or even fight a war.

By strengthening alliances in Europe, the president directly impacts U.S. basing and troops in the region. Spats between partners could negatively impact basing if a country tired of presidential rhetoric asks America to remove its troops. Not only does the United States lose, but so does American and European security.

### **III. Cost plus 50 —**

In early 2019, rumors began that Mr. Trump wanted to enact a Cost plus 50 scheme that would require host nations to pay 100 percent to house U.S. troops, plus pay an additional 50 percent, according to media reports. While Mr. Trump has criticized NATO members for not paying their fair share on defense, this scheme was seen by many as too much to ask of European allies, some of whom have budget rules on the amount it can spend on defense. When the plan was first reported, many critics called it a ‘bad move.’ Later, Trump defense officials said the United States was not considering such a move, but news reports continue to suggest Mr. Trump would consider the proposal.

If the plan is to be believed, then a country like Germany could be asked to pay billions. According to the Berlin Policy Journal, Germany currently pays \$1 billion annually toward the 30,000 plus U.S. troops stationed there. According to the U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, it costs the United States \$8.1 billion to locate troops in Germany. That cost includes personnel, operations, maintenance, facilities, family housing and an unspecified revolving fund.<sup>324</sup> If Cost plus 50 news reports are to be believed, then Germany could be

---

<sup>324</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation and Maintenance Overview, Fiscal Year, 2020, Overseas Cost Summary,” 2019, accessed on 26 December 2019 at [https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020\\_OM\\_Overview.pdf](https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_OM_Overview.pdf), page 182.

asked to pay \$12 billion, Portugal \$60 million and the United Kingdom about \$1.5 billion.<sup>325</sup> However, it appears this scheme might be targeted to specific nations — and not all. (The plan seems to target Japan, South Korea and Germany if one examines specific news reports.).

In an analysis for the Washington Post, Stacie Pettyjohn said Cost Plus 50 could possibly damage American partnerships. She said this type of transactional foreign policy increases the risk that countries will rethink their agreements to host U.S. troops and this could negatively impact the United States' ability to obtain access to certain bases during times of crisis.<sup>326</sup>

Pettyjohn, a senior political scientist for the RAND Corporation, a well-respected think tank that focuses on defense issues, said the proposal could cause countries such as Germany to change their minds about U.S. troop presence.<sup>327</sup> There have been many media reports about the proposal and nearly all have reported on the plan in a negative light, with members of Mr. Trump's Republican Party criticizing the plan.

In a November 2019 article in Foreign Policy, the magazine reported Mr. Trump wants Japan to increase the money it pays to house U.S. forces by 400 percent; But the authors warned that the request could increase tensions in the region and play into the hands of China and North Korea.<sup>328</sup>

If rumors of Cost Plus 50 are to be believed, then the United States could be pushing a policy that could damage relations between partners and negatively impact U.S. presence

---

<sup>325</sup> These figures represent how much the United States pays to place troops in these locations, plus 50 percent. The cost America pays to house troops in Germany, the United Kingdom and Portugal for fiscal year 2020 came from the Operations and Maintenance Overview from the U.S. Department of Defense. The U.S. spends \$39.6 million to house troops in Portugal; and \$962 million for the United Kingdom.

<sup>326</sup> Pettyjohn, Stacie, L. "Cost Plus 50 Could Damage U.S. Alliances: Here's what you need to know," 15 March 2019, The Washington Post, accessed 26 December 2019 at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/15/cost-plus-could-damage-us-alliances-heres-what-you-need-know/>

<sup>327</sup> Pettyjohn, Stacie, L. "Cost Plus 50 Could Damage U.S. Alliances," Ibid.

<sup>328</sup> Seligman, Lara and Gramer, Robbie, "Trump Demands Tokyo Quadruple Payments fo U.S. Troops in Japan," 15 November 2019, Foreign Policy, accessed 26 December 2019 at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/15/trump-asks-tokyo-quadruple-payments-us-troops-japan/>

in Europe. The proposal seems to be a way to punish partners, such as Germany, for not spending more on defense. It could be seen as arrogant — in that the United States is attempting to force countries to pay an extra 50 percent for the privilege of having U.S. troops in their country. It also harkens back to the time when the world leaders used mercenary forces such as The White Company of Italy or the Catalan Grand Company of Spain to fight wars and protect its people. The United States military is not a mercenary force and Mr. Trump's plan could have the appearance of such.

While Trump officials have said they are not discussing Cost Plus 50, they also did not seem to rule it out in the future. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan was quoted as saying the media reports on Cost Plus 50 were incorrect. But it did appear as if he was trying to get the attention of allies the administration feels do not pay enough for defense. In a news article, Mr. Shanahan said, "We're not going to run a business and we're not going to run a charity. The important part is that people pay their fair share, and payment comes in lots of different forms."<sup>329</sup> Mr. Shanahan's response may not be a great way to strengthen alliances — particularly if the words charity are used.

Such proposals, leaked to the press, can negatively impact not only Mr. Trump, but can hurt the reputation of the United States. Alliances, this work asserts, cannot be built through bullying, extortion or verbal attacks on European partners.

#### **IV. European Defense Initiative**

Mr. Trump could be seen as an enigma. In one sense he demands countries like Germany and France spend more for U.S. troops and in another sense, he supports a program to give additional funding for European security. Mr. Trump signed the U.S. Defense Budget into law on December 26, 2019 and part of the budget includes the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), giving \$5.9 billion toward training, equipment and troop rotations into places such as Poland and Romania. This program began with Mr. Obama and has

---

<sup>329</sup> Babb, Carla, "Defense Secretary: U.S. Won't Charge Nations, 'Cost Plus 50' for Bases," 14 March 2019, Voice of America, accessed 26 December 2019 at <https://www.voanews.com/usa/defense-secretary-us-wont-charge-nations-cost-plus-50-bases>.

given about \$19 billion to improve European security since 2014.<sup>330</sup> For the sake of brevity, this chapter will highlight the program for the upcoming fiscal year and note that while this coming year has slightly less funding toward European defense than last fiscal year's \$6.5 billion, the program only funded \$4.8 billion in 2018.<sup>331</sup> The aim of the program is to deter Russian aggression and assure European allies as they train and work with American partners.

Here is a snapshot of some of the funding for the EDI for fiscal year 2020:

- \* *\$875.9 million toward Army troops that rotate into Europe;*
- \* *\$105.1 million toward aviation assets that rotate into Europe to train and participate in exercises;*
- \* *\$77.9 million for a U.S. battalion to support NATO's enhanced Forward Presence;*
- \* *\$127.9 million for combat air forces to train in several unspecified European cities;*
- \* *\$608.7 million for exercises and training to increase readiness and enhance interoperability;*
- \* *\$2.3 billion to preposition equipment of troops that will rotate into Europe; It also spends another \$1.8 billion to permanently house equipment such as two ABCTs, two fire brigades, air defense, engineer and medial units. funds will also be used to build and modernize facilities to hold this equipment;*
- \* *\$250 million in security assistance to Ukraine to replace equipment and could also include troop training and intelligence assistance;*
- \* *And \$340 million for joint division level exercises.<sup>332</sup>*

---

<sup>330</sup> "Backgrounder," From the Heritage Foundation/U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, a list of annual EDI funding from 2014 to 2019. This work then added the amount for fiscal year 2020, which brings the total to \$19.8 billion. The figures accessed on 27 December 2019 at [https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/BG3319\\_2.pdf](https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/BG3319_2.pdf), page 6.

<sup>331</sup> "Backgrounder," Heritage Foundation, Ibid.

<sup>332</sup> U.S. Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2020, "European Deterrence Initiative," March 2019, accessed September 2019 at [https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020\\_EDI\\_JBook.pdf](https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_EDI_JBook.pdf)



Mr. Trump has been criticized for this funding, in part because he has requested that NATO members do more in the way of defense, yet the United States is spending more money on European defense.

In an analysis article for DefenseOne, Daniel DePetris said EDI funding program sends the wrong message to our European allies. He said EDI is a duplicative program that functions as an entitlement to Europe — a region composed of wealthy and economically vibrant countries that are able to take more responsibility for their own security.<sup>333</sup> Instead, he said the administration should have approached Germany, France and other European countries about how they could spend more on defense and help Eastern European nations that are the target of Russian aggression; Programs such as EDI, DePetris said, undermine the burden-sharing concept and embolden rich European nations to remain security consumers rather than security providers.<sup>334</sup>

Not everyone agrees with DePetris. While many conservatives support EDI, it has also garnered support from more liberal pundits and lawmakers. And while most feel the program helps European neighbors, Mr. Trump has made signals the program may not be as important to his administration. In September 2019, the administration announced it would divert \$1.8 billion of EDI funding to build a wall between the United States and Mexico. When Mr. Trump campaigned for the presidency, he said the wall would stop the flow of illegal immigration and he declared the issue a national emergency, according to media reports. Mr. Trump had said Mexico would pay for the wall. Mexico has refused. However, Mr. Trump has tried repeatedly to get Congressional funding for his ‘wall’ project. Instead, when he could not secure Mexican or U.S. government funding, he diverted money from Fiscal year 2019 and 2020 EDI construction projects.

---

<sup>333</sup> DePetris, Daniel, “The European Deterrence Initiative sends the wrong message,” 21 March 2019, DefenseNews, accessed 26 December 2019, at <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/21/the-european-deterrence-reassurance-initiative-sends-the-wrong-message/>

<sup>334</sup> DePetris, Daniel, “The European Deterrence Initiative sends the wrong message,” Ibid.

While the number of projects to be cut are too long to list in this work, a few of the important projects include:

- \* \$15 million for a Special Operations Facility and a Special Operations Training Facility in Estonia;
- \* \$31 million for a mission training complex in Grafenwöhr, Germany;
- \* \$100 million for staging areas and other construction in Poland;
- \* About \$250 million for elementary, middle and high schools for children (on U.S. European bases), storage facilities and intelligence and squad operations facilities and other projects in the United Kingdom;
- \* And other projects in Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Turkey.<sup>335</sup>

A former Obama official was quoted in the electronic magazine, *The Daily Beast*, as saying the Trump Administration is “punishing the Europeans” with the cuts. But it is unlikely that Mr. Trump or anyone from his administration would admit to punishing any country through targeted cuts. Mr. Trump seems committed to keeping his campaign promise to build the wall — even though he could not secure congressional funding for the project.

Building the wall has been a controversial topic within America, which like Europe, is struggling to handle economic immigrants and persecuted people seeking refuge. Mr. Trump said he would revamp America’s immigration system and that he wants to protect America’s border. Mr. Trump also expressed fears that violent extremist groups might seek to enter America through the border with Mexico, according to media reports. The United States also borders Canada, but there are few Canadians seeking to enter into the country for asylum or to work illegally in the United States.

---

<sup>335</sup> Esper, Mark, “Memorandum for acting secretary of defense (comptroller)/chief financial officer,” 3 September 2019, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed on 26 December 2019 at <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/04/2002178837/-1/-1/1/MIL-CONSTRUCTION-NECESSARY-TO-SUPPORT-THE-USE-OF-ARMED-FORCES-IN-ADDRESSING-THE-NATIONAL-EMERGENCYOSD009322-19-FOD-FINAL.PDF>

As stated earlier, it is unknown if Mr. Trump cut EDI funding and diverted it to build a wall is a punishment or just a way for him to keep a campaign promise. However, it does send a signal, whether intentional or not — that these construction projects in Europe are not crucial to American strategy or foreign policy aims. Mr. Trump may not be concerned about the perception, but it does look as if these projects are not important to the United States. Mr. Trump must weigh how these cuts will impact European security, particularly for countries such as Poland and Estonia. These cuts could negatively impact relations between Europe and the United States as allies may feel the United States is abandoning them when they most need it.

#### **V. Impeachment:**

While this work will not analyze Mr. Trump's impeachment and its proceedings in the U.S. House of Representatives, it is important to address this matter because it concerns the Ukraine.

Mr. Trump was impeached on December 18, 2019 because he was accused of pressuring Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky to find damaging information on his Democratic challenger for the 2020 presidential race — Joe Biden and his son Hunter Biden.<sup>336</sup> Mr. Trump is accused of pressuring Zelensky by withholding \$400 million in military funding that was approved by the U.S. Congress — unless Zelensky helped find information on the Bidens.<sup>337</sup> A 'whistleblower,' who was an U.S. government employee, complained about Mr. Trump's behavior and an investigation was launched, according to news reports. The U.S. House of Representatives charged Mr. Trump with abuse of presidential power and obstructing the U.S. Congress. The House impeachment is a signal that lawmakers do not think he should remain America's leader. However, it is a non-binding decision because the U.S. Senate did not vote to impeach him. If that would have occurred, Mr. Trump would have been forced to resign the presidency. The United States has given the Ukraine \$1.5 billion in

---

<sup>336</sup> BBC, "Trump impeachment: A very simple guide," 19 December 2019, accessed 27 December 2019, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39945744>

<sup>337</sup> BBC, "Trump Impeachment: A very simple guide," Ibid.

security assistance since 2014, when Russian-backed separatists began driving tanks through eastern Ukraine.<sup>338</sup> The United States has expressed support in helping the Ukraine handle increased Russian aggression.

Some of the first questions people may ask is: How will the impeachment impact U.S.-Ukrainian relations?; How will it impact EDI funding to the Ukraine? While the Ukraine did get the \$400 million dollar aid package Mr. Trump allegedly threatened to withhold, (not money but it included in-kind services such as equipment and training), there is no public indication Mr. Trump would seek to end EDI funding to the Ukraine or seek to cut those funds. However, the fact that Mr. Trump was impeached for abuse of power says many things about how he governs and what he thinks about European partners. Allegedly bullying other nations to do one's bidding does not build partnerships. It does not cause such nations to trust America and its commitment to European security. It also puts America in a negative light because its leader tried to get a service from another leader in exchange for foreign military aid. Also, Mr. Trump allegedly spoke poorly about other European nations such as Germany during his phone call with Zelensky because they did not do enough to help Ukraine.<sup>339</sup>

This issue could cause concern for other European nations, that Mr. Trump or future leaders could leverage EDI funding to get assistance in another area. It could also make some countries reluctant to take American EDI funding because of the perception that a leader is beholden to the United States. This incident could have a detrimental impact on U.S. relations with some nations around the globe.

---

<sup>338</sup> Gould Joe, and Altman, Howard, "Here's what you need to know about the U.S. aid package to Ukraine that Trump delayed," 25 September 2019, DefenseNews, accessed 27 December 2019, at <https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/09/25/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-us-aid-package-to-ukraine-that-trump-delayed/>

<sup>339</sup> Reuters, "Factbox: Six new pieces of information in memo on Trump's Ukraine call," 25 September 2019, Excerpts can be accessed at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-whistleblower-factbox/factbox-six-new-pieces-of-information-in-memo-on-trumps-ukraine-call-idUSKBN1WA2J3>

## VI. Drone Attack in Iraq -

While the scope of this work ends 31 December 2019, this work will include a crisis that began at the end of December and continues through January 2020. In late December, Iraqis began protesting at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq and things escalated, according to numerous news reports. TV news channel CNN said protestors scaled the walls of the embassy and forced the gates of the compound as hundreds demonstrated against American airstrikes on an Iran-backed militia group.<sup>340</sup> The protests and attack on the U.S. embassy was reportedly in response to a series of U.S. airstrikes that killed 25 militia fighters, however the U.S. air strikes were retaliation for a rocket strike that killed a U.S. defense contractor and injured a U.S. service member.<sup>341</sup> On January 3, 2020, Mr. Trump approved an airstrike in Iraq that killed Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran's Quds Force, the foreign arm of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps that has supported militias throughout the Middle East, including Iraq.<sup>342</sup>

Iran has threatened to get back at the United States for killing its general, according to media reports. Since then, some have wondered if Mr. Trump's actions could lead to a war with Iran. Mr. Trump has sent more U.S. forces to Iraq. And Iran's government said it would end participation in the 2015 nuclear deal and would no longer limit its enrichment of uranium.<sup>343</sup>

These events could be troubling for a number of reasons. Now that Iran is no longer honoring its nuclear deal, does that mean that it will enrich enough uranium to arm a nuclear weapon? If so, does that mean the United States or its troops are at greater risk of a nuclear

---

<sup>340</sup> Damon, Arwa and Diamond, Jeremy, "Trump threatens Iran after protestors attack U.S. embassy in Baghdad," 1 January 2020, accessed 5 January 2020 at <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/31/middleeast/iraq-protests-us-embassy-intl/index.html>.

<sup>341</sup> Law, Tara, et al, "Iran Vowed Retaliation After U.S. Strike Killed a Top Iranian General. Here's a Timeline of Recent Escalation," 31 December 2019, Time Magazine, accessed 3 January 2019 at <https://time.com/5757228/us-iran-events-timeline/>

<sup>342</sup> Law, Tara, et al, "Iran Vowed Retaliation After U.S. Strike Killed a Top General,": Ibid.

<sup>343</sup> The New York Times, "Iran Ends Commitment to Landmark Nuclear Deal: Live Updates," 5 January 2020, accessed 5 January 2020 at <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/iran-us-trump.html>.

attack by Iran? Does it mean that Americans and Westerners in the Middle East could now be at increased risk for terror attacks? This work does not have the answers; that would require additional analysis as events unfold. But perhaps it could provide some insight. America does not know if or when or how Iran might retaliate for the death of its general. However, it could appear that the United States as well as countries that host U.S. troops could be at possible risk if Iran uses violence to get back at the United States. This incident has probably hurt relations between the United States and Iraq. The New York Times reported on 5 January 2020 that “Iraqi lawmakers voted 170-0 in favor of expelling American troops from their country.”<sup>344</sup> The parliament vote was not binding. The general’s death could have repercussions that could impact NATO as well. Alliance forces assisted the United States in its war in Afghanistan and provided support. Therefore, NATO could be seen as a supporter of the United States and its members could possibly be under increased risk of being attacked by Iran.

It is unknown as of the deadline of this work, how Iran might attack the United States in retaliation or if the United States will go to war with Iran. However, the Washington Post newspaper quoted an Iranian official who said the regime would go after the U.S. military. Hossein Dehgham, an Iranian military advisor was quoted as saying, “The response for sure will be military and against military sites. The only thing that can end this period of war is for the Americans to receive a blow that is equal to the blow they have inflicted.”<sup>345</sup>

If this Iranian official can be taken at his word, then Iran attends to attack U.S. military forces somewhere around the globe. It is unclear how Mr. Trump would handle a possible attack on the military, but this crisis could have the potential to escalate into a full-scale war.

---

<sup>344</sup> The New York Times, “Iran Ends Commitment to Landmark Nuclear Deal,” Ibid.

<sup>345</sup> Cunningham, Erin, “Iran announces it is suspending all commitments to the 2015 nuclear deal,” 5 January 2020, accessed 5 January 2020 at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/body-of-commander-slain-by-us-strike-arrives-in-iran-to-crowds-of-mourners/2020/01/05/4ca3281a-2f17-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/body-of-commander-slain-by-us-strike-arrives-in-iran-to-crowds-of-mourners/2020/01/05/4ca3281a-2f17-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html).

## **VII. Conclusion**

Mr. Trump was elected to office after campaigning to bring a new kind of change to the United States. He wanted to 'Make America Great Again,' modernize its military and remove the United States from agreements and trade pacts that he felt were unfair. While he made great strides in working to modernize the military, his decisions to remove America from agreements, such as the Iran Nuclear deal and refusing to sign the Paris Climate Accord, could be seen as missteps, along with his impeachment for trying to force the Ukraine to gather information on political rivals. He also antagonized European partners for not spending enough on defense, yet gave Europe more money to help ensure their defense. Mr. Trump complained that he wanted to leave NATO, but has stayed in the alliance and also said he wants to strengthen relations with European partners. Only time will tell if Mr. Trump is truly committed to NATO, European security and U.S. military presence in Europe.

## Survey —

This dissertation includes a survey to measure public opinion about military presence in Europe. The survey was conducted between 3 December 2018 and 1 January 2019.

Those who participated in the survey were asked 10 questions regarding U.S. military presence. The survey yielded interesting results, which included a majority of respondents saying the United States should base more troops in Europe; respondents also agreed that NATO members should pay more toward their own defense.

Below, are the 10 questions given to participants and the next page shows how those questions were answered:

1. Have you ever served in any branch of the United States Military?
2. Have you ever served in Western Europe or had assignments in Poland?
3. The United States currently has \*62,000 troops in Europe. Do you think this is enough troops to sufficiently deter Russia?
4. The United States has more than 800 foreign bases, do you think this is too many bases or too few?
5. Do you think the United States should open a permanent base in Poland?
6. Lajes Air Base in the Azores Portugal was once an instrumental base for troops during World War II and the first Gulf War because planes were able to refuel there. Such refueling bases are no longer needed because the planes can fly further or can refuel at more convenient locations. Do you think the United States should keep its base open in the Azores?
7. The United States has decided to close some of its bases in the United Kingdom and to station F-35 places at RAF Lakenheath. Do you think that relations between the United States and the United Kingdom will change because it is leaving the European Union?
8. Relations between U.S. President Donald Trump and some NATO members have been strained, in part because Trump does not feel like these countries pay their fair share for



defense (2 percent of their GDP). Do you think every NATO member should pay 2 percent of its GDP on defense?

9. How would you rate Trump's foreign policy goals?

10. What do you think of Obama's foreign policy strategy for the American military during his tenure?

### **Survey Responses —**

The survey had several surprising results. Below, is a snapshot of participants views on U.S. military presence. Of those who participated in the survey, the majority of them said that they served in the U.S. military. Other responses found that:

- \* The majority of respondents were stationed in Western Europe while in the military;
- \* The respondents believe the United States needs more U.S. troops in Europe to deter Russia;
- \* The respondents believe the United States has too many foreign bases;
- \* A majority of respondents would support keeping Lajes Field open;
- \* A majority of respondents do not believe America's relationship with the United Kingdom will change because of BREXIT;
- \* A majority of respondents feel NATO members should spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense;
- \* A majority of respondents felt Mr. Obama had a poor foreign policy;

Here is a look at the specific responses of those who participated in the survey:

Q1: 70.97 percent said yes; 29.03 percent said no.

Q2: 61.9 percent said yes; 38.10 percent said no.

Q3: 39.53 percent said yes; 60.47 percent said no.

Q4: 59.52 percent said too many; 11.9 percent said to few; and 28.57 percent said they did not know.

Q5: 69.77 percent said yes; 30.23 percent said no.

Q6: 51.16 said yes; 39.53 said no and 9.30 percent said other.

Q7: 18.60 percent said yes and 81.40 percent said no.

Q8: 90.7 percent said yes; 9.30 percent said no

Q9: an unknown error occurred.

Q10: 37.21 said good; 39.53 said poor; and 23.26 said they were unsure.

The survey, entitled "U.S. Military Presence in Europe," was conducted by Survey Monkey, which also provided a graphic analysis of the results.

## Chapter 6A — Scenarios

**Research Question: Why should the United States move 20,000 of its 30,000 troops currently based in Germany to a new base in Poland?**

<b><i>The Stakeholders:</i></b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Government</b>	<b>Economy</b>	<b>Military expenditures</b>	<b>Activities of International Community, borders.</b>
<b>United States</b>	329.3 million	Constitutional Republic	America is the most technologically powerful economy on the globe— but its advantages narrowed after 1945. It has less growth than China	The United States spent 3.16 percent of its GDP on defense in 2018. It has 1.3 million active duty troops. It has a volunteer army.	Is a member of NATO and is bordered by Canada and Mexico.
<b>Germany</b>	80.6 million	Federal Parliamentary Republic	It is Europe's largest economy and has highly skilled labor and premium exports.	Spent 1.24 percent of its GDP on defense (2018). Ended compulsory military service in 2011.	NATO member bordered by Poland, Denmark, Luxembourg, France, Czech Republic, Netherlands and Austria.
<b>Poland</b>	38.4 million	Parliamentary Republic	It is the sixth largest economy in the EU and is one of the largest world economies (25th). It is modernizing its military and pursuing economic liberalization policies.	Spent 1.99 percent of its GDP on defense. Conscription military service was phased out. It has a volunteer force who can serve permanently (2018).	Is a member of NATO. It is threatened by Russian aggression. It is located in between Germany and Russia. Its other neighbors are Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania.
<b>Russia</b>	142.1 million	Semi-Presidential Federation	<b>Russia is a state economy. Much of the country's wealth belongs to state officials. It is a leading producer of natural gas and oil.</b>	<b>Spent 3.93 percent of its GDP on defense. It has a compulsory one-year obligation. Russia announced in 2019 it would end mandatory military service (2018).</b>	<b>Is not a NATO member. It borders Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus, North Korea, China, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Mongolia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Has behaved aggressively toward neighbors.</b>
<b>NATO</b>	29 member countries	N/A	N/A	<b>** Members have invested more than 130 billion in Defense (2019).</b>	<b>Has 29 members, including the United States, Germany and Poland.</b>

\* Source of information in the grid came from: CIA World Facebook (Russia, Poland, United States), accessed 14 December 2019 at [cia.gov](https://www.cia.gov); Deutsche World News service accessed 15 December 2019 at <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-suspend-compulsory-military-service/a-6315122>; \*\* NATO "London Declaration," 4 December 2019, accessed 15 December 2019 at [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_171584.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm?selectedLocale=en); U.S. Department of State accessed on 15 December 2019 at [https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICS-Poland\\_UNCLASS\\_508.pdf](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICS-Poland_UNCLASS_508.pdf).

**Who is driving this particular change?:** In 2018, Polish officials issued a White Paper asking the United States to locate a permanent base in Poland. The officials said their government would pay up to \$2 billion for an American base. While American officials are still studying the permanent base option, U.S. troops have continually deployed to Poland since 2017 and are essentially permanently based out of Poland on a rotational basis. Poland's request for a base was a bit controversial for some military and political leaders who fear it would anger Russia and cause the country to become more problematic and aggressive. The issue of placing a permanent base in Poland will be discussed in Chapter 7 in the case study section. For now, this section will primarily address moving troops from Germany to Poland.

An estimated 4,500 troops rotate into Poland. In summer 2019, Polish President Andrezej Duda and Mr. Trump signed an agreement to send an additional 1,000 U.S. troops to Poland and media reports indicated Mr. Trump might move those troops from Germany. So, if Mr. Trump moves 1,000 troops to Poland, then one can argue, if a permanent base is established, then permanent troops could also be moved from Germany to Poland. (The two countries are neighbors). Mr. Trump was quoted in a Bloomberg article as saying he wanted to move troops to from Germany to Poland because Germany is not funding defense at 2 percent of its GDP and Poland is meeting that funding guideline.

German officials understand that Mr. Trump is serious and is starting to address their own security. Roderich Kiesewetter, who serves as Prime Minister Angela Merkel's foreign policy expert, told DW News that, "For Germany's own sake we need to finally — in a significant and permanent way that reflects our own global commitments — increase defense

spending. This has nothing to do with the American President, but with our responsibilities to our soldiers in Europe, and credible burden sharing.”<sup>346</sup>


The DW News article went on to say that Mr. Trump’s idea to move U.S. troops based in Germany to Poland fits in with his “frequent lecturing,” to Germany. In a March 2017 Twitter social media post, Mr. Trump attacked Merkel and Germany for low defense spending. He wrote: “Nevertheless, Germany owes vast sums of money to NATO and the United States must be paid for the powerful, and very expensive defense it provides to Germany.”<sup>347</sup>

---

<sup>346</sup> DW News, “Trumps troop talk again rattles Germany’s security assumption,” 13 June 2019, accessed 15 December 2019 at <https://www.dw.com/en/trumps-troop-talk-again-rattles-germanys-security-assumptions/a-49187076>.

<sup>347</sup> DW News, “Trumps troop talk again rattles Germany’s security assumption,” *Ibid.*

**Scenario Axis and Logics:**



**Development of this issue:** Russia, Poland/NATO and the United States are key players. The former Soviet Union became an increasing threat to the region in 2013 when Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovich moved to forge a closer relationship with Russia and ended ties with the European Union. As protests spread across the country, people were injured and killed, and Yanukovich was removed from power.<sup>348</sup> More fighting and protests occurred with Russia helping Crimean rebels, according to media reports. A referendum was later held in the Crimean region of the Ukraine and voters decided to join Moscow.<sup>349</sup> The results were disputed and the West imposed sanctions on Russia. The 2014 annexation of Crimea increased tensions with neighboring countries.

Russia is now concerned about increased American presence in the Baltic Region, particularly in Poland. America does not have “permanent bases” in Poland but training

<sup>348</sup> BBC News, “*Ukraine Crisis in Maps*,” 18 February 2015, accessed on the internet on 30 August 2017 at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27308526>

<sup>349</sup> BBC, “Crimea referendum: Voters back Russia Union,” 16 March 2014, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097>

facilities. In January, Russian officials told the Guardian UK newspaper that U.S. troops in Poland were a “threat” to its security. The comments came after 1,000 U.S. troops arrived in Poland for a training mission. When asked about American troops in January 2017, Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said: *“The actions threaten our interests, our security. Especially as it concerns a third party building up its military presence by our borders. (The U.S.) is not even a European state.”*<sup>350</sup> *The United States countered by saying that Putin was trying to “break NATO.”*<sup>351</sup>

Russia had hoped that Trump — who had strong Russian ties as a businessman — would possibly halt U.S. troop deployments to Poland.<sup>352</sup> But this has not happened.

While tensions in the Baltic region rises, Poland has continually signaled it wants to have good relations with Russia. In a 2013 White Paper, Polish officials said that “cooperation between Russia is very important for security of the whole Euro-Atlantic area.”<sup>353</sup> In the report, Poland also said it wants “cooperation,” “amity” and “partnership,” with Russia. It’s important to note this report was issued one year before Russia annexed Crimea, but it also sheds light on Poland’s own strategy and how it can work with America’s goals.

In the 2018 White Paper, Poland said it wants to have a permanent U.S. base and the country seeks to “strengthen its strategic partnership with the United States.”<sup>354</sup> This report is important in that it shows an existing strategic partnership between Poland and the United

---

<sup>350</sup> MacAskill, Ewen, *“Russia says U.S. Troops Arriving in Poland Pose Threat to its Security,”* 12 January, 2017, The UK Guardian Newspaper, accessed on the internet on 30 August, 2017 at <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/12/doubts-over-biggest-us-deployment-in-europe-since-cold-war-under-trump>

<sup>351</sup> Ibid.

<sup>352</sup> MacAskill, Ewen, *“Russia says U.S. Troops Arriving in Poland Pose a Threat to its Security,”* Ibid.

<sup>353</sup> Poland White Paper: Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022,” 2013, accessed by internet on 31 August 2018 at [http://en.mon.gov.pl/p/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2014/01/ENGLISH\\_SRSBN\\_RP\\_do\\_pobrania.pdf](http://en.mon.gov.pl/p/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2014/01/ENGLISH_SRSBN_RP_do_pobrania.pdf)

<sup>354</sup> Poland White paper, “Proposal for a U.S. Permanent Presence in Poland,” 2018 U.S. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Poland, can be accessed at <https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Proposal-for-a-U.S.-Permanent-Presence-in-Poland-2018.pdf>.

States and that the two country's share a strategy when it comes to missile defense and troop training/exercises.

**Long-Term vision:** European security; deter Russia, and possibly add more troops to Poland/Europe; Realign U.S. troops to where they are most needed rather than keeping the status quo.

**What if America does not move troops from Germany to Poland? And What happens if it does?:** The United States has many options. Some of them include:

- \* It can move troops from Italy, which has also been discussed in news reports. However, Italy would be more expensive as it is further away from Poland. Germany and Poland share a border.
- \* The United States could move troops from other locations such as Asia but that would not be cost effective and could undo years of work to let Asian allies know that American cares for its security as well. Troops were realigned to Asia under the Obama Administration as part of his Asia-Pacific pivot.
- \* Troops could come from the continental United States and that could have many unforeseen consequences: 1. While Americans understand and generally support NATO and European security, they might be more apprehensive about sending troops from America to Poland because it might seem more like a “Cold War” deployment rather than a new European location to house troops. 2. There would be a tremendous cost to send thousands of troops, support staff, equipment, weapons and vehicles to Poland from the United States. 3. A large deployment from America would risk a political fall out from lawmakers, whose districts would lose government funding and jobs if tens of thousands of troops, families, support staff and equipment were sent to Poland.
- \* A troops shuffle from one European country to another (Germany) could appear less threatening to Russia. If America keeps its current configuration to about 68,000 troops in



Europe and then sends more troops to Poland, Russia could be threatened by the perceived build up in Europe and on its border. Such a move could actually increase tensions between Poland and Russia and have a negative impact of Russia building up along its border, making Poland the next Berlin in the New Cold War.

**Rival voices, rival plans, additional questions:** NATO leader Jens Stoltenberg, issued his support of additional troops to Poland through social media. However, Russia opposes a troop build-up in its region. After Mr. Trump announced plans to send an additional 1,000 troops to Poland, Russia complained that the plan could “destabilize Europe.” The Russian Foreign Ministry said the planned U.S. boost to Poland was a betrayal of Russia’s deal with NATO reached in 1997 under which NATO would not permanently site significant forces inside the territory of its newer members.<sup>355</sup> However, one could argue that NATO is not placing troops in Poland — the United States is doing it. One could also argue that 4,000 troops plus an additional 1,000 is not a significant number. After all, Germany has 30,000 U.S. troops in its country and that could seem like a more significant number than 4,000. But to some Russian officials, it is not the number of troops, but the intent. Russian lawmaker Vladimir Shamarov told DW News that he is concerned that U.S. drones based out of Poland could be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.<sup>356</sup> The United States did not report drones used in Poland would be carrying nuclear weapons or that such weapons would be aimed at Russia, and Shamarov’s statement could be seem as a dramatic news bite to increase attention to the matter.

**Public reaction to proposal:** A survey conducted for this research in December 2018 found that 69.7 percent of respondents said the United States should have a permanent base in

---

<sup>355</sup> DW News, “Russia warns NATO over US-Poland troop move,” 13 June 2019, accessed 15 December 2019 at <https://www.dw.com/en/russia-warns-nato-over-us-poland-troop-move/a-49188555>.

<sup>356</sup> DW News, “Russia warns NATO over US-Poland troop move,” Ibid.

Poland. In that same poll, 59.52 percent of respondents said America has too many foreign military bases. If America moves troops from Germany to a permanent site in Poland, then several Germany bases may close because they are no longer of use. America could possibly save money because the cost of living and business is cheaper in Poland than in Germany. Poland does not use the Euro, but its own currency, the Polish Zloty. (1 Zloty equals 23 cents of the Euro, as of December 15, 2019). In another research question, 90 percent of respondents said that NATO members should spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense.

**Conclusions:** After examining the data, some conclusions can be offered:

1. The United States could do nothing. It could stop troop rotations into Poland and stop a proposed 1,000 troop increase because the plan is offensive to Russia and could increase tensions between European neighbors.
2. The United States could put a hold on moving troops from Germany to Poland, once and if it announces plans to have a permanent base in Poland. It could continue the temporary troop rotations to a permanent base structure. This move could appease Russia.
3. The United States could move a few thousands troops from Germany to Poland, so not to upset the power balance in the region and upset Russia.
4. The United States could also make a more strategic move. American leaders, since the end of World War II have said they are committed to European Security. NATO's Article 5 states that an attack against one NATO country is an attack against all — that means that America would help its allies if they are attacked and further infers it would help allies if they felt threatened. Poland has said it feels threatened by Russia —even though it seeks a relationship with Russia. If that is the case, America could help restore faith in European security by sending additional troops to Poland. The most cost effective way to do that could be by sending troops from Germany, which is no longer under threat of

Russian invasion or economic instability. America, under the Obama Administration, was forced to cut defense spending. Asking Americans to spend additional money to move troops from the United States or Asia to Poland, may not have taxpayer support and could risk killing the plan to have a permanent U.S. base in Poland. One of the best options to have a permanent base in Poland could be to move troops from Germany to Poland— despite Russia’s concerns that additional troops in Poland could destabilize the region.

After examining the data, this work takes the position that the United States will move some of its troops from Germany to its base in Poland (when it opens). U.S. officials were recently quoted in the newspaper that they are working on a deal to open a U.S. base in Poland and they hope to have an agreement in a year (this is detailed in chapter 7 case study). When the base opens, the United States will likely have a mix of rotating and permanent troops at the site and will need to ‘stock the pool,’ by moving troops to the base. The most economic solution is to take troops from Germany. U.S. forces, after World War II, served as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, who had taken over Eastern Germany. Russia’s former Warsaw Pact allies are now free, democratic and some fear Russia’s growing aggression. Since there is a greater probability that Russia would act more aggressively toward its Eastern European neighbors than it would Central or Western European countries, it makes sense to reshuffle troops currently placed in Germany to Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe.

In addition, If Germany is concerned about the absence of U.S. troops, it can perhaps increase its military funding and its own troop count so that it can provide for its own defense.



**Research Question: Should the United States decrease its participation/funding to NATO because some of its members have failed to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense?**

The Stake Holders:	Defense/Military Expenditures	Military Size	Related Transnational Concerns
United States	\$989 Billion, includes \$576 billion base budget, \$174 billion for overseas contingency, \$212 billion for other agencies and \$26.1 billion for OCO funds, State Department and Homeland Security (fiscal year 2020) . The U.S. spends 3.42 percent of GDP on defense (Source: Military Balance 2019).	1.3 million active duty troops	Has no major concerns with nearby neighbors, except has issues with illegal immigrants coming over the Mexican border to the United States. As the world's largest economy, the U.S. is concerned with European security, Russian aggression, China's rise, fragile and failing states and violent extremist groups around the globe.
NATO	NATO members were asked to fund defense at 2 percent of their GDP, and to spend 20 percent of those funds on equipment. Members who fund at the 2 percent level are: the United States, Greece, Estonia, UK, Romania, Poland and Latvia. Lithuania spent 1.98 percent.	NATO has 29 member nations and could call on the alliance during a crisis. NATO invoked Article 5 after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks and sent thousands of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq to help the United States	Is reportedly concerned with the rise of Russian aggression and supports United States efforts to rotate troops into Eastern Europe as a show of force and to train NATO members and partners. It has a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, has troops in Afghanistan and has a mission in the Mediterranean.
Russia	\$65.96 billion — which is 3.6 percent of its GDP (2017 figures)	*About 1 million active duty troops (RAND Corporation).	Russia has reported it feels threatened by increased American and NATO troop presence in Poland and Eastern Europe. It is seen as an aggressive nation that could bully or invade its neighbors. Russia also is concerned with Chechnya rebels, ISIS Caucasus and other violent extremist organizations within the country, according to U.S. government reports.

\* Source for material in this grid come from: The Military Balance, "U.S. Military Budget, It's Components, Challenges and Growth," 7 December 2019, accessed 16 December 2019 at <https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320>; <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2017/03/russia-defence-spending>; Crane, Keith, et al, "Trends in Russia's Armed Forces: An overview of budgets and capabilities," Rand Corporation 2019, accessed on 16 December 2019 at [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR2500/RR2573/RAND\\_RR2573.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2573/RAND_RR2573.pdf); [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2019\\_06/20190625\\_PR2019-069-EN.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_PR2019-069-EN.pdf); and "Operations and Missions: past and present," 25 April 2019, NATO, accessed 16 December 2019 at [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52060.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm).; "Russia," CIA World Fact Book, accessed 16 December 2019 at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>.

**Who is driving this particular change?:** Mr. Trump has been critical of NATO since he won the Presidency in 2016. His greatest concern is some NATO members are not paying their “fair share,” which he considers 2 percent of each countries’ GDP, with 20 percent of defense spending on equipment; This 2 percent framework was created by NATO members in 2014 as a goal to reach by 2024, according to NATO. However, Mr. Trump feels the goal should have already been reached and alleges countries such as Germany do not pay enough for their defense. In November 2019, CNN television network reported Mr. Trump would cut America’s contribution to NATO’s collective budget (Common Fund). CNN called it “a symbolic move that comes as many continue to question President Donald Trump’s commitment to the transatlantic alliance as he prepares to attend a summit to mark its 70th anniversary.<sup>357</sup> CNN said NATO’s “direct budget” is \$2.5 billion. The United States currently funds 22.1 percent of that budget/common fund, France gives 10.4 percent, Germany contributes 14.7 percent and Italy 8.1 percent.<sup>358</sup> The CNN report said Mr. Trump wants to cut the U.S. contribution to 16 percent. It is unknown how NATO would react to a cut in the U.S. contribution. Cutting the U.S. contribution to NATO’s budget could prove negative, causing NATO to cut staff or services. It could lead some to wonder if the U.S. is committed to European security. Following the CNN report, a DW News report said Germany would meet American spending on the NATO budget starting in 2021. The share of the NATO budget covered by Germany will increase from 14.8 percent in 2021 to 16.35 percent and the share covered by the United States would decrease from 22.1 percent to 16.35 percent.<sup>359</sup>


---

<sup>357</sup> Browne, Ryan, “Trump Administration to Cut its Financial Contribution to NATO,” CNN, 29 November, 2019, accessed on 16 December 2019 at <https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/27/politics/trump-nato-contribution-nato/index.html>.

<sup>358</sup> “Funding NATO,” NATO, 27 June 2018, accessed 16 December 2019 at [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_67655.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm).

<sup>359</sup> DW News, “Germany will increase contribution to the NATO budget to be in line with what the U.S. pays,” 28 November 2019, accessed 17 December 2019 at <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-match-us-contribution-to-nato-budget/a-51446211>

**Scenario axis and logics:**



**Development of the issue:** In June 2018 Merkel said Germany will not reach the 2 percent funding threshold until after 2024, according to news reports. She said Germany will spend just 1.5 percent of its GDP on defense by 2024, according to media reports. In November 2018, Merkel was quoted as saying that perhaps the European Union should create its own military. “The times when we could rely on others are over. This means that we Europeans have to take our fate fully into our own hands,” Merkel said.<sup>360</sup> French President Emmanuel Macron has also been a vocal critic of the United States regarding NATO funding and European security. In a radio interview in November 2018, Mr. Macron said, “We have to protect ourselves with respect to China, Russia and even the United States of America.”<sup>361</sup> Mr. Macron went on to say that Europe cannot be protected until the countries decide to

<sup>360</sup> Lough, Richard, “Germany’s Merkel calls for a European Union Military,” 13 November 2018, Reuters News Service, accessed 16 December 2019 at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-politics-merkel/germanys-merkel-calls-for-a-european-union-military-idUSKCN1N11UQ>.

<sup>361</sup> Stone, Jon, “Emmanuel Macron calls for creation of a ‘true European army,’” 6 November 2018, UK Independent, accessed on 16 December 2019 at <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-european-army-france-russia-us-military-defence-eu-a8619721.html>.

have ‘a true European army.’<sup>362</sup> Mr Trump was not happy with Mr. Macron or Ms. Merkel’s statements and news reports began to surface that Mr. Trump wanted the United States to leave NATO. In January 2019, a New York Times article said Trump was unhappy with NATO members funding and wanted to remove the United States from the alliance. The newspaper wrote that, “Several administration officials told the New York Times that several times over the course of 2018, Mr. Trump said he wanted to to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Current and former officials who support the alliance said they feared Mr. Trump could return to his threat as allied military spending continued to lag behind the goals the president had set.”<sup>363</sup>

The issue of whether America leaves NATO, cuts NATO funding and Mr. Trump’s provocative comments to force European partners to increase its funding is starting to resemble a school fight amongst children. No one seems happy with any of the outcomes. Mr. Macron remarked in November 2019 that NATO was experiencing “brain death.” Mr. Macron was upset that Mr. Trump authorized the removal of U.S. forces from Syria without first talking with members (some U.S. troops have since returned) and Mr. Macron feared America did not care about European security, according to news reports. European leaders, including Merkel, were quick to separate themselves from Mr. Macron’s comments, saying they did not agree with his statements, according to news reports. Mr. Trump, at a press conference at the December NATO summit in London, said Mr. Macron’s remarks were “insulting to a lot of different forces, including to Stoltenberg, who Mr. Trump said was doing a really good job of running NATO.”<sup>364</sup> Stoltenberg, who was seated next to Mr. Trump, disagreed that NATO is experiencing “brain death,” and said that NATO is “active” and

---

<sup>362</sup> Stone, Jon, “Emmanuel Macron calls for creation of a ‘true European army,” Ibid.

<sup>363</sup> Barnes, Julian and Cooper, Helene, “Trump discussed pulling U.S. from NATO, aides say Amid new concerns over Russia,” 14 January 2019, The New York Times, accessed 15 December 2019 <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html>.

<sup>364</sup> NATO, “NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and U.S. President Donald Trump,” 3 December 2019, accessed 15 December 2019 at [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_171542.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_171542.htm?selectedLocale=en).



“agile.”<sup>365</sup> Also, there were video and news reports of some European leaders making fun of someone at a Buckingham Palace reception during the London NATO summit and there was much speculation they were talking about Mr. Trump; The U.S. president was not happy with the laughter and attacked at least one of the leaders.<sup>366</sup> It is unknown at this point how this incident will impact American- European relations in the future — particularly if Mr. Trump is reelected.

**Long term vision:** A safe, secure, and financially stable United States and NATO/Europe, with the maximum ability to deter Russian aggression and any violent extremist groups that attempt to attack member states. NATO also wants to reach out to Eastern European partnership nations to help them modernize and beef up their defense and possibly join NATO one day. Poland was a Partnership for Peace nation and is now a full NATO member.

**What happens if the United States leaves NATO? What happens if it stays within NATO?:**

If the United States leaves NATO, it would have drastic consequences not just for Europe, but for American power projection and security. It might also leave Eastern European nations more vulnerable to Russian aggression and could essentially end the usefulness of the alliance.

When news reports spread that Mr. Trump wanted to leave NATO, several politicians, scholars and former government officials gave their views — the majority of which opposed American withdraw from NATO.

Dr. Jorge Benitez, an assistant for alliance issues to the director of NATO for the Obama Administration, was asked as part of this scenario if he thought the United States would pull

---

<sup>365</sup> NATO, “NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg and U.S. President Donald Trump,” Ibid.

<sup>366</sup> Birmingham Michael, et al, “NATO summit ends with Trump calling Trudeau ‘two-faced’ after video of world leaders apparently mocking the president,” accessed 31 December 2019 at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nato-braces-for-contentious-summit-as-trump-other-leaders-gather-near-london/2019/12/04/5994d97c-0fc0-11ea-924c-b34d09bbc948\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nato-braces-for-contentious-summit-as-trump-other-leaders-gather-near-london/2019/12/04/5994d97c-0fc0-11ea-924c-b34d09bbc948_story.html)

out of NATO in the same way that France did, and he said he could not exclude that possibility. But Benitez said that a more likely or dangerous scenario is that America may pull out of NATO without saying so.

It is possible “the U.S. would continue to abandon leadership and not play a role, not try to lead and help the alliance and that we would just sit. We would still be at the table but a lot less quietly and a lot less to contribute. By the way, that would mean acting a lot like the Europeans. Time and time again, American leaders have asked them to step up and the Europeans have politely said yes and dragged their feet. So I could see President Trump dragging his feet and not contributing much and I don’t think that’s good for us. But I think that’s possible,” Benitez said.<sup>367</sup>

To be clear, Benitez said he does not think the United States should leave NATO. But he said both Americans and Europeans can make bad decisions that are very harmful and those decision may make the alliance look weak enough that a foreign power may take unnecessary risks. For example, Benitez said no one thought Putin would risk attacking Georgia in 2008, but he did. He added, “No one thought Putin would take the risk of attacking Ukraine. No one thought Putin would take the risk or have the capabilities left over to intervene in Syria. Time and time again, he has shown us that he is less risk adverse. And he takes risks that others would not. It is in the interest of (the United States and NATO) to make smart decisions.”<sup>368</sup>

Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield, in a separate interview, addressed the vitality of NATO.

“At the end of the day, these organizations — NATO is an organization — is only as strong as the political spirit that animates not the leaders, not the parliaments, not the commanders but the general public in all those countries, particularly in this century where information is so widely dispersed, political leaders don’t enjoy the same kind of implicit authority that they used to have two generations ago because everyone knows everything and they are sort of shouting it at their leaders and that’s democracy in the modern era,

---

<sup>367</sup> Benitez, Jorge Dr., interview in Washington, D.C. area in June 2018.

<sup>368</sup> Benitez, Jorge Dr., Ibid.

which is to say, if we don't understand what the essence of solidarity is between ourselves and the Atlantic alliance countries than we are taking a risk," he said.<sup>369</sup>

Bloomfield said NATO and America's policies and actions should be measured against the common interests of the two societies — what values are they upholding and what kind of a world are they interested in steering together. Bloomfield said there are multiple threats to America and Europe and that is why NATO adopted out of area operations, when they assisted the United States in Afghanistan, and then went into Libya — which is not a European mainland.

"I think NATO has showed its ability to be dynamic, to be able to modernize its thinking," Bloomfield said. "For a while there was a question of rival impulses in Europe, where the EU Defense Force might be draining some of the support from NATO. I don't think we feel that way anymore. So, if there are concerns about the vitality of NATO, it's not necessarily NATO's fault, it's a question of political solidarity that it felt by people — and that is something that political leaders need to think about."

And Dr. Alex Weisiger, who teaches political science at the University of Pennsylvania, said that American leaders being upset about NATO members not paying more toward defense is not totally novel. "People have been complaining about NATO allies not paying their weight for quite some time," Wiesiger said.<sup>370</sup> He added that Obama also picked fights with allies — but he chose Israel, while Mr. Trump has picked on Germany. Mr. Trump has also been a vocal critic of France and Macron. Weisiger added that during the presidential debates, Mr. Trump did not think a lot about foreign policy, however, the logical implications of what he was saying is that the United States should not be involved in all the disputes around the world. <sup>371</sup>

The Cato Institute, a conservative think tank in America, has differing views on the transatlantic alliance. In a paper released after NATO's London Summit in December, The institute said that NATO, "no longer serves American interests." Doug Bandow, who

---

<sup>369</sup> Bloomfield, Lincoln Ambassador, interviewed in Washington D.C. in June 2018.

<sup>370</sup> Weisiger, Alex Dr., professor of political science at University of Pennsylvania, was interviewed in Philadelphia in June 2018.

<sup>371</sup> Weisiger, Alex, Dr., Ibid.

authored the paper said it makes no sense for U.S. taxpayers to subsidize the defense of European nations that can defend themselves — even if they have shared interests with America.<sup>372</sup> Bandow said NATO has many problems, the first one being that Europe no longer faces an “existential threat,” and he doubts European nations would be willing to increase defense spending.<sup>373</sup> Bandow said he doubts Europe would ever create its own military because it has NATO. He also added this point about America: “Europeans know that they can rely on the United States to act irrespective of how little they contribute to their militaries.”<sup>374</sup> Bandow’s comments do not take into account the Reuters poll that a sizable number of Americans want to link American help with whether European nations spend enough on defense (see below for details). And he probably didn’t take into account Mr. Trump’s desire to leave the alliance or decrease American funding to NATO.

**Rival voices, rival plans, additional questions:** If the United States leaves NATO, it brings about many questions and this work could not answer them all in a scenario. But some of the questions are: What would happen to jointly run NATO bases around Europe? Would U.S. forces still train with NATO troops or would the training be limited to countries where the United States has permanent military bases? Would NATO have to cut participation in training, exercises and peacekeeping missions without U.S. funding and participation? Would some of the U.S. troops at NATO bases (such as Oeiras, Portugal) be sent back to America? But perhaps a larger and more important question is how many troops does America need to deter Russia and ensure European peace whether it is a part of NATO or not?

**Public reaction to the proposal:** A poll conducted 3 December 2018 to 1 January 2019 for this work, found that 90 percent of respondents agreed that NATO members should spend 2

---

<sup>372</sup> Bandow, Doug, “NATO no longer serves American interests,” 5 December 2019, Cato Institute, accessed on 17 December 2019 at <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-no-longer-serves-american-interests>.

<sup>373</sup> Bandow, Doug, “NATO no longer serves American interests,” Ibid.

<sup>374</sup> Bandow, Doug, “NATO no longer serves American interests,” Ibid.

percent of their GDP on defense. A national poll also found that nearly half of Americans agree with Trump that Europeans should pay more for defense. The poll, conducted by Reuters News Service, found that 49 percent of respondents said the United States should not have to uphold its treaty commitment of allies that do not spend more on defense.<sup>375</sup> And another 18 percent were not sure if the United States had to uphold NATO commitments.<sup>376</sup> While Americans think NATO members should pay more, they still support the historic alliance. The Pew Research Center, found that 62 percent of American respondents viewed the alliance as favorable; however, 48 percent of Americans thought NATO did too little to solve the world's problems.<sup>377</sup> There are many surveys and studies on NATO, funding for NATO, attitudes about the alliance and whether individual European countries would help neighboring countries attacked by Russia. But what is more important to note is that while Americans see NATO as a good thing, it still wants European allies to spend more for their own defense, particularly since America cut its budget, defense spending and troop levels in Europe.

**Conclusions:** After examining the data, several conclusions could be made about whether the United States should leave NATO:

1. The United States could agree to leave NATO. This could be disastrous for the transatlantic alliance. Never mind that the United States funds 22 percent of its common fund, it also provides troops and equipment and has encouraged the alliance to have interoperability capabilities, to modernize equipment and to take on areas outside of its

---

<sup>375</sup> Stewart, Phil, "Nearly half of Americans link defense of NATO to allies' spending: Reuters/IPSOS Poll," 12 July 2018, accessed 17 December 2019 at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nato-voters/nearly-half-of-all-americans-link-defense-of-nato-to-allies-spending-reuters-ipsos-poll-idUSKBN1K82QK>

<sup>376</sup> Stewart, Phil, "Nearly half of Americans link defense of NATO to allies' spending," Ibid.

<sup>377</sup> Fagan, Moira, "NATO is seen as favorable in many member countries, but almost half of Americans say it does too little," Pew Research Center, 11 July 2018, accessed 17 December 2019 at <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/09/nato-is-seen-favorably-in-many-member-countries-but-almost-half-of-americans-say-it-does-too-little/>

purview (such as Libya). The U.S. has taken the leadership role in missions such as Kosovo. Which European country would take over the leadership role if the United States leaves? Leaving NATO could mean Europe is less safe as it could no longer have access to vital American intelligence on violent extremist groups and their plans for Europe. What would happen diplomatically between the United States and European countries as a result of America leaving? And could an America withdraw from NATO lead to a tit-for-tat battle where some European host nations tell American troops to leave or give back their bases because they are no longer part of NATO? Would the world be less safe if the United States leaves NATO and would that mean the United States would no longer honor Article 5 that a threat against one NATO member is a threat against all? Also, would this move become the impetus Russia needed to invade the Ukraine and to begin bully attacks on other NATO nations or partners such as Poland, Estonia and Lithuania? The prospect of the United States leaving NATO has more questions than answers and could not be entirely answered in the scope of this work.

2. Second, the United States could decrease funding. CNN news reports said the United States would lower its contribution to NATO's general fund to 16 percent. Such a move might upset NATO and its members or it might spur it into action. It could cause some countries to increase their defense spending. However, if nations want American participation and commitment to NATO, they might consider increasing their defense spending.
3. The United States could increase funding. It is highly unlikely the United States could increase NATO funding, unless of course, there is a major war or conflict in Europe. Mr. Trump has complained some European nations do not fully fund defense at 2 percent of their GDP and attempted to bully nations into spending more. In a November 2018 tweet about news that Europe may create its own army, Mr. Trump wrote: "Emmanuel Macron suggests building its own army to protect Europe against the U.S., China and Russia. But it was Germany in World Wars One and Two. How did that work out for France?"

They were starting to learn German in Paris before the U.S. came along. Pay for NATO or not!”<sup>378</sup> Some may argue that Mr. Trump’s tweet was crude or unpresidential, but it was exactly how he felt about this issue. It is unlikely Mr. Trump would increase NATO spending after his tweet — unless European allies did the same.

4. The United States could keep things as is — the status quo. This could be a possibility, if European allies continue to increase defense spending. However, the Trump Administration has already signaled it would slightly decrease defense spending. If that is indeed the case, then the status quo could be gone during the Trump era.
5. Mr. Trump could take a wait and see attitude and decide in 2024 to see if every member will meet or come close to meeting the 2 percent guideline. Mr. Trump, through statements and tweets, seemed impatient to wait until 2024. Whenever there is a NATO conference or NATO event, he brings up funding. He has personally attacked Merkel and Macron for low defense spending. While this is a scenario of what could happen in the near future, it does not seem probable that Mr. Trump could do nothing and wait on leaders to spend more in defense.
6. If Mr. Trump is impeached or resigns from office or decides not to seek re-election, the alliance could take its chances with whomever replaces Mr. Trump, but it does not seem as if American leaders would drastically change course on NATO funding requests from members. If Mr. Trump does not finish his term, then the issue will be decided by Vice President Mike Pence, a conservative Republican, who has similar views about NATO funding. On a recent trip to Poland in September 2019, Mr. Pence said Germany did not meet defense spending guidelines and has instead supported a natural gas pipeline; “It simply makes no sense for people of the United States to bear the lion share of the burden of defending Europe... to see Germany become dependent on Russia for their

---

<sup>378</sup> Trump, Donald, Tweet, 13 November 2018, accessed 16 December 2019 at <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1062311785787744256>.

energy is another point that President Trump will continue to raise,” Pence said.<sup>379</sup> However, there is no way to tell if Mr. Pence would conclusively support additional funding decreases or withdrawing from NATO, but it is possible he could support a funding decrease. Joe Biden, the Democratic front-runner for President and former Vice-President for Mr. Obama, has been critical of Mr. Trump’s demands that allies fully fund defense spending now. In a statement that seemed geared toward Mr. Trump in December 2019, Mr. Biden, who was touring the country, said “NATO is not a protection racket.”<sup>380</sup> ‘Protection racket,’ is an organized crime euphemism that means people must pay a certain amount of money to be protected.

While American leaders will have to decide on an appropriate response to NATO members funding in the future, Mr. Trump has already signaled he would support option No. 2 for now — if media reports are to be believed. Mr. Trump’s aides have also been quoted in the news as saying he wanted to leave the alliance. Mr. Trump often says things that seems impulsive, changes his mind, and then goes back to his original comment — so it could be possible he could consider leaving the alliance, but it is much more possible he wants members to fully fund defense budgets so the burden does not fall on America. Mr. Trump, known for his book, *Art of the Deal*, and who as a real estate tycoon bragged about extraordinary deals he reached, could be trying to get better terms for America instead of the status quo. Only time will tell which approach works best for NATO and the United States.

After examining the data, this work takes the position that Mr. Trump will try in a more stealthy manner, to leave NATO. This conclusion, however, is based on many variables. But

---

<sup>379</sup> DW News, “U.S. Vice President Mike Pence sings out Germany for not meeting NATO spending,” 2 September 2019, accessed 17 December 2019 at <https://www.dw.com/en/us-vice-president-mike-pence-singles-out-germany-for-not-meeting-nato-spending/a-50257786>.

<sup>380</sup> Caputo, Mark and Korecki, Natasha, “NATO is not a protection racket: Biden test-drives new Trump attack,” 5 December 2019, Politico Magazine, accessed 17 December 2019 at <https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/05/nato-joe-biden-trump-076529>.



if Mr. Trump is re-elected and if NATO member states do not begin funding their defense at 2 percent of their GDP over the next two years, then Mr. Trump will start a campaign to decrease funding to NATO, first through cutting the American contribution to NATO's administrative costs, then decreasing U.S. participation and exercises with Western and Central European allies. Instead of NATO exercises Mr. Trump will focus on circumnavigating NATO by using the European Deterrence Initiative to fund those projects he supports from allies and partners who pay their 'fair share' toward defense. Mr. Trump has already shown he will use EDI to fund those projects important to him. Earlier this year the Defense Department announced it would cut \$1.8 billion in EDI funds and use that money to provide a border wall between the United States and Mexico — the border wall, although controversial, was one of his main campaign promises to constituents. Mr. Trump has also talked to aides about the possibility of leaving NATO, according to media reports. And, plans for Europe to create their own defense force seem stalled for now.



## Chapter 7 - Case Studies

To more clearly examine U.S. strategy for its European bases, this work examines two case studies to provide better insight into America's commitment to European security and how foreign military bases fit into American strategy. This chapter will examine case studies involving Lajes Field in Portugal and a proposal to place a U.S. base in Poland. This work will examine Lajes and a possible base in Poland to determine if they are important to American base strategy today and in the future.

### Case Study 1

#### **Subject:** Poland and European Security

**Question:** Why should the United States consider placing a permanent base in Poland?



This map of Poland came from Stratfor at <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/fort-trump-united-states-military-base-options-poland-russia-belarus-map>

**Levels of Analysis:** International and Transnational. This issue will be viewed through the lens of the United States and Europe through an international level of analysis; and will be viewed through the lens of NATO, the United States and Europe through a transnational level of analysis.

**Proposition:** The United States is committed to European security and strategically located bases in Europe since the Cold War to deter Soviet (and now Russian) aggression.

**Data:** Interviews with former government officials, a survey, scholarly works, newspaper articles, White papers and government documents examining U.S. presence in Europe, the United States' commitment to European Security and the importance of NATO in deterring Russia. This data is connected to the research question and the proposition because it deals with whether the United States should locate a base in the Poland, which would ultimately impact European security, U.S. troop presence and Russia.

**History:** In 2018 Polish officials issued a White Paper asking the United States to locate a permanent base in Poland. Officials said their government would pay up to \$2 billion for a base. The report was controversial and some former military officials denounced the plan. Former U.S. Lt. General Ben Hodges wrote an editorial in Politico magazine saying that America should not put a U.S. base in Poland. In the editorial, Hodges wrote: *To begin with, many of our allies would see the establishment of a U.S. military base in Poland — or anywhere else in Central or Eastern Europe — as unnecessarily provocative.<sup>381</sup> It would give Moscow an easy opportunity to claim that NATO is an aggressor and to somehow respond to Russian sovereignty.<sup>382</sup>*

Following the release of the report, U.S. Sen. John Bookman introduced an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2019 Defense Budget, requesting the U.S. Department of Defense conduct an assessment of the 'feasibility and advisability' of permanently locating

---

<sup>381</sup> Hodges, Ben "Don't Put U.S. Bases in Poland," Politico Magazine, 4 June 2018, <https://www.politico.eu/article/dont-put-us-bases-in-poland/> (accessed on 4 June 2018).

<sup>382</sup> Hodges, "Don't put U.S. Bases in Poland."

an Army Brigade Combat Team in Poland.<sup>383</sup> The written plan would be submitted to Congress. The report was due in March, but was not handed in to Congress as of July 2019, according to media reports.

In April 2019, Bloomberg News reported that U.S. and Polish officials were close to an agreement that would construct a U.S. base in Poland. Bloomberg reported that it was unclear if Mr. Trump fully supports the deal but he has said publicly that he is seriously looking at establishing a U.S. base in Poland.<sup>384</sup> Kathryn Wheelbarger, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs, testified before the U.S. House Arms Services Committee in March and said they are currently in the midst of bilateral discussions with the Polish government and the United States views Poland's offer as an indication of its commitment to promoting regional security and burden sharing.<sup>385</sup> Wheelbarger told the committee she could not discuss the particulars of the bilateral meetings in an unclassified meeting. However, she was quoted in Time Magazine as saying that a technical agreement could be finalized in a six months to one year.<sup>386</sup>

#### **What people are saying:**

There appears to be mixed support for a base in Poland, in part, because of Russia.

Dr. Jorge Benitez, who worked for the Secretary of Defense under the Obama Administration, supports increased U.S. presence in Europe, but he would prefer increased multilateral presence — not an additional base in Poland. Benitez said he does not believe bilateral agreements such as this base proposal from Poland is best for Polish or American

---

<sup>383</sup> Boozman, John, U.S. Senator, (Republican from Arkansas) 14 June, 2018 "U.S. Sen. Boozman on Senate Floor — live video feed from his Twitter account," at <https://twitter.com/johnboozman/status/1007346991414890496?lang=en>, accessed on 27 June 2018.

<sup>384</sup> Jacobs, Jennifer, et al, "Poland and the U.S. Closing in on Deal to Build Fort Trump, Sources Say," 16 April 2019, accessed 17 April 2019 and can be accessed at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-16/pires-and-u-s-said-to-close-in-on-deal-to-build-fort-trump>.

<sup>385</sup> Wheelbarger, Kathryn, "Statement before the 116th Congress Committee on Armed Services," 13 March 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109096/witnesses/HHRG-116-AS00-Wstate-WheelbargerK-20190313.pdf>, page 12.

<sup>386</sup> Hennigan, W.J., "Fort Trump? The Pentagon Takes a Step Toward Establishing Base in Poland," 14 March 2019, accessed 28 December 2019 at <https://time.com/5551061/poland-military-base-fort-trump/>.

security. “I think there is a misconception that U.S. troops are the best defenders of European security,” Benitez said, adding, “that is false.”<sup>387</sup>

To support his claims, Benitez cited surveys conducted between 2015 and 2017 on NATO countries about Russia. The respondents were asked in 2015 if one of their NATO allies were attacked by Russia, should your country defend it. In none of the surveys did a majority of people say yes, Benitez said. The only two countries that said yes were the United States and Canada, he said, adding the survey results got a lot of attention. The survey was conducted in 2015 and 2017. In 2017, Benitez said the Dutch were the first survey respondents to say they would help defend a neighbor if attacked by Russia. Benitez said the survey results were disconcerting. “Many (European nations) are not willing to defend themselves, but they think Uncle Sam should and that is the danger because they do not understand or appreciate the fact that many of our own leaders don’t understand and appreciate that can’t be the answer,” he said. “That might be the answer in the short term, in terms of a crisis, but it can’t be the force structure we prepare for because even though there is bipartisan support in Congress right now, I am sure if the president asked for his Polish base, there is so much criticism of Russia right now, especially with their intervention in our election, it would get approved.”<sup>388</sup>

But Benitez said he does not think a base in Poland would get continual support each year because lawmakers would ask why is it only American troops in Poland and not troops from other nations. They would also ask why this is not a NATO mission, he said. Benitez agrees that there should be more U.S. troops in Eastern and Central Europe, but they should be there with European troops. Benitez said there should be multinational European forces in the East in larger numbers to decrease deterrence.

Instead of a base in Poland, Benitez said the United States should build a NATO training center in Lithuania. This training center would not be a permanent base, but would

---

<sup>387</sup> Benitez, Jorge, Interview in Washington D.C. on 22 June 2018.

<sup>388</sup> Benitez, Ibid.

be home to a permanent U.S. battalion and European brigade, which would serve as a training force for all NATO-member militaries that rotate into the base to be trained.<sup>389</sup> Benitez compared it to America's National Training Center to Fort Irwin, California — where the U.S. military trains troops with exercises and mock battles before deploying into war zones or other missions.

The Lithuanian training center that Benitez proposes would be located in the Suwalki Gap bordering Poland — which the Atlantic Council think tank called NATO's vulnerable link in Europe because it could be a target of Russian aggression.<sup>390</sup>

The training center would also train European military units which would cycle through to improve their readiness and forcing them to face the challenges of their equipment and personnel in that region of the country, Benitez said. This would also increase readiness. Benitez said the training center would be a “more peaceful way, a less confrontational way” to deal with Russia and to say the United States is not building bases in Poland, but is building a training facility. “It is going to improve deterrence because at any given time you are going to have at least a U.S. battalion and a European brigade training (close to the border).”<sup>391</sup>

While Benitez thinks a training center in Lithuania is a good compromise to strategically deal with Russia, others believe the United States should be sensitive to Russia's concerns about a troop build up on its border.

When Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield, who served under the George W. Bush Administration, was asked his opinion on U.S. plans to possibly transition rotation forces in Poland to permanent troops, Bloomfield said the issue is not just a question of logistics or geography. He said since the end of the Cold War, the United States has come out a lot

---

<sup>389</sup> Benitez, Jorge Dr., “Interview with Dr. Benitez in Washington, D.C. on 22 June 2018,” taken from audio tape and notes.

<sup>390</sup> Grigas, Agnia, “NATO's Vulnerable Link in Europe: Poland's Suwalki Gap,” 9 Feb. 2016, The Atlantic Council, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-s-vulnerable-link-in-europe-poland-s-suwalki-gap> accessed on 28 June 2018.

<sup>391</sup> Benitez, Jorge, Dr., Ibid.

worse regarding relations with Russia. “What Russia wanted to know more than anything when we last reorganized our military footprint, was where the permanent forces would be and they are very sensitive about certain countries near their border,” he said. “I think the Americans should be sensitive to Russia’s concerns. I think instead of figuring out how much we can get away with, I think we ought to be considering how to reach a better understanding with Russia so that we don’t become 21st century permanent adversaries.”<sup>392</sup>

Bloomfield was asked if he thought it was likely and he said no. However, he is concerned about what has become of U.S.-Russian relations under Russian President Vladimir Putin and even under former President Bush. He said, “We seem to be pushing very hard to expand NATO to the east and adding countries into the Partnership for Peace Program without any consideration of whether this is a problem in Russia. We assume that after Democracy, or Boris Yeltsin took office that those concerns were gone, but they were not gone.”<sup>393</sup> (Yeltsin, Russia’s first elected president, served from 1991-1999. Russia is also a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace.)

Bloomfield said the United States made some mistakes in pushing so hard on this issue. He remarked that in 2003 the U.S. European Command conducted 33 exercises with the Red Army. The United States, he said, was engaging with Russia. He remembers a time when he accompanied the deputy secretary of state and other U.S. government officials to a terrorism bilateral in Russia. He said: “We briefed the National Security Advisor and Deputy Foreign Minister in a room full of Russian officials on our global footprint and we answered all their questions and we told them the truth. It was sensitive information. I think our instinct was that we don’t need to be adversaries and what has happened in more recent years has made America very perturbed today. I think that we can do a better job of thinking

---

<sup>392</sup> Bloomfield, Lincoln, Ambassador, interview in June 2018 in Washington D.C. He served as special envoy for MANPADS Threat Reduction from 2008-2009 and was given the rank of ambassador. He is also a former assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs. He currently works as a consultant at his firm Palmer Coats LLC.

<sup>393</sup> Bloomfield, Lincoln, Ambassador, Ibid.



strategically for the future and trying to steer U.S. Russia relations to a safer, better ground, otherwise, we would be wasting a lot of effort on adversarial issues.”<sup>394</sup>

While Ambassador Bloomfield would like to take a diplomatic approach with Russia and troop strength in the region, it may not be possible in the current environment. But even so, can the United States expect Russian push back from locating a base in a sovereign nation on its border?

Dr. Alex Weisiger, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, said in an interview that while Russia would not be happy about the base, he does not think they would do anything specifically about it. “Europe is part of the American sphere of influence — they don’t call it that. Outside of egregious things, stuff the U.S. does within its sphere of influence, the Russians can’t do much about it.”<sup>395</sup> He said it was in the same way Americans looked at the uprising in Hungary in 1956 and wished them the best to the people carrying out this uprising, but said the United States would not get involved.

Weisiger said this issue becomes a debate about the future of EU. It also a question of if a country wants to be pro-American. Weisiger said he does not see much significance in whether the base in Poland is permanent or not.

And Chuck Vinch, a long-time journalist who wrote about the military for Stars and Stripes and served as a managing editor for the Military Times family of newspapers, said in an interview that he didn’t think there was a bonafide need for the United States to keep troops or a permanent base in Poland. “To me, this is more of a diplomatic issue than it is a military issue,” said Vinch, an Army veteran who also worked in Europe. “Even this long after the Cold War ended, Polish officials are still uneasy about being positioned so close to Russia and would like a U.S. military presence on their soil mainly to serve in that tripwire

---

<sup>394</sup> Bloomfield, Lincoln, Ambassador, Ibid.

<sup>395</sup> Weisiger, Alex, Dr., associate professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. He was interviewed in June 2018.

role.”<sup>396</sup> If Russia did threaten Poland and there was a U.S. base in the country, Vinch said it would risk inviting a larger confrontation with the United States as well.

### **Why a base in Poland and why now?**

Russia became an increasing threat to the region in 2013 when Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovych moved to forge a closer relationship with Russia and ended ties with the European Union, according to media reports. As protests spread across the country people were injured and killed and Yanukovych was removed from power.<sup>397</sup> A referendum was later held in the Crimean region of the Ukraine and voters decided to join Moscow.<sup>398</sup> The results were disputed and the West imposed sanctions on Russia.

Russia is now concerned about increased American presence in the Baltic region, particularly in Poland, according to media reports. America does not have “permanent bases” in Poland but training facilities where it rotates in troops for what it calls training missions and military exercises. The troops also serve as a show of force against Russia.

In June 2019 Mr. Trump signed a ‘Joint Declaration,’ agreement to send an extra 1,000 troops to Poland, according to media reports. The plan also calls for the location of an Army Division headquarters; joint training centers; a U.S. Air Force surveillance and reconnaissance squadron; special forces capability to support air, ground and maintenance operations; and infrastructure to support the presence of an Army Combat Aviation Brigade and an Army Combat Sustainment Support Battalion.<sup>399</sup>

**Conclusions:** This case study attempted to show what was happening in Poland and Europe that could cause Poland to request a base in the country. The conclusions from examining the data is that a U.S. base in Poland is highly likely and would be a meaningful

---

<sup>396</sup> Vinch, Charles, email interview conducted on 29 April 2018. Vinch was a former journalist for the Stars and Stripes newspaper and served as the Washington D.C. bureau chief, writing about the Pentagon.

<sup>397</sup> BBC News, “*Ukraine Crisis in Maps*,” 18 February 2015, accessed on the internet on 30 August 2017 at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27308526>

<sup>398</sup> BBC News, “Ukraine Crisis in Maps,” Ibid.

<sup>399</sup> Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Military Presence in Poland,” 1 August 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11280.pdf>.

deterrent to Russia. Since the United States currently rotates 4,000 troops into the country to serve in a temporary capacity at Polish sites, it would not be much more difficult to make a permanent base in Poland. U.S. troops are already scattered around Poland, with most of them in the western part of the country. U.S. Gen. Phillip Breedlove and U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow wrote a report on U.S. military presence in Europe and outlined where troops were located in Poland (circa 2018):

- \* there was a armored brigade combat team at four to six training sites in Zagan, Skwlerzyne, Boluslawiec and Swietoszow;
- \* a battle group of about 550 soldiers were in Orzysz;
- \* an aviation brigade in Powidz;
- \* U.S. Command personnel were located in Szczecin and Elblag;
- \* U.S. Mission Command members were in Poznan;
- \* about 100 personnel were at the Aegis Ashore construction site in Redzikowo;
- \* an aviation detachment in Miroslawiec;
- \* a special force detachment ws in Krakow;
- \* a reserve transportation battalion was in Powidz;
- \* military personnel were assigned to a NATO force integration unit in Bydgoszcz;
- \* and a defense attaché office in Warsaw also has U.S. troops.<sup>400</sup>

This work thought it was important to list the locations of U.S. troops to show that American forces already have an important presence throughout the country and are forging relationships with NATO and the Polish military. Transitioning to a permanent base would only make relations stronger as troop rotations in the country would become troop deployments. The average U.S. Army assignment to Europe is two to three years, an ideal

---

<sup>400</sup> Breedlove, Phillip, Gen., and Vershbow, Alexander, Ambassador, "Permanent deterrence: Enhancements to the U.S. military presence in North Central Europe," accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Permanent-Deterrence-Enhancements-to-the-US-Military-Presence-in-North-Central-Europe.pdf>.

environment to form relationships, versus the current nine-month rotations into the theater.<sup>401</sup>

In addition to the up side of having a more permanent roster of service members in Poland, the project could wind up costing the United States more money than one might think — but one could argue it would be worth the cost. The United States might have to secure additional housing, medical facilities, training facilities and storage areas and other buildings to take care of permanent U.S basing needs. Or perhaps, arrangements could be made for U.S. troops to use Polish facilities if there is enough room for both militaries. Such a move would no doubt concern Russia, but would not cause a war between the countries. Instead, Russia is more likely to retaliate by building up its troop presence near the border of Poland. While Poland has agreed to pay \$2 billion to build the base, the cost to run the base is likely to be much higher. For example, the Department of Defense Comptroller's office reported it costs the United States \$2.2 billion to operate and maintain its bases in Italy for fiscal year 2018.<sup>402</sup> That price includes things such as personnel and operations. This dissertation is not suggesting that it would cost the United States \$2 billion to operate a base in Poland. This work does assert that the cost will be in the millions to pay for troops and facilities and it is unclear if Poland will pay all costs associated with having U.S. troops in their country or just the initial costs to build the base.

Putting a base in Poland would be an immediate way to show American strength and deterrence and if relations between the United States, Russia and Europe mellow to a point that no one is threatened, then the base could be closed or downsized. If the United States is truly committed to European security and wants to deter Russia from any more aggression toward its neighbors, the base in Poland is one step in the right direction.

---

<sup>401</sup> The website *the balance, careers* reports the average overseas assignment is 24 months for a single person and 36 months for a married person, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.thebalancecareers.com/what-the-recruiter-never-told-you-3332708>

<sup>402</sup> Department of Defense Comptroller, "Operation and Maintenance Overview, Fiscal Year 2020 Budget," page 178-179, accessed on 26 December 2019 at [https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020\\_OM\\_Overview.pdf](https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_OM_Overview.pdf).

And some military officials agree. U.S. Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti (now retired), told a congressional panel that he supports a permanent base in Poland. Scaparrotti said he would like to see a mix of permanent and rotational forces at the proposed base.<sup>403</sup> Scaparrotti, who served NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, said that a permanent base in Poland would be helpful because of the relationships that would be built and because of the troops mission.<sup>404</sup> Scaparrotti's plan for mixed and rotation plans has merit and would probably find support amongst lawmakers and military leaders.

---

<sup>403</sup> Henningan, W.J. "Fort Trump? The Pentagon Takes a Step Toward Establishing a Base in Poland," *Ibid.*

<sup>404</sup> Henningan, W.J. "Fort Trump? The Pentagon Takes a Step Toward Establishing a Base in Poland," *Ibid.*

## Case Study 2

**Subject:** Lajes Field, Portugal

**Question:** Why should Lajes Field U.S. military base on Terceira Island in the Azores stay open?



This map of the Azores came from Searchbonus at <https://searchbonus.eu/v-i-business-insider-china-may-be-trying-to-take-over-a-critical-us-air-base-in-the-atlantic/>

**Levels of Analysis:** International and Transnational: This issue will be viewed through the lens of the United States and Portugal through an international level of analysis. And it will be viewed through a transnational lens of the United States, Portugal, NATO and China.

**Proposition:** The United States is committed to European security and strategically located bases in Europe since the Cold War to deter Russian aggression, project power and rapidly deploy and or refuel its planes during times of crisis.

**Data:** Interviews with former government officials, a survey, scholarly works, newspaper articles, government documents that examine U.S. presence in Europe, the United States' commitment to European Security, the importance of NATO in deterring

Russia. This data is connected to the research question and the proposition because it deals with whether the United States should maintain a base in the Azores, which would ultimately impact European security because the base has been used as a refueling stop during times of crisis. This base would also impact U.S. military presence in Europe.

**History:** The Azores, a group of nine islands in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, were considered by the Allies, and particularly by the United States, as a “stepping stone,” in the Atlantic, facilitating the transport of U.S. forces for the opening of a second front on the European continent.<sup>405</sup> During World War II, Allied forces believed that by using Lajes Field, they could save 51.5 million gallons of aviation fuel.<sup>406</sup> The base hosted aircraft and troops that helped in the war effort by getting materials to troops in Africa and Europe during World War II; the base also hosted B-17 bombers and combat engineers.<sup>407</sup> Since that time, the United States has depended on Lajes Field as an important refueling base in times of war and crises. To understand the significance of this base and the Portuguese government’s agreement to let America use it, this work looks at the 1951 agreement between the two parties. This work focuses on Article 1, which states: “The Portuguese government grants to the government of the United States in case of war in which they are involved, during the life of the North Atlantic Treaty and within the framework and by virtue of the responsibilities

---

<sup>405</sup> Rodrigues, Luis Nuno, “Crossroads of the Atlantic: Portugal, the Azores and the Atlantic Community (1943-57) accessed on 31 December 2019 at [https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/1770581/Crossroads.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DCrossroads\\_of\\_the\\_Atlantic\\_Portugal\\_the.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200104%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4\\_request&X-Amz-Date=20200104T193648Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=926ee7f1cb0d85b1a4ef23c4d13e0867a5172c1bd5b84c12909ae4c12440c15a](https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/1770581/Crossroads.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DCrossroads_of_the_Atlantic_Portugal_the.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200104%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20200104T193648Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=926ee7f1cb0d85b1a4ef23c4d13e0867a5172c1bd5b84c12909ae4c12440c15a)

<sup>406</sup> Rodrigues, Luis, Nuno, “Crossroads of the Atlantic,” *Ibid*, page 458.

<sup>407</sup> 65th Air Base Wing History Office, “A Short History of Lajes Field,” accessed 31 December 2019 at [https://archive.org/stream/AShortHistoryOfLajesFieldTerceiraIslandAzoresPortugal/A%20Short%20History%20of%20Lajes%20Field%20%7C%20Terceira%20Island%2C%20Azores%2C%20Portugal\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/AShortHistoryOfLajesFieldTerceiraIslandAzoresPortugal/A%20Short%20History%20of%20Lajes%20Field%20%7C%20Terceira%20Island%2C%20Azores%2C%20Portugal_djvu.txt)

assumed thereunder the use of facilities in the Azores which will be provided for in technical arrangements to be concluded by the ministers of defense.”<sup>408</sup>

So how important was such an agreement? Important, not just because the Portuguese government gave the United States, through NATO, a base it could use in times of crisis, that was strategically located in the Atlantic, but because of how the base functioned. It is an impressive air field. The base can currently store more than 65 million gallons of jet propulsion fuel in its tank farm and is the U.S. Air Force’s largest fuel repository in Europe and the second largest of America’s overseas bases.<sup>409</sup>

The U.S. military describes the importance of the base through the years: *The base was used during the Arab-Israeli Conflict when other European neighbors would not allow the United States to use their air bases; America used Lajes again when former President George Bush launched Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq and Enduring Freedom on Afghanistan; However, there have been no permanently assigned aircraft at the base since 1975.*<sup>410</sup>

By the 1990s, the base had 3,000 people working on it, including service members and civilians.<sup>411</sup> Today, there are 232 U.S. service members in all of Portugal, with 182 of them working for the U.S. Air Force.<sup>412</sup> In 2012, the U.S. government announced it would

---

<sup>408</sup> Yale Law School library website, “Military Facilities in the Azores: Agreement between Portugal and the United States,” accessed on 29 December 2019 at [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/port001.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/port001.asp)

<sup>409</sup> Amaral, Rui, F., “U.S.-Portuguese relations and Lajes Field Air Base,” a thesis for the U.S. Navy Postgraduate School accessed on 29 December 2019 at [https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/44511/14Dec\\_Amaral\\_Rui.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/44511/14Dec_Amaral_Rui.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y). Amaral’s information on the base’s fuel capacity came from McDonald, Marcus, “Team Lajes offloads fuel for the fight,” 65th Air Base Wing, public affairs, 19 April 2007.

<sup>410</sup> U.S. Air Force, “A Short History of Lajes Field, Terceira Island, Azores Portugal,” accessed by internet on 31 August 2017 at <http://www.lajes.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110621-022.pdf>

<sup>411</sup> Kates, Graham, “Defense Department decision gives China chance for foothold between U.S. and Europe,” 20 September 2017 accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/azores-withdrawal-gives-china-foothold-between-us-europe/>

<sup>412</sup> Defense Manpower Data Center, “Number of Military and DOD Appropriated Fund Civilian Personnel Permanently Assigned,” 30 September 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 at [https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp\\_reports.jsp](https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp).



downsize the base in an effort to save money. The base has since been reduced in size and some politicians wonder if this base is still a necessary part of America's strategy of the 21st Century. However, Scholar Michael Rubin, in an opinion essay in Newsweek Magazine, cautions America over abandoning the base because it has logistical importance in anti-submarine warfare.<sup>413</sup> Rubin and many news outlets reported that China would eagerly take over the base if America decided to leave.

Lawmakers and scholars are now pondering if Lajes Field should stay open, stay at its current downsized level or increase its troop presence, not just as a deterrence to Russia, but because of its prime location in the Atlantic. In addition, China has expressed interest in the base and nearby port for scientific and commercial purposes. China and Portugal have strengthened their relationship over the last eight years, according to Portuguese Scholar Livia Franco and Susi Dennison. Portugal and China have developed new links in trade, tourism, agriculture, education and technology.<sup>414</sup> Could access to Lajes Field or nearby port be a natural extension of this growing relationship? While that is to be debated, some pundits are wondering if the United States should keep the base not just because of its location, but to prevent China getting access to the base and a foothold into Central Europe via Portugal.

**What people are saying:** Benitez said he is in favor of the United States and NATO keeping as many bases as possible. He said it is not just China that is interested in acquiring bases. He said this is part of a larger trend happening in Europe. He cited the case of Norwegians building a 'top line submarine base' that was sold and later resold to Russia. Another example he cites is the former U.S. base in Keflavik, Iceland. "This was a very

---

<sup>413</sup> Rubin, Michael, "Did the Defense Department Lie About Closing Lajes," 22 September, 2016, *Newsweek Magazine*, accessed on the internet 31 August 2017 at <http://www.newsweek.com/did-defense-dept-lie-about-closing-lajes-500794>

<sup>414</sup> Franco, Livia and Dennison, Susi, "The Instinctive Multilateralist: Portugal and the politics of cooperation," 2 October 2019, European Council on Foreign Relations, accessed on 31 December 2019 at [https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/instinctive\\_multilateralist\\_portugal\\_politics\\_cooperation#](https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/instinctive_multilateralist_portugal_politics_cooperation#)

important, strategic base during the Cold War,” Benitez said, “But during the Cold War, no one thought there was a reasons for it. The U.S. (decided to leave).”<sup>415</sup>

The Icelandic community wanted the United States to stay. And Iceland was trying to decide what to do with the base. They tried to sell it and a Chinese company approached them about buying it, Benitez said. “The Chinese are doing this all around the world,” he said, pointing to strategic locations such as the Panama Canal. China is also expanding its presence near the canal, according to media reports. The Chinese government has encouraged state-run companies to invest in infrastructure across the globe as part of its One Belt, One Road Initiative and it has already invested in key logistics hubs such as Piraeus, Greece and Bandar, Malaysia.<sup>416</sup>

Benitez said at the same time, Russia was “behaving badly” — and keeps reminding the United States that not everyone is a good neighbor and that America may need some of these bases to keep the peace. “The U.S. and Iceland have negotiated and they are reopening the base at Keflavik and we will be stationing some of our new ... submarine helicopters out of there,” Benitez said, adding, “But that is a direct result of Russian aggression in Europe, the development of new Russian submarines that are quieter (deploying them in North Atlantic in very provocative ways).”<sup>417</sup> Benitez said some of the Russian submarines have gotten increased attention because they have spent time near undersea cables that control the internet.

Ambassador Bloomfield had a birds eye view of China’s rise and prominence in the world. In 2004 he remembers attending a bilateral where an undersecretary of defense briefed Chinese officials. At that time, Bloomfield said he could clearly see China was growing and expanding.

---

<sup>415</sup> Benitez, Jorge, Ibid.

<sup>416</sup> Goh, Brenda, “China State-Firm eye land around Panama Canal: Waterway Authority,” 27 March 2017, accessed on 29 December 2019 at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-canal-land-idUSKBN16Y13J>.

<sup>417</sup> Benitez, Ibid.

“And the question is what do we care about from a security standpoint? I look at Portugal,” said Bloomfield, adding, “I think back to the 1700s and 1800s where the whaling routes of Portugal or what brought Portuguese speakers to Massachusetts and Cape Verde was a major area off the coast of Africa and again we have a Portuguese population in New Bedford and Falls River Massachusetts. I have to believe there is something quite strategic about these Atlantic sea lanes, but on the other hand, China is a rising power and our strategic goal must be to find ways to converge with the great powers.”<sup>418</sup>

Bloomfield said the United States cannot grow at the same rate as China, and America runs the risk of being an escalating adversary. “It doesn’t mean we should concede to them because their political systems are not based on freedom, and so this is a burden for us and this is a burden for them. One party states are not survivable — that is my political view so Russia is in trouble long term. China is in trouble long term. Iran, Syria and North Korea are in trouble. if that happens we will be tied to a very large economy that is going through a crisis. So these are things to think about.”<sup>419</sup>

While Bloomfield looks at China’s interest in Lajes Field through the lens of its growth and rise in the world, to some the issue is about keeping America’s influence in and China’s out.

Weisiger said he would be ‘absolutely shocked,’ if the Americans left Lajes Field and China established a base there. “It is something, again, outwardly we are not going to say we are playing a sphere of influence game, but Europe is a member of the American sphere of influence.”<sup>420</sup> In the same respect, Weisiger said that Russia has influence in Eastern Europe and other places various places. Weisiger does not believe China has a big enough sphere of influence in Europe to have a base there.

---

<sup>418</sup> Bloomfield, Lincoln, Ambassador, Ibid.

<sup>419</sup> Bloomfield, Lincoln, Ambassador, Ibid.

<sup>420</sup> Weisiger, Alex, Ibid.

**Why now?:** In February 2019, U.S. Ambassador George Glass was quoted in a Xinhua News Agency article saying that Lajes Field is fundamental for security in the Atlantic.<sup>421</sup> He was quoted as saying he was confident in the continuity of the air base; and that the base was increasing in size and missions and has been a tremendous success.<sup>422</sup>

There have been numerous media reports about China's interest in Lajes Field, if the United States decided to leave the base. In 2013, after news of the American drawdown, a Chinese State Oceanic Administration official visited the Azores because China wanted to establish a scientific research facility at Lajes.<sup>423</sup> Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the Azores the following year, according to media reports. His visit could be seen as China's keen interest in establishing a base or deeper business interests on the Island. There have also been recent media reports that China wants to install a business center at Lajes, to act as a hub for goods from China that would allow easier distribution to Europe, Africa and the Americas.<sup>424</sup>

Portuguese leaders have been asked about China's interest in the base and whether Portugal would consider allowing China to use the base if the United States left. In a 2016 interview for Bloomberg, Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa was asked about Chinese investment in Portugal as well as Chinese interest in the Azores/Lajes Field.

Costa, who spoke through a translator, said Portugal would like to continue the agreement it has with the United States to occupy the base; The Azores will be very important both logistically in the Atlantic, but also in terms of technology and research and

---

<sup>421</sup>Xinhua News Agency, "U.S. base in Azores fundamental for security in the Atlantic," 13 February 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 at [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-02/13/c\\_137816585.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-02/13/c_137816585.htm)

<sup>422</sup> Xinhua News Agency, "U.S. base in Azores fundamental for security in the Atlantic," Ibid.

<sup>423</sup> Kates, Graham, "Defense Department decision gives China chance for foothold between U.S. and Europe," 20 September 2017, CBS News, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/azores-withdrawal-gives-china-foothold-between-us-europe/>.

<sup>424</sup> Kavanah, Ruairi, "China Eyes Azores as Possible Commercial Hub Amid U.S. Concerns," 11 October 2019, accessed 29 December 2019, at <https://www.southeusummit.com/europe/portugal/china-eyes-azores-as-possible-commercial-hub-amid-us-concerns/>

the field of climate change and deep water research, he said.<sup>425</sup> Costa said this would be a great opportunity to create a platform for scientific research in the Azores and that Portugal is open to cooperation with all partners — including China.<sup>426</sup> Costa was asked by a journalist that if the United States leaves Lajes, whether he would consider negotiating with the Chinese to use the base. He said, “ *The military use of the American base at the moment is not on the table. What is on the table is to reuse the infrastructure for scientific research purposes. it would be a huge shame not to use that infrastructure And if we are not going to use it for military purposes, then why not scientific research?*”<sup>427</sup>

However, critics have said that irregardless of what it is called, if China uses Lajes Field, it would have a military base in Europe.

Michael Rubin, who has written extensively about China’s interest in the Azores for the think tank American Enterprise Institute, said that while China might call a potential investment in Lajes Field and nearby Praia Vitória, civilian only — just as they have in Gwandar, Pakistan — the Chinese upgrade facilities to military specifications making them bases in all but name.<sup>428</sup>

Rubin said China’s interest in the American base is about two issues: American strategy and criminality.<sup>429</sup> He believes the Azores base is crucial to American strategy. Regarding the second issue, the base was involved in international intrigue as U.S. Rep. Devin Nunes, a Portuguese-American lawmaker, suggested the base be the site of an intelligence center. After lengthen investigations, the Pentagon decided to place the center in the United Kingdom. However, Rubin claims that documents show that U.S. defense officials

---

<sup>425</sup> Costa, António, “Portuguese Prime Minister on Chinese Investment,” video interview, 12 October 2016, Bloomberg, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-12/portugal-open-to-china-investment-in-azores-as-u-s-sway-wanes>.

<sup>426</sup> Costa, António, “Portuguese Prime Minister on Chinese Investment,” Ibid.

<sup>427</sup> Costa, António, “ Portuguese Prime Minister on Chinese Investment,” Ibid.

<sup>428</sup> Rubin, Michael, “China accelerates moves on Azores,” 22 September 2016, American Enterprise Institute, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/china-accelerates-move-on-azores/>.

<sup>429</sup> Rubin, Michael, “China accelerates moves on Azores,” Ibid.

were not completely forthcoming about the process in which they chose to put the center in the United Kingdom.<sup>430</sup>

Rubin's article on the Azores also featured an excerpt from Nunes letter to then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter in 2016, which said, *"China is spreading its influence through similar infrastructure investments in Djibouti, Sri Lanka and elsewhere around the globe. It is now using the same tactics to establish a foothold in the Azores which if successful will be used for logistics and intelligence hub that could ultimately be expanded for other military purposes, adjacent to critical U.S. military facilities,"* Nunes wrote, adding that the Chinese have expressed interest in using the runway at Lajes Field.<sup>431</sup>

While China has a military base in Djibouti — it does not have any military bases in Europe. China does not call its base in Djibouti a military base, instead it is called a "support facility," or a "logistical facility."<sup>432</sup> The United States also has a military base in Djibouti.

There is a fear that Portuguese-American relations could worsen if the base were turned over to Chinese researchers or used as a military base and that could spill over into issues with NATO presence in Portugal. However, Mr. Trump has been quoted in the press as saying he supports the base and has had talks and meetings with Portuguese officials on a number of issues,<sup>433</sup> indicating they have a good working relationship.

In a news article, Portuguese Scholar Raquel Vaz-Pinto was asked about China's interest in Lajes Field. Vaz-Pinto said China is interested in having a foothold in the middle of the Atlantic that would greatly favor its influence in the region.<sup>434</sup> She also said all the

---

<sup>430</sup> Rubin, Michael, "China accelerates moves on Azores," Ibid.

<sup>431</sup> Rubin, Michael, "China accelerates moves on Azores," quoting a letter written by U.S. Rep Devin Nunes, a republican from California, to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Ibid.

<sup>432</sup> Headley, Tyler, "China's Djibouti Base: A one year update," 4 December 2018, The Diplomat, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/chinas-djibouti-base-a-one-year-update/>.

<sup>433</sup> Thomas, Ken, "Trump meets with President of Portugal at White House," 27 June 2018, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://apnews.com/0433d925e37b49eca15bb907eac2b06a>

<sup>434</sup> Ames, Paul, "China's Atlantic stopover worries Washington," 29 September 2016, Politico Magazine, accessed 31 December 2019, at <https://www.politico.eu/article/chinas-atlantic-stopover-terceira-worries-washington-li-keqiang-united-states/>

interest over Lajes Field and the Azores shows one undeniable reality: China today is more and more a global player and it has no worries about trying to play in U.S. territory.<sup>435</sup>

### **What happens at the base?**

There have been a number of news reports from the 65th Air Base Group, which commands Lajes Field, about some of its recent missions. In addition to normal refueling missions, the base is also used for training exercises. A U.S. Strategic Command article recently detailed how U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit plane (stealth bomber) flew from the United Kingdom to Lajes in September 2019 to conduct a hot-pit refueling training.<sup>436</sup> According to the military, the training mission allowed pilots and crew to familiarize themselves with the area and it also demonstrated U.S. commitment to its European allies through the deployment of force.<sup>437</sup> The base also had visits from a KC-46 Pegasus tanker and the EA-6B Prowler Tactical Jamming Aircraft in May 2019, according to media reports. The Prowler had stopped on the base after its crew had just completed a seven-month combat deployment in support of the United States Central Command.<sup>438</sup>

All of these planes are necessary for the safety and security of the United States and Europe. The pilot interviewed about the jamming plane said the Azores base was his last stop before going home to his duty station. It is unknown if he was based in the United States or Europe. It also appears as if the base provides crucial training opportunities and rest for pilots and crew, in addition to its strategic location in the Atlantic.

**Conclusion:** While there are pros and cons about whether the United States should keep Lajes Field open, the data shows the base plays a crucial role in European security and in Portuguese-American relations. If for no other reason, this base should stay open to

---

<sup>435</sup> Ames, Paul, "China's Atlantic stopover worries Washington," Ibid.

<sup>436</sup> U.S. Air Forces in Europe, "B-2 Spirit aircraft conduct hot oil refueling at Lajes Field," 10 September 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:321K9tNI-8oJ:https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1956087/b-2-spirit-aircraft-conduct-hot-pit-refueling-at-lajes-field/+&cd=38&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari>

<sup>437</sup> U.S. Air Forces in Europe, "B-2 Spirit aircraft conduct hot oil refueling at Lajes Field," Ibid.

<sup>438</sup> "EA-6B Prowler Tactical Jamming Aircraft at Lajes Field," 17 May 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.lajesfss.com/index.php/video/447/ea-6b-prowler-tactical-jamming-aircraft/>.

prevent China from having an economic and military advantage in Europe. It has been shown in the past that China has opened a foreign base and not called it as such. This work cites the example of China's Djibouti base in the horn of Africa as evidence. In addition, China wants to strategically locate bases near the United States, if it can, so that the United States cannot have a greater sphere of influence in certain parts of the world. But more important than China's growing influence, Lajes Field should remain open because it plays a role in keeping alive the long-standing relationship between the United States and Portugal.

Rui Amaral, in his thesis for the U.S. Navy Postgraduate School, wrote that Portugal's status as a founding member of NATO after having been a western ally through World War II, should give it historical credibility to receive continuing U.S. support.<sup>439</sup> This work agrees with his statement and also asserts that continued U.S. presence in Portugal — not just Lajes Field — is important to European security, American security, NATO and for U.S.- Portuguese relations. While this work does not begrudge China a military base in Europe, that base should not be in the Azores as the base was originally envisioned as being a help to the United States and NATO.

#### **Some final thoughts on the case studies -**

These two case studies have shown there is a strong likelihood the United States could open a military base in Poland to serve as a deterrent to Russia and to calm the fears of European allies. This work has also shown there is a strong likelihood the United States would not completely abandon Lajes Field, in part because it wants to keep its presence in the Azores and does not want China to use the base or nearby Port. While Portugal is free to decide its own basing agreements with countries, the United States, who has been at the base for decades, has a strategic advantage and relationship with Portugal that could enable the country to keep America at the base. When all of these issues are examined in totality, the conclusion could be made that the United States is committed to European security and

---

<sup>439</sup> Amaral, Rui, F., "U.S. Portuguese relations and Lajes Field," Ibid.



wants to keep a presence in Europe by having bases in these two countries, and that the United States, through its presence at these bases, also seeks to deter Russia and China.

## **Chapter 8:**

### **Conclusions of this research:**

This work set out to examine the role of U.S. troops and bases as part of America's strategy for the 21st century. In forming the foundation of its findings, this work offered a literature review; a brief history of U.S. bases; an analysis on whether U.S. troop presence was good for Europe and what would be an appropriate number of troops stationed in Europe. This work also sought to find answers by analyzing the foreign policies of former U.S. President Barack Obama and by looking at the current policies of current U.S. President Donald Trump. In addition, this work used graphic charts, maps, case studies and scenarios to also find and answer to America's strategy in Europe.

This work has many findings, but it is important to note this is an open thesis that always has to be reviewed according to the changes in the world. Not only does the world change fast, but it also changes in an unpredictable way. That is why this thesis used two scenarios based on what might happen in a constantly changing world. And because this is an open thesis, the findings/conclusions are based on many variables. Firstly, in examining the foreign policy of Mr. Trump, this work does hypothesize that Mr. Trump could continue his term in office and continue his 'principled realism' strategy. In addition, the results are also contingent upon whether the United States is at peace, at war with Afghanistan and whether or not the United States wages a war with Russia or Iran or faces some other crisis. This is important because the United States and Iran had a verbal spat after the United States accused the country of burning the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. Things worsened when the United States authorized airstrikes that killed Iran's top general.

These findings are also contingent upon whether Russia acts violently toward Ukraine, Georgia, another Eastern European neighbor or launches a physical or cyber war against the United States or seeks to "meddle" in the 2020 presidential election. Other variables that could possibly skew results is whether or not NATO members agree to fund

defense at 2 percent of their GDP or maintain defense levels as is for the near future. With those things in mind, the results and findings can be revealed for this work.

These results could also change if America: grapples with a pandemic such as the coronavirus; gets into a conflict with any other country; or European or Asian partners have to deal with issues such as cyber security, climate change or transnational crime.

### **Conclusions —**

This work has shown that U.S. military bases in Europe project power not just to deter adversaries, but to allies. This work has shown that bases have been strategically located throughout Western Europe and that it has given the United States a geographical advantage because it can deploy its troops to hotspots around the world in less time.

While critics (such as David Vine) complain that foreign bases make America “unsafe,” this work has shown how bases in Europe make the world safer — not just in projecting power, but Europe based troops often train with European allies and such actions increase troop readiness and therefore safety. U.S. troops in Europe also deployed to fight in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and they also trained other American forces in Europe before they deployed to the Middle East.


American bases in Europe are important because it helps deter violent extremist organizations that might seek to harm European nations. The United States collects intelligence at its European bases and would share that information if there were overt threats of possible terrorist attacks or violent extremist groups hoping to harm European citizens.

Foreign bases also back up American and European and NATO foreign policy aims. As stated earlier, the Kosovo War would be a prime example of how NATO forces worked together to stop the persecutive and expulsion of the ethnic Albanians and worked for a more peaceful solution. However, when peace talks failed, the United States and NATO

partners, unleashed a bombing campaign until Serbian Leader Slobodan Milosevic agreed to peace.

Foreign bases are a means to show American soft power. Military troops and their families serve as unofficial ambassadors when they are sent to duty stations in places such as Germany, Portugal and Poland. Sometimes they could be the first American that local nationals ever meet. In addition, Americans learn more about the culture of their host nations and also form bonds with their military compatriots, thus improving readiness and creating a new kind of 'soft power interoperability' between the nations and troops.

Foreign bases are an important symbol of America's important bond with NATO and Article 5, which states that an attack against one is an attack against all. It might be difficult for a country to believe that America would truly defend it if attacked by Russia — but if America has thousands of troops stationed in that country, than it would be easier to believe that America not only supports this country's security but would fight if it were attacked by a regime that wants to take over its land and people. This work, through interviews with Dr. Jorge Benitez, discussed the importance of the United States having troops in Eastern Europe and how it would be an important symbol.



## Findings —

1. The role of U.S. bases in Europe is crucial to U.S. strategy, especially if the United States goes to war with **Iran** over aggression in the region, the bombing of Saudi oil fields or the restart of its nuclear program. The U.S. may need to use Turkish Air Space to help launch a war in a timely manner. The United States may also need to use Lajes Field for refueling mission for its stealth bombers and planes that jam electronic signals. Also, as the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan show, the United States may probably deploy some troops from Europe as well as deploy troops from the United States. In addition, this work has shown that training centers in Germany and their troops are used to train troops before they deploy into a war zone. It is possible the United States could train some troops in Germany for specific aspects of a war with Iran or another crisis.

2. The role of U.S. bases in Europe is crucial if the United States goes to war anywhere in the world with any adversary. The above map of maritime shipping routes shows the importance of geography when waging wars, trying to stop conflicts through peacekeeping; dispatching troops for humanitarian assistance or the emergencies. One

can see that Western Europe is much closer to Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia than to the continental United States. (The above map was accessed from [transportgeography.org](http://transportgeography.org)). There is an old American cliché that says when a person is looking for a house, there are three important things to consider: location, location and location. The same can be said about America's basing strategy and or having to fight a war — location is very important. If America has to fight a conflict in the Middle East, it could be advantageous to send some troops already stationed in Europe, Asia or other parts of the Middle East. And if America had to send equipment to a conflict zone in the Middle East, it would be easier and cheaper to send equipment from Europe and Asia than the continental United States. The shipments from America would literally have to cross an additional ocean before arriving in theater. Europe is geographically closer to the Middle East and Asia than the continental United States. Another advantage is the United States has large military bases spread throughout Europe, that are virtually cities, that could serve as a way to stage some troops before moving them into theater — if it was involved in a conflict in or near Europe. Without bases, the staging of troops in key locations would be more difficult.

3. The role of U.S. bases in Europe is crucial if **Russian** aggression continues and the former Soviet Union attempts to invade the Ukraine or Poland in response to U.S. presence in the region. If the United States goes to war with Russia, European bases will be absolutely crucial to getting the troops to the war zone and providing protection for NATO allies and enforcing troops and borders. In addition, the United States could task European based troops to be part of a larger 'first wave' of troops to fight because of their geographical proximity. America will need equipment, weapons systems, munitions and other vehicles to launch a successful campaign. As this work has shown, the United States has already pre-positioned equipment in places such as Poland so that it could better accommodate troops that rotate in to train with Eastern European partners and

provide deterrence. Also, the United States is close to completing a missile defense system in Poland which could be used in the event of war.

4. Having bases in Europe improves the United States ability to fight cyber crime. As previously reported in this work, the United States deployed cyber troops to Europe to prevent tampering in its 2018 mid-term elections. While the reports did not name an enemy, Russia has been accused in the past of cyber espionage — using the internet — to interfere with American elections. While there is no indication Russia would do it again, there is no guarantee they would not. American cyber troops also worked with European militaries and in addition to creating better working relationships, this effort could improve the cyber security of Europe and the United States, as the training could improve response time and readiness regarding future attacks.

5. U.S. presence in Europe also means that the United States could be in a better geographical location to handle issues such as Climate Change and natural disasters that seem to most often impact countries in Africa and Asia. However, such “acts of nature,” could occur in any location and any time and having bases in Europe would allow for the United States to better coordinate relief efforts and to arrive at the disaster areas quicker.

6. Having bases in Europe would become especially important if the world politic changes. Today, the world can be considered unipolar with the United States as the most powerful nation in the world. However, things could change to a bipolar or multipolar system. By having presence in a foreign country, particularly an allied country, the United States could show strength and deter adversaries. After World War II, the United States, along with Europe, were in a Cold War with the Soviet Union. During that time, U.S. base presence in Europe was crucial as it served as a way for the United States to ‘project power,’ towards the Soviets, while thousands of troops and weapons served as a deterrent. While this work does not know the future and cannot make future forecasts, there is a possibility the world could return to a bipolar system of world order or a

multipolar one that includes Russia, China and the United States/Europe. If this occurred, America's foreign bases could be a critical way to assure allies that America would "protect allied interests," and ensure open trade routes and fight against cyber attacks and or piracy from adversarial nations or groups.

7. Mr. Trump is likely to continue expressing his unhappiness that some **NATO** nations do not fund their defense to the level of 2 percent of their GDP. As examined through a scenario, Mr. Trump will likely reduce U.S. contributions to the administration of NATO and to reduce U.S. participation if member funding is not increased in the next two years. (Mr. Trump has signaled that he thought 2024 was too far away). In addition, in late 2019, Mr. Trump cut funding projects from the European Deterrence Initiative to fund a border wall project. Some have argued that through the funding cuts, Mr. Trump was punishing European nations for not spending enough on defense. If this is indeed the beginning of a pattern for Mr. Trump, then more cuts could be likely to EDI until or unless European countries put more money toward defense.





This photo of Lajes Field came from the U.S. Military, accessed at <https://www.lajesfss.com/index.php/p/61/> websiteimages/newcomers/old/ExploringTerceira.pdf

8. It is likely the United States will not end its agreement with The Azores/Portugal to use **Lajes Field**. This work has shown that Chinese companies have expressed interest in the base if Americans leave, and a Chinese firm also requested access to Praia Vitória Port, located a few kilometers from the base. China hopes to gain a foothold in Europe and recently unveiled its second “charm offensive,” known as the Belt and Road Project, in which it has been spending billions of dollars to increase countries’ infrastructure in return for access to key ports, businesses and buildings. The United States, conscious of China’s rise and proposed plans for Lajes Field, is likely to keep the base in part, to prevent China from obtaining it. This work also understands that Portugal is a sovereign nation and can make any decision it wants regarding the base, but this work believes Portugal would honor the ‘spirit’ of the 1951 agreement that gave the United States access to the base to fight wars, as a member of NATO. And while

agreements can change from year to year, the American-Portuguese relationship can probably be seen as one of the most stable in Europe — particularly under the leadership of Mr. Trump.

9. The United States will most likely open a military base in Poland to serve as a deterrent to Russia and to house permanent and rotating troops in the country. Polish officials asked the United States to open the base because it was concerned about Russia aggression. There are currently about 4,000 U.S. troops that rotate into Eastern Europe as part of the European Deterrence Initiative and most of those troops are in Poland. However some of the troops also rotate into other Eastern European countries. Having a permanent base would project U.S. strength in a region the United States has mostly ignored because of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

10. If the United States agrees to open a base in Poland, it is likely that some of those forces could move from neighboring Germany. Mr. Trump has been upset that Germany does not spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense and media reports said that he remarked that he might move troops from Germany to Poland. While it is easy to dismiss some of Mr. Trump's social media outbursts, he seems to mean what he says. He has a pattern of making a statement, then changing his mind, then going back to his first statement. It is unknown if this is a bargaining position or just how he operates. Mr. Trump has praised Poland for meeting spending levels and for being a NATO partner.

11. Mr. Trump was not re-elected in November 2020, so it is unknown if any of these findings will come to pass. However, President-elect Joe Biden has taken similar positions as Mr. Obama on NATO spending levels and U.S. troop presence in the region.

The United States and Europe are facing uncertain futures as U.S. funding cuts, troops reductions and Russian aggression has created tension in Europe. Earlier in the decade, the United States was consumed by fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and previous administrations focused on the Middle East and Asia. And while it could be true that

Europe may no longer be the most important strategic partner for the United States, it is still a very important partner that desires forming a better relationship with America. Some European countries would also like an increased U.S. troop presence in Eastern Europe. Mr. Trump appears to value the relationship between the United States and Europe but may have caused the relationship harm by ‘publicly lambasting’ European leaders for not spending enough on defense. Yet, Mr. Trump has increased funding to an initiative to deter Russian aggression.

American troops have been a steady presence in Europe since fighting World War II and will likely remain in Europe for years to come. This work argues that the United States should increase its troop presence in Europe, open a military base in Poland, keep Lajes Field and reshuffle troops from Germany to Eastern Europe to deter enemies and to help guarantee European security. This work has shown troops based in Europe are much more than a means to deter enemies: the troops have become a lasting symbol of the relationship between the United States, Europe and NATO. And therefore, America’s bases and its troops based in Europe are crucial to America’s strategy for the 21st century.

This work will end with a quote from Mr. Obama, who summarizes the United States relationship with Europe:

“... Given our shared interests, Europe will remain a cornerstone of Americas engagement with the world. European countries are and will remain among our closest allies and friends and Europe is an indispensable partner around the globe.”<sup>440</sup>

---

<sup>440</sup> Obama, Barack, “Remarks by President Barack Obama, President Tusk of the European Council and President Juncker of the European commission after the U.S.\_EU Meeting in Warsaw Poland, 8 July 2016 at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/08/remarks-president-obama-president-tusk-european-council-and-president>.

### **Further Study —**

Many topics merit further study in the area of U.S. Presence in Europe. This work will describe some of those topics which could be pursued.

In 2020 the United States will host Defender 2020, one of the largest military exercises in Europe in many years. This exercise could shed additional light on American commitment to training allies and protecting European security. (This military exercise was postponed because of concerns about the coronavirus. So, if this exercise is held again in the upcoming years, it could also provide insight into how European forces train to keep the region safe and what lessons were learned during this historic deployment).

While Defender 2020 was cancelled, it may be important to examine how COVID 19 (coronavirus) will impact U.S. military readiness, NATO funding and NATO's mission. Some European countries are using their militaries to treat patients as well as fly in needed equipment, medical supplies and vaccines.

In addition to Defender 2020 being of significance, the United Kingdom and its plan to leave the European Union might also be studied in 2020 and 2021. One specific area that merits further study is what will happen to the United States' relationship with the UK in light of BREXIT and would it impact any plans for the United States to locate any bases or planes in the country.

Another area of interest is the Great Power Competition between the United States, Russia, and China and what is emerging as a new Cold War. One specific area of interest is how this competition could have a drastic impact on the balance of power and European security.

China in Portugal is another important research area. China has begun what looks like a charm offensive in Portugal. China has heavily invested in the country in the hopes of gaining access to Lajes Field for "scientific purposes," but what will be the real cost to Portugal, NATO and the United States if China is given access to a European base in the

Azores? And would giving China access to the base in the Azores make it a true world power broker because it has a foothold in Europe?

And lastly, a look at the U.S. Space Force. President Donald Trump signed legislation creating the Space Force and one specific area of research could examine if there will be room for NATO or European cooperation agreements when it comes to keeping the peace and waging war in space. It would also be important to see if the U.S. Space force would have bases in Europe and in what countries.

## **Bibliography**

### **Interviews:**

**U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield:** Served as ambassador from 2008-2009 under George Bush, where he was the special envoy for MANPADS Threat Reduction. He founded Palmer Coates LLC, a political consulting firm. Bloomfield worked in defense and national security for presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. He was an assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs from 2001-2005; deputy assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs from 1992-1993; deputy assistant to Vice President Dan Quayle for National Security Affairs from 1991-1992; and was a principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security from 1988-1989. He was interviewed in-person in 2018.

**Dr. Alex Weisiger:** He is currently an Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, Pa. Weisiger is the author of the book, "Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts." Weisiger's research interests include how decisions are made to use force in conflicts and international politics. He teaches game theory, international relations theory, war and peace and ending wars. He was interviewed in-person in 2018.

**Dr. Jorge Benitez:** He is currently a Professor at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia. Benitez, who worked under the Obama Administration, previously served as assistant for Alliance issues to the director of NATO Affairs in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense. He was also a specialist in international security for the U.S. Department of State and for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Some of his interests and expertise include NATO, European politics, Russia, the National Security decision making process and military history. He was interviewed in-person in 2018.

### **Interviews conducted by e-mail:**

**Vinch, Charles:** interview conducted on 29 April 2018. Vinch was a former journalist for the Stars and Stripes newspaper and served as the paper's Washington D.C. bureau chief, writing about the Pentagon. He also worked as an editor for the Military Times family of newspapers.

### **Conferences Attended:**

Brookings Institution, "Is the Army ready for great power competition?", U.S. Army Secretary Mark T. Esper, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. April 30, 2019 from 11 a.m. to 12 p.m.

## General Bibliography – Written Materials:

Amaral, Rui, F., “U.S.-Portuguese relations and Lajes Field Air Base,” a thesis for the U.S. Navy Postgraduate School accessed on 29 December 2019 at [https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/44511/14Dec\\_Amaral\\_Rui.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/44511/14Dec_Amaral_Rui.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y).

Ames, Paul, “*China’s Atlantic stopover worries Washington*,” 29 September 2016, Politico Magazine, accessed 31 December 2019, at <https://www.politico.eu/article/chinas-atlantic-stopover-terceira-worries-washington-li-keqiang-united-states/>

Anton, Michael, “*The Trump Doctrine*,” 20 April, 2019, Foreign Policy Magazine, accessed 12 December 2019 at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/20/the-trump-doctrine-big-think-america-first-nationalism/>. Associated Press, “*NATO Shows off its Military Muscle in a 30-Nation Exercise*,” 20 Oct. 2015, *UK Daily Mail*, accessed on the internet on 29 June 2016 at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3281117/NATO-shows-military-muscle-30-nation-exercise.html>

Babb, Carla, “*Defense Secretary: U.S. Won’t Charge Nations, ‘Cost Plus 50’ for Bases*,” 14 March 2019, Voice of America, accessed 26 December 2019 at <https://www.voanews.com/usa/defense-secretary-us-wont-charge-nations-cost-plus-50-bases>.

Bacevich, Andrew J., *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*, (2013: Oxford University Press, Oxford).

Bader, Jeffrey, *Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asian Strategy* (2012: The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.)

Bartels, Frederico and Kochis, Daniel, “*Congress Should Transform the European Deterrence Initiative into an Enduring Commitment*,” Backgrounder Magazine, The Heritage Foundation, Issue No. 3319, 29 May 2018, accessed 10 December 2019 at [https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/BG3319\\_2.pdf](https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/BG3319_2.pdf)

BBC, “*Kosovo profile – timeline*,” 29 July 2019, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18331273>.

BBC, “*U.S. Embassy attack: Protestors withdraw after standoff in Iraq*,” 1 January 2020, accessed 1 January 2019 at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50966958.s>

BBC, “*U.S. to withdraw two Europe combat brigades*,” 12 January 2012, accessed on 9 December 2019, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/16543456>.

Bender, Bryan, “*The White House is not to be Trusted Right Now*,” Politico magazine, 22 October 2019, accessed 5 November, 2019 at <https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/22/trump-jim-mattis-policies-book-054967>.

Besch, Sophia, “*EU Defence, Brexit and Trump*,” Report from the Centre for European Reform, December 2016, accessed by the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at [https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pb\\_defence\\_14dec16.pdf](https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pb_defence_14dec16.pdf)

Bershidsky, Leonid, “*U.S. Should Move Forces In Germany to Poland*,” Bloomberg News, 2 June 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/us-should-move-forces-in-germany-to-poland-1.530699>



Bialik, Kristen, "U.S. Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas is at its Smallest in Decades," 22 August 2017, Pew Research Center, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at: [www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/22/u-s-active-duty-military-presence-overseas-is-at-its-smallest-in-decades/](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/22/u-s-active-duty-military-presence-overseas-is-at-its-smallest-in-decades/)

Birnbaum, Michael, "German town fears loss of U.S. Army base," 27 March 2012, *The Washington Post*, accessed 28 December 2019, at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/german-town-fears-loss-of-us-army-base/2012/03/23/gIQAoNzzeS\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/german-town-fears-loss-of-us-army-base/2012/03/23/gIQAoNzzeS_story.html).

Birmingham Michael, et al, "NATO summit ends with Trump calling Trudeau 'two-faced' after video of world leaders apparently mocking the president," accessed 31 December 2019 at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nato-braces-for-contentious-summit-as-trump-other-leaders-gather-near-london/2019/12/04/5994d97c-0fc0-11ea-924c-b34d09bbc948\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nato-braces-for-contentious-summit-as-trump-other-leaders-gather-near-london/2019/12/04/5994d97c-0fc0-11ea-924c-b34d09bbc948_story.html)

Black, James. et al, "Defense and Security After Brexit: Understanding the possible implications of the UK's decision to leave the EU," 2017, The Rand Corporation, accessed on the internet on 28 August 2017 at [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1700/RR1786z1/RAND\\_RR1786z1.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1786z1/RAND_RR1786z1.pdf)

Blake, Aaron, "The American people are war-weary. That doesn't mean they're pacifists," *The Washington Post*, 29 September 2014, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/09/29/the-american-people-are-war-weary-they-are-far-from-pacifists/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.4daf08dbc877](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/09/29/the-american-people-are-war-weary-they-are-far-from-pacifists/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4daf08dbc877)

Breedlove, Phillip, Gen., and Vershbow, Alexander, Ambassador, "Permanent deterrence: Enhancements to the U.S. military presence in North Central Europe," accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Permanent-Deterrence-Enhancements-to-the-US-Military-Presence-in-North-Central-Europe.pdf>.

Center for a new American Security, "Defense Priorities: Linking Strategy to Budget," January 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept 2018 at <https://www.cnas.org/research/defense-strategies-and-assessments/defense-priorities-linking-strategy-to-budget>

Center for Strategic and International Studies, "The European Reassurance Initiative," 9 Feb. 2016, CSIS, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/european-reassurance-initiative-0>

Coffey, Luke, "The Future of U.S. Bases in Europe: A View from America," a 15 July 2013 lecture at the Defense College in Tartu, Estonia, accessed on the internet on 29 June 2016 at <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/the-future-of-us-bases-in-europe-a-view-from-america>

Congressional Research Service, "U.S. Military Presence in Poland," 1 August 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11280.pdf>.

Cooley, Alexander, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*, (2008: Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY). accessed on the internet through JSTOR at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7z61w> and *Foreign Affairs Magazine* at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2005-10-01/base-politics>



Copp, Tara, "DOD Requesting 3,000 to 5,000 more troops for Europe in FY 17 budget," Stars and Stripes, 1 Feb. 2016, accessed on the internet on 29 June 2016 at <http://www.stripes.com/news/europe/dod-requesting-3-000-5-000-more-troops-for-europe-in-fy17-budget-1.391680>

Cornish, Audie, "All Things Considered: Trump's National Security Strategy Empowers Military Commanders," National Public Radio, 14 April 2017, accessed by the internet on 21 June, 2017 at <http://www.npr.org/2017/04/14/523997033/trumps-national-security-strategy-empowers-military-commanders>

Costa, António, "Portuguese Prime Minister on Chinese Investment," video interview, 12 October 2016, Bloomberg, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-12/portugal-open-to-china-investment-in-azores-as-u-s-sway-wanes>.

Council on Foreign Relations, "The Iraq War: 2003 to 2011," accessed on 30 December 2019 at <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war>.

Crocker, Chester and Hampson, Fen Oster and Aall, Pamela, editors, *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, (2007: United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.).

Damon, Arwa and Diamond, Jeremy, "Trump threatens Iran after protestors attack U.S. embassy in Baghdad," 1 January 2020, accessed 5 January 2020 at <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/31/middleeast/iraq-protests-us-embassy-intl/index.html>.

Davidson, Janine, "Obama's Last National Security Strategy," Foreign Affairs, 2 March, 2015, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/usa/2015-03-02/obamas-last-national-security-strategy>

\*\*\*Davis, Lynn E., Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Melanie W. Sisson, Stephen M. Worman, and Michael J. McNerney. "Strategic Choices: Overseas U.S. Military Presence." In *U.S. Overseas Military Presence: What Are the Strategic Choices?*, 29-32. Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1211af.12>.

Deni, John, R. (editor), "Current Russia Military Affairs: Assessing and Countering Russian Strategy, Operational Planning and Modernization," U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2018, accessed on the internet 12 Sept. 2018 at <http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3545.pdf>

DePetris, Daniel, "The European Deterrence Initiative sends the wrong message," 21 March 2019, DefenseNews, accessed 26 December 2019, at <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/21/the-european-deterrence-reassurance-initiative-sends-the-wrong-message/>

DW English, "Anti-Drone rally at U.S. Air Base Ramstein draws thousands," 11 June 2016, accessed by the internet on 12 June 2016 at <http://www.dw.com/en/anti-drone-rally-at-us-air-base-ramstein-draws-thousands/a-19323459>

Duke, Simon, "Underpaid, Undersexed and On the Way Out? The Past, Present and Future of U.S. Basing in Europe," in *Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges*, eds Rodrigues, Luis and Gebov, Sergiy (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009).

Eaglen, Mackenzie, *“Closing Old Military Bases Will Help Our Defense — And Our Communities,”* American Enterprise Institute, 28 July 2017, accessed on the Internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <http://www.aei.org/publication/closing-old-military-bases-will-help-our-defense-and-our-communities/>

Emmott, Robin and Ali, Idrees, *“U.S. tells NATO Allies Spending Plans Still Falling Short,”* Reuters, 14 Feb. 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nato/u-s-tells-nato-allies-spending-plans-still-falling-short-idUSKCN1FY013>

Erlanger, Steven, *“Europe Feels Snubbed by Obama,”* New York Times, 2 February 2010, accessed on 4 December 2019 at <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/world/europe/03europe.html?auth=login-email>

Enthoven, Alain, C., *“U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?,”* April 1975, Foreign Affairs, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1975-04-01/us-forces-europe-how-many-doing-what>.

Esper, Mark, *“Memorandum for acting secretary of defense (comptroller)/chief financial officer,”* 3 September 2019, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed on 26 December 2019 at <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/04/2002178837/-1/-1/1/MIL-CONSTRUCTION-NECESSARY-TO-SUPPORT-THE-USE-OF-ARMED-FORCES-IN-ADDRESSING-THE-NATIONAL-EMERGENCYOSD009322-19-FOD-FINAL.PDF>

U.S. European Command, *‘Fact Sheet and U.S. Military Presence in Europe (1945 to 2016),’* 26 May 2016, accessed on the internet on 21 June 2017 at [www.eucom.mil](http://www.eucom.mil)

U.S. European Command, *“2017 Posture Statement,”* 23 March 2017, accessed on the internet on 21 June 2017 at <http://www.eucom.mil/mission/eucom-2017-posture-statement>

U.S. European Command, *“European Initiative Fact Sheet,”* 5 January 2017, accessed on 10 December 2019 at <https://www.eucom.mil/media-library/document/35544/eri-fact-sheet>.

European Union, *“Illegal Annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol: EU extends sanctions by one year,”* 20 June 2019, accessed on 25 November, 2019 at [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/64430/illegal-annexation-crimea-and-sevastopol-eu-extends-sanctions-one-year\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/64430/illegal-annexation-crimea-and-sevastopol-eu-extends-sanctions-one-year_en)

EUROPOL, *“European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015,”* accessed on 10 December 2019 at [www.europol.europa.eu](http://www.europol.europa.eu), page 6.

France 24, *“NATO: Russian ‘aggression’ in Ukraine must be countered,”* 24 June 2015, accessed 28 December 2019 at <https://www.france24.com/en/20150624-nato-russian-aggression-ukraine-must-be-countered>.

Franco, Livia and Dennison, Susi, *“The Instinctive Multilateralist: Portugal and the politics of cooperation,”* 2 October 2019, The European Council on Foreign Relations, accessed on 31 December 2019 [https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/instinctive\\_multilateralist\\_portugal\\_politics\\_cooperation#](https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/instinctive_multilateralist_portugal_politics_cooperation#), section on, *“The Importance of Geopolitics.”*

Frum, David, "Trump's trip was a catastrophe for US-Europe Relations," 28 May 2017, The Atlantic Magazine, accessed on the internet on 30 August 2017 at <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/trump-nato-germany/528429/>

Gallup, "President Approval Ratings — Donald Trump," survey conducted between Dec. 2-5, 2019 and the results were accessed on 26 December 2019 at <https://news.gallup.com/poll/203198/presidential-approval-ratings-donald-trump.aspx>

Gallup, "Iraq," various public opinion polls, accessed on 9 December 2019 at <https://news.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx>

Gaspar, Carlos and de Sousa, Teresa, "Portugal, the European Union and the Crisis," 2018, *Relações Internacionais*, Special Issue, pages 77-92, accessed on 31 December 2019 at [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carlos\\_Gaspar8/publication/330613800\\_Portugal\\_the\\_European\\_Union\\_and\\_the\\_crisis/links/5c86b747458515b59e452a10/Portugal-the-European-Union-and-the-crisis.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carlos_Gaspar8/publication/330613800_Portugal_the_European_Union_and_the_crisis/links/5c86b747458515b59e452a10/Portugal-the-European-Union-and-the-crisis.pdf), pages 84-85.

George, Addalyrica, Q. U.S. Colonel, "U.S. Military Overseas Bases — How They Began and the Enduring Need for Forward Based United States' Troops," U.S. Army War College research paper, 6 April 2017, accessed on the internet on 12 Sept. 2018 at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038289.pdf>

Gillem, Mark L., *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire*, (2007: University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis).

Glasser, John, "Why We Should Close America's Overseas Military Bases," 7 October 2016, Time Magazine, accessed on the internet on 30 August, 2017 at <http://time.com/4511744/american-military-bases-overseas/> and the full policy analysis at the CATO Institute at <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/withdrawing-overseas-bases-why-forward-deployed-military-posture>

Glaser, John, *The Case Against, U.S. Overseas Military Bases: Why they are no longer a strategic asset*, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 25, July 2017, accessed online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-07-25/case-against-us-overseas-military-bases>.

Goh, Brenda, "China State-Firm eye land around Panama Canal: Waterway Authority," 27 March 2017, accessed on 29 December 2019 at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-canal-land-idUSKBN16Y13J>.

Goldberg, Jeffrey, "A Senior White House Official Defines the Trump Doctrine: 'We're America, Bitch,'" The Atlantic Magazine, 11 June 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/a-senior-white-house-official-defines-the-trump-doctrine-were-america-bitch/562511/>

Good, Chris, "When and Why Did Americans Turn Against the War in Afghanistan?" The Atlantic, 22 June 2011, accessed on 6 December 2019 at <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/06/when-and-why-did-americans-turn-against-the-war-in-afghanistan/240880/>

Goodman, Melvin, *National Insecurity: The Cost of American Militarism*, (2013: City Light Books, San Francisco).

Gould Joe, and Altman, Howard, *“Here’s what you need to know about the U.S. aid package to Ukraine that Trump delayed,”* 25 September 2019, DefenseNews, accessed 27 December 2019, at <https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/09/25/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-us-aid-package-to-ukraine-that-trump-delayed/>

Hanke, Jakob, *“Merkel Endorses Macron’s EU Military Plan,”* Politico, 4 June 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-angela-merkel-endorses-eu-military-plan/>

Headley, Tyler, *“China’s Djibouti Base: A one year update,”* 4 December 2018, The Diplomat, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/chinas-djibouti-base-a-one-year-update/>.

Hendrix, Jerry, *“There is No NATO Without the North Atlantic,”* 29 Jan. 2018, National Review Magazine, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/01/nato-naval-security-north-atlantic-control-key/>

Hennigan, W.J., *“Fort Trump? The Pentagon Takes a Step Toward Establishing Base in Poland,”* 14 March 2019, Time Magazine, accessed 28 December 2019 at <https://time.com/5551061/poland-military-base-fort-trump/>

Heritage Foundation, *“2017 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Europe,”* 2017, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept 2018 at <https://index.heritage.org/military/2017/assessments/operating-environment/europe/>

The Heritage Foundation, *“Backgrounder,”* accessed on 27 December 2019 at [https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/BG3319\\_2.pdf](https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/BG3319_2.pdf), page 6.

Hicks, Kathleen, Green, Michael J., and Conley, Heather A., *“Donald Trump Doesn’t Understand the Value of U.S. Bases Overseas,”* 7 April 2016, Foreign Policy Magazine, accessed on the internet on 30 August 2017, at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/donald-trump-doesnt-understand-the-value-of-u-s-bases-overseas/>

Hill, Fiona and Gaddy, Clifford, G., *“The American Education of Vladimir Putin,”* 15 February 2015, The Atlantic, accessed on the internet on 23 December 2020 at <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/the-american-education-of-vladimir-putin/385517/>

Hodges, Lt. Gen Ben, *“Don’t Put U.S. Bases in Poland: NATO can and must do a lot more to deter Russia without dividing allies,”* Politico, 4 June 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.politico.eu/article/dont-put-us-bases-in-poland/>

Hodges, Ben, Lt. Gen., *“Army Europe: Making 30,000 Troops Looks Like 300,000,”* 14 July 2014, Association of the United States Army, speech, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.ausa.org/news/army-europe-making-30000-troops-look-300000>

Horn, Heather, *“Why Europe Should be Glad it’s U.S. Troops are Leaving,”* 23 Jan. 2012, The Atlantic Magazine, accessed on 29 June 2016 at <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/why-europe-should-be-glad-its-us-troops-are-leaving/251768/>

Independent Panel Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review, *“The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, the final report of the Independent Panel’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010,”* accessed 9 December 2019 at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/QDR-IntroCompilation.pdf>, Chapter 3, section ii.

Insinna, Valerie, U.S. Air Force Tests “Base in a Box,” in Poland to Prep for Future Wars,” 26 Aug. 2018, Defense News, accessed on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/08/27/us-air-force-tests-base-in-a-box-in-poland-to-prep-for-future-wars/>

Joffe, Josef, *“Europe’s American Pacifier,”* Foreign Policy Magazine, No. 54, Spring 1984, pages 64-82, a pdf copy accessed on the internet through JSTOR, on 14 Dec. 2017.

Johnston, Seth A. *American Grand Strategy and the Future of U.S. Landpower.* Report. Edited by Da Silva Joseph, Liebert Hugh, and Wilson Isaiah. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2014. 287-306. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11930.19>.

Judson, Jen, *“Funding to Deter Russia Reaches \$6.5 Billion in FY19 Defense Budget Request,”* 12 Feb. 2018, Defense News, accessed by the internet on 11 Sept. 2018, at <https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/02/12/funding-to-deter-russia-reaches-65b-in-fy19-defense-budget-request/>

Kates, Graham, *“Defense Department Decision Gives China for Foothold Between U.S. and Europe,”* 20 Sept. 2017, CBS News, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/azores-withdrawal-gives-china-foothold-between-us-europe/>

Kaufman, Robert, G., *Dangerous Doctrine: How Obama’s Grand Strategy Weakened America,* (2016, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington).

Kaufman, Robert, G., *“Two First Quarter Cheers for Trump’s Principled Realism,”* Strategika Magazine, Issue No. 45, September 2017, accessed 15 December 2019 at [https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika\\_45\\_web.pdf](https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika_45_web.pdf), page 5.

Kirby, Paul, *“Russia’s Gas Fight with Ukraine,”* 31 October 2014, BBC, accessed on 28 December 2019 at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29521564>.

Kreig, Adreas, *“Externalizing the Burdens of War: The Obama Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East,”* 8 January, 2016, accessed in 14 November 2019 at [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/INTA92\\_1\\_05\\_Krieg.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/INTA92_1_05_Krieg.pdf), page 104.

Kroenig, Matthew, *“The Case for Trump’s Foreign Policy,”* May/June 2017, Foreign Affairs Magazine, Volume 96, Number 3, pages 30-34.

Kydd, Andrew, H., *“Game Theory and the Future of International Security,”* The Oxford Handbook of International Security, March 2018, accessed on the internet on 12 Sept. 2018 at <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198777854-e-13>

Law, Tara, et al, *“Iran Vowed Retaliation After U.S. Strike Killed a Top Iranian General. Here’s a Timeline of Recent Escalation,”* 31 December 2019, Time Magazine, accessed 3 January 2019 at <https://time.com/5757228/us-iran-events-timeline/>

Lee, Carol E. and Barnes, Julian E, “*Despite Criticism of European Defense Spending, U.S. Plans Military Boost for NATO,*” 24 May, 2017, Wall Street Journal, accessed on the internet on June 25, 2017 at [WSJ.com](http://WSJ.com)

Legvold, Robert, “*Managing the New Cold War: What Moscow and Washington Can Learn From the Last One,*” July/August 2014, Foreign Affairs, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-06-16/managing-new-cold-war>

Lemos, Pires, Nuno, “As Forças Armadas e o Terrorismo Transnacional,” 2015, No. 31 *Segurança & Defesa*, pages 8-14, accessed at [https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/39401982/FA\\_e\\_terrorismo\\_SD\\_abr2015.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DAs\\_Forcas\\_Armadas\\_e\\_o\\_Terrorismo\\_Transna.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200104%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4\\_request&X-Amz-Date=20200104T213559Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=8cf10a8b0c9d633451de558129d13af1ee2e697ca410b65870f4e2a3f6b37097](https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/39401982/FA_e_terrorismo_SD_abr2015.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DAs_Forcas_Armadas_e_o_Terrorismo_Transna.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200104%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20200104T213559Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=8cf10a8b0c9d633451de558129d13af1ee2e697ca410b65870f4e2a3f6b37097)

Lemos Pires, Nuno, “From piracy to global cooperation — A Portuguese Tale,” 11 Feb. 2011, NATO Mess dinner — piracy evening, accessed 31 December 2019 at [https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/32380649/From\\_piracy\\_to\\_global\\_cooperation\\_-\\_A\\_Portuguese\\_Tale\\_-\\_Feb\\_2011.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DFrom\\_piracy\\_to\\_global\\_cooperation\\_A\\_Port.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200104%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4\\_request&X-Amz-Date=20200104T213057Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=9cf482dc6c31fa5bcf2032ce78b25a8588c5f8f1c488f1a962d32a9b48943375](https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/32380649/From_piracy_to_global_cooperation_-_A_Portuguese_Tale_-_Feb_2011.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DFrom_piracy_to_global_cooperation_A_Port.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200104%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20200104T213057Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=9cf482dc6c31fa5bcf2032ce78b25a8588c5f8f1c488f1a962d32a9b48943375)

Lopez, Todd, “*Army to Realign Brigade, Cut 40,000 Soldiers, 17,000 Civilians,*” U.S. Army 9 July 2015, accessed on 10 December 2019 at [https://www.army.mil/article/151992/army\\_to\\_realign\\_brigades\\_cut\\_40000\\_soldiers\\_17000\\_civilians](https://www.army.mil/article/151992/army_to_realign_brigades_cut_40000_soldiers_17000_civilians).

Lostumbo, Michael, et. al, “*Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits,*” RAND Corporation, 2013, first accessed on the internet on 29 June 2016 at [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR200/RR201/RAND\\_RR201.sum.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR201/RAND_RR201.sum.pdf)

Lutz, Catherine, *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts*, (2009: New York University Press, New York).

MacAskill, Ewen, “*Russia Says U.S. Troops Arriving in Poland Pose Threat to its Security,*” 12 January 2017, The Guardian Newspaper, accessed the internet on 30 August 2017 at <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/12/doubts-over-biggest-us-deployment-in-europe-since-cold-war-under-trump>

Mattis, Jim, Gen., “*Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,*” accessed 22 December 2019 at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>



Mazzucchi, Nicolas and Desforbes, Alix, "Preparing for the Next Cyber Crisis," 28 November 2019, from Carnegie Europe's *New Perspectives on Shared Security: NATO's Next 70 Years*, accessed 31 December 2019, at <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/web-wars-preparing-for-next-cyber-crisis-pub-80420>

McBridge, James, "The State of U.S. Infrastructure," 12 January 2019, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed on 26 December 2019 at <https://www.cfr.org/background/state-us-infrastructure>

McFaul, Michael, "Russia As It Is: A Grand Strategy for Confronting Putin," *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, July/August 2018 Issue, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2018-06-14/russia-it?cid=int-lea&pgtype=hpg>

McCain, John U.S. Sen., "Restoring American Power: Recommendations for the FY 2018-FY2022 Defense Budget," Budget Report from the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 2016 (undated document), accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at [https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/\\_cache/files/25bff0ec-481e-466a-843f-68ba5619e6d8/restoring-american-power-7.pdf](https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/25bff0ec-481e-466a-843f-68ba5619e6d8/restoring-american-power-7.pdf)

Mearsheimer, John, J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (2001: W.W. Norton and Company, New York).

Miller, Greg, "Under Obama, an emerging global apparatus for drone killing," *The Washington Post*, 27 December, 2011, accessed on 21 November 2019 at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/under-obama-an-emerging-global-apparatus-for-drone-killing/2011/12/13/gIQANPdILP\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/under-obama-an-emerging-global-apparatus-for-drone-killing/2011/12/13/gIQANPdILP_story.html)

Milmo, Cahal, "Unknown Territory: America's secret Archipelago of UK bases," *UK Independent*, 24 January 2014, accessed on the internet on 28 August 2017 at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/unknown-territory-america-s-secret-archipelago-of-uk-bases-9084129.html>

Ministry of National Defense — Republic of Poland, "A White Paper: Proposal for a U.S. Permanent Presence in Poland," 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Proposal-for-a-U.S.-Permanent-Presence-in-Poland-2018.pdf>

Morris, Ian, *Why The West Rules for Now: The patterns of history and what they reveal about the future*, (2011: Profile Books Limited, London).

Mosbergen, Dominique, "Trump Blasts NATO Allies for Spending Too Little on Their Own Defense: Report," *Huffington Post*, 3 July 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nato-trump-letters-spend-more-defence\\_us\\_5b3b189fe4b07b827cba4672](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nato-trump-letters-spend-more-defence_us_5b3b189fe4b07b827cba4672)

Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark, G., "Public Opinion and Counterterrorism Policy," 20 February 2018, Cato Institute, accessed 27 December 2019 at <https://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/public-opinion-counterterrorism-policy>.

Nair, Ajay and Barnes, Joe, "Twenty-three of 28 not paying! Trump Rips Apart European Leaders For Using U.S. to Fund NATO Defense," *UK Express*, 26 May, 2017, accessed on the internet on 25 June 2017 at <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/809292/Donald-Trump-NATO-news-President-rips-apart-Europe-leaders-over-military-budget>

Nakamura, David, and Phillip, Abby, "Trump Announces New Strategy for Afghanistan That Calls for a Troop Increase," The Washington Post, 21 August 2017, accessed on the internet on 29 August 2017 at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-expected-to-announce-small-troop-increase-in-afghanistan-in-prime-time-address/2017/08/21/eb3a513e-868a-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.7ef405cc24cf](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-expected-to-announce-small-troop-increase-in-afghanistan-in-prime-time-address/2017/08/21/eb3a513e-868a-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html?utm_term=.7ef405cc24cf)

The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, "Ensuring A Strong U.S. Defense for the Future," accessed 2 December 2019, at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring-a-Strong-U.S.-Defense-for-the-Future-NDP-Review-of-the-QDR.pdf>

National Geographic, "Guantanamo Bay Naval Base History," 26 March 2011, accessed on 30 December 2019 at <https://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/people/guantanamo-bay-naval-base-history.aspx>

NATO Review Magazine, accessed on 12 November 2019 at <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/Topics/EN/Smart-Defence.htm>

NATO, "Cyber defence," 6 September 2019, accessed 31 December 2019 at [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_78170.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm)

Nelson, Michael, A. Lt. Col., 2016, "Promise Without Presence: A New Approach to U.S. Global Commitments," U.S. Air War College paper, Air University, accessed via the internet on 22 Sept. 2019, at <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1036917.pdf>.

Newport, Frank, "More Americans Now View Afghanistan War as a Mistake," Gallup Organization, 19 February 2019, accessed 9 December 2019, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/167471/americans-view-afghanistan-war-mistake.aspx>

The New York Times, "Iran Ends Commitment to Landmark Nuclear Deal: Live Updates," 5 January 2019, accessed 5 January 2019 at <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/iran-us-trump.html>.

Obama, Barack, "Speech at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs," 23 April, 2007, accessed on 14 November 2019 at [https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/remarks\\_of\\_senator\\_barack\\_obam.html](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam.html).

Obama, Barak, President of the United States, *National Security Strategy 2010*, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/4/>

Obama, Barak, President, United States of America, *National Security Strategy 2015*, accessed on the internet on 29 June, 2016 at [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov)

Obama, Barack, President of the United States, "Remarks by President Barack Obama, President Tusk of the European Council and President Juncker of the European commission after the U.S.\_EU Meeting in Warsaw Poland, 8 July 2016 at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/08/remarks-president-obama-president-tusk-european-council-and-president>



Obama, Barack, *Remarks by President Obama at Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center in Athens*, The White House, 16 November 2016, accessed 10 December 2019 at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/11/16/remarks-president-obama-stavros-niarchos-foundation-cultural-center>.

O'Hanlon, Michael, E. *Don't Close U.S. Bases Overseas*, 28 June 2015, The Brookings Institution, accessed on the internet on 29 June 2016 at <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/07/28-closing-us-bases-overseas-ohanlon>

Osborne, Martin, J., and Rubenstein, Ariel, *A Course in Game Theory*, (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1994) e-book, updated 24 September 2012, accessed on 4 December 2019 at <http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il>.

Osborne, Samuel, *Donald Trump Promises Historic Increase in U.S. Military Budget*, The UK Independent, 27 Feb. 2017, accessed on the internet on 25 June 2017 at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-us-military-budget-historic-increase-a7602241.html>

Oxford Dictionaries, accessed 12 July 2016 on the internet at <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/colonialism>

Panetta, Leon U.S. Secretary of Defense and Obama, Barack, U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012, introduction page, accessed 12 November 2019 at [https://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense\\_Strategic\\_Guidance.pdf](https://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf)

Pavgi, Kedor, *Barak Obama's Foreign Policy*, Foreign Policy Magazine, 17 November, 2011, accessed on 13 November 2019 at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/17/barack-obamas-foreign-policy/>

Pettyjohn, Stacie, *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783-2011*, Rand Corporation, 2012, accessed on the internet on 12 Sept. 2018 at [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND\\_MG1244.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1244.pdf)

Pettyjohn, Stacie, L. *Cost Plus 50 Could Damage U.S. Alliances: Here's what you need to know*, 15 March 2019, The Washington Post, accessed 26 December 2019 at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/15/cost-plus-could-damage-us-alliances-heres-what-you-need-know/>

Pew Global, *NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid*, 10 June 2015, accessed 30 December 2019 at <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/>

Pew Research Center, *The Politics of Climate*, 4 October 2016, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-climate/>

Poland White Paper, *National Security Strategy for the Republic of Poland 2014*, accessed on the internet on 30 August 2017 at [https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/NSS\\_RP.pdf](https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/NSS_RP.pdf)

Popescu, Ionut, *"Trump Doesn't Need a Grand Strategy: Why planning is overrated,"* Foreign Affairs Magazine, 21 May 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-05-21/trump-doesnt-need-grand-strategy>

Potirniche, Marius, *"Military Scenario Development,"* October 2017, National Defence University, Romania, accessed on 11 December 2019 at [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320588106\\_Military\\_Scenario\\_Development](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320588106_Military_Scenario_Development).

Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010, accessed by the internet at <https://archive.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf>

Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, accessed by the internet on 29 June 2016 at [www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov)

Robson, Seth, *"2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment Prepping for Afghanistan Rotation,"* 23 October 2009, The Stars and Stripes, accessed 30 December 2019 at <https://www.stripes.com/news/2nd-stryker-cavalry-regiment-prepping-for-afghan-rotation-1.95832>.

Rodrigues, Jean-Paul, Dr. "Main Maritime Shipping Routes," Transport Geography, accessed 3 January 2019 at [https://transportgeography.org/?page\\_id=2067](https://transportgeography.org/?page_id=2067). The map was used for Chapter 8, findings.

Rodrigues, Luis Nuno, "Crossroads of the Atlantic: Portugal, the Azores and the Atlantic Community, (1943-57), accessed on 31 December 2019 at [https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/1770581/Crossroads.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DCrossroads\\_of\\_the\\_Atlantic\\_Portugal\\_the.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200104%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4\\_request&X-Amz-Date=20200104T193648Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=926ee7f1cb0d85b1a4ef23c4d13e0867a5172c1bd5b84c12909ae4c12440c15a](https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/1770581/Crossroads.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DCrossroads_of_the_Atlantic_Portugal_the.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200104%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20200104T193648Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=926ee7f1cb0d85b1a4ef23c4d13e0867a5172c1bd5b84c12909ae4c12440c15a)

Rubin, Michael, "China accelerates moves on Azores," 22 September 2016, American Enterprise Institute, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/china-accelerates-move-on-azores/>

Sandole, Dennis, J.D., *"John Burton's Contribution to Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: A Personal View,"* International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 6 No. 1, Spring 2001, accessed on the internet on 25 June 2017 at [http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6\\_1/Sandole.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6_1/Sandole.htm)

Sanger, David and Habermas, Maggie, *"In Donald Trump's Worldview, America Comes First and Everybody Else Pays,"* 26 March 2016, The New York Times, accessed on the internet on 29 June 2016, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy.html>

Savell, Stephanie and 5W Infographics, *"This Map Shows Where in the World the U.S. Military is Fighting Terrorism,"* Smithsonian Magazine, January 2019, accessed on 30 December 2019 at <https://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/people/guantanamo-bay-naval-base-history.aspx>.

Searchbonus, Map of the Azores and United States, accessed on 31 December 2019 at <https://searchbonus.eu/v-i-business-insider-china-may-be-trying-to-take-over-a-critical-us-air-base-in-the-atlantic/>

Seligman, Lara and Gramer, Robbie, “*Trump Demands Tokyo Quadruple Payments for U.S. Troops in Japan*,” 15 November 2019, Foreign Policy, accessed 26 December 2019 at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/15/trump-asks-tokyo-quadruple-payments-us-troops-japan/>

Shapiro, Jeremy, “*What America First Will Cost Europe*,” Foreign Affairs, 12 June 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-05-21/trump-doesnt-need-grand-strategy>

Sheftick, Gary, “Cyber teams deploying to safeguard national security,” 17 September 2019, U.S. Army News Service/U.S. Army Cyber Command, accessed 31 December 2019 at [https://www.army.mil/article/227274/cyber\\_teams\\_deploying\\_to\\_safeguard\\_national\\_security](https://www.army.mil/article/227274/cyber_teams_deploying_to_safeguard_national_security).

Smith, Robert James, “*Protection or Provocation: Does Hosting a U.S. Military Base Increase the Incidence of Terrorist Attack in a Country?*” a PhD dissertation for Auburn University, USA, 2010 accessed on the internet June 28, 2016, from <http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/856344546.html?FMT=ABS>

Sputnik, “*People Rally in Lisbon Protesting Against NATO Exercises*,” 25 Sept. 2016, accessed on the internet on 29 June 2016 at <http://sputniknews.com/europe/20151025/1029067357/portugal-anti-nato-protest.html>

Stars and Stripes, “*Fallen Hohenfels Troops Honored With New Memorial*,” 23 May 2015, accessed on 30 December 2019 at <https://www.stripes.com/news/fallen-hohenfels-troops-honored-with-new-memorial-1.348126>.

Stratfor, Map of Poland, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/fort-trump-united-states-military-base-options-poland-russia-belarus-map>

Svan, Jennifer, “*Senate May Require Pentagon to Study Permanent U.S. Presence in Poland*,” The Stars and Stripes, 18 June 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/06/18/senate-may-require-pentagon-study-permanent-us-presence-poland.html>

Taylor, Paul, “*Trump’s Next Target: NATO*” Politico, 14 June 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.politico.eu/article/will-donald-trump-wreck-nato-summit-too-g7/>

Telo, António José, “*Que Visão para a Defesa?*” speech from 4 May 2009 at the National Defence Institute, accessed on 31 December 2019 at [https://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/3600/1/NeD124\\_AntonioTelo.pdf](https://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/3600/1/NeD124_AntonioTelo.pdf)

Telo, António José, “Um Mundo Em Transformação. A decadência da Europa,” January 2016, Ameaças E Riscos Transnacionais No Novo Mundo Global,” accessed 31 December 2019 from [https://www.fd.unl.pt/docentes\\_docs/ma/FPG\\_MA\\_27511.pdf](https://www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/FPG_MA_27511.pdf), pages 7-27.

Teixeira, Nuno Severiano, “Portugal e a NATO: 1949-1999,” Spring 1999, No. 89, *Nação e Defesa*,” accessed 31 December 2019 at [https://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/1516/1/NeD89\\_NunoSeverianoTeixeira.pdf](https://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/1516/1/NeD89_NunoSeverianoTeixeira.pdf). pages 26-28.

Tharoor, Ishaan, "Trump's Principled Realism is an Incoherent Mess," 20 September 2019, Washington Post, accessed on 12 December 2019 at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/20/trumps-principled-realism-is-an-incoherent-mess/>.

The Balance, "Careers," accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.thebalancecareers.com/what-the-recruiter-never-told-you-3332708>The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015.

The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 2018, (Summary), accessed on the internet on 11 Sept 2018 at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

Thrall, Trevor and Friedman, Benjamin, H., *U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The case for restraint*, (2018: Routledge, New York).

Trump Donald, President of the United States, National Security Review, 2017, accessed on the internet at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>

Trump, Donald, "President Trump's Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit," 21 May 2017, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, accessed 12 December 2019 at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit/>.

Thomas, Ken, "Trump meets with President of Portugal at White House," 27 June 2018, Associated Press, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://apnews.com/0433d925e37b49eca15bb907eac2b06a>

United Kingdom's White Paper on Withdrawal from the European Union, 30 March 2017, accessed on the internet on 28 August 2017 at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-repeal-bill-white-paper>

The United Kingdom's International Defense Engagement Strategy, 2017, accessed on the internet on 28 August, 2017 at [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/596968/06032017\\_Def\\_Engag\\_Strat\\_2017DaSCREEN.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/596968/06032017_Def_Engag_Strat_2017DaSCREEN.pdf)

Uria, Daniel, "22 Percent of Military Bases Will Be Excess by 2019," 16 April 2016, United Press International, accessed on the internet on 29 June 2016 at [http://www.upi.com/Top\\_News/US/2016/04/16/Pentagon-22-percent-of-military-bases-will-be-excess-by-2019/6011460816494/](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2016/04/16/Pentagon-22-percent-of-military-bases-will-be-excess-by-2019/6011460816494/)

U.S. Defense Manpower Data Center, "Department of Defense Personnel, Workforce Report and Publications," July 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018, at [https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp\\_reports.jsp](https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp)

U.S. Department of Defense, *Base Structure Report, for Fiscal Year 2015* accessed on the internet on 25 June 2017 at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY15.pdf>

U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD Announces European Infrastructure Consolidation Actions and F-35 Basing in Europe," 8 Jan. 2015, accessed on the internet on 22 June 2017 at <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/605338/dod-announces-european-infrastructure-consolidation-actions-and-f-35-basing-in/>

U.S. Department of Defense, "2017 *Defense Posture Statement: Taking the Long View, Investing for the Future*," Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, February 2016, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at [https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017DODPOSTURE\\_FINAL\\_MAR17UpdatePage4\\_WEB.PDF](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017DODPOSTURE_FINAL_MAR17UpdatePage4_WEB.PDF)

U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, "Operation and Maintenance Overview, Fiscal Year 2020 Budget," page 178-179, accessed on 26 December 2019 at [https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020\\_OM\\_Overview.pdf](https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_OM_Overview.pdf).

U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, "Report of Investigations on Allegations Related to the Department of Defense's Decision to Relocate a Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex," 30 Oct 2017, DOD report No. DODIG-2018-003, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://media.defense.gov/2017/Nov/09/2001840992/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-003.PDF>

U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, "The Final report of the Independent Panel's Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review," 29 July 2010 accessed on 5 December 2019 at <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hrg62163/html/CHRG-111hrg62163.htm>

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine Note 1-18," Strategy, 25 April 2018, page v, accessed on the internet on 26 September 2019, at [https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jdn1\\_18.pdf](https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jdn1_18.pdf).

U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "EUCOM Announces European Reassurance Initiative Implementation Plan," 30 March 2016, accessed on the internet on 29 June 2016 at <https://nato.usmission.gov/eucom-announces-european-reassurance-initiative-implementation-plan/>

vanden Heuvel, Katrina, "From the hope of 1989 to a new Cold War," 12 November 2019, The Washington Post, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/12/hope-new-cold-war/>

Vanden Brook, Tom and Collins, Michael, "Mueller Report: 5 things to know about Russian interference in U.S. elections," 22 April 2019, accessed 30 December 2019 at <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/04/22/mueller-report-what-know-russian-election-interference/3538877002/>

Vandiver, John, "Former Army Europe Boss: Pulling U.S. troops from Germany would be a big win for Russia," 2 July 2018, The Stars and Stripes, accessed on the internet on 11 September 2018, at <https://www.stripes.com/news/former-army-europe-boss-pulling-us-troops-from-germany-would-be-a-big-win-for-russia-1.535699>

Viana, Alfred, Lt. Col., "Overseas Military Presence: U.S. Land Forces in Europe," noted this section from Meigs, Montgomery C., "U.S. Army Europe: Ready for Deployment on a Moment's Notice," Army 2002-2003 Green Book, page 75.

Vine, David, *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World*, (2015: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, New York).

Viotti, Paul and Kauppi, Mark V., *International Relations Theory, Fourth Edition*, (2010: Pearson Education Inc., New York)

Wheelbarger, Kathryn, "Statement before the 116th Congress Committee on Armed Serves," 13 March 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109096/witnesses/HHRG-116-AS00-Wstate-WheelbargerK-20190313.pdf>, page 12.

The White House, "Factsheet: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of Allies and Partners," 3 June 2014, The White House, accessed on 25 November 2019 at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-and-other-us-efforts-support->.

Topol, Sarah, "What Does Putin Really Want?" 25 June, 2019, The New York Times Magazine, accessed on 23 December 2020, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/magazine/russia-united-states-world-politics.html>

Willekens, Marian, et al, "Developing socio-economic scenarios — Exploratory Scenario Approach," IMCORE, 2014, accessed on the internet on July 2019, at <https://imcore.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/establishing-future-visions-becn-exploratory-scenario-approach.pdf>

Wolfgang, Ben, "Russia Seething: Poland wants permanent U.S. Military Base, willing to pay \$2 billion for it," 28 May 2018, Washington Times, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/may/28/poland-wants-permanent-us-military-base-willing-pa/>

Worland, Justin, "Donald Trump Called Climate Change a Hoax. Now He's Awkwardly Boasting About Fighting It," 9 July, 2019, Time Magazine, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://time.com/5622374/donald-trump-climate-change-hoax-event/>

Yale Law School library website, "Military Facilities in the Azores: Agreement between Portugal and the United States," accessed on 29 December 2019 at [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/port001.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/port001.asp)

Yeo, Andrew I, "The Politics of Overseas Military Bases," Perspectives on Politics, Vol15, Issue 1, March 2017, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/politics-of-overseas-military-bases/5EB9C6DDB5CF005DB3A97D08E9EC98EF>

Yeo, Andrew, I., "Not in Anyone's Backyard: The Emergence and Identity of a Transnational Anti-base Network," International Studies Quarterly, No. 53 Issue 3, pages 571-94, September 2009, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/53/3/571/1792753>

Yin, Robert, K., "Case Study Research: Design and Methods," Chapter 1: Getting Started, accessed on 11 December 2019 at [https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/1742025/mod\\_resource/content/1/How%20to%20know%20whether%20and%20when%20to%20use%20the%20case%20study%20as%20a%20reserach%20method.pdf](https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/1742025/mod_resource/content/1/How%20to%20know%20whether%20and%20when%20to%20use%20the%20case%20study%20as%20a%20reserach%20method.pdf), page 2.

Zemla, Edyta and Tuecki, Kamil, "Poland Offers U.S. up to \$2Billion for Permanent Military Base," Politico, 27 May 2018, accessed on the internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-poland-offers-us-up-to-2-billion-for-permanent-american-military-base/>



Zinglerle, Jason, "How Devin Nunes Turned the House Intelligence Committee Inside Out," 24 April 2018, The New York Times, accessed on the Internet on 11 Sept. 2018 at <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/magazine/how-devin-nunes-turned-the-house-intelligence-committee-inside-out.html>

65th Air Base Wing, "A Short History of Lajes Field, Terceira Island, Azores, Portugal," accessed on the internet on 31 August 2017 at <http://www.lajes.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110621-022.pdf>

65th Air Base Wing, "EA-6B Prowler Tactical Jamming Aircraft at Lajes Field," 17 May 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://www.lajesfss.com/index.php/video/447/ea-6b-prowler-tactical-jamming-aircraft/>.

65th Air Base Wing/U.S. Air Forces in Europe, "B-2 Spirit aircraft conduct hot oil refueling at Lajes Field," 10 September 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 at <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:321K9tNI-8oJ:https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1956087/b-2-spirit-aircraft-conduct-hot-pit-refueling-at-lajes-field/+&cd=38&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari>

65th Air Base Wing/U.S. Air Forces Europe, *Map of Terceira Island, Azores*, accessed 31 December 2019 at <https://www.lajesfss.com/index.php/p/61/websiteimages/newcomers/old/ExploringTerceira.pdf>

**Television and radio:**

Esper, Mark, "Is the Army ready for great power competition," 30 April 2019, Brookings Institution, can be viewed at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2UGKGIvhLMU>







