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Social Reincorporation of FARC-EP's Former Combatants:

The case of the Colombian Peace Agreement 2016.

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Master's in International Studies

Supervisor:

Doctor Marcelo Adrian Moriconi Bezerra, Researcher and Guest Assistant

Professor International Studies Centre,

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ABSTRACT

Four years after the implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement in Colombia, this dissertation evaluates the development of the measures related to the social reincorporation of the FARC-EP into the community. The social reincorporation of former combatants was considered, since the beginning of the debates on the Agreement, as one of the key factors for the success and consolidation of the peace process. The study uses a triangulation method that includes document analysis and interviews, stemming from fieldwork in Colombia, supported by scientific articles and meetings, as well as non-participant observation in conferences. This work analyses the perceptions of the actors involved and the guerrilla who seeks to reincorporate into a social life within a legal framework. Although the existing literature is critical about the degree of success, this work shows that social reincorporation, in general, is being achieved, with some exceptions in which the Agreement likely will have to be adapted to the current needs and urgencies.

Keywords: Colombia, 2016 Peace Agreement, FARC-EP, Social Reincorporation, DDR, Peacebuilding.

RESUMO

Quatro anos após a implementação do Acordo de Paz de 2016 na Colômbia, esta dissertação avalia a implementação de medidas relacionadas com a reintegração social das FARC-EP na vida civil. A reinserção social da guerrilha foi considerada, desde o início dos debates em torno do acordo, como um dos fatores-chave para o sucesso e consolidação do processo de paz. Este estudo utiliza uma triangulação de métodos que inclui análise documental e entrevistas, resultado de trabalho de campo na Colômbia, suportadas por artigos científicos e reuniões, bem como observação não-participante em conferências. A investigação analisa também as percepções dos atores envolvidos e dos guerrilheiros que procuram reintegrar-se na vida social dentro do âmbito da lei. Embora a literatura existente seja crítica quanto ao grau de sucesso, este trabalho mostra que a reincorporação social, em geral, está sendo alcançada, com algumas exceções em que o Acordo terá provavelmente que ser adequado às necessidades e urgências do presente.

Palavras-Chave: Colômbia, Acordo de Paz de 2016, FARC-EP, Reincorporação Social, DDR, Construção da Paz.

RESUMEN

A cuatro años de la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de 2016 en Colombia, esta tesis evalúa la implementación de las medidas relacionadas con la reincorporación social de las FARC-EP a la vida civil. La reincorporación social de guerrilleros fue considerada, desde el inicio de los debates en torno del acuerdo, como uno de los factores claves para el éxito y consolidación del proceso de paz. Este estudio utiliza una triangulación de métodos que incluye análisis documental y entrevistas, fruto de trabajo de campo en Colombia, suportadas por artículos científicos y reuniones, y por observación no participante en conferencias internacionales. La pesquisa también analiza las percepciones de los actores envueltos y de los guerrilleros que procuran reinsertarse en una vida social en el marco de la ley. Si bien que la literatura existente es crítica sobre el grado de éxito, este trabajo demuestra que la reincorporación social en general se está logrando, con algunas excepciones en que el Acuerdo tendrá, probablemente, que ser adecuado a las necesidades y urgencias del ahora.

Palabras Clave: Colombia, Acuerdo de Paz 2016, FARC-EP, Reincorporación Social, DDR, Construcción de la Paz.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADO - *Autodefensa Obrera* (Self-Defense Workers Movement).

ARN (ACR) – *Agencia Nacional para la Reincorporación y la Normalización* (National Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation).

AUC – *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia).

CNMH - *Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica* (National Centre for Historical Memory).

CNR – *Consejo Nacional de Reincorporación* (National Council for Reincorporation).

CNRR – *Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reincorporación* (National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation).

CONPES - Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (National Council for Economic and Social Policy).

CSIVI – *Comisión de Seguimiento Impulso y Verificación a la Implementación* (Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Final Agreement).

DDR - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.

ETCR – *Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación* (Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation).

EU – European Union.

ELN - *Ejército Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army).

EPL - *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (Popular Liberation Army).

FARC-EP – *Fuerzas Armada Revolucionaria de Colombia – Ejército Popular* (Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia – Popular Army).

FIP – *Fundación Ideas para la Paz* (Ideas for Peace Foundation).

NAR – *Nuevas Áreas de Reincorporación* (New Areas of Reincorporation).

M-19 – *Movimiento del 19 de Abril* (April 19 Movement).

OAS – Organisation of American States.

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

PCCC - *Partido Comunista Colombiano Clandestino* (Clandestine Colombian Communist Party).

PDET – *Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial* (Territorial Focused Development Plans).

PMI – *Plan Marco Implementación* (Implementation Framework Plan).

PND – *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo* (National Development Plan).

PRT - *Partido Revolucionario de Los Trabajadores* (Workers Revolutionary Party of Colombia).

SIDDR - Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration.

UN – United Nations.

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

UNVMC – United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia.

UP – *Unión Patriótica* (Patriotic Union).

USA – United States of America.

USAID – United States Agency for International Development.

ZTVN - *Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización* (Transitory Villages Zones of Normalisation).

CHAPTER 1 - Introduction

Colombia's recent history from the last 60 years has been marked by internal armed conflict with the constant emergence of new players, including leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitary groups, and drug cartels. On 26 September 2016, the Colombian Government signed a Peace Agreement with the largest guerrilla, FARC-EP (Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia - Popular Army). However, four years have passed since the Agreement's signature, and there are critical voices that argue that the process is not having the desired effect. One of the elements of this Agreement is social reincorporation¹, which is the main topic of this research.

This dissertation aims to understand the perceptions of the state of the social reincorporation process from the point of view of the Government, the FARC-EP, the Institutions, and civil society. The study falls under the theoretical framework of peacebuilding and DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) programmes and includes an overview of academic literature related to previous peace agreements around the world with the intent of comparing them to the 2016 Colombian Agreement. There is ample literature² contemplating the Peace Agreement's development and the reincorporation of FARC-EP; however, we found that perceptions and comparisons in the social reincorporation domain are missing in the analysed literature. In addition to seeking to contribute to filling this gap, our research presents and discusses what has been implemented so far and explores the topic of safety related to the community, which is part of the social process.

To provide a concrete analysis, our research question is: *How effective are the measures to socially reinstate former combatants promoted under the Colombian Peace Agreement, since 2016 until 2020, according to the perceptions of the actors involved in the process?*. In light of this question, we propose two hypotheses to answer it: (A) Under the terms signed in 2016, the current political agenda of the Colombian Government is failing to achieve effective measures to socially reincorporate former combatants, and (B) Social reincorporation has been compromised by non-compliance with security measures.

To analyse these hypotheses, the study encompasses a triangulation of document analysis and semi-structured interviews, supported by non-participant observation, scientific literature, reports, and quantitative data. In addition to providing clarity on the topic and to eliminating potential biases, the application of this method is relevant primarily because of the importance of acquiring new data on the perceptions of the actors that take part in the process. The study counted with a brief two-week fieldwork to Colombia, in February 2020, where interviews were conducted. In this context, four former

¹ When referring to the FARC-EP's process, the concept used was reincorporation (or *reincorporación*), rather than reintegration, in accordance to the 2016 Peace Agreement. The concept reincorporation means the act of (re)-including someone as part of something larger (Oxford Dictionary, 2020; Cambridge Dictionary 2020).

² Nussio & Kaplan (2018) and Castrillón-Tores & Cadavid-Ramirez (2018) presented a similar topic, nonetheless, they used different methods and hypothesis to present their work. Moreover, recent academic works were done in other fields related to the FARC-EP's reincorporation: Cf. Ehasz, 2020; Stalder 2020; Zambrano Quintero, 2019; Segura & Stein, 2019; Mejía Gómez, 2014; Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2019; Bonilla, 2015; Phelan, 2019.

combatants (FARC-EP) were interviewed, along with members of governmental institutions (Embassy of Portugal in Bogotá and ARN), and national and international organisations (Foundation PARES and Kroc Institute). In order to enrich our analysis, we also conferred with scholars from Universidad del Rosario who are currently working on this topic. Moreover, we carried out non-participant observation at a conference in The Hague, in December 2019 (where fourteen Colombians were present), and at an online International Conference for Peace on 26 September 2020.

Regarding the structure, this dissertation is divided into five chapters. The introduction provides an overview of the reasons why we chose this topic and the research process. Chapter 2 is divided into two parts: the first part corresponds to a historical context analysis by means of a scientific literature review on the topic. Here, we analyse Colombia's background, focusing on the last sixty years, while also providing an overview of the conflict's evolution related to FARC-EP; the second part focuses on a characterisation of the emergence of FARC-EP as a guerrilla until they officially relinquished their weapons in 2016. The aim is not to analyse every single aspect or actor of this particular conflict, since Colombian history has many complex strands and it would be difficult to refer to every victim or armed actor that was part of it. Instead, in this second part we focus mainly on the events that led to the Final Peace Agreement. The second part of Chapter 2 includes a literature review on the concepts of peace, peacebuilding, and reincorporation from a historical perspective. We also engage in a reflection and comparison with previous peace agreements and examples of peacebuilding missions in the world. The purpose of this section is not to cover every conflict that led to a peace agreement, but to grasp similarities with the Colombian Agreement with the goal of identifying certain points that might be present or not in prosperous peacebuilding actions. Finally, in this part we also engage in a literature review and analysis of the 2016 Peace Agreement in Colombia, where we explore the topics of DDR programmes along with the social reincorporation of former combatants from FARC-EP.

In Chapter 3 we identify and explain the methodology, covering the choice of triangulation and present the process of data collection and data analysis techniques.

Chapter 4 introduces the discussion of the problem, followed by the presentation of the data analysis, which helps clarify the research question and, later, to verify or refute the hypotheses. In this chapter, we analyse the development of the FARC-EP's social reincorporation process, within the interpretation and evaluation of each idea. This chapter ends with the discussion of the results and an effort to present a possible explanation for the results of the hypothesis testing, aided by the previously studied literature in supporting arguments and comparing outcomes.

Chapter 5, the final chapter, contains the final remarks and a conclusion to the research. Here we discuss all the previous chapters and present limitations and recommendations.

CHAPTER 2 – Contextualisation and literature review

2.1. Colombia's history of violence

According to Bonnila and Restrepo (2018, p. 278) Colombia is characterise by the “State vulnerability, the socioeconomic asymmetries, the low institutional framework of public power, the rupture between the State and civil society, poverty, inequality and the armed conflict in which political, economic and territorial interests of various actors from the left (guerrillas), from the right (paramilitary groups converge), drug cartels and the State itself as promoter of violence”. One of the periods considered among the most violent were the last sixty years, starting from around 1960 until 2016 (Posso et al., 2010; Rodriguez Lopez et al., 2015), emphasising the 1990 decade, when “the country became one of the most violent in the world” with the “massacres of civilians” (Leech, 2011, p. 106). During this time, Colombia became known for having the most prolonged internal armed conflict in Latin American history. At some point, this violence became a way for the society to function, as sociologist Daniel Pécaut (1997) explains. However, as Bjorn (2018, p. 99-100) argues, the conflict³ is neither “black or white, right or wrong”. Various authors analysed throughout this dissertation have divergent opinions on when the conflict began, while agreeing that it is common to affirm that it started with the rising of the guerrillas in the 1960s (Pécaut, 2011, p. 138).

The United Nations (UN) (2004) described it as ‘the worst humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere’. According to the Colombian National Centre of History it is estimated that solely from 1985 to 2003, around ‘5.7 million were forced to flee from their homes’. Representing the ‘highest number of internally displaced people in the world’. During these years of internal conflict, almost 220 thousand were assassinated, 25 thousand violently disappeared, 27 thousand victims kidnapped (in total 60.600 people, the highest number of disappearances yet). Many more were victims of mines, massacres, bombs, and children recruited (*Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica*, CNMH, 2013, p. 34) More than numbers, these are people that went through a traumatic and violent past, victims of this conflict and of a society that took decades to recognise the conflict's existence. Now, the civil society is looking for peace and harmony (CNMH, 2012, 2013, 2016; Enns and Lozano, 2017; Vidal-López, 2012).

During these sixty-years, many were the belligerent actors involved in this complex and vast conflict; however, one that was particularly known for its violent acts was the guerrilla FARC-EP - considered “Colombia's oldest and largest guerrilla group” (Theidon, 2007, p. 68). The guerrilla fought for more than six decades and it took around thirty years of negotiations and accords to achieve peace.

³ Conflict can be a constructive element that helps the advancement of a given society. Conflict is problematic when it is associated with the use of violence, both direct structural and cultural. The conflict is not a problem that concerns the others, it is part of everyone, every family and community (Castrillón-Torres and Cadavid-Ramirez, 2018). “Conflict is the process that starts when a person or a group perceives that another person or a group negatively affects something that is valued”. Source: Professor Srdjan Sremac, Class of Conflict and Peacebuilding, November 19, 2019, at the Vrije Amsterdam University.

A war made of political and military interests over the country, “based on complex alliances and social dynamics”, that separated families, left people living in fear and millions of people displaced or dead. The violence against civilian populations was more than collateral damage, being part of an organised military strategy. Throughout the years it was always hard to achieve peace, between the Government and the illegal actors due to either indecision or vacillation from one of the sides (CNMH, 2013, p. 31).

The countless changes that the conflict went through are related to different factors: the persistence of problems related to land control; the drug trafficking business (an industry-economy, which has generated inequality and poverty, despite being a billion-dollar business); the limitations and possibilities of political participation; the influences and pressures of international actors; the institutional and territorial fragmentation of the State; the close articulation between legal and illegal actors within the political system; the constant transformations of the conflict throughout the years; and the ongoing dispute to establish who had the biggest empire of terror (ibid., p. 111; Gutiérrez, 2015).

Finally, in 2016 a Peace Agreement was signed between the Government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP. The 2016 Peace Agreement represented a historical turn point for the country, taking into consideration that, until that year, most Colombians had not lived even one day of peace (Theidon, 2007).

Distinct researchers and historians argue that the Colombian conflict is quite hard to understand, not only due to its length, but because of the constant switch between legal and illegal actors (CNMH, 2013, p. 19), along with the ‘social disorganisation’ of the country (Pécaut, 2001). It would be wrong to use standard assumptions about a single Colombian context since, throughout its history, multiple contexts and transformations occurred. Over the years, the conflict “evolved through several stages, originated in several regions” expanded to different directions, and other guerrillas and right-wing parties emerged through the struggle LaRosa and Mejía (2017, p. 232). Therefore, it is possible to affirm that these multiple conflicts overlapped, but there was not just one single conflict *per se*. However, LaRosa and Mejía (2017) posit that the conflict was not a civil war, which contrasts with the perspective held by Fearon (2007) and Hironaka (2005)⁴. Another key aspect to the conflict’s roots was always the topography of the territory. Due to its irregularity, it was, for a long time, hard to move from one city to another, and even more to remote places. This situation represented a challenge when it came to instituting regulations or obtaining trust in the government. And for too long the government’s presence was non-existent, resulting in no control over its national territory (Leech, 2011, p. 4-5).

Since its colonisation by the Spanish in the late 15th century (1499 – 1502), up until its independence in July 1810, *La Gran Colombia*⁵ continuously represented a place of violence and disagreements (Melo, 2017, p. 39), which would mark future occurrences in the country. Yet, one of the most challenging

⁴ Fearon (2007) and Hironaka (2005) define civil war as a “violent conflict within the country” with different organised groups aiming to achieve power and governmental change, usually fighting against the state.

⁵ *La Gran Colombia* (former country in South America) refers to the older union of the current countries of Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador. Source: Tour visit Bogotá, February 2020.

periods for Colombia was the 20th century, facing a long period of violence and internal armed conflict(s) (Posso et al., 2010, p.17). This particular century defined Colombian history, not only influencing the 60-year conflict, but also Colombia today. In the late 19th century, beginning of the 20th century, right after the implementation of the Republican system, a rivalry between the two elitist parties, the Conservative and the Liberal, escalated. That led to the so-called ‘Thousand Days War’, where political violence emerged. Later on, between 1930 and 1953, violence escalated again, in an episode known as the violence of the thirty years (ACR, 2016, p. 5).

Yet again, only five years later, between 1948 - 1958/60, the Conservative and the Liberal⁶ political parties were fighting once again for the power of the elite (formed by Spanish descendants), reaching its most critical level ever (Rodriguez Lopez et al., 2015, p. 172; Theidon, 2007, p. 68; CNMH, 2013, p.112; Pécaut, 2001). This period was known as *La Violencia*, and researchers such as Theidon (2007), Denissen (2010), LaRosa and Mejía (2017), Rodriguez Lopez et al. (2015), Rios Oyola (2018), and Gutiérrez (2015), describe it as the stepping-stone for the start of the recent conflict. The political situation demonstrated the “weakness of the Colombian state”, along with the separation “between urban and rural” and between “the wealthy and the poor” (LaRosa and Mejía, 2017, p. 93-94). It illustrates a time of chaos and constant violence, responsible for 200,000 deaths (Pécaut, 1997, p. 12). The people in the countryside realised that the government was not able to respond to their necessities, therefore deciding to take the initiative to change the situation (LaRosa and Mejía, 2017, p. 94). It was in that period, around 1950, when the emergence of guerrillas started, along with an outbreak of “extreme-right wing illegal paramilitary groups⁷” (Rios Oyola, 2018, p. 207), as an alternative to the elite parties - which had always ruled the country (Pécaut, 2001). Following in the next two decades, the 1960s and the 1970s, an anti-regime insurgency of left-wing groups (FARC-EP, ELN, M-19, EPL,⁸ and other smaller groups) emerged, fighting against “government forces and right-wing anti-guerrilla paramilitaries” (Duncan, 2006,⁹ apud Kreutz and Nussio, 2019, p.11). This fight led to the beginning of the sixty-year conflict, when violence prevailed against the civilian population¹⁰ as a military strategy to achieve control over the territory, and land dispossession to establish political authority and to appropriate legal and illegal resources (CNMH, 2013, p. 15).

⁶ The Conservative and Liberal parties in 1957 created the National Front, where the two parties would rotate every four years, sharing equally the political power in Colombia (LaRosa and Mejía, 2017, p. 94). According to the CNMH (2013) this would mean that the political system was no longer Bipartisan, but instead a subversive violence (p. 112).

⁷ Neither the Paramilitary groups nor the guerrillas were created only in the 20th century. They have always been present in Colombia, but that time represent an increase of these groups and a phenomenon that started to collide with the regime (CNMH, 2013; Pécaut, 1997, p. 13).

⁸ (ELN) National Liberation Army, revolutionary left-wing armed group founded in 1964; (M-19) April 19 Movement, guerrilla founded in 1970; (EPL) Popular Liberation Army, communist guerrilla founded in 1967.

⁹ Duncan, Gustavo (2006). *Los Señores de La Guerra: De Paramilitares, Mafiosos y Autodefensas En Colombia*. Bogotá, Colombia: Planeta.

¹⁰ The guerrillas were responsible for the majority of the crimes related to victims within the country, followed by the *bandas criminales* and the paramilitaries (CNMH, 2013).

During this period, the country saw different attempts to achieve peace, along with the constant emergence of new actors and distinct processes of disarming, demobilisation, and reintegration (ACR, 2016, p. 5). This period was considered “the lengthiest internal conflict in the western hemisphere” (Rodríguez Lopez et al., 2015, p. 172), creating a situation where neither the state, society, nor the armed groups had shown the capacity to find a solution for the armed conflict (Posso et al., 2010, p.18).

Although the numbers of victims are not precise, since there is no statistical consensus, many Colombians suffered due to this conflict. Merely in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, Amnesty International estimated that 70.000 people were killed and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 3 million people were internally displaced. Thousands were “kidnapped, disappeared, tortured and forcibly recruited by illegal armed groups”, as previously mentioned (Theidon, 2007, p. 68). Resulting in a humanitarian crisis in Colombia and one of the largest in the world (CNMH, 2013; Sriram et al., 2013, p. 220).

Following a ‘dark’ past, Colombia is still a violent country in almost all its territory. According to the Atlas of Violence in Latin America (Solís Delgadillo and Moriconi, 2018), only the regions of Vaupés and Guainía have an average of murders of less than 10 per 100,000 inhabitants (according to the World Health Organization, more than 10 murders per 10,000 inhabitants is considered a pandemic). However, even though nowadays Colombia is still considered a dangerous and violent place, the country has much more to it than what is portrayed in western news or tv series. One of the most interesting things that resulted from fieldwork in Colombia was the realization of the people’s willingness to achieve peace, despite their challenging past. While there, it was possible to see that the community is tired of the ongoing violence and several recognise that achieving peace must be one of the political priorities (as shown in the Report from *Observatorio de la Democracia*, 2018).

2.2. The former guerrilla FARC-EP.

FARC-EP is a complex organisation and politicians James LeMoyné and Paul Wolf argue that defining FARC-EP as a terrorist group is misjudging them, because their philosophy is much more than “the use or threat of violence, against civilians, for political gain”¹¹. However, FARC-EP was indeed considered a terrorist organisation in the eyes of the international community, as it was “included on the EU [European Union]’s list of terrorist organizations” (Castañeda, 2014, p. 152), or considered to have “belonged in the same category as al-Qaeda” by the United States of America Secretary of State, Colin Powell (Leech, 2011, p. 86). Therefore, the way locals describe a particular group or situation in the country depends entirely on the experience they had with them.

¹¹ Leech’s definition of a terrorist group (2011, p. 100).

Established in 1964¹², FARC-EP emerged with communist and Moscow-oriented origins (Denissen, 2010, p. 330) and, throughout time, they embraced Marxist ideology (Theidon, 2007, p. 68). Their Marxism was influenced by the rural Colombian reality (Posso et al., 2010, p. 124), aiming to fight against “inequity, bureaucracy, isolation and political and economic oppression” (Rodriguez Lopez et al., 2015, p. 172). Since its foundation, in the 1960s, until 2016, it represented a challenge, as an illegal actor, to the Government (LaRosa and Mejía, 2017, p. 96).

As Melo (2017) explains, the rural-based guerrilla gained so much power and influence in Colombia because many of its founders used to participate in liberal guerrillas in the 1940s and 50s, becoming a trustworthy entity for the rural community. Despite the *campesinos*¹³ not being directly interested in FARC-EP’s revolutionary project, the community felt that they could put their trust in the guerrilla, therefore guarantying them protection. The guerrilla’s interests were political, and they aimed to defend themselves and fight against state oppression, due to the discontent on how the state was ruling the country (Leech, 2011, p. 21-22). However, recently, victims of the conflict claim that this is not entirely true because, in fact, FARC-EP forced the *campesinos* to collaborate with them (PARES, 2020c).

Throughout the years, FARC-EP committed crimes such as “kidnappings, extortions, drug trafficking¹⁴ and drug trade protection”, sex violations and recruitment of child-soldiers, from which they would finance themselves, and became “one more violent armed actor” (Theidon, 2007, p. 68). Nonetheless, if we look at official documents from Colombians, we observe that the FARC-EP was not merely a violent armed actor, as it left thousands of victims through the years, and the ones that suffered the most were the civilian population (CNMH 2013). FARC-EP’s precise strategic and patient plan was to start from the local power, as sociologist James Petras¹⁵ (1999) argues, which they did successfully throughout the years, but were never able to do the same with the major cities (apud, Brittain, 2010, p. 48). However, in the 1980s FARC-EP tried to switch their military strategy, aiming to expand to larger cities, becoming more involved in fighting against the government, fighting for a deeper engagement in the country’s politics, and exponentially growing¹⁶ in numbers (Leech, 2011, p. 25; CNMH, 2013).

Over the years, different governments tried to sign an agreement and institute a ceasefire with the FARC-EP. From 1982 until 1986, President Belisario Betancur engaged in the first peace talks between the Government and the FARC-EP¹⁷. In 1984, aiming to strengthen peace, both sides agreed on a

¹² On the FARC-EP website, the reference date to the creation of the guerrilla is in 1964, in the city of *Marquetalia* (Cf. <https://www.farc-ep.co/nosotros.html>).

¹³ *Campesinos*, a Spanish word used to make reference to the rural people, the farmers or the ‘peasants’.

¹⁴ According to Pécaut, the “drug economy has also completely disrupted the values and the social structures”, and FARC-EP was one of the biggest beneficiaries from the drug business (2001, p. 140).

¹⁵ Petras, James (1999) *The Left Strikes Back: Class conflict in the age of neoliberalism*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

¹⁶ In 1980 FARC-EP, expanded from 500 people to 3.000 fighters (Leech, 2011, p.22). The highly demanding recruitment dynamics of FARC-EP (as lifetime membership, everyday activity highly structured and the non-payment), explain the guerrillas’ enlargement (Gutiérrez, 2015, p. 29; Nussio and Howe, 2012).

¹⁷ President Betancur also engaged in dialogues with other illegal groups as M-19, the EPL and the (ADO) Self-Defence Workers movement (CNMH, 2013, 135).

bilateral truce and a ceasefire was instated. With the agreement, FARC-EP promised to end kidnapping and extortion practices and, in exchange, they were allowed to create the Patriotic Union party (UP). In practical terms, this would mean that a dismantling of the guerrilla would start gradually (CNMH, 2013, p. 135).

Although at first it seemed that both sides were willing to proceed with the ‘Betancur Agreement’, the FARC-EP did not trust the Government, therefore rejecting the process and ending the peace talks (Durán, 1992; Chernick, 2012). This distrust was directly connected to the events of *La Violencia*, in the 1950s, when the Government granted amnesty to the *guerrilleros* and later started to kill them (Leech, 2011, p. 27). The situation repeated itself in the 1980s and after the creation of the Patriotic Union, when around 3.000 members of the FARC-EP were killed by the paramilitaries. As Theidon (2007, p. 71-72) explains, once again “the [G]overnment proved to be incapable of guaranteeing the security of the ex-combatants”. However, this did not stop FARC-EP from political and territorial expansion, which was supported by the escalation of kidnapping and extortion (Denissen, 2010; Leech, 2011; CNMH, 2013).

The territorial expansion of FARC-EP in the 1980s and 1990s was directly connected to the consumption of cocaine in the United States of America (USA)¹⁸; the “intensification of the forced displacement of ‘campesinos’ by the paramilitaries”; “the rise of neoliberalism”; “the free market” along with new “economic policies” that lead to a discontentment on the poor population; and to an increased gap between rural and urban areas, with fewer people supporting FARC in the main cities (Leech, 2011, p. 36, 66; Nussio and Howe, 2012).

When President César Gaviria Trujillo raise to power in 1990-94¹⁹ the government kept peace negotiations with different armed-groups such as FARC-EP, EPL, ELN, and PRT²⁰ (ACR, 2016). However, mistrust again between the Government and FARC-EP was again noticeable, due to past events. Simultaneously, there was still an absence of assurances that the guerrilla would have political representation, security measures, and economic and social reforms (CNMH, 2013, p. 154).

Four years later, President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) engaged in peace talks both with the FARC-EP and the ELN. In January 1999, the dialogues of *El Caguán* took place and the Government negotiated with FARC-EP a twelve-point agenda to achieve peace (Posso et al., 2010, p.43). The negotiation consisted of the creation of a ‘cleared zone’ (or *zona de despeje*²¹), but this would mean that outside of these areas the conflict was still ongoing (LaRosa and Mejía, 2017; Leech, 2011; Castañeda,

¹⁸ From 1994 to 1995, the FARC-EP would have gone from 200 billion pesos to 269 billion, of which 140 would come from activities related to drugs, 55 of the "taxes", 60 of the payment of ransoms for kidnapped and 10 of the discount on public spending (Pécaut, 1997, p. 19). However, in the following year, 1996 their narcotraffic profits were established at 685 billion pesos (Gutiérrez, 2015, p. 18).

¹⁹ In 1991 the Constitution of Colombia was signed, also known as the declaration of the Human Rights (Pécaut, 1997; Gutiérrez, 2015).

²⁰ (PRT) Workers Revolutionary Party of Colombia, 1982 until 1991, was a group with Marxist-Leninist Roots.

²¹ The aim of the cleared zone was to implement a peace agreement and end with the conflict. A demilitarised zone where the army had withdrawn but where FARC-EP could freely deploy their forces (Pécaut, 2001, p. 147).

2014, p. 56). This time, the population believed that negotiations would be possible, since FARC-EP's demands (as agrarian reform, investment in the social sector, human rights, natural resources, and electoral reforms) were in line with the Government's ideas (Chernick, 2012, p. 59).

It was also in 2000 that FARC-EP started to reinforce its influence in the largest cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and Cartagena) by launching the Clandestine Colombian Communist Party (PCCC). However, towards the middle of September 2000, the process was in crisis, once again due to the evident distrust between the two parties, but also due to a throwback of the *Plan Colombia*²² (created in 1999). As a consequence, during the subsequent years, the *Caguán's* Agreements "failed and did not even present the change to address the humanitarian issues".²³ Both parties discarded the negotiation as a solution or as a strategy to end the armed conflict and saw the negotiation as a way to strengthen the war (CNMH, 2013, p. 169, Posso et al., 2010, p. 27, 43).

After this failed attempt, the population started to doubt FARC-EP's willingness to achieve peace, due to their ambiguity and strategy, which was, more than ever, based on threats and intimidations (CNMH, 2013, p. 166). Moreover, "between 1996 and 2005, the war reached its maximum expression, extension and levels of victimization", turning the country into a "dispute for land, territory and local power" (ibid., p. 156), which is demonstrated by the numbers of deaths and disappearances, as mentioned before.

In 2002, President Uribe was elected, and his Government was not willing to start a peace dialogue strategy with any illegal actor. Instead, the Government's political agenda was focused on fighting the guerrilla²⁴ group(s), under the premise that Colombia was not facing a civil war, but instead "fighting criminal and terrorist organisations" (Leech, 2011, p. 88; Posso et al. 2010; Theidon, 2007, p. 72). For President Uribe, a negotiation would only happen if the illegal group would agree to a ceasefire beforehand. Arguing that the previous "failure of the peace process with the FARC-EP was considered (...) to be proof of their unwillingness to talk about peace" (Castañeda, 2014, p. 118).

Under the administration of President Uribe, a major social and economic shift occurred in the country. Neoliberalist strategy brought a wider ridge between the poor and the wealthy classes. The democratic security strategy became a significant cause of the country's escalating refugee crisis, with 2.4 million displaced people during President Uribe's eight years in office, from 2002 until 2010 (Leech,

²² *Plan Colombia* was created in 1999, between United States President Clinton and Colombian President Pastrana. It started from being a political measure to end with the illicit drugs, but after the 9/11 attacks, the USA used Plan Colombia to focus on their anti-terrorist war (Leech, 2011, p. 75/ 80; Posso et al., 2010, p. 37-38; Schultze-Kratz, 2017, p. 485).

²³ In the beginning of the 21st century, Colombia had the highest number of loss of life: more than 25,000 homicides per year, that is, a rate of 70 deaths per 100,000 population. The number of kidnappings, that exceeded 3,000 per year, constituted a record on the planet and the total displaced was estimated at 1,800,000, which also made Colombia one of the most serious cases (translated from Spanish Pécaut, 2001, p. 134).

²⁴ President Uribe's Government represented the first time that the Government located and killed a FARC's leader (Chernick, 2012, p. 12).

2011, p. 141). To worsen the situation, Colombia faced a case of ‘false positives’²⁵ (or *Falsos Positivos*) between 2002 and 2007, with “the assassination of more than 1,100 civilians by military forces (...) to artificially increase the statistics of guerrilla combatant deaths” (Castañeda, 2014, p. 124). Nonetheless, the popularity of President Uribe did not decrease, for eight years it was above 60% (ibid., p. 123).

As shown in Albertus and Kaplan’s study (2012, p. 208, fig. a), there was a correlation between every time peace talks took place and an increase in the guerrilla’s actions, showing that “government after government refused to address effectively the root causes of the conflict” leaving the country’s population living in a war for decades (Posso et al., 2010, p. 124).

In 2010, Juan Manuel Santos was elected President of Colombia and was able to change the political paradigm in the country. The Government’s agenda focused on redefining the country’s foreign relations, especially with other South American²⁶ countries. In June 2011, the Government established the Law of Victims and the Lands’ Reinstitution, implying the recognition of all the victims from the Colombian conflict from 1985 onwards. Santos also started a round of peace negotiations with FARC-EP, which would represent the biggest challenge of his Government (LaRosa and Mejía, 2017, p. 211; ACR, 2016, p. 20). This pursuit of peace resulted in the attribution of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Santos.

In 2012, the peace negotiations started in Habana (Cuba) with a five-point agenda aiming to: achieve a political agrarian development, ensure political participation for FARC-EP, solving the problem of illicit drugs, ensure restoration to the victims, establish a transitional system, and ensure the laying down of weapons to end the conflict (ACR, 2016, p. 21). In 2016, the final agreement was signed, and a cease-fire was instated. This would represent one of the greatest achievements of the Government since, after sixty years of war, they were able to start a process of reincorporation of former combatants into civil life.

This first part of the contextualization and literature review served the purpose of providing an overview of the history of Colombia and that of the former guerrilla. While the Agreement represented a historical turning point for the country, it did not mean that immediate peace was implemented. Although FARC-EP is no longer an illegal armed actor, that does not indicate that Colombia is finally at peace, since they were not the only violent actor in the country (Bonnilla and Restrepo, 2018).

2.3. The concepts of peace and peacebuilding.

²⁵ *Falsos Positivos* - a concept used to refer to the assassination of innocent people to present them as members of the guerrilla. This situation was used to show that the paramilitaries were killing more *guerrilleros* than they actually were (Gutiérrez, 2015, p. 37).

²⁶ Foreign relations with Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Peru and Argentina were solidified and a trade dialogue opened with Europe and China, pointing the focus beyond the USA (LaRosa and Mejía, 2017, p. 211).

“Peace is much more than the absence of war. It is about respect, tolerance, and thriving societies in which people live in harmony with each other and with the environment.” (Guterres, 2020)²⁷

The concept of peace emerges “as a necessity in a country where armed conflict threatens to collapse with the weak articulation between the state and society” (Durán, 1992, p. 44). However, researchers argue that peace is much “more than the absence of war” (Cady, 2016, p. 197; Castrillón-Torres and Cadavid-Ramirez, 2018), being a transformative process where groups agree to achieve “tranquillity of order”, as Bishop Augustine refers (Mattox, 2006, p. 175). At the same time, Kreutz and Nussio (2019, p. 2) argue that a peace process involves all the stakeholders of the conflict and, to achieve positive peace, it is essential to integrate external actors in the peace talks, aiming to enforce and support a peaceful environment. Contrasting with Posso et al.’s (2010) position, Herbolzheimer and Mestizo (2010, p. 12-14) characterise peace as a fragile and relative concept, arguing that “the only ones able to stop a war are the ones who do it”. The concept of peace not only refers to ending violence (negative peace) but also a realisation of justice, fairness, and equal opportunity (positive peace) (Alger, 2014, p. 5; Kurtenbach, 2010). Peace agreements need to include a transformation within the society, in the “relations between state and society”, to achieve equal opportunities and peace (Prado,²⁸ 1998, apud Jeong, 2002, p. 113/114).

According to the literature, a peace process can experience the following stages: peacemaking (the act of negotiating a peace agreement, leading to a cease-fire); peacekeeping (achieves peace by the use of military or police forces); and peacebuilding (helps the countries in their transitions from war into a sustainable and positive peace). This dissertation focuses on the latter process (Krondorfer, 2018; Galtung and Webel, 2007; UN, 2020; Zartman, 2007).

The essence of peacebuilding is characterised “by the overwhelming demand for reconstructing societies crippled by serious long-term conflict” (Jeong, 2002, p. 3). It represents an elastic concept and a long-term process which aims to create conditions to endure lasting peace and reducing “the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management” (United Nations, 2010, p. 5; Jeong, 2002; Paris, 2004).

Peacebuilding implies bringing opponent parties to negotiate and achieve an agreement, guaranteeing that each side maintains its word. It is an arduous task, representing one of the reasons why not every peacebuilding process succeeds in achieving lasting peace. Many conflicts ended up being “unsustainable” because both parties failed in achieving its goals and keeping an agreement in its strategies (Jeong, 2002, p. 3/147).

²⁷ António Guterres, Secretary-General of the UN, retrieved from Twitter, retrieved 22 September 2019, from <https://twitter.com/UNPeacebuilding/status/1175047147890364416>.

²⁸ Prado, T. P. (1998). *Advocates and Guarantors: Establishing Participative Democracy in Post-War Guatemala*, *Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives*.

The negotiation phase is just the beginning of a peace process. After the negotiation, it is indispensable to address issues rooted within society by elaborating reforms to reconstruct the community. The population needs to embrace the process and to deal with negative psychological emotions, beliefs, and prejudice (Maoz, 2004). These issues need to be addressed with sensitivity, always maintaining the needs of society at its core, while trying to “[remove] the negation of the other” and looking for ways to overcome the conflict by strengthening “their own social identity” (Krondorfer, 2018, p. 92). As such, the negotiation phase acknowledges the social, political, economic, and cultural components of the conflict itself (Posso et al., 2010, p. 13).

According to Castañeda (2014, p. 10) and Jeong (2002, p. 20-24), peacebuilding is defined by three dimensions. First, the creation of security²⁹ measures, providing “a security transition” that aims to build trust between the parties, to prevent the recurrence of violence. Secondly, the development of “a socio-economic transition”, with “rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation of societies that have suffered the ravages of armed conflict”. And, lastly a democratic transition, where the process of democratisation starts to be implemented. That may integrate an external intervention (for example the UN) “to help to create conditions conducive to peace” (ibid.).

Nevertheless, peace is complicated to achieve. The definition of peace does not mean the same for everyone, and the process is extremely complex. As mentioned by Kurtenbach (2019, p. 287), “there is no one-size-fits-all”, every conflict has its particularities, hence the need to adopt different strategies. The first step needs to be an understanding of the elements that originated and led to each specific conflict (Castrillón-Torres and Cadavid-Ramirez, 2018, p. 152). The key element is to maintain dialogue and trust between parties. Despite it not being a straightforward task, these two key terms are essential to guarantee the relinquishing of weapons. These processes may take years or even decades not only to achieve an agreement but also to guarantee the transformation of “a society and a state from war to peace is fully underway” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006, p. 20).

2.4. The emergence of peace in the 20th century.

In the 20th century, international peace organisations started to emerge, which saw “the termination of war as a window of opportunity for fundamental change” (Kurtenbach, 2010, p. 95). In 1919 with the creation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, a new concern to end war and disputes was evident. The League aimed to provide “collective security” to endure peace and order, “to prevent the outbreak of violence”, and to establish the international tools for “disarmament and arms control” (Alger, 2014,

²⁹ As mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, the security transition is highly present in the “security dilemma on ex-combatants” along with their lack of trust of the ability from the Government to protect them (Jeong, 2002, p. 31). This has represented one of the major hesitations from the FARC-EP members, that with demobilising could represent security issues since they still have old enemies.

p. 34). As a result of the League, in 1928, the Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand) was signed, representing the beginning of ‘outlawing war’ and bringing in a more peaceful era (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2017).

Later on, in 1945, a post-World War II meant the establishment of the UN Charter. It would incorporate the same values as the League of Nations, aiming to “strengthen and safeguard the peace of nations” and the resistance to war (ibid., p.195). After World War II, in 1951, the world saw a few European countries founding an alliance. Nowadays, the European Union (EU) promotes the principles of peace, equality, human rights, and the rule of law.

Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War (1947 - 1991), there was an international boom of peacekeeping missions and the involvement of international actors in war areas. With it came the creation of new opportunities for mediation³⁰ and the implementation of DDR programmes in countries where new and ongoing conflicts were taking place (Alger, 2014; Muggah, 2009; Paris, 2004; Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006). Today, these agencies, along with others³¹, have an essential role in facilitating peace in zones of conflict.

2.5. Lessons learned from previous Peace Agreements.

According to Kurtenbach (2010), the international paradigm of the 20th and 21st century emerged due to two reasons. First, the world is today much more globalised, where post-war societies have a significant impact on others. In addition, today’s peacebuilding actions involve a multitude of actors, not only counting with international aid agencies, but also having to honour international norms and treaties. Kurtenbach (ibid.) clarifies that these external actors should only partly influence the peacebuilding process, rather than having full participation. The second reason is regarding the peacebuilding missions which have “underestimate[d] the influence of local or national development features” and its potential to end in conflict. According to this logic, societies should be the main focus of every peacebuilding mission (ibid., p. 96).

Despite the rising, in the 20th century, of international concern to bring peace, there is still a gap in “a more systematic approach” on how to transition from conflict to peace, as explained by Jeong (2002) and Posso et al. (2010). This represents a need to study previous peace operations when trying to propose a peacebuilding design, as Jeong (2002) argues.

As shown by researchers, not every moment is propitious to start peace negotiations, and few opportunities present favourable conditions. This explains why “few negotiation processes reach an agreement, few agreements are implemented, and few implementations are successful” (Posso et al.,

³⁰ In 1992 the UN created the Agenda for Peace, adopting the liberal paradigm. The peacebuilding negotiations started to focus on ending the conflict, democratisation and state-building (Kurtenbach 2019, p. 286).

³¹ The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; the Organization of American States; the Bretton Woods Institutions (The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) or the National Development Agencies and the International Non-Governmental Organizations (Paris, 2004); are a few of that can be highlighted.

2010, p. 151). In most cases, the appearance of new actors or new elements keeps feeding the cycle of violence (ibid.).

Despite the Colombian conflict presenting its peculiarities, the studied authors have shown that it is essential to look at other countries, to analyse what worked and what did not, and then apply the lessons learned. The following table describes different reasons why peacebuilding did not achieve the expected goal in countries as Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. The table is divided into three steps: (i) Setbacks which occurred during a peace agreement. Which include the setback of one party from the negotiation process, or the implementation of a later agreement; (ii) Problems during the transition from war to peace, which tends to be a challenging process, but is the most crucial phase to deal with social restoration and to implement DDR programmes; and (iii) The process of keeping a long-lasting peace, which can take years or in most of the cases decades. In this phase, the international community and a strong government policy towards peace are the key actors to success.

Table 2.1 – Lessons which can be learned from previous Peace Agreements.

1st - Setbacks in the peace agreement:	Examples by country:
→ When the adversarial parties are not willing to negotiate, it is common the recurrence of violence and hostilities after an agreement (Gutiérrez, 2015; Jeong, 2002).	→ Angola ³² , Cambodia ³³ .
→ Short period(s) of “relative stability in the aftermath of peacebuilding” (Paris, 2004, p.154).	→ Angola, Cambodia, Liberia ³⁴ .
→ It is highly important to begin the peace agreement’s implementation right after its signature (Adriana Escobar, 2013, p. 81; Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006).	→ Cambodia and Liberia.
→ The failure of the DDR programmes into providing peace, led to a return to weapons (recidivism).	→ Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo.

³² Angola - in 1991 one of the opposition parties abandoned the peace agreements, which hindered the process of achieving stability. Later, in 1992 the elections did not succeed in achieving reconciliation, followed by a return to weapons (Paris, 2004, p. 64). The war in Angola, lasted for decades, interspersed with relative periods of peace.

³³ Cambodia - in 1991 the Paris Agreement was signed, but the Khmer Rouge (a 70s guerrilla) showed a lack of commitment, while controlling a few parts of the country. The Agreement showed a “lack of coherence between DDR, amnesties and transitional justice” (Sriram et. al, 2013, p. 113). The priority was reconciliation and stability but little concern with accountability (the guerrilla killed around two million people) (Paris, 2004; BBC, 2018).

³⁴ Liberia - after seven years of conflict (1990-97) “more than 21,000 combatants” were demobilised in less than five months. However, after a short period, Liberia entered again in war (Paris, 2004, p. 79, 91), and then was considered a failed state. The UN Mission in Liberia was considered a failure, leading to a “lack of an effective judicial system fuels impunity and (...) insecurity”, still felt today (Sriram et al., 2013, p. 188).

2nd. Transition is a challenging process:	Examples by country:
→ Lack of social restoration, leaving many wounds, traumas (as PTSD and stigma) and divisions within the population, which takes decades to overcome (Alger, 2014; Castellano da Silva, 2016; Paris, 2004; Kroc Institute, 2020).	→ Bosnia ³⁵ , Rwanda ³⁶ and South Africa ³⁷ .
→ A slower transition into peace can contribute to hardener the settlement of a peaceful environment and can mean the failure of the DDR Programmes (Boutellis and Zahar, 2017; Paris, 2004; Sriram et al., 2013).	→ Mali, Mozambique and Sierra Leone.
3rd. A long path to achieving long-lasting peace.	Examples by country:
→ Rising of new illegal armed groups and insurgencies, and the recurrence of violence (Esperanza Durán, 1984; Paris, 2004, p. 112).	→ Central America ³⁸ : El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua.
→ Persistence of injustices, inequality, violence and crime to this day (Meltzer, 2004; Paris, 2004).	→ Central America ³⁹ :
→ Absence by the government, for example in achieving a programme, can lead the opposition forces to stop an ongoing disarmament process (Ho-Won Jeong, 2002, p. 4).	→ Central America.
→ The fragile institution of peace by international actors, or lack of support (Sriram et al., 2013).	→ Cambodia, Lebanon, Northern Uganda and Rwanda.

Comparing conflicts and the outcome of each peacebuilding mission is not an obvious task. Every country presents its unique aspects, where, as seen above, different contexts mean different solutions,

³⁵ Bosnia and Herzegovina - in 2002, the reintegration process and the attempts for the (TRC) Truth and Reconciliation Commissions did not achieve what was expected. The peace in the country was “tense and dysfunctional”, and the cultural and religious differences remained a problem (Boyle, 2009, p. 210), with a division in the population, still present today, mainly because of a lack of social restoration (Sriram et al., 2013, p. 149).

³⁶ Rwanda - twenty-five years have passed since the 1994 genocide (a conflict from 1992 until 1995), yet, the path towards recovery appears long and insidious. The conflict left many wounds, thus, the society is still divided or facing their traumas from the past events (Haperen, 2012; Lemarchand, 2004; Paris, 2004; Tatum, 2010).

³⁷ South Africa - due to the Apartheid (1948-1994) the country was left with an enormous division and segregation within the population until today. The TRC although provided truth-telling, and eventually amnesty to the perpetrator (Mamdani, 2002, p. 33), also left many wounds and traumas in the victims, who did not receive sufficient psychological support (Clark, 2012; Ross, 2012; Mendeloff, 2004; Krondorfer, 2018; Malala, 2019).

³⁸ Central America – After many attempts to achieve peace (Cf. Central America Governments, 1987; Esperanza Durán, 1984), during the last years of the Cold War, new revolutionary movements rose in the countries in the attempt to overthrow the Government, leading to a recurrence of violence (Paris, 2004, p. 112).

³⁹ In El Salvador new types of violence emerged, the death-squads prevailed, the armed groups and the criminal gangs grown, and state legitimacy is unstable. Today is considered one of the deadliest and most dangerous countries in the world. Guatemala still has numerous illegal actors, high insecurity and a substantial part of society is living in poverty (Jeong, 2002; Mejía Gómez, 2004; Posso et al. 2010; Malala, 2020).

and in some, fragile peace led to a recurrence of war (Boyle, 2009, p. 154). As Jeong (2002, p. 4) argues, it is essential to take into consideration that “peace agreements are not the end of old conflict because they do not by themselves provide a guarantee for successful implementation”.

A transition to peace represents an exhaustive and long-term process, which explains why sometimes peace is characterised as a utopia, where it can be impossible to achieve a long-lasting peace.⁴⁰ As Paris (2004, p. 56) argues, defining a successful peacebuilding mission “primarily on whether or not peace exists at the moment peacebuilders go home” is not appropriate, since it goes against the concept and aim of peacebuilding in itself, “and therefore sets the bar too low”.

The previous peace processes in Latin America,⁴¹ as mentioned above, provided an opening for Colombia’s 2016 Agreement. The Agreement between the Government and the FARC-EP represents an end of a war-era in Latin America. It provides an international opportunity, where the UN could show their good practices, overcoming previous failed missions. Colombia can now also strengthen its relationship with the international community and with other countries (especially within Latin America).

This sub-chapter is pertinent for the upcoming sections of the dissertation. Since there was more literature available regarding these Agreements and more time has passed, it became easier to research what was successful and not. By very briefly and generally comparing these peace processes with the 2016 Colombian Agreement, it is possible to observe that the latter aimed for much more than the reincorporation and demobilisation of former combatants. It also addressed underlying issues (structural reforms) such as drugs, land reform, support to the victims, or ending illegal actors. In this matter, the Colombian agreement has shown to be much more pertinent (Drange, 2019). More than a peace agreement with the former guerrilla FARC-EP, it was a peace agreement for every Colombian citizen (former combatants 1, 2, interviews 2020). Nonetheless, this also means that the Agreement aims to reform too many points, which can make it harder to achieve, as we argue in the following sub-chapter.

2.6. The 2016 Final Agreement to end armed conflict and build a stable and lasting peace.

“Peace is our most precious value and the essence of our work. All we strive for as a human family depends on peace. But peace depends on us” (Guterres, 2020)⁴².

As previously mentioned, the academic literature shows that few moments are opportune to start peace negotiations, further increasing the process’ difficulty (Posso et al. 2010, p. 116). The Colombian case

⁴⁰ Professor Rosanne Anholt, Class of Peace and Conflict, October 29, 2019, at the Vrije Amsterdam University.

⁴¹ In 2014, “33 governments of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)” announced their regions as a ‘zone of peace’. This happened due to the termination of conflicts in Central America (El Salvador 1992, Guatemala 1996, Nicaragua 1990); Peru (1998) and in 2016 the Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP, raising “expectations that the cycle of political violence and civil wars underway since the late 1940s could come to an end” (Kurtenbach 2019, p. 283).

⁴² António Guterres, Secretary-General of the UN, retrieved from Twitter, retrieved on 9 January 2020, from <https://twitter.com/unpeacebuilding/status/1215295593708388352>.

is an accurate example of this. In thirty years of trying to achieve peace, the country acquired significant experience⁴³ in how to cease a conflict (Chernick, 2012, p. 18; Portuguese Embassy, interview from 2020).

After the 2010 elections, with the newly elected President Santos, the government's political agenda switched. Their main focus was to end the armed conflict, but without persisting with the rigidities and arbitrariness of the previous government (Melo, 2017, p. 278). President Santos pursued a plan of negotiations, arguing that this would be the most effective way to achieve his political goals. Over the following years, the process unfolded. Formal negotiations started in 2011 in Oslo, Norway, but afterwards were moved to Havana, Cuba, to ensure confidentiality. The process was divided into three phases: a preliminary phase, an exploratory phase, and the formal negotiations (Schultze-Kraft, 2017, p. 486).

With the first negotiations, the Government aimed to put an end to a long and expensive war with a guerrilla group whose political project had completely failed. The FARC-EP did not achieve its goals of taking control nor did it possess any kind of widespread support at that moment (Melo, 2017, p. 278). As Oyola (2018) and Schultze-Kraft (2017) refer, when talking about the agreement: on one side we have President Santos, with his governmental agenda, proposing a modern project and economic growth for Colombia. On the other side, the FARC-EP, that no longer had the military power to fight the government, a weakened and debilitated organisation.

Despite there being a need for Colombia to achieve this Agreement, it was challenging to settle. During several occasions, the "negotiations were interrupted for shorter periods", and it was common to see both parties pointing fingers at each other. However, both sides were also aware that even the tiniest leak could destroy the possibility to sign the Agreement (Schultze-Kraft, 2017, p. 489).

In 2012, the unfolding of the Agreement⁴⁴ process' agenda between the Government and the FARC-EP started in Havana. The first years of negotiations were the toughest because there was mistrust and tensions between the two opposing parties. Between the dialogues, victims' commissions shared their suffering and the crimes committed by FARC-EP, which was unprecedented. During this time, several countries joined in to help in the negotiation process. The peace-guaranteeing countries were Norway and Cuba,⁴⁵ the accompanying countries were Chile and Venezuela, and, during the negotiations, the

⁴³ Until this date, Colombia had already signed almost forty peace agreements with different groups, according to the UN Peacemaker Website. One of the agreements that served as one basis for the FARC-EP Agreement, was the one signed in 2003 between the Government and the paramilitaries (AUC) United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Melo, 2017, p. 276-7). Along with the political reintegration of the M-19 in the early 1990s, often mentioned as a positive case, which can be an example to FARC-EP, to transit from war to peace (Angelo, 2016).

⁴⁴ The agenda focused on land redistribution; political implementation; end to the conflict and drug trafficking; right to the truth and political opposition. It represented an atypical transitional justice because the process occurred during the armed conflict (*Gobierno de Colombia*, 2016; Ramírez, 2013, p. 119; Schultze-Kraft, 2017).

⁴⁵ After the signature of the Agreement, Cuba provided a thousand medicine scholarships to former combatants of FARC-EP, victims of the conflict and the public power. Norway supported the social-economic reincorporation process (CSIVI, 2020a). Both countries continued as guarantors of the implementation of peace.

USA and EU countries provided extra help (Ramírez, 2013, p. 125; *Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz*, 2018).

After years of negotiations, on 26 September 2016, the parties signed the first Peace Agreement proposal. Later, on 24 November 2016, at the Theatre Colon, the signature of the definitive and final Colombian Peace Agreement took place. It was signed by President Santos and Timoleón Jiménez (Rodrigo Londoño), commander-in-chief of FARC-EP. After almost sixty years of conflict, Colombians were expecting justice and that FARC-EP would pay for their crimes. However, after the application of a transitional justice system, the *guerrilleros* still have to show how much they regret their actions in order to be granted full amnesty and to become part of the country's political system.

The 300-page Agreement was established by a series of accords that constitute a whole enduring agreement. It is based on the terms of Colombia's 1991 Constitution, containing all the precautions to ensure a non-return to war. Besides aiming to a cease-fire, it is a document which takes into consideration the human, gender, and territorial-based approach (Piccone, 2019). These provisions' stated purpose is to engage in a long-term peaceful and prosperous coexistence. The Agreement is divided into six points, namely: a Comprehensive Rural Reform (*Reforma Rural Integral*): Structural reform of the countryside, by "creating conditions of well-being and quality of life (...) contribute to the eradication of poverty, promote equality and ensure full enjoyment of the rights of citizenship" (p. 7); Political Participation (*Participación Política*): "A democratic opportunity to build peace", peacebuilding's consolidation, democracy to incorporate a more comprehensive, pluralist and inclusive policy, "thereby enriching debate and deliberation", guaranteeing the representation of society's diverse visions and interests (p. 7-8); the Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and Laying down of Arms (*Cese al Fuego y de Hostilidades Bilateral y Definitivo y la Dejación de las Armas*): Aiming to end the conflict between the "Colombian State Armed Forces (which include both the Military Forces and the National Police) and the FARC-EP". This chapter also includes the reincorporation of the FARC-EP into civilian life (within economic, social and political matters), along with the security guarantees and measures to fight against illegal armed actors (p. 8); a Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problem (*Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas*). It includes ending with the illicit crops, and the production and sale of drugs, providing incentives to the *campesinos* to switch their crops to a legal production (p. 8-9); a section focusing on the Victims (*Víctimas*) – stating that "victim compensation should be at the core of any agreement," which includes monetary compensations to the victims, a sanction of serious violations of human rights (under the humanitarian law) and truth-telling as well as the creation of the "Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Non-Recurrence" (p. 9); Implementation and verification mechanisms, which created a "Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement" (CSIVI - Follow-up Commission and final closing implementation) which is composed of representatives from the National Government and the FARC-EP. The Commission aims to monitor the components of the Agreement and verifying compliance therewith (p.10).

It was not an easy Agreement to achieve⁴⁶, nor is it perfect, but, according to Cassel (2016), it is the best Agreement that could have been achieved. The focus was to learn from previous mistakes, so future generations did not have to live under conflict. This is one of the reasons why Colombians nowadays have changed their perspective towards the Agreement, embracing it, as they have started to see its benefits. Colombians want a more tranquil life, with a decrease in violence and long-lasting peace.

2.7. DDR Programmes:

The term DDR refers to recommendation programmes proposed by the UN⁴⁷ for proceeding with the reintegration process. The DDR is defined by the withdrawing or laying down of weapons on behalf of combatants, along with their military structures, to end armed conflict (Castrillón-Torres and Cadavid-Ramirez, 2018, p. 153; Theidon, 2007, p. 66, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006), followed by the reintegration of former combatants, by assisting them in the social and economic reintegration into society. They aim to “promote reconciliation and minimise recidivism to illegal activities” by turning the combatants into “functioning members of society”, providing them with education possibilities, “occupational training, psychosocial counselling, police monitoring (...) and financial subsidies” (Kaplan and Nussio, 2018, p.133).

DDR programmes hold five goals: (1) Facilitate reintegration, by contributing to security; (2) Rebuild the trust between the society and former combatants; (3) Help to prevent the recurrence of conflicts; (4) Contribute to the reconciliation of the nation; and (5) Built resources for reconstruction and development (Castrillón-Torres and Cadavid-Ramirez, 2018). However, each DDR programme tends to be adapted to the context, turning each case unique. DDR programmes in Colombia consisted of four stages:

Table 2.2 - Stages of the DDR programmes.

(Adapted from ACR, 2016, p. 15; Theidon, 2007, p. 71; Denissen, 2010, p. 335).

1 st Disarm:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collection, documentation, control and elimination of weapons. The hand-over of weapons marked the beginning of the transition from illegality to legality. In March 2017, the guerrilla members started to give their weapons to the UN. In June 2017, the individual letting of weapons was completed (Melo, 2017, p. 280; United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia [UNVMC], 2017).

⁴⁶ A study made by the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) shows that in 2015, 77.2% of the population supported a negotiated to the armed conflict. Nonetheless, this survey also shown that people did not believe that an agreement was going to be achieved, neither the demobilisation of FARC-EP (Garcia Sánchez et al., 2015). Later on October 2016, a national plebiscite was held regarding the Peace Agreement, but it only drew 37.4% of voters (and the majority voted against it), showing the Agreement would still need a few alterations and that people did not know that it could benefit more the population than the guerrilla.

⁴⁷ The UN’s role on the DDR process is to “advice on how to engage with armed groups and ultimately contribute to the signing of an agreement”. In the Colombian case, the mission evolved to a Special Political Mission, similar to the cases of Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Burundi, among others. Today the UN still provides socio-economic projects to former combatants (Peacekeeping UN, 2020).

2nd. Demobilisation:

- The formal and controlled licensing of active members of illegal armed groups. Where the illegal organisation is dismantled, ending the “state of war to a state of peace”. The first phase is the concentration of these actors in special designated areas for this operation. Despite being so in practice, in the case of FARC-EP, the former guerrilla does not agree with the term 'demobilisation', since they considered that the process was held voluntarily and considering that the FARC-EP still exists as a political party (former combatants, interviews 2020).

3rd. Reinsertion:

- Temporary assistance or relocation benefits, to motivate them to leave the illegal groups and to re-enter civilian life. In this phase, benefits are granted (pension, food, clothing, shelter, health, job training, professional training and instruction in productive activities). The goal is to help themselves to strengthen themselves as individuals and their families to achieve social, economic, and political reintegration in society.

4th. Reincorporation:

- Through this process, the demobilised person acquires civil status and achieves employment and sustainable income. It consists of two stages: the initial reincorporation/reintegration and the long-term one. This phase also comprehends the reparation and reconciliation with the victims. Reparation “addresses the needs of the victims by offering them money, official apologies, and days of commemoration, for instance”, and “reconciliation means that victims and perpetrators start accepting each other and see how they can move on and work on a constructive relationship” (Denissen, 2010, p. 336).

The 4th phase – reincorporation (on which this study focuses) – is considered the most challenging one in the DDR process. It is a “complex, long-term process (...) to (re)settle in post-war communities (...) engage in sustainable civilian employment (...) deal with their war-related mental trauma”. This is a process that first needs to acknowledge the challenges of former combatants, and their involvement into communities in being “re-socialised” (Theidon, 2007, p. 71; Rodriguez Lopez et. al., 2015, p. 173; Wiegink, 2014, p. 35). The reincorporation process is a never-ending process, which aims to prevent recurrence. As Theidon (2007) and Wiegink (2014, p. 35) argue, it is the “weakest link” in the DDR programmes, because it cannot be “planned nor evaluated with clear parameters”, however, it is the most crucial element of DDR. Nevertheless, it helps to “limit the recurrence of civil war” and prevent the repetition of future conflict, since former combatants can participate and be involved in social environments or in the communities, which makes them “feel socially fulfilled and accepted”. It reduces their “connections to their former armed groups' networks” (Kaplan & Nussio, 2015, p. 133).

According to the UNHCR (2004), the facets of reintegration are: firstly, legal: with “legal support for ownership of property, land and housing”; secondly, political: Guarantee of a stable government; full participation in political processes; gender equality; (...) freedom of thought and expression; protection from persecution; thirdly, economic: “Access to productive resources” including “land, agricultural inputs and livestock”; and fourthly, social: “Access to services; security; absence of discrimination; community-level dispute resolution” and reconciliation or reparation with the community (ibid., p. 39).

Reconciliation, which is part of the 4th phase, is one of the most pivotal parts in a peace agreement process. Reconciliation is “an ethical concept, a moral good, and a social and political practice” (Rosoux, 2008, p. 544) by repairing the damages done in the past by violence. It is a process that might take decades and generations to carry out, but it is essential to accomplish a peaceful environment. Rosoux (2008) and Krondorfer (2018) distinguish reconciliation in three approaches: structural, social-psychological, and spiritual. While Maoz (2004, p. 225) explains reconciliation as a “cluster of cognitive and emotional processes through which individuals, groups and states come to accept relationships of cooperation, concession and peace in situations of former conflict”. Lederach (1997, p. 30), in turn, sees it as “a focus and a locus”, where the first is the event of building new relationships with the enemy, and the ‘locus’ represents a place where the parties of a conflict meet.

The DDR programmes are not linear processes, and critics as Humphreys and Weinstein (2007); Caramés and Sanz (2009); Muggah (2005 and 2007) claim that these they tend to be “too narrowly focused, inflexible and technocratic and detached from the political transition or broader recovery and reconstruction strategies” (Nussio, 2013; Muggah 2009; Muggah and O’Donnell, 2015).

2.8. The unfolding of FARC-EP’s reincorporation in the 2016 Peace Agreement.

The previous sub-chapter, which discusses the lessons that could be learned from previous peace agreements, provides a clearer understanding of the Colombian Agreement’s unfolding in this part.

After the signature of the final 2016 Agreement, its application started and so did the developing of FARC-EP’s reincorporation. That represents a positive point, since, according to Escobar (2013), it is highly important to start the peace agreement’s implementation right after its signature. Nonetheless, setbacks during a peace agreement are very common, as seen in the cases of Angola, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, or Liberia. However, as Posso et al. (2010, p. 1) argue, for a peace agreement to be successful, three characteristics need to be fulfilled. First, the population wins (where a victims’ procedure is approved, with transitional justice, compensations and land reforms). Then, the government wins (ending a sixty-years-war and achieving peace). Lastly, the guerrilla wins (obtaining something for returning their weapons, in this case, a political party, amnesty, and integration in the reincorporation process and in society). Therefore, it can be argued that the Colombian Peace Agreement is an agreement for everyone, as previously explained.

The Peace Agreement was constructed by and for multiple actors (not only by the international actors, but also the rural communities, indigenous people, Afro-Colombians, and the victims), which resulted in a document based on principles of restorative justice and human rights, a combination of judicial and non-judicial measures, truth commissions, and guarantees of non-repetition. Likewise, to

ensure a successful implementation and reincorporation, the Government also counted on multiple organisations⁴⁸ that became responsible for the monitorisation of the Agreement.

However, for a better understanding of the unfolding of FARC-EP’s reincorporation in Colombia, the table below provides an overview of the number of FARC-EP members that put down their weapons, the two different phases of reincorporation, and the benefits for the participants. The programmes aim to promote sustainability in civil life, coexistence, reconciliation, and social acceptance, to guarantee that recidivism does not occur (ACR, 2017; Rodriguez Lopez et. al., 2015, p. 183).

Table 2.3- Unfolding of FARC-EP’s reincorporation.

<p>The number of reincorporated FARC-EP members (to date):</p>	<p>→ A total of 13.202 former FARC-EP members were accredited by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, where, currently 12.948 people⁴⁹ are in the reincorporation process; 9,225 people living outside of ETCR⁵⁰; 2.984 people living inside of ETCR; and 765 people whereabouts unknown (which does not imply all are living in the illegally) (Attachment A; CNR 2017; Piccone, 2019; UNVMC, 2020).</p>
<p>Phases of the reincorporation:</p>	<p>→ 1st phase – from 16 August 2017 until the beginning of 2018. Seeking initial adaptability and stabilisation. In this phase, the group received support in health, education, basic training, knowledge identification, adequate use of free time, emotional stabilisation and economic support, so that they can adapt while preparing to enter the labour market (translated from CNR, 2017).</p> <p>→ 2nd phase – Long-term reincorporation (See Attachment B for the long-term route, which includes education, community, economic, family, housing, psychologic and healthcare measures).</p>
<p>Benefits⁵¹ of participating in</p>	<p>→ Economic support ‘ECOMUN’⁵², with a basic income (90% of the minimum wage - \$790.023 pesos) and subsidies to create productive projects or housing (with a one-time benefit of 8 million pesos); Psychological Support;</p>

⁴⁸ Including international actors (UN, EU, OAS), national governments (UK, Norway, Germany, Canada, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, New Zealand, South Korea, Chile, Emirates, Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands, among others), local organisations (ACR, CNR- Nacional Council for Reincorporation, NGOs, churches, schools, associations, CSIVI, Paz Colombia, *Mandato Ciudadano para la Paz, Consejo Nacional de Paz - Law 434 and Comisión de Conciliación Nacional*’.

⁴⁹ However, more recent data (UNVMC, 2020) shows the Government counted 12.891 accredited individuals.

⁵⁰ (ETCR) Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation, initially were not within the Agreement, but later were established to train former FARC-EP combatants in their transit to civilian life and meet the technical training needs of the nearby communities. Firstly, were named (ZTVN) Transitory Villages Zones of Normalisation, on the 1st phase of reincorporation, and later their purpose was extended, and from 16 August 2017 began to be known as ETCR (*Dirección de Desarrollo del Talento Humano en Salud*, 2017).

⁵¹ These transitional benefits help the former combatant to become a productive member of the community, providing basic needs to them and their families. Besides it contributes to pacify the former combatants (Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006, p. 24).

⁵² ECOMUN refers to a programme in charge of the collective-economic reincorporation.

these programmes:	Counselling; Healthcare; Education (vocational training, grants for projects); Work Training; Social service (by working with the communities, learning tolerance and participation to integrate communities); Citizenship and Judicial Assistance (for example opening a bank account) (ACR, 2017; <i>Presidencia de la República</i> , 2020; former combatant 3, interview 2020).
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A peace agreement does not only comprehend a demobilisation process and a non-returning to weapons; it also serves to provide economic, political, and social development, as previously mentioned in table 2 (Ramírez, 2013, p. 122). These dimensions are essential to the FARC-EP’s reincorporation process, and they all are related to each other and tend to overlap. The following division provides a clearer view on these: (1) Political - “the capacity of individuals to be members of political entities with the aim of exercising their right to participate in governance”; (2) Social - within the civil and social citizenship, which they are entitled to enjoy equality under the law. This factor also comprehends the security and community reconciliation values; (3) Economic - “to denote benefits and responsibilities to employment, investment and taxation”; and (4); Judicial or Legal, regarding the possession of land and housing (Rodríguez Lopez et. al., 2015, p. 175).

Our aim is to focus on the social aspect within reincorporation, more specifically on the issues of security and reconciliation with the community. According to Annan and Cutter⁵³ (2009, p. 2, apud, Kaplan & Nussio, 2018, p. 133-35), social reintegration is directly connected to community reconciliation, where former combatants became involved in “community reconciliation, justice, and psychological healing”, along with the security and wellbeing of the population. This tends to be the most challenging part of the reincorporation process. However, once social reincorporation is achieved, the process itself becomes smoother. Nonetheless, the social reincorporation process is quite controversial. There are different perspectives regarding whether social reintegration of former combatants can indeed contribute to society. A few authors argue that they “contribute positive leadership to their communities” (McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009). While others (Themner, 2011) defend that former combatants are a problem for security and beget violence, which not only fails to comply with the consolidation of peace, but also endangers their relationship and acceptance in the community, since security issues can have consequences on the surrounding population (Kaplan & Nussio, 2015, p. 133).

Even so, it is essential to address the difficulties which former combatants face during a social reincorporation process. When in a community, former combatants might have to deal with: stigma⁵⁴;

⁵³ Annan, J. and Cutter, A. (2009) Critical issues and lessons in social reintegration: Balancing justice, psychological well-being, and community reconciliation. In: CIDDR Conference, Cartagena.

⁵⁴ In 2015, a survey was conducted, and it showed that people were sceptical regarding having a FARC-EP member as a neighbour, being able to forgive, give amnesty, or hire them for a job, saying that they would feel unsafe living next to former combatants. However, 49,2% also said that it would contribute to a more inclusive and tolerant society (García Sánchez et al., 2015).

adjustment to a new narrative (moving through the war narrative towards a more peaceful path); security-issues (most of them prefer to live in anonymity); oppression or jealousy problems; and dealing with traumas and rejection by the communities (Kreutz and Nussio, 2018 and 2019; Nussio, 2011; Springer, 2005; Krondorfer, 2018). If this is the case, how can a peace agreement guarantee a successful social reincorporation? As Kaplan and Nussio (2018) have shown, there is a high need for an open-mind, or willingness, on behalf of the society to accept the combatants – including the need of a more participatory community and the creation of joint projects. Likewise, a secure environment is a must, since former combatants need to feel safe within these communities, along with the implementation of transitional justice measures, truth-telling procedures, compensations to the victims, reconciliation approaches, and public forgiveness, as seen in the case of Boyajá⁵⁵ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006, p. 30; Oyola, 2018, p. 220; CNRR, 2010).

Social reincorporation “will continuously reopen old sores” and it will take time for people to heal (Nussio and Howe, 2012, p. 64.) The Colombian population has a difficult past, but they also believe that “*el tiempo todo lo cura*” – “time heals everything”, and rather than deal with the past, they prefer to forget it. However, this way of thinking leaves Colombians with resentments and painful experiences that have not yet been processed (García,⁵⁶ 2020).

This section of the dissertation started out by presenting the main concepts that the study focusses on, followed by a brief overview and comparison with other peace agreements around the world. This part was important not only to present the Colombian Peace Agreement, but to identify the focus of the analysis and pave the way for the subsequent chapter, regarding data and methodology. The research question and the hypothesis were framed taking into consideration this contextualisation and literature review. Furthermore, the discussion of the results also reintroduces a few ideas and lessons taken from this section.

⁵⁵ One of the communities that suffered the most due to FARC-EP’s violence, was the Boyajá community. Despite that they agreed to provide forgiveness, under the condition for FARC-EP cease violence and to ask a public forgiveness (Oyola, 2018, p. 220).

⁵⁶ César García (2020), General Secretary of MWC, Koloquium Colombian thesis, Research Group in Amsterdam, presentation from 10 June 2020.

CHAPTER 3 - Methodology

As mentioned previously, the research question that guides our dissertation is: *How effective are the measures to socially reinstate former combatants promoted under the Colombian Peace Agreement, since 2016 until 2020, according to the perceptions of the actors involved in the process?*. To answer this question, we propose two hypotheses: (A) Under the terms signed in 2016, the current political agenda of the Colombian Government is failing to achieve effective measures to socially reincorporate former combatants, and (B) Social reincorporation has been compromised by non-compliance with security measures. Our analysis encompasses a triangulation of document analysis and semi-structured interviews, supported by non-participant observation, scientific literature, reports, and quantitative data.

3.1. Triangulation in Methodology:

This study encompasses the triangulation tool (within methodology⁵⁷), to provide greater clarity on the topic and to eliminate potential biases. The application of this method was used to analyse qualitative data, as analysis of governmental and institutional documents, articulation with the literature review, field research (non-participant observation), semi-structured interviews, and political discourses. It also briefly included quantitative data-collection from pre-existing databases or reports, in order to enrich the analysis.

Originally, the term triangulation referenced the navigation system used by the military, to mention multiple “points to locate an object’s exact position” (Smith, 1975, p. 357; Jick, 1979, p. 602). However, at the end of the 1950s, it started to be used as a methodological research concept, by Campbell and Fiske (1959) (Jonsen and Jehn, 2009, p. 126). Currently, when authors refer triangulation in research, they refer to the use of at least two or more sources or methodologies to research and corroborate a question (e.g. Denzin, 1978; Redfern and Norman, 1994; Risjord et al., 2001; Foss and Ellefsen, 2002; Halcomb and Andrews, 2005; Bowen, 2009; Casey and Murphy, 2009; Hussein, 2009 and 2019; Jonsen and Karen, 2009) like, for example, by combining document analysis with other methodologies, aiming to study the same phenomenon. By using different data methods, the researcher can corroborate her/his findings and curb potential biases or subjectivity. The authors tend to give preference to triangulation, since it increases “the credibility and validity of research findings” (Noble and Heale, 2019, p. 67). This technique not only provides a clearer explanation to readers, but it also provides a “more comprehensive picture of the results”, leading to an increase in accuracy and reliability to support the author hypothesis’ confirmation (Heale and Forbes, 2013, p. 98).

⁵⁷ Triangulation in methodology is the use of more than two methods to study the same phenomenon, for example, interviews and observations. This is the most current type of triangulation, commonly used in social sciences. It can also be used to compare only qualitative data sources or combine qualitative and quantitative (Noble and Heale, 2019; Hussein, 2009).

However, other authors, as Tashakkori (2003), Oberst (1993), Sandelowski (2003), question the validity of the term ‘triangulation’, since it is so broadly defined (Heale and Forbes, 2013; Jonsen and Jehn, 2009). Triangulation can also add “to the complexity of the research making it more time-consuming” and, if “used as a method for combining research methodologies, triangulation may not be achieved in a uniform or consistent manner”. In addition, it can include the incorrect application of methods leading to inconsistent or conflicting data (Noble and Heale, 2019, p. 68). For example, when using both qualitative and quantitative methods, which can add “a paradigmatic connection”, since they are “epistemologically and ontologically” different. When this happens, a researcher should question her/himself about which results should be considered valid (Hunt⁵⁸, 1991, apud Hussein, 2009, p. 2).

To overcome these problems, as Bekhet and Zauzniewski (2012) explain, it is important to have a “focus, concise and relevant” research question, which can be achieved by using Casey and Murphy’s (2009) criteria of “truth value, applicability, consistency and neutrality” (Bekhet and Zauszniewski, 2012, p. 7). It becomes essential to understand that both paradigms can have strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, combining them in a research study can also bring benefits to achieve more accurate results and support its outcome (Hussein, 2009). By becoming an “interdisciplinary research”, where the shortcomings of one method can benefit the other (Yeasmin and Rahman, 2012, p. 154-155).

However, applying this technique to our dissertation, if the data shows to be inconsistent, can also be a way to refute the hypothesis, since contradictions can mean that the Peace Agreement’s implementation is not being successfully fulfilled. The decision to use triangulation in this study is because this particular method has proved to be more appropriate to this case. Not only using it “as an end (...) rather it can stimulate to better define and analyse problems in social context” (Jick, 1979, p. 608), improving the description of a particular problem, as explained by Yeasmin and Rahman (2012) and Simons and Zanker (2012), who argue that triangulation is used to overcome constraints within the field of social sciences and peace and conflict research.

When conducting document analysis, we take into consideration Bowen’s recommendations (2009), in the sense that we not only refer to information and quotes from the documents or interviews, but our analysis also encourages a further discussion of the data in itself, in addition to taking into consideration the credibility and accuracy of these documents, since not all were suitable for the study.

3.2. Process of data collection & data analysis techniques.

The process of data collection consisted of one year and a half of a methodical research of over 100 documents, articles, and reports.⁵⁹ We began our research with a substantial analysis of books and

⁵⁸ Hunt, S. D. (1991). *Modern Marketing Theory: Critical Issues in the Philosophy of Marketing Science*. Cincinnati, OH: South-Western.

⁵⁹ The criteria of identification for choosing these specific documents, is aiming to analyse governmental and international institutions reports that are anyway related to the topic. Along with academic articles that we consider pertinent for the case. Nonetheless in the end, not all of them are cited in the dissertation.

scientific articles related to the topics of Colombian history; the FARC-EP; peace agreements worldwide and the 2016 Colombia Peace Agreement. Subsequently, the data collection for our document analysis (soft data) included newspapers, documentaries, surveys, opinion-based articles, and reports formulated by the UN, EU, Peace Institutions,⁶⁰ and governmental documents.⁶¹ The reports are fundamental for providing information, data, and identifying official definitions. Most of these documents are available online; however, others were provided by researchers or organisations related to the Colombian Peace Agreement.

Not only is it important to analyse the state of the art on peacebuilding and reincorporation, but also having a deeper understanding of the Colombian context. For this purpose, we conducted field research with a focus on non-participant observation, nine exploratory semi-structured interviews to key actors involved in the Peace Agreement (to corroborate arguments and ideas), a descriptive-interpretative reflection, and presence in two international conferences.

We followed a semi-structured approach with open-ended questions in our interviews, which allowed a high degree of freedom and adaptability both for the interviewer and the interviewee. The questions firstly were focused on the interviewee's background (age, education, city and profession), followed by emotional questions regarding facts and perceptions related to the Colombian conflict that might have affected their daily life. Lastly, a series of questions focusing on their opinions and values, namely what they think about the reincorporation of the former combatants into society, how they view living today in Colombia in comparison to before the Peace Agreement, or if they perceive the Peace Agreement to be in danger. These interviews were mostly conducted in person, with a few exceptions through Skype and Zoom. All the translations are by the author from Spanish to English, with editions made for clarity. Since criminal and or illegal behaviour might be involved, any disclosure of sensitive information could have negative impacts on the jobs, careers and the security of the research participants, therefore, a high level of anonymity is guaranteed (Tolich 2004; Moriconi and De Cima 2020), also considering the need to establish trust and rapport with participants (Bahn and Weatherill, 2013, p. 21; Brettell, 1994; Nordstrom and Robben, 1996). Moreover, the dissertation will not include names of the interviewees and the author declares not having any interest of conflict.

Among our interviews, two were carried out in governmental institutions to a representative of the Portuguese Embassy in Bogotá - one of the institutions responsible for carrying projects related to FARC-EP's reincorporation; and a director of the ARN - National Agency for Reincorporation - the Colombian government's institution in charge of the reincorporation of former combatants. In addition, four former FARC-EP's combatants were interviewed. These former combatants were from different

⁶⁰ These included documents from PARES Foundation; FIP - Fundación Ideas para la PAZ; the Kroc Institute; *Observatorio de la Democracia*; CNMH; *Fondo Europeo para la Paz en Colombia*; *Instituto Marquês Valle Flôr* in Lisbon, Portugal; UNVMC and the UNHCR.

⁶¹ For example, from the *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo*; the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs – (SIDDR) Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration; ARN; CNR; CSIVI-FARC; CNRR - National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation and Peace Agreements as the *Acuerdo de Estípulas*.

regions in Colombia, with ages ranging between 50 and 60 years old. They all spent their lives fighting for FARC-EP and, due to their acts, were imprisoned between seven and thirteen years. All of them were front commanders of their regions (and some were part of the FARC-EP's national board), and today are part of different projects, such as the FARC-CSIVI; the CNR, or owners of productive projects, and all of them were part of the Peace Agreement negotiations. Two more interviews were conducted in organisations responsible for monitoring the peace agreement, namely the Kroc Institute - the Institute for International Peace Studies of the Notre Dame University, responsible for monitoring the Peace Agreement implementation, where the person interviewed is responsible for monitoring the socioeconomic and political reincorporation of former combatants; and the PARES Foundation, where we interviewed one of the responsible people from the peace and post-conflict research team. We also met with a Professor from the University of Rosario, following a more informal approach, since it was a conversation for academic guidance, as well as obtaining articles, reports, and other resources. However, in the end, the Professor's opinion regarding the Agreement was shared with the researcher.

In the process of data collection, we also took part in a Conference in the Hague, in the Netherlands, entitled "Profiles of the Missing from Colombia" on 11 December 2019. In this conference, we were able to listen to, and talk with fourteen Colombians who shared their sufferings from the conflict, one of them a former FARC-EP combatant, and all of them involved in the International Commission of Missing Persons in Colombia. Later, on 26 September 2020, an International Peace Conference took place online, focusing on a four-year balance of the Peace Agreement, and where the representatives from the Colombian Government, the International Community, and the FARC-EP were present.

Moreover, the study counted with an exchange of more than forty emails and, in some cases, meetings with academics and researchers from Colombia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Czech Republic, Switzerland, and Sweden. From these emails, only fifteen people⁶² responded positively.

To write the dissertation we considered it essential to take into consideration the reliability of the data collected. In research concerning countries moving from conflict to peace, some of the main obstacles have to do with dealing with sensitive information and actors that may try to manipulate data. In order to overcome these issues, the amount and diversity of data analysed is important, by not only using data from one place, and always comparing it with other information. So, the reports that were collected stem from international organisations, such as the UN, Museums, independent organisations/archives, humanitarian organizations, and NGOs. During the interviews it was imperative to ask participants to clarify certain data, and to see if they responded differently according to their background or narrative.

⁶² These included academics and actors involved in the Peace Agreement, namely: ETH University, Switzerland; Uppsala University, Sweden; University of Andes, Colombia; University ICESI Cali, Colombia; EAFIT University Medellín; Charles University in Prague; former combatants from FARC-EP; the Amsterdam Centre for Religion and Peace & Justice Studies; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands; ISCTE, University Institute of Lisbon, Portugal; Latin American Institute at Amsterdam – UVA, The Netherlands; Autonomous University of Bucaramanga, Colombia.

CHAPTER 4 – Data analysis and results.

4.1. The Colombian Government's broken promises:

At the time of the writing of this dissertation, in 2020, it will be four years since the 2016 Peace Agreement was signed between the Government and the FARC-EP, along with the initiation of the former combatants' reincorporation. Almost four years after one of the most acclaimed peace agreements in the world, is Colombia finally moving towards a peaceful path? As Melo (2017, p. 281) predicted, the Peace Agreement would face some difficulties. The Agreement aimed to transform the country, to create a solution for rooted problems which have been going on for decades. It is a complex Agreement with several actors and reforms. As the author explains, it was possible to see discontentment in a part of the population due to the generosity shown in 2016 towards the FARC-EP. In addition, there was a new election approaching, which could bring difficulties in its application (ibid.), which was also corroborated by the interviews.

In August 2018, President Iván Duque Márquez was elected, “on promises to revise key provisions of the accord”, in relation to amnesty (Piccone, 2019). Throughout the years, his party, the Democratic Centre, has expressed scepticism and never fully accepted the Peace Agreement. Both the President before the Agreement, Álvaro Uribe, and the current President Iván Duque Márquez, are some of the fiercest critics when it comes to the negotiations with the FARC-EP (Casey, 2019; Torrado, 2019).

Despite the party's disagreement towards the Agreement, on 17 December 2018, the Government announced the PND⁶³ (National Development Plan). They launched their political agenda, ‘peace with legality’, indicating that they would keep with the Agreement as long as FARC-EP would keep their commitment to legality, arguing that the Government is taking efforts and measures to implement the Agreement (UNVMC, 2020). According to Kroc's 2019 report, the Government is prioritising policies as legality, ending with drugs, security, strengthening of justice, and the country's development (in accordance with the Agreement). However, the FARC-EP⁶⁴ has been critical regarding the measures taken by the Government to keep with the Peace Agreement, arguing that the scope of ‘peace with legality, is “a narrow interpretation of the peace agreement” (UNVMC, 2020, p. 2), and that the latter uses language that might incite war again (former combatant 4, interview 2020). This critique argues that the Agreement is presented in a way that makes it seem like peace and legality contradict. Nonetheless, the Agreement provides a rule stating that it is not possible to legislate against the accord for three presidential terms (former combatant 1, interview 2020).

⁶³ On the first Government's agenda, neither the Peace Agreement's implementation, nor its financing were mentioned. However, due to the active presence of international organisations, the Government felt pressured to comply with the Agreement, including it on the PND (2018-2022).

⁶⁴ In the interviews, the former combatants show their disagreement towards the Government's agenda, since it does not clear states the measures that are going to be implemented (former combatant 1, interview 2020).

Nonetheless, the international community has also shown its concerns regarding the Peace Agreement's future, due to the slow pace in its implementation and insecurity. The Secretary-General of the UN, António Guterres, warned the Government to keep with the Agreement's development, through the advancement of "a public policy to dismantle criminal organi[s]ations and their support networks" (UN News, 2020; UN Colombia Reports, 2019), while Foundation PARES and the Kroc Institute (2019; interviews 2020) raised the lack of political willingness and the Government's failure towards the Institutional Court (with "the veto portions of the transitional justice statutory law in March 2019", Piccone 2019, p. 4) as some of their main concerns. Despite the ongoing international concerns, President Duque's administration declared that they are complying with the Agreement (*Gobierno de Colombia*, 2019). Apart from the political discrepancies, the Agreement is part of the Colombian state, and even if people do not agree with the FARC-EP's amnesty and reincorporation, they can agree on achieving peace and ending the conflict.

Taking into consideration the dissertation's focus on the analysis of the 3rd point of the Peace Agreement regarding reincorporation, several relevant issues have been emerging. Firstly, in 2019, a small group of FARC-EP members declared relinquishing of weapons.⁶⁵ Among them were a few influential leaders who signed the Peace Agreement, such as Iván Márquez. Secondly, poverty, crime insecurity, and violence persist, especially in the FARC-EP's previously controlled territories. Despite the end of the conflict, there are still small insurgent groups.⁶⁶ The territories that used to be occupied by FARC-EP are now being taken over by other illegal armed organisations (CSIVI, 2020b). The ongoing violence and massacres are currently some of the most significant barriers in achieving positive peace (Parkin Daniels, 2020). Thirdly, the State maintains a limited presence, particularly in the Cauca, Chocó, and Nariño regions⁶⁷ and close to the border with Venezuela (FIP, 2019a; 2019b; Conference in the Hague, 2019). Another relevant issue that impacts reincorporation is that former combatants are not acquainted with productive processes, including their formalisation and legislative norms. In Colombia, these processes are highly complex and bureaucratic, costing a lot of money, making the process even harder (PARES, interview 2020). Understanding the ETCRs' future⁶⁸ and the opportunities of the New Areas of Reincorporation (NAR) is also relevant in terms of reincorporation. These, however, are currently not recognised by the government (Kroc Institute, interview 2020). Former combatants are

⁶⁵ Within the FARC-EP, leaders as Iván Márquez, Jesús Santrich and Dário Velásquez - 'El Paisa' said that they no longer agree with the Agreement, being a reason for their return to illegality (*CNN en Español*, 2019; *RT en Español*, 2019; *Torrado*, 2019).

⁶⁶ However, these small insurgent groups do not have the same capacity, as military and territorial control as FARC-EP used to had (FIP, 2018).

⁶⁷ Colombia is a place where the state never had capacity to build the necessary infrastructure or reforms, neither had a strong presence in the rural territories (UN News, 2020, 13 January).

⁶⁸ The Peace Agreement did not take into consideration the urban reincorporation, neither the NAR (which are not recognised by the Government). So, now it is needed to work on the future interpretation of these spaces. Most of the former combatants decided to leave the ETCRs due to lack of security, juridical land-reform guarantees. Some of them were persecuted, tortured and went to jail. Currently the group is dispersing, and the majority of the people went to the cities (former combatants 3, 4, interviews 2020). A total of 9.412 former combatants are living outside the ETCRs (UNVMC, 2020, point 26 and Kroc, 2020).

leaving the ETCR and dispersing into more than 430 municipalities across the country. A representative of the Portuguese Embassy mentioned that the ETCRs were initially designed to be temporary, and now have been acquiring a more permanent character. Furthermore, the Government is evaluating the situation on a yearly basis (interview 2020). Stigmatisation and segregation, which also impact reincorporation, are still present in the country, which can be overcome by working towards stewardship and non-bias (Piccone, 2019). As one of the former combatants said in the interview: “People today are starting to change their perception towards us since we are fighting for the same”. However, on the other hand, many former combatants still prefer to live in anonymity (1, 2020). Finally, the fragile relationship between the Government and the FARC-EP ultimately impacts reincorporation. As mentioned on Chapter 2, this situation has been evident since the beginning. There has always been mistrust between the parties due to *La Violencia* in the 1950s, which led to failed peace negotiations attempts.

As analysed earlier in this study, a peace agreement is a long-term process, due to the time that reconciliation, forgiveness, and healing take. The 2016 Agreement was the beginning for reforms within Colombia, rather than an end to the rooted problems and it will take years to achieve these. As previously mentioned in the contextualisation and literature review on the former guerrilla FARC-EP, it is important to consider that the first years represent the most significant ones in an agreement’s implementation and can determine if the country achieves positive peace. As former President Santos said, ending a conflict is not the same as building peace (Presidencia Gov., 2018), since often building peace can present more challenges than the negotiation in itself (Piccone, 2019).

As two of the former combatants (2020) explained, the Agreement brought many positive aspects to the Colombians that are aiming to achieve the transformations that the country still needs. It was an Agreement based on the principles of historical changes, fighting for democratic and liberal reforms, land propriety, transitional justice, and a reincorporation process. However, after its signature, the Agreement started to display problems. The implementation of the reforms’ measures started too slowly and have not been covering the rooted problems. Instead, the government is working on a so-called ‘fast solution’. Achieving peace for Colombians has been a daily fight, and people are now realising that peace is a strong event that can lead to change.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is no one-size-fits-all approach and, in order to build peace, there is a need to adapt to each specific case. Colombia has already taken many necessary steps towards peace. When it comes to ending the conflict, laying down weapons and starting the reincorporation of Colombia’s former biggest guerrilla are paramount. There is now a need to accelerate the implementation of the Peace Agreement on the areas of land reform, end illicit crops, and address the criminal groups issue, asserting a stronger State presence, while simultaneously guaranteeing compensation to the victims through transitional justice and following FARC-EP’s reincorporation within the communities and to ensure security measures. As mentioned, this dissertation focuses on these last two points (social reincorporation and security).

4.2. Data analysis.

The 3rd point of the Agreement, corresponding to the reincorporation of FARC-EP, is a vital step to implementing peace (UN, Colombia Reports, 2020). Four years have passed since the Agreement's signature, and several critical voices are arguing that the process is not having the desired effect, thus the need to study social reincorporation as one of the key-elements of the process. In order to analyse social reincorporation, a methodological triangulation technique was used (Chapter 3), by articulating the literature review (namely the lessons learned from previous agreements) with governmental and institutional documents/ reports (to investigate the social reincorporation of FARC-EP), in combination with interviews primarily aiming to understanding the perceptions of FARC-EP, the Government, Organisations, and civil society. Although the scientific literature contemplates the Agreement's development, both an analysis of the perceptions of the actors involved, as well as a comparison with other agreements, are still missing in the academic debate. To fulfil that purpose our research comprehends a timeline from the end of 2016 (the signing of the Agreement) until the middle of 2020 (the writing of this dissertation).

In this dissertation, we aim to analyse the effectiveness of the measures to social reinstate former combatants promoted under the Colombian Peace Agreement, since 2016 until 2020, with a focus on the perceptions of the actors involved in the process. The aim is to understand what was and was not achieved within social reincorporation, since non-compliance with the Agreement can lead to armed conflict. To do so, we propose to test two hypotheses. The hypothesis considers the Agreement's implementation regarding social reincorporation: *under the terms signed in 2016, the current political agenda of Colombia's Government is failing to achieve effective measures to socially reincorporate former combatants (as of 2020)*; the second hypothesis explores the core issues of the social problems, focusing on the violence and its danger to achieve a peaceful environment: *social reincorporation has been compromised by non-compliance with security measures*. With this framework, we seek to analyse the development of FARC'EP social reincorporation process, within DDR programmes, by identifying which mechanisms were implemented, which ones were successful and which ones raise new problems, according to different narratives and perceptions. These hypotheses stem from our overview of the lessons learned from previous Peace Agreements, along with allegations made by international and national organisations, newspapers and researchers, as it will be explained in the next sub-chapter.

4.2.1 Implementation of the FARC-EP's social reincorporation process.

It takes years for a peace agreement to be implemented, and it is common for people to think that progress is slow, or it is taking too much time. However, a peace agreement should be faced as an urgent need, which needs to be implemented as soon as possible, in order to guarantee and prevent a recurrence

of hostilities. When compared to other contexts, if the peace processes are not implemented at a high enough level, and if it “stop[s] working, the risk of falling into armed conflict and collapsing the entire peace process increases significantly” (Kroc, 2019, p. 3). In this section, we will begin by considering the first hypothesis: *under the terms signed in 2016, the current political agenda of Colombia’s Government is failing to achieve effective measures to socially reincorporate former combatants (as of 2020).*

There are different components in the reincorporation process, and not all of them have been progressing the same. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are two phases in the reincorporation process. The first phase regarding the ceasefire and relinquishing of weapons was achieved. After the Agreement, FARC-EP laid down their weapons which gave them the support of the international community. However, the second phase of implementation, regarding the structural reforms such as land reform, security issues, ending the illicit drugs problem, ending illegal armed actors,⁶⁹ and ensuring reparation to the victims has proved to be more difficult.

As Piccone (2019) argues, while some believed that after FARC-EP was successfully disarmed, the Government lost interest in keeping with the rest of the Agreement (which was also corroborated by the interviewees from FARC-EP). In contrast, others believe that this is due to corruption. Nonetheless, almost all of the interviewees⁷⁰ argued that, in practice, the process is moving at a slow pace with many setbacks and the Government is reducing investment in the Agreement, as more than half of the Agreement’s points are either incomplete or yet to be implemented. Nonetheless, without urgent structural reforms, there is “little hope for moving from “negative peace”—the absence of warfare—to “positive peace” (Piccone, 2019, p. 18; Kreutz and Nussio, 2019). The civil population has a quibble among them which goes “2020, looks more like 2002”⁷¹ since it was in that period (between 1996 and 2005) that the violence reached its peak (see Chapter 2; CNMH, 2013).

It is a constant battle between the Government and the FARC-EP. The Government⁷² mentions that the FARC-EP has not committed to the implementation. Arguing that the group did not deliver all the minors recruited; that there have not been compensations to victims with FARC-EP resources; that there has been no contribution to eradicating the illicit crops; that only 85% of FARC-EP members are still in the reincorporation process; and that neither has delivered all their weapons⁷³ (*Presidencia de la*

⁶⁹ The *guerrilleros* who do not want to demobilise or left the Peace Agreement, are pairing with other insurgence groups and taking advantage of the lack of state authority in the borders with Venezuela (Piccone, 2019).

⁷⁰ Interviews: Institute Kroc, PARES Foundation, former FARC-EP *guerrilleros* and the civil population, 2020.

⁷¹ Civilian from Colombia, 2020.

⁷² On the *Presidencia de la República* report it is possible to see all the investment that the Peace Agreement has received in the last years. Nonetheless it is important to take into consideration that most of the investment is provided by the international community (Rosario Guerra, 2020; *Presidencia de la República*, 2020).

⁷³ The Government issued a decree, giving the deadline of 31 July 2020 to FARC-EP (currently postponed to 31 December 2020, due to the pandemic), “to hand over all assets included in the inventory that was submitted in August 2017”. However, FARC-EP shown their disagreement, arguing that three years have passed and they “lost its capacity to keep custody of those assets after laying down the weapons” (UNVMC, 2020; former combatant 1, interview 2020; *Redacción el Tiempo*, 2020).

República, 2020). To this, the CSIVI (2020b) responded that currently 82 former members, who are recognised by FARC-EP, are not a part of the list, along with other 168 former members who are still waiting to be recognised by FARC-EP.⁷⁴ In addition, a total of 371 people were excluded after the verification process. In response, they argued that they have been working hard to keep with the transitional justice promoted under the Agreement.

Nonetheless, the current Government has shown its willingness to keep with the Agreement when it launched the PND (2018-2022), that covers the new policy of ‘peace with legality’. However, the document only comprehends three pages regarding the Peace Agreement, entitled ‘*Pacto por la Construcción de Paz: Cultura de la legalidad, convivencia, estabilización y víctimas*’. The PND refers solely to the creation of a reincorporation route,⁷⁵ which was launched on 24 December 2019 but does not mention further policies and reforms regarding the Agreement (*Gobierno de Colombia*, 2018-2022). Other documents were released as the PDET (Territorial Focused Development Plans) aiming to transform poor neighbourhoods that were affected by the conflict and proposing security programmes, along with the PMI - Implementation Framework Plan on how to proceed with the Agreement’s implementation, which is a complement to the PND (*Gobierno de Colombia*, 2016, 2020). Ultimately, the Government has kept a positive perspective. Dr Emilio Archila, one of the Government’s advisors, said that he believes that the Agreement will keep going on (International Peace Conference, 2020).

When interviewing a representative of the Portuguese Embassy in Bogotá, they explained that the Colombian Government, with their considerable experience throughout history with reincorporation processes, is trying to learn from past lessons to successfully reincorporate the FARC-EP. Affirming that they see reincorporation as a seeming priority for the Colombian Government, as well as to Miguel Ceballos Arévalo, the High Commissioner for the Consolidation of Peace: “For the Colombian Government reincorporation is a priority (...), and the future of the former combatants is vital for the Peace Agreement’s future” (Portuguese Embassy, interview 2020). Nonetheless, the Embassy representative also agrees that, after three years, several critical voices say that the implementation should have been done in a different way (*ibid.*).

The CSIVI argues that, due to the non-integral implementation of the Agreement and the absence of a governmental regulatory framework to the development and implementation thereof, the violence and the killings are a persistent risk. The ongoing violence (with systematic threats, disappearances, kidnappings, and forced displacement) composes a threat to the social reincorporation of the former combatants along with their families and the surrounding community (CSIVI, 2020c). Juan Fernando Cristo, a former negotiator of the Agreement, and part of the movement “*Defendamos la Paz*”, also urged the need to defend peace, arguing that “there has been zero dialogue from the current

⁷⁴ The Agreement was signed with around 13 thousand fighters, and last year in December, a census was made and pointed that more than 12 thousand fighters (so less than 1 thousand people outside of the Agreement), with 190 killed, around 70 died for natural causes, and others outside of the process. Which leaves only a small dissident group that returned to the weapons (former combatant 4, interview 2020; Cassey, 2019).

⁷⁵ Nonetheless the Reincorporation Route received several critics regarding prioritising an individual path.

Government” and an absence from the Government in developing the Agreement (International Peace Conference, 2020).

However, it is essential to understand that the Agreement favours around 10% of former combatants, and the other 90% favours the community. The Agreement is meant to build peace in Colombia, and the population needs to know that they are the ones benefiting more from the Agreement (former combatants 2, 4, interview 2020). According to the Kroc Institute (2019), in terms of implementation of the whole Peace Agreement, until February⁷⁶ 2019, only about 23% has been completed, and an additional 12% is expected to be completed within the upcoming years. Moreover, 34% of the Agreement is in a state of minimal implementation, and 31% of the commitments have not started yet. Comparing this data with the most recent Kroc Report,⁷⁷ until the end of 2019, only 25% of the Agreement was completed (representing an increase of 2%), 15% is in an intermediary stage (an increase of 3%), 34% in a minimal stage (about the same percentage as in the previous year), and 26% did not start yet (a positive decrease of 5%). According to this information, it is possible to argue that the Agreement is being implemented at a slow pace, from the beginning of 2019 until the end. The development was only 2% to 3% which is not enough to be completed within the period of ten to fifteen years. That can represent severe barriers to Colombia’s future when it comes to achieving a completely peaceful environment, since it can lead to discontentment from the FARC-EP and from the community towards the State, along with uncertainties regarding future structural reforms in the country.

The Kroc Institute and the UN indicate that the third point of the Agreement (regarding reincorporation) is one of the topics that has shown some of the most considerable developments in the first three years of implementation (ARN, interview 2020). However, it is the one that comprehends the short-term period transitions, including achieving a cease-fire, the end of the conflict between the Government and the FARC-EP, laying down weapons, and the transition into a legal path. The Kroc Institute (2020) mentions that this Agreement is taking a similar development when compared to other peace agreements, since these measures tend to be easier to implement when comparing to reforming rooted problems. Regarding the third point, the data shows that 45% of the reincorporation process is completed, 17% in an intermediate-term, and 18% in a minimal stage.⁷⁸ The third point also comprehends the need to end incident groups, which has been a problem since the FARC-EP laid down their weapons, not only for the FARC-EP’s security but also for the ‘*campesinos*’, since they no longer have the FARC-EP’s protection. Adam Isacson (2019), an analyst at the Washington Office for Latin American Affairs, recognises that the Government did not take control over these areas, which made it possible for new illegal groups took over the territories once again, “they did not seize the moment (...), and now the coca[ine] remains an option for the farmers” (Cassey, 2019).


⁷⁶ Cf. the 3rd report of 2019 from the Kroc Institute and see notes for the graphic.

⁷⁷ Cf. the 4th report of 2020 from the Kroc Institute and see notes for the graphic.

⁷⁸ Taking into consideration that a peace process between the Government and the ELN is still in negotiation, since the ELN is the only major group that has yet to be demobilised.

Figure 4.1 - Implementation level (until November 2019) of the 3rd Point of the Peace Agreement.

Adapted from Kroc Institute, report 4 (2020, p. 57).



As shown in the chart above, the points regarding cease-fire and relinquishing of weapons present a high degree of implementation, with 97% completed and 3% at a minimal stage. Regarding the social, political and economic reincorporation of FARC-EP, the data also shows positive levels of implementation, with 56% completed, 28% at an intermediary level, 10% at a minimal stage, and 5% that still needs to be started. However, when it comes to security guarantees, which incorporate structural reforms and security programmes, the progress was minor: only 14% was completed, 17% is at an intermediary stage, 36% is at a minimal stage, and 33% has yet to be started. This represents the most significant challenge when it comes to the security of the former combatants, their families, and the surrounding communities, as it will be further explained.

Affirming that the terms signed in 2016 are not being fulfilled would be a false affirmation. Nevertheless, it can be stated that it is taking longer than expected. The slow pace of the process affects the reincorporation of former combatants, in social, economic, and political matters, reinforcing the idea that the Agreement covers many aspects of the Colombian society and many reforms that will take more than a decade to be fulfilled, mostly when it comes to bringing water and electricity⁷⁹ to rural areas: “Anyone who thinks we were going to solve these problems in two years does not understand the magnitude of the problem” (Cassey, 2019; International Peace Conference, 2020). Yet, this only highlights the need to keep with the international pressure, to finish approving laws and reforms to “protect the legal stability of the Final Agreement” (Kroc, 2019). To this end, politician and sociologist Ant3nio Sanguino (2019) argued that the Agreement is not in danger, but rather taking a “laid back progression”. However, what Colombia is facing now is an urgent need for political pressure, to keep

⁷⁹ “Millions of Colombians who lived in rebel-controlled territories, are still waiting for the arrival of roads, schools and electricity. The government’s promise to support rural development was one of the great motivations for the guerrillas to disarm. (...) If that warranty is revoked, many could view the process as a hoax. And that could be a decisive factor for the resumption of hostilities (adapted from Cassey, 2019).

the peace, and to restart the dialogues with the ELN. And it is in this instance that the international community plays a vital role in preventing a conflict recurrence (Piccone, 2019):

Sentimos que todavía falta muchísimo (...) y es necesario que el gobierno cumpla y respete el Acuerdo (...) donde los planes sean una realidad. “(...) Ya ha pasado mucho tiempo, y el acuerdo debería haber sido incorporado. (...) Tenemos que estar en las mesas de conversa, para que no se repitan los errores del pasado. Escuchar la gente, reforzar nuestros grupos, porque sin nosotros el gobierno no hace nada. Tiene que haber una verdadera lucha política (...) dónde la comunidad internacional tiene que enviar un mensaje a Colombia para que si cumpla lo que ha sido propuesto⁸⁰ (Victim of the conflict, Conference the Hague, 2019).

While the Agreement was planned to be finalised in a period of ten to fifteen years, on the fourth year we can argue that its implementation is progressing at a slow pace. At the moment of the writing of this dissertation, there are two main problems regarding reincorporation. First, the development of the Agreement needs to ensure a community-based approach which is going to favour its progress. Colombia is an intercultural State, and the peace needs to be inclusive, not only for the FARC-EP and the community, but also for minorities, including the indigenous communities, the *campesinos*, the afro-Colombians, the LGBTQ+ community, women, youth, and children (Chernick, 2012, p. 14; Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006, p. 31). Some progress has been made, but there is still a need for greater focus when it comes to this topic (UNVMC, 2020, pp. 39). The FARC-EP has already admitted that they made a lot of mistakes (especially towards the community), but they argue that they are trying to gain back their trust and to be accepted within the communities, through transitional justice:

La comunidad si nos apoya, mucha gente nos llama, nos dice bueno yo no comparto con ustedes nada, pero los felicito por haber avanzado en la paz y cuenten con nosotros⁸¹ (former combatant 2, interview 2020).

The data from this research shows discrepancies regarding the idea that the Agreement is achieving positive peace. On one side, the civil community and the former combatants dispute that, overall, peace has not been achieved, arguing that the persistence of several illegal groups, violence, and segregation will lead the country to a conflict recurrence (interviews 2020). On the other side, the governmental institutions have shown to be more positive towards the process:

⁸⁰ “We feel a lot is still missing (...) and it is important that the Government comply and respect the Agreement (...) where the plans can become a reality”. “It has passed a lot of time, and the agreement should have been implemented. We need to be at the dialogue table, so we don’t repeat the mistakes from the past. Listen more to the people, reinforce our groups, because without us the Government does not do anything. We need a real political fight (...) where the international community needs to send a message to Colombia, so they comply with what was propose” (adapted from Conference Profiles of the Missing from Colombia, 2019).

⁸¹ “The community supports us several people call us and say that they congratulate us for achieving peace and that we can count with their support” (former combatant 2, interview 2020).

Yo creo que es una necesidad grande de mantener el esfuerzo de mantener las velas extendidas para seguir avanzando. Necesitamos mucho más conocimiento y respaldo de la sociedad en general. (...) Tenemos un desafío que va a desarrollarse no solamente de aquí a 2022, sino probablemente hasta el 2030. (...) Y que Colombia siga siendo una referencia internacional. (...) Llevamos 3 años que han sido decisivos para aprendizajes y avances, para seguir avanzando. Yo tengo una grande expectativa, sobretudo en medio de la circunstancia en que estamos viviendo, las cosas se puedan mantener. Que los excombatientes tengan también un poquito de paciencia para la adaptación institucional que esto requiere (...) pero no solo pedido-les paciencia como también dando estrategias concretas⁸² (ARN interview, 2020).

The former combatants, the civil society and the organisations believe that currently, Colombia is losing the opportunity to implement the Agreement and reform the country (interviews 2020), considering that the Agreement's success it will not only depend on the end of the conflict between the government and the FARC-EP. Around 90% of the Agreement regards structural reforms for everyone, including rural reforms, political reforms, solving the illicit drugs issue, security, and the state presence, which are all structural problems.

No queremos volver al ciclo otra vez de la guerra. Si requiere de todos los lados fuerza para empujar este proceso. (...) La mayoría de la sociedad colombiana quiere realmente que se avance⁸³ (former combatant 4, interview 2020).

Nosotros decimos: Colombia si ha cambiado, y ha cambiado mucho. Ojalá el estado colombiano cumpliera con mucha más rapidez. Tan poco podemos decir que no se cumplió todo, eso seria falso, si cumplió, pero con mucha traba, con mucha dificultad, con mucha lentitud y muy poco. Colombia ha cambiado mucho y seguramente seguirá cambiando. Si todos toman la decisión de lograr la paz, seguramente Colombia en unos 15 o 20 años será otro cuento. Pero si este mismo estado persiste en la guerra, Colombia será una catástrofe peor que la acabamos de sufrir⁸⁴ (former combatant 2, interview 2020).

⁸² "I believe it is a great necessity to keep the effort, to keep developing. We still need more knowledge and support from society in general. A challenge that will keep developing, not only until 2022, but probably until 2030. And that Colombia keeps being an international reference. It has been 3 years with a lot of learnings, and now it is important to keep with them, and advance. We have a lot of expectations, for the things to keep. And that the former combatants need to be patient regarding the institutional reforms that this takes. Not only with asking them patience, as well as to provide them strategies" (ARN interview 2020).

⁸³ The Colombian state has to submit to the international pression. We do not want to return to the previous cycle. So, from every side it is important for people to push for the fulfilment of the agreement. The majority of the society wants that the agreement goes ahead (former combatant 4, interview 2020).

⁸⁴ "Usually we say: Colombia has changed a lot. We wish that the Colombian State would have accomplished it faster. However, we cannot say that nothing was achieved, that would be false, it was achieved with a lot of obstacles, difficulty and slowness and few things were achieved. In this 3 years Colombia has changed a lot, and it is still changing. If everyone agrees to fight and keep going with peace, for sure in 15- or 20-years Colombia

*Tenemos que trabajar como colectivo, fortalecer el grupo, con el apoyo de organizaciones internacionales. Buenaventura y Choco todavía están en conflicto (las FARC protegían el territorio y hoy no hay nadie que lo proteja). (...) EL Paro Nacional, no se ha visto nada igual desde 1987, y fue muy importante para que no se repita la guerra*⁸⁵ (Victim of the Conflict, Conference the Hague 2019). *El Acuerdo fue un proceso largo, largo y la firma ha sido el principio. (...) Infelizmente nosotros en Colombia estamos ante un gobierno que ha andado para tras con el acuerdo, y que no hace de su agenda una justicia de transición. (...) Uno de los desafíos más importantes para Colombia es hacer algo para no dejar el acuerdo retroceder*⁸⁶ (Victim of the Conflict, Conference the Hague 2019).

Likewise, the data shows that the ongoing violence with the killing of former combatants and social leaders, and the clash over the land ownership, is a result of a country that needs to address its core issues. The civil community and the former combatants argue that the international community still needs to keep pressuring the Government to achieve what was agreed on 2016 (interviews, 2020; Conference in the Hague, 2019). The international community has a vital role not only on the financial resources (since most of them come from external partners), but also, in accompanying Colombia through a diplomatic, systematic and international process (former combatant 2, interview 2020).

In the following section we will now consider the second hypothesis that we proposed in order to answer our research question, namely: *[that] social reincorporation has been compromised by non-compliance with security measures.*

2019 was the most unsafe year for the FARC-EP since the Agreement was signed. UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, highlighted the need to create more practical and effective protective measures for former combatants along with a public policy to end with illegal armed actors (UN Missions Colombia, 2019; PARES, 2020a). If this does not happen, it can leave the Peace Agreement in danger, along with the social reincorporation of the former combatants, since the lack of security tends to lead to recidivism along with decreasing the chances of a successful reincorporation, as seen in the literature review in Chapter 2.

That was the case in some other countries, with the rise of new illegal armed groups and insurgencies, persistence of injustices, inequality, violence, and crime, along with a governmental

will be another tale. But if the Colombian state perseveres the war, Colombia will be a catastrophe, even worse than the one before” (former combatant 2, interview 2020).

⁸⁵ “We need to work as a collective, empowering the group, with the support of international organisations. Buenaventura and Choco still in conflict (the FARC used to protect the territory and now there is no one to protect it). (...) The ‘Paro Nacional’, nothing equal has been seen since 1987, and it was really important so that war does not happen again” (Conference the Hague, 2019). The Paro Nacional was a mobilisation movement to show the discontent of people towards the government, people are fighting against repression. The most relevant one took place on 28th November 2019, where millions went to the streets to protest against the government.

⁸⁶ “The agreement has been a long process, and the signature was just the beginning. (...) Unfortunately, our government has step back when it comes to the agreements, and the transitional justice is not part of their agenda. (...) One of the most important challenges is that Colombia cannot allowed for the agreement to not move forward, to back off” (Conference the Hague, 2019).

absence in achieving a positive peaceful environment. For example, this situation was seen in countries in Central America –El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua –, as well as in Burundi, Sierra Leone and Uganda⁸⁷, which also display similar characteristics to the current situation in Colombia.

A major problem within the implementation of the Agreement is the physical integrity and the lack of security measures for the former combatants. In Colombia, the situation worsened with the emergence of new armed groups and the ongoing violence committed by the ELN. Also, taking into consideration that, for FARC-EP, the security topic is fundamental, as it was one of the reasons for them to lay down their weapons (interviews 2020). The security issues are a problem rooted within Colombia, since there was always a lack of State presence in the most remote regions. Furthermore, this year 2020, a new wave of massacres happened, which has hampered these security measures (Parkin Daniels, 2020).

Since the signature of the Agreement until the moment of the writing of this dissertation, a total of 190 former combatants were assassinated (UNVMC, 2020). Solely in the year of 2019, 77 former combatants of the FARC-EP were killed, as well as 86 social leaders. One of the victims was killed inside of an ETCR, which was presented as a cause for the former combatants feeling unsafe in those spaces (Portuguese Embassy, interview 2020). The head of the UNVMC, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, highlights the worrying events, reinforcing once again the words of António Guterres, and warning that, if the violent attacks do not end, Colombia will not be able to fully achieve peace (PARES, 2020b). Representative Massieu proclaimed the urgency to reinforce the State's presence in different areas of the country "to protect (former) combatants, social leaders and human rights defenders", as already more than 8,000 former combatants are living today outside the ETCR, which endangers their security guarantees, taking into account in that the security of the former combatants "is intrinsically linked to the security of their communities" (Latin America Post, 2020; see Attachment E).

At the Table of Conversations in Havana, a potential insecurity issue was brought up, and the Peace Agreement⁸⁸ tried to cover security measures and programmes to overcome it. It was agreed that the Government must contribute to the protection and guarantee of the effective enjoyment of the rights of all former combatants, without any discrimination⁸⁹ (Colombian Government, 2016, p. 193). While, at the same time, the State must construct a stable and lasting peace, with a strong presence in the rural

⁸⁷ As Muggah (2005, p. 241) and the Kroc Institute (2019) show in their study, for example: in Guatemala, after the disarming and demobilisation of the combatants, in the following five years, the number of killings was "close to the annual average for the 37-year war"; in Sierra Leone the DDR programmes did not help to decrease stigmatisation and violence; in Bougainville, Cambodia, the Solomon Islands and Sri Lanka, there were cases of sexual violence and lack of reconciliation between citizens and soldiers; in Angola and Burundi the implementation of the Agreement became more fragile with the rise of new incident groups.

⁸⁸ The Peace Agreement proposed the creation of a Security and Protection Corps destined to guard the members of the FARC party; a High-Level Instance of the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Policy; a Technical Table for Safety and Protection and the Implementation of Self-Protection Measures. However, so far, the creation of these measures has been on hold.

⁸⁹ Along with respect for equality and non-discrimination, providing equal opportunities for all former members of the FARC-EP and their families. No restriction or impairment of the rights of people (former members of the FARC-EP, their families and communities) regardless of their gender, age, religious beliefs, opinions or ethnic identity (adapted from Table of Conversations in Havana, 2016, page 193).

territory (ibid., p. 13). Section 3.4 of the Peace Agreement describes mechanisms to protect the communities, the leaders, the human rights defenders and the former combatants, and it also addresses the issue of dismantling illegal organisations, aiming to end the violence (Gobierno de Colombia, 2016).

Right after the laying down of weapons, the UNVMC (2017) referred the urgency to protect the former combatants, providing individual and collective security guarantees. Along with them, the National Commission on Security Guarantees has advanced this year (2020) in the development of a security guarantee policy, by taking into consideration the civil society’s advice (UNVMC, 2020). Nonetheless, security and protection continue to be the main challenges of the Agreement and the reincorporation process. In the interviews, all of the former combatants referred to insecurity as one of the major problems within the Agreement’s development. The situation not only affects the former FARC-EP combatants and their families, as well as the social leaders, human rights defenders, humanitarian risk communities, land restitution, process peasants, among others (Kroc Informe, 2019; Conference in the Hague, 2019).

Figure 4.2 – Implementation Level of the Security Guarantees within the 3rd Point of the Peace Agreement. Adapted from Kroc, report 4 (2020, p. 61).



The chart above provides information regarding the implementation level of the security guarantees (as of November 2019). The only security guarantee which was fully implemented (100%) was regarding surveillance and private security. All the other guarantees are still at low levels of implementation (for example, the Special Unity of Investigation with 30% completed and 30% at an intermediary level; and the Comprehensive Security System and Exercise of Politics – SISEP –, with only 23% completed and

18% at an intermediary level). At the same time, others are at a minimal stage of implementation or yet to be initiated (namely, Security and Protection Guarantees for the Exercise of Politics; National Political Pact; National Commission of Security Guarantees; Comprehensive Safety and Protection in the Territories; and Prevention and Fighting against Corruption). In addition, in 2020, there were over 400 pending requests for protection, showing the urgent need for applying security measures for the former combatants (UNVMC, 2020).

The Institute PARES (2019) published an article mentioning the following reasons for the targeting against former FARC-EP members today: (i) '*Saboteadores de la paz*' or Spoilers of peace, meaning people that are against the FARC-EP and the implementation of the Peace Agreement. These people have aligned themselves with violent actors who are fighting against those within the reincorporation process (for example former combatants and social leaders) (PARES, interview 2020). (ii) The settling of old scores by former wartime enemies or due to vendettas that come from abuses and attacks against the population committed by FARC-EP in the past. One such event happened in August 2020, when a leader from FARC-EP was killed by the ELN (Expresso, 2020). (iii) Territorial intelligence, due to the knowledge of FARC-EP's members of battle strategies, illicit businesses, which increases the illegal groups interested in recruiting those members. This situation can be economically attractive for them, as these illegal groups can offer them economic opportunities. Nonetheless, a lot of them have rejected this. However, once the former combatants decline it, the illegal groups can target them and their families' lives (PARES, interview 2020). This information shows the need to complete the implementation of the security guarantees, mentioned on figure 4.2.

Besides the physical threats, there are also the judicial ones (with the tendency to destroy the integral justice, truth, reparation, and non-repetition system), the political threats (since the political reforms were not fully achieved), and the economic threat (where there is still a rising motivation to keep fighting).

However, the lack of security can determine the success or failure of the Peace Agreement and of the reincorporation in particular.⁹⁰ If it fails, it can lead to a return to arms. According to Kaplan and Nussio (2018, p. 88), there is a higher chance of recidivism among "individuals who have taken up arms once", and when it comes to recidivism, FARC-EP tends to be more responsive than the paramilitaries (ibid. p. 80). However, a situation of recidivism is unlikely to happen in this case. Although the security situation is not perfect now, it has improved a lot when compared to before 2016, so the former combatants have no willingness to comeback (Kroc Institute, interview, 2020). As Denissen (2010, p. 337) explains, it is common for former combatants to feel frustration after the DDR process, and to feel a lack of commitment by the Government. However, to improve the reincorporation process, the

⁹⁰ The main reasons for a combatant to return to weapons are economic difficulties, security dilemmas, preferring violent lifestyles, criminal opportunities, receiving threats (fear), old rivalries, lack of confidence in the Government and receiving protection from armed groups (Kaplan and Nussio, 2018, p. 69). A study made by the Fundación Ideas para la Paz, shows that 24% of the former combatants tend to return to illegal activities due to the reasons mentioned above (Castrillón-Torres and Cadavid-Ramirez, 2018, p. 158).

following needs to happen: (1) basic living guarantees; (2) preventing new recruitments; (3) involvement and reconciliation with the community; (4) focus on the reintegration policies previously proposed; (5) contemplate psychological needs; (6) provide family support; (7) ensure security guarantees, along with (8) provide educational and productive programmes. These are analysed and explained in Chapter 2, in the DDR programmes section, where we explain that physical security and ending with illegal armed actors are one of the pillars for a successful reincorporation.

During the interviews with the governmental agency – ARN – we asked them to comment⁹¹ on the security guarantees of former combatants, however they could not provide further information, since the topic is part of the Advisor’s work and Dr Carlos Caecedo, of the stabilisation council, who asked the ARN to respect the security topic, due to the latest occurrences (ibid., interview 2020). Nonetheless, the Government has guaranteed that they are working on the insecurity issues. In 2018, the security costs of former combatants were \$119.429.801.000 COP and in 2019 were \$129.782.893.218 COP. In total from the UNP (National Protection Unity), 1.186 security escorts were assigned to former combatants, with 248 security schemes (Rosario Guerra, 2020). At the end of June 2019, under the Government of President Duque, new security measures were announced to strengthen the former combatants’ protection guarantees, through 23 actions⁹² (Kroc, 2020). Furthermore, each month a report on the security guarantees is launched, the ‘*Informe de Gestión 22 meses Consejería para la Estabilización e la Consolidación*’, which includes strategies and programmes to provide security guarantees to everyone. However, a way to act towards the ending of these killings and the ongoing massacres is by defining a strategy against illegal actors, “dissent, deserters, successor paramilitary groups and criminal gangs occupying spaces left by the FARC”; end with the illegal and parallel economies, and end with “inequality and extreme poverty” as well as the corruption within the country (Kroc Informe, 2019, p. 7).

4.3. Results Discussion:

As Baños López (2016) explains “the long duration of the armed conflict has generated a rupture in the social fabric within the Colombian society”, especially in the territories that always lived with violence,

⁹¹ When it comes to the interviews by the governmental organisations, they provide a more positive analogy for the Agreement’s future. The ARN and the Portuguese Embassy (along with statements from members of the Colombian Government) their responses were all relatively similar. This is explained by the cognitive-behavioural, since they are all part of the same group, with similar ideas and goals so their response tends to coincide (Source: Summer School, “Construction and power of narratives in conflict-loaded societies polarisation and/or transformation, 21-29 September 2020, online Webinar, at the Vrije University Amsterdam.

⁹² The security guarantees included a strengthening of the Early Warning System for the People’s Defence (SAT); for the comprehensive protection program for former combatants along with the Police Unit for Peace Building (UNIPEP) in the ETCRs. The implementation of projects to improve coexistence with neighbouring communities on issues such as prevention of gender-based violence and conflict transformation. Along with the Strategic Security and Protection Plan which represents an opportunity to development proactive measures. The comprehensive protection program implemented 270 individual and 30 collective protection schemes for former FARC-EP combatants (Kroc, 2020).

and “where the reincorporation process is taking place”. That idea is also explored in Chapter 2 of this study, in the section concerning Colombia’s history of violence, where we interpret the “rupture of the social fabric” by the constant change between legal and illegal actors, the social disorganisation and dispersion of people.

Pécaut (2019) finds that the problem with the Peace Agreement is that it was signed in a country with no national concordance. The conflict(s) were always within the country, and Colombia never had anything as coordinated as the 2016 Agreement. The author believes Colombia never had a development vision, and now people realise that the Agreement and its reforms were too ambitious. This idea was also verified in the dissertation and corroborated by the interviews. Nonetheless, affirming that the Agreement has high aspirations is too broad. Of course, it brought several hopes for Colombians, but it is essential to consider that, besides the Agreement’s efforts, there is much more that still needs to be done. Although the majority of people can benefit from the Agreement, the problem tends to be more complicated, since several actors still see advantages in keeping relations with the criminal world, where people either concur with the Agreement or not.

Overall, this dissertation shows that violence has always been a way to solve political, social and economic problems or disputes within Colombia. Although this study focusses on a specific literature to justify the data, other theories, for example: violence, corruption and illegality can be used to explain the development of the Peace Agreement. As Schultze-Kraft et al. (2018) emphasize, the paradox is that, despite being the most violent region in the world, Latin America has not presented significant ruptures as far as their political regimes are concerned. For instance, Colombia has not stopped living its particular ‘democracy’ despite the violence. Society and institutions adapt to the new context without having to radically modify their structures. People continue voting and, even in the middle of violent conflict, Colombia improved its economic performance, received external investment, gained international prestige, joined the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and was considered one of the best tourist destinations in the world in 2020 (Colprensa, 2020).

Colombia always had a paradox in the coexistence of legality and illegality, which is characterised by a hybrid regime. A series of works by Dewey et al. (2017), Desmond Arias (2017), Schultze-Kraft et al. (2018), and Moriconi (2011, 2013 and 2018) explain the process from which certain legalities are delegitimised, and some illegalities are legitimised, helping to understand why democracy can continue to function despite the chaos. What is vital in Colombia are the articulations between legality and illegality that occur, and it is in those articulations where democracy materialises and where the peace process fails to unfold. For example, the peace process aimed to reincorporate the former combatants but did not create the conditions to foresee the elimination and prevention of stigmatisation and discrimination - nor the significant structures to guarantee the security of former combatants, as previously explained. Since insecurity is one of the major challenges of the process, with ongoing assassinations, massacres and violence. Moriconi (2018, p. 8) calls this “the collapse of legality as a categorical imperative”.

La gente quiere la paz, y la gente defiende el Acuerdo de Paz, y eso ha sacado a la calle millones de ellos, en el 28 de noviembre. (...) Eso me da la tranquilidad de que vamos bien. (...) Nada es fácil en nuestra vida, lo importante es que acertemos nuestro camino, aquí va a haber paz inevitablemente. (...) Muchos de nosotros morimos desde la implementación del Acuerdo, pero yo decía a mis camaradas: ¿cuantos de nosotros moríamos al año durante la guerra? Y ahora por lo menos confrontación con nosotros no hay ninguna. (...) Por lo menos, ahora todos estamos beneficiando. Entonces creo que vale a pena correr el riesgo, que es el mismo riesgo que teníamos cuando ingresamos⁹³” (former combatant 1, interview 2020).

With the findings of this study, which were achieved through a triangulation technique of multiple methodologies and data, it is possible to discuss the following outcomes regarding the reincorporation process and the security guarantees. First, it would be wrong to assume that the social reincorporation process it is not being implemented under the terms signed in 2016. From a total of 13.202 (ACR, 2017) former combatants, a total of 12.891 (UNVMC, 2020) FARC-EP members are still within the reincorporation process, which correspond to 97.6%⁹⁴ of people’s initial total. So, it is possible to affirm that the reincorporation process is moving forward. Nonetheless, the process is also moving too slow, as previously described. The Kroc Institute data shows that 45% of the reincorporation process is complete. With higher implementation levels on the ceasefire, laying down of weapons (97% completed achieved), and the social, economic, and political reincorporation (56% completed). However, the one that shows less development is security guarantees, with only 14% achieved. The Agreement was meant to be finalised within ten or fifteen years, which the data shows is not going to take place if the development keeps at this level. This was also the opinion of the FARC-EP, the organisations and the civil society on the interviews.

We conclude that the 1st hypothesis raised is inaccurate. Indeed, the Government has shown to not fully comply with the Agreement, especially on the first months after the elections (after announcing their political agenda in 2018 without mentioned the Peace Agreement). On the other hand, multiple organisations kept pressuring for the Agreement's development, which made a few points move forward (including a ceasefire with FARC-EP, relinquishing of weapons, and the social reincorporation). However, now it is vital to implement structural reforms regarding security and reconciliation, while, at the same time, taking into consideration stigmatisation (more evident among the *farianas*⁹⁵),

⁹³ “People want peace, and people defend the Peace Agreement, being the reason why millions were on the streets, especially on the 28 November. (...) That gives me the tranquillity that we are going well. (...) Nothing is easy in our life, but the important thing is that is we hit our way, and inevitably there will be peace. (...) Since the implementation of the Agreement several of us died, but I always say to my comrades: how many of us used to die every day during the war? Now we are no longer in confrontation with anyone. (...) At least now everyone can benefit. So, I believe that it is worth to take this risk, which is the same as we had before” (former combatant 1, interview 2020).

⁹⁴ However, the Government in their report (*Presidencia de la República*, 2020) shows that only 85% of FARC-EP members are still in the reincorporation process.

⁹⁵ *Farianas* – term used to make reference to the former female *guerrilleras*.

forgiveness, and acceptance (Barrios Sabogal and Richer, 2019). Nonetheless, that does not mean that the reincorporation is developing towards positive peace, considering the need to rebuild society, promoting trust among communities. However, reconciliation and reincorporation (directly connected to rebuilding society) are undoubtedly the most difficult points of the Agreement's agenda, since it aims to achieve security, dialogue, compromise, overcome the stigmatisation over perpetrator vs perpetrated, and overall positive peace (UN Secretary-General, 2017). If these processes become unsuccessful, due to violence and bias, they can end the Peace Agreement. Here, the international community, along with their reconciliation and reincorporation projects, can play an essential role, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2.

Regarding the 2nd hypothesis, despite the data showing high development in the cease fire and dismantling of weapons, the security guarantees has proven to be one of the most worrying points of the Agreement, which was aggravated with the current massacres. The security issues have been rising, and this does not only put in danger the former combatants' lives, but also all the community. Forthwith, a reinforcement of the legal security guarantees is needed, in concordance with the data, by adopting the security strategies mentioned in the Agreement, which focus on the former combatants and the community. There is a need to guarantee the stability and juridical security, following the Agreement, concluding with the amnesty process and the prisoners' release. Furthermore, there is a need to work towards the disruption of illegal armed actors, otherwise they can jeopardise the Agreement's development and the reincorporation process (as mentioned in the reports from FIP, 2019a, 2019b; and *Observatorio de la Democracia*, 2017). The affirmation that if a situation of non-compliance with security measures continues, it could jeopardise the success of social reincorporation has proven to be correct. Currently, four years after the cease-fire with the FARC-EP, people are witnessing a new rising in criminal violence and insecurity (Parkin Daniels, 2020). Showing how crucial it is to move forward with the Peace Agreement, complying to its deadlines and developing its programmes. To prevent a hardener settlement of a peaceful environment which can lead to a failure of the transitional conflict to peace programmes.

Throughout the dissertation, it was always assumed that the Agreement must be developed taking into account different voices. It is essential to have a balance and a fair dialogue where people can share their stories and perspectives. In the end, the use of triangulation has shown to be relevant since it combined different perspectives and counter-analysed contrasting information, from multiple groups. Regarding the governmental institutions (in the interviews - the ARN and the Portuguese Embassy), they shared a positive perspective towards the development of the Agreement, as seen on the data analysis. Both the ARN and the Embassy argue that the Colombian Government is taking the Agreement and the reincorporation as a priority. However, the perspective changes when it comes to the ones in the field (the FARC-EP, the civil society, the Kroc Institute and the PARES Institution). These actors are the ones that face the measures from the Government and see both positive and negative points of the process. They argue that the Agreement is not taking their needs into consideration. As the Professor

from University of Rosario said, the perceptions in the interviews are always going to be different, because one is implementing the measures and the other is living with them.

The findings of the study show that there are clearly two main perceptions regarding the Agreement's development. That idea is possible to see in four main points in relation to the social reincorporation.

First, the Reincorporation Route (see Attachment B), where the governmental institutions believe that the route is going to bring a step forward in the reincorporation process, with education, community, economic resources, family, housing and healthcare. However, the FARC-EP and the Pares Foundation, in the interviews shown to be critical regarding the route: "I see in this route the brake of the collective reincorporation (...) It is a risk because it ends the FARC's hopes for more collective projects" (PARES, interview 2020). This was due to the expectations of the former guerrilla to enter in a collective reincorporation process. Nonetheless, they believe that the route is prioritising a more individual path, going against their group ideology, and taking into consideration that a collective reincorporation was a reason to relinquish the weapons. On the other side the ARN, argue that the route is an operative and practical way to increase the life conditions of former combatants (for the ones that decided to do a collective and individual process) and to benefit their transitional process. Their intention was neither to give preference to an individual path, but rather to include everyone. Where people can become more autonomous and generate capacities for their transition to legality (interview 2020).

Second, the security measures, which as previously explained are one of the most worrying topics. Although this was always a rooted issue in Colombia, after the Peace Agreement the population was hoping that the violence and massacres would decrease, since the FARC-EP had left the weapons, and the ELN were about to start peace negotiations. However, a lack of security measures can represent a setback in the Agreement and in achieving positive peace, since this situation already happened in other countries (e.g. Central America). Kaplan and Nussio (2018, p. 26) had shown that security is a must for a successful reincorporation. Although FARC-EP, the civil society and the international community have shown their worries, the Government has shown to be positive regarding the measures that they are taking (interviews 2020; International Peace Conference, 2020).

Third, the productive projects, which are part of the social and economic reincorporation process. During the interviews it was possible to see a disparity of opinions. The FARC-EP has shown to be positive regarding the projects, but afraid that they might not be long-term sustainable. The Government explained that these productive projects are still an ongoing process, which tends to be highly bureaucratic and expensive, so they ask for patience towards the process. Moreover, the ETCRs and NARs need to be reformulated, since they have the capacity for productive projects and to create spaces for coexistence and reconciliation to reduce polarisation and stigmatisation.

Lastly, the relation with the community, which is directly connected to the productive projects and the security guarantees, since both can contribute to achieving a positive environment within the community. Therefore, working on an articulation between the local communities and the

reincorporation process by means of active participation becomes a priority, aiming to promote trust among former combatants and communities. In addition, “the victims should stay at the centre of the Agreement” (Dag Nagoda, Norway Embassy, International Peace Conference, 2020), to overcome their differences and work towards coexistence, non-stigmatisation, and reconciliation. The process of FARC-EP asking for forgiveness is a never seen event in Colombia, and the communities will need time to adjust and potentially forgive the former combatants. It is in this regard that the Government and the international community play a vital role for a positive peace (in conjunction with the community and former combatants) that can be achieved through productive projects and reconciliation programmes. These can be accomplished through the development and implementation of tolerant dialogue strategies between communities, together with an adaptation of different agendas that are suitable according to the specificities of the Colombian context(s) (*Fondo Europeo para la Paz de Colombia*, August 2018; *Informe Annual 2018, Fondo Multidonante De Las Naciones Unidas Para El Sosteenimiento De La Paz En Colombia*; FIP, 2019b).

“Hoy en día la situación ha cambiado, hace 3 años alguien se le decía que era guerrillero y se asustaban y me evitaban. Hoy en día no, porque la gente ja nos ve en persona (...) y cambia su percepción. (...) No es fácil cambiar la imagen, pero en tres años larguitos hemos podido cambiar totalmente eso. Sin embarco cuando pedimos perdón, (...) la gente admite nuestro pedido de perdón y se terminan abrazando con nosotros. (...) Yo hablaba con un coronel del ejercito retirado (...) y le dice que era exguerrillero (...) y ele me preguntó se creía que se sirve para algo el proceso de paz, y yo le dice: por lo menos usted y yo estamos aquí hablando y no nos estamos dando bala. (...) El conflicto no fue fácil tiene unas génesis, unas causas y tiene una historia que atraviesa casi toda la historia de este país⁹⁶” (former combatant 1, interview 2020).

With the findings of this study, it is possible to conclude that the Agreement, mainly the social reincorporation, still presents major issues regarding security guarantees and infrastructural reforms, showing a lack of adjustment to the current necessities and urgencies, that can guarantee that reincorporation is successfully achieved.

For the upcoming years, the Peace Agreement’s development and the FARC-EP’s reincorporation are going to face unexpected challenges. Although this dissertation’s aim was not to foresee the future, it is crucial to acknowledge future problems. First, the dispersion of the FARC-EP as a group can become problematic, as they will need to understand and reform their political and social future role

⁹⁶ “Nowadays the situation has changed, 3 years ago, people were scared when I told them I used to be a guerrillero, and they would avoid me. Today is not like that, because people see us in person (...) and change their perception. (...) It was not easy to change this image, but in 3 years things have improved a lot. (...) When we asked for forgiveness, people accepted it and end by hugging us. (...) When I meet with a former coronel, after saying that I used to be a guerrillero, he asked me what I thought about the Agreement, and I said: at least we are talking now, instead of changing bullets. (...) The conflict was not easy, has difficult roots, causes, and history” (former combatant 1, interview 2020).

within society. Second, addressing the future of the productive projects and what can happen if they are not long-term viable is still required, as it happened with AUC's projects (Portuguese Embassy, interview, 2020). The other problem is the current situation of COVID-19,⁹⁷ which is going to bring setbacks and delays to the structural reforms and the Agreement's development. However, even with the pandemic, the work continues (as mentioned by the ARN, interview 2020, and on the International Peace Conference, 2020). Currently, the ARN is carefully planning their agenda for 2021 (trying to measure the impact of the pandemic), as each month they need to make adjustments to the implementation, according to the pandemic. However, educational and economic benefits were kept, along with the agency's collaborators who stayed in the ETCRs working to help with the reincorporation process, as well as in places that are outside of the ETCR. The Government created resolution 843⁹⁸, which allows people to keep their work even with the current situation (ARN, interview 2020). The third challenge will be keeping the safeguard of the former combatants, their families, and civil society, as well as social leaders and minorities, which becomes even more of a challenge with the COVID-19 pandemic, because it limits the state's presence. And lastly, the main problems remain the perseverance of stigmatisation, the ongoing access to the land problem, the gender and ethnic approach, and the reparation of victims (PARES, interview 2020).

En 20 años Colombia puede ser un país desarrollado, con inclusión y justicia social, dónde si han acabado las grandes diferencias entre ricos y pobres. Un país que tenga un nivel de vida, donde se han desarrollado las fuerzas productivas y que tenga un modo de vida igual o de pronto superior a de los países desarrollados. Pero eso va a depender de la decisión que tome el estado colombiano si quiere la paz o si quiere la guerra. Pero por otro lado podemos encontrar un país en una violencia total, con una desigualdad peor que la ya tenia (somos uno de los países más desiguales del mundo)⁹⁹ (former combatant 2, interview 2020).

⁹⁷ Currently the CNR is having online meetings, along with the Government and the FARC-EP, trying to keep with the Agreement's development (ARN, interview 2020).

⁹⁸ Cf. *Ministerio Salud y Protección Social, Normatividad Resolución 843* from 2020.

⁹⁹ "In 20 years, Colombia can be a developed country, with inclusion and social justice, where the biggest differences between poor and rich are over, a country with a life level, where it has developed the productive forces, and with a way of living equal of superior to the developed countries. But this is going to depend on the Colombian government's decision if they want peace or war. But on the other side we can find a country in a complete violence, with an even highest inequality (worse than the one before, since it is already considered one of the most inequality countries in the world)" (former combatant 2, interview 2020).

CHAPTER 5 – Conclusion

The research aimed to analyse the social reincorporation process of the FARC-EP, promoted under the 2016 Peace Agreement signed in Colombia, comprehending a timeline of four years after its signature. The topic was raised due to the multiple critical voices towards its development. The goal was to understand if the reincorporation process is or is not achieving the desired effect. Moreover, the analysed literature was found to be unclear regarding what is the problem with the reincorporation process, which is why we opted for considering the different narratives from the actors involved in the Agreement.

This dissertation started by raising the question: 'How effective are the measures to socially reinstate former combatants promoted under the Colombian Peace Agreement, since 2016 until 2020, according to the perceptions of the actors involved in the process?' aiming to analyse the social reincorporation process. At the outset, it was known that the Agreement was failing, and the reincorporation was not having a positive development. Nonetheless, this has proved to be wrong. After analysing the data (reports, grey literature, and governmental documents) and connecting it to the interviews (field research) through a triangulation technique, the findings clearly show that the problem with the Peace Agreement is that its reforms were too ambitious. It aims to solve too many rooted issues, and these measures are going to take generations to be completed. The Agreement touches upon legal frameworks, infrastructural reforms, reconciliation in a society characterised by a traumatic and violent narrative, and the forgiveness that FARC-EP is asking its victims after so many atrocities. In addition, violence in Colombia persists, with the rising of new illegal groups, the ongoing ELN's presence and the current massacres (Expresso, 2020; Kroc Institute, 2020; Suárez, 2020). However, the data shown that the social reincorporation is being achieved, although at a slow pace. At the same time, the point which comprehends more urgency is the lack of security guarantees towards the former combatants and the social leaders.

Regarding the limitations, two main barriers were encountered during this research. First, the budget restrictions, which limited to develop even further the field research. Nonetheless, for future research, it would be interesting to integrate, as a non-participant observant, one of the ETCRs, which would be possible if the field research time was longer and with economic support. During the visit to Colombia, there was the possibility to participate in an observation United Nations mission, to one of the ETCR in La Macarena, unfortunately, due to the short time that was not possible. However, this would be a possibility for future research. Concerning future work suggestions, it would be crucial to see the role of *guerrilleros* in the reincorporation process, since they are the ones facing more stigmatisation and barriers when integrating the community (according to the Kaplan and Nussio, 2017; Barrios Sabogal and Richter, 2019) or further to analyse the community's acceptance of the former combatants. Additionally, the findings of this research may also be relevant for other conflict scenarios, by looking at the Colombian case when it comes to negotiations into achieving a cease-fire. The second barrier is that it became essential to look at the data critically by trying not to be biased and explaining the data in

a way that would tend for no side. As seen in the study of Simons and Zanker (2012, p. 17) “research in conflict countries (...) makes data collection a daunting task (...) makes it difficult to undertake research or work as a journalist”.

At first, this dissertation aimed to give a more in-depth focus on interviewing different genders and analysing different opinions. Due to the short period of field research in Colombia and due to the COVID-19 pandemic, that was not possible. However, we were able to ensure some diversity in our interviews, which included different sides (governmental, *guerrilleros*, organisational, and civil society). We found that there are multiple internal contradictions and divisions, where different groups retain diverse perspectives regarding the Peace Agreement. It is essential to take into account that everyone has distinctive narratives, and that is why not everyone feels the same about the process, nor about the development of the Agreement by the State. Some will say that it was a mistake and it was a way for FARC-EP to get impunity for their atrocities. While, on the other side, the majority believes in the future of the Agreement (according to the *Observatorio de la Democracia*, 2017 and our own interviews), considering that the Agreement favours everyone, and just a small part refers to the former guerrilla. During the interviews, this was possible to observe, as the governmental institutions, the ARN and the Portuguese Embassy, displayed a more positive and hopeful perspective towards the Agreement, believing it is going in the right path, contrasting, with the FARC-EP, the civil society, the Kroc Institute and the Pares Foundation. The latter, in turn, believe that the Agreement is not achieving what was primarily agreed upon. In addition, they argued that Colombia is not heading to a positive peace path. Notwithstanding, these reforms can take decades to be completed, as observed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation. Additionally, we must also consider that other interpretations might be provided, mainly concerning a topic where the perspective depends on the narrative¹⁰⁰ of each person.

Ultimately, this dissertation was useful in providing a more profound understanding regarding the topics of the development process of peacebuilding and reincorporation of a former guerrilla into a society from the viewpoint of the actors involved. For future considerations, we found that the Agreement and the social reincorporation need to be adapted according to these current necessities and urgencies, with an open dialogue from both parts. Along with it, it is essential to keep talking about the social reincorporation to support the Agreement's development when it comes to structural reforms, victims' compensations, land reforms, non-violence and ending with illegal armed actors.

¹⁰⁰ As the magic-realistic Colombian writer, Gabriel García Márquez, said, "*La vida no es la que uno vivió, sino la que uno recuerda, y cómo la recuerda para contarla*" - "Life is not what one lived, but what one remembers, and how one remembers it to tell it" (own translation). This notion can be understood within the multiple Colombian narratives, that took place throughout the years. Which, then led to a country that no longer accepts to be defined by war, oppression, violence, suffering or poverty (Palacios, 2006).

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
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ATTACHMENTS

Attachment A



Attachment B

La Reincorporación TEMPRANA


Comprende los primeros 24 meses después del ingreso a la ARN. En esta etapa se desarrollan todas las acciones que facilitan la adaptación de las personas en reincorporación a la vida civil; así como el acceso de esta población a la oferta institucional, de acuerdo con sus necesidades e intereses.



La Reincorporación A LARGO PLAZO


Inicia una vez finalizan los 24 meses de la Reincorporación Temprana. En esta etapa se amplía la oferta institucional, se fortalecen las capacidades individuales y colectivas de las personas en reincorporación para el ejercicio de los derechos y deberes; y lograr su reincorporación integral y efectiva.

La Reincorporación a Largo Plazo contempla siete componentes:



Attachment C

Estado de la implementación por punto del Acuerdo Final, febrero de 2019



Attachment D

Gráfico 1 Niveles mensuales de implementación de todas las disposiciones del Acuerdo Final de Colombia





Gráfico 2

Estado de la implementación por punto del Acuerdo Final de Colombia: noviembre del 2018 vs. noviembre del 2019³⁹

■ No iniciado
■ Mínimo
■ Intermedio
■ Completo





Sin tregua contra la paz

28 de julio de 2020

Con rabia y profundo dolor denunciarnos ante la comunidad nacional e internacional, ante toda la institucionalidad estatal y ante las diversas organizaciones y plataformas de derechos humanos, que seguimos siendo objetivo del plan de exterminio que se propone hacer trizas el acuerdo de paz. En el día de hoy, 28 de julio de 2020, alrededor de las 6 de la tarde, hombres armados realizaron un atentado contra el esquema de seguridad del firmante de la paz, José Ignacio Sánchez Ramírez, promotor de las actividades de la Comisión Especial de la Verdad en el noroccidente del país, líder y coordinador de los esfuerzos de reincorporación para los NAR del municipio de Urao y el de la Blanquita en el municipio de Frontino.

Durante el ataque, resultaron muertos el firmante del acuerdo de paz Unaldo de Jesús Castillo, y el agente escolta y hermano de otro firmante del acuerdo paz, Yoiman Giménez, quien desempeñaba labores de protección para José Ignacio Sánchez R. Dos vidas más asesinadas bajo la mirada indolente del gobierno y que para Antioquia ya asciende a la desgarradora cifra de 25 firmantes de la paz asesinados, sumándose a los cientos de líderes y líderes, defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos que han perdido la vida por su compromiso con la paz.

Reiteramos una vez más el llamado urgente al gobierno nacional y a toda su institucionalidad, a que cumpla con la implementación integral del Acuerdo de Paz, a que haga presencia robusta en los territorios que ocupaba FARC durante el alzamiento armado, a que brinde verdaderas garantías para la vida y para la construcción de paz desde los territorios y que desmantele de una vez por todas, las organizaciones heredadas del paramilitarismo, tal y como lo mandata el Acuerdo de La Habana. De igual forma, a la comunidad internacional, a la segunda misión de la ONU, a los países acompañantes, y a todas las organizaciones, defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos y a las personas de la sociedad civil en general, a que rodeemos de manera decidida el Acuerdo de Paz, que exijamos su implementación y que se detenga la matanza y el exterminio contra el pueblo colombiano.

Una vez más, señalamos la responsabilidad de estos crímenes al gobierno nacional en cabeza de Iván Duque, a la fuerza pública y a todo el ministerio público, pues a pesar de la Alerta Temprana (AT) 027-19, en la cual se advertía de estos escenarios de riesgo en el Municipio de Urao, no se hizo nada para evitarlos. Exigimos al gobierno y a toda la institucionalidad estatal implementar integralmente las medidas de protección establecidas en el acuerdo de paz y realizar acciones concretas y efectivas para proteger los derechos fundamentales, pues no queremos que la vida, sueños e ilusiones de todos nuestros compañeros terminen en la insensibilidad de una cifra que hoy alcanza a 222 asesinados.

Toda nuestra solidaridad con las familias de los compañeros asesinados y un abrazo de fortaleza para afrontar estas aciagas horas, en donde la mano criminal de los enemigos de la paz sigue accionando con conveniente complicidad por parte del gobierno.

**Consejo Departamental de los Comunes Antioquia
Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común**

**#UnaNuevaForma
DeHacerPolítica**

RÉSUMÉ



Ana Rita
Rosário da Silva Cruz

DATE OF BIRTH:
19 Apr 1996

CONTACT

Nationality: Portuguese

Gender: Female



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EDUCATION AND TRAINING

OCT 2018 - CURRENT - Avenida das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, Portugal, Lisbon, Portugal

Master's Degree

ISCTE University Institute of Lisbon - Politics Faculty

Field(s) of study

- International Studies - Specialisation in European Studies and Research in Colombia

Thesis - Social Reincorporation of FARC Former Combatants: The case of the Colombian Peace Agreement | EQF level 7 | <https://www.iscte-iul.pt/>

SEP 2019 - JAN 2020 - De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Minor (Erasmus+)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Field(s) of study

- Peace and Conflicts

<https://www.vu.nl/en/>

SEP 2014 - JUL 2017 - Quinta do Contador, Estrada da Serra, 2300-313 Tomar, Portugal, Tomar, Portugal

BA Degree

Polytechnic Institute of Tomar - Management Faculty

Field(s) of study

- Tourism and Cultural Management

15 | EQF level 6 | <http://www.ipt.pt/?lng=en>

WORK EXPERIENCE

29 JUL 2020 - 29 OCT 2020 - Lisbon, Portugal

Student Research Assistant

ISCTE - CEI-IUL, Center for International Studies

- Attendance in Academic Research Workshops (with theoretical and methodological modules);
- Development of an individual research project related to the master's dissertation;
- Debate of research projects which were developed during the internship.

FEB 2020 - CURRENT - Amsterdam

Student Research Assistant

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU Amsterdam)

Research Assistant at the Amsterdam Centre for Religion and Peace & Justice Studies (academic research centre).

- Support on Workshops and events;
- Part of the Doktorandencolloquium's group;
- Part of the Research group on 'Peace, Trauma and Religion';
- Part of the Summer School of Construction and Power of Narratives in Conflict-Loaded Societies.



MAR 2018 - JUN 2019 - Murcia, Spain

● **Translator**

StreetProRunning

Translation Content from Spanish to Portuguese (ES-PT)

- Translate the Website's company. Translate sports goods, related to running, paddle, tennis, trekking, fitness and trail.
- Translate Legislation documents, related to the General Data Protection Regulation.

<https://www.padelnuestro.com/>

<https://www.streetprorunning.com/pt/>

FEB 2019 - APR 2019 - Lisbon, Portugal

● **Fundraising assistant**

UNICEF

Part of the Fundraising team for UNICEF, while working on a call-centre.

- Customer Support;
- Fundraising;
- Promotion of UNICEF's goals and projects;
- Part of the training team (during my last month).

OCT 2018 - DEC 2018 - Lisbon, Portugal

● **Assistant Communication Department**

AIDGlobal

Team member of the communication and press department, while doing the following tasks:

- Organisation of events;
- Work on event's logistic;
- Press-releases;
- Translation of documents (from Portuguese to English);
- Work on Data base on Excel;
- Administrative work.

SEP 2017 - JUN 2018 - Murcia, Spain

● **Translator Manager**

Erasmusu

Translator Content Manager for the Portuguese Webpage, under the programme Erasmus+.

- Translation from and to Portuguese, English and Spanish (PT-ES; PT-EN; EN-PT);
- Content Creation both in Portuguese and English;
- Elaboration of a City Guide about Lisbon, Portugal;
- Correction of translations from other interns.

Profile Link --> <https://erasmusu.com/es/rita-cruz-779102>

Prague's blog --> <https://erasmusu.com/en/erasmus-prague/erasmus-blog/3-day-trip-in-prague-608160>



JUN 2017 - AUG 2017 - Lisboa, Portugal

● **Intern**

Turismo de Portugal

Department of Development and Innovation.

- Working in the Accessible Tourism area;
- Working with Excel;
- Helping the Accessible Tourism Projects.

SEP 2016 - NOV 2016 - Eger, Hungary

● **Erasmus+ Internship**

Eszterházy Károly University

Intern at the Mobility Office in the Eszterházy Károly University.

- Events' Organisation;
- Cultural Visits and Workshops for international students;
- Management of the University Mobility Office's website;
- Support on Promotional Material;
- Administrative work related to the Erasmus+ programme.

LANGUAGE SKILLS

MOTHER TONGUE(S): Portuguese

English

Listening C1	Reading C1	Spoken production C1	Spoken interaction C1	Writing C1
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Spanish

Listening C1	Reading C1	Spoken production B2	Spoken interaction C1	Writing B2
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Dutch

Listening A2	Reading B1	Spoken production A2	Spoken interaction A2	Writing A2
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DIGITAL SKILLS

Office Tools

Microsoft Word / Microsoft Office / Google Docs / Google Drive / Microsoft Powerpoint / Outlook

Personal Skills

Team-work oriented / Motivated / Decision-making / Organizational and planning skills / Good listener and communicator