

#### **IUL - School of Social Sciences and Humanities**

Department of Social and Organizational Psychology

### **Intergroup Implications of Moral Divides over Arranged Marriages in Germany**

### Lynn Giersberg

Dissertation submitted as partial requirement for the conferral of

Master in Psychology of Intercultural Relations

### Supervisor:

Dr. Kinga Maria Bierwiaczonek, Post-doctoral Research Fellow University of Oslo

### Co-supervisor:

Prof. Dr. Christin-Melanie Vauclair, Professora Auxiliar & Integrated Researcher

ISCTE – University Institute of Lisbon



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#### INTERGROUP IMPLICATIONS OF MORAL DIVIDES OVER ARRANGED MARRIAGES

#### Abstract

Due to migration, two different marriage systems came to co-exist in Germany: love marriages and arranged marriages, with the latter triggering a heated debate in the German society. This study investigated the moral underpinnings of negative attitudes towards groups that engage in arranged marriages amongst adult Germans (N=327). Based on the Moral Foundations Theory, the individualizing and libertarian moral foundation were hypothesized to predict negative attitudes towards people who engage in arranged marriages, with the attitudes towards arranged marriages mediating this relationship. Intercultural competences were expected to buffer the relationship between moral foundations and attitudes towards arranged marriages. Unexpectedly, the results showed that individualizing and libertarian moral foundations predict more positive attitudes towards the groups that engage in arranged marriages (i.e., less social distance and less dehumanization). By contrast, the binding foundation predicted more social distance and more dehumanization of groups that engage in arranged marriages. The mediating role of attitudes towards arranged marriages was not supported. Intercultural competences were not significant moderators. The results and their implications are discussed.

### Keywords:

arranged marriages, moral foundations theory, intercultural competence, Germany

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#### Resumo

Devido à migração, dois sistemas matrimoniais vêm a coexistir na Alemanha: casamentos por amor e casamentos arranjados, sendo esto último desencadeado um debate intenso na sociedade alemã. Este estudo investigou os fundamentos morais das atitudes negativas em relação aos grupos que se envolvem em casamentos arranjados entre cidadãos adultos alemães (N=327). Com a base na Teoria das Fundações Morais, os fundamentos morais individualizados e libertária foram hipoteticamente para prever as atitudes negativas em relação aos casamentos arranjados, sendo as atitudes em relação aos casamentos arranjas a mediadora desta relação. A partir daí, são introduzidas competências interculturais como moderadores, que amortecem a relação entre convições morais e as atitudes negativas em relação aos casamentos arranjados. Inesperadamente, os resultados mostraram que os fundamentos morais individualizados e libertários têm atitudes mais positivas em relação aos grupos que se envolvem em casamentos arranjados (i.e., menor distância social e desumanização). Em contraste, a fundação vinculativa prevê um maior distanciamento social, e desumanização dos grupos que se empenham em casamentos arranjados. O papel do mediador em relação às atitudes da prática não foi apoiado. As competências interculturais não foram moderadoras significativos. Os resultados e as suas implicações são discutíveis.

#### Palavras-chave:

casamentos arranjados, teoria dos fundamentos morais, competência intercultural, Alemanha

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### Introduction

Arranged marriages prevail for around half of the world's population, yet their stigmatization is intense and approaches a sense of moral outrage in Western democracies (Baykara-Krumme, 2017; Penn, 2011). The disparagement of arranged marriages as an 'uncivilized' marriage system that is an infringement of one's liberty (Enright, 2009; Bahandary, 2018) is widespread. Arranged marriages among some of the migrant population in Western Europe have become a "key symbol of cultural differences" (Shaw, 2006, p.210). However, with increasing cultural diversity due to pervasive migration to Western Europe, countries like Germany are witnessing the coexistence of different types of marriage systems (Hense & Schorch, 2011). Germany ranks first as the European destination country, with almost one-fourth of the population in Germany having a migration background (Federal Office for Migration & Refugees, 2017).

"No one who comes here has the right to put his cultural values or religious beliefs above our law" – states the German Justice Minister Mass in June 2016 to advocate the right to define marriage according to the German law, even for marriage unions that are legal in other countries, like those of arranged marriages. There is a broad consensus in Germany that arranged marriages should be rejected and not considered as an equivalent form of partner selection (Straßburger, 2007). The political attempt to support this societal norm is mirrored by the auxiliary bills and legislations of the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the majority parties in the country's governing coalition. For instance, in 2014, the federal government passed a more restrictive family migration law that confined family reunification, aiming to control the unwanted flow of family migration to Germany due to arranged marriages. Former Interior Minister Schäuble of the CDU stated that:

"Up to 50 per cent of the third generation of certain migrants have spouses who did not grow up in Germany. This indicates that these are often arranged marriages (...) This is an abuse that inhibits integration, which we have to fight precisely in the spirit of Article 6 [which protects marriage and family] of our constitution" (16/103: 10598 emphasis added)

Such symbolic cultural differences are an example of how the majority group distances itself from immigrant minorities (Alba, 2005). With Muslim immigrants as the largest group of

immigrants in Germany that practice arranged marriages (Hense & Schorch, 2011), it ultimately nurtures the growth of Islamophobia and acts of violence in Germany (Lewicki, 2018; Machtans, 2016). In fact, anti-Muslim views were supported by about half of the German population by 2016, and racist violence reached alarming peaks in 2015 and 2016 (Lewicki, 2018). For this reason, it is relevant to understand the psychological underpinnings behind the negative attitudes towards arranged marriages amongst the nationals of countries receiving immigrants from cultures that practice arranged marriages, in our case Germany. Therefore, the present project proposes an examination of attitudes towards arranged marriages and toward groups that practice them, viewing the fundamental division in the approach to marriage as a manifestation of moral diversity.

Because the practice of arranged marriage is not only specific to Muslims, this study will focus on two social categories: the members of the German majority ingroup and the members of a broadly defined minority outgroup that engage in arranged marriages. Such an intergroup context, based on one cultural practice as the attribute distinguishing the ingroup from the outgroup, differs from those typically studied in intergroup research (e.g., based on skin color or nationality). However, in line with the social identity theory, any meaningful and/or salient group attribute can be a basis for social categorization into ingroups and outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Provided the dynamic debate around arranged marriages in Germany, for a typical member of the German majority engaging in this practice is likely to be both a meaningful and salient basis for categorizing other people as outgroup members.

The study will add to the existing research by examining the intergroup implications of moral divides over arranged marriages. Specifically, we will assess whether endorsing certain moral foundations can lead to negative attitudes towards people who engage in arranged marriages. By doing so, we aim to look at the process behind these associations (mediation) as well as the conditions under which they are found (moderation). Hereby, the current study extends previous research on individualizing and binding foundation to the recently added libertarian foundations. Contrary to most research in this area, we include those who endorse liberal values in order to show that they can also be prejudiced towards others if an issue violates their moral foundations. With respect to the attitudes, we opt to look at two forms of negative attitudes towards the groups that engage in arranged marriages: social distance and dehumanization. The study fills an important gap in the literature by linking a distinct form of

### INTERGROUP IMPLICATIONS OF MORAL DIVIDES OVER ARRANGED MARRIAGES

outgroup derogation – dehumanization – to people's moral attitudes. Lastly, to our knowledge this is the first study to examine whether intercultural competencies extend their beneficial effects to moral diversity issues by buffering the relationship between moral convictions and attitudes towards arranged marriages.

### **Chapter I – Literature Review**

### **Arranged Marriages in German Society**

Marriage - broadly defined as the long-term committed and socially acknowledged relationship between two people - is considered a cross-cultural universal; its meaning, purpose and practice in which spouses are selected, however, varies across cultures (Regan, Lakhanpal & Anguiano, 2012; Hatfield, Mo & Rapson, 2015). At a basic level, the following typology of two forms of marriage has evolved in the literature: 'love marriages' and 'arranged marriages' (Annabi, McStay, Noble & Sidahmed, 2018). Whereas a 'love' marriage is mainly a Western construct, where partners choose each other in a self-organized manner (Munshi, 2014), an arranged marriage is one where partner choice is arranged by the family on behalf of the couple (Allendorf, 2013; Bowmann & Dollahite, 2013; Harkness & Khaled, 2014).

Arranged marriages are a common feature in various cultures with a collectivistic orientation (societies in South and East Asia, the Middle East, South America and Africa) (Regan et al., 2012; Ahmad, 2012, Allendorf, 2013, Munshi, 2014; Nasser et al., 2013). Although the notion of arranged marriage is predominately perceived as an Islamic construct, they are not confined to the cultural context of Islam. It is present in many ethnic and religious groups, for example Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism and Jainism (Penn, 2011; Bowmann & Dollahite, 2013; Siebzehner & Lehmann, 2014). Nevertheless, the cultural conceptualization of arranged marriages is not compatible with the ideology of the contemporary Western matrimony that depicts this form as a "duty-bound system that suppresses individual freedom" (Ahmad, 2012, p. 194). De facto, autonomous spouse selection, romantic love and personal gratification are of primary concern in the Western self-organized marriage regime and are therefore conceptualized as 'love marriage' (Nauck & Klaus, 2008; Zaidi & Shuraydi, 2002; Dion & Dion, 1996).

On the contrary, arranged marriages are not only considered a dyadic junction of the spouses, but also include the recognition of the relationship as the union of the two respective families. Thus, promoting an underlying collectivistic extended-family culture, where a value system of strong familial links prevails (Buunk, Park & Duncan, 2010; Penn, 2011; Annabi et al., 2018). Inferential to this, the process of an arranged marriage considers the "interest of the individuals concerned against the needs of the families as a whole" (Hense & Schorch, 2011, p.

107). Typically, the selection criteria that the family deems to be precursory for successful enduring marriage does not acknowledge love as an important one, but rather the same caste and religion of the couple (Allendorf, 2013). In fact, the custom of arranged marriages accentuates the social restraint of predominant love (Dion & Dion, 1996), fortified by the proscription of unlawful sexual intercourse in Islam, for example. Studies have shown that married couples that got acquainted through an arranged marriage reported the expectation of love to be weak in the beginning, however the perception of a stronger and longer lasting martial bond developed over time (e.g., Epstein, Pandit & Thakar, 2013). These results challenge the claim that feelings are not taken into account when deciding for the arranged choice of partner but imply that although love marriages and arranged marriages may be mutually exclusive in the beginning, arranged marriages are not the opposite of love in the long term.

Arranged marriages are, from a purely descriptive perspective, a particular form of matchmaking that rely on some sort of social arrangement. Enormous variability exists in the procedure of arranged marriages across cultures (Straßburger, 2007). Most essentially, they need to be distinguished from forced marriages, that are usually seen as being a subgroup of arranged marriages (Hense & Schorch, 2011). Therefore, it is worth remarking that arranged marriages and forced marriages are conceptually and legally distinct (Enright, 2009). A forced marriage occurs in spite of refusal from one or both of the spouses, by means of psychological or physical pressure to marry another person (Karkasoglu & Subasi, 2007; Straßburger, 2007). Generally, arranged marriages do implicate active involvement and control on the choice of partner (Shaw, 2006; Nasser, Dabbous & Baba, 2013), meaning it is mutually consensual (Zaidi & Shuraydi, 2002). Nonetheless, most lay people as well as several researchers reject this differentiation, as the lines are blurred in view of free will versus fear of social exclusion within the family or imminent sanctions from part of the family (Miera, 2007; Hense & Schorch, 2011).

In Germany, arranged marriages follow the discriminatory mainstream discourse that equates arranged with forced marriages and not the consensual-arranged marriages (Straßburger, 2007). The linchpin in both cases is the question of free will. In a nutshell, the debate is: Can an arranged marriage be a form of free partner choice? Straßburger (2007) argues the following:

"Entering into an arranged marriage is by no means a sign of oppression and domestic violence, but rather a yes to a certain form of partner choice, which, like a self-organized

marriage, is based on a free decision. Marriages in which this is not the case are not arranged marriages but forced marriages. The difference is therefore essential." (p.69).

Based on her work and research with young Turkish migrants in Germany, Straßburger (2003) advocates for the explicit recognition of arranged marriages as an equivalent form of partner choice, based on the free will of both partners. Likewise, the German women's right organization 'Terre des Femmes' argues that arranged marriages are based on the voluntary consent of both spouses, whereas forced marriages occur when the person concerned feels compelled to marry (Volz, 2004). Indeed, the involvement of the spouses' families is a key characteristic of arranged marriages, with their central role of influencing the selection in a more direct, legitimate and comprehensive way (Hense & Schorch, 2011). Nonetheless, the spouses still have the 'last word', yet if tangible economic interests or family pressures play a role in the marriage negotiations, the room for maneuver by the futures spouses may shrink (Volz, 2004). Whether, however, there is an impairment of free will can ultimately and only be judged by those affected themselves (Straßburger, 2007).

Overall, Western activists vehemently object to the practice of arranged marriages, with the explicit division in judgments about arranged marriage being visible at a cultural level, meaning Western versus Non-Western cultures (Baykara-Krumme, 2017; Penn, 2011). Hereby, the Western societies lose sight of the situated cultural practice in which arranged marriages are negotiated (Annabi et al., 2018). The fact that a self-organized marriage signals a 'free' choice of partner, conversely an arranged marriage signals a lack of freedom that is brought about by pressure or coercion, touches upon determinants of human morality: harm, rights and individual freedom. Much of research on social justice and moral psychology was limited to individual-based concerns of harm and fairness, when judging morally charged content domains (Kohlberg, 1984; Turiel, 1983). Here we take the position of more recent theorists, that morality is socially and culturally construed and consists of different considerations beyond harm and fairness (Haidt, 2007; Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993). These differing moral sensibilities are, according to this thesis, fundamental to why people's opinions about arranged marriages clash across cultures. Indeed, research has shown that the disagreement about moral values lie at the roots of many cultural conflicts (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto & Haidt, 2012).

#### **Moral Diversity**

In the current moral perspective, also called the relativistic perspective, human morality is considered culturally specific and makes reference to moral issues beyond individual-based concerns of harm, fairness, justice and rights (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra & Park, 1997; Haidt, 2001). The moral domain takes into consideration aspects of social solidarity as well as collective and religious responsibilities when making moral judgments. Empirical support for this descriptive approach to morality stems from studies testing the well-established Moral Foundation Theory (MFT; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). It posits the moral mind as a composition of 5 moral foundations: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity. Conceptually, the five moral foundation are divided into two overarching foundations: individualizing foundation and binding foundation.

The approval of individuals who relieve or prevent harm and the disapproval of those who cause suffering and pain symbolizes the harm/care foundation, whereas fairness/reciprocity is based on the sensitivity towards issues of justice and equality (Graham, Haidt, Nosek, Ivyer, Koleva & Ditto, 2011). Together these two foundations form the individualizing foundation, as the locus of moral value lies within the individual (Haidt et al., 2009). The binding foundation is subdivided into ingroup loyalty, authority and purity/sanctity. Ingroup loyalty typifies the attachment to groups (i.e. family, church or country), incorporating behaviors that foster trust, cooperation and cohesion within the ingroup. The tendency to adhere to hierarchical structures within the society describes the foundation of authority and respect, as it entails virtues of dominance and subordination. The fifth foundation called purity/sanctity underlies moral regulations that guide individuals to strive for a dignified life, to protect the sanctity of body and soul and to devoid sin or contaminations related to issues of sexuality, food or religious law (Haidt et al., 2009). Ultimately, the theories main premise posits that culture edits these foundations to the extent to which people put more or less emphasis when making moral judgments (Haidt et al., 2009).

Additional support for the role of culture in moral judgements stems from a study that reviewed data on individuals' attitudes towards moralized issues in view of cultural value dimensions (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011). Individualism-collectivism significantly predicted moral attitudes for personal-sexual issues (e.g., abortion and homosexuality), with collectivistic

cultures being stricter in their moral judgment than individualistic cultures because of authority, ingroup and purity considerations, namely the binding foundations.

Besides this cultural perspective, many researchers took a sociopolitical outlook at the MFT to identify differences in moral judgments on the liberal and conservative spectrum (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Haidt (2012) argues that liberals and conservatives differ in their moral judgements, with political liberals consistently endorsing moral intuitions that are primarily based upon the individualizing foundation, whereas conservatives generally endorsed all five foundations. Hence, political psychology and social justice researchers attributed the tension arising in many sociopolitical issues to the moral commitment of benevolence, nurturance and equality to liberals, whilst the additional moral commitments of traditionalism, strictness and religious sanctity hold for conservatives (Feinberg & Willer, 2015).

Recently, a sixth moral foundation was introduced—the libertarian foundation—that goes beyond the bipolar view of liberal and conservatives (Ivyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto & Haidt, 2012). The foremost value of the libertarian foundation lies within the individual liberty, a moral value that was not yet captured as such by the existing five foundations in the MFT. The libertarian foundation makes reference to Berlin's (1969) notion of negative liberty, that proposes the liberty of the individual as to be free from any interferences or external restraints, such as governmental interferences. It contrasts with the vision of positive liberty, where individual freedom is construed by opportunity in order to fulfill one's own potential (Ivyer et al., 2012). In other words, libertarians are bound to a moral philosophy that antagonizes the idea to impose any particular moral code upon others by placing the moral value on liberty at the expense of all other moral principles. Ivyer & collegeaus (2012) differentiate between two types of freedoms: economic government liberty and lifestyle liberty. For this study's purpose, only the lifestyle liberty is of interest, as arranged marriages can be considered a matter of lifestyle and not so much an economic issue. Certainly, economic concerns may play a role in the selection process of arranged marriages in some cultures, nevertheless, the focal interest of this study lies within the social perspective of whether people perceive arranged marriages as a way of living life that should be free from any governmental or external inferences.

So far libertarianism has only been studied in the US with politically engaged, educated, white, liberal citizens, thus limiting its generalizability. Yet, examining the libertarian foundation

outside of the US context, seems to be of particular interest for the current research for two reasons. First, exploring the libertarian foundation in a different national context, the EU context, could contribute to the generalizability of the findings. Second, the main argument at stake in the discussion about arranged marriages depicts the core value of the libertarian foundation: individual liberty.

Together the current state of literature seems to suggest the idea that Germany - an individualistic culture (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010), with a liberal conservatism ideology - promotes a value structure that is characterized by stronger moral convictions to fundamental aspects of the individual, namely harm and fairness (individualizing foundation) and individual liberty (libertarian foundation), whilst de-emphasizing the aspects of the collective, such as group loyalty and authority (binding foundations). Such a configuration of moral beliefs is likely to lead to negative attitudes toward the phenomenon of arranged marriage. Indeed, the main argument in the dominant Western discourse against arranged marriages is the lack of individual autonomy (evoking the violation of the individualizing and libertarian foundations) due to the presence of family pressure and interests (evoking the binding foundation to which the West seems to attribute less value) (Baykara-Krumme, 2017; Straßburger, 2017). Social and religious responsibilities such as the maintenance of social order, the importance of group norms and tradition as well as the cultural transmission of endogamy rules prevail as the main reasons for arranged marriages (Hense & Schorch, 2011; Regan et al., 2012). However, with the coexistence of the different types of marriages systems in Germany arises the question of the extent of consequences of this moral dissonance about the concept of arranged marriages.

Social and cultural psychologists share the expectation that moral diversity may have consequences such as divisiveness and conflict (see Haidt, Rosenberg & Hom, 2003). Possessing the strong and absolute belief that something, for instance the practice of arranged marriages, is right or wrong, moral or immoral, is referred to as a moral conviction (Sktika & Mullen, 2002). Much research has shown that attitudes that are rooted in moral convictions have detrimental interpersonal consequences (Sktika & Mullen, 2002; Skitka, Baumann & Sargis, 2005; Wright, Cullum & Schwab, 2008). Thus, the first research question deals with whether endorsing certain moral beliefs may lead to negative attitudes toward certain cultural phenomena such as arranged marriages, which in turn impacts the way people relate to others who are involved in such negatively perceived cultural phenomena. Previous research did not make this conceptual

distinction between attitudes towards a phenomenon, and attitudes towards people that engage in it. Hence, this study proposes that attitudes toward the phenomena precede attitudes towards people engaging in this practice in a theoretical causal chain. Differently than most of previous research, the present study looks at intergroup rather than interpersonal outcomes of moral foundations, namely social distance toward and dehumanization of groups that engage in arranged marriages.

### **Intergroup Implications of Moral Divides**

People who hold strong moral attitudes seem to be more intolerant towards attitudinally dissimilar others in intimate and non-intimate relationships, show lower levels of good will and cooperativeness in attitudinally heterogenous groups and actively discriminate those who do not share their moral attitudes (Sktika & Mullen, 2002; Skitka, Baumann & Sargis, 2005). For example, being friends with, having a neighbor, or even sitting next to someone that has different moral convictions, were sensed with reluctance. Skitka and colleagues (2002, 2005) congruently found that attitudes held with strong moral mandates showed immense interpersonal consequences, such as greater social distance.

Moral principles tend to be perceived as objective and universal by those who endorse them (Sktika, Baumann & Sargis, 2005). Therefore, people perceive the violation of these principles as psychologically self-evident (Sktika, 2010). Its correctness is perceived as universally true and understood in terminal absolutes, meaning it is not bound to one's culture of origin, but surpasses the boundaries of persons and culture. Therefore, it applies to everyone and including those living in other cultures (Skitka et al., 2005; Sktika, 2010). After all, strong moral attitudes can lead to pervasive divides within society based on cultural differences (Sktika & Mullen, 2002; Skitka et al., 2005).

These notions are important to consider with regards to attitudes towards arranged marriages as people in Western societies might experience them as psychologically nonnegotiable due to a lack of a common moral ground, which disables any understanding of the other's viewpoint and the possibility for engaging in a compromise. Ditto and Koleva (2011) connotate the inability to understand moral worldviews different from their own as the "moral empathy gap". Given this lack of empathetic concern and tolerance for deep moral cleavages as well as the fact that morality is tied to what we believe is fundamentally right, this study opts to

go one step further by examining whether those who are perceived as not adhering to moral values may be stripped of their 'humanity'.

Broad range of research has examined the concept of dehumanization, that is, the denial of full humanness to others (see Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). The pioneering work covered mostly the blatant and explicit aspects of dehumanization linked to violent and hostile conflicts between groups (Optow, 1993). Only later, social psychologists proposed a more subtle view of dehumanization, yet representing a pervasive and widespread phenomenon (Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demouli, Rodriguez-Perez & Gaunt, 2000). A number of studies have demonstrated that people do not grant equal humanness to all human beings and this was found in both interpersonal and intergroup contexts and across social domains not limited to explicit conflict as originally proposed (for reviews see Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Vaes, Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014).

One of the main theories that approached a subtle form of dehumanization in the growing body of research is Haslam's (2006) two-dimensional model of humanness that distinguished between animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization. Haslam (2006) proposed two forms of humanness, defined as the qualities that are denied to others when they are dehumanized: characteristics that are uniquely human (HU) and characteristics that comprise human nature (HN). Denying uniquely human attributes that involve civility, refinement, moral sensibility, rationality and maturity to others equals the animalistic dehumanization, as they are represented as animal-like. Denying human nature to others means considering them as objects or automata, also denoted as mechanistic dehumanization, where core human attributes that include emotionality, warmth, cognitive, openness, agency and depth are denied (Haslam, 2006).

Dehumanization of outgroup members has attracted the attention of a large amount of research (Leyens et al., 2000; Leyens et al., 2007), with the congruent finding that people tend to dehumanize the outgroup, whilst humanizing the ingroup (Vaes et al., 2012). Research showed that outgroup dehumanization is linked to several negative consequences for the outgroup members: reduced prosociality (Vaes, Paladino & Leyens, 2002) and empathy (Čehajić, Brown & González, 2009) or diverse forms of hostility, such as punitive and aggressive actions, that are perceived as retaliatory and righteous by the perpetrator (e.g. Rudman & Mescher, 2012).

Other consequences of dehumanization were found to be linked to moral principles, more specifically to the implications for moral judgments of targets. People were considered as less

blameworthy and punishable for immoral behavior when they were seen as lacking uniquely human traits, whilst people were viewed less worthy of protection, less deserving praise for moral behavior, and less capable of rehabilitation when they were seen as lacking human nature (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam & Koval, 2011). Hence, people who were perceived as less human, were placed outside of normal moral consideration. These findings underlie the assumptions that being human presupposes a particular moral status of having a moral value, agency and responsibility (Bastian et al., 2011). Different from these notions of moral worth, this study opts to take another perspective by examining one's moral foundations as the antecedent of dehumanization. Hence, the endorsement of individual-centered moral foundations is the driving force that leads to the dehumanization of groups that engage in arranged marriages.

Given the inarguably difficult nature of divergent moral beliefs and its major consequences at an interpersonal level (Haidt et al. 2003; Sktika et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2008), personality characteristics might help to overcome the "gaps" in our ability to empathize with moral minds different from our own. The current study introduces the intercultural traits of cultural empathy and open-mindedness as individual dispositions that are assumed to act as a buffer against the partisan attitudes towards those that oppose us. However, to the best of our knowledge, the beneficial role of intercultural competence has only been demonstrated in intercultural transitions or situations of direct contact with the cultural other (van der Zee & van Oudenhoven, 2002; Leong, 2007; van Oudenhoven, Mol & van der Zee, 2003); it was not yet explored in the context of moral diversity in modern societies. Thus, the second research question is: Do intercultural competences serve as buffer for how people view moral issues stemming from cultural diversity?

### The Impact of Intercultural Competences

With multiculturalism depicting one of the most politically and socially quarrelsome issues of our era (Ward & Szabo 2016), researchers thoroughly investigated the relation between personality factors and multiculturalism and identified certain personality dispositions to intercultural success. The concept of multicultural personality has widely been used as a theoretical framework in the cross-cultural competence (3C) literature (Matsumoto & Hwang, 2013) and the Multicultural Personality Questionnaire (MPQ: van der Zee & van Oudenhoven, 2000) has shown explanatory value above and beyond the Big 5 (Leung, Ang & Tan, 2014).

The MPQ consists of the following dimensions as predictive of intercultural effectiveness: cultural empathy, open-mindedness, social initiative, emotional stability and flexibility. The former three traits are classified as social-perceptual traits, whilst the latter two are stress-buffering traits. In particular, the social-perceptual traits of cultural empathy and openmindedness seem to be highly relevant for attitudes towards arranged marriages. Cultural empathy is conceptualized as the capability and sensitivity to notice cultural differences and empathize with the feelings, thoughts and behaviors of individuals from different cultures (van der Zee & van Oudenhoven, 2013). For example, empathy for the moral intuitions of culturally different groups could result in a more positive assessment of their motivations for engaging in arranged marriages. Open-mindedness consists of an open and unprejudiced attitude toward cultural differences and being able to refrain from judgment when confronted with different behavior or value system (van der Zee & van Oudenhoven, 2013). This ability may contribute to apprehend another's moral mind by enabling understanding for each other's viewpoints and leaving room for psychological negotiation – qualities that are usually absent and rather fuel the divide over attitudes that stem from moral convictions (Sktika, 2010; Ditto & Koleva, 2011). In other words, cultural empathy and open-mindedness may prevent strong moral convictions from translating into negative attitudes toward groups that do not share these convictions, or practices that flow from different moral systems. This does not seem to be the case with social initiative (referring to active behavior during interpersonal interactions), emotional stability and flexibility (protecting against the stress of intercultural interactions) that seem mostly relevant in direct interactions with culturally different people, and less relevant in the case of an abstract construct such as arranged marriages (van der Zee & van Oudenhoven, 2014). Therefore, we will not consider these three traits further.

Open-mindedness and cultural empathy may have a crucial role for attitudes towards abstract cultural constructs because they are thought to facilitate cultural learning and drive to appeal social and cognitive opportunities of intercultural situations (van der Zee & van Oudenhoven, 2013; 2014). Another interesting feature of these two traits is that they seem to be trainable (van der Zee & van Oudenhoven, 2013). The socio-perceptual traits have shown to be good candidates for intercultural training scenarios, because of the social component they encompass (Herfst, van Oudenhoven, & Timmermann, 2008). Taking the perspective of culturally different or postponing one's judgment seems easier to translate into training goals

than becoming emotionally stable or more flexible, which opens a promising potential avenue for practical implications of this study. If these traits are trainable, then by training them (in schools, for example), attitudes that stem from moral convictions could be influenced. Yet, openmindedness and cultural empathy are also considered to be the more culturally specific traits as compared with the others (van der Zee & van Oudenhoven, 2013). Altogether, open-mindedness and cultural empathy are both plausible moderators that may facilitate attaining acceptance of cultural differences, including those that are grounded in moral diversity.

### **Present Study**

The present study sought to understand the psychological underpinnings of the moral foundation theory in relation to the attitudes towards people that engage in arranged marriages, measured as social distance and dehumanization. Specifically, we expect that the individualizing and libertarian moral foundations are associated with more social distance and dehumanization of groups that engage in arranged marriages, and that the negative attitudes towards arranged marriages mediate this association. The opposite relationship should apply to the binding foundation, that is, less social distance and dehumanization. Moreover, we hypothesize that intercultural competences, specifically cultural empathy and open-mindedness moderate the association between all the moral foundations and the practice of arranged marriages itself. That is, the link between endorsing specific moral foundations and negative attitudes towards arranged marriages is weaker for those individuals who show high intercultural competence than for individuals with low intercultural competence. <sup>1</sup>

The current study adds theoretical, empirical and practical value. Theoretically, there are three major contributions of this research. First, we introduce a conceptual distinction between attitudes towards a practice and attitudes towards groups endorsing this practice. Second, we establish a link between the moral foundation theory and the phenomena of dehumanization (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014) by examining the intergroup implications of moral divides over a

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
¹ We opt to hypothesize a moderation of path *a* (i.e. MFT − attitudes towards arranged marriages link), as the study proposes that attitudes toward the practice precede attitudes towards people engaging in this practice in a theoretical causal chain. Thus, we aimed to examine the function of intercultural competences on the precedent, underlying variable, that is, attitudes towards arranged marriages in its association with the predictor, namely one's moral foundation. Supporting reasons for this choice are outlined in the section 'The Impact of Intercultural Competences'.

conflict that is rooted in cultural differences regarding marriage. Third, this study offers a novel view on intercultural competence. It goes beyond the idea that intercultural competences are only adaptive in intercultural transitions or in situations of direct intercultural contact by proposing that they also affect how people view moral issues stemming from cultural diversity of today's societies.

Empirically, the current research attempts to replicate Skitka's (2002, 2005) findings that strong moral attitudes predict more social distance towards morally dissimilar others and extends them by adding dehumanization as a second theoretically distinct intergroup outcome. Also, we add to the literature by examining the libertarian foundation in the German context, as to the best of our knowledge it had only been studied previously in the US context. Practically, we contribute to a novel intergroup perspective on the role of moral concerns, which has important implications for intergroup relations, and we propose two moderators (cultural empathy and open-mindedness) that may help prevent negative attitudes toward morally different others.

Considering previous findings regarding moral foundation theory, attitudes towards arranged marriages and intercultural competences, we formulated the following theoretical model (Figure 1) and hypotheses.

**Figure 1.**Theoretical Model



*Note*. Conceptual model estimating the effects of moral foundations on social distance and dehumanization directly as well as indirectly through attitudes towards the cultural practice of arranged marriages, with conditional indirect effects moderated by cultural empathy and open-mindedness.

### **Hypotheses**

H1: Individualizing and libertarian moral foundations are associated with negative attitudes towards outgroups that engage in arranged marriages in the form of social distance (H1a) and dehumanization (H1b). This link is mediated by the attitudes towards arranged marriages (H1c).

H2: The binding moral foundation is associated with positive attitudes towards outgroups that engage in arranged marriages in the form of social distance (H2a) and dehumanization (H2b). This link is mediated by the attitudes towards arranged marriages (H2c).

Although H1 and H2 test indirect effects, we were also interested in examining if these mediated effects were a function of intercultural competence of individuals. Therefore, we examined moderated mediation models in order to determine if significant indirect effects uncovered through our hypothesis testing (H1 and H2) varied systematically as a function of intercultural competences. See Figure 1 for the conceptual model guiding the moderated mediation tests. Two hypotheses of moderated mediation are proposed:

H3: The indirect effects of the individualizing and libertarian foundation on attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages is moderated by cultural empathy (H3a) and open-mindedness (H3b) such that the association between the individualizing foundation and attitudes towards the practice is weaker at higher levels of cultural empathy and open-mindedness than at lower levels.

H4: The indirect effects of the binding foundation on attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages is moderated by cultural empathy (H4a) and open-mindedness (H4b) such that the association between binding foundation and attitudes towards the practice is weaker at higher levels of cultural empathy and open-mindedness than at lower levels.

### Chapter II - Method

### **Participants and Procedure**

According to Preacher, Rucker & Hayes (2007) a sample of 100 people is needed to detect a single moderated mediation effect of medium size with a power of 0.95 and a sample of 500 is needed to detect a small effect with a power of 0.88. Therefore, we aimed at a sample size in between these two reference numbers. Participants were recruited via personal contacts and social media platforms (Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram), using convenience sampling. An online survey on Qualtrics platform was designed, where the survey was advertised to examine how people relate to different cultural patterns. By means of an informed consent, voluntary participation, anonymity and confidentiality were assured. Debriefing was offered with leaving contact information at the end of the questionnaire. Participants who answered all focal measures were retained for analysis. 142 participants failed to answer at least one of the focal measures and were therefore excluded from the analysis. The final sample comprised of 327 participants, that met the criteria of being resident in Germany (91.1%), possessing the German citizenship (90.2%), or being born in Germany (86.9%).

The majority of the participants were aged between 21 and 30 years (49.2%), followed by 13.1% that were between 51 and 60 years old and 9.2% and 7% being between 31-40 and 41 and 50 years old, respectively. 182 (55.7%) of the participants were female. 58.4% of the participants obtained a university degree (a bachelor/master's degree or equivalent). Most of the participants were employees (53.5%), followed by students (26.3%) and people who are pensioned (5.8%). 18 participants (5.5%) belonged to a cultural group that practices arranged marriages and 74 participants (22.6%) indicated to have a different ethnicity within their family. On average, the participants reported to have moderate contact with immigrants (M = 3.78, SD = 1.76, range: 1-6) with these contacts experienced being mostly positive (M = 2.89, SD = 1.81, range: 1-6). In terms of political views, the sample was rather left-winged (M = 3.44, SD = 2.57, range: 1-7). More specifically, with regards to the German Federal Elections in 2017, 119 participants (36.4%) indicated to have voted the left-wing party 'Alliances 90/The Greens, followed by current governing party CDU/CSU (12.5%). Participants, on average, scored below the middle point of the scale measuring religiousness (M = 2.73, SD = 1.70, range: 1-7).

#### Measures

Questionnaires were available in German and English and were structured by closed questions providing ordinal data using a continuous rating scale (see English version in Appendix B). Unless stated otherwise, Likert scale was used. At no point in the questionnaire reference was made to any particular ethnic group that engages in arranged marriages.

#### Outcome measures.

Attitudes towards outgroups that engage in arranged marriages were operationalized in two ways. First, an adaptation of the attitudinal Social Distance Scale by Triandis & Triandis (1960) consisting of five items was used, assessing the permission of psychological approach of people that engage in arranged marriages. Exemplary, the two opposing (highest vs lowest distance) items are "How would you feel about giving someone who entered an arranged marriage asylum in Germany?" and "How would you feel about having someone who entered an arranged marriage as your (extended) family member?" (1 = very negative to 7 = very positive). Weighted averages were obtained, with higher scores equaled stronger distance towards people that engage in arranges marriages. The scale demonstrated good reliability, with a Cronbach's alpha of .88.

Second, we used an adaptation of Bastian, Denson & Haslam (2013) measure that assessed the denial of Human Nature (4-items, e.g., "I feel like people who enter engaged marriages are emotional, like they are responsive and warm" [reversed], and "I feel like people who enter engaged marriages are mechanical and cold",  $\alpha = .81$ ) and the denial of Human Uniqueness (4-items, e.g., "I feel like the person in the story was refined and cultured" [reversed], "I felt like the person in the story was unsophisticated",  $\alpha = .81$ ; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Positive items were reversed, so that higher values indicated stronger dehumanization of people that engage in arranged marriages.

#### Predictor measures.

The Moral Foundation Questionnaire was administered (MFQ; Graham et al., 2009). Generally, the self-report scale is divided into moral relevance and moral judgment items; however, in this study, participants were only administered moral judgment items. Because moral relevance items only cover the relative importance of abstract concerns related to the five foundations, whilst moral judgment items capture contextualized and concrete cases that embody or negate the abstract principles that are elsewise prior rated by the relevance items, we opted to

measure only the moral judgment items. This choice being considered by Haidt's (2001) finding that moral judgments items are said to be more crucial for prompting the desired moral foundations. A total of 22 moral judgment statements were used, with four judgments for each of the five foundations (e.g., "Loyalty to one's group is more important than one's individual concerns" for Loyalty; (1 = strongly disagree and 7= strongly agree)). The Lifestyle Libertarian foundation consisted only of two target judgments (e.g., "People should be free to decide what group norms or traditions they themselves want to follow", split-half reliability L = .213) (Iyer et al., 2012).

A mean score for the individualizing foundation (8 items; comprised of harm and fairness), the binding foundation (12 items; comprised of group loyalty, authority and purity) and the libertarian foundation was obtained by aggregating the scores, with a higher score output indicating greater importance related to that particular moral foundation. In general, the MFQ has demonstrated adequate reliability, with Cronbach's alpha coefficients ranging from .65 to .84 (Graham et al., 2011). Test-retest reliability and construct validity have been reported to be adequate (Zhang, Hook & Johnson, 2016). Initially, the reliability of the individualizing foundation scale was .58. Reliability analysis suggested better reliability without the item "If a friend wanted to cut in with me on a long line, I would feel uncomfortable because it wouldn't be fair to those behind me" (Questions 1.3.1 in Appendix B). Its removal increased reliability to  $\alpha = 0.65$ .

#### Mediators.

Attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages itself were evaluated by the semantic differential technique (Osgood, 1952). Participants were given a definition of the concept "An arranged marriage can be described as one in which the decision to marry is made jointly with the family and is assessed positively by the person concerned with regard to his or her circumstances. We would like to emphasize that in this case we do not refer to forced marriage or child marriage". Subsequently, participants were asked to rate the concept of arranged marriages through a set of seven bipolar adjectives. Exemplary items of the bipolar adjectives are good/bad; kind/cruel; fair/unfair and moral/immoral. The semantic differential technique has demonstrated adequate reliability coefficients ( $\alpha = .81$ ) and convincing face validity (Osgood, 1952). With this sample, reliability coefficients reported high internal consistency ( $\alpha = .94$ ).

In addition, attitude extremity, attitude justifiability and moral conviction towards the concept were measured with one item each<sup>2</sup>. Attitude extremity was measured by asking participants the extent to which they supported or opposed arranged marriages (1= strongly support and 7= strongly oppose). This scale was coded as ranging from +3 to -3. Attitude justifiability was assessed by asking participants how justifiable or unjustifiable arranged marriages were to them (1= very justifiable and 7=very unjustifiable). Higher scores equaled stronger endorsement of unjustifiability towards the concept of arranged marriages. Domain-specific moral conviction was evaluated with the item: "My attitude about arranged marriages reflects something about my core moral values and convictions." (1= very much agree and 7= very much disagree).

### Moderators.

Intercultural competence was measured with short form of the Multicultural Personality Questionnaire (MPQ- SF; van der Zee, van Oudenhoven, Ponterotto & Fietzer, 2013). In response to the sentence stem; "To what extent do the following statements apply to you?" items were placed accordingly (1 = totally not applicable and 7 = completely applicable). Originally, the scale consisted of five factors, however for the current study only two factors (open-mindedness and cultural empathy; each eight items) were administered. The open-mindedness scale measured the extent to an open and unprejudiced attitude towards different cultural norms and values (e.g. "Has feeling for what's appropriate in culture"  $\alpha$  = .83). The cultural empathy scale captured the ability to empathize with the thoughts, feelings and behaviors of individuals from a different cultural background (e.g. "Getting to know others profoundly",  $\alpha$  = .83). Higher values indicated greater endorsement of the respective intercultural competence. The MPQ-SF has demonstrated to be a reliable scale and evidenced high correlations to the original MPQ long scales, that showed good internal consistencies (Leone, van der Zee, van Oudenhoven, Perugini & Ercolani, 2005) as well as reliability coefficient ranging between .70 and .90 (Ponterotto, 2008).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For the main analysis the semantic differential technique was used as the single mediator. Although the analysis was conducted with all additional attitude measures as mediators as well, yielding similar conclusions, only the results for semantic differential technique are reported because of the advantages of a multi-item measure with high reliability over an item-by-item analysis.

#### Additional Variables.

Contact quantity and contact quality was measured with two items separately. First, participants indicated how much contact they have with immigrants (1= A great deal and 7= None at all). Then, respondents were asked to what extent these experiences with immigrants were positive (1= extremely positive and 7= extremely negative).

Political orientation was assessed with one item: "When it comes to politics, it is often talked about the differentiation between "left" or "right". Where would you place yourself on such a scale if 1 means left and 7 right?". In addition, two questions were taken from the ESS9 (2018) political module, where it is asked about the two votes of the last Bundestag elections in Germany. Participants indicated their first vote for a candidate from the constituency and the second vote for a party, constituting of CDU/CSU, SPD, The Left, Alliances90/ The Greens, FDP, AfD, Pirate Party Germany or NPD. In case someone did not vote, it is asked whether there is one political party, that the participants feel closer to. If the participants response is yes, the particular political party is asked to be indicated.

Social desirability was measured with the 6-item Social Desirability–Gamma Short Scale, which was used in its original German version 'Soziale Erwünschtheit-Gamma' (KSE-G) (Kemper, Beierlein, Bensch, Koleva & Rammstedt, 2014). The scale measured whether participants exaggerated positive qualities and minimized negative qualities (e.g., "In an argument, I always remain objective and stick to the facts" (1= doesn't apply at all and 7= applies completely)). The scale has been validated in the adult German population, irrespective of social class or age and demonstrated adequate reliability ( $\alpha$  = .69 to .72) (Nießen, Partsch, Kemper & Rammstedt, 2019). Within this sample, Cronbach's alpha for positive and negative qualities items were .59 and .58, respectively.

### Sociodemographic questions.

Regarding demographics, age, gender, education, job situations, country of origin of the individual and their parents and country of residence were assessed. Moreover, we asked whether the participants belonged to a cultural group that practices arranged marriages. 18 participants indicated to belong to a cultural group that practices arranged marriages. We retained these for our analysis, as they met the criteria of being resident in Germany, possessing the German citizenship or being born in Germany, thereby forming part of the German society. We also assessed religious affiliation which was assessed with one item: "Regardless to whether you

belong to a particular religion, how religious do you feel?" (1 = not at all religious to 7 = very religious).

### Statistical Analyses.

Analyses were performed using the IBM SPSS (26). Regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between all variables. Using PROCESS macro by Andrew and Hayes (2019) six moderated-mediation models were tested (Model 9)<sup>3</sup>. The first model tested the empirical estimation of the association through which an individualizing foundation predicts attitudes towards people that engage in arranged marriages (Figure 2; direct effects of individualizing foundation on social distance [Model 1.1] and dehumanization [Model 1.2]; and indirect effect through the attitudes towards the concept of arranges marriages itself). The pathway of individualizing foundation and attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages was assumed to be moderated by intercultural competences, namely cultural empathy and openmindedness. The second and third model differ only in the predictor variable of libertarian foundation (Model 2) and binding foundation (Model 3). The resampling technique of Bootstrapping was used to test indirect effects and to account for the fact that studied variables were not normally distributed (all Kolmogorov-Smirnov p < .001). 5,000 bootstrap resamples were utilized to construct 95% percentile confidence intervals. Confidence intervals that do not include the value of zero are considered statistically significant.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For parsimony reasons, we present three overall models according to the three predictor variables (Model 1. Individualizing, Model 2. Libertarian and Model 3. Binding Foundation), with each model summarizing the results of both outcome variables (social distance and dehumanization). Note, however, that the analyses were conducted for each outcome separately.

### Chapter III - Results

### **Preliminary Analysis**

Spearman's rho ( $\rho$ ) is reported for correlations, due to the non-normal distribution of the variables (all Kologomorov-Smirnov ps > .001). Mean scores, standard deviations and intercorrelations among the hypothesized variables are presented in Table 1.

Unexpectedly, the individualizing foundation was significantly and negatively correlated with social distance and dehumanization, meaning that higher levels of individualizing moral foundation are associated with lower degree of social distance and lower dehumanization towards people that engage in arranged marriages. Likewise, the libertarian foundation was significantly and negatively correlated with social distance but not with dehumanization. On the other hand, the binding foundation demonstrated a positive and significant association with social distance and dehumanization, indicating that the binding foundation is linked to a higher degree of social distance and dehumanization towards people that support that practice. No relation was not found between individualizing, binding and libertarian foundation and the attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages itself. Moreover, open-mindedness and cultural empathy did not correlate significantly with the attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages. However, cultural empathy did correlate significantly and positively with the individualizing foundation and the libertarian foundation, but not the binding foundation. Openmindedness only correlated significantly and positively with the libertarian foundation, but not with the remaining moral foundations.

Among the additional variables, interestingly, political right-wing orientation positively and significantly correlated with the binding foundation, whilst negatively and significantly associated with the individualizing and libertarian foundation, similarly to Haidt & Graham (2007) and Graham et al. (2009). Implying that people who self-identified as closer to the political right wing are associated with greater endorsement of the binding foundation and less endorsement of the individualizing and libertarian foundations. Negative contact valence and political right-wing orientation both correlated positively and significantly with dehumanization and social distance, meaning that a more right-wing orientation and/or negative contact

# INTERGROUP IMPLICATIONS OF MORAL DIVIDES OVER ARRANGED MARRIAGES

experiences with immigrants is associated with greater endorsement of the negative attitudes towards people that engage in arranged marriages.

### INTERGROUP IMPLICATIONS OF MORAL DIVIDES OVER ARRANGED MARRIAGES

Table 1.

Means Standard Deviations and Correlations Between the Variables Included in the Hypothesized Model

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. IndFound	5.36	.77	_							
2. LiberFound	6.02	.79	.253**	_						
3. BindFound	3.78	.72	086	101	_					
4. AttiArrang	4.78	1.39	.002	047	.006	_				
5. SocDist	2.15	.73	111*	182**	.152**	.346**	_			
6. Dehuman	3.70	.82	149**	091	.241**	.355**	.455**	_		
7. CulEmp	5.68	.66	.240**	.139*	.016	015	136*	130*	_	
8. OpenMin	4.94	.77	.105	.134*	020	035	-035	023	.475**	_

*Note:* \*p < .05. \*\*p < .001., IndFound = Individualizing Foundation; LiberFound = Libertarian Foundation; BindFound = Binding Foundation; AttiArrang = Attitudes Towards Arranged Marriages; SocDist = Social Distance; Dehuman = Dehumanization; CulEmp = Cultural Empathy; OpenMin = Open-Mindedness

#### **Moderated Mediation Models**

For the main analysis, we used the macro Process for SPSS (Hayes, 2019). We specified six moderated mediation models (Model 9 in Process) with each of the moral foundations as predictors, attitudes towards the people that engage in arranged marriages as the outcome (i.e. social distance and dehumanization tested separately), attitudes towards the concept itself as mediator and intercultural competences as two moderators tested simultaneously (see Figure 2 for conceptual model and Table 2 for a summary of unstandardized path coefficients and standard errors for a, b, and c' paths). The procedures and recommendations outlined by Hayes (2013) to test conditional indirect effects were used to examine the moderated mediation models.

### Model 1. Individualizing Foundation.

The first model included the individualizing foundation as a predictor. We report the complete results of this analysis in Table 2 (Model 1.1. for social distance as the outcome and Model 1.2 for dehumanization as the outcome). The results showed a negative direct effect of individualizing foundation on social distance and dehumanization. Hence, the predictive role of the individualizing foundation on social distance (H1a) and dehumanizing attitudes (H1b) towards people that engage in arranged marriages was found, but in the opposite direction than hypothesized. There was no significant association between individualizing foundation and the attitudes towards arranged marriages itself. However, attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages predicted significantly and positively social distance and dehumanization. That is, participants who had more negative attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages were more likely to report more social distance and dehumanized attitudes towards people who engage in arranged marriages. There was no significant indirect effect of individualizing foundation through attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages on social distance (B = .007, SE = .019 95% CI = [-.029, .048]), and dehumanization (B = .011, SE = .023, 95% CI = [-.031, .060]). Hence, we did not find mediation and consequently, H1c was not supported.

Moderated mediation analyses revealed no significant interaction between individualizing foundation and intercultural competences when predicting attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages. The nonsignificant index of moderated mediation showed that there was no moderated mediation (for social distance:  $B_{\text{CulEmp}}$ : .045, SE = .030, 95%CI = [-.017, .102];  $B_{\text{OpenMin}}$ : -.036, SE = .030, CI = [-.091, .030]; for dehumanization:  $B_{\text{CulEmp}}$ : .060, SE = .036,

95%CI = [-.014, .129];  $B_{\text{OpenMin}}$ : -.041, SE = .036, CI = [-.109, .036])<sup>4</sup>. The 95% confidence intervals for all the conditional indirect effects did include zero, signifying that the interaction effects were statistically nonsignificant (1 *SD* below the mean, at the mean, and 1 *SD* above the mean). Thus, there was no support for H3a and H3b.

#### Model 2. Libertarian Foundation.

Model 2 included the libertarian foundation as the predictor and was otherwise identical to Model 1. We report the complete results of this analysis in Table 2 (Model 2.1 for social distance, Model 2.2 for dehumanization). The results showed a negative direct effect of libertarian foundation on social distance and dehumanization. Hence, the predictive role of the libertarian foundation on social distance (H1a) and dehumanizing (H1b) attitudes towards people that engage in arranged marriages was found, but in the opposite direction than hypothesized. The negative regression indicates that a higher endorsement of the libertarian foundation was associated with less social distance and dehumanizing attitudes. There was no significant association between libertarian foundation and the attitudes towards the concept itself. As in Model 1, attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages predicted significantly and positively social distance and dehumanization. There was no significant indirect effect of individualizing foundation through attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages on social distance (B = -.019, SE = .015, 95% CI = [-.050, .010]), and dehumanization (B = -.018, SE = -.018

Moderated mediation analyses revealed no significant interaction between libertarian foundation and intercultural competences when predicting attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages. The nonsignificant index of moderated mediation showed that there was no moderated mediation (for social distance:  $B_{\text{CulEmp}}$ : -.015, SE = .027, 95%CI = [-.073, .035];  $B_{\text{OpenMin}}$ : .012, SE = .026, CI = [-.039, .064]; for dehumanization:  $B_{\text{CulEmp}}$ : -.006, SE = .032, 95%CI = [-.069, .058];  $B_{\text{OpenMin}}$ : .016, SE = .032, CI = [-.047, .079]). Furthermore, the 95% confidence intervals for all the conditional indirect effects did include zero, signifying that the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Confidence intervals including zero for each index of moderated mediation indicate that any two conditional indirect effects are significantly indifferent from each other. Hence, the relationship between the indirect effect and the moderator is zero – no moderated mediation.

effects were statistically nonsignificant at all levels of cultural empathy and open mindedness (1 *SD* below the mean, at the mean, and 1 *SD* above the mean). Thus, there was no support for H3a and H3b, respectively.

#### Model 3. Binding Foundation.

Model 3 included the binding foundation as the predictor and was otherwise identical to Model 1 and 2. We report the complete results of this analysis in Table 2 (Model 3.1 for social distance, Model 3.2 for dehumanization). The results showed a positive direct effect of binding foundation on social distance and dehumanization. Hence, the predictive role of a binding foundation on social distance (H2a) and dehumanizing (H2b) attitudes towards people that engage in arranged marriages was found, however in the opposite direction as hypothesized. The positive regression indicates that a higher endorsement of the binding foundation was associated with greater social distance and dehumanizing attitudes. There was no significant association between the binding foundation and the attitudes towards the concept itself. As in Model 1 and 2, attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages predicted significantly and positively social distance and dehumanization. There was no significant indirect effect of binding foundation through attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages on social distance (B = -.002, SE = .018, 95% CI = [-.038, .037]) and dehumanization (B = -.010, SE = .022, 95% CI = [-.055, .034]). Hence, we did not find mediation and consequently, H2c was not supported.

Moderated mediation analyses revealed no significant interaction between binding foundation and intercultural competences when predicting attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages. The nonsignificant index of moderated mediation showed that there was no moderated mediation (for social distance:  $B_{\text{CulEmp}}$ : -.003, SE = .029, 95%CI = [-.062, .055];  $B_{\text{OpenMin}}$ : -.006, SE = .034, CI = [-.076, .059]; for dehumanization:  $B_{\text{CulEmp}}$ : -.010, SE = .035, 95%CI = [-.082, .060];  $B_{\text{OpenMin}}$ : .005, SE = .041, CI = [-.079, .086]). Furthermore, the 95% confidence intervals for all the conditional indirect effects did include zero, signifying that the effects were statistically nonsignificant at all levels of cultural empathy and open mindedness (1 SD below the mean, at the mean, and 1 SD above the mean). Thus, there was no support for H4a and H4b, respectively.

Table 2.

Model Coefficients for the Conditional Process Model 1-3

			Out	comes					B     SE     p     B     S.       8.227     4.832     .090     3.92     .3      616     .878     .484    222     .0       —     —     .203     .03				
		AttiArran	g		SocDist	t		A	AttiArran	g		Dehuma	n
Predictors	В	SE	p	В	SE	p		В	SE	p	В	SE	p
Model 1.1							Model 1.2						
Constant	7.192	4.845	.139	1.946	.296	<.001		8.227	4.832	.090	3.92	.329	<.001
IndFound	430	.883	.626	111	.050	.025		616	.878	.484	222	.055	< .001
Atti.Arrang				.168	.028	< .001					.203	.032	< .001
OpenMin	1.097	.662	.009					1.048	.654	.110			
Ind.Found x OpenMin	213	.124	.087					203	.123	.100			
CultEmp	-1.419	.965	.142					-1.580	.962	.102			
Ind. Found x CultEmp	.269	.174	.124					.295	.173	.090			
		$R^2 = .013$			$R^2 = .1$	13			$R^2 = .01$	4		$R^2 = .13$	53
	F (5, 31	6) = .804,	p < .547	F (2, 319	) = 20.28	30, p < .001		F(5, 302)	(2) = 1.859,	p < .506	F (2, 305	5) = 9.635	5, p < .001
Model 2.1							Model 2.2						
Constant	4.307	5.097	.399	2.404	.324	<.001		8.227	4.832	.090	3.543	.380	<.001
LiberFound	.035	.883	.967	169	.047	< .001		616	.878	.484	129	.056	.021
AttiArrang				.160	.028	< .001					.195	.032	< .001
OpenMin	487	.871	.576					1.048	.654	.110			
LiberFound x OpenM	.077	.142	.592					203	.123	.100			
CultEmp	.622	1.003	.535					-1.580	.962	.102			
LibertFound x CultEmp	092	.163	.574					.295	.173	.090			
		$R^2 = .006$	5		$R^2 = .1$	13			$R^2 = .014$	4		$R^2 = .17$	23
	F (5, 31	6) = .360,	p < .876	F (2, 319	) = 24.51	5, p < .001		F(5, 302)	(2) = 1.859,	p < .506	F (2, 305	) = 21.47	9, p < .001

Model 3.1							Model 3.2						
Constant	3.492	3.869	.367	.784	.241	.001		8.227	4.832	.282	1.814	.275	<.001
BindFound	.298	.986	.763	.152	.053	.004		.127	.979	.897	.245	.059	< .001
AttiArrang				.166	.028	< .001					.201	.032	< .001
OpenMin	.104	.628	.869					122	.628	.846			
BindFound x OpenM	035	.166	.831					.027	.167	.872			
CultEmp	.128	.678	.850					.234	.674	.728			
BindFound x CultEmp	019	.176	.915					051	.175	.771			
		$R^2 = .001$			$R^2 = .12$	22			$R^2 = .00$	01		$R^2 = .1$	55
	F (5, 310	5) = 1.942,	p < .998	F (2, 319	(2) = 22.13	0, p < .001		F(5, 30)	(2) = 1.884	l, p < .998	F (2, 30	(5) = 28.0	64, p < .00

*Note*. Non-standardized regression coefficients are reported. The column AttiArrang refers to effects on the mediator (attitudes toward arranged marriages), while the columns SocDist and Dehuman refer to effects on the outcome (social distance and dehumanization, respectively). The difference in degrees of freedom is due to missing values.

#### **Chapter IV - Discussion**

Departing from social psychological research and theory positing the power of moral attitudes (Sktika et al. 2002, 2005; Wright et al., 2008), this study aimed at examining intergroup implications of moral divides over arranged marriages. Building on preliminary research on moral diversity (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011; Haidt et al. 2003; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Koleva, Graham, Ivyer, Ditto & Haidt, 2012), we investigated whether attitudes towards the concept of arranged marriages explain why moral foundations contribute to social distance and dehumanization of groups that engage in arranged marriages. In order to build peaceful intergroup relations, it is necessary to understand how such groups are perceived by the German majority, and to examine factors that might affect their attitudes in a positive way, such as intercultural competences.

Contrary to the expected, the individualizing and libertarian moral foundations predicted more positive attitudes toward groups that engage in arranged marriages, that is, less social distance toward and less dehumanization of the groups that engage arranged marriages. In contrast to that, it was the binding moral approach (ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, purity/sanctity), that predicted more social distance and more dehumanization. We expected that the binding foundation would mean more understanding for group traditions and hence more positive attitudes towards groups that engage in arranged marriages, but what we found were actually more negative attitudes. Previous research showed a similar pattern, that is, the binding foundation predicting stricter moral judgments on issues related to sexuality and relationships (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011; Kolvea et al. 2011) as well as negative intergroup outcomes, such as negative behavioral intentions (Hadarics & Kende, 2018a) and increasing prejudice (Hadarics & Kende, 2018b).

Our findings replicated, to an extent, Skitka and colleagues' (2002, 2005) findings that strong moral attitudes predict more social distance towards morally dissimilar others and extended them by adding dehumanization as a second theoretically relevant intergroup outcome. Interestingly, we only found direct effects of moral foundations on the attitudes toward the people that engage in arranged marriages, but no mediation via attitudes toward the practice itself. Given that neither of the three moral foundations was associated with attitudes towards the practice of arranged marriages itself, the study did not corroborate the hypothesized underlying

process through which social distance and dehumanization of cultural groups engaging in arranged marriages occurs. Future research may investigate other theoretically plausible explanations for these direct effects.

Lastly, the results do not suggest that cultural empathy or open-mindedness go beyond their adaptive role in intercultural transitions or in situations of direct intercultural contact. In other words, the link between attitudes towards the practice and the moral foundations was not dependent on an individual's level of cultural empathy or open-mindedness.

### **Individualizing Foundation and Intergroup Attitudes**

We propose five conclusions that can be drawn from our results. First, we found that the individualizing foundation predicts more positive attitudes towards groups that engage in arranged marriages. Previous research found that in an individualistically oriented culture, like Germany, emphasizing the individualizing foundation (and disregarding the binding foundation) predicts more positive moral judgments on issues in the personal and sexual sphere (Vaulciar & Fischer, 2011). They argued that moral issues tapping into the binding moral system receive more approval in cultures where individuals' interests stand above the interests of the group (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011). That is because in individualistically oriented cultures, personal goals and self-fulfillment are primary moral considerations. Hence, individuals in these cultures have more positive attitudes towards issues that appeal to their independent selves, whilst deemphasizing social duties and obligations (e.g., dishonoring one's ingroup).

In contrast to this, we speculated that individuals should make more negative judgments towards people that engage in arranged marriages as it evokes a violation of individual independence and personal fulfillment (i.e. individualizing foundation) and prompts the idea of a duty-bound system (i.e. binding foundation). Yet, the very fact of endorsing the individualizing foundation and supporting such non-binding foundations actually predicts more positive attitudes towards groups that engage in arranged marriages. Thus, endorsing the individualizing foundation may translate into greater accepting of non-individualistic values and customs, such as that of arranged marriages and possibly positing an expression of individual (or group) freedom. In fact, individuals who endorse the individualizing foundation more than the binding foundation are more concerned with equitable distribution of power (Federico, Weber, Ergun & Hunt, 2013). It therefore seems plausible, that such individuals, even if they see the structural

underpinnings of the practice of arranged marriages as problematic (e.g. lack of individual autonomy, presence of family pressures and interests), are still less likely to blame the affected spouses for their situation. These attitudes may be driven by compassion (harm foundation), sense of justice and equality (fairness foundation) for the people that engage in arranged marriages. Hence, these individuals tend to have less social distance and dehumanizing perceptions of people who engage in arranged marriages.

#### **Libertarian Foundation and Intergroup Attitudes**

Second, and similar to the individualizing foundation, we found that the libertarian foundation also predicts more positive attitudes towards groups that engage in arranged marriages. However, we again speculated that individuals who endorse the libertarian foundation would have more negative attitudes towards people that engage in arranged marriages. Our reasoning was grounded in the idea that the value of individual liberty, whose violation allegedly underlies arranged marriages, is the main argument at stake against arranged marriages. However, this does not seem to be the whole picture: Individuals who endorse the libertarian foundation may neither perceive arranged marriages as morally acceptable, nor may they feel that any governmental or external interferences should have an impact on the individuals who engage in such practices, such as legal actions against the practicing of arranged marriages. This notion underlies the libertarian vision of negative liberty (Berlin, 1969), instead of the liberal vision of positive liberty captured by the individualizing foundation (MFT's original conception; Haidt & Jospeh, 2004).

Therefore, the libertarian foundation differs from the individualizing foundation in that it is bound to a moral thinking that emphasizes the illegitimacy of imposing any particular moral code upon others, as the moral value of liberty supersedes all other moral principles (Ivyer et al., 2012). Indeed, when libertarians are faced with liberal concerns for social justice or conservatives concerns for respecting existing social structures, they are willing to reject both, for the sake of the superordinate concern in preserving individual liberty (Ivyer et al., 2012). That is, in case of a decision *for* an arranged marriage agreement it still illustrates a free choice, and thus upholding the value of individual liberty. Even though an arranged marriage may not only have implications for the spouses, but also for the extended family or social group, these social interdependencies are taken into account by the spouses and are not necessarily seen as a

suppression of their freedom. Yet, what is called an infringement of people's freedom in one culture, does not necessarily mean the same in another. Therefore, it is a possibility that in its current form, this foundation fails to capture cultural variation in how liberty is interpreted. Freedom of choice in Western cultures usually emphasize individual rights to choose as opposed to obligations toward one's group, while the opposite seems to be true in collectivistic cultures. Notwithstanding, when individuals recognized the decision in favor of an arranged marriage as a free choice without prejudice to the cultural, social or historical context of arranged marriages (thus strongly endorsed libertarian foundation), they tended to report less social distance and dehumanization of groups that engage in arranged marriages.

#### **Binding Foundation and Intergroup Attitudes**

Third, we found that the binding foundation predicted more negative attitudes towards groups that engage in arranged marriages. However, we hypothesized that the binding foundation would contribute to more positive rather than more negative attitudes. Specifically, we expected that the binding foundation, to which the West attributes less value, would be linked to an understanding for group traditions, social considerations (e.g. cultural transmissions) and interdependencies that are behind arranged marriages. In other words, an understanding for the fact that individual self-fulfillment may be of secondary concern whilst the moral obligation to meet other people's needs is primary (Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993). The findings, in contrast, suggest that more social distance and dehumanizing perception of people that practice arranged marriages is associated with the presence of moral intuitions about ingroup/loyalty, authority and purity concerns (binding foundation).

One possible reason is that individuals who endorsed the binding foundation to a relatively high extent considered the norms and traditions of their own ingroup (German people who engage in love marriages) as the standard of comparison, leading to the disapproval of outgroup members engaging in practices rooted in a value structure foreign to the German ingroup (i.e., arranged marriages). Concerns about ingroup loyalty could be accompanied by those about migration policy issues, such as that of marriage migration, that may be seen as threatening to the maintenance of social order and rules of the Germany society (authority/respect). It is also possible to see individuals' disapproval of non-Western institution of marriage (e.g. arranged marriages) as an outcome of attachment to traditional practices of their

ingroup or a discomfort with potential change. With regards to the purity/sanctity foundation, Koleva and colleagues (2012) highlight its dominating importance in predicting moral disapproval on cultural war issues, such as same-sex marriage. Arranged marriages may challenge the Western idea of purity, which is related to love, while 'giving away' a daughter or son for the sake of family interests may be closer to what the West considers impure.

Thus, individuals who strongly endorse the binding foundation may be more likely to view people who engage in arranged marriages as a threat to Western societal norms, or even perceived their preference for arranged marriages as impeding their assimilation to the German culture. In fact, the binding foundation was found to be associated with protecting communal norms and identities (Federico et al., 2013) and in the case of Germany, the rejection of an arranged marriage is often considered an indicator of cultural integration into German society and is characterized as a benchmark for the 'integration process' (Huth-Hildebrandt, 2002, p. 163). This may explain why Germans endorsing the binding foundation may tend to regard those who engage in arranged marriages more negatively, and report more social distance and dehumanizing perceptions towards them.

Previous research demonstrated that individualism-collectivism predicted moral attitudes for issues related to sexuality and relationships, with collectivistic cultures being stricter in their moral judgment than individualistic cultures due to their emphasis on the binding foundation. Thus, the binding foundation is assumed to be culture-specific to collectivistic cultures or non-Western societies (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011; Graham et al., 2009). Therefore, the surprising part of our finding is the very fact that it occurred in Germany, an individualistically oriented culture (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010) that is assumed to actually de-emphasize the binding foundation. Note that previous findings referred solely to personal and sexual issues that are more common and accepted in today's Western societies, such as same-sex marriages, having a baby outside of marriage or divorce (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011; Koleva et al., 2012). In contrast to that, arranged marriages are not the norm in Western countries. They are aimed at transmitting cultural values and maintaining the traditional social order and roles, and therefore, are largely approved in non-Western cultures, whilst receiving high rates of disapproval in Westernized societies. Taken together, it seems like the binding foundation (in both individualistic and collectivistic cultures) predicts stricter attitudes towards practices that deviate from the ingroup norms.

Another possible explanation may flow from the link that we found between the MFT and dehumanization. Those who endorse the binding foundation do not seem to grant full humanness to those who engage in arranged marriages. As the binding foundation involves a motivation to protect ingroup norms and identities, it seems plausible that those who are perceived as not adhering to these are denied corresponding characteristics (i.e. civility, maturity as HU attributes and interpersonal warmth, individuality or depth as HN attributes). It highlights the idea of the German Leitkultur, that takes an assimilationist approach to cultural differences and may be driven by the propensity to experience social power. That is, requiring cultural minorities to give up his or her own cultural identity and customs and become absorbed into the German culture. Empirical support for the role of power on dehumanization stems from two studies that found that those who were assigned high-power roles or who had a greater personal sense of power tended to dehumanize their low-power out-group (Lammers & Stapel, 2011; Gwinn, Judd & Park, 2013). However, individuals who endorse the individualizing or libertarian foundation strongly advocate for equitable distribution of power (Federico et al., 2013) and the proposition to be freed from any external powers (i.e. government) (Ivyer et al., 2012), respectively. Thus, the social-structural factor of power does not seem to affect them.

#### **Attitudes towards Arranged Marriages**

Fourth, we found that moral foundations do not affect attitudes towards the practice of arranged marriages itself. Hence, our results failed to explain why moral foundations contribute to social distance and dehumanization of groups that engage in arranged marriages. In general, participants might have felt inhibited or sensitized to give affective valence (e.g. good-bad, kind-cruel) to cultural differences in an overt and explicit way. Because Muslims receive high amount of stigmatization in Germany and the public discourse about arranged marriages is being pinpointed to this particular ethnic group<sup>5</sup>, it seems plausible that members of the society do not want to make judgments that could be attributed to ethnic bias. Alternatively, because our sample

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For example, minister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU), as mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, blamed "certain migrants" for impeding integration due to the practice of arranged marriages. He also stated that "up to 50 per cent of these second and third generation of Turkish origin marry partners from abroad". It is thus obvious that Schäuble addresses with "certain migrants" the residents of Turkish origin, that is, Muslims.

actually represented rather leftist political affiliation, participants could be motivated to reaffirm the crucial liberal norm of equal treatment regarding German policies on foreigners. In this spirit, these individuals do not feel compelled to give valence to customs or practices that are different, foreign or archaic. Note that the free self-determination recognized in the human rights also encompasses options for lifestyles outside of heterosexual marriage, such as single life and same-sex forms of life or other 'alternative' models of living together. One might also argue that online match making, as done in many Westerns societies nowadays, is also some kind of arranged form that is based on social conventions in the globalized world.

While the above may explain why neither of the three moral foundations was associated with attitudes towards the practice of arranged marriages itself, it does not explain, however, why we found effects on attitudes toward groups but in the same time no effects on attitudes toward the concept. Theoretically, social desirability or a motivation to be congruent with one's declarative ideological standpoint should apply to either. One potential explanation for this finding can be found in the social intuitionist approach to morality (Haidt, 2001) that states that moral judgments are not always rational, but are primarily driven by quick, automatic, emotionladen moral intuitions. It is possible that participants who feel that arranged marriages are morally wrong and feel strong emotions towards people engaging in them (i.e. social distance and dehumanization), cannot really tell why it is wrong. Haidt (2001) states that moral intuitions are "the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion" (p. 818). Thus, moral reasoning is considered a post-hoc justification for one's moral intuitions. Additional support for this stems from studies showing that moral judgments were based on gut feelings instead of reasoning (Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy, 2001) and that people are unable to find supporting reasons or explanations for how they actually reached a judgement (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).

#### The Role of Intercultural Competency

Lastly, we did not find support for the moderating role of cultural empathy or open-mindedness on the moral foundation – attitude towards arranged marriage link. A potential theoretical concern is that the multicultural personality model failed to capture the complexity of intercultural competences. The model proposes three major drawbacks: (1) it is domain-specific

insofar that it is solely a trait-based model of intercultural competences (2) it opts an interindividual outlook as opposed to outgroup-ingroup outlook and (3) it is vastly based on expatriate literature and therefore limits the generalizability to our target group of ethnic minorities.

Conceptually, the problem may lie within the trajectory of intercultural competences development, as it progresses from an ethnocentric mindset (perception of one's own culture as a standard of comparison) towards an ethnorelative or cosmopolitan mindset (ability to shift between cultural perspective) (Bennett, 1986, 1993, 2004). Having cultural/global worldviews that are sophisticated and demonstrating a complex understanding of cultural commonalities and differences, refers to the attitude/worldview domain of intercultural competences (Bennetts, 1986). Given the interrelatedness of the three content domains that conceptualize intercultural competence as a whole - intercultural traits, intercultural attitudes/worldviews and intercultural capabilities (Leung, Ang & Tan, 2014) - it seems crucial to further explore intercultural competences in their complexity (mixed models as opposed to domain-specific models) in order to ascertain if it affects people's views on moral issues stemming from cultural diversity (see the Global Competencies Inventory, GCI; Bird et al., 2010; Global Mindset Inventory, GMI; Javidan & Teagarden 2011).

#### Limitations and future directions

One limitation of this study is that it relied on self-reports, and since the topic was rather sensitive, the responses might have been biased. Indeed, the social desirability measure showed slightly higher scores than the reference ranges (Nießen et al., 2019)<sup>6</sup>.

Further, the convenience sample used for this study was not representative for the general German population. For instance, while the governing coalition in Germany consists of an alliance of the CDU and SPD party suggesting that the overall German population is rather conservative, the vast majority of our sample indicated to have voted the more left oriented party

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The means of the current sample ( $M_{PQ} = 4.5$ , SD = 1.08;  $M_{NQ} = 3.2$ , SD = 1.39) were slightly higher than from the reference range proposed by Nießen (2019) ( $M_{PQ} = 3.67$ , SD = 0.68;  $M_{NQ} = 2.12$ , SD = 0.89). Thus, indicating possible interference with regards to response authenticity. An implicit evaluation measure should be of interest for future research.

called Alliance 90/The Greens in the previous federal elections in 2017. Therefore, the sample's ideological outlook might have differed from the population, potentially biasing the results.

Moreover, this study focused on only one national context. The question remains to what extent the results are generalizable to the German population and beyond it. Future studies could attempt to replicate these findings with representative samples and in different national contexts. As a result of international migration, the co-existence of these two broad types of marriage system within Western Europe became a research area in its own rights, and one that has largely been overlooked so far (Drago, 2007; Cherlin, 2009). Alike Germany, other European countries like France and the Netherlands showed a common trend towards decreasing marriage migration rights (Bonjour & Block, 2016), thus depicting particular interesting countries for future research.

The reliabilities of the moral foundations, assessed as the predictor variables, were considerably low. A low reliability of psychological measures can be attributed to measurement error or to a low number of items. First, an examination of the open-ended commentaries that participants had a possibility to leave at the end of the questionnaire showed that some had difficulties to answer the questions of the moral foundation measure (see Appendix A, Question Blog 1). Although the moral judgment items are assumed to be more contextualized and concrete than the moral relevance items in the MFQ (Haidt, 2001), they were still perceived as too abstract by the participants. Second, the libertarian foundation consisted of only two items. Both of these reasons might have played a role. Note, however, that other authors also reported low reliability coefficients (Haidt et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011).

Moreover, this study did not ask the participants whether they were thinking of any particular ethnic group that engages in arranged marriages, while answering the questionnaire. As a point of fact, Muslim immigrants are the largest group of immigrations in Germany that practice arranged marriages (Hense & Schorch, 2011). Although we consciously choose not to bring attention to this fact in our survey, one may suspect that the particular ethnic group of Muslims might have been evoked, alongside with the prevailing stereotypes associated with this highly stigmatized group in Germany. If that was the case, our results referring to the attitudes toward arranged marriages and people who engage in them could have been confounded with ethnic prejudice. Future research could consider possible ways to distinguish these two aspects,

for example by using manipulations that involve fictitious groups engaging in arranged marriages.

Another limitation is related to the validity of using direct attitudes measure for an individual's social attitude. As we did not find any mediation effect of the attitudinal measure (i.e. attitudes towards the practice of arranged marriages assessed by semantic differential scale), the study failed to explain *why*, for example, the libertarian and individualizing foundation is associated with positive attitudes towards people engaging in arranged marriages. Future research could make use of indirect attitude measures (e.g. projective techniques or the implicit association test). Note, the present study opted for a merely quantitative approach. In order to follow up the genuine processes behind these associations, future research could take a qualitative or mixed methods approach.

Also, it is noteworthy that there is no reference in the definition or items as to arranged marriages portraying a *cultural* practice. Instead, this study departed from an assumption that Germans consider arranged marriages a cultural practice that is a defining feature of a broadly defined cultural outgroup. However, arranged marriages could also be seen as an individual preference for choosing one's partner, that is not necessarily bound to the group level, which would imply that the results refer to an interpersonal rather than an intergroup level. Even though no specific outgroup label was not given in our questionnaire, the items we used implied an intergroup perspective, as we asked participants to judge others based only on the specific attribute of practicing arranged marriages (i.e. defining their outgroup membership). By consequence, we discuss our results from an intergroup perspective, but and interpersonal perspective is also possible and future research may take it into account.

Finally, for feasibility reasons in the context of a master dissertation, the current study solely focused on the attitudes of the majority host society members. However, as pointed out by Penn (2011) both arranged and love marriages share value systems with a mutual perception of 'superiority' of their own system of marriage, and the corollary derogation of the other. To fully understand the outcomes of moral reasoning behind these attitudes, research could apply a broader approach, examining attitudes towards both marriage systems in societies in which arranged marriages are the norm and in societies in which love marriages are the norm.

#### **Concluding Remarks**

The present study showed that, in an intergroup context where groups are based on their approach to one specific, morally tinted issue: marriage, moral foundations endorsed by the majority group members may have implications for their attitudes toward cultural minorities. Interestingly, the findings are somewhat counterintuitive. While in Germany and other Western countries, the debate about arranged marriages evokes concerns about self-fulfillment, fairness and individual freedom, so typical for the individualizing and libertarian foundation, Germans who endorse these two foundations also show the most positive attitudes toward those who enter arranged marriages. In contrast to that, the most negative attitudes towards people who engage in arranged marriages are predicted by the binding foundation. It appears that this finding draws on moral intuitions that protect ingroup norms and identities — although on the surface these issues may bring up very different concerns, such as individual freedom and human rights. The findings, therefore, offer an interesting first step toward understanding how morality drives individuals to develop certain perceptions of people that engage in arranged marriages. Taken together, our findings may suggest that rationales for or against a particular cultural phenomenon may be actually disconnected from the intuitions that drive the attitude in the first place (Haidt, 2001). We may not even be consciously aware of the intuitive base that underlies the attitudes on moral and social issues (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).

Given these conclusions, it is difficult to indicate practical implications of this study. However, aiming at the bigger picture, what might be missing in the framework to address those negative attitudes toward cultural minorities? To answer this question a multi-level approach is crucial: Diversity per se does not define multiculturalism, how diversity and equitable inclusion is managed or accommodated is of equal, if not the greatest importance (Berry & Ward, 2016). From an ideological point of view, and because moral foundations are strongly bound to individuals, perhaps opinion-makers (people whose opinion strongly influence the opinion of many others, i.e. bloggers or journalists) who vouch for acceptance of diversity could tap into the moral intuitions of decision-makers, politicians and the general public to anchor more multiculturalist ideologies within the society. Until now, the government took a rather rejecting stance on cultural practices different form their own (i.e. confining family reunification and migration due to arranged marriages specifically; from a generic perspective Germany is situated in the lowest rank of the Multicultural Policy Index (MPI - a database which illustrates and

evaluates the status of national multicultural policies; Banting & Kymlicka, 2006 – 2012)), presumably fueling the idea of one powerful German Leitkultur that drives these negative attitudes towards people who engage in arranged marriages. Therefore, a change at the policy-level might also encourage the promotion and acceptability of diversity within the members of the society (i.e. equitable inclusion of minorities who want to practice arranged marriages in Germany), ultimately mitigating the negative attitudes towards cultural minorities.

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# Appendix A – English questionnaire

# **Q1 Moral Foundations**

Stror disag	• •	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	A	gree	e		ong gree	•	
1	2	3	4	5		6			7		
1 1	Harm Farm dation										
<b>1.1</b> 1.1.1	Harm Foundation Compassion for thos	Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtu									
1.1.1	Compassion for thes	e who are sum	oring is the inc	ost oraciar virtae		2	3	4	5	6	7
1.1.2	If I saw a mother slap	f I saw a mother slapping her child, I would be outraged									
1.1.3	The government mus	st first and fore	emost protect a	all people from	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	harm								_		
1.1.4	It can never be right	to kill a humar	n being		1	2	3	4	5 □	6 □	7
1.2	Fairness Foundatio	n									
			4h a maamah an aa		1	2	2	1	_	_	7
1.2.1	When the government should be ensuring the			ne principie	1	2	3 □	<b>4</b> □	5 □	6	<b>7</b> □
1.2.2	Justice, fairness and for a society	equality are the	e most importa	ant requirements	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
1.2.3	In the fight against to violated	errorism, some	people's right	ts will have to be	1	2	3	<b>4</b> □	5 □	6	<b>7</b> □
1.2.4	If a friend wanted to uncomfortable becau		_		1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
1.3	Ingroup-Loyalty Fo	oundation									
1.3.1	If I knew that my bro	other had comr	nitted a murde	er, and the police	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	were looking for him			-							
1.3.2	When it comes to clo	_		_	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	is okay for people to religious group	seek out only	members of th	eir own ethnic or							
1.3.3	Loyalty to one's grow	up is more imp	ortant than on	e's individual	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	concerns										

	In this case we are interested in your personal attitude towards In the following we will give you adjectives and ask you for a br			_			ing.	
2.1.	An arranged marriage can be described as one in which the decipiontly with the family and is assessed positively by the person cor her circumstances.  We would like to emphasize that in this case we do not refer to family and is assessed.	onc orc	erno ed r	ed w	vith riag	rega e or	ard chi	to his
Q2	<b>Attitudes Towards the Concept of Arranged Marriages</b>							
1.6.2	People should be free to decide what group norms or traditions they themselves want to follow	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.6.1	I think everyone should be free to do as they choose, so long as they don't infringe upon the equal freedom of others	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.6	Lifestyle Libertarian Foundation							
1.5.4	The government should try to help people live virtuously and avoid sin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.5.3	Chastity is still an important virtue for teenagers today, even if many don't think it is	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.5.2	I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural	1	2	3	4	<b>5</b> □	6	7
1.5.1	People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
1.5	Purity Foundation							
1.4.4	If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.4.3	Men and women each have different roles to play in society	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.4.2	Respect for authority is something all children need to learn	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
1.4.1	When the government makes laws, those laws should always respect the traditions and heritage of the country	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
1.4	Authority Foundation							
1.3.4	The government should strive to improve the well-being of people in our nation, even if it sometimes happens at the expense of people in other nations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Positive DDDDD Negative

Wise	Foolish
Moral	Immoral
Kind	Cruel
Honest	Dishonest
Fair	Unfair

## 2.2 To what extent do you support or oppose arranged marriages?

Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral or neither	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly
support	support	support		oppose	oppose	oppose
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## 2.3 How justifiable or unjustifiable are arranged marriages to you?

Very justifiable	Moderately justifiable	Slightly justifiable	Uncertain	Slightly unjustifiable	Moderately unjustifiable	Very unjustifiable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

# 2.4 My attitude about arranged marriages reflect something about my core moral values and convictions.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

# **Q3** Intercultural Competences

To what extent do the following statements apply to you?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

## 3.1 Cultural Empathy

3.1.1	Pays attention to the emotions of others	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.2	Is a good listener	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.3	Senses when others get irritated	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.4	Getting to know others profoundly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.5	Enjoys other people's stories	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
3.1.6	Notices when someone is in trouble	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
3.1.7	Sympathizes with others	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.8	Sets others at ease	1	2	3 □	4	5 □	6 □	7
3.2	Open-Mindedness							
3.2.1	Tries out various approaches	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
3.2.2	Is looking for new ways to attain his or her goal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.2.3	Starts a new life easily	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
3.2.4	Likes to imagine solutions to problems	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.2.5	Is a trendsetter in societal developments	1	2	3	4	5 □	6 □	7
3.2.6	Has feeling for what's appropriate in culture	1	2	3	4	5	6	
3.2.7	Seeks people from different backgrounds	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
3.2.8	Has broad range of interests	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

# Q4 Social Distance Please provide your first feeling in each case.

	Extremely positive	Moderately positive	Slightly positive	Neither positive nor negative	Slightly negative		egative		E	Extrem		•
	1	2	3	4	5	6				7		
4.1	How w	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
4.2	How would you feel about granting someone who entered an arranged marriage German citizenship?								4	5	6	7
4.3		How would you feel about having someone who entered into an arranged marriage as your neighbor?							4	5	6	7
4.4		How would you feel about having someone who entered an arranged marriage as your close friend?						3	4	5	6	7
4.5		· ·	_	someone who ed) family men		1	2	3	4	5	6	7

# Q5 Dehumanization

Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

## 5.1. Human Nature

5.1.1	I feel like people who enter engaged marriages are open-minded,			3	4	5	6	7
like they could think clearly about things								
5.1.2	I feel like people who enter engaged marriages are emotional, like	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	they are responsive and warm							

5.1.3	I feel like people who enter engaged marriages are superficial, like they have no depth	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5.1.4	I feel like people who enter engaged marriages are mechanical and cold	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5.2	Human Uniqueness							
5.1.2	I feel like people who enter engaged marriages are refined and cultured	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5.2.3	I feel like people who enter engaged marriages are rational and logical	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5.2.4	I feel like people who enter engaged marriages lack self-restraint	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5.2.4	I feel like people who enter engaged marriages are unsophisticated	11	2	3 □	4	5	6	7
Q6	Social Desirability The following statements may apply more or less to you person Please indicate to what extent they apply to you.	ally	•					
D	The following statements may apply more or less to you person	ally	•			Appl omp	lies letel	ly
D app	The following statements may apply more or less to you person Please indicate to what extent they apply to you.  Doesn't		6		CO			ly
D app	The following statements may apply more or less to you person Please indicate to what extent they apply to you. Doesn't oly at all				CO	omp		ly
D app	The following statements may apply more or less to you person Please indicate to what extent they apply to you.  Doesn't bly at all  1 2 3 4 5		6	3	C(	omp		7 <sub>□</sub>
D app	The following statements may apply more or less to you person Please indicate to what extent they apply to you.  Doesn't oly at all  1 2 3 4 5  Exaggerating positive qualities (PQ+)	1	6		4	7 5	letel	7

6.2 Minimizing negative qualities (NQ-)

6.2.1	It has happened that I have taken advantage of someone in the past	1	2	3	4	<b>5</b> □	6	7
6.2.2	I have occasionally thrown litter away in the countryside or on to the road	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6.2.3	Sometimes I only help people if I expect to get something in return	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Q7</b>	Demographics							
7.1	What is your gender?							
	Male							
7.2	How old are you?							
	21 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 50 51 - 60 61 - 70 71 - 80							
7.3	How do you identify?							
	German and ethnic minority							
7.4	What is the highest level of education you have completed?							
	Secondary school graduation Secondary school leaving certificate (middle school) High school University degree (Bachelor)							

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Which is your current employment status?

7.5

	Student Unemplo Employed Retired Different	•	plicable,	please indicat	e your j	professi	on	)		
7.6	Do you h	ave the	e Germa	n citizenship	?					
	Yes No									
7.7	Were you	born i	in Germ	any?						
	Yes No									
7.8	Was your	mothe	r born iı	n Germany?						
	Yes No (Pleas	se indic	ate the co	ountry in whic	ch your	father v	was born _	)		
7.9	Was your	father	born in	Germany?						
	Yes No (Pleas	se indic	ate the co	ountry in whic	ch your	father v	was born _	)		
7.10	Are you	curren	tly resid	lent in Germa	any?					
	Yes No									
7.11	Do you l	belong	to a cult	ure that prac	tices aı	ranged	l marriag	es?		
	Yes No									
7.12.1 In the Bundestag elections, you were able to cast two votes. The first vote for a candidate from your constituency, the second vote for a party. Which candidate did you give your first and second votes to?										
	CDU /CSU	SPD	Die Linke	Bündnis90/ Die Grüne	FDP	AfD	Piraten partei	NPD	Don't know/Don 't want to answer	I did not vote
First Vote										

Second Vote									
				there a poli			t you are	closer to th	an any
	es No prefer not		wer						
"									een "left" and e left and 7 means
	Left				Center	•			Right
1		2		_	4		5	6	7
				3 ⊐	<del>4</del>		<i>3</i> □		
Not at religio									Very religious
1		2		3	4		5	6	7
□ Y	<b>o you hav</b> Yes No	e anyo	ne of diffe	rent ethnici	ity in yo	ur close	est famil	y?	
7.16 H	ow much	contac	t do you h	ave with im	migran	ts?			
A grea	nt deal								None at all

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

#### 7.17 To what extent is the memory of contact with immigrants more or less positive?

Extremely positive						Extremely negative
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## Appendix B – German questionnaire

#### Q1 Moralische Grundlagen

	stimme erhaupt	Ich stimme nicht zu	Ich stimme eher nicht	Ich stimme weder zu,	Ich stimme eher zu	9	Icl stim		Ic	h st vol	imn I un	
	cht zu		zu	<b>3.33.</b> 2.0		ΖÜ		ganz zi				
1		2	3	dagegen 4	5		6			7		
1.1		ındlagen	1 ' 1 ' ' , 1'	: 1 .: TD	•	1	2	2	4	~	_	7
1.1.1	Mitgefu	hi fur die, die	leiden, ist die	wichtigste Tug	end	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.1.2	Wenn ic empört	ch eine Mutter	sehen würde,	die ihr Kind sc	hlug, wäre ich	1	2	3	<b>4</b> □	5 □	6 □	7
1.1.3	Die Reg	~	n erster Linie a	alle Menschen	vor Schaden	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.1.4	Es kann	kann niemals richtig sein, einen Menschen zu töten						3	4	5	6	7
1.2	Gerech	Gerechtigkeitsgrundlagen										
1.2.1		Wenn die Regierung Gesetze erlässt, sollte das oberste Prinzip sicherstellen, dass alle fair behandelt werden					2	3	4	5	6	7
1.2.2		igkeit und Gle etzungen für e		~		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.2.3		pf gegen den ' en verletzt we		nüssen die Rech	nte einiger	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.2.4	einreihe		le ich mich un	ange Schlange wohl fühlen, w		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.3	Gruppe	enloyalitätsgr	undlagen									
1.3.1	begange			meine Schwes uchte, würde ich	ter einen Mord ch ihn der	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.3.2	geht, ist	-	g, nur Mitglied	nd romantische ler der eigenen	_	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.3.3	_	ralität gegenüb Iellen Anlieger	_	Gruppe ist wi	chtiger als die	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1.3.4	Die Regierung sollte sich bemühen, das Wohlergehen der Menschen in unserer Nation zu verbessern, auch wenn dies manchmal auf Kosten der Menschen in anderen Nationen geschieht	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.4	Autoritätsgrundlagen							
1.4.1	Wenn die Regierung Gesetze erlässt, sollten diese Gesetze immer die Traditionen und die Kulturerbe des Landes respektieren	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
1.4.2	Respekt vor Autorität ist etwas, das alle Kinder lernen müssen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.4.3	Männer und Frauen haben unterschiedliche Rollen in der Gesellschaft	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.4.4	Wenn ich Soldat wäre und den Befehlen meines Kommandanten nicht zustimme, würde ich trotzdem gehorchen, denn das ist meine Pflicht	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.5	Reinheitsgrundlagen							
1.5.1	Menschen sollten keine Dinge tun, die andere empören, auch wenn niemand verletzt wird	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
1.5.2	Ich würde einige Handlungen als falsch bezeichnen, weil sie unnatürlich oder ekelhaft sind	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.5.3	Keuschheit ist auch heute noch eine wichtige Tugend für Jugendliche, auch wenn viele nicht daran glauben	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.5.4	Die Regierung sollte versuchen, den Menschen zu helfen, ein rechtschaffenes Leben zu führen und Sünde zu vermeiden	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.6	Libertäre Lebensstil Grundlagen							
1.6.1	Ich denke, dass jeder frei sein sollte, so lange man nicht die gleiche Freiheit der anderen verletzt	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.6.2	Die Menschen sollten frei entscheiden können, welchen Gruppennormen oder Traditionen sie selbst folgen wollen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Q2	Einstellung gegenüber des Konzepts der Arrangierten Ehen							
2.1.	Von einer arrangierten Ehe kann dann gesprochen werden, wer gemeinsam mit der Familie gefällt wird und dieser von den Bet auf die Lebensumstände bewertet wird. Wir möchten betonen, nicht auf Zwangsheirat oder Kinderheirat beziehen! Wir interessieren uns hier für Ihre persönliche Einstellung gege	roff das	ene s wi	n po r un	siti s in	v im die	Bez sem	zug Falle

Im Folgenden geben wir Ihnen Adjektive und bitten Sie um eine kurze Einschätzung.

Gut 🗆 🗘 🗘 Schlecht

Hochzeit.

Positiv	Negativ
Vernünftig	Närrisch
Moralisch/Sittlich	Unmoralisch/Sittenwidrig
Gütig	Ungütig
Ehrlich	Unehrlich
Gerecht	Ungerecht

#### 2.2 Inwieweit unterstützen oder lehnen Sie arrangierte Ehen ab?

Starke Unter-	Mäßige	Neutral	Neutral oder gar	Leichte	Mäßige	Starke
stützung	Unter-	oder	nicht	Ablehnung	Ablehnung	Ablehnung
	stützung	gar nicht				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

#### 2.3 Wie gerechtfertigt oder ungerechtfertigt sind arrangierte Ehen für Sie?

Sehr	Mäßig	Etwas	Unsicher	Etwas	Mäßig	Sehr
gerecht-	gerecht-	gerecht-		ungerecht-	ungerecht-	ungerecht-
fertigt	fertigt	fertigt		fertigt	fertigt	fertigt
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

# 2.4 Meine Einstellung zu arrangierten Ehen spiegelt etwas über meine moralischen Grundwerte und Überzeugungen wider.

Ich stimme	Ich	Ich stimme				
überhaupt	nicht zu	eher nicht	weder zu,	eher zu	stimme	voll und
nicht zu		zu	noch		zu	ganz zu
			dagegen			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

#### Q3 Interkulturelle Kompetenzen

Inwieweit treffen die folgenden Aussagen auf Sie zu?

Tale addresses	T.14!	T.14!	T.1/!	Tale officers	T .1.	T.1
Ich stimme	Ich stimme	Ich stimme	ich stimme	Ich stimme	Ich	Ich stimme
überhaupt	nicht zu	eher nicht	weder zu,	eher zu	stimme	voll und
nicht zu		zu	noch		zu	ganz zu
			dagegen			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## 3.1 Kulturelle Empathie

	•							
3.1.1	Achtet auf die Gefühle anderer	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.2	Ist ein guter Zuhörer	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.3	Spürt, wenn andere gereizt werden	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.4	Andere gründlich kennenlernen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.5	Genießt die Geschichten anderer Leute	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.6	Bemerkt, wenn jemand in Schwierigkeiten ist	1	2	3	<b>4</b> □	5 □	6	<b>7</b> □
3.1.7	Sympathisiert mit anderen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.1.8	Beruhigt andere	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
3.2	Aufgeschlossenheit							
3.2.1	Erprobt verschiedene Ansätze	1	2	3	4	5	6 □	7
3.2.2	Sucht nach neuen Wegen, um sein oder ihr Ziel zu erreichen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.2.3	Beginnt leicht ein neues Leben	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.2.4	Stellt sich gerne Problemlösungen vor	1	2	3	-	5	_	
3.2.5	Ist Trendsetter in gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	
			_	2	4	_	6	7
3.2.6	Hat Gespür für das, was in einer Kultur angemessen ist	1	2	3 □	4	5		

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3.2.8

Hat eine Palette von Interessen

<b>)</b> 4	Sozia	le Distanz											
	Extrem positiv	geben Sie in Mäßig positiv	jedem Fall Ih Ein wenig positive	Weder positive noch negativ	ihlsreaktion an. Ein wenig negativ	Mäßig negativ			Extrem negativ				
	1	2	3	4	5	6				7			
4.1			fühlen, jemand l in Deutschlan		arrangierte Ehe en?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
4.2			fühlen, jemand deutsche Staats		arrangierte Ehe zu verleihen?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
4.3			fühlen, jemand hren Nachbarn		arrangierte Ehe	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
4.4			fühlen, jemand hren engen/e F		arrangierte Ehe lin zu haben?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
4.5			•		arrangierte Ehe glied zu haben?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Q5	Bitte geb			<u>.</u>	enden Aussagen	zus							
	ch stimme überhaupt nicht zu	Ich stimme nicht zu	Ich stimme eher nicht zu	Ich stimme weder zu, noch dagegen	Ich stimme eher zu		Ic stim zı	me	Ic		imn 1 un 1z zi	d	
	1	2	3	4	5 □		6			7			
5.1.	Menschl	liche Natur											
5.1.		n, aufgeschlo	dass Menscher essen sind, als k	_		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

5.1.2	Ich habe das Gefühl, dass Menschen, die arrangierte Ehen eingehen, emotional, ansprechbar und warmherzig sind	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5.1.3	Ich habe das Gefühl, dass Menschen, die arrangierte Ehen eingehen, oberflächlich sind, als hätten Sie keine Tiefe	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5.1.4	Ich habe das Gefühl, dass Menschen, die arrangierte Ehen eingehen, mechanisch und kalt sind	1	2	3	4	5 □	6	7
5.2	Menschliche Einzigartigkeit							
5.1.2	.2 Ich habe das Gefühl, dass Menschen, die arrangierte Ehen eingehen, gebildet und kultiviert sind				4	5	6	7
5.2.3	Ich habe das Gefühl, dass Menschen, die arrangierte Ehen eingehen, rational und logisch denken				4	5	6	7
5.2.4	Ich habe das Gefühl, dass es Menschen, die arrangierte Ehen eingehen, an Selbstbeherrschung mangelt	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5.2.4	Ich habe das Gefühl, dass Menschen, die arrangierte Ehen eingehen, naiv sind	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
•	oziale Erwünschtheit Bitte geben Sie bei jeder Aussage an, wie sehr die Aussage auf	Sie z	zutri	fft.				
trifft garni	cht zu					ft vo gan		
1	2 3 4 5		6		,	7		
6.1	Übertreibung positiver Eigenschaften (PQ+)							
6.1.1	Im Streit bleibe ich stets sachlich und objektiv	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6.1.2	Auch wenn ich selbst gestresst bin, behandle ich andere immer freundlich und zuvorkommend	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6.1.3	.3 Wenn ich mich mit jemandem unterhalte, höre ich ihm immer aufmerksam zu				4	5	6	7

6.2	Minimierung negativer Eigenschaften (NQ-)							
6.2.1	Es ist schon mal vorgekommen, dass ich jemanden ausgenutzt habe	1	2		4	<b>5</b> □	6	7
6.2.2	Ich habe schon mal Müll einfach in die Landschaft oder auf die Straße geworfen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6.2.3	Manchmal helfe ich jemandem nur, wenn ich eine Gegenleistung erwarten kann	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Q7</b>	Demographien							
<b>7.1</b>	Was ist Ihr Geschlecht?							
	Weiblich Männlich Ich möchte keine Angabe machen							
7.2	Wie alt sind Sie?							
	20 oder jünger 21 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 50 51 - 60 61 - 70 71 - 80 Älter als 80							
7.3 V	Vas ist Ihr höchster Bildungsabschluss?							
	Grundschulabschluss Hauptschulabschluss Realschulabschluss (Mittlere Reife) Abitur Universitätsabschluss (Bachelor) Aufbaustudium (Master / Magister/ Diplom / Doktortitel) Weiß ich nicht							
7.4	Was ist Ihr aktueller Beschäftigungsstatus?							
	Studierend Arbeitslos Beschäftigt (wenn zutreffend, bitte geben Sie Ihren Beruf an Verrentet/pensioniert	)						

☐ Anders

7.5		Haben S	ie die d	eutsche	Staatsbürger	schaft?	•				
		Ja Nein									
7.6		Sind Sie i	n Deut	schland	geboren?						
		Ja Nein (Bit	te gebe	n Sie das	Land an, in d	lem Sie	gebore	n wurden <sub>.</sub>	)		
7.7		Ja			chland gebore Land an, in d		e Mutte	r geboren	wurde	)	
7.8		Ja			land geboren Land an, in d		Vater g	eboren wı	ırde	_)	
7.9		Sind Sie	derzeit	in Deuts	chland ansäs	ssig?					
		Ja Nein									
7.1	0	Gehörei	ı Sie eiı	ner Kult	ur an, die arı	rangier	te Ehei	n praktizi	ert?		
		Ja Nein									
Ka	ndi	daten aus	Ihrem	Wahlkr	l konnten Sie eis, die Zweit timme gegebe	stimme					
		CDU /CSU	SPD	Die Linke	Bündnis90/ Die Grüne	FDP	AfD	Piraten partei	NPD	Ich weiß nicht/ Ich möchte nicht antworten	Ich habe nicht ge-wählt
	nme	e									
	eit- nme										

ls allen anderer		, , early gen,		, ,, ,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		
□ Ja						
□ Nein						
	te nicht antw	orten				
.12 Wenn es ur Vo würden Sie	n Politik gel	nt ist häufig d				bedeutet?
Links			Mitte			Rechts
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Überhaupt nich religiös	ht					Sehr religiös
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	0					
□  14 Haben Sie □ Ja □ Nein	e eine andere	e ethnische Z		□ Ihrer engster		
□  14 Haben Sie □ Ja □ Nein	e eine andere	e ethnische Z	□ ugehörigkeit ir	□ Ihrer engster		
□ Ja □ Nein  15 Wie viel K	e eine andere	e ethnische Z	□ ugehörigkeit ir	□ Ihrer engster		Überhaupt
□ Ja □ Nein  15 Wie viel K	e eine andere	e ethnische Zu	□ ugehörigkeit ir mit Migranten	Ihrer engster	n Familie?	Überhaupt nicht

# 7.16 In welchem Maße ist die Erinnerung an den Kontakt/Bezug zu Migranten/innen mehr oder weniger positiv?

Extrem posit	tiv					Extrem negativ
1	2	3	4	5	6	7