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Is standing by your moral opinion a Western phenomenon?

A Cross-cultural study on moral consistency

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*To my beloved parents
who regardless of countless difficulties supported me in every situation throughout my life.*

*May you live long
and may your blessings always stay with me
for the rest of my life. Amen.*

. I hope I have made you proud.

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Abstract

Western theories on morality imply that being consistent in one's moral beliefs, i.e. moral consistency, is a fundamental attribute of a moral person. In this study, it is argued that this kind of moral consistency can be counter-productive in some cultures, especially if demonstrated in social situation with ingroup members. When moral consistency entails confronting others with opposing opinions about moral issues, relationships with ingroup members may be seen at risk of being jeopardized in Eastern cultures that value interdependent and harmonious relations with others. In this case, moral consistency might be seen as a sign of arrogance, impurity and rebellion. In order to examine the hypothesis that there is cross-cultural variation in moral consistency, two empirical studies were conducted. A pilot study was conducted to identify specific issues that are considered to be equally moral and debatable between an Eastern and a Western culture. In the main study, participants' attitude on moral and non-moral issues were assessed (in favor or against) and they were then instructed to imagine different social situations in which either outgroup or ingroup members would have opposing opinions. Hence, the experiment consisted of a 2 (culture: West vs. East) x 3 (issue: death penalty, torturing terrorism suspects to extract information, drinking orange juice at breakfast) x 3 (social situation: strangers, friends, family) mixed design with issue and social situation being within-subject factors. The results partially confirmed the hypothesis by showing that Westerners are overall more consistent in expressing their moral opinions than Indian participants. This has important implications for intercultural interactions, because this cultural difference in context-independent and context-dependent moral functioning can create serious misunderstandings in intercultural encounters.

Keywords: morality, consistency, culture, self-expression

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Introduction

I visited my hometown back in Pakistan in the winter of 2014. Two years had passed since I had left the country to pursue further education. I visited my former schoolteachers at school and during the break, my former teachers were having a discussion about the role of the army in politics. The majority of them expressed their support for the martial law and how the army's rule had been beneficial economically for the country compared to the democratic system in the past. I felt highly uncomfortable as I believe that democracy is the best way to govern the country and it is rather unethical if certain institutions determine people's choice and impose their own policies without any people's representation. When I was asked my opinion about this, interestingly rather than saying what I truly believed, I complied with my former teachers views on that matter. There were several reasons for this, such as avoiding conflict, maintaining my good image in my teachers' eyes and group harmony.

Similarly, during a family gathering, the matter of women's dowry in Pakistan (a highly acceptable and preferable cultural practice in the country) was discussed. I was against this norm which stipulates that the bride's family saves money for years so that they can send their daughters off to the groom's home with all house appliances, gold and sometimes even a car. This puts a lot of pressure on the bride's family and sometimes the groom's family's demand of dowry is too high so that the bride's parents have to take loans to marry their daughter off. In short, I considered excessive dowry as highly unacceptable, immoral and against basic human values. Yet, the rest of the family was in favor of dowry as their main argument was "whatever the bride will bring, will be hers, and will be beneficial for her for later in her life". Moreover, "the groom is responsible for the home, and all the financial responsibilities lie on the groom's shoulder, for the rest of his life, therefore, bringing dowry would make the newly wed couple's life easier in the distant future". In face of these arguments, I stayed silent for the whole time and could not say it out loud of what I thought regarding dowry as I didn't want to go against my family and wanted to avoid any conflict with them. In short, my family's harmony and conflict avoidance were more important for me than speaking out my mind.

These aforesaid events and many more like them made me to question the notion of being consistent in one's moral opinion in the face of different social situations. While pursuing my education in a Western setting, I realized the importance of consistency in the Western world, especially when it pertains to moral issues. However, I was increasingly wondering whether

being morally consistent was not as important in some cultures compared to others and maintaining the group's harmony could take precedence over expressing one's moral opinion.

From intercultural communication studies, we know that for people with interdependent self-construal, being direct and speaking one's mind can be considered as rude to the group hence, a threat to the group harmony (Becker, 1986). Moreover, in face of opposite opinions, they tend to develop and prefer unanimous decisions on any matter to maintain the group harmony (Doi, 1973). However, for people with highly independent self-construal, speaking one's thoughts is highly valued and is considered likable (Elliot, Scott, Jensen, & McDonough, 1981). Given that being morally consistent may be highly culturally bound, in intercultural interactions Westerners might think that Easterners have no own opinion about moral matters. This can cause some serious misunderstandings in daily life considering that Westerners would define a moral person, i.e. a trustworthy and good person, as someone who is consistent in their moral opinions. Therefore, there was a need to study this phenomenon in detail.

Literature Review

1.1 The concept of Moral Consistency

1.1.1 A rule-based moral mindset

Moral consistency has already been studied in the social psychological literature, albeit from a different angle than proposed in this study. It has been mainly studied as part of moral self-regulation models, i.e. moral consistency and moral balancing (Joosten, Van Dijke, Van, & De Cremer, 2014). Within this framework, moral consistency refers to engaging in an ethical or unethical behavior that increases the tendency of that behavior in the subsequent situations (Monin & Jordan, 2009). Whereas moral balancing, (Nisan, 2013) refers to engaging in an ethical or unethical behavior that reduces the possibility of that behavior to appear in the near future (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). These models originate from distinctive moral regulation mindsets based on the philosophical concepts of deontology and consequentialism (Pettit & Singer, 1991) which influence one's moral behavior. These mindsets are also labelled as rule-based mindset and outcome-based mindsets respectively (Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009).

It has been found that recalling a previous moral act in an abstract way that emphasizes one's moral identity (Blasi, 1980 ; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007) induces a rule-based mindset (that focuses on norms/rules and obligations), which in turn increases the chances that any subsequent behavior is in line with the previous moral act, hence yielding a

form of moral consistency (Barque-Duran, Pothos, Yearsley, & Hampton, 2016). In other words, a rule-based moral mindset enhances moral consistency which means that a person will stick to their previous moral behaviors (Cornelissen, Bashshur, Rode, & Le Menestrel, 2013).

However, if the previous moral behavior is recalled in a more concrete way (emphasizing on the specifics of actions), it entails, that one has already fulfilled their moral duty, therefore they feel they have more room to act in the way of their self-interests (Conway & Peetz, 2012). Therefore, for subsequent behaviors, there is an availability of some space to engage in self-interest rather than following the moral code. This phenomenon is called moral licensing or moral balancing (Nisan, 2013; Merritt et al., 2010).

It is clear that the dominant perspective on moral consistency in the literature is based on moral self-regulation models, i.e. moral balancing and moral consistency. Apart from moral self-regulation models, moral consistency in moral psychology has also been studied under the domains of moral hypocrisy (Batson, Thompson, Seufferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999) and consistency between cognitive processes and moral behaviors etc., (Blasi, 1980). However, this study aims to explore moral consistency rather differently.

1.1.2 A working definition

In this study, moral consistency specifically refers to the consistency between one's moral attitude and self-expression in the case that one's moral attitude is challenged in a social situation. It is based on the premise that opinions about morally relevant issues are strong moral convictions (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005) tied to a person's moral identity (Blasi, 1980), and therefore, should require people to stick to their moral opinions and not to deviate from them in the face of social pressure. It can be well understood with the metaphor of "moral compass", which refers to an inner voice that guides people in different circumstances about the "right" way to act (Bennett, 1995). In other words, a moral compass refers to an inner sense that guides a person to judge what is right or wrong and to act accordingly which should also include the self-expression of these moral judgments. However, drawing on cultural theories it is here argued that this is a highly Western understanding of moral functioning. The extent to which one listens to this inner voice and then acts accordingly can be strongly influenced by culture and the nature of the social setting.

1.2 Moral consistency in Western cultures

1.2.1 The importance of consistency for self

According to Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit (1997, p. 24) “ Persistent need for consistency and stability” is a fundamental attribute of a Western self. An ideal self-view is the one which is coherent across all social contexts (Lecky, 1945). Early theories and studies on self-actualization (Maslow, 1954) and psychological functioning (Rogers, 1951) suggested that a coherent self-view is paramount in Western cultures. Consequently, several studies have been conducted in the Western context regarding how people maintain their consistent self-view (Jourard, 1963 ; Swann, 1983 ; Swann & Read, 1981). In Western cultures, the self is considered as unique, bounded and a product of exclusive characteristics, where being consistent between one’s attitude and behavior is a prerequisite for a healthy psychological life (Kim, 2002). Therefore, consistency is a fundamental characteristic for a Western self-view.

Some other studies have revealed the role of consistency in regard to applied social phenomenas, such as compliance and conformity (Cialdini, Wosinska, Barrett, Butner, & Gornik-Durose, 1999), which are also built on the premise of a consistent self. It has been argued that certain techniques such as the foot in the door technique, reciprocity and peer pressure etc., can be used to change one’s attitude towards a desired direction or to have desirable outcomes (Cialdini, 1987). At its core this entails that once a decision is being made, regardless of the situation, people tend to be consistent with their previous judgments and behaviors. They tend to maintain their self-concept (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962). This has been empirically examined in decision-making processes and free choice dilemma, which revealed that once a decision is being made people tend to stick with this decision even if they have realized later that other choices could be more beneficial. They tend to do so in order to maintain their positive self-view and remain consistent with their previous judgments. This phenomenon has been well studied within the framework of self-affirmation theory by Steele (1988) and compliance and conformity by Cialdini (2009). The general conclusion that can be drawn from this work is that a coherent and a consistent self-view is an important characteristic in the Western setting.

1.2.2 Moral consistency and moral identity

Apart from self-view another important concept to fully understand the importance of being consistent in a Western setting is the concept of identity. Erikson (1964) defined identity as the core to oneself, which makes a person true to their actions. Moreover, personal

identity is considered significant for social identification (Tajfel, 2010) and a cognitive schema to navigate the world by giving meanings to one's daily experiences (Stryker & Burke, 2000). Because it is a cognitive schema, and therefore once salient and incorporated into the self, people tend to act in identity salient ways and consistently across time and situations (Stryker & Burke, 2000). It was Blasi (1980) who gave way to the idea of moral identity and is considered as one of the forefathers in the field of moral identity (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2004). For Blasi moral identity is the core to one's moral self and is of key importance to one's moral functioning (Blasi, 1984). It guides people in their moral world and helps them to make sense of their surroundings (Stets & Carter, 2011). Although there can be difference regarding significance of different moral characteristics i.e. harm, justice etc., for different people. However, when people identify with any moral aspect and consider it as the core to their moral judgment then people tend to preserve this and remain self-consistent across time and situations (Blasi, 1984). Therefore, it is argued that people who view themselves as moral, tend to act in line with this view, which in turns doesn't violate their self-concept and moral consistency is sustained. In addition, Skitka et al. (2005) coined the term of "moral conviction", which refers to the idea that attitudes with moral relevance are stronger than the attitudes without any moral relevance. Therefore, we would expect that if a moral attitude is challenged, this would lead to a stronger reaction to "stand firm" in line with this moral attitude compared to an attitude without any moral relevance.

1.3 Cross cultural differences

1.3.1 Personal vs social morality

In the Western setting, moral identification has been treated as a disposition or a trait (Aquino & Reed, 2002). It is important to note that traits or dispositions are a fundamental characteristic of an independent self, where each person is unique in its own, and possess certain exclusive characteristics that differentiate it from others (Kim, 2002). There is less emphasize on the contextual or situational forces in order to explain one's moral identity. As Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan (1999) argue:

“one of the greatest and most remarkable misunderstandings we have about people, one that gives rise to many other inferential failings, is the belief that behavior is usually best regarded as reflecting personality traits or other inferential attributes” (p. 47)

Therefore, it is argued that in Western setting it is assumed that moral identity is something personal and unique to each person, and not much emphasize has been placed on either situation or context. However, in the cultures that entail an interdependent self, the focus is on the situation or context (Choi et al., 1999).

Until recently morality itself was studied and understood mainly through the Western point of reference, therefore social or contextual forces were overshadowed by dispositionalism. Cross-cultural research in morality based on the Kohlberg's theory of moral development (Snarey, 1985 ; Boyes & Walker, 1988 ; Eckensberger & Zimba, 1997) revealed that while talking about morality, people from non-Western cultures mentioned also ideas about respect, authority and social harmony – i.e., a social morality. However, as these concepts neither belonged to the personal domains of harm nor of fairness, these concerns were considered as an exception (Blasi, 1984). Yet, recently it has been revealed by Moral Foundation Theory (Graham et al., 2013) that there are indeed more foundations to morality than harm and care, and that moral concerns in some cultures include issues of authority, loyalty and purity etc., that are more related to a social morality than the personal one. Though these foundations do not represent the Western model of morality of harm and care, they certainly take into account non-Western moral issue of interpersonal harmony, benevolence and love, as well as authority and loyalty. This suggests that morality can manifest itself differently across cultures and in more situational and contextual way in Eastern cultures.

Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu (1997) further classified morality into duty-based morality vs rights-based morality. Duty based morality is linked with maintaining status quo and fulfilling one's obligations – i.e. social morality (where focus is on the interpersonal relationships and fulfilling one's assigned duties to maintain the social harmony). Whereas, a rights-based morality is, not based on the duties, but rather focus is on the individual liberty and individual rights – i.e. personal morality. Therefore, it is safe to argue that morality can be divided into personal vs social morality, where personal morality is well represented in the Western setting by the independent self-view and moral identity, whereas, a social morality is more represented in the Eastern cultures where interdependent selves prevail.

1.3.2 The importance of social harmony in Eastern cultures

Interpersonal harmony is highly valued in Eastern cultures (Moore, 1967). Due to its importance in the Eastern setting, psychological functions such as cognitive dissonance have been influenced by cultural norms and values (Rosenberger, 1992). For example, cognitive

dissonance is more acceptable for Easterners than Westerners (Heine & Lehman, 1997), and behaviors that are not aligned with private attitudes are seen as rather acceptable in the East (Kashima, Siegal, Tanaka, & Kashima, 1992). Moreover, the willingness to self-censor construct by Hayes, Glynn, & Shanahan (2005) proposed that there is a huge variability when it comes to confronting a majority with an opposing opinion. There are people who tend to self-censor themselves in order not to go against the group decisions or majority's opinion. This construct is manifested through the idea of conformity, which is relatively more evident in the cultures that are collectivist in nature and entail interdependent view of self (Bond & Smith, 1996).

As mentioned earlier, being morally consistent can be considered as a fundamental attribute of a moral person in the Western society. However, it can be argued that this moral consistency can be harmful in the context where relationships with others might be jeopardized when morality includes also the maintenance of good relationships (Rai & Fiske, 2011) and being consistent might be considered as being arrogant, impure and rebellious etc., (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

1.3.3 Significance of the study

This literature review showed how significant consistency is in general, and moral consistency in particular, for Western cultures. Therefore, it is less likely that someone with an independent self would give up their moral position for the sake of group harmony. However, this might not be true in the Eastern setting, where roles are well defined, and the group takes precedence over the individual. There is a possibility that one might comply with the majority in order to maintain a good relationship with the group. Changing one's moral opinion just for the sake of group harmony might seem unusual to Westerners. Therefore, in an intercultural setting it can cause serious misunderstandings regarding one's moral opinion and can even foster prejudice and biases towards members of certain cultural groups. Hence, it is important to address the issue of consistency pertaining to moral domain and unpackage any cultural differences that might drive this effect.

All the aforesaid cross-cultural difference mentioned above i.e. differences pertaining to self-view, identity and consistency can be trickled down and measured by the concept of self-construals. Self-construals are the instruments that tap into the cultural difference and measure them at the individual level (Singelis, 1994). An independent self is bounded and unique and the scale measuring the characteristics of an independent self is generally referred as the independent self-construal. On the other hand, an interdependent self is contextualized

and emphasizes group identity, social roles and interpersonal harmony and the instrument measuring the interdependent self attributes is called interdependent self-construal (Kim, 2002). Therefore, in the following study these terms will be mainly used in reference to Western and Eastern cultures respectively.

1.4 Research gap

In last couple of decades, the literature has exploded in cross-cultural research and is filled with the cross-cultural comparisons of different psychological constructs (for detail see: Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). However research on cross-cultural comparisons in the moral domain was monistic in nature (Graham et al., 2013) with the majority of studies focusing on moral development and moral judgment (Snarey, 1985 ; Ma & Cheung, 1996). Moral consistency itself was explored as a moral self-regulation construct (Barque-Duran et al., 2016). However, to date there is no cross-cultural research looking at moral consistency dealing with the consistency between one's moral attitude and self-expression.

The current research project is empirical in nature and conceptualizes moral consistency as the consistency between moral attitude and self-expression in the face of the moral attitude being challenged in a social situation. The aim is to explore this concept in a cross-cultural setting. For this study, India and the USA were considered as the geographical nations representing the Eastern and Western cultures that entail the interdependent and independent self-construal respectively.

1.4.1 Research question and hypotheses

The main research question is: Are there cross-cultural differences in consistency regarding the expression of moral opinions in social situations? Given that Eastern cultures are collectivistic and endorse interdependent self-construal which means that in-group harmony is highly valued, it was expected that they would generally show less consistency in the expression of their opinion in social situations when challenged than individuals from Western cultures which are individualistic and endorse independent self-construal. Hence, a main effect of culture was hypothesized:

H1: Easterners show less consistency than Westerners between their actual opinion and its expression if challenged in the social situations.

Moreover, harmony with ingroup members is especially important for Eastern culture with interdependent self-construal which is why a 2-way interaction between culture and type of social situation (ingroup vs outgroup) was expected:

H2: Easterners show generally less consistency than Westerners between their actual opinion and its expression if challenged in social situations, but this effect should be even more pronounced for interactions with ingroup members than outgroup members.

Divergent opinions about moral issues can carry a great potential for conflict because of the moral conviction attached to them. This is why it was expected that concerns about harmony would be even stronger for Easterners when it comes to moral issues compared to non-moral ones. Hence, a 3-way interaction was hypothesized:

H3: The cultural difference in consistency across different social situations should become most evident in regard to opinions about moral issues compared to non-moral issues.

Empirical Studies

2.1.Pilot study

The main study centered on assessing participants' opinion about moral issues and on examining how they might react when their opinion is challenged in different social contexts. Hence, it was crucial to first determine which issues are regarded as moral as well as debatable in the two cultures that are compared in this research project, i.e. the U.S. and India. With debatable is meant that there could be divergent opinions about the issue and that one could discuss them specifically with ingroup members. It is because specifically for the Indians, there might be some issues that could be taboo in the cultural context and not to be discussed with family or friends. It was important to select those issues for the main study that are considered as equally moral and debatable in both cultures. For this purpose, a pilot study was conducted with participants from both countries. Therefore, if a significant difference was found between the two cultural groups in the main study, it would be safer to assume that it is due to the culture rather than due to perceived differences in the characteristics of the issues.

2.1.1 Methods

2.1.1.1 Participants

Data from a sample of 125 participants residing in the USA or India were collected. However, two participants were dropped as one had incomplete responses while the other was neither a national of the USA nor India. Therefore, the final data for analysis was comprised of 123 participants, including 71 participants from the USA and 52 participants from India. The average age of all the participants was 30 years ($SD = 8.03$). Most participants indicated to be male (79.67%).

Regarding the country-specific samples, the average age for Indian participants was 28 years ($SD = 3.20$). Almost all of the Indian participants indicated to be male (90.38%). The average age of participants from the USA was slightly higher with 32 years ($SD = 9.91$). The gender distribution was also a bit different with 71.83% of the USA participants indicating to be male.

2.1.1.2 Measure

A list of 40 issues, including 25 moral and 15 non-moral issues was developed after a series of discussions between the main researcher (from Pakistan - South Asia) and the two supervisors of this master thesis project (from Western Europe). A consensus was reached within the research team about categorizing the issues as either moral or non-moral.

This list was then presented to the participants and they were asked: “to *what extent do you think the following issues can be considered as morally wrong?*” - e.g. Piracy (illegal downloading). The responses to each of the 40 issues were measured on a 6-point Likert scale, with 1 labelled as *not at all morally wrong* to 6, labelled as *extremely morally wrong*. Another question asked to what extent each issue was seen as “debatable” followed by a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 as *not at all debatable* to 6 as *extremely debatable*. The full questionnaire can be seen in Appendix A.

2.1.1.3 Procedure

An online questionnaire was developed on Qualtrics and administered to the participants through the online platform, Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-Turk). The validity of Amazon M-Turk has been well established, and studies have shown that it can be considered equivalent to the lab setting for an experiment design (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Indian participants were paid 1\$ per participant, whereas US-American participants were paid 2.3\$ per participant, as a reward to fulfill the online questionnaire. Average time to complete the online questionnaire for all participants was a little above than 6 minutes.

2.1.2 Results and Discussion

The analyses were conducted separately for the issues that were a priori categorized as moral or non-moral by the researchers. This allowed to verify whether participants from both cultural samples would agree with the categorization of the issues as either moral or non-moral and whether the two cultural groups significantly differed from each other in their evaluation of the moral relevance and the debatable aspect of the issue. The final aim was to identify equally morally relevant and debatable issues across the two groups as well as equally non-moral and debatable issues for inclusion in the main study.

2.1.2.1 Moral issues

An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the evaluation of issues regarding their moral relevance as well as whether they are debatable for the Indian and American participants. As can be seen from Table 1.2, there was no significant difference in scores for Indian and US-American participants regarding the issues *smacking children*, *animal testing*, *internet censorship*, *torturing terrorism suspects* and *death penalty* when it comes to their moral relevance *and* the debatable aspect of it.

In order to verify, that these issues had been indeed evaluated as moral issues and as debatable in each cultural group, a one-sample t-test was conducted for these issues with the mid-point of the scale as the test value (3.5). Table 2.2 shows that the following issues were evaluated as significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale for evaluations of the moral relevance and debatable aspect: *torturing terrorism suspects* and *death penalty*. Hence, these issues were considered for inclusion in the main study.

Table 1.2

Moral & debatable relevance of moral issues across cultures

	t-test for Equality of Means								
	India		USA		<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	95% CI	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>				Lower	Upper
Piracy (MW)	4.59	1.15	3.55	1.55	4.03	120	.000	.52	1.54
Piracy (D)	4.25	1.44	3.96	1.56	1.05	121	.292	-.25	.83
Gambling (MW)	4.12	1.26	2.66	1.71	5.16	121	.000	.89	2.01
Gambling (D)	4.27	1.35	3.79	1.64	1.71	121	.088	-.07	1.03
Smacking children (MW)	4.29	1.28	4.01	1.59	1.01	121	.311	-.25	.80
Smacking children (D)	3.94	1.37	3.83	1.63	.39	121	.692	-.44	.66
Euthanasia (MW)	4.42	1.21	2.44	1.87	6.69	121	.000	1.39	2.57
Euthanasia (D)	4.52	1.21	4.48	1.44	.16	121	.870	-.44	.52
Animal testing (MW)	4.13	1.44	3.86	1.64	.96	121	.335	-.28	.83
Animal testing (D)	4.23	1.30	4.25	1.49	-.08	121	.930	-.53	.48
Environmental protection (MW)	3.37	1.76	1.89	1.65	4.76	121	.000	.86	2.09
Environmental protection (D)	4.02	1.73	3.55	1.72	1.49	121	.138	-.15	1.09
Minimum wage (MW)	3.81	1.62	2.55	1.71	4.11	121	.000	.65	1.86
Minimum wage (D)	3.78	1.46	3.72	1.80	.21	120	.830	-.54	.67
Internet censorship (MW)	3.98	1.36	3.83	1.74	.51	120	.611	-.43	.72
Internet censorship (D)	3.96	1.20	3.83	1.67	.47	121	.633	-.40	.67
Torturing terrorism suspects (MW)	4.04	1.52	4.23	1.52	-.67	121	.502	-.73	.36
Torturing terrorism suspects (D)	4.29	1.37	4.52	1.47	-.89	121	.375	-.75	.28
Burning flag (MW)	4.65	1.29	3.20	1.97	4.63	121	.000	.83	2.07

Burning flag (D)	4.27	1.52	4.13	1.68	.48	121	.630	-.44	.72
GMO (MW)	4.00	1.44	2.49	1.87	4.80	120	.000	.88	2.12
GMO (D)	4.29	1.36	3.75	1.59	1.98	121	.050	.00	1.08
Cloning (MW)	4.12	1.51	3.07	1.82	3.36	121	.001	.43	1.66
Cloning (D)	4.42	1.22	4.24	1.67	.66	121	.505	-.36	.72
Adoption (MW)	3.42	1.75	1.89	1.61	5.02	121	.000	.93	2.14
Adoption (D)	3.77	1.43	2.96	1.75	2.73	121	.007	.22	1.39
Plastic surgery (MW)	3.75	1.58	2.42	1.82	4.21	121	.000	.70	1.95
Plastic surgery (D)	4.00	1.26	3.37	1.65	2.31	121	.022	.09	1.17
Refugees-immigration (MW)	3.83	1.49	2.23	1.79	5.23	121	.000	.99	2.20
Refugee- immigration (D)	4.08	1.23	4.01	1.73	.22	121	.824	-.49	.62
Death penalty (MW)	4.31	1.40	4.01	1.64	1.03	121	.301	-.26	.85
Death penalty (D)	4.33	1.21	4.62	1.47	1.16	121	.245	-.78	.20
Marriage outside religion (MW)	3.38	1.81	2.07	1.76	4.02	121	.000	.66	1.96
Marriage outside religion (D)	3.90	1.49	3.41	1.63	1.71	121	.088	-.07	1.06
Marriage outside cast (MW)	3.54	1.72	1.97	1.66	5.08	121	.000	.95	2.17
Marriage outside cast (D)	4.10	1.44	3.06	1.82	3.40	121	.001	.43	1.64
Polyamory (MW)	4.65	1.24	3.21	1.92	4.66	120	.000	.82	2.04
Polyamory (D)	4.31	1.33	3.83	1.64	1.71	121	.089	-.07	1.02
Plastic bags (MW)	4.42	1.24	2.54	1.69	6.79	121	.000	1.33	2.43
Plastic bags (D)	4.27	1.51	3.28	1.75	3.26	121	.001	.388	1.58
Eavesdrop (MW)	4.22	1.34	3.28	1.44	3.62	120	.000	.42	1.44
Eavesdrop (D)	4.17	1.36	3.45	1.56	2.66	121	.009	.18	1.25
Travelling without ticket (MW)	4.48	1.35	3.68	1.64	2.88	121	.005	.25	1.35
Traveling without ticket (D)	4.08	1.23	3.51	1.75	2.00	121	.047	.00	1.13
Plagiarism (MW)	4.53	1.15	4.24	1.34	1.24	120	.216	-.17	.75
Plagiarism (D)	4.37	1.29	3.25	1.73	3.89	121	.000	.54	1.67
Serving in army (MW)	3.31	1.88	2.11	1.68	3.69	120	.000	.55	1.84
Serving in army (D)	3.54	1.60	3.20	1.74	1.10	121	.270	-.26	.95
Arguing with parents (MW)	4.35	1.21	2.65	1.74	6.03	121	.000	1.14	2.25
Arguing with parents (D)	4.00	1.52	3.37	1.62	2.19	121	.030	.06	1.20

Note. (MW) refers to morally wrong while (D) refers to debatable. In bold are issues for which no significant differences were found between the Indian and the U.S. sample regarding the evaluation of their moral relevance and debatable aspect of it.

Table 2.2

Statistical significance from the midpoint of scale for moral issues

Nationality	Test Value = 3.5						
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	95% CI	
						Lower	Upper
Smacking children (MW)	4.29	1.28	4.41	51	.000	.43	1.15
Smacking children (D)	3.94	1.37	2.31	51	.025	.06	.83
Animal testing (MW)	4.13	1.44	3.17	51	.003	.23	1.04
Animal testing (D)	4.23	1.30	4.02	51	.000	.37	1.09

	Internet censorship (MW)	3.98	1.36	2.51	50	.015	.10	.86
	Internet censorship (D)	3.96	1.20	2.76	51	.008	.13	.80
	Torturing terrorism suspects (MW)	4.04	1.52	2.55	51	.014	.12	.96
	Torturing terrorism suspects (D)	4.29	1.37	4.13	51	.000	.41	1.17
	Death penalty (MW)	4.31	1.40	4.13	51	.000	.42	1.20
	Death penalty (D)	4.33	1.21	4.90	51	.000	.49	1.17
	Smacking children (MW)	4.01	1.59	2.70	70	.008	.14	.89
American (USA)	Smacking children (D)	3.83	1.63	1.70	70	.093	-.06	.72
	Animal testing (MW)	3.86	1.64	1.84	70	.069	-.03	.75
	Animal testing (D)	4.25	1.49	4.26	70	.000	.40	1.11
	Internet censorship (MW)	3.83	1.74	1.60	70	.114	-.08	.74
	Internet censorship (D)	3.83	1.67	1.66	70	.100	-.07	.73
	Torturing terrorism suspects (MW)	4.23	1.52	4.01	70	.000	.36	1.09
	Torturing terrorism suspects (D)	4.52	1.47	5.84	70	.000	.67	1.37
	Death penalty (MW)	4.01	1.64	2.63	70	.010	.13	.90
	Death penalty (D)	4.62	1.47	6.38	70	.000	.77	1.47

Note. (MW) refers to morally wrong while (D) refers to debatable. Only the issues that were rated as significantly above the neutral mid-point of the scale for the morality and debatable aspect in both samples are shown in bold.

2.1.2.2 Non-moral issues

For the non-moral issues, an independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the evaluation of issues regarding their non-moral relevance as well as whether they are debatable for the Indian and American participants. As can be seen from Table 3.2, there was a significant difference in scores for Indian and US-American participants regarding all the issues. This might be due to a response style for Indian participants which shows that they respond to every non-moral issue towards the midpoint of the scale, while the US sample scores are clearly below the midpoint of the scale for both moral relevance and the debatable aspect of the non-moral issues. This might be explained by a lack of importance of these issues: US participants may not consider these issues relevant enough to have a debate about them with other people. Therefore, it was decided to randomly select a non-moral issue from the list for the main study, which was “*drinking orange juice at breakfast*” as shown in Table 4.2.

Table 3.2

Moral & debatable relevance of non-moral issues across cultures

t-test for Equality of Means

	India		USA		<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	95% CI	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>				Lower	Upper
Wearing socks (NMW)	3.52	1.89	1.92	1.58	5.10	121	.000	.98	2.22
Wearing socks (D)	3.87	1.65	2.46	1.88	4.28	121	.000	.75	2.04
Playing tennis (NMW)	3.60	1.75	1.90	1.58	5.59	121	.000	1.09	2.29
Playing tennis (D)	3.50	1.69	2.55	1.91	2.85	121	.005	.29	1.61
Eating spicy food (NMW)	3.52	1.77	1.99	1.73	4.79	121	.000	.90	2.16
Eating spicy food (D)	3.79	1.56	2.48	1.96	3.97	121	.000	.65	1.96
Playing guitar (NMW)	3.39	1.74	1.86	1.59	5.03	120	.000	.93	2.13
Playing guitar (D)	3.69	1.81	2.45	1.92	3.62	121	.000	.56	1.92
Watching TV (NMW)	3.42	1.81	1.94	1.68	4.64	121	.000	.84	2.11
Watching TV (D)	3.67	1.70	2.49	1.91	3.53	121	.001	.51	1.84
Wearing sunglasses (NMW)	3.69	1.63	2.01	1.67	5.49	120	.000	1.07	2.27
Wearing sunglasses (D)	3.63	1.60	2.46	1.95	3.52	121	.001	.51	1.82
Reading comics (NMW)	3.48	1.68	1.87	1.67	5.24	121	.000	1.00	2.21
Reading comics (D)	3.50	1.67	2.54	1.91	2.91	121	.004	.30	1.62
Drinking tea (NMW)	3.54	1.61	1.82	1.53	6.01	121	.000	1.15	2.28
Drinking tea (D)	3.84	1.69	2.59	2.05	3.56	120	.001	.55	1.94
Eating with hands (NMW)	3.46	1.75	2.04	1.70	4.50	121	.000	.79	2.04
Eating with hands (D)	3.62	1.84	2.69	1.90	2.69	121	.008	.24	1.60
Taking a nap (NMW)	3.79	1.76	1.94	1.67	5.90	121	.000	1.22	2.46
Taking a nap (D)	3.35	1.70	2.42	1.87	2.80	121	.006	.27	1.57
Using a computer (NMW)	3.40	1.87	1.90	1.67	4.76	121	.000	.87	2.12
Using a computer (D)	3.65	1.67	2.49	1.91	3.49	121	.001	.50	1.81
Using comb (NMW)	3.44	1.81	1.89	1.55	5.09	121	.000	.95	2.15
Using comb (D)	3.39	1.67	2.38	1.96	2.97	120	.003	.33	1.68
Using liquid soap (NMW)	3.54	1.78	1.86	1.57	5.50	121	.000	1.07	2.28
Using liquid soap (D)	3.60	1.74	2.41	1.81	3.64	121	.000	.54	1.83
Using handmade products (NMW)	3.46	1.93	1.85	1.69	4.91	121	.000	.96	2.26
Using handmade products (D)	3.50	1.79	2.46	1.88	3.06	121	.003	.36	1.70
Drinking orange juice at breakfast (NMW)	3.39	1.63	1.93	1.58	4.96	120	.000	.88	2.04
Drinking orange juice at breakfast (D)	3.54	1.62	2.45	1.93	3.29	121	.001	.43	1.74

Note. (NMW) refers to non-moral issues considered as wrong while (D) refers to debatable.

Table 4.2

Statistical significance from the midpoint of scale for non-moral issues

Nationality		Test Value = 3.5					
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	95% CI Lower Upper
Indian	Drinking orange juice at breakfast (NMW)	3.39	1.63	-.47	50	.640	-.57 .35
	Drinking orange juice at breakfast (D)	3.54	1.62	.171	51	.865	-.41 .49

American (USA)	Drinking orange juice at breakfast (NMW)	1.93	1.58	-8.37	70	.000	-1.94	-1.20
	Drinking orange juice at breakfast (D)	2.45	1.93	-4.57	70	.000	-1.51	-.59

Note. (NMW) refers to non-moral issues which may be considered as morally wrong while (D) refers to debatable.

To conclude, the pilot study revealed that two moral issues *death penalty* and *torturing terrorism suspects* were considered as equally morally wrong as well as equally debatable with ingroup members, for both Indian and American participants. Therefore, in the main study these issues will be used as moral issues, while *drinking orange juice at breakfast* will be used as a non-moral issue.

2.2 Main Study

2.2.1 Methods

2.2.1.1 Participants

A power analysis for computing sample size, using the software G*power, indicated that a sample size of $N = 200$ would be enough for the main study given an effect size of .22. It was considered as an acceptable effect size, due to the fact of most of previous social psychology studies had the similar effect size of $r = .21$ (Richard, Bond Jr, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003) However, because of the possibility of some missing data in the responses, 125 participants per culture with a total of 250 participants were aimed for in this study. Eventually, due to a technical issue data were collected from a sample of 263 participants. Yet, 30 participants were excluded from the analysis because they either failed to follow the attention check ($N = 29$) or were not a national of the target countries ($N = 1$). Therefore, the final data for analysis were comprised of 233 participants, including 113 participants from the USA and 120 participants from India. The mean age of all the participants was 30 years ($SD = 6.78$). Most participants indicated to be male 61.37%. Whereas one participant chose the *other/rather not say* option.

Regarding the country-specific samples, the average age for the Indian participants was 28 years ($SD = 4.62$) and 71.66% of the participants indicated to be male. One participant chose here the *other/rather not say option*. The average mean age for the USA participants was 32 years ($SD = 7.94$). The gender distribution was almost equal as 50.44% reported to be male while 49.55% reported to be female. Moreover, 43.36% of the USA participants identified themselves as European Americans, 23.89% as Native Americans, 17.69% as Asian Americans, 7.07% as African Americans, 2.65% as Latin Americans and

5.30% identified themselves as others. There were significant age differences between the two samples, $t(231) = -4.95, p = .000$, as well as differences in the proportion of males, $\chi^2(2, N = 233) = 12.62, p = .002$.

2.2.1.2 Procedure

The purpose of the main study was to examine cultural differences in moral consistency across different social contexts, i.e. whether expressing one's moral opinion and stick with it in different social situations depends on the culture and degree of closeness with others (i.e., outgroup members: strangers vs ingroup members: friends and family members). The pilot study had revealed that two issues – *death penalty* and *torturing terrorism suspects* – were equally considered as moral issues and debatable in both the USA and India. However, to provide a better context to understand the issue *torturing terrorism suspects*, it was followed by an additional phrase *to extract information*. Therefore, the finalized version of the issue was *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information*. These two issues categorized as the “moral issues” were used in the main study along with the non-moral issue of *drinking orange juice at breakfast*. An online questionnaire was developed in Qualtrics and administered to participants from the USA and India through the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-Turk). Indian participants were paid 1\$ per participant, whereas US-American participants were paid 1.75\$ per participant as a reward to fulfill the online questionnaire.

Firstly, participants' self-construals were assessed with a sub-scale of harmony and self-expression as devised by Vignoles et al. (2016). Participants' attitudes on the three moral and non-moral issues were then assessed (in favor or against) and they were finally instructed to imagine different social situations in which either outgroup or ingroup members would have opposing opinions about these issues. Participants were asked to indicate how they would probably behave in these situations with items assessing moral consistency. Hence, the experiment consisted of a 2 (culture: West vs. East) x 3 (issue: death penalty, torturing terrorism suspects to extract information, drinking orange juice at breakfast) x 3 (social situation: strangers, friends, family) mixed design with issue and social situation being within-subject factors. Finally, participants responded to an assertiveness scale and demographic details such as age, nationality and ethnicity. In the end participants were debriefed about the study in detail. Average time to complete the online questionnaire for all participants was around 13 minutes. The full questionnaire can be seen in Appendix B.

2.2.2 Measures

2.2.2.1 Manipulation check

In order to confirm that the moral and non-moral issues differed in regard to their perceived moral relevance, a manipulation check was administered to all participants. This was done by assessing individuals' moral attitude regarding all issues *death penalty*, *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information* and *drinking orange juice at breakfast* with the following moral conviction item developed by Skitka et al. (2005): "*My opinion about [issue] reflects something about my core moral values and convictions*". Responses were measured on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 labelled as "*very much disagree*" to 7 labelled as "*very much agree*" (see Appendix B). Hence, higher scores represent greater moral relevance of the respective issue. A repeated measures ANOVA with contrasts showed that for US-Americans, *death penalty* ($M = 5.20$; $SD = 1.17$) was evaluated significantly different from *drinking orange juice at breakfast*, ($M = 3.98$; $SD = 2.02$), $F(1, 112) = 30.27, p = .000$. Similarly, *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information* ($M = 5.19$; $SD = 1.48$) was also significantly different from *drinking orange juice at breakfast*, $F(1, 112) = 24.51, p = .000$, confirming that US-Americans treat the moral issues (*death penalty* and *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information*) as more morally relevant than the non-moral issue (*drinking orange juice at breakfast*). Surprisingly, however, for Indian participants the moral issue *death penalty* ($M = 5.00$), ($SD = 1.61$) was significantly different from the nonmoral issue *drinking orange juice at breakfast* ($M = 5.49$; $SD = 1.47$), $F(1, 119) = 6.07, p = .015$, yet in the opposite direction: the *death penalty* was considered as less morally relevant compared to *drinking orange juice at breakfast*. Similarly, *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information* ($M = 4.85$; $SD = 1.58$) showed the same pattern: *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information* was considered as significantly less morally relevant compared to *drinking orange juice at breakfast*, $F(1, 119) = 10.50, p = .002$. This indicates that Indian participants considered their opinions about non-moral issue (*drinking orange juice at breakfast*) as more important for reflecting their core moral values and convictions than the *death penalty* and *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information*. It is argued, as similar to the pilot study, this might be due to the response style of the Indian participants which will be further elaborated in the discussion section. For now, it can be said that the manipulation check was successful with the US-American sample, but unsuccessful with the sample from India.

2.2.2.2 Self-construal

Participants responded to a 6-items sub-scale of self-expression vs harmony by Vignoles et al. (2016). Three items tapped into independent self-construal, while another three items, which were reverse coded in this study, assessed the interdependent self-construal. This sub-scale is one of seven sub-scales pertaining to the Culture and Identity Research Network Self Construal Scale Version 3 -CIRN-SCS-3 (Vignoles, 2019)¹. The self-expression versus harmony subscale was used in this study, because it measures the tendency to favor self-expression over group harmony, which is expected to have an effect on moral consistency in this project. Furthermore, Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggested that self-construal is the most important tool to differentiate cultures. The I-C (individualism and collectivism) dimension has been widely used at the culture level to measure cross-cultural differences, specifically the difference between Western and East Asian cultures (Triandis, 1988): Western cultures emphasize personal autonomy, a bounded self, individual ability and unique traits, hence known as individualistic culture, whereas East Asian cultures value the connectedness, social harmony and relationships over personal goals and are, therefore, known as collectivistic cultures. Yet, Eastern and Western cultures differ in regard to many other aspects as well and, therefore, it is crucial to assess whether it is indeed the I-C dimensions that plays a role in this study. At the same time, the I-C dimension is a group-level construct and cannot be measured at the individual-level. The individual-level equivalent to I-C is the independent-interdependent self-construal (Singelis, 1994). Hence, the self-construal scale served to confirm that the two cultural samples differ in regard to this dimension which is culturally relevant. US-Americans have been found to score higher on independent self-construal, while Easterners have been found to score higher on interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This is why it was expected here that US-American participants will score higher on independent self-construal items and Indian participants will score higher on the interdependent self-construal items.

Composite scores were computed for independent and interdependent self-construal items separately. An example item of independent self-construal is *“You prefer to express your thoughts and feelings openly, even if it may sometimes cause conflict”*. Responses were measured on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 labelled as *“does not describe me at all”* to 5, labelled as *“describes me exactly”* - (see Appendix B). Higher score indicates an independent self-construal. Whereas an example item of interdependent self-construal is *“You try not to*

¹ It is an "unpublished manuscript" and the scale was received by means of personal communication.

express disagreement with members of your family”- (see Appendix B). Higher score indicates an interdependent self-construal. Cronbach’s alpha of the sub-scale (independent self-construal items) for Indian participants was .55, while reliability for the American participants was .71. Whereas, Cronbach’s alpha of the sub-scale (interdependent self-construal items) for Indian participants was .41, while for US-American participants it was .70.

Contrary to the expected results, an independent t-test reveals, that surprisingly compared to US-Americans ($M = 3.41$; $SD = .86$) Indians ($M = 3.70$; $SD = .72$) were significantly higher on independent self-construal $t(231) = 2.74$, $p = .007$. Moreover, Indians ($M = 3.63$; $SD = .69$), were also significantly higher on interdependent self-construal compared to US-Americans ($M = 3.30$; $SD = .90$), $t(231) = 3.08$, $p = .002$. This result of Indians being higher on both independent and interdependent self-construals was rather unexpected, therefore is further discussed in the Discussion section below.

2.2.2.3 Moral consistency

In order to measure consistency, (moral) consistency related to moral issues and consistency related to non-moral issues, a modified version of the Willingness to Self-Censor Scale (WTCS) by Hayes et al. (2005) was used. An example item is “*it will be easy for me to express my opinion*” The responses were measured on a 6-point Likert scale with 1 labelled as *extremely unlikely* to 6 labelled as *extremely likely*. Higher scores indicate greater consistency. The original scale consists of eight items, however, two more items were included to the original scale: “*I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think*” (item number 9, see Appendix C) was added on the premise that underlying moral opinions are strong moral convictions Skitka et al. (2005) and that morally consistent individuals would want to convince others of what they think. The second item “*Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion*” (item number 10, see Appendix C) was added to tap into the inconsistency between one’s moral attitude and expressing one’s moral opinion resulting in compliance. Moreover, the original scale was slightly simplified for the purpose of this study. For example complex items such as “*There have been many times when I have thought others around me were wrong but I didn’t let them know*” were modified into a simpler version “*even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know.*” (see Appendix C) for the comparison between the original scale and its modified version used in the study. All the items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicate greater (moral) consistency, except for item 4, 6, 8 and 9 (see Appendix C). For the sake of simplicity, henceforth moral

consistency related to moral issues and general consistency related to non-moral issues, will be simply referred as *consistency*.

Given the repeated-measure design of this experiment, Cronbach's alpha of this scale was assessed separately for each social situation and issue. The reliabilities are reported below in Table 6.2 in the Results section. It shows that reliabilities are satisfactory and above the .60 cut point for both cultures in general across situations except for the Indian participants in regard to the non-moral issue when two subfactors of this scale are considered.

2.2.2.4 Assertiveness

Assertiveness as a trait may confound with self-expression in social situations rather being related to the cultural self-construals. Past research has shown that Caucasians are more assertive than Asians (Fukuyama & Greenfield, 1983) – especially in the case of the U.S., it has been found that being more assertive is more likeable than being less assertive (Zakahi, 1985). Therefore, to control for assertiveness, participants were also assessed on the assertiveness scale. The 6-items scale used to measure assertiveness was taken from the Big Five Aspect Scales by DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson (2007) – (see Appendix B). An example item is “*I like to take charge*”. The responses were measured on 6-point Likert scale with 1 labelled as “*completely disagree*” to 6 labelled as “*completely agree*”. Reliability of the scale for Indian participants was .84, while for the American participants it was .85, indicating that reliability of the scale was high for both samples. Hence, a composite score was computed, and an independent samples t-test was administered in order to confirm any difference between US-American and Indian participants. Surprisingly and contrary to the literature, the results showed that Indians were significantly more assertive ($M = 4.71$; $SD = .80$) compared to the US-American participants ($M = 4.26$), ($SD = 1.01$), $t(231) = 3.83$, $p = .000$. This will be further discussed in the Discussion section below.

2.2.3 Analysis Plan

Given that the dependent variable *consistency* was based on a modified scale, a principal component analysis was run in order to identify possible factors followed by a reliability analysis. Next, descriptive statistics are presented along with the results of a mixed ANOVA testing the hypothesis that Indian participants are less consistent for in-group social situations compared to US-American participants, especially when it comes to moral issues.

2.2.4 Results

2.2.4.1 Principal Component and Reliability Analyses

First, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was run in order to examine if the modified scale assessing consistency – the dependent variable- possessed more than one factor. The PCA was run separately for each issue and every social situation with varimax rotation and Kaiser’s criteria of eigenvalues > 1 , resulting in nine PCAs. The results indicated the presence of two or three underlying factors across all issues and social situations. However, the third factor emerged inconsistently across samples, issues and social situations. Moreover, it never explained more than 16% of the variance. Therefore, it was decided not to retain the third factor in the following analyses.

According to the PCA, consistency consists of a factor that taps into passive consistency (non-self-censorship; not going along with others) and another factor that can be described as an active form of consistency (measuring the willingness to express one’s opinion). Items tapping into passive consistency factor were reverse coded to assess this aspect of consistency- such as “*I will rather go along than argue about it*” hence (non-self-censorship). It was based on the items 1,2,3,5,7 and 10 respectively. The factor 2 was comprised of items that tap into active consistency hence willingness to express one’s opinion, such as “*I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think*”. Items that tap into the second factor were items 4,6,8 and 9 respectively. Henceforth, first factor will be called “*passive consistency*” and second factor will be called “*active consistency*”. Along with PCA, maximum likelihood analysis was also run due to the fact of presence of reverse coded items. However, results remained the same using PCA or maximum likelihood analysis i.e. - presence of two factors.

Table 5.2

Principal component analysis for all issues and situations

Issue	Situation	PCA					
		India			USA		
		Passive consistency Factor 1	Active consistency Factor 2	Factor 3	Passive consistency Factor 1	Active consistency Factor 2	Factor 3
Death	Strangers						
	Item 1	.80			.79		
	Item 2	.75			.76		
	Item 3	.66			.84		
	Item 5	.80			.56		
	Item 7	.73			.83		
	Item 10	.70	-.32		.77		
	Item 4		.86			.77	

Moral Consistency across Cultures

	Item 6		.66			.55	
	Item 8		.71		.36	.72	
	Item 9		.73			.77	
	Explained variance (Eigenvalues)	34.25% (4.22)	24.89% (1.69)	-	37.11% (3.99)	21.46% (1.86)	-
Death	Friends						
	Item 1	.77			.78	.31	
	Item 2	.76			.78		
	Item 3	.79			.79		
	Item 5	.73			.68		
	Item 7	.78			.83		
	Item 10	.77			.85		
	Item 4		.77			.69	
	Item 6		.74			.67	
	Item 8		.66		.36	.69	
	Item 9		.68			.69	
	Explained variance (Eigenvalues)	36.24% (4.00)	22.54% (1.87)	-	39.63% (4.37)	20.79% (1.67)	-
Death	Family						
	Item 1	.78			.78		
	Item 2	.81			.76		
	Item 3	.80			.85		
	Item 5	.82			.70		
	Item 7	.77			.83		
	Item 10	.77			.82		.30
	Item 4		.82			.68	.51
	Item 6		.77				.91
	Item 8		.74		.30	.75	
	Item 9		.73			.88	
	Explained variance (Eigenvalues)	38.81% (4.24)	24.35% (2.06)	-	39.33% (4.70)	20.68% (1.58)	13.15% (1.02)
Torture	Strangers						
	Item 1	.68		.35	.76		
	Item 2	.78			.71		
	Item 3	.46		.64	.86		
	Item 5	.82			.76		
	Item 7			.89	.86		
	Item 10	.74			.80		
	Item 4		.88			.79	
	Item 6		.72				.95
	Item 8	-.67	.43	.36		.80	
	Item 9		.71			.83	
	Explained variance (Eigenvalues)	30.46% (3.91)	21.79% (1.71)	15.86% (1.18)	39.10% (4.16)	21.65% (1.96)	10.64% (1.00)

Moral Consistency across Cultures

Torture	Friends					
	Item 1	.76		.82		
	Item 2	.79		.78		
	Item 3	.77		.80		
	Item 5	.79		.77		
	Item 7	.76		.84		
	Item 10	.72	-.31	.86		
	Item 4		.83		.75	
	Item 6		.77		.49	
	Item 8		.75		.78	
	Item 9		.62		.81	
Explained variance (Eigenvalues)		36.40% (4.26)	24.51% (1.83)	-	41.39% (4.59)	22.53% (1.80)
Torture	Family					
	Item 1	.73		.76		
	Item 2	.81		.74		
	Item 3	.76		.75		
	Item 5	.71		.63		
	Item 7	.80		.85		
	Item 10	.73	-.30	.83		
	Item 4		.79		.68	
	Item 6		.77		.62	
	Item 8		.67		.80	
	Item 9		.74		.73	
Explained variance (Eigenvalues)		35.59% (4.10)	24.08% (1.86)	-	36.28% (4.15)	22.28% (1.69)
Orange	Strangers					
	Item 1	.81		.84		
	Item 2	.74		.73	.39	
	Item 3	.63		.72	.41	
	Item 5	.75		.78		
	Item 7	.78		.81		
	Item 10	.66	-.50	.84		
	Item 4		.87		.61	.39
	Item 6		.54			.94
	Item 8		.69		.64	
	Item 9		.71		.88	
Explained variance (Eigenvalues)		33.60% (4.23)	24.41% (1.57)	-	40.49% (4.69)	20.02% (1.43)
Orange	Friends					
	Item 1	.77		.82		
	Item 2	.75		.79		.33
	Item 3	.73		.75		.38
	Item 5	.72		.76		

Moral Consistency across Cultures

	Item 7	.81		.83	.33		
	Item 10	.69	-.37	.88			
	Item 4		.80		.72		
	Item 6		.55		.81		
	Item 8		.71		.77		
	Item 9		.64			.92	
Explained variance (Eigenvalues)		34.31% (3.81)	21.32% (1.75)	-	40.96% (4.85)	20.88% (1.56)	12.60% (1.03)
Orange	Family						
	Item 1	.73		.83			
	Item 2	.79		.76		.43	
	Item 3	.77		.61		.57	
	Item 5	.81		.76			
	Item 7	.81		.82			
	Item 10	.79		.80			
	Item 4		.67	.42	.66		
	Item 6		.58		.75		
	Item 8		.64		.63		
	Item 9		.77			.88	
Explained variance (Eigenvalues)		37.91% (4.07)	19.12% (1.63)	-	38.31% (4.64)	16.89% (1.29)	14.46% (1.03)

Note. For better readability, only loadings >.30 are reported. Substantial factor loadings >.60 are in bold. Death here refers to “*death penalty*”, torture refers to “*torturing terrorism suspects to extract information*”. Orange refers to “*drinking orange juice at breakfast*”.

Reliability analyses using Cronbach’s alpha on all consistency items or the items making up the active and passive consistency subscales respectively, revealed that the modified scale was highly reliable in both cultural samples for the “passive consistency” factor and somewhat less but still acceptable for the “active consistency” factor. However, when not distinguishing between the two factors showed that Cronbach’s alpha was less reliable in the Indian sample compared to the US American sample. Therefore, a composite score was computed for both factors separately and used in the mixed ANOVA analyses. Reliabilities of all items and items for each factor separately are reported in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2

Reliability Statistics for collapsed items and both subfactors

Issues	Situations	Cronbach's alpha of all items		Cronbach's alpha of passive consistency factor		Cronbach's alpha of active consistency factor	
		India	USA	India	USA	India	USA
Death penalty	Strangers	.55	.80	.85	.86	.76	.69
Death penalty	Friends	.66	.84	.87	.88	.70	.67
Death penalty	Family	.68	.87	.89	.89	.77	.73
Torturing terrorism suspects	Strangers	.53	.81	.83	.88	.71	.69
Torturing terrorism suspects	Friends	.63	.85	.87	.90	.75	.71
Torturing terrorism suspects	Family	.62	.83	.86	.86	.75	.70
Drinking orange juice at breakfast	Strangers	.51	.85	.85	.90	.70	.59
Drinking orange juice at breakfast	Friends	.63	.87	.85	.91	.64	.70
Drinking orange juice at breakfast	Family	.66	.86	.88	.89	.61	.57

Note. Items with reliability less than .70 are reported in bold.

2.2.4.2 Descriptive statistics and main analysis

First descriptive statistics are presented. It can be seen from the table 7.2 that for passive consistency factor as well as active consistency factor there is not much difference in means for Indian participants regardless of the issue or social situation. It seems, the nature of issue or situation is irrelevant for the Indian participants regarding both sub-factors.

Table 7.2

Descriptive statistics by conditions for the active and passive consistency factor

Issues and social situations	Passive consistency factor				Active consistency factor			
	India		USA		India		USA	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Death penalty-Strangers	2.90	1.11	3.33	1.23	4.40	0.98	4.04	1.05
Death penalty-Friends	2.96	1.19	3.46	1.31	4.51	0.89	4.11	0.98
Death penalty-Family	2.90	1.17	3.61	1.36	4.44	0.99	4.29	1.03
Torturing terrorism suspects-Strangers	2.91	1.05	3.32	1.23	4.43	0.92	3.89	1.06
Torturing terrorism suspects-Friends	3.00	1.19	3.55	1.37	4.53	0.92	4.15	1.03
Torturing terrorism suspects-Family	2.92	1.11	3.66	1.28	4.43	0.95	4.28	1.01
Drinking orange juice at breakfast-Strangers	2.87	1.10	3.74	1.43	4.47	0.92	4.44	0.97
Drinking orange juice at breakfast-Friends	2.94	1.13	3.89	1.46	4.57	0.81	4.64	0.96
Drinking orange juice at breakfast-Family	2.90	1.17	3.83	1.41	4.60	0.83	4.59	0.85

Note. Torturing terrorism suspect refers to torturing terrorism suspects to extract information.

The experiment consisted of a 2 (culture: West vs. East) x 3 (issue: moral, non-moral) x 3 (social situation: stranger, friend, family) mixed design with issue and social situation being within-subject factors. Hence, a mixed ANCOVA was conducted controlling for assertiveness. However, assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was violated for both subfactors therefore mixed ANOVA results are reported on the two consistency factors separately (passive and active consistency). The purpose was to test the following three hypotheses:

H1: Easterners show less consistency than Westerners between their actual opinion and its expression in challenging social situations - between subject effect.

H2: Easterners show less consistency than Westerners between their actual opinion and its expression in challenging social situations which should be more pronounced for interactions with ingroup members than outgroup members - situations x nationality interaction.

H3: Concerns about harmony would be even stronger for Easterners when it comes to moral issues compared to non-moral ones. The cultural difference in consistency across different social situations should become most evident in regard to opinions about moral issues compared to non-moral ones - issues x situation x nationality interaction.

2.2.4.3 Results for the passive consistency factor (non-self-censorship)

Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effects of issue, $\chi^2(2) = 53.78, p = .000$ and situation, $\chi^2(2) = 11.06, p = .004$, whereas it was not violated for the interaction between issues and situations, $\chi^2(9) = 14.51, p = .105$. Therefore, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates are reported below for the issues and situations. For the sake of completeness, all effects are reported, however, only the interaction effects central to the hypotheses in this study will be interpreted.

There was a significant difference in consistency ratings between the two cultural samples, indicating that consistency ratings for participants from India ($M = 2.92; SE = .10$) were generally significantly lower than for US-American participants ($M = 3.60; SE = .10$), $F(1, 231) = 21.68, p = .000$, therefore confirming hypothesis (H1). This shows that Indian participants were more compliant in general regardless of issues and situations than US-Americans.

There was a significant main effect of the type of issue, [$F(1.65, 382.29) = 8.09, p = .001$], on consistency ratings. Simple contrasts analyses revealed that consistency ratings were significantly different between moral and non-moral issues, i.e. when the issues death penalty, $F_{death\ vs\ orange}(1, 231) = 11.13, p = .001$, and torturing terrorist suspects were

compared with orange juice, $F_{torture\ vs\ orange}(1, 231) = 8.04, p = .005$. Interestingly consistency ratings were lower for moral issues than non-moral issue, ($M_{death} = 3.19; SE = .07; M_{torture} = 3.23; SE = .07; M_{orange} = 3.36; SE = .07$).

There was also a significant main effect of situation on consistency ratings, [$F(1.91, 441.28) = 9.94, p = .000$]. Simple contrasts comparing ingroup versus outgroup situations showed that the outgroup situation ($M_{strangers} = 3.18; SE = .07$) yielded significantly lower consistency ratings than the ingroup situations friends [$M_{friends} = 3.30; SE = .07; F_{friends\ vs\ strangers}(1, 231) = 18.31, p = .000$] and family [$M_{family} = 3.30; SE = .07; F_{family\ vs\ strangers}(1, 231) = 13.18, p = .000$].

There was a significant interaction effect between the type of issues and nationality of the participant, $F(2, 462) = 10.91, p = .000$. The effect shows that consistency ratings of different issues differed for US-American and Indian participants. Simple contrast analyses revealed significant interactions when comparing consistency scores for Indian and US-American participants regarding moral and non-moral issues, $F_{death\ vs\ orange}(1, 231) = 13.12, p = .000; F_{torture\ vs\ orange}(1, 231) = 13.63, p = .000$. The means show that US-American participants consistency scores were lower for moral issues compared to the non-moral issue, ($M_{death} = 3.47; SE = .10; M_{torture} = 3.51; SE = .10; M_{orange} = 3.82; SE = .11$). Whereas, consistency ratings for Indian participants were almost similar regardless of the issue, ($M_{death} = 2.92; SE = .10; M_{torture} = 2.95; SE = .10; M_{orange} = 2.90; SE = .11$).

There was also a significant interaction effect between the social situation and nationality of the participants, $F(2, 462) = 6.31, p = .002$. This shows that consistency ratings of different social situations differed for US-Americans and participants from India. Simple contrast analyses showed that consistency scores were significantly different for the ingroup situation family compared to the outgroup situation strangers, $F(1, 231) = 10.83, p = .001$. An inspection of the means shows that this difference holds only for the US-American participants ($M_{family} = 3.70; SE = .11; M_{strangers} = 3.46; SE = .10$), but not to the Indian participants ($M_{family} = 2.91; SE = .10; M_{strangers} = 2.90; SE = .09$). This suggests that US-American participants are more consistent in the ingroup situation compared to the outgroup situation. However, there was no ingroup-outgroup differentiation effect for the Indian participants. Hence, the second hypothesis (H2) which suggested that Easterners should be even more compliant than Westerners when faced with ingroup members compared to outgroup members was not confirmed.

There was no significant issue x situation interaction, $F(4, 924) = 1.11, p = .351$, indicating that consistency ratings for different issues did not differ according to the social situation.

Most importantly, the issue x situation x nationality interaction was not significant, $F(4, 924) = 1.61, p = .169$. This indicates that consistency ratings do not differ as a function of nationality, the type of issue and social situation. Hence, this result is contrary to the third hypothesis (H3) that the cultural difference in consistency scores across different social situations would become most evident in regard to opinions about moral issues compared to non-moral issues.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the results and shows clearly that Indians have lower consistency scores than US-Americans and these scores are very similar across all issues and social situations. In other words, the results show that Indians were generally less consistent on the passive consistency factor which was somewhat expected. However, it was expected that it would matter whether the issue at hand has moral relevance or whether they imagine interacting with an ingroup or outgroup member. Yet, the graph shows that the consistency scores were unaffected by the type of issues or social situations.

Figure 1.2.




Figure 1.2. Passive consistency rating across both samples. Death refers to *death penalty*, while torture refers to *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information*, and orange refers to *drinking orange juice at breakfast*.

2.2.4.4 Results for the active consistency factor (expressing one's opinion)

Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effects of issue, $\chi^2(2) = 36.59, p = .000$, situation, $\chi^2(2) = 12.63, p = .002$, and its interaction, $\chi^2(9) = 19.76, p = .019$. Therefore, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates are reported below.

There was a significant difference between the two cultural samples, indicating that consistency ratings from Indian participants were significantly higher ($M = 4.49; SE = .06$) from the US-American participants ($M = 4.27; SE = .06$), $F(1, 231) = 5.09, p = .025$. Though a significant result, hypothesis (H1) of Indian participants being less consistent than US-American participants is still not confirmed. It is because, interestingly Indians scored higher on active consistency scale than the US-Americans.

There was a significant main effect of the type of issue on moral consistency ratings, [$F(1.74, 402.75) = 22.43, p = .000$]. Simple contrasts analyses revealed that consistency ratings were significantly higher for the non-moral issue ($M_{orange} = 4.55; SE = .05$) compared to the moral issues death penalty [$M_{death} = 4.30; SE = .05; F_{death vs orange}(1, 231) = 24.90, p = .000$] and torturing terrorist suspects [$M_{torture} = 4.28; SE = .05; F_{torture vs orange}(1, 231) = 32.27, p = .000$].

There was also a significant main effect of situation on consistency ratings, [$F(1.89, 438.56) = 11.31, p = .000$]. Simple contrasts showed the outgroup situation ($M_{strangers} = 4.28; SE = .05$) yielded significantly lower consistency ratings than the ingroup situations friends [$M_{friends} = 4.42; SE = .05; F_{friends vs strangers}(1, 231) = 16.23, p = .000$] and family [$M_{family} = 4.44; SE = .05; F_{family vs strangers}(1, 231) = 15.50, p = .000$].

There was a significant interaction effect between the type of issues and nationality of the participants, [$F(1.74, 402.75) = 9.86, p = .000$]. The effect shows that consistency ratings of different issues differed for US-Americans and participants from India. Simple contrast analyses revealed significant interactions when comparing consistency scores for Indian and US-American participants regarding moral and non-moral issues, [$F_{death vs orange}(1, 231) = 9.86, p = .002; F_{torture vs orange}(1, 231) = 15.21, p = .000$]. Similarly, to the passive consistency factor, the means show that US-American participants consistency scores were lower for moral issues compared to the non-moral issue ($M_{death} = 4.15; SE = .08; M_{torture} = 4.11; SE = .08; M_{orange} = 4.56; SE = .07$). Whereas, consistency ratings for Indian participants were very

similar regardless of the issue, ($M_{death} = 4.45$; $SE = .07$; $M_{torture} = 4.46$; $SE = .07$; $M_{orange} = 4.55$; $SE = .07$).

There was also a significant interaction effect between the social situation and nationality of the participants [$F(1.89, 438.56) = 4.13$, $p = .018$]. Simple contrast analyses showed that consistency scores were significantly different for the ingroup situation family compared to the outgroup situation strangers, $F(1, 231) = 6.49$, $p = .011$. An inspection of the means shows that this difference holds only for the US-American participants ($M_{family} = 4.39$; $SE = .07$; $M_{strangers} = 4.13$; $SE = .07$), but not for the Indian participants ($M_{family} = 4.49$; $SE = .07$; $M_{strangers} = 4.43$; $SE = .07$). There was no ingroup-outgroup differentiation effect for the Indian participants. Hence, the second hypothesis (H2) which suggested that Easterners should be even more compliant than Westerners when faced with ingroup members compared to outgroup members was not confirmed.

There was also no significant issue x situation interaction, [$F(3.85, 890.71) = .527$, $p = .709$], indicating that consistency ratings for different issues did not differ according to the social situation.

Finally, the issue x situation x nationality interaction was significant, [$F(3.85, 890.71) = 2.93$, $p = .022$] indicating that consistency scores for different types of issues do differ according to the social situation if the nationality of the participants is taken into account. Simple contrasts were used to break down this interaction. These contrasts compared Indians and US-Americans scores in regard to each ingroup situation (friends, family) versus the outgroup situation (strangers) as well as each moral issue (death penalty, torture) versus the non-moral issue (orange juice). Only one significant contrast was found which suggested that there was a difference between US-American and Indians when comparing the family situation to the stranger situation when the moral issue torturing terrorist suspects was compared to the non-moral issue drinking orange juice, $F(1, 231) = 7.72$, $p = .006$. Although a 3-way interaction was hypothesized, Figure 3.2 shows that it is not in line with what was expected. The significant interaction is driven by the ratings of the US-American participants: consistency ratings for torture were significantly higher in the family situation ($M_{family} = 4.28$; $SE = .09$) compared to the stranger situation ($M_{strangers} = 3.89$; $SE = .09$). Consistency scores were generally higher for non-moral issues, but the difference between family ($M_{family} = 4.60$; $SE = .08$) and stranger situations ($M_{strangers} = 4.44$; $SE = .08$) was less accentuated.

For Indian participants consistency ratings for torture were almost identical for both social situations ($M_{strangers} = 4.44$; $SE = .09$; $M_{family} = 4.43$; $SE = .09$). For the non-moral issue

drinking orange juice, the consistency ratings were slightly higher in the family situation compared to the stranger situation ($M_{family} = 4.60$; $SE = .07$; $M_{strangers} = 4.47$; $SE = .08$).

To conclude, the hypothesis that for the sake of interpersonal harmony Easterners would show less consistency in ingroup situations compared to outgroup situations, particularly when moral issues are discussed was refuted (H3). However, interestingly, the ratings were generally similar for Indian participants and the US-American participants. It gives an idea, that contrary to passive consistency factor, Indians were as vocal (expressing their opinion) overall as the US-Americans for active consistency factor.

Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2. Active consistency rating across both samples. Death refers to *death penalty*, while torture refers to *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information*, and orange refers to *drinking orange juice at breakfast*.

Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2. 3-way interaction contrast results.

General Discussion

3.1 Summary of the main findings

For a long time period, psychological findings were considered to be universal, generalizable to all human beings. Yet, these findings were mainly based on a sample of societies that can be characterized as WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich and Democratic) (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Cultural differences were considered as an exception to the rule and were not treated as significantly important enough to revise established theories. This is also applied to morality which was studied and understood mainly through the Western point of reference until recently. This project, with the aim to move beyond a Western understanding of morality, tackled the concept of moral consistency. Moral consistency is here defined as sticking to and standing by one's moral beliefs which in the West is seen as a sign of moral integrity. The question then arises whether the phenomenon of moral consistency is culture-bound and less evident in non-Western cultures.

In order to assess cross-cultural differences in moral consistency, i.e. consistency between a person's moral attitude and self-expression in social situations, data were collected from Indian and US-American participants respectively. Initially a pilot study was conducted in order to filter out those issues that are considered equally moral and debatable across both samples. The pilot study revealed two issues i.e., *death penalty* and *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information* that fulfilled the criteria of being equally moral and debatable for both Indian and US-American participants. Whereas, *drinking orange juice at breakfast* was selected as a non-moral issue. Participants were instructed to imagine a debate

with ingroup or outgroup members about moral and non-moral issues and were asked how they would most likely behave in this situation. The dependent variable, consistency in the sense of sticking to and standing by one's moral or non-moral opinion was operationalized via a modified version of the willingness to self-censor scale (Hayes et al., 2005). It is noteworthy that in the present study, the scale yielded two subfactor and using them as separate dependent variables in the analysis resulted in the slightly different findings.

Results showed that for the so-called passive consistency factor i.e. non-self-censorship, Indian participants scored significantly lower compared to the US-American participants regardless of the issues and situations. As expected and congruent with hypothesis (H1), Indians were more compliant than US-Americans when challenged, possibly because of their cultural tendency to avoid the conflict. However, neither the social situation (ingroup or outgroup) nor the issue (moral or non-moral) had any effect on the consistency ratings of the Indian participants. Hence resulting in refuting the second hypothesis (H2) i.e. effect of ingroup social situation on consistency ratings as well as refuting the third hypothesis (H3) i.e. interaction effect of moral issues and ingroup social situation on the consistency ratings of Indians compared to the US-Americans.

However, interestingly there was much more variation in consistency scores in the US-American sample: US-Americans were more consistent regarding non-moral issue (*drinking orange juice at breakfast*) particularly in an imagined family situation compared to being challenged on moral issues when interacting with strangers. This suggests that US-Americans tended to be more non-compliant when they were being challenged on non-moral issue and by significant others, i.e. their family. This might be explained by the concept of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962). People tend to identify themselves with similar others and they tend to spend their time with those who share the same opinions, values and beliefs (Stets & Burke, 2000). However, in the context where significant others have complete opposite opinions and values then it could cause the discrepancy between one's own values and the fact, that opposite opinions are held by the people who are close to them i.e. their family. Therefore, to reduce this discrepancy they might use a way of asserting themselves and defending their opinions in a social context where it may matter the most to them i.e. family context. With strangers, there are little consequences, as there might be no future social interaction, therefore discrepancy can be reduced by moving away from strangers than changing their opinions. However, with family it is different, as it is a significant long-term relationship therefore, in order to reduce the discrepancy, it is important to not comply and assert even more to stand by with one's own opinion.

As for the active consistency factor, there was a significant difference on consistency ratings in general between Indian and US-American participants. However, interestingly opposite to the passive consistency factor this difference was because of Indians scoring significantly higher than the US-Americans in almost every social situation and issue except in the friend's social situation where they scored slightly lower for non-moral issue (orange juice). Therefore, hypothesis (H1) of Indians being more compliant than US-Americans when challenged was refuted. As the active consistency factor pertains to expressing one's opinion when challenged, this result suggests that Indians were more vocal overall than the US-Americans when they were being challenged. This might be explained by the assertiveness score of the Indians which were significantly higher than the US-American participants. Moreover, there is also a positive correlation for Indian participants between the active consistency factor and assertiveness $r = .45, p = .000$. Therefore, having a higher consistency score compared to the US-American participants on active consistency factor might be because of Indians being more assertive than US-Americans. There was also a significant three-way interaction - but again it was mostly driven by responses of the US-American participants who exhibited particularly high scores on active consistency for the moral issue *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information* in a family social context compared to a stranger situation. They were also somewhat more consistent in the non-moral issue (orange juice) in a family situation compared to the stranger situation. Interestingly, the family situation regarding the non-moral issue yielded also the highest consistency score in the Indian sample, while the difference between the family and stranger situation was negligible when it came to moral issues. However, similar to the passive consistency factor neither the nature of the situation (ingroup or outgroup) nor the issue (moral or non-moral) influenced the consistency scores of Indian participants significantly. Therefore, refuting the hypotheses (H2) and (H3) respectively.

One of the main reasons that hypotheses (H2) and (H3) were not confirmed in both consistency subfactors could be because the Indians did not differentiate between moral and non-moral issues as mentioned in the results of pilot study. It is argued that this could be due to the response style of Indian participants particular to the issues or situations that are related to morality and embodies a disagreement. Previous literature on response styles suggests that Indians tend to have extreme response style that with acquiescence while responding a survey (Harzing, 2006). This response style was also observed in this study through the responses of Indian participants regarding assertiveness and self-construals items. Indian participants scored higher on self construals (both independent and interdependent) as well as on the

assertiveness compared to the US-Americans. However, it is argued that response set might differ in case of items that relate to morality and embodies the disagreement. It might be due to the possibility that Indian participants tend to answer these questions towards the mid-point of scale. Therefore, there was no difference in scores regardless of issue or situation. Hence, rating non-moral issues as moral doesn't necessarily mean that Indian participants considered those issues as moral, rather it could be the response style specific to morality and the disagreement which gave that sort of result. Another reason could be that debating about non-moral issues could also lead to interpersonal conflict and harm the harmony. Because upholding harmony might be seen as a moral end in itself and it might not matter whether underlying disagreement is a moral or non-moral matter and in what situation the disagreement is being taken place. What is important is the disagreement and the desire not to fuel it regardless of the social situation or the issues in hand.

Though not related to hypotheses, an interesting result that needs further exploration is related to the fact that there was a significant interaction effect driven by US-American participants between the type of issues and nationality of the participant for both subfactors. This result is rather interesting because US-Americans were more consistent in expressing their opinion as well as not complying when challenged regarding the non-moral issue of *drinking orange juice at breakfast*. It goes against the idea of moral conviction by Skitka et al. (2005) that attitudes related to morality are stronger compared to non-moral attitudes. This needs to be further explored, also in the context of what it means to have a moral identity in the West and how moral consistency relates to it. A possible explanation can be that when moral issues are presented with the non-moral ones that are very common such as *drinking orange juice at breakfast*, then there is a possibility that the evident acceptance of a non-moral issue in the society acts as a rule, i.e. it is acceptable by everyone. It guides one's attitude to justify it and defend it without much risk in social situations compared to the moral issue where there can be different opinions in society.

In sum, this suggests that consistency is high in both cultures for non-moral issues. Maybe there is no risk associated with non-moral issues whereas debating moral issues can really upset others. This is contrary to what was expected as the main idea was being consistent on moral issues is an important characteristic for Western moral identities and a fundamental attribute of a moral person (Blasi, 1980). However, maybe US-Americans are more careful about sticking to and standing by their moral opinions compare to the non-moral opinions. This might be because of the current climate of political correctness that these

moral issues tap in. In short there is a need to explore the notion of moral integrity is moral consistency in more detail.

3.2 Limitations

This project was based on a bottom up approach i.e. to let the participants decide what they consider as moral and debatable. For this sake a pilot study was administered. However, although it worked well for the moral issues across both samples, for non-moral issues, there were certain complications regarding Indian participants. As mentioned above all non-moral issues mentioned in the Table 3.2 were rated as moral ones by Indian participants. Not even a single issue was considered as a non-moral issue. This already suggests that participants from India may not differentiate between different issues. This trend was significantly visible in the main study as well, in which Indians considered *drinking orange juice at breakfast* more moral than *death penalty* and *torturing terrorism suspects to extract information*. Therefore, the manipulation check in order to assess the participant's attitude did not work for the Indian participants which can be one of the biggest limitations of this project.

Another limitation was the conceptual and cultural semantic understanding of the moral vs non-moral. It is argued that for the general public in South Asia there might be no clear linguistic and conceptual distinction between the terminology of immoral and non-moral issues. This is because non-moral and immoral terms might not be mutually exclusive in the South Asian context. It could be due to the possibility of referring non-moral to anything which is "bad" or/and "sinful", whereas moral referring to something as "good" or "allowed to do in society". Therefore, there might not be many issues that would fall under the domain of Western understanding of non-morality. This could explain the fact that all the non-moral issues mentioned in the table 2.3 were considered as moral issues for Indians. Here moral issues might mean (allowed to do) or the opposite of immoral rather than the non-moral. Therefore, rating *drinking orange juice at breakfast* as morally relevant could mean that this issue is either "a good thing to do" or/and "an act allowed in society". In short, this project did not take the cultural semantics and conceptual differences into account regarding cultural understanding of what is non-moral and immoral. Therefore, there is a need to linguistically and conceptually differentiate these concepts to conduct further cross-cultural studies in the domain of morality. Moreover, this project could not address the possible issue of Indian's response sets in detail, therefore, further research is needed in order to assess the impact of cultural response sets on the valuation of moral issues.

Both samples were assessed on a self-construal and assertiveness scale as well. Interestingly, compared to US-Americans, Indians scored significantly higher on the

independent self-construal which is contrary to the literature (Kapoor, Hughes, Baldwin & Blue, 2003). One of the reasons could be the nature of data collection that was used for the study. It is possible that Indians who use the M-Turk platform do not represent the general population. They tend to be more educated and possess enough English language skills and computer knowledge to answer an online survey in English (Ross, Irani, Silberman, Zaldivar & Tomlinson, 2010). If data collection was executed in field, then result might have been different and more in line with the previous literature which suggests that Eastern cultures are more interdependent (Kim, 2002). Future research could address this issue by collecting data from a more representative sample in India on paper and pencil and compare the results to an M-Turk sample from India. Similarly, Indian participants also scored higher on the assertiveness scale compared to the US-American participants. Moreover, both samples also differed significantly on gender distribution and age. This could have also influenced the results of the study. Therefore, future research could address this issue by minimizing age differences and having equal gender representation across both samples.

3.3 Future Perspectives

Although morality has been well studied in the west for a long period of time, cross-cultural perspectives are rather scarce. Therefore, there is a need to address the concept of morality from a cultural lens. As mentioned above, firstly the important thing is to differentiate the concepts of non-moral and immoral on linguistic and conceptual level as these concepts might not be mutually exclusive in certain cultures. Furthermore, *moral consistency* has not been studied before in a cross-cultural setting. There is a need to study this concept as defined in this project across many other cultures. In future studies, the cognitive aspect of moral consistency can be also explored. When people comply with others on moral issues even if it is contrary to their own beliefs, how do they rationalize their thinking process? Moreover, does complying in a social situation regarding a moral issue induce any emotional response? In addition, how does cognitive dissonance relate to moral consistency?

Self-construal analyses showed that Indian participants scored higher on both independent and interdependent self-construals than US-American participants. This needs to be further explored as well. It is clear that Indians were overall more compliant for the passive consistency factor compared to the US-Americans. This effect of compliance might be because the interdependent self is more salient, therefore compliance is rather acceptable. However, for the active consistency factor Indians scored significantly higher than the US-American participants on overall consistency ratings. This might be due to the fact that the

independent self was more salient for the active consistency factor. Given that Indians were more interdependent and independent than the US-American participants, it might explain the fact that Indians scored lower on the passive consistency and higher on the active consistency subfactors respectively.

In addition, US-Americans were more consistent in regard to non-moral issues contradicts the previous findings in the moral conviction literature by Skitka et al. (2005) which argues that opinions about morally relevant issues are strong moral convictions and the attitudes that are morally relevant are stronger than the non-moral ones. Therefore, there is a need to explore the consistency differences in self-expression regarding moral vs non-moral issues. In short, these are some of the ways in which future research can be directed in the domain of moral consistency.

3.4 Conclusion

This project proposes that consistency is more complex than anticipated by the mere fact that there are different dimensions to it (active and passive). In the face of current political climate (being politically correct), there is a need to revisit the idea that moral integrity is moral consistency and that being morally consistent is a fundamental attribute of a moral person. The fact that Westerners generally were more consistent towards non-moral issues than the moral ones imply that there is a need to be more careful about sticking to and standing by one's moral opinions. This could be due to the current climate of political correctness that these moral issues tap into. There might be no risk associated with non-moral issues therefore they are acceptable to debate on, whereas debating moral issues can really upset others. Moreover, there is also a need to revisit the cultural semantics on morality. Although since Moral Foundation Theory (Graham et al., 2013), trend is shifting from Western perspective on morality to understand it in a cross-cultural setting, it is still new and there is a lot of room to expand the research on morality and moral consistency in different cross-cultural settings.

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Appendix A - Pilot study

Informed Consent

Background and purpose

This is a request for you to participate in a pilot study which helps understanding what kind of issues are considered to be morally relevant and debatable across various cultures. This research is conducted by a collaboration of ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon and the University of Oslo. You can contact Thomas Schubert, thomas.schubert@psykologi.uio.no or Christin-Melanie Vauclair, melanie.vauclair@iscte-iul.pt, for questions and comments.

What does the study entail?

This study is an online survey. During the study you will be presented with various issues where one could have a moral opinion. You will be asked to make a decision whether you consider certain issues as morally wrong or not. Moreover, you will be asked to indicate whether certain issues can be discussed with the friends and family members. Each survey will take approximately 6 minutes to finish. Only the information given by participants will be considered as data. This is a cross-cultural study and due to established cultural differences in self-view, this study is being conducted with participants from various countries.

Potential advantages and disadvantages

The study gives you an opportunity to think about moral decisions. There are no known disadvantages.

What will happen to the information about you?

The data that are registered about you will only be used in accordance with the purpose of the study as described above. All the data will be processed without name, ID number, IP address, or other directly recognizable or identifying type of information. It will not be possible to identify you in the results of the study when these are analyzed or when these are published.

Voluntary participation

Participation in the study is voluntary. You can withdraw your consent to participate in the study at any time and without stating any particular reason. If you wish to participate, indicate your consent below before proceeding. If you agree to participate at this time, you may later on withdraw your consent. If you later on have questions concerning the study, you may contact thomas.schubert@psykologi.uio.no.

We ask you to finish the questionnaire. You can however leave out questions that you do not wish to answer.

Privacy

Information that is retained about you are only the answers you give in the questionnaire. No identifiable information, such as IP, is saved.

Releasing material and data to other parties

Your answers are merged with the answers of the other participants in a large database; your answers can not be traced back to you. This database might be shared with other researchers, which is recommended best practice in any psychological research.

Right to access and right to delete your data

If you agree to participate in the study, you are entitled to have access to what information is registered about you.

Funding and the role of ISCTE-IUL & University of Oslo

The study is funded by research grants from the Department of Psychology ISCTE-IUL, Portugal & the University of Oslo, Norway.

Information about the outcome of the study

You are entitled to receive information about the outcome/result of the study. Please contact the research team to do so. This study has been notified to the Internal Review Board of the Department of Psychology at the University of Oslo.

Please do not participate in this study if you are younger than 18 years.

IF YOU PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY VIA MTURK, PLEASE COPY THE CONFIRMATION CODE YOU GET AT THE VERY END BACK TO QUALTRICS.

I have read and agree with the terms above (Note that you will only proceed if you choose 'Yes')

Yes (1)

No (2)

Gender

Male (1)

Female (2)

Other (3)

Age in numbers

Nationality

Indian (1)

American (USA) (2)

Other (3)

Ethnicity

- Latin American (1)
- Asian American (2)
- Native American (3)
- African American (4)
- European American (5)
- Other (6)

Religion

- Protestant (1)
- Catholic (2)
- Islam (3)
- Judaism (4)
- Hinduism (5)
- Sikhism (6)
- Taoism (7)
- Buddhism (8)
- Confucianism (9)
- Jainism (10)
- Atheist (11)
- Agnostic (12)
- Other (13)

To what extent do you think the following issues can be considered as morally wrong?

	Not at all morally wrong 1	2	3	4	5	Extremely morally wrong 6
Piracy (Illegal downloading) (1)						
Gambling (2)						
Smacking your children to discipline them (3)						
Doctors assisting a terminally ill patient to die (4)						
Animal testing (5)						
Environmental protection (6)						
Minimum wage (7)						
Internet censorship (8)						
Torture of terrorism suspects (9)						
Burning your country's flag (10)						
Production of genetically modified food (11)						
Genetic cloning (12)						
Adopting a child from different ethnic group (13)						
Plastic surgery that is not medically necessary (14)						
Increasing the number of accepted refugees in your country (15)						
Death penalty (16)						
Marrying outside one's religion (17)						
Marrying someone outside your social class (18)						
Polyamory (having intimate relationships with more than one partner) (19)						
Using plastic bags (20)						
Drinking orange juice for breakfast (21)						
Wearing socks at work (22)						
Playing table tennis as a hobby (23)						
Eating spicy food (24)						
Playing the guitar (25)						

- Watching TV on a sunny day (26)
- Wearing sunglasses on a rainy day (27)
- Reading comics (28)
- Taking a nap during daytime (29)
- Drinking tea (30)
- Using a computer (31)
- Using a comb to brush your hair (32)
- Using liquid soap for personal hygiene (33)
- Eavesdrop (secretly listening to a conversation) (34)
- Travelling without paying for a ticket (35)
- Using handmade products (36)
- Eating with your hands (37)
- Plagiarism (38)
- Serving in the army (39)
- Arguing with your parents (40)

There are some issues that you could argue or debate with friends or members of your family, and there are probably some issues that you could never discuss with them. We want to know whether you could discuss the following issues with friends or family members. Please indicate for every item how much you could discuss or debate it.

Please pay close attention to the issues and then choose your answer.

To what extent do you think the following issues are debatable among your friends and family members, i.e. they can have different opinions about it?

	Not at all debatable	2	3	4	5	Extremely debatable
	1					6
Piracy (Illegal downloading) (1)						
Gambling (2)						
Smacking your children to discipline them (3)						
Doctors assisting a terminally ill patient to die (4)						
Animal testing (5)						
Environmental protection (6)						
Minimum wage (7)						
Internet censorship (8)						
Torture of terrorism suspects (9)						
Burning your country's flag (10)						
Production of genetically modified food (11)						
Genetic cloning (12)						
Adopting a child from different ethnic group (13)						
Plastic surgery that is not medically necessary (14)						
Increasing the number of accepted refugees in your country (15)						
Death penalty (16)						
Marrying outside one's religion (17)						
Marrying someone outside your social class (18)						
Polyamory (having intimate relationships with more than one partner) (19)						
Using plastic bags (20)						
Drinking orange juice for breakfast (21)						
Wearing socks at work (22)						
Playing table tennis as a hobby (23)						
Eating spicy food (24)						
Playing the guitar (25)						
Watching TV on a sunny day (26)						

Wearing sunglasses on a rainy day (27)
Reading comics (28)
Taking a nap during daytime (29)
Drinking tea (30)
Using a computer (31)
Using a comb to brush your hair (32)
Using liquid soap for personal hygiene (33)
Eavesdrop (secretly listening to a conversation) (34)
Travelling without paying for a ticket (35)
Using handmade products (36)
Eating with your hands (37)
Plagiarism (38)
Serving in the army (39)
Arguing with your parents (40)

Debriefing

Thank you for participating in the survey. This is a pilot study which helps understanding what kind of issues are considered to be morally relevant and debatable across various cultures. This research is important to understand the cultural differences related to moral judgement. Results of the study will be used in further research related to moral judgement across various cultures. Thank you once again for participating in the research.

Your MTURK participation code is \${e://Field/random}

Please press continue again before closing the survey.

Appendix B – Main study

Before starting the survey, in order to see you are not a robot please answer the following simple arithmetic question.

2+2 =?

Informed Consent

Background and purpose

This is a request for you to participate in a research study that intends to measure the attitudes towards various issues across different social situations. This research is conducted by a collaboration of ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon and the University of Oslo. You can contact Thomas Schubert, thomas.schubert@psykologi.uio.no or Christin-Melanie Vauclair, melanie.vauclair@iscte-iul.pt, for questions and comments.

What does the study entail?

This study is an online survey. During the study you will be presented with various issues. You will be asked to make a decision whether you are for or against that issue. Afterwards you will be asked to answer various questions concerning the issues in social situations. This is a cross-cultural study and due to established cultural differences in self-view, this study is being conducted with the participants from various countries. This survey will take approximately 18 minutes to finish. Only the information given by participants will be considered as data.

Potential advantages and disadvantages

The study gives you an opportunity to think about several issues. There are no known disadvantages.

What will happen to the information about you?

The data that are registered about you will only be used in accordance with the purpose of the study as described above. All the data will be processed without name, ID number, IP address, or other directly recognisable or identifying type of information. It will not be possible to identify you in the results of the study when these are analysed or when these are published.

Voluntary participation

Participation in the study is voluntary. You can withdraw your consent to participate in the

study at any time and without stating any particular reason. This will not have any consequences for your further treatment. If you wish to participate, indicate your consent below before proceeding. If you agree to participate at this time, you may later on withdraw your consent without your treatment being affected in any way. However, you will not be paid if you withdraw from the survey via MTURK. If you later on have questions concerning the study, you may contact thomas.schubert@psykologi.uio.no.

We ask you to finish the questionnaire. You can however leave out questions that you do not wish to answer.

Privacy

Information that is retained about you are only the answers you give in the questionnaire. No identifiable information, such as IP, is saved.

Releasing material and data to other parties

Your answers are merged with the answers of the other participants in a large database; your answers can not be traced back to you. This database might be shared with other researchers, which is recommended best practice in any psychological research.

Right to access and right to delete your data

If you agree to participate in the study, you are entitled to have access to what information is registered about you.

Funding and the role of ISCTE-IUL & University of Oslo

The study is funded by research grants from the Department of Psychology ISCTE-IUL , Portugal & the University of Oslo, Norway.

Information about the outcome of the study

You are entitled to receive information about the outcome/result of the study. Please contact the research team to do so.

This study has been notified to the Internal Review Board of the Department of Psychology at the University of Oslo.

Please do not participate in this study if you are younger than 18 years.

Consent agreement

I have read and agree with the terms above (Note that you will only proceed if you choose 'Yes')

Yes

No

Self-construal

Following are some statements that someone might use to try to **describe you**. Probably some of the statements will not describe you well, whereas others will describe you better. **Please tick a number beside each statement to show how well it describes you.** For example, if the statement doesn't describe you at all, then tick 1. If the statement describes you very well, then tick 4. If you are undecided between two possible answers, you can tick the number in between 1 and 5.

How well does each statement **describe you?**

	Does not describe me at all 1	Describes me a little 2	Describes me moderately 3	Describes me very well 4	Describes me exactly 5
You prefer to express your thoughts and feelings openly, even if it may sometimes cause conflict.					
You like to discuss your own ideas, even if it might sometimes upset the people around you.					
You show your true feelings even if it disturbs the balance in your family relationships.					
You prefer to preserve harmony in your relationships, even if this means not expressing your true feelings.					
You try to adapt to people around you, even if it means hiding your feelings.					

You try not to express disagreement with members of your family.

Introduction

In every society, people can have very different opinions about some topics. In general, they tend to be either in favor or against an issue. We would like to know what your PERSONAL OPINION is about the following issues.

Are **YOU** in general **in favor of** or **against**

The Death Penalty

in favor of

against

Please also indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statement

	Very much disagree	Slightly disagree	Moderately disagree	Neutral or Neither	Moderately agree	Slightly agree	Very much agree
My opinion about the death penalty reflects something about my core moral values and convictions.							

Are **YOU** in general **in favor of** or **against**

Torturing terrorism suspects to extract information

in favor of
against

Please also indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statement

	Very much disagree	Slightly disagree	Moderately disagree	Neutral or Neither	Moderately agree	Slightly agree	Very much agree
My opinion about torturing terrorism suspects to extract information reflects something about my core moral values and convictions.							

Are **YOU** in general **in favor of** or **against**

Drinking orange juice at breakfast

in favor of
against

Please also indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statement

	Very much disagree	Slightly disagree	Moderately disagree	Neutral or Neither	Moderately agree	Slightly agree	Very much agree

My opinion about drinking orange juice at breakfast reflects something about my core moral values and convictions.

Instructions

In the following, you will be asked to imagine different social situations in which a specific topic is discussed. These social situations consist either of a **A GROUP OF STRANGERS**, or, **A GROUP OF FRIENDS OF YOURS**, or, **A GROUP OF FAMILY MEMBERS OF YOURS** (e.g., your parents, aunts, uncles etc). Please try to imagine each social situation as vividly as possible before answering the questions.

Death penalty

You previously indicated that you are **PERSONALLY** $\{e://Field/opinion\}$ $\{e://Field/issue\ 1\}$. Now, please imagine a social situation in which this issue is discussed in **A GROUP OF STRANGERS** you have just met at a dinner party. It becomes clear from the discussion that everyone is strongly $\{e://Field/express\}$ this issue. How will you most likely behave in this situation?

	Extremely unlikely			Extremely likely		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
It will be difficult for me to express my opinion. Even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know.						
I will rather go along than argue about it.						
It will be easy for me to express my own opinion.						
I will feel uncomfortable if they asked about my opinion.						
I will speak my opinion if I feel I can trust them.						

I will rather keep quiet than publicly speak my opinion.

I will have no problem of letting them know that I disagree with them.

I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think.

Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion.

You previously indicated that you are **PERSONALLY** $\{e://Field/opinion\}$ $\{e://Field/issue\ 1\}$. Now, please imagine a social situation in which this issue is discussed in **A GROUP OF FRIENDS OF YOURS**. It becomes clear from the discussion that everyone is strongly $\{e://Field/express\}$ this issue. How will you most likely behave in this situation?

	Extremely unlikely			Extremely likely		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
I will be difficult for me to express my opinion.						
Even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know.						
I will rather go along than argue about it.						
It will be easy for me to express my own opinion.						
I will feel uncomfortable if they asked about my opinion.						
I will speak my opinion if I feel I can trust them.						
I will rather keep quiet than publicly speak my opinion.						
I will have no problem of letting them know that I disagree with them.						
I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think.						
Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion.						

You previously indicated that you are **PERSONALLY** $\{e://Field/opinion\}$ $\{e://Field/issue\ 1\}$. Now, please imagine a social situation in which this issue is discussed in **A GROUP OF FAMILY MEMBERS OF YOURS**. It becomes clear from the discussion that everyone is strongly $\{e://Field/express\}$ this issue. How will you most likely behave in this situation?

	Extremely unlikely			Extremely likely		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
It will be difficult for me to express my opinion. Even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know. I will rather go along than argue about it. It will be easy for me to express my own opinion. I will feel uncomfortable if they asked about my opinion. I will speak my opinion if I feel I can trust them. I will rather keep quiet than publicly speak my opinion. I will have no problem of letting them know that I disagree with them. I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think. Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion.						

Torturing terrorism suspects to extract information

You previously indicated that you are **PERSONALLY** $\{e://Field/opinion\}$ $\{e://Field/issue 2\}$. Now, please imagine a social situation in which this issue is discussed in **A GROUP OF STRANGERS** you have just met at a dinner party. It becomes clear from the discussion that everyone is strongly $\{e://Field/express\}$ this issue. How will you most likely behave in this situation?

	Extremely unlikely			Extremely likely		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
It will be difficult for me to express my opinion. Even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know. I will rather go along than argue about it.						

It will be easy for me to express my own opinion.
 I will feel uncomfortable if they asked about my opinion.
 I will speak my opinion if I feel I can trust them.
 I will rather keep quiet than publicly speak my opinion.
 I will have no problem of letting them know that I disagree with them.
 I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think.
 Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion.

You previously indicated that you are **PERSONALLY** opinion 2. Now, please imagine a social situation in which this issue is discussed in **A GROUP OF FRIENDS OF YOURS**. It becomes clear from the discussion that everyone is strongly express this issue. How will you most likely behave in this situation?

	Extremely unlikely			Extremely likely		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
It will be difficult for me to express my opinion. Even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know. I will rather go along than argue about it. It will be easy for me to express my own opinion. I will feel uncomfortable if they asked about my opinion. I will speak my opinion if I feel I can trust them. I will rather keep quiet than publicly speak my opinion. I will have no problem of letting them know that I disagree with them. I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think. Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion.						

You previously indicated that you are **PERSONALLY** $\{e://Field/opinion\}$ $\{e://Field/issue\ 2\}$. Now, please imagine a social situation in which this issue is discussed in **A GROUP OF FAMILY MEMBERS OF YOURS**. It becomes clear from the discussion that everyone is strongly $\{e://Field/express\}$ this issue. How will you most likely behave in this situation?

	Extremely unlikely			Extremely likely		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
It will be difficult for me to express my opinion.						
Even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know.						
I will rather go along than argue about it.						
It will be easy for me to express my own opinion.						
I will feel uncomfortable if they asked about my opinion.						
I will speak my opinion if I feel I can trust them.						
I will rather keep quiet than publicly speak my opinion.						
I will have no problem of letting them know that I disagree with them.						
I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think.						
Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion.						

Drinking orange juice at breakfast

You previously indicated that you are **PERSONALLY** $\{e://Field/opinion\}$ $\{e://Field/issue\ 3\}$. Now, please imagine a social situation in which this issue is discussed in **A GROUP OF STRANGERS** you have just met at a dinner party. It becomes clear from the discussion that everyone is strongly $\{e://Field/express\}$ this issue. How will you most likely behave in this situation?

	Extremely unlikely			Extremely likely		
	1	2	3	4	5	6

It will be difficult for me to express my opinion.
 Even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know.
 I will rather go along than argue about it.
 It will be easy for me to express my own opinion.
 I will feel uncomfortable if they asked about my opinion.
 I will speak my opinion if I feel I can trust them.
 I will rather keep quiet than publicly speak my opinion.
 I will have no problem of letting them know that I disagree with them.
 I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think.
 Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion.

You previously indicated that you are **PERSONALLY** $\{e://Field/opinion\}$ $\{e://Field/issue\}$ 3}. Now, please imagine a social situation in which this issue is discussed in **A GROUP OF FRIENDS OF YOURS**. It becomes clear from the discussion that everyone is strongly $\{e://Field/express\}$ this issue. How will you most likely behave in this situation?

	Extremely unlikely			Extremely likely		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
It will be difficult for me to express my opinion. Even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know. I will rather go along than argue about it. It will be easy for me to express my own opinion. I will feel uncomfortable if they asked about my opinion. I will speak my opinion if I feel I can trust them. I will rather keep quiet than publicly speak my opinion. I will have no problem of letting them know that I disagree with them.						

I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think.

Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion.

You previously indicated that you are **PERSONALLY** $\{e://Field/opinion\}$ $\{e://Field/issue\}$ 3}. Now, please imagine a social situation in which this issue is discussed in **A GROUP OF FAMILY MEMBERS OF YOURS**. It becomes clear from the discussion that everyone is strongly $\{e://Field/express\}$ this issue. How will you most likely behave in this situation?

	Extremely unlikely			Extremely likely		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
It will be difficult for me to express my opinion.						
Even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know.						
I will rather go along than argue about it.						
It will be easy for me to express my own opinion.						
I will feel uncomfortable if they asked about my opinion.						
I will speak my opinion if I feel I can trust them.						
I will rather keep quiet than publicly speak my opinion.						
I will have no problem of letting them know that I disagree with them.						
I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think.						
Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion.						

Assertiveness

Please read the following statements carefully and answer according to what describes you the best.

Completely disagree Completely agree

	1	2	3	4	5	6
I like to take charge.						
I have a strong personality.						
I know how to captivate people.						
I see myself as a good leader.						
I can talk others into doing things.						
I am the first to act.						
We would like to make sure that you are paying attention to the wording of the questions. Please click "completely agree" as a response to this item.						

Demographics

Gender

Male

Female

Other / rather not say

Age

▼ 18 ... 99

Nationality

Indian

American

Other

Ethnicity

Latin American

Asian American
Native American
African American
European American
Other

Religion

Christianity (Protestant)
Christianity (Catholic)
Christianity (other)
Islam
Judaism
Hinduism
Sikhism
Taoism
Buddhism
Confucianism
Jainism
Atheism
Agnosticism
Other

Debriefing

Thank you for participating in the survey. This is a research study which helps understanding the attitudes towards various issues across different social situations. This is a cross-cultural study and due to established cultural differences in how we view ourselves, this study is being conducted with the participants from various countries. Results of the study will be used in further research related to moral judgement across various cultures. Thank you once again for participating in the research.

Your MTURK participation code is \${e://Field/random}

Appendix C – (Modified) Willingness to self-censor scale

Original willingness to self-censor scale

- 1) It is difficult for me to express my opinion if I think others won't agree with what I say.
- 2) There have been many times when I have thought others around me were wrong, but I didn't let them know.
- 3) When I disagree with others, I'd rather go along with them than argue about it.
- 4) It is easy for me to express my opinion around others who I think will disagree with me.
- 5) I'd feel uncomfortable if someone asked my opinion and I knew that he or she wouldn't agree with me.
- 6) I tend speak my opinion only around friends or other people I trust.
- 7) It is safer to keep quiet than publicly speak an opinion that you know most others don't share.
- 8) If I disagree with others, I have no problem letting them know it.

Modified willingness to self-censor scale

- 1) It will be difficult for me to express my opinion.
- 2) Even if I think they are wrong, I will not let them know.
- 3) I will rather go along than argue about it.
- 4) It will be easy for me to express my own opinion.
- 5) I will feel uncomfortable if they asked about my opinion.
- 6) I will speak my opinion if I feel I can trust them.
- 7) I will rather keep quiet than publicly speak my opinion.
- 8) I will have no problem of letting them know that I disagree with them.
- 9) I will express my opinion to convince others of what I think.
- 10) Even if I think they are wrong, I will pretend to endorse their opinion.