



School of Sociology and Public Policies
Department of Political Science and Public Policies

**The Voice of Civil Society Organizations: Engagement of Civic
Organizations in the Democratic Governance in Cabo Verde**

José Maria Gomes Lopes

Thesis specially presented for the fulfillment of the degree of
Doctor in Public Policies

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Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

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Jury

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December 2018

*To the memory of my father, Punoi di N' Tónia,
and the love of the family Queen, Nha Liba.*

*To my sisters, and to my brothers, with much
appreciation!*

To Luísa, Mário, Djusé, with much respect!

For Arlinda, Ju and Ary, with love!

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the engagement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the public policy process in Cabo Verde. It has three focuses: It starts with the analysis of CSOs engagement in the national public policy process; then it focuses on CSOs involvement in local governance process, while the third part analyses the influence of that engagement on the performance of local government institutions. The thesis develops around two fundamental questions: “What factors influence the engagement of CSOs in the political process in Cabo Verde?” and, “To what extent does the engagement of CSOs influence government performance in Cabo Verde?” To answer these questions, two hypotheses have been considered: the institutional hypothesis, focusing on “political opportunity structures” that lead the engagement of CSOs in politics. The second hypothesis is the social capital, in its bridging and linking forms. The social changes occurred in Cabo Verde after its independence and the inauguration of democracy in 1990 prompted the resurgence of old social and solidary institutions of collective public goods that had existed in the country throughout its history. As these institutions gained conscience of the strength of their resource power, they became more politically active, and so, more engaging in the country’s political process. The institutional and the social capital hypotheses guide the development of the present work. They are not contradictory, as they may seem. Instead, they are harmonized throughout the research to complement each other.

Key words: *Civil society, civil society organizations, governance, political engagement, public policy, government performance*

Resumo

Esta tese analisa o envolvimento de organizações da sociedade civil (OSC) nos processos de produção e implementação de políticas públicas em Cabo Verde. Essa análise é desenvolvida em três momentos: começa com a abordagem do envolvimento das OSCs nos processos de formatação e implementação de políticas públicas a nível nacional; depois, e num segundo momento concentra-se no envolvimento das OSCs no processo de governança local. Por último, a análise centra-se na influência que o envolvimento das OSC exerce sobre o desempenho dos governos locais (Câmaras Municipais). A tese desenvolve-se em torno de duas questões fundamentais: “Que factores influenciam o envolvimento das OSCs no processo político em Cabo Verde?” E, “Até que ponto o envolvimento das OSCs influencia o desempenho das instituições governamentais em Cabo Verde?” Para responder a estas perguntas, foram consideradas duas hipóteses: a hipótese institucional, com o foco nas “estruturas de oportunidade política” que conduziram ao engajamento das OSC no processo político em Cabo Verde. A segunda hipótese é a do *capital social*, nas suas formas de *bridging* e *linking*. As mudanças sociais que ocorreram em Cabo Verde após a independência, e a inauguração da democracia em 1990, levaram ao ressurgimento de “instituições tradicionais” de solidariedade, de produção de bens públicos coletivos, e resolução de problemas colectivos. Deste modo, as formas organizacionais colectivas tradicionais ganharam consciência da força do seu poder, e se tornaram politicamente mais ativas e, portanto, mais engajadas no processo político do país. Assim, as duas hipóteses, institucional e de capital social, norteiam o desenvolvimento do presente trabalho. Elas não são contraditórias como podem parecer. Em vez disso, elas se harmonizam, e se complementam ao longo do desenvolvimento da pesquisa.

Palavras-chave: *Sociedade civil, organizações da sociedade civil, governança, envolvimento político, políticas públicas, desempenho de instituições governamentais*

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ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACD	Community Development Associations
ACDI-VOCA	Agriculture Cooperative Development International / Volunteers Overseas Cooperative Assistance
ADB	African Development Bank
ADVIC	Cape Verdean Association of visually impaired people
AIMO	High Labour Intensity
AJEC	Cape Verdean Association of youth Entrepreneurs
ANMCV	National Association of Cape Verdean Municipalities
CBO	Community Based Organizations (Used to replace ACD)
CDF	Common Development Framework
CNRP	National Committee for Poverty Reduction
CONG	Coordination Committee of Non-Governmental Partners
CRP	Regional Commission of Partners
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVE	Cape Verdean Escudos
DGASP	Government Department for Environment, Forestry and Fishery
DGES	Directorate General of Higher Education
DGP	Directorate General of Planning
DGPOG	Direcção Geral de Planeamento, Orçamento e Gestão (Directorate General of Planning, Budget and Management)
DNE	National Direction of Education
FAC	Support Fund for Cooperatives
FAC	Cape Verdean Broad Front/Frente Ampla Cabo-verdiana
FAIMO	Front of High Labor Intensity
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FECAP	Cape Verdean Federation of Teachers
FICASE	Fundação Cabo-verdiana de Acção Social Escolar
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRIS	Revolutionary Group for Socialist Intervention
GPRSP	Growth Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ICS	Cape Verdean Institute of Solidarity
IDRF	Household Income and Expenditure Survey
IEFP	Institute of Work and Professional Training
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGAs	Income Generating Activities
IMC	<i>Inquérito Multiobjectivo Comum</i>
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	National Institute of Cooperatives/ Instituto Nacional de Apoio às Cooperativas
INE	Institute of National Statistics
INERF	National Institute of Rural and Forest Engineering
IPAJ	Institute for Juridical Assistance
iPRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
LOPE	Law of Political Organization of Sate
MAHOT	Ministry of Environment
MDR	Ministry of Rural Development
MED	Ministry of Education
MFI	Ministry of Finance

MPD	Movimento Para Democracia (Movement for Democracy)
MPIP	Multiannual Public Investment Program
MPs	Member of Parliament
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organization(s)
NPAD	National Poverty Alleviation Program
OMCV	Organização das Mulheres de Cabo Verde (Cape Verdean Women Organization)
PAICG	African Party for the Independence Cabo Verde and Guinea Bissau
PAICV	African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde
PEMSMAA	Emergency Program for Mitigating the Effects of Droughts
PLPR	Rural Poverty Alleviation Program
PNA-EPT	National Action Plan of Education for All
PND	National Development Plan
POSER	Programa de Promoção de Oportunidades Socioeconómicas Rurais (Program of Rural Socioeconomic Opportunities)
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSGD	Socioeconomic Promotion of disadvantaged Groups Program
QUIBB	Questionário Unificado de Indicadores Básicos de Bem-Estar
RNCEPT	National Network Campaign of Education for All
SINDEP	Cape Verdean National Teachers Union
SIPROFIS	Teachers Unions of Santiago Island
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
SONERF	Sociedade Nacional de Engenharia Rural e Florestas
SSDP	Social Sector Development Project
UCID	Democratic and Independent Cape Verdean Union (União Caboverdiana Independente e Democrática)
UCP	Coordination Unit of Programs
UDC	Democratic Union of Cabo Verde
UDP	Popular Democratic Union
UN	United Nations
UPIC-CV	União do Povo das Ilhas de Cabo Verde
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

INTRODUCTION

Robert Putnam opens his political science classic, “Making Democracy Work” (1993), by asking, “Why do some democratic governments succeed and others fail?” Putnam himself recognizes that question to be an “ancient” query, but “timely”. I agree one hundred percent with him on this matter. Building on Putnam’s concept of “civic community” to explain the success and the failure of governments, the present thesis seeks to analyze the process and the outcomes of the engagement of civil society organizations in the democratic governance in Cabo Verde.

Civil society and its “byproducts”, civil society organizations and civil society participation, have become dominant buzzwords in contemporary government systems, whether democratic or not. However, that concept has been often treated as an abstract and theoretical construct, which can only be grasped empirically in its observable dimensions: “material, organizational and ideological” (Bratton, 1994, p. 64). Thus, civil society is embodied in independent citizens’ organizations or associations that mobilize resources to pursue the materialization of a specific ideology. Nevertheless, in the present technological era, the organizational dimension of civil society is not restricted to physical associations only, as individual citizens connect virtually with one another to mobilize resources in defense of an ideology, or a “cause”, either locally or on a global scale. Hence, independent voluntary associations, acting as “intermediary institutions” (Tocqueville, 1998) between citizens and the state, become a relevant analytical tool for the analysis of policy process in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. While the advocates of liberal democratic regimes sanctify civil society and its participation, the autocrats and anti-democratic regimes often control, repress, and even demonize it. Why is that so? The answer to this question lies in the nature of the relationship that both democratic and non-democratic regime states establish with civil society organizations.

The deification of civil society, or its organized forms- civil society organizations (henceforth, CSOs), in liberal democracies builds on the ideals of people’s power sovereignty that is transferred and exercised by the state, the “Leviathan”. According to these ideals, the exercise of such sovereignty should be under the permanent watch of the “independent eye of society”, which is made of a “plurality of interacting, self-organized and constantly vigilant civil associations” (Tocqueville, 1998, p. 218). Thus, civil associations are “a power seen afar”, whose “actions serve for an example and whose language is listened to” (Tocqueville, 1998, p.218). Therefore, CSOs are the cornerstone for the edification, maintenance and consolidation

of any democratic regime (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993), and even for the economic advancement of nations (Putnam, 1993; Krymkowski and Hall, 1990). Furthermore, CSOs as citizens' intermediary organizations, embrace the key functions of nurturing "basic rights, to advocate popular claims, and to educate citizens in the democratic arts of tolerance and accommodation" (Bratton, 1994, p. 54) within the state machinery. As independent groups located within society, CSOs participate in the public sphere as the citizens' voices, liaising with the state in defense of citizens' interests and concerns. The fact that CSOs are a "power", and whose voices are "listened to" (Tocqueville, 1998) by both the common touch and the political power, make them a fertile research subject in the field of public policy. What is the power of these organizations? How and to what extent do they influence political decisions? How do they influence "who gets what, when, how" (Lasswell, 1958). The success of industrial and advanced democratic regimes, mainly the western liberal democracies, has been greatly attributed to their "civic culture" (Almond and Verba, 1963), or their "civicness" (Putnam, 1993), derived from their citizens' participation in public affairs. Therefore, what is the status of civil society/CSOs and their participation in the public affairs in less democratic and advanced countries?

On the other hand, civil society and its organizations in the authoritarian regimes are often depicted as coopted, controlled, and threatened entities, and in some circumstances banned from formal existence. Under such regimes, when they exist, CSOs are objects of a strict control by the authorities because of the "power" and the threat they might represent for the stability of the regime and the incumbent power holders. What often happens in this context is that state coopts CSOs and obliges them to act more as its agencies than being citizens' independent organizations. Where CSOs challenge the authoritarian regimes, they undergo severe repression, and in many occasions, they are denied legal existence. This situation often causes loud social unrest and a permanent state of "contentious politics" (Tarrow, 2011). That is because civil society exists, as Bratton points out, even in "defensive or underground form, under all types of political regime" (1994, p. 57) as a "bevy of institutions for protecting collective interests" (Bratton, 1989, p. 411). Thus, where civil society grows to a point that it cannot be defeated by the state, the country either democratizes or undergoes a permanent state of upheaval and social contestation.

Thus, the failure of democracy to establish and consolidate in any country, lies either in the institutional constraints for the development of independent civil society organizations and their effective engagement in matters of public affairs, or simply because citizens lack a refined "civic culture" of participation in such affairs. These two variables are often taken as

explanators the poor democratic performance of Sub-Saharan African countries (Noor, 2016). On the one hand, institutional constraints keep civil society *aside* and “disengaged” (Azarya, 1994) from the state affairs, or lead to the development of a tailored civil society that is incapable to affirm by itself. On the other hand, the absence of institutional conditions explain the existence of a “lethargic civil society” (Costa, 2013; Noor, 2016; Ndegwa, 1996) in Africa, proving itself unable to challenge the authoritarian rulers to democratize, or influence public policies. However, this theoretical bias on Africa’s “uncivic culture” and its “uncivil civil society” (Lynch and Crawford, 2011) often supports itself on the absence of a serious and an in-depth research of civil society participation in political process across the continent (Evans, 1997, p. 2). Against this theoretical bias, civil society in Africa, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, “far from being stunted [...], it is often vibrant” (Bratton, 1989, p. 411). In fact, “the existence of various voluntary associations [is a] proof of an active civil society” on the continent (Azarya, 1994, p. 94), which similarly in the advanced democratic countries, play important political and socioeconomic roles (Boadi, 1998), however, with its own idiosyncrasies.

CSOs’ engagement in the democratization process in the Sub-Saharan region is an often-cited example of the political roles they are able to play. For instance, studying the political transition into democracy in the postcolonial Sub-Saharan African countries, Bratton (1994), LeBas (2011) and Barmeo and Yashar (2016), illustrate how civil society organizations, the unions and grassroots organizations, were essentially important in mobilizing the population against the authoritarian regimes, and demanding political change. In Zimbabwe and Zambia for instance, LeBas (2011) found out that the unions and other grassroots organizations, despite their initial collaborations with the single party regimes in policy implementation, became gradually the leading voices against those very same regimes. As a matter of fact, the unions turned into the principal actors in the formation and support of new opposition parties. In fact, as Bratton (1994) affirms, CSOs at the period of democratic transition became shelters for many political dissidents and oppositionists, who find in these organizations a means to do politics in disguise.

In Kenya, the renowned environmental and political activist Wangari Maathai, and her organization *Green Belt Movement*, led an open and a firm campaign against the authoritarian regime of the president arap Moi. In 2004, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of the work she had done to promote democracy, peace and sustainable development. The boosting of CSOs in the 1980s and 1990s in Africa, with a heavy support from international development agencies, indicate, on the one hand, how the citizens were

committed to mutual solidarity in providing for themselves where public authorities were failing, and on the other hand, committed to change the political status quo of their countries. As mentioned in the above paragraph, some social movements ended up being the basis for the formation of new political parties, and those that did not transform into parties, joined these organizations in the struggle to uproot the authoritarian regimes and implant democracy. As Barneo and Yashar (2016) affirm, “where [civil society] movements and parties are absent or weak, the [democratic] regimes that emerge are built on sand” (p. 24). While movements of civil society act outside the sphere of government, but seek to influence it through pressures, political parties not only make demands, but also look to seize power to exercise authority themselves. As the authors conclude, “social movements are pivotal in the street, while parties are pivotal actors in formal institutions” (Barneo and Yashar, 2016, p. 22). Thus, it is against the theoretical bias of Africa’s “*uncivic culture*”, that the present thesis dissertation is framed. ***The object of analysis of this dissertation is the process and the outcomes of the engagement of civil society organizations in politics Cabo Verde, as a case study of civil society engagement in young democratic Sub-Saharan African countries.*** Although the empirical analysis focuses solely in the case of Cabo Verde, the arguments are generalizable to a group of other Sub-Saharan African late third wave democratizers with similar characteristics, which I will identify and describe in the next section of this introduction.

The late Third wave democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the afterwards

By young democratic Sub-Saharan African countries, I mean a group of countries that made their transition into democracy in the 1990s and 2000, or the so called the late “third wave of democratization” (Samuel Huntington, 1990). This sample comprises a set of fourteen countries as identified by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). Six of them, including Benin, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Mali, Senegal and South Africa, made a full transition to democracy, while the other eight made a “partial” transition, knowing that they still keep vestiges of authoritarian practices and institutions, and some now and then experience democratic reversals. These countries are Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia (See Table 01). Among these countries, Cabo Verde and South Africa are the top two countries regarding their democracy index (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016), with overall scores of 7.94 and 7.41 respectively. In the Sub-Saharan region, Cabo Verde stands on the second position, while South Africa occupies the fourth position in *The Economist Intelligence Unit* ranking of democracy. The region is led by Mauritius, the only “full democracy” with an overall democracy score of 8.28. On the other extreme, Ethiopia stands at the bottom of the ranking

among the above sample, being the only case where signs of democratic reversals have been mostly evident. With an overall democracy score of 3.5, this country has been classified as an authoritarian regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016).

Table 0.1- Some characteristics of Late Third Wave Sub-Saharan African democratizers (full transition and partial transition into democracy).

Full transition Countries	Per Capita GDP in 1990	Year of Transition	Economic develop. Per capita GDP at the Transition	Economic develop. Per capita GDP in 2016	% growth of Per capita GDP at Trans.	Democracy Score in 2016	Regime type	Economic classification
Benin	393,6862	1991	393,686214	788,532442	200,3	5.67	Hybrid Regime	Low income
Cabo Verde	897,6495	1991	913,963943	3037,52564	338,4	7.94	Flawed democracy	Lower middle income
Ghana	402,5889	1992	414,767341	1517,496	376,9	6.75	Flawed democracy	Lower middle income
Mali	316,8166	1992	319,1914	779,9448	246,2	5.70	Hybrid Regime	Low income
Senegal	756,6085	2000	473,45	952,7715	125,9	6.21	Flawed democracy	Low income
South Africa	3076,455	(1994)	3390,494	5280,018	171,6	7.41	Flawed democracy	Upper middle income
Partial transition into democracy								
Ethiopia	253,1929	1995	133,7289	712,8779	281,6	3.46	Authoritarian	Low income
Lesotho	371,8442	1993	491,4205	1039,703	279,6	6.59	Flawed democracy	Lower middle income
Malawi	199,2859	1994	120,6293	300,3077	150,7	5.55	Hybrid Regime	Low income
Madagascar	265,6761	1993	265,9345	401,7423	151,2	5.07	Hybrid Regime	Low income
Mozambique	189,6245	1994	161,7049	382,0695	201,5	4.02	Hybrid Regime	Low income
Nigeria	322,8412	1999	300,609	2175,673	673,9	4.50	Hybrid Regime	Lower middle income
Tanzania	172,0448	1995	180,465	877,5076	510,0	5.76	Hybrid Regime	Low income
Zambia	409,258	1991	410,0719	1262,99	308,6	5.99	Hybrid Regime	Lower middle income

Source: Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008); The Economist Intelligence Unit (2016); World Bank (2016)

Looking at their economic development, with the exception of South Africa, all the countries in the sample were in the *low-income* category at the time of their transition to democracy. Cabo Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Nigeria and Zambia have climbed up to *lower middle-income* country category (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). Cabo Verde is a special case within the aforementioned group of countries. Despite being a very small country, regarding both its

population and territory¹, and having departed from the same economic level as the other countries (all low-income country, except South Africa), Cabo Verde has made a spectacular economic progress since its transition into democracy. Its per capita GDP has increased almost threefold, from 913.9 US dollars in 1991 to 3037.5 US dollars in 2016. Actually, the country made its transition to the middle-income category in 2008, at a time when its GDP per capita reached 3639.9 US dollars. In respect to its democratic performance, as noted in the above paragraph, Cabo Verde ranks second in the Sub-Saharan region, only after Mauritius. *Thus, this Cape Verdean singularity makes it an appealing case to analyze the status and the role of civil society in the democratic and economic progresses of Sub-Saharan late third wave democratizers.*

Cabo Verde and its path to democratic progress.

Cabo Verde was a former Portuguese colony from the time of its discovery in 1460 until its independence in 1975. The independence itself was an outcome of approximately 20 years of social contestation and military struggle in Guinea Bissau led by PAICV, a political party founded in 1956 by *Amilcar Cabral* and his close comrades. Inspiring in Cabral's ideology of "unity", PAIGC fought for the independence of both Guinea Bissau and Cabo Verde. However, while the military fight occurred only in the former country, in latter one, the "fight" took the form of societal mobilization in its favor. The two countries remained united from their independences in 1974 and 1975 respectively, until January 1981. A coup d'état led by the then Prime Minister, General Nino Vieira, in November 1980, caused a rage in the Cape Verdean elites, who on January 20th, 1981, formally broke up with the unification. Consequently, the Cape Verdean elites formed PAICV-*Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde*, occupying solely with politics in Cabo Verde.

Since its independence in 1975², Cabo Verde has made an outstanding economic progress, culminating with its integration into the group of Middle Income Countries in 2008, outpacing all the other former Portuguese colonies in Africa, and some other sub-Saharan late democratizers richer in natural resources and bigger in population. The country's per capita income made a spectacular increase from 541 in US dollars in 1980 to 3692 US dollars in 2008,

¹ Cabo Verde has a population of 546,388 people, and territorial dimension of 4,000 square kilometers of area.

² In fact, many Cape Verdeans strongly opposed the independence based on its economic unviability (Vicente Lopes, 2013)

increasing more than six-fold. Per capita income stood at 3086 in 2016. Along with this positive economic performance, Cabo Verde, as mentioned earlier, has also experienced a record democratic performance since its independence. After fifteen years of single-party regime, the country made a peaceful transition into democracy in 1990, and became in fact the first state in Sub-Saharan Africa to hold democratic elections in the third wave period, on January 13th, 1991. Since then, free multiparty elections have been taking place regularly in all levels of government, and the presidency as well. The uninterrupted democratic regime in place since 1990, has granted Cabo Verde the classification of a “stable democracy” (Riedl, 2016). In fact, Cabo Verde fits perfectly into the set of countries whose transition and construction of a stable democracy have happened “against the odds” (Bermeo and Yashar, 2016). These odds had been its poor wealth and GDP per capita (Lipset, 1959; Barro, 1999; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997), and the authoritarian regime inherited from the colonial period. However, despite the odds, and unlike most of the late third wave Sub-Saharan democratizers, Cabo Verde has made both pronounced economic and democratic progresses since 1990. Therefore, *the working hypotheses for this dissertation thesis is that what account for Cape Verdean successful democratic transition and stability over the years, as well as its economic progress, are the political institutional conditions reigning in the country, and the structure and engagement of its civil society in politics and public policy process.* I call these two hypotheses of institutional and social capital hypotheses. The former refers to the political conditions created by the state rulers for democracy to be implanted. The latter refers to the social capital, understood as the stock of resources built in the network of relationships that individuals develop among themselves (the *bridging social capital* of CSOs), and their linkage with the state (the *linking social capital*). I will elaborate more on these two hypotheses later in this introduction, and then develop them further in chapters 1 and 2. In the next section, I will briefly analyse the emergence, structure and evolution CSOs/*social capital* in Cabo Verde

The emergence, structure and engagement of CSOs in Cabo Verde

The emergence of civil society groups in Cabo Verde dates back to the colonial era, and since then, they have grown and developed substantially. The same applies to the social capital engendered within these groups, as well as in their relationship with other collective actors in the Cape Verdean society, being political or others. In 2015, Cabo Verde had 724 formally registered CSOs (Plataforma das ONGs, 2015). These organizations are grouped into seven types, distributed in the following way: 73.5% of them are community development organization (ADC, which I will refer in this work, especially in chapter 6, as CBOs), followed

by the Non-governmental Organizations for Development (ONGD)-19.8%. Other CSOs include Institutions of Micro Finance (1.7%) and Mutual Help Associations- (0.3%). Sports Associations represent 3.0%, Cooperatives 1.0%, and Foundations 0.8%. These CSOs cover a wide range of activities, as defined in the Law of CSOs (Law N° 114/VIII/2016). All these small typologies of CSOs, however, can be perfectly grouped under one category of CSOs, *the developmental and solidarity CSOs*, which are often called in Cabo Verde of “*social developmental partners*”.

Civil society organizations, as independent citizens’ organizations acting either as oppositionists or as government partners, are as old as the history of Cabo Verde itself. The Cape Verdean historiography often traces the emergence of peoples’ organizations outside the state’s affairs from the beginning of colonization. Slaves, sellers and free farmers often formed underground associations not only to exchange cultural practices, but most importantly to plan escaping strategies and ways to protect and defend themselves from the harsh colonial practices. Examples of these associations and their struggles include farmers’ revolts in Santiago Island (Camilo, 2006, 2014; Furtado 1993). The first more prominent organized groups of individuals acting against the colonial government practices dates back to XVIII century. For instance, in the island of Santiago “The tenants [...] congregated against the decisions of administrative and judicial authorities, and collectively disobeyed and transgressed them. [Thus, circa 1723] “the administration [...] prohibited that slaves and “free Negroes” [...] constituted in groups, which was a great threat to the Portuguese colonial authorities” (Camilo, 2006, p. 62). Later in the XX century, literary movements began to position against colonial practices, launching therefore the seeds for the independence movement, which emerged in the 1950s.

On the other hand, in the face of the absent and repressive colonial state, people created community groups of solidarity and initiatives as a means to provide for their own collective needs unmet by the government. As Bratton (1994) puts it, “the deliberate atomization of social organization forces local communities to rely increasingly on their own resources” (p.61), to meet their own needs. As cited above, conglomerate of farmers, traders, groups of Tabanka, are examples of “people’s organizations” (Fetton, 1995) that emerged in Cabo Verde, which functioned as their own resources to help solve for their collective problems back then. These peoples’ organizations, however, did not only intervene as solidarity and mutual help strategies, but they also worked as a means of cultural resistance and opposition against the colonial rules. Thus, “two faces of civic society” (Ndegwa, 1996) could be said to have emerged in the colonial period in Cabo Verde. On the one hand, a set of “disengaged” (Azarya, 1994) groups of solidarity emerged as the result of the absent and uncaring government. These groups were

alien to the state political affairs, and engaged totally in the autonomous production and delivery of community collective goods. On the other hand, the same regime praxis motivated the boosting of a contestant type of civic groups that were eager to face and challenge the authorities, and determinant to seek the change of the political *status quo* (Camilo, 2006, 2014; Furtado, 1993).

The independence in 1975 brought a new “political opportunity structure” (Tarrow, 2011) for the emergence of a new type of CSOs, which would eventually be incorporated in the new government policy-making and implementation processes, as part of the strategy to “build the nation”. Unlike the disengaged and contestant civil society organizations and movements that emerged in the colonial period, the independence generated a new wave of civil society organizations, more inclined to collaborate with the government than to oppose against it. This new typology of civil society groups, which I call of *collaborative CSOs*, and their incorporation within the government activities, had much to do with the ruling party’s willingness to promote a societal mobilization for the “reconstruction of the nation”. Such a goal could only be achieved with a full and “democratic” participation of all. Indeed, soon after the independence, PAIGC “began work on the problem of democracy by creating its own branches in the countryside and encouraging the population to participate in their deliberations” (Foy, 1988, 3). The “mass organizations” that emerged right after the independence were labeled of “autonomous organizations”, were extremely and sinergically linked to the ruling party and the state in the definition and implementation of public policies.

With the inauguration of democracy in 1990, and the granting of freedom of expression and associations, it was expected that CSOs would expand and take a more intervening role in the public arena to influence public policies. In fact, CSOs grew substantially in the 1990s³. However, the CSOs born in this period kept strictly the same pattern of intervention strategies and relationship with the state inherited from the previous political regime: an accommodative behavior, seeking spaces for participating in the government policies rather than being an oppositional force, capable of influencing the direction of public policies. Despite a more visible movement of civil society, which culminated with the creation of the National Platform of NGOs in 1996, one could hardly speak of the emergence of a “challenger”, and oppositionist civil society in the 1990s. Indeed, there was a process of disengagement of CSOs from the state activities. According to Azarya (1994), disengagement refers to the civil society “withdrawing or keeping distance from the state”, either because of the state is “repressive”, or it is

³ 27% of the existing CSOs in 2015 in Cabo Verde were born in the 1990s

“uncollaborative” (p. 83) with civic organizations. The new democratic government dismantled the cooperative sector and cancelled all the support for CSOs, despite of their importance in supplying critical social services to the underprivileged population and in promoting a sustainable development in the country (Furtado, 2016). The privatization of the economy only worsened the state support for the CSOs. Thus, as the state capacity to provide for social services “gradually decreased”, the communities throughout the country organized themselves as a means to satisfy their collective needs unmet by the government. Interestingly, the majority of the leaders of these community organizations were former leaders of cooperatives in the 1980s. According to a former leader of INC, as the cooperative system disintegrated in the 1990s, many people, mainly in the rural communities were in fact left out of the new economic system. Thus, they found in their community associations a means to keep themselves socially networked, and to find means to guarantee their economic sustenance (Interview with Edmundo Pereira, Oct. 24, 2018).

With the return of PAICV to power in 2001, the “incorporation” (Azarya, 1994) of CSOs in the state policymaking and implementation regained breath again, much due to the new government’s proclivity for social welfare policies and its ideological tradition towards these organizations. As chapters 2 and 6 further demonstrate, the construction of the relationship between state and society in Cabo Verde has developed very much in tandem with the political institutional conditions put in place by the two parties that have occupied power since 1975, PAICV and MPD.

However, despite the sophistication of institutional mechanisms to engage and incorporate CSOs in the government activities in Cabo Verde, an oppositionist face of civil society, eager to oppose the government policies began to emerge in the beginning of the second decade of 2000s. Here I am not referring to the unions, which remain sectarianist in defending their affiliated workers’ interests. I am referring to organized social movements that are willing to challenge, oppose and even threaten the state and its policies, when these are understood to go against the public collective interests, or any other specific cause they stand for. Two of the most recent examples, with remarkable political influences, are the movement for the regionalization of Cabo Verde, and MAC#14. I will later analyze these two movements of civil society and their major achievements regarding the policy directions in Cabo Verde recently.

Social Capital: The Cabo Verde’s miracle?

The typologies of civil society organizations and the patterns of their relationship with the state as described above, are both the manifestations and generators of social capital developed in

Cabo Verde over the years. The central idea of social capital theory is that the network of relationships and “associated norms have values” (Putnam, 1993, p.1). In turn, these values are important assets available to both individuals and a polity itself which they can use in their struggle of solving their collective problems. Thus, the dynamics of associational activities throughout the years have led to the emergence of three dimensions of social capital in Cabo Verde: bonding, bridging and linking dimensions of social capital as Woolcock (2002) defines them. *Bonding* refers to the family blood, tribal or strong horizontal neighborhood ties and exchanges. *Bridging* is also a horizontal form of relationship, but connecting individuals that are not linked by blood or any cast ties. Bridging is typically manifested in the community associations and other sectors of CSOs and networks that emerged both during colonization and in the post-independence period. Finally, *linking* social capital refers to the vertical relationship between the civil society groups and the individuals in position of political power, or to the state institutions themselves.

The colonial period saw the emergence of both bonding and bridging dimensions of social capital. On the one hand, the collective activities and norms of relationship developed by families and neighbours were valuable resources to provide for their own needs unmet by the distant colonial state. Social practices such as *djuda*, *djunta mon*, *mitin*, *troka pratu* are clear manifestations of this form of social capital. On the other hand, individuals who were not connected by blood, friendship or neighboring ties, but who were moved by common ideals developed *bridging* relationships to gather and build resources in pursuance of their ideals and common interests. Manifestations of this dimension of social capital could be observed in the literary and some other civic groups that emerged in the first half of the XX century, and then developed during the years that preceded the independence in 1975. If bonding social capital was for solving immediate material needs among the extended family members and neighbors, bridging social capital went beyond that purpose. It also aimed at mobilizing communities against the repressive colonial rules. However, what made this mobilization possible? The bonding social capital was born from the camaraderie and daily toiling of friends, families and neighbors who found in the art of mutual cooperation an effective strategy (social capital) to overcome their miserable conditions in the face of an uncaring and a “distant state” (Bierschenk and Sardan, 1997). For its part, the emergence of the *bridging social capital* such as manifested in the literary circles (Silva, 1997; Lopes, 2013) and farmers’ associations, is explained by two factors: the advanced level of education system, and the exposure of Cabo Verde to external influences, facilitated by its role in the international commerce, with an emphasis on slave trade. The colonial regime introduced an education system, which at the beginning targeted the

ecclesiasts and the slaves only, as a marketing strategy to capitalize them in the market, but soon was extended to the larger members of society (the laic community). The everyday natural encounter of the students and their teachers, and the knowledge of the world they were acquiring allowed them opportunities to exchange ideas concerning issues beyond their immediate material needs. The academic associations formed in Mindelo (Silva, 1997), and the secret meetings held in the students' houses can be taken as an example of the bridging social capital generated and propelled by the education system.

On the same token, Cabo Verde was for many years the key point in the triangular slave trade, connecting the continents of Europe, Africa and America. In addition to that, the construction of seaport *Porto Grande* in Mindelo, in the Island of São Vicente, triggered an influx of so many "independent" foreigners to invest in the country, who naturally inspired a new life style and new ways of thinking in the natives. The economic dynamics around *Porto Grande*, and the diffusion of a new mode of life as the result of the exchange with the *new people*, catapulted a new conscience formation amongst the residents of São Vicente and, and then, spread to the residents of the other parts of the country as well. Some civic organizations were created as the result of the new life style and economic dynamics: The chamber of Commerce of São Vicente, the association of workers of Porto Grande, and the youth meetings-*encontro de mocidade*, are some examples mentioned by Silva (1997).

With the independence, societal and community bridging continued to be nurtured, now with a strong institutional support from the state authorities. However, the type of social capital that emerged during single party regime is more like the *linking social capital*, a vertical kind of relationship through which CSOs "leverage resources, ideas and information from formal institutions beyond the community, most notably the state" (Woolcock, 2002, p. 23). The government created institutional conditions for incorporating the CSOs within its development policies. Such conditions, not only propelled the increase of CSOs, but also reinforced both the population's trust and dependency on the state/party. The population gained trust on the state because of the mechanisms created for them to engage and collaborate in the policymaking and implementation. Thus, the population understood and supported the state's commitment to tackling the problems affecting them. On the other hand, CSOs developed a spirit of dependency and paternalistic relationship with the state as the result of the linkage pattern established with the party-state. As financially weak organizations, their activities were thoroughly supported by the state.

The mobilization of the bridging social capital galvanized again with the inauguration of democracy in the 1990s, as the new government's change of priorities regarding economic

policies, as well as the implementation of structural adjustment programs. The “ideological stigma” that accompanied the cooperatives and other sectors of civil society, linking them to PAICV (Challinor, 2008; Santos, 2013), led the MPD government to withdraw the state support that CSOs had been enjoying. The state’s withdrawal created a certain social anomie and community disengagement, which led to a reactivation of *social bridging* as a form of communities’ self-mobilization of resources to help them guarantee the supply of collective goods in the face of government change of focus. In the 1990s, there was a quick growth of community-based associations, specific interest associations, foundations and mutual help groups (Santos, 2013, p. 5). In addition to the government change of focus, and the social anomie resulted thereof, international development agencies launched new implementing methods of development and anti-poverty programs, built on the social capital of the poor (Paul, 1987). To counteract the high prevalence of poverty, and the government inefficiency in utilizing the resources made available to tackle this social phenomenon, those agencies directed their funds now towards the population through their representative CSOs. In Cabo Verde, the Agriculture Cooperative Development International/Volunteers Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI-VOCA), an American NGO funded by USAID, led this donors’ policy. Thus, CSOs linkage with the government now took a new format. It became more a *contractual relationship* rather than simply a joint and voluntary collaborative effort with the government in developing and implementing public policies. In the 2000s, the reemergence of linking social capital has been evident with the government led by PAICV. As chapters 2 and 6 demonstrate, the political opportunities created by the new government favored the reactivation and development of this typology of social capital.

In addition to the three dimensions above described, a new form of social capital has emerged in Cabo Verde: the *societal linking social capital*. This dimension of social capital is characterized by a thread of relationship of social “corporate actors” (Coleman, 1988), linking the diverse set of organizations that make up the Cape Verdean society: CSOs, companies, the media, the political parties, and the government offices. Unlike the bridging and linking social capital that focus on the relationship among people, and the people’s organizations linkage with the state respectively, *societal linking social capital* focuses on the linkage among the collective entities, as a means of construing a societal synergy to address community issues. This social capital dimension is further developed in chapter 6. Its use in this chapter helps in the analysis of CBOs’ (Community Based Organizations) linkage to the other “corporate actors” to build its resources and then influence the local government policy.

Social capital in Cabo Verde, in all its four dimensions above described has propelled the formation of formal political institutions in a way that it has not occurred in the other late third wave democratizers in sub-Saharan Africa. As these formal institutions gained root in the country since the early days of independence, a sense of an ethical constitutionalism has been developed in the population, being this the foundation of Cabo Verde's thriving liberal democracy, while in some of the other cases, a more likely "illiberal" type of democracy (Zakaria, 1997) seems to have prevailed. Practices of some malicious "informal institutions" (Bratton, 2007) have not disappeared though, but only tolerated to a certain limit. As an example, some recent mediatized corruption scandals have brought harsh political consequences for their perpetrators. Three examples could be highlighted: the case of the two million US dollars allegedly deviated from the government coffer in 2000, with MPD castigated at the 2001 parliamentary polls. The others include the nomination made by a former minister of her own husband to the board of the National Institute of Social Security (INPS), and the allegedly deviation made from the Environment Fund in 2015, which contributed decisively to the loss of PAICV at the polls in 2016 legislative elections. Cape Verdeans know that these practices often happen. However, they seem less tolerant towards them and tend to punish their perpetrators. Nevertheless, people often recur to informal institutional practices (often-called *spidienti* in Cabo Verde) to solve their immediate needs, as the formal procedures sometimes prove ineffective. Nobody can deny this "cultural practice" of *spidienti* in Cabo Verde.

The growth of CSOs, and the stock of social capital they generate, as I have mentioned above, have contributed for both the pacified political system and the economic progress of Cabo Verde. However, they have also triggered waves of discontentment and social contestation, leading to substantial political changes in the country. The following session analyzes three examples of critical junctures and opportunity structures that invited active political engagement of CSOs and social movements. These critical junctures are the transition to democracy in 1990, the parliamentary approval of new Statute of the political office holder in 2015, and finally the debate of regionalisation in Cabo Verde, which culminated with its approval by the House of Parliament in October 2018.

Civil society and the politics of contestation in the post-independence era

a) Transition to democracy in 1990

The emerging CSOs during the single party regime, as stated in the section above, were more "captive" and "accommodative" organizations (Ndegwa, 1996), acting in straight collaboration

and under the watch of the government, than being contestant and oppositionist actors. Therefore, they did not apparently represent any threat for the stability of the regime. In the other late Sub-Saharan democratizers, which is the case of Zambia and Zimbabwe, the workers union joined with other grassroots collective organizations to stand against the authoritarian regimes and demand change of political system. However, the maximum that “the greatest challenge to [the authoritarian rule]... is likely to come from the new or revived identities and capacity for collective action of the working class” (O’ Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 52), does not fit for the Cape Verdean case. The first and the only central union that prevailed during the single party regime was *União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Cabo Verde* (UNTC-CS). This organization was an important ally for the ruling party, and indeed, it played a key role in the adoption and implementation of government work policy. In January 1990, when the wave of democratic change was about to hit the Cape Verdean shore, one of the top leaders of UNTC-CS stated during a press conference,

“We want to work and we will behave in accordance with the circumstances and the concrete reality of the present moment. We will always look to influence the direction of this country taking into account the high interests of the country, of the workers [...] and the limitations and difficulties that [...] *our party* has identified to be overcome” (*In Tribuna*, 1 January 1990/VI, II SÉRIE, N0. 32/64).

By saying “our party”, the UNTC-CS leader clearly expresses *his loyalty* to the political system. The structure of the union remained firm, and there was no faction or movement from within that contested the regime or advocated for change. Unlike what occurred in some other Sub-Saharan countries, like Zambia (LeBas, 2011), the union did not benefit from its linkages with the workers and their grassroots organizations to evolve itself into an opposition party, nor affiliated with any oppositionist figure who might have had that purpose. The president of the union himself would later run as a PAICV candidate for Parliament in the first legislative election in January 1991. Other sectors of civil society were also growing, as the result of the Law-Decree No. 28/III/87, December 31, 1987, which had liberated the creation and the operation of CSOs in the country. Like the unions, despite its growing number, civil society organizations in Cabo Verde remained pacifist and unconcerned to the politics, and thus posed no signs of threat to the regime by 1990.

The absence of CSOs’ engagement in popular mobilization and movement of contestation against the authoritarian regime did not mean, however, that civil society was totally “disengaged” and unconcerned about the political development in the period preceding the *abertura política*. There was a sector of civil society, the church and the press, with an apparent liberty and independence from the state. Individual voices, connected to Catholic

Church and acting on their own, threw harsh criticisms against the regime. Such criticisms were voiced through the written press led by the Catholic monthly magazine *Terra Nova*. This religious magazine became a *de facto* representative voice of the movement of contestation against the single-party regime.

Apart from the contesting faction of civil society aforementioned, there was a long dormant actors of “political society” (Stepan, 1988) in Cabo Verde, awaiting for an opportunity, or a critical juncture to reactivate and strike. These actors of political society, often mistakenly taken for actors of civil society, were mainly the political parties and political movements, which despite the constitutional barrier to openly contest for power, did not vanish away. Some of these movements include: UPIC-CV (The Union of the People of Cabo Verde), UDC (Democratic Union of Cabo Verde), IPAJ (Institute for Juridical Assistance), GRIS (Revolutionary Group for Socialist Intervention), CCPD (Cape Verdean Circle for Democracy), Cape Verdean Human Rights League, FAC (Cape Verdean Broad Front, uniting all oppositionist forces against PAICV), UCID (Independent Cape Verdean Democratic Union), the Trotskyists movement, *Jornal Terra Nova*, and the Movement of Emigrants (Vacilísio, 2016).

The critical juncture, or the opportunity the aforementioned actors had been waiting for was the *abertura política* announced in February 1990 by the then Prime Minister, and the assistant General Secretary of PAICV, Pedro Pires. According to Stepan (1988), political society refers to the “arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus” (p.4). Such an arrangement, announced with *abertura política*, allowed the reemergence of those political actors- parties, and other institutions that would lead to an effective democratic transition in 1991. However, for the case of Cabo Verde, these political actors did not represent any challenge or threats to the stability of the single party regime. As an evidence of their unchallenging and unthreatening capabilities, none of these movements and parties could organize itself in due time to run for elections in 1991.

Thus, unlike most of the late Sub-Saharan democratizers, and against all the odds (Barneo and Yashar, 2016), the political opening in Cabo Verde was not forced from below by the power of the street, nor by any elitist oppositional forces. The transition, as Baker (2009) puts it, “was an elite negotiated transition settlement, rather than the outcome of popular pressure” (p.137). However, by any circumstances was the elite in power forced to negotiate. Under the circumstances above described, PAICV by itself took the initiative to announce the *abertura*, and then invited “the others” to seat and discuss its process at the negotiation table.

Thus, a fundamental question arises. **What led PAICV to announce the *abertura política*?**

Two set of reasons explained the *abertura política* in Cabo Verde in 1990: the diffusion process of the democratic ideals navigating in the “Third Wave of democracy” (Huntington, 1991), and the absence of internal threats to political stability and the incumbent power holders. On the one hand, the democratic ideals sweeping across nations were gaining ground in Cabo Verde, as the result of diffusion mechanisms of coercion and learning (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett, 2007; March and Sharman, 2009). Since the third Congress of PAICV in 1988, the government had been partially implementing liberal economic policies, answering to a certain extent, the donors’ call for economic liberalization. In 1988, PAICV carried out a constitutional amendment, creating legal conditions for the emergence of an “open economy” and for external and private investment. However, the liberal economic policies were tailored to fit within the ideals of the single party regime.

Internally, political leaders learned from their own experiences and from the inputs coming from the society, that democracy was indeed the *spirit of the time*, and in fact, it was time to make transition. The speech excerpt of the then Prime Minister, Pedro Pires, proves that learning process,

“Nós, na nossa análise não consideramos que o sistema estivesse esgotado, mas se nós esperássemos que se esgotasse, penso que seria tarde. Na política, o momento é a coisa mais importante. Nós pensamos que este momento é bom, tendo em conta que vamos realizar as eleições” (Tribuna, N0. 36/68, 1-15 March, 1990).

The phrase “this is the moment” captures very well “the learning” that the political leaders had taken from the functioning of the single party regime, as well as from the inputs received from the critics coming from within the party itself, and from the society in general. The ruling party, PAICV, in its extraordinary convention held in March 1990, recognized that in addition to opposition manifested by some members of civil society, there were also voices within the party that wanted democracy (the Trotskyists). Instead of repressing these opposing voices, which happened in other sub-Saharan democratizers, PAICV chose democratization, therefore avoiding possible mass contestation or other forms of protests. Thus, the fact that both the leaders and the citizens had a common “view of the democracy”, and their understanding that it was time for change, “the likelihood of [the] state moving towards the democratic end” increased greatly (Marsh and Sharman, 2009, p. 277).

The second reason that led PAICV to announce *abertura política* and the consequent transition to democracy back in 1990 was the absence of any internal security threats that could jeopardize the political stability reigning in the country. Cabo Verde enjoyed two distinctive characteristics unknown to most of other Sub-Saharan cases, which zeroed the possibility of

the country running into internal conflicts or political turmoil in the period following the regime change: The first is its homogeneous society. The country is “free from ethnic competition and the burdens of tradition” (Baker, 2006, p. 504) which is often the root cause of conflicts in many African countries. The absence of tribes or casts, the language unity (Portuguese is the official language and Cape Verdean language is spoken by everybody) and its religious uniformity, Catholicism, are some of the key traits that describe Cape Verdean homogeneous society. According to Krymkowski and Hall (1990) “ethnic diversity remains one of the continent's most difficult internal problems [...] because it can prevent or retard the establishment of national political unity” (p. 315). Such a diversity, for sure, has not been the case of Cabo Verde. Perhaps this has been part of the explanation for its political and democratic stability along these years. However, in some other countries like Mali, the ethnic diversity was not an obstacle for democratic transition (Smith, 2001). All the ethnic diversities, similarly to the Zambian and Zimbabwean cases (LeBas, 2011) united around the democracy ideals, and so joined their forces to bring about the change they wished to see.

The second distinctive characteristic of Cabo Verde was the absence of any long internal oppositional force that could represent threats to the incumbent power. PAICV leaders and their supporters did not see any eminent threats for their safety and security in case the party lost power in the polls. Owusu (1997) affirms that “in Africa, the obviously difficult democratic transition process of the 1990s is complicated by the inter-ethnic suspicion and mutual mistrust the endemic “feud mentality” produced and perpetuated by civil wars, bloody coups, and counter coups” (p. 130). Such “mutual mistrust” and endemic “feud mentality” were not applicable for the case of Cabo Verde. In fact, PAICV had an “over exaggerated confidence that it would win elections”⁴. The party lost at the polls, but as it came to prove, the political and social peace continued to reign in the country, and no serious political persecution against the former single party and government leaders was triggered off.

Thus, the answer to the question “*what led PAICV to announce the abertura política?*” is that Cabo Verde benefited from favorable “initial conditions” (Temple, 1998) at the time of political transition, which the other late Sub-Saharan democratizers did not. These conditions, in addition to the learning of the democratic ideals allowed a smooth and peaceful transition to democracy, within the “institutional framework” designed by PAICV itself.

In conclusion, the transition from the authoritarian rule to democracy in Cabo Verde was distinctive for its rapidity and peacefulness due to the reasons aforementioned. The

⁴ Interview with Edmundo Pereira, a former member of Parliament during the single party regime.

mobilization and opposition of civil society in this process was important but tiny, and incapable to instigate the democratic change as occurred in the other late third wave Sub-Saharan democratizers. As Baker suggests, “the democratic revolution of 1990 [...] did not result from either internal or external pressure against a reluctant one-party state” (2006, p. 495). However, despite the civil society weakness to overturn the single party regime, its voices gained eco in the public sphere and within the single party structure, which astutely understood the “*momentum*” to proceed to democratization, so much wished by the population. The grasp of that “moment” by the power elite, in addition to existing social and institutional prerequisites described in the paragraphs above, made it possible for a top-down transition rather than its inverse.

b) The Movement for Regionalization of Cabo Verde and Autonomy of São Vicente

The Movement for Regionalization of Cabo Verde, founded predominantly by emigrants and retired public servants, was formally and strategically launched in 2010 on the eve of 2011 legislative elections. It was a strategic moment because its mentors meant to attract the political parties’ as well the citizens’ attention and interests for their cause. In fact, they reached their purposes as regionalization, along with unemployment and energy sectors were the dominant themes of the political campaign for the legislative election in 2011.

In 2012, an association named *Grupo de Reflexão para a Regionalização de Cabo Verde* was born in Mindelo, in São Vicente Island. This association came to add strength to the movement launched in 2010, in their advocacy for the regionalization of the country and the autonomy for the island of São Vicente. With its epicenter in Mindelo, and mentored by its intellectual guru and its most prominent speaker, Dr. Onésimo Silveira, the movement launched a fierce campaign both internally and in the diaspora in search of support to influence the government to carry out administrative reform conducive to regionalization of the country. Along with its harsh criticisms and accusations against the government for lacking the political will to implement regionalization, the movement constructed supporting narratives around the asymmetrical development of the country due to over-centralization of power in Santiago island. Onésimo Silveira often refers that island as “República de Santiago”. The movement also devoted itself to constructing evidences and elaborating proposal for the regionalization. Thus, this movement became a policy entrepreneur in its own right. From the several encounters and workshops, a book was launched in 2014, “*Cabo Verde- Os Caminhos da Regionalização*”, containing reflections of a myriad of personalities over the topic of regionalization in Cabo Verde.

By 2015, regionalization had made its way to the top government agenda, and the issue now was not whether there should be regionalization or not, but what model of regionalization should be implemented in Cabo Verde. In April 2015, the government organized the first high-level conference to debate the theme, joining leaders of local governments, academicians, national and international experts to reflect and propose the best working model for the regionalization to be implemented in the country. However, the results were not definite, and no proposal was advanced for implementation. Nonetheless, the theme of regionalization did not vanish away from the partisan agenda. Indeed, regionalization heated the political campaign again during the campaign for the 2016 legislative election.

The two major contending political parties, PAICV and MPD, as well as the minority party- UCID, assumed the compromise to keep regionalization in their political and government agenda if elected, in an attempt to conquer the electors who support that policy. MPD made the boldest promise that if it won the elections, it would create conditions to implement regionalization by the end of 2016. The party won the election. However, that promise was not fulfilled, and the government paid very dear by facing now a very fierce civic opponent, SOKOLS 2017, a civic movement born in São Vicente in 2017, which became practically the leading actor in the fight for regionalization of Cabo Verde. On July 5, 2017, SOKOLS organized one of the biggest street protest ever led by a civic movement in Cabo Verde, denouncing the government for having failed to fulfill its promise of regionalization, and for not implementing any policies conducive for the amelioration of life conditions in Cabo Verde, and São Vicente in particular. On September 5, 2018, the Prime Minister and its delegation while in a visit to São Vicente, were blocked on their way out of the airport by a smaller caravan of protesters again led by SOKOLS, showing banners and chanting, “Autonomia já! Descentralização e Promessa é Dívida”⁵. On that occasion, one of the leader of this social movement stated that their motivation to provoke that incident was to show their “discontentment” with the government unfulfilled promises. This leader stated,

“Ele (the Prime Minister) enganou-nos e voltou atrás, tratando-nos de crianças e não podemos continuar a aceitar esse tipo de coisas. Estamos a lutar para a descentralização e para a regionalização planeada e com data. Pois, é a vidas das pessoas que estão em causa” (*In, Santiago Magazine, September 5th, 2017*).

The pressure coming from SOKOLS, in line with the movement and Association for the Reflection over the Regionalization, caused some hurries on the part of the government and the

⁵ Autonomy now! Decentralization and Promise are Debt! [to the people]

opposition party, PAICV, to draft and present their own proposals. The government proposal was voted favorably in Parliament, on October 25, 2018, with votes of all the MPs for MPD, the three MPS for UCID, and two MPs for PAICV, who decided to vote against their party's position to abstain, and so allow the government proposal to pass. The government declared victory. However, the clear victory went to SOKOLS and the other groups of civil society organizations, who amazingly did not organize any public gathering for celebration.

c) MAC#104, and the presidential veto of the new statute of political office holders

In April 2015, the national House of Parliament debated and unanimously approved a new *Statute for the political office holders in Cabo Verde*. The bill got passed particularly in a moment the country was going through a tense political and social stress. Several unions had been protesting and demanding for higher payment and better working conditions. The most vibrant protests were being carried out by the judiciary police, which for some occasions led the government to decree the civil requisition to guarantee basic services. The approval of the *Statute for the political office holders* bill by the House of Parliament caused a national anger, with harsh criticisms against the MPs and their parties, coming from all strata of life. This entire scenario represented a perfect “political opportunity structure” (Tarrow, 2011) for the emergence or reactivation of social actors to strike. Thus, **Mac# 114** appeared in the scene. This civic movement had made its debut on January 20th 2015, on the occasion of the official ceremony of the 40th year of Amilcar Cabral's death. A small group of people in their twenties and mid-thirties marched silently towards the site where the ceremony was being held. They followed the ceremony thoroughly and wordlessly. The movement was just making its debut. Despite being active on social media, Mac#114 had been almost an unknown organization, and its cause unfamiliar to many. As the *Statute of the political office holders* bill started being debated in the public sphere, Mac#114 arose as a movement condemning and vehemently opposing the approval of the bill. Through social media, its leaders threw harsh criticisms against the proposal, attacking principally the intention to increase the politicians' salary by 65%, in addition to other special benefits, not enjoyed by any other professional class, or segment of population in the country.

The bill was unanimously approved by the House of Parliament in March 2015, and soon Mac#114 promised to trigger a cycle of “contentious politics” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 16) in Cabo Verde. It did, though the cycle would later prove to be too short. On March 30th 2015, with the help of social media, Mac#114 took thousands of people to the streets all around the country to protest against the *new statute of the political office holders*, and demanded that the

President of the Republic veto the bill. Indeed, on April 9th, 2015, president Jorge Carlos Fonseca showed that he had heard the *eco and the power of the streets*, and so, he vetoed the bill. All the party leaders recognized the existing of a tense political moment, with a clear awakening and affirmation of civil society, and its proclivity to oppose the political class when needs be.

Mac#114 was on the mouth of everybody, for good and for bad reasons. Despite being praised by distinguished elements of the Cape-Verdean civil society sector and other individuals, Mac#114 encountered harsh opposition from the parties, mainly the opposition party, MPD, whose leaders officially supported the bill. Counter narratives coming from politicians, treating the leaders of that movement as mere “discontented kids” who are simply looking for a “space” in the country political system. Whether this being true or not, the truth is that Mac#114 made a difference by helping prevent the implementation of the bill. However, the movement has faded away since then, and it has not been able to lead any other significant protest initiatives, or any other visible activity that has merited the public attention. The movement has practically vanished from the national public sphere. Tarrow (2011) argues that the actions of social movements are “based on dense social networks and effective connective structures and draw on legitimate, action-oriented cultural frames, they can sustain these actions even in contact with powerful opponents” (p.16). This is exactly what Mac#114 lacked. The fact that it emerged in an episodic political moment, and being disconnected from other social structures, and so lacking a clear “action-oriented cultural frames”, Mac#114 has not been able to stand against the powerful party opponents. However, unlike Mac#114, the movement for the regionalization of Cabo Verde and SOKOLs 2017 above presented, are perfect examples of successful social movements acting in context such as Cabo Verde.

However, despite the observations made about Mac#114, it seems that a contestant civil society, very determined to stand against and challenge the political power, has gained impetus in Cabo Verde. The veto of the *new Statute of the political office holders* along with its withdrawal from the national political agenda, and the approval of the bill of regionalization by the parliament in October 2018 are two unquestionable evidences of the strength the civil society is garnering, and stand as a strong voice capable of influencing policy decisions in Cabo Verde. The role of civil society over policy influence is furthered developed in the second part of the thesis, in chapters 3, 4, 5, and then in chapter 6 in the last part of the thesis.

The hypotheses

The present doctoral thesis develops around two main hypotheses to analyze the engagement of CSOs in policy process in Cabo Verde: The institutional and social capital hypotheses. From the institutional perspective, the analysis focuses on formal political institutions, as well as the institutional practices and narratives to explain the engagement of SCOs in the policy process. The question then raised for this hypothesis is the extent to which the political and institutional designs implemented in Cabo Verde over the years, have either propelled or constrained the engagement of CSOs in the policy process. Though the analysis focuses mainly on the period following the independence, the colonial epoch will also merit some attention to help understand the trajectories those institutional determinants have made.

The second hypothesis is the social capital, in its *bridging* and *linking* (including its *societal linking*) dimensions (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Evans, 1997; Woolcock, 1998, 2000, 2002). The focus of the research here is the extent to which the people's bridging relationship, the linkage of their organizations with other "corporate actors", as well as their linkage with the institutions of power, have led their autonomous organizations, the CSOs to formally be incorporated in the processes of policymaking and implementation in Cabo Verde. The main argument in support of this hypothesis is that the institutional arrangements for CSOs engagement in politics, was not only the result of the political or the governments' will, but also the result of mobilized societal forces, or the social capital of its people. What is the status of this claim? I foresee that the Cape Verdean CSOs' awareness of the strength of power they represent for the political game, have turned them into more politically active and demanding, and therefore, they are gaining space in public policy process. The social capital hypothesis is also used to analyse the performance of local governments presented in chapter 7. Here, social capital in its *bridging* and *linking* forms are taken as the explanatory variables to measure the performance of the aforementioned local institutions.

Thus, both institutional and the social capital hypotheses guide the development of the present work. They are not contradictory hypotheses, as they may seem. Instead, they are harmonized throughout the research to complement each other. Thus, guided by these two hypotheses, this dissertation will seek to answer the two following questions: "*What factors have contributed to the birth, expansion and engagement of CSOs in the political process in Cabo Verde, between 1975 and 2015?*", and, "*To what extent does the engagement of civic groups (the social capital) influence government performance in Cabo Verde?*"

Against the institutional and the social capital hypotheses, stands the socioeconomic development hypothesis as the explanation for the democratic development and the consequent engagement of CSOs in governance (Lipset, 1959; Muller, 1995; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Przeworski et al., 1996; Barro, 1999; and Przeworski et al., 2000). At the heart of this theory, lies the argument that a country's economic level influences its democratic advancement. One of the earliest theorists of this school of thought is Lipset, who in his 1959 article states that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy" (1959, p.56). However, although he puts a high emphasis on economic development of a country, Lipset also highlights the importance of some other factors that support the thriving of democracy. He defends that "the growth of urbanization, education, communications media, and increased wealth, [and] autonomous private associations" [are] the conditions conducive to survival of democracy" (Lipset, 1959, p. 97). Authors that followed this economic school of thought after Lipset seem to have adopted a more radical view in their defense of economic conditions as the essential prerequisite for the success of liberal democratization process. According to Przeworski and Limongi (1997) "even if the emergence of democracy is independent of the level of development, the chance that such a regime will survive is greater if it has been established in an affluent country" (pp. 158-159). On the same line of argument, Barro (1999) argues that "democracies that arise without prior economic development [...] tend not to last" (p.163).

However, the deterministic economic view to the survival of democracy seems not to have been applicable to the case of Cabo Verde, and some other late third wave Sub-Saharan democratizers. Benin and Mali for instance, had a GDP per capita of 393.7 and 316.7 USD respectively at the time of their transition into democracy. Some have considered Benin has the "Francophone Africa's 'laboratory of democracy'" (Fomunyoh, 2001, p. 37), and Mali a case where "democracy can prosper in the absence of wealth" (Smith, 2001, p. 73). For the case of Cabo Verde, despite its economic and physical constraints being "so enormous" (Foy, 1988: 2), the country made a successful transition into "liberal democracy", as Zakaria (1997) conceives it. The following excerpt is illustrative of that process,

"Something fascinating is happening in Cape Verde. This tiny Island state of barely 300,000 people is quietly undergoing a revolution without bloodshed, without civil disorder and without economic chaos. Its armed forces have not fired a shot in hanger since independence and political prisoners are unknown to its jail. Yet radical changes are taking place in Cape Verde [...]" (Foy, 1988, p. 1).

Thus, do the prevailing political atmosphere (institutionalism) and a culture of civic participation in the state affairs (social capital) explain Cabo Verde's democratic success?

Przeworski and Limongi (1997) predicted that authoritarian regime countries of which per capita GDP is less than 1000 US dollars would be less likely to change into liberal democracy. The successful case of Cabo Verde proves that they had been partly mistaken in their theory. As Boix and Stokes (2003) affirm, “[There] are no grounds to believe that economic development breeds democracies” (p. 521). On the same line of argument, Joseph (1991) had affirmed that “a virtual miracle seems to be leading Africa away from authoritarianism and toward democratic governance” (p. 3). I believe that part of this miracle, specifically for the case of Cabo Verde, has been its institutions and social capital of its people and government.

Research objectives

By focusing on the engagement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the public policy process in Cabo Verde, this research aims at achieving two main objectives: Firstly, it aims at unveiling and understanding the factors that enhance political participation of civic organizations in countries with a relatively short tradition of democratic participation and rather unfavourable economic conditions for citizen engagement. Secondly, the research aims to understand how and the extent to which civic groups can improve public policymaking in a country whose public sector and political institutions are characterized by relatively scarce personal and financial resources, added to its limited scientific expertise. How and to what extent can the involvement of CSOs help mitigate such resource scarcity? Besides these two general objectives, the project targets at the following specific objectives:

1. Understanding the institutional variables that explain the birth and expansion of civic associations in Cabo Verde from the colonial period up to the democratic era.
2. Determining and understanding the patterns of civic groups’ engagement with government of different ruling parties, MPD and PAICV. The aim here is to understand how and the extent to which these two parties support the engagement of civic groups in government public policy processes, both at the central and the local levels.
3. Finding out whether and the extent to which CSOs’ engagement in the policy process (linking social capital) influences the performance of government. This objective is pursued through a comparative analysis of CSOs’ engagement across the 22 municipal governments in Cabo Verde. However, intensive case study was carried out only in three municipalities, 2 created in 2005 and one in 1992, statistical data available allow the determination of the influence degree of social capital on the performance of each of the 22 municipalities.

4. A fourth objective is to bring a contribution to the literature on civil society and its organizations' engagement in the political and policy process in the African context, focusing on the cases of Sub-Saharan African late third wave democratizers. By deeply analyzing the case of Cabo Verde, some important lights are shed regarding the patterns of civic engagement in these countries.

Research design

This work is a *case study* research on the engagement of civic associations in governance in Cabo Verde. This country is taken as an example of a larger set of countries- the Sub-Saharan Africa late third wave democratizers, as contexts where civil society and their representative organizations (CSOs), by their nature, are very unlikely expected to engage in the political and policy process. A case study is defined here as a “detailed and intensive analysis of a single case” (Bryman, 2004, p. 48) or a “unit”, for “the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Guerring, 2004, p. 342). Therefore, the analysis of civic groups engagement in Cabo Verde will help understand, to a certain extent, how these groups are engaged in the other aforementioned cases.

For the purpose of the “intensive analysis” carried out in this work, I used qualitative, comparative and case study methods. Qualitative method involves “an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p. 2), without relying “on numerical measurements”, but on an analysis of a “small number of cases”, by using “intensive interviews or in-depth analysis of historical materials” for the purpose of scientific inference (King, Keohane & Verba, 1996, p. 4).

In its turn, the comparative method is defined as “one of the basic methods-the others being the experimental, statistical, and case study methods-of establishing general empirical propositions” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 682). In this research, the comparative method has been used to determine CSOs' engagement patterns pursued across time, more specifically, across three periods: 1975 to 1990, corresponding the authoritative single party regime; 1991 to 2000, corresponding the period of democratic establishment, under the ruling of a new political party, MPD. The third period goes from 2001 to 2016, corresponding the PAICV ruling under the democratic regime. Comparison of CSOs engagement in these three different periods has allowed the drawing of interesting conclusions. PAICV governments (in both authoritative and democratic regimes) and MPD governments show different proclivities for CSOs engagement policies. Chapter 2 and 6 provide details over the differences of engagement patterns followed by these two ruling parties. Comparative method is also used in chapter 6 to compare the extent

to which CSOs are engaged in local governance across the 22 municipalities. In the same token, this method is used again in chapter 7 to compare local government performances, taking now the CSOs engagement (the linking social capital) as the independent explanatory variable. The purpose of this comparison is to find out the extent to which different level of civic groups' engagement (or the stock of social capital) in policy-making in municipal governments influence the performance of these institutions.

Finally, an intensive case study was carried out in three municipalities, 2 institutionalized in 2005 (*São Salvador do Mundo* and *Ribeira Grande de Santiago*) and the other one created in 1992, *Santa Catarina de Santiago*. All these three municipalities are located in the Island of Santiago, the biggest and the most populous in the country. The first two cases have been chosen based on their simultaneous institutionalization in 2005, and also for the fact that they were both ruled by the same party (PAICV) until 2008. Therefore, this fact allows the observance of the extent to which the same ruling party influences equally or not the CSOs engagement in different municipalities. MPD came to power in Ribeira Grande de Santiago in 2008, and since then, it has been ruling the municipality. The same is the case for Santa Catarina de Santiago. For the case of São Salvador do Mundo, PAICV remained in power until 2016, when PMD took over. Ruling parties, as part of institutional determinants, are important explanatory variables to understand CSOs engagement in the local level governance. However, if at the national government level, there are strong evidences of the ruling parties' differences concerning their policies for civic engagement, at the local level governments, the differences are thinner, and engaging CSOs is more likely to function as electoral strategies in the hands of the local office holders and party leaders. Chapter 6 provides further insights into this matter.

Methods of data collection

A case study is usually approached qualitatively, with the purpose of understanding the underlying problem, or the issue being studied from the perspective of the local population it evolves. Thus, the study of CSOs engagement in the Cape Verdean policy process has been done with the support of qualitative methods of analysis to better “infer” the existing reality, from the perspective of those who are mostly directly involved with civic groups and governments. Hence, the following methods have been used for both data collection and analysis presented in this thesis:

In-depth interviews: A wave of interviews with both current and former councilors, leaders of national, regional and local CSOs, and leaders of both national and local party

structures. In addition, interviews were also conducted with some former government representatives, and experts with proven record of experiences across all the four cases of CSOs engagement analyzed in this work. Government representatives include former Directorate General of Planning, with responsibility over the formulation and implementation of GPRSPs; Former Directorate General of Planning and Budget of the Ministry of Education; the former Directorate General of Planning and Budget Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; and finally the former Directorate General of the Decentralization Department. The experts include Secretary General of Commercial Chamber of *Sotavento*, former leader of the Association of Youth Entrepreneurs, consultants and academicians. These experts provide important “independent insights” for the understanding of the engagement of civil society in Cabo Verde. Appendix C shows the list of the people interviewed, with the exception of the list CBOs leaders, presented separately in the Appendix B.

Focus group: A group of 20 CBOs leaders in the three case study municipalities was selected. These leaders were chosen based on the vibrancy of their CBOs, as well as their accessibility and availability for interviews. Contacts were tried with every single one of the 72 CBOs in the three municipalities (Plataforma das ONGs, 2015). However, many of these organizations had been inactive for a while, and it was difficult to find anyone who could provide accurate information about them. The 20 CBOs chosen had been active at least until 2016. The in-depth interview with these leaders aimed at getting a deep understanding of the work carried out by their organizations to supply community collective goods, their role in the community bridging, their relationship with governments (central and local), political parties and other “corporate actors” in their municipalities. The twenty CBOs leaders also responded to a structured questionnaire, aiming to collect data on their organizations’ engagement in the sector policies: education, rural poverty, GPRSPs and local government policy processes. CBOs, as it will be further developed and clarified in chapter 6, are considered as one sector or typology of the of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Cabo Verde. They refer to small-scale and local communities (geographical communities), including associations of famers and neighborhood associations. Their activities are circumscribed to small localities, but sometimes extend to the entire municipality. The questionnaire and the list of the 20 Community Based Organizations are provided in the appendix A and B respectively.

Finally, I carried out a comprehensive *qualitative analysis of legislations*, covering all the major important legislative acts on civil society organizations in Cabo Verde, as provided in the bibliography list.

In addition to the aforementioned data collection methods, quantitative data produced by National Statistics Institute and government departments have been used throughout this research to complement the qualitative data. In summary, all the data gathered have been compiled and analyzed under three focuses: The first focus centers on the analysis of the CSOs participation in the national government policy making from the perspective of institutionalism and social capital. The second focus is on the analysis of Community-Based Organizations' engagement in the local government policymaking and implementation processes. Here, the institutional and social capital continue to be the explanatory variables, like in the first focus. Finally, in the third focus, the CSOs' engagement is taken as an independent variable to explain the performance of local governments in Cabo Verde. Performance of local governments has been measured based on these institutions' "responsiveness" to their constituents and their "efficiency in conducting the public business" (Putnam, 1995, p. 63). These two aspects are assessed based on 10 indicators that comprise some of the major areas of interventions under the responsibility of local governments, as stated by the Law N°. 134/IV/95: planning, basic sanitation, rural development, health, housing, education, and professional training. The performance of these indicators is assessed based on the outputs regarding the policy decisions made, but also on social outcomes, and the the citizens' level of satisfaction (Putnam, 1993).

Structure of the thesis

This dissertation is structured in three main parts, covering seven chapters. The first part, comprising the chapters 1 and 2, focuses on the theoretical framing of CSOs engagement in the public policy process, and then lay down the major hypotheses for CSOs engagement in Cabo Verde. The first chapter looks at the theoretical conceptions of CSOs and their engagement in democratic political process, and then presents the two major hypotheses that have guided this research: institutionalism and social capital. The second chapter builds on these hypotheses to analyze the birth, expansion and the evolution of CSOs engagement in Cabo Verde.

The second part of the thesis presents an analysis of CSOs engagement in three sectors: two key sectorial government policies, education and rural development, and then a third area, which is the formation and implementation of Poverty and Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs, GPRSPs in the Cape Verdean version- "G" stands for *Growth*), corresponding to chapters 3,4, and 5 respectively. Chapter 3 traces non-state actors' involvement in the education sector from the colonial period up to 2015. From the church's leading role in the sector, the planning and delivery of education services have become a societal entrepreneurship. Thus, the state has created formal mechanisms of engaging CSOs in such an entrepreneurship. The chapter also

provides an evolution of the education outcomes and tries to analyse the extent to which such an evolution associates with the increasing engagement of CSOs in the sector. The development of chapter four follows the same approach used in the previous one. It first presents the major rural development policies implemented in Cabo Verde since the late years of the colonial era up to the present: *Strada* in the colonial period; Emergency Program- AIMO and Rural Assistance Program during the single party regime; FAIMO and the Community Work Fronts during the 1990s; and finally, the Rural Poverty Alleviation Program (PLPR), and Promotion of Rural Socioeconomic Opportunities (POSER) in the 2000s. After describing these programs, the chapter analyzes how CSOs engage in design and implementation of each one of them. Finally, the fifth chapter analyses the emergence of Poverty Reduction and Strategy Papers in Cabo Verde, and the involvement of CSOs in their formulation and implementation. (G)PRSPs is not a sectoral policy in itself, but a constellation of policy lines aiming at reducing poverty through economic growth. Hence, it is pertinent to look how CSOs are engaged in drawing and implementing such lines.

The third part of the present work focuses on the CSOs engagement in the local governance process. It comprises the last two chapters, 6 and 7. Chapter 6 builds on the institutional and social capital hypotheses to explain the incorporation of CSOs in the local government policy process, with a special focus on the Community Based Organizations, a smaller subset of civil society that carry out their activities in local villages and municipalities throughout the country. Regarding the institutional variables, the chapter traces the evolution of political institutions, as well as practices and narratives around CSOs engagement in the local governance constructed in the post-independence era in Cabo Verde. For the social capital hypotheses, engagement of CSOs in local governance is analyzed based on *bridging* and *linking* social capital variables. Chapter 7, takes engagement of CSOs as an independent explanatory variable to explain the extent to which the municipality's intra "cooperative capacity" (Boix and Posner, 1998, p. 690) influences its performance of local government institutions in Cabo Verde. Data available for all the twenty-two municipalities allow a sound comparison of the extent to which their stock of social capital influence their performances.

Finally, the dissertation ends with a conclusion, where the main research thesis, the findings and arguments are revisited and discussed again. A reflection on the policy implications based on the main finds are also attempted.

PART ONE : THEORETICAL FRAMINGS OF CSOs' ENGAGEMENT IN GOVERNANCE

CHAPTER I- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: WHY DO CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS MATTER FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE?

1.1 Introduction

The concept of civil society organizations (CSOs) has become a *buzzword* in political sciences, with a particular prominence in the post-independence era of the former European colonies in Africa, Latin America and other developing countries. In the field of Public Policy, studies on CSOs have usually focused on their emergence and the extent to which they engage and influence government policy process. CSOs are often described as being the counterpoise to the state and market powers, with the purpose of leveraging citizens' power resources. In fact, CSOs are the citizens' intermediary organizations in relation to the state and market institutions. Therefore, they do not only influence the quality of the policy decision, but also become policy entrepreneurs and policy implementers in their own right. CSOs as such, are commonly denominated the third sector organizations that look to compete, and to affirm positions in the policymaking arena along with the primary state organizations and the secondary market/business organizations. The participation of CSOs in public policy process has been thus treated both in academia and by International development agencies as an explanation variable for the advancement of democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993), government performance and the socio-economic development (Paul, 1988; Collier, 1998; Putnam, 1993; Woolcok, 1998) of countries across the world.

However, scholars often differ on the theoretical foundations of CSOs' formation and engagement, as well as its effects on governance. This chapter looks exactly at these theoretical conceptions of CSOs in the Public Policy field, focusing on their emergence and engagement in governance process in liberal democratic regimes, and then explore their theoretical framing in the African context by concentrating on the case of Cabo Verde.

The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part presents the main theoretical conceptions of CSOs, focusing on their origin, engagement in the policy process and their influence on government performance in liberal democracies. The second part focuses on the theorization of CSOs in Africa, highlighting the case of Cabo Verde. Here, I present the main hypotheses for the emergence and engagement of CSOs in the policy-making process, and its impacts on the country's socio-economic development. Finally, the chapter closes with a conclusion on the main aspects addressed.

1.2 Theoretical conceptions of CSOs

What are CSOs? Mancur Olson wittingly argues that “the logical place to begin any systematic study of organizations is with their purpose” (1971, p. 5). Thus, answering the question ‘What are CSOs?’ would necessarily demand first answering the question “what are the purposes of CSOs?” However, unlike the Olson’s view that “organizations [are] expected to further the interests of their members” (Olson, 1971, p. 6), the focus of this research is on the organizations that are expected to further the interests of a larger community of constituents, exceeding by far the individual interests of their promoters. Thus, in this work CSOs are conceived of as “organization[s] that work in the arena between the household, the private sector, and the state, to negotiate matters of public concern” (Court et al., 2006, p. 5). Despite arising out of private initiatives of independent individuals, the citizens, CSOs by their own nature pursue public purposes, regarding the production and delivery of collective public goods that are not restricted to the interests of their founding members. CSOs are thus, non-for profit voluntary organizations.

Beyond its purposes, a civil society organization comprises two more elements that are essential for its understanding: its sources of income, and its basic structure and operation (Anheier, 2005, p. 49). Regarding the former, a CSO is *stricto sensu* a not-for-profit organization, whose income derives primarily from its volunteer members, private or state donations, or through its own entrepreneurial initiatives. In respect to its structure and operation, a CSO is a private, autonomous and “self-governing” entity, functioning “institutionally separate from government” (Anheier, 2005, p. 49). Having these defining characteristics, CSOs range from the wide variety of NGOs (national and international), professional associations, groups of interests, clubs, and a variety of formal and informal grass-roots organizations.

The second pertinent question to understand CSOs is how they come about. Fukuyama asserts that civic groups are the “manifestation” of social capital which arises through an “instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals” (2001, p. 7) to solve some sort of their collective problems. Civic associations, independently of their sizes and types, would be a reflection of such a cooperation among individuals in their joint efforts to pursue common purposes, in a society where purposes are themselves diffuse. However, why do individuals form CSOs to pursue their collective goals? In the field of political sciences, more specifically the branch of Public Policies, two theoretical arguments have been put forward as responses to that question: the institutional failure and the participatory democracy arguments. The failure of institutions to provide for public collective

goods, both in desired quantity and quality, provokes some social anomie that requires societal readjustments to cope with and overcome them. These readjustments encompass the citizens' active participation in the public policy process in their polity. Each of these theories will be further developed in the following separate sections.

1.3 The institutional failure perspective

The institutional failure stands on both the government and the market failures to provide satisfactorily for public collective goods and services. Government is expected to produce public collective goods that are satisfactorily sufficient and distributed fairly to the population it serves. Failure to do so provokes some social anomie and discontentment that would require some societal readjustments to avoid chaos. Individuals affected by such an anomic circumstance, seek strategies to overcome their "disillusionment with government" (Ewosh, 2004, p. 229), and therefore, look to fill in the gap left by the institution's inefficiency to provide for their needs. The formation of collaborative actions, often in the form of some sort of associations, has always been a strategy used by the population from all sphere of society, to respond to the government inefficiency.

With the advent of market economy, a strong belief has been put on the market institutions to be "self-regulating" and to benefit all in a global scale. However, market institutions, like the government, have failed to live up to that precept. These institutions, and the way they operate have "inevitably" caused disturbances such as capital dislocation, "unemployment, wide fluctuation in prices, waste, and so forth [which] inevitably produced associations-of owners, of workers, of farmers-operating upon government to mitigate and control the ravages of the system through tariffs, subsidies, wage guarantees, social insurance and the like" (Anheier, 2005, p. 122). As it can be seen, population disenchantment with market, like the government, has led them to cooperate and form associations as a strategy to protect themselves against such failures. The "suffering", "dislocation", and "disturbance" brought by the market has almost inevitably resulted in organized political pressures from below, the disadvantaged groups, who found in "the art of association" (Tocqueville, 1998) an important means to resist against unfettered market practices, and fight for their fair share.

Giddens corroborates with the thesis of market and the state institutional failure to provide "public good [and] social protection" (2000, p. 58) fairly and within the expected limits to all segments of population in a polity as the ground for the emergence of CSOs. He argues that the state and the democratic institutions are being detached from the interests and the concerns of the common citizens. Therefore, citizens are becoming "alienated from the political

process” (Giddens, 2000, p. 48). Thus, citizens’ trust on the state and the government as their legitimate representatives is declining. On the same line of argument, Hirst (1994) states that “modern representative democracy offers low levels of governmental accountability to citizens and of public influence on decision making” (1994, p. 3). Once citizens feel they are “stripped off the protective cover of lively democratic institutions and threatened with all manners of social dislocations, [they] construct social solidarities and express a collective will” (Harvey, 2005, p. 171), to face such challenges, and hence ameliorate their own conditions. CSOs become therefore alternative institutional forms through which the disaffected segments of population in a democratic polity seek to improve their conditions by pursuing their collective interests in the arena of political process. The CSOs stand therefore as representative and protective institutions for the disenfranchised segments of population, acting as their intermediary agents (Schmitter, 1998) with state and market institutions.

1.4 Participatory democracy perspective

The second theoretical perspective on the emergence and participation of CSOs in contemporary democracy stands on the participatory democracy arguments. These arguments arose as the result of the institutional failures described above, and the consequent citizens’ disenchantment with those institutions, the representative government and the market. Thus, in line with these conceptions, CSOs are framed under three different school of thoughts: CSOs as a “school of democracy” (Tocqueville, 1998; Warren, 2004), the deliberative democracy (Barber, 1984, Fishkin, 2011) and the associative democracy (Hirst, 1994; Cohen and Roger, 1995; Pateman, 1970).

The theory of CSOs as “school of democracy” stands on the idea that these organizations cultivate in common citizens the civic virtues of participating in public life (Tocqueville, 1998; Almond and Verba, 1963) by taking actions that aim at influencing decisions on issues that affect their own existence, their socioeconomic conditions, or any sort of their interests. Alexis de Tocqueville observes that “Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations” (1998, p. 215), and reiterates that there is a clear “connection between the principle of association and that of equality” among men (*ibid*; p. 216). Associations connect their members through the network of trust and norms of reciprocity generated in their relationship and in their dealings to solve their collective problems, left unresolved by the government and the market. The spirit of equality is built upon the sense of belonging to the same community of trust, values and norms the members cultivate and preserve. Associations in this sense become “schools of democracy” where citizens learn to

cooperate with one another, develop and socialize norms and trusts as well as learning the skills that enable them to intervene in the public matters (Tocqueville, 1998; Putnam, 1993; Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba, Scholzman and Brady, 1995). Associations as *schools of democracy* do not only develop a spirit of trust, solidarity and equality among citizens, but also teach them political skills and stimulate them to participate in political life of their communities (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady, 1995). CSOs are therefore venues through which citizens articulate their concerns and demands on common issues, as well as requesting for the right policies to address their demands. They are the aggregators of individuals and the community's interests, which they would then present and stand for in policy arenas. Hence, they become "intermediary institutions" (Schmitter, 1993) which mediate between citizens and the state and the market institutions. As Giddens points out, "state and the government do not represent the public domain when they become detached from their root civic association" (Giddens, 2000, p. 65). As citizens learn how to collectively articulate and present their demands to the government, their voices will sound louder at the ears of their government representatives in the policy formation and implementation processes.

The deliberative democratic perspective on CSOs focuses on these organizations' agency to participate in the government decision-making process. While the participatory democracy emphasizes the citizens' direct actions over the public issues that affect their lives, the deliberative democracy builds on argumentative exchanges, involving the citizens' (their representatives CSOs) interactions with the government elected officials in public debate around issues preceding decision making (Florida, 2013). According to this perspective, CSOs as the citizens' aggregated voices, do not only present issues and demands raised by their constituents to the government, but also participate actively in debating such issues and policy formulation, as a means to guarantee that their concerns are duly addressed. CSOs are important deliberative actors themselves in the policy process, and not simply government informants. Such an engagement process, defends Barber (1984), makes democracy "stronger", as the deliberated policies would contain not only the information provided by the citizens, represented by their CSOs, but most importantly, the policies would also reflect the views and arguments they bring to the discussion table. The "strong democracy" argument then "tries to revitalize citizenship without neglecting the problems of efficient government by defining democracy as a form of government in which all the people govern themselves in at least some public matters at least some of the time" (Barber, 1984, p. XIV). CSOs, as the citizens' aggregated voices, become therefore engaged in "an institutional relationship between the system of authoritative decision-making and interest representation which can be considered as

generically corporatist” (Schmitter, 1974, p. 88). However, Barber (1984) cautions us on the possibility and optimism over civic participation on the deliberative process of policy formation, by setting up limits to the extent that such participation can occur.

“I have insisted that strong democracy entails both the intimacy and the feasibility of local participation and the power and responsibility of regional and national participation [...] This is not to say that strong democracy aspires to civic participation and self-government on all issues at all times in every phase of government, both national and local. Rather, it projects some participation some of the time on selected issues. If all of the people can participate some of the time in some of the responsibilities of governing, then strong democracy will have realized its aspirations” (p. 267).

Therefore, deliberative democratic process does not aim at replacing the elected government by civic self-government. However, it encourages “some participation some of the time”, and “on some of the selected issues”. How can this process work? Barber (1984) proposes institutional initiatives, both at local and national levels, to make it possible: neighborhood assemblies, town meetings and civic communication cooperatives, and referendum process. These institutional initiatives would be important vehicles through which citizens participate actively in the deliberation processes, by presenting and defending their articulated interests and concerns. However, what is missing in Barber’s theory is a more developed argument on how CSOs are involved in the implementation of the deliberations for which they contribute. Although he presents some suggestions on the need of establishing moments for common policy-making, such as common work, citizen service, etc., where citizens engage (or are induced to engage by the government or other entities) in the realization of common decisions (Barber, 1984), he does not make it clear how this engagement should occur. It is this gap that associative democracy tries to fill in.

Thus, the *associative democratic perspective* on the engagement of CSOs builds actually on these institutions’ educational and deliberative roles as described above. This perspective has been mostly theorized by Paul Hirst in his book *Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance* (1994). The author supports on the the argument that “modern representative democracy offers low level of governmental accountability to citizens and of public influence on decision-making” (Hirst, 1994, p. 3). This crisis or failure of representative democracy stands on its exclusionary nature and unresponsiveness to citizens’ demands. This crisis is understood to be at the root of many social unrest our society faces today. As Hirst argues, “the disaffected cannot overthrow society but they can make it impossible to live in” (1994, p.10). Therefore, to “escape” or remedy the socioeconomic plight affecting societies, Hirst (1994) proposes an *associative government system*, a “system that

combines citizens' choice with public welfare" (p. 6). The central thesis of associative government model is that the governance of a polity, to be as much accountable and inclusionary as possible, should be done in conjunction with civic voluntary groups. These groups, as representative of preferences of a wide variety of constituents, should become integral part of the state and its governing system. Indeed, the state should "adequately" fund voluntary organizations, and work with them in a relationship of partnership (Hirst, 1994, p. 10). Voluntary organizations should be granted the required capacity to carry out their mission of looking after the interests of the disaffected segments of population independently. The associative democratic perspective conceives civic organizations as integrating members of the state, and as such, they should be allowed to cooperate with state institutions in the production and implementation of public policies (Salamon, 1995). Unlike the deliberative perspective, the associative one goes beyond the formal policy deliberation, or the formalistic act of decision making, to "incorporate" (Azarya, 1994) the CSOs in the actual implementation of policy decisions. Salamon (1995) calls this engaging process of CSOs in policy implementation of "third-party government", a mechanism "to increase the role of government in promoting the general welfare" of the citizens, "without unduly enlarging the state's administrative apparatus" (Salamon, 1995, p. 42).

CSOs would not only participate in the deliberative process, meaning the policy formulation process, but they would also participate in the implementation of the deliberations for which they contribute. Thus, CSOs become part of the governing and government apparatus themselves, in a sense that they participate actively and thoroughly in the policy processes, from agenda setting up to the implementation of decisions made (Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Fung, 2003; Hirst, 1994; Pateman, 1970; Warren, 2004; Salamon, 1995). This perspective of CSOs engagement in governance gives them a stronger role and status in the democratic process. They are not simply mere non-governmental institutions with restricted roles of demanding welfare programs from the state. They are also intervening actors who engage and participate directly in the formulation and implementation of the state and government's affairs. As Cohen and Rogers put it:

"By altering the terms, conditions, and public status of groups, we believe, it can improve economic performance and government efficiency and advance egalitarian-democratic norms of popular sovereignty, political equality, distributive equity and civic consciousness" (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, p. 9).

Associations are here taken as members of the state as government institutions are, and therefore, they have high stakes in the state's businesses. Thus, there is a need to change or

rearrange the institutional frameworks (the “terms”, the “conditions” and the “status”) to allow the civic groups to participate in the governance process. This integration of civic organizations in the business of governing, conforms to what Barber (1984) calls of “strong democracy”, and actually, as he states, “associate democracy, with a civic culture” is democracy’s “central virtue” (Barber, 1984, p. 25). The implementation of the associative democracy principle demands thus institutional arrangements that would “encourage the relevant actors [associations are seen as such, together with state actors] to engage in collective discussion and to reach agreement with each other” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.11) on public policies. Hirst himself defends that associations should be allocated public resources to provide services which should be properly monitored by the state (1994, pp. 24-25). However, the cooperation between state and CSOs, should not, at any circumstances interfere with the CSOs autonomy and independence. For this respect, Hirst (1994) highlights that “unless civil society is given certain political attributes through self-governing associations that perform public functions, then it will be difficult to preserve its autonomy” (p. 25). The aim of state intervention would be strictly for the purposes of “increasing the inclusiveness of the group representation and to reduce the obstacles to weaker groups influencing public policies” (Hirst, 1994, p. 37).

The institutional reforms advocated by the associative model of democracy, as it has been presented here, would end up improving the liberal representative democratic governance, by making it in fact more pluralized and more accountable. Regarding their contribution to the economy, associative democracy encourages cooperation and mutual exchanges among state and non-state institutions, and among individuals themselves. Such exchanges would lower both social and market economic transactions costs.

The three theoretical perspectives on the CSOs roles in Public Policies presented above, all offer useful propositional insights for the rethinking of public policy-making in the liberal representative democracies. The civil society participation in governance process, as narrated by the three models of participatory democracy, will “save” democracy (della Porta, 2013) from perishing, and make it even “stronger” (Barber, 1984).

However, despite the optimism of participatory theories as the recipe to “save” and strengthen democracy, they are not immune of concerns. The strengthening and engagement of civil society organizations in the policymaking can also be dangerous for democracy, while trying to improve it. Thus, there are three main concerns raised around the optimism of these theories: state paternalism, exclusion, and assault on the state by rent-seeking groups. Each of these concerns is developed separately in the following paragraphs.

State paternalism: the CSOs engagement in policy process, as Barber (1984), Hirst (1994) and Cohen and Roger (1995), and other cited authors have defended it, may lead to state paternalism and exploitation, as the state institutions are the main resource provider. The danger here is that the state (the government and the institutions that represent it), may coopt CSOs and have them implement its agenda, rather than these organizations influencing the state's agenda. If that situation occurs, CSOs will lose their independence along with their legitimacy to truly stand for their constituents, and therefore, be no longer an independent "voice" of civil society in the game of policymaking.

Exclusion: this second concern is often directed to the pluralist perspective of democracy. This concern stands on the assumption that not every group has the required resources to compete on equal terms to influence policy decisions. Weaker groups might find it harder to influence government policies as they lack resources (human, finance or social capital) to present adequate policy alternatives. However, this critic can be downplayed with Barber's (1984) argument that just "some participate some of the time on some issues" (p. 267). Dahl (2005) had already advanced this argument that not all groups have a say, nor interest on every issues. However, the problem raises when in some circumstances, those who may want to have a say in the policy process, are silenced by other groups, whose voices speak louder as they have more and better resources at their disposal to push their interests forward. Therefore, the problem of exclusion remains when there are issues that interest the weaker groups, but who find themselves powerless to intervene and defend them. A recent case in Cabo Verde is the Santa Maria Islet Tourist Project in Praia, the capital city. When that project was made public, some civic groups came out to position against the construction of the tourist facilities on that isle, arguing that it would damage the ecology of the isle, and bring undesired social ills to the capital city, and the country as a whole. An environmentalist group even camped for several days on the isle in protest, just to end up being escorted out by the law enforcement a few days before the construction took off.

Rent seeking groups: Finally, the engagement of civic groups in policy-making might be hurtful to democracy and civic participation itself, when these (or some of these) groups adopt rent-seeking behavior, acting in a manner to conspire "against the public interest" (Hirst, 1994, p. 63), rather than promoting it. Indeed, as Kasfir (1998) argues, "the growth of the voluntary sector will not necessarily lead to the consolidation of civil society, because the organizations that are so parochial either ignore the state, or try to take it over" (p. 6). Parochialism here refers to the tendency of groups to isolate their interests from the rests of

others', in a way that their unique purpose in seeking engagement is to pursue the materialization of their particularistic intents through manipulation of state machinery.

These three concerns over participatory democratic theories reinforce the thesis that the engagement of CSOs in the policy process presented above, would have to stand on firm institutional rearrangements if it is to become a viable strategy to improve democracy and democratic governance, as well as achieving higher socioeconomic developmental goals. Institutions stand therefore as important explanatory variables to understand the extent to which CSOs engage in governance. In addition, unlike the treatment Putnam (1993) gives to institutions in his analysis of civic engagement in regional governments in Italy, institutions are important to understand the dynamics, involvement and CSOs' capacity to influence decisions and government performance. Thus, changes in political institutional arrangements have effects on the engagement of CSOs in the policy process. This is especially important for the African context, where "government adopts a political view of [CSOs]" (Fowler, 1999, p. 57). This institutional hypothesis will be dealt with in more depth in chapter two on the CSOs' engagement in Cabo Verde. CSOs, as they have been conceived of by both set of theories, the institutional failures and the participatory theories, represent valuable assets for the people in defense of their collective interests. CSOs are therefore the people's social capital. The next section will elaborate more on this concept.

1.5 CSOs and the social capital formation

The use of the concept of "social capital" in Social Sciences could be traced back to the early works of sociologists Piere Bourdieu (1980) and James Coleman (1988). Reading these authors, one can apprehend their concepts of social capital as intangible resources that emanate from the structure of stable relationships people develop and establish among themselves in different contexts. This concept of social capital, as resources inhered in relationship structures has been appropriated and widely used in the field of public policy and development studies. Indeed, some have argued that "understanding how social capital works helps policy makers evaluate the hierarchy of needs among the populations they seek to assist" (Lang and Hornburg, 1998, p.13). Social capital, like the physical capital, has values, and so, it allows the "achievement of certain ends" which would be impossible in its absence (Pateman, 1988). Therefore, it can be used to generate outcomes or returns for both the user and the public at large. From the perspective of "social capital", civic associations are platforms through which its members network and develop the trust and norms of reciprocity that support their everyday relationship.

Through their face-to-face interactions in associational activities, as well as in their interactions in any other informal encounters, individuals, on the one hand, build a community of trust and norms of reciprocity among themselves, which will strengthen their collaborative strategies to solve their collective problems (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993, 2000). On the other hand, such a culture, as values generated within the groups, produce externalities – “the public returns of social capital”, in a way that, when the “collective problem is solved”, not only the individual feels satisfied, but also the community at large does (Putnam, 1993). Thus, CSOs as voluntary associations, “are seen as creators of social capital because of their socialization effects on democratic and cooperative values and norms” (Coffe’ and Geys, 2005, p. 489). As a network, or platform that connect individuals through their trust and shared norms of reciprocity, CSOs allows an “institutional transfer of experiences” among agents “through network of structured relationships” (Crouch and Farrel, 2004, p. 34). Members of a civic community are entrenched in a network of “multiplex relations”, allowing “the resources of one relationship to be appropriated for use in others” (Coleman, 1988, pp.108-109). These resources are being constantly transferred or diffused within, and benefited by the network members. Let us say that an individual *A* is a member of an association *X*, a civic association that promotes the education of children with learning disabilities. *A* is a public servant at the Ministry of Education, where he meets and deals with *B* (representing the people he encounters and deals with every day). *A* has opportunities to attend some of the important meetings at the Ministry, often with the presence of the top decision makers, including the Minister of Education and some other important figures of government policy-makers in this sector. Outside his work, *A* meets *C* (representing several figures he meets at bars, church he attends, neighbors, etc.). One would assume that the culture or the values that *A* acquires in his Association *X*, will probably shape him and influence his relations with others. Furthermore, the Association *X*’s concern, improving the education of children with learning disabilities, is also *A*’s concern. Therefore, one would expect that whatever chances *A* may have in his/her interactions with others (*B* and *C*), he/she will bring that concern to the table, seeking therefore to influence production of policies to help solve his group’s collective problem. Still, from a macro perspective, *A* and his Association *X* might take other venues to influence the production of their pet policies, such as public campaign using mass media, protests, etc. As Coleman states, social organizations, “once brought into existence for one set of purposes, can also aid others, thus constituting social capital available for use” (1988, p. 108) by those who are not members to the organization where the capital is formed. This benefit appropriation happens as a result of the “spillover effect” of the social capital, which is generated “from learning to trust other co-members in

civic associations to trusting unknown people in more general contexts” (Paraskevopoulos, 2010, p. 483).

Once individuals are entangled in a multiplex relations of network such as the one exemplified above, they not only share their problems, which become therefore the community collective problems, but also develop norms and strategies to overcome such problems. Associations, thus, generate social capital, which will become the property of no particular individual, but a community’s possession as well. Hence, the volume of the social capital a community possesses will have impact on the “policy activism” on the part of the public authorities (Tavits, 2006). The CSOs, as a manifestation of individuals and a community’s social capital, make demands, exercise pressure, and as these grow and escalate, the probability of public authorities’ responses increases. CSOs, as both a manifestation and generator of social capital of a community of individuals and places, are given more attention in the public sphere and the policy arena. As a result, they are better engaged in the policy design and implementation that have interests for their constituents. When this collaboration happens, the performance of the government in addressing the demands is expected to be more positive. As Putnam puts it, “collaborative institutions [...] seem to work more effectively” and in fact, they can “improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (1993, pp. 166-167).

The situation above described typifies associations both as “schools of democracy” and participatory agents. On the one hand, associations cultivate in their members and their constituencies the civic virtues that enable them to participate actively in public life (Tocqueville, 1998; Almond and Verba, 1963). On the other hand, they can be conceived of as agents who participate in the governance process by articulating and voicing population’s demands, as well as engaging in the deliberative and implementation policy processes (Barber, 1985; Hirst, 1994). Putnam (1993) provides a groundbreaking example on how civic participation contributes to the democratic and government performance improvement, with his analysis of civic participation in the regional governments of Italy. He concludes that the norther regions with more civic vibrancy- quantity of civic organizations existing in a region - have better institutional performance than their southern counterparts which have a less vibrant civic community. Putnam’s explanation for such an influence lies on the “social capital”, the values such as solidarity and mutual trust, and norms of reciprocity. However, what Putnam (1993) does not demonstrate in his analysis is how the civic groups themselves, the social capital, relate or are appropriated by the public authorities to improve government performance and democracy. To fill in this gap, studies led by some other scholars (Evans, 1997, 1999; Ishman et all, 2002; Salamon, 1995; Woolcock, 1998, 2000, 2002), focus on how state develop

relationships with civil society organizations (the social capital), to produce and deliver collective goods to the population. For these latter studies, the stock of social capital accumulated in a community would be of little value to promote development if they are not incorporated into the government public policy process. My argument on CSOs engagement in government policy process in Cabo Verde builds on this latter thesis of the use of social capital.

1.6 Measuring the engagement of CSOs in governance

Civic engagement in politics and governance process has been a keen theme in the Political Science, and Public Policy in particular, in both developed and developing countries. Scholars, policy-makers and aid agencies have all manifested great interest in the topic, and thus they have studied it from different perspectives. Such interests have developed based on the roles CSOs play for democracy and socioeconomic development as described in the sections above. Vibrant civic communities have been deemed decisive to promote “face-to-face democracy” (Berry, 1999) and a “strong democracy” (Barber, 1984), and in fact, the *sine qua non* condition for “making democracy work” (Putnam, 1993). However, the birth and the spreading of civic associations *per se* are not enough to promote democracy or development. There is a need of a “precise social science model” describing the process by which civil society groups influence the public policy process (Berry, 1999, p. 388). Thus, the central questions in this regard are: how and to what extent do civic groups (CSOs) relate with and influence the government policymaking process? To what extent does such a relation influence the government institutional performance, resulting therefore in the betterment of the democratic quality and the socio-economic conditions of a polity?

The social capital concept as it has been conceived of by Coleman (1988), and later developed and used and by Putnam (1993, 2000) has been described to be the “societal social capital” dimension (Andrews, 2011; Maloney, Smith, and Stoker, 2000). The values, norms and the spirit of reciprocity generated in civic group interactions are important resources for individuals to address their collective problems. However, the existence of these groups *per se*, as Fox (1997) argues, is no panacea for solving societal collective problems. If the societal social capital is important to help people “get by”, they need a different form of social capital to “get ahead”, or advance economically. The linkage of civic groups with institutions of power characterizes this different form of social capital. Evans (1997) calls this linkage of “synergy”, and Woolcock (1998, 2000, 2001, and 2002) calls it of “linking social capital”. The linkage or a strong collaboration between CSOs and the government in the policy-making process characterizes this social capital dimension.

For Evans (1997), the synergy generated from the relationship between the state and the society, or the society “corporate actors” in a polity, is vital to provide these communities with the resources they need to get ahead, or to make economic advancement. Fox’s (1997) research on Mexican Rural communities found that the existence of rural network associations might be important to help people find survival means to go through their daily difficulties, but not sufficiently enough to take them out of their abject conditions. Referring to the societal form of social capital as elaborated by Putnam (1993), Fox states the following:

“For Putnam, the micro-units of choral societies and soccer clubs are taken to be indicators of the stock of social capital spread throughout society. This view assumes that social capital is “continuously distributed” both horizontally and vertically. If this assumption were valid, then many of Mexico’s poorest regions would be considered to have large stocks of social capital. They are covered with strong horizontal associational webs at the most local level. Yet these are precisely the country’s poorest regions, with the worst systems of governance in terms of both process and performance” (Fox, 1997, p. 124)

Despite the rural communities analyzed by Fox being dense in associational groups of all kinds, they remain very poor. What these communities lack, argues Fox (1997), is “synergistic relations” between the state and their civic organizations in the production and supply of collective goods. In this “synergistic relations”, the civil society organizations and the state (the government institutions) would join their resources and skills in the “co-production” (Ostrom, 1997) and delivery of demanded public goods. It is the “linking social capital” typology that poor communities need “to generate social ties extending beyond their primordial groups if long-term developmental outcomes were to be achieved” (Woolcock, 1998, p. 168). This social capital dimension is measured based on the extent to which CSOs engage in the public policy process. Focusing on the case of Cabo Verde, the *linking social capital* is measured based on CSOs’ participation in the policy making and implementation processes. CSOs vibrancy has been measured solely based on the density of CSOs, membership rates and their typologies. CSOs’ participation in the policy process has been determined based on their project execution rate, as it is further detailed in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.

The linking social capital argument stands on the assumption that engagement of CSOs in governance allows these organizations to participate in governing process, as a way to improve the government performance, its responsiveness and efficiency (Putnam, 1993, p. 63). Thus, following this line of argument, one would expect the quality of government performance to be influenced by the extent to which CSOs are engaged in governance. A strong engagement would result in a strong government performance, while a weak engagement would lead to a weak performance.

The analysis of CSOs' influence on government institutional performance draws on the theoretical perspectives of social capital and institutionalism, dealt with in details in the next section. On the one hand, the social capital generated in a community facilitates "collaboration and collective activity" among community members in respect to the formulation and expression of their preferences and the demand services they will put on the government (Tavits, 2006, p. 212). Government does not simply provide the public goods, but such provision depends on the level of demands and pressures exercised by the communities or their representative civic groups. Therefore, one would expect that "higher levels of social capital within a society enable the societal mobilization necessary for the provision of public good and services" (Tavits, 2006, p. 212). Hence, the stronger the mobilization to produce demands is, the higher is the government performance in delivering the demanded services.

In respect to the institutional explanation, the focus is on the micro-institutional tools put in place by governments to incorporate the CSOs both in central and local governance. Such practices include formal laws, resolutions, dispatches or agreements and other institutional arrangements to engage CSOs formally in governance process. Furthermore, institutional practices of *collaborativeness* between CSOs and local governments also counts for the local institutional performance. The institutional hypothesis here is that the government with institutional arrangements that allow a stronger inclusion of CSOs in the policy processes is expected to have a better performance than the ones that allow a weaker inclusion. However, the institutional hypothesis remains simply as an argument to measure the engagement of CSOs and not the performance *per se*. It is expected that the municipalities with a strong linking social capital stock, their government performance should be higher. This hypothesis is further developed in chapter 7. The empirical analysis of the aforementioned models of government performance uses data covering the 22 municipal governments in Cabo Verde. Although intensive case study is carried out only in 3 municipalities, two created in 2005 and one in 1992, data gathered from all the 22 local governments have allowed the findings of patterns of correlation between their stock of social capital and their performances.

1.7 CSOs, social capital, and governance in Africa

Social capital- as both the prompter and the product of civic participation- and its engagement in governance process has often been conceived of as being an attribute of the advanced democratic and industrialized countries, and scarcely a feature of developing and short-experienced democratic states, and even worse for the undemocratic regimes. Such strong linkages between civil society and the democracy, and economic development in the Western

countries, as Almond and Verba (1989) argue, produce a “civic culture” that is conducive for a healthy democratic functioning, in contrast to the situations where it reigns a more “uncivic culture”, which many consider to be the case of Africa (Noor, 2016). Therefore, one wonders what hinders the development of the sort of social capital that is conducive to the socio-economic development in the latter case. For the specific case of African continent, and more concretely the case of the late Third Wave democratizers, the theory of an “uncivic culture”, as Noor (2016) defends is questionable though. What is the status of CSOs, and the social capital in Africa? To what extent are they incorporated in state affairs? What explain their “incorporation” or their “disengagement” (Azarya, 1994)? Finally, what are their roles for democratic and socio-economic development on the continent, and more specifically in the aforementioned countries? This section focuses in the case of social capital in the form of organized civil society organizations in the context of Africa, by emphasizing the case of the late Third wave Sub-Saharan African democratizers.

1.7.1 Social capital and policy making in the African context

Social capital, as a resource emanating from the network of established relationships among individuals from their engagement in civic groups or associations, formal or informal, and the norms of reciprocity and trust they attached to their relationships, is a distinct trait of African’s *modus vivendi*. African countries are characterized by strong cultural diversities, with a mosaic of tribal and ethnic groups being the basic structure of their societies. A tribe has its own norms, values and culture that connect its members to one another, and they have their own set of rules and strategies to solve their collective problems. However, beyond this cultural group orientation, there are civil society groups of all sorts, ranging from NGOs, unions and grassroots organizations, present in almost all countries across Africa (Diamond, 1989; Rijnierse, 1993; Bratton, 1994; Anheier, 2005). As Anheier puts it,

“The nonprofit sector is not limited to the developed countries of America, Asia-Pacific, and Europe. In Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, India, and Central and South East Asia, too, we find a rich tapestry of organizational forms and activities in the nonprofit field...Prominent examples include [...] the countless rotating credit associations in West Africa [...]” (2005, p. 8).

As this excerpt illustrates, African countries, as well as the developing countries in other continents, are dense in civil society organizations, contrasting the theoretical view of their “uncivic culture”. However, two concerns linked to the associations and their generated social capital in Africa have been raised: On the one hand, the networks of relationship within family, cultural or tribal groups remain very sectarian and prone to defend their parochial interests. The

social capital generated within these groups has been termed of “bonding” social capital, referring “to the inner strengths of primary social groups such as families, clans, and neighbors in a community in defense of the groups’ interests...” (Paraskevopoulos, 2010, p. 478). Bonding is treated in fact as “unsocial capital”, since its sectarian and tribalism natures do not allow connection and “institutional transfer of experiences” from agents across society. This absence of “transfer” of experiences would diminish the benefit of social capital accumulated by a group to the wider society (Crouch and Farrel, 2004).

However, besides *bonding*, Africa is also rich in “*bridging*” social capital. Bridging is understood as the “associational capacity of a community to express dense networks of social exchange, which are viewed as countering bonding forces” (Paraskevopoulos, 2010, p. 478). This type of social capital is generated not from blood ties, nor *culturally* inscribed upon individuals, but from the community’s capacity to associate beyond their tribal or family interests. In Africa, *bridging social capital* emerged in the colonial times, when Africans found “in the art of associations” (Tocqueville, 1998) a mechanism to protect themselves against the oppressive colonial regimes they were subjected to, and in the same token, to provide themselves for their immediate material needs unmet by the colonizers. Following the period of colonization “African citizens are more organized in this century than they have been since European colonization disorganized their tradition societies [and so], CSOs in Africa, have proved more effective reducing human suffering and development than their state counterparts” (Ewoh, 2004, p. 229). Thus, such an art of association developed after the independence, and grew as societal forces capable of shaking political regimes in the late years of the authoritarian rules across the continent in the 1980s and 1990s (Bratton, 1987; LeBas, 2011; and Barneo and Yashar, 2016). Some have associated the quick development of CSOs along with their capacity to generate social capital in the later years of the authoritarian rule, to the intervention of International NGOs development agencies, which saw them as important actors to accelerate the democratization process (Bratton, 1987).

However, despite being rich or dense in associations and the correlated bonding and bridging social capital, another question arouses. To what extent are these associations and the social capital they generate being incorporated in the state affairs? What explain their “incorporation” or their “disengagement” (Azarya, 1994)? In line with what Fox (1997) found about the poor rural Mexican communities, civic associations only matter to promote democratic governance and socioeconomic development if they are linked to the institutions of power, or, when there is the presence of *linking social capital*. This form of social capital, as we saw earlier, “refers to the mechanisms which enable a community’s associational capacity,

namely, bridging social capital, to express itself through interactions with political institutions, thus contributing to the production of public goods and policy outcomes at large” (Paraskevopoulos, 2010, p. 478). As Evans puts it,

“If synergy can regularly emerge out of communities that seem quite ordinary in terms of their stock of social capital, but governments vary dramatically in terms of their ability to act as counterparts in the creation of developmentally effective civic organizations, then perhaps the limits to synergy are located in government rather than in civil society” (1997, p. 193)

Yes, “...perhaps the limits to synergy are located in government rather than in civil society”. The African governments have often been portrayed to impose harsh limits on civil society participation in governance, hampering therefore the creation and establishment of synergistic relations that are propitious to promote their democracy and socioeconomic development indicators (Evans, 1997; Diamond, 2008).

Post independent African states have produced different types of civil societies: the “predatory civil society”, created and controlled by state agents as means to serve their own rationalistic ends; the “middle sector” composed of business agents, and finally, the “popular civil society” which comprises the rural people, farmers and the disaffected community associations (Fatton, 1995; Diamond, 2008). All these forms of civil societies have emerged, or reemerged in a context of economic scarcity and asymmetries, and their roles situate between competing for their share of the state scarce resources, and serving the population failed by, and disenchanted with their political representatives (the government). The predatory and the middle sector civil society organizations, characteristically of the authoritarian states regime, seem to have played the first role, while the popular civil society seems to focus on the second task.

The predatory nature of states in Africa may have limited the development and maturation of free civil society organizations that are capable to stand firmly and express the people’ discontentment and defend their interests in the political arena. The authoritative states, as Evens (1997) argues, have failed to create conditions to establish productive and synergistic relations with these peoples’ organizations (the civic organizations- the CSOs) to produce and deliver public collective goods in both desired quantity and quality. Additionally, CSOs are incapable to confront the state (Ewuh, 2004, p. 232) on issues in which their positions would cost them dear sanctions or threats by the public office holders. On the other hand, the state officers’ discretion on resource distribution allows them freedom to decide and choose the CSOs to relate with according to their convenience. The CSOs with a “collaborative face” develop amicable relationship with the state, and so get the support they desire. On the other

hand, CSOs with a contentious face are usually marginalized and denied support. Ndegwa (1996) argues that in this scenario of predatory states in Africa, “two faces” of civil society have emerged: one face that is “actively advocating for political pluralism”, and seeking the incorporation of the disaffected or the disengaged segments of population, and the other face that remains “politically obtuse” (p.1). It is within this African scenario of civil society organizations and their relations with the state, that the case of Cabo Verde is considered.

Although the CSOs that emerged during the single-party regime in Cabo Verde were coined as “autonomous mass organizations”, they were often described as predatory on the one hand, and coopted organizations on the other, serving as instruments through which the state power (the party) disseminated its ideology. As Santos and Bastin (1988) state about civic participation during the aforementioned period,

“The Cape Verdean regime defines participation as both a means and a goal of its political project. Popular participation for development is then institutionalized and all modern forms of economic and social organizations, namely cooperatives and associations, were taken and defined as the elements that characterized the regime” (p. 2012. *Author’s translation*).

The mass organizations, as we understand them to be the civic organizations in the modern nomenclature, were under the state’s control, and as such, they were instruments to disseminate the party state’s ideologies, along with serving the population immediate needs and interests. Some mass organizations, like the Organization of the Cape Verdean Women (OMCV), and the National Federation of Cape Verdean Workers’ Union (UNTC-CS), were granted some autonomy to formulate and present their constituents’ social and economic interests and concerns to the government (Foy, 1988; Furtado, 1993). However, the presence of party militants and leaders in these organizations, with clear surveillance and liaison roles, undermine very much their independence. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight the state’s willingness from the very beginning of the independence to have “the peoples’ organizations” on its side in the business of governing the country. Thus, for the case of Cabo Verde, the *bridging* social capital of “autonomous mass organizations”, and the “synergistic relationship” (Evens, 2006), or the *linking social capital* emanated from their incorporation (Azarya, 1994; Kasfir, 1994) into the government policy process, is part of the explanation for the country’s spectacular democratic and socioeconomic progress since independence in 1975. From an “unviable” country in 1975, Cabo Verde was promoted from the least to medium income country category in 2008, and it is the second most democratic country in Africa (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016). This social capital hypothesis will be further developed in the next section.

With the inauguration of democracy in many Sub-Saharan African countries in the 1990s (the so called the late Third Wave Sub-Saharan democratizers), independent CSOs emerged to perform “the role of picking up where physical capital or whatever leaves off, emphasizing social organization, culture, norms, networks and trusts, etc., [... to] allow physical capital or whatever to function more effectively” (Fine, 2003, p. 35). The liberal economic policies introduced in the continent to replace the state economic planning, generated other types of CSOs, namely the business organizations - “the middle sector”, and the “popular organizations”, representing the interests of the most disenfranchised segment of populations (Fatton, 1995). Unlike the situation in the industrialized and consolidated democratic countries, the hypothesis of social capital and CSOs engagement to understand the policy process in the late Sub-Saharan democratizers remains underexploited. In this research, Cabo Verde is taken as a studying case to analyze the social capital hypothesis as an explanatory variable for its democratic and economic advancements. The next section explores the hypotheses of institutionalism and social capital to analyse the singularity of Cabo Verde regarding CSOs engagement in its democratic process.

1.8 CSOs’ engagement in the policy process in Cabo Verde: Finding an explanation

“What influences CSOs’ engagement in the public policy process in Cabo Verde?” I seek to answer this question from two theoretical perspectives: the new institutionalism (Olsen and March, 1974; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Ostrom, 1997; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013) and the social capital perspective (Pateman, 1970; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock, 1998, 2000, 2002; Evans, 2006). These two theoretical perspectives and the framing hypotheses are developed separately in the two sections below, 1.8.1, and 1.8.2 respectively.

1.8.1 The New Institutionalism perspective on the Engagement of CSOs in Governance

The new institutionalism hypothesis for the participation of CSOs in governance in Cabo Verde states that *the engagement of these organizations in the policy process is a consequence of the political and administrative institutional changes and adjustments, as well as the institutional practices and narratives occurred in the country after its independence.* The post-independence political regime changes have created institutional opportunity structures (Tarraow, 2011) for civil society organizations to engage in the governance process. These institutional opportunities are crystalized in the formal legislations and administrative apparatus put in place during both the single party and the democratic regimes. Opportunities have also been created

and promoted through political practices and narratives constructed by political actors throughout the aforementioned period.

New Institutionalism, as a theoretical analytical model, takes institutions as the main independent variables for the analysis of policy and political phenomenon. Institutions are understood here as “not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 947). Unlike the “old institutionalism”, the new perspective takes the “formal and recorded” institutions including, political organizations, written laws and rules-, but also the “practices” and “narratives” (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013) which, all together, constrain how decision-makers behave (John, 1998). As a policy analytical tool, institutionalism sees decision-making process as a competing arena where the decision-makers are constrained, or bounded not only by the formal rules of the game, but also by shared and accepted practices and narratives constructed by individuals to either legitimize or delegitimize actions.

New institutionalism has evolved into three different intellectual currents: the historical institutionalism, the rational choice institutionalism and the sociological institutionalism. The historical institutionalism seeks the explanation for policy decisions in the past historical events, which set the boundaries within which new policy-decision are made. In other words, past policy creates an institutional context and generates both political and societal interests that condition the change or the formation of new related policies. Old policies work as a vehicle of *information*- “policy feedback”, to decision makers (Pierson, 1994), informing them about the norms and interests already in place, and to the extent which the new decisions should affect such norms and interests. As Olsen and March (1988) argue, “rules and repertoires of practices embody historical experience and stabilized norms, expectations and resources; they provide explanations and justifications for rules and standard ways of doing things” (p.10).

The rational institutionalism comes as the second dimension of the new institutionalism theory. According to this perspective, institutions are the outcomes of individuals’ rational calculations, aiming at maximizing the attainment of their own preferences (Olson, 1965). Therefore, rather than being constrained by past policies, new policies derive from current contexts, and they are shaped to fit particularistic preferences of rational groups. Then, the analysis of the engagement of CSOs in the policy process, as a policy itself, would require the understanding of what and whose preferences they seek to protect in the policymaking arena.

The rational choice institutionalism builds on two maximums: the first is that life is “a series of bargaining game” (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 36), while the second states that

politics is “as a series of collective action dilemmas” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 945). In the face of such a bargaining game and dilemmas, actors are left with nothing but to pursue their own “self-interest in the context of a rational calculation of what is the best course of action to achieve [their] strategic intent” (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 36). Actors struggle for “a fixed set of preferences or tastes [and they] behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of these preferences and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 944-945). Unlike the historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalists focus their analysis on actors’ commitment to challenge, reshuffle and the institutional *status quo* for the one that best protect their preferences, and “which will detect and deal with cheating on the part of delinquents” (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 36). The delinquents are those who look to “maximize the attainment of their own preferences [and] are likely to produce an outcome that is collectively suboptimal” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 945). Politics would be simply a zero sum game, where some players lose and some others win. Rather than looking at the history to understand how individuals or groups form their interests, rational choice’s concern is how they take the present institutional arrangements to shape their preferences, and how such preferences affect the redesign of new institutional architecture.

Nevertheless, rational choice institutionalism also stresses the need to analyze actions not only from the individual’s rational calculations, but also from the perspective of social context (Coleman, 1988). An individual’s preferences are to a certain extent, constrained by what he perceives to be the preference of other individuals in his community. Thus, individuals’ preferences are embedded in their community’s preference. A person is not expected to act so selfishly to the extent that he would strip the community off its wealth for his own benefit in the detriment of the majority’s preference. Then, rather than looking strictly to maximize the attainment of their own particularistic preferences, individuals are expected to aim and act in a way to maximize the attainment of optimal collective interests. Therefore, they embark themselves in creating institutions that favour the achievement of collective purposes, at the expenses of individualistic purposes. The following extract from Hall and Taylor (1996) clearly illustrates this strategic calculation,

“an actor’s behavior is likely to be driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but by a strategic calculus and, second, that this calculus will be deeply affected by the actor’s expectations about how others are likely to behave as well. Institutions structure such interactions, by affecting the range and sequence of alternatives on the choice-agenda or by providing information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about the corresponding behavior of others and allow ‘gains from exchange’, thereby leading actors toward particular calculations and potentially better social outcomes” (p. 945)

The institutions become therefore a collective construction, embedding the preferences and the calculus of their actors who are entrenched in a societal network of relationship. Such a network decreases the uncertainty among the actors in formulating their preferences, and increase their willingness to cooperate in order to maximize the attainment of optimal outcomes for all of them. The structure of such a network becomes therefore the “social capital” inhered “in the structure of relations between actors and among actors” (Coleman, 1988, p. 98).

Finally, the sociological dimension of institutionalism puts emphasis on the cultural value system, which defines who the actors are and what is appropriate for them to do. Unlike the rational choice, for sociological institutionalists, “institutions do not simply affect the strategic calculations of individuals [...] but also their most basic preferences and very identity” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 948). Individuals construct their preferences based on their own interpretation of the cultural system and values they understand to be socially appropriate in the polity where they live. Therefore, “institutions influence behavior not simply by specifying what one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 948). An individual thus orients his actions in a way to enforce and strengthen such a system of values that function as “the logic of appropriateness” (Olsen and March, 2009). In this perspective, institutions are therefore designed or redesigned, not to legitimize or challenge historically appropriate institutional practices, nor to maximize the attainment of self or parochial interests, but to enable individuals, groups or organizations to “define and express their identity in socially appropriate ways” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 949).

After having described the new institutionalism theory in its three variations, I now pose the following questions for the case study at hand: How have the institutions changed over the years, from the colonial period up to the present? How and to what extent have these institutions influenced the birth, expansion and engagement of CSOs in the democratic governance process in Cabo Verde?

The institutional perspective on the analysis of CSOs in the democratic governance process in Cabo Verde, concentrating primarily on the post 1975 period, will include traits of all the three perspectives, historical, rational and sociological arguments. Building on the historical institutionalism, I pose the following questions: “to what extent have the new post-independent institutional arrangements incorporated the CSOs? To what extent such an incorporation has reflected the legacies of past institutional practices and repertoires of CSOs’ participation? A diachronic analysis of CSOs engagement from 1975 up to 2016 (March of

2016, the end of the PACV's term in office) will either strengthen or deny the historical institutional hypothesis. From the rationalistic point of view, the question is "how, and to what extent have the new institutions implemented been influenced by either groups' particularistic preferences, or by groups that seek the attainment of collective community interests? Finally, for the sociological perspective, the issue will stand on "the logic of appropriateness" (Olsen and March, 1988) applied on the new institutional design, in respect to the civic engagement. Here, institutional practices and narratives around political party relationship with CSOs play an important role in the analysis presented in chapter 6.

In addition to the points raised in the paragraph above, there are two other elements within the institutional perspective, which due to their importance to understand the engagement of CSOs in governance in Cabo Verde, deserve further development: policy window (Kingdon, 2014) and political party (Petrocik, 1980; Schmidt, 1996; Fernandes, 2014).

1.8.1.1 The policy window

The policy window concept is part of the multiple streams approach to public policy analysis. As Kingdon (2014) conceives it, the approach consists of three independent streams of events - problem, policy and politics, which at some critical point in time are copulated, creating therefore a *policy window* favorable for the adoption of a public policy. Although each stream develops independently from one another, their copulation results from the perspicacity of the *policy entrepreneurs*, who are able to identify the "right time" to bring them together, and so provoke policy change. Although my focus is on the concept of policy window, it is important to provide a brief explanation of the other elements of the Multiple Streams hypothesis to allow a better understanding of the events that resulted in the *window opening*, or the "political opportunities" (Tarrow, 2011) for the CSOs engagement in the policy process in Cabo Verde. However, I do not intend to apply the theory of multiple streams to analyze the whole process of CSOs engagement, but only "in its capacity to explain policy formulation" (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 65), i.e., to explain the institutional changes to accommodate engagement of CSOs in policymaking process. Therefore, the concept of *policy window* will be mostly important for the analysis I intend to carry out in this work. The following paragraphs describe each of the five elements that make up the policy stream theory.

The *Problem Stream* "consists of various conditions that policy makers and citizens want addressed" (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 70). These conditions are determined based on the indicators, focusing events and feedback load generated around an issue. The rationale for the engagement of civic participation on the government process in Cabo Verde, since the

colonization, has always been the socioeconomic exclusion of the disenfranchised segments of population, and over centralization of policy decision in the hand of public authorities. The problem of exclusion focuses mainly on the poor segment of population whose absence in the sphere of decision-making process gives them scarce opportunities to benefit from the state services. On the other hand, the problem of exclusion is raised by the non-poor groups, who complain against the state's monopoly over decision-making, excluding the possibility of important contributions from civil society organizations on issues that are important to them. Poverty figures, round table events organized since the independence on the participation of civil society in governance processes, and the echo these events have created in the sphere of government, could all be taken as the conditions that have kept the problem of exclusion alive throughout the years in Cabo Verde.

The Policy Stream is where the elaboration of proposals of solutions to the problem under discussion takes place. These proposals are prepared by a wide range of policy entrepreneurs (described below), varying from political community, involving academics, bureaucrats, parliamentarians, etc. A proposal either wins or fails to get the attention of decision makers, depending on a set of factors such as the political weight and the sphere of influence of its proposers, its technical and financial feasibility, as well as its underlying values (Kingdon, 2014). For the case at hand, proposals of better civic engagement in Cabo Verde have been presented by several groups, depending on the interests and goals of the different segments of population. However, as I will later demonstrate in this chapter when approaching the political party, institutional factors are also important for the success of a proposal.

The Politics Stream is composed of a set of phenomena such as pressure group campaigns, public mood, reluctant voters, partisan ideologies and changes in the administration (Kingdon, 2003). These phenomena constitute the political context conducive to the adoption of a given policy. In the case of CSOs engagement policy in governance process in Cabo Verde, the analysis focuses on the role of the ruling party ideology and practices for the adoption of that policy. The ruling political parties, their ideologies and the new administrative apparatus implemented might all have played a critical role in favoring the engagement of CSOs in governance process.

The fourth element that makes up the structure of multiple stream approach is the *policy entrepreneurs*. These are the “advocates who are willing to invest their resources, time, energy, reputation, money to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 179). Unlike the three aforementioned streams that flow independently, policy entrepreneurs are always connected to

one or all those streams, and they are the ones who keep the problem alive and who draft and present proposals for their solutions. Most importantly, they play the crucial role of copulating the three streams at some critical junctures (Jones and Baumgartner, 2007), and so create a *policy window* propitious for the adoption of new policy proposals. The analysis of civic groups involvement in policymaking process in Cabo Verde focuses, on the one hand, on the actors behind its promotion, and on the other hand, in a more micro-perspective, on the entrepreneurs' efforts to engage civic organizations in the sectoral policy processes of education, PRSPs formation and implementation, rural development and local government.

Finally, the fifth element of the multiple streams, *the policy window*, is understood as “an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problem” (Kingdon, 2014, p. 165). A *policy window* occurs when the three streams of problem, policy and politics are copulated at some “critical junctures” (Jones and Baumgartner, 2007), “when certain policy-makers happen to be in power” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 4). This coupling creates an opportunity for the policy entrepreneurs to put forward their policy proposals, with some high level of probability of being approved. Looking at the policy of civic groups' engagement in Cabo Verde, from a macro perspective, one can identify three policy windows, which remained open for quite long periods of time, each leading to substantial institutional changes to accommodate CSOs in governance. These *policy windows* are the independence of Cabo Verde in 1975, the inauguration of democracy in 1990, and the return of PAICV to power in 2001. These three windows will be developed in depth in chapter two, as I analyze the institutional designs put in place to engage CSOs participation in governance. However, it is important to stress the relevance the ruling party ideology and strategies as important variables for the opening of the aforementioned windows or political opportunities. The party variable is analyzed in the following section.

1.8.1.2 The role of political parties

The change of political parties in power has been identified as one of the utmost important element of *politics stream* (Kingdon, 2014) conducive to both institutional and policy changes. This is because parties have their own agenda, mostly supported and directed to meet the interests of their constituency (Petrocik, 1980, p. 828). In democratic societies, political parties are central organizations through which citizens periodically and freely choose their government representatives. In contrast, in undemocratic societies, such as the “single-party state regimes”, the “party state” assumes to itself the task of appointing the representatives,

banning therefore any formal existence of other organizations aspiring to perform such a task. However, political parties not only are the pool from which citizens pick up their representatives through elections, but they are also key policy entrepreneurs and policy influencers over the governance process. Parties in polyarchic societies (Dahl, 1989) may have to compete with other groups, political or not, for policy outputs, but their distinctive characteristic of being the only groups that seek control over state power, gives them certain advantages to influence policy process in relation to other groups. Therefore, parties become the *primus inter pares* among other groups of civil societies (Rosenblum, 2000), being not only political office seekers, but also “policy seekers for whom ideology and the realization of their program count” (Bouteca and Devos, 2015).

Ideologically, parties have been divided into two broad categories, left and right (Bobbio, 1996). Other subcategories, as “the middle” or “the center”, somehow fall within these two mainstream political ideologies. The main defining characteristic between left-and right wing party ideologies, lies on how they approach the concept of equality and the policies they pursue to promote it. The former is more inclined to promote an “egalitarian policy” through government, aiming to “remove the obstacles which make men and women less equal” (Bobbio, 1996, p. 80). On the other hand, right-wing parties, when in power, “allow and promote less egalitarian policies” (Bobbio, 1996, p. 95), i.e., rather than the state promoting policies that target at the social “equaling” of individuals, right-wing governments opt to liberalize the market economy, so that individuals can have equal access to the existing opportunities of being equal. It is the “minimal state” ideology.

Left and right wing parties have their own constituents, and they get in permanent confrontations with those they consider the “bad guys” (Giddens, 2000). For the left, the bad guys are the “capitalists, markets, the large corporations, [and] the rich”. On the other hand, for the rightists, the “bad guys” are “the big government, cultural relativists, the poor, immigrants and criminals” (Giddens, 2000, p. 38). Hence, both left and right wing parties, when in power, “pursue [...] policies broadly in accordance with the objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their class-defined core political constituencies” (Hibbs, 1997, p. 1464). As Hibbs puts it, the left [as the democratic party in the USA] has “relatively close connections to organized labor and lower income and occupational status groups, while the republican party [right-wing] is generally viewed as being more responsive to the interests of capital and business, or the upper income and occupational status groups” (1997, p. 1475). The leftists are keen on policies targeted at those positioned in the lower social ladder. Left parties’ constituents are the masses, the poor, and the less fortunate in the market economic structure.

On the other hand, for the rightists, the state would only intervene where the market proves incapable to guarantee egalitarianism. The right wing is more concerned to protect the capitalists, the market, the corporatists and the well-offs. However, such a distinction does not imply that the right aims purposefully at promoting social injustice or inequality, nor hardening the conditions of the poor. On the contrary, their policies towards justice simply do not match the ones defended by their left opponent.

The concept of left and right ideologies, despite the criticism they have been subjected to, still survive and do make sense as they are “not just ideologies”, but also “indicate opposing programs in relation to many problems of whose solution is part of everyday political activity” (Bobbio, 1996, p. 3). As Hinich and Munger (1997) state, “people associate left and right with positions on real policies” (p. 16), not simply with the formal declarations of parties’ statements. In fact, there is “a strong correspondence between popular preferences, the ideological orientations of elected representatives, and government policies” (Barry et al., 1998, p. 327). Hence, the ideological orientation of a government gives rationale for the institutional changes it pursues, and consequently the policies it seeks to formulate and implement. For the purpose of the present research work, the focus is on the extent to which the two main political parties in Cabo Verde, PAICV (leftist) and MPD (rightist), have engaged themselves in enacting policies to involve CSOs in governance. How do these two parties collaborate with CSOs, and to what extent do their ideological differences influence the participation of CSOs in the process of public policy formation and implementation in Cabo Verde?

Studying the engagement of CSOs in governance (the dependent variable) from the perspective of the ruling party ideology (as an institutional determinant) is methodologically challenging though, for four main reasons. Firstly, the ruling party aiming at winning elections and maintaining itself in power may occasionally and strategically link with CSOs, even with those who are their fiercest opponents such as unions and other prominent advocacy groups, in search of votes (Kitschelt, 2000). On the second hand, economic and political crises might limit the government policy choices, which in many circumstances jeopardize the good relationship between their supporting parties and their constituent groups. One example of such a limitation is the wave of protests in Portugal, Spain and Greece when these countries were hit by the financial crisis. The third reason would be the forces that external powers exercise on national governments towards certain policy options. Through coercive diffusion mechanisms, countries are sometimes “obliged” to adopt certain policies, even though this might jeopardize their relationship with their partners at home. Finally, a fourth motive is when the government is composed by a coalition of parties which do not necessarily share the same political ideologies,

but which for reasons of their political convenience, align with common policies, that may go against the will of their particular constituents. From these four reasons, only the first and the third ones will deserve our attention in analyzing the engagement of CSOs in Cabo Verde. I exclude the other two, as they have not occurred yet in Cabo Verde corresponding the time span covered by the present analysis. The political party variable, as an institutional determinant to explain the engagement of CSOs in Cabo Verde will be further developed in chapter 2.

1.8.2 The social Capital perspective on CSOs Engagement

The second explanation for the emergence, expansion and engagement of CSOs in policy process in Cabo Verde stands on the social capital hypothesis. Social capital, as defined above refers to the resources emanating from the “ties and norms binding individuals within constituent elements of large [social] organizations” (Woolcock, 1998, p. 156), CSOs in our case, and the mobilization of these organizations towards the attainment of communities’ goals. Thus, the social capital hypothesis states that the engagement of CSOs in the policy making and implementation processes in Cabo Verde in the post-independence era, *along with* the institutional determinants, is prompted by *society self-mobilization* to overcome institutional and economic barriers that obstruct their self-advancement and development.

Civil society organizations in Cabo Verde, like in other African countries, emerged in a context of repression, exploitation and in an environment of human suffering imposed by colonialism. The disenfranchised, repressed and exploited majority of population, once reduced to the condition of “objects” (Mbemb, 2014), and being victims of exclusionary policies, found in the “art of association” (de Tocqueville, 1998) a means of self-help and to ameliorate their condition of existence. Forming independent civic associations in the colonial period was a dangerous task for the natives though, as the colonizers would repress any social movement they perceived would bring threat to the stability of the regime. However, the regime was incapable to oversee and annihilate all the private attempts of the colonized to form associations. As Bratton points out, “civil society exists, even if in defensive or underground form, under all types of political regime” (1994, p. 57). Such are the case of literary movements, and other *forças vivas* that appeared in Cabo Verde in the colonial period. In his book, *Os Bastidores da Independência*, José Vicente Lopes (1996) gives examples of several attempts of Cape Verdeans who tried to form underground associations, to protest and resist against the colonial government regime. The Cape Verdeans novelist Baltasar Lopes da Silva (1997) also gives examples of several citizens’ groupings and events meant to mobilize protests against the colonial regime practices. In many occasions, as these two authors illustrate, when the

representatives of the Metropole government were on visit to the Archipelago, they required “meetings” with the *forças vivas*⁶ to hear their concerns regarding the governance of the colony.

The emergence of CSOs in Cabo Verde, as mentioned in the above paragraph, was society centered, and not the result of any government policy to promote it. It was their miserable social conditions, and their disengagement with the state affairs that motivated individuals to associate around informal groups aiming at solving their collective problems generated by the colonial repressive and exploitative regime. Thus, by the independence in 1975, social institutional practices of solving collective problems were already a reality in Cabo Verde. The often-cited examples of such practices include the farmers revolts in Santiago Islands (Furtado, 1993; Camilo, 2014), the practices of *djunta mon*⁷, rotating credit associations (*totocaixa*) and burying associations (*Mitin and botu*) (Pina, 2007). These informal ties and cultural social institutions are still in practice today, despite the emergence and rooting of widespread *marketized* forms of relationship. This social bridging- the bridging social capital, manifested in the civil society groups, and its linkage with government is taken in this research work as the second explanatory variable for the creation of institutions favorable for the incorporation of CSOs in the government public policy process in Cabo Verde.

At the time of independence, there were already five legally recognized CSOs in the country (Pina, 2007) and hundreds of small and informal community organizations. The new independent government counted on the social capital of the existing organizations to implement its governance program and ideology, rather than suppressing them, although limiting their political intervention. The “historical experiences” of the civil society institutions was incorporated in the repertoires of practices of the new government. The CSOs, whether clandestinely or with the acknowledgement of the authorities, had been acting as important actors in solving collective problems of the disenfranchised population in the colonial period. Therefore, marginalizing them now, or annihilating them in the new regime would go against the philosophy of *djunta mon* (joining hands) that had nurtured the fight for the independence. The state and all the society were now expected to join hands, and work together in the construction of the “imagined [Cape Verdean] community” (Anderson, 1983). Civil society

⁶ Meaning *civic groups*

⁷ *Djunta mon*: meaning literally *joining hands*, it is a long traditional mutual help practice predominant mainly in the rural villages. It is practiced mainly among neighbors who join to help one another in turn, until everyone’s work is completed.

groups had historically played efficient role in providing public collective goods, even clandestinely. So why excluding them now?

The enshrinement of citizens' social rights in the constitutions of 1980, and later in 1992, prompted the reemergence and expansion of CSOs across the country. Engaging CSOs in providing such rights, was perceived as an institutionally appropriate (March and Olsen, 2009) strategy to guarantee the social stability and promote socio-economic development of the country. The revitalization of CSOs in the 1990s and 2000s gave further impetus to the institutional designs and adjustments to accommodate them in the governance process. The engagement of CSOs after the inauguration of democracy in 1990 was meant to establish and enforce the logic of appropriateness of counting on their social capital to govern.

1.9 Conclusion

This chapter has been developed around two central questions: "*Why do Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) matter for democratic governance?*" and "*what explain the engagement of CSOs in the policy process in Cabo Verde?*" Regarding the first question, a tentative answer is that CSOs matter as long as they stand, on the one hand, as the society bridging, and on the other hand, stand as the representative voices of the disaffected and the disengaged segments of society in the sphere of public policy. As community bridging, CSOs matter to the extent to which they generate the social capital required to produce and supply public collective goods unmet by the government. As the people representative voice, they matter because they express and stand for the interests of the disaffected ones in the governance process. Thus, CSOs' play the key role in educating and cultivating the "civic culture" of citizens, and strengthening their participation in policy deliberations and implementation processes. A "strong democracy" (Barber, 1984), with informed and participatory citizens who make demands and actually contribute to the formulation and implementation of policies, lead, on the one hand, to a better government responses (policy activism, Tavits, 2006), and on the other hand, to a more efficient government in delivering services (Putnam, 1993). This is because of the strength of their social capital. This hypothesis will be further developed in chapter 6, on CSOs' influence on the local government performance in Cabo Verde.

The second question focuses on the explanatory variables of CSOs engagement in policy process in Cabo Verde (the dependent variable). Two hypotheses are considered in this research work to analyze the dependent variable: Institutional and social capital hypothesis. The institutional hypothesis inspires in the new institutionalism ideals, in its historical, rational and sociological forms, to define the institutional determinants that explain the CSOs engagement

in Cabo Verde. Colonial government, though it tried, had not been able to ban civic groups from the social and political maps in Cabo Verde. *Forças vivas* were indeed often listened to in matters of governance (Lopes, 1996; Silva, 1997) even though for cosmetic or Machiavellian purposes. This past legacy was somehow inherited by the post-independence governments, which through formal institutional mechanisms create conditions to incorporate CSOs in the in the policy process.

Two other important institutional determinants to understand CSOs engagement are the policy windows and political parties' linkage strategies and ideologies. The independence in 1975 and the inauguration of democracy in 1990, as well the PAICV return to power in 2001 opened *window of opportunities (policy window)* and created institutional opportunity structures (Tarrow, 2011) for the participation of new actors in governance, crystalized in new political institutions adopted. These opportunities, however, have been very much due to the political parties' linkage strategies and their ideological stands towards CSOs engagement.

The second hypothesis to analyze the engagement of CSOs in Cabo Verde is the social capital variable, taken as the bridging and linkage ties of cooperation among people through associations, and these with the state. People have discovered in the "art of association" an important strategy to express their demands and pressure the public authorities to respond. CSOs themselves have been rational actors who have perceived the importance of their involvement in the production and delivery of public collective services, as a strategy to help them maximize the achievement of preferences of their constituents. Therefore, it is expected that the emergence and growth of CSOs not only increases pressure for service supply, but they also demand for their own participation in government public policy process, and contribute for the production and delivery of services, supplementing or complementing the state and market, and making up for their failures in meeting the needs of the population. The institutional and social capital will guide the development of this research work.

CHAPTER II- INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE ENGAGEMENT OF CSOs IN CABO VERDE

1.1 Introduction

This chapter builds on the institutional perspective to analyze the emergence, growth and engagement of CSOs in governance process in Cabo Verde in the post-independence era. On the one hand, it looks at the macro-institutional changes and the consequent “political opportunity structures” (Tarrow, 1994; 1996, Meyer, 2004) created to accommodate civil society and its representative organizations in the policy process. On the other hand, the chapter traces the emergence and evolution of micro-institutional determinants that frame the engagement of CSOs in politics within the aforementioned period. The set of institutional determinants considered here are the discourse of political parties, governments, legislations enacted and other institutional practices implemented after the independence.

The chapter is structured in four main parts. The first part centers on the analysis of political parties and the governments’ discourses and practices towards the promotion and engagement of civil society in the policy process. The second part looks at the constitutional framing of civil society participation in Cabo Verde within the broader African context. The third part presents an analysis of the macro-political institutional changes and opportunities that led to the adoption of new institutional framings, to either incentivize or constrain the formation and participation of CSOs in the case of Cabo Verde. Finally, the chapter ends with a conclusion reflecting on the main points discussed.

2.2 Political party discourse, practice, and engagement of CSOs

Cabo Verde is indeed an interesting case for studying the applicability of political party as the explanatory variable for the engagement of CSOs, as the country has been governed by “one party majority rule” (the winning party forms government) since its independence in 1975. There has never been a coalition government in the country, where the *majoritarian democracy* model in place since 1991, has allowed the ruling party to exercise important effects on public policy. The analysis here is based on the discourses and proposals of the country’s two main political parties, PAICV and MPD, as presented in their statutes, electoral platforms and the government programs approved by the National Assembly in 1975 and 1986 (PAICV), 1991 and 1996 (MPD), and 2001, 2006 and 2011 (PAICV). For each document, I analyze the sections of the parties’ and their governments’ proposals to engage civil society and their representative organizations (CSOs) in the governing process. The proposals cover the issues concerning the vibrancy of civil society and its organizations, as well as their participation in the government

policy processes. Table 2.1 summarizes the two parties' commitments to engage CSOs as stated in their governing programs.

Table 2.1. Parties' (PAICV and MPD) proposals to engage CSOs in Governance, as stated in their electoral platforms and their governing programs: 1975-2016

Legislatures	Proposals on the engagement on civil society
I & II: 1975-1981 1982-1985 Ruling Party- PAICV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "... the political power must allow the participation of the popular masses in solving their own problems, which is the only way of not harming the creative capacity of the people" • "[the government should] favor the creation of agricultural cooperatives"
III: 1986-1990 Ruling Party- PAICV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Encourage and facilitate the participation of the population in the exercise and control of State power" • "Encourage civic organizations to defend specific or professional interests, with the purpose of giving concrete content to democracy, in pursuit of national and community objectives" • "... Promote the organized participation of the different social groups in the identification of problems, in the programming of activities, and in the evaluation of the actions of economic and social development. • "Promote the development of private associations".
IV: 1991-1995 Ruling Party- MPD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote the emergence of cooperatives in the different sector economy: of primary, secondary and service sectors • Promote and help cooperatives and associations of the poor segment of population • Help and stimulate associative practices for community service providences • Restructure the national coordinating institutions of CSOs • Create legal framework to "enhance all non-conventional forms of cooperation". • Create credit institutions for associations
V: 1996-2000 Ruling Party- MPD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Help and stimulate the emergence and consolidations of CSOs • Create legal framework to provide help and incentives to trade unions • Create legal framework with respect to the constitution of CSOs • Promote projects for the creation of an Association of NGOs <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create conditions for an effective participation of ONGs in political, economic, social and cultural decisions • Create a FORUM of ONGs, a space for reflection, coordination and concertation with state institutions with respect to public policy-making • Promote meetings between public and civil society organizations to promote dialogue between them to evaluate public policies • Create an inter-departmental unit to coordinate the services of NGOs <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transfer of some state responsibilities to NGOs • Stimulating complementarities between NGOs' work and government where it shows useful • Create legal mechanisms to assess and monitor projects implemented by NGOs
IV: 2001-2006 Ruling Party- PAICV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote international exchanges of CSOs • Strengthen the institutional capacity of CSOs, • Incentivize and assist training to CSOs to re-inforce their capacity to intervene • Promote a friendly environment for the emergence of cooperatives • Create legal, technical and institutional frameworks for the implementation of a cooperative policy

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote more engagement of civil society, more specifically of the organizations that represent the poor • Establish partnerships with CSOs and the government • Facilitate access to funding on the part of CSOs • Establish dialogue and consultations with CSOs • Preparing, in partnership with CSOs, legal framework for incentives to CSOs • Create a platform for dialogue between State, CSOs and international actors for defining development policies and strategies
VII : 2006-2011 Ruling Party-PAICV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhance the institutional capacities of CSOs • Enhance their intervention capabilities • Give financial incentives to CSOs • Adopt a policy to finance CSOs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confer a wider space for participation of CSOs in direct collective interest issues
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop partnership with CSOs in implementing government projects and programs, concerning poverty reduction, community development and others • Create legal and institutional conditions to develop an effective partnership with NGOs and other CSOs
VIII: 2011-2016 Ruling Party-PAICV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase help to CSOs to raise their capability of intervention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen relationship with CSOs to help design and implement policies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involve citizens and CSOs in the implementation of the government program

Source: Suplemento ao Boletim oficial de Cabo Verde No. 31, August 8th, 1991; No. 12, April 30, 1996; No. 6, March 13, 2001; No. 14, May 22, 2016; No. 20, June 14, 2011

The reason for focusing only on these two parties' programs is that they are the only ones that have been occupying power alternately in Cabo Verde since the independence in 1975, and the first multi-party election in 1991. There are other parties in the country, namely *União Caboverdiana Independente e Democrática* (UCID), *Partido Popular* (PsP), *Partido do Trabalho e da Solidariedade* (PTS), *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD). Among these smaller parties, only UCID has been able to have representatives in Parliament, having elected one deputy in 2006, 2 in 2011 and most recently in 2016, it elected three deputies. The other smaller parties have had very little political expression. The two ruling parties, PAICV and MPD, establish different relationship patterns with CSOs, and engage them differently in the policy process. Thus, the question that I raise now is the extent to which the proposals collated in *table 2.1* reflect the two parties' ideology, approaches and practices towards the engagement of civil society and their representative organizations (CSOs) in the governance process.

Over its 15 year-rule in the context of single party regime from 1975 to 1990, PAICV developed a strong discourse around the importance of engaging civil society organizations in the "reconstruction of the nation". As the nation was bare of resources, there was a need of involving everyone in the construction of solutions to deal with such scarcity of resources and promote development. In addition, the masses had to be allowed to congregate in ways to

“exercise and control the State power” (COSNT., 1980). Such a control would be materialized by engaging the civic organizations in the “identification of problems, in the programming of activities, and in the evaluation of the actions of economic and social development” (COSNT., 1980). Thus, despite being an authoritarian state party, PAICV had an extreme favorable discourse towards the CSOs participation in the public policy process. The policies the party implemented to promote the engagement of these organizations, as they will be analyzed in the next section, are consistent with the party discourse.

In its first term in office, from 1991 to 1995, the IV legislature, the MPD’s proposal focused greatly on the vibrancy dimension of CSOs, by emphasizing the promotion, funding and creation of legislations to boost and strengthen CSOs. Such a concern on promoting the vibrancy of CSOs is understandable if we take into account the change in the macro political context. CSOs had been operating under the watch of the one party-state regime for fifteen years since 1975, and highly coopted by the state institutions (Costa, 2013). The MPD, with its landslide victory in the first ever multi-party elections in Cabo Verde in 1991, and due to some “pressure” from international donors, was expected to remove the existing institutional barriers that hinder the free creation, expansion and operation of CSOs. On the other hand, the new government and its supporting party were expected to implement new institutional designs to integrate CSOs in the policymaking and implementation processes, as well as changing their practices and relationship patterns with these organizations.

In the course of its second term in office, from 1996 to 2001, MPD government’s proposals went beyond the vibrancy dimension, to focus on the need of engaging CSOs in the policymaking and implementation processes as well. We can see discourses such as “effective participation” of CSOs in the decision processes, “creation of Forums and promotion of spaces for dialogue” between civil society and the government, as well as transference of government responsibilities to CSOs, are all positive indicators of a pro-civil society government.

PAICV returned to power in 2001, and in its three consecutive government programs, like MPD, outlined its proposals to engage CSOs in the governance process. In its first term in office from 2001 to 2005, the PAICV government proposals concentrated on strengthening the vibrancy of CSOs and participation in the policymaking process. As illustrated in table 1, there is a concern in promoting the expansion of CSOs and their participation, by creating supporting legal mechanisms and platforms of dialogues as arenas of policy process. In its subsequent programs, PAICV government kept its proposals on strengthening CSOs vibrancy and their capability of intervention in the policy making and implementation processes.

However, by simply looking at the proposals laid down in the different government platforms, it is methodologically challenging or even inaccurate to conclude whether one party or the other is more or less prone or committed to engage CSOs in government. Despite the relevance of the analysis of the parties' proposals, it is even more important to look at the actual policies implemented to materialize such intentions. For this purpose, I will now analyze an array of decisions made by governments supported by the two parties to engage CSOs, and then try to show any existing linkage between such policies and their ideological arguments. This analysis will deserve a further development in section 3 of this chapter, and in the subsequent chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the preset thesis.

From the very beginning of its governance, MPD pursued the implementation of liberal market economic policies, where competition for market dominance and influence over the government power would assume a distinctive importance. Both "middle sector" and "popular" civil society organizations (Fatton, 1995) have ever since been competing between themselves to, on the one hand, get access to state resources, and on the other hand, influence the government to adopt policies that mostly answer their constituents' demands. In the 1990s, the Cape Verdean most powerful vested-interest organizations were born: Commercial Chambers stand as an example of such organizations. Therefore, one wonders now what kind of relationship MPD government would establish with these two sectors of CSOS in the 1990s. Thus, the following analytical questions are raised: Which type of CSOs was mostly protected and given most access to the state resources and services? Which type was most effective in influencing government decisions and why? On the other hand, to what extent were the government proposals to engage CSOs actually implemented?

An often-cited policy on civil society organizations the MPD government adopted at the beginning of its first mandate in 1991, is the withdrawing of state support for the *cooperativas*⁸, despite having proposed on its government platform to leverage and make them better and more strengthened institutions to serve the under-privileged segment of populations. The liberal government of MPD, inspired by market economy and the *minimalist-state* ideologies, withdrew its participation from those organizations, as well as the political and financial support they had been receiving from the former PAIGC/PAICV governments. *Cooperativas* would now function independently under the logic of market economy (Évora, 2001) as any other private enterprise. Ideologically, the PAICV government from 1975 to 1990 had conceived

⁸ *Cooperativas* are associations of consumers and farmers whose core business is supplying the market through their joint productive means, or through reselling of imported goods.


cooperativas as the popular civic groups and enterprises, and as important actors in freeing the most disadvantaged segments of population from the economic dependency (from the state or international donors). For that party, the utmost important goal to achieve with *cooperativas* was the prevention of people's exploitation from private interests. The philosophical principle behind the PAICV government support for *cooperativas* was that once people were economically free, they would elevate their cultural and political awareness, and therefore, become more politically empowered- the Marxist mass empowerment idealism. The withdrawal of political support for *cooperativas* and other non-state organizations in the 1990s, on the ground of minimalist state ideology and the freedom of civil society, left these social organizations economically and politically vulnerable, as their unequal economic resources would not allow them to compete equally against the new business organizations that emerged with market liberalization. The people's organizations therefore had their capacity to influence government decisions weakened, as the ones more economically empowered would now be in a better position to exercise such an influence (Dahl, 2005). Therefore, despite the quick growth of CSOs in the second half of 1990s, their linkage with the government was weak, and their maintenance was primarily due to international organization programs operating in the country.

In her field research on community participation in Cabo Verde, Challinor (2008) found out that MPD lacked support for *cooperativas* and other grassroots associations on the ground that PAICV had been behind these "populist organizations". For MPD, these CSOs- the so-called 'mass organization', had been PAICV's main army of its political propaganda and dissemination of its ideological principles in the decade preceding the inauguration of democracy in 1990. In an interview with a former leader of INC (Instituto Nacional de Apoio às Cooperativas), and lately ICS (Instituto Caboverdiano de Solidariedade), he affirms that the majority of leaders of the new CSOs that emerged in the 1990s were in fact people linked to PAICV, due to the experiences they had acquired under that party ruling. Such an argument suggests that MPD, more inclined to capitalist ideals, was less responsive to the emerging CSOs' and their demands, despite its discourses in favor of these organizations. As Tavits (2006) states, "political party and ideological preferences may play an important role in determining policy activism" (2006, p. 223).

Did the return of PAICV to power in 2001 mean the opening of a new policy window for CSOs' engagement in government policy-making processes? As I have highlighted earlier, both MPD and PAICV strongly proposed the engagement of CSOs in governance in their successive government platforms. However, did PAICV materialize its proposals more than MPD did? If so, to what extent? To what extent does PAICV's inclination to the left ideology

contribute to such a materialization? Anheir (2005) points out that “there is a deeper ideological reason for the growth of the nonprofit sector” (2005, p. 371), and Tavits (2006) emphasizes that “it is reasonable to expect that leftist parties are more favorable toward increasing the scope of public service provision than their rightist counterpart” (p.214). Following this line of argument, Baker affirms that PAICV’s “principal support is among the poor, both in the high-density areas of the capital and among agricultural workers in areas of the industrialized islands”, while “the MPD [...] appeals more to the urban-based middle class” (Baker, 2006, p.498). Building on this argument, it is reasonable to affirm that the two parties’ ideological background have influenced differently their design and implementation of institutional conditions to engage CSOs in the policy process in Cabo Verde. PAICV has embarked on a broader institutional arrangement, which led to an exponential growth of CSOs in the 2000s. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of CSOs grew more than twofold compared to the number of CSOs already created by 2000. Figure 1.1 below depicts the growth of CSOs from the colonization period up to 2015.

Figure 2.1- Evolution of CSOs in Cabo Verde from 1975 to 2015



Source: Plataforma das ONGs (2015) - graph prepared by the author

A clean visual look at the figure above tells us that the growth of CSOs took off after 1990 with the inauguration of democracy in Cabo Verde. In 2000, there was an approximate of 199 CSOs in Cabo Verde, corresponding to 27% of the total (724) CSOs existing in 2015. Between 2000 and 2010, there was a growth of 412 CSOs approximately, more than double of the number existing in 2000. In addition to the increase of CSOs’ vibrancy, with the return of PAICV to power in 2001, data collected through interviews with leaders of some CSOs and some former

party leaders, civic organizations in the 2000s came to be more actively engaged in government policy process- agenda setting, policy formation and implementation, than in the previous years. As Lasswell (1958) states, “judgements about all the traditional patterns of policy-making and administration requires constant revision in the light of the purposes to be served in changing circumstances” (p. 365). CSOs themselves noticed in fact, a change in the “traditional patterns” of institutional arrangements for their engagement in policies after 2001. When asked whether the participation of CSOs after 2001 had been more capable to participate and influence government agenda, the manager of the Platform of NGOs in Cabo Verde answered “yes, because the situation has changed, and [...] so the discourse on engaging CSOs”. Section 2.3 presents and describes these institutional changes in more detail, in line with the party discourse described so far.

2.3 The constitutional framing of civic participation in African

Civil society participation in post-independent African countries is often depicted as feeble and simply too weak to influence politics and the government policies. Such characteristics are due to two set of factors: Firstly, the presence of authoritarian political regimes conceives the state as the sole and the main trustee of the people’s will. States in these political regimes are unwilling to decentralize and share power with other actors, and so, develop a centralized and monopolistic style of governance. By including non-state actors in the government activities, and making them de facto government agencies, state and society become simply borderless, being the ruling party the force that lead them both. However, this situation creates in the non-conformant common citizens- the oppositors of the regime, a feeling of apathy and disbelief in the value of the political participation being promoted by the state. So, they “disengage” themselves from the state activities (Azarya, 1994; Kasfir, 1994) and seek other ways of participation.

Secondly, authoritarian regimes have established a paternalistic relationship with CSOs (Ewoh, 2004), making these organizations too fragile, dependent and exploited institutions, and so, incapable of articulating and stand for the citizens’ voice and interests. In such contexts, the role of CSOs as school of democracy and participative development actors become very limited. Indeed, CSOs limited capacity of intervention has been identified as one of the key factors for the low democratic quality in Africa (Diamond, 2008). Some studies of both normative and empirical natures (Paul, 1987), have highlighted the need of a more vibrant and engaged civil society organizations in Africa and other developing countries, as part of the key policies to

improve democratic quality and achieve higher developmental results (Kasfir, 1998; Kalu, 2004; Diamond, 2008; Obadare, 2011).

The role of CSOs in the process of development and democratic consolidation in African continent can be analyzed from two perspectives: firstly, from the upstream viewpoint, the analysis focuses on their roles to influence the government agenda setting and design of formal state institutions, taking here the example of the constitution, as well as other legislations and government policies. Secondly, from the downstream perspective, the analysis centers on the CSOs' roles in the implementation of the constitutional precepts, to guarantee that there is a state of actual constitutionalism, a fundamental prerequisite to achieve and maintain political and social peace on the continent. This is because the constitutional making in the post-independence era has opened real *windows of opportunities* for a multitude of contending actors to seek to advance, negotiate and imprint their interests in the new constitutions, as “social contracts” that would bind them among themselves, and them to the state. As a contract, the constitution should therefore reflect the core interests and preferences of all the political and non-political stakeholders.

The process of constitutional making and reforms in Africa, as Masya and Mutasa (2014) argue, follows two trends: a top-down and bottom-up trends. The former is elitist, unidimensional and exclusionary. This trend follows the “DEAD” principle (Decide, Educate, Announce and Defend) to the constitutional making and reform. This principle means that the ruling elites “decide and map the way forward prior to the resorting to public consultations that they only use as way to create legitimacy for their conclusion” (Masya and Mutasa, 2014, p. 12). In some circumstances, CSOs are denied even a modicum of opportunity to involve in the process on the ground that constitutional making is a *partisan business*. In a statement about CSOs participation in constitutional making in Zambia, the president Mwanawasa states,

“I feel the question of the constitution-making process should be led by politicians and not the NGOs. If the NGOs want to contribute to the process, they should join political parties [...]. We have never refused them from joining political parties. Why should they be concerned with matters of government? Instead of talking poverty, you have engaged yourselves into politics” (Wallen Simwaka, Daily Mail, 2007).

President Mwanawasa's statement is a calling for non-interference of CSOs in the political institutions' business, as this is solely interpreted as an affair of politicians. Such a position is somehow resonated across African countries, where civic organizations' activities are highly constrained by political institutional barriers, as the political class see them as potential opponents and threats to their power tenure (Ewuh, 2004). For the case of Cabo Verde, which we will see in detail later in this chapter, the Constitution of 1980 was a political class product,

rather than a document adopted by common consent, representing the views of the different societal segments. Another example we can cite here is the Angolan case. As one author states,

“[...] there arose within the government [in Angola] an absurd idea that NGOs, who are called to help solve citizens' problems, should not contribute to the definition of public policies or for the solution of such problems, nor for the defense of those same citizens' rights, because if they do, they will be getting involved in politics, as if the Constitutional Law banned citizens the right of being involved in politics” (Pacheco, 2009, p. 6).

As it can be noticed in this excerpt, civic engagement in the political institutional reforms and policymaking is perceived as a real threat to the political power holders. The political elite in power does not expect CSOs to interfere with politics, because this is a matter of political parties.

The constitutionalism in Africa stands on the need to assure the granting of basic human rights, not as a discourse but as palpable facts, to the oppressed and the disenfranchised segments of population (Arjomand, 2007). Thus, the bottom-up analysis of CSOs' engagement in the constitution making focuses not only on the constitutional framings of civic participation in governance, but also on the actual implementation of such framings, henceforth understood as *constitutionalism*. Therefore, the analysis of constitutionalism in Africa should focus on the CSOs movement, as the societal forces coming from below, no longer satisfied with the current *status quo*, and their role in triggering the process of both constitutional change and the actual materialization of the constitutional precepts regarding the people's political and socioeconomic rights. In this scenario, CSOs as representatives of civil society, even under repressive authoritarian regimes, they manage through “contentious politics” (Tarrow, 2011) to have their say and influence the constitutional making and other institutional reforms. The granting of economic, social and political rights to common citizens in the constitution of the independent countries was the condition *si ne qua non* for the achievement of such progressions. Therefore, the demand of organized civil society to participate in the constitutional drafting would ensure the granting of the aforementioned rights in their mother law, or in the “social contract” binding them to the state, and the state binding to them. This participation would also allow the CSOs to demand, supervise, and participate actively in the materialization of the citizens' constitutional rights. CSOs reemerged thus as rational people's institutions (Fatton, 1995), to guarantee through pressure but also through private initiatives, that the constitutional rights are enforced, and so prevent their retrocession. Examples of this fight include cases like Zambia, Zimbabwe and Kenya (LeBas, 2011), as well as South Africa (Bratton, 1994) at the transition period to democratic regime. When these organizations are fairly engaged to

represent the views of not only the contending political forces, but also those outside the political society, the constitution will embody in itself a sense of attachment and belonging from all segments of interests, guaranteeing *a priori* a set of conditions for a politically stable and peaceful society. To some extent, this has been the case of Cabo Verde.

This chapter focuses precisely on the case of constitutional framing of CSOs engagement on the constitutional making itself, but also their role in constitutionalism in Cabo Verde in the post-independence period. How has the Cape-Verdean constitution (including its subsequent reforms) framed the engagement of CSOs in the policymaking process? To what extent have these organizations participated in the constitutional framing, and in the implementation of these framings themselves? What is the foundation of the constitutional engagement of CSOs in the public policy-making in Cabo Verde?

Starting with the last question, CSOs in Cabo Verde, as in other Sub-Saharan African late third wave democratizers, emerged in a context of oppression, exploitation and injustice imposed on the natives by the colonizers. Despite being constantly under the watch of the authorities, and prohibited when they were perceived as threats to the regime, informal organized civic groups emerged substantially during the colonial period. Examples of these groups include the farmers' associations formed across the archipelago, *the workers Movement of São Vicente*, *students associations*, *cultural groups*, *Tabanka*, etc. With the independence in 1975, the colonial surviving civic organizations, and the ones that emerged were incorporated within the new institutional designs as partners of government to participate in the "construction of the nation" and the materialization of the people's socioeconomic progress.

In the 1990s and 2000s, with the support of foreign NGOs (the western donors), CSOs expanded exponentially and today they stand as recognized institutions in the country's sociopolitical and governance arena. In the subsequent sections, the chapter focuses on the institutional determinants and the engagement of CSOs in governance in Cabo Verde. The major focus here is on the constitutional changes and other legislative acts to engage CSOs. How has Cape-Verdean constitution (including the reforms) framed the engagement of CSOs in the policy making process since the independence in 1975? To what extent have the new institutional designs been materialized? The sections below seek to answer these questions.

2.4 Windows of opportunities: institutional designs and CSOs engagement

As I have mentioned earlier in this work, in the history of Cabo Verde there have been three major windows of opportunities for the emergence of new institutional reforms, regarding the framing of civil society organizations and their relationship with the state. These windows are

the independence in 1975, the inauguration of democracy in 1991, and the return of PAICV to power in 2001. I will now elaborate on each of them in the following sections.

2.4.1 The independence in 1975 and the Enactment of LOPE⁹

On the independence day, July 5th 1975, the just installed Cape Verdean National Popular Assembly and its inducted members approved what is considered to be the country's first Constitutional text, LOPE (Law of Political Organization of the State). It was not a constitution in its *stricto sensu*, but in a *lato sensu*, yes. As any other constitutional text, LOPE was a guiding document that outlined the political orientation and defined the most important administrative structures of the just born Cape Verdean state. According to Furtado (2016), LOPE was “um simulacro da Constituição da República” (p. 868). Indeed, LOPE had the force of a constitution. It was in compliance with this institutional document that the administrative service machinery was structured, and from which all the subsequent legal instruments were generated and enacted.

Designed to be in force for 90 days while an appointed steering committee would work on the constitutional draft (Art.2, BO¹⁰ N0. 1, 5 July 1975), LOPE was enforced for 5 years until September 1980. If the independence opened a window of opportunity for the participation of the masses in the construction of the nation, to what extent did LOPE create “political opportunity structures” (Tarrow, 2011) to allow political pluralism, and the engagement of non-political actors in such a construction? Concerning political pluralism, LOPE stated in its article 1 that PAIGC is “the ruling political force of the society”, banning therefore the possibility for any other political actor to participate in the state affairs. As Furtado (2016) argues, PAIGC (the party that fought for the independence, and to whom power was handed by the colonizer in 1975) “curtailed in a constitutional law, the possibility of legal consecration of a plural political reality” (p. 868). On the line of political rights denial, in its 23 articles, LOPE did not make any specification to the rights to be enjoyed by the citizens, except for the article number 21, which states that “*o direito de defesa é garantido ao arguido e ao acusado*”¹¹. However, it lacks the fundamental rights - social, economic and political rights, which had been long

⁹ LOPE stand for “*Lei da Organização Política do Estado*” meaning in English **Law of Political Organization of the State**.

¹⁰ BO- Bolitim Official

¹¹ the right of defense shall be guaranteed to the suspected and/or the accused (author's translation)

cherished by the population. In tandem with such an absence of political and socioeconomic rights, there was also a complete absenteeism of expressions like “civil society”, “civil society organizations”, “masses” or any other expressions related to social organizations, which would set the ground for a free political and social pluralism, regarding the governance of the country.

Some considered that the exclusion of civil society and opposition political forces from participating in the political game since the very begging of independence, was in fact a betrayal to the people by the political elite, and in fact, “an assault on the hope” of the population, who had wholeheartedly embraced the independence cause (Cardoso, 2016). The former colonized and oppressed civic groups had expected the independence would be the “*streams of politics*” which would open new windows and bring new opportunities for their affirmation and participation in the national construction. Unlike what civic actors had expected, LOPE did not make it “constitutional” for them to participate in the process of building their “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983). In that way, as a political institution, LOPE was a “constraining, superimposing condition of possibility for mobilization, access, and influence” (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010, p. 17) of the civic groups representing the masses. Indeed, as Chabal (1992) argues, what followed the independence of African countries was that civic groups were deceived by the new political designs. They felt disappointed and so, they “disengaged” (Azarya, 1994) and “exited” (Hirschman, 1970) from the postcolonial elite ruling system, for being denied the legal space to participate in the state management affair. In Cabo Verde, the new post-independence institutional structure gave total monopoly to the ruling party, PAIGC/PAICV, over the policy process, limiting therefore the free participation of civil society. Cardoso (2016) described this situation as an “assault on the hope” of those who had been expecting better days with the declaration of independence.

LOPE was a ruling party imposition, a nonconsensual top-down contract that would guide the Cape-Verdean society, in all its spheres, for 5 years. Its exclusionary nature of other collective civic and political actors, explained the low growth and affirmation of those actors during that time span. Only 1% of CSOs existing in Cabo Verde in 2015 (Plataforma das ONGs, 2015) had been created from 1975 to 1980. This might have been a reflection of the aforementioned institutional context.

2.4.2 The Constitution of 1980

Five years after its independence, in September 1980, the Cape-Verdean state was finally adopted with what became its first constitution in *stricto sensu*, despite the observations made about LOPE in the preceding section. In its preamble, the constitution states that the

independence had set the ground for a “just, free and fraternal society”, values that are later enshrined in the chapter II, the citizens’ “fundamental rights, duties, freedoms and guarantees”. The rights enlisted from articles 25 to 48 include the rights to a family, health, education, association and freedom of expression, and economic rights. The 1980 constitution attributes the state the responsibility to both guarantee and protect those rights. However, rather than making it a sole obligation of the state, it also determines the need of citizens’ collaboration for the materialization of their constitutional rights. Such is the case stated in article 42: “Every citizen has the right to health protection, as well as the duty to promote and defend it themselves”. The citizens’ rights as well as their “duties” in the materialization of their constitutional rights are of fundamental importance in the reconfiguration of the social and political institutional settings for the civic engagement. The 1980 constitution opened new institutional possibilities, new windows and new “political opportunity structure” for civil society and their representative organizations to engage in the government policymaking and implementation.

The relationship between the state and the CSOs, and the roles reserved to these organizations are those enshrined in the articles 6 and 7 of chapter 1, article 47 of chapter 2, and article 94 of chapter 5. As for example, article 6 of chapter 1 articulates that, “the state of Cabo Verde promotes the creation and supports the actions of territorially decentralized collectivities endowed with autonomy as the law determines”¹². Article 7 of the same chapter adds on that by declaring that:

“1- The State supports and protects mass organizations and other legally recognized social organizations which, organized around specific interests, frame and foster popular initiative and ensure broad participation of the masses in the national reconstruction. 2 - The State, in exercising its duties, relies on mass organizations and other social organizations, to which it may transfer certain activities that they accept to assume. 3- The State creates conditions for the development of the material basis of mass organizations and other social organizations and protects their heritage” (CONST., 1980).

Despite making no reference to the concept of “civil society” or “civil society organizations” (concepts that became in vogue in late 1980s and 1990s), the nomenclatures used - “collectivities”, “mass organizations” and “social organizations”- showed that the constitution, as a political institution, opened new possibilities for the existence and affirmation of non-state actors, as well as their cooperation with the government. However, as mentioned earlier, it was just possibilities, as the ruling party still kept for itself the role of being the guide of the society

¹² The author himself has done the translations of all the constitutional articles presented throughout this work.

and the state (CONST., 1980, art. 4). Political pluralism was yet a dream to come true. Although the constitution did not directly prohibit the creation of political parties, the proposition stated in the article 4- “in the Republic of Cape Verde, the African Party of Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC-later in 1981, PAICV) is the leading political force of society and state”- was often interpreted as an institutional barrier for the creation and coexistence of any other political force along with PAICV in the market of political power in Cabo Verde. Nonetheless, mass-organizations were often proclaimed to be “autonomous” and “independent”, despite being under strict party-state surveillance and control. Mass organizations, rather than growing to challenge the state power, became quasi state or government agents in the implementation of public policies.

In addition to the aforementioned articles, the article 47 states that the “freedom of expression, assembly, association, demonstration and the freedom of religion are guaranteed under the conditions provided by the law”. Finally, article 94 stipulates that “the local power structures are part of a unitary state power [...] based on popular participation, relying on the initiative and creative capacity of local communities, and acting in close coordination with mass and other social organizations”. The content of this article focuses on the relationship between local government and associations, which together form a “unitary power structure”.

The state’s role in promoting and protecting mass organizations demonstrated its commitment to support and engage them in its governing activities. However, did the state’s protectionist and its paternalistic behaviors affect the “autonomy” of civic organizations, and so transform them into “predatory civil societies?” Fatton (1995). The reality was that within the existing political context, CSOs are encouraged to focus on ‘nonpolitical’ issues, by limiting their activities to the production and delivery of services rather than challenging the state (Bukenya and Hickey, 2014). In such a context, CSOs are weakly empowered to hold the state accountable for its governing actions. However, for the case of Cabo Verde, the state’s recognition of the importance of CSOs, the support and protection it provides to these organizations contributed to a certain extent to the affirmation and engagement of CSOs in “nonpolitical issues”. The state’s recognition of the importance of “mass organizations” as “development partners” in the “national reconstruction”, along with the foreign NGOs (Azevedo, 1995), was demonstrated with the creation of three public institutions, as part of government policy to promote and foster the incorporation of CSOs, and strengthen these organizations’ capacity to participate in the socioeconomic development of the country. These institutions are *The Instituto Nacional de Apoio às Cooperativas (INC)*, *Instituto Cabo-Verdiano de Solidariedade- ICS*, and *Fundo de Apoio às Cooperativas (FAC)*. By

implementing such policies and creating new institutional support for CSOs, the state was able to avoid and prevent, to a certain extent, the emergence of “contentious politics¹³” (Tarrow, 2011) throughout the single party regime.

It should be emphasized that 4% percent of the existing CSOs in 2015, emerged from 1980 to 1990, comparing to the 1% that had existed before 1980. This has been in part due to the new aforementioned constitutional provisions on citizens’ roles in the materialization of their granted rights. The fact that the state delegates responsibilities to associations, it prompts the appearance of other organizations interested in collaborating. The skepticism expressed by Costa (2013) and Cardoso (2016) over the existence of an independent civil society in the years following the independence of Cabo Verde, stands exactly on the state’s paternalistic relationship with CSOs, hampering therefore these organizations’ capacity to truly be the citizens’ independent voices. For these critics, the emerging organizations were “colonized” and “coopted” institutions at their outset, by the state itself, the political party or other particularistic interests. Such a situation, argues Costa (2013), has produced a “lethargic civic society” in Cabo Verde, unwilling and incapable to affirm itself as a societal power that can offset the state power, and create a desired power equilibrium in the Cape Verdean political system. As the state assumes to itself the protection of the civil organizations, by promoting their creations, providing funding, and keeping a surveilling eye on their activities, critics undermine the CSOs’ autonomy and independence as they lack any real power capacity to set their own agenda, or exercise any pressure on government. However, what the aforementioned critics have undermined, and often dismissed in their analyses of post-independence civil society in Cabo Verde, are the constitutional principles of CSOs’ engagement in the policy process, as we have seen in the constitutional articles aforementioned. The lethargy theory on Cape Verdean CSOs following the independence is questionable though, if one looks at their engagement from a cooperative and a collaborative governance principles, rather than taking them simply as counter power institutions, provocateurs or instigators of a state of “contentious politics”. If one looks at some of the initiatives taken by CSOs in areas like education, rural development and agricultural development, as well as the government’s policies to enhance their engagement in the aforementioned sectors, they will conclude that post-independent civil society in Cabo Verde had not been totally excluded from the governance process, as the critics claim. As Furtado states (1993), “the constitution of a civil society that can confront the state

¹³ “Contentious politics” – According to Tarrow (2011), it means “what happens when collective actors join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their claims or the claims of those they claim to represent” (p.4).

to a certain extent, brings a sense of change in the agricultural policy” (p.104) that was implemented in the 1980s. In fact, the agricultural policy drafted and implemented during the single-party regime offers a good example of the kind of relationship existing between the state and CSOs on policymaking and implementation. The increasing demands for agricultural products, and the state’s limited capacity for supply, motivated the agrarian policy reform in the 1980s. The farmers’ association, the *cooperativas*, and coordinated groups of emigrants emerged as actors who in conjunction with the government institutions, would give form to that policy through a bargaining process. As Furtado affirms,

“The different social actors, whether for or against the Agrarian Reform, will give concreteness and meaning to the proposals of the government in the social relation that surrounds them. The Basic Law of Agrarian Reform itself is the result and the reflection of these relations initiated by the antagonistic social actors. On the same token, the application of these laws depends on the correlation of forces between the social groups involved” (Furtado, 1993, p. 172).

What critics did not realize about the emergent CSOs in the years following the independence, as in other African post-independent countries, is that these organizations were not ripen enough, given the short period of their existence, to play the role as they could possibly be expected to play in the advanced democratic countries. As Makumbe (1998) states, “to expect Africa's civil society to be as vibrant and dynamic as that in some developed countries after so short a period is to be grossly inconsiderate” (p.310). Therefore, the state support for the CSOs was utmost important for the growth and consolidation of these organizations in Cabo Verde.

Even coopted institutions, by participating in the governance process, CSOs acquired important experiences that would help them in their maturation process, and calibrate their intervention strategies. The post-independence CSOs, whether with the state or foreign NGOs’ support, as the result of new institutional environment, were also agents that would ultimately bring changes to the very same institutional framework that had created them. It is their demand for political and institutional change – something they had been doing during the struggle for the independence, the “nationalist politics” (Chabal, 1992: 86) that had led colonial government officers to see CSOs as suspicious entities, and as elements that could pose threats and destabilize government activities. Therefore, their continuous struggle for institutional change, whether clandestinely or in an open competition with state agencies, weakens the argument that CSOs in Africa had been lethargic actors. The works of Bratton (1994, 2007), Diamond (1989, 1996, 2008), LeBas (2011), and Barmeo and Yashar (2016) witness the intervening role of CSOs in the democratization process in the continent. Specifically for the case of Cabo Verde, the CSOs during the single party regime, despite of their prominent “collaborative face”, there was a sector of civil society that adopted a contentious face (Ndegwa, 1996), and an antagonistic

stand against the state, in the defense of their constituents' interests (Furtado, 1993). The achievement of CSOs' interests is not only a matter of their power resource, as the pluralists would argue (Dahl, 1989; 2005). It is also a matter of a "positive governability" (Schmitter, 1974), and the "synergy" (Evans, 1997) created by linking themselves to the state as a way to strengthen government responsiveness and efficiency in service delivery to the population. The single party regime did try to create such a synergistic relationship.

In addition to the constitutional provisions and the creation of public policies targeted at promoting CSOs, PAICV government took other institutional initiatives to trigger the creation and expansion of civic organizations. These initiatives include the Law-Decree No. 50/80, of July 12 1980, which instituted the workers union, and mainly the Law-Decree No. 28/III/87, December 31, 1987, which guaranteed and regulated the citizens' rights to organize and create associations, as well regulating the activities of these organizations. These institutional steps, besides contributing to the emergence of new CSOs, they also strengthened their role and voices in the public sphere. As they were gaining technical and financial support from the international donors, CSOs' influence over government decisions was becoming more palpable. Even the CSOs heavily supported by the state, which was the example of OMCV (the Cape Verdean Women's Organization) organizations, supported protests against some state measures (Foy, 1988). Indeed, the government did not lose sight of the increasing number of CSOs, of their demands and protests. In October 1987, INC, ICS and FAC promoted a round-table discussion around the issue of cooperation between CSOs and government. That event attracted so much political attention and provoked an intense debate over the roles of CSOs in governance in Cabo Verde. The round-table was actually an "occasion" for the "affirmation" of CSOs in the country's political scenario (Azevedo, 1995, p. 4). The increasing number of CSOs, and their participation in the aforementioned roundtable received high appreciation from the international donors, such as the Northern NGOs. The attention and strength the CSOs were getting in the national political arena motivated the creation of a tripartite committee- The Coordination Committee of Non-Governmental Partners (CONG), with National NGOs, Foreign NGOs and governmental institutions, functioning as a platform for discussing and deciding over some of the important policy issues for the development of Cabo Verde.

In Cabo Verde, the institutional changes and the events described above are evidences of the existence of a participative civil society during the single-party regime, which downplays the critics who defend the opposite (Costa, 2013; Pina, 2013; Cardoso, 2016). They are wrong on their criticism as they "seem to have been more eager to philosophize on the possibility of civil society existing and flourishing in [Cabo Verde] than describe the forms and features of

actually existing civil society”, (Obadare, 2014, p. 2). Cabo Verde is then a case in the Third Wave late democratizers where CSOs, as civil society representatives, developed “two faces” (Ndengua, 1996): a captive and an accommodative face on the one hand, and a contentious face on the other. While the first was manifested through their engagement in government activities, the second was weakly manifested through discontentment and protests when the state affairs were conducted in a way that greatly differed from their consent. Such is the case of the aforementioned example with OMCV. Thus, CSOs in Cabo Verde during the single party regime acquired distinctive features in comparison to the other late Sub-Saharan late democratizers. How would CSOs engagement change with the inauguration of democracy in 1991, and the new institutional designs that followed? The next session will answer this question.

2.4.3 Democratic transition, Constitution of 1992 and Engagement of CSOs in Politics

The democratic transition in 1990 was the second major critical juncture (True et al, 2007), which opened windows of opportunity (Kingdom, 2014) in the Cape-Verdean political history for the change of the country policy direction. New “political opportunity structure” (Tarrow, 2011) emerged then for the adoption of new policies, exemplifying the CSOs engagement in governance. In the previous 15 years of single party regime, PAICV¹⁴ had been “the leading force of the state and society” (Const., 1980, art. 4), which had banned any attempts for the creation of open oppositional forces, whether political or not. However, in the late 1980s, a “concatenation of changes in the international political order- the end of Cold War, the collapse of socialism”, the demise of single party regimes and pressure from opposition groups occurring in many African countries influenced, the political regime change in Cabo Verde (Sanshes, 2013, p. 249). Cabo Verde, indeed, did not get off the hook of the diffusion process triggered by the third wave of democracy (Huntington, 1991). On the same token, in the national political spectrum, movements within PAICV had manifested some discontentment with the regime, and expressed some desire to change the political *status quo*. However, without totally discarding the influence of external or internal reasons, they were insignificant to force the regime change. The discontentment coming from *factions* within the party, as well as from actors of “political society” (Stepan, 1988), such as the political parties UPIVC, UDC and UCID, was not enough

¹⁴ Formerly PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde). In 1980, the military coups in Guinea Bissau led by the General Nino Vieira, led the Cape Verdean authorities to create their own and independent branch of the party, PAICV (Partido Africano Para a Independencia de Cabo Verde)

to provoke a revolutionary transition process to democracy in Cabo Verde. Indeed, as Baker argues, “PAICV had actually been liberalizing politically since the mid-1980s” (Baker, 2006, p. 495). The party had already considered changing the political regime, and so, at the end of the 1980s, it initiated a top-down negotiation process for the materialization of that purpose (Foy, 1988; Baker, 2006). In 1990, after PAICV had announced the political opening, it negotiated the transition term with the discontents, and the steps forward to carry out such a change. Thus, Cabo Verde had a “pacted transition” (Fernandes, 2014, p.16), or a negotiated transition among elites into democracy, rather than a revolutionary transition (Baker, 2006, 2009). The first and utmost important step towards that change had been the constitutional reform, which dropped the article 4 of the 1980 constitution. This article stated the following:

“1. In the Republic of Cabo Verde, the African Party of Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC, which changed to PAICV in the end of 1980) is the leading political force of society and the state. 2. In carrying out its historic mission, the PAIGC plays its leading role on the basis of this Constitution, and shall be designated as follows: a) Establish the general bases of the political, economic, social, cultural, defense and security by the State; b) Define the stages of the National Reconstruction and establish the ways of its realization” (CONST., 1980, art. 4).

The drop of the article 4 inaugurated the introduction of political pluralism in Cabo Verde, ending the monopoly of political power and the censorship against oppositionist actors (Furtado, 2016) in place since 1975. A new political party soon emerged in consequence of that institutional reform, the Movement for Democracy (MPD). This party ended up winning the first multiparty parliamentary elections held on January 13 in 1991, with a landslide victory. Only MPD and PAICV ran for this election, as the other political parties- the banned UPICV and UDC, and UCID could not organize in due time to run for the election.

The change in the aforementioned macro political system, as the new streams of politics, would ultimately create “political opportunity structures” for the adoption of institutional designs to engage CSOs in governance. Thus, the analysis in this section will focus on the new constitution of 1992 and its framing of CSOs’ engagement in the government policy process in the democratic period. The focus will also covers its subsequent revisions, and other legislations produced from 1991 to 2016 to promote CSOs engagement in governance.

2.4.4 The Constitution of 1992 and the framing of CSOs

Cabo Verde’s transition to democratic regime in 1991, as I have stated above, was the second major “window of opportunity” for the adoption of new policies in the country. The new ruling party (MPD), under the influence of neoliberal ideals, introduces major institutional changes, encompassing political, social and economic spheres. Without any doubt, the adoption of the

new constitution in 1992 has been the most important institutional innovation in this new era. The constitution, in its preamble defines Cabo Verde as a “democratic state with a vast list of rights, liberties, and guarantees to citizens, the concept of the dignity of the human being as the absolute value which is supreme over the State itself”. In addition, it determines the adoption of a “system of government with a balance of power between the various national institutions” (CONST., 1992). Furthermore, the constitution defines as the state’s fundamental objective to be the “realization of economic, political, social, and cultural democracy, and the construction of a free, just, and cooperative society (CONST., 1992, art. 1).

The statement, “system of government with a balance of power between the various national institutions” depicts the basic principle of the liberal democracy ideology, characteristic of the pluralistic, or the *poliarchy* regimes (Dahl, 2005). Power, in this regime, has a diffusing nature, dispersed in a plurality of actors. In the case of Cabo Verde, with the inauguration of the democratic regime, these actors would be the new state sovereign political institutions, on the one hand, and the non-state actors, on the other. The former comprises of the government (executive), the parliament (legislative), the courts (judiciary) and the president of the republic. These independent political actors would have their power limited according to the principle of the separation of powers. However, these institutions are still members and representatives of the same and a bigger entity, the state. Despite having separate and constitutionally bounded powers, and being checkers of each one, they belong to the same structure. Yet, the central issue of the representative democracy remained: Who would check the state’s power? In addition to that, who would check that the elected institutions would commit themselves to fulfil their roles as representatives of the people, and not serve their own interests? These questions, as we have seen in the previous section, would set the ground for the re-emergence of the second set of institutions, the CSOs, and their engagement in the governance process. CSOs, on the one hand would be the state’s checker regarding the materialization of the citizens’ constitutionally granted rights – *the constitutionalism*-, and on the other hand, they would be participating in that materialization of those rights themselves, by engaging in government policymaking and implementation processes. The constitution itself determines that the state shares responsibilities with CSOs for the realization of the individual rights. This calling for citizens’ participation, through organized civic groups, reinforced the synergistic relationship (Evans, 1997) and associative government practices (Cohen and Roger, 1995; Hirst, 1994) over policy deliberations and implementations.

The framing of CSOs’ engagement in policy process in Cabo Verde in the constitution of 1992 is enshrined in the chapters “*Fundamental principles*” and “*fundamental rights and*

duties". Such framings could be analyzed from two different perspectives: On the one hand, the institutional designs (principles and citizens' rights) that frame the creation of associations and regulation of their activities, and secondly, the engagement of these associations in government policymaking and implementation. Concerning the former perspective, the articles 7-f; 22, No. 2; 29, No.2, and article 51, define the state's role in promoting the creation of new associations. As an example, *article 51* illustrates the nature of civil society groups, referred to in the constitution as "associations":

"1-The constitution of associations shall be free, and shall need no administrative authorization. 2- Associations shall pursue their aims freely and without interference of the state authorities. 3- The dissolution of associations or the suspension of their activities can only be determined by judicial decisions and in accordance with the law. 4- Armed, military or paramilitary associations and those intended to promote violence, racism, xenophobia or dictatorship, or which pursue purposes contrary to the existing criminal law shall be prohibited. 5- Nobody shall be compelled to associate or to remain associated" (CONST, 1998, *art. 51*).

This article makes it clear that the state should refrain itself from any interference in the formation and the business of associations, except for the case of the associations that are operated illegally, and which pursue interests contrary to the country's laws. Other than that, individuals form associations as their interests fit, and they do not need state's authorization to do so. However, similar to the constitution of 1980, the constitution of 1992 gives the state a heavy responsibility to promote and support CSOs. The following extracts support this argument:

"the state and society shall support the creation of youth organizations for cultural, artistic, recreational, sports, and educational pursuits" (art. 71); "encourage and support the creation of institutions and public and private associations which promote education and the defense of national culture." (Art. 79); "[...] stimulate the formation of associations and sports collectivities" (art.82, No. 2); and finally, "the public authorities foster and help consumers' association [...]" (art. 79, No.2).

If the state does not interfere in the creation and management of associations, it is still its responsibility to "stimulate" their creation as well as providing them with institutional support.

In the second perspective, the constitution frames CSOs and their engagement in the policy process, as collaborative actors with "duties" in the realization of their granted rights. The "duties" are understood here as their participation in the formation and implementation of policies to guarantee their enjoyment of such rights. For example, in the sector of education, article 49, No.6, acknowledges the state's non-exclusiveness and the importance of other actors in "creating schools and education establishments". The articles 75, 76, 77, and 78, define the role of the state in promoting the participation of associations in education, culture and sports. In addition to that, art. 71, No. 4, determines that,

“the state, in cooperation with parents’ associations, private institutions and youth organizations, will adopt a national policy for youth, which shall promote and foster professional training for the young people, access to first jobs and a free intellectual and physical development of youth” (CONST., art. 71, No. 4).

Another example of CSOs’ participation in the policy process is the workers’ unions. Article 63 defines the rights of workers’ union to participate in concertation dialogues with government, and in the formation of policies and institutions concerning the workers’ rights. In addition, in the area of social protection, article 72, No.2, determines that “the state, in cooperation with private entities and the handicapped or elderly associations, shall promote national policies which will gradually” guarantee the accomplishment of these groups’ rights. The same engagement principle of associations applies for the housing (art. 69), and family policies (art. 88). Finally, the constitution frames the engagement of civic organizations in local government in the article 260, by stating that “the local authorities can delegate administrative tasks in the community organizations, which do not involve the exercise of authority powers”. The engagement of CSOs in education, rural development, elaboration and implementation of GPRSP, and in local government, will be dealt with in more details in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively.

The two perspectives on the constitutional framings of CSO’s engagement in the constitution of 1992 described above, allow the drawing of two conclusions. On the one hand, the constitution conceives the state to be the main responsible institution regarding the creation of a supportive environment for CSOs to operate freely and autonomously from state interference. On the other hand, CSOs are framed as state’s partners in providing for the fulfillment of the citizens’ rights. Unlike the constitution of 1980 that had granted the state/party (PAICV) the sole responsibility over the citizens’ welfare, and defines the CSOs as its extension agencies in carrying out that task, the 1992 constitutions conceives CSOs as independent partners, and with a substantive role in providing services independently from the state control. However, the state in the constitution of 1992 continues to be a “welfare state [...], and provider of goods and services” (Silva, 2004, p. 86), very similar to what the 1980 constitution had stated, despite the differences shown in this chapter. The institutional settings for a wider participation of the CSOs in the 1990s was also in part due to the expansion of the welfare state.

The constitutional reform of 1999 re-dimensioned the state’s role, ideologically associated with the crises of the welfare state (Silva, 2004), by minimizing its intervention and transferring some key service provisions to the hands of private entities for efficiency reasons (Pierson, 1994). In respect to the social services delivery, the constitution reform of 1999

replaced the concept “state” for the “public powers”, and so, reducing the state intervention, by introducing a plurality of institutions to provide those services. As Miranda (2004) argues, the most important thing about constitutionalism is a non-authoritarian and statist realization of citizens’ consecrated rights. What matters is that citizens themselves and their representative organizations participate in the realization of such rights (Miranda, 2004).

However, despite the different conceptions the two constitutions of 1980 and 1992 have of CSOs, one thing remains constant: the recognition of those organizations as important agencies in providing services for the materialization of citizens’ rights. Nevertheless, “the constitution norms which confer [the rights of association and participation] are not rules of the game as such: they are preliminary rules which allow the game to take place” (Bobbio, 1987, p. 25). In this regard, both constitutions set the macro-institutional boundaries for the game to take place, but there should be other detailed norms specifying the moves the players are supposed to make for the realization of their intended purposes. This is the *constitutionalism in practice* with regards of CSOs engagement. To what extent have the constitutional precepts on CSOs’ engagement been actually implemented? This question will be answered in the subsequent chapters. In this work, I take the aforementioned detailed norms to be the legislations on CSOs’ engagement produced by the two governments of PAICV and MPD from 1975 through 2016. Table 2.2 summarizes these legislations.

Table 2.2. Legislations on civic participation in Cabo Verde from 1975-2015

<i>Legislations produced</i>	<i>Periods:</i>	<i>Ruling party in power</i>
1. Ordinance No. 8/1976, of March 26, that approves the statutes of <i>Caritas Caboverdiana</i> , granting it the status of a public utility institution.	1975-1990	PAIGC/CV
2. Law-Decree No. 108/1984, November 3, which establishes the Red Cross of Cape Verde as an International Non-Governmental Institution.		
3. Law No. 28/III of December 31, 1987. This Law defines the general legal framework of constitutions of not-for-profit organizations		
4. Law-Decree No. 34/88, of 17 April, which regulates the general purposes, the constitution and the organization of the officially recognized Sports Associations.		
5. The Law decree No. 170/91, November 27-institutionalizes liberty for workers’ association, and banned the “union monopoly in the country” and introduced competitiveness in the sector.	1991-2000	MPD
6. Law No. 106/IV/94, September 5 (Defines fiscal incentives to NGOs		
7. Law Decree No. 3/1999, of 29 March- that approves the Code of commercial enterprises, with specific provisions on cooperative societies.		
8. Law No. 25/VI/2003 of 21 July 2003. This Law defines general legal framework of constitutions of not-for-profit organizations (this law revoked the Law No. 28/III of December 31, 1987.	2001-2016	PAICV
9. Law No. 26/VI/2003, July 21, 2003- which institutionalizes youth associations.		

10. Law No. 35/VI/2003, 15 September, which approves the Code of commercial enterprises, with specific provisions on cooperative societies, in the ambit of rural poverty alleviation program.		
11. Patronage Law (Law No. 45/VI/2004, 2 July) which was seen as a mechanism to promote cooperation between businesses and CSOs, while the former benefit from state fiscal incentives.		
12. Law Decree No. 59, September 19, 2005- which defines the legal framework of collective organizations of public utility.		
13. Law-Decree No. 42/2010, of 27 September, which approves the Volunteering scheme.		
14. Law No. 69 / VII / 2010, 16 August, which defines three categories of non-profit civil society organization: 1) Private non-profit organization, "CSO", Non-Governmental Organization, NGO, and 3) Community Association.		
15. Lei n.º74/VII/2010, 16 August, regulates the participation of CSOs in Public Private Partnership (PPP)		
16. Law-Decree No. 42/2010, of 27 September, which approves the regime for the volunteer sector.		
17. Law No. 17/2011, 21 February, which defines the legal system applicable to housing and construction cooperatives.		
18. Regulatory Decree No. 7/2011 of 7 March, which defines the Legal Regime of Voluntary Service.		
19. Law No. 25/2012, of September 30 that creates the National Volunteer Corps.		
20. Law No. 64 / VIII / 2014, of May 16, that defines the juridical regimes of religion and worshiping.		
21. Law-Decree No. 34/2016 of 5 May, which defines the juridical regime of access and exercise of funeral activity, reserved for agencies and mutual societies.		
22. Government Ordinance No. 27/2013, of 17 April, which establishes the rules and procedures for granting financial support to associations and non-governmental organizations.		
23. Government Ordinance No. 13/2016 of 18 March, which defines the terms for the registry private collective entities in the Registry Office.		
24. Law No. 83/VIII/2015, of 16 January, which defines the microfinance activity regime and its institutions, with specific provisions for mutual societies and savings and credit cooperatives, considering them as non-profit institutions.		
25. Law No. 114 /VIII/2016, of 21 March, which defines the status of organizations of the Developmental Civil Society Organization (OSCD)		
26. Law No. 122 / VIII / 2016 of 24 March, approving the juridical regime of the social and solidary economy.		


Source: (Santos, 2016; Collection done by the author)

Table 2.2 displays chronologically all the major legislations, including laws and government decrees, produced from 1975 up to 2016, as institutional tools that frame CSOs engagement in policy process in Cabo Verde. Figure 2.2 below displays graphically these legislations distributed per government terms from 1975 until 2016.

From a total of 26 identified legislative acts dealing directly with CSOs, enacted from 1975 to March 2016, we can see that in the two first PAICV government terms from 1975 to 1985, the rate was very low, below 5%, representing 1 legislation for each term. In the PAICV

government before democratization in 1990, the rate increased to 8%, representing 2 legislative acts enacted in this period.

Figure 2.2- Distribution of Legislations on CSOs engagement (1975-2016)



Source: (Elaboration of the author)


Between 1991 until 2000, with MPD in power, the rate of legislation continued standing at 8%, keeping the trend from the last PAICV government. The exponential increase of legislations, as the graph shows, started in 2001, with the PAICV in power again. Between 2001 and 2005, the first PAICV’s term in the democratic regime, five legislations were enacted, representing 19% of the total twenty-six existing legislations. This percentage decreased to 15% in the following term, to increase dramatically again to 35% in the last term (2012-2016), representing 9 legislative acts.

To what extent did the above distribution of the formal legislative acts influence the growth of the CSOs along these years? If we look at figure 2.3, a visual representation of the growth of CSOs and the percentage-growth of the legislations enacted along the years, suggests the existence of some association between the two variables.

A clean visual look at the graph allows the drawing of two main conclusions: Firstly, CSOs grew in tandem with the increase of legislations enacted throughout the period being analyzed. The growth of CSOs took off from 1990 and grew exponentially in the first decade of 2000¹⁵. One can also observe how the density of legislations grew over that period.

¹⁵ The years 2001/2011 and 2012/2016 refers to the legislations

Figure 2.3- Growth of CSOs vs. the density of legislations on CSOs engagement



Source: (Elaboration of the author)

Was it the growth of CSOs and their demands that led to the production of more laws, or vice versa? They have both influenced one another. The new political context, in addition to the new legal framework adopted have influenced the growth of CSOs, on the same way that the growth of CSOs, by demanding institutional adjustments for their incorporation in governance, has also pushed for the adoption of new legislations to meet their demands. This latter case is explained by the theory of “policy activism”, as Tavits (2006) describes it.

The second observation is that the highest growth of CSOs and legislations took place in the years with PAICV in power. The periods corresponding 2011-2015 and 2012-2016 cannot yet be compared to the previous ones as they cover only four-years. However, the high percentage of legislations verified here is due to two set of reasons: on the one hand, the opportunities created by pro-CSOs policies (PRPL, for example), and on the second hand, the return of PAICV to power, a party that is ideologically more open to CSOs’ participation in government policy process than its rival MPD, a pro-market party.

To what extent have the institutional changes in the 1990s altered the relationship pattern between the state and the CSOs? It is clear that the institutional designs implemented in that period ended the political control over the creation and functioning of the civil society organizations. However, the principle of CSOs participation in government policy-making and implementation processes remained the same. In the democratic era, the central government remains as the state’s leading resource manager and distributor, and so, continues to enjoy great discretion over the engagement of non-state actors in the government activities. If CSOs gain more freedom to express their demands, the access to the state resources still depends greatly on the government discretion. Then, what can explain such maintenance of CSOs engagement

pattern in the policy-making and implementation processes? My argument is that the relationship pattern established between the state and the CSOs during the authoritarian regime, defined the path that would influence their relationship in the years to come. Civil society organizations were seen as important actors that should work collaboratively with the government to reconstruct and develop the Cape Verdean nation. Therefore, they had to be protected and supported by state, so that they could carry out their attributed roles. These organizations, bounded by political institutional constraints, since very early developed a spirit of dependency on the paternalistic state and its resources to operate. They developed a collaborative mindset, rather than being challengers to the state. The discourse of CSOs as collaborators in the development process, as long as their dependency on the government resources to function, remain practically unaltered with the advent of democracy. This institutional path dependency (Pierson, 1994) traced early in the beginning of the independence of the country, justifies the kind of the existing relationship between CSOs and the government today.

Despite the argument above presented, the growth and engagement of CSOs differ depending on the political opportunities created. As figure 2.1 shows, CSOs grew differently in the 1990s than in the 2000s. It can also be noted that the load of legislations differ in the two periods. Thus, what explains this difference lies in the windows and political opportunities (Kingdom, 2014; Tarrow, 2011) available for the emergence and engagement of CSOs.

2.4.5 The return of PAICV to power in 2001: A new era for CSOs?

The third window of opportunity for the reemergence of CSOs and their engagement occurred in 2001 with the return of PAICV to power. PAICV has been described as a party that was born from the masses, and so, it has umbilical linkages with mass organizations and civil society groups. Unlike PAICV, MPD was a political party born out of a circumstantial event- the *abertura política* announced in 1990. It was predominantly formed by an elite fraction within the PAICV itself, and other cadres within the state administrative machine. Thus, genetically, MPD has no link with the masses. The return of PAICV to power in 2001 animated again the hope of civil society actors to get a closer linkage and develop “synergistic relationships” with the state. Here, the *party ideology* matters to a great extent for the incorporation of CSOs in governance, as it influences the policy packages to be adopted and implemented as a reflection of the interests and the preferences of the party’s constituents (Schmidt, 1996; Hibbs, 1997; Tavits, 2006; Kitschelt, 2000). Thus, PAICV’s ideological orientation influenced positively the

creation of opportunities that would ease the engagement of CSOs in the governance process. I argue that for the case of Cabo Verde, PAICV, a leftist family-party, has created a greater space and opportunities for the inclusion of CSOs in the policy process than the MPD, a right-policy oriented party. Such a claim is supported from the load of legislative initiatives taken by the two parties, and the quick expansion of CSOs in the 2000s (*see tables 2.2 and graph 2.1*). However, the party ideology argument should not be taken as an isolated determinant. Actually, it gives corpus to the institutional and the multiple streams arguments. When in power, these two parties differ from each other only in the institutional arrangements, practices and narratives they support and construct to incorporate or exclude CSOs in the governance process.

The evolution of CSOs in Cabo Verde, as well as the pattern of their engagement in the governance process, as we have seen so far, have been influenced by the institutional opportunity structures created throughout the history of the country. These opportunities are enshrined in the formal rules, institutional practices and the narratives constructed by both political and CSOs leaders. Actually, narrative is the essential element for the legitimation of institutions (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013).

The legislations listed in the table 2.2 set the formal institutional boundaries for the operation of CSOs and their relationship with the state, within the boundaries of the constitution. As we have seen earlier, formal rules constrain as much as they allow CSOs to exist and engage in the governance process. Rules define the “appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1984) of CSOs interference with the governance process. Comparing the amount of legislations produced between 1990 and 2015, one easily sees that in the 2000s, the “appropriateness”, or the extension of CSOs engagement was much more widened in comparison to what had happened in the 1990s.

However, the institutionalization of CSOs in Cabo Verde in the aforementioned period has been also part of a legacy of former practices of solving collective problems individuals had been using throughout their oppressive history. Since the colonial period, Cape Verdeans had discovered in the “art of association” (Tocqueville, 1998) an important strategy to resist the oppression and address their common hardships. The already cited examples of cooperatives, agricultural associations, *tabanka*, rotating credit organizations, the social practice of *djunta mon*, meaning literally “joining hands”, and other forms of mutual helps, had been (and they are in the lower segments of population) some of the collective strategies embedded in the Cape Verdean tradition. The cultural practices of association in Cabo Verde had been a reality long before the independence. Baltazar Lopes da Silva (1997) exemplified such a culture in his immortal and classic novel, *Chiquinho*. It was often an expected practice for, in the years that

anticipated the independence, the colonial powers to meet the non-political *forças vivas* for consultations on matters concerning the administration of the colony. Therefore, the long tradition of associative practices in Cabo Verde, gained momentum with the democratic political regime in the 1990s, motivating therefore the adoption of formal institutional practices to strengthen the engagement of CSOs. The third institutionalization process is the narrative constructed by different set of actors to legitimize and give strength to the practices of CSOs engagement in governance. The narratives vary in favor or against the engagement, depending on the actors' interests. The main narrative in Cabo Verde in favor of CSOs engagement focuses on their roles as important partners for “cooperative development”, and as promoters of a sustainable and inclusive development. The argument for the involvement of mass organizations in the government programs after the independence was that the construction of the nation required the joint efforts of its people. This argument has been maintained throughout the years, though the institutional practices and the legislations that support them have changed considerably. In its last term from 2011 to 2016, PAICV government enacted several legislative measures to strengthen the engagement of CSOs. Such measures aimed at creating “all the legal mechanisms to allow a better regulation of ONGs, guaranteeing equality of opportunities to the access of public funds, and provide the best conditions for the work of all the NGOs and other CSOs in the country” (former Prime Minister José Maria Neves, in *A Semana*, 27 January 2016). Such policies, argue the Prime Minister, is to continue empowering the CSOs in the important work they do for the development of the nation.

On the other hand, the opposition party along with the presidents of local City Councils (*Câmaras Municipais*) have been very skeptical on the government funding of CSOs- mainly the local community based organizations, as part its policy implementation strategies. In the last PAICV government term from 2012 to 2016, these skeptical actors argue that the local community based organizations were receiving more funds from central government to execute contracted projects than the City Councils were. In addition, these local government politicians have been strongly accusing the central government of favoritism, for benefiting CSOs that are “friends” to their supporting parties, while ignoring the law that regulates such financing scheme. All these arguments were presented in the support of the narrative against the CSOs incorporation in the public policy implementation.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the institutional analysis of CSOs engagement in politics and governance processes in Cabo Verde. The effort has been put on determining the institutional variables that influence the growth and the political engagement of CSOs. Three main critical junctures have occurred in the history of Cabo Verde, which subsequently have opened policy windows for institutional designs and opportunities to promote representative organizations and their participation in the governance process: the independence in 1975, the inauguration of democracy in 1990, and finally, the return of PAICV to power in 2001. Despite being strictly controlled by the state power during the single party regime from 1975 to 1990, CSOs gained space in the governance process, as they were considered key actors for the “reconstruction of the nation”. In the 1990s, CSOs gained their political independence from the state. However, the introduction of market economy and neoliberal policies in the country relegated the CSOs to a less prominent position, regarding their participation in government policy-making and implementation. Nevertheless, the growth of CSOs registered in the 1990s was in fact, due in part to the institutional changes, mainly the constitution, that guaranteed the rights and freedoms to citizens to create associations without any political constraints. In addition to that, the growth of CSOs in the 1990s had also been for the adoption of socially unfriendly policies, leading people to form organizations as strategies for collective production and supply of public goods. In the 2000s, the PAICV government brought new political and institutional atmosphere that have favored a revitalization of CSOs. The quick growth of CSOs registered in the 2000s can be attributed to a pro-engagement policy, backed by the load of legislations produced.

della Porta asserts that “democracy develops with the permanent contestation of power” (2013, p. 5). CSOs and social movements are in the best position to lead such a contestation, as they are in a closer relationship with the disenfranchised segments of population, and those the political power mostly forget to provide for. However, the CSOs’ contestation of power does not aim at occupying power, but simply getting the right to participate in the table of policy-making and implementation, or at least, the right to show their discontentment. This right claiming is to guarantee a continuous participation of citizens in the government process, strengthening therefore the *check and balance* principle required for a healthy functioning of democracy. However, how can citizens participate in the government decision process? Within constitutional framework, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), as they have been conceived in this work, are the bridges that lead people, the common touch, into the government affairs in order to influence their decision, promote democracy and a sustainable economic growth.

**PART II: ENGAGEMENT OF CSOs IN THREE SECTORAL POLICIES: Education,
Rural Development and GPRSPs**

CHAPTER III- ENGAGEMENT OF CSOs IN EDUCATION

3.1 Introduction

The pioneering study of James Coleman (1988) on the impact of social capital on education triggered a number of subsequent studies on the field of education (Dika and Singh, 2002; Acar, 2011; Bankston, 2004; Francis, 1998; Israel, Beaulieu and Hartless, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Sun, 1999), with various results on the relationship between those two variables. This interest has also attracted government policymakers and international multilateral institutions and development agencies. However, these studies have been narrowly oriented to focus on the community's bonding and bridging dimensions of social capital (Woolcok, 1998, 2000), and their influence on the educational outcomes in a polity. To a certain extent, researches on the influence of social capital on education have overlooked the role of *linking social capital* - the relationship between society organizations (CSOs) and the institutions of power, the government, in the design and implementation of education policies. Putting it differently, how does the government network with society's social capital institutions (CSOs) to formulate and implement education policies? To what extent does this networking enhance the educational achievements in a polity? Without undermining the value of the bonding and bridging dimensions of social capital, this chapter focuses on its linking dimension to analyze the design and implementation of education policies in Cabo Verde. The analysis presented here builds on empirical data collected through interviews with some key stakeholders in the education sector, including former government officers, leaders of teachers' unions, and leaders of CSOs specialized in education. In addition to that, a comprehensive examination of government and statistical reports have been carried out for the purpose of this research.

The chapter is organized into five parts. The first part focuses on the historical contextualization of CSOs' involvement in education planning and service delivery in Cabo Verde. The second part looks at the constitutionalization of the rights to education, and the constitutional framing of CSOs' participation in the education policy process. Next, the focus is put on the empirical evidences of CSOs engagement in the education policy process. The fourth part builds on the third one to analyze the theoretical linkages between social capital and education in the Cape Verdean context. Finally, the chapter ends with a conclusion, reflecting on the policy implications concerning the impacts of social capital on education in the context of Cabo Verde.

3.2 Historical contextualization of CSOs' engagement in education sector in Cabo Verde

The engagement of non-state actors in the education sector lies deep down in the Cape Verdean history. From the onset of the colonization and the slavery trade in Cabo Verde, the colonial government developed an educational and instruction system to serve its purposes of culture assimilation, and the slave business trade. Indeed, by the XIX century, the country became a “training center” for public service workers, who would be transferred to other colonies to work in the public administration, as soon as they finished their training in Cabo Verde. However, the top position of Cabo Verde in the sector of education process in relation to other colonies, was in part due to the historical development of slavery business on its land, and the role the church played in this process. The Catholic Church implanted itself in Cabo Verde from the very beginning of the colonization process. This institution, under the protection of the kingdom, took a key role in the “evangelization of the souls” and the “ladinization” of the slaves, as a process of making them more profitable “goods” for the slavery market. The ladinization process consisted in the teachings of the basic Christianity principles and the baptism of the “new comers” (slaves) to the Island of Santiago, and a rudimentary knowledge of “lengua Portuguesa” (Portuguese language). All these “education” activities were aimed at valuing the “goods” before being exported to the Americas (Carreira, 2000). The *ladinization process* was such a profitable business for the state and the church that, according to Carreira, “the king instructed D. António Salgado, Governor of Cabo Verde [...] to built enough facilities in Santiago Island, where the slaves could be ‘educated and instructed’ before their departure to Brazil, the Antilles and other parts of America” (2000, p. 272). The king’s order, despite being challenged by the Cape Verdean Provincial government officials, would have to be executed and monitored in conjunction with the church officials. This *evangelistic mission* (to a certain extent, Machiavellian) of the church, which in reality was nothing more than a marketing strategy for the slavery business, could in fact be seen as an embryonic step towards the relationship between state and non-state actors in the sector of education.

With the decline of the slavery trade, and the separation of the state from the church in Portugal in 1911, the colonial government started to give more attention to the education policy in the Cape Verdean colony. Such an attention shift was in part due to the increasing need to supply the state administration with sufficient and qualified staff, not only in Cabo Verde, but also in the other Portuguese colonies in Africa. Nevertheless, the imperial state’s intervention in the education planning never ousted the church participation, as the state itself had been incapable to “educate the natives”. In addition, the church continued to play an important role

in the establishment of “the lusitan values” in the colonies (Moniz, 2008, p. 224). The decline of the slavery trade made the government change its focus now to the administration of Cabo Verde, as the colony lost its prominence in that business. In this regard, the church’s role became even more evident with the creation of the first Seminar in Cabo Verde in 1570, “*The Seminar of S. Thiago on the Island of Cabo Verde*” under the auspices of the resident Bishop. Beyond the ecclesiastic training, the religious seminars played an important role in the training of ruling elites in the early days of the colonization. Even in the late years of colonization with the statute of the Missionaries in the archipelago issued in 1941, the teaching of the natives was at the hand of priests and missionary brothers from Metropole (Moniz, 2008).

The state’s commitment to strengthen education services in the country became more salient with the creation of seminaries outside Santiago Island. Despite being built and run by the Catholic Church, these teaching institutions needed government consent and acknowledgment for their functioning. In 1866, the “Seminar of Cabo Verde” in the island of São Nicolau entered into the annals of the country, for being the first teaching institution built outside Santiago Island. In 1892, this institution was baptized, “Seminário Liceu”. Until 1917, it served as the only secondary teaching establishment in the country, training priests and bureaucrats (Ramos, 2012) for public administrative machinery. With its extinction in 1917, the “Liceu Nacional de Cabo Verde”, better known as “Liceu Gil Eanes” in São Vicente was established on the very same year, and it lived until the independence in 1975. The name *Gil Eanes* was replaced to “Liceu Ludgero Lima” in that same year. All these events characterize a period (until 1975) which the education actors and their policies did not aim at serving Cabo Verde, but the kingdom of Portugal. The collaboration between the colonial state and the church in the formation and implementation of education policies had the sole purpose of establishing the values, cultures and meeting the developmental goals of the kingdom.

The independence in 1975 was a “critical juncture” (True, Jones, and Baumgartner, 2007) which changed the policy directions in Cabo Verde across all sectors. Now, the power to make and implement policies rests in the hands of the country’s own leaders, who have to decide for their country’s destiny. In the sector of education, the government partnerships with civil society actors nevertheless continues. Besides the church, other non-state actors with intervention in the education sector emerged and evolved over the years. The analysis in this chapter looks at the emergence of these actors, the CSOs, and their relationship with the state/government in the education policymaking and implementation processes in the post-independence era, with a major focus on the democratic period- 1990 to 2015. This analysis is theoretically framed under the concepts of linking social capital. Governance is understood here

as an institutional framework that conceives governing process based on “self-organizing” and inter-organizational networks” (Rhodes, 1996, p. 652), for the planning and delivery of public service (Salamon, 1995; Osborne, 2010; Boris and Steurle, 2017). It is an institutionalized “synergistic relationship” (Evans, 1997) involving state institutions and actors of civil society in the processes of public policymaking and implementation.

The linking social capital is, to a certain extent, the resource emanating from the aforementioned institutional “synergistic relationship”. Thus, linking social capital is better understood as the CSOs’ “capacity to leverage resources, ideas and information from formal institutions beyond the community [-ies they serve], most notably the state” (Woolcock, 2002, p. 23). The engagement of CSOs (the nonprofit organizations) in this network of relationship with the state is analyzed from three perspectives: CSOs as supplementary, complementary and adversarial institutions to the state. However, before getting into this analysis, this section starts with the constitutional framing of the educational rights, and the institutional boundaries to CSOs’ participation in the materialization of such rights. The central questions addressed in this section are: *what are the institutional anchoring of CSOs engagement in the education policies in Cabo Verde? What form of relationship, or partnership do CSOs maintain with the government in the planning and delivery of education services? Finally, what are the outcomes of CSOs and government relationship, in the form that it takes, in the process of planning and delivery of education services in Cabo Verde within the period analyzed?*

3.3 The constitutional framing of CSOs’ engagement in education policy in Cabo Verde

The constitution of 1980 states that “all citizens have the right to education” and that it is the state’s sole responsibility to “gradually promote free education and an equal possibility of access to different levels of education for all citizens” (CONST., 1980, art. 44). It adds that through education system, the state aims to provide an “integral education” for the citizens and their integration into the community where they live. Furthermore, it determines that it is the “state’s most fundamental task” (CONST., 1980, art. 15) to eradicate illiteracy in the country. It can be inferred from these constitutional provisions that there was a strong state centralization regarding the responsibility to plan and provide the education services. The sociopolitical context in the 1980s, dominated by the single party regime, favored such centralism, leaving therefore limited freedom for a free and unconstrained formation and participation of autonomous non-state actors in the education policymaking process.

With the inauguration of democracy in 1990, and the adoption of a new constitution in 1992, there was not only an extension of the social and political rights granted to citizens, but also new institutional infrastructures were born for the materialization of these rights. Part of these infrastructures, along with political institutions, were the civil society institutions that started booming in the 1990s, achieving their peak in the first decade of 2000s. The rapid growth of these institutions is explained by two sets of reasons: on the one hand, by the political institutional changes and the political opportunity structures they generated (the election of a new party into power, the constitution and the subsequent policies on CSOs engagement) - the institutional explanation. On the other hand, by the increasing demand of citizens for the accomplishment of their constitutional rights to education and other social rights- the social capital explanation.

With respect to educational rights, the 1992 constitution stipulates in its article 73 that, “**1.** Everyone shall have the right to education; **2.** the state shall assure universal primary education, free and compulsory...” and finally, “all education shall be supported by State taxation”. Here the state calls to its responsibility the financial costs of education, taking therefore the burden off the families’ shoulders, preventing their financial constraints to be an impediment for them to enjoy their constitutional rights. Therefore, “the state shall guarantee to poor students access to the various levels of education, and shall promote a policy of granting scholarships and financial aid based on the capacity and personal merit of the student” (CONST., 1992, art. 74). These constitutional provisions would give corps and support to the major education policies formatted and implemented in the subsequent years. However, it should be emphasized that this welfare state style was inherited from the previous single party regime, which had already developed and implemented some social welfare policies in the country.

However, despite calling to itself the responsibility of promoting policies for the materialization of the education rights, the 1992 constitution, unlike the 1980 one, opened the window for the emergence of new actors, the non-state actors, to participate in the education policy process. In its article 75, the constitution declares that,

“The State shall recognize private and cooperative education, and shall guarantee private entities and institutions and cooperatives the right to create schools of different levels, as provided by law”. [In addition,] “the State shall cooperate with private or cooperative schools to promote and enlarge the educational system, to eliminate illiteracy, to promote permanent education, to improve the quality of education, to train and retrain teachers, and other conditions necessary for the improvement of education” (CONST., 1992, art. 75).

This constitutional provision defines the institutional basis for the establishment of a complementary relationship between government and nongovernment actors. Such a complementarity principle defined the ground for the democratization of the education sector by setting institutional arrangements to allow CSOs to engage and participate in the formation and implementation of education policies. This democratization process opened windows of opportunity for CSOs to participate as, not only state's collaborators in providing education services, but also as advocates and watchdog institutions that guarantee the fulfillment of the citizens' constitutional rights to education. In the constitutional reform of 1999, the provision that "all education shall be supported by State taxation" (CONST., 1992, art. 74, No. 3) was literally removed, and replaced instead for "the state shall promote the socialization of the costs of education" (CONST., 1999, art. 77º, No., 3. F). This constitutional move was part of the state retrenchment in social services (Silva, 2004), a policy highly influenced by the minimalist state and neoliberal ideologies in vogue in the western countries and implemented elsewhere by IMF and World Bank in the 1990s. My expectation with this research is to find out the extent to which the state's retrenchment (in supporting the cost of education) influenced the societal mobilization to participate in the education policy, through CSOs, whether as *suplementers*, *complimenters* or *adversaries*. On the other hand, I will also look at the extent to which these roles assumed by the CSOs have influenced the government performance in the education sector. This influence will be further developed in chapter 7.

3.4 Emergence and engagement of CSOs in the education sector

The engagement of non-state actors in education as narrated above is deeply rooted in the history of Cabo Verde. The commitment of the church in "preparing" the slaves for the market (Carreira, 2000), and the training of the ecclesiasts and public servants has been the pioneer experience concerning state and non-state actors partnership in education service delivery. However, with the laicization of the state, new actors and new forms of partnership have emerged throughout the time. These actors are the various CSOs, national and international, as well as international agencies that collaborate with Cabo Verde in the sector of Education. Some CSOs, despite not being specialized in the education sector, have come out as emergent entrepreneurs, in seeking to influence education outcomes in Cabo Verde. There are approximately 50 CSOs specialized in the education sector in Cabo Verde. This figure has been determined based on the CSOs Guide Book (Plataforma das ONGs, 2015), analysis of education reports and official documents by the ministry of education, in addition to interviews with some

education experts, including former and current government office holders. These CSOs range from national and international NGOs, Foundations, Cooperatives and Teachers' Unions.

In addition to these specialized organizations, there are a number of Community Base Organizations, as well as informal networks that are excluded from the 2015 CSOs Guide Book. According to this document, 7.8% of Community Based Organizations' activities, known in Cabo Verde as *Associações de Desenvolvimento Comunitários* (ADC) is dedicated to education. The Cooperatives dedicate 16.7%, being the highest percentage. The ONGD dedicate 10.4%, while Foundations 9.1%. With a lower percentage is the Microcredit institutions, with only 2.1% of its activities dedicated to education. In total, only 8% of the activities carried out by the Cape Verdean CSOs focuses on the education sector. Although this figure seems low, what these organizations do in other areas end up influencing the education outcomes, directly or indirectly. This is because education is entrenched in a plethora of social, economic and political variables, and CSOs' interventions in other sectors influence the outcomes in the education sector. Thus, specialized CSOs and other nonprofit organizations, including Community Associations, engage either formally or informally in the national education policymaking process in three different ways: as complimentary, supplementary and adversarial institutions to the government in the planning and delivery of education services.

The complementary roles of CSOs are based on “contracts and partnerships between government [and CSOs] framed within the context of the new public management and “outsourcing” policies (Anheier, 2005: 284), as well as the “coproduction” and delivery of public collective goods model (Salamon, 1995; Ostrom, 1997, Evans, 1997). The neoliberal policies introduced in the 1990s disengage CSOs from government activities, as the government withdraws the institutional and financial support for them. A contractual relationship came to be established, replacing the previous umbilical and paternalistic relationship with political institutions that existed before. The new policies created a social service delivery vacuum, which the new CSOs would fill in. Particularly in the sector of education, the birth of private secondary schools is a distinctive example. When the constitution determines that the society should participate in the cost of education, society had to mobilize itself to guarantee such a participation. The creation of CSOs would facilitate a *society collaborativeness* to achieve that purpose.

Thus, a great number of CSOs participate as *supplementary* organizations in the education service delivery. They voluntarily mobilize resources and provide voluntary services to guarantee access to education for children and young adults, who otherwise would be left out of the system. This role comes out in response to government cutbacks in social services in the

1990s, and then maintained throughout the years. One example worth mentioning here is the work carried out by the associations representing people with disabilities, and the community based associations. The former actors are participative in mobilizing resources both from national and international partners to implement initiatives at both local and national levels to allow access to education for people with disabilities, whom public schools fail to integrate in the system. The establishment of schools for blinds, deaf and other learning disabilities in Cabo Verde is a good example of the CSOs supplementary role. The leader of *Paralympics Committee of Cabo Verde* states during an interview for the purpose of this work: “we create opportunities for these young kids with physical disabilities, so that they can fully integrate in the education and sports, and succeed in life equally as everybody else”¹⁶.

The community associations are also participative in supplementing actions to guarantee access to education of the most underprivileged kids and young adults, mainly in the remote areas of the country where the state is practically “absent” (Bierschenk and Sardan, 1997). In these areas, community associations play an important role in providing primary school goes with uniform, school materials and help with transport costs.

Finally, the *adversarial* role of CSOs consists in “advocating the rights of the most needy people left unserved and under-served by state” (Anheier, 2005, p. 284). For the case of education sector in Cabo Verde, what is noticed is that the advocacy role is played in tandem with the complimentary and supplementary roles of CSOs. It is the same organizations that publicly denounce the state for failing in its responsibilities to provide conditions for the disenfranchised groups of population to have access to education that align and seek to get contract and support from the state to provide services for such groups. Thus, the line that separates these three roles is very thin. However, what is worth highlighting here is that in Cabo Verde, due to the lack of financial resources, CSOs are weak at playing the advocacy roles and supplementing services without the state support. CSOs that are extremely outspoken are usually connoted as oppositionist, and therefore, they are excluded (unofficially though) from receiving the state financial support. As CSOs look to get that support, they seem to self-censure themselves from being real advocates. The reality is that everybody wants to be collaborators, and avoid being seen as the “bad guys” (Giddens, 2000).

Having presented and described the three possible roles and the pattern of relationship between CSOs and the state in Cabo Verde in the sector of education, I now focus on how these

¹⁶ interview with Mr. Rodrigo Bejarano, the acting president of Cape Verdean Paralympic Committee, (November 2017)

relationships are materialized in the context of a specific education policy design and implementation: *Plano Nacional de Acção de Educação Para Todos*¹⁷ (PNA-EPT). In addition to this policy, I will also analyze how CSOs are engaged with the government around the Local Group of Education Partners, a policy network community whose main purposes are drafting the major national education policies in Cabo Verde.

3.5 Engagement of CSOs in the National Action Plan of Education for All

The National Action Plan of Education for All was drafted in the aftermath of the World Education Forum held in 2000 in Dakar, Senegal. The participants of this Forum agreed on the *Dakar Framework for Action*, a policy guideline that sets out the main education goals to be achieved by all the signatory countries by 2015. That policy emphasizes the promotion and development of basic education as a key instrument for reaching social integration and inclusion across nations. Accordingly, the Education Action Plan for All is a broad policy guideline, aiming to integrate and articulate the different components of the education subsystems with other policy sectors, with the purpose of raising the cultural level of the population through the provision of quality education services.

Having each signatory country the responsibility to formulate and implement its own “Action Plan”, Cabo Verde completed and presented its version in 2002. The conception of the policy adopted a methodological approach based essentially on:

"(i) consultation of the basic documents; (ii) construction of indicators; (iii) analysis and diagnoses of national and international studies (iv) consultation with the actors at the level of the deconcentrated services (delegations of the Ministry of Education) and local authorities; (v) systematic concertation with the national coordinator and the team of Education for All (PNA-EPT, 2002, p. 1).

The approach adopted in the preparation of the Action Plan does not mention any intervention of CSOs in the process. It draws primarily on technical documents and the work of government agencies and experts. However, in respect to the implementation process, it states that,

“at the central level, the General Directorate of Basic and Secondary Education, in close collaboration with the General Direction of Literacy and Adult Education, shall coordinate and monitor the entire implementation process of the National Action Plan of Education for All, promoting the adoption of measures aiming the involvement and participation of all the stakeholders. At the local level, it is the responsibility of the Delegations of the Ministry of Education to coordinate the implementation of the actions in partnership with local authorities, NGOs, community associations and religious bodies, safeguarding the linkage of the Plan with projects and programs involved in social development” (PNA-EPT, 2002: 15- *translation of the author*).

¹⁷ National Action Plan of Education for All (author’ translation)

The CSOs (NGOs) are only expected to engage in the implementation phase of the Action Plan. However, the conception document of that policy does not specify what roles are reserved to CSOs in the implementation process, except for the expectation that, as national partners, they should participate, along with the society, in its implementation costs, as the following excerpt exemplifies:

“Within the framework of the commitments to be made by the international community, the financing of PNEPT will involve multilateral cooperation agencies, UN agencies in particular. At the national level, the government shall commit to mobilize strategic partnerships in the framework of bilateral cooperation, and with NGOs, as well promoting participation of society in the costs and management of basic education” (PNA-EPT, 2002,p. 15- *translation of the author*).

Data on CSOs’ financial contribution for education policies are not available. All we know is that 8% of their activities are carried out in the education sector (Platform of NGOs, 2015). However, if one takes the “participation of society” to be the family’s financial cost with the education, we can see that families (understood here as society) are playing an increasing role in supporting the cost of their children education. Data available for the 2009 (table 3.1), show that the household expenditures with education corresponds to 12.1% of the total cost of the sector for that year. Almost 90% of the costs in the pre-school education, which is not mandatory, 4.3% of the cost in the primary education (despite this being mandatory, so supported by the state revenues), 9.7%, 12. 6% and 14.2% for the three cycles of the secondary education respectively, and a significant amount of 28.4% in the tertiary education sector. This financial burden hit the poor families the hardest, knowing they have to cut from their basic needs, such as nutrition, to cover the expenses with education. Other data show that in 2015, families spend 2.3% of their own budget on education (INE-IMC, 2015) against 1% in 2000/2001 (INE-IDRF, 2000/2001). This increasing costs with education, calls CSOs to intervene to complement, and in some circumstances even to supplement the insufficient or the absence of the state support.

Table 3.1 Household estimate expenditure on children education (2009).

	Pre-school	Primary school	Sec. Educat. 1st cycle	Sec. Educat. 2nd cycle	Sec. Educat. 3rd cycle	Higher Education	Total
Expenditures with children in 2007 (in CVE)	3600	1650	3506	5.559	7738	30 996	
Expenditures with children in 2009 (in CVE)	3803	1712	3677	5836	8270	31752	
Total No. of students in 2009	22 191	73548	26 112	20328	14329	8 465	164973
Total expenditures in 2009 (Millions of CVE-2009)							
Household expenditures	84,4	125,9	96,0	118,6	118,5	268,8	812,3
Current expenditures as of the State Budget	9,5	2793,4	893,7	824,8	714,0	676,7	5912,2
Total current expenditures (Household+ State)	93,9	2919,3	989,7	943,5	832,5	945,5	6724,5
% of current expenditures supported by the household	89,8%	4,3%	9,7%	12,6%	14,2%	28,4%	12,1%

Source: MED (2011)

CSOs, whether specialized or not, carry out a myriad of fundraising activities to support their constituents and help them achieve their education goals, mainly at the primary and secondary levels of education. At the tertiary level education, however, as the cost is much higher, the capacity of CSOs to help is lower. As the leader of a community based organization reports,

“we have had some partners who usually support us with school materials and uniform, so that we can help kids in the community. We have also tried to help some children of our associates in higher level of education, but it is more difficult to help them” (Interview with Maria Teresa, the leader of APDEZA in São Salvador do Mundo).


These initiatives of CSOs have been of utmost importance in complementing the state’s effort to provide education for all. As mentioned earlier, sometimes CSOs even fill in the gap left by the state’s absence in proving conditions for individuals to attain their education goals. In a conversation with a former leader of a civic group in a fishery village in the Municipality of Ribera Grande de Santiago, the state absence becomes obvious:

“here in the community, back in 2006, almost nobody held university degree, and only a few people managed to finish the secondary level education. We created a group (to mean an “association”), and one day we organized a big community meeting. Many people participated. We invited the president of the Municipality and he showed up. Since then, with the support of some authorities, we have helped many kids to attend school. I became teacher in the adult education sector. Many things have changed in the community ever since” (Interview with Carlos, Porto Mosquito- February 2018).

This interviewee’s testimony shows that the community felt a need of self-organization and mobilization as a means to intervene and fill in for the absence of the state. With mobilization, the local political authority “was alerted” to intervene, and cooperate with the group to address the identified community issues. That was another example of the “society participation in the cost of education”. Nevertheless, despite the society’s contribution in the cost of education, the

“public powers” are the main supplier of education services, and the one that cover the most expenses (MED, 2015, p. 244). As figure 3.1 below shows, in comparison with some comparable African countries, in 2009 Cabo Verde was the third country where the state mostly spent in education in relation to family expenses (MED, 2011).


Figure 3.1- Percentage of household expenses in the national current expenditures in Education (2009)



Source: MED (2011)

The share of household expenditures in current national expenditure on education represents 12% in Cabo Verde in 2009. It is below the average of the thirteen countries for which these data are available (28.3%). It is clearly noticeable that the Cape Verdean government greatly assumes the education expenditure in order to allow families to afford the least cost possible, as well as Djibouti (8%), Mauritania (11%), Niger (14%) or Mali (16%). When comparing the current expenditure borne by households according to different levels of education, figure 3.2 presents the situation of Cabo Verde in comparison to the average of the 13 comparable countries.

Figure 3.2- Percentage of household expenses in the national current expenses in Education (State + Family) per level of instruction (2009)



Source: MED (2011)

The household contribution by level of education, with the exception of Higher Education, is clearly higher in countries comparable to Cabo Verde. While the household contribution for Basic education stands at 4.3% for the total expenditure in Basic education in Cabo Verde, the contribution in the other countries is 23.8%. In Cabo Verde, the families contribute with 9.7%, and 13.4% for the total expenditure of the first and second cycles of secondary education respectively, while in the other countries the family expenditure represents 38.7% and 37.5% respectively. However, the figures inverted for the higher education sector. The household contribution for the total expenditure in higher education is 28.4%, while the average household expenditure for other comparable countries is 20.7%. Thus, a more contrasting difference in the household expenditure in these countries is situated in the lower levels of education. As an official report states, “the low weight of Cape Verdean household expenses on the country basic education expenditures has undoubtedly contributed to Cabo Verde’s accomplishment of the universal basic education goal, contrary to most comparable countries” (MED, 2015).

Despite the data on government expenditure being optimistic, the work of CSOs has been of utmost importance to achieve the progress accomplished in the ambit of the implementation of the Education Action Plan for All. The work carried out by the *Rede Nacional da Campanha de Educação para Todos em Cabo Verde*¹⁸ (RNCEPT), sets a good

¹⁸ National Network Campaign of Education for All in Cabo Verde

example to illustrate the role CSOs play. This network functions as a platform linking all the CSOs specialized in education, as well as the Community Based Associations that carry out activities in the education sector. RNCEPT works in three fronts: with its individual association members, to conduct permanent needs assessment in the education sector and support their advocacy work. Secondly, RNCEPT develops “synergistic relationship” (Evans, 1997) with the government in their efforts to provide education services where the government’s presence is unnoticed, or insufficient. The government, in fact, has been keen to work cooperatively with RNCEPT. A good example of their relationship is that the Ministry of Education pays the salary for the national coordinator of RNCEPT. In addition, RNCEPT is a member of the Local Group of Education Partners, which I will develop in more details below. It should be stated that the government also makes financial contribution to some SCOs, either being members of RNCEPT or not, upon requests to implement identified projects considered relevant for the development of the sector, the communities or the country as a whole. In addition to that, government allocates resources to CSOs in the annual state budget, in the ambit of the education policy implementation. For example, as table 3.2 shows, the funds allocated in the state budget to CSOs between 2012 and 2016, fluctuated mildly between 9% and 12% of the total budget of the Ministry of Education.

Table 3.2. Budget allotted to CSOs by the Ministry of education (2012-2016)

Year	Budget allocated to CSOS (CVE)	Total budget of the Ministry of Education	% of budget allocated to CSOs
2012	82,682,160	8.007,000,000	10%
2013	82,682,160	8.469,000,000	10%
2014	80,612,160	8.706,000,000	9%
2015	82, 298,416	8.752,000,000	9%
2016	12,588,160	10. 486. 717.851	12%

Source: Ministry of Finance- State budgets Reports (2012-2016); Série cronológica da Educação (2015).

Besides the funds coming from the government through the state budget, RNCEPT also mobilizes resources from its international partners to finance its supplementary activities in the education sector.

3.6 (Partnership through) privatization of education

A second form of societal participation in the implementation of education policies in Cabo Verde has been the establishment of private teaching institutions, encompassing all cycles of instruction. Private education is nothing new in Cabo Verde. If one considers the role the

catholic teaching institutions have played in the education sector, the conclusion is that “private education” dates back from the very beginning of the country’s history. However, it is with the state retrenchment in the social policies implemented by the end of the 1990s that private providers, mostly nonprofit private providers, felt encouraged to establish and expand in Cabo Verde. These private institutions cover all levels of education, from pre-school to higher levels of education. At the pre-school level, the private sector is dominant, as it had not been part of the state mandatory system of education until 2018. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 below show the distribution of the classrooms in Cabo Verde from 2000 to 2015, categorized as private and public, covering pre-school and primary levels of education.

Table 3.3 Evolution of Teaching Establishments for Preschool-Education (2000-2015)

Establishments	Academic years															Tx.Var. %
	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	
Cabo Verde	384	413	419	446	460	465	473	484	492	500	504	507	516	526	540	40,6
Public	220	240	244	259		290	290	286	296	308	316	316	313	315	318	44,5
Private	164	173	175	187		175	183	198	196	192	188	191	203	211	222	35,4

Source: MED (2015)


Table 3.4 Evolution of Teaching Establishments for Basic-Education (2000-2015)

Estabelecimentos	Academic Years															Tx. Var. %
	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	
Cabo Verde	420	422	425	423	422	426	424	421	418	427	420	420	417	420	415	-1,2
Public	420	422	425	423	422	426	424	421	415	424	416	416	413	413	407	-3,1
Private	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	4	4	4	7	8	166,7

Source: MED (2015)

The private providers of education services registered a steady growth from 2000 to 2015. The growth has been more expressive in pre-school education level, offering around half of the education establishments throughout that period. In the primary sector, the growth of private establishments has been very low, increasing from three (3) in 2007 to eight (8) in 2015. As I have stated earlier, this difference between pre-school and primary education levels might have been due to fact that the primary education level is mandatory, and so the state covers the most expenses of it. In fact, the private education establishments in the primary level education are attended by the children from the most fortunate parents. Figure 3.3 below shows the evolution of student population attending public versus private establishments in the different levels of education, with the exception of the higher education.

Figure 3.3 Growth of student population in Private and public schools (%) 2000-2015



Source: MED (2015)

As the data collated in the graph above show, the student population in Pre-school private establishments grew by 21.9% between 2000 and 2015, while in the public providers it grew negatively by -5,6%. In the primary education, despite the general decrease of student population by 28.7%, it can be noted that registration in the private establishments grew exponentially by 132.7%, while it decreased in the public sector by -28.4%. The only decrease verified in the private sector is in the secondary level, explained by the massive investments in the construction of high schools in every municipality of Cabo Verde. The number of high school establishments grew from 29 in 2000 to 50 in 2015 (MED, 2015).

3.7 Local Group of Education Partners.

The engagement of nonprofits, and the society in the planning and delivery of education services as described above has based on the state's absence, or its inefficiency to intervene and meet the demands sufficiently and qualitatively enough. For instance, the various secondary private teaching institutions that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s were propelled by the government inefficiency to provide alternatives for the many people who legally, did not meet the requirements to continue in the formal education system. Still nowadays, the leaders of these institutions often claim they have no support from the state. These private institutions are totally supported by their students' fees, often insufficient.

In some circumstances, the engagement of nonprofits depends more on the opportunities for private investments (more for qualitative motives), and on the will of the actors involved, rather than on the existence of any formal network/platform that enforce such a “synergistic relationship”. This situation changed in 2014, with the institutionalization of the *Local Group of Education Partners*, a sort of a corporatist “policy community” (Schmitter, 1974) congregating some of the major institutional stakeholders in the education sector in Cabo Verde, including governmental institutions, multilateral and bilateral international organizations, and national CSOs (see table 3.5). This policy community emerged as an outcome of a coercive diffusion process (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett, 2007), triggered by the Global Partnership for Education Funds. This institution, founded in 2002, functions as a multilateral partnership body in the education sector across the world. It covers around 60 developing countries, donor governments, international organizations, private sector, teachers and civil society groups with the aim of providing a quality education for all across the world. Therefore, the creation of *Local Group of Education Partners* became a compulsory mechanism, and in fact, a must prerequisite for any country wishing to have access to the funds made available by the Global Partnership for Education.

The *Local Group of Education Partners* was born to be in fact a “network of cooperating service providers” (Provan and Miward, 2001, p. 414) on the premise of guaranteeing effectiveness and efficiency in the formulation and implementation education policies. Indeed, “interdependent groups of two or more organizations that consciously collaborate and cooperate with one another are more effective at providing a complex array of [...] services than the same organizations are able to do when they go their own ways” (Provan and Miward, 2001, p. 415). The former minister of Education, Fernanda Marques, stated at the occasion of the constitution of that group that the underlining rationale for such an initiative “is about developing education in a sustainable way, through the integration of all educational actors. Thus, unions, government representatives, CSOs and other national and international partners constitute this local group” (<http://www.minedu.gov.cv> assessed on December 7, 2017). This group, thus, stands at the forefront of the formulation and implementation of the major education policies in Cabo Verde, highlighting the examples of *Strategic Plan for Education 2002-2015*; *Carta da Política Integrada da Educação, Formação e Emprego (2013)*, *Carta da Política Educativa (2015)*, and the revised *Strategic Plan for Education 2017-2021*.

Table 3.5 Members of the Local Group of Education Partners

	Institutions	Type of Institution
1	Plataforma das ONGs	NGO
2	SINDEP	Civil Society
3	SIPROFIS	Civil Society
4	RNEPT	Civil Society
5	FECAP	Civil Society
6	European Union Delegation	Partner
7	Angola Embassy	Partner
8	Portuguese Cooperation	Partner
9	Luxembourg Cooperation	Partner
10	Angolan Cooperation	Partner
11	SNU/UNICEF	Partner
12	UN-Women	Partner
13	UNRC/UNICEF	Partner
14	DGES	Governmental
15	IEFP	Governmental
16	CNU	Governmental
17	MFI/DGPOG	Governmental
18	DGPOG/MED	Governmental
19	DNE	Governmental
20	ANMCV	Governmental
21	DNP/MF	Governmental
22	ANMCV	Governmental

Source: Ministry of Education (2017)¹⁹

Unlike the CSOs' engagement based of contingent funding of projects, the *Local Group of Education Partners* is a more organized state and society partnership committed to making “binding regulations and to solve problem [...] based on a complex mutual resource transfer between state and associations in the framework of their cooperation” (Mayntz, 1993, p. 18). The group, however, involves partners not only representing the state of Cabo Verde, but also other states and international institutions, such as European Union, United Nations, Angola,

¹⁹ This list was made available by a senior staff member in the Ministry of Education, May 2018.

Portugal and Luxembourg. The presence of these international actors is justified not only for their technical expertise, but also for the financial resources they contribute with for the formulation and implementation of education policies in the country. Hence, the *Local Group of Education Partners* in Cabo Verde is not a simple intermediary institution (Schmitter, 1978) with the role of mediating the relationship between state and the citizens. It is a platform of collaboration (Barber, 1984), and synergy (Evans, 1997), or what Hirst (1995) and Cohen and Roger (1995) have termed of “associative government”, bringing different actors together over education policymaking and implementation processes in Cabo Verde.

However, the participation of civil society organizations in the education policy process, outside the *Local Group* framework, is yet deficient as they feel that when they are invited to participate in the formulation of some specific policies, their views and concerns are often disregarded. In addition, in respect to the implementation process, CSOs feel they are quite often marginalized. The following interview excerpts with the representative of Paralympics Committee of Cabo Verde, a CSO integrated in the Cape Verdean Platform of NGOs and RNCEPT, clearly exemplifies occasions of both integration and marginalization;

“in the sector of sport adapted to the disabled, as well as for example in the elaboration of educational programs and policies for this segment of population, we are called to collaborate because the government does not have the technical capacity to do it. It is us [the CSOs in the sector] who know how to do things”²⁰.

Nevertheless, despite recognizing that they are engaged in the policy making process, there is still a sentiment that when it comes to the implementation of the agreed and adopted policies, the government, through its implementation agencies, often disregards the CSOs’ concerns. As the aforementioned representative affirms,

“the government listens to the associations, but the inclusion of our concerns in the policies adopted and implemented are still inadequate. An example is the ramps in public buildings, such as schools. The laws establish that these buildings should provide access to the disabled, but in practice such access does not exist at all. The most blatant example of such a non-compliance with the law by the state itself is the case of the National Institute for Social Security (INPS)”²¹.

The government authorities, nevertheless recognizes the existence of the deficiencies regarding the implementation mechanisms to guarantee policy efficacy. Such deficiencies are explained by the failure of the state, whose institutions “do not function as docile and neutral instruments, but engage in governing themselves as they use the discretion conceded to them or manipulate and circumvent the rules” (Mayntz, 1993, p. 14). Therefore, policy implementers become

²⁰ Interview with to the author on August 25th, 2017

²¹ idem

policy-decision makers in their own right. For the case of *deficient implementation* of the education policies in Cabo Verde, it is explained by the disengagement of some partners, CSOs including, as the government choose to carry out the implementation solo, through its agencies. This disengagement creates a missing link among the stakeholder, resulting in a weak linking social capital resource that would positively influence the policy implementation. For instance, there is a perception that there is a need of a “joint mechanism” that brings together the government and civil society, to not only elaborate the policies, but also monitor its implementation. One situation where the absence of this mechanism is felt, concerns with to the implementation of access to public services by people with physical challenges.

The five CSOs integrating the formal institutionalized *Local Group of Education Partners*, have a far more capacity to influence the government policy than their counterparts acting individually outside that platform, at least when such policy is expected to get support from the international organization, the Global Partnership for Education. One of the key compulsory procedure this group has to go through is that each one of its member has to sign every policy proposal or projects to be submitted to the organization, meaning that their voices must be represented in order to merit their consent. Thus, the strength of these five CSOs and their capacity to influence the agenda setting regarding the education policy lies, on the one hand, on the imposition of Global Partnership for Education, and on the other hand, on the support they get from network of CSOs they belong to. It is worth mentioning that these five CSOs, three unions and two networks of CSOs, are themselves representative bodies acting on behalf of a larger number of other CSOs, including NGOs, community associations, etc. As the case of RNEPT, it is a network of CSOs with national and local coverage all over the country, focusing primarily on the pre-school education sector, and students with physical or any learning impairments. The network’s advocacy campaign and intervention with their target groups has won them formal protocols with the Ministry of Education in the sector of pre-school education.

However, despite the existing collaboration and their capacity to exercise some influence over government agenda, CSOs still share a sentiment of being unable to exercise their desired influence on the implementation of adopted policies, and therefore, their frustrations of not seeing their concerns being addressed. This situation induces us to question whether the CSOs’ influences are being decisive enough in the policy arena, once the implementation stage deviates from consented policies. The engagement has been productive in the policy formation stage, but curtailing CSOs’ participation in the crucial stage of where things really happen- implementation. Hill and Hupe (2002) argue that in the implementation

process, “policy continue to be shaped” (p.8). Therefore, the non-engagement of CSOs in the implementation process leaves them out of the policy shaping maneuvers, which will thus downplay the concretization of theirs and their constituents’ preferences. The president of Cape Verdean *Paralympics Committee* manifests his concerns for the CSOs not being involved in the “implementation, monitoring e evaluation of the government decisions”²². What can be inferred then is that there is a gap between the policy adopted and its implementation. What is yet more evident is that the inexistence of an implementation mechanism that integrates the civil society organizations will not only hamper the implementation itself, but will also difficult the attainment of the societal education goals.


3.8 The “Why” and the “so what” of Government and CSOs Partnership in Education Policies

The engagement of CSOs in the education policy process presented in the section above, has been purely qualitatively descriptive based on the interviews and analysis of government official reports. This section seeks to provide an understanding of the explanations and the outcome of the CSOs engagement above described. It is about the “why”, and the “so what” of CSOs engagement in education. Thus, two questions are raised here: Why does CSOs matter for the education policymaking and implementation? To what extent have CSOs contributed to the success of education policies implemented, and improved the education outputs in Cabo Verde? Based on the analysis done, CSOs engagement in education policies in Cabo Verde have influenced positively the performance and the outcomes of that sector throughout the years.

To measure the policy education outcomes, I consider two indicators: the growth of student population in the pre-school, primary and secondary levels of education, and the literacy rate in the country. Cabo Verde has developed substantially in terms of its student population growth from the independence in 1975. Although these indicators are not the direct achievements of any specific policies, they reflect the overall outcomes of all the government policies and other public and private contributions to the development of the education sector along the years. Figure 3.4 shows the growth of student population from 1975 to 2014.

²² Idem

Figure 3.4 - Growth of student population in Cabo Verde (1975 – 2014).



Source: INE (2015)

As it can be noted in the figure above, primary education coverage had already been substantial by the independence. However, the figures in the secondary education remained very derisory, as the result of a very selective education policy, which imposed enormous barriers on the socially underprivileged class to access to higher levels of education (Afonso, 2002). With the independence in 1975, education policies were adjusted to strengthen the country’s values and respond to the national developmental challenges. Nevertheless, despite this new policy reorientation, the student-population growth in the first years of independence was not as expected, as the higher levels of education remained selective and accessible mostly by the socially privileged class. According to Afonso (2001), such a late expansion in secondary education was yet the effect of education policy practices inherited from the colonial era, which were not easily to replace. This “policy feedback” (Pierson, 1994) would only start to slightly loose influence from 1986 onwards, with the implementation of the second National Development Plan (PND II). This Plan framed education as a means to achieve both individual and societal progresses, and therefore, societal effort would need to be mobilized to attain such a purpose. Such an effort led to the first major education reform in Cabo Verde in 1990. The pre-school subsystem only kicked off in the 1990s. Despite the political regime change and the election of a new government in 1991, the education policy remained as the reform of 1990 had delineated until 2010. In 1999, some changes were made to the 1990 reform, only in respect to higher education sector.

Regarding the literacy rate of the Cape Verdean people, it went up from 44.7% in 1980 to 82.90% in 2010, almost double. Like the increase of the student population, the substantial

growth of literacy rate also reflects the joined effort of state and civil society in attaining better results in the education policy in Cabo Verde.

What have been the influence of CSOs (social capital) in the education policies in Cabo Verde, and to what extent have they contributed to the outcomes of such policies? The analysis of education progress in Cabo Verde has been often framed strictly within the institutionalist perspective (Alfama, 2008; Afonso, 2002). This section does not minimize such a perspective. However, it takes the *social capital* as the main explanatory variable for the development of education in Cabo Verde. In my perspective, ignoring the societal forces that concur for the adoption and implementation of policies would give a myopic understanding of the reality. State, through its government officials and agencies, is in fact the ultimate policy decision maker and implementer, but societal institutions- the CSOs, play a valuable role in generating demands, and also contributing to the formulation and implementation of policies to help meet their own demands. I take these societal institutions- the networking CSOs, as both the manifestation and a source of social capital (Fukuyama, 2001; Putnam, 1993, 2000), to be part of the explanatory variable for the education boom and the performance outcome achieved throughout the years. The following two subsections, explore further the associations between the social capital (taken here as the vibrancy of CSOs) and the two measuring indicators of education outcomes: growth of student population and the evolution of the literacy rate.

3.8.1 Social capital and growth of student population

The social capital is understood here as the “synergistic relationship” (Evans, 1997) built on cooperation among the civil society organizations (CSOs), state and international institutions in the planning and delivery of education services. This relationship guarantees resource mobilization that allows improvement of access and the quality of services provided. Looking specifically at the CSOs and state “synergistic relationship”, the resources they mobilize, and the services they provide where the state is absent or inefficient, count as important contribution to the growth of student population and the literacy in Cabo Verde. The various voluntary civic organizations that have emerged since the independence (Plataforma das ONGs, 2015), have on the one hand, strengthened the *bridging social capital*- the community trust, and channels of mutual help and cooperation, and on the other hand, they have strengthened the *society linking social capital*, the synergistic networks among the society “corporate actors” around the education. However, most importantly, the linkage or the cooperation between the state and the CSOs, the *linking social capital*, has greatly contributed to the achievement of the country educational goals. Rosenau (2000) shows for instance, how the (societal) linking social capital

functions, when the public, private and voluntary organizations join their resources in the delivery of education service,


“The public sector draws attention to public interest, stewardship and solidarity considerations [...] The private sector is thought to be creative and dynamic, bringing access to finance, knowledge of technologies, managerial efficiency, and entrepreneurial spirit [...] The not-for-profit organization is strong in areas that require compassion and commitment to individuals” (p. 218).

On the same line of argument, Acar (2011) defends that, “since educational success is highly associated with participation by others, such can be found in parental and community involvement, social capital may play a critical role in improving overall successes in education” (p. 4570). For the case of Cabo Verde, the success measured in terms of student population growth is in part due to the role played by the synergy emanating from the linkage among state, for-profit, nonprofit institutions, and other society “corporate actors”. As Coleman (1998) puts it,

“the social capital that has value for a young person’s development does not reside solely within the family. It can be found outside as well as in the community consisting of the social relationships that existed among parents, in the closure exhibited by this structure of relations, and in the parents’ relations with the institutions in the community” (Coleman, 1988: 113).

These “institutions in the community”, once they are in the possession of information about the education needs in the community, and the need of its individual members, mobilize resources from within, or through networking with state or other private institutions to supply for such needs. Figure 3.5 below shows the association between the growth pattern of CSOs and student population in Cabo Verde (including pre-school, primary and secondary levels of education).

Figure 3.5 Growth of Student Population vs. growth of CSOs



Source: Elaborated by the author

The student population grew substantially from 1980 to 2000, and then remained basically the same until 2010. It continued decreasing until 2015. We can see that the rapid increase of student population from 1990 to 2000, and its stability in the 2000s, followed the same growth pattern of CSOs. Interestingly, the same growth pattern of the two phenomena can be observed from 2010 until 2015, despite the visual decreasing trend of CSOs is more evident. The question we can therefore raise here is the extent to which there is any “causal explanation” (Little, 2005), between these two social phenomena. The social capital hypothesis takes the CSOs as the explanation variable, however, without running the risk of making it the “causal mechanism” (Little, 2005) for the growth of the student population recorded from 1975 to 2015. Nevertheless, the importance of the political institutional change, and the mass education policy introduced in the 1990s should not be diminished, nor the capital invested in the construction of the new school infrastructures, as possible explanations for the education outcomes registered in the subsequent years. However, *per se* they are not sufficiently enough to have brought about and explain the observed education outcomes, as the economically disadvantaged segment of population in the 1990s continued having barriers to fully enjoy their rights to education (Afonso, 2002). The constitutional revision of 1999 opened the possibility for government to implement retrenchment policies on the welfare state, which worsened the conditions of the disadvantaged groups. It is under this situation that the work of CSOs become of utmost importance. CSOs’ influence on education policies then happens in two directions: Their roles in generating demands and putting pressures on the state increase “policy activism” (Tavits, 2006). On the other hand, they have played a key role in mobilizing resources, tangible and intangible, to supplement where the state and the market fail, in order to help the disenfranchised groups achieve their educational goals.

As both the counter-power and the state’ collaborators, CSOs stand and speak for the concerns of a large group of constituents, and thus, they are likely to be heard by the power authorities (Tocqueville, 1998; Tavits, 2006). The strength CSOs have accumulated throughout the years make them influential actors in the education sector, both as advocates and policy implementers. CSOs’ demands have taken several forms, since frequent claims of community leaders complaining through the media, the difficulties children face to go to schools due to long distance, students strikes demanding for scholarships (2000s), the unions’ pressures, etc. CSOs have gotten support to carry out their activities both internally and from external actors. The Jomtien Conference on Education for all, held in Thailand 5-9 March 1990, and the recommendations produced (UNESCO, 1990) regarding the engagement of CSOs in the national education policies was an example of the external support. The education reform of

1990 and the constitutionalization of the right to education imprinted in the constitution of 1992 could be understood as “policy activism” initiatives (Tavits, 2006), as the aftermaths of the aforementioned advocacy and demand led by CSOs. In addition to these two institutional reforms, other education policies implemented in the 1990s are listed in table in 3.6.

Table 3.6 Education Policies and projects implemented in 1990s

Education Policies in the 1990s
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PREBA (Project for the Renewal and Extension of Primary Education); • PRESE (Project of Restructuring and Expansion of Education System); (a project developed under the auspices the World Bank for Development) • PUENTI (Project of Utilization of New Technologies and Information in the Education System); • PAC (Aid Project to School Canteens) (PAM) • PEVF (Education Projects for the Family Life) • PFIE (Project for Training and Information for the Environment) (Afonso, 2002, p. 123) • PROMEF- (Project for the Consolidation and Monetarization of Education and Training, a project developed in the ambit of the Cooperation with the World Band and Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation).
<p><i>Source: (Afonso, 2002, p. 123- The author's translation).</i></p>


Once the state felt compelled to take and implement these policy initiatives, it would count on its international partners for the financial and technical collaboration, including the World Bank, African Development Bank, the World Food Program, UNESCO, International Labor Organization, the Colouste Gulbenkian Foundation in Portugal, and other bilateral organizations such as Luxembourgish and Portuguese Cooperation agencies. However, if the international multilateral organizations and CSOs were acting at the front of educational macro policies, the emerging national CSOs were acting on both the demanding and intervention sides. CSOs intervention go beyond voicing concerns and complaining, to actually mobilizing resources to provide services to compensate for the state absence or inefficiency. Such is the example of the special education CSOs- ADVIC, the RNCEPT, and other prominent specialized CSOs in sector of education.

In conclusion, CSOs as intra-community bridging institutions, as well as its role in linking the communities to the state, have been key factors for the increase of student-population in Cabo Verde. These networks of relationships have become a *public social capital* (Coleman, 1988, p. 113) which has been essentially important for the educational advancement in Cabo Verde, measured in terms of access to education.

3.8.2 Social Capital and evolution of literacy rate

The second indicator of analysis regarding the education development in Cabo Verde is the literacy rate of its population. Figure 3.6 shows the growth trend of the literacy in parallel with the growth trend of CSOs from 1980 up to 2010.

Figure 3.6 Evolution of literacy rate vs. growth of CSOs



Source: Elaborated by the author

As the information collated in figure above shows, literacy rate grew in tandem with CSOs from 1980 onwards, despite a slower growth of CSOs in the 1980s. The engagement of CSOs in education in Cabo Verde, as it has been described above, gained a stronger momentum in the first decade of 2000s as they become more vibrant (in higher numbers) across the country. Between 2000 and 2010, the number CSOs grew by 57%. For the same period, the literacy rate increased by 8.10%. As Afonso (2002) argues, government policies would not automatically guarantee in practice access to education to everybody, neither guarantee the eradication of illiteracy of the population, giving the state's incapacity to create the required conditions that would respond to the demands of the sector. The CSOs capacity to mobilize financial and human resources to implement community projects, such as community libraries, school material distributions, life skills training, voluntary adult education programs, etc., have contributed to assist those most disfavored to get access to education throughout the years, and so, contribute to the increase of the literacy rate.

According to Borja (2009), CSOs' engagement in education in the 1990s was important, as it was a context that "participation and citizenship stood as levers for development" (p.74). The Cape Verdean civil society felt the need to liberate itself from a certain apathy and started conquering its space in the "new dynamics imposed by the historical [democratization] process"

(Borja, 2009, p. 74). The CSOs born in the aforementioned context, took education as part of their core mission. Therefore, as actors involved in the process of change, they had to take an active role in the “mobilization, education and organization of communities” (Azevedo, 2009, p. 86). Even for the CSOs whose primary vocation encompasses areas such as gender and equity, children, environment etc., they dedicate part of their activities to the education sector. Education has been a cross-sectional activity in the projects and programs of all CSOs, and it has been assumed as a fundamental “strategy for the people to participate in the redirection of social life” (Azevedo, 2009, p. 86). Chapter 7 provides a more in-depth analysis of CSOs’ (the social capital) influence on the literacy rate across the twenty-two municipalities in Cabo Verde.

3.9. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the engagement of CSOs in the education planning and service delivery in Cabo Verde in the post-independence era. The engagement of these institutions has been analyzed from the perspective of two sets of explanatory variables: institutions and social capital. Regarding the former, the institutional changes as the constitutions, legislations and the change of the state’s predisposition itself to engage CSOs in policy-making and implementation have played an important role in the development of the education sector. Secondly, from the perspective of social capital, the success of the education policies in Cabo Verde measured in terms of the student-population growth, and the literacy rate, is also explained by the engagement of CSOs. Such an engagement has taken two forms: Firstly, it occurs as an institutionalized incorporation of CSOs in the government policy process, as the case of the *Local Group of Education Partners*. Secondly, the engagement takes the form of intra-community engagement (the *bridging* and the *societal linking social capital*), where CSOs mobilize resources within the community to provide services undersupplied by the government. This second form of engagement, in fact, resulted from a disengagement process of the community from the state, as the state itself disengage with the community, regarding policy priorities. The incorporation of CSOs’ engagement, the *linking social capital* dimension, focuses on the CSOs’ formal participation in the education policy community, as a resource mobilization strategy to plan and delivery education services. Concerning the second form of engagement, it is explained from the perspective of the *bridging* and *the society linking social capital* dimensions, which refer to the community networks created and maintained through the extra-family interactions of people, and the interactions of the society “corporate actors” respectively, with the aim of solving community collective problems. CSOs, ranging from

community associations, NGOs and other form of social institutions with both local and national coverage, are the most developed form of bridging social capital.


Thus, from a qualitative analytical perspective, both government-CSOs *linking social capital*, and *bridging/society linking social capital* dimensions are positively related to the attainment of the country's educational goals. Higher density of social capitals, on the one hand, increase and improve the quality of demands, and also compliment and supplement capacities of CSOs to act where the government fails to intervene. On the other hand, the linkage social capital allows resource mobilization from the CSOs, which increases effectiveness and efficiency in the planning and implementation of education policies. In conclusion, the success of these policies have been greatly influenced by the social capital generated in the country throughout the years.

CHAPTER IV- ENGAGEMENT OF CSOs IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN CABO VERDE

4.1 Introduction

The analysis of civil society organizations and their engagement in the governance process in Cabo Verde is particularly relevant for the case of rural development policies. This is because “poverty is an endemic issue” (iPRSP, 2001, p. 7) in this country, and it hits the rural population in the hardest way. Cabo Verde has grown from a rural to a dominant urban population. In 1980, with a population of 295.703 inhabitants, 269.723 were living in rural areas against 25.980 living in the cities. However, from the 1980s onwards, rural population began decreasing constantly, and in fact, the urban dwellers in the 1990s outpaced the rural population. In 2000, according to the general population census, 234.368 people were living in the urban areas, against 200.257 in the rural areas. The same trend continued in 2010 census. Figure 4.1 illustrates these changes.

Figure 4.1- Evolution of Cape Verdean Population: 1970-2015 (urban vs. rural population)




Source: INE (2015)

The continuous decrease of rural population, in contrast with the increasing tendency in the urban centers, has been primarily motivated by the persistent high prevalence of poverty in the rural areas of the country, leading people to migrate either to the cities or to foreign countries in search of better life conditions. According to the Household Expenditure Survey-IDRF (1988/1989), poverty rate stood at 30.2% of the population at the national level in 1989. From that percentage, 14% was “the very poor”. Poverty is largely rural; nearly 70% of the poor and 85% of the “very poor” lived in the rural areas, which reflected the pronounced rural dimension of poverty in Cabo Verde. However, the urbanization of poverty took an increasing trend, due

in part to the aforementioned rural exodus, therefore transferring poverty from the rural areas to the urban centers.

In 2002, according to IDRF (2001/2002), absolute poverty rate in Cabo Verde stood at 37%, a 6.8% increase in relation to 1989 (IDRF 1988/1989). The percentage of poor living in the rural areas in 2000 was 51.1%, against 25.0% living in the urban centers. That trend continued in 2007, according to QUIBB 2007. This study found out that 26% of Cape Verdeans lived under the poverty line (with less than 1 USD a day) in 2007. From that percentage, 44.3% was the rural poor, against 13.2% in the urban centers. In 2015, as the last IDRF reports, the poverty rate in Cabo Verde dropped slightly to 24.2%, but the percentage remained excessively high in dominant rural area at 40.9%, against 15% in the urban centers. Figure 4.2 below provides a clearer picture of the poverty rate evolution in Cabo Verde throughout the years.

Figure 4.2 Evolution of Poverty rate in Cabo Verde



Source: INE (IDRF 1989, 2002, 2015; QUIBB 2007)

The high prevalence of rural poverty in Cabo Verde throughout the years, as one can imagine, has generated great demands on the government to generate policies to ameliorate the life conditions of rural population. On the other hand, the rural exodus has also generated pressures on the urban centers, which also needs to be addressed by the public authorities. This chapter is framed within this context of rural poverty in Cabo Verde. The chapter has three main objectives: firstly, it aims at tracing the major policies implemented in Cabo Verde to address

rural poverty from the end of the colonial period up to 2012. Secondly, it presents an analysis of CSOs engagement in the design and implementation of each one of the identified policies throughout the aforementioned period. The third objective focuses on exploring the extent to which involvement of CSOs has contributed to poverty alleviation in the country in general, and particularly in the rural areas. Each objective is treated in its separate section.

4.2 The path of Rural Development Policies in Cabo Verde

From an evolutionary perspective, policies targeted specifically at promoting rural development in Cabo Verde can be traced back to the late years of colonization up to the current days. Thus, four comprehensive policies covering this period have been identified in this section. They are: *The support for the populations affected by the draughts (Strada, or Apoio)* in the colonial period; *Emergency Program- AIMO*, during the single party regime; *FAIMO* in the 1990s, and finally, *PLPR* in the 2000s.

4.2.1 Support for the populations affected by the draughts (Strada)

By the end of colonization in Cabo Verde, the frequent droughts that had hit the archipelago had thrown the majority of Cape Verdean population into deep poverty, famine and despair. Many had to flee to other destinies, such as the USA, Europe and other African countries in search of better life conditions, and many of those who couldn't flee, were merged in the “*desespero de querer partir, e ter que ficar*”²³, as the country famous poet Jorge Barbosa once wrote. The colonial administration was being under pressure, both from internal and external forces, for not doing enough in rescue of the starving population. Thus, the colonial administration, in an attempt to respond to its critics, adopted the policy “*Apoio ás Populações Sinistradas pelas Secas*”, meaning in English “Support for the populations affected by the draughts” (Challinor, 2008), to help alleviate the effects of the droughts. This policy, henceforward, “*strada*”, by its name, suggested that famine and extreme poverty in the country were due to the “natural disasters alone”, and not the government failure, drawing thus the critics’ “attention away from the structural causes of poverty in the Islands” (Challinor, 2008: 91). The *strada* policy consisted in recruiting members of the families in the direst needs to work in the construction and maintenance of public roads and forestation. Rather than simply distributing food to the population, a practice that had been the norm for many years, the *strada* policy now was slightly innovative in a way that people were working to get an income, and

²³ The despair of longing to leave, but forced to stay

then they would use the money to buy their own stuff. However, the work-fronts were nothing more than palliative measures to attenuate the death toll caused by the droughts hitting the archipelago year after year. The meager and the seasonal income generated could hardly help the mass population get through the hardship caused by the lack of rain (Challinor, 2008).

The maneuver of the colonial government in attributing the causes of poverty to natural disasters alone, rather than its inefficient policies, clearly portrayed its lack of resolve to design and implement effective strategies that would tackle the social and structural roots of that phenomenon. However, why would the colonial government be interested in doing so, if all that mattered for the system was that the colonizers were being guaranteed conditions to extract and accumulate wealth? Why adopting policies to allow a “fairer” distribution of wealth produced in the colony? The conclusion one can draw is that, the government’s tactics to hold the natural disasters accountable for the chronic poverty in the country was nothing more than an attempt to camouflage its inoperativeness, ineffectiveness and failure in dealing with that social problem. There was obviously a lack of political resolve, as the major commitment of the rulers was channeling the wealth to the metropole in the detriment of the pauperization of the colony and its people.

4.2.2 Emergency Program: AIMO and Rural Assistance Programs

The independence in 1975 opened a window of opportunity (Kingdom, 2014) for the adoption of new policies to fight against famine and poverty in the country. The first step the new independent government took was the replacement of *strada* policy for the “Emergency Program”, which would be financed by the National Development Fund, through the commercialization of the international food donation (Challinor, 2008, p. 92). The Emergency Program targeted specifically at the rural population. It was then composed by two main subprograms: AIMO (*Alta Intensidade de Mão-de Obra*- translated into English as High Intensity of Manual Labor), and *Programa de Assistencia Rural* (Rural Assistance Program), implemented from 1982 to 1990. The former consisted in employing a great number of poor people in the soil and water management projects, aiming at both improving the conditions for agricultural production, and generating income for the poor labors. The second program consisted in training “rural technicians- the *rural extensionist* workers” who would be transferring technical skills to workers and supervising the quality of work being carried out in the ambit of AIMO projects all over the country. How different was the “emergency program” from the *strada* program during the colonization? Looking at the name “emergency program”, it suggests an assumption on the part of government that there was an urgent problem, poverty,

which needed to be addressed. Therefore, poverty was not simply taken as a consequence of natural disasters, but a structural social problem that needed to be approached with innovative government policies. Therefore, both AIMO and the Rural Assistance Program expressed the government effort to provide income and technical expertise and skills to the rural poor, as the means to uplift them and promote a sustainable development of rural areas of the country.

4.2.3 FAIMO, and the Community Work Fronts

The change in the political system and government in 1991, was the second major window of opportunity (Kingdom, 2014), which would allow the creation of “political opportunity structures” (Tarrow, 2011) for the formation and implementation of new policies to combat the high incidence of poverty in Cabo Verde, and its chronic persistence in the rural areas of the country. The first measure undertaken by the new MPD government after being elected in 1991 to combat rural poverty, was changing AIMO (High intensity of Manual labor) to FAIMO (Fronts of High Intensity of Manual Labor). According to Challinor (2008), what motivated this change was to make the “system more effective and more productive” (p.93), but in practice, the new name did not bring much or no difference in the policy substance, at least in its initial years of implementation. In fact, FAIMO continued being a seasonal mass employment policy, just as AIMO had been in the previous years. However, it later received some incremental changes in the subsequent years motivated by pressures from external donors, namely USAID, that had been funding the policy through its food aid program. These changes were geared towards the privatization of FAIMO. The first attempt in that direction was the creation of the *Instituto Nacional de Engenharia Rural e Florestal- INERF*²⁴, on April 16, in 1992 by the Law Decree No. 33/92, B.O. No. 19, starting its operationalization in January 1993. INERF was a parastatal institution with the primary role of implementing and monitoring projects in the domain of rural engineering, water, soil and forestry management projects, guaranteeing therefore the quality of projects execution and efficiency, and promoting rural community development. INERF maintained as a parastatal institution until 2007, when its statute was changed into a public private corporation, managed through a public-private partnership (PPP), as stipulated in the Resolution N0. 40/ December 2007. In 2012, the name INERF was changed to SONERF (National Society of Rural and Forest Engineering²⁵), but its statutes remained as a mixed capital company.

²⁴ National Institute of Rural and Forest Engineering

²⁵ Sociedade Nacional de Engenharia Rural e Florestas-

In the 1990s, more specifically from 1992 onwards, under the coordination of INERF, and in collaboration with the Agricultural Cooperative Development International (ACDI-VOCA), a USA nonprofit supported by USAID, the FAIMO projects (forestry, roads construction and maintenance along with soil and water conservation projects) were subjected to a privatization process. Such a process was implemented through the contractualization of local community associations to execute government projects. These organizations were expected to promote communities' engagement around project execution as a means to better guarantee their effectiveness and efficiency (Paul, 1987). The involvement of the community associations in projects implementation, allowed them to generate and provide income not only to the needy workers, but also to guarantee surplus accumulation, which would be used to address some community collective needs. According to Challinor (2008), this new policy strategy propped up a multiplication of local associations across the country, as people understood they were having an opportunity to maximize their incomes through the community partnership with government. On the other hand, as the government and the development agencies in Cabo Verde perceived that the FAIMO productivity was increasing with the engagement of community associations, more of these organizations were created and motivated to participate.

Thus, FAIMO privatization policy pursued three main objectives: improving productivity and the quality of work performed (by increasing effectiveness and efficiency); promoting the capacity building of people in the rural areas, and thirdly, involving the beneficiary population in the cost sharing of the projects to be implemented (Paul, 1987). During the first republic, from 1975 and 1990, AIMO had been conceived of simply as a mass employment program to temporarily assist the population handling their misery situation, giving therefore, less relevance to the sustainability of the work being done. Managing misery was the top priority. However, for the MPD Government, influenced by a coercive retrenchment policy diffusion process (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett, 2007), privatizing FAIMO would be the way to improve both the quantity and the quality of the soil and water management works, making them more sustainable projects. FAIMO became then known as the "community work fronts", meaning that the communities were in the lead. Challinor (2008) found out that as the community associations were recruiting workers from their own communities, people were not only working to get income, but they were also working on the preparation of their own land for agricultural works. In addition to that, the local associations, by keeping the surplus generated from project implementation, were becoming able to develop and implement other social projects to benefit their communities. Thus, the community associations along with

FAIMO “created an important social safety net for the poor that helped to maintain social cohesion in the country” (Siri and Goovaerts, 2002, p. 5)

The Community-work-front was an attempt to create what Ostrom (1990) called “the solution” to manage the common pool resources- water, soil and forest- in the Cabo Verdean rural areas, and therefore help the poor take the lead in the improvement of their conditions. Through this network of community associations, and their cooperative actions, the residents could easily know and decide where to place constructions, who should be employed, where to apply the surplus generated from the implementation of projects, etc. However, as we will see later in this section, the financial paternalization of community associations characterized by their complete dependency from government, or donor financial transfer would be a challenge to the sustainability of these organizations and the work they do in the fight against poverty in the rural areas of Cabo Verde. In addition to that, as Siri and Goovaerts (2002) pointed out, in the long run, FAIMO “tended to generate a welfare-dependency mentality among the poor, and many of its projects were characterized by low efficiency” (p.4).

Despite the changes introduced in the FAIMO projects, poverty rate increased during the 1990s. As it is stated in the Cape Verdean Interim Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper, “FAIMOS’s effectiveness in terms of reducing poverty is limited, as they do not present a ‘way-out’ of poverty” (iPRSP, 2002, p. 11). In fact, poverty grew from 30.2% in 1989 (IDRF 1988/1989) to 37% in 2002 (IDRF 2001/2002). Indeed, it seemed that government had been aware of the inefficiency of FAIMO policy on poverty reduction. In 1997, the government, again with the assistance of international partners, began drafting a new policy to address the poverty issue in the country- National Poverty Alleviation Program- (NPAP)²⁶, completed in July 1999 and submitted to International Funding for Agriculture Development (IFAD) and other donors for funding in September 1999. Being granted the funds, Cabo Verde signed the credit agreement No. 510-CV on November 15th, in 1999 between the Cape-Verdean government and IFAD. In the following section, I will develop more in depth the NPAP, with the focus on one of its subprogram, PLPR.

4.2.4 National Poverty Alleviation Program- (NPAP), and the PLPR

National Poverty Alleviation Program (NPAP) is part of the Cape Verdean government continuous struggle in the fight against the endemic poverty in the country. As I have stated in the section above, by the end of 1997, the government and its allies, principally the IFAD

²⁶ *Program Nacional de Luta Contra a Pobreza (PNLP)*

(International Fund for Agriculture Development), and USAID, became aware of the inefficiencies of FAIMO, and therefore embarked on the search and formulation of new strategies to combat poverty. NPAP was the strategic policy put together for that purpose. Launched in 2000, the program consisted of three major sub-projects: Social Sector Development Project (SSDP), implemented from 2000 to 2004 across the national territory; Rural Poverty Alleviation Program (PLPR), implemented between 2000 and 2012; and the Program of Socioeconomic Promotion of Disadvantaged Groups (PSGD) that was implemented from 2000 to 2005 in the islands of Santo Antão, São Vicente and Santiago. This section focuses solely on the *Rural Poverty Alleviation Program (PLPR)*, as it represents the government's most elaborated effort in the fight against the prevalence of rural poverty. In addition to that, PLPR offers the finest elements for the analysis of CSOs engagement in policy process in Cabo Verde, as it was conceived specifically to target the rural poor, in the most agricultural islands and municipalities of the country. It came out as an answer to the inefficacy of the antecedent programs- AIMO and FAIMO, in breaking up with the poverty and dependency cycles the rural population had been going through along the years.

The total cost for the implementation of PLPR has been estimated around 18 335 million USD, financed by IFAD (50%), by the government of Cabo Verde (36%), and by the projects beneficiaries (14%). The beneficiaries' engagement in the implementation of this program is the object of the analysis done in the next section, not only because of their participation in sharing the cost of projects, but more importantly, for the social capital that it generates, and its relevance for the success and sustainability of PLPR.

PLPR was formatted to be implemented in three phases: the first, from 2000 to 2003, focusing on the creation of institutional conditions, training of staff for all the agents involved, namely central and local governments, national NGOs and community based associations, as well as community members. In addition to training, there was also an implementation of several "demonstrating activities", as the working methodology to allow the stakeholders to learn how to design and implement micro-projects in the field. The second phase initially designed to last for three years (from 2003 to 2006), ended up extending until 2007. It was during this phase that implementation of projects prepared by the stakeholders started to take form. Finally, the third phase, which was due to close in 2009, was extended up to 2012, as the government of Cabo Verde had filed a request to the IFAD at the end of the second phase for an extension of the program to other parts of the country that had been left out in the two previous phases. In 2012, by the end of the third phase of PLPR implementation, the government negotiated with IFAD another financing package to extend the program until 2018,

as the rural poverty continued to hit the country severely. The government was successful in its attempt, and in fact, it was able to get another financial package estimated at 25.6 million USD for the extension of the program, now named POSER (Program of Rural Socioeconomic Opportunities). As its implementation was still running in the course of this research, and as it follows the same implementation approach used for PLPR, POSER is not fully covered in this research.

4.3 The Social Capital and rural development policies

The engagement of civil society in governance process has been judged as an influential factor for the political and socioeconomic advancement of a polity. Putnam (1993) argues that "horizontal networks of civic engagement bolsters the performance of the polity and the economy, rather than the reverse: Strong society, strong economy; strong society, strong state" (p.176). By "horizontal networks of civic engagement", Putnam (1993) means the reciprocal exchange between individuals, important for strengthening their mutual trust and common values. Once society gets stronger, with people engaged in networks of social organizations, it gets better in framing its demands (Tocqueville, 1998; Tavits, 2006), and participate itself in the solving of its collective problems. A strong society is, therefore characterized by vibrant and engaging civic organizations that mobilize and connect individuals to create "social capital", a valuable tool in addressing their social problems. A strong society is believed to contribute to a more responsive and efficient government (Putnam, 1993; Tavits, 2006). Thus, in analyzing the rural poverty alleviation policies in Cabo Verde, it is quintessentially important to ask the following questions: to what extent have civic organizations (social capital) been engaged in the elaboration and implementation of the aforementioned policies? What explains their engagement, and what are expected from them, by both their constituents and the state runners? How and to what extent have they influenced the performance of the rural alleviation policies in Cabo Verde? I will attempt to answer these questions by focusing on the engagement of CSOs in the four policies described in the above section: "Support for the populations affected by the draughts during colonization (*strada*), AIMO in the first republic, FAIMO in the 1990s, PNLPR (and POSER) in the 2000s.

4.3.1 Engagement of CSOs in the "Strada" and "AIMO" policies

During the colonial regime, as I have stated above in this chapter, poverty was attributed to cyclical natural phenomena, rather than the result of political and government policy inefficiencies. Poverty was simply taken as a *natural human condition*, being the consequence

of natural catastrophes, as the scarcity of rain. Thus, the *strada* policy was a contingent program to manage poverty, rather than a structural and steady policy to fight against its prevalence, principally in the rural areas of the country. *Strada* was a centralized government program, conceived and implemented by the colonial administrative apparatus. One could not speak about the engagement of civil society organizations in the state affairs yet, as there was no state. Cabo Verde was an extension of the colonial empire. Thus, the implementation of *strada* policy, as any other policy, was solely delegated to the representatives of colonial government and its administration machinery. The vertical relationship characteristic of that regime, and the inexistence of an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983), uniting the governors (colonizers) and the governed (colonized, the Cape Verdeans) was by itself a hindrance to the participation of non-state actors in the construction of such a community.

Despite the fact that Cape Verdean society enjoyed a modicum of social and cultural autonomy from the metropole (Furtado, 1993), its population was kept under harsh surveillance, and often objects of exclusionist political and administrative practices. Therefore, the implementation of *strada* as a political tool to manage misery, did not count on the social capital of the *forças vivas* (civic groups) already present in Cabo Verde (Silva, 1997; Lopes, 2013). However, there were occasions that these *forças vivas* were consulted by the administrators, but when this occurred, its purpose was to simply calm tensions among the discontent population, who were becoming more “conscientious” of their conditions. As that “class conscience” became more vibrant and demanding, the colonial authorities got aware of the need to create opportunities to meet the class representatives (*forças vivas*) to lower their tensions and discontentment, but not to engage them in the direction of the administrative system.

The independence in 1975 came as a window of opportunity to break up with the colonial legacies and accelerate the process of the country development. Civil society groups would be expected now to play new and more active roles in the governance process. The mass employment policy- AIMO, the Agrarian reform and the promotion of *cooperativismo* (cooperativism) were the most salient policies aimed at addressing the poverty in the country. The new government counted greatly on the social organizations and its social capital, for the implementations of new policies. The constitution of 1980 defined civic organizations, using the nomenclatures “mass organizations” and “social organizations” as valuable and indispensable actors in the process of nation construction. Thus, in its article 7, the constitution states that,

“1. The State supports and protects mass organizations and other legally recognized social organizations, which organized around specific interests,

frame and foster popular initiative and ensure the broad participation of the masses in the national reconstruction. 2. The State, in its action, relies on mass organizations and other social organizations to which it may transfer certain activities which they agree to assume. 3. The State creates conditions for the development of the material basis of mass organizations and other social organizations and protects their property "(CONST., 1980).

Clearly, the state expectation with the civil society participation is high. Hence, the state becomes both the promoter and the regulator of civil society. As stated in article 4, “the African Party of Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC-PAICV) is the leading political force of society and the state”. CSOs, still kept their voluntary and autonomous characteristics, but bounded by the party state’s control mechanism. Thus, the space of civil society was the state itself, not outside its sphere. Now there is one “imagined community”, the Cape Verdean nation, around which all the dreamers imagine themselves as members of that one community and one state, which they would have to join forces to build. However, critics see such state and non-state actors’ partnership as an instrumentalist approach being used by the single party regime to widespread and enforce its political ideology, and not simply a mere strategy to “reconstruct the nation”, nor to promote the country development. As Santos and Bastin put it,

“Le rapport administration/populations ainsi que le role de l’Etat dans la promotion du developpement, la problematique majeur se situe au niveau politique. Ainsi, le regime capverdien definit la participation, simultanément, come un moyen et une finalité de son project politique. La participation populaire au developpement est donc institutionnalis e, est toutes forms modernes d’organisation de la participation au d veloppement sont des instruments de la politique de d veloppement du Cap-Vert” (1988, w/p)

Civil society and their organizations were not conceived as separate entities from the state, but as its integral part. Thus, their participation should be institutionally oriented to serve the goals pursued by the state. Analyzing the civil society participation in the AIMO policy within such a political context, one would expect a high state support to materialize that participation. Thus, despite the criticism on their control by the ruling party, the social organizations, being leveraged by the state, they played an important role in galvanizing the popular participation in the AIMO and other policy process in the promotion of the country development in its first years of independence. Furtado (1993) provides one example of such a participation in his analysis of the Land Reform policy implemented in the 1980s. The state engaged farmer associations and groups of emigrants in the Land reform policy by considering their claims and concerns about the changes expected to be made. In fact, some of their claims and concerns were duly integrated in the text of the Land Reform. Such was the case of the organization of emigrants who could convince the government not to take or nationalize their lands, or even to

allow them to get more lands, in case they decided to resettle and work in Cabo Verde (Furtado, 1993).

With the creation of the *Rural Assistance Program* in 1982, the state aimed at giving an incremental change to the AIMO policy, by strengthening the engagement of civic organizations in its implementation. During the 1980s, rural work extensionists- *extencionistas rurais*²⁷ were sent across the country to mobilize farmers to form associations. According to Paul (1987) and Bamberger (1988), community mobilization and participation in development projects initially aimed at empowering the beneficiaries and promoting the projects' effectiveness and efficiency. In the long run, community participation ended up also creating community social capital, as people intertwined in threads of relationship, acquired knowledge and develop trust, in addition to creating a culture propitious for development. For the case of Cabo Verde, the farmers and the community associations, as a former rural extensionist, *Patxani*, reported to me, “were not only participating in the construction of the works, but very importantly, they were intermediary bodies that would facilitate communications with the farmers”. There was a need to organize farmers so that they could receive training in the new agricultural practices (empowerment), and the best way to do that would be in partnerships with the community organizations. These organizations were functioning like instruments to facilitate the AIMO policy implementation. I asked Patxani how the mobilization of population to create association was done and his reply was:

“actually it was done with close collaboration with the local leaders. We would approach a local leader-easily identified because once you talked to somebody in the community, he/she would simply say ‘go talk to *Mr. or Mrs. So and So...*’ Then, we would go to the indicated *Mr. or Mrs. So and So* to discuss the issue with him/her, and they would mobilize the rest of the community. Usually this is the way it happened”.

This quote suggests that community associations were not merely instruments of party ideology dissemination, as Santos and Bastin (1988) suggest. They were also actors in possession of social capital (the social network of their members, the trust and knowledge acquired) that once used in combination with the state's resources (human capital- the *extentionists*, and the money made available), would facilitate the implementation of AIMO policy, and therefore contribute to the amelioration of the community life. As Putnam puts it, “where trust and social network flourish, individuals, firms, neighborhoods, and even nations prosper” (2000, p. 319). The

²⁷ *Extencionistas rurais* are agricultural technicians and experts working for the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, whose primary job was conducting research and training farmers throughout the country in new agricultural practices.

communities' bridging social capital (Woodcock, 2002), enhanced in the community associations became a powerful resource, and in fact, "the solution" for the people themselves in solving their own common problem. As Challinor (2008) points out in her study of community associations in Santiago Island, by 1986, four years after the start of *Rural Assistance Program*, the community associations, whether formally constituted or not, were being able to identify, by themselves, specific projects to be implemented in the communities, and "indicate where they had to be built" (pp. 52-53). Once this was done, community associations would then negotiate their implementation with the *extentionists*, "who in turn would present the proposal to the Ministry of Rural Development and Fishery" (Challinor, 2008, pp. 52-53). This policy networking process of involving community associations, the *rural extentionists* as government brokers, and the government decision makers, made it truly a "collaborative governance" experiment in the first republic. Despite the critics made on the nature of civil society participation (Santos and Bastin, 1988; Costa, 2013; Cardoso, 2016), what is clear is that, there was a political orientation and a policy in place to promote such participation.

4.3.2 Engagement of CSOs in FAIMO policy

In 1995, five years after the termination of *Rural Assistance Program* (PAR), a component of AIMO inherited from the single party regime, FAIMO policy continued counting on the experience of community associations' engagement in the implementation of soil conservation projects, now financed by USAID and implemented by ACIDI-VOCA, in cooperation with DGASP (Government Department for Environment, Forestry and Fishery). As I have mentioned earlier, incremental changes with the privatization measures were added to that policy though. Through the intermediation of ACIDI-VOCA, community associations were being invited to sign out contract directly with the government agency- DGASP, to implement those projects (Challinor, 2008; Pina, 2007). As this experience showed productivity, more associations were created and encouraged to participate in the FAIMO implementation projects. The projects implementation through this partnership was proving to be successful regarding their effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, as a social service delivery system, FAIMO was becoming partly privatized with the transfer of its implementation to the hands of community associations and other private entities. This privatization process was in fact a startling difference from the way AIMO policy had been implemented in the previous regime. According to Pina (2007), engagement of associations gained a strong support from international donors as they saw that

channeling funds through local organizations was being far more efficient for project implementation performance than channeling them through government.

In the single party regime, the nationalization of the economy and centralization of policy-making were a hindrance for the development of business entities, as community organizations, to generate income. The Marxist oriented constitution itself limited the development of private initiatives as it emphasized the “liquidation of the exploitation of man by man, and the elimination of all forms of human subjection to degrading interests, for the benefit of individuals or groups” (CONST., 1980, art. 10). However, the liberal MPD government promoted in the 1990s a “new model of governance” of public service delivery, by opening the door to for-profit organizations to operate in the country, as well as a wider voluntary participation of nonprofits, which was the case of FAIMO policy. The wave of privatization of the parastatal companies initiated in that period was part of that model of new governance. According to Challinor (2008), ACIDI-VOCA Cabo Verde defended that community associations should work as small private enterprises and use the surpluses generated to re-invest and grow into bigger enterprises. The quick growth of CSOs in the 1990s was therefore, partly an outcome of this “political opportunity structure” (Tarrow, 2011) created by new the political and economic contexts introduced with the inauguration of democracy in Cabo Verde.

However, as the state created opportunities for private entities to get in, it used the very same opportunities to get itself out of some of the sectors that had been its sole responsibility. The privatization of service delivery system such as that of FAIMO, was also an attempt for the state to withdraw itself, or launch retrenchment measures on the social service delivery system. Such an attempt, within the framing of the “minimalist state” ideology, gave birth to different kinds of CSOs, as well as to different types of partnerships with the state. In the first republic, CSOs (mass and social organizations) were “integrating parts of the state” (CONST., 1980) and their engagement was based on an *ideological relationship* of unionism, unlike the relationship mediated based on contracts, characteristic of the later liberal government of MPD. In the former regime, CSOs were embedded in a culturally bounded rationality, which it would be rather better for them to respond to the party-state to engage in the policy process than turn their backs and do things on their own way. The linkage between CSOs and the state was in fact eased to a certain extent as most of these organizations were led by embedded party figures. As the former *rural extensionist* Patxani puts it, “the leaders of the associations created during PAR projects, were usually strong party figures in the community”. In a situation like this,

characterized by a strong politicization of society, cooperation would not be a matter of choice, but a matter of the best choice to make.

With the democratization in the 1990s, and the consequent separation of society from the state, engagement of CSOs in government policy became to be intermediated through contracts. It was the beginning of a type of collaboration based on “contractual relationships” (Gazley and Brudney, 2007) and a programmatic linkage (Kitschelt, 2000) between the state and the CSOs around public policy making and implementation. As stated above, for the case of Cabo Verde, this sort of CSOs engagement began in 1996 when they started being directly contracted out by the DGASP to carry out FAIMO projects. Such a policy practice enforced by the liberal MPD government was an outcome of policy diffusion process triggered in the West, more specifically in England and the USA in the 1980s under the neoliberalism ideals (Pierson, 1994; Salamon, 1995) championed by the prime minister Thatcher and president Reagan in the two respective countries. Indeed, the often-quoted Reagan’s 1981 speech on voluntarism illustrates this new policy trend:

“With the same energy that Franklin Roosevelt sought government solutions to problems, we will seek private solutions. The challenge before us is to find ways once again to unleash the independence spirit of the people and their communities [...] Voluntarism is an essential part of our plan to give the government back to the people” (Reagan, 1991²⁸).

The heavy welfare program in place since the Great Depression, further consolidated after the World War II, had put too much burden on the state’s shoulder. Not only financial burden, but also the burden and the role of the state being the caretaker of individual citizens. This state centrality, Reagan argued, diminished the individual and private initiatives, and created a dependency mentality on the state. Therefore, once the state retreats, citizens would take care of their own lives, through private and voluntary initiatives, something that had been the hallmark of the American democracy (Tocqueville, 1998). Only by doing so, Reagan believed, the people would be again in control of their government.

The neoliberalism ideals put great emphasis on dismantling the welfare state in England and the USA, under Thatcher and Reagan administration respectively, by reducing the presence of the state while increasing the private’s roles in social service delivery (Pierson, 1994). Indeed, during their tenures, “non-governmental and grassroots have grown and proliferated remarkably [...] giving the rise of the belief that opposition mobilized outside the state

²⁸ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the National Alliance of Business," October 5, 1981. *Online* by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44337>.

apparatus and within some separate entity called *civil society* is the powerhouse of the oppositional politics and social transformation” (Harvey, 2005, p. 76). Reagan had in fact made it clear that “the real source of our progress as a people was the private sector” (Reagan, 1991²⁹). The state was no longer seen as the leading role player in the transformation of society. Instead, non-state institutions of civil society, representing the “oppositional politics” (Harvey, 2005) and the source of progress (Reagan, 1981) would stand to take the lead of social transformation, even though it had to be done, sometimes, through a contentious political process.

The Cape-Verdean constitutional amendment of 1999 incorporated such neoliberal and minimalist state ideals, by withdrawing the state’s sole responsibility on funding and supplying social services, calling therefore upon the need for non-state actors to participate in supplying such services (Silva, 2004). It is within this neoliberal policy diffusion in Cape Verdean politics that rural development policies were given a different turn, and so was the engagement of civil society. The engagement based on contractual relationship with the state was innovative as it allowed responsibility to communities to collaborate in the public provision of social services, and so generate surplus for other autonomously run social projects. However, such a relationship was yet too dependent from the state. Community associations could only carry out projects when there were contracts with the state, or being funded by a foreign donor. As Challinor (2008) cites a then USAID expatriate in Cabo Verde, “contractualisation of community associations was FAIMO in another outfit”. In 1997, after realizing the inefficiency of FAIMO policy in producing the expected outcomes on poverty alleviation, the government reformulated the poverty policy in Cabo Verde into what came to be known as the “National Poverty Alleviation Program”, an overarching policy, under which the Rural Poverty Alleviation Program (PLPR) was framed. It is the engagement of civil society in this latter program that I will now turn into in the following section.

4.3.3 Engagement of CSOs in the Rural Poverty Alleviation Program (PLPR)

In 2003, a team composed of national and international consultants carried out the first comprehensive NPAP evaluation. According to this evaluation report, 85% of the beneficiaries considered that the NPAP policies had responded positively to the need of the communities, while 92% evaluated positively the impact of PLPR on the community development. However, a lesser percentage, 82%, evaluated positively the PDSS (IDRF, 2002: 21). Regarding the

²⁹ Idem

participation of the beneficiaries in the design and implementation of NPAP, according to the same source, the majority 69% affirmed they had not participated in the projects implemented [which they did not directly benefit from]. Only 11% reported they had participated in the project identification phase, and only 9% said they participated in the implementation of the identified phases. In the design and planning stages, participation did not exceed 6%. The reasons people pointed out for their non-participation are lack of time (24%), lack of interest (15%) and lack of invitation (14%) (IDRF, 2002, p. 22). Overall, these indicate that the level of community engagement in the NPAP projects implementation was in fact low, despite a high percentage of 92% of beneficiaries considered their life conditions had been positively changed by the projects they were benefited with. Thus, how would this low participation in the NPAP program change in the following year?

Focusing strictly on the PLPR projects, its conception and implementation were done based on the principle of community participation, through an “extensive consultation with various stakeholders under the government’s leadership” (IFAD, 2015). Thus, the NPAP Coordination Unit Program (UCP) put a participative scheme in place with the purpose of connecting all the stakeholders, including government institutions, CSOs, donors and business representatives around the design and implementation of PLPR projects. Rather than being a centralized top-down program, PLPR had to follow a bottom-up process approach. The use of this approach inspired, on the one hand, in the experience of civic engagement already tried in FAIMO implementation projects in the previous years, and, on the other hand, by the IFAD Flexible Lending Policy guidelines, which demanded the active participation of the population in the development projects. These both policy feedback effect (Pierson, 1994) and coercive diffusion process (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett, 2007), manifested clearly on the formulation and implementation processes of PLPR. As the PLPR is a branch within the overarching national poverty alleviation program (NPAP), I am not dedicating here much attention on the events that led to its formulation. However, my focus is on its implementation process, of which design was a component of the policy formulation itself. As Hill and Hupe (2002) argue, the decision on how a policy should be implemented is part of the policy making itself.

The PLPR, in its three-implementation cycles, from 2000 through 2012, and then, POSER from 2012 through 2018, built significantly on institutional innovations, basing on a “collaborative framework for fighting rural poverty and to contribute to enhancing the government’s decentralization policy” (IFAD Report, 2015, p. 5). The implementation of PLPR would be carried out based on this collaborative (Barber, 1984) and associative governance (Hirst, 1995, Cohen, and Rogers, 1995), integrating multiple “corporate actors”- government,

private and non-government institutions. These actors are organized in three different institutional levels: Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Regional Partner Committees (CRPs), and the central Program Coordination Unit (UCP). The UCP is the upstream institution, working closely with the government and the donors. Once it was set up, it launched the PLPR program, starting with the recruitment and training of “community mobilizers”, agents that work closely with populations in the various communities in the islands or municipalities beneficiaries of the PLPR programs. These agents, the main *street-level bureaucrats* of PLPR policy, mobilized and encouraged the populations to create associations, CBOs, across the country. This upstream policy activity was meant to mobilize the community social capital, which would leverage the implementation of PLRP policy. Once they were set up, the various associations, the NGOs, private sector representatives, local governments and decentralized government agencies of each considered region (an island or a group of municipalities within an island that are territorially demarcated for the implementation of the program) formed the CRPs, which became therefore the regional coordinating unit of the PLPR. The CRPs are intermediary institutions, mediating between the CBOs and the UCP. In its first phase, between 2000- 2007, the program had four CRPs, one in Santo Antão, one in Fogo, one in Brava Island, and another one in Santiago Island, covering the municipalities of Tarrafal and São Miguel. With the extension of the program to other islands and municipalities, by 2009 there were 9 CRPs (Santo Antão, São Vicente, São Nicolau, Maio, Santiago Norte, Santiago Centro, Santiago Sul, Fogo e Brava), with almost 700 members, being most of them the Community Based Organizations, estimated to be around 500. The CRPs, with the engagement of its participative stakeholders, become therefore the regional and local platform where collaborative governance is exercised in the design of local development plans, as well as their implementations and evaluation. This institutional network in the implementation of PLPR is what Osborne (2010) calls of “network governance”.


The coordination of PLPR at the national level follows the same principle of *collaborative governance* imprinted in the CRPs and CBOs. As figure 4.3 bellow illustrates, the top leading organization, the *Conselho Nacional de Redução da Pobreza* (The National Council for Poverty Reduction- CNRP), under the Ministry of Youth, Employment and Human Resources, is a network institution comprised of state, CSOs and International donor institutions, with the role of collecting and sharing information on poverty amongst its constituent members. In addition to that, the council defines and socializes the macro-policies to address poverty in the country. Under the CNRP, there is the UCP, the NPAP/PLPR coordination unit that manages the implementation of the policies produced by the former.

However, the actual implementation, or the operationalization of the emanated policies and projects lies on the shoulder of the CRPs, through CBOs and private enterprises at the local levels. The role of CBOs is quintessentially important, seeing that they are responsible for proposing “projects” to the CRPs to be executed in the communities they represent. Along with the CRPs, CBOs also play the role in the operationalization of the financed projects. However, isolated CBOs have no power to pronounce on the typologies of projects to be financed and implemented. Such pronouncements come down from UCP, then pass through CRPs, and finally to CBOs. In the words of Ostrom (1990), the rules of the lower level institutions are nested within the rules of the next above institutions.

“The processes of appropriation, provision, monitoring, and enforcement occur at the operational level. The processes of policy-making, management, and adjudication of policy decisions occur at the collective-choice level. Formulation, governance, adjudication, and modification of constitutional decisions occur at the constitutional level” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 52).

However, there is some institutional interdependency among the four level organizations, CBOs, CRPs, UCP, and the CNRP. While the institutions at the downstream, the CBOs and the CRPs, implement rules imposed by the CPU, this intermediary institution defines the “collective rules” on the policies to be implemented by the former institutions. At the most upstream level stands the CNRP, functioning as the constitutional watchdog overseeing the whole policy implementation process. Figure 4.3 provides a visual illustration of this interrelationship. However, the overseeing of this policy process would not be possible without the full commitment of the institutions at the bottom and middle levels, which contribute with information and data on the flow of the policy. Nevertheless, one should not assure that the interdependency operates on equal terms. Indeed, by the fact that the institutions at the operational level depend on the rules and the funds that come from the upper stream organizations, (the collective and the constitutional ones), one might say that there is a risk of establishing a paternalistic linkage among these organizations.

Figure 4.3- Organigram of PLPR/POSER



Source: (FIDA, 2012)

The situation described above shows that the design and implementation processes of poverty alleviation policies in Cabo Verde are characteristics of both a “pluralist state” and of a “plural state”. The former *refers to the state* “where multiple processes inform the policy-making system”, whereas the latter refers to the one “where multiple interdependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services” (Osborne, 2010, p. 9). If at the design phase, we see the prevalence of a certain pluralism, involving multiple actors to work collaboratively to put together the policy solutions to address poverty in Cabo Verde, in the implementation phase a plurality of these actors have also been engaged in the service delivery scheme. Thus, the implementation of PLPR

“a ...contribué à la mise en place d’un dispositif participatif et ascendant à plusieurs échelles, qui a prouvé sa pertinence: les Associations communautaires de développement (CBOs) au niveau local, les Commissions régionales de partenaires (CRP) au niveau régional/insulaire et le Conseil national de Réduction de la Pauvreté (CNRP) et l’Unité de coordination du Programme (UCP) au niveau national” (IFAD, 2012).

According to the IFAD report (2015), by the end of PLPR implementation in 2012, nine (9) CRPs and 496 CBOs had been established³⁰. “The CRPs fully played their roles as the interface between the rural populations and partners at local level” (p.5). Despite the reference made to the powerlessness of CBOs in influencing policy rules, at the community levels they play an important role in bringing people together in the community assemblies, to discuss and propose projects to be submitted to CRPs, or to other entities for funding. The IFAD Report, indeed stresses the fact that by “the end of the program [in 2012] about 77 percent of the resources of the CBOs were mobilized outside the PLRP framework, which demonstrates the high degree of autonomy reached by these organizations and a solid partnership between the CRPs and the public” (IFAD, 2015, p. 5). Such a claim reveals that the promotion and engagement of CSOs (including CBOs and other organized types of civil society organization) through a partnership with the government had contributed greatly to their strengthening and affirmation. Having this said, now the question that should be raised is “to what extent has the engagement of the identified CSOs (namely CRPs and CBOs) in the PLRP have contributed to its effectiveness in the reduction of poverty in the rural areas in Cabo Verde?”

4.3.4 Engagement of CSOs and its impacts on rural poverty alleviation in Cabo Verde


To answer the question posed at the end of the previous section, it would require a detailed collection of both qualitative and quantitative data on the PLPR implementation, and their linkages and correlations with the evolution of poverty figures. This task will be dealt with more in depth in chapter 7 on the engagement of CSOs and the performance of the municipal governments. In the present section, I will make use of the national data on poverty evolution provided by the National Institute of Statistics from 2000 through 2015, and then establish its association with CSOs’ *bridging social capital* (measured by the vibrancy of CSOs, on the one hand, and government-CSOs linkages, on the other).

In 2002, according to the second IDRF (2001/02) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics, 36.7% of Cape Verdean population lived below the poverty line, and more than half of this population (51.1%) was living in the rural area of the country. Poverty was predominantly rural, and therefore the adoption of a policy specifically targeted to this segment of population- the PLPR, would make all sense. In 2007, seven years after the launch of PLPR, poverty rate declined to 26.6%, while in the rural area it remained high at 44.3%, but lower by 6.8% in relation to 2002. In 2015, the third IDRF determined that the total percentage of

³⁰ Originally only five CRPs and only 234 ACDs had been predicted.

population living below the poverty line stood at 24.2%, while the rural poverty rate stood at 40.9%, a 3.4% decrease comparing to 2007. Therefore, the percentage of rural poverty decreased by 10, 2% from 2002 to 2015, as figure 4.4 illustrates.


Figure 4.4- Evolution of poverty: Urban vs. Rural poverty



Source: INE (2015)

I argue that the reduction of rural poverty rate in Cabo Verde during the aforementioned period is explained by the *social capital* created and mobilized in the ambit of PLPR projects implementation, both in its bridging and linking dimensions. The exponential increase of civic organizations, as well as their membership rates in the first decade of 2000s, caused an increase in the policy activism for the fight against poverty (Tavits, 2006). Based on the data collected by the *Plataforma das ONGs de Cabo Verde* (2015), there were approximately 195 organizations of civil society in Cabo Verde in 2000 and by 2015 that figure increased to 724 and approximate growth of 371%. When one compares (qualitatively) the growth of CSOs and the evolution of poverty in Cabo Verde, we can see that while the former goes up, the latter goes down (Figure 4.5). However, this study is not suggesting there is a direct correlation between these two variables, difficult to prove statistically due to lack of precise quantitative data for the corresponding years. Nevertheless, the association between the two can not be denied.

Figure 4.5 - Evolution of Rural poverty vs. growth of CSOs in Cabo Verde (1989-2015)



Source: Graph elaborated by the author

The decreasing trend of rural poverty contrasted with the increasing trend of CSOs during the 2000s, corresponding to period of PLPR implementation projects. The number of CSOs almost doubled. The great majority of these CSOs are Community Associations (CBOs), which in 2015 represented 73% of the total CSOs, in Cabo Verde (Platform das ONGs, 2015). Thus, the increase of CSOs strengthens the argument of social capital in generating policy activism (Tavits, 2006). On the second hand, CSOs have played an important role in promoting the practice of social and solidarity economic practices, such as cooperatives, microfinances, rotating credits, and other small community auto-managed economic practices. These practices, according to Santos (2017), have contributed positively to formation and sustaining community forms of safety nets, with important impacts in the lives of rural people.

The second dimension of social capital in the poverty analysis is the *linking social capital* (Woolcock, 1998, 2000, 2002), built upon the relationship and partnership between CSOs and government. The government collaborates with CSOs to implement PLPR projects, counting therefore on these organizations' resources (Kistshelt, 2000; Zald and MacCarthy, 1979) to build synergy (Evans, 1997; Salamon, 1995), and mutual trust (La Porta et al., 1997) in the fight against poverty. This networking relationship between government and CSOs creates what Moore and Hartley (2010), Hartley (2005) and Osborne (2010) coin of "innovation in governance", and partly what Salamon (1995) calls of "third party-government". Innovation in governance occurs when "different organizations" within a polity are knitted together to create "a more effective problem-solving approach to a given problem" (Moore and Hartley,

2010, p. 56). This is because “the solving of the major problems and the creation of major opportunities in modern societies are a combined responsibility of state, market and civil society together” (Kooiman, 1993, p 72). This joint responsibility would require therefore, a ‘networked governance’ (Hartley, 2005, p. 29) resulted from an interrelation of the plurality of institutions that make up the polity. For Hartley (2005), innovation is characterized by a “change in the relationships between service providers and their users” (p.27). Citizens should not be perceived merely as passive policy recipients, but active participants in their conception and implementation. Once citizens, through their independent organizations (CSOs) participate actively in the making and implementation of policies that they themselves are the beneficiaries, a kind of a third party government evolves (Salamon, 1995). The implementation of PLPR took an innovative turn in comparison to previous rural poverty policies. Despite the fact that local associations had already been engaged in the implementation of AIMO and FAIMO policies, these policies had remained government centralized. As we saw earlier in this chapter, the government department of agriculture and its agencies directly administered the AIMO/FAIMO programs, even when there were contracts with the local associations. In addition, when the associations were contracted out to implement projects, they had no say in what projects should be carried out, but merely limited themselves in carrying the job they were contracted to implement.

The innovation introduced in the implementation of PLPR to address the rural poverty issue in Cabo Verde resides in the knitting together the state, market and the civil society, as well as international actors in the effort of creating and providing solutions for the rural poverty problem. I call this knitting together of *societal linking social capital*, a concept I will further develop in chapter 6. Along with the structure illustrated in figure 4.3, other decentralized instruments were created to monitor the implementation of PLPR programs. These instruments include the *National Alliance for Social Development*, and the *National Committee for Reflection on Poverty*, institutions that work in close cooperation with PLPR management structures to guarantee its implementation success. Thus, the creation of a plural and decentralized network structure to manage the implementation of PLPR, gave this program a distinctive characteristic from the previous rural poverty policies. These networking institutions, promoted by the state, but not state owned, as Moore and Hartley (2010) argue,

“enlarge the range of resources that can be tapped to enlarge and improve the performance of the production [and implementation of the policy] system. They involve changes in what instruments government uses to animate and direct the production [and implementation] system for achieving the desired goals. They alter the configuration of decision-making rights with respect to how private

and public resources will be used. And they raise important questions about the distribution of burdens and privileges in the society” (p.69).

The network of institutions knitted together and engaged around the policy, contributes with financial, material and human capital in its production and implementation. The CSOs together with their resources, as the other actors, become instruments for the operationalization of the PLPR policy, and therefore facilitate the achievement of the “desired goals”. In addition, the engagement of the different actors- state, market and civil society, implies a redefinition of the locus of the right and responsibility to decide and act to solve social problems, such as poverty. Thus, deciding over the solution for societal problems require a “combination or governing efforts” (Kooiman, 1993, p. 73), not only with resources, but also in judging over the value of what is produced and distributed in the society. Once this institutional network is in place, the locus of policymaking and implementation is partly moved away from the state/government domain to societal institutions. “Serving the public interest is not only the duty of the state, but also the permanent task and responsibility of all citizens”, argue Moore and Hartley (2010, p. 17).

Thus, engaging the CSOs in this web of institutional network relationship generates a linking social capital that “facilitates cooperation and helps to overcome the agency problem within the bureaucratic organization” (Tavits, 2006, p. 211), in this case, the government at large. The institutional cooperation around the policy implementation would avoid shirking, and in contrast, would strengthen the government performance regarding the policies implemented. Putnam (2000) finds that social capital is a valuable asset for mitigating “the insidious effects of the socioeconomic disadvantage” (p.319). Putnam’s empirical study in Italy (1993) and the United States (2000) found out that communities that are benefited with high index of social capital, do much better economically than the ones with lower index. Why is that so? Tavits (2006) argue that this “positive relationship” is due to policy activism. Communities with high social capital (both in its *bridging* and *linking* dimensions) are much more able to mobilize and put political pressure on “institutions of government” to respond to their demands. On its side, the government office holders, as they need to keep their constituents satisfied, and avoid the risk of not being reelected, fell pressured to respond positively to the demands posed to them. La Porta et al., (1997) argue that social capital “enables individual bureaucrats to cooperate better with each other and with private citizens, making government more productive” (p.334). In summary, the linkage social capital hypothesis stands on the argument that the “fight against poverty and social exclusion should not transform people and

communities into passive and permanent beneficiaries of assistance programs” (Oliveira, 2002, p. 15). Instead, the poor should be taken as active agents that participate in the formulation and implementation of policies targeted at themselves. Such a participation happens through their own independent organizations, the civil society organizations.

In his analysis of the *Comunidade Solidária* policy, a poverty alleviation program implemented during the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil, Oliveira (2002) states that citizens “are constantly being called upon to produce value judgements and to make choices [and not simply having] to conform to a pre-established destiny” (p. 17). He adds that the mobilization of citizens occurs with

“the most varied of actors, from the ordinary citizen to the entrepreneur, from NGOs to churches, and from unions of professional associations [which] increases resources and stimulates innovative solutions”. Such initiatives are becoming more and more two-way streets – they are channeling not only generosity and donations, but also opening up to new experiences, and providing learning opportunities as well as the pleasure of feeling useful to a community” (Oliveira, 2002, p. 19)

Such a stimulation of “innovative solutions”, also supported by Moore and Hartly (2010), and Kooiman (1996), resides on the fundamental rights the different groups possess over the social goods, but also on the responsibilities they hold over the production of these social goods (Ostrom, 1997). Thus, the “citizen involvement and public-private partnerships do not constitute an alternative for the programs and policies implemented by the state, but rather a prerequisite for their implementation in a more efficient and equitable way” (Oliveira, 2002, p.19).

The innovation brought by the PLPR lies in its institutional collaborative approach for its implementation. The web of networking institutions, joining the state, market and civil society organizations, have contributed to the efficiency of the policy implementation, as argued in the evaluation reports. According to the IFAD report (2015), results obtained by the end of the third phase of PLPR in 2012, show that the goal of “increasing the social capital of the poor people living in rural areas, and mobilizing the entrepreneurial potential of local communities” (IFAD, 2015) was plainly achieved. Throughout the implementation of PLPR, 9 CRPs were created instead of 5, and 496 CBOs were created instead of the 234 originally planned. This success shows that the networking institutions involved in the implementation of the policy exceeded the expectations that had been set upon its adoption. On the same token, the report emphasizes the fact that by the end of the third implementation phase, a high percentage of CSOs, around 77%, was being able to mobilize resources outside the PLPR funding structure to finance and carry out their projects. This fact strengthens the argument that

institutions involved in innovative governance bring in resources attached to their responsibilities, which influence the results of the problem at hand (Moore and Hartley, 2010). However, despite the recognition of social capital as an “important factor in poverty reduction”, it is difficult to measure quantitatively the existing relationship between the two (Kazancigil and Øyen, 2002, p. 6). Putnam (1993) recognizes such a difficulty by distinguishing between “policy outputs” and “societal outcomes” measures. While the former refers to observable and quantifiable measures linked directly to policy implementation, the latter “conflate government activities with factors beyond government control” (Tavits, 2006, p. 215). However, the qualitative “logic of inference” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1996), is likely to enlighten some association between the implemented policies with the societal outcomes, which is the case of poverty rate in the rural areas of Cabo Verde.

From the social capital perspective, the CSOs mobilization and collaboration with government, have contributed positively to the effectiveness of PLPR implementation and its impacts in poverty reduction. Qualitative data gathered through the reports on rural poverty, in conjunction with in-depth interviews with some CSOs leaders, added to the group discussions with members of Community Based Organizations (three of them); demonstrate that CSOs participation and their collaboration have helped achieve tangible impacts in the amelioration of life conditions of the communities. For example, the following excerpt from the IFAD report (2015) (a kind of supra-report prepared based on the reports provided by the CRP managers) provides some qualitative evaluation of the impacts achieved with PLPR implementation:

“the intensive training in professional skills and Income Generating Activities (IGAs), provided by the PLPR, had raised the level of community development capacity, contributed to increasing social capital, empowerment and motivation, improved, human, social and personal assets and impacted on interpersonal skills and self-confidence. Tangible results were reached with regard to micro projects in agriculture, livestock and fisheries, together with improved access to water and irrigation. The program had also actively promoted gender equality, particularly in terms of a stronger inclusion of women, in a number of aspects, in access to social services as well as to training, productive activities, community micro projects and IGAs” (IFAD, 2015, p. 11).

Direct interviews with PLPR program beneficiaries illustrate some of the gains highlighted in the IFAD report. Dona Anita, a 60-year-old single-mother, resident in the municipality of São Salvador do Mundo in Santiago Island, and a beneficiary of an income generating activity (IGA) project in the ambit of PLPR, puts her story in the following way:

“The project I was contemplated with has given me an extraordinary help. The association helped me buy the equipment to install my own bakery at home. Since then, I have been making and selling bread every single day. Thanks God, I have managed to refurbish my house, educate my children without any difficulties. I have been fortunate,

and in fact I am very happy with this project” (interview given to the author on July 26, 2017).

Besides receiving money to buy the equipment, Dona Anita also received a crash course on small business management together with some other women from her village. The fact that she can manage by herself, paying back the grant, refurbishing her house and sending her children to school without asking for government assistance, it is a clear indication of the ascendance she has made in her economic condition, and on the other hand, a clear example of PLPR success.

To what extent has the innovation through partnership governance in the implementation of PLPR influenced its effectiveness and efficiency? Answering this question would be easier if we could only wind back the PLRP to its departure point and see it implemented without such an innovation. This would allow a comparative analysis of the two implementation approaches, and therefore, sound conclusions would be drawn. However, such an exercise is quiet impossible in the field of social sciences. Therefore, we should content with the facts and the data at our disposal, rather than hypothetically recreate them in order to draw inferences. The percentage of the population living below the poverty line decreased from 36.7% in 2002 to 24.2% in 2015. On the same token, rural poverty rate fell from 51.1% to 40.9% in the same period. However, despite the caveat that change in the poverty rate is an outcome of a concatenation of many variables, and not as the direct result of any single policy (Putnam, 1993; Tavits, 2006), the present research has found strong association between PLPR policies with poverty reduction in the rural areas of Cabo Verde. This conclusion has been backed by the data presented in the IFAD report and collected through interviews.

On the eve of its termination in 2012, the Cape Verdean government negotiated a new financial package with IFAD to continue with its rural development policy and the alleviation of poverty in the country. Prepared to benefit the same target population, the rural poor, the new policy would be given a different focus: empowering the poor economically, by transforming them into active and participative actors in the economic development of the country. The new policy is called POSER-Promotion of Socio-economic Opportunities for the Rural Population (translation of the author), and its implementation is expected to last from 2012 through 2018. The conception document of POSER justifies its relevance by stating the following:

“Bien qu’ayant reculé, la pauvreté continue de toucher principalement mais pas uniquement, les zones rurales. Les caractéristiques des vulnérabilités de l’archipel et la persistance de la pauvreté empêchent encore le Cap-Vert de se passer de l’aide au développement. Un nouveau programme de développement

promouvant l'emploi et les opportunités économique en faveur des zones rurales permettrait de contrevenir aux disparités existant entre les îles touristiques et les autres, et de contribuer au rééquilibrage en faveur d'une croissance économique inclusive et équitable" (FIDA, 2012, p. vi-vii)

Despite the positive results achieved with PLPR, poverty remains a challenge in the country, and therefore, the need to continue addressing it with overarching and ambitious policies. POSER aims to be a policy with these characteristics. Its implementation follows exactly the same governance approach used with PLPR, by relying on the people's social capital as a proxy for the socioeconomic advancement of the rural population (Fukuyama, 1995). POSER is therefore a continuation of PLPR program, or better, PLPR in a different outfit.

4.4 The limits of social capital on poverty alleviation in Cabo Verde

Social capital generated in the thread of the networking and collaborative institutions has influenced positively the implementation of rural policies in Cabo Verde. Such an influence happens essentially on lowering the policy design and implementation costs (Paul, 1987; Ostrom, 1990). However, is the engagement of CSOs (bridging and linking social capital forms) the panacea for rural poverty reduction? Despite the advantages of social capital for promoting development, studies on the engagement or partnerships between the state, market and civil societies organizations, the so called the PPPs (Public and Private Partnership) and the third-party government (Salamon, 1995) for the design and implementation of public policies, have often cautioned the policy makers on the pitfalls of such a partnership.

Faranak Miraftab (2004), in her study of PPP on housing policy in South Africa, asserts that government and private partnership often functions as a scheme for the contracted organizations to look for the maximization of their own self-interests, rather than the attainment of collective goals. For instance, for-profit organizations benefit by far more from the protection of neoliberal policies (the PPP is itself a tool for neoliberal policy implementation) than nonprofit CSOs representing the poor. Thus, for-profits organizations are in a better position to overlook "the terms of agreement" with the state over certain policies for their own favor, ignoring therefore the benefits or the gains of the powerless actors. As Miraftab argues, "in the context of the third world's wide socioeconomic gaps and decentralizing states, where central governments often have neither the will nor the ability to intervene effectively, PPPs are free to operate as the "Trojan Horses" of development (p. 89). PPP comes in as a good offer, but at the end of the day, it turns out to be a big problem to be solved. The governance through PPP, the policy tool for the neoliberal New Public Management theory (Osborne, 2010), by decentralizing government responsibilities over policymaking and implementation, poses the

questions of who is in control, and who is really benefiting from the governance system. To overcome this situation, Peters (2010) calls for the need of a “metagovernance” system, a process that “recognizes the need for some delegation and devolution of some governing but at the same time recognizes the need for greater central direction” (p.37). On the same line of argument, Miraftab (2004) argues that although the state allows non-state actors to “row the boat” in the provision of public services and basic infrastructure, it still should hold leadership position in “deciding the direction of service provisioning”, which therefore requires an “adequate state capacity to do so” (p.93). In this way, within the collaborative governance approach, the government has to guarantee that the engaging parties will not defect and stay committed to the attainment of the common agreed goals.

In the governance structure as described above, not only for-profit organizations defect and act selfishly, but CSOs (their leaders and managers) also run that risk. They may also defect and betray the other partners, as well as their own constituencies. A CBO leader I interviewed for the purpose of this research reports his frustration over the way the CRP- Regional Partners Committee in his region (Northen Santiago Region) was managing the implementation of PLPR:

“One day, one of the CRP managers called me early in the morning that I had to sign a project-contract my Association had been awarded by the PLPR program. I was thrilled when I received this information, but only for a short period. When I asked if “our project” was 100% funded, the guy told me that it was a “different project”. Actually what he was asking me to sign was a project the association had never submitted, and I had never heard about, as it had never been discussed among the members. That was a total violation of the PLPR procedures to fund projects. That really caught me in surprise, and I later came to realize that they wanted to involve me in a possible corruption scheme” (Interview given to the author on July 20, 2017).

This account shows that, despite the importance of social capital manifested in the association and its linkage with CRP, there is still a need of a sound and stronger monitoring and controlling mechanism to guarantee mutual compliance and accountability from the different stakeholders. The central government here should be understood not as an external agent whose role is to impose constitutional regulations over the common projects implementation (Ostrom, 1990), but as one of the stakeholders with the essential monitoring role. Otherwise, as the leader of the association quoted above reports, as well as the findings by Miraftab (2004) in her study on PPP in housing policy in South Africa, engagement of CSOs may not be the panacea approach for fighting against poverty. If such an engagement is not properly enforced and monitored, participation of CSOs in governance system might only aggravate the problem rather than cure it. Therefore, an agreed enforcing and monitoring mechanism that involves the government,

for-profit organizations, and CSOs would lower the risk for these engaging actors to defect. The CSOs or for-profit organizations would not lose their independence from the state though, nor necessarily run the risk of being caught in a paternalistic relationship with the state. Instead, such a mechanism will guarantee a more strengthened interconnection among them, and thus enhance the fairness, quality and efficiency of policy design and implementation. As Miraftba argues, “to sustain a partnership [these three set of institutions] must have reciprocal benefits and hold complementary roles” (2004, p. 92) over the implementation of the policy at hand. This linking social capital, what is called in Cabo Verde of *djunta mon*, if intelligently used will prove effective in the fight against poverty.

4.5 Conclusion

The analysis presented in this chapter has focused on the engagement of CSOs in the major public policies implemented in Cabo Verde throughout its history, in the fight against the endemic rural poverty. Engagement, understood as the CSOs’ active participation in the process of policy formulation and implementation, has changed over the years, motivated by two streams of factors, institutional and social capital factors. On the one hand, CSOs participation is explained from the perspective of political and institutional changes, and institutional opportunity structures that such changes have brought. On the other hand, from the social capital perspective, engagement of CSOs in the poverty policy process is seen as an outcome of the Cape-Verdean society’s awakening, in which people have become conscious of their rights and interests, and more critical to the governments unresponsiveness and inefficiency in meeting such rights and interests. Therefore, CSOs come out as the people’s strategy to conduit their demands to the governments, as well as to produce their own collective goods in the face of unresponsive and ineffective government. Thus, institutional arrangements have been made to create opportunity structures to engage CSOs in government policy making and implementation.

Answering the question whether the engagement of CSOs has been effective or not in the fight against rural poverty in Cabo Verde, both qualitative and quantitative data gathered for the purpose of this work, confirm that it has. Focusing on the period between 2002 and 2015, where the CSOs vibrancy grew substantially, along with their intensive engagement in the PLPR projects, overall poverty rate decreased by 12.5% from 36.7% in 2002, down to 24.2% in 2015. In the same token, rural poverty rate fell from 51.10% in 2002 to 40.90% in 2015, a decrease of 10, 2%. Chapter 6 will explore more in depth how the engagement of CSOs in the

public policies is operationalized, by focusing on their involvement in the local policymaking and implementation process.

V- ENGAGEMENT OF CSOs IN THE CAPE VERDEAN GPRSPs PROCESS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the engagement of civil society organizations in the design and implementation processes of Poverty and Reduction Strategy Papers in Cabo Verde. It looks at the context in which PRSPs emerged in the country, and the extent to which civil society organizations have been engaged in their design and implementation throughout the years. The chapter is then structured into four main parts. The first describes the context in which PSRPs emerged in the developing countries, as a sequel of the failed international institutions' structural adjustment policies to promote growth and reduce poverty. The second part focuses on the emergence of the PRSPs in Cabo Verde. Then, the third part concentrates on the engagement of CSOs in the design of PRSPs (GPRSPs in Cabo Verde), as part of their participatory approach process. Following its design process, the fourth part looks at how CSOs have been engaged in the implementation of GPRSPs from its inception in 2002 up to the third GPRSP in 2012. The chapter ends with a conclusion, summarizing and reflecting on the main arguments presented.

5.2 Contextualizing the emergence of PRSPs

In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the newly independent countries in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and South America- the so called the “Third World”, and now the “developing countries”, underwent a wave of economic adjustment programs led by the Bretton Woods institutions- the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Such programs aimed at prompting the economic growth in these countries as the recipe to promote development and poverty reduction. The commonality of these adjustment policies was that they were all drafted by the World Bank and IMF under the principles of neoliberal economic principles of free market economy, dominant in the USA and other western developed countries. The defeat of the communist ideologies gave strength to neo-liberal market ideology in the 1990s, and soon it propagated throughout the world as the standard model for the economic growth and poverty reduction. A model that the developing countries had to follow, not by choice but by imposition, if they wanted assistance to move out of poverty. The “third world countries” in fact caught themselves standing between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, they could continue with their centralized and state-controlled economic model, despite its inefficiencies to promote growth and reduce poverty. On the other hand, the choice of embracing adjustment plans and market democratization would mean losing the state's control over the economy, and therefore

losing the economic power. However, as the Bretton Woods institutions conditioned the delivery of any aid programs upon the acceptance of the adjustment programs, “third world country” leaders could hardly choose otherwise. As Naomi Klein (2007) astutely puts it, these poor countries were so indebted that they were forced to either “be privatized or die” (p.10). Being plunged into deep debt crisis, the developing countries’ leaders had to accept the neoliberal “shock treatment on the promise it would save them from deeper disaster” (Klein, 2007, p. 10).

However, by the end of the 1990s, the belief that the neoliberal economic policies prescribed by the Bretton Wood institutions would generate growth and bring economic prosperity to all in the developing countries did not succeed as they had been expected. The transition of these countries into market economy, instead of bringing prosperity to all, it brought, and to a great extent, an increased social and economic inequality. As Stiglitz (2005) states, “clearly, something was wrong with the way we were taking the world to the new international order” (p.90). Even in countries with registered growth, the Bretton Woods adjustment policies’ effect on the poverty alleviation was very mild or non-existent. In a cross-country econometric analysis on the effect of economic growth on poverty reduction, Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) state that during the 1980s and 1990s, “several countries knew only limited changes in poverty despite satisfactory growth performance, whereas poverty fell in some countries where growth has been disappointing” (p. 3). Such is the case of some African countries where “there are considerable disparities in terms of [their ability] to translate growth to poverty reduction” (Fosu, 2010, p. 3).

The inconsistency of the growth-elasticity of poverty across countries showed the inability and inefficiencies of the Bretton Woods neoliberal economic policies on poverty reduction in the developing countries throughout the 1990s. Such weaknesses became more evident by the end of that decade, as the developing countries became more and more heavily indebted to the international creditors/donors, and at the same time, incapable of satisfying the basic demands of their people at home. According to Stiglitz (2003), “as unemployment and the sense of vulnerability increase, and the fruit of any limited growth that occurs goes disproportionately to the rich, the sense of social injustice also increases” (p. 89). Being aware of that situation, the international organizations, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund saw the need of restructuring their adjustment policies, and so find alternative or incremental policy measures to promote poverty reduction in the developing countries. It was within this context of the failed adjustment programs that the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) came out as a policy solution for alleviating poverty in the developing

countries. PRSP initiative was launched in 1999 as means “to improve the planning, implementation, and monitoring of public actions geared toward reducing poverty” (World Bank, 2004, p. 1). Unlike the adjustment programs, which was fabricated within the doors of the Bretton Woods’ offices and then injected directly into the developing countries, the design and implementation of the PRSPs would follow a different path.


PRSPs were expected to be “country driven, results-focused, long-term, comprehensive, and partnership-oriented” (World Bank, 2004, p. xiii) policy packages designed to promote economic growth, as the means to reduce poverty. As a country driven and participatory approach policy package, PRSP would reflect the views of the various national stakeholders, including the government, international, private and civil society actors. However, despite the rhetoric of being a country driven and participatory process, PRSPs have been strictly underpinned and monitored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, through their monitoring mechanism, the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). This holistic approach to development balances macroeconomic with structural, human, and physical development needs. In fact, on the same line of adjustment programs introduced in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, completion and submission of PRSPs to the WB and IMF have been the key conditionality for the debt relief and aid programs to the developing countries. For this reason, critics have questioned therefore, the extent to which PRSPs have been a participatory and country driven process. Indeed, if PRSPs were really “country-owned” and homegrown policy packages, the international organizations would not undercut the sovereignty of target countries by demanding their completion and approval as the conditions for them to have access to funds and debt relief programs. This chapter focuses on the PRSPs’ designing and implementation processes in Cabo Verde. It first analyses the inception PRSP in that country, and then focuses on the nature of its participatory process, concentrating primarily on the analysis of engagement of civil society organizations in their formulation and implementation phases.

5.3 The emergence of PRSP in Cabo Verde

Cabo Verde adopted liberal market economic policies in the 1990s as the aftermath of the political and institutional changes occurred in the first years of this decade. The unfolding political events in the beginning of the 1990s ended the single party regime in power since the independence in 1975, and the election of a new born right-wing liberal political party (MPD) to power in 1991, opened a “window of opportunities” (Kingdom, 2014) for the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies. These policies created “political opportunity structures”

(Tarrow, 2011) for the privatization of the major parastatal enterprises, attracting foreign direct investment mainly in the sectors of tourism, real estate, telecommunications and electricity. As figure 5.1 below shows, the FDI flow into Cabo Verde took off in the 1990s, having an average growth of 0.06 billion US dollars, with a minimum of 0 (zero) billion U.S. dollars in 1986 and a maximum of 0.21 billion US dollars in 2008.

Figure 5.1- Evolution of Foreign Direct Investment in Cabo Verde (1995-2016)



Source- Retrieved from: https://pt.theglobaleconomy.com/Cape-Verde/fdi_dollars/

In the 1990s, the average annual growth of real Gross Domestic Product stood at 7.93%, compared to 6.16% registered in the previous decade. While in the 1980s, the growth had been promoted primarily by public investment, in the 1990s it was due to the increasing FDI in the sector of tourism, real estate and the privatization of the state-owned companies. In terms of *Per capita GDP*, it grew from 897.65USD in 1990 to 1239.38 USD in 2000, a 12.5% increase, prompted by a steady increase of economic growth in the 1990s at an average percentage of 6,1% per year (IDRF, 2002). To what extent did this economic growth transform in the reduction of existing poverty and inequality gap in Cabo Verde?

According to the Household Expenditure Survey conducted by the Cape Verdean National Institute of Statistics in 1989/90, and in the years 2001/2002, the percentage of population living under the poverty line (less than 1 US dollar a day) increased from 30,2% in the first period (1990) to 36,7% in the second (2002). The same sources indicate that the proportion of “the very poor” increased from 14% to 29% during the same period, “essentially as a result of the increase in inequality” (IMF, 2005). Therefore, the growth dividend, as Bourguignon and

Morrisson (2002), Stiglitz (2005), and Fosu, (2010) suggest, was only being benefited disproportionately, with the mass population continued being sunk in absolute poverty. For the case of Cabo Verde, the Gini index in 2002 was 0.57, which shows the high inequality regarding the wealth distribution in the country. The government of Cabo Verde, being aware of the increasing socioeconomic inequality and the rising rate of poverty, elaborated the National Program for Poverty Alleviation in 1997, and started its implementation in 2000 with funds provided by IFAD, World Bank, UNDP and ADB (IDRF, 2001/2002). However, as the Bretton Woods institutions had already been trying PRSPs in other developing countries, Cabo Verde was required to present a more “comprehensive” program that would focus on both the macro and micro policies to approach the poverty challenge in the country. This situation set the scene for the inception and implementation of PRSP in the country in 2002.

When approached by the Bretton Wood institutions on the need to present a PRSP, the Cape Verdean government initially denied doing it, on the argument that the country was already running a poverty reduction program of its own- the National Poverty Alleviation Program- NPAP³¹. However, as the completion of PRSP became a mandatory tool under which negotiations of any new aid packages would now take place, the government was left with no other alternatives but accepting to elaborate an interim PRSP (iPRSP), which was later submitted to the IMF and the World Bank in 2002. In September 2004, the government of Cabo Verde completed its first *Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (GPRSP), to emphasize its ambition on growth promotion as a way to reduce poverty. The second GPRSP was presented in May 2008, and the third one in December 2012 to be implemented until 2016.

5.4 Engagement of CSOs in GPRSP formulation and implementation processes

5.4.1 Engagement of CSOs in the Formulation phase of GPRSPs

The elaboration and implementation of PRSP (GPRSP in the case of Cabo Verde) is expected to go through a participatory approach, engaging all the country stakeholders in the process. As a consensus policy package, it should reflect the views of all the development actors on the policies judged pertinent to promote growth and reduce poverty. These actors include public, private and civil society organizations, as well as international development partners, who provide financial support, mentorship and supervision of the programs design and implementation. In this context, this section focuses on the engagement of civil society

³¹ Interview with Mr. Manuel Pinheiro, former Directorate General of Planning of the Ministry of Finance (13-10-2017).

organizations (CSOs) in those processes. To what extent have CSOs been engaged in the GPRSPs formulation and implementation in Cabo Verde? What factors have been determinant for their engagement or exclusion?

Studies on the engagement of CSOs in the PRSP elaboration and implementation processes have inspired greatly on the analytical models of individual participation in associations and politics (Verba and Almod, 1963; Putnam, 1993 and 2000; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995). One example of this adaptation is the model Dewachter and Molenaers (2011) present in their analysis of CSOs' participation in the Honduran PRSP process. These authors build on the civic voluntarism model of Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) to understand why CSOs participate in the PRSPs elaboration and implementation. The model focuses on three explanatory variables of participation: resources, preferences (their willingness to participate), and recruitment (whether individuals are invited to participate or not). People participate in politics within their resources capacity (finance, time, skills), their belief on the value of their participation to influence politics, and finally, whether they are invited to participate or not. Based on this model, Dewachter and Molenaers (2011) frame CSOs' participation in PRSP process, following the same logic. Resources, political preferences, and invitation, are the variables that determine CSOs' participation in public policy. The analysis of CSOs' participation in the GPRSPs in Cabo Verde presented in this section follows the same approach.

The term "participation of CSOs" in the GPRSPs elaboration processes has been extensively employed in their inception documents and reports. The analysis of the interim and the three subsequent GPRSPs documents and reports, and more specifically, of the chapters that describe their elaboration and implementation processes, provides many passages praising and encouraging the participation of civil society organizations. In the interim PRSP of 2002, it is stated that the adoption of any policies should involve "the population through a participatory process that seeks consensus and engagement of society as a whole in the fight against poverty" (PRSP, 2002, p. 30). However, later on page 33, it states,

"the poor will participate through a *simple qualitative survey*, which may be necessary to fine-tune the diagnosis of economic welfare and poverty; the *purpose will be to capture the views of the poor* regarding their situation and the survival strategies adopted. In this way, poverty reduction strategies and objectives can be geared to reality and thus contribute to effective improvements in the living conditions of the poor" (p. 33- emphasis is mine).

This excerpt offers two interpretations: on the one hand, there is an atomization of civil society participation, by focusing on individual consultation, rather than consulting their representative

organizations, the CSOs, theoretically better informed, both quantitatively and qualitatively regarding the country's and community life conditions. The consultative process focuses on the "individual poor", rather than their aggregations or their representative body, CSOs. Secondly, the "simple qualitative survey" applied on the atomized poor to "capture" their views "regarding their situations and the survival strategies" (iPRSP, 2002), does not give them the option to express what they would like to see implemented to rescue them from their miserable circumstances. The survey had mere consultative purposes, but on the issues already decided by the decision makers. This methodology, however, was not alien to what was going on in some other countries undergoing through similar process of drafting their PRSP for the first time. As Curran (2005) affirms, "in many countries, the processes were rushed because governments were in need of the debt relief funds linked to the PRSP, but in other instances, governments were not interested in including civil society in policy discussions so did the minimal amount of consultation required" (p. 3).

The GPRSP I (2004-2007) was drafted based on the experience of the interim PRSP, and on the feedback provided by the IMF. Its formulation was guided by a "coordinating committee of representatives from public and private entities, as well as civil society organizations traditionally involved in the issue of poverty reduction" (GPRSP I, 2004, p.12). It was expected that representatives from these institutions engage themselves in "various levels of dialogue" in a "congregating efforts" to establish better options for poverty reduction in Cabo Verde. In addition, the National Poverty Reduction Board, an organization that had been created to assist the implementation of the National Poverty Alleviation Program, also played an advisory role for the formulation of the GPRSP II. However, it seems that these bodies acted more on the "hearings" and "advisory" levels than defining and influencing the contents of the policy document. Who have really been engaged in the business of drafting the GPRSPs are the technocrats working in the different government ministries, with the support of World Bank and the IMF experts. The following excerpt is an evidence of the government centralization of GPRSP II formulation process:

"The sectoral Offices for Planning and Studies (GEPs) within each line Ministry contributed by specifying their respective policy objectives and policies envisaged to overcome the problems identified in the context of the poverty profile. Based on the agreed strategy, each sector then proceeded to draft a list of policies and activities it considers relevant, all of which must be coherent with those policies and activities included in the National Development Plan" (GRSP I, 2004, p. 12).

For the elaboration of GPRSP II (2008-2011), a steering committee of twenty members was constituted, with the mission of orienting the decision making process for "all relevant matters".

From the twenty members, only three were not from the government structure: one representative from the civil society – the President of the platform of NGOs, one representative from the private sector, appointed by the Superior Council of the Chambers of Commerce of Cabo Verde, and finally, the representative of the National Association of Cape Verdean Municipalities. This third one was still within the public administration sphere. All the other seventeen members were representatives (mostly directors) of each department of planning within the government ministries (GPRSP II, 2008, p. 86).

On its turn, the elaboration of GPRSP III (2012-2016) went through a deeper pragmatic participatory approach. Under the coordination of Directorate General of Planning of the Ministry of Finance, a multidisciplinary steering committee was created for that purpose. In 2012, this committee organized and conducted three Advisory Forums, bringing representatives from the government, private and civil society sectors. In the ambit of these forums, thematic groups were set up around the major government development strategies and policy sector, along with the outcomes of their discussions to be presented in the form of a memorandum, which would be incorporated in GPRSP. The novelty of this approach is that, rather than having one centralized drafting committee working on a proposal to be endorsed in the “technical validation workshops”, it allowed the thematic groups to work independently and then formulate their own proposals to be included in the GPRSP strategies. Thus, formulation of GPRSPs became overtime more participative, at least in the hearing consultation phases, aimed for information gathering.

5.4.2 Engagement of CSOs in the Implementation phase of GPRSPs

In respect to the implementation process of GPRSPs in Cabo Verde, as it has been intentionally established in the policy documents (Hill and Hupe, 2002), has taken a very government-centralized approach. The analysis of the GPRSPs evaluation reports³², along with interviews with some former and current leaders of CRPs, CSOs, Platform of NGOs, Unions, and the Directorate General of Planning in the Ministry of Finance, indicate that rather than being a societal endeavor, the implementation of the poverty reduction strategies have been more a government centralized task. On the one hand, the implementation and monitoring structure is composed primarily with staff from the different government departments, giving the civil society representative bodies a mere consultative role. Following a top down chain of

³² IMF Country Report No. 05/135-2005

command, the Directorate-General of Planning (DGP) under the Ministry of Finance, coordinates the overall management and implementation of PRSPs. Then, under its guidance, the department of planning and budget of the different ministries (the DGPOGs) occupies with the “planning in their respective sectors, as well as the relevant monitoring and evaluation” (GPRSP II, 2008, p. 150). In respect to monitoring and evaluation, each DGPOG appoints a representative who is responsible for feeding sectoral data and information into the monitoring system supervised by the Directorate General of Planning (DGP). As one can see, all this process is government led, leaving the private and the civil society out.

On the second hand, the implementation of the GPRSPs have always been dependent on the political will and development strategies pursued by the government and the guidance from its development partners. Therefore, such wills and strategies are defined and imprinted in the government annual budgets. During the budgeting process, the different government stakeholders (civil society here is absent) advance their pet proposals, influencing therefore both the content (in terms of policies) and resource allocation. In this bargaining process, politics matter, and it does matter a lot. Therefore, political preferences and political weight of government actors may prevail over others’, which will constrain, to a certain extent, the implementation of GPRSPs themselves. The report *Avaliação global do DECRP 2005-07*³³, questions the extent to which “all the intervening” partners in the implementation of GPRSP “would be sufficiently clarified and prepared to efficiently answer to the challenges which the new approach [to fight poverty] would require” (p. 36). The report then concludes that,

“It is unanimous that the attribution of powers to the Government in the allocation of resources in budget support induces increased responsibilities: (i) in the creation of information systems; (ii) the use of criteria that promote social justice in the creation and redistribution of income; (iii) in the capacity of monitoring and (iv) in the institutional relationship” (p. 36).

Such a conclusion suggests that the participatory approach underlining the formulation and the implementation of GPRSPs has been whether misinterpreted, or deliberately downplayed by the government, by calling to itself the central role in the process. The processes of elaboration and implementation of GPRSPs described in the preceding paragraphs, denote that, on the one hand, there has always been a concern of integrating the civil society, and, on the other hand, such integration has been unsystematic and at times, overlooked by the government and the committee in charge of the formulation and implementation. The inclusions of civil society is

³³ *Global Evaluation -DECRP 2005-07*

done mostly through individual consultation (through surveys) and in some other occasions, by involving the organized civil society only at the consultative phases of the process. This superficial engagement of CSOs in the GPRSPs' formulation and implementation processes bases on three different explanatory dimensions: resources, political preferences, and recruitment (Dewachter and Molenaers, 2011). Each of this dimension is developed separately in the paragraphs below.

Resource dimension: The resource dimension focuses on the CSOs' stock of material resources, human, political and social capital to leverage their participation in the highly centralized process of GPRSPs formulation and implementation. The material resources consist of all the financial assets CSOs have at their disposal, which together with their human capital (skills) are required to conduct research and studies in order to gather and construct evidences to support their policy proposals when a policy window is open for them, in this case the GPRSPs formulation. In the same token, the social capital, taken here as the individuals' participation and network relationship, along with the trust generated in the CSOs, stands as an important resource to these organizations to leverage their engagement. CSOs depend primarily on their members' solidarity and voluntarism to carry out their work. Therefore, when participation is strong, this might compensate for their lack of financial resources. Participation also generates trust, and vice versa. When people participate, as they see their expectations being accomplished (when the solution for their collective problems is being effectively provided), they become more confident on the value of their participation, hence, they deposit more trust on the CSOs' capacities. Thus, as their trust increases, the higher is their solidarity and their contribution to CSOs' activities. Finally, political capital of CSOs, or their "linkage social capital" (Woolcock, 1998), should also be understood as part of their resources. When they have high stock of social capital, CSOs have a better possibility to influence policies. One thing worth mentioning here is that the other resources are important for building this linkage social capital dimension. It is easier for CSOs to get the attention of the power officers when they are financially resourced, and with extraordinary capacity to mobilize people around its activities. Visible and dynamic CSOs naturally attract politicians and the power officers' attention in Cabo Verde, whether for collaboration or as target that to be knocked down.

The hypothesis therefore is that the more resources CSOs have at their disposal, the more participative they are in the GPRSP processes. Based on the interviews carried out with some leaders (former and current) of CRPs, Platform of Cape Verdean NGOs, and Unions who

take seats in the National Council of Social Concertation in Cabo Verde³⁴, resource constraints are often cited as an impediment to participation. The following extract from the interview with the executive secretary of the Cape-Verdean Platform of NGOs is an illustrative example of that claim:

“The Platform of NGOs participate physically, but its participation is not always the one we desire. Because sometimes we are in a commission, and for instance, the issues being dealt with are of legal nature. In this case, the Platform would like to be able to acquire the opinion of legal experts so that we can produce and bring some valuable arguments to the discussion table, and say this is the position, the vision of civil society. In the discussion table, the experts present are usually on the side of the government, who have the resources to hire them [...]. For these reasons, the CSOs participation is limited to a face-to-face participation and the signing of the minutes, just to confirm presence in the meetings. In addition, we [the CSOs] do not have the means, sometimes, the time to deepen the internal debate and reach consensus among our members, so that we can present a solid position, supported with credible and technical expertise” (Praia, November 2016).

On the same line of argument, the manager of a CRP states that,

“there are moments that we simply do not have time to summon the assembly of the CRP (composed by all the CSOs in the region, the private sector and local government representatives), to work on the proposals to be presented to the government committee. When these situations occur, the board of CRP meet with the management staff to make decisions” (interview with the author: November 2, 2017).

These interview extracts describe how the lack of resource hinders the participation of the CSOs. In the first extract, the interviewee recognizes that CSOs are given opportunities to participate in the formulation of economic policies. However, such opportunities are reduced to mere “physical participation” due to their limited resource capacity to formulate and present credible and convincing proposals, backed with gathered evidences, to the PRSP committee. In the second extract, the time constraint (part of the human capital) is pointed as the hindrance to participation. When convened to take part in the GPRSP consultation process, CRPs as a consortium of all the CSOs plus the private and local government in a specific region, must hold a meeting with all its stakeholders in the general assembly to debate and formulate proposals that would be presented in the policy forums. However, CRPs are often requested to present their proposals at a short notice. Thus, they simply send what is their administrative staff’s proposal, without even consulting their representative members.

The civil society participation in the elaboration of the Interim and the first GPRSP drew solely on the engagement of CRPs, as agencies with experiences on dealing with poverty. However, due to situation described in the preceding paragraph, and their lack of resources to

³⁴ This forum has become best venue other mass media, for these organizations to voice their concerns regarding economic policies in place in Cabo Verde.

produce sound proposals, their capacity to influence the content of the policy had been very little, not say null. Their participation has been limited to the consultation phase. However, this consultation process led to the exclusion of CRP members, who could have provided deeper data and information for the policy content, and on the other hand, created a sense on inclusiveness. These groups, in most of the cases, are the representatives of rural poor communities, rural women, peasant organizations, trade unions and other disenfranchised groups.

Political engagement dimension: The political engagement dimension stands on the assumption that CSOs' participation in the public policy process is driven by their belief on the worth of their participation. When CSOs perceive that their involvement will have impacts or influences on the outcomes of the policy, the PRSPs in the case, they are more likely to take initiatives and demand that they participate. On the other hand, if they understand that their participation will not influence the process or its outcome, their contribution will be low or even null (Dewachter and Molenaers, 2011). Considering this hypothesis, I asked some leaders of CRPs, unions and the Platform of Cape Verdean NGOs, to what extent they believed in their organizations' capacity to influence the outcome of the GPRSP process. The interviewees were unanimous in affirming that their capacity to influence policy process is very limited, given the resources they have at their disposal. Despite recognizing the value CSOs involvement could have, they do not think these organizations will bring impacts to the process outcomes, given the conditions in which they participate. The managing director of a CRP is even more plainly at stating that he does not "interfere with politics", denoting that he distances himself from the decision-making arena. On the other hand, this very same CRP leader confirms that the CRP only "intervenes in the execution of the policies and recommendations, and at any circumstance should interfere with the political decision" (Interview Fogo CRP managing unit, November 2, 2017).

However, despite recognizing the weak participation and the lack of influence and ineffectiveness of CSOs over the GPRSP formulation and implementation process, the representative of the Platform of Cape Verdean NGOs still thinks that CSOs have the potential to contribute positively to the GPRSP policy process and its outcomes. This is only possible if CSOs provide themselves with the required resources. As he states in the interview cited above, "The Platform of NGOs participate physically, but its participation is not always the desired one". The interviewee does not believe the participation of CSOs under the conditions that it is being done will influence the process and outcome of the policies in the GPSRP. It is this

“philanthropic insufficiency” (Salamon, 1995, p. 45) of CSOs that hampers their sense of utility in influencing the implementation of GPRSP policy process in Cabo Verde.

Recruitment dimension: This dimension stands on the assumption that the probability of CSOs to engage in the policy process is higher when they are formally invited to participate by the leaders of the process (the recruitment hypothesis). In an interview with a former Directorate General of Planning in the Ministry of Finance, the department in charge of coordinating the GPRSP in Cabo Verde, I asked him about the frequency and the mechanisms in place for inviting CSOs to participate in the GPRSPs, at least for the time he was in office (from 2002-2012). His answer was that “the government should not invite CSOs to present policy proposals. The initiative to participate should come from the CSOs themselves in order to avoid their manipulation” (Praia, 13-10-2017). What he defended instead, is that civil society participation in the GPRSP should happen in the context of the *Concelho de Concertação Social* (Social Concertation Council), where the Platform of NGOs has a seat. In addition, he argues that, besides the “CSOs being weak”, which should be understood as being resourceless, “their individual consultation is difficult, and in fact, it doesn’t work”.

However, bringing in CSOs to participate in the implementation of GPRSP is not a matter of government interference in their business or their manipulation, as the director stated in the interview. In fact, experiences of CSOs participation in the PRSP process in some other countries, such as the case of Bolivia, the “Government [in response of CSOs pressure] designed the National Dialogue linked to the PRSP in July and August 2000” to provide CSOs space to participate in the process (Curran, 2005). Engagement of CSOs, of the various kinds including national and international NGOs, did not mean their manipulation, but a window of opportunity and “political opportunity structure” (Tarrow, 2011) to build consensus around the strategies to ease social and economic inequalities. When different stakeholders feel their concerns and perspectives are being heard and taken into consideration, their propensity to engage in a “contentious politics” (Tarrow, 2011) might be minimized (Ewos, 2004). In the case of Cabo Verde, the CSOs’ propensity to engage in contentious politics is in fact low, due to their meager resources. Hence, the authorities’ indifference to invite them to participate in the GPRSP.

Instead of inviting the CSOs to formulate proposals and contribute to the formulation and implementation of GPRSPs, the government limit to carry out rounds of “consultation meetings” with some CSOs (in the Social Concertation Committee), giving these institutions opportunities to opine simply on certain issues (the micro policies), and later in the validation

phases. This participation approach shows that the quality of discussion and debate of policy issues with CSOs has been poor in Cabo Verde.

However, if the “government should not recruit” the CSOs to participate in the formulation of the GPRSP for the reasons aforementioned, their recruitment in the implementation phase (at least in the sectorial policies to reduce poverty) has been a necessary and a practice in Cabo Verde. The engagement of CSOs in the implementation of poverty alleviation programs started in the 1980s, and then expanded in the 1990s with the creation and contract of Community Based Organizations to execute AIMO and FAIMO projects in the rural areas of the country. In the late 1990s, the conception of the National Poverty Alleviation Program (NPAP) built on the experiences of FAIMO to strengthen the inclusion of CSOs implementation of the framed policies. The implementation of this program in the 2000s follows the same approach. It was in this context that CRPs were established throughout the country, accompanied by a quick increase of the community associations. As the policies to combat poverty in the GPRSPs had been articulated in line with the policies in the NPAP, CRPs, Community Associations and other sectors of CSOs have been frequently recruited, and in fact, are the neuralgic institutions in the implementation of these policies.

The engagement of CSOs in the formulation and implementation processes of GPRSP in Cabo Verde, measured by the three explanatory dimensions described in the above paragraphs- resources, political engagement, and recruitment dimensions, leads to the conclusion that the involvement has been weak in the formulation process, but with some significance in the implementation phases. Unsupplied with resources that allow them to gather and construct “evidences” (Curran, 2005) to present and support policy proposals, CSOs behave as if they self-censor themselves, and retreat from participating in the elaboration phase of GPRSPs. The cases of Bolivia and Tanzania, as Curran (2005) puts it, show an opposite situation. In these countries, the CSOs financed mainly by international NGOs, demanded their participation in the PRSP process because they were in the condition to present and support policies that in their views were being disregarded by their government and their supporting institutions. In the case of Cabo Verde, because of their deficient resource capabilities, CSOs fail to believe that their demand or contribution will influence the PRSP process. Such a situation and belief have hampered their participation. Finally, the non-recruitment, or the non-asking of the CSOs to formally engage in the GPRSP formulation process on the part of the government leaders, hinders even deeper their participation in both stages. It does not matter how much the resources they have at their disposal, or their motivation to participate, but if

they are not formally invited to do so, CSOs' chances to participate and influence the formulation process of PRSP is reduced.

For the case of Cabo Verde, the factors above described have been determinant for the weak or non-participation in the formulation process of the GPRSP. CSOs' participation is more visible in the implementation phase. However, the participation in the implementation process is restricted to the "soft" policies, or the so-called "social policies" for the alleviation of poverty (the PNLPR and POSER are examples of these policies), and not the macro-economic policies that reside in the hand of the government decision-makers, backed by the expertise of international and national consultants. Due to their noticeable presence in the implementation process of GPRSP, the following section will further explore how CSOs' participation in this phase is operationalized.

5.5 The role of CSOs in the implementation of GPRSPs

Hill and Hupe (2002) affirm that "between the formulation of the intentions of a policy, [...] and the delivery of related policy outputs, [...] in fact a process of transformation takes place" (p.163). This "process of transformation" between the intentions of the policy and the policy output is due to its adopted implementation mechanisms. Building on these ideas, this section looks how the CSOs participate in the actual operationalization of the GPRSPs in Cabo Verde. One thing is the intention manifested by the policy designers in engaging the CSOs, and another thing is what is observable regarding such an engagement. This section focuses on the latter case.

The implementation of GPRSPs follows a top-down decentralized approach, with tasks distributed among the decentralized government agencies, local government institutions and actors of civil society. As the GPRSP I Report states,

"From a perspective of sustainability and ownership of results, GPRSP establishes the mechanisms for implementation and the role of stakeholders, focusing on decentralization policies, the relevance of civil society organizations, and the transformation of public administration, bringing them closer to the citizens, guarantor of the fundamental rights and a promoter of fairness and fair redistribution of income" (World Bank, 2004, p. 9).

There is a clear concern in including the local governments (*Câmaras Municipais*) and the civil society organizations in the implementation of poverty reduction policies in the ambit of GPRSPs. The engagement of these actors is justified by the fact that they are "closer" to the population, and they know the needs of the communities and the people far better than the central government does. Consequently, they are better prepared to manage the operationalization of the adopted policies at the local levels, guaranteeing therefore the

attainment and sustainability of the results sought in the GPRSPs. This section focuses on the actual participation of civil society organizations in the implementation processes of GPRSP in Cabo Verde. It is not implementation as the “policy intentions” assert, but the implementation verified based on empirical observations and data collected through interviews and government reports.

An important factor that influences the participation of voluntary organizations, as referred in the section above is their resource capacity, along with their motivation and state openness to engage them (Dewachter and Molenaers, 2011). In a country such as Cabo Verde, financial and human resources stand as the most important determinants for participation. Why? Because their motivation and their invitation depend greatly on their resource capacity to “gather evidences” to support their advocacy work, and then be recognized by the state as credible contributors to policy development in their respective areas. These resources help the CSOs raise the mobilization of human, social and political capital around policy implementation. Therefore, it is important to understand how CSOs are provided with the required resources as a means to guarantee their engagement in the implementation of GPRSP policies. This research identifies two mechanisms through which the government provides such resources to engage CSOs: subsidization through state budget expenditures, and the fiscal incentives attributed to these organizations.

5.5.1 Engagement of CSOs in the state budget implementation

GPRSPs policies are implemented through the annual state budget making and execution processes, which allocate resources for timely accomplishment of government programs and goals. Thus, it is utmost important to look how resources are distributed in the state budget if one wants to understand how CSOs are being considered and financially empowered to carry out the roles they are expected to. For this analysis, I carried out an intensive examination of state budget reports, and the Cape Verdean Court of Auditor’s opinions on the State General Accounts, covering the period 2004 through 2015, to identify the amount of subsidies allocated to CSOs. The focus on this period is justified by the fact that the first GPRSP started in 2004, and the last State General Accounts report available for public consultation refers to 2015. In the state budgets, CSOs are referred as “Non-Governmental Organizations”, or “Non-for-profit organizations”. Table 5.1 lists the amount of “non-reimbursable subsidies” transferred to non-governmental institutions (the CSOs) from 2004 to 2015.


Table 5.1- Government transfer to CSOs (2004-2016)³⁵

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012*	2013	2014	2015
Budget (prevision)	----	---	26013	27588	28076	37548	35563	28596,9	302189,4	114792,910	101677,415	105230,533
Executed budget	21720	24678	25311	25023	27080	31131	27263	27409,3	300940,5	114660,107	100375,220	105202,230
% Execution	---	---	97,3%	90,8%	96,5%	82,9%	76,7%	95,8%	97%	99,9%	98,7%	99,97%
% weight in the Non-reimbursable subsidies	---	--	---		1,6%	2,1%	1,9%	1,6%	24,50%	11,7%	11%	10,9%

Source: State Budgets 2004-2015; The Court of Auditors' opinions on the State General Accounts, 2004-2015: Data Compilation by the author

The information collated in the table above shows that CSOs have been constantly subsidized over the period being considered, 2004-2015. However, looking at the amount transferred, it can be noted that until 2011, the value had been relatively low, below 40 million Cape Verdean escudos (CVE). In 2012, the amount predicted and executed rocketed to above three hundred million CVE, and then remained above one hundred million in the subsequent years. Figure 5.2 displays that change more illustratively.

Figure 5.2 - Evolution of government financial transfer to CSOs (2004-2015)




Source: Graph prepared by the author based on the State Budget 2004-2015; Court of Audit on the State General Accounts, 2004-2015.

³⁵ Amount in Million Cape Verdean Escudos (CVE). 1 Euro equals 110 CVE.

What explains the exponential increase of the amount transferred to CSOs in 2012 is the CSOs contracting out in the ambit of WASH³⁶ projects implementation, financed by MCA-Second Compact. Some CSOs (mainly NGOs with national and regional coverage) were hired to implement highly money-value projects of water and sewerage connection systems, life skills training, gender issues etc. In addition, CSOs were involved in the monitoring and evaluation of WASH projects, to help guarantee that all the objectives set are fully achieved.

The central government, through its annual budget execution, has been the primary providing entity of financial resources to CSOs as a means to guarantee their participation in the implementation of poverty reduction policies. However, other entities have engaged in this process of working with CSOs as well. Figure 5.3 below displays the percentage of financial resources provided to CSOs by different entities, as of 2015.

Figure 5.3 Sources of Funding of CSOs



Source: Elaborated by the author, using data provided by Plataforma das ONGs (2015)

The Public Administration, including the central and the local governments is undoubtedly the major source of funding, with 28% and 11% respectively, totaling 39%. Public administration is followed by international and multilateral organizations, namely IFAD, UN agencies, Embassies and agencies of cooperation from friendly countries. National NGOs, which work primarily with smaller CSOs, also contribute with financial resources. Finally, the private sector contributes with around 11%. However, according to Santos (2015), these values are just

³⁶ Water, Sanitation and Hygiene- A project financed by MCA in the amount of 41,1 million USD

estimates, as there are many transfers from government that are not clearly allocated in the budget, due the budget implementation discretion the government officers enjoy. On the same token, there are also transfers from other entities that are not easily measurable.

Although the state budget does not specify the types of CSOs it allocates money to, a survey carried out in 2015 by the Plataforma das ONGs, found out that the aforementioned donors and entities, distribute their financial aids unevenly to the different typologies of organizations. Table 5.2 below displays the financial aids distributed to different types of CSOs, listed according to the sources of funding (the donors).

Table 5.2 Sources of funding and its distribution according to the typologies of CSOs

Sources of financing	Types of CSOs						TOTAL
	ADC (CBOs)	ADR	COOP	FUND	ONGD	IMF	
Central Government	30%	39%	0%	0%	23%	17%	28%
PNUD	5%	0%	0%	0%	4%	3%	5%
UNICEF	1%	0%	0%	0%	3%	3%	2%
FIDA	17%	11%	0%	0%	6%	3%	13%
Private Sector	11%	11%	33%	25%	11%	10%	11%
Internat. NGOs	5%	6%	0%	0%	14%	14%	8%
USA Emb.	4%	0%	0%	0%	3%	7%	4%
Partuguese Emb/Coop	1%	0%	0%	0%	2%	3%	1%
Brazilian Emb.	0	0	25%	0%	1%	0%	0%
National NGOs	9%	17%	33%	25%	13%	14%	11%
Spanish Coop.	1%	6%	0%	25%	4%	10%	3%
Emb Francesa	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	10%	1%
Local Governments	12%	11%	33%	0%	11%	0%	11%
European Union	1%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	2%
Total	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100%

Source: Plataforma das ONGs (2015)

The Community Development Associations (CBOs) and Recreational and Sports Associations (ADRs), receive their aids primarily from the public administration (central and local governments), IFAD, private sector and other national NGOs. Cooperatives, which are run more like private business, are funded primarily by the private sector, National NGOs, and Local governments. Foundations, more than any other organizations, receive their aids from private sector, national NGOs, Brazilian and Spanish Cooperation agencies. ONGDs, a type of CSOs that enjoy special statutes from government as developmental organizations, are mostly financed by the central and local governments, national and international NGOs, and private sector. Finally, Institutions of Micro-Finance receive the least percentage from government aids and, in fact, nothing from the local government institutions. They are more likely to be funded by other NGOs- both national and international, embassies and bilateral international

organizations. One important thing to notice in these various sources of funding is the role of “National NGOs”. These type of CSOs function mainly as resource mobilizers and look to operate their activities in close partnership with smaller CSOs, which are the case of CBOs.

The state’s financial support to CSOs is framed within the implementation of government programs, including the Multiannual Public Investment Program (MPIP). The implementation of MPIP is legally defined as a mission of government, executed by its different departments. However, the budget law states that “the execution of MPIP can also be decentralized to other institutions, among which includes CSOs” (GOV, 2005, art. 40). Such participation of decentralized institutions in the implementation of MPIP, is materialized through projects execution, which require the subcontracting of these institutions by the government entity in charge of project management- Directorate General of Planning (in the Ministry of Finance). However, the CSOs that participate in the implementation of MPIP are those that have special conventions with the government, the so-called ONGD (Box 5.1). This requirement impedes a great number of CSOs to sign contracts with the government, knowing that only a few of them have the resource capacity to meet the conditions imposed by the law to meet the required the prerequisites.

Box 5.1 Government Conventions with Civil Society Organizations

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|--|
| <p><i>Conventions with Civil Society Organizations</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The Government may establish agreements with top-level Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), defining the conditions and forms of their relationship within the framework of the decentralized implementation of the MPIP.2. Without prejudice to others that may be established by conventions, CSOs with interventions in social areas that meet the following requirements<ol style="list-style-type: none">a) are constituted according to the law;b) have in effective and regular operation all its bodies as defined in the statutes, namely: the general assembly, the fiscal council and the administration;c) have proven technical and operational competence in the management of social development projects and the accounting and administrative organization;d) have a registered office in a permanent establishment and the minimum material conditions for the operation of their services;e) have experience in the execution of social development projects at regional or national level;3. CSOs that have conventions with government may be authorized to celebrate specific agreements with locally or regionally based associations. They can also sign contracts for the implementation of projects with municipalities, public institutes, associations and companies.4. Without prejudice to specific rules, conventions shall require: |
|--|

- a) The existence of a manual of project management procedures, in the terms to be agreed with the Government;
- b) Provision of periodic information on the execution of contracted projects, under the terms to be established by the Government;
- c) The carrying out of internal or external inspections and audits on the financing of the CSO and on the execution of projects, in the terms to be established by the Government.

5. Each agreement shall be signed by the Government, by duly mandated representatives of the government departments responsible for Finance and Planning, Local Government and the sector or sectors to which the subject of the agreement refers directly.

Source: Budget report 2005, Art. 42

5.5.2 State support to CSOs through fiscal incentives

Since the ruling times of Pharaohs and kings, “societies have acknowledged the presence of a nontaxable sector” (Brody and Cordes, 2017, p. 133). That is true when Joseph proclaimed the law determining that “the Pharaoh should have the fifth part; except the land of priests only, which become not Pharaoh’s” (Genesis, 47: 26). Time has passed, but that maximum has endured throughout the years and it is still a practice across the world today. Religious charitable institutions as well as other sectors of civil society organizations benefit from a range of tax incentives as a means to supply them with resources to carry out their missions. In Cabo Verde, CSOs benefit both directly and indirectly from fiscal incentives. Directly when they are themselves exempted from paying taxes on certain circumstances, and indirectly when other private organizations- business, receive fiscal incentives to encourage them to cooperate with CSOs.

Tax exemptions

CSOs in Cabo Verde are exempted from paying “fees and charges” for the notary acts for their mandatory registration in order to get the official recognition of the state and other institutions. In addition to the exemptions awarded at their act of formalization, the law determines that it is the responsibility of government and local governments to exempt civic associations from paying taxes, contributions and fees, as a means to motivate and prompt the creation of more voluntary associations. (Tax exemption Code-Law n°. 106/IV/94, and 2013; Law NO. 114/VIII/2016, 21 of March).

Early in 1994, the law on fiscal incentive (Law n°. 106/IV/94, September 5, 1994), in respect to NGOs, stipulates that these organizations are

“free of duty, excise duty and general emoluments, on the importation of goods offered or financed, within the framework of international cooperation or by entities or

organizations of Cape Verdeans abroad." [Such tax exemption is also applicable to] Non-governmental institutions recognized by the state [hence the importance of having legal personality], which aim exclusively at humanitarian, religious, cultural, educational, sporting and other social purposes, without any commercial character, in the context of socio-economic and cultural development projects promoted by these institutions" (*translated by the author*).

Therefore, such institutional incentives are part of the explanation for the boom of the associations in the second half of the 1990s and in the 2000s. Actually, these incentives were kept and even strengthened with the returned of PAICV into power in 2001. Tax incentives generated new opportunities for CSOs to work collaboratively with the government in the implementation of GPRSPs.

Concerning custom tax exemptions (Law N0. 114/VIII/2016, 21 of March), the incentives only benefit the CSOs that are officially registered in the National Notary, and that meet the criteria of ONGDs. Such incentives awarded to CSOs are applicable for the acquisition of vehicles, equipment and imported materials to be used exclusively by CSOs to pursue their own objectives. In addition to that, within the ambit of "international decentralized cooperation", CSOs benefit from custom duty expenses according to Law Decree No. 39/88, 28 of May, with change made by the article 47 of the Law No. 7/V/2002, 28 of January, and the Law No. 21/VI/2003, 14 of June. The Law N0 26/VIII/2013, regulating the tax breaks applicable to "collective persons", in its article 49, that law determines that

"são isentos de direitos aduaneiros a importação, feita no quadro da cooperação internacional ou por entidades ou organizações estrangeiras ou de cabo-verdianos residentes no país ou no exterior dos seguintes bens: b) Bens oferecidos ou financiados às instituições não governamentais reconhecidas pelo Estado, que visem exclusivamente fins humanitários, religiosos, culturais, educativos, desportivos e outros fins sociais, sem qualquer carácter comercial, designadamente no âmbito de projectos de desenvolvimento socioeconómicos e culturais promovidos pelas referidas organizações."

The incentives aforementioned apply both to CSOs themselves, and to other entities, national or foreigner, when the goods imported are to benefit CSOs. As the Law N0. 26/VIII/2013, 21 of January states, "companies benefit from tax reductions on the donations granted to NGOs" (art., 39, d).

5.6 Conclusion

The GPRSP policies were launched in Cabo Verde at a critical juncture characterized by a shift in the ruling party and government policy orientation. PAICV had just won the 2001 legislative elections, and its government was in fact cooking new policies to promote a sustainable and inclusive development of the country by applying

“uma política económica que garanta um desenvolvimento sustentado, compatível com a solidariedade social, regional e intergeracional e que seja consentâneo com a durabilidade ambiental e assente num padrão de crescimento ancorado em crescentes ganhos de produtividade [...] Um desenvolvimento que minimize a pobreza e a exclusão social e seja portador de equidade e de justiça social” (GOV., 2001: 3).

Such a sustainable and inclusive development orientation, would have to deviate somehow from the neoliberal economic policies of the 1990s followed by MPD government, and build on a more likely “third way politics” (Giddens, 2000). Indeed, despite the optimistic economic growth of the 1990s (GDP grew in average 6.8% between 1993-2000), poverty rate seemed not to have followed that trend. Poverty rate grew from 30% in 1989 (IDRF, 1988/1989) to 37% in 2002 (IDRF, 2001/2002). This contrast registered between the economic growth and the increase of the poverty rate proved that the economic adjustment policies the MPD government had followed in the 1990s had failed on its promises to reduce poverty. It was based on that discrepancy that PAICV government built its rhetoric of a “sustainable and inclusive development of the country”. The government’s initial reluctance to accepting the PRSP could be attributed partly to their fear of repetition of the 1990s prescription imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which had failed in promoting an inclusive development in the country. However, their fear of having to face the coercive measures that would be applied by those international institutions left the government with no choice, but accepting to elaborate and present an Interim PRSP.

Despite being sold as a “country driven strategy” (World Bank, 2004) which should be designed and implemented based on a participatory approach, the making and implementation of PRSP have to follow a logic of priorities not strictly defined and controlled by the country. As Craig & Porter (2003) put it, “this ordering of priorities [the design of PRSPs have to follow] has a certain logic which is worth reiterating: global economic integration first, good governance second, poverty reduction following as a result [...]” (p. 54). For the case of Cabo Verde, that logic is also imprinted in the IPRSP and the subsequent GPRSPs. Taking the case of civil society organizations, their participation has been more confined to consultative and implementation stages of policies which they have had little or no influence over its conception. This little or zero influence of Cape Verdean CSOs over the GPRSPs policies is motivated by their weak resources (financial, political, human and social capital resources), which impede them to stand shoulder to shoulder with other policy entrepreneurs to make their case heard, and also, a lack of political will to integrate them.

PART III: ENGAGEMENT OF CSOs IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

CHAPTER VI- ENGAGEMENT OF CSOs IN THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROCESS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the engagement of civil society organizations (CSOs) with the municipal government institutions, the Town Councils, in the local policymaking and implementation processes. After presenting the analysis of the engagement of overall typologies of CSOs, the chapter focuses primarily on the involvement of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in the local government policy process. Very likely to the analysis presented in chapter 2, engagement here is approached from both institutional and social capital perspectives. From the institutional point of view, the incorporation of CSOs in the local government policy process in Cabo Verde is explained through the lens of structural changes in the political institutions (Hyden, 1997; Maloney, Smith, and Stoker, 2000; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Rothstein and Stolle, 2003) occurred from the colonial era up the inauguration of democracy in 1990. However, the analysis presented in this chapter dismisses the details on the macro-political regime changes, and focuses instead on the government administrative changes and the “political opportunity structures” (Tarrow, 2011) created to engage CSOs in local governance process. Here decentralization, understood as the transfer of political power and material resources to independent local administrative authorities- the Town Councils, play the central focus of the institutional analysis.

On the other hand, the social capital perspective focuses on the vibrancy of “civic community” (Putnam, 1993, 2000) as the *bridging social capital*, along with the *linking social capital*, as analytical categories to analyze the participation of CSOs in the local governance process. These two hypotheses may seem paradoxical, but in fact, they complement one another.

The chapter is thus structured into five main parts: it starts by tracing the process of local government institutionalization in Cabo Verde, from the colonial period up to the present days. The second and the third parts explore the institutional and the social capital hypotheses respectively to explain the engagement of CSOs in local governance. The fourth part, building on the social capital hypothesis, develops the concept and the determinants of *linking social capital*, based on case studies with CBOs carried out in three municipalities on the Island of Santiago: Ribeira Grande, São Salvador do Mundo and Santa Catarina. The fifth part continues with the case study analysis, focusing now on the practical engagement of CBOs in two local policymaking and implementation processes: education and rural development policies.

Finally, the chapter ends with a conclusion, highlighting the main points discussed and the policy implications of the results found.

6.2 Contextualizing the institutionalization of local governments (Town Councils) in Cabo Verde

The creation of local governments in Cabo Verde is framed within the bigger context of government power decentralization to subnational governing bodies. The first attempt to decentralize the national government and create local government structures in Cabo Verde dates back to the colonial period. The Administrative Political Statute of Cabo Verde (*Estatuto Político Administrativo de Cabo Verde*) dated 22 November 1963, and approved by the Overseas Ministry's Decree No. 45871, determines that the colony is territorially and administratively subdivided into Parishes (*freguesias*) and Municipalities (*concelhos*), thus decentralizing partly the daily administrative burden that had been the sole responsibility of the Governor General (*Governador Geral*). Under that legislative act, the Parishes are administered by a chairperson of the Parish Council, while the municipalities are governed by town administrators, appointed by the Governor General.

Besides the administrative divisions into Parishes and Municipalities, the aforementioned political statute divides the country into two districts, *Barlavento* (the Northern islands of Santo Antão, São Vicente, Santa Luzia, São Nicolau, Sal and Boa Vista: the Windward Islands) and *Sotavento* (the Southern islands of Maio, Santiago, Fogo and Brava: the Leeward Islands). The former district had its headquarters in Mindelo, the capital city of São Vicente, while the latter had its base in Praia, the capital city of Cabo Verde, located in Santiago Island. Each district was administered by a governor appointed by the Governor General. This government administrative system lasted until the independence in 1975.

With the independence, and the inauguration of the single party ruling system, some profound administrative reforms started to be implemented, despite the maintenance of the strong and central government system. In respect to municipal administration inherited from the colonial regime, the new government appointed Delegates of the Internal Administration and Administrative Secretaries (*Delegados da Administração Interna e de Secretários Administrativos*) in all the 9 existing municipalities by the time of the independence, as stated in the Law Decree n° 47/75, of November 15th 1975. These Delegates replaced the figure of the *administrator of the municipality* in place during colonization. They became therefore the legitimate representatives of the central government in the municipalities, and acting as the government agencies for implementing public policies at the local levels. In addition, these

delegates were in charge of linking and coordinating the local administration with the decentralized party structure in the municipalities (Semedo *et al.*, 2013). They were in fact the main authority figures in the municipalities, undermining therefore the roles of the town councilors, whose services had been framed within the former municipal administrative system in the colonial period.

In its first years in power, PAICV government assigned the local administrative institutions the primary task of promoting “the economic, social and cultural development of the municipalities”, as a means to meet the local collective needs and “the interests of local populations [...] All these, however, had to be done within the guidelines of the Government programs, [...] in coordination with the structures of PAICV and mass organizations” (arts. 3 and 4, of the Law Decree n° 47/75). As one can infer from this quote, local administration was highly dependent on the central government and the directions of the ruling party. This fact is confirmed in the Constitution of 1980, in its article 94^o, Chapter IV, which proclaims that “the structures of local power are part of the unitary state power” (CONST., 1980).

The institutional framework of local administration in Cabo Verde changed radically in 1989 with the implementation of two legislative acts - Law N0. 47/III/89, 13 of July, which defined the basic principles of the municipal governments, and the Law No. 48/III/89, 13 of July, which regulated municipal elections (Semedo *et. al.*, 2013). These legislative initiatives represented a move from “a hyper-centralized administration to its opposite, a largely decentralized administration” (Semedo *et. al.*, 2013, p. 46). By decentralizing the power, the government aimed to create territorially public “collectivities”, in the form of local councils (*autarquias locais*), expected to be the main driving organization in local development, and hence promoting the development of the country. These public collectivities, as they were established and localized closer to the population, would be in a better position to identify local needs and challenges, and propose solutions in cooperation with the “masses”, local party structures and the central government itself. However, unlike the Law Decree 58/75 that had framed the local administration as an extension and simply the representation of the central government, the Law No. 47/III/89, 13 of July gave some independence to the local power structure in respect to the policymaking and implementation. Such an independence was strengthened with the Law No. 48/III/89, of the same day, 13 July, which introduced local election as the means for choosing the local authorities, breaking up with the appointment system in place since the colonial period. On this line of institutional rearrangement, in 1990, the government approved new guidelines that would help prepare the election, establishment and functioning of local governments in Cabo Verde (Law-Decree n° 52-A/90).

The first municipal elections in Cabo Verde was held on December 15th, 1991, the same year MPD had ousted PAICV from power after its 15-year-rulling. The new constitution of 1992 came to reinforce the political power decentralization in Cabo Verde by stipulating that “the Republic of Cabo Verde recognizes and respects, in the organization of political power [...] the existence and autonomy of local power and the democratic decentralization of the Public Administration” (article 252). In addition to recognizing the local power structures, the new constitution sets the boundaries for their financial autonomy, organization, duties and the relationship with the central government. From nine local Town Councils in 1991, the number grew exponentially to 22 in 2005. This growth shows the important role that the issue of central government power decentralization plays in Cape Verdean politics. Indeed, in recent years, groups of civil society have been pressuring the government to create a new municipality in the Island of Sal, adding to the movement for the autonomy of the island of São Vicente and regionalization of Cabo Verde, as explained in the introduction of this thesis. This growth of local power institutions has brought a deep change in the administrative system of the country, both quantitatively and qualitatively, since the decentralization process initiated in 1975. Quantitatively in terms of material and human resources that have to be allocated, and qualitatively in terms of services to be rendered to communities.

The decentralization of political and administrative power initiated in the end of 1980s, and then strengthened in the 1990s, led to the adoption of further institutional rearrangements to frame the functions of the new independent subnational government structures, the Town Councils. These rearrangements are those instituted in the Statutes of the Municipalities –Law N0. 134/IV/95, 3 July 1995, in the Framework Law of Decentralization- Law N0 69/VII/2010 of 16 August, and in the Statutes of the Cities, Law-Decree N0 15/2011 of 21 February. The Statutes of Municipalities define the principles of election, organization, composition and power boundaries of these decentralized power structures (the Municipal governments), as well as of their political leaders. The Framework Law on Decentralization establishes the basis for decentralization of administrative bureaucracy, as well as the system of public-private partnerships at regional, municipal and community levels, representing therefore an important step towards the consolidation of government power decentralization in Cabo Verde. Finally, the Statutes of the Cities, based on the reality of a quick and continuing urbanization of the country, defines the political orientation for the organization and the development of the urban areas.

These major institutional developments and changes have contributed to the reconfiguration of the public administrative structure in Cabo Verde, culminating with the

creation and establishment of independent local power structure, the Municipal governments, known in the country as *Câmaras Municipais*, or the Town/City Councils. We have seen, during the colonial and the single party regimes, despite the attempts to decentralize government activities, the exercising of power continued in fact to be highly monopolized by the central government, with local governments being only mere “delegations”, without any political nor financial autonomy to design and implement local policies. This situation changed in the 1990s, with the inauguration of political democracy in the country, and the subsequent institutional adjustments aforementioned. The main rationale underpinning decentralization now, is that it would “offer new possibilities not only for improving the quality of local public service delivery, but also new opportunities for enhancing the quality of local democracy” (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p. 4). If that is true, to what extent have the new institutional arrangements created possibilities and opportunities for local people to engage in the exercise of power (policymaking and implementation)? The next section will provide the answer to this question, by analyzing how the institutional arrangements presented above create “political opportunity structures” for the engagement of CSOs, taken here as representative institutions of individuals’ aggregated interests in the local policymaking and implementation processes. However, the engagement is analyzed from two perspectives, institutionalism and social capital. Each of these perspectives will be explored separately in the two next sections.

6.3 Institutions and the Engagement of CSOs in local governance

From the institutional perspective, engagement of CSOs (as structural social capital form) in local government policy process, is framed within the political context and institutional designs expected to create political opportunity for these non-state organizations to participate (Hyden, 1997; Maloney *et al.*, 2000; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Rothstein and Stolle 2003). Thus, political institutional setting determines the extent to which participation occurs. As Lowndes and Wilson (2001) put it, there is a need of a “civic minded government”, that recognizes the importance of civic engagement in governance, so that it could develop mechanisms to allow it to happen. This is especially important for the case of Africa, as already cited above, where “government adopt a political view of [CSOs]” (Fowler, 1991, p. 57). On the line of the political power decentralization presented above, this section analyzes how the local government institutional designs in Cabo Verde, known as *Autarquias Locais*, have created political opportunity structures for the engagement of civil society and their representative organizations (CSOs) in the local governance. In the following sections, I will trace how this engagement evolved from the colonial period up to the present democratic era.

6.3.1 Engagement of CSOs in local governance in the colonial and the single party-regimes

The decentralization of government activities during the colonial period, implemented through the administrative division of the colony, did not refer to the participation of civil society or its organizations in the administration of local divisions or districts. Despite the existence of some groups of civil society, which were occasionally consulted by the representatives of Metropole government (Lopes, 1996; Silva, 1997), they were excluded from participating in the bureaucratic business of the colony. Indeed, the existing civic groups were highly controlled and monitored by the state apparatus, as a strategy to prevent them from “destabilizing” the regime (Camilo, 2006). As Fernandes (2006) highlights, the Portuguese colonizers saw in the “social closure” a mechanism to prevent actions of contestation, which were emergent in other contexts, such as the movement of the black American intellectuals in the United States of America, and Negritude movement in the former francophone colonies. The governance, understood here as the acts and processes of government decision-making and implementation, still rested solely on the will of the Governor General.

With the independence in 1975, government institutional changes were introduced to open the decentralized Municipal administrative bodies to the “initiatives and popular participation” (Law Decree 58/75 arts. 3 and 4). Such participation in the local administration would be implemented through consultations of “mass organizations” (like OMCV, JACV, ABEL DJASI, UNTCS-CS, and others) whose creation and functioning were strictly kept under the watch of PAICV. Indeed, PAICV was embedded in these social organizations, aiding the party to implant and root itself throughout the country, and across all segments of population. The Constitution of 1980 defines at the highest level how the state/party supports itself on the mass organizations to make and implement public policies:

“1- The State supports and protects mass organizations and other socially recognized organizations, which organized around specific interests, frame and foster popular initiative and ensure the broad participation of the masses in national reconstruction. 2- The State, in its action, relies on mass organizations and other social organizations to which it may transfer certain activities they agree to assume. 3- The State creates conditions for the development of the material basis of mass organizations and other social organizations and protects their heritage” (CONST., 1980, Art. 7).

PAICV was born from the masses in Guinea Bissau (PAICV derived from PAIGC, after the Cape Verdean political elite decided to separate themselves from this party due to a coup d'états perpetrated by one of its factional movement in Guinea Bissau in 1980). The masses, whose disenchantment and discontent with the colonial practices had reached their apogee, responded wholeheartedly to Amilcar Cabral's and other Marxist ideologist leaders' appeal to trigger

protests, and later, to join the armed fight against the Portuguese colonizers in the streets and bushes of Guinea Bissau. Thus, PAICV became then a political party on its own, after the de-unification of Cabo Verde and Guinea Bissau in 1981, in the aftermath of the aforementioned political events. The party kept its linkage to the masses after the independence, engaging them in the process of the “reconstruction of the nation”. As a matter of fact, as the 1980 Constitution states,

“The Republic of Cabo Verde is a state of national revolutionary democracy founded on national unity and effective popular participation in the performance, control and direction of public activities and directed towards the construction of a society liberated from the exploitation of man by man” (CONST., 1980, Art. 3)

However, critics disagree with the effectiveness of mass participation in the public policy during the single party regime, on the argument that these organizations were not free and independent, and therefore, they were not true civil society organizations, but coopted, highly exploited, manipulated and politicized by PAICV governing "praxis" (Santos, 2013; Costa, 2013). In the face of such institutional context, these organizations could stand as the voice of civil society, and participate freely in the policymaking and implementation processes. Thus, how could mass organizations be the representative of civil society if they were ideologically created, supported and manipulated by the ruling party? As Costa (2013) asks, how could there be free civil society organizations, if PAICV is the leading political force of society and the state?

Santos and Bastin (1988) went even further by arguing that the way the party state (PAICV) engineered the mass participation was a means to achieve its political project goals: the dissemination and ideological indoctrination of the party values. Therefore, “popular participation for development is then institutionalized and all modern forms of economic and social organizations, i.e., cooperatives and associations, were assumed and defined as the elements that characterized the regime” (Santos and Bastin, 1988, p. 2012). Despite these critics, what could be noticed is that the political regime put a strong emphasis on the emergence and engagement of the non-government organizations in the policy process, despite the paternalistic relationship established with them.

The Basic Law on Local Authorities-Law No. 47/III/89, 13 of July, reinforced the need of civic participation in public policymaking by “holding the population responsible for the management of the issues that affect them directly” and therefore improving “transparency and participative democracy”. Therefore, institutional opportunities were created to engage population, through their representative organizations such as neighborhood associations and other civil society organizations, in the local government policymaking and implementation

activities. The aim of civil society participation was to guarantee an approximation of power to the people, and thus encourage them to participate in the public policies implemented.

The engagement of population in the local governance was framed in line with the recommendations of the III Congress of PAICV, held in November 1988. Indeed, as mentioned above, for historical reasons, the party had been keen on reinforcing the decentralization and promoting popular participation. The Law-Decree N0. 52-A/90 brought some changes to reinforce the 1989 laws on decentralization, by putting a particular emphasis on the “popular participation in the performance, control and direction of public activities” (art. 24^o), regarding the preparation, implementation and control of plans and programs of interest to local populations.

6.3.2 Engagement of CSOs in the 1990s

The inauguration of democracy in 1991, and the first free multi-party elections of local governments held in December of the same year, are the “critical junctures” (Jones and Baumgartner, 2012) for prompting the institutional rearrangements to engage civil society and their representative organizations in the local governance processes. Such adjustments are enshrined in the 1992 Constitution, and the Statutes of Municipalities- Law No. 134/IV/95, 3 of July. The 1992 Constitution defines that the decentralization of the public administrative machinery should be open to the involvement of local communities and civil society. In this context, it stipulates that “local bodies [local power structures] may delegate to community organizations administrative tasks which do not involve powers of authority” (CONST., 1992, art. 260, No. 2). This is a huge difference from what the decentralization mechanisms in the 1980s had prescribed. The community organizations, under the new constitution, are now involved directly in the implementation of policies, freely and unconstrained by the ruling party. At least, this is what the new official rules of the games define.

The Statutes of Municipalities- Law No. 134/IV/95, 13 of July, is the first step towards the materialization of the aforementioned constitutional precepts on the civic participation in local governance. For this purpose, it instructs that “the municipality may transfer to foundations, associations of economic, social, cultural or sports nature, or companies, the implementation of activities they are devoted to, whenever necessary, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public services” (art. 9). In addition, the local government can also delegate to community-based organizations (CBOs) “administrative tasks which do not involve the exercise of power authority” (Art. 123).

The Framework Law on Decentralization- Law No. 69/VII/2010 of 16 August, and the City Statute's Law, Law-Decree N0. 15/2011 of 21 February, gave a new impetus to the engagement of civil society and their representative organizations in the local government policymaking and implementation processes, by reinforcing policy consultation mechanisms, and strengthening the need of tasks delegation to CSOs. For example, that Law delineates the possibility for “temporary delegation of tasks or administrative tasks of Local Authorities to Civil Society Organizations” (Art. 5). Another important participatory tool introduced by this legislative measure is the participative budget making in the local governance. In this matter, it states that “municipalities should adopt a participatory budget management approach, including public debates, hearings and consultations on the proposals of the multiannual plans, the budget framework law and the annual budget proposal, as a mandatory condition for their approval by the respective municipal government body” (Art. 20). The non-compliance with that procedure may force the Municipal Assembly board, the local legislative body, to refuse the scheduling of public budget presentation, debate and approval by the Municipal Assembly Members. For its part, the City Statute's Law puts an emphasis on the democratization of “the management of urban spaces, through the participation of populations and representative associations of community segments in the formulation, execution and monitoring of urban development plans, programs and projects” (Semedo, *et al.*, 2013, p.152).

The institutional changes introduced in the 1990s, and enshrined in the Constitution and other legislative measures described above, redefined the macro-political context that determines the state-society relations, creating therefore “political opportunity structures” (Tarrow, 2011) and institutional conditions (Maloney et al., 2000; Lowndes and Wilson 2001; Rothstein and Stolle 2003) to engage CSOs in the local government policy processes. Such changes emphasized the importance of a “synergistic relationships” (Evans, 1997), and the “interpenetration of state and civil society” (Maloney et al., 2000) in the Cape Verdean local political process. However, engagement of CSOs has not been simply a gift by the political elites, nor simply for the change in the institutional designs implemented. Forces coming from below and within the society, which I call the *bridging social capital*, has also been a key determinant for such institutional changes and participation of civil society organizations in the policymaking. I will now analyze this social capital perspective in the section below.

6.4 Social capital and engagement of CSOs in local governance

The incorporation of CSOs in local governance analyzed through the social capital lens, takes the concept of social capital in its *bridging and linking dimensions* (Woolcock, 1998; 2000; 2002). CSOs are understood as the network of relationship individuals establish among themselves with the purpose of solving their communities' collective problems. These organizations play an integrating role of connecting people together around their community issues, and together, they participate in the planning and production of solutions to address them. The main argument here is that CSOs, while playing the integrating roles (Woolcock, 1998), they become important power resources, capable of influencing the political process. As they understand their power potential, they demand their integration and participation in the local policy process. In the case of Cabo Verde, these organizations' capacity to mobilize resources has prompted institutional redesigns and adjustments to accommodate them in local governance process.

The history of government decentralization in Cabo Verde provides us with rich evidences of grassroots organizations claiming and demanding change in the administrative system, through its decentralization to subnational levels of government. In addition to that, the demands have not only focused on the change itself, but they have also stressed the need of an effective engagement of civil society in local level government policymaking and implementation processes. In 1995, it was held in São Vicente, the second most populous island of Cabo Verde, a forum, "*Forum Convergência: De Mindelo para Cabo Verde- Convergência para a Solidariedade*"³⁷, to call for the central government awareness on the need of power decentralization in the country. The leitmotif of that conference was the need for the citizens' participation in the governance process, as a way to revitalize the country's democracy, which, according to the Forum organizers, "despite being young, was giving sign of dismal". The following comment made by a member of the organizing committee of that Forum exemplifies such a concern:

"Despite the understanding and the complacency due to the young [Cape Verdean] democracy, some citizens from Mindelo, being aware of the country's political and economic development, had soon realized, mainly through their frequent informal conversations, that there are numerous anomalies that, to a certain extent, are damaging the health of the country. These conversations have focused on issues like the weak capacity of civil society to intervene; the indifference of *Mindelenses* cadre for politics; the poor performance of the Members of Parliament; the willingness with which laws are broken without the least respect to the common accepted values; the exercise of local

³⁷ Forum for Convergence: From Mindelo to Cabo Verde- Convergence for Solidarity (author's translation)

politics, and the problems inherent in the exaggerated centralization of the means necessary for good management” [of the country] (Araújo, 1995, p. 11)³⁸.


The concern and disgruntlement demonstrated by the *Mindelense* cadres on the direction the country’s democracy and the governance were taking, added to the Forum they put together to address their concerns, were a call for an institutional change in the government administrative system. In the same year, 1995, actors of civil society organizations, in partnership with government and international organizations, organized a forum in Santiago Island around the theme of *Non-Governmental Cooperation in Cabo Verde* (Azevedo, 1995). Following the foot steps of the *Forum Convergência* of Mindelo, the *Non-Governmental Cooperation* forum focused on defining the strategies to engage non-government actors in the governance and development process of the country. In addition, in 1995, the national NGOs grouped together to create the Platform of Cape Verdean NGOs, encompassing different types of CSOs with the exception of the unions. Thus, this platform came to function as an umbrella organization that would unite and strengthen the voice of civil society in the public policy arena in Cabo Verde. The Statutes of the Municipalities, approved in the same year, 1995, and other institutional adjustments that followed, could be interpreted as the responses to the concerns manifested by the civil society organizations regarding their engagement in the country governance process. The PAICV government, in 2001, after ousting MPD from power, stated in its first government program its commitment to engage civil society organizations in the local development, by recognizing them as “strategic partners” (GOV. Program, 2001). The government realized the importance of establishing a “synergistic relationship” (Evans, 1997; Woolcock, 1998) with civil society, based on the conviction that “NGOs and other civil society organizations can facilitate creative combinations by taking into account the local particularities and the mobilization of local actors with greater capacity to undertake the strategies to combat poverty and exclusion” (GOV. Program, 2001).

In the 1990s, CSOs grew quickly, both quantitatively and qualitatively. As they became more expressive, they also became better organized, more efficient and better prepared at articulating their interests. Their congregation into the Plataforma das ONGs is an example of their improved organization and efficiency. Consequently, their voices started resonating with higher vibrancy in the ears and minds of political elites. The local government institutional adjustments for the CSOs incorporation in local governance, as shown in the section above, has been in part due to their advancement and strategy refinement in articulating their interests. The

³⁸ Translated from the original by the author

citizens’ awareness, their interactions and their grouping together to reflect on their communities’ challenges as referred by Araújo (1995), are important part of their social capital mobilization. On the one hand, based on this mobilization, CSOs sent signs to the political elite, urging them to redesign and adjust institutions, as a way to create opportunity structures to guarantee their involvement. On the other hand, the organized forums and other linkage events engendered a “*linking social capital*” typology (Woodcock, 1998), connecting the CSOs with the institutions of power in the formulation and implementation of local policies. The government, by understanding the strength and importance of society mobilization, and the “benefits of intensive intra-community integration”, created mechanisms to promote an “extensive extra-community linkages” (Woolcock, 1998, p. 175), connecting government with civil society organizations as a strategy to create synergy (Evans, 1997) to promote local development. The high-level meetings and other networking events, bringing together CSOs of all kinds and government institutions, such as “*Atelier de reflexão sobre processo de descentralização em Cabo Verde*”, *Forum Convergência de Mindelo*, and the Forums referred by Azevedo (1995), are examples of strategies to mobilize *linking social capital* to be put in the service of national and local development. Figure 6.1 below illustrates this linkage process between state and CSOs in the local governance process.

Figure 6.1- Linkage between social capital institutions (CSOs) and state institutions



Source: Created by the author

The vertical arrows illustrate the influence direction and the anchorage seeking of both political and social capital institutions. The political institutions- the laws and the structures of local powers, the ruling party and their leaders, are responsible for creating and defining political opportunities to engage CSOs. In addition, as the relationship between political institutions and CSOs develop, they both seek to create linkages (Kistchelt, 2000) and embeddedness (Evans, 1997) within one another, as a way to achieve their particularistic purposes. While political institutions seek to gain CSOs' trust and support for reelection and for policy issues, CSOs influence the political institutions from below, either to get specific policies approved, or to get material resources for the implementation of their own projects. As power resource organizations (Korpi, 1985), CSOs enter into the bargaining process of institutional design and adjustment, making sure that their demands are considered. However, the limited power of CSOs in relation to political institutions, put them on a weaker position, where they have to seek an upwards anchorage in these institutions. In this confluence of linkage process, these two sets of institutions are expected to work based on consensus building regarding the institutional adjustment of policy processes. However, in this thread of relationship, some argue that local CSOs "are also prone to elite capture, [as] they are quite often poorly equipped with skills and technology [...] they frequently look upwards (to donors) rather than downwards (to their constituents) for legitimacy and direction" (Krishna, 2003, p. 362).

In conclusion, the engagement of civil society organizations in local governance in the 1990s and 2000s has been the result of a convergence of both institutional and social capital determinants. On the one hand, the change in the political systems led to institutional adjustments that have progressively created structures of political opportunity structures (Tarrow, 2011; Maloney *et al.*, 2000) to accommodate civil society organizations in the local governance system. On the other hand, the engagement process has been triggered by the CSOs themselves, which at a certain point in the history of Cabo Verde became more conscious of their power resource, and then mobilized themselves to demand their participation in the governance process. These two hypotheses are complimentary rather than contradictory. With the institutionalization of CSOs participation in place, the question to be addressed now is the extent to which engagement of civil society, more specifically organized civil society, with local government in the process of policymaking and implementation occurs. This is the aim of the two next sessions of this chapter.

6.5 Measuring CSOs' engagement in local governance

This section focuses on the measurement of CSOs' engagement in the local governance in the 22 Municipalities of Cabo Verde. Governance is here taken to be a “process whereby elements in society wield power and authority, and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life and economic and social development” (Anheier, 2005, p. 230). Thus, the extent to which CSOs participate, determines very much their influence over the local government decisions and public policy success. Measurement of CSOs engagement treated in this section is limited to the decision-making and local policy implementation processes in the 22 municipalities in Cabo Verde. The implementation rate of projects by the CSOs in each of the 22 municipalities is taken as the unit of measure of their engagement. The independent variable is the stock of *bridging social capital* for each municipality, determined based on the CSOs density and the associational life (membership rate). It is expected that the municipalities with higher stock of *bridging social capital* have a higher rate of CSOs engagement. The opposite is also expected to occur.

6.5.1 Determining the bridging social capital index

As mentioned in the paragraph above, the stock of *bridging social capital* available in each municipality is measured based on two indicators: the CSOs density and their membership rate. The choice of just these two indicators is because they represent more candidly the extent to which the communities are mobilized and bridged around its associational networks to solve their collective problems, and influence local government policies. Other indicators of social capital used elsewhere (Putnam, 1993) seem to be more an outcome of the social mobilization and structuring than their instigators. Social norms of solidarity and reciprocity are generated through interactions people have in their network of relationships. It is only when people start to bridge that these norms are strengthened and entrenched in the communities.

6.5.1.1 CSOs density across the 22 Municipalities

The CSOs density is measured here based on the data made available by the Cape Verdean *Plataforma das ONGs* (2015). According to the data provided, in 2015 there were 724 registered civil society organizations in Cabo Verde, classed under 7 typologies, and distributed unevenly throughout the 22 municipalities as shown in the table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Density of CSOs across the 22 municipalities

Municipality	TYPOLOGIES							TOTAL	%
	ADC	ADR	COOP	FUND	ONG/MUT	ONGD	ONGD/IMF		
Brava	16	6				1	1	24	3.3%
Mosteiros	14	2				1		17	2.3%
Sao Felipe	32		1			3	2	38	5.2%
Sta C. Fogo	13	2				2		17	2.3%
Fogo Island	59	4	1	0	0	6	2	72	9.9%
Praia	50		2	3		52	4	111	15.3%
R.G.Santiago	16					2		18	2.5%
São Domingo	35					1		36	5.0%
S.L. Orgãos	16					1		17	2.3%
Santa Cruz	37				2	3		42	5.8%
S.S. Mundo	10						1	11	1.5%
Sta. C. Santiago	46					5		51	7.0%
São Miguel	19			1		1	1	22	3.0%
Tarrafal Santiago	25	1	1			2		29	4.0%
Santiago Island	254	1	3	4	2	67	6	337	46.50%
Maio	16	7	1	1		1	1	27	3.7%
Boa Vista	10	2				6		18	2.5%
SaL	20		1			9		30	4.1%
Ribeira Vista	26					4	1	31	4.3%
Tarral Sao Nicolau	14					1		15	2.1%
São Nicolau Island	40	0	0	0	0	5	1	46	6.4%
São Vicente	23	2	1			32		58	8.0%
Paul	15					6		21	2.9%
Porto Novo	39					1		40	5.5%
R.G.Santo Antão	40			1		9	1	51	7.0%
Santo Antao	94	0	0	1	0	16	1	112	15.5%
TOTAL	532	22	7	6	2	143	12	724	100%
%	73,50%	3%	1%	0,80%	0,30%	20%	2%	100%	

Source: (Plataforma das ONGs, 2015)

Looking at the distribution of CSOs across the islands, we can see that Santiago island has the highest number and percentage of CSOs- 46%, followed by Santo Antão with 15.5%, and then Fogo stands on the third place with 9.9%. Boa Vista stands at the bottom of the ranking with 2.5%, which corresponds to 18 CSOs. Comparing the CSOs distribution across the 22 municipalities, Praia is the most vibrant municipality, having 15.3% from the total number of the organizations in the country, almost as twice as São Vicente, which follows on the second place with 8%. Santa Catarina de Santiago and Ribeira Grande de Santo Antão has each 7%. At the bottom of the ranking, stand Santa Catarina do Fogo, São Lourenço dos Orgãos with 2.3% each, followed by Tarrafal de São Nicolau with 2.1%, and finally São Salvador do Mundo with 1.5%. These four municipalities, together with Ribeira Grande de Santiago, with 2.5%,

were all created in 2005, being therefore the youngest municipalities of the country. Looking at the percentage of population covered by 1 CSO, I take as the most vibrant municipalities the ones with the lowest percentage of population served by one CSO. Thus, as table 6.2 shows, the most vibrant municipalities are Praia, Santa Catarina de Santiago and São Vicente. Following this same criterion, the least vibrant municipalities are São Salvador do Mundo with 9.1%, followed by Tarrafal de São Nicolau with 6.7%, then the Municipalities of São Lourenço Orgãos, Mosteiros and Santa Catarina do Fogo with 5.9%.

6.5.1.2 CSOs membership (the associational life)

The second indicator of *bridging social capital* is the *associational life*, measured as a percentage of CSOs membership rate over the total population in each municipality. This indicator is taken independently from the CSOs density, and it is important that it is treated separately because mixing it with the density of CSOs might be misleading, as these organizations differ greatly in membership and dynamics. Active CSOs are the ones that count with the engagement of its members for the production and delivery of collective goods to their constituents. Large number of CSOs in a municipality might be unimportant for the generation of social capital if they have few people around them, supporting and engaging in their activities. The more people join an organization, the more is their acquaintanceship and their interaction, and therefore, the higher is the possibility for them to trust one another (Putnam, 2000), and engage in collective initiatives to solve their community problems. Based on this assumption, membership rate is judged important for the construction of social capital. To obtain the membership rate percentage (the associational life rate), I divide the total members of all the CSOs in each municipality by its total population for 2015.

Table 6.2 Associational life (membership rate of CSOs) in the 22 Municipalities

Municipalities	Nº. of CSOs (2015)	Membership (2015)	Population 2015	% Population Served by 1 CSO /CSO density (2015)	Membership/ Associational life (2015)
RG Santo Antão	51	2886	17017	2,0	17,0
Paul	21	1482	6099	4,8	24,3
Porto Novo	40	2812	17431	2,5	16,1
S. Vicente	58	6960	81014	1,7	8,6
R. Brava SN	31	1186	7182	3,2	16,5
Tarrafal SN	15	946	5242	6,7	18,0
Sal	30	3209	33747	3,3	9,5


Boa vista	18	1312	14451	5,6	9,1
Maio	27	2005	6980	3,7	28,7
Sta. Catarina SanTiago	51	1900	45123	2,0	4,2
Praia	111	9607	151436	0,9	6,3
S. Domingos	36	2363	14037	2,8	16,8
S.Miguel	22	1322	14671	4,5	9,0
Sao Salv. Mundo	11	5512	8652	9,1	63,7
Sao Lourenço Org.	17	904	7127	5,9	12,7
RG Santiago	18	829	8415	5,6	9,9
Tarrafal Sant	29	1202	18314	3,4	6,6
Santa Cruz	42	1803	26360	2,4	6,8
Mosteiros	17	1270	9364	5,9	13,6
S. Felipe	38	2490	21194	2,6	11,7
Sta Cat. Fogo	17	845	5279	5,9	16,0
Brava	24	1084	5698	4,2	19,0
Nacional	724	53929	524833	0,1	10,3

Source: Anuário Estatístico (INE, 2015)

As the data collated in the table above show, the municipality with the lowest number of CSOs, and so the least vibrant in terms of percentage of population served by one CSO- São Salvador do Mundo, unexpectedly presents the highest membership rate as a percentage of its population, 63.7%. It is followed by Maio with 28.7%, then Brava with 19%, and on the third place, São Vicente with 18.6%. São Felipe do Fogo presents the lowest rate of associational life rate with 1.7%.

Having determined the two indicators of the *bridging social capital* stock for each municipality- the percentage of population covered by one CSO (*CSOs density*), and the percentage of its population who are members of CSOs (*the associational life*), the task now is to analyze their association with CSOs' engagement, or their incorporation in the public policy process. I take the CSOs project implementation rate (figure 6.2) as the indicator of their engagement in the policymaking and implementation processes.

Figure 6.2 CSOs project execution rate (2015)




Source: Plataforma das ONGs (2015)

The relevance of using the project execution as a proxy to measure CSOs’ engagement in the policymaking and implementation processes bases on the fact that these organizations by themselves are financially incapable of implementing any sizable projects (the non-profit failure theory- Anheir, 2005; Boris and Steuerle, 2017). To do so, they need to count on the support of either public (local and central governments organizations) or other entities. Therefore, the rate of project execution depends on the availability of such financial means put at their disposal based on partnership mechanisms, or “tools” (Salamon, 2000) they establish with councils, government, business and other entities. On the same token, it is assumed that the councils fund CSOs’ projects when they are in line with their policy guidelines, which means that, to a certain extent, CSOs support the local government policies or programs. It is also appropriate to highlight that even though CSOs might carry projects without being funded by the local government, in many occasions, they still need the consent of these institutions, and so, the projects must be framed within the context of the local or municipal development plans, as well the central government plans.

The Municipalities of Praia, São Vicente, Sal and Ribeira Grande de Santo Antão present the highest rate of engagement when looked at the CSOs’ rate of project execution, while São Miguel, São Salvador do Mundo and Tarrafal de São Nicolau stand at the bottom of the ranking. Why? Without establishing any “causal relationship” (della Porta and Keating,

2008) between the CSOs density/associational life and the rate of projects executed- the CSOs engagement, figures 6.3 and 6.4, present a visual correlation between them.


Figure 6.3 - Relationship between CSOs density and the CSOs engagement in local policy process across the 22 Cape Verdean Municipalities



As the above scattergraph illustrates, there seems to be a proportional relationship between the CSOs’ density and their engagement in the policy process in many municipalities. It can be noticed that in the municipalities where the percentage of population served by one CSO increases, - the cases of Tarrafal de Santiago and São Salvador do Mundo, the engagement rate decreases. However, this relationship is not constant across all the municipalities. There are some exceptions, which are the cases of the municipalities of Porto Novo and Ribeira Brava, with high density of CSO but with a low engagement rate.

Now, attempting a visual correlation between the associational life and the CSOs’ engagement rate, the following figure is obtained.

Figure 6.4 Relationship between associational life and the CSOs engagement across the 22 Municipalities



Apparently, the *associational life* is not strongly associated with CSOs engagement rate. Praia, for example has a low associational life rate, but with the highest rate of engagement. On the opposite side stands the municipality of Sao Salvador do Mundo. Despite its higher associational life, it presents a very low engagement rate. This discrepancy might be explained by two set of reasons: membership quality and the typology of CSOs, on the one hand, and the socioeconomic development of the municipalities, on the other. Field research carried out in this municipality shows that its high CSOs membership rate does not reflect the reality of its associational life on the ground. This is because one single CSO, a micro-credit institution (FAMI-PICOS), has 57% of the total CSOs membership rate in that municipality. In addition, around 40% of members of this particular CSO is not from or does not live in the municipality. Therefore, there is little engagement of members in the life of the CSO, which will also reflect in the engagement of CSO in project implementation. In respect to the typologies of CSOs, Praia and São Vicente for example, have the greatest concentration of bigger NGOs with far more resource mobilization capacity than the ACDs-Community Based Organizations, more dominant in the other municipalities. The second set of reason is the economic development of these municipalities, applied for the cases of Sal and Boa Vista. These municipalities have a

higher economic growth, and the business actors make higher endowments to the CSOs, as well as the individual members' dues. Individual dues are particularly important in the municipalities of Brava and Fogo, where there is a high contribution of emigrants from these islands living in the USA. Despite their absence, they make high contributions, either with cash or with goods in kind to relatives and to the communities in general (*Interview with a former Government official in the Ministry of Education*).

So far, this chapter has focused on two fundamental analytical categories to explain the engagement and participation of CSOs in the local government policy making and implementation: institutions and the social capital. While the former explain CSOs participation based on political regime changes and the institutional designs implemented since the independence, the latter justifies engagement based on societal mobilization through organized civil society organizations to pressure government to respond to their needs. With respect to this second variable dimension, the data presented above suggest that both CSOs density and associational life in the municipality matter. They are both components of the bridging social capital, and they both influence CSOs engagement in the local policy making process. In fact, both institutional changes and the social capital influence, independently, the engagement of CSOs in policymaking across the 22 municipalities, despite some odd cases observed above.

Looking at the social capital variable, so far the focus has been solely on the *societal* or the "community social capital" (Andrews, 2011), and its influence over CSOs' engagement in local policymaking process. This community social capital, or what Woodcock (1998) treats as the "bridging social capital", *refers* to the network of relationship, bonds of trust, and cooperation people develop through their associational lives (community bonding and bridging). Civic associations are the epitome of such networks. However, there is a second dimension of society social capital to be explored in this chapter: the inter-organizational *linking social capital*. This social capital dimension is characterized by a "synergistic relationship" (Evans, 1997) the Community Based Organizations (CBOs) develop with business, political parties, media, the institutions of local government, and finally, with other civil society organizations within the municipalities. It is expected that CBOs' linkage with these organizations leverage them, and so, make them stronger actors in the policy arena. Thus, it is methodologically relevant to decode how the CBOs link with the other organizations and how this linkage catapult them to engage in and influence local policy-making and implementation processes. The *linking social capital*, as formal and "vertical linkage" CSOs to the institutions of power (Woodcock, 1998, 2000, 2002; Rothstain, 2001, 2003), is essentially important for generating the "synergistic relationship" (Evens, 1997) and resource mobilization

(Zald and McCarthy, 1979) for the development of communities, both geographical communities, and the communities of people. However, my focus on the linking social capital, as it will be developed in the next sections of this chapter, goes beyond the CBOs' formal and "vertical linkage" with institutions of political power, to encompass its linkage with other actors, including political parties, media, and other civil society organizations. I call this kind of network CBOs develop with other organizations of *societal linking social capital*, a thread of relationship that produces value for the society at large. It is to this dimension and concept of social capital and its influence over the local policy process in Cabo Verde that I now turn to analyze.

6.6 The *societal linking social capital* and CSOs' over local governance

The concept of *societal linking social capital* this sections focuses on builds on the Woodcock's (1998, 2000, 2002) notion of linking social capital as the linkage CSOs establish with institutions of power. Building on this concept, *societal linking social capital* refers the network of relationship of Community Based Organizations (CBOs), widely known in Cabo Verde as *Associações de Desenvolvimento Comunitário*, with a larger group of dominant organizations within the municipality, or from without. These organizations, as aforementioned in the above section, includes not only the local government power structure (the local City Councils), but also the ruling parties, companies, the media, and other CSOs.

CBOs are small community organizations that emerged in Cabo Verde in the colonial period as the people strategy to produce and provide themselves with collective goods unmet by the government. However, it was after the independence that they spread quickly throughout the country. From 1975 to 1990, an approximate number of 300 CBOs were created in Cabo Verde with a strong support from the government. These community organizations had a noble task of "carrying out the production of primary goods and promoting their sales in cooperatives" (JICA, 2010, p. 16). In the 1990s, most of the CBOs inherited from the single party regime disappeared, and new ones were created instead to give the idea of their *separation* from the state, as they became highly connoted as a byproduct of the previous regime. New CBOs emerged then, with the support of international NGOs established in Cabo Verde, led by the American NGO ACDI/VOCA. CBOs then grew quickly, skyrocketing in the 2000s, in the ambit of rural development policy implementations (Chalinor, 2008). The term "community" here refers to geographically demarcated neighborhoods in each municipality, and not to communities of other kinds, for example race, religion or other issues. Indeed, CBOs stand "as an organizational response, most often instrumental and sometimes political, of the [local]

community [...] in pursuit of alternative strategies” for its development (Paul, 1987). Thus, the network of relationship CBOs establish with the other “corporate actors” generates social capital for them as it “allows the resources of one actor to be appropriated for use by others” (Coleman, 1998, p.109). This *societal linking social capital* resource mobilization in a given community, is quintessentially important in the production and delivery of public collective goods at the local levels. As Lang and Hornburg (1998) affirm,

“The nation also needs to provide assistance in a way that builds and sustains bridges between civic organizations. Such bridges form civic infrastructure. *Civic infrastructure* refers to the network that exists among local groups such as community development corporations (CDCs), foundations, other nonprofits, local governments, public housing authorities, businesses, and voluntary associations [including political parties]. The links between these various civic-oriented groups can form an effective coalition to manage the devolution of [public collective goods] (p.5).

Thus, the “civic infrastructure” emanating from the linkage and coalition among local “corporate actors” not only strengthens each other’s resources, but it also creates a local synergy, a *societal linking social capital* that stands as an important asset for the development of the local communities, the municipalities and the country as a whole. CBOs, as part of the “corporate actors”, benefit from the resources of other actors in that thread of their relationship, which allows them to grow more powerful in the public policy bargaining process. Thus, the hypothesis laid down in this section is that the level of CBOs engagement in the local policy process depends very much on the quality of linkage they have with other aforementioned organizations, or the “corporate actors” in the municipality (*the societal linkage social capital*). As data to carry out such an analysis across the 22 municipalities are unavailable, case studies were conducted in three municipalities of Santiago Island: Ribeira Grande de Santiago, São Salvador do Mundo, and Santa Catarina. The choice of these three municipalities has been done base on two sets of reasons: firstly their history: Ribeira Grande de Santiago is known to be the cradle of Cape Verdean nation, as it is the first place to be settled by the Portuguese colonizers in the country. For its turn, Santa Catarina is well known for its avid population, who in the past showed strong eagerness to join (in Tabanka or other informal associations) and embark themselves in numerous revolts against colonial practices (Camilo, 2006, 2014; Furtado, 1993). Finally, São Salvador do Mundo, which besides being in the past a temporary shelter of the Governor General of Cabo Verde, is one of the few places in Cabo Verde where the traditional forms of social solidary is far more imprinted in the population than in any other places.

The second set of reasons, with utmost importance for this research, is the methodological and theoretical reasons. These three cases serve perfectly to test our societal

linking social capital and engagement hypothesis. As it has been demonstrated in the section above, these three municipalities accumulate different stocks of bridging social capital. Difference is also observed in the CSOs' project accomplishment rate, understood as their engagement level in the local governance. However, in such a context, CSOs has been taken to include all types of civic organizations, which makes it difficult to understand the level of engagement of the each type of organizations, nor the resources they count with to influence and leverage their engagement. Thus, trying to fill in that gap, this section looks specifically at the extent to which the CBOs, one specific type of CSOs, engage with the institutions of power in these municipalities, and the factors that influence such and engagement. On the other hand, concerning the political institutional determinants, the variance in the ruling party in these three municipalities serve well for the analysis at hand. Ribeira Grande de Santiago and São Salvador do Mundo were both created in 2005 and ruled by the same party (PAICV) until 2008, when their mayors and the councilors were elected for the first time. In Ribeira Grande de Santiago, MPD took over the power in 2008, and it has been ruling the municipality ever since. Whereas, in São Salvador do Mundo, PAICV continued ruling until 2016. MPD also took over power from PAICV in Santa Catarina in 2008, and then ruled until 2016. Therefore, this fact allows the observance whether the different ruling parties has accounted for the same level of CBOs engagement in policymaking or not. The change of ruling party in Ribeira Grande de Santiago and in Santa Catarina make it possible to determine the extent to which the two different ruling parties (PAICV and MPD), along with their institutional initiatives, influence the engagement of CBOs in the local policymaking and implementation processes in the same Municipalities from 2005 to 2016. Boxes 1, 2, and 3 present further descriptions of each of these municipalities.

Box 6.1- Case 1: Municipality of Ribeira Grande de Santiago

Ribeira Grande de Santiago, famously known as *Cidade Velha*³⁹, is “the cradle” of Cape-Verdean nation. Founded in 1462, two years after the discovery of Cabo Verde by the Portuguese navigators, Cidade Velha became the first European city in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the first city capital of Cabo Verde. Cidade Velha also became the headquarters of the first Diocese in West African Coast, as instituted by papal bull “Pro excellenti” in 1533.

Its localization in fertile valleys with abundant water for agricultural practice, favored its choice to be the first inhabited region in Cabo Verde. The city soon became a strategic

³⁹ “The Old City”

intercontinental slave trading post, interconnecting African and American continents. However, the decadence of Ribeira Grande de Santiago, motivated by the decline of slavery trade, with its abolishment, the attacks of pirates and insalubrity of the land, dictated the transfer of the capital to the city of Praia in 1769.

Ribeira Grande de Santiago regained again its status of municipality in 2005 (Law 63 / VI / 2005 of May 9), and as a city in 2011 (the Law-Decree No. 15/2011). Composed of two boroughs, *Nhu Santo Nome* and *São João Batista*, the municipality has a territorial area of 164 km², being one of the largest municipalities in the country. It is located about 15 km west of the country's capital, Praia. Ribeira Grande is predominantly rural, with 86% against 14.6% of the population living in the urban area. The total population in 2010 was 8325 and 8415 in 2015 (INE, 2010, 2015).

Poverty in the municipality, according to IMC (INE, 2016), reached 39.1% of its population, well above the national average, which stands at 35%. The main economic activities of the municipality are based on the agriculture sector, fishery, livestock farming and small-scale handicraft trade. Nevertheless, the service sector has been gaining some boost since the classification of the city “Cidade Velha” in June 2009 as one of the Seven Wonders of Portuguese origins in the world, and as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO. Tourism is gaining ground as a promising economic activity.

The Council Installing Committee appointed in 2005 had very limited powers in comparison with the already established local governments. Its limitations were concerned with budget, both human and physical resources to put together a three-year plan to adopt the municipalities with the minimal conditions for its full autonomy in 2008, the year that the new councilors would be elected. In 2008, PAICV, the party that had been leading the installing committee, lost to MPD, and this party has been ruling the municipality ever since, winning the local elections in 2012 and 2016.

Box 6.2- Case 2: Municipality of S.S. do Mundo

Likely Ribeira Grande de Santiago, the municipality of São Salvador do Mundo was officially created in 2005 by the Law 63 / VI / 2005 of May 9. The municipality is located in the central part of the Santiago Island, occupying an area of 30 km². It borders with three other municipalities - Santa Catarina, São Lourenço dos Orgãos and Santa Cruz. According to INE projections for 2015, the municipality has 8652 inhabitants, 52% males and 48% females, distributed in 18 communities. 83.8% of the population resides in rural areas versus 16.4 in urban areas. The population of the Municipality is mostly young, 32% under 15 years old, 60.5% between 15 and 64 years old, while 7.50% is over 64 years old (INE, 2015). Poverty rate stands at 49.7% (INE, 2016), being one of the poorest in the country.

The main economic activities of the Municipality are agriculture and livestock, however, not as dynamic as its neighbor Santa Catarina. The rudimentary and predominantly subsistence agriculture and livestock techniques, allow very little surplus for market. Recently in 2012, the government built a dam which is expected to boost agribusiness activity in the municipality.

Box 6.3- Case 3: Municipality of Santa Catarina de Santiago

The Municipality of Santa Catarina was created in 1991, in the wave of the first democratic elections in Cabo Verde. It is located in the central and coastal part of the island of Santiago. It is the second largest municipality in the island, covering an area of 274 Km², which represents about 7% of the total area of the national territory, and 25% of the area of the island. Santa Catarina has 45123 inhabitants (INE, 2015). It is essentially rural, with 85.6% of its population living in rural area, and around 15% living in urbanized centers.

The city of Assomada is the most important urban center, housing approximately 27% of the population of the Municipality. Poverty rate reached 36.9% of its population in 2016 (INE, IMC 2016). Due to its high poverty rate along the years, Santa Catarina is among the municipalities that have mostly benefited from the rural development programs implemented in country (Siri and Goovaerts, 2002).

The main economic activities are subsistence rain fed agriculture, livestock and fishing, mainly for local consumption, as well as for small-scale trade. Regarding the livestock activity, the municipality is famously known as the national leading producer of bovine and goats. Also relevant for its economic base, is the growing importance of the sector of commerce and services. Commerce, in turn, represents a sector of great importance for Santa Catarina, covering the public, private, cooperative and informal sector. Assomada is the trade center of the municipality. People come from all the surrounding communities to sell and buy goods.

6.7 Determining the components of the *societal linking social capital*

What is the relationship between CBOs and the other corporate actors? Why, and to what extent does this relationship count for the CBOs engagement in the local governance process? To answer these questions, a round of survey and in-depth interviews with leaders of CBOs were carried out in the three selected municipalities presented in boxes 1, 2, and 3 above. The survey and the interviews aimed at collecting data to allow the measurement of the existing stock of *societal linking social capital* in each of the three municipalities. Thus, I firstly determine the weight of linkage between CBOs and each of the other aforementioned organizations, and then measure its influence on the CBOs engagement in the local governance. The linkage CBOs establish with each organization is taken here as the different components of societal linking social capital.

In-depth interviews were conducted with 48 personalities (see appendixes B and C), including 20 one-on-one interviews with leaders of CBOs in the three aforementioned municipalities. The list also includes local party chapter leaders, councilors with responsibility over education and rural development, delegates of the ministry of education, technicians at the

Ministry of Agriculture, and delegates of the Ministry of agriculture for Santa Catarina, who also oversees São Salvador do Mundo. On the same token, the interviews include some people in the business sector, and some leading experts and researchers in the sector of civil society in Cabo Verde, including university professors and individual consultants. Furthermore, I interviewed some CBOs' program beneficiaries. The surveys applied with the 20 CBOs leaders are treated quantitatively, although its purpose is not representativeness. The aim is to simply get a combined "quantitative" glimpse of these actors' perspective on the issue at hand. I will present and describe the CBOs linkage with each of the "corporate actors" aforementioned" in the following paragraphs.

6.7.1 CBOs Linkages with political Parties

Political parties matter for any democratic regime, as they "are expected to aggregate citizens' interests and voice them in the arena of policy decisions" (Kitschel and Wang, 2014, p.VI). Therefore, by linking with political parties, CBOs, which by themselves aggregate citizens' interests, seek vehicles to voice and make their concerns heard in the policy arenas. Parties then play three key roles: create bridge between CSOs and the government decision-maker, a resource mobilization machinery, and thirdly, act as the "protector" of the communities by providing them "allies at higher levels" (Castellano, 2010, p. w/p40).

The relationship between CBOs and political parties in Cabo Verde has often been the topic of hot debates in the political and academic arenas. In the political arena, one often sees political parties throwing mutual accusations of trying to manipulate community organizations and other civil society organizations for electoral purposes. CBOs are often dubbed "party associations" (*Associações de Partido*), connoting their linkage with a specific political party. As for example, in 2015, MPD accused PAICV government of illegally distributing the "Environmental Fund" (*Fundo de Ambiente*) to its "friendly" Associations and other NGOs, led by the then minister of Agriculture and Environment, Mr. Antero Veiga. The president of the National Association of Cape Verdean municipalities, an MPD leader, filed a criminal complaint against that minister at the Attorney General of the Republic. In fact, some of the current PAICV members of parliament (former government officers) have had their parliamentary immunity lifted so that they could respond judicial processes in the court of law, which link them to the *Fundo de Ambiente*. MPD created a narrative that PAICV was trying to embed itself in the communities through associations as a strategy to buy votes, by illegally

[40](#) w/p- without page

giving them public money, supposedly to be channeled to City Councils to fund their activities. This narrative had two purposes: on the one hand, it aimed at weakening the image of the associations and their leaders, mainly in the municipalities where MPD was in power. These organizations were in fact, contracted out by the government to implement important community projects such as household connection to the public water and sewage systems, and housing projects. The CBOs leaders were gaining some reputation with the completion of these projects. On the other hand, it aimed at hitting some of the iconic PAICV figures, therefore debilitating their images, as it was on the eve of 2016 parliamentary elections. The leading figure behind that narrative, the mayor of Ribeira Grande de Santiago, Mr. Manuel de Pina, was strongly backed by his party, MPD. PAICV defended itself against the accusation and wrongdoings, arguing that the policy of contracting out community associations and NGOs to carry out public work had been a policy long practiced in Cabo Verde, and it had been part of PAICV priority to strengthen civil society, as a means of tackling poverty.

In the academic field, linkage practices between CSOs and political parties in Cabo Verde is often interpreted as a parties' stratagem to coopt and exploit civil society, hampering therefore the development of an independent organized civil society, and so, the country's democratic process. According to this line of thought, the question then is the extent to which there is a true participation of civil society in Cabo Verde (Costa, 2013). Against this argument, this chapter sees linkage between CBOs and the parties as a resource mobilization strategy for both CSOs (in this case the CBOs) and the political parties to help them maximize the attainment of their goals. For the parties, the goals might be simply their reelection, while for the CSOs they might be getting funds for their community projects, or get policy decisions approved that would benefit their constituencies, or, in a more disguised manner, get public offices for their leaders. Whatever their particularistic interests are, what is important is that the synergy emanated from their relationship produces positive externalities that are beneficial for the development of the municipalities, and the local communities. As Anheier, (2005) states, "whether nonprofit entrepreneurs try to maximize quantifiable aspects (such as members) or abstract concepts (such as "salvation" or some ideology) is irrelevant; what matters is that they often seek to combine such maximization efforts with service delivery" (p.128). Therefore, CSOs interference with politics or vice versa, is seen as part of their entrepreneurial nature in the production and supply of public collective goods. CBOs in this context act, to a certain extent, as rational actors by using the means at their disposals to achieve their intended goals (funds for the communities, decisions that benefit the communities, or even some sort of personal gains for their leaders). Knowing the CBOs are financially weak and dependent from

donors, their subsistence or the capacity to carry out any sizable projects depends very much on the donations they receive, directly or indirectly from other organizations.

The *CBOs Linkage with political Parties*, as the first component of the societal linking social capital, focuses on the CBOs relationship with the two major political parties in Cabo Verde, PAICV and MPD. The analysis of this relationship bases on three aspects, knowingly: *the issue/programmatic relationship* (the extent to which the two parties collaborate mutually on community issues and information exchange, as well as financial collaboration to address community identified issues); *the leaders' party militancy*; and finally, the leaders' *perception of the quality of relationship* between their associations and the two political parties, PAICV and MPD. The data for this analysis were generated through structured questionnaire (see Appendix A1) applied directly with the 20 leaders of CBOs in the three municipalities. These CBOs were identified in the CSOs Census Book (Plataforma das ONGs, 2015). From a total of 72 Community Based Associations identified in the three municipalities, I tried to contact every single one of them. However, despite the efforts and trials, some of the CBOs leaders of these were impossible to reach, and in fact, some of these organizations had been inactive for some time, which made it almost impossible to get anyone who could speak with authority about them. In addition to the questionnaire, one-on-one in-depth interviews were conducted with each one of the 20 leaders. These interviews provided details of the relationship, as it will be shown later, that are hard to catch through questionnaire. The tables below display information got only from the questionnaire applied to the 20 CBOs' leaders. The data collected through the in-depth interviews with the other actors will be properly cited throughout the work.

1) *The issue/programmatic relationship*

The issue or programmatic relationship focuses on the extent to which the parties and the CBOs collaborate mutually on information exchange to tackle identified community problems. This mutual collaboration is determined based on four indicators as shown in table 6.3- a) CBOs' trust on the party to voice their concerns; b) mutual consultation; c) regular formal meetings, and d) financial support.

Table 6.3- Indicators of issue/programmatic relationship

	1) CBOs trust the parties represent the their interests and concerns in the public arena	2) CBOs and the parties consult one another and exchange information on regular bases	3) CBOs and the parties hold regular meetings to debate community issues	4) The party finance the activities of CBOs	Average percentage
Never	55	75	65	85	70
Rarely	15	5	15	15	12,5
Sometimes	30	20	20		23,33
Frequently	0	0	0	0	0
Always	0	0	0	0	0
Do not know/no answer	0	0	0	0	0
Difference between affirmative answers and “never”	-10	-50	-30	-70	-34,17

Building on the answers collated on the table above, the *issue relationship* between CBOs and the parties is relatively weak if we consider the average percentage of the “never” answer. In fact, the difference between those who answer “rarely” or “sometimes”, and the “never” answer is negative for all the four indicators. 55% of the interviewees state they do not trust the party leaders in the municipalities defend the CBOs’ interests and concerns, and in fact, 75% declare there is no mutual consultations between their CBOs and the local party structures. On the same token, 65% state there is no regular meetings with parties to discuss community issues, while 85% state their CBOs have never received finance from any political party. The rest 15% report they have received, but only rarely. However, the value of this linkage strategy should be treated cautiously, as the majority of the leaders interviewed are party militants. Thus, they might present and discuss their community concerns with the party leaders through informal avenues, rather than formalized channels. The case study on CBOs engagement in the local education and Rural Development policies treated in later sections of this chapter will provide further analysis of this unconventional and informal linkage practices, which nor the CBOs’, nor the party leaders feel comfortable to report fully.

2) *CBOs leaders’ party militancy/sympathy*

The leaders of CBOs are usually individuals with some charisma, and enjoy some credibility in their communities. Therefore, they are potential assets for the parties. As a matter of fact,

political parties develop some efforts to “hunt” and militate them. Having the leaders of CBOs on their side, political parties have a means to establish and “embed” themselves in the communities (Evans, 1997). Thus, it is not a surprise that CBOs are usually associated with the parties to which their leaders belong. “*Associação de Partido*” is an often-used derogatory term to label CBOs that are highly linked to a certain political party. In the face of such a linkage pattern, it is reasonable to affirm that the leader’s militancy helps influence the relationship between his CBO with that political party, as well as the others of which he is not a member. The leader’s party militancy prompts and fosters the party embeddedness in the community, as well as facilitates CBOs’ access to state resource when his party is in power. This relationship game is even strengthened when high party figures are members of the CBOs. Taking party militancy as an indicator of CBOs linkage with the parties, the CBOs leaders were asked to indicate to which party they belonged. Table 6.4 displays their answers.

Table 6.4- Political Party militancy or sympathy of CBOs Leaders

	Frequency	Percent
PAICV	13	65,0
MPD	1	5,0
Does not answer	6	30,0
Total	20	100,0

The majority of the interviewees (65%) declare to be militants of PAICV, against 5% who assume to belong to MPD. 30% of them prefer not to answer the question, or say they “have no parties” (*Ami N ka ten partidu*⁴¹). Therefore, taking militancy as an indicator of linkage, the conclusion is that CBOs in the three municipalities studied have stronger linkage with PAICV than with MPD.

3) Leaders’ perception of the quality of relationship between their associations and the two political parties, PAICV and MPD

Concerning the CBOs leaders’ perception of the quality of the relationship between their organizations and PAICV and MPD, they show very contrasting views towards these two parties. They were asked to describe the relationship between the CBOs and these two parties separately, as excellent, good, acceptable, bad, very bad, or don’t know. 60% percent of the leaders consider there is a good relationship between their CBOs and PAICV, 15% describes it as excellent, and 15% thinks it is acceptable. Surprisingly, as the table 6.5 shows, none of the

⁴¹ “I don’t have party”, meaning “I am not a militant of any political party”.

interviewees considers the relationship with MPD to be excellent or good, and in fact, the overwhelming majority of 60% describes it to be “very bad”. It should be clear that this perception refers only to relationship between the CBOs and the parties, not the leaders and the party leaders.

Table 6.5 Leaders' perception of the relationship between their CBOs and PAICV/MPD

Perception of	PAICV	MPD
Excellent	15,0	
Good	60,0	
Acceptable	15,0	10,0
Bad		15,0
Very bad		60,0
Dot know/Do not answer	10,0	15,0
Total	100	100

The CBOs linkage with political parties, based on their leaders' party militancy and their perception of the relationship quality with the political parties, indicate that the linkage with PAICV is far stronger than with MPD. One important thing to mention here is that the relationship with PAICV and MPD depends very much on the kind of either relationship the CBOs maintain with the central or the local government supported by those two parties. The positive perception the leaders have of their CBOs' relationship with PAICV derives very much from the support they have received from the government institutions headed by that political party. In São Salvador do Mundo, where PAICV occupies power from 2005 to 2016, the CBOs leaders state they have had either good or strong relationship with the party, since they have received support from both central and local PAICV governments. On the other hand, as the local governments headed by MPD has been very averse to cooperate with CBOs, it is quite understandable the negative perception that the CBOs leaders nourish towards this party.

6.7.2 CBOs linkages with other Civil Society Organizations

The second component of the *societal linkage social capital* is the horizontal linkage the CBOs establish with other sectors CSOs within the municipality (and sometimes from the outside), as a means to mobilize resources for the production and provision of community collective goods. This dimension is important knowing that 19.8% of CSOs in Cabo Verde are ONGDs (NGOs for Development) which often work in partnership with local CBOs to implement their activities (Plataforma das ONGs, 2015). This adds to the Foundations (0.8%) which usually use the same working approach. Table 6.6 displays the three measuring indicators of CBOs' linkage

with other CSOs: meeting with other CSOs to discuss community issues and present projects; joint preparation of project with other CSOs, and finally, joint implementation of projects.

Table 6.6 CBOs' linkage with other CSOs

	1) Meet other CSOs to discuss community issues and present projects to request funds (%)	2) Prepare project in conjunction with other CSOs (%)	3) Implement projects in conjunction with other CSOs (%)	Average percentage
Never	20	50	50	40
Rarely	15	5		10
Sometimes	35	25	30	30
Frequently	20	15	15	16,67
Always	10	5	5	6,67
Total	100	100	100	100
Difference between the "Never" and the "positive answers"	60	0	0	<u>23,33</u>

As the data collated on the table above show, CBOs do make some efforts to link with other CSOs in the country. 20% of the CBOs leaders report they have never met other CSOs to discuss community issues and present projects to request for funds, and 50% of them have never worked on the preparation, nor implemented any projects in conjunction with other CSOs. Looking at the means percentage, 40% of the leaders interviewed say they have never established any kind of linkage with other CSOs, against 60% that have. However, the fact that the majority of them have at least tried to bridge with other civil society organizations to mobilize resources shows that the linkage does exist, and overall, it is positive.

6.7.3 CBOs linkage with companies

The relationship between companies, or for-profit organizations and CSOs in general, can take different forms: 1) they can be competitors in service production or delivery; 2) they can establish a principal-agency relationship, or they can work as collaborators in the production of "private public good" (Anheir, 2005). The competitive relationship occurs in situations where CSOs provide services that resemble the quality and price provided by companies, creating therefore a likely competition and conflict climate between them. In other situations, CSOs that do not provide services, but act in defense of their constituents' rights (advocacy CSOs), such

as the consumer defense groups, may be in conflict with the companies for the information they bring to the public concerning the quality or the price of services or goods provided to consumers.

Regarding the principal-agency relationship, companies transfer or hire CSOs to be the implementing agencies of some of their services in exchange of material benefits. In the case of Cabo Verde, this relationship is often observed with Telecommunications companies hiring some CBOs, as they do with smaller private entities, to sell phone cards and other services. Finally, the collaborative relationship is based on the companies’ and CSOs agreement to work together in the coproduction (Ostrom, 1997) and delivery of public collective goods to the communities (Anheir, 2005). The fieldwork done for the purpose of this research focused on this third form of relationship, the collaborative relationship between companies and CBOs. The leaders of CBOs interviewed were asked three questions (table 6.7) to underline the extent to which they work collaboratively with companies to address their community issues.

Table 6.7 CBOs’ linkage with companies

	1. Do Companies work with CBOs to prepare and implement their “social responsibility projects?”	2. Do companies hear the concerns of the Association?	3. Do companies finance the activities of the Association?	Average percentage
Never	80	90	60	76,67
Rarely	10	0	5	7,5
Sometimes	10	10	25	15
Frequently	0	0	10	10
Always	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100
Difference between “Never” and the “positive answers”	-60	-80	-20	-44,17

A staggering figure of 80% of the interviewees affirm their CBOs have never prepared or implemented any project in conjunction with companies, nor have they been hired to implement any company’s social responsibility projects. In the same token, 90% of the respondents state they have never been consulted by any companies regarding their community concerns. Finally, 60% report they have never received finance from any companies to implement their activities. In fact, the average percentage difference between the “never” answers, and the “rarely,

sometimes, frequently and always” answers is -44.17%. Indeed, this low collaboration between companies and CBOs is close to the conclusion reached by *Plataforma das ONGs* (2015), which states that only 11% of the funds received by CSOs in Cabo Verde come from the private sector.

In addition to the findings presented above, leaders of CBOs were asked to assess their satisfaction with their relationship with companies both from within and outside their municipalities. As table 6.8 shows, more than a half percent of the interviewees stated they were unsatisfied with their CBOs’ relationship with companies. This means that they think or expect that companies could collaborate more with CBOs to address community issues.

Table 6.8 CBOs leaders’ satisfaction with companies

	Frequency	Percent
Very Unsatisfied	3	15,0
Unsatisfied	8	40,0
Not satisfied Nor Unsatisfied	1	5,0
Satisfied	6	30,0
Very satisfied	1	5,0
Do not know/No answer	1	5,0
Total	20	100,0

More than half of the answers shows dissatisfaction with the CBOs’ relationship with companies, which denotes that their leaders and, perhaps the communities as a whole expect a better cooperation with companies in the production and delivery of community goods.

6.7.4 CBOs linkage with mass media

Castells (2008) argues that “it is through the media, both mass media and horizontal networks of communication, that non-state actors influence people’s minds and foster social change” (p. 98). Therefore, developing linkages with mass media stands as a crucial strategy for CBOs to amplify the voice of their communities, and so, participate and influence the decision-making process. The measurement of CBOs linkage with mass media actors in the three municipalities studied bases on four indicators: 1) invitation of media to cover CBOs’ activities; 2) the frequency of media coverage of CBOs’ activities; 3) training of media professionals on areas of CBOs domain, and 4) use of media to pressure local government authorities.

As the table 6.9 shows, the majority of CBOs (80%, including those who rarely do it) has invited media at least once to cover their activities. However, a lesser percentage, around 65% of the invitation has been answered, meaning that there is still a significant number (around

35%) of CBOs that have never had their activities covered or broadcasted by the media. Promoting forums or workshops with journalists is an important aspect of *linkage* because it allows the media actors to get to know in depth the core missions of CBOs, and therefore be better prepared to cooperate with these organizations in voicing their concerns in the public arena. However, due to their financial constraints, 80% of the CBOs have never engaged media actors in any forums, workshops or training activities. Those who have are usually CBOs with large experience, and of which activities cover the municipal territories. Finally, when asked about the frequency they use media to consciously attempt to influence local government public policies, 65% of them say they have never done it, 25% declare they sometimes to it, and only 5% affirm they do it whenever they have an opportunity to.

Table 6.9- CSOs' linkage with media

	1) The Ass. invites media to cover its events	2) Do the media always cover the CBO's activities	3) The CBO promote forums/workshops with journalists (and deliver training to journalists)	4) The CBO uses the media to consciously to pressure the local government on certain issues	Average percentage
Never	20	35	80	65	50
Rarely	5	5	15	5	7,5
Sometimes	45	40	5	25	28,75
Frequently	20	10		5	11,67
Always	10	10			10
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Difference between "Never" and the "positive answers"	60	30	-60	-30	<u>7,92</u>

Looking at the average percentage of the leaders' responses, half (50%) of them consider their CBOs are not linked in any ways to the media, and around 40 percent can be said to be well connected to the media, if we take into consideration the mean percentage of those who answered sometimes or frequently linked to the media. Therefore, taking into account the leaders who are committed to engage with the media to influence policies (the 40%), the conclusion is that, in general, CBOs have a fairly good relationship with the media, despite this sector of civil society's low visibility in the policy dialogue arena.

6.7.5 CBOs linkage with councilors

The councilors, with a particular reference to the mayors, are the key power holders in the municipalities, as they play the central roles in the local policymaking and implementation processes. Therefore, it is a must for anybody who wants to be engaged and influence local policies, to link with these political office holders. The analysis presented above on the CBOs linkage with political parties shows that such a linkage is based primarily on the party membership of the CBOs leaders or the relationship they establish with the parties. However, linkage with office holders does not necessarily depend on party membership (though most of the time it does). Table 6.10 shows the degree of linkage between CBOs and the councilors in the three municipalities studied. This linkage measured based on four indicators: 1) access to the councilors, 2) trust on the CBOs by the part of the councilors, 3) trust on the councilors by the part of CBOs, and finally, 4) availability of information on community projects.

Table 6.10- CBOs linkage with the City Councilors


	1-Access to the councilors and other public officials in the Municipality	2- The Councilors trust the Association	3- The Association trust the Council	4- Availability of information on community projects run by the council	Average percentage
Never	25	45	20	5	23,75
Rarely	35	20	40	65	40
Sometimes	20	25	25	15	21,25
Frequently	15	10	10	5	10
Always	5	0	5	0	5
Does not know/does not respond	0	0	0	10	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Difference between “never” and the positive answers	50	10	60	90	<u>62,75</u>

An average of 23.75% of CBOs leaders consider their organizations have never established any linkage with their municipal councilors in any ways, and in fact, 40% rarely seek to link to these political office holders in the three municipalities. A percentage of 25% state they have never had access to the councilors when they required to. On the same token, 20% of them do

not trust the councilors in their municipalities, adding the 40% of those who only rarely do. Finally, 5% of the leaders report they have never had access to information about community projects run by individual councilors, while 65% do. In conclusion, if we consider the percentage of those who never or only rarely link to the councilors, we can infer that CBOs linkage with the councilors is relatively weak. In addition, it should be highlighted that the existing linkage between the CBOs leaders and the councilors, does not necessarily mean that they develop a compromised synergistic relationship in the formation and implementation of policies, but simply a machiavellic attempt to achieve electoral advantages.

Figure 6.5 illustrates the network CBOs try to establish with other organizations-councilors, companies (market), media and civil society organizations, as a resource mobilization strategy for their community development projects. This network of relationship, which is taken here as the *societal linking social capital*, is believed to be an important asset for the CBOs to leverage their engagement in the local policy-making process.

Figure 6.5- The thread of CBOs linkage with other corporate actors (Societal linking social capital)



Source: Elaborated by the author

The strength and weakness of the linkage with each actor in the figure above is summarized on table 6.11. The data collated on this table represent (tentatively) the stock of linkage capital, or the resources generated from CBOs’ linkage with each of the other four “corporate actors” as illustrated in the figure above. The data represent the percentage difference of those who answer “Yes” (sometimes, frequently and always, rarely) minus the percentage of those who answer “never” for the questions posed to CBOs leaders in their relationship with each of the identified actor as described above. The data are combined for all the three municipalities together.

Table 6.11- Components and stock of societal linking social capital

	Percentage difference between “sometimes + frequently + always” and “Never” answers	Linkage (<i>positive (+), weak (-)</i>)
Linkage with political parties	-34,17	-
Linkage with CSOs	23,33	+
Linkage with companies	-44,17	-
Linkage with media	7,92	+
Linkage with councilors	42,5 %	+

The symbols “+” and “-” represent the CBOs’ positive and weak linkage respectfully with each actor. CBOs maintain a vibrant or positive linkage with other sector of CSOs, with the media, and with the councilors. On the opposite, the linkage with political parties and the company is weak. The unexpected weak linkage with parties go against the common sense that CBOs are “agents” of political parties. This finding, however, is somehow contradictory in many cases to the results of the interviews, which sometimes point to a close relationship between CBOs and the parties. Anyway, the nature of the relationship, either strong or weak, the CBOs establish with the other aforementioned actors, make up the stock of the *societal linking social capital*, a resource on which CBOs leverage to influence the policy decisions in their municipalities.

6.8 Engagement of CBOs in local Governance

This section focuses on the engagement of CBOs in the local government policy processes. Policy process and local governance are used here interchangeably to mean exactly the same thing. Engagement of CBOs should be understood solely as the actual involvement of CBOs in the different phases of local government policy process: issue raising, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation (Dye, 2011). However, the analysis presented in this section focuses primarily on policy formulation and implementation, considering “issue raising” as part of the formulation process. CBOs engagement is measured based on qualitative data gathered

through questionnaire and interviews with CBOs leaders in the three municipalities. I first focus on the CBOs leaders' perception of their engagement in the local governance process as a whole, and then center the analysis on two local policy sectors, education and rural development policies. Next, I explore the relationship between the CBOs engagement in the different phases of the policy process aforementioned with their stock of capital accumulated in their relationship with other "corporate actors" (Coleman, 1988) as the data collated in 6.11 illustrate.

6.8.1 Measuring CBOs engagement in local governance

Starting with the CBOs participation in the local governance process, table 6.12 presents the frequencies the CBOs have participated in each of the policy process identified- issue raising, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. Although the interviews with the leaders focus on the frequency the CBOs are involved in the local overall policy process, the emphasis is put on the elaboration and implementation of two important governing instruments of the City Councils: the *budget* and the *annual plan of activities*. Thus, the answers collated on table 6.12 refer specifically to the processes of preparation, implementation and evaluation of the Council's budget and the annual plan of activities. The use of the term "policy/policies" in this section refers to those two local government instruments.

Table 6.12- Frequency of CBOs' participation in the different policy phases

	1) Issue raising (advocacy, raising issues and pressuring Government)	2) Participate in formulation of policies *Budget and plan of activities	3) Participate in the implementation and monitoring of policies in the interested sector	4) Participate in the activities of policy evaluation in the interested sector	Average Percentage
Never	35,0	75,0	70,0	90,0	67,7
Rarely	30,0	10,0	5,0		15,0
Sometimes	10,0	10,0	25,0	5,0	12,5
Frequently	20,0				20,0
Always	5,0			5,0	5,0
Do not Know/Do not answer		5,0			5,0
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	
Difference between "never" and the positive answers	+30	-60	-40	-80	-37.5

An average of 67.7 % of the CBOs leaders interviewed declare their CBOs have never participated in any of the identified policy process in their municipalities. 35% have never taken any initiatives to push for the entrance of “their issues” into the local government policy agenda, and 30% only rarely do. Around 65% of the CBO leaders state that they have taken initiatives to influence policy agenda at least once. However, the reality is that a great majority of them have the feeling of being left out of the formulation and implementation processes of local government policies, namely the formulation and implementation of the municipal budget and its annual plan of activities. Worse than that, is the fact that 90% of the interviewees report they have never been involved in any evaluation initiative regarding projects implemented by the councils in the three municipalities. Those who have done it at least once, agree that their participation have been limited to simply “fill-in the forms”. When the leaders were asked to describe the frequency their organizations had involved in the municipal budgetary process, all of them answered “never”, with the exception of a small percentage of 5% who considered they had signed contracts at least once with the councils to implement community projects they had themselves presented to the Councils. These figures show that the great majority of CBOs have been kept at the margin of the local policy making and implementation process.

If we look at the percentage of those who answer “Yes” (including “rarely”, “sometimes”, “frequently” and “always”) minus the percentage of those who answer “never” on the four indicators, as table 6.12 illustrates, we will notice that the only positive value (30%) is on the policy issue raising. This positive percentage difference is understandable if we compare it to the CBOs’ linkage with mass media. There is a positive difference of 7.92 % between those who have never and those who have had established some linkages with mass media actors. The positive connection CBOs leaders maintain with media allows them to voice their community issues and pressure the local government to take actions. However, what the other engagement indicators suggest is that, despite the CSOs being aware of their community concerns, and being able to demand actions from the local political power authorities, they are kept at the margin of the policy making and implementation processes. In fact, the difference between the mean percentage of those CBOs that have engaged at least once, and those who have never been engaged, in any form, in local government policymaking and implementation is negative (-37.5%). Applying the same logic, linkage with political parties (-34.17%), linkage with CSOs (23.33%) and linkage with councilors (42.5 %) all seem to have a positive influence on the CBOs’ capacity to raise issues and demand actions, but a weaker influence on the engagement in other policy phases.

6.8.2 Linking social capital and CBOs engagement

Having determined both the *societal linking social capital* stock and the CBOs' engagement in the local policy process, the focus now is the analysis and understanding of the relationship between these two variables. Table 6.13 gives a clearer picture of the association between the societal linking social capital stock and the CBOs' engagement in the different policy phases. The societal linking social capital is taken as the independent variable, while engagement is the dependent variable.

Table 6.13- Influence of societal linking social capital over of CBOs' engagement in local policy process

	(Issue raising) advocacy, raising issues and pressuring Government (+30)	Participate in the formulation of policies and government decisions *Budget and plan of activities) (-60)	Participate in the implementation and monitoring of policies in the interested sector (-40)	Participate in the activities of policy evaluation in the interested sector (-80)
Linkage with political parties (-34.17)	+ (linkage with oppositionist party) - (linkage with ruling party)	+ (linkage with ruling party) - (linkage with oppositionist party)	+ (linkage with ruling party) - (linkage with oppositionist party)	+ (linkage with ruling party) - (linkage with oppositionist party)
Linkage with CSOs (23.33)	+	-	+-	+ (When other CSOs, usually bigger NGOs request them to participate by fill in forms)
Linkage with companies (-44.17)	+-	-	-	-
Linkage with media (7.92)	+	-	-	-
Linkage with councilors (42.5 %)	+-	-	+-	-

Source: Elaborated by the author

Table 6.13 gives ground for five propositions on the *societal linking social capital* and its influence on CBOs engagement in the local government policy process. The two symbols, (+ and -), indicate positive and negative influence of linking social capital on the CBOs engagement respectively. I will present and elaborate on these prepositions one by one, as it follows.

Proposition 1- *CBOs' linkage with parties can either strengthen or hinder their engagement in the local government policy process.*

When CBOs have a strong linkage with the opposition party, their capacity to formulate and voice their community concerns as part of their efforts to influence agenda setting seems to be strengthened. This is very true as the opposition party embeds in the community associations, and actually do politics through these organizations by trying to propel and mobilize community to express their discontentment against the local government authorities. By doing this, the opposition party tries to increase its presence and trust in the communities. However, linkage with opposition party influences negatively the CBOs participation in the formulation, implementation or even the evaluation of the council's annual budget and plan of activities. As the councilors and the ruling party perceive that a CBO is associated with an opposition party, they exclude it from the processes of preparation of annual budget and the plan of activities because "there is a lack of mutual trust" between this CBO and the council, as one councilor in Santa Catarina states. The leaders of CBOs also understand this exclusion. As the leader of a CBO in Ribeira Grande de Santiago puts it, "the Council knows that we [the CBO managers] are not on their side, so, why should they [the councilors] support us knowing we will not back them up when the elections come?"

On the other hand, linkage with the ruling party can also be negatively associated with CBOs' advocacy role. The "*Associações de partido*" strategically behave, (and in fact are instructed accordingly) not to "damage their party's image", or otherwise run the risk of being sidelined by the local party structure, as well as the councils. The cooperating CBOs, however, use their linkage with the ruling party as a passport for participation in the formulation of budget and plan of activities, through inputs or even "demands" to receive contracts from the councils, as part of their participation in policy implementation.

Proposition 2- *CBOs' linkage with other CSOs give them political clout to stand up for their communities and influence local government agenda, but not necessarily participate in the formulation, implementation or evaluation of local government annual budgets and plan of activities.*

CBOs' high linkage with other civil society organizations, either from within or outside the municipalities, get them more support in voicing their community's concerns, and therefore, they become stronger at pressuring the local government for actions. An interviewee, a CBO leader and the president of a youth league in the municipality of Santa Catarina, opines that "the high inter-connection among the associations give them a certain sense of independency" (interview conducted by the author, 22 February 2018). Such an independency gives strengths to CBOs to do their advocacy work. However, these stronger CBOs, to a certain extent are

coined as “rival forces” by the councilors, and consequently, they are not fully engaged in the elaboration and implementation of Council’s budget and annual plan of activities. About this rivalry, Mr. A.J., who is an MPD militant in the municipality of Santa Catarina, puts it in the following way, “of course the city council (being ruled by MPD) does not, and should fund these so called ‘independent associations’, because, in reality, we all know they work for and in fact, are connected to the opposition party. Unfortunately, this is how parties work” (Interview with the author, June 2018).

Proposition 3- CBOs linkage with companies increases their visibility and their credibility in the communities, but not necessarily their engagement in the local government policy process.

Linkage with companies allows CBOs to mobilize resources to carry out their community projects, and so, increase their social capital, as they become more visible and enjoy a higher trust from their constituents. When this occurs, they are more likely to be heard by the local government structure (the City Council and the local party chapters). In fact, when CBOs are financially leveraged by the local economic elite, as well as from outside firms, the councilors at least pretend to listen and to care about their concerns, and in fact, they often promise to address them. However, the councilors may choose to address such concerns, or part of them, either through the CBOs- if they are “friendly CBOs”, or opt to address themselves (which often is the case), as a means to increase their own political capital instead. One illustrative example of a CBO well linked with companies is provided by the CBO leader of Fonti Lima, a peripheral neighbourhood in the municipality of Santa Catarina:

“We have a good relationship with the Telecommunications Company “XYZ” in Santa Catarina. This company helped us build a playing ground in the community, and the people appreciated our commitment and the job we did. That has been one of the major accomplishments of the Association. We work for the community, but the Town Council associates the Association with the opposition political party. Once we had a project which the council agreed to cooperate in its implementation, but the council took the project and implemented it by itself without even recognizing our efforts and willingness to cooperate, and in fact, the association was kept away from the construction process. We believed the council did this with the intention of weakening us in the eyes of the community, trying to give the impression that they were the ones who were working for the community, and not the association” (February 17th, 2018- Assomada).

Despite this particular association being strongly leveraged by the company, a corporate actor representing the local economic power, and despite its effectiveness in delivering community collective goods, it is still excluded from council projects implementation, because it is connected to the oppositionist party.

Proposition 4- *Linkage with media leverages the CBOs' advocacy roles, but not their engagement in the budget making and other projects implementation processes.*

The media, as the examples of the state national TV and radio channels, leverage CBOs by covering and broadcasting their events (though not as much as expected). On the one hand, such a coverage allows CBOs to let the public know about their existence and their commitment to work in the production and delivery of community's collective goods and services. On the other hand, the CBOs leaders use the media to either request for more state cooperation, or speak out about their community abandonment. The media thus become a vehicle for the CBOs to demand for the local government (as well as the central government) responsiveness. However, having visibility and making demands and criticisms through the media, is not a guarantee of CBO to be actively engaged in the policy formulation and implementation. Charismatic CBOs leaders are considered valuable political assets who can work in favor or against the ruling party. If these leaders are close to the opposition party, involving them in the formulation and implementation of the council projects would be "giving them the stick to beat me", says the leader of one CBO in Ribeira Grande. This is true because the leaders would increase their popularity as they would always assume the project implementation as their own achievements, not the Council's.

CBOs that are strongly leveraged by the media cause some discomfort for the councilors as they perceive that they are being challenged, or even "overtaken" by those societal organizations, possibly with the opposition party behind. Therefore, marginalizing CBOs, and keeping them out of the council's project making and implementation is a strategy of "murdering the opposition", as the aforementioned CBO leader in Ribeira Grande says.

Proposition 5- *Linkage with councilors increases the CBOs' chances in participating in the policy-making and implementation.*

Around 23.75% of the CBOs leaders interviewed agree they have no trust on the councilors in their municipalities. However, in-depth interviews with these leaders, the local party leaders and the councilors, reveal that contacts, both informal and formal, happen without any major difficulties. As an example, the leader of another association in Ribeira Grande de Santiago (São João Batista) states the following,

"access to the councilors or the major is not a problem for me, even though they know I am not their supporter, as I belong to the opposition party. They receive me whenever I request speaking to them. The problem is that they listen to your concerns, but never deliver what you demand or ask for. They always have excuses. This situation has discouraged me to make any further contacts. I rarely get in touch with them [the

councilors] now (Interview with the leader of CBO of São João Batista, Ribeira Grande de Santiago).

This excerpt reveals that, “knowing and talking to the councilors” is not a passport for the CBOs’ leaders to be fully engaged in the councils’ policymaking and project implementation processes. For this to happen, it all again depends on the approximation of these leaders to the ruling party.

The strength and influence of each of the component of the *societal linking social capital*, generated in the thread of relationship of the aforementioned “corporate actors” (Coleman, 1988), over the CBOs’ engagement in the local policymaking and implementation seems to be determined by one common factor: the CBOs approximation to the party. If CBOs are “friendly” to the ruling party, I mean, if their leaders use the organizations as party instruments, their engagement in policy or project implementation is more likely to occur. In the three municipalities studied, it is evident that for the period considered, 2008-2016, the influence of the linking social capital variable on the CBOs engagement changes from one municipality to the other, depending on the ruling party. In Ribeira Grande and Santa Catarina de Santiago, MPD had been in power since 2008, being therefore an oppositionist force for the engagement of the great majority of CBOs, seen to be close allies of PAICV. On the other hand, in the municipality of São Salvador do Mundo, PAICV had been the ruling party throughout that period. As expected, the majority of the CBOs leaders interviewed agree they have had good relationship with the council, and their organizations had been occasionally engaged in implementing the council’s projects, or got finance to implement some of their activities. In conclusion, CBOs are more likely to be engaged in the local government policymaking and implementation processes, if they have strong linkage with the ruling party, and there is a certain amount of mutual trust among the two. On the other hand, the CBOs that oppose the ruling party are more likely to be excluded from the local government policy process, as there is a lack of mutual trust they nourish to one another. CBOs’ engagement is mostly noticeable in the issue raising to influence the local government agenda. Beyond that, CBOs’ initiatives are usually limited to policy or project implementations through financial support, or in collaborative community project activities like clean-up campaigns and other small-scale activities. CBOs have been totally excluded from policy formulation process, despite the laws (Statute of Municipalities, the Framework Law on Decentralization and the Statute of the cities), defends their incorporation. Policymaking and implementation have been totally monopolized by the councilors and the Presidents of the Town Council themselves. This

relationship between CBOs and the two parties, MPD and PAICV, is further exemplified in the analysis of CBO's engagement in two specific policy sectors: education and rural poverty reduction policies at the municipal level, as presented below.

6.9 Engagement of CBOs in the Local Education planning and service delivery

By engagement of CBOs in the local education policymaking and implementation, I mean the institutional networking and cooperativeness between these organizations and the local government institutions (City Councils) in the planning and delivery of education services in the municipality. Following the analysis made in chapter 3, which focuses on CSOs engagement in education policymaking and implementation at the national level, engagement of CBOs in the planning and delivery of education services at the municipal level is framed within the constitutionalism argument. The roles of City Councils in the planning and implementation of sectoral policies are part of the decentralization processes of government power analyzed earlier in this chapter, with the aim of bringing power closer to the people, and thus strengthening local democracies (Burns et al., 1994). This transfer of policy powers to local government authorities is believed to guarantee a better responsiveness and efficiency in service delivery to the population, as these local authorities are "closer" to the people, and therefore, in a better position to identify their needs, and so, design and implement the best solutions to the address such needs. Therefore, the question to be answered in this section is the extent to which and how the constitutional precepts, in respect to the societal participation in the planning and delivery of education services are being put in practice by the local governments. Again, this analysis is restricted to the three case study municipalities aforementioned in this chapter. On the second hand, the aim is to understand the factors (independent variables) that influence such an engagement, and/or its absence.

The role of the City Councils in delivering education services, as we saw in chapter 3, is framed within the constitutional precepts, which holds the state is accountable for the delivery of such services. The Councils therefore, are part of the state apparatus that should direct its action in a way to achieve that purpose. However, it is the local governments' statutes (Law No.134/IV/95, 3 of July) that defines the roles of these institutions in the education sector:

"In the field of education, the Municipality is responsible for: a) construction, equipment, management and maintenance of education infrastructures for the pre-school and basic education sectors; b) School transport organization; c) promotion of actions, campaigns and literacy programs; d) do the follow-up of post-literacy activities; e) provide incentives to private education" (Law No.134/IV/95, 3 of July, art. 34, 1995).

Engagement of the City Councils in the education policies, as it can be noted in the citation above, is framed within the realm of service delivery in the pre-school and basic education sectors. For the pre-school sector, the councils have the full responsibility over the construction of facilities and their maintenance, covering the staff's payment and secure regular hot meals for the children. However, the organization of syllabi and all other pedagogical concerns are the responsibility of the ministry of education. Concerning the basic education, the councils' intervention is "rarely noticeable", as one delegate of the ministry of education confesses, with the exception of some sporadically refurbishing works, like school painting and distribution of school materials to kids in some selected neighborhoods, usually at the beginning of school years. Basic education is part of the national education system, under the responsibility of the ministry of education. However, despite their institutional and resource limitations, the councils often intervene in the secondary and higher education levels, by providing transport services to students who live very far from the school establishments, or to those who study in a different municipality due to lack of offer in their own towns. In addition, the councils sometimes negotiate and request vacancies from both foreign and national institutions of higher education for their residents who aspire to get university diplomas. In the municipalities where this research took place, all the three councils have established protocols with some institutions of higher education in Portugal. Almost every year, they select group of students to benefit with vacancies to study in higher education and professional training institution in that country. Nationally, the usual participation of councils in the secondary education is restricted to paying tuition fees and transport subsidies to selected beneficiaries. In respect to policy formulation, the process is strictly under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, being the local councils kept on the sideline of the process. Often, the councils complain for the fact that the Ministry of Education turns its back to them regarding the execution of education policies, creating occasions of some chaos and inefficiency in the service delivery system. Therefore, rather than analyzing the policy formation process, the focus of this section is on the participation of CBOs in the process of planning and delivery of education fees and transport subsidies in the three municipalities observed. The choice of education fees and transport subsidies is justified on the fact that they are the issues the councils mostly occupy with in the sector of education. The results presented here have been collected through in-depth interviews with CBOs leaders, former and current councilors who bear responsibilities for the education sectors in the three municipalities, delegates of the ministry of education, and former chair of the Department of planning in the Ministry of Education. In addition, an intensive desk analysis of the Councils' annual budgets and activity plans for the years 2008-2016 has been conducted.

Four actors are identified to be playing a crucial role in the process of planning and delivery of education services in the three municipalities: the City Councils, the Delegation of the Ministry of education, the Community Based Organizations and the political parties. The council as the leading power authority in each municipality; the delegation of the Ministry of education as the decentralized government agency that looks after the implementation of education policy at the municipalities; the Community Based Organizations as autonomous grassroots organizations, with independent elected leaders whose missions is to promote the inclusive and sustainable development of their communities. Finally, the parties, whose main purposes is to win the sympathy of the voters and win elections. The inter-relations among these actors, part of the *societal linking social capital* treated above, affect very much the planning and delivery of education services in the municipalities.

Looking first at the partnership between the City councils and the delegations of the Ministry of Education, being both public organizations, one would expect that they work collaboratively in the planning and delivery of education services in the municipalities. However, the reality is often the opposite. In the three municipalities studied, striking mismatches are noticed in the way these two entities relate to each other. In the municipality of Santa Catarina, for instance, a representative of the delegation until 2016, describes past relationship between the two entities (from 2008 until 2016) as somehow “tense, distrustful, suspicious, leading the two organizations to turn their backs on each other”⁴². The current delegate (at the time of the interview, February 2018), in power since May 2016, describes a changing scenario in the way the two institutions relate to each other: “we are trying to get closer to each other, and tune our efforts in the planning and delivery of education services in this municipality”. The councilor in charge of education department in Santa Catarina, agrees that their relationship is changing with the Delegation. One example they both cite to support their proximity, is a jointly signed agreement that every single selected company to carry out public work in the municipality must agree and sign a binding contract that obliges it to refurbish an identified public school in that municipality. What could explain this changing relationship? According to the delegate of the Ministry of Education, the explanation could be the change of the delegation, in the aftermath of the change of party in the central government. The delegation’s former administration was led by PAICV, while MPD had been the ruling party in the municipality. The delegate thinks that the “lack of trust” between the people running the two institutions, might have obstructed them to cooperate. Unlike the past situation, now

⁴² Interview with the author in February, 2018.

that the same party, MPD, runs both the delegation and the City Council, and since both the delegate and the councilor belong to this party, it is quite normal that they work more cooperatively in the design and implementation of the local education services.

In my quest to understand the party factor in the relationship pattern between the delegation and the councils, I further looked at the cases of the municipalities of Ribeira Grande de Santiago and São Salvador do Mundo. The relationship patterns seem to follow the same logic. For the case of Ribeira Grande de Santiago, a former representative of the ministry of education (in power until May 2016), describes the relationship between his delegation and the Council to have been “a little distant”, being each organization occupied with their “own business”, despite the occasional “official” encounters. Apart from the requested official meetings, cooperation is described as “non-existent”. In the case of São Salvador do Mundo, the former representative-delegate agrees that “conversation was possible with the councilor in charge of education, or even the mayor, whenever requested”⁴³. Despite believing that the two organizations might have their own separate agenda, he agrees that “some cooperation has been possible”, regarding the allocation of school and transport subsidies to the beneficiary students. In this municipality, it should be noted that PAICV was in power until 2016, the same party ruling the central government, differently from the municipalities of Ribeira Grande and Santa Catarina, where MPD had been in power since 2008. In 2016, MPD won the councils in all these three municipalities. In fact, the new councilors and the delegates interviewed are unanimous in affirming that the relationship between the two entities in the planning and service delivery are improving for the better. However, some caution needs to be kept with this positive expectation as the delegate of the Ministry of Education of Santa Catarina puts it:

“despite being of the same party family, you know that sometimes, relationship between these two institutions get very “sour” because of the people leading these institutions. If they do not get on very well, the institutional relationship may also deteriorate. And all this is because of politics” (February, 2018).

Despite this caveat, the three municipality cases analyzed suggest that the trust between the delegations and the councils is more probable when the two institutions are run by the same political party, than when they are run by the two opposing parties, PAICV and MPD. Does this party factor also influence the relationship between the councils and the CBOs? Putting the question differently, “to what extent does the ruling party influence the engagement of CBOs

⁴³ Interview with the author, in February 2018

in the design and implementation of the education services in the three municipalities?” The following section tries to answer these questions.

6.9.1 Partnership between the City council and Community Based Organizations

Krishna (2003) argues that “the utility of both local governments and community-based organizations can be considerably enhanced when these agencies work in partnership with one another” (p. 361). The value of this statement stands on the fact that Community Based Organizations (CBOs) contain a stock of social capital generated through the daily interactions of their constituents (the bridging social capital), as well as its linkages with other organizations in the municipality, as demonstrated above in this chapter. This argument’s rationale is that if public authorities take the advantage of this social capital stock when planning and delivering education services as well other public goods, the effectiveness and efficiency in doing so would improve (Paul, 1987). In the cases of the three municipalities aforementioned, there are a total of 72 registered community associations, 46 in Santa Catarina, 16 in Ribeira Grande de Santiago and 10 in São Salvador do Mundo. To what extent do the City Councils (*Câmaras Municipais*) partner with these organizations to improve the responsiveness and efficiency of education service delivery? Before answering this question, it should be observed that CBOs, as *generalist organizations*, cover a wide range of activities in their communities. Education is usually at the top of their priority. In fact, CBOs in Cabo Verde dedicate 7.8% of their activities in the education sector (Platform of NGOs, 2015). These activities vary from equipping and running community libraries, distributing school materials, subsidizing school transport, etc. Looking at how the councils engage these organizations in the specific policy of school transportation and distribution of school subsidies, the interviews with the councilors and the leaders of CBOs in the three municipalities allow the inference of two main realities. On the one hand, the councils centralize and assume the monopoly of these services, and, on the other hand, there is a tendency of political manipulation and instrumentation of CBOs, creating therefore opportunities for paternalistic relationships between these two set of organizations.

The daily transportation of students attending high schools is “a big business” in Cabo Verde, and assumes a particular importance in the more predominant rural municipalities. As the communities are geographically dispersed, with the majority of students living away from the school facilities, the local authorities, with the support of *FICASE*, have the responsibility to provide regular transport to the most underprivileged students from and back to the communities. This situation puts a big pressure on the families and the public authorities to cover the expenses accrued with students’ everyday commuting. The three councils (similarly

to other municipalities across the country), to respond to such a demand, have acquired school buses, which despite being used for other purposes, guarantee the daily transportation of students. Where these busses are not enough to meet the demands, the councils hire private vehicles and drivers to fill in the gap. The issue of CBOs participation in this process of transportation arises precisely around the selection of the beneficiary families and students to use the councils' buses, or to receive vouchers to use public private transport service.

The selection process of the families and students to benefit from school transport services usually occur in September and October, around the beginning of the new academic year. The councils' social service department usually carries out this process, and sometimes they include representatives from the delegation of the Ministry of Education, and FICASE, the institution that runs the government social service programs in the sector of education. The Councils' social service department occasionally organize meetings in the communities to listen to parents and inform them on the selection procedures. According to the Councilor in charge of education and social services department of Santa Catarina, "the selection of beneficiaries is done in partnership with schools, the delegation of the Ministry of Education, and the community agents" (usually individuals who enjoy some credibility and reputation in the communities, but not necessarily leaders of CBOs). The school principals, based on the work prepared by their social service departments, send the list of the poorest students to the Councils and the delegations. However, it is not clear how the "community agents" are involved. When the CBOs are asked to participate in the process, what is usually requested from them is the preparation of the student-beneficiary list based on their overall community assessments. However, as the CBOs are often excluded from this process, individual persons in the community, based on their *amiguismo político* (*partisan friendship*) are usually preferred instead. This concern is common in all the three municipalities studied, and it is more evident when the CBOs are perceived to be close or affiliated to a party different from the one in power. When asked about the procedures, or even the decision whether or not to engage CBOs in the selection process of the beneficiaries of school transport subsidies, the councilor of Santa Catarina boldly assumes that "there is no relationship with the associations because there is a lack of mutual trust (no social capital)". However, she assumes that they "are trying to get closer to CBOs again".

Another issue concerning the school transport is the hiring of this service from private providers by the City Councils, knowing that their own buses are insufficient. This is a big business opportunity for some drivers and particular car owners to increase their income. On the same token, the community associations (CBOs) do have interest in participating in this

business, as they see it as an opportunity to “generate income” for the communities. In the three case study municipalities, only two associations have acquired their own mini-buses to provide that service, one in São Salvador do Mundo and the other in Santa Catarina. For instance, an association from Santa Catarina- *Associação para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário de Anti Pico Redea*, bought a car to transport students to schools in Assomada (the headquarters of the municipality) and back to the community, which is about one-hour drive from the students’ village. According the former president of this association,

“We had a contract with the Council, under which it payed half the price and the families contributed with the other half for the monthly fees each student had to pay. In 2016, the new elected mayor and his councilors ended that contract with us, and gave it to an individual in the community. What once used to be a source of income for the association and the community, is now the source of income for one single person, an emigrant who is not even concerned about the needs of the community, and someone who is not really interested in the development of our community” (Interview with the author on February 17th, 2018).

Despite the association’s willingness to cooperate, the councilors prefer to work with an individual who, in the words of the interviewee, is “distant from the community values and interests”, just because he is economically powerful and has heavily financed the MPD’s campaign that helped the current mayor to be elected for office in 2016. The interviewee confesses that “it was evident” that the Council ended the contract with the association because they (the councilors elected for MPD) knew the leader of the association is a militant of PAICV, and in fact he campaigned actively for PAICV during the local government electoral dispute in 2016. Thus, politics here plays a major role when it comes to planning and delivering services, rather than guaranteeing their effectiveness or efficiency. Therefore, one strategy the CBOs leaders have found to participate in the planning and delivery of education service in these municipalities is to get contract directly with the central government, rather than the councils. This situation was particularly observed in the municipality of Ribeira Grande de Santiago, where since 2008, the leaders of CBOs had been supported by the central government.

The involvement of the CBOs in the transportation system in Ribeira Grande de Santiago is done with the central government agency, FICASE, rather than with the City Council. A CBO of the community of *Tronku*, in Ribeira Grande, in partnership with other associations in the nearby communities of the municipality, signed a contract with FICASE, under which this agency pays a fixed monthly amount of money according to the list of students presented, and the association hires and pays the contracted vehicles/drivers. According to the president of the aforementioned association, the list of the beneficiary students is prepared by the associations, in partnership with the secondary school board in the municipality (there is

only one secondary school facility in the municipality). The association does its own management of the budget. The leader of that CBO guaranteed that the partnership had been working so well that some savings had been possible, which were used for solving other minor community issues. Unfortunately, the contract with the government was ended in 2016, with the change of the central government administration.

In the case of São Salvador do Mundo, the school transport system is also centralized by the Council, being the leaders of associations sporadically asked, upon their own request, to submit the list of students to benefit from the service. The leaders of CBOs interviewed agreed that their involvement in the school transport service management was restricted simply to presenting the list of potential beneficiaries, but only occasionally were they asked to do that. However, the leaders guaranteed that, due to their easy access to the councilors, they had been able, in some occasions, to “get some names in the list”. There was an association that until 2016 offered its mini-bus to transport students upon a monthly fee payment by the council, but unfortunately, that service was cancelled in 2016 with the change of the ruling party in the council.

Concerning the selection process for the distribution of school subsidies (in the form of tuition fees and rent payment or transport subsidies) for the students attending university or professional education sectors, this is a highly centralized process, with little or no involvement of CBOs. The committees, usually made up of councilors and the mayor themselves, control directly the whole process. However, leaders or any other individual in the community may occasionally contact the councilors to get “some names” in the final list, due to their proximity with the councilors. However, CBOs are totally kept out of the process. In the words of a CBO leader, the selection of students to benefit from tuition subsidies in universities or professional training centers, is “highly politicized” as the local politicians use it to “buy votes” or to reward some key former campaign allies, or even to directly benefit closed relatives. The mayor of São Salvador do Mundo elected in 2016, referring to the way his antecessor managed the scholarship distribution in his municipality, stated that “more than 90% of the subsidies given went to people close to the former mayor”. However, the veracity of this statement could not be verified as it was quite impossible to have access to the documents at the Council to allow the analysis of the referred selection process.

Another illustrative example showing the role politics plays in the distribution of school subsidies comes from the leader of a CBO in the municipality of Ribeira Grande. He reveals that, “two years ago, it was so difficult to get placements in the institutions of professional training in Portugal for a group of youth from my neighborhood made available through the

City Council, because we were connoted to belong to the opposition party (PAICV)”. The leader of this CBO had to contact the mayor from a different municipality, a “party friend”, to guarantee placements for his group. For his happiness, the placements were guaranteed “for some elements of the group we presented”.

The qualitative analysis of the CBOs’ participation in the planning and implementation of education services in Cabo Verde, focusing on the three cases studied, reveals two important observations: First, CBOs as the communities’ representative institutions, are left highly marginalized from the processes. Secondly, the CBOs’ leaders take the advantage of their party proximity with the councilors to influence decisions, not in the name of the organizations, but based on their own “party friendship”. This scenario, as it is shown later in the analysis of the rural development policy, goes very much against the leader’s answers that they try not to get too close to the parties to avoid being “connoted” as partisan. However, as the president of a CBO in Santa Catarina confesses, “if you don’t use your political linkages, it is hard to get things done” (Interview with the leader of the CBO of Pedra Barro, March 2018). Thus, avoiding “being connoted as partisan” does not seem to apply to CBOs leaders. Despite the institutional framework that encourages the engagement of community organizations in the local governance, the reality is that the engagement depends primarily on the *party linkage* (Kistchelt, 2000) between the CBOs and the two political parties, MPD and PAICV. Engagement of CBOs is more likely to happen when their leaders belong or support the ruling party. If CBOs’ leaders are known to belong to the opposition party, they are completely overlooked in the process, and the Councils take the monopoly and centralize the planning and delivery of education services. These are the cases of the municipality of Ribeira Grande and Santa Catarina.

6.9.2 Engagement of CBOs in the local rural development policies

As we saw in chapter 4, the engagement of Community Based Organizations has been in the center of rural development projects in Cabo Verde since independence. With the process of central government decentralization initiated in the late 1980s, CBOs have ever since been considered one of the key actors in the promotion of socio-economic development and the promotion of local democracy (Burns, Hambleton Hoggett, 1994). Thus, this focusses on the *extent to which the institutionalization of local governments framed the engagement of CBOs as collaborative and participative actors in the planning and delivery of rural development policies at the municipal level in Cabo Verde*. Like the analysis of CBOs engagement in

education, the analysis of CBOs involvement in the local government rural policy process builds on the data collected through interviews and surveys applied with councilors, leaders of CBOs and local political leaders in the three municipalities where the case studies were carried out. For the matter of simplifying this analysis, the data collected focus primarily on CBOs' engagement on two specific programs: the emergency programs put in place in the aftermath of the droughts that hit Cabo Verde in 2014 and 2017.

The role of Councils in the design and implementation of rural development policies is restricted primarily to the promotion of rural extension activities, as well as providing incentives for the creation of agricultural, livestock, handicraft and industrial production units in their respective municipalities. In addition, the councils play an important role in promoting and supporting the creation of "cooperatives" to leverage the agro-business activities of the cooperative units (Article 30, Law No. 134/IV/95, 3 July). A great number of existing CBOs today in Cabo Verde was born in the ambit of rural development policies implemented after the independence. An approximate number of 300 CBOs were created between 1975 and 1990 (JICA, 2010). The international development agencies that assisted Cabo Verde in its rural development policies greatly encouraged, and to a certain extent, obliged the creation and involvement of CSOs in the implementation of those policies (Challinor, 2008). Therefore, the CBOs and rural development policies have umbilical linkages. In the context of decentralization and de-concentration of government powers, focusing on the transfer of some institutional capacity to local councils to create and implement rural development policies, to what extent have CBOs been incorporated in this process?

I seek to answer the aforementioned question based on the analysis of CBOs' engagement in the formulation and implementation of emergency programs to mitigate the effects of the drought that hit Cabo Verde in 2014 and 2017. In 2014, the rainfall shortage led the government to adopt the *Rural Emergency Program*, to minimize the drought impacts on the lives of the most affected people in the rural areas of the country. It was estimated that about 30,000 people were in urgent need of assistance throughout the country. According to reports made available by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the emergency program of 2014 aimed to assist around 8237 most vulnerable rural households affected by drought. The then Cape Verdean prime minister, José Maria Neves, announced the mobilization of 1.7 million euros destined to buy pastures and water for animals, water for irrigation, and food supply for the most needy families.

In 2017, Cabo Verde was hit again by one of its worst drought in the last 40 years⁴⁴, with direct impacts on the lives of an estimate of 17.203 agricultural households (62.3% of rural household). In consequence, in October 2017, the government adopted PEMSMAA⁴⁵ to minimize the drought impacts. With a total cost estimated at 765.000.000 CEV (6,954,545 Euros), PEMSMAA is a contingency program, which focuses on increasing water production and distribution for human consumption and irrigation, increasing the ration availability for animals, and finally, increasing household income by creating mass-public work, and promoting income generating activities. As we can notice, a natural problem – drought, ended up worsening an already an existing structural problem, poverty in the rural areas of the country. Both the 2014 Rural Emergency Program and PEMSMAA 2017 are central government policies, elaborated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and then implemented through decentralized government agencies- the Delegations of Ministry of Agriculture, and the City Councils. However, according to the representatives of the delegation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and the councilors interviewed in the three municipalities, the elaboration of these two programs went through a double process: bottom-up and top-down processes. On the one hand, the local councils and the delegations of agriculture were the main informants to the Ministry of Agriculture in charge of drafting the policy, by providing information on the needs of the populations and the projects that would better suit to different municipalities. On the other hand, once they had provided this information, it was entirely up to the Ministry to decide on the content and the implementation strategies to be adopted. What roles were reserved to the civil society organizations? Focusing on the case of CBOs, their participation in the two processes was poorly conceived, mainly in the ambit of PEMSMAA 2017, by both central and local government structures.

During the preparation phase of the Rural Emergency Program 2014, the Delegations of the Ministry of Agriculture consulted CBOs to request information on livestock population and the identification of people who would be mostly likely to benefit from the government support in the communities. However, rather than being asked to formulate and present projects

⁴⁴ As it was widely commented in the mass media.

⁴⁵ The PEMSMAA - *Programa de Emergência para Mitigação da Seca e do Mau Ano Agrícola* (Emergency Program for Mitigating the Effects of Droughts)

to be implemented in the communities, the CBOs⁴⁶ were taken merely as informants, or data providers to the ministry inquirers. Was this due to the passivity and lack of will of the COBs or the central government policy orientation, that purposefully kept CBOs out? In other words, was it due to the weak communities' social capital, or was it due to the absence of institutional opportunities for such a participation to take place? A mixture of both. "A quiet child is not milked", says an African proverb. CBOs are financially resourceless institutions, which usually look up to the state organizations or other independent institutions for funding. Thus, if CBOs do not do enough mobilization to articulate their interests and pressure the power elite to respond to such interests, they will go unnoticed. Hence, they are easily manipulated by the political elite, which may downgrade their roles of advocating and voicing firmly their community concerns. Thus, the risk of being overlooked by the public authorities is enormous. On the other hand, if the local power, the City Councils, do not offer and create conditions for CBOs to engage, these organizations will be likely to disengage themselves from the policy process (Azarya, 1994; Kasfir, 1994). A bit of both factors have accounted for the weak participation of CBOs in the Drought Emergency Programs implemented in the different municipalities.

Regarding the engagement of CBOs in the implementation of PEMSMAA, differences between 2014 and 2017 are convincingly reported by all the three categories of the interviewees: the leaders of CBOs, the councilors and high rank officers in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The interviewees felt that in 2014 the implementation was done in a closer partnership with CBOs, despite the concerns raised above. In addition to their use as policy informants, CBOs were also engaged in the management of small grants for promoting livestock and agricultural activities. However, in the years 2017/2018, the government put the implementation of PEMSMAA in the hands of the delegations and the City Councils. Even though the policy document states that the implementation should follow a "participative approach", involving the "beneficiaries, Central and Local Government Structures, Business sector and civil society organizations"(PEMSMAA 2017/2018, p. iii), CBOs leaders, councilors and agents from the Delegations of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural development agree that CBOs are being sidelined from the implementation process. A CBO leader in the municipality of Santa Catarina expressed his frustration for being excluded from participating in the PEMSMAA 2017/2018 by sayin:

⁴⁶ However, not all the CBOs had the privileged of being asked, as some of the leaders I interviewed reported to me.

“we had contract to rehabilitate “*strada*”⁴⁷ when PAICV was in power (referring to the year 2014), but now the council does all the work by itself. Now, under the program of PEMSMAA, the council recruits workers and they are implementing the project directly, without even considering the associations” (Interview with the author, Feb. 17th, 2018.)

What justifies this change in CBOs’ engagement in the two programs? The interviews reveal two contrasting arguments: on the part of the leaders of CBOs, this change is motivated by “politics”. The same aforementioned CBO leader puts it in the following way:

“politics does not let anything move forward. If the councilors know you do not support their party, they will do anything to annihilate you. They will cut all the relationship with the association. This is bad because the association works for the community and not for the leader of the association”.

This leader’s concern strongly shows how engagement of CBOs depends on the political linkage the party has with these organizations. That leader is a militant of PAICV, and, when this party was in power, he felt his association was getting contracts to manage public work program –*strada*. However, with the change of the ruling party in the central government (MPD took over the power), and with same party ruling the Council, that association was sidelined, and excluded from participating in the local public work management. Such a situation illustrates how engagement of a CBO in the program implementation is very much dependent on the sort of linkage it has with the ruling party. This patronage relationship kind (Kistchelt, 2000) allows the political elites to manipulate associations for their own self-interest, rather than considering the advantages of including them as independent actors who would contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of the program.

The councilors and the delegates of the Ministry of Agriculture interviewed agree that the City Councils, as the leading public authority in the municipalities, are technically better prepared to implement community projects than the CBOs. However, despite accepting that the technicality is important for project implementation, the COBs leaders totally refute the idea that the Councils are better prepared to implement community projects. One leader from Santa Catarina, talking about the capability of his CBO, affirms that his “association has been doing a good job for the development of the community within the limit of its capacity. And if it had not been for the association, this community would be in the mud now”. Then he wonders, “why is this council (referring to the council of Santa Catarina), and its ruling party doing their best to kill the association? The council has enters into a well-functioning community (referring to his community) and it is simply destroying it. For what?” (Interview given to the author,

⁴⁷ The expression *strada* is a Capeverdean language word, and it means “public roads”

February 17th, 2018).

The councilors and the agents in the Delegations of the Ministry of Agriculture interviewed, recognize that associations are “helpful” in some circumstances. However, as a counselor in Santa Catarina affirms, “there is some distance and a lack of mutual trust between them and councils”. If the associations are helpful, why aren’t they being properly integrated in the PEMSMAA implementation then? As the aforementioned CBO leader asks, “for what?” The answer is “politics”, the aforementioned CBO leader emphasizes. The councilors and the ruling party are looking to embed in the community through CBOs, and if these organizations stand on their ways, they are sidelined from the local policy process. The strong engagement of the City Councilors in PEMSMAA implementation is considered by the majority of the CBOs’ leaders interviewed, as a strategy MPD leaders is using to embed in the communities, building up their image, as a way to catapult the party to reelection in the 2020 local government, and 2021 legislative elections.

6.10 Conclusion

The analysis presented in this chapter has focused on the engagement of CSOs in local government policy process in Cabo Verde. Engagement of these organizations has been analyzed from two perspectives: institutional and social capital perspectives. The former sees the involvement of CSOs in governance as the result of institutional changes and designs carried out after the independence in 1975. The constitutions and other administrative mechanisms have progressively created “political opportunity structures” for the incorporation CSOs in governance processes. However, political actors often manipulate and such institutional designs in respect to CSOs engagement in politics. Such manipulation is clearly visible at the local government level, where engagement of CSOs (and CBOs in particular) seems to depend more on the will and strategies of the political actors than on the written institutional rules of the game. That is the example of political parties’ practices of manipulating CBOs, and the type of patronage behavior they seek to develop with these organizations.

The second perspective sees the creation of “political opportunities” not as something simply handed out to CSOs by the political class, but also as a conquest of civil society. The CSOs, as the civil society’s organized forms of social capital, have gained conscience of the value of their resources for the development of the municipalities, and the country as a whole. Therefore, as the civil society resource (the social capital) mobilization grows stronger, so grows their participation in the local government policy process. The mobilization of civil society social capital, as it has been treated in this chapter, has taken two forms: the *bridging*

social capital, and the *societal linking social capital*. While the former refers to the horizontal relationship among people within their communities, and the values and the norms that emanate from such a relationship, the latter refer the relationship, both horizontal and vertical, the different society's "corporate actors" (Coleman, 1988) develop among themselves. These both forms of social capital catapult the civil society organizations, with a particular emphasis to CBOs, to engage in the local policymaking process.

The institutional and social capital as analytical categories for the analysis of engagement of CSOs in the local governance, have been used in this chapter as complementary, rather contradictory tools. If the social pressure coming from below change politics, one will also agree that changes in politics will potentially lead to change in society. The local governance process in Cabo Verde builds on a close interlocking relationship between the politics (the political class that controls the politics) and the CSOs. However, the political class still gets a greater influence over the planning and delivery of public collective goods and services. The political class-the party leaders and the councilors, may feel pressured to make certain decisions, take or avoid certain actions, but they still enjoy a great discretion over what they do, despite the institutional rules they have observe.

The engagement of CSOs, the CBOs in particular, in the local policymaking and implementation processes, has it has been demonstrated in this chapter is weak, despite the numerous laws that determine their incorporation in such processes. Will CSOs, particularly the CBOs, be able to survive and continue to position as important actors in the promotion of local socioeconomic and the democratic development? Are there a need of new institutional designs, which give CSOs better-defined roles in the local development policies? Alternatively, are the politicians discouraging citizens to participate in these organizations, so that they themselves could rule *unchallengingly*?

The main findings presented in this chapter show that citizens do play an important role in promoting the local development through the creation of network associations (the bridging and the societal linking social capitals). However, what seems to work imperfectly and depending on the contingent circumstances is an institutionalized form linking social capital that binds the City Councils and the civil society organizations to work collaboratively on a permanent basis. Hence, the political class' indifference towards CSOs integration in policy process, as it seems to be the reality, demands a review of the institutional framework in place regarding such an integration. That applies mostly to case of CBOs, the main responsible organizations for galvanizing the local social capital, an indispensable resource for promoting local development in Cabo Verde. The review of such institutional framework is important,

because strengthening the engagement of CSOs in the local governance is deemed to be a key policy to promote local government performance and the development of the municipalities. This is the subject for the next chapter.

CHAPTER VII- SOCIAL CAPITAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

7.1 Introduction

The institutionalization of autonomous local governments (Town Councils) in the 1990s has been considered as one of the key achievements in the democratization and political power decentralization processes in Cabo Verde. In the center of these processes lays the transfer of the political *authority, autonomy, accountability and capacity* to municipal level governments to design and implement policies within municipal territories. These transfers aim at establishing and democratizing the local governance, understood as a “process whereby elements in society wield power and authority, and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life and economic and social development” (Anheier, 2005, p. 230). Local governance has been in fact, a major political strategy sought to produce and provide for collective goods more effectively and efficiently. As addressed in the previous chapter, decentralization in Cabo Verde aimed to achieve two major purposes: Firstly, it targeted at creating venues for citizens to participate actively in the exercise of power (authority) autonomously from the central government. Secondly, decentralization has been a political mechanism through which citizens hold the local power holders accountable (accountability) for their government policies. Thus, participation would demand citizens’ resource mobilization, in the form of their social capital to influence the local government decisions. Then the questions I raise in this chapter are the followings: “to what extent do CSOs, as the structure of citizens’ social capital (*bridging* and *linking*) influence the performance of local governments in meeting the demands and needs of their constituents? “What are the impacts of the stock of social capital available in each municipality on the local government’s responsiveness and efficiency in the production and supply of the collective goods?

The social capital hypothesis, however, concurs with two other explanations for local government performance, namely the institutional determinants (Lowndes, V. and Wilson, D., 2001) and the economic determinants (Woolcock, 1998; Przeworski et al., 2000). The former focuses on local institutional designs and initiatives taken by individual councils as the main factor for the local government performance. The latter put the focus on the local government’s economic and financial capacity to respond to the population needs with the effectiveness and efficiency required. Although these arguments are considered important, they have been dismissed in the present analysis of local government performance in Cabo Verde. All the Town Councils work, in principle, under the same organizational designs, and under the same local

government laws. This, however, does not impede individual councils to be creative in their own manner in the production and delivery of public services. Nevertheless, this institutional variable is not considered in this chapter, as there is lack of observable data across the 22 municipalities that provide evidences of any groundbreaking initiatives taken and implemented by these institutions as part of their policy to improve their service delivery efficiency. Nor does the case study carried out in the three municipalities provide elements of such institutional initiatives. Regarding the economic factors, it is indeed an important variable. It is clearly expected that a municipality with abundance of economic resources, should respond with more efficiency and efficacy to its population's needs than the municipalities that lack such resources. However, the capacity to generate resources depends also on other actors' behavior and commitments, which complement the local government institutions themselves. Non-governmental actors, taken here as civil society organizations, may play a great role in this matter, and therefore, contribute on greatly for the provision of public collective goods. Therefore, the social capital variable remains strong to explain the local government performance across the 22 Municipalities, and so their different socio-economic development outcomes. Thus, the main argument defended in this chapter is that the social capital stock available at each municipality, both in its *bridging* and *linking* dimensions, influence its government performance, in respect to its responsiveness and efficiency in producing and delivering public collective goods.

Performance is here understood as the local institutions' "responsiveness" to their constituents, and their "efficiency in conducting the public's business" (Putnam, 1995, p. 63). While the former focuses on the tangible policy outputs, the latter focuses on the policy process that leads to the desired outputs. The measurement of "responsiveness" and "efficiency" of local governments is done here based on four categories of indicators: process, output, outcome and perception indicators (Putnam, 1993; Wilde et al., 2008). The data on output, outcome and the process indicators were collected based on the statistical reports produced by the Cape Verdean National Institute of Statistics (INE) and government departments. Perception indicators have been determined based on the surveys and interviews carried out in the three municipalities where the case studies were conducted. The measuring indicators used throughout the chapter focus on some of the major policy sectors under the responsibility of local governments, as stated in the Law N°. 134/IV/95: Budget and planning, basic sanitation, education, professional training, housing, health and poverty.

The objective of this chapter, however, is not restricted to measuring the performance of the local governments *per se*, but once this is done, the performance indicators in the different

municipalities will be related to their stock of linking social capital to determine their level of association. Therefore, the hypothesis states that the stock of the linking social capital a municipality has influences its performance. Putting it differently, the higher the stock of the linking social capital accumulated in the municipality, the higher is the performance of its government. I will use the percentage and scatter graphs as tools to look at this association. In addition, I will also use qualitative data collected through interviews to explain any possible relations between social capital and the local government performance.

Thus, the chapter is structured into three main parts. The first part focuses on the theoretical implications of social capital on government performance, and then lays down the main hypotheses to be analyzed; the second part presents the performance indicators collected through desk and fieldwork research. Finally, the third part looks at the association between social capital and the performance indicators. The chapter ends with a concluding section, presenting the main reflections on the findings, and on the policy implications.

7.2 Social capital, government performance and local development

Social capital, “as the informal rules, norms, and values that facilitate coordinated action for the members of the society”, works as an “important resource available to societies” (Coffe’ and Geys, 2005, p. 485), to allow them to both “get by” and to “get ahead” (Fox, 1997). This happens because social capital “enables cooperative ventures [in the production and supply of collective goods] that would otherwise be infeasible” (Fedderke, *et. al*, 1999, p. 709). The more society relies on this “cooperative venture”, the more effectively and efficiently are the public collective problems addressed. People rely on their relationship ties, both their strong and their weak ties, as well the existing ties between their social representative organizations and the institutions of power, to help them get through circumstances that by themselves they would be unable to cope with. On the other hand, social capital “helps mobilize resources in ways that the state alone is unable to do” (Hyden, 1997) to respond to citizens’ demands.

As studies on many other cases of developing countries (Fedderke, *et al.*, 1999; Evans, 1997) report, Cape Verdean’s traditional institutions of solidarity, such as *djunta mon*, *botu*, *mitin*, *djuda*, have played important roles on the country socio-economic development (Santos, 2017; Challinor, 2008; Pina, 2007). Cape Verdeans have relied on these traditional forms of solidarity for a myriad of purposes: working on the field, house construction, economic assistance for personal religious sacraments as baptism and marriages, as well as in occasions of personal or family tragedy such as death (Pina, 2007). Indeed, these traditional forms of

social capital have contributed for the production and provision of subsistence goods, and been a real social welfare system for the poor. In line with these traditional forms of social capital, the boom of organized civil society groups (CSOs) in Cabo Verde, more specifically in the period following the independence, has allowed the formation of organized or structured/rational forms of social capital. These organizations of civil society are believed to have not only facilitated cooperative actions for the production of societal collective goods, but also created more politically conscious and demanding citizens. Associational form of social capital, according to Boix and Posner (1998), improves government performance “to the extent that it makes citizens sophisticated consumers of politics” (p. 690). Citizens’ participation in associations increases their “political awareness” by engaging themselves in the discussion of political affairs of their polities (Scheufele, et al., 2004), and hence, make more and better articulated demands from the government. According to Tavits (2006),

“public provision of public goods does not just happen. Political pressure must be mobilized to encourage the institutions of government to make this provision a matter of public policy. [the supply of public goods] depends on individuals and groups successfully engaging in collective action to get the government to provide them” (p. 212).

Following Tavits’ argument, a thicker civil society, crystalized in dense associational groups and associational life demanding for public goods, would result in a greater response on the part of government authorities in the production and provision of those goods. However, I argue that more than simply posing demands, the engagement of these groups in the process of planning and delivering services will further contribute to their effectiveness and efficiency, or better, to the government performances. I call this engagement process of *linking social capital*. Jonathan Fox’s (1997) analysis of social capital in Rural Mexico reports that the existence of rural network associations (the *bridging social capital*) might be important at helping people “get by”, but not “getting ahead”. The Mexican rural communities, he affirms, are dense in associational aspect; however, they have been very poor. For Fox (1997), the act of getting ahead, in other words, the socioeconomic advancement of the neighborhoods, is very much dependent on “synergistic relations” between the state and the civil society organizations in the production and supply of collective goods, something these communities lack. When the civil society organizations and the local government institutions (representing the state) join their resources and skills in the “co-production” (Ostrom, 1997) of the public goods (formulation and implementation of policies), they improve their chances to deliver such goods in more quantity, and in a better quality. Based on this theoretical perspective, this chapter builds on the argument that the stock of *linking social capital* (linkage between local governments and CSOs)

at the disposal of a municipality, determines the level of its government performance and development.

7.3 Measuring the performance of local governments

Local government performance is here understood as the “outputs or results achieved by local governments in service delivery” (Wilde et al, 2008, p. 8). Performance measurement, done either internally or externally, has been identified as a key process, “to help local governments and citizens communicate, collaborate and make choices” (Bracergirdle, 2003, p. 11). This is because the outputs, or results achieved provide governments with important inputs for their policy strategies and developments (including policy process and policy pronouncements) in order to meet their constituencies’ demands. On the other hand, the disclosed performance indicators allow citizens to evaluate and hold their governments accountable, as well strengthening or weakening their trust and loyalty to the local power institution (and the ruling party).

Following Putnam’s (1993) analysis of institutional performance, and Wilde et al.’s guide for measuring local government performance (2008), the assessment of democratic government performance should consider both its capacity to respond to the “demands of its citizenry” (its responsiveness), and its efficiency when acting “upon these demands” (Putnam, 1993, p. 63). Thus, to what extent are the Cape Verdean local governments being “responsive” to their constituents, and “effective” in conducting its public business? While “responsiveness” focuses on the policy outputs (what Putnam terms of “policy pronouncements” and “policy implementations”), which yield the palpable results of governments’ actions, effectiveness focuses on the policy process that leads to such outputs. Therefore, measuring the “responsiveness” and “efficiency” of local governments implies the observance of indicators that reveal information on the things that have been actually done (the policy outputs), and how the “things done” have been done (the policy process). In addition to process and outputs, two other groups or categories of indicators have been considered in this chapter: outcome and perception indicators. Despite the caveat on the use of “outcome indicators”, as they “conflate government activities with factors beyond government control” (Tavits, 2006), in the context such as of Cabo Verde, societal outcomes depend very much on the dynamics of local actors, where the Town Councils play the most important role. Each of this category of indicators is explained in more details in the following paragraphs.

Policy process indicators are conceived of as the “procedures adopted and actions undertaken” (Wilde *et al.*, 2008) by the local councils in order to achieve the optimal policy results in response to the population’s demands. From many possible procedures, I focus on the key “management instruments”- the annual budget implementation and more specifically, the capacity of the municipalities to generate their own internal income as a proportion to the total income the local governments have expect to collect one specific year. Cape Verdean local governments have two main sources of income: permanent central government transfer⁴⁸ (and some other external entities), and their own internal resources. The proportionality of their own internal resources generating capacity determines very much their financial sustainability.

Policy output indicators refer to actual implemented policies, measurable in terms of both quantity and quality. These actual implemented policies produce the required “goods” and “services” to meet the demand of the citizens, for example, water pipes installed, health units built, pre-school infrastructures built, numbers of houses build for the poor, etc.

Thirdly, the *policy outcome indicators* measure the long-term goals achieved or benefits derived from the policies implemented, usually in the form of satisfied needs, or achievement of broader development goals. I include this category of indicators, despite the caveat aforementioned that outcomes are explained by a concatenation of factors, rather than the result of any single policy or policies. Finally, the *perception indicators* assess the citizens’ perceptions or their opinions on the quality of services provided in the different policy sectors analyzed in their municipalities.

My effort to carry out a comprehensive performance evaluation of all the 22 municipalities has been greatly hampered by the lack of sufficient data covering all performance issues initially intended. However, based on the data made available by the INE, government and independent expert report studies, some data have been collected on some specific indicators, which allow a comparison of the performance results across all the 22 municipalities. Regarding the people’s perception on government performance, due to the absence of comparable data, I attempt to fill in this gap with some qualitative data collected through interviews I conducted in the three case study municipalities. As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, all the indicators used focus strictly, on the areas under the responsibility of local governments.

⁴⁸ Permanent government transfer (FFM- *Fundo de Financiamento Municipal*), to Local Councils is guaranteed through allocation of resources in the annual state budget.

7.3.1 Process indicator


I start with the policy process focusing on the local governments' (henceforth, the City Council, or simply the Council) efficiency in mobilizing resources to implement their programs (the Annual Plan of Activities). There are two aspects related to this efficiency: the councils' capacity to generate internal resources, which consequently lead to the second aspect, the overall (in) efficiency of budget execution (the gap between the planned and the executed budget).

Indicator 1: Councils' own revenue generation capacity

The first process indicator is the councils' capacity to generate their own revenues, in proportion of the transfers they receive from the central government and other entities. This indicator varies enormously from municipality to municipality. Taking the year 2013⁴⁹, the municipalities with the highest performance on this indicator are Sal, Boa Vista and Praia, each contributing with 58%, 56% and 44% respectively, of their own incomes as a percentage of the total income projected for the year 2013. At the other extreme, the worst performing municipalities are São Salvador do Mundo, São Lourenço dos Orgãos and São Miguel, contributing with 3%, 8% and 9% respectively of their own internal income for the total income projected for the same year. As figure 7.1 suggests, in 2013 the majority of the municipalities had a very low capacity to generate their own revenues, therefore, making them economically dependent from the central government and other donors' transfers. According to an expert report study by PD Consult (2015), done for the government department with supervision responsibility over the local governments (MAHOT), the weak performance of municipalities in generating their own revenues is greatly due to the councils' inefficiency and their deficient internal capacity to supervise and fight against the tax evasion. In addition, it is also due to their internal and external organizational deficiencies, which result in a loss of "potential revenues".

⁴⁹ Data available only refer to this year

Figure 7.1 Municipalities' own generated income as the percentage of their total income (2013)




Source: PD Consult (2015)

Indicator 2: Budget execution

The second aspect of the councils' budget management process, which is very much linked to their inefficiency in generating internal revenue, is their overall inefficiency of budget execution- the gap between the planned and executed budget. This inefficiency can be considered to be a plague across all the 22 municipalities, but affect some of them harder than others. Due to their inefficiencies to collect taxes and generate resources from means other than the central government and donors' transfers, the councils are constantly underperforming in generating their own income, and so, they are always running budget deficit. For example, figure 7.2 displays the differences across the 22 municipalities in this regard.

Figure 7.2 – The municipalities’ collected revenue vs. projections revenues (2013)



Source: PD Consult (2015)

The variables to explain the councils’ inefficiency in their financial management have to do with the organizations’ own internal deficiencies. However, what the report disregards is the possibility of the existence of other explanatory factors, including the engagement of non-governmental actors in the municipality in the budget making and implementation process as a means to guarantee their management efficiency. This point will be further developed in the second part of this chapter.

7.3.2 Policy output indicators


Now moving to the output indicators, the focus is on the actual goods and services to satisfy the citizens’ needs, delivered by local Councils. These outputs include the infrastructures for pre-school education, health, sanitation, number of professional training events and beneficiaries across the 22 municipalities.

Indicator 3: Pre-school education infrastructure

The major intervention of the local Councils in the education policy is in the pre-school education sector. Their role focuses on the infrastructure buildings, the teachers’ payment, and food supplying. I take the evolution of rooms built in the pre-school sector from 2000 to 2015 as the metric to measure the performance the 22 municipalities. Looking at figure 7.3, it can be seen that some municipalities succeeded in providing more infrastructures than the others. For example, Paul had an average variation rate of infrastructures provided of over 100% in 2000, while Ribeira Brava had a less than 20% average variation rate, meaning that some infrastructure in use in 2000 are no longer in use in 2015. However, this difference might have to do with

other reasons not related to the performance of local government *per se*, like the reduction of the birth rate, or the entrance of privates in the pre-school education business, which is a common practice in Cabo Verde.

Figure 7.3 Evolution of Pre-school Infrastructure - %. (2000-2015)




Source: MED (2015)

Indicator 4: Professional training (2011-2016)

The local councils have the responsibility to plan and deliver professional training programs to its constituents, as part of its job promotion policy. For the analysis done in this section, the focus on the percentage of population benefited with professional training programs between 2011 and 2016. As figure 7.4 shows, there is a great discrepancy between the municipalities regarding their accomplishments on this indicator.

Figure 7.4 - Percentage of population who benefited from professional training programs across the 22 municipalities (2011-2016)




Source: INE (2016)

The municipalities of Santa Cruz and São Domingos stand on the highest positions on this indicator, with 1.8% and 1.3% of their population receiving professional training respectively. Some other municipalities had performance “0”, meaning they did not carry out any professional training events in their territories during the aforementioned period.

Indicator 5: Community Based Health facilities (Unidade Sanitária de Base-USB)

With respect to construction and maintenance of Community-based health facilities (USBs), here the available data do not provide any information on the period regarding their construction. However, their existence does confirm that the councils are still taking care of them. These health units are important for the population because they are installed within the communities, which shorten the user’s distance to receive basic health treatment. Therefore, I take as the metric of analysis the local government performance, the average percentage of population served by one existing USB in each municipality.

Figure 7.5 Distribution of USBs and percentage of population served by one USB (2015)



Source: INE (2015)

Municipalities with good performance indicators are the ones with the lowest percentage of its population per one USB. On the other hand, the municipalities with a high percentage of its population per a single USB, *ceteris paribus*, shows that the local government’s efforts to build or provide health facilities have been low. As figure 7.5 shows, the percentage of people using these facilities varies considerably from one municipality to the other, with the worst performing municipalities having one single USB covering 50% of its population- the case of São Salvador do Mundo, São Lourenço dos Orgãos and Tarrafal de São Nicolau. The best performing municipalities are Porto Novo and Sal, with the lowest percentage of population being assisted by one USB.

7.3.3 Policy outcome indicators

The next set of performance indicators focuses on the “policy outcomes”, which measure the “achievement of broader development goals” (Wilde *et al.*, 2008), in each of the 22 municipalities, in the sectors of basic sanitation, housing, education and poverty. Despite the caveats associated with this type of indicators (Putnam, 1993; Tavits, 2006), outcome indicators related to policy sectors under the responsibility of the City Councils (or in which they have some modicum of role), are important for the evaluation of these institutions’ performance, as well as for the level of development they have brought the municipalities into. Four indicators are taken here to measure the outcome performance.

Indicator 6: Household sanitary conditions

The “sanitary conditions” in Cabo Verde, in general, improved considerably from 2012 to 2016 (table 7.1). The population with better house sanitary conditions increased by 7.4% (INE, 2016), going up from 72.9% of population in 2012 to 80.3% in 2016. When looking at the improvement rate across the 22 municipalities, substantial differences can be noticed. For example, Maio, São Vicente, Tarrafal de S. Nicolau, and Tarrafal de Santiago, had the worst performance. On the other hand, the municipalities of São Salvador do Mundo, São Miguel and Boa Vista had the highest increase of percentage of households with improved sanitary conditions.

Table 7.1- Evolution of population (%) with improved house sanitary conditions (2012-2016)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	% growth (2012-2016)
Cabo Verde	72,9	71,8	73,9	77,2	80,3	7,4
RG S.A	77,9	74,8	78,2	80,2	85	7,1
Paul	70,7	69,3	71,2	71,2	72,7	2
P. Novo	59,8	63,3	65,4	68,7	69,9	10,1
S. Vicente	87,4	83,8	85,1	87,1	88,3	0,9
R. BSN	71	70,4	66,3	77,7	82,7	11,7
Tar. SN	85,2	82,5	86,1	83,8	86,6	1,4
Sal	89	89,4	91,4	93,4	92,2	3,2
B.Vista	61,5	68,1	68	70,2	76,6	15,1
Maio	89,2	88,6	91,9	90,5	89,9	0,7
SC S.Tiago	65	58,6	57,3	69,4	72,7	7,7
Praia	57,7	58,3	60	63,3	71,6	13,9
S.Doming	39,8	45,1	48,9	53,2	54,4	14,6
S.Miguel	81,9	77,4	80	84,6	86,1	4,2
SS. Mundo	54	52,6	52,1	53,6	64,6	10,6
SL Orgãos	46,7	42,8	50	47,7	61,5	14,8
RG ST	45,4	45,2	51,8	53,6	63,8	18,4
Tar. S.T	53,3	62,1	65,2	68,5	68,6	15,3
Santa Cruz	41,4	48,1	45,4	49,8	55,7	14,3
Mosteiro	83,1	89,1	87,8	87,4	93,5	10,4
S. Filip	77,1	79,1	82,1	82,8	81,5	4,4
SC Fogo	74,3	81,9	83,6	82,6	88,2	13,9
Brava	86,1	86,6	87,4	87,6	91,4	5,3

Source: INE (IMC, 2016)

Indicator 7: Improved Housing conditions

In recent years, housing policy has been given a prominent position in the government agenda in Cabo Verde. This position has been also extended to local level governments' agenda. There have been occasions that these two level of governments have disagreed with one another on housing developmental issues. Local government institutions have often accused the central government of usurping their powers, for directly implementing housing programs in their municipal territory without even acknowledging or engaging them in the process. That was the case of *Casa Para Todos* (House For All), a central government policy that focuses on building and managing affordable middle-standard house units in urban centers throughout the country. The local governments, however, plays a key role on house rehabilitation and construction for the most underprivileged segment of population in their respective constituencies, and as the demand for this good has been high, their performance in providing such a good is always under the scrutiny of local citizens.


Table 7.2 displays the evolution of urban population living in “degraded or precarious” houses from 2000 to 2014. For the reasons stated above, this indicator is taken as an outcome one, that measures more the developmental state of the municipality on the housing sector, than the performance of the local government institution.

Table 7.2 – Evolution of urban population living in degraded or precarious house- % (2000-2014)

	2000	2010	2013	2014	Difference % between 2000 & 2014
Cabo Verde	61,6	43,2	35,2	33,0	28,6
RG S.A	56,3	31,2	13	14,2	42,1
Paul	81,6	33,3	42,3	41,4	40,2
P. Novo	72,9	50	41,3	38,4	34,5
S. Vicente	57,6	35,6	27,8	28,1	29,5
R. BSN	56,9	21,4	20,1	25,1	31,8
Tar. SN	61,1	39,7	30,9	24,1	37
Sal	51,6	41,5	32,6	29,3	22,3
B.Vista	52	61,8	59,9	52,7	-0,7
Maio	68,7	34,2	29,1	47,9	20,8
SC S.Tiago	76	38,5	45	32,9	43,1
Praia	47,5	44,7	29,5	26	21,5
S.Doming	76,7	55,5	48,1	56	20,7
S.Miguel	63	47,3	38,4	34	29
SS. Mundo	69,6	40,1	25,1	54,2	15,4
SL Orgãos	83,2	47,4	41,1	30,7	52,5
RG ST	-	63,4	55	46	17,4
Tar. S.T	-	55	23,8	28,5	26,5
Santa Cruz	-	47,7	42,1	45	2,7
Mosteiro	35,5	39,4	25,1	26,4	9,1
S. Felip	57,6	30,6	20,1	21,7	35,9
SC Fogo	-	45,1	50	48	-2,9
Brava	54	28,7	17,9	31,2	22,8

The decrease of population living in poor housing conditions changes considerably from one municipality to the other. Ribeira Grande de Santo Antão, Santa Catarina de Santiago and São Felipe have the biggest decrease of people living in poor housing conditions from 2000 to 2014. At the other extreme, Municipalities of Boa Vista and Santa Catarina de Fogo have more people living in poor housing conditions in 2014 than in 2000, and 2010 (for the case of Santa Catarina de Fogo). Figure 7.6 depicts the distribution of the percentage of population living in poor housing conditions only in 2014.

Figure 7.6 Distribution of population (%) living in poor housing conditions in 2014



Source- INE (IMC, 2015)


Education

Two aspects are considered in determining the local government performance in the education sector: dropout rate in secondary education (2000-2015) and Literacy rate (2000-2015).

Indicator 8: Dropout rate in secondary education (2000-2015)

With respect to dropout rate in the secondary level education, it is worth emphasizing that it is an encompassing phenomenon across all the 22 municipalities. However, in just a few municipalities the percentage of secondary dropouts is very expressive. This is the case of Mosteiros with 8.8% dropout rate in 2015, despite being much lower than 2000/2001, which was 12.5%. There was also an increase in the dropout rate in Santa Catarina do Fogo (3.7%) and São Lourenço dos Órgãos (3.9%) from 2001 to 2015. Figure 7.7 shows the percentage of secondary school dropouts in 2014 across the 22 municipalities.

Figure 7.7- Secondary school dropout rate in the academic year 2013/2014 (%)




Source: MED (2015)

As the data confirm, the dropout rate is higher in the municipalities of Santa Catarina do Fogo, Paul and Brava, with 13%, 11.1% and 11% respectively. On the other side, the three municipalities with the lowest dropout rates are Praia, Sao Vicente and São Domingos with 3.9%, 3.5%, and 3.1% respectively.

Indicator 9: Literacy rate (2000-2015)

The level of education of any population is the outcome of a concatenation of factors, and not solely the result of any specific government policy. Other societal factors are deemed important for the achievement of the educational goals. Therefore, the inclusion of the literacy rate here as a broader outcome indicator, is perfectly understood, if one aims to grasp the influence of such “societal factors”, or the social capital on the literacy rate of each municipality.

Figure 7.8. Literacy rate across the 22 municipalities (2015)




Source: Anuário Estatístico (INE, 2015)

The municipalities of Sal, Boa Vista and Praia present the highest literacy rate, with 93.5% for the former two, and 91.7% for Praia. On the other extreme, the municipalities of Tarrafal de Santiago, Porto Novo and Ribeira Grande de Santiago present the lowest rate of literacy rate, with 75.3%, 75.6%, and 76.7% respectively.

Indicator 10: Poverty rate (2016)

Like the literacy, poverty rate, as an outcome indicator to determine the performance of local government and the level of development of the municipalities, is the result of a combination of factors and not the direct impact of any specific government policy. However, it is believed that the local Council, as the primary promoter of the development of the municipality, its actions (policies) have a greater influence on the general outcomes. Based on this assumption, figure 7.9 below depicts the poverty rate distribution across the 22 municipalities in Cabo Verde in 2016. Boa Vista, Sal and São Vicente are the municipalities with the lowest poverty rate, with 8.30%, 19%, 27.40% respectively, in contrast to the municipalities of Santa Cruz (60,30%), São Lourenço Orgãos. (58.50%), and S. Felipe Fogo (54.80%).

Figure 7.9 - Poverty rate across the 22 municipalities (2016)



Source: INE (IMC, 2016)

The process, output and outcome performance indicators presented and described so far, have been drawn and prepared based on government and expert study reports, and the publications of National Statistics Institution (INE). The desegregation of data by municipalities has allowed some comparative analysis regarding their performance in each indicator provided. However, this has not been the case for the last proposed indicator for analysis in the chapter, the people’s perception of the local government performance.

Indicator 11: CBOs Leaders’ perception of local government

Different from the set of indicators presented above, there is an absence of statistical and qualitative produced data that allow an analysis of the people’s perception of their local government performance across all the twenty two municipalities. Thus, to fill in this vacuum, I collected some qualitative data based on interviews and surveys with CBOs leaders in the municipalities of Ribeira Grande de Santiago, São Slavador do Mundo and Santa Catarina de Santiago. However, due to the smallness of samples for each municipality, the survey results are presented in bulk for all the three municipalities combined, then, comparative analysis will be established based on the interview quotes and other qualitative collected information.

The perception of the leaders of the CBOs interviewed on the local government performance is part of the larger constituency's evaluation of their local government's responsiveness to their demands, and the efficiency with which such responses are being provided. CBO leaders' commitment to their communities and municipal development, allow them to have a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of *what*, and *how much of what* the local government is doing to address the communities' demands. On the same token, CBOs leaders are aware of the means the local governments employ to do what they do. Hence, due to lack of qualitative and quantitative data of constituency's perception of their local governments, taking the CBOs leaders' evaluation here is perfectly understandable. The evaluation I present here is qualitative rather than quantitative, drawn on in-depth interviews carried out with those leaders. Each of these leaders was asked to rate their satisfaction on their council's performance on each of the 16 policy sectors of the responsibility of the councils. Table 7.3 display their answers.

Table 7.3 - CBO Leaders satisfaction with the city councils on the specific policy sectors in the three Municipalities (2008-2016) - (The figures should be read as percentage-%)

Policy sectors	Degrees of Satisfaction					
	Very Unsatisfied	Unsatisfied	Not satisfied Nor Insatisfied	Satisfied	Very satisfied	Do not know/No answer
1. Culture	10	15	20	50		5
2. Education	15	20	10	45	5	5
3. Health	15	40	10	20		20
4. Services of Social Promotion	25	15	30	20		10
5. Tourism and Environment	15	15	15	20		5
6. Community development	20	25	25	25		5
7. Promotion of Civil society?	30	30	25	10		5
8. Governance	15	45	5	10	10	15
9. Rural Development	25	30	30	5	5	5
10. Basic sanitation	20	20	20	35	5	
11. Economy, Entrepreneurship/ Business	15	35	15	30		5
12. Agriculture	10	30	20	20	5	15
13. Housing	15	30	5	35	10	5
14. Sports	15	35	20	25		5
15. Professional Training	5	15	5	55	5	15
16. Planning (Budget, annual planning of activities)	55	5	15	5	20	
MEAN % of Satisfaction	19,06	25,31	16,88	25,63	8,13	8,57

25.31% of the respondents say they are unsatisfied, while 19.06% say they are very unsatisfied with the local council's performance. 16.88% of them think that things have kept pretty the same from 2008 to 2016 (the not satisfied, nor unsatisfied), adding to the 8.57% who did not

know how to answer. Looking at the satisfaction score for each individual policy sector, it can be seen that professional training, culture and education receive have the highest appreciation scores from the CBOs leaders. With 55%, 50% and 45% respectively. It is perfectly understandable that culture receives the highest performance appreciation, knowing the high publicity and investments the councils do on the cultural activities. One local politician said, “if you want to take the party into the communities, gain some friendship and conquer the people’s trust, the smart way to do that is to ally with cultural groups” (Interview with J.A., former secretary of PAICV in São Salvador do Mundo, February 2018). In fact, it is a common practice to see “cultural groups”, as *grupos di batukus*, performing on stages, supporting their friendly political parties during election campaigns. Therefore, financial efforts are done to keep these groups active, for the value they represent for the parties when election time comes is high. The practices of funding education and professional training, giving cement and other construction material for house refurbishment and small benefits for community members function as the bargaining chip for electoral purposes. When I say education, I mean strictly the financial grants or subsidies (sometimes vouchers) for those attending secondary school or universities. On the other hand, the sectors with the lowest performance appreciation performance by the CBO leaders are the budget making process (5%), Rural Development (5%), governance, and promotion of civil society with 10% each. All these sectors have to do essentially with policy process.

When looking at the municipalities separately, the CBOs’ leaders express different degrees of satisfaction for the performance of their respective Town Councils. For the case of Santa Catarina de Santiago, there is a general feeling among the leaders that from 2008 to 2016, the Council had a bad performance across all the policy sectors. One leader, referring to the former Mayor, states, “a president like that, we have no desire to have him back. Santa Catarina does not deserve him”, adding that if MPD had presented that same Mayor for reelection in 2016, “he would surely have lost”. Another CBO leader emphasizes that “Assomada [the city center] stopped in time”, just to illustrate the poor progress the city had made.

For the case of Ribeira Grande and São Salvador do Mundo, the leaders’ satisfactions with their local governments’ performance are convergent, despite some harsh criticisms regarding some issues. The convergence of the leader’s evaluation might have to do with the fact that both these municipalities were officially institutionalized in 2005. Thus, the leaders recognize the efforts the councilors have made to start and equip the Councils with the minimum conditions to work, and minimally respond to their constituents’ demands. However, it is observed that the leaders in São Salvador do Mundo are more sympathetic with the

performance of council than the ones in Ribeira Grande. This difference, however, might be biased by their party proximity, an analysis I will further develop in the second part of this chapter when analyzing the influence *linking social capital* over performance.

7.4 Social Capital, local government performance and Municipal Development in Cabo Verde

Having presented the data on the performance indicators for the 22 municipalities, I now turn to the explanations for their different level of performance. What account for such a different performance? Why do the municipalities present different levels of development? Two hypotheses have been so much in vogue to explain such development discrepancies: Institutional inefficiency, and deficient economic structure of the municipalities (PD Consult, 2015). Regarding the first hypothesis, in recent years, the need to carry out a comprehensive government administrative reform in Cabo Verde has been the buzzword of political debates, as well as in some spheres of civil society. The main arguments in favor of such a need, is the possibility it brings for the implementation of institutional reforms that would allow the creation of better and more efficient local government institutions. For instance, the PD Consult report on the Cape Verdean Local government sustainability (2015), conducted under the request of MAHOT, concludes that the low performance of local governments in collecting taxes and mobilizing resources through mechanisms other than the state transfer, is due to either their internal management deficiencies or the institutional constraints imposed by the laws. The study points out that better organized municipalities have better resource mobilization capacity than the ones that present serious internal organizational deficiencies. On the other hand, municipalities have limitations, for instance, in the extent they have access to funds, due to constraints imposed by the national laws. However, for the councils to improve their performance on this regard, two things would have to happen: on the one hand, the Councils have to carry out internal institutional readjustments to improve their efficiencies. On the other hand, they would have to count on the central government to implement macro-institutional changes, which would give them additional means to increase their resources.

The second commonest explanation focuses on the economic structure of the municipalities. The argument is that more economically developed municipalities benefit from a higher taxation base, and therefore, they have more financial resources at their disposal to implement projects and deliver services to its citizens. *Ceteris paribus*, these municipalities are expected to have better performance in all the indicators. However, what can be observed from the list of performance indicators presented and discussed above, their relationship with the

level of economic development of the municipalities is not so linear. For example, Brava is economically less developed than Boa Vista, but the former presents a higher percentage of people who enjoy comfortable house sanitary conditions than the latter. Thus, performance might be related to variables other than economic development or institutional factors. Hence, this chapter does not build on the institutional nor on the economic variables to explain the municipalities' performance, but on the social capital hypothesis.

In his analysis of institutional performance in Italy, Robert Putnam asks, "Does the performance of an institution depend on its social, economic, and cultural surround?" (Putnam, 1993, p. 4). His likely answer to that question is the social and cultural surrounds, what he calls of social capital. Social capital, for Putnam, influences the regional Italian government institutional performance, while the economic surrounds and the government institutional designs do not seem to play any big role (Putnam, 1993), or he did not dedicate much of his interest and time in studying the existence of such an association. On the same line of argument, Hyden (1997) sees civil society organizations and the social capital that inheres in them, as "necessary to achieve [...] development" (p. 4). Particularly for local development, Krishna (2003) argues that "the stock of social capital is brought to bear more effectively upon institutional performance when community associations engage with government programs at the local level" (p. 362).

Thus, this section bases on the *linking social capital stock* available in each municipality as the analytical category of their performance level. The linking social capital, as defined in chapter 6, refers to the formal incorporation of CSOs in the local governance process. For the linking social capital variable, I take as the unit measure the "CSOs engagement rate", determined by their "project execution rate" as presented in chapter 6. Therefore, this engagement rate, now representing the stock of *linking social capital* is taken as the independent variable to explain the local government performance. We saw earlier in chapter 6 that the CSOs project execution rate depends very much on the level of their collaboration with the local governments (and not only). One would expect that when collaboration is strong, the project implementation rate is also higher, leading therefore to a higher development indicators in the different municipalities. Hence, I foresee that where the social capital stock is high, the performance is expected to be stronger as well. The opposite is also expected to occur. In addition to the comparable quantitative data available for the 22 municipalities, qualitative data collected through interviews will be used here to support the validity of this linking social capital argument. Firstly, the analysis focuses on the association between each performance indicator and the stock of linking social capital, with scatter graphs displaying such a


relationship in each municipality. Secondly, the relationship between the two variables is presented focusing on two specific sector policies, education and rural development programs. Here the analysis will be strictly qualitative.

7.4.1 Social capital and Process outputs

1- Own-Revenue generation capacity

Figure 7.10 indicates that there is some association between linking social capital stock at the disposal of municipalities and their government capacity to generate their own revenues. The concentration of the municipalities in the bottom left-hand corner of the graph in Figure 7.10 shows that the lower linking social capital stock is positively associated with municipalities' low capacity to generate revenues. For instance, the two contrasting cases of São Salvador do Mundo and Praia are paradigmatic. Being the poorest in linking social capital stock, the former is also the weakest in generating its own internal income, while the latter has the highest stock of linking social capital, and so, is amongst the highest performance municipalities in terms of own internal income generating capacity.

Figure 7.10 Linking social capital and the municipalities' Own-Revenue generation capacity



The linking social capital explains the revenue generating capacity of local governments in two different ways: firstly, it creates an environment of trust within the municipality's boundary, which lowers transaction cost between interactors at all levels (Knack, 2001). People trust and develop positive attitudes towards the local governments' rules and regulations, and so increases the compliance with such rules and regulations; investors feel safer and more confident to create new business, generating jobs and income for the families, etc. This environment is particularly important for the "tax morale" of individuals (Alm and Gomez, 2008). Individuals feel more enthusiastic to pay tax and other dues to the local authorities, if they know and trust the authority's plans and intentions with their contributions. Thus, by engaging the different stakeholders to disseminate the rules and regulations within the municipal territory, compliance will increase. Secondly, linking social capital plays an important role in easing the process of individuals' contributions. As Hyden (1997) argues, "development benefits from the freedoms that civil society [and the social capital] provides because people can take initiatives they would not otherwise do" (p. 12). A good example of the social capital incorporation in local governance, is the case of the partnership the Town


Council of Praia has developed with the associations of Taxi owners, the association of inter-cities transport (*Associação de Condutores de Hiaces*) and associations of other formal and informal business sectors. The Town Council has also established partnerships with other non-state organizations for collecting the municipal taxes and fees. In the Municipalities of São Salvador do Mundo and Ribeira Grande de Santiago, for example, that kind of linkage between the Councils and the local associations is not observable, nor the de-concentration of any kind of municipal services. Looking at the development level of Praia, in comparison with the other two municipalities, one may feel tempted to establish some positive relationship between the linking social capital and the performance of local governments in promoting municipal development.

7.4.2 Social capital and output indicators

2) Pre-school education infrastructure (2000-2015)

How has the supply of pre-school education infrastructure been influenced by the linking social capital in the Cape Verdean municipalities? The answer is that the linkage relations between local governments and CSOs help in the needs analysis and resource mobilization for the construction and maintenance of infrastructures. On the other hand, it contributes to the cost reduction of the construction and maintenance of those infrastructures. One example of this contribution is the community mobilization by local associations for refurbishing and painting village schools. Figure 7.11 shows that there is some association between the two variables if we look at the concentration again of the majority of the municipalities in the bottom left-hand corner of the figure.

Figure 7.11- Linking Social capital and Pre-school education infrastructure (2000-2015)




However, some odd cases can be verified here. For example, the municipality with the highest performance on the *Pre-school education infrastructure*, Paul, is among the ones with lowest linking social capital. However, it is known that in the sector of education, Paul has had a strong presence of collaboration of NGOs like BØRNEfonden, and the Luxembourg Cooperation. These and other non-state institutions have given a lot of contribution to the sector in that municipality. Increase and decrease of population rate of the municipalities throughout the period analyzed might have also accounted for such a performance. Sal, Boa Vista, São Vicente for example have seen a quick increase of their population, greatly due to their tourism development industry and their economic development. This might increase the pressure on the local governments to provide for the public goods, both quantitative and qualitatively sufficient. Thus, collaboration, or linkage with CSOs/social capital increases the local government response rate in providing school infrastructures.

7.4.3 Social capital and Professional training (2011-2016)

Professional training is part of the human capital formation, a means the municipality has to promote local employment, mainly self-employment. However, in the case of Cabo Verde, that task is in great part under the responsibility of IEFP⁵⁰, the central government’s agency in charge of designing and implementing employment and professional training policies. In many occasions, professional training programs implemented in the different municipalities are done in collaboration with IEFP, or other organizations. Figure 7.12 shows that there is a weak association between the linking social capital and professional training events, as well as the percentage of population who received professional training in the different municipalities from 2011 to 2016.

Figure 7.12 - Linking Social capital Professional training (2011-2016)




However, one can still see that the municipalities of Sal, São Vicente and Praia, which have a higher linking social capital index, have a better performance in this indicator than the majority of the municipalities in short of linking social capital stock.

⁵⁰ IEFP- Work and Professional Training Institute

7.4.4 Social capital and Health- Community Based health facilities (USB)

It is expected that municipalities with higher stock of linking social capital index, present lower percentage of population being served by one USB. Figure 7.13 below shows that the relationship between these two variables is not constant across the 22 municipalities. On the one hand, in some municipalities like São Salvador do Mundo, Tarrafal de São Nicolau, São Lourenço do Orgãos, Santa Catarina to Fogo, Brava and Sal, their low stock of linking social capital corresponds to a high percentage of population served by one single USB. On the other hand, municipalities like Porto Novo and Tarrafal de Santiago, despite having low stock of linking social capital, provides more USBs for their population.

Figure 7.13 Linking social capital and the supply of USB




Nevertheless, this mild association is comprehensible to a certain extent, because similarly to professional training, health policy has been greatly under the purview of the central government. Indeed, the construction and modernization of various regional and other local hospital facilities have reduced the need for the construction of community health units.

However, it is still held true that the availability of these health units closer to the population is a great value for them as it shortens their distance to get health treatment.

7.4.5 Linking social capital and improvement of household sanitary condition (2012-2016)

Apart from supplying houses for the poor, local governments also have the responsibility to provide affordable and quality sanitation services to the communities and households, like building toilets for poor families, as well as connecting houses to public sewage system. The relationship between the linking social capital and the “improved house sanitary conditions” is in general weak, as there are some municipalities with low stock of linking social capital, but still with high indices of sanitary house service delivery. These are the cases of Ribeira Grande and Tarrafal de Santiago. On the other extreme stand the cases like the municipality of São Vicente, which despite its higher social capital stock, is among the lowest performing municipalities in regarding the housing sanitary condition indicator.

Figure 7.14- Linking social capital and house sanitary conditions




It should be highlighted that recently, for the period considered, huge public investments have

been done in the sectors of water and public sanitation. However, these investments are under the direct purview of the central government, leaving the municipalities with some minor interventions. That is the case of Ribeira Grande de Santiago. Due to its elevation to the status of the World Heritage Site in 2009, it has attracted heavy government and foreign donors' funds to invest in infrastructure. Nevertheless, it can be noticed that social capital is still linked to improvement of housing sanitary conditions in some other municipalities. For example, Porto Novo and Tarrafal de São Nicolau present both low stock of linking social capital and low rate of housing sanitary conditions. On the other hand, Praia presents high stock of linking social capital and high rate of housing sanitary conditions.

7.4.6 Linking social capital and improvement of housing conditions

The last output performance indicator this section focuses on is the “percentage of population with improved housing conditions”. To what extent does the linking social capital influence improvement of housing conditions across the municipalities? Figure 7.15 below displays the existing relationship between these two variables.

Figure 7.15 Linking social capital and improvement of housing conditions (2014)



The relationship between the *linking social capital and improvement of housing conditions* is somehow mild, as there are municipalities with low stock of linking social capital, but still with low percentage of people living in poor housing conditions. The municipalities like Ribeira Brava, Tarrafal de São Nicolau, and São Felipe are the examples of odd cases. They have low stock of social capital and still present a low percentage of people living in poor housing conditions. There is a proportional relationship between the stock of social capital and the reduced percentage of people living in poor housing conditions in Sal, São Vicente, Praia and Ribeira Grande de Santo Antão. On the other hand, the municipalities in the top-left hand corner of figure 7.15 present high percentage of people living in poor housing conditions, along with their low stock of linking social capital stock.


Improving housing conditions for poor people is one of the top priorities, and indeed, one of the core activities of CBOs and some other CSOs, both in the urban and rural areas of the country. During the field research with the leaders of CBOs, some of them lamented the fact that the Town Councils “ignore the associations’ resources and capacities” to implement housing construction or reconstruction programs. “With the money the Council builds one house, we can build two houses”, affirms a CBO leader from Ribeira Grande de Santiago. This example shows that engaging CSOs contribute positively to reduce the percentage of people living in poor house conditions, as they can contribute with their own resources (in most of the cases, the free community labor) to the effectiveness and efficiency of the construction or refurbishment housing projects. When there is partnership, or engagement of CSOs in the construction of houses, the probability to improve the Town Council’s responsiveness and efficiency rate on this indicator is higher.

Having shown the relationship between the linking social capital and output indicators, now the focus changes to the three outcome indicators: secondary school dropout and literacy rates in the education sector, and the poverty rate. Social outcome indicators, as Putnam (1993) points out, should not be directly linked to any specific public policy, as they may be the results of a myriad of factors prompted by either political institutions or other societal variables. However, it is convenient to say that the social capital expressed by the synergetic relationships (Evans, 1997) do play a role in the performance of those indicators. As we try to understand the extent to which the synergistic relationship between the CSOs and the local governments influence the performance of these latter institutions, and the achievement of broader local development goals, it is of utmost important to consider the outcome indicators.

7.4.7 Linking social capital and secondary education dropouts (2000-2015)

Figure 7.16 displays the relationship between the linking social capital and secondary school dropouts between 2000 and 2015. Dropout rate varies from each municipality, depending to a certain extent on the social capital stock at their disposal.

Figure 7.16- Linking social capital and secondary education dropout rates




The relationship between linking social capital and secondary school dropout rate is strong in the municipalities of Praia and São Vicente, as they have higher stock of social capital and lower dropout rates. Similarly, some municipalities like Santa Catarina de Fogo, Paul and Brava present the highest school dropout rates, as they also have low stock of social capital. However, cases like São Lourenço dos Orgãos, Maio and others with low stock of linking social capital, present low dropout rates, as well. Cases like the Municipalities of São Salvador do Mundo, Ribeira Grande de Santiago and Santa Catarina de Santiago, with relative low stock of linking social capital, but with low rate of school dropouts, have recently benefited from new teaching establishments, therefore reducing the distance from students' home to school. São Salvador do Mundo and Ribeira Grande de Santiago had their first and unique high school infrastructure built in 2009. In the municipality of São Salvador do Mundo, the dropout rate went down from 7.8% in the academic year 2007/2008 to 2.2% in 2014/2015. No one can deny the influence the new infrastructure has had on that decrease. That infrastructure has greatly shortened the

distance between students' home and school in the municipality, knowing that they used to attend school in the nearby municipality of Santa Catarina.

7.4.8 Linking social capital and literacy rate (2000-2015)

The other outcome indicator to measure the local government performance in the education sector is the literacy rate. Here the association between linking social capital and the performance level of municipalities is strong, despite the existence of some deviant cases. Praia, again, with the highest stock of social capital, presents the highest performance after Boa Vista and Sal. The clustering of municipalities with both low stock of linking social capital and literacy rate in the bottom-left-hand corner of figure 7.17 shows that there is some association between the two indicators.

Figure 7.17 Linking social capital and literacy rate




CSOs in Cabo Verde dedicate 8% of their activities in the education sector (Plataforma das ONGs, 2015), indicating their valuable contributions for the achievement of higher level of education literacy of their constituents and the population in general. Even those CSOs whose

core activities are concerned with other sectors, have indirect impacts in the education. That is the case of the woman I interviewed in the municipality of São Salvador do Mundo, who benefited from the assistance of a local CBO to start her small bakery business. With the income generated from her business, she was able to send her kids to school and refurbish her house. Thus, the work done by these civil society organizations when leveraged by the local government structures through synergistic relationships (Evans, 1997), end up influencing positively the performance of municipalities in different sectors, including education.

7.4.9 Linking Social capital Poverty

Now focusing on the last outcome indicator, poverty, it can be noticed that the clustering of municipalities near the top-left-hand corner of figure 7.18, indicates a strong relationship between their poverty levels and their stock of linking social capital.

Figure 7.18 - Linking social capital and poverty rate



Tarrafal de Santiago, São Lourenço dos Orgãos and São Salvador do Mundo are examples of these poor social capital and poor performing municipalities, regarding the policy rate. On the other hand, the municipalities of Praia, São Vicente and Sal respectively, present the lowest poverty rates, in association with their higher stock of linking social capital. Decreasing poverty

levels of population is one of the core missions of CSOs in Cabo Verde. Thus, their support from the local governments, and the creation of synergy between them around programs and projects for poverty alleviation shall only produce positive results. As figure 7.18 shows, municipalities with high poverty rates are also poorly linked with the local governments (poor linking social capital). Without attempting to point out any “causal relationship” (della Porta and Keating, 2008), between the two variables, by saying that the presence of social capital implies the reduction of poverty rate, or that the absence of the former automatically increases the presence of the latter, one can certainly make some inference from the relationship existing between these two phenomena. The interviews with the leaders of CSOs and some of the beneficiaries of CBOs’ projects in the three municipalities studied, allow the inference that when these organizations are engaged with the local government structures around both production and implementation of anti-poverty projects, their effectiveness, efficiency, but most importantly, their impacts on the people’s life are dearly positive.

The data and their interpretations presented in the above paragraphs suggest that engagement of CSOs in the local government policymaking and implementation processes (treated throughout the second part of this chapter as the linking social capital) influence the government performance. The visual representation of the data collected in the figures above demonstrate considerable associations between CBOs engagement and performance, despite the occurrence of some odd cases. However, one cannot deny the contribution of variables such as direct public investment, or people’s own investment in their material and human capital development, changing therefore their economic and social statuses. Nevertheless, these factors and their relationship with government performance should be considered as objects of a different study. The study presented in this chapter has focused solely on the influence of the linking social capital- engagement of CSOs in the local policymaking and implementation processes, over the performance of the local government institutions.

The last set of performance indicator as presented in the first part of this chapter is the degree of satisfaction of citizens with the local government service delivered. As there is lack of quantitative data that allow a comparative analysis across the 22 municipalities, I tried filling in this gap with some qualitative information gathered through interviews and survey analysis with the Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in the three case study municipalities. However, due to reduced number of interview and survey samples, it is unfeasible to try any quantitative relations between the linking social capital and the satisfaction level. The linkage is thus strictly descriptive and qualitative.

All the three municipalities present very low stock of linking social capital, but São Salvador do Mundo has the lowest, after Ribeira Grande and Santa Catarina with 1.6%, 2.6% and 4.1% respectively. In all the three municipalities combined, only 25.63% of the interviewees express satisfaction and only 8.13% of them say they are very satisfied with the overall local government performance from 2008 and 2016. The majority of the satisfied or very satisfied answers come from the CBOs leaders in São Salvador do Mundo and Ribeira Grande de Santiago. These interviewees justify their answers with the fact that the local authorities have been able to put their Councils on foot knowing that they were institutionalized in 2005. However, between these two municipalities, in São Salvador do Mundo the leaders seem to be more sympathetic in their satisfaction with the overall local government performance, as the majority of them are close to the ruling party, PAICV. In Ribeira Grande and Santa Catarina, those who declare their party militancy, go clearly by the same bias as well. One interviewee, describing his opinion on the performance of the former local government executive from 2008-2016, in respect to the local community development, states “we do not have any nostalgia of those people (referring to the former councilors). Santa Catarina stopped in time during their administration” (Interview with Mr. Emílio, February 2018).

For the case of São Salvador do Mundo, one of the interviewees states, “I recognize the tremendous work the Council has been doing since its installation in 2005. Now we have a Town Council como *ill faut*, despite the challenges it is still facing. We all see the good work the council has done so far across the sectors. What we hope is that things will continue in the same direction” (Interview with Mr. Jorge., February 2018). Despite the municipality of Santa Catarina has a higher stock of linking social capital, the level of satisfaction with the service delivered by the City Council is less positive than the satisfaction expressed for the Councils in the two other municipalities, Ribeira Grande Santiago and São Salvador do Mundo.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has been developed around one central question: the “so what” of social capital. Focusing on the concept of *linking social capital*, understood as the engagement of civil society organizations in the local policymaking and implementation process, the main argument has been that the stock of this form of social capital at the disposal of a municipality influences its government performance. This influence happens because when local governments engage CSOs, they can count on these actors “unique [...] resources, skills, relationships or consent” (Brinkerhoff, 2002, p. 26) to plan and deliver services to the communities. When such a

collaboration occurs, I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this chapter that the impacts on both local government responsiveness and efficiency tend to be better. The municipalities with higher stock of linking social capital tend to present higher indicators of performances, as well as higher levels of development regarding the indicators used in this chapter, despite the occurrence of odd cases. The chapter however, does not completely rule out other hypotheses, namely the institutional and economic development hypotheses, to explain the local government performance. However, these hypotheses have not been taken here for two reasons: On the one hand, local government institutions in Cabo Verde are ruled under similar institutional designs, and no institutional creativeness in service delivery on their part has merited any valuable attention of the public. On the other hand, the economic development of municipalities depends very much on their internal dynamics, in which the social capital itself plays an important role (Fukuyama, 1995; Hyden, 1997; Knack, 2001). However, these hypotheses need to be further developed in other independent research studies. In conclusion, based on the data gathered and presented along this chapter, partnership between local governments and the local CSOs seems to be a sound strategy to promote local development. However, to achieve such a purpose, both social capital and institutions need to be reactivated, mobilized and be put at the servive of local development. On the one hand, it seems that citizens need propel their bridging network organizations, galvanize resource, and then demand their incorporation in the local governance process. On the other hand, both local and central governments should guarantee institutional conditions to promote the incorporation of CSOs and the social capital in the governance process.

CONCLUSION

The research work presented in the chapters above is on the engagement civil society organizations (CSOs) in the governance process in Cabo Verde. The concepts of “governance” and “public policy process” have been used interchangeably throughout this study to roughly mean the very same thing. Thus, governance refers to the “role of citizens in the policy process and how groups within a society organize to make and implement decisions on matters of great concerns” (Brinkerhoff, 1999, p. 124). By focusing on a single country analysis, this research assumes itself as a case study on the engagement civil society organizations (CSOs) in the governance process. Cabo Verde is highlighted amongst the group of the Sub-Saharan Africa late Third Wave democratizers. Against the theoretical biases regarding the civic participation in Africa, the Sub-Saharan late democratizers are examples that civil society does exist, and play an essential role in the democratic and socioeconomic development process on the continent. The mobilization of civil society organizations in the democratization process in the 1990s, and their involvement in open “contentious politics” was essential to defeat the authoritarian regimes (LeBas, 2011; Bermeu and Yashar, 2016). For the socioeconomic development, civil society organizations have been essentially important in producing and supplying collective public goods, supplementing the state’s failure to do so. Thus, to the question posed in the first chapter of this work, “why do civil society organizations matter?” the answer is that, for the particular case of the Sub-Saharan late democratizers, they do matter both for democratic and socioeconomic advancement of nations. CSOs involvement in politics in Cabo Verde as an explanatory variable for the country’s socioeconomic and democratic progress, has been highlighted in this research as a successful case among other Sub-Saharan late democratizers.

To analyze such a contribution, this research traces the engagement of CSOs from the colonial period up to the mid of the second decade of 2000s, in an attempt to find both the explanatory variables and the outcomes of such an engagement. Regarding the former, two set of explanatory variables have supported the analysis of CSOs’ involvement in the policy process in Cabo Verde, with emphasis in four key policy sectors- education, rural poverty, GPRSPs, and local government. These two set of variables are institutional and social capital variables.

On the one hand, the pattern of CSOs engagement has changed across the time, along with the changes in the country’s political institutions, namely government regime, political parties, institutional designs, practices and narratives prevailing in Cabo Verde regarding the

incorporation of civil society in the government system. While the colonial regime barred the existence of free and participative organizations of civil society, in the post-independence era, the state itself assumed the key role of creating “opportunity structures” to promote the CSOs and their engagement in public affairs. During the single party regime, engaging CSOs in the political affairs became a matter of state’s primary goal. Specific policies were adopted, as demonstrated in chapters 2 and 6, to include “mass organizations” in the government programs design and implementation. Such a policy was justified for the fact that the masses and their organizations had played important role to subvert the colonial regime, and now with the independence, they had to be included in the “reconstruction of the nation”. Despite the criticism over the single party manipulation of CSOs (Costa 2013), what can be inferred is that the patterns of collaborative relationship between state and the CSOs which would endure in Cabo Verde up to the present days, originated in the single-party regime.

The inauguration of democracy in 1990, and the adoption of new institutions, with the emphasis on the new Constitution, untied the CSOs from the direct control of the ruling party, and the government. The adoption of market policies in the 1990s, led the CSOs to lose the state support they had enjoyed in the previous regime. Therefore, a process of CSOs “disengagement” (Azarya, 1994; Kasfir, 1994) from the government activities was initiated in the aforementioned period.

Apart from the change in government, legislations, along with institutional practices and narratives, political parties also play an essential role as an explanatory variable for the engagement of CSOs in governance in Cabo Verde. This research has highlighted that PAICV, a leftist party, has been more prone to CSOs engagement than MPD, a right-wing political party. However, parties often approach engagement as a strategy to mobilize resources rather than a strategy to promote governance. Chapter 6 has widely explored this parties’ stratagem.

The second set of explanatory variables of CSOs engagement in policy process in Cabo Verde is the social capita. Social capital has been treated in this work as the trust, and norms of reciprocity generated from the thread of interpersonal and inter-organizational relationships developed through network of associations, both at the national and local levels. Thus, social capital has been represented in three different dimensions: bonding, bridging and linking dimensions (Evans, 1997; Fox, 1997; Woolcock, 1998, 2000, 2002). The first dimension, referring to networking of people based on their blood or tribal ties, has not received much focus in this research. The bridging dimension of social capital refers to the network of people not linked by blood ties, but by a common concern, and the norms and values emanating from such a relationship. The bridging social capital is generated within the civil society groups that

act outside the spheres of family and the government, but which try to link and influence the latter to some extent. Finally, the linking social capital refers to linkage of groups of civil society to the institutions of power, the government. However, this research, in its chapter six, suggests a new dimension of social capital, which is the *societal linking social capital*. This new dimension of social capital refers to the networking of the different “corporate actors” (Coleman, 1988) that make a polity. These actors include the CSOs, Business corporations, the media, the political parties, and the institutions of political power. It is believed that the relationship maintained among these groups will, on the one hand, increase the power resource of each one of them, and on the other and, produce a type of synergy- *the society linking social capital*, that is beneficial for the success of policy implementation and the promotion of a sustainable development (Brown and Ashman, 1996). An example of such a synergy and its correlated power resource is provided in chapter 6, in which the CBOs, a subset of civil society organizations, is much more empowered to influence local policy decisions when they have strong linkages with the other “corporate actors” in a given municipality. Thus, this new dimension of social capital, added to the other three as described by Woolcock (1998, 200, 2002) are important to explain the engagement of CSOs in the governance process and the socioeconomic development of the municipalities, and Cabo Verde as a whole. That is because as the civil society organizations, along with the social capital they generate, become resourcefully stronger, they become much abler to link and develop “synergistic relationship” (Evans, 1997) with government, and so become into an important mechanism to “support cooperative problem solving” (Brown and Ashman, 1996, p. 1468), both locally and nationally.

Engagement of CSOs in the 4 policy sectors: Success and failure

The two sets of institutional and social capital explanatory variables described above have been used throughout this work to analyze the engagement of CSOs in four key policy sectors: education, rural poverty, GPRSPs, and local government. To these four sectors are added the political regime change in 1990, and the two most recent debates of regionalization and the statute of political office holders in Cabo Verde analyzed in the introduction section.

From the institutional perspective, it can be observed that *formal institutional conditions* are in place to guarantee the participation of civil society and its representative organizations across all the policy sectors. The constitutions and other legislations not only frame the CSOs’ engagement, but also encourage and promote it. State institutions and political parties all have developed favorable discourse towards the incorporation of CSOs in the policy process. However, what can also be observed is that the ineluctable relativistic appropriation of the

institutional norms by political actors hampers largely the formal realization of CSOs' incorporation in the policy process. This fact is mostly observable with CSOs' engagement in the local governance process. That is also applicable for the case of GPRSP, which elaboration and implementation is supposed to be "country participative" with strong engagement of civil society. However, as a macro-policy instrument, the elaboration of GPRSPs in Cabo Verde is government led, with the involvement of civil society organizations only in their late stage of implementation.

In the sectors of Rural Poverty, more concretely the PLPR, and Education, there are formally institutionalized structures and procedures for the approval and implementation of new policies. Regarding the former, the *Coordination Unit of Programs* (UCP), a national umbrella public institution that coordinates the elaboration and implementation of policies for alleviating poverty in the country, harbors within its structure both public civil society institutions. Regionally, there are the *CRPs* (Comissão Regional de Parceiros), which are the regional network of local organizations- local government, Enterprises and CSOs, that design and oversee implementation of local policies to tackle poverty. Thus, civil society organizations have an institutionalized vehicle to voice the community concerns.

With respect to the education policies, only recently circa 2014, there was institutionalized a formal structure for civil society collaboration in the elaboration and implementation of education policies. Other than that, the institutional incorporation of civil society in education policies have been kept at discourse level, and dependent on the discretion of political actors.

Regarding the social capital explanatory variables, their strength to explain the engagement of CSOs across the four aforementioned policy dominions, builds on these organizations' capacity to mobilize resources that catapult them into decision-making table. From the four dominions, social capital strength seems to have been mostly impactful in education and rural poverty policies. The participation of CSOs in the *Local Group of Education Partners*, has been possible because of their mobilized resources (social capital) that project them as strong policy entrepreneurs in the education sector. The same argument is applicable for the case of CSOs engagement in the rural policy, concretely in the PLPR. These two policy cases are undoubtedly the most successful cases of CSOs' incorporation in the policymaking and implementation processes in Cabo Verde.

Concerning the CSOs' participation in the GPRSPs, it is relatively weak on the stage of formulation, exactly because they lack the resources to present policy alternatives at the negotiating table. GPRSPs define the government's macro-policies, with the support of

international organizations, for promoting economic growth and poverty reduction. For civil society organizations to influence such policies, they would have to have enough material, human and social capital resources to gather evidences and construct viable policy alternatives in relation to the ones presented by the government. The Cape Verdean CSOs are financially weak, and so, could not compete against government regarding policy alternatives.

The social capital perspective to the engagement of CSOs in the local governance seems to follow the logic of institutional perspective. The opportunistic institutional practices carried out by political actors, rather than endorsing the formal political institutions (as the constitution and the set of legislations), hamper greatly the formal and institutionalized incorporation of CSOs in local policy process. In the face of the institutional constraints, the CSOs' social capital, either in the form of bridging or societal linking social capitals, underutilized in the process of local policymaking and implementation.

The so what of CSOs' engagement?

Another important aspect this research has focused on is the “*so what?*”, or the outcome of CSOs' involvement in the public policy process in Cabo Verde. What are the gains of CSOs involvement in the policy process? Civil society participation in governance, as shown in chapter 1, has been widely sold as an attribute of economically advanced and consolidated democratic countries (Almond and Verba, 1969). One wonders though whether this attribute is a prompter or an outcome of the economic development and democratic consolidation. Focusing on the case of Cabo Verde, a case in the Sub-Saharan Africa late Third Wave democratizers, this research shows that the engagement of civil society and their organized institutions, the CSOs in the governance process, has been at the root (prompter) of the country's economic and democratic advancement. If we take civil society to be the spaces of the individuals' intervention over public issues, either in isolation or in groups, but outside the sphere of government (Ewloh, 2000), it emerged in Cabo Verde in the period of colonization. Although organized civil society was not involved in the “geometry of relationships” (Castell, 2008) with the government, civil society groups propelled various interventions, which would eventually turn the course of the Cape Verdean History. Farmers' revolts, movement of intellectuals' organizations, accompanied by their public interventions, are just some examples. The Cape Verdean independence was not simply handed out to the people by the former colonizers. The people conquered their own independence.

The formal institutionalization of CSOs' incorporation in the government activities in the years following the independence in 1975, should not be simply taken as an offer from the

political organizations either. During the single party regime, the authoritative government created opportunities for the civil society to participate in the state affairs, based on the argument that civil society and their representative organizations had been in the forefront of the struggle for the liberation movement, and therefore, they should not be left out of the process of the country's reconstruction. That was a fact, despite the criticism that the single party regime designed the engagement of society organizations *à sa manière*, to serve its own purposes (Santos and Bastin, 1988; Costa, 2013; Santos 2016).

The transition of Cabo Verde to democratic regime in 1990 was not a result of any revolution, political, military or of any other kind. Some have pointed out that it was the result of a confluence of both external and internal factors (Baker, 2006). Focusing on the internal factors, the argument presented in this research, as developed in the introduction, is that the engagement of civil society and their organizations in the government affairs during the single party regime, contributed enormously to widen their democratic awareness, and so, the desire of change in the political system. Thus, the announcement of regime change in 1990 was greatly due to a more "mature" and demanding civil society, despite its mobilization not being up to the point of transforming into the *power of the street*, as happened in most other late Sub-Saharan late democratizers, which ultimately forced the regime change. Such a change, "freed" civil society, in the sense that there was a separation between the state/the ruling party and the society. However, if in the previous regime the state "protected" and "supported" the organizations of civil society, as incorporated agencies of policy implementation, in the 1990s, the separation between the state and the society led largely to the "disengagement" (Azarya, 1996; Kasfir, 1994), and "exit" (Hirschman, 1970) of CSOs from the government activities.

The bridging social capital then re-emerged in the 1990s with the boosting of small community associations throughout the country, as strategies of production and supply of public collective goods, no longer provided by the state. With the marketization of economy, and the state retrenchment policies adpted in that decade, CSOs became then the safety network for the most disadvantaged segment of population. Thus, alike its democratic advancement, Cape Verdean economic progress would not have reached the level it is today, if it had not been for the involvement of institutions of social and solidarity economy (Santos, 2016) which have provided for those excluded by the formal market economy. From the very beginning of the independence, the engagement of the peoples' cooperatives in the production and food delivery systems, agricultural system and other activities, contributed greatly for the economic sustenance of many Cape Verdeans.

Chapter 7, more emphatically than the others, shows why the engagement of CSOs count. The engagement of CSOs in governance, more specifically in local governance influences the performance of local government institutions. Why is this so? That is because CSOs participate with their resources (time, money, skills, etc.), which contributes to the government responsiveness (Putnam, 1993), and “effectiveness and efficiency” (Paul, 1997) of the implemented policies. Chapter 7 shows that municipalities with higher rate of CSOs engagement in local policymaking process- the *linking social capital* tend to present higher levels of performance.

In summary, the *so what* of CSOs’ engagement in Cabo Verde is that it has both prompted the democratic and economic advancement of this country. Civil society in Cabo Verde has always been in the forefront of democratic and economic development of the country, and as these two phenomena develop, it has become more “matured”, more demanding, and in fact, more respected by the political actors. In the 2000s, as referred in chapter 2, numerous laws and government resolutions were enacted, as part of the institutional conditions to incorporate civil society and its organizations in governance, as strategies to promote an “inclusive and sustainable development” (Govern. Program, 2001). Some political events that took place during the last PAICV’s government from 2011 to 2016 are further evidences of such a civil society maturation and contribution to the country’s democratic and socioeconomic development. The street protests led by MAC#14 in 2015 against *Estatuto dos titulares de cargos políticos* led the Presidential of the Republic to veto the bill, and since then no political actor has had the courage to bring it to the public debate again. The movement in favor of Regionalization of Cabo Verde, most recently joined by SOKOLs 2017, have campaigned hard for the country’s political and administrative reforms to create regional governments. Their campaign gained echo, and in October 2018, the House of Parliament approved the bill that enacted the regionalization policy. The *victories* led by these movements are clear evidences of the power the Cape Verdean civil society has garnered, and the contribution they can make to the country’s governance system. However, despite the attempt made in chapter 7 to measure the influence of civil society organizations over the local governance, there is yet a need of more precise data quantification of their contribution of the country democracy’s and socioeconomic development indicators.

This research has focused primarily on the physical organized forms of civil society (Bratton, 1994; Ewob, 2004), the CSOs and their relationship with government. However, in recent years, civil society has been greatly relying on less conventional and in new ways of intervention and influencing policy-the use of social media. MAC#14, referred to in the above

paragraph, relied on Facebook to take thousands of people to street to protest against the *Estatuto dos Titulares de Cargos Políticos*. Social media has allowed for individualized forms of participation of civil society (Ewoh, 2004), but still capable of generating impacts at a large scale. The internet and the social media in particular, might have greatly reduced the traditional forms of face-to-face interaction through associational activities, but will never be a threat to the existence of these peoples' association. In fact, the associations can use the social media to strengthen their advocacy work and seek more cooperation from the public. The associations, or the CSOs will keep being vital, not only for the country's democracy, but also for its economic development.

The emphasis put on the civic participation- the social capital, as an explanatory variable for the democratic and economic advancement of Cabo Verde does not diminish the roles of political institutions. If CSOs engagement generates social capital that is important for democracy and economic development, political institutions' openness for such an engagement also counts. The inexistence in Cabo Verde of a permanent "contentious politics" (Tarrow, 2011) is the result of such a political openness to the civil society engagement. Thus, the institutional and social capital variables have been used harmoniously throughout this work to explain the engagement of CSOs in the policy process in Cabo Verde. Hence, the findings revealed in this research answer the questions posed earlier in the introduction: "*what are the determinants of CSOs' engagement in Cabo Verde?*" CSOs engagement in governance in Cabo Verde has been influenced by both institutional and social capital determinants. The confluence of these two categories of factors has given corps to a distinctive "geometry of relationship" (Castell, 2008) between the CSOs and the state in Cabo Verde, which makes this country a successful case among other Sub-Saharan African late third wave democratizers.

Some policy implications

What now? The analysis of CSOs' engagement in the policy process in Cabo Verde, and the highlighted findings on both the determinants and the outcomes of such engagement as they have been presented in this research, call for some important policy refinements on the relationship between state and CSOs with regards to the governance process. This refinement would have to be orientated in two directions: On the one hand, it should center on the revisiting the institutional atmosphere and mechanisms under which CSOs operate and engage in governance. Chapters 2 through 6 highlight that despite the existence of formal institutional structures that frame CSOs' activities and their involvement in the policy process, they are often

overlooked and manipulated by political actors, who try “to bend or hijack [the CSOs’ engagement process] for their particular interests” (Brinkerhoff, 1999, p. 139). Political actors often make paradoxical comments regarding CSOs, and sometimes positioning against the contracting out of these organizations to implement public services. The local mayors for instance, strongly oppose the contracting out of CSOs by the central government to carry out public work, despite the existing of institutional mechanisms that allow such a policy. Therefore, if it is a fact that CSOs’ incorporation help achieve policy responsiveness and efficiency, there is a need of enactment of clearer institutional mechanisms, that candidly set the boundaries for political actors’ intervention over the work of CSOs and their incorporation in the public policy processes, both at the national and at the local levels. At the local level government for instance, Krishna (2003) argues that “by engendering a climate suitable for association building and civic engagement, local governments can enhance the utility and effectiveness of community associations” (p. 362) in the policy process. The same idea is backed up by Tendler (1997) and Abers (2000).

The second policy refinement would have to focus on the empowerment of CSOs. This empowerment should take two forms: On the one hand, CSOs need to find new and diversified means to mobilize resources, including social capital in all its dimensions, human capital and financial resources. This mobilization would necessarily imply a stronger societal networking, from all levels: stronger community bridging, and a stronger linking among society’s “corporate” actors. A stronger and more effective community bridging will require the institutionalization of an educational program, or a policy to promote and encourage active citizen participation. On the second hand, apart from the citizens’ participation, CSOs need to be strongly linked with other institutions, either to mobilize material resources or trust, and then be catapulted into the political arena of policymaking and implementation. Once standing as resource independent institutions, CSOs will indeed become a “power seen afar” and act as the “independent eye of society” to surveil the state’s affairs (Tocqueville, 1998, p. 218), and influence the public policies. As Azarya (1994) puts it, “civil society does not just exist as a natural component of any society. It has to be constructed, tended to, protected, transmitted from generation to generation; otherwise, it may wither and disappear” (p. 96). Civil society and the CSOs, are key elements to build a “strong democracy” (Barber, 1984), or even “save” it (della Porta, 2013), as well as to promote socioeconomic development of a polity. This has been the case of Cabo Verde. Thus, to prevent the civil society and its organizations from withering away, there is a need of an intelligent public policy adoption, targeted specifically at empowering civil society and its organizations. With such a policy in place, “synergistic

potentials emerge, and societal-problem solving capacity increases” (Brinkerhoff, 1999, p. 128). Cabo Verde has had these potentials, and it needs to keep on nurturing them, if the country still aims at becoming an advanced economy and a consolidate democracy in the world.

Some Challenges encountered during the research

This research is on CSOs engagement in Cabo Verde. Despite focusing on the whole country, a case study analysis was initially designed to be implemented in six municipalities. However, financial means and time constraints made it unfeasible to include all the six municipalities, and so, only three ended up being considered for the case study analysis. Nevertheless, this reduction of the cases did not affect the model of analysis adopted, nor the results themselves. The three cases chosen fitted the theoretical framework adopted accordingly.

A second challenge had to do with data collection. Most of the country statistical reports are available on the internet. However, getting government reports or data relevant for the research that are not available on the internet was difficult, and was sometimes even impossible. In conversation with a senior officer in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development about the data regarding the rural development policies implemented in recent years, he plainly put it like this, “we have this report, but up to now, it is confidential”. I wrote emails to some government institutions requesting data, but only a few responded to my requests.

Difficulties were also felt on the terrain during interviews and application of questionnaire. Meeting the leaders of CBOs was not easy. The distance of the communities where they live, and their working schedule made it difficult for us to meet and talk. Even more difficult was answering the questionnaire by themselves. First, I send the questionnaire to some of them. However, whenever I called to ask whether it was ready or not, the usual answer was “I am not done with it yet”. Then I realized that their difficulties might have been due to the complexity of some of the terms used, so I decided to conduct interviews in person with each of the 20 leaders I defined as my focus group, and fill in the questionnaire myself. It consumed a lot of my time and other resources, but it proved far more effective. The findings reported in this research has greatly to do with the approach I took.

I was born and raised in the countryside, an agricultural village in Santiago Island. Thus, getting early in the morning and walking long distance (sometimes more than two hours walking) to work on the field was part of my daily routine. I still remember with some nostalgia, my siblings and I saying while going through the everyday long distance, *forti kaminhu ki ka ta kaba* (*What a distance that never ends!*). A thesis research is like a long walking distance

that seems endless, but which eventually ends. It ends, not because it has reached the end point of the walk, but simply because the walker (in this case the researcher) decides to make a pause, leaving for others to judge his track. That is how I feel now.

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⁵¹ National Action Plan of Education for All (author' translation)

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A- QUESTIONNAIRE

SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONS FOR COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATIONS (Associations) IN CABO VERDE

Questionnaire form

This questionnaire is part of an investigation a PhD thesis in the Public Policy at the University Institute of Lisbon-ISCTE. The results will be used solely for this purpose, strictly academic. The interviewee's answers represent only his opinion, and the position of the organization he represents. There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, it is requested that the interviewee answers to all questions spontaneously and sincerely. Thanks for your collaboration (By **José Lopes**)

I. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE ASSOCIATION

01. Name of the Organization: _____ NO. Members of ____ (M__ F ____)

02. Contact of the interviewee _____

A1. Year of foundation _____

A2. The Association is formally legalized and recognized in the Registry? Yes No? _____

A3. Which of the following types of organization does your Association fit in?

1. Community Development Association _____
2. Association self-help _____
3. National NGO _____
4. International NGO _____
5. Federation _____
6. Cooperative _____
7. Union _____
8. Other (Please specify type) _____
99. Do not know / Do not Answer _____

A4. Association activities are developed at the level (of)?

1. Local Community	1
2. Municipal	2

3. Regional (Islands)	3
4. National	4
5. Transnational / International	5

A5. What are the three main areas of intervention of the Association?

Activity areas	Options
1. Culture	1
2. Education	2
3. Health	3
4. Social Services / Social Promotion	4
5. Tourism and Environment	5
6. Development of local communities	6
7. Promotion of Civil Society	7
8. Good Governance	8
9. Rural Development	9
10. Sanitation	10
11. Economics, Entrepreneurship / Trade,	11
12. Agriculture	12
13. Housing	13
14. Sports	14
15. Other (please specify)	15

A6. What is the mission and the main objectives of its Association?

A7. Who created the Association?

	Yes	No
Independent Citizens / Community Members		
National NGOs		
NGOs / representatives International NGO		
Political Parties / parties representatives (people with strong connection to Political Parties)		
City Council		
Central government		
Other (Please specify)		

A8. To what extent does your Association cooperate with the following institutions? Assess the degree of cooperation with each institution on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 means no cooperation, and 4 - a very strong cooperation.

	No Coop.	weak Coop	Some Coop	Strong coop	Don't know / No answer
1. Central Public Administration (central government)	1	2	3	4	99
2. Local public administration (City council)	1	2	3	4	99
3. National NGOs	1	2	3	4	99
4. Foreign NGOs	1	2	3	4	99
5. Other foreign entities	1	2	3	4	99
6. Media	1	2	3	4	99
7. Companies	1	2	3	4	99
8. Political Parties	1	2	3	4	99
9. Other (specify)	1	2	3	5	99

A9. To what extent do the following factors influence the activities of the Association? (Only one response per column)

FACTORS	Never Influence	Rarely Influence	Influence	Influence frequently	Always Influence	Do not know / No answer
1. Needs of the Members of the Association	1	2	3	4	5	99
2. Community Needs	1	2	3	4	5	99
3. Government Programs	1	2	3	4	5	99
4. Agenda donors / sponsors (national, international)	1	2	3	4	5	99
5. Schedule of political parties	1	2	3	4	5	99
6. Other (please specify)	1	2	3	4	5	99

A10. In your view, to what extent does the use of the following strategies by Association influence the decisions/policies of the City Council in your municipality?

Strategies	Never Influence	Rarely influence	Influence	Influences frequently	Always influences	Do not know / No answer
1. Participation in discussions, meetings, conferences, locally and nationally, promoted by civil society and / or public authorities	1	2	3	4	5	99
2. Development of studies and bill proposals around an issue, followed by their publication in mass media/ Social Media	1	2	3	4	5	99
Participation in meetings with local political officers	1	2	3	4	5	99
Participation in Municipal advisory boards	1	2	3	4	5	99
Participation in activities promoted by the Political Parties.	1	2	3	4	5	99
Other (please specify)	1	2	3	4	5	99

II- RELATIONSHIP WITH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A11. How do you assess the relationship between your Association and the City Council in the municipality?

1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Acceptable
4. Bad
5. Very bad
99. Do not know / No answer

A12. How do you evaluate the relations between the Association and Central Public Administration (central Government) in Cabo Verde?

1. Excellent
2. Good
3- Acceptable
4. Bad
5. Very bad
99. Do not know / No answer

A13 / 14. How do you assess the relationship between your Association and the City Council during the incumbency of the PAICV / MDP.

	Incumbency of PAICV	Incumbency mandate MPD
1. Excellent	1	1
2. Good	2	2
3- Acceptable	3	3
4. Bad	4	4
5. Very bad	5	5
Do not know / No answer	99	99

A15 / 16- In your opinion, how your is the association linked to the City Council / Central Government in the formulation and implementation of public policies?

Forms of Linkage	City council		Central Government	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
The Association initiates projects jointly with the City Council / Government	1	2	1	2
The Association participates in the decision processes regarding community issues led by the City Council / Government	1	2	1	2
The Association participates in the preparation of the Annual Plan of activities and the Budget of the Council / the Government program in the sector it operates	1	2	1	2
The Association is hired only to provide advisory services to the City Council / Government	1	2	1	2
The Association is only contracted to execute / implement activities under a specific public policy.	1	2	1	2
The Council / Government only in certain circumstances support (financially) the Association when requested.	1	2	1	2

A17 How often does the Association engages/ or is involved in the policy process of in the local government policymaking and implementation?

Stages of the Policy process	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always	Do not know / No answer

The association does advocacy work to influence the local government agenda	1	2	3	4	5	99
The association participates in formulation of policies aiming at solving a particular problem	1	2	3	4	5	99
The association participates in the implementation and monitoring of policies in the sector in which it intervenes	1	2	3	4	5	99
The association participate in policy evaluation activities implemented in the sector involved	1	2	3	4	5	99

A18 / 19. In your view, to what extent does your association influence the decisions made by (the)...

	City Council	Central government
Never Influence	1	1
Rarely Influence	2	2
Influence	3	3
Influence often	4	4
Always influences	5	5
Do not know / No answer	99	99

A20. In your opinion, to what extent does the following factors hinder a good relationship between the association and public administration (the City council and the central government, or its agencies headquartered in the municipality)?

Factors	Does not hinder	Hinde	Hinder a little	Hinder a lot	Always hinder	Do not know / No Answer
Not having access to the authorities of the Public Administration (PA)	1	2	3	4	5	99
State institutions do not trust the Association	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association does not trust the State institutions	1	2	3	4	5	99

Unwillingness of public institutions to cooperate with the Associations	1	2	3	4	5	99
Corruption	1	2	3	4	5	99
Lack of information on the forms of cooperation	1	2	3	4	5	99
Low technical preparation of the Association's staff, and financial means for the promotion of projects and attract the attention of Public administration	1	2	3	4	5	99
Lack of visibility of the Association's activities	1	2	3	4	5	99
Other (specify	1	2	3	4	5	99

A21. In your opinion, to what extent has the Association contributed to the development of the following sectors in your municipality? Evaluate the degree of your contribution in each sector on a scale of 1-5, as indicated:

	No contribution	weak Contribution	some contribution	A strong contribution	Do not know / No answer
1. Culture	1	2	3	4	99
2. Education	1	2	3	4	99
3. Health	1	2	3	4	99
4. Social Services / Social Promotion	1	2	3	4	99
5. Tourism and Environment	1	2	3	4	99
6. Development of local communities	1	2	3	4	99
7. Promotion of Civil Society	1	2	3	4	99
8. Good Governance	1	2	3	4	99
9. Rural Development	1	2	3	4	99
10. Sanitation	1	2	3	4	99
11. Economy, Entrepreneurship / Trade development	1	2	3	4	99
12. Agriculture	1	2	3	4	99

13. Housing	1	2	3	4	99
14. Sports	1	2	3	4	99
Professional Training	1	2	3	4	99
Planning (budget, annual plan of Activities of the City Council)	1	2	3	4	99

A22. How would you rate your satisfaction with the performance of the Municipality in the following sectors, with special regard to the period 2005-2016?

	Very unsatisfied	Unsatisfied	Not satisfied/	Satisfied	Very satisfied	Do not know / No
1. Culture	1	2	3	4	5	99
2. Education	1	2	3	4	5	99
3. Health	1	2	3	4	5	99
4. Social Services / Social Promotion	1	2	3	4	5	99
5. Tourism and Environment	1	2	3	4	5	99
6. Development of local communities	1	2	3	4	5	99
7. Promotion of Civil Society	1	2	3	4	5	99
8. Good Governance	1	2	3	4	5	99
9. Rural Development	1	2	3	4	5	99
10. Sanitation	1	2	3	4	5	99
11. Economics, Entrepreneurship / Trade	1	2	3	4	5	99
12. Agriculture	1	2	3	4	5	99
13. Housing	1	2	3	4	5	99
14. Sports	1	2	3	4	5	99
Professional qualification	1	2	3	4	5	99
Planning (budget, annual plan of Activities of the City Council)	1	2	3	4	5	99

III RELATIONSHIP WITH POLITICAL PARTIES

A23. How would you describe the relationship between your association and political parties?

Relationship	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	Ever	Do not know / No Answer
The Association transmit to the parties their interests and concerns, and the parties defend them in decision-making arenas	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association provides relevant information to political parties	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association organizes meetings with the parties to present and debate community issues	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association participates in the vote mobilization for the parties	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association provides finance to political parties	1	2	3	4	5	99
The parties influence the agenda of the Association	1	2	3	4	5	99
The parties finance the activities of the Association	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association avoids contacts with the parties not to be labeled as "partisan"	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association supports different political parties	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association maintains alliance with only one political party	1	2	3	4	5	99
The parties are hostile to the Association and see it as their opponent.	1	2	3	4	5	99
The ruling party affects the activities of the Association	1	2	3	4	5	99

A24. What is your overall rating of the relations between civil society organizations and political parties in Cabo Verde?

Relationship with parties	Rating
Great	1
Good	2
Rasoável	3
Bad	4
Very bad	5
Do not know / no answer	99

A25 / 26. How do you evaluate the relations between your association and the two largest political parties in Cabo Verde, PAICV and MPD?

PAICV	MPD

Great	1	1
Good	2	2
Acceptable	3	3
Bad	4	4
Very bad	5	5
Do not know / no answer	99	99

IV- COOPERATION WITH OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (CSOs)

A27. How does your association link to other CSOs (national and foreign) in the municipality, or others?

Relationship	Never	Few times	Sometimes	Many times	Always	Do not Know / No Answer
CSOs meets with the Association to hear its concerns and discuss community problems	1	2	3	4	5	99
CSOs and the Association prepare jointly projects to be implemented in the community	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association Implement projects of other CSOs in the community	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Ass. And other CSOs are part of same platforms of national and international NGOs	1	2	3	4	5	99
Other (specify)	1	2	3	4	5	99

V- COOPERATION WITH ENTERPRISES

A28. How does the Association cooperate with companies in the municipality (private sector)

	Never	Few times	Sometimes	Oftentimes	Always	Do not Know / No Answer
Initiation of joint projects	1	2	3	4	5	99
Companies consult the Association on specific subjects of your domain	1	2	3	4	5	99

The Association is hired by the company to provide services within its area of intervention	1	2	3	4	5	99
Business finance the activities of the Ass.	1	2	3	4	5	99
Other relationships (please specify)	1	2	3	4	5	99

A29. How would you rate your satisfaction with the relationship between the Association and the companies in the municipality, with particular attention to the period that goes from 2005 to 2015?

- Very unsatisfied _____
 Unsatisfied _____
 Nor dissatisfied / Neither satisfied _____
 Satisfied _____
 Very satisfied _____
 Do not know / Not aware _____

VI- RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MEDIA

A30. How does the Association relate with the media?

	Never	Few times	Sometimes	Oftentimes	Always	Do not Know / No Answer
The Association invites the Media to cover its events	1	2	3	4	5	99
The media works with the Association. In the implementation and dissemination of its activities	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association promotes training for journalists in its areas of intervention	1	2	3	4	5	99
The Association utilizes the media to influence the government agenda and policies in the sector it intervenes	1	2	3	4	5	99
Other (please specify)	1	2	3	4	5	99

VII- FINANCING OF THE ASSOCIATION

A31. Over the past 10 years (2005-2015), what have been the main sources of funding of the Association? Choose from the options listed, categorizing them according to the volume of available funding, in which 1 is not an important source and 4 is a very Important source.

	Not important	Little important	Important	Very important
Members' dues	1	2	3	4
Services provided to third parties	1	2	3	4
Donations from Companies	1	2	3	4
donations from International CSOs	1	2	3	4
Donations from national NGOs	1	2	3	4
Central government	1	2	3	4
City Council	1	2	3	4
Political parties	1	2	3	4
Other (Specify	1	2	3	4

VIII- INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEE

<p>A32. Years of collaboration with the Association Less than one year _____ 1-3 years _____ 3-5 years _____ 5-10 years _____ More than 10 years _____</p> <p>A33. What is your position in the Association? Member of direction Member of the Association Other _____</p>	<p>A34. Area of your residence is</p> <p>Urban Rural</p> <p>A35. Education Primary school _____ Secondary education _____ Professional Education _____ Degree _____ Illiterate _____</p> <p>A36. Do you have any partisan sympathy? Yes _____ Not _____ Does not reply _____</p> <p>A37. Which political party do you belong to? PAICV _____ MPD _____ Other _____</p>
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End- Thank you for your cooperation APPENDIX B - LIST OF CBOS/LEADERS INTERVIEWED

APPENDIX B- LIST OF CBOs/LEADERS INTERVIEWED

Nº	Name of the CBOs	Municipality	Year of Foundation	Name of the Leaders interviewed	Date of the Interview
1	Associação para o Desenvolvimento de Pico Reda- ADCEPR	Santa Catarina de Santiago	1999	Victor Gonçalves	February 17 th , 2018-
2	Associação de Solidariedade e Apoio aos de Santa Catarina ASAC-SC	Santa Catarina de Santiago	2014	<i>Mr. Emídio Fernandes</i>	February 7 th , 2018-
3	Associação Corpo jovem de Santa Catarina	Santa Catarina de Santiago	2006	Hermínio	February 17 th , 2018-
4	Associação Desenvolvimento Comunitario de Fonte Lima	Santa Catarina de Santiago	2008	Sr. Adilson	February 17 th , 2018
5	Associação Comunitária do Engenhos	Santa Catarina de Santiago	2008	Sr. Ana	February 17 th , 2018
6	Lajusca	Santa Catarina de Santiago	2003	Sr. Ana	February 17 th , 2017
7	Associação Desportiva Recreativa Cultural de Porto Mosquito	Ribeira Grande de Santiago	2011	Manuel Jesus Lucas	February 28 th , 2018
8	Associação para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário de São Martinho Grande	Ribeira Grande de Santiago	2010	Sr. Jorge	February 28 th , 2018
9	Associação para o Desenvolvimento Comunitario Integral de Belém	Ribeira Grande de Santiago	2010	Sra. Anícia	February 28 th , 2018
10	Agroconvento	Ribeira Grande de Santiago	1996	Sr. André	November 12 th , 2017
11	Associação Comunitária para o Desenvolvimento de Porto Mosquito	Ribeira Grande de Santiago	2007	Sra Clarisse	December 3 rd , 2017
12	Associação Comunitária para o Desenvolvimento de Salineiro	Ribeira Grande de Santiago	2010	Sr. Val	December 3 rd , 2017
13	Associação Comunitária Desenvolvimento de	Ribeira Grande de Santiago	2005	Sr. Rivaldo	December 3 rd , 2017

	Beatriz Pereira- São João Batista				
14	Associação Alto Goveia	Ribeira Grande de Santiago	2009	Sra. Teresa	December 3rd, 2017
15	Associação para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário de Picos Acima-APDEZA	São Salvador do Mundo	2006	Sra. Maria Teresa	January rd, 2018
16	Associação dos Agricultores, Avicultores e Pecuários de Jalalo Ramos- Ajar Caper	São Salvador do Mundo	1996	Sr. Adilson	March 3rd, 2018
17	Associação para o Desenvolvimento Comutário de Mato Limão	São Salvador do Mundo	2000	Sr. Nuno	March 3rd, 2018
18	Associação para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário de Picos-ADP	São Salvador do Mundo	1994	Sr. Osvaldo	January 25th, 2018
19	Associação para o Desenvolvimento de Abrobreiro	São Salvador do Mundo	2006	Sr. António Torres	January 25th, 2018
20	FAMI-PICOS	São Salvador do Mundo	1994	Sr. Antero	January 27th, 2018

APPENDIX C- LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Nº	Names of the Interviewees	Institution	Date of the interview
1	Paulino dias	Former president of AJEC (Cape Verdean Association of youth Entrepreneurs)	October 2017
2	José Luís Neves	Secretary General of the Chamber of Commerce of <i>Sotavento</i> region	October, 2017
3	Mário Moniz	Secretário Executivo da Plataforma das ONGs	7 Novembro 2016
4	<i>Name not identified</i>	Secretary Executive of City Habitat	November 2017 (Written)
5	Rodrigo Bejarano	President of the Paralympics Committe of Cabo Verde	25-8-2017
6	Abrão Borges	Secretary Executive of RNEPT Secretary Executive of SIPROFIS	August, 2017
7	António Melo	Presidente da Federação das Associações de Deficiencia	28-8-2017
8	Graciano Moreno	Former- Rural extencionist	4-09-2017
9	Pedro Brito	Former Directorate General of Budget and Planning in the Ministry of Education	24-07-2017
10	Manuel Osório	Administrator of SONERF	12-09-2017
11	Manuel Pinheiro	Former Director of Directorate General of Planning in the Ministry of Finance	13-10-2017
12	Avelino Bonéfácio	Former President of Plataforma das ONGs de Cabo Verde	October 2017 (Written Interview)
13	Julio Ascensão Silva	Former Leader of the UNTC-CS	October 2017- Written Interview
14	Mr. João Silva*	Manager of CRP Fogo	November 2, 2017
15	António Mendeonça*	Manager or CRP Brava	November 2, 2017
16	Sr. Pedro	Delegate of the Ministry of Education in Santa Catarina de Santiago	March 2nd, 2018
17	Isabel Monteiro	Councilor for the area of education- Santa Catarina de Santiago	March 2 nd , 2018
18	Sr. João*	Agricultural extension agent of Ribeira Grande de Santiago	June, 2018
19	Sr. Clarimundo	DGEPG- Ministry of Agriculture	March 15th, 2018
20	(Name not identified)	Delegado MED- SSM	March, 2018

21	Armando Varela	Extencionista delegação MDR	March, 2018
22	António de Jesus	Expert in Civil society engagement	May 31, 2018
23	Oswaldo Borges	Representative of CRP Santa Catarina de Santiago	March, 2018
24	Edmundo Pereira,	Former leader of INC	Praia, Oct. 24
25	Mr A.J.*	An MPD militant in the municipality of Santa Catarina	June 2018
26	Mrs. Ana Varela.*	Representative of the Delegation of the ministry of education in Ribeira Grande de Santiago	April 2018
27	Sr. Emilio*	Representative-delegate of the Delegation of the ministry of education in São Salvador do Mundo.	April 2018
28	Mrs. Anita Correia	Beneficiary of CRP project	April 2018

- The names have been changed as the interviews manifested the wish of not having their names cited in the study