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Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

IUL - School of Social Sciences and Humanities

Department of Social and Organizational Psychology

"Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité?" How different conceptions of Laïcité and threat perception motivate dehumanization of Muslims and vote choices among (ir)religious majorities in France.

Margot Latasa

Dissertation submitted as partial requirement for the conferral of Master in Psychology of Intercultural Relations

Supervisor:

Doutor Ricardo Borges Rodrigues, Professor Auxiliar Convidado,

ISCTE – University Institute of Lisbon

October, 2019

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"The best way to overcome the threat of violence based on religion and belief is by uniting our voices for good, countering messages of hate with messages of peace, embracing diversity and protecting human rights."

- UN Secretary-General António Guterres, New York, August 22, 2019, first-ever International Day of Victims of Violence Based on religion or Belief

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Laïcités, perception of threat, dehumanizing processes toward Muslims, and behavioral intention to vote among (ir)religious majorities in France.

Abstract

The present study analyzed the effect of a Historical form of Laïcité (more inclusive), and a Newer form of Laïcité (more restrictive), on intergroup relations in France. Precisely, it assessed how exposure to different forms of laïcité impacts threat perception for the (ir)religious majorities (Atheists and Catholics), blatant and subtle dehumanization towards Muslims, and behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive president. Participants ($N = 182$) were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (Historical Laïcité, New Laïcité or a control condition). Results indicated that both Historical and New forms of Laïcité can increase different levels of blatant dehumanization, and both equally decreased Catholic's behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive president. Also, symbolic threat appeared to be a strong predictor of subtle and blatant dehumanization towards Muslims, and behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate. Finally, our results revealed an implication of (ir)religious identification in blatant and subtle forms of dehumanization and perception of threat: Atheists (vs. catholics) seem to dehumanize more blatantly, Catholics (vs. Atheists) seem to dehumanize more subtly, and Catholics (vs. Atheists) seem to experience more symbolic and anxiety threat from Muslims.

Keywords:

Laïcité, intergroup threat, blatant dehumanization, subtle dehumanization

PsychINFO Codes:

3000 Social Psychology

3020 Group & Interpersonal Processes

3040 Social Perception & Cognition

2960 Political Processes & Political Issues

2920 Religion

Laïcités, perception of threat, dehumanizing processes toward Muslims, and behavioral intention to vote among (ir)religious majorities in France.

Resumo

O presente estudo analisou o efeito de uma forma de Laicidade Histórica (mais inclusiva), e de uma forma de Laicidade Nova (mais restritiva) nas relações intergrupais em França. Especificamente, analisou-se se a exposição a diferentes formas de Laicidade afeta a perceção de ameaça intergrupal das maiorias religiosas/não religiosas (ateus e católicos), assim como a expressão de formas flagrantes e subtis de desumanização dos muçulmanos, e a intenção de voto a favor de um presidente inclusivo. Os participantes ($N = 182$) foram aleatoriamente distribuídos por três condições experimentais (i.e., Laicidade Histórica, Nova Laicidade, condição de controle). Os resultados indicam que, quer a Laicidade Histórica, quer a Nova Laicidade podem aumentar os níveis de desumanização flagrante, e que ambas diminuem a intenção de voto dos Católicos num candidato inclusivo. Além disso, a ameaça simbólica constitui um preditor forte da desumanização subtil e flagrante dos muçulmanos, e da intenção de voto num presidente inclusivo. Finalmente, os resultados mostram uma implicação da identificação (ir)religiosa nas duas formas de desumanização a na perceção de ameaça: os ateus (vs. católicos) parecem desumanizar de forma mais flagrante, já os católicos (vs. ateus) parecem desumanizar mais de forma mais subtil e experimentam mais ameaça simbólica e ansiedade face aos muçulmanos.

Palavras-chave:

Laicidade, ameaça intergrupal, desumanização flagrante, desumanização subtil

Códigos PsycINFO:

3000 Psicologia Social

3020 Grupos & Processos Interpersonais

3040 Percepção Social & Cognição

2960 Processos Políticos & Questões Políticas

2920 Religião

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Introduction

In the past five years, 1.8 million refugees have arrived in Europe (UNHCR, 2019), the majority of them identified as Muslims (UNHCR, 2019). Muslims represent the religious minority that is the most discriminated against. In 2016 one Muslim person out of three reported being a victim of discrimination, harassment, or arrest (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017). However, it is important to provide a more specific look at the national contexts in which these discrimination events can occur. In the French context, 3% of the population identifies as Muslim, compared to 48% identifying as Catholic and 34% identifying as Atheist (Viavoice, 2019). France often times is referred to as the country of Human Rights (Gil-Robles, 2006), however, *s*ince 2004 the country has developed policies reported as discriminatory against the Muslim community (Kamiejski, De Oliveira, & Guimond, 2012), and islamophobic behaviors have been on the rise (CCIF, 2019)**.** Moreover, during the last presidential election, the country had a record number of votes supporting the extreme right French party, Front National (today called Rassemblement National), which is known for its anti-immigration and anti-muslim policies. These policies include cancelling the right of regularization of "illegal migrants" and the automatization of their deportation, reducing the rights associated to family reunification and asylum right, and the extension of religious invisibility to the public and work space specifically targeting women wearing headscarves (Front National, 2017).

Research on intergroup relations often addresses the role of ideologies (see Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009). Ideologies can be defined as a "a more or less systematic ordering of ideas with associated doctrines, attitudes, beliefs, and symbols that together form a more or less coherent philosophy or *Weltanschauung* for a person, group, or sociopolitical movement."(APA Dictionary). Until now, a significant number of studies focused on two ideologies in particular, namely: *colorblindness*, which encourages the minimization of the significance of racial group membership (Plaut, Thomas, Hurd, & Romano, 2018), group differences, and emphasizes commonalities (Wilton, Apfelbaum, & Good, 2019); and *multiculturalism*, which encourages the recognition and the appreciation of group differences (Wilton, Apfelbaum, & Good, 2019) as well as the acknowledgement and respect of group memberships (Plaut, Thomas, Hurd, & Romano, 2018). Even though these ideologies can also be observed in the French context (Guimond, de la

Sablonnière, & Nugier, 2014; Mahfud, Badea, Verkuyten, & Reynolds, 2017), the most prominent secular ideology is Laïcité, which is based on a "legal principle enforcing the State and civil servants' neutrality in terms of religious and political opinions, to guarantee freedom of expression and religion in public places" (Adam-Troian, Arciszewski, & Apostolidis, 2019). Recent works have exposed the dual nature of this ideology, differentiating between a more *historical* and tolerant conception, and a *new* and more restrictive one (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017b).

The role of ideologies on intergroup relations has been analyzed in social psychology for quite some time (for a review see Rattan & Ambadi, 2013), however only a few studies have manipulated ideologies (such as Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000; Apfelbaum, Pauker, Sommers, & Ambady, 2010; Madera & Hebl, 2013; Wilton, Good, Moss-Racusin, & Sanchez, 2015; Mahfud, Badea, Verkuyten, & Reynolds, 2017). Even fewer have focused on Laïcité. A very recent study examined the influence of the New form of Laïcité on discrimination and support for discriminatory policies (Adam-Troian, Arciszewski, & Apostolidis, 2019). As Adam-Troian and colleagues (2019) demonstrated, New Laïcité directly predicts support for discriminatory policies, and indirectly through a reinforced sense of identification with the national ingroup. Moreover, New Laïcité directly predicts a negative Maghrebi evaluation. Furthermore, studies have shown that colorblindness can predict greater implicit and explicit racial bias (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004), suggesting that ideologies can impact different forms of intergroup bias.

Based on these findings, the current study aims to test and compare the influence of two different forms of Laïcité (e.g., Historical vs. New) on intergroup relations, which has not yet been thoroughly examined, and more specifically, if they might promote or hinder forms of prejudice (e.g., subtle and blatant dehumanization) towards religious minorities such as Muslims, and inclusive voting behavioral intention.

In the following sections, we present and define the main theoretical constructs that inform our theoretical model. We first focus on the French Laïque ideology, respectively retracing its history, its duality, and its outcomes. Then, we report the role of intergroup threats (e.g., symbolic and anxiety threat) in the present context. Finally, we discuss the potential moderating

role of (ir)religious identification in regard to the relationship between Laïcité and intergroup threat.

Laïcités, perception of threat, dehumanizing processes toward Muslims, and behavioral intention to vote among (ir)religious majorities in France.

Chapter I - Literature Review

20 million Muslims currently live in Europe, which makes them the second largest religious group within the European Union (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017). Still, this community cannot enjoy their right to inclusion and freedom of religion (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017). Indeed, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2017) has reported that first and second generation Muslims both felt discriminated against because of their skin color, ethnic origin, immigrant background, religion or religious beliefs, including wearing visible religious symbols. Most Muslims living in Europe reside in Germany and in France (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017) where the acts of islamophobia, which target mostly women, have increased 52% between 2017 and 2018. Importantly, institutions have been the first agents of discriminatory acts (CCIF, 2019). Indeed, since 2004, France has been reinforcing Laïcité in the school context (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2015), through policies supporting the ban of headscarves, both for children at school and mothers accompanying their children on schools trips, as well as for women working in organizations welcoming children under six years old. Additionally, in July 2010, the French National Assembly banned the complete covering of one's face in public. These instances suggest that Laïcité can play a leading role in supporting and legitimizing prejudices and discriminations against Muslim communities in France.

One current form of prejudice in contemporary societies is dehumanization (Wilde, Martin, & Goff, 2014). Dehumanization is generally defined as the denial of human characteristic to individuals because of their group membership. According to Haslam (2006), two forms of dehumanization can be distinguished. One refers to the perception of lack of *human uniqueness* traits differentiating humans from animals (e.g., cognitive capacity, civility, and refinement); the other refers to the perception of lack of *Human Nature* traits differentiating humans from robots or objects (e.g., emotionality, vitality, and warmth) (Haslam, 2006). It affects moral standings (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011) and predicts lower levels of prosociality (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014) such as prosocial responses to others (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens. 2002), collective helping (Zebel, Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008) or intergroup forgiveness (Wohl, Hornsey, & Bennett, 2012).

Furthermore, another distinction can be made between a subtle form of dehumanization, characterized by the perception that a given group, or its members, lack specific traits, and a blatant form of dehumanization, characterized by a direct association of someone with an animal or a robot. Blatant dehumanization is direct, consciously, and overtly assumed (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014), contributes strongly to negative attitudes and behaviors of intergroup hostility (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz & Cotterill, 2015; Kteily, Hodson, & Bruneau, 2016), and support for extreme political candidates (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017).

The extreme right wing French party, known for its anti-immigration sentiments, was strongly supported in 2017, during the presidential elections, receiving 21.53% of votes cast (Pommiers, 2017), and during the European elections with 23.31% in 2019 (Boichot, 2019). In the meantime, the number of arrivals of refugees in Europe keeps on increasing, as well as the number of reported dead or missing refugees in the European area (UNHCR, 2019). France is the third highest country in Europe in terms of asylum applications, however it is 26th out of 28 countries when it comes to acceptance rate (Euractiv, 2018), with a rejection rate of 71.3% in 2018 (Forum Réfugiés, 2019). Since the French citizens can express their support or rejection of the French way to deal with immigration when electing a presidential candidate, it is important to understand what can predict the voting behavior in this regard. Adam-Troian and colleagues (2019) work suggests that New Laïcité predicts support for discriminatory policies. It would be interesting to understand if different forms of laïcité could be involved in the behavioral intention to vote for a presidential candidate in favor of muslims immigration.

Laïcité

History of Laïcité

The ideology of Laïcité is complex and many forms of Laïcité can be found throughout the world (Baubérot, 2010). In our study we focus specifically on the French context, where the notion of Laïcité emerged. Laïcité is simultaneously, a part of the national identity and political means to deal with the dimension of religiosity in society, but also a set of national values (Baubérot, 2005). To provide a more complete and accurate definition of Laïcité requires that we put forward specific historical and socio-contextual information.

The initial components of Laïcité that emerged from the French Revolution in 1789 can be summarized as the freedom of conscience and collective practice of any cult; non domination of Religion on the State and the society, with separation of the political and the religious spheres; principle of equality and non-discrimination on the basis of religious reasons with the concept of "abstract citizen" independent from religious appearances (Baubérot, 2005). This initial form of laïcité has evolved from a legal framework to a shared identity around core values, grounded on the principle of protecting people from the influence of Catholicism and allowing them to engage in other religions or to be Atheist (Baubérot, 2005).

A second era of Laïcité, more restrictive and discriminatory, emerged in 1962, when France restored independence to Algeria marking the end of the French colonial empire (Baubérot, 2005). Following this a succession of historical events involving Muslims led to the perception of Islamism as a threat to French laïques values and rights (Baubérot, 2005), creating a hostile environment for Muslims. Perhaps one major event that played a significant role in ushering in the new era of Laïcité, occurred on March 15th, 2004, with the adoption of the Laïcité Law, which forbade people from wearing ostentatious religious symbols in public school settings. This event symbolically marked a clear divide and contradiction with the initial laïque principle stating the neutrality of the State and its agents with regards to religious matters. That law specifically targeted Muslim communities (Baubérot, 2012 ; Kamiejski, Guimond, Oliveira, Er-Rafiy, & Brauer, 2012 ; Nugier, Oppin, Cohu, Kamiejski, Roebroeck, & Guimond, 2016) which fostered feelings of stigmatization within the French Muslim community (Kamiejski et al., 2012). In the meantime, multiple deadly attacks by Islamist terrorist groups occurred in various cities of France between 2012 and 2018, which played a major role in further reinforcing the negative perception of Muslims (Anier, 2018a).

Laïcité or Laïcités?

Within the research on intergroup relations addressing the role of ideologies, such as multiculturalism and colorblindness, colorblindness and Laïcité have often been used as synonyms (Guimond, de la Sablonnière, & Nugier, 2014). For instance colorblindness and Laïcité share their malleable aspects. Indeed, Knowles, Lowery, Hogan and Chow (2009) showed that

colorblindness is composed of the egalitarian principle of distributive justice and the anti-egalitarian principle of procedural justices. Typically, anti-egalitarian individuals are disinclined to subscribe to colorblindness since they seem to firstly perceive in the ideology a principle of distributive justice. However, in the presence of a threat, these individuals might perceive colorblindness as a principle of procedural justice and endorse it to legitimize their status quo (Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009). Roebroeck and Guimond (2017a) found similar results for Laïcité. Indeed, French anti-egalitarian individuals showed more attachment to Laïcité[1] in a situation of symbolic threat, which led the authors to think that the participants were shifting between different notions of Laïcité depending on the context (threat vs. no threat). To confirm this belief, the authors measured the level of attachment to New Laïcité and found that support for this construal was the same for egalitarian and anti-egalitarian individuals in the absence of perceived threat. However, when exposed to symbolic threat, anti-egalitarian individuals increased their support of New Laïcité. These findings suggest that colorblindness and Laïcité can both explain variations in anti-immigrant stances and Muslim prejudices (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017a, Nugier et al., 2016). Moreover, colorblindness and Laïcité both downplay categorization processes (Guimond, de la Sablonnière, & Nugier, 2014) and both may have originated from the French revolution. However, colorblindness understates the importance of racial and ethnic group membership in order to guarantee citizen's equality, while laïcité focuses exclusively on the religious affiliation, emphasizing the necessity of it remaining private, (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017a), and the role of values and beliefs in public life (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017a).

Both ideologies coexist within the French context (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017a), and it is also the case for multiculturalism which supports the recognition of identities. Indeed, research indicates that even if French majority individuals do not perceive multiculturalism as normative in France, they are not opposed to it (Guimond, Streith & Roebroeck, 2015). Moreover, Kamiejski and colleagues (2012) wanted to assess the relationship between the French republican ideology (supporting the elimination of social categories) and multiculturalism, generally considered as its antithesis. In their work the authors considered Laïcité within the dual perception of the French republican ideology composed of both laïcité and citizenship (Kamiejski

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[1] No specific definition of Laïcité was given to participants.

et al., 2012). Kamiejski and colleagues (2012) showed that the concept of citizenship, emphasizing the idea of the equality of every citizen independent of their religious beliefs, was independent from the concept of Laïcité, emphasizing the confinement of religious matters within the private sphere. Moreover, when they assessed the relationship between the French republican ideology and multiculturalism, their results showed that the republican ideology was not contradictory with the multicultural ideology. As a matter of fact, the concept of citizenship was positively correlated with multiculturalism and negatively linked to prejudices. Simultaneously Laïcité was positively correlated to prejudices (Kamiejski et al., 2012), suggesting that citizenship would share with multiculturalism an egalitarian orientation.

However, Roebroeck and Guimond (2017b) replicated the study and suggested another way to interpret these two dimensions. Citizenship would actually be included in a dimension of Laïcité called "Historical Laïcité", meaning that the concept Laïcité would be composed of two dimensions leading to different outcomes. The Historical Laïcité, is the basic form of the concept, defined by the law and political philosophy. It is liberal and inclusive, and since 1905 values the separation of the Church and State and the neutrality of the State in regards to religion. It also asserts the equality of all citizens, religious or not, in the eyes of the law, and the freedom of belief. This form of laïcité has positive outcomes such as tolerance (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017b).

However, the most widespread form of laïcité is also the most recent one. New laïcité is a civil society concept, but is also identity related and an exclusive term (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017b). It detaches itself from the historical version by applying the concept of neutrality, not only to the State and its representatives, but also to the citizens. As a result, the religious manifestations belong to the private sphere at the potential cost of freedom of conscience and equality of citizens (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017b). This most recent adaptation of Laïcité seems to target one religious group in particular: Muslims (Kamiejski et al., 2012; Nugier et al., 2016).

Correlates and outcomes of Historical and New Laïcité for intergroup relations

There is abundant research on intergroup ideologies such as colorblindness or multiculturalism suggesting that ideologies play an important role in prejudice, stereotyping, and intergroup relations (see Levin, Matthews, Guimond, Sidanius, Pratto, Kteily, Pitpitan, & Dover, 2012). On the contrary there is not a lot of research on Laïcité within social psychology since the topic is quite recent (Anier, Badea, Berthon, & Guimond, 2018).

A few correlational studies have highlighted interesting findings about New Laïcité and Historical Laïcité. For instance, New Laïcité systematically correlates with the expression of prejudice against North African descendants and immigrants (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2015; Guimond, de la Sablonnière, & Nugier, 2014; Kamiejski et al., 2012). In contrast, Historical Laïcité seems to be negatively linked to prejudices and social dominance orientation (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017b). Also, beyond the nature of Laïcité as a dual concept, research suggests that both New Laïcité (Kamiejski et al., 2012) and Historical Laïcité (Anier, 2018) may have become a norm within the French Republican Model. A recent paper assessed the moderating role of the New and Historical Laïcité norms in regard to the impact of the perceived host culture adoption, which is "the extent to which immigrants are perceived as adopting the French culture" (Anier et al., 2018, p. 510.), and national identification on discrimination against immigrants. The results showed that when the perception of host culture adoption and national identification on the part of immigrants were weaker, the level of discriminatory behavior of the native French participants was higher, especially when the norms of New Laïcité were involved (Anier et al., 2018). These results suggest that New and Historical forms of Laïcité may influence differently intergroup discrimination (Anier et al., 2018). Still within this normative perspective, a more recent work showed that New Laïcité's norms seem to increase discriminatory behaviors and demands of the French and Belgium majority groups towards the acculturation behavior of minority groups; which is the opposite for Historical Laïcité's norms. These findings indicate that New and Historical Laïcité have opposite effects in regard to discrimination (Anier, 2018).

A very recent study tested the influence of New Laïcité as an independent variable (Adam-Troïan et al., 2019). Precisely, New Laïcité directly predicted support for discriminatory policies and a negative evaluation of North Africans as an outgroup. In addition, and on an exploratory basis, New Laïcité predicted support for discrimination through an increased sense of

national identification. These findings suggest that New Laïcité might predict negative intergroup outcomes. However, the study doesn't provide a comparative impact of the two forms of Laïcité, which the present study aims to accomplish.

Intergroup Threats

The main idea of Realistic Conflict Theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966) is that group conflicts can result from a competition for scarce resources between two groups. More recently, Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 1996, 2000) has offered supplementary explanations for intergroup conflicts which include various forms of threats such as symbolic threat and anxiety threat. These perceived threats have been tested and can predict prejudice (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; McLaren, 2003; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Bobo, 2000; LeVine & Campbell, 1972), even when they are not real (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

Symbolic threat involves perceived opposing views in terms of values, morals standards, beliefs, and attitudes emerging from one's conviction that the ingroup values are correct and the outgroup's values are wrong (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). This idea can be found in the French New Laïcité (Baubérot, 2012). This type of threat is induced by the perception that the outgroup challenges the ingroup's value system (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Intergroup anxiety is a feeling of personal threat due to an intergroup interaction that is perceived as potentially leading to negative outcomes for the self. This type of threat has directly been connected to intergroup prejudice in Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

Prior level of anterior conflict increases the perception of threats such as symbolic threat and anxiety threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and different political dynamics should lead to different levels of threat (Stephan, 2014). Also, a lack of knowledge about the outgroup leads to greater perception of differences and unfamiliarities triggering fear (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). New Laïcité tends to promote the avoidance of religious matters and restrains religious visibility in public life, and thus can lead to very little knowledge of religious outgroups. Indeed, Laïcité is an ideology connected to the role of values and beliefs in the public sphere, that can restrict religious practices perceived as a threat to the dominant cultural values (e.g., wearing a headscarf) (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017a).

Different types of threats can impact different outgroups, and Muslims are mostly targeted by symbolic threat (Velasco González et al., 2008). Several works on symbolic threat characterize it as an antecedent of prejudices (Stephan & Stephan 2000; Stephan, Stephan, & Gudykunst, 1999; Spears, 1988). Also, symbolic threat has an explaining role in studies examining the indirect relationship between religious background (e.g., Christian vs. Muslims) and ill-treatment and exclusion of Muslims (Viki, Zimmermann, & Ballantyne, as cited in Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009). Similarly, intergroup anxiety predicts intergroup prejudice among majority and minority (e.g., Muslims, see Tausch, Hewstone, & Roy, 2009), unfavorable behavioral intentions concerning outgroup contact (Martínez, 2000), unwillingness to help outgroup members (e.g., immigrants, see Costello & Hodson, 2011), and offensive behavior (e.g., using stereotypes) or aggressiveness (Van Zomeren, Fischer, & Spears, 2007). It is also a strong mediator of the relationship between contact and emotions (Binder et al., 2009), and between contact and attitude towards minorities (Swart, Hewstone, Christ, & Voci, 2010).

Religious Identification

(Ir)religious affiliation is a dimension of social identity involving a system of guiding beliefs, therefore it should impact psychological and social processes in a powerful and unique way (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). A study showed that religious identification can play an important role in individual well-being and that some religious beliefs have positive effects on tolerance towards religious outgroups (Abu- Rayya & White, 2010). However it can at the same time serve as a basis for facilitating intergroup conflicts (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). In other words, religious differences are often present in intergroup conflicts (Wellman & Tokuno, 2004). When religious identity is made salient, and when a faith-based threat is perceived from the outgroup's set of beliefs, group-based division can be intensified (Ysseldyk, Haslam, Matheson, & Anisman, 2011). Indeed, self-categorization is associated with ingroup and outgroup differentiation (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), and in some contexts associated with ingroup favoritism and outgroup bias (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), outgroup depreciation (Aberson & Howanski, 2002; Branscombe & Wann, 1994), or outgroup prejudice and hostility (see Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). For instance, in a study, Christian

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participants presented higher levels of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation towards Atheists (Hunter, 2001) when they felt ill-considered (Hunter, Kypri, Stokell, Boyes, O'Brien, & McMenamin, 2004). Also, a strong identification with Christianity can lead to perceiving a religious outgroup as threatening (Choma, Haji, Hodson & Hoffarth, 2016). Furthermore, studies have examined the relationship between political ideologies (i.e., conservatism and liberalism) and religiosity, and have found that Christianity and political conservatism often overlap (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008), and that a strong identification with Christianity induces more opposition to pro-interfaith policies and practices, and support of policies and practices that foster religious expression (Choma, Haji, Hodson, & Hoffarth, 2016). Other recent works have shown that shared (ir)religious beliefs can foster ingroup favoritism in empathy for other's pain in both Chinese Christian and Atheist participants (Huang & Han, 2014). More precisely, both Christian and atheist participants showed stronger empathy towards the suffering of people with the same beliefs as them. Their findings also showed that Christian participants reported greater in-group favoritism in the likability of people who shared the same beliefs as them compared to atheist participants. However, these results suggest that visible belief differences produce stronger ingroup favoritism in empathy than dissimilarity in physical appearance (Huang & Han, 2014). In parallel, another work showed that atheism and low levels of self-reported religiosity were associated with lower levels of racism and prejudice towards racial minority target groups (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). Furthermore, other studies support the idea that Atheists have unique reactions to (ir)religious identity threat and (in)tolerance (Ysseldyk et al., 2010; Ysseldyk, Haslam, Matheson, & Anisman, 2011). For instance, in Uzarevic, Saroglou, and Muñoz-García's study (2019) it was found that both believers and nonbelievers can show disdain towards moral and religious antiliberals (antigay activists and fundamentalists). However only atheists (and agnostic) can, not only show prejudicial discriminatory attitudes toward anti-liberals, but also towards mere religious group such as Christians and Buddhists (Uzarevic, Saroglou, Muñoz-García, 2019). Finally, for many people Atheism is characterized by the absence of beliefs, Atheists can be devoted by holding to a set of views, values, or philosophies through which they interpret the world (Fales, 2007; Taylor, 2007). When the Atheist's belief system is perceived as

threatened, similar coping and emotional responses can be observed in the context of religious identity threat.

Present study

The present study aims to test the effect of French Laïcité ideology on different forms of subtle dehumanization (i.e., lower assignment of traits associated to Human Uniqueness and Human Nature) and blatant dehumanization (direct association of someone with an animal, a robot, or an object) towards Muslims, and voting behavior related to the inclusion of Muslim immigrants. Two distinct forms of Laïcité that have been identified in the literature are tested and contrasted – Historical Laïcité (the most ancient and inclusive form) and New Laïcité (the most recent and restrictive form) – in their effects on dehumanization of Muslims and voting behavioral intention. In addition, the study tests the potential mediating effects of anxiety and symbolic threat and if (ir)religious identification moderates the effect of Laïcité on anxiety and symbolic threat. From the literature review the following theoretical model and hypothesis can be derived.


Figure 1. Theoretical model: the mediated effect of New & Historical Laïcité via anxiety and symbolic threat on blatant & subtle dehumanization and inclusive voting behavioral intention with moderating effect of (ir)religious identification.

Laïcités, perception of threat, dehumanizing processes toward Muslims, and behavioral intention to vote among (ir)religious majorities in France.

Hypotheses

In light of all the empirical findings previously presented, we expect New Laïcité to be associated with negative intergroup outcomes and Historical Laïcité to be associated with more positive ones. Specifically, we expect a negative effect of Historial Laïcité compared to New Laïcité on subtle and blatant dehumanization against Muslims and a positive effect on inclusive voting behavioral intention towards this same (ir)religious minority. Also, Adam-Troïan and colleagues (2019) findings suggest that support for discriminative policies (i.e., suppress free healthcare for French citizens of foreign descent, lower legal immigration quotas, prioritize employment of French citizens with no foreign background) can depend on different forms of Laïcité. Furthermore, Kamiejski and colleagues (2012) suggested that the relationship between Laïcité and intergroup relations could be tested through the perspective of Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 1996, 2000). In line with this, we expect New Laïcité compared to Historical Laïcité to increase levels of symbolic and anxiety threat, and in turn, symbolic and anxiety threat to increase the expected negative outcomes of subtle dehumanization and blatant dehumanization, for outcomes variables including Muslims (e.g., Muslims vs. (ir)religious ingroup, Muslims vs. French). However, we do not have specific hypothesis for the contrast French vs. (ir)religious ingroup. Also, we expect low levels of symbolic and anxiety threat to increase the level of behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate. Finally, our study assessed participants (ir)religious identification, namely as Catholics, or Atheists. According to the literature, ingroup identification can trigger intergroup threat (Stephan, 2014), notably in regard to religious identification (Costello & Hodson, 2011; Blair, Park, & Bachelor, 2003; Matthews, Levin, & Sidanius, 2009). Previous studies showed that Christians could present higher levels of ingroup favoritism compare to Atheists (Huang & Han, 2014) and that Catholics could feel their religious identity threatened by the presence of Muslims in the European context (Croucher, Galy-Badenas, & Routsalainen 2014). Also, lower levels of religiosity can be associated to less racism and prejudices towards religious minorities (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). In accordance, we expect the effect of New and Historical Laïcité on anxiety and symbolic threat to depend on the (ir)religious affiliation of participants. More specifically, we expect higher levels of anxiety and symbolic threat following the New Laïcité priming for participants identifying as

Catholics compared to Atheists. Each of the following hypothesis focuses on a specific outcome variable, respectively blatant dehumanization, subtle dehumanization, and behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive president, while specifying the effects that are included in the proposed model:

H1: We expect that Historical Laïcité will generate lower levels of blatant dehumanization toward Muslims (H1.1) than New Laïcité; that the level of blatant dehumanization of Muslims will be decreased via lower levels of anxiety threat (H1.2a) and symbolic threat (H1.2b); that Historical Laïcité will generate lower levels of anxiety threat (H1.3a) and symbolic threat (H1.3b) than New Laïcité; and that the effect of New Laïcité increasing anxiety threat (H1.4a) and symbolic threat (H1.4b) will be stronger for participants identifying as Catholics than Atheists.

H2: We expect that Historical Laïcité will generate lower levels of subtle dehumanization (H2.1) more than New Laïcité; that the level of subtle dehumanization will be decreased via lower levels of anxiety threat (H2.2a) and symbolic threat (H2.2b); that Historical Laïcité will generate lower levels of anxiety threat (H2.3a) and symbolic threat (H2.3b) than New Laïcité; and that the effect of New Laïcité increasing anxiety threat (H2.4a) and symbolic threat (H2.4b) will be stronger for participants identifying as Catholics than Atheists.

H3: We expect that Historical Laïcité will generate higher levels of inclusive voting behavioral intention (H3.1) than New Laïcité; that the level of inclusive voting behavioral intention will be increased via lower levels of anxiety threat (H3.2a) and symbolic threat (H3.2b); that Historical Laïcité will generate lower the levels of anxiety threat (H3.3a) and symbolic threat (H3.3b) than New Laïcité; and that the effect of New Laïcité increasing anxiety threat (H3.4a) and symbolic threat (H3.4b) will be stronger for participants identifying as Catholics than Atheists.

Chapter II - Method

Participants

Recruitment of participants was done via social network platforms and text messages. Participants were invited to participate in a study about "Laïcité in France" and were informed that they could have the chance to be rewarded with a 60€ Wonderbox through a lottery. The data collection was stopped after one month of publication of the questionnaire. Participants were given an informed consent reminding the goal of the study, highlighting its anonymity and voluntary aspect, while providing more precise information regarding the lottery. The consent form was followed by an eliminatory question asking people to indicate whether they were living in France or not. Out of 230 participants, 48 were excluded because they did not meet the inclusion requirement. Our final sample resulted in 182 French residents who had been randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions (56 to the Historical Laïcité, 59 to the New Laïcité, and 67 to the control condition).

The 182 eligible participants had a mean age of 26.68 (SD = 13.491, range: 18-82) and 118 identified as women (64.8%). The level of education of the sample was divided into three main categories: 68 participants had a high school level of education (38.6%), 61 participants had an undergraduate level of education (34.7%), and 47 had an either graduate or higher level of education (26.7%). 134 participants were employed (73.6%) and 116 had either no income or a maximum household income of 2500€ per month (66.7%). 87 people from the sample indicated a rather left-wing preference on the political self-placement-scale (47.5%), against 47 participants indicating a rather-right wing preference (25.7%), and 49 participants indicated not knowing where to stand (26.8%). 110 of the respondents identified as Atheists (60.4 %), while 72 identified as Catholics (39.6%). Atheists indicated a medium level of identification with their (ir)religious group (M = 5.22, SD = 1.48, range: 1-7) and Catholics indicated a rather medium to low level of identification with their (ir)religious group (M = 4.22, SD = 1.38, range: 1-7).

Procedure

The study includes 6 parts (Figure 2). In the first part, after validation of the consent form, participants were asked to confirm their French residency before we measured their religious identification. Then, part two displayed a scientific article consisting of two sections about the opinion of French citizens regarding Laïcité. Participants were instructed to read the scientific article, which served as the manipulation. Depending on the conditions, the articles contained information about either an inclusive side of Laïcité, a restrictive side of Laïcité or an unrelated topic (control condition). Following the second section of the article, participants were asked to elaborate two short answers in relation to the article. This last task served the double purpose of reinforcing the priming and generating content for a manipulation check. In the third part we measured our dependent variables. In the fourth part we collected participants' demographic data. Finally, the participants were provided with their anonymous identification number allowing them to ask for an eventual removal of their responses and/or to participate in the lottery. Following this, the debriefing message informed them that they had been presented with fabricated documents in order to study whether different perspectives of Laïcité would influence non-Muslim French in their perception of French Muslims and or migrants. Then, they were provided with a link leading to a follow-up lottery questionnaire.

Part 1: Moderator assessment

Part 2: Laïcité Manipulation

Part 3: Mediators assessment: Symbolic and Anxiety Threat

Part 4: Outcome Variables assessment: Subtle dehumanization, Blatant dehumanization, Inclusive voting behavioral intention.

Part 5: Demographics

Part 6: Debriefing + Lottery

Figure 2. Study procedure.

New and Historical Laïcité Manipulation

Participants were instructed that the documents presented to them (see appendix A) were divided into two sections. Also, they were asked to read the information very carefully because they would have to answer questions about the topic. For the control condition texts, participants were not informed about the questions to answer. The two sections of the articles consisted of a bar chart and a short report. Both Historical and New Laïcité conditions were showing information about Laïcité adapted from Roebroeck and Guimond's work (2017b). Precisely, Roebroeck and Guimond (2017b) adapted the scale of Kamiejski and colleagues (2012) to create their own 15 items scale assessing the level of support for the Historical and the New Laïcité. To create the content of our priming we only selected four protruding and distinct items for each Laïcité to avoid redundancy. The content of the article was changing according to Historical or New Laïcité condition.

Both first sections of the Laïcité conditions were presented as "Results from the CNRS survey from September 2018 about French citizens opinions concerning Laïcité". Next, a bar chart titled "Proportion of French citizens agreeing and disagreeing with items about Laïcité, results are presented in percentages" was displayed. The Historical Laïcité's graph contained four items showing high levels of agreement towards an inclusive form of Laïcité (e.g., It is important to respect the equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law, regardless of their origins, race or religion; I do not want people in France to be predefined based on their origins or religion; Each citizen must have the freedom to practice the religion of their choice; In a democratic State all religions should be considered as equal).

For the New Laïcité, the four items, also being predominantly agreed on, showed a restrictive form of Laïcité (e.g., I am in favor of the separation of religion and State in France as well as in other countries; The government must not finance the construction of religious buildings; As much as possible, religious practices should remain private rather than public; It seems normal to me that in all the French public schools, visible religious symbols are forbidden).

In the second part of the priming, both versions displayed the same message "The participants of this survey have also selected the elements that best define Laïcité. Among 10

elements, the following three were selected most frequently". After that, Historical Laïcité presented elements highlighting the freedom to believe and practice and the equality of rights for all citizens, whereas for New Laïcité the elements highlighted restrictive dimensions such as the separation of religion and State, interdiction of wearing visible (ir)religious signs in public establishments, the limitation of (ir)religious practices to the private sphere. Then participants were asked to provide two reasons when answering to the following question, "Why do you think French agree with these ideas?" In the control condition participants read the results of a study about tap water which had a comparable length to the priming ones. Then they were then asked to provide two opinions about "Why do you think French people prefer consuming tap water?".

Measures

Demographics

The following demographics were measured at the end of the questionnaire: gender, age, country of birth, time spent in France, education, political orientation, job situation, and income. The complete questionnaire is available in Appendix A.

Manipulation check

For the manipulation check we designed a measure to check if participants understood the content of the manipulation by asking them to provide two brief reasons why French people agree with the ideas of the article presented to them.

(Ir)religious identification

(ir)religious identification assessment consisted of one question. Participants were asked to indicate the (ir)religious group they identified with (e.g., Atheist, Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Other: indicate). Also, to measure the level of (ir)religious identification, we used the single-item social identification (SISI) measure by Postmes, Haslam and Jans (2012) (e.g., I identify with [Atheists / Catholics / Muslims / Protestants / My religious group]).

Symbolic and Anxiety threats

To assess the level of symbolic threat we adapted a measure from Velasco, Gonzalez, Maykel and Verkuyten (2008) developed from Stephan and colleagues (1999, 2000, 2002). Symbolic threat was assessed with three items (e.g., In France Muslims should learn to conform with the norms and rules of the French society as soon as possible; Some Muslims are a threat for the French culture; From a (ir)religious and moral view, the values and beliefs of some Muslims aren't compatible with the French values and beliefs; α =.825). Participants that were not identifying as Muslim were told "We would like to know how you perceive non-Muslims people opinions. To what extent do you think non-Muslim people would agree with the following affirmations". All items were measured on a 7-points Lickert scale (1 = I don't agree at all, 7 = absolutely agree). Higher scores indicated higher levels of perceived symbolic threat.

Anxiety threat was measured through an adaptation of Stephan and Stephan anxiety threat scale (Koc & Anderson, 2018; Stephan & Stephan 1985). Koc and Anderson's adaptation (2018) comprised six items (e.g., anxious, worried, tense, apprehensive, awkward, and nervous). We broke the scale down to four items for length purposes and picked the items that were most appropriate for our study. Participants had to indicate how they would feel if they had to interact with a Muslim person (e.g., anxious, nervous, tense, apprehensive; α = .955) on a 10-point scale (0 not at all – 10 totally). Higher scores indicated a higher level of anxiety threat. Participants identifying with Muslims had to answer the same question in regard to the outgroup "non-Muslims".

Subtle dehumanization

To assess the level of subtle dehumanization, we created a scale based on both Bastian and Haslam (2010), and Viki and colleagues (2006) works. Our scale presented itself as an ipsative task similar to Viki and colleagues' (2006). At first participants were asked to select between one and ten words characterizing Muslims and following this they were asked to select between one and ten words characterizing their (ir)religious ingroup (e.g., Atheist, Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Own (ir)religious group). Every participant was being given the same set of twenty words composed of five positive Human Uniqueness traits (e.g., broadminded, conscientious, humble, polite, thorough), five negative Human Uniqueness traits (e.g.,

disorganized, hard-hearted, ignorant, rude, stingy), five positive Human Nature traits (e.g., active, curious, friendly, helpful, fun-loving) and five negative Human Nature traits (e.g., impatient, impulsive, jealous, nervous, shy) from Bastian and Haslam (2010). The order of the words was randomized for each participant. Relative subtle dehumanization of each group was computed the following way a) Positive Human Nature ingroup traits - Positive Human Nature outgroup traits, b) Positive Human Uniqueness ingroup traits - Positive Human Uniqueness outgroup traits, c) Negative Human Nature outgroup traits - Negative Human Nature ingroup traits, d) Negative Human Uniqueness outgroup traits - Negative Human Uniqueness ingroup traits, so higher values were indicating higher level of outgroup subtle dehumanization.

Blatant dehumanization

Blatant dehumanization was assessed with an adaptation of The Ascent of Man measure (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). The original measure is preceded by an illustration of the human evolution. In our adapted version the image was removed and the scale was preceded by the following instructions "The human being hasn't stopped evolving and transforming through times. Using the slider, indicate the degree of evolution for each group from 0 (no evolution) to 100 (maximal evolution).". Five groups were appearing in a chart (e.g.; Muslims, Atheists, Catholics, Protestants, French) each followed by a single slider bar. Relative dehumanization of each group was computed by subtracting the target group rating to the ingroup rating so higher scores were indicating higher level of outgroup dehumanization ($\alpha = .854$).

Behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate

We created a measure to assess participants' intention to vote for an inclusive candidate. The instructions were " In the context of future presidential elections, indicate the degree to which you would vote for:". And the measure following it was a three items scale (e.g.; Candidate open to welcoming more Muslim refugees in France; Candidate open to welcoming more economic Muslim migrants in France; Candidate open to welcoming more Muslim students in France). Refugees, economic migrant, and students were chosen because of the differences in their status. For each item participants had to indicate their level of intention to vote on a 7-points Lickert

scale (1 = Absolutely improbable to 7 = Very probable). Higher scores indicated a higher

intention to vote for a candidate that is inclusive of Muslims ($\alpha = .931$).

Chapter III - Results

Manipulation check

We conducted an independent-sample t-test to check for differences in the effectiveness of our Historical and New Laïcité manipulations. The results show that the Historical Laïcité ($M = 1.15$, SD = 0.98) was more effective compared to the New Laïcité manipulation ($M = 0.47$, SD = 1.16) (t (105) = 3.24, p < .002). In addition, one sample t tests against 0 indicate that, despite the differences between the conditions, both manipulations were effective given that their scores were significantly higher than 0 (Historical Laïcité: t (46) = 8.06, p < .000; and New Laïcité: t (59) = 3.13, p < .003).

Indirect effect of Historical and New Laïcité

We ran sixteen moderated mediation models with 5000 bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals using SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018) to test the indirect effects of our experimental conditions on blatant dehumanization, subtle dehumanization and behavioral intention to vote. In eight models the Historical vs. New Laïcité served as predictor (contrast coding: historical Laïcité = lower value vs. New laïcité = higher value) and Laïcité (Historical Laïcité + New Laïcité) vs. Control was used as a covariate. In the other eight models Laïcité (Historical Laïcité + New Laïcité) vs. Control served as predictor (contrast coding: Control = lower value vs. Laïcité = higher value) and Historical vs. New Laïcité served as a covariate. In all of the sixteen models anxiety threat and symbolic threat were the mediators, and (ir)religious identification the moderator (contrast coding: Atheist = lower value vs. Catholic = higher value).

In the following section we present our results on: 1) Blatant dehumanization, of 1.1) Muslims versus the (ir)religious ingroup of participants, 1.2) Muslims versus French, and 1.3) French versus the (ir)religious ingroup of participants; 2) Subtle dehumanization of Muslims via, 2.1) Human Uniqueness traits, 2.1.1) positive and 2.1.2) negative, 2.2) Human Nature traits, 2.2.1) positive and 2.2.2) negative; and 3) Behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive

presidential candidate, in favor of receiving Muslim migrants. Results about the models with

Laïcité vs. Control as dependent variable were only reported in footnote when significant.

Blatant dehumanization of Muslims in comparison with (ir)religious ingroup.

The results showed no direct effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the

level of blatant dehumanization of Muslims in relation to Atheists/Catholics, thereby not

confirming *H1.1* ($b_{H1.1}$ = -1.92, *SE*= 2.66, 95% CI [-7.17, 3.34]).

Anxiety threat

Also, no indirect effect of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on blatant

dehumanization of Muslims in relation to Atheists/Catholics via anxiety threat was found, thereby

not confirming *H1.3a* and *H1.2a*. Specifically, the effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité

condition on anxiety and the effect of anxiety threat on the level of blatant dehumanization of the

outgroup Muslim were both non-significant (respectively, $b_{H1.3a}$ = 0.16, *SE*= 0.18, 95% CI [-1.19,

0.51]; $b_{H1.2a}$ = 0.10, *SE*= 1.27, 95% CI [-2.42, 2.61]). Also, not supporting *H1.4a*, the results

showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and

participants (ir)religious identification on anxiety threat ($b_{H1.4a}$ = -0.02, *SE* = 0.37, 95% CI

[-0.76, 0.71]).

Symbolic threat

As for symbolic threat, the results showed no reliable indirect effects of the Historical

Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of blatant dehumanization of Muslims, thereby not

supporting *H1.3b*. More specifically, the effect of the priming on symbolic threat was non-

significant ($b_{H1.3b}$ = 0.12, *SE* = 1.15, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.42]). Also, contrary to *H1.4b*, the results

showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and

the (ir)religious identification on symbolic threat ($b_{H1.4b}$ = 0.31, *SE* = 0.32, 95% CI [-0.32, 0.93]).

However, the expected *H1.2b* relationship between symbolic threat and the level of blatant

dehumanization of Muslims was significant ($b_{H1.2b}$ = 3.49, *SE*= 1.49, *p* < .05; 95% CI [0.55,

6.43]), indicating that the increase in symbolic threat was associated to higher levels of blatant

dehumanization of Muslims (Figure 3). Finally, the results revealed a significant effect of (ir)religious identification on the level of blatant dehumanization of Muslims (b = -15.94, SE = 4.61, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-25.06, -6.83]). More specifically, results showed that the level of dehumanization of Muslims was higher for participants identifying as Atheist compared to those identifying as Catholic.


Figure 3. Significant Effects of Symbolic threat and (ir)religious identification on blatant dehumanization - Muslims vs. (ir)religious ingroup.

Note. *** = *p < .000*, ** = *p < .01*, * = *p <.05*, - - - = new significant unexpected results

Blatant dehumanization of Muslims in comparison with French.

The results showed a significant direct effect of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of blatant dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to French ($b_{H1.1}$ = -8.35, SE= 2.84, $p < .004$, 95% CI [-13.96, -2.74]), not supporting *H1.1* (Figure 4) . Specifically, the results showed that participants in the Historical Laïcité presented a higher level of blatant dehumanization towards Muslims relative to French, than participants in the New Laïcité condition. Also, the results showed a significant interaction effect between the New Laïcité vs. Historical Laïcité condition and (ir)religious identification on participant's level of blatant dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim relative to the French (b = 12.32, SE= 5.92, $p < .04$, 95% CI [0.62, 24.01]). Precisely, the results revealed that the Laïcité priming was significant for Atheists (b = -13.06, SE = 3.54, $p < .0003$, 95% CI [-20.05, -6.08]) but not for Catholics (b = -0.75, SE = 4.75, 95% CI [-10.12, 8.63]), and that Atheists they were dehumanizing more in the Historical Laïcité condition relative to New Laïcités .

Anxiety Threat

Then, the results showed no reliable indirect effects of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of blatant dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to French via anxiety threat, not confirming *H1.3a* and *H1.2a*. Specifically, the effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on anxiety and the effect of anxiety threat on the level of blatant dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim were both non-significant, (respectively $b_{H1.3a} = 0.16$, SE= 0.18, 95% CI [-1.19, 0.51]; $b_{H1.2a} = 0.96$, SE= 1.36, 95% CI [-1.73, 3.64]). Also, and not supporting *H1.4a*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and participants (ir)religious identification on anxiety threat ($b_{H1.4a} = -0.02$, SE= 0.37, 95% CI [-0.76, 0.71]).

Symbolic threat

As for symbolic threat, the results showed no reliable indirect effects of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of blatant dehumanization of Muslims in relation to French, not supporting *H1.3b*. More specifically, the effect of the priming on symbolic threat was non-significant ($b_{H1.3b} = 0.12$, SE= 0.15, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.42]). Also, and contrary to *H1.4b*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and the (ir)religious identification on symbolic threat ($b_{H1.4b} = 0.31$, SE= 0.32, 95% CI [-0.32, 0.93]). However, the expected *H1.2b* relationship between symbolic threat and blatant dehumanization of Muslims was significant ($b_{H1.2b} = 4.18$, SE= 1.59, $p < .01$, 95% CI [1.05, 7.32]), indicating that the increase in symbolic threat was associated with higher levels of blatant dehumanization of Muslims compare to French. Finally, the results showed a significant effect of (ir)religious group on symbolic threat ($b = 0.72$, SE= 0.26, $p < .006$, 95% CI [0.21, 1.22]). Precisely, results revealed that Catholics participants presented a higher level of symbolic threat relative to Atheists.

Figure 4. Significant effects of the priming, symbolic threat and (ir)religious identification on blatant dehumanization - French vs. Muslims.

Note. *** = *p < .000,* ** = *p <.01,* * = *p < .05,* - - - = new significant unexpected results

Blatant dehumanization of French vs. (ir)religious ingroup identification.

The results showed a significant direct effect of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of blatant dehumanization of the ingroup French in relation to Atheist/ Catholic, supporting *H1.1* (*b* H1.1 = 6.19, SE= 2.65, *p* < .02, 95% CI [0.95, 11.42]) (*Figure 5*). Precisely, results showed that the level of dehumanization of the ingroup French in relation to Atheist/Catholic was higher for participants that were in the New Laïcité condition than those who were in the Historical Laïcité condition.

Anxiety Threat

Also, no indirect effect of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of blatant dehumanization of the ingroup French in relation to Atheist/Catholic via anxiety threat was found, not confirming *H1.3a* and *H1.2a*. Specifically, the effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on anxiety and the effect of anxiety threat on the level of blatant dehumanization of the outgroup French were both non-significant, (respectively, *b* H1.3a= 0.19, SE= 0.18, 95% CI [-1.16, 0.54]; *b* H1.2a = -1.03, SE= 1.26, 95% CI [-3.52, 1.46]). Also, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and

participants (ir)religious identification on anxiety threat ($b_{H1.4a}$ = 0.05, SE= 0.37, 95% CI [-0.68, 0.79]), not supporting *H1.4a*.

Symbolic threat

As for symbolic threat, the results showed no reliable indirect effects of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of blatant dehumanization of French, not supporting *H1.3b* and *H1.2b*. Specifically, the effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on symbolic and the effect of symbolic threat on the level of blatant dehumanization of the outgroup French were both non-significant, (respectively, $b_{H1.3b}$ = 0.14, SE= 0.15, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.44]; $b_{H1.2b}$ =-0.80, SE= 1.48, 95% CI [-3.73, 2.12]). Also, contrary to *H1.4b*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and the (ir)religious identification on symbolic threat ($b_{H1.4b}$ = 0.35, SE= 0.31, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.97]).

Finally, the results showed a significant effect of (ir)religious identification on symbolic threat (b = 0.74, SE= 0.26, p < .004, 95% CI [0.24, 1.25]). Specifically, results revealed that Catholic participants in relation to Atheists, presented a higher level of symbolic threat. Also, the results revealed a significant effect of (ir)religious identification (Atheist vs. Catholic) on the level of blatant dehumanization of the ingroup French in relation to Atheist/Catholic (b = -20.69, SE= 4.59, p < .0000, 95% CI [-29.76, -11.64]). Specifically, the results showed that the level of dehumanization of the ingroup French in relation to Atheist/Catholic was higher for participants identifying as Atheist than the one of participants identifying as Catholic.[2]

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[2] The results revealed a significant direct effect of the Laïcité condition vs. control condition on the level of blatant dehumanization of the ingroup French in relation to Atheist/Catholic (b = 4.26, SE= 1.56, p < .0071, 95% CI [1.18, 7.34]). Precisely, results showed that the level of blatant dehumanization was stronger in the Laïcité condition than in the control. Also, the results showed a significant effect of (ir)religious group on symbolic threat (b = 0.75, SE= 0.26, p < .004, 95% CI [0.24, 1.26]). Specifically, the results revealed that Catholic participants in relation to Atheists, presented a higher level of symbolic threat. Finally, results revealed a significant effect of (ir)religious identification (Atheist vs. Catholic) on the level of blatant dehumanization of the ingroup French in relation to Atheist/Catholic (b = -20.67, SE= 4.61, p < .0000, 95% CI [-29.77, -11.57]). Precisely, the results showed that the level of dehumanization of the ingroup French in relation to Atheist/Catholic was higher for participants identifying as Atheist than the one of participants identifying as Catholic.

Figure 5. Significant effects of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité, Laïcité vs. Control and (ir)religious identification on blatant dehumanization - French vs. (ir)religious ingroup, and Symbolic threat.

*Note. *** = p < .000, ** = p <.01, * = p < .05, - - - = new significant unexpected results*

Subtle dehumanization of Muslims in comparison with (ir)religious ingroup through the attribution of Human Uniqueness traits

Positive Human Uniqueness traits

The results showed no reliable direct effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to the ingroup Atheist/ Catholic, through the attribution of positive Human Uniqueness traits, not confirming *H2.1* ($b_{H2.1}$ = -0.04, *SE* = 0.22, 95% CI [-0.47, 0.]).

Anxiety Threat

Also, there was no indirect effect of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic, not confirming *H2.3a* and *H2.2a*. Specifically, the effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on anxiety and the effect of anxiety threat on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic were both non-significant, (respectively, $b_{H2.3a}$ =

-0.00, *SE*= 0.20, 95% CI [-0.42, 0.41]; *b* H2.2a = 0.02, *SE*= 0.16, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.34]). Also, and

not supporting *H2.4a*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical

Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and participants (ir)religious identification on anxiety threat (*b*

H2.4a = 0.24, *SE* = 0.41, 95% CI [-0.57, 1.06]).

### Symbolic threat

As for symbolic threat, the results showed no reliable indirect effects of the Historical

Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim

in relation to Atheist/Catholic via symbolic threat, not confirming *H2.3b*. More specifically, the

effect of the priming on symbolic threat was non-significant (*b* H2.3b = 0.17, SE= 0.24, 95% CI

[-0.32, 0.67]). Also, and contrary to *H2.4b*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect

between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and the (ir)religious identification on

anxiety threat (*b* H2.4b = 0.75, SE= 0.49, 95% CI [-0.23, 1.73]). However, the expected *H2.2b*

relationship between symbolic threat and the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup

Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic was significant (*b* H2.2b= 0.35, SE= 0.14, *p* < .015, 95% CI

[0.07, 0.62]), indicating that the increase of the level of symbolic threat was related to a rise in the

level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic (Figure 6).

Finally, the results showed a significant effect of (ir)religious group on symbolic threat (*b* = 1.12,

SE= 0.42, *p* < .01, 95% CI [0.28, 1.95]). Precisely, results revealed that Catholic participants

relative to Atheists presented a higher level of symbolic threat.

Figure 6. Significant effects of Symbolic threat on subtle dehumanization via positive Human Uniqueness traits, and of (ir)religious identification on symbolic threat.

Note. *** = *p* < .000, ** = *p* <.01, * = *p* < .05, - - - = new significant unexpected results

Negative Human Uniqueness traits

The results showed no reliable direct effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim relative to Atheist/ Catholic, through the attribution of negative Human Uniqueness traits, not confirming *H2.1* (b H2.1 = 0.12, *SE*= 0.41, 95% CI [-1.03, 1.28]).

Anxiety Threat

Also, no indirect effect of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic was found, not confirming *H2.3a* and *H2.2a*. Specifically, the effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on anxiety and the effect of anxiety threat on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic were both non-significant, (respectively, b H2.3a = 0.94, *SE*= 0.62, 95% CI [-0.49, 2.37]; b H2.2a = 0.02, *SE*= 0.21, 95% CI [-0.55, 0.59]). Also, and not supporting *H2.4a*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and participants (ir)religious identification on anxiety threat (b H2.4a = -0.47, *SE* = 1.25, 95% CI [-3.35, 2.40]).

Symbolic Threat

As for symbolic threat, no indirect effect of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/ Catholic was found, not confirming *H2.3b* and *H2.2b*. Specifically, the effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on symbolic threat and the effect of symbolic threat on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic were both non-significant, (respectively, b H2.3b = 0.08, *SE*= 0.71, 95% CI [-1.55, 1.71]; b H2.2b = 0.19, *SE*= 0.30, 95% CI [-0.64, 1.01]). Also, and not supporting *H2.4b*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and participants (ir)religious identification on symbolic threat (b H2.4b = 0.62, *SE* = 1.42, 95% CI [-2.65, 3.90]). Finally, the results showed a marginally significant effect of (ir)religious group on the level of subtle

dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim (relative to Atheist or Catholic), through the attribution of negative Human Uniqueness traits (b = -0.79, SE= 0.35, p < .08, 95% CI [-1.76, 0.17]) (*Figure 7*). Precisely, results seemed to reveal that Atheist participants relative to Catholics presented a higher level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic.


Figure 7. Marginally significant effects of (ir)religious identification on subtle dehumanization via negative Human Uniqueness traits.

*Note. *** = p < .000, ** = p <.01, * = p < .05, - - - = new significant unexpected results*

Subtle dehumanization of Muslims in comparison with (ir)religious ingroup through the attribution of Human Nature traits

Positive Human Nature traits

The results showed no direct effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic, through the attribution of positive Human Nature traits, not confirming *H2.1* ($b_{H2.1}$ = 0.01, *SE*= 0.15, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.32]).

Anxiety threat

Also, no indirect effect of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic, not confirming *H2.2a*. Specifically, the *H2.3a* effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on anxiety threat was significant ($b_{H2.3a}$ = -0.39, *SE*= 0.18, p < .04, 95% CI [-0.76, -0.02]), indicating that New Laïcité was related to lower levels of anxiety threat than Historical Laïcité (*Figure 8*). However, the effect of anxiety threat on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic was non-significant ($b_{H2.2a}$ = -0.01, *SE*= 0.11, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.21]). Also, and not supporting *H2.4a*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect

between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and participants (ir)religious identification on anxiety threat ($b_{H2.4a}$ = 0.42, *SE* = 0.38, 95% CI [-1.18, 0.33]). Finally, the results showed a significant interaction effect of anxiety threat and (ir)religious identification on subtle dehumanization through the attribution of positive Human Nature traits (b = 0.51 , SE= 0.23, *p* < .0347, 95% CI [0.04, 0.98]), with marginally significant effects for both Catholics and Atheists (respectively, *b* = 0.31 , SE= 0.20, *p* < .1252, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.71]) ; (*b* = -0.20 , SE= 0.13, p < . 1269, 95% CI [-0.46, 0.06]). Specifically, the results seem to show that Catholics present higher levels of subtle dehumanization through the attribution of positive Human Nature traits when their level of anxiety threat was higher contrary to Atheists who presented higher levels of subtle dehumanization when their level of anxiety threat was low.

Symbolic Threat

As for symbolic threat, the results showed no reliable indirect effects of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic via symbolic threat, not confirming *H2.3b*. More specifically, the effect of the priming on symbolic threat was non-significant ($b_{H2.3b}$ = 0.03, SE= 0.21, 95% CI [-0.40, 0.46]). Also, and contrary to *H2.4b*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and the (ir)religious identification on symbolic threat ($b_{H2.4b}$ = -0.04, SE= 0.44, 95% CI [-0.92, 0.84]). However, the expected *H2.2b* relationship between symbolic threat and the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic was significant ($b_{H2.2b}$ = 0.23, SE= 0.09, *p* < .02, 95% CI [0.04, 0.42]), indicating that the increase in the level of symbolic threat was connected to a rise in the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic.

Finally, the results showed a significant interaction effect of symbolic threat and (ir)religious identification on subtle dehumanization through the attribution of positive Human Nature (*b* = 0.40 , SE= 0.19, *p* < .0441, 95% CI [0.01, 0.79]), with a significant effect for Catholics only relative to atheists (respectively, *b* = 0.48 , SE= 0.15, *p* < .0025, 95% CI [0.18, 0.78]; *b* = 0.08 , SE= 0.12, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.32]). Precisely the level of subtle dehumanization

was higher when the level of symbolic threat was higher and this was only when participants

were identifying as Catholics relative to Atheists. [3]

Figure 8. Significant effects of the priming on anxiety threat; effects of symbolic threat, interaction effects of symbolic threat with (ir)religious identification and anxiety threat with (ir)religious identification on subtle dehumanization via positive Human Nature traits.

Note. *** = $p < .000$, ** = $p < .01$, * = $p < .05$, - - - = new significant unexpected results

Negative Human Nature traits

The results showed no reliable direct effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition

on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic,

through the attribution of negative Human Nature traits, not confirming *H2.1* ($b_{H2.1} = 0.09$, *SE=*

0.23, 95% CI [-0.40, 0.57]).

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[3] As for Laïcité vs. Control, we found a significant effect of symbolic threat on subtle dehumanization through the attribution of positive Human Nature ($b = 0.23$, SE= 0.09, $p < .0199$, 95% CI [0.04, 0.42]) indicating that participants with a high level of symbolic threat presented higher level of subtle dehumanization. Also, the results showed a significant interaction effect of symbolic threat and (ir)religious identification on subtle dehumanization through the attribution of positive HumanNature ($b = 0.40$, SE= 0.19, $p < .0462$, 95% CI [0.01, 0.78]), with a significant effect for Catholics only relative to Atheists (respectively, $b = 0.47$, SE= 0.15, $p < .0031$, 95% CI [0.17, 0.78]; $b = 0.07$, SE= 0.12, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.32]). Precisely the level of subtle dehumanization was more important when the level of symbolic threat was higher and this was only when participants were identifying as Catholics relative to Atheist. Furthermore, the results showed a significant interaction effect of anxiety threat and (ir)religious identification on subtle dehumanization through the attribution of positive Human Nature ($b = 0.52$, SE= 0.22, $p < .0218$, 95% CI [0.08, 0.96]), with a marginally significant effect for Catholics only relative to Atheists (respectively, $b = 0.32$, SE= 0.18, $p < .0886$, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.69]; $b = -0.20$, SE= 0.13, 95% CI [-0.46, 0.06]). Precisely the level of subtle dehumanization seemed to be more important when the level of anxiety threat was higher and this was only when participants were identifying as Catholics.

Anxiety Threat

Also, no indirect effect of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic was found, not confirming *H2.3a* and *H2.2a*. Specifically, the effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on anxiety and the effect of anxiety threat on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic were both non-significant, (respectively, $b_{H2.3a}$ = 0.42, *SE*= 0.58, 95% CI [-0.80, 1.63]; $b_{H2.2a}$ = -0.17, *SE*= 0.12, 95% CI [-0.42, 0.08]). Also, and not supporting H2.4a, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and participants (ir)religious identification on anxiety threat ($b_{H2.4a}$ = 0.99, *SE* = 1.26, 95% CI [-1.65, 3.64]).

Symbolic Threat

As for symbolic threat, no indirect effect of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/ Catholic, not confirming *H2.3b* and *H2.2b*. Specifically, the effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on symbolic and the effect of symbolic threat on the level of subtle dehumanization of the outgroup Muslim in relation to Atheist/Catholic were both non-significant, (respectively, $b_{H2.3b}$ = 0.10, *SE*= 0.40, 95% CI [-0.75, 0.94]; $b_{H2.2b}$ = 0.01, *SE*= 0.16, 95% CI [-0.33, 0.35]). Also, and not supporting *H2.4b*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and participants (ir)religious identification on anxiety threat ($b_{H2.4b}$ = -0.54, *SE* = 0.88, 95% CI [-2.37, 1.30]).

Behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive presidential candidate, in favor of receiving Muslim migrants.

The results showed no reliable direct effect of Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate, not confirming *H3.1* ($b_{H3.1}$ = 0.03, *SE* = 0.13, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.29]).

Anxiety Threat

Also, the results showed no reliable indirect effects of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate, not supporting *H3.3a*. More specifically, the effect of the priming on anxiety threat was non-significant ($b_{H3.3a}$ = 0.19, SE= 0.19, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.55]). Also, and contrary to *H3.4a*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and the (ir)religious identification on anxiety threat ($b_{H3.4a}$ = 0.21, SE= 0.38, 95% CI [-0.55, 0.97]). However, the expected *H3.2a* relationship between anxiety threat and behavioral intention to vote was significant ($b_{H1.2a}$ = -0.22, SE= 0.06, *p* < .0002, 95% CI [-0.79, -0.50]), indicating that the decrease in the level of anxiety threat was related to a rise in the level of intention to vote for an inclusive candidate (Figure 9).

Symbolic Threat

As for symbolic threat, the results showed no reliable indirect effects of the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition on the behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate via symbolic threat, not confirming *H3.3b*. More specifically, the effect of the priming on symbolic threat was non-significant ($b_{H3.3b}$ = 0.12, SE= 0.15, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.40]). Also, and contrary to *H3.4b*, the results showed no reliable interaction effect between the Historical Laïcité vs. New Laïcité condition and the (ir)religious identification on symbolic threat ($b_{H3.4b}$ = 0.27, SE= 0.30, 95% CI [-0.32, 0.86]). However, the expected *H1.2b* relationship between symbolic threat and the intention to vote for an inclusive candidate was significant ($b_{H3.2b}$= -0.65, SE= 0.07, *p* < .0000, 95% CI [-0.79, -0.50]), indicating that the decrease in the level of symbolic threat was related to a rise in the level of intention to vote for an inclusive candidate. Finally, the results showed a significant effect of (ir)religious group on Symbolic Threat (b = 0.82, SE= 0.24, *p* < .001, 95% CI [0.34, 1.30]). Precisely, results revealed that Catholic participants relative to Atheists

presented a higher level of symbolic threat.[4]

*Figure 9.* Indirect effects of the primings on the intention to vote for a president in favor of welcoming more Muslim migrants.

*Note. *** = p < .000, ** = p <.01, * = p < .05, - - - = new significant unexpected results*

_____

[4] As for Laïcité vs. Control, the results showed a significant interaction effect between the Laïcité condition vs. control condition and religious identification on the behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate (b = -0.30, SE = 0.15, p < .05, 95% CI [-0.61, -0.00]), with a marginally significant effect only for Catholics relative to Atheists (respectively, b = -0.20, SE = 0.12, p = .0976, 95% CI [-0.43, -0.04]; b = 0.11, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [-0.08, -0.30]). Precisely, results showed that the priming only influenced Catholics and that they seemed to present a higher intention to vote in the Control condition than in the Laïcité one. Also, the results showed a significant effect of symbolic threat on the intention to vote for an inclusive candidate (b = -0.65, SE= 0.07, p < .0000, 95% CI [-0.79, -0.50]), indicating that the decrease in the level of symbolic threat was related to the level of intention to vote for an inclusive candidate.

Chapter IV - Discussion

The majority of Muslims in Europe reside in France (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017) where they represent at least 3% of the population (Statista, 2019). Despite their rather large population, Muslims are victims of discrimination in society (CCIF, 2019) and as a result of policies emanating from the laïque ideology (Adam-Troïan et al., 2019). The aim of this dissertation was to evaluate within the French context, how different forms of Laïcité (Historical vs. New Laïcité) can lead (ir)religious majorities (Atheists and Catholics) to blatantly and subtly dehumanize the Muslim religious minority, and influence their behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate. All this, while taking into account, the levels of symbolic and anxiety threat. We hypothesized that Historical Laïcité, compared to New Laïcité, would trigger less blatant and subtle dehumanization towards Muslims and more behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate. We also hypothesized that Historical Laïcité, compared to New Laïcité, would decrease the levels of symbolic and anxiety threat towards Muslims, particularly for Catholics participants (compared to Atheists). Also, lower levels of symbolic and anxiety threat would decrease blatant and subtle dehumanization and increase behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive president.

The model we tested did not work exactly as we expected. The hypothesized mediating roles of symbolic and anxiety threat were not confirmed. However, higher levels of symbolic threat seems to be consistently and directly predictive of more negative outcomes. Specifically, high levels of symbolic threat predicted, higher levels of blatant dehumanization when Muslims where targeted (meaning that symbolic threat did not predict blatant dehumanization of French vs. (ir)religious ingroup), and higher levels of subtle dehumanization of Muslims exclusively via positive traits (e.g., positive Human Uniqueness traits & positive Human Nature traits). In other words, symbolic threat did not predict subtle dehumanization via negative Human Uniqueness traits or negative Human Nature traits. This indicates that symbolic threat is involved in both blatant and subtle forms of dehumanization. Also, lower levels of symbolic threat predicted higher levels of inclusive voting behavioral intention. These results are consistent with our hypothesis and with previous research about the role of symbolic threat in the explanation of intergroup prejudices (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and about the impact of symbolic threat on

Muslims (Velasco González et al., 2008). As for anxiety threat, its influence was notable on, subtle dehumanization via positive Human Nature traits, and on behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate. Anxiety threat seemed to function in the same way as symbolic threat, meaning that high levels of anxiety threat increased subtle dehumanization via positive Human Nature traits (except for Atheist participants for whom, marginally significant results showed that, low levels of anxiety threat increased the subtle dehumanization) and that low levels of anxiety threat increased the behavioral intention to vote. These findings are in line with our hypothesis and with previous works showing that anxiety threat can foster negative outgroup cognitions, negative beliefs about the outgroup and biases in the perceptions of the outgroup (Stephan,2014).

Regarding the rôle of Laïcité on blatant dehumanization, our results suggest that Historical and New Laïcité directly and primarily influence blatant forms of dehumanization. However, the way Historical and New Laïcité exert an influence can depend on the targeted groups and the (ir)religious identification of individuals. Specifically, the priming only influenced blatant dehumanization when the category French was involved (which means that Laïcités did not impact blatant dehumanization of Muslims when compared to the (ir)religious ingroup of participants). As a matter of fact, the results showed that Historical Laïcité, compared to New Laïcité, led to lower levels of blatant dehumanization of French (vs. (ir)religious ingroup). But the opposite occurred for the levels of blatant dehumanization of Muslims (vs. French). In addition, an interaction effect of Laïcités with (ir)religious identification revealed that the priming only impacted Atheists. These results first suggest that Laïcité may be related to a national level, which could explain why it only exerts an influence when the category French is involved. Then, in our priming both forms of Laïcité were presented as a consensual concept among the majority of French. However, our manipulation check showed that participants in our study seemed to provide explanations to the presented results more accurately in the Historical condition than in the New laïcité condition. This suggests that our participants, who were also majority left wing oriented (45,5%), could have shown higher levels of agreement with Historical Laïcité than New Laïcité. Also, our findings, suggesting that New Laïcité might be related to blatant dehumanization of French and Historical Laïcité to blatant dehumanization of Muslims, adding to the previous literature by enlarging the scope of populations targeted by New Laïcité. One

explanation could be that when New Laïcité was involved, participants who were not supporting this form of Laïcité dehumanized French who were presented in the priming as supporter of the New Laïcité. Then, even if participants seem to support Historical Laïcité, the results show that this form of Laïcité is not an effective way to reduce blatant dehumanization of Muslims. Besides, these findings could be associated with research on the malleability of ideologies and of Laïcité suggesting that the use of Historical or New Laïcité could be shifting depending on the context of threat (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017a). In our study, the shifting between these two forms of Laïcité could vary in function of the targeted group.

Concerning subtle forms of dehumanization, we expected that Historical Laïcité, compared to New Laïcité, would reduce levels of subtle dehumanization of Muslims (vs. (ir)religious ingroup), but no effect of the priming occurred. This suggests that the Laïque ideology does not directly predict subtle forms of dehumanization. In line with the previous explanation about blatant dehumanization results, these findings could be explained by the fact that our subtle dehumanization measure did not include the category French. Another possible explanation could be that, Laïcité is directly associated with the creation of Human Rights that have emerged in France. In this sense, Laïcité can be perceived by the French, similarly to Human Rights, as a more accomplished form of cultural evolution. In parallel, Muslims are often depicted in the media and public discourses as undermining Human Rights. However, while blatant dehumanization (or at least our measure of blatant dehumanization) is directly related to cultural development, subtle dehumanization is closer to handing out stereotypes.

About the behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive president, both historical and New Laïcité (vs. control) decreased the level of inclusive voting behavioral intention, for Catholics participants only. This is consistent with our previous results suggesting that Laïcité may not be involved in anti-discriminative processes. Also, these findings are consistent with the perception of Muslims as a threat for Catholics.

Additionally and as previously suggested, Historical and New Laïcité did not influence symbolic threat. However, New Laïcité compared to Historical Laïcité, predicted lower levels of anxiety threat towards Muslims, within the statistical model testing the predictive variables of subtle dehumanization of Muslims via positive Human Nature traits. One explanation could be

that the controlling aspects towards Muslims displayed by New Laïcité could be reassuring for the French (ir)religious majorities.

Finally, (ir)religious identification seemed to directly influence symbolic threat, blatant and subtle forms of dehumanization. Results showed that overall, Catholics reported higher levels of symbolic threat (compared to Atheists), indicating that Catholics may feel more threatened by Muslims than Atheists. These result suggest that Catholics may perceive their status as threatened by the increasing presence of Muslims in France. Also, previously exposed interaction results between (ir)religious identity and threats suggests that Catholics dehumanize more in a subtle way, via the use of positive Human Nature traits. Furthermore, results suggested that Atheists presented overall higher levels of blatant dehumanization toward Muslims and French, and higher levels of subtle dehumanization via negative Human Uniqueness traits compared to Catholics. An explanation of these results could reside in the findings of Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) about superordinate categories and ingroup projection. Their results stipulate that an outgroup can be evaluated negatively if both ingroup and outgroup are perceived as belonging to the same superordinate category, and if the ingroup is perceived as more typical of this category than the outgroup. In our study Historical and New Laïcité could prime with the superordinate category "laïque" or simply "Laïcité". In presence of the New Laïcité, Atheists could dehumanize the group French (vs. (ir)religious ingroup) the most because they could perceive their ingroup more prototypical of the superordinate category "Laïcité" than French (which could include religious individuals). In turn, in presence of the Historical Laïcité, Atheists could dehumanize the group Muslims (vs. French) the most because they could perceive their ingroup more prototypical of the superordinate category "Laïcité" and because they could perceive Muslims as being even less prototypical than French. In other words, Atheists could consider the fact to be Atheist as the most prototypical form of Laïcité, even before being French. Besides, these results suggest that overall, Atheists seems to dehumanize in a more blatant way and Catholics in a more subtle way. This could be explained by the Catholic values of inter-religious respect, including Catholic/ Muslim relations, recently promoted by Pope Francis (2013), but also, blatantly dehumanizing another religion could undermine them as well. On the contrary, Atheists could dehumanize more

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blatantly since they would not see any legitimacy of religious identities, and/or associate them more with conflicts.

Limitations and future research

Our findings support the importance of ideologies in intergroup relations and the very recent research on Laïcité and its duality (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2017b; Anier, 2018; Anier et al., 2018; Adam-Troian & al., 2019) hinting that Historical and New Laïcité may be involved in different levels of prejudice and discrimination toward the Muslim community in France. Overall, New laïcité seemed to foster less blatant dehumanization towards Muslims than Historical Laïcité. In spite of the pioneer theoretical contribution, these results, do not suggest that any form of Laïcité could be more inclusive than another. Results should be interpreted with caution and limited in their generalizability. The recruited sample ($N = 182$) used for this research was rather small, the majority of participants were Atheists (60.4%) compared to Catholics (39.6%), and the majority of our participants were left-wing orientated (45.5%). As it has already been shown in the literature, political orientation can predict various outcomes such as individual's way of thinking (Piazza & Sousa, 2014).

Moreover, our manipulation check did not allow us to see if priming with either one or the other forms of Laïcité could control the other one in the mind of the French people. This ideology is taught in schools and is pervasive in France in a non-dual manner. And if social scientists have been able to distinguish two forms of Laïcité, it might not be the case for regular French. This echoes the Adam-Troïan and colleagues (2019) paper's limitations suggesting that exposing individuals to New Laïcité may not impede participants from referring themselves to elements of the Historical Laïcité. Thus, in order to strengthen our theoretical statement, works on the duality of Laïcité should be replicated in different national contexts where Laïcité is a newer concept to the participants.

Another limitation to our study is that levels of religious identification was not explored and that the level of religious participation was not assessed. Previous studies have shown that level of religious identification induced higher levels of prejudice towards the outgroup (Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell & Hewstone, 2006) like islamophobia (Johnson Rowatt & Labouff, 2012;

Hewstone, Clare, Newheiser & Voci, 2011), opposition to inter-religious relationships and pro-interfaith policies (Cila & Lalonde, 2014). Also, other studies have shown that religious participation can have positive and negative connections with prejudice (see Burch-Brown & Baker, 2016). Future studies should consider including these variables when measuring religious identification.

Research also showed that when a high status group feels that their group's position in the hierarchy is unstable, they experience *group status threat* (Major, Blodorn & Major Blascovich, 2018). This type of threat increases discrimination against outgroups (Branscombe & Wann, 1994) and support for anti-imigrant policies (Major et al., 2018). Catholics represent the first religious group in France and the Muslim community could represent a status threat for them. Also, previous research on the Spanish context has shown that Muslims could represent a threat to the Spanish Catholic religious identity (Croucher, Galy-Badenas, & Routsalainen, 2014), which seems to be the case in the French context. This is why future research on Historical and New Laïcité should assess the level of perceived status threat and realistic threat.

Furthermore, despite our attempts to include Muslim participants to our study, the level of Muslim participants was extremely low. This is why we were not able to asses the effect of Historical and New Laïcité on this religious minority. We believe that the perspective of this minority would bring valuable understanding of the intergroup relations and Laïcité in the French context.

Finally, because this work was realized in the context of a master thesis, the study focused on the macro aspects of Historical and New Laïcité. However, previous works have highlighted the multi-conceptual characteristic of ideologies (Feldman, 2013; Gabel & Huber, 2000; Lijphart, 1990), and works, in social sciences, about Laïcité have shown that within its ideological aspect, Laïcité includes specific features relating to values (Prades, 2019), norms (Anier, 2018, 2019), political principles (Kamiejski et al., 2012), and identity (Baubérot, 2012). Future research could examine whether these different features have different implications in intergroup relations.

Conclusion

The present research adds to the recent existing literature on Laïcité by showing the predicting role of Historical and New Laïcité on blatant dehumanization and intention to vote for an inclusive president, in France. Our results indicate that both Historical and New Laïcité seem to exclusively influence blatant forms of dehumanization, and that both Historical and New forms of Laïcité can increase levels of blatant dehumanization. Also, New and Historical Laïcité equally decreased the behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive president for Catholic participants. Thus, our results do not allow us to suggest that either form of Laïcité can be associated with inclusive outcomes. Furthermore, our results highlighted the implication of (ir)religious identification in blatant and subtle forms of dehumanization and perception of threat. Atheists seem to dehumanize more blatantly compared to Catholics, and Catholics seem to dehumanize more subtly. Also, Catholics seem to experience more symbolic and anxiety threat from Muslims than Atheists. Finally, symbolic threat appeared to be a consistent and strong predictor of subtle and blatant dehumanization towards Muslims and behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate.

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Appendix A - Questionnaire

Q1 French Residency

Do you reside in France?

☐ Yes

☐ No

Q2 (Ir)religious Identification

2.1 (Ir)religious identification

☐ Atheist

☐ Catholic

☐ Muslim

☐ Protestant

☐ Other (Precise)

2.2 Level of (ir)religious identification[5]

Indicate your level of agreement with the following affirmation from "Not al all" to "Totally".

I Identify with Atheists/ Catholics/ Muslims/ Protestants/ members of my religious group						
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

---

[5] An adapted question was presented to participants depending on their choice of (ir)religious identification, all following questions were adapted accordingly, using just one of the three indicated labels.

Q3 Ideology priming[6]

**3.1 Historical Laïcité**

<div style="color:red; text-align:center; font-weight:bold">
The presented document includes two parts (access Part 2 on the next page) read it carefully. You will be asked questions regarding the topic.
</div>

Part 1

Results from the CNRS survey from September 2018 about French citizens opinions concerning Laïcité.

Graph 1: Proportion of French citizens agreeing and disagreeing with items about Laïcité, results are presented in percentages.

Legend: ■ Did not respond   ■ Pas d'accord   ■ D'accord

It is important to **respect** the **equality** of all **citizens** in the eyes of the law, **regardless** of their origins, race or **religion**.
- 1.6
- 10.4
- 88.0

I do **not** want people in France to be **predefined** based on their origins or **religion**.
- 0
- 12.4
- 87.6

Each citizen must have the **freedom** to **practice** the **religion** of their **choice**.
- 0
- 7.2
- 92.8

In a democratic State all **religions** should be considered as **equal**.
- 1.5
- 33.4
- 65.1

100% ———— 0%

Source: CNRS, Republic and Laïcité survey 2016-2017.

Part 2

The participants of this survey have also selected the elements that best define Laïcité. Among 10 elements, the following three were selected most frequently:

Laïcité consists of three main elements:
-the **freedom** to **believe** or **not believe**

---

[6] Participants were randomly assigned to one of the following conditions 1) Historical Laïcité, 2) New Laïcité, 3) Control.

-the **freedom** to **practice religion** of one's **choice** or **not**
-**equal rights** for all the citizens regardless of their religion

Why do you think French agree with these ideas? Give two brief reasons:

Reason 1

Reason 2

3.2 New Laïcité

The presented document includes two parts (access Part 2 on the next page) read it carefully. You will be asked questions regarding the topic.

Part 1

Results from the CNRS survey from September 2018 about French citizens opinions concerning Laïcité.

Graph 1: Proportion of French citizens agreeing and disagreeing with items about Laïcité, results are presented in percentages.

Source: CNRS, Republic and Laïcité survey 2016-2017.

Part 2

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The participants of this survey have also selected the elements that best define Laïcité. Among 10 elements, the following three were selected most frequently:

Laïcité consists of three main elements:
- The **separation** of the **state** and **religion**
- **Forbidding** all **visible religious symbols** in **public establishments**
- **Limiting** religious practices to the **private sphere**

Why do you think French agree with these ideas? Give two brief reasons:

Reason 1 [   ]

Reason 2 [   ]

3.3 Control

The presented document includes two parts (access Part 2 on the next page) read it carefully.

Part 1

Results from the IFOP survey from September 2018 about French citizens opinions concerning tap water.

Graph 1: Proportion of French citizens agreeing and disagreeing with items about tap water, results are presented in percentages.

Source: IFOP, survey about tap water in France 2016-2017.

Part 2

The results of the survey have highlighted the habits of French citizens in their consumption of water. Three given factors are shown to be particularly important:

Tap water is:
-The **primary drink consumed** in the home
-The type of water that the French **prefer to consume**
-**Filtered** by 20% of French citizens

Why do you think that the French prefer to consumer tap water rather than bottled water? Give two brief opinions:

Opinion 1   [_____]

Opinion 2   [_____]

Q4 Threat perception

4.1 Symbolic threat

4.1.1 Symbolic threat scale for non-muslim participants

Indicate your level of agreement with the following affirmation from "Not al all" to "Totally".

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

4.1.1 a	In France Muslims should learn to conform with the norms and rules of the French society as soon as possible	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.1.1 b	Some Muslims are a threat for the French culture	1 2 3 4 5 6 7

| 4.1.1 c | From a (ir)religious and moral view, the values and beliefs of some Muslims aren't compatible with the French values and beliefs | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

4.1.2 Meta-symbolic threat scale for muslim participants

Indicate the way you feel non-Muslims would answer these questions.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

4.1.2 a	In France Muslims should learn to conform with the norms and rules of the French society as soon as possible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4.1.2 b	Some Muslims are a threat for the French culture	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4.1.2 c	From a (ir)religious and moral view, the values and beliefs of some Muslims aren't compatible with the French values and beliefs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

4.2 Anxiety threat

On a scale from 0 to 10 report how would you feel if you were in the following situation

4.2.1 Anxiety threat scale for non-Muslim participants

How would you feel if you had to interact with a Muslim person?

4.2.2 Anxiety threat scale for Muslim participant

How would you feel if you had to interact with a non-Muslim person?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Anxious

Nervous

Tense

Afraid

Q5 Subtle dehumanization[7]

5.1 Subtle dehumanization of the outgroup for non-Muslim participants

Among the following words, select the words characterizing Muslims (Minimum 1, Maximum 10).

Click here to select the

broadminded conscientious humble polite thorough disorganized hard-hearted ignorant rude stingy active curious friendly helpful fun-loving impatient impulsive jealous nervous shy

5.1.1 Subtle dehumanization of the ingroup for non-Muslim participants

Among the following words, select the words characterizing Atheists/ Catholics/ Protestants/ members of your religious group (Minimum 1, Maximum 10).

Click here to select the

broadminded conscientious humble polite thorough disorganized hard-hearted ignorant rude stingy active curious friendly helpful fun-loving impatient impulsive jealous nervous shy

---

[7] The order of the words was randomized in each scale.

5.2 Subtle dehumanization of the outgroup for Muslim participants

Among the following words, select the words characterizing Atheists/ Catholics/ Protestants/ members of your religious group (Minimum 1, Maximum 10).

Click here to select the

broadminded conscientious humble polite thorough disorganized hard-hearted ignorant rude stingy active curious friendly helpful fun-loving impatient impulsive jealous nervous shy

## 5. 2.2 Subtle dehumanization of the ingroup for Muslim participants

Among the following words, select the words characterizing Muslims (Minimum 1, Maximum 10).

Click here to select the

broadminded conscientious humble polite thorough disorganized hard-hearted ignorant rude stingy active curious friendly helpful fun-loving impatient impulsive jealous nervous shy

Q6 Blatant dehumanization

Human beings have not stop evolving and transforming themselves through time. Indicate the degree of evolution for each group going from 0 (no evolution) to 100 (maximal evolution) using the slider.

Q7 Behavioral intention to vote for an inclusive candidate

In the context of future presidential elections, report the level of likelihood for you to vote for:

Very unlikely	Unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither likely or unlikely	Somewhat likely	Likely	Very Likely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7.1   A candidate ready to welcome more Muslim refugees in France   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7.2   A candidate ready to welcome more Muslim economic migrants in France   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7.3   A candidate ready to welcome more Muslim students in France   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Q8 Demographics

Please, fill in the following information.

8.1 Gender

☐ Female

☐ Male

☐ Other

8.2 Age

[⌄]

8.3 Country of birth

[⌄]

8.3.1 (If not France) For how long have you been living in France?

☐ less than a year

☐ 1 year

☐ 2 years

　　…

☐ 10 years

☐ more than 10 years

8.4 What is the highest level of education you have completed?

☐ No final certificate

☐ Completion of compulsory basic secondary schooling

☐ Completion of secondary education

☐ Junior high school

☐ High school

☐ Completed training course

☐ College Bachelor's degree

☐ College Master's degree

☐ PhD

8.5 Where would you place yourself politically?

Extreme left wing	Left wing	Somewhat left wing	Center	Somewhat right wing	Right wing	Extreme right wing	I don't know
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

8.6 What is your status?

☐ Student

☐ Unemployed

☐ Retired

☐ Employed

8.7 If you add all the revenues of your household per month, which one of this bracket is the most similar to yours?

☐ less than 1130

☐ between 1131 and 1450€

☐ between 1451 and 1760€

☐ between 1761 and 2110€

☐ between 2111 and 2500€

☐ between 2501 and 2950€

☐ between 2951 and 3490€

☐ between 3491 and 4200€

☐ between 4201 and 5440€

☐ more than 5440€