



Escola de Sociologia e Políticas Públicas  
Departamento de História

The Legitimacy of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the  
European Union: A critical discourse analysis of the EU's normative  
justification as a crisis management actor

Inês Marques Ribeiro da Silva Casais

Tese especialmente elaborada para obtenção do grau de  
Doutor em História, Estudos de Segurança e Defesa

Júri:

Doutora Laura Ferreira Pereira, Professora Catedrática, Universidade do Minho  
Doutora Raquel Freire, Professora Associada com Agregação, Universidade de Coimbra  
Doutora Patrícia Daehnhardt, Professora Auxiliar, Universidade Nova de Lisboa  
Doutor Luís Nuno Rodrigues, Professor Catedrático, ISCTE-IUL  
Doutor Tobias Schumacher, Professor (Chairholder), College of Europe

Dezembro, 2018



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing a PhD thesis is a challenging task. Two people in particular which have accompanied me throughout this process and have provided me with guidance and support in very different ways deserve my gratitude. I would like to thank my friend and supervisor, Tobias Schumacher, for his patience, support, and confidence in me; and my friend and mentor, Luís Nuno Rodrigues, for believing in my potential and guiding me through the process of becoming a teacher. I also owe a very special thank you to Bruno Cardoso Reis.

I have also benefited from comments and encouragement provided by Sven Biscop, Knud Eric Jørgensen, Ana Gomes, Licínia Simão, Münevver Cebeci, Madalina Dobrescu, Anna-Sophie Maass, Riccardo Marchi, Ana Lúcia Sá, Ana Mónica Fonseca, António Raimundo, Filipe Vasconcelos Romão, Vasco Martins, Maria João Vaz, Pedro Seabra, among others.

During my research, I conducted interviews that ended up not being used in this particular study. Nonetheless, I counted on the support of diplomats and EU officials working in Brussels. I take this opportunity to especially thank each and every one of them for lending me their precious time and attention. The data collected in these interviews is useful knowledge that will be included in other scientific endeavours.

Outside of the academic world, some people are always there to support me, no matter what. I would like to thank my twin Mafalda whose support has been instrumental throughout the elaboration of this research project, as well as throughout my entire life. I would also like to thank my brothers Miguel and Vasco, my mom Graça, Amber, Francisco, and Leão, as well as everyone else in my giant and loving family. My friends have also been extraordinarily understanding and supportive. I would like to especially thank my best friends, Catarina and Érica, for their precious support and irreplaceable friendship, as well as each and every one of my Clássicas for encouragement, kindness, and friendship.

I also take this chance to thank my colleagues and friends at CEI-IUL Noémia, Raquel, Sandra, Maria João, Fernanda, and João, the very competent and helpful ESPP and GAI teams at ISCTE-IUL, as well as my students.

This research project was conducted with the support of a doctoral grant awarded by Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia with the reference SFRH/BD/69405/2010.



## **ABSTRACT**

Legitimacy is mostly how institutions and polities ensure compliance / endorsement in the absence of coercion. Looking at the European Union's actorness in crisis management, since the creation of the CFSP and of the ESDP in the 1990s until the 2016 Global Strategy, we analyse how it seeks to legitimate its identity and actions by justifying them normatively through discourse. We highlight the importance of normative justification in ensuring actorness legitimacy, as not a lot of attention is paid to the EU's discursive ability to convince other actors in the international system of its appropriateness to engage in external action, especially when strong normative components are involved. The area of crisis management is marked by its emergency and crisis nature and deployment on a case-by-case basis, unlike most external policies, so the EU's normative justification narratives focus on its own potential role, identity, and value-added, rather than on countries that might receive this help. Thus, we focus on how the EU convinces others and itself (including the governments and wider public in its Member States) to validate and endorse it, rather than on the receiving end of the policy. We use critical discourse analysis (CDA) embedded in post-structuralism due to their focus on deconstruction and critique of asymmetric power relations, their effort to 'denaturalise' meta-narratives that shape the social world, and due to the importance of language and discourse for the legitimation of organised power relations. The identified narratives reveal an asymmetry between the EU and its interlocutors: the EU assumes that others want to emulate its standards, brands itself as an ideal model, and places itself at a superior level. Thus, by attempting to make others 'normal' and 'adequate' by organising and modernising them according to the standards that the EU considers ideal or universal, the EU assumes a 'civilising' attitude that goes beyond crisis management.

## **Key words**

Actor, actorness, Common Security and Defence Policy, crisis management, critical discourse analysis, European Union, legitimacy, post-structuralism

## **RESUMO**

Legitimidade é o principal meio para instituições e entidades políticas garantirem validação na ausência de coerção. Focando a ‘actorness’ da União Europeia na área de gestão de crises, desde a criação da PESC e da PESD nos anos 90 até à Estratégia Global de 2016, analisamos o modo como procura legitimar a sua identidade e acções, justificando-as normativamente através do discurso. Enfatizamos a importância da justificação normativa na garantia de legitimidade da ‘actorness’, já que pouca atenção é prestada à capacidade discursiva da UE na procura de convencer outros actores no sistema internacional da sua adequação para desenvolver uma acção externa, especialmente quando esta envolve fortes componentes normativas. A gestão de crises caracteriza-se por uma natureza de emergência e crise, e é desenvolvida e implementada caso a caso, contrariamente à maioria das políticas externas, portanto as narrativas de justificação normativa da UE focam-se no seu próprio potencial papel, identidade, e valor acrescentado, e não nos eventuais países receptores. Portanto, centramo-nos em como a UE convence outros e a si mesma (incluindo governos e público dos Estados Membros) a validar e sancioná-la, em detrimento da recepção desta política. Recorremos à análise crítica do discurso orientada pelo pós-estruturalismo, dado o enfoque desta abordagem na desconstrução e crítica de relações assimétricas de poder, o seu esforço de ‘desnaturalização’ de meta-narrativas que moldam o mundo social, e a importância da linguagem e do discurso para a legitimação de relações de poder organizadas. As narrativas identificadas revelam uma assimetria entre a UE e os seus interlocutores: a UE assume que os outros querem emular os seus padrões, marca-se como modelo ideal, e coloca-se num patamar superior. Ao procurar fazer os outros ‘normais’ e ‘adequados’, organizando e modernizando-os de acordo com os padrões que a UE considera ideais e universais, a UE assume uma atitude ‘civilizadora’ que ultrapassa a gestão de crises.

### **Palavras-chave**

‘Actorness’, actor, análise crítica do discurso, gestão de crises, legitimidade, Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa, pós-estruturalismo, União Europeia

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>i</b>
<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>Resumo</b> .....	<b>iv</b>
<b>Table of contents</b> .....	<b>v</b>
<b>Acronyms</b> .....	<b>vii</b>
<b>Chapter 1 - Introduction and Scholarly State of Play</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1 - The EU legitimacy debate .....	8
1.1.1 - Limitations and weaknesses in the EU legitimacy debate.....	12
1.2 - Actorness, legitimacy, and normative justification .....	19
1.2.1 - Actorness conceptualisations.....	19
1.2.2 - The EU's power-related role conceptions .....	30
1.3 - Normative justification as a means to achieve actorness legitimacy .....	33
<b>Chapter 2 - Framework of analysis</b> .....	<b>43</b>
2.1 - Post-structuralism .....	43
2.2 - Critical discourse analysis .....	49
2.2.1 - Research questions and analytical framework.....	51
2.3 - Main objectives and claims .....	55
<b>Chapter 3 - The network of practices: the context of the EU's normative justification as a crisis management actor</b> .....	<b>59</b>
3.1 - Discursive struggles in EU crisis management policy .....	59
3.2 - Selection of an EU crisis management normative justification discursive corpus.....	63
<b>Chapter 4 - The semiotic evolution of the EU's normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor</b> .....	<b>75</b>
4.1 - The genesis and first steps towards the establishment of the ESDP .....	75
4.2 - The European Security Strategy and the launch of the ESDP.....	113
4.3 - Crisis management goals and actions on the path to the Lisbon Treaty .....	138
4.4 - The Lisbon Treaty: an effort toward coherence, effectiveness, and visibility .....	163
4.5 - Resilience and retraction in the EU's normative ambitions .....	196
<b>Chapter 5 - Narratives, hierarchizations, omissions, and representations</b> .....	<b>223</b>
5.1 - The EU's discursively constructed identity.....	223
5.2 - The EU as a peace promoting 'model' .....	226
5.3 - The EU as a security actor that brings value-added .....	229
5.4 - The EU's 'civilising' attitude and 'normalisation' narrative .....	231
5.4.1 - The EU as a post-colonial actor.....	233
5.4.2 - The 'security-development nexus' narrative .....	235

5.4.3 - The EU as an ‘anchor of stability’ .....	237
5.5 - The primacy and universality of EU values, principles, and norms.....	239
5.6 - Other discursive omissions and conceptual imprecisions .....	241
5.7 - The representation of different actors.....	245
5.7.1 - The EU’s ‘strategic’ international partners .....	245
5.7.2 - The E/CSDP host countries and potential host countries .....	247
5.7.3 - EU Member States and targets of the EU’s discourse .....	252
<b>Chapter 6 - Conclusion .....</b>	<b>255</b>
6.1 - Possible avenues for future research .....	260
<b>References .....</b>	<b>262</b>
<b>Sources: Discursive corpus.....</b>	<b>291</b>



## ACRONYMS

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoR	Committee of the Regions
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CPMD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DG	Directorate-General
DG RELEX	Former DG of the Commission for Foreign Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Communities
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EU INTCEN	EU Intelligence Analysis Centre
EUFP	European Union Foreign Policy
EUGS	EU Global Strategy
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FP	Foreign Policy
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH
GNP	Gross National Product
HR/VP	High Representative / Vice President

HSG	Heads of State and Government
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
IR	International Relations
MD	Managing Directorate
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MMA	Monitoring, Mentoring, and Advising
MS	Member States of the European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATO SG	NATO Secretary General
NP	National Parliament
NPE(U)	Normative Power Europe(an Union)
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QMV	Qualified majority voting
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TEU	Treaty on European Union (as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon)
UK	The United Kingdom
UN(O)	United Nations Organisation
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US(A)	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union

## CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND SCHOLARLY STATE OF PLAY

The main goal of this study is to conduct a post-structuralism-inspired critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the European Union's (EU) normative<sup>1</sup> justification narratives as a central element in its legitimation efforts as a crisis management actor since the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the 1990s, up until the launch of the 2016 EU Global Strategy. The focus of our analysis falls on how the EU legitimates itself as a crisis management actor through discourse, rather than on how this policy is received.

The area of security and defence in the context of the EU has had a fast yet oftentimes underwhelming evolution. Unlike what the name might suggest, the core of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)<sup>2</sup> remains crisis management rather than a more traditional territorial defence policy, such as the ones states usually have in place. The initial page of the CSDP on the website of the European External Action Service (EEAS) briefly states what is encompassed in the concept of crisis management, and what the EU's ambitions in this area are:

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a *leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention* and in the *strengthening of the international security*. It is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> “‘Normative’ is the adjective derived from the noun ‘norm’, which signifies either the average or usual level of attainment or performance for an individual or a group; or and more usually in philosophical discussion, a standard, rule, principle used to judge or direct human conduct as something to be complied with” (Honderich, T., 1995, ed., *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 626, cited by Manners, 2006d: 117).

<sup>2</sup> The ESDP was renamed CSDP following the Lisbon Treaty. We may refer to this policy as E/CSDP in general terms throughout the thesis for practical purposes, while occasionally making a distinction when referring to specific time periods.

<sup>3</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en).

A key difference between crisis management<sup>4</sup> and a more traditional territorial defence is where the policy takes place. In case of the former, that is predominantly outside of the actor's territorial sphere, while the latter, by and large, takes place within its territory. Although this distinction is somewhat artificial, the underlying idea is that a traditional defence is more often linked with ensuring territorial security in the context of an external threat or attack, whereas the concept of crisis management linked to security and defence is more commonly applied to external emergencies. This raises different questions regarding legitimacy. For territorial defence, domestic legitimation is what is mostly required, while for external crisis management both domestic and external legitimation are required. In both cases there are other considerations – such as the degree of civilian and military input – that also affect legitimacy.

The evolution of the EU has triggered extensive academic debates about its legitimacy and actorness practically since its inception, and especially since the entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty. These debates, however, have been developing mostly separately. In this study, we pinpoint the usefulness of looking at both debates and highlight the importance of ensuring legitimacy for the EU's actorness by analysing a core component of the EU's legitimation efforts as a crisis management actor, namely the discourses and narratives that provide normative justification for the EU's identity and involvement in this policy area.

The study of EU actorness and the legitimacy thereof is primarily justified by the EU's frequent affirmation of an ambition to be a full-fledged international player. This aspiration is visible in EU treaties, official documents and statements, where the EU engages in practices of purposeful construction and dissemination of a common identity as a global actor with a 'vital interest' and a 'responsibility' to get involved in conflicts and crisis situations outside of its territorial sphere, or in efforts of promotion of allegedly universal norms and values (e.g. European Council, 1999b; European Council, 2003a: 5; Solana, 2004: 20; Council, 2004b: 1; Solana, 2009b: 74; Ashton, 2010: 26; European Council, 2012: 8; HR, 2013a: 3; HR, 2013c: 1; EP, 2013: 3; Council, 2015: 2).

---

<sup>4</sup> When we speak of 'crisis management' we essentially refer to the actions and positions assumed by the EU in the area of security and defence, under the aegis of the CSDP, as this terminology is often used by the EU's institutions and bodies to illustrate what it does in the context of this policy. Examples of the use of the general expression 'crisis management' in the context of the CSDP include the crisis management procedure (i.e. the CSDP's decision-making procedure), the crisis management concept, or the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management. Thus, for practical purposes, we will use both terms – crisis management and CSDP – interchangeably.

On its own, the study of EU legitimacy as a crisis management actor can be justified by both domestic and external aspects. Legitimacy is usually mostly brought up in academic debates when it is deemed to be missing, and the academic debate concerning the legitimacy of the E/CSDP seems to suggest that this is the case (e.g. Cutler and Von Lingen, 2003; Wagner, 2005, 2006, and 2007; Mittag, 2006; Stavridis, 2006; Bono, 2006; Oppermann and Höse, 2007; Brummer, 2007; Sjursen, 2008, 2011, and 2015; Comelli and Zanon, 2009; Stie, 2010; Comelli, 2011; Kaldor, 2012; Wouters and Raube, 2012; Schlomach, 2014; Peters, 2014). Nonetheless, this policy is different from the ‘Community method’ policies, not to mention that it is entirely externally oriented. So, the fact that the E/CSDP legitimacy debate focuses almost exclusively on domestic aspects of legitimacy – important as they may be – can be problematic and leave a gap in the literature.

The study of the EU’s legitimacy in this or any other policy area matters because of how it affects the attitudes and behaviours of citizens within (and outside) the EU “to the extent that people acknowledge power as rightful, as validly acquired and properly exercised, they will feel a corresponding obligation to obey and support it without having to be bribed or coerced into doing so” (Beetham, 2013: xi). This applies both domestically and externally, even to a policy like the E/CSDP, with a markedly external orientation, as validation comes from both directions.

Domestically, the EU’s broad foreign policy framework – the CFSP – has been undergoing gradual changes that have been dissolving its initial strict intergovernmental features that draw on the indirect democratic accountability of the members of the Council and other national delegations and representatives in Brussels. There has been a progressive introduction and reinforcement of supranational elements within its functioning and decision-making with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty which have had an impact on the way foreign policy at the EU level is perceived and have rendered its internal legitimating mechanisms subject to a deeper examination and discussion.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Some examples of the introduction of supranational elements within the CFSP by the Lisbon Treaty include the extension of the possibility of QMV for a Council decision regarding an EU action or position based on a proposal presented by the High Representative on his/her own or at the request of the European Council; or the possibility of extension of QMV in the Council to other matters by unanimous decision by the European Council (although the possibility of extension of QMV to decisions with military or defence implications is, for now, out of the question). Other elements with supranational traits (albeit more vaguely and superficially so) can also be found in the increase

Endeavours to make the EU appear stronger, more coherent, more visible, and more effective in this area (HR, 2013a: 3) have often resulted in a delegation of competences to non-elected EU institutions and bodies, especially within the context of the recently created EEAS. In addition, there has also been a growing tendency and even an active effort on behalf of the Member States, towards the pooling of efforts, resources, and capabilities, including the creation of multinational battle groups. This tendency is partly due to crisis-driven cutbacks in national defence expenditure and to an increasing understanding that a growing number of crises can no longer be tackled alone. Moreover, despite the fact that the military component of crisis management is less visible than the civilian one, it is nevertheless present and openly being developed, which raises additional legitimacy concerns (Franck, 2002; Buchanan, 2010; Kantner, 2014; Martin, 2011: 195).

The most visible aspect of the academic debate concerning the legitimacy of the E/CSDP has been its focus on domestic (EU) institutions and the democratic credentials thereof, in particular the inconsistency of parliamentary scrutiny (both at the EU and national levels). This arguably weak *input legitimacy*<sup>6</sup> allegedly stems from the indirect legitimacy of the main decision-makers (national Member State representatives in the Council) since they are elected by national constituencies primarily to carry out national office functions. This situation is supposedly worsened by what some scholars have labelled a ‘double democratic deficit’ (Comelli, 2010: 84). The latter allegedly results from the increased difficulty of national parliaments to scrutinise the E/CSDP, as each parliament can only oversee actions taken by their own government, and thus cannot oversee the policy as a whole. Furthermore, there has not been an increase in the European Parliament’s (EP) responsibilities and powers in this area

---

of the EP’s annual debate on CFSP to twice a year and the extension thereof to CSDP; in the Member States’ duty to try to find a common approach on foreign and security policy issues; and in the requirement of consultation in the European Council or Council regarding individual Member States’ foreign policy options that may affect the interests of the EU.

<sup>6</sup> Fritz Scharpf distinguishes between input and output-oriented legitimacy sources. On one hand, ‘input legitimacy’ is understood as mainly procedural, i.e., isolated from cost/benefit control by the parties, and ultimately regards the democratic accountability of those making decisions. On the other hand, ‘output legitimacy’ is based on the maximisation of common welfare and the fair distribution of costs and benefits, and rests on the quality of the results produced by the decisions made. Ultimately, the author claims that not all EU policies require (democratic) input legitimacy, and that some policies that require less democratic support, can rely on output legitimacy. Bartolini, 2005: 168-169, citing Scharpf, F.W. (1970), *Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung*, Konstanz, Universitnderstood.

to potentially compensate for the national parliaments' limitations, as these remain extremely residual and the EP's engagement in the E/CSDP remains far from systematic (Riddervolda and Rosén, 2016: 693). Although the Lisbon Treaty changed many aspects of the EU's external action, it did not bring much change to its parliamentary scrutiny (Huff, 2013). While the EP has had, since the Lisbon Treaty, to ratify Association Agreements containing stipulations on CFSP and third countries' participation in E/CSDP missions, it remains quite peripheral and informal in the E/CSDP's formal decision-making procedures (Herranz-Surrallés, 2011; Wouters and Raube, 2012). When it comes to the E/CSDP there is "no explicit delegation, neither of decision-making authority nor of parliamentary control and scrutiny, to the European level" (Peters et al., 2014: 444). In addition, the EP (alongside national parliaments) becomes mostly involved 'only after key political decisions had already been made' (ibid.: 430; Riddervolda and Rosén, 2016).

As for other dimensions of actorness legitimacy beyond domestic democratic accountability – which include the EU's legitimation narratives as a global or regional actor –, they have been largely overlooked by the academic debates looking into EU or E/CSDP legitimacy, as well as the EU actorness debate. The study of actorness legitimacy matters in particular because it is vastly understudied, and also because legitimation is mostly how non-state international institutions, such as the EU, ensure compliance or endorsement in their external relations in the absence of enforcement through coercion (which is seldom present at the international level) (Beetham, 2013: 270). This means that legitimacy is intricately related to the concept of 'actorness'. This is where our study seeks to make a contribution to the debates: we highlight the importance of legitimacy for ensuring and strengthening EU actorness, while focusing in particular on the link between legitimacy and both inward- and outward-oriented EU legitimation discourses. This focus helps advance the academic debates, especially because the relation between external legitimacy and actorness has been generally neglected by both academic debates even in the case of EU studies where so much attention has been given to both these concepts separately, as the link between the two concepts has primarily focused on domestic legitimacy (e.g. Sjöstedt, 1977a; Allen and Smith, 1990; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Hettne, 2008; Čmakalová and Rolenc, 2012).

The crisis management area is "widely marked by a lack of critical distance towards its research object as well as a lack of reflexivity towards practices of knowledge production" (Chamlan, 2016: 394); moreover, when it comes to studying the EU's legitimacy in foreign relations, not a lot of attention is paid to its discursive ability (Jørgensen, 2015: 503; Diez,

2014a: 27; Chamlian, 2016) to convince other actors in the international system of its appropriateness to engage in external action – including crisis management – especially when strong normative components are involved. The EU’s narratives as a ‘responsible’ actor and a ‘model’ of ideals and norms constitute one of the most important components of its external legitimation process (Diez, 2005; Manners, 2009b; Føllesdal, 2006; Pace, 2007; Martin, 2011; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Schumacher, 2015; Chamlian, 2016).

Our thesis is structured as follows: in order to understand how our study can contribute to the academic debates concerning EU legitimacy and actorness, we will begin by identifying the scholarly state of play (chapter 1). This implies identifying the main authors and debates, and how analyses concerning this field have evolved and ramified. We will essentially look at two scholarly debates, one concerning EU actorness, and another one concerning EU legitimacy. Our examination of the actorness debate will include both actorness conceptualisations and power-related role conceptions, and how these two branches are lacking a focus on legitimacy *tout court*, and particularly on normative justification through discourse concerning EU foreign policy in general and specifically crisis management. Our examination of the scholarly debate around EU legitimacy will help us identify the normative standards used to assess legitimacy at the EU level and at the specific level of the E/CSDP, and the problems that result from borrowing state-like standards and applying them to the EU level. The identification and exploration of these scholarly debates will allow us to identify not only where our study fits, but also potential gaps in the literature that it may help to fill, or at least contribute towards narrowing.

Throughout the subsequent chapter (chapter 2), we will explain the conceptual and analytical orientation that will guide us throughout our analysis, and we will identify the main goals of the thesis and certain key ideas vehiculated by the scholarly debates that we will attempt to either confirm or refute. Even though our study is methodologically grounded in CDA and post-structuralism, and thus has a post-positivist nature, we found it useful to look at some of the key claims found in the scholarly literature and attempt to either corroborate or counter them, at least temporarily. This does not mean that we will be testing hypotheses, but rather that we mean to link our study to the current scientific literature in this area, and thus contribute towards the advancement of the corresponding scholarly debates.

Our analysis begins in chapter 3 with the identification of the discursive corpus that will be subject to CDA, and the identification and explanation of the respective characteristics and contexts of the actors that create and reproduce the EU’s normative justification discourses and narratives in the area of crisis management. Afterwards, throughout chapter 4, we analyse the



historical and semiotic development of crisis management as a policy field at the EU level, with a focus on discourses and narratives and the key moments that drove the development and practical implementation of this policy area. This historical focus in our analysis has multiple purposes: it is useful in understanding how and why the EU's discourses evolved the way they did; it provides a context for 'textual'<sup>7</sup> production, i.e. it indicates the set of conditions and circumstances that frame and structure the production of discourses; and it also helps to frame and understand the intertext, i.e. the discourses' relation with other discourses and predominant narratives.

This chapter will follow a chronological sequence since the establishment of the CFSP and of the ESDP in the 1990s until the launch of the EU Global Strategy in 2016. The beginning of the chosen timeframe for our analysis coincides with the formal establishment of the EU in 1992, which is relevant considering that our analysis focuses on the EU's discourse as an actor in a given policy field. As such, it is logical and coherent to set the beginning of our analysis at the very inception of the EU as such. The end of our chosen timeframe coincides with the EU's revision of its main strategic document for external action, which provides a framework for the EU's understanding of its own ontological security and its intentions towards the rest of the world. The 2016 Global Strategy represents a turning point in the EU's strategic thinking (which nonetheless happened progressively), marking a new set of paradigms, including a focus on resilience and stability, a closer link between domestic and external security, and a redesign of the EU's framing of its own role as a global actor. Even though the policy in focus – crisis management – has evolved since the launch of the 2016 Global Strategy, it has not changed substantially in overall conceptual and strategic terms. The main change that has occurred at the level of this policy that has had an effect on the EU's projected or perceived actorness concerns the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism in December of the subsequent year (2017). Yet, as, at the time of the writing of this thesis, the PESCO projects were only in their early stages of implementation, and the Global Strategy remained the EU's main strategic document, we opted for focusing on the latter as the end of our timeframe. Thus, the collected data from discourses produced throughout the chosen timeframe is not only appropriate, but also pertinent, current, and illustrative, allowing us to further the understanding of the EU's normative justification discourses as an actor in the policy field of crisis management.

---

<sup>7</sup> Text / textual is used here in the semiotic sense of discursive instance, a verbal recording which can take the form of written or oral discourses, or other manners of conveying messages.

Throughout chapter 4, the importance of the EU's normative justification discursive corpus in the area of crisis management actorness is emphasised, and the main discursive patterns, hierarchizations and omissions which will be further addressed in the subsequent chapter are identified. As such, in chapter 5 we identify, analyse, and discuss these elements that have resulted from (and in continuation of) the CDA applied to the previous chapter and put them in relation to the wider scholarly debate. The thesis concludes with chapter 6, where we present our conclusions while revisiting our research questions.

More than repeating the process of simply assessing whether or not the EU is a global actor (regardless of the policy area), in what would potentially result in a poor (or at least repetitive) contribution to the EU actorness debate, this study intends to make a scholarly contribution by emphasising the importance of legitimacy as a central and (so far) widely neglected dimension of actorness, through the critical analysis of the EU's discursive efforts to provide normative justification, and thus legitimate, its crisis management actorness. This is important because, regardless of whether or not the EU possesses capabilities, as long as it is *perceived* as a crisis management actor, it can be said to be one. Consequently, the EU's discourses are crucial in influencing how it constructs itself and is seen by others. This thesis is not primarily about how others perceive and thus legitimate the EU's crisis management actorness, but rather about the EU's own normative justification discourse. Nonetheless, we maintain the importance of external perceptions, which is reinforced by the post-structuralist tenet that defining the 'Self' requires an 'Other', as the construction of the EU's creation of an identity as a crisis management actor reflects the 'othering' of many of its interlocutors.

As mentioned, we will begin in the subsequent sections by critically engaging with the scholarly state of play concerning the EU legitimacy and actorness debates, in order to identify what has been written so far about these subjects and what gaps or problems remain unsolved, as well as to identify our study's contribution to the academic discussion.

## **1.1 - The EU legitimacy debate**

Nowhere in the field of legitimacy studies is there more disagreement than about legitimacy in the European Union (Beetham, 2013: 279).

Legitimacy depends on different (academic, historical, cultural, and social) contexts, and has acquired different collective meanings for different sets of actors throughout history (Clark, 2005: 13). It is typically referred to in political, sociological, and philosophical contexts, and it

has mostly been reflected upon in reference to nation states (ibid.: 14). However, due to this focus (and possibly even due to a deliberate disregard) there has not been, in the past, much written about legitimacy in the specific context of International Relations (Hurd, 2007: 29; Clark, 2005: 11), and only recently, especially with the emergence of the EU, has this debate began to grow outside of the national sphere. The academic debate about EU legitimacy has generated a widespread discussion that stems largely from the existence of fundamental disagreements regarding the very nature, purpose, and reach of the EU – not to mention *disagreements concerning the normative standards underlying the concept of legitimacy itself* – not only on behalf of practitioners, but also (and perhaps especially) scholars. The vast majority of studies regarding EU legitimacy produced in the last decades focus either on policy areas that fall under the scope of the so-called community method, or on the EU's domestic legitimacy in general.

If legitimacy at the EU level is a complex and contentious subject, legitimacy at the E/CSDP level is perhaps even more so. This policy takes place at the international level, where the EU as a complex multilevel actor assumes a relationship with third countries in a field that is itself often labelled 'sensitive', and where the EU frequently tries to project its values and norms, such as liberal democratic legitimacy standards, for example through the construction of state institutions in the context of peace building (Bouris and Reigeluth, 2012; Bouris, 2012; Turner, 2012). In addition, this policy does not involve the supranational decision-making structures of the EU as much as other areas, as it concerns mostly the European Council and the Council deciding unanimously. It is important to highlight in the existing literature about EU and E/CSDP legitimacy not only the diversity and subsequent lack of coherence in determining how to assess the EU's legitimacy, but also the transfer of analytical standards and conceptualisation difficulties from the domestic to the external level. This transfer, in turn, stems from the effort to mimic liberal democratic nation-state-type legitimacy standards in the EU context, and to extend these domestic community-method-type democratic scrutiny practices (themselves borrowed from nation states) to the EU's external action. All the claims and analyses presented in this subchapter must be looked at in the context of the time period that they were proposed or developed in, as both the EU and the E/CSDP are constantly changing, and legitimacy-related considerations are contingent upon these changes.

In what concerns EU legitimacy, the views are many and diverse. Some authors consider the EU to be a predominantly regulatory polity (Majone, 2006; Eriksen and Fossum, 2002) without any real commitment regarding the establishment of a supranational constitutional order (Majone, 2006; Scharpf, 2007). Others do not even consider this debate to be necessary,

as the indirect democratic scrutiny provided by national governments is seen as sufficient and the functions delegated to the EU as requiring low direct popular participation (Moravcsik, 2002: 605-6). It is logical to assume that those scholars who claim that the EU does not need to be further politicised to become legitimised also think in similar terms when it comes to foreign policy or security and defence policy, particularly as the latter are even more intergovernmental than most EU policies. However, this is a mere assumption, as it is not that simple to find scholarly works that explicitly address the CFSP / E/CSDP in these terms. Moravcsik, for example, argued – before the Lisbon Treaty came into force – that legitimacy in EU foreign policy was not an issue at all and claimed that foreign and defence policies at the EU level were quite modest when compared to the powers held by the Member States at the national level (2008: 333).

Authors that reject a ‘democratic deficit’ often do so while claiming that the EU draws from ‘different’<sup>8</sup> sources of legitimacy that suit its specificities and are often related to the EU’s effectiveness and efficiency (Héritier, 1999; Micossi, 2008; Scharpf, 2007; Menon and Weatherill, 2008; Eriksen and Fossum, 2002; Schmitter, 2001). Opposite views, arguing that the EU’s putative move towards multilevel governance and policy networks leads instead to a decrease in democratic accountability, thus jeopardising its legitimacy, are also present in the literature (Papadopoulos, 2010; Hurrelmann, 2007; Bartolini, 2008: 15). Other perspectives claim a synergetic relationship between input and output sources of legitimacy (Hurrelmann, 2007: 23-25; Lindgren and Persson, 2010: 452-453; Schmidt, 2010; Wagner, 2005).

The most widespread and discussed claim in the EU legitimacy debate argues that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit and must be politicised in order to be fully legitimised (Føllesdal and Hix, 2005; Eriksen and Fossum, 2002: 22; Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004; Decker and Sonnicksen, 2011; Bogdanor, 2007; Schmidt: 2010; Lord: 2003, to name just a few). This is the most evident case of a tendency not only of transfer of nation state domestic legitimacy standards to the EU’s domestic legitimacy, but also to the EU’s external action. Strategies suggested by authors for an application to the EU’s domestic sphere of normative democratic legitimacy standards that usually apply to nation states include contestation for political leadership through an increase in the EU’s ‘partisanship’ features and an amplified focus on the EP (Føllesdal and Hix, 2005: 4; Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004: 383-395), or the

---

<sup>8</sup> This claim focuses on legitimacy sources that are different from the democratic-oriented sources traditionally associated with ‘Western’ nation states, even though it does not exclude the latter.

possibility of contestation of the post of president of the European Commission and the tying thereof to the EP elections<sup>9</sup> (Decker and Sonnicksen, 2011; Bogdanor, 2007; Schmidt, 2010; Lord, 2003).

In the academic debate about E/CSDP legitimacy, this is also the most frequent claim, and it is mostly coupled with the argument that output-oriented legitimacy appears to no longer be sufficient on its own (Bickerton, 2007), not unlike Christopher Hill's criticism about a 'capabilities-expectations gap' in EUFP (Hill, 1993). In this sense, some authors argue that the 'permissive consensus' that was once in place in this area is progressively dissolving, thus calling for an increase in input legitimacy (Wagner, 2005, 2006, and 2007; Sjursen, 2011 and 2015; Stie, 2010; Bono, 2006; Stavridis, 2006; Kaldor, 2012). In fact, a growing number of authors tend to share a concern for the need for an overall reinforcement of the democratic channels of legitimacy not only within the EU as a whole, but also within the CFSP and the E/CSDP in particular. When searching for academic publications related to E/CSDP legitimacy, the vast majority we found focused on this policy's alleged democratic legitimacy shortcomings. Most of the authors that claim that the E/CSDP suffers from a democratic legitimacy deficit argue, in general, that in order to be able to develop legitimately, these policies (CFSP and E/CSDP) call for an increase in democratic legitimating mechanisms, either through an increase in democratic participation in the decision-making process, with a particular focus on the role of the EP (Comelli and Zanon, 2009; Comelli, 2011: 54-56; Schломach, 2014; Cutler and Von Lingen, 2003; Mittag, 2006; Wouters and Raube, 2012) or through a boost in overall public support for this policy (Brummer, 2007; Peters, 2014; Oppermann and Höse, 2007: 156-159), sometimes coming as close as admitting the possibility of applicability of federal state legitimacy models to the EU framework (Sjursen, 2008: 13).

This latter view does not diverge substantially from other frequent views in these debates, for the simple reason that there is a general tendency for applying liberal democratic nation state type legitimacy models and ideals – even if only partially or implicitly, such as the claim for the need to increase democratic scrutiny – to the EU and, consequently, to its policies (including the E/CSDP).

---

<sup>9</sup> Evidence of which was seen during the 2014 European Parliament elections.

### 1.1.1 - Limitations and weaknesses in the EU legitimacy debate

The scholarly debate concerning EU legitimacy reveals a clear lack of consensus on what the EU is and on how its legitimacy can be assessed. It also demonstrates the difficulties most authors seem to experience in distinguishing domestic and external legitimacy – vastly derived from the EU’s uniqueness and lack of direct normative model upon which to base itself and thus replicate ‘appropriate’ legitimacy standards. The perspectives presented here show a strong inclination towards prescription, as authors mostly seem to attempt to show how the EU *should* be legitimated. This debate also reflects a general concern that there might be a problem with the EU’s legitimacy, which, again, stems from lack of consensus on what the EU is, or should be. It also stems from an overall propensity towards equating democracy with legitimacy (either directly or indirectly), and with the application of liberal democratic nation state type legitimacy standards to the EU, likely reproducing the researchers *qua* individuals’ biased normative repertoire of beliefs. Interestingly, the vast majority of these studies do not even provide a straightforward *definition of legitimacy*, which is a serious weakness.

The fact that the EU is neither a state nor an international organisation, but rather includes traits of both and traits of regional integration organisations as well, it is under construction, with supranational and intergovernmental characteristics, and with an extensive measure of international legal personality (Article 47 TEU), has resulted in a lack of consensus regarding the kind of legitimacy it has, needs, or should strive for. Even if we were to apply to the EU the same legitimacy standards that apply to nation states, we would still have to select one of many models with differing strategies (Schmitter, 2001: 2). In fact, the attempt to draw a distinctive line between the EU and the nation state, by assuming the premise that the state is not a suitable comparative model to assess the legitimacy of the EU, is in itself a difficult dilemma to solve. This is due to the fact that the EU is made-up of distinct and (for the most part) independent states, was created by the latter to cater to their needs, and shares many of their features, while remaining, however, a distinct and rather new type of polity (Kaldor, 2012; Čmakalová and Rolenc, 2012: 261). The legitimacy criteria dilemma only becomes closer to being solved if we take a few steps back and identify the core criteria of the concept of legitimacy *tout court*.

Even though our focus is not the EU’s domestic legitimacy as such, but rather an externally-oriented intergovernmental EU policy, the complexity of the topic of legitimacy in the overall context of the EU, and especially the lingering academic inclination towards the transfer of solutions from the domestic to the international sphere, make this dimension of the debate unavoidable. It is mostly useful in order to understand how scholars view legitimacy in

the EU context, and, perhaps more importantly, how they define the concept of legitimacy (or rather how, as mentioned, a clear definition is lacking in the literature). Although EU legitimacy has been widely discussed in recent times, EU foreign policy and particularly the E/CSDP are not common subjects in this debate. As referred to previously, the existing discussion concerning E/CSDP legitimacy appears to be excessively Eurocentric – it is an EU policy after all – and almost exclusively focused on EU domestic democratic legitimacy. Authors repeatedly mention the importance of (domestic) public perceptions and support (e.g. Brummer, 2007; Peters, 2014; Oppermann and Höse, 2007), yet there is an overwhelming disregard for *how* the EU seeks to ensure such support by *convincing* both domestic and external actors to endorse its positions and actions and thus to legitimate its external policies.

In order to better understand what is entailed by this effort of legitimation of external policies, we must look at how “member state governments work towards the creation of a ‘common’ policy but eschew the traditional means by which such policies have been legitimated within the EU” (Tonra, 2011: 1190-1) by means of discursive action and narrative construction. In the subsequent section we broaden the scope of the academic debate concerning the concept of legitimacy beyond the EU debate and explore the notion of normative justification as a central legitimation tool in the context of foreign policy.

### 1.1.2 - Legitimacy and actorness

As we have seen, the concept of legitimacy is quite complex, and there is not much consensus on what it entails, at least at the EU level, hence the need to take a step back. Legitimacy is a socially constructed concept (Beetham, 2013: 100-114; Suchman, 1995: 574) that refers to a specific kind of power relationship between different groups of actors (Beetham, 2013: x) about shared expectations in asymmetric relations (Schmitter, 2001: 2). Similarly to actorness, legitimacy is not an entirely consensual concept: it can be interpreted in diverse ways, it can be applied to several different objects of study, and it largely varies according to the observer and the latter’s specific context (Beetham, 2013: x, xi; Hurd, 2007: 34).

One recurrent aspect that we found in various conceptualisations of legitimacy is this concept’s link to *perceptions* and *beliefs*, which makes it potentially subjective (Suchman, 1995: 574, Wallner, 2008: 423). Many authors – including, perhaps most notably, Max Weber – have emphasised this idea (Hurd, 2007: 31). However, defining ‘legitimacy’ as the same as the ‘*belief* in legitimacy’ can be problematic, as emphasising beliefs or opinions takes away the focus from issues or problems concerning structural aspects of the system of government itself

(Beetham, 2013: 9). This *subjective* focus reveals a lack of *objective* standards with which to assess legitimacy. Beetham criticised this sort of limited view, arguing that the focus should not fall on the beliefs themselves, but rather on *how a given power relation can be justified in terms of the beliefs of those that take part in it* (ibid.: 11).

Legitimacy influences individual behaviour, as individuals respond differently to rules or institutions whether or not they consider them to be legitimate (Hurd, 2007: 30; Tyler, 2006: 378). In terms of individual conduct, if a rule or institution's legitimacy is behaviourally significant (Hurd, 2007: 31) it is complied with voluntarily and based on the conviction in its appropriateness, desirability, meaningfulness, predictability, and trustworthiness in the context of a "socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995: 574-575), without the presence of coercion (Franck, 1990: 16) or self-interest (Hurd, 2007: 35). So, legitimacy is not only about the authority that the rulers exert upon the ruled, but especially about why this authority is attributed to those in power in the first place, and how this relationship is not only perceived but also (and especially) acted upon by those affected by it.

Another recurring aspect in the academic literature concerning legitimacy is its tendency towards *prescription*. Many authors frequently refer to democracy as something like a 'gold standard' for legitimacy in the context of the state (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 416). In fact, many authors tend to propose how a system *should* be shaped or arranged in order to be legitimate. As seen in the EU legitimacy scholarly debate, authors oftentimes seem to either directly equate legitimacy with the concept of democracy, or argue that this is the most relevant standard of legitimacy (e.g. Bogdanor, 2007; Brummer, 2007; Comelli and Zanon, 2009; Comelli, 2011; Cutler and Von Lingen, 2003; Decker and Sonnicksen: 2011, Eriksen and Fossum, 2002; Føllesdal and Hix, 2005; Lord, 2003; Mittag, 2006; Oppermann and Höse, 2007; Peters, 2014; Schlomach, 2014; Schmidt, 2010, Sjursen, 2008; Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004; Wagner, 2005, 2006, and 2007; among others).

As mentioned previously, non-coercive compliance with a rule, norm, or policy is usually based on a conviction that it is appropriate, desirable, meaningful, predictable, and trustworthy (Suchman, 1995: 574-575). In the specific context of liberal democracies, this is most evidently displayed in the individuals' behaviour towards rules and institutions through democratic practices. However, the assumption that democracy is a core standard of legitimacy often relates to the researchers' own contexts, biases, and normative beliefs. Following this criticism, Beetham attempts to go beyond what is taken for granted in specific contexts and identify major commonalities between different types of legitimate administrations. Not all states or governmental institutions are set in democratic contexts, yet they are considered valid and



legitimate by their intended audiences. This means that this kind of assumption is not only limited and biased, but it overlooks other structural dimensions that are common to legitimate forms of government (democratic or otherwise). As such, it is possible to identify certain features that form a core definition of legitimacy that can be applied to different types of power relations. According to Beetham, the core structure of legitimacy is comprised of three basic principles: legality, normative validity or justifiability, and actions towards those in power – including consent or compliance (Beetham, 2013: 64-99). We interpret them, in this study, as *legitimation* principles, in the sense that they constitute the *process* through which an entity, institution, or policy achieves a state or condition of legitimacy.

The first legitimation principle – legality – implies that “any form of power should be acquired and exercised in accordance with established rules” (ibid.: 64). Legality and legitimacy are distinct concepts – as are legality and justice, for example. What is legal may not necessarily be legitimate (Franck, 1990: 37; Coicaud, 2004 [1997]: 22), since a legal rule can, for example, stem from a government that enforces it through coercion. However, legality does form a fundamental part of legitimacy and reinforces it (Warning, 2009: 184; Coicaud, 2004 [1997]: 23; Føllesdal, 2006: 154), since it both justifies and limits rules and policies. Generally, legality is what regulates and predicts (Beetham, 2013: 65) the conduct of individuals and establishes its appropriateness and boundaries, and ultimately boosts the probability that rules are complied with.

The second legitimation principle – normative validity or justifiability – mainly concerns the beliefs of the affected populations in the rightfulness of the *source* of authority and the purposes of the system. The ultimate source of authority can be internal or external, and it can be a number of things. In the specific case of liberal democracies, for example, such a source is popular will. Nonetheless, this does not mean that democracy is any sort of universal basis for legitimacy, nor that this is applicable to any context. Other examples of sources of authority include tradition, divine command, or scientific doctrine, among others. It is this ultimate source of authority that provides the validity for the political sphere that, in turn, creates the laws in a given society. Thus, the political sphere is dependent upon that ultimate source of authority for its legitimacy (ibid.: 69-70).

The third legitimation principle – performative endorsement – concerns actions towards those in power, namely the latter’s ultimate legitimation through expressed consent. According to Beetham, it is not easy to determine whether consent is voluntary or otherwise, and especially how this can be assessed, so a researcher is more likely to focus on *actions* that publicly demonstrate such agreement because they visibly bestow legitimacy upon those in power – they

are a manifestation of the underlying agreement. Despite these actions not being the only source of legitimacy for those in power, they are nonetheless important (ibid.: 91). One example of such actions of public validation of power is the aforementioned practice of elections in the context of liberal democracies, where the people choose candidates or parties among alternatives. This is, however, one among many kinds of such actions. Other types include swearing an oath of loyalty, taking part in consultations or negotiations with those in power, or public acclamation of leadership, to name a few examples (ibid.: 92-94).

Beetham's legitimacy conceptualisation was mainly developed considering the domestic context of the state. As such, like many other authors, it refers mostly to the relationship between the dominant and the subordinate. As this sort of asymmetric binary conceptualisation was envisaged for the nation state framework, it is not evident that it can be applied for an assessment of the EU's domestic legitimacy. The use of these terms becomes even less evident in the case of international relations – or in this specific case, in the context of the EU's external relations and the legitimation of practices and policies in that context. In fact, Beetham argues that there is a general agreement that legitimacy at the international level differs substantially from that at the level of nation states – not least because the actors, contexts, delegated sovereignty, etc. are different for domestic and external policies.

The creation of asymmetric relationships between the EU and other actors in the international system through the EU's discourses, actions, and legitimation thereof is an important element of our study; and the fact that this asymmetry is less evident in the context of EU foreign policy than in the context of relations between actors inside the state is what makes it powerful. Beetham (2013: 269-294) raises the issue of international and European legitimacy, in reference to the legitimacy of authority systems with limited means of enforcement, and the latter's reliance upon the different audiences thereof for ensuring legitimacy. In the case of institutions at the international level (similarly to the state level) perceptions of legitimacy matter considerably. However, the international level differs from the state context in that power is more dispersed, and international institutions require separate and continuous legitimation (ibid.: 270).

Another substantial difference – perhaps the most evident – lies in the audiences. Unlike in the context of states, where citizens are the main legitimating audiences, in the international context, this role falls mostly (though not exclusively) on the states themselves and their respective audiences (ibid.: 271). In the case of the EU's domestic level and in the context of community method policies, however, this is not as straightforward, since there is much more interaction between the national and international level than in most cases – derived from


sovereignty and competence delegation – meaning that both political elites from the Member States, citizens at the national level, and even other actors are involved in the internal legitimisation of the EU (ibid.: 280). However, in the case of external policies – particularly in the case of the E/CSDP – there is a much greater level of independence of the Council in making decisions from other domestic institutions and actors, that nonetheless respects established EU requirements and legal procedures. The Council’s centrality in the E/CSDP decision-making is the main reason why Council (and European Council) decisions are at the core of the discursive corpus that we will be analysing in this study.

Yet the main audience for actorness legitimacy claims are not only third states (or rather state authorities) with which the EU engages in missions and operations and other international organisations, but also EU Member States themselves, as the latter’s representatives are simultaneously part of national governments and members of the Council, representing both national and EU interests. Due to the near absence of an ‘authoritative interpreter’ of rules at the international level, states are able to interpret laws and policies more in line with their interests, sometimes even subverting them. This means that, in the context of international relations, *normative justification* acquires a greater importance. This principle is precisely the main focus of our study.

Despite repeatedly affirming that there are substantial differences between the state and international levels when it comes to legitimacy, Beetham does argue in favour of the usefulness of the three principles of his core definition, with the necessary adaptations, thus highlighting the validity of his conceptualisation (ibid.: 271-272). As mentioned, the author proposes three principles – legal authority, normative justifiability, and performative endorsement. In applying them to actorness legitimacy, as demonstrated in figure 1, we identify these principles as different stages in a process.

The process begins with an actor that holds legal authority (first principle) to act in a given area – as the EU does, as authorised by the treaties and by the representatives of the legitimate governments of the Member States in the Council – attempting to have its actions and positions validated and endorsed by its interlocutors, including those for whom the policy is made and domestic actors as well (third principle). So, as coercion is not a suitable nor recurrent means of enforcement at the international level, the most important legitimacy principle for an international actor like the EU is the normative justifiability principle (second principle), which entails the actor’s *convincing* of its domestic and external interlocutors of why the EU is the appropriate actor to perform in the name of common purposes, and of how what

it does is done in accordance with procedures accepted as fair (ibid.: 271-272), in order to obtain their endorsement and validation.



**Figure 1** - Visual representation of the actorness legitimation process, based on David Beetham's conceptualisation

As mentioned previously, this study is not concerned with whether or how this validation occurs in the end, but rather on *the EU's process to convince domestic and external actors* to ensure that it does, through normative justification. This process is especially important because without normative justification it is very difficult to convince other actors in the international system to do something, or comply with something (be it a policy, a position, a narrative, an action, etc.) without the use of coercive means (either force or conditionality). And while the results and outputs that come out of the practical application of a policy can also contribute towards its legitimation, these can only be considered an additional contribution to the legitimation of a policy that is already in place, because for a policy to be in place, it is likely to already have some sort of legitimacy (Cerutti, in Cerruti and Lucarelli, 2008: 10-11; Schmidt, 2010: 13, 16). Furthermore, the purpose of an actor's normative justification works at a more fundamental level than the practical implementation of a policy, since it encompasses aspects of the actor's identity and claims of actorness that seek validation. Føllesdal identifies justifiability as a *conception* of legitimacy, arguing that

(...) some are concerned about the *normative* legitimacy [of the EU], often expressed in terms of *justifiability among political equals*, for instance by appealing to hypothetical

notions of acceptance or consent. (...) Laws (or authorities) are *normatively legitimate* insofar as they can be *justified* to the people living under them, and impose a moral duty on them to comply. Normative theorists often judge *normative legitimacy* to be fundamental (Føllesdal, 2006: 156).

In our analysis, we look at the discursive component of the EU's legitimation efforts in the area of crisis management. While we recognise that the process of legitimation does include other elements, our analysis will focus on the EU's discursive endeavours to normatively justify its crisis management *actorness* (i.e. more than just the policy, or a specific mission or operation), in an effort to ensure the policy's legitimacy. We seek to contribute to the enrichment of the actorness and legitimacy academic debates in the EU context, and also to contribute to the expansion of the study of discourse in the context of EU foreign policy, and in particular crisis management.

As such, the subsequent section considers the scholarly state of play regarding EU actorness, paying attention to criteria, definitions, and the evolution of conceptualisations of actorness applied to the EU, including criteria linked to legitimacy. This will help us to better understand not only to what extent the EU is a crisis management actor, but also the importance of the EU's legitimation efforts for ensuring actorness, and the importance of studying the EU's normative justification narratives for ensuring the legitimacy of its external action in a given area.

## **1.2 - Actorness, legitimacy, and normative justification**

### 1.2.1 - Actorness conceptualisations

Our study seeks to emphasise how legitimacy and actorness, despite being mostly debated separately, are deeply rooted in one another and mutually constitutive. While discussing the same basic idea, different authors refer to the central concept in this debate in different manners – agency, actor capability, actorness, actorhood, actor capacity, etc. In our study, we deliberately opted for referring consistently to this concept as *actorness*, not only because it is one of the more common designations, but also because of the simplicity and practicality of this description, as, linguistically speaking, when the suffix 'ness' is added to an adjective or a noun in the English language, the resulting word quite literally becomes the state of the original word. In the case of actor + ness, it becomes the state of being an actor, which essentially entails

not necessarily the process that leads to becoming an actor (although this is very important), but rather *the condition(s) for an actor to be an actor*.

The EU actorness debate is as old as the European integration project; however, it has been gaining new momentum with the Lisbon Treaty. In fact, this debate was largely developed *because* of the European integration project and the inherent difficulties in conceptualising this unique and distinct non-state actor. This debate concerns mostly the EU's ability to act on the global stage, its performance, and its effectiveness, and focuses on various areas of EU external action: "the dominant discourse on the Union as an international actor with its proper interests is reflected in the Union having a policy line across a whole range of functional and geographical areas, although of varying intensity and detail" (Larsen, 2004: 70). The scholarly debate on EU actorness concerns not only conceptualisations of 'actorness' itself, but also different types of roles assumed by, or ascribed to, the EU on the international scene. The conceptualisations of actorness are generally based on criteria that the EU needs to fulfil, according to scholars, in order to achieve this status. Although some of these studies include aspects of legitimacy (essentially domestic legitimacy), none directly proposes legitimacy as a condition for actorness *per se*, and none that we found focuses predominantly on this topic in the context of crisis management actorness. Much like the EU legitimacy debate, it is important to note that these conceptualisations were elaborated during different stages of the European integration project. This, in turn, reflects the appropriation and evolution of some concepts by scholars throughout time so as to adapt them to new circumstances, as the interpretation of the EU's fulfilment of certain criteria is contingent upon issues such as its legal diplomatic status, the level of delegated competences, and even the global environment at any given time. As our study focuses on the EU's actorness in the field of crisis management, we will use this example as we go through the evolution of the scholarly debate and make a preliminary assessment thereof which will be beneficial for our study of the EU's discursive construction thereof.

One of the first attempts to conceptualise actorness in the context of the European integration process, which became one of the most widely cited and recognised conceptualisations to date, was developed by Gunnar Sjöstedt, as he argued that the term 'actor' had been, up until then, either rarely or poorly defined (Sjöstedt, 1977a: 5). The author proposed to establish an operational definition based on the concept of 'actor capability', defined as the "capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system" (ibid.: 16). By means of a collective crisis management policy that has been developed under the aegis of the EU (albeit predominantly intergovernmental), the EU currently can be

said to have ‘actor capability’ in this field (however vague and ambiguous this may be at this point in our assessment of the EU’s crisis management actorness).

Sjöstedt argued that a key trait that determines a unit’s actorness is its *autonomy*, which, in turn, is present upon fulfilment of two basic conditions: separateness from the external environment, and internal cohesion. As we will see in our brief assessment of both these criteria as they were further developed by James Jupille and Joseph Caporaso (1998), the EU also does greatly fulfil them (despite many conceptual difficulties which will be pointed out further ahead in this chapter). Sjöstedt argued that what makes an autonomous unit an actor is having ‘actor capability’ (ibid.: 15). The idea of capability – including the ability to act and draw on resources to do so – is attributed to the EC by its Member States, and thus it is presented as a dynamic concept that entails a set of ‘structural prerequisites’ for actorness which “can be expected to grow over time” (ibid.: 143). This implies that certain conceptual limitations that the author experienced could be blamed on the low level of integration experienced at the time. As the EC and the EU evolved in legal and practical terms, the academic debate evolved as well, so as to accommodate these changes and developments.

Due to the volatility of these structural prerequisites, Sjöstedt argued in favour of adding another indicator for actor capability: the ‘performance of actor behaviour’, i.e. “the actual execution of unitary outward-directed actions of the EC” (ibid.: 17), that is an “expression of the identity of the European Commission as a whole and not of one of its constituent parts” (ibid.: 20). The idea that the EC was already perceived as having its own identity in the late 1970’s enhances the idea that the EU currently also has an identity that eventually evolved from that one, and it reiterates the importance of ‘identity’ for the study and conceptualisation of actorness. This idea is reinforced by Sjöstedt’s argument that these transactions, that are part of the performance of actor behaviour, must conform to the EC’s own stated external relations goals (ibid.: 24). Sjöstedt’s ‘performance of actor behaviour’ criterion is also important in the sense that it involves an external dimension of actorness that implies an interaction – or transaction – between the EC and its external interlocutors, which goes beyond the Rome Treaty’s (limited) judicial criterion for the EC’s competences in the field of foreign affairs (ibid.: 20-21). In this sense, the author includes diplomatic interaction within the range of performance of actor behaviour, which is quite similar to Jupille and Caporaso’s 1998 recognition criterion. Despite being considered innovative, Sjöstedt’s conceptualisation focused predominantly more on internal aspects, to the detriment of external ones (even though the latter are present), which can be viewed as a shortcoming (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 16). Nonetheless, all aspects of the actorness conceptualisation – especially the criteria of

autonomy and actor capability – developed by Sjöstedt have been frequently revisited and improved upon by numerous authors, validating their quality and usefulness, but also the author’s innovative effort in developing an important and (up until then) neglected concept in IR literature.

David Allen and Michael Smith, in 1990, proposed another dimension to the ‘actorness’ debate. Although the authors pointed out the many conceptual and analytical difficulties underlying the idea of a ‘Western Europe’, namely with regard to the extent of the existence of a foreign policy thereof and to the ambiguity of its status and impact, they argued that its ‘multi-dimensional’ *presence* and consequence in the international arena were undeniable, and more important than actorness *per se* (Allen and Smith, 1990: 20). ‘Presence’, a predominantly externally oriented concept, was defined as “(...) the ways in which a particular notion or set of expectations is shaped by the attention of policy and institutions can itself enter the realm of political reality and play a consequential role in unfolding events” (ibid.: 21). According to the authors, factors such as credentials and legitimacy, the ability to act and muster resources, as well as the way it is perceived, define a particular ‘presence’ (ibid.). In fact, Allen’s and Smith’s concept of ‘presence’ allows us to think differently about issues such as international legitimacy with regard to non-traditional actors, suggesting that it may be applied to ‘ideas, notions, expectations and imaginations’, and thus to ‘Western Europe’ (ibid.: 22). The idea of EU-led crisis management, particularly considering that it is well embedded in the spread of EU values and norms such as democracy and the rule of law, illustrates the EU’s perception of the link between institution building and security. The requests that the EU receives for engaging in crisis management practices under these terms validate certain aspects of the EU’s ‘presence’, such as the impact and consequence of its identification as a standard bearer for these values or the expectations, on behalf of E/CSDP host countries, as to how mimicking the EU’s loose model may result in greater security and prosperity.

Allen and Smith’s external focus in their conceptualisation of ‘presence’ somehow overlooked domestic actors and factors that determine if and how the unit acts (by providing resources and ascribing authority, i.e. by legitimating it internally). Nonetheless, the authors did mention fleetingly that the idea of legitimacy (namely related to the attribution of authority by European states to a European entity) was determining for Western Europe’s presence (ibid.: 25, 36). Thus, even though this was not straightforwardly meant as an actorness conceptualisation, it greatly enriched the actorness academic debate, as it came to complement Sjöstedt’s conceptualisation, and the concept / criterion of ‘presence’ itself has been reproduced and improved upon (and thus validated) multiple times since. Ultimately, ‘presence’ itself is a



legitimizing factor for the EU's actorness, in the sense that that the EU's presence shapes perceptions of others and reinforces EU actorness.

The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 gave way to a 'second wave of conceptual works' (Ginsberg, 1999: 432) on issues related to EU actorness and European Union Foreign Policy (EUFP) behaviour. In a 1993 article, Christopher Hill introduced the idea of a 'capability-expectations gap' in the EC's actorness. The author's goal with this article was not necessarily to create a normative conceptualisation of the EC/EU's actorness, but he did borrow from, and added to, the existing concepts of *actor capability* (Sjöstedt, 1977a) and *presence* (Allen and Smith, 1990). Consequently, Hill ended up not only consolidating these concepts, but also proposing and strengthening (from an analytical point of view) the idea that internal and external factors can be mutually reinforcing in establishing a units' overall actorness.

In 1998, Jupille and Caporaso proposed a new conceptualisation of actorness, or 'actor capacity', based on a number of domestic and external criteria that are "observable, continuously variable, and abstract from any particular institutional form" (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998: 214). These criteria, which the authors proceeded to apply to the EU, are recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion.

*Recognition* refers to the external acknowledgement of the EU's (or any other actor's) presence. It is considered by the authors to be the most basic condition for a unit to be considered an actor in the international system (ibid.: 215). The authors distinguish between *de jure* and *de facto* recognition, despite considering both types to be intricately linked. They define *de jure* recognition as involving "either diplomatic recognition under international law or formal membership in international organisations" (ibid.). At the time, the authors pointed out that the EU had some problems with diplomatic recognition, as it was not a state nor was it sovereign, and thus it did not benefit from the norm of automatic diplomatic recognition attributed to states. Nonetheless, these problems were mitigated after the 2009 Lisbon treaty's attribution of *de jure* legal personality to the EU as a whole, and after the establishment of the EEAS in subsequent years. On one hand, despite not being a state, the EU in its entirety (rather than just a specific pillar or institution) can currently be treated by other actors in the international system as an actor, by being able to establish bilateral diplomatic relationships

and signing treaties with the latter. On the other hand, the EEAS was created to operate as a kind of Foreign Affairs Ministry of the EU, thus imitating state structures.<sup>10</sup>

As for membership in international organisations, the authors argued that it was problematic precisely due to the (then) absence of diplomatic recognition (ibid.: 215). This situation has changed with regard to diplomatic recognition and also, somewhat, in the context of the EU's relationship and membership of IOs.<sup>11</sup> Despite the persistence of some reluctance in attributing membership status to the EU in many cases, the EU's profile has, nonetheless, improved in this regard since Jupille and Caporaso's chapter was published. This is also exemplified by the more than 30 E/CSDP missions and operations that would not have happened or have been possible if the EU's presence was not recognised by the E/CSDP host countries. And although *formal* EU membership in IOs is still not the norm, there is a visible effort to convey unity and common positions, through internal arrangements and informal means. According to the authors, the EU's *de facto* recognition, on the other hand, is different, taking place when "third parties that decide to interact with the EU implicitly confer recognition upon it" (ibid.: 215-216). This idea draws from Allen and Smith's 'presence', as the validation of the fulfilment of these criteria is put on third parties' engagement with the EU as such. In the case of crisis management, for example, this type of recognition is mostly evident in the formal

---

<sup>10</sup> This administrative and diplomatic service had, by 2016, amounted to 139 EU Delegations and Offices all over the world, and a diplomatic corps composed of more than 3.400 people that were initially transferred either from the Commission's former DG RELEX, from the Council Secretariat, or seconded from EU Member States.

<sup>11</sup> The EU is a full member of the WTO, like its 28 Member States, and the Commission speaks on behalf of all the latter. In the context of the UN, the EU has a status of 'enhanced observer' but has no vote, and it is party to more than 50 UN multilateral agreements as the only non-State participant in a number of important UN conferences, nonetheless, the EU has obtained a special 'full participant' status, and EU representatives can present common positions to the UN General Assembly. NATO formally regards the EU as a partner (sharing both responsibilities and capabilities), and out of its 28 Member States, 22 are EU Member States. In the context of the ICC, all EU Member States are signatories to the Rome Statute (i.e. the document that established the ICC), and despite the EU being unable to be considered a State Party to the ICC per se, there is an EU-ICC Cooperation and Assistance Agreement in place, and the EU drafts common positions in this context. The OECD has 34 participating states, out of which 21 are EU Member States, and the European Commission participates as a representative of the EU. The OSCE has 57 Member States, including all EU Member States; and the EU Delegation in Vienna represents the EU, usually speaking on behalf of all EU Member States.

invitations made by host countries, and further confirmed in the signing of SOMAs and SOFAs, for example.

The criterion of *authority* was defined by Jupille and Caporaso as “the EU’s legal competence in a given subject matter” (ibid.: 216). According to the authors, authority is delegated to the EU by the Member States, following a principal-agent logic (ibid.). While this is fairly evident in areas where there is straightforward authority delegation for the EU to act collectively, such as trade, the same cannot be said for the area of crisis management. One cannot consider the Council and the Member States (collectively) to be entirely distinct entities, which means that, from a strictly technical point of view, an EU institution (the Council) has been delegated authority to be the main deciding body in the area of crisis management, but that same institution is made up of members that are simultaneously principals and agents. On the other hand, there has been some competence delegation to non-elected EU institutions and bodies in the context of crisis management, although we cannot argue that this is the same as authority delegation since most decisions (and all *major* decisions) are still made unanimously by the Member State representatives in the Council. Nonetheless, the crisis management procedure is, in practice, increasingly dominated by those E/CSDP institutional bodies, and this area is “deep into the practice of constructive abstention, where you don’t stand in the way (...) if others want to go forward.”<sup>12</sup> So, authority in the area of crisis management is a complex matter. It is essentially guaranteed by the fact that political and strategic issues are decided unanimously by the Council, and technical competences are delegated to the EU bodies and institutions involved in the crisis management procedure. In addition, we argue that a part of the EU’s authority to act externally in the area of crisis management is deeply linked to both its domestic and external legitimacy, as it also stems from international legal instruments (including UNSC resolutions) and formal invitations on behalf of countries requesting assistance in the form of E/CSDP missions or operations.

The criterion of *autonomy* (as inspired by Sjöstedt’s work) is very much linked with the authority criterion, in the sense that it displays similar conceptualisation problems when applied to the EU, especially due to the aforementioned ‘hybrid’ position of Council Members between an EU institution and Member States’ governments. According to the authors, this criterion requires institutional distinctiveness (i.e. a distinctive institutional apparatus) and independence (ibid.: 217). The authors argued that these difficulties can affect the assessment of the EU’s

---

<sup>12</sup> Interview with a senior EU official working in a Council body related to the civilian dimension of crisis management, 2013.

actorness (ibid.: 218), even though the simple fact that the EU has its own institutional apparatus is extremely relevant. While in some areas, some EU institutions, such as the EP or the Commission, can be considered autonomous to a certain degree, the case of crisis management is more complex. The main difficulty in assessing the EU's autonomy in this area lies, as mentioned, with the fact that the main institution in charge of making decisions therein is the Council, which is made up of representatives of the Member States that concurrently assume national and EU functions. When the EU Member State representatives in the Council, with the support of EU crisis management institutional bodies, unanimously decide to launch an E/CSDP mission or operation, they do so in the name of the EU as a whole, even if not all Member States actually participate in the mission or operation in practice.

In such instances, we can identify some distinction between the Member States' representatives *qua* members of national governments and *qua* members of the Council of the EU. The same can be said for the signing of SOMAs and SOFAs, which is done between the EU as a whole and host countries. On the other hand, when in the Council, members of Member States' governments still represent national interests, rendering the issue of distinctiveness somewhat challenging to determine. The Council's independence from third actors, on the other hand, is likely to be less problematic. We can also argue that socialisation practices in the context of EU institutions (and especially in the context of the Council) can aid in creating or reinforcing some distinctiveness or separation of roles. In fact, some EU actors argue that the EU's institutional framework – namely the PSC – is meant to “generate the kind of atmosphere where the ambassadors are sending back the message that ‘we need to move our [national] position in order to achieve the consensus.’”<sup>13</sup>

This issue is also very much linked with the criterion of *cohesion* (also likely inspired by Sjöstedt's work). While acknowledging the difficulties associated with the definition and assessment of the criterion of cohesion, the authors defined it as having four dimensions: value or goal cohesion, tactical cohesion, procedural cohesion, and output cohesion. The Lisbon treaty has created mechanisms to ensure that, in most areas (including crisis management), the EU has the tools to act as a cohesive actor. The attribution to the EU of *de jure* legal personality is, in this context, one of the most important features of this treaty. This means that the EU is implied as a whole in the activities and policies that it develops and implements. Such activities include what takes place within the framework of its crisis management policy, namely civilian missions and military operations. Member States involved in the launch of civilian missions

---

<sup>13</sup> Interview with a senior EEAS and PSC official, 2013.

and military operations ultimately do so bearing the EU flag, they do so in the name of the EU,<sup>14</sup> and they agree upon the crisis management concepts by following EU decision-making processes (i.e. the crisis management procedure) alongside EU institutional bodies.

The EU sometimes launches E/CSDP missions and operations with *ad hoc* coalitions of smaller groups of willing and able Member States and even in cooperation with third states (Tardy, 2014). While the latter do not have the same weight with regard to decision-making, they also end up *acting on behalf of the EU* (European Council, 2000: 24). Both situations, however – smaller *ad hoc* groups of Member States and third states participating in E/CSDP missions – reflect, on one hand, the fluidity of the EU's *presence* and identity as a crisis management actor, and, on the other hand, the relative rigidity of its *authority*, as the decision-making has to be subject to unanimity among all Member States regardless of the number of Member States actually participating, stemming from the fact that it is an EU (intergovernmental) policy, using mostly EU tools and instruments, and determined by EU objectives. In addition, SOMAs and SOFAs, as well as other related agreements, are signed between the countries hosting E/CSDP missions and operations and the EU as a whole (rather than an *ad hoc* group of Member States).

Moreover, the introduction of the concepts of 'comprehensive' and 'integrated' approach to external conflicts and crises means that the E/CSDP ceases to be a completely isolated policy. Nonetheless, it does maintain a singular character largely dominated by intergovernmental cooperation, in the sense that no major decision (especially those with political consequences) is made, in the context of this policy field, without unanimity. Unanimity may mean that decisions sometimes result in the lowest common denominator, but it also ensures that, whatever the decision, it is agreed upon equally by all members, in the sense that none is unwillingly subject to collective decisions with which they may not agree, thus ensuring cohesion in the process of launching missions and operations.

In 1999, when EUFP was taking its first steps, the actorness debate revisited the need to look also into practice and effectiveness (after Hill's 1993's article), in addition to theory (Ginsberg, 1999), as well as an increasing concern with identity and discourse linked to practice. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler developed one of the most widely cited and recognised conceptualisations of EU actorness to date based on a set of interconnected

---

<sup>14</sup> Article 44 TEU allows for a group of willing and Member States to launch a mission under the EU flag (the decision-making, however, has to be collective and subject to unanimity).

concepts: *opportunity*, *presence* (drawing from Allen and Smith's 1990 article), and *capability* (amply based on Sjöstedt's 1977 conceptualisation of actor capability).

The criterion of *opportunity* essentially indicates the 'structural context of action' where actorness may occur, which encompasses dynamic processes of shared understandings and attribution of meanings that constitute intersubjective structures and interpret material conditions, where the EU's discourses of construction and projection of a collective identity are especially relevant (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 23). In this context, the EU's enlargements and discourses concerning the growing interdependence that stems from globalisation have contributed to shaping the environment that has enabled the opportunity for the EU to be an actor, and simultaneously influenced the construction of its identity.

According to the authors' definition, the *presence* criterion is quite broad in scope, encompassing more than just presence *tout court*, as it also contains elements of identity (i.e. what the unit is, or rather, how it portrays itself), recognition (i.e. how it is seen), and also of some kind of external normative capacity (i.e. how it can influence others). Moreover, it is not obviously, nor necessarily, linked to external *action*, but rather to the consequences that derive from the EU's mere existence and its understanding on behalf of itself and others (ibid.: 22). In fact, the idea of an identity that is constructed and projected by the EU was one of the key factors in Bretherton and Vogler's conceptualisation (ibid.: 26), and one of the main differences between the latter and Allen and Smith's conceptualisation. The EU's *presence* results in an 'attractiveness' (Chebakova, 2008: 5; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 211) that often (purposefully) leads other actors in the international system to seek to emulate the EU (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 54) or even, as far as E/CSDP missions are concerned, participate in EU crisis management actions and subordinate themselves to the EU's command. This is manifest, for example, in the many requests for membership (Risse, 2004: 154), partnerships, in requests for assistance in civilian or military matters, and also in the participation in EU-led crisis management missions and operations. In this latter case, a growing number of third countries – including FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Iceland, among others (Tardy, 2014) – cooperate with the EU to participate actively in E/CSDP missions and operations with the purpose of increasing their membership prospects. These actions reflect logics of appropriation or emulation of certain norms, institutions, and standards set by the EU on behalf of other actors of the international system who request or participate in such support and assistance, somewhat validating the EU's claim as an actor with some degree of normative influence. They also reflect a logic of consequences, particularly in the cases where these

actions are “driven by subjective assessments of outcomes of alternative courses of action” (Schulz, 2014: 1).

Bretherton and Vogler’s *capability* criterion concerns both internal and external elements, and it encompasses both material conditions and the meanings and understandings associated with them. In particular, issues such as internal and external perceptions of the EU’s effectiveness and the appropriateness of its instruments are especially relevant. Bretherton and Vogler proposed four basic conditions for the *capability* criterion: a shared pledge to a set of values; domestic legitimation of foreign policy procedures and priorities; the capacity to identify priorities and formulate policies with consistency and coherence; and the access and ability to use (diplomatic, economic, military, etc.) policy instruments, which is not only contingent upon the mere willingness of the Member States, but also very much dependent upon achieving coherence and consistency in the identification of priorities and policy formulation.

After the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU actorness debate gained new momentum, not least because one of the apparent main goals of this treaty was to improve the EU’s actorness by “reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world” (TEU preamble). Nonetheless, the focus shifted more towards the EU’s (regional or global) performance in practice, or in theory (Baird, 2015; Barrinha, 2016) to the detriment of new actorness conceptualisations and criteria. This shift towards performance was done either by revisiting previously established criteria, such as recognition or autonomy (Gehring, Oberthür, and Mühleck, 2013), or by proposing additional dimensions linked to the concept of actorness, such as effectiveness or internal cohesiveness (Groen and Niemann, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014), and especially by looking at the latter’s empirical assessment (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013; Hoffmann and Niemann, 2017), as well as the link between theory and practice (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013).

As with legitimacy, defining actorness in the field of IR – as was demonstrated by the discussion above – is not a straightforward task, and there are numerous conceptualisations available. However, there seems to be a commonality between the latter, as conceptualisations of actorness are often motivated by claims of the EU’s uniqueness as an entity, or polity, i.e. by the fact that it is neither a state nor an International Organisation, that it is constantly evolving and changing, and that it includes supranational, technocratic, and intergovernmental characteristics (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998: 214). The different actorness conceptualisations are made up of different benchmarks or criteria that have been proposed by scholars throughout

time (and throughout the EU's process of evolution), yet these criteria have been progressively either improved or linked to one another by subsequent scholars, or simply reproduced to display many common aspects. We thus argue that there is sufficient consensus to claim that the EU is an international actor in general – and that it is also a crisis management *actor* – although this actorness is multidimensional, as it includes both internal and external aspects and the EU acts concurrently as a security provider and consumer (Barbé and Kienzle, 2007); and it is complex, as it does not depend solely on the EU's actorness claims, but also on many other factors, such as the nature and appropriateness of its external action, how it justifies the latter, how decisions are made, how effective it is, or on how it is perceived as an actor.

While we reiterate the claim that aspects of legitimation that surpass domestic democratic legitimacy are missing in the actorness debate, there is a strand of literature, within (or rather intertwined with) the EU actorness debate, which approximates these aspects more than the actorness conceptualisations do. In this literature strand, scholars attempt to discover what kind of actor the EU is, strives to be, or has the potential to be, and attempt to establish a link between role attributions and the concept of power. This debate has produced dozens of attempts to conceive of the EU as some sort of power. Against this backdrop, the subsequent section explores types of power-related role conceptions that have been (re)claimed by the EU or attributed to the latter by scholars. This strand of the EU actorness debate is useful in understanding the dynamics that surround the construction and projection of an EU identity as a global actor (in many areas, including crisis management), and its efforts to legitimate that identity.

### 1.2.2 - The EU's power-related role conceptions

One of the most recognised and influential power-related role conceptions ascribed to the European project (Western Europe, the EC, or the EU) is that of *civilian power*, first introduced by François Duchêne (1972, 1973). Despite the latter “only offer[ing] a short and descriptive account of Europe's possible role in the world” (Orbie, 2006: 123), Duchêne's vague and ambiguous conceptualisation (and thus flexible for multiple interpretations) (ibid.: 124) remains extensively used in both academic and policy contexts. The premise underlying Duchêne's civilian power Europe concept was that the EC was a “civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force” (Duchêne, 1973: 19). Though the EC did not have a security and defence crisis management policy in the 1970's when this concept was developed, it was, nonetheless, engaged in the solving of disputes between the



Member States. Duchêne used this concept to explain the EC's focus on civilian means of solving such conflicts. For Duchêne, conflict solving on behalf of the EC would only happen in this specific context, as he did not envisage that this entity might become engaged, decades later, in crisis management of a different kind outside of its territorial sphere. In other words, Duchêne looked into explanations that would help understand why conflict between Member States had allegedly become unthinkable. Thus, the EC, in his view, represented a 'crisis management' tool to the extent that it helped Member States to resolve their conflicts peacefully and in a civilian way. Duchêne's contributions indicate that the EC's civilian role in the world was what made it different and potentially normatively strong, especially in matters of economic interests (Orbie, 2006: 124-125). Duchêne's original idea of a 'civilian power Europe' was later picked up and further advanced by subsequent authors, in light of the EC's own development as an actor (Sjöstedt, 1977b; Padoa-Schioppa, 2004), as well as by the EU itself.

Orbie points out that Duchêne's focus on "low politics, non-state actors, ideational influences, international interdependence" made it fall into a "'pluralist' tradition" which was vehemently opposed by Hedley Bull's realism-inspired 'military power' concept (Orbie, 2006: 124). In 1982, Bull proposed a vision of a *military power Europe* that was, on one hand, the result of the state of affairs of the international system at the time, where a 'return to power politics' dynamic was gaining strength (Bull, 1982: 150); and, on the other hand, a proposed solution for Western Europe's dependence on the USA and NATO for military defence in face of the then 'Soviet threat' (ibid.: 154-156). Nonetheless, Bull did not consider the EC to be able to develop any kind of actorship *per se*, but only the Member States as a collective (ibid.: 151). In response to growing criticism that began to rise in the mid-1990s to Duchêne's civilian power concept in the midst of the emergence of a military component in EU foreign policy – namely the Petersberg Tasks – other concepts appeared, such as *militarised yet civilian power Europe* (Stavridis, 2001), or a revised idea of *soft power Europe* (Nielsen, 2013).

Another extremely influential and much debated power-related role conception ascribed to the EU – and one that is especially relevant for this study – is Ian Manners' *normative power Europe* (NPE) (Manners, 2000, 2002, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2013a, 2013b; Diez, 2005; Diez and Manners, 2007; Pace, 2007; Tocci, 2007; Merlingen, 2007; Gerrits, 2009; Whitman, 2011; Bickerton, 2011a, 2011b; Manners and Whitman, 2013; Gordon and Pardo, 2014; Del Sarto, 2016, etc.). NPE was first conceptualised by Manners in 2000 and in 2002 in reference to Bull's 1982 military power Europe's opposition to Duchêne's 1972 civilian power Europe, and as a new approach to the

evolution of EUFP during the late 1990s. The NPE emerged as “an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics” (Manners, 2002: 252). According to Manners, during the 1990s the EU became a promoter of norms, and able to (or, at least, convinced that it could) “shape conceptions of ‘normal’” (ibid.: 240) in international relations. According to Manners, “the reinforcement and expansion of the [EU’s] norms (...) allows the EU to *present and legitimate* itself as being more than the sum of its parts” (ibid.: 244). This ‘normative power’ approach led to a shift of focus away from the state, and from the binary concepts of military and civilian power, as “the EU’s normative difference comes from its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution” (ibid.: 240).

The concept of *Ethical power Europe* – derived from the EU’s self-image and discourses – was proposed by Lisbeth Aggestam (2008) as resulting from a conceptual shift in the EU’s actorness from what it is (an attractive role model) to what it does, or rather to what it should allegedly be doing (being a proactive actor), and the author links the concept with the EU’s foreign policy legitimisation efforts. Aggestam’s conceptualisation was expanded by other authors like Tim Dunne’s (2008) *Good Citizen Europe*, Adrian Hyde-Price’s (2008) depiction of the EU as a *Tragic actor*, Ian Manner’s *normative ethics* of the EU, as well as a recurrent use of the idea of Europe’s discourse as a *force for good* (Aggestam, 2008; Hyde-Price, 2008; Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008).

Somewhere in between NPE and *Empire Europe* (Zielonka, 2006), Del Sarto identifies the EU as *normative empire Europe*. In her theory-informed article of 2016, she argues that the EU displays, in the context of the ENP, a norm-based constructivist-type behaviour, which is, nonetheless, motivated by utility maximising rationalist-type motivations (Del Sarto, 2016: 216-217). This conceptualisation reveals the fragilities of separating theoretical approaches and practice in dichotomist ideas that do not consider the nuances of a complex multi-layer actor such as the EU. Del Sarto argues that the EU, in this sense, is constructing a ‘normative’ identity (ibid.: 216). By using the concept of ‘empire’ in her conceptualisation effort, Del Sarto is inherently assuming a critical position, as this term “captures the configuration of unequal power relations between the EU and its borderlands” (ibid.: 222). Even though the author argues that the promotion of norms is not always a priority for the EU, she positions herself critically *vis-à-vis* the inequality of power relations generated by the EU’s normative attitude in the area of crisis management policy (similarly to our study). The author claims that the EU engages in a ‘civilising mission’ that “contributes to the EU’s perception of itself as a benevolent ‘normative power’” (ibid.).

Like Manners, several authors have either described or prescribed the EU as a post-modern entity, actor, or power with regard to different policy fields (Caporaso, 1996; Gress, 1997; McCall, 1998; van Ham, 2001; Cerutti, 2003; Dunne, 2008; Ivik and Lakicevic, 2011; Ferhati and Tarifa, 2014). Other proposed role conceptions include the EU as a *regional international society* (Jovanovic and Kristensen, 2015), the EU as a naïve and idealistic *Idiot power* (Carta, 2014), or *Transformative power Europe* (Leonard, 2005; Börzel and Risse, 2009). Many other power-related role conceptions have been ascribed to (and appropriated by) the EU over the years, and new ones still come up with a remarkable variety and frequency. Other examples include Chad Damro's idea of *Market power Europe* (Damro, 2015; Kelstrup, 2015), introduced in 2015, and described as a dynamic conceptual framework (rather than an explanatory theory) that establishes a link between comparative and international political economy, and the academic debates about EU power-related roles and identities; Joachim Koops's (2011) application of Kenneth Boulding's idea of *Integrative power* to the EU; Wolfgang Wagner's (2015) *Liberal power Europe*, motivated by Europe's composition of liberal democracies and the consequences thereof for EU policy-making; or Ramon Pardo's (2012) *Normal power Europe*, an idea that argues that the EU simply does not need to be categorised as distinct from other powers, as it is as self-interested and security-centred as any other actor in the international system, whether the means it uses for ensuring security are civilian or otherwise.

In the subsequent section we delve deeper into the NPE concept and return to David Beetham's legitimation principles in identifying *normative justification* as a key element in the EU's legitimation of its actorness, and as a key analytical tool for the present thesis.

### **1.3 - Normative justification as a means to achieve actorness legitimacy**

From a discourse analytical point of view, the most interesting question about normative power therefore is not whether Europe is a normative power or not, but *how it is constructed as one* (Diez, 2005: 626).

Looking at the scholarly debates on EU actorness (including conceptualisations and power-related role conceptions) is useful in exploring how the EU's identity and role as an actor have been conceptualised by scholars throughout their evolution. The academic literature on power-related role conceptions that we briefly went through in the previous section is much more inclined to try to understand how the EU portrays itself, and to look at its intrinsic

characteristics. Similarly to what our study attempts to do, these power-related role conceptions do not focus so much on explaining why others may endorse the EU on specific policy areas, but more on how the EU attempts to convince them to do so. However, the overall lack of critique over the asymmetric power relations generated by the superior hierarchic positioning of the EU as a *power* of any kind (civilian, normative, ethical, model), a *force for good*, a *provider* of norms and rules, on behalf of scholars and practitioners, in turn, reveals another gap in the actorness literature which the present study intends to address.

We acknowledge the importance of the NPE approach, which has been extensively revised, debated and improved by both Manners and other authors in several instances, in light of developments in EUFP and criticisms in the context of the relevant academic debate. We particularly acknowledge the importance of the notion of normative justification that stemmed from Manners' attempts to clarify the NPE approach. Manners establishes “a distinction (...) between a normative form of power, or *pouvoir*, and normative ideal type of actor, or *puissance*” (Manners, 2013b: 39; 2013a). In the first instance, Manners points out the importance of normative justification *vis-à-vis* the ability to use material incentives or physical force and describes *pouvoir* normative as “normative justification *in action*” by means of norms diffusion (Manners, 2013b: 39-40). This ‘normative justification’ that Manners refers to (Manners, 2006d, 2009b, 2013a, 2013b, Manners and Whitman, 2013; Manners, 2011) concerns “attempting to ensure that EU relations and policies with the rest of the world are *explicable and justifiable* to first, second and third parties – the EU, its citizens and other non-EU parties” (Manners, 2009b: 2). This is closely related to what we address in our thesis, as we seek to analyse the EU's discursive endeavours in normatively justifying its actorness in a given policy field (as well as the accompanying normative attitude and corresponding legal obligations) in the context of its legitimation efforts.

Manners (possibly as a response to some criticisms over the ‘power’ dimension of NPE, such as Diez, 2005), reiterates that the ‘purest / ideal’ form of the concept of NPE is ideational and not material or physical, meaning that

(...) [NPE's] use involves normative justification rather than the use of material incentives or physical force. (...) [Which] implies a very different timescale and form of engagement in world politics. In this respect, relations and policies with the rest of the world should be ‘normatively *sustainable*’ – i.e. ‘normatively’ explicable and justifiable to others; ‘sustainable’ into the next generation (Manners, 2009b: 3).

Manner's normative justification approach draws from Helene Sjørusen's analysis of the EU's enlargement policy, which, in turn, is inspired by Max Weber's idea that legitimacy is fundamental for the continuation of government and authority, and Jürgen Habermas' communicative action theory (Manners, 2006d; Sjørusen, 2002). This idea is quite similar to that presented by Beetham (2013) and Føllesdal (2006), in that it emphasises the importance of normative justification as a key element in ensuring legitimacy, in the sense that it is *used as a mechanism for ensuring sustainability in power relations without coercion*. Our focus on discourse and on a post-structuralist-inspired CDA is precisely grounded on this core idea that *normative justification through communication is crucial for an actor's external legitimation process*, especially concerning a foreign policy with a strong normative dimension.

As such, NPE is a useful concept for our project, even though we would not use it quite as Manners and others have. Instead of arguing that the EU is a normative *power* in the area of crisis management, we argue that the EU has a normative *attitude* that results from self-imposed ambitions and obligations stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty and 'rhetorical entrapments' (i.e. constraints resulting from an actor's previous identification with certain discourses that may cease to be entirely relevant or applicable in current circumstances) (Nițoiu, 2013: 242), regardless of its actual performance. We do not argue, in this study, that the EU necessarily has the *ability* to 'shape conceptions of normal'; instead we argue that the EU acts and 'speaks' as if the norms and values it promotes were universally accepted, which are fundamental differences from the arguments offered by most of the proponents of the NPE concept. Nonetheless, this approach proves quite useful in understanding the idea of having a normative attitude, ambition, and self-conception. As such, we agree with the idea that "[the NPE] concept is better seen as a *discursive self-construction*, imbuing the integration project with new force and *establishing an EU identity against Others*, rather than an objective analytical concept" (Diez and Pace, 2007: 1).

The approaches that classify the EU as a *model* or an *ideal power* (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Cebeci, 2012, 2017; Chamlian, 2016: 396-7) result from discourses and an identity that has been constructed primarily by the EU to legitimate itself as an actor – often regardless of the *effectiveness* of its norms exports – and by scholarly research, and the examples presented in this subchapter systematically reinforce this kind of rhetoric.

Our post-structuralist theoretical guidance leads us to critique the EU's 'civilising' normative attitude that characterises its actorness discourses rooted in its own identification as any one of the above-mentioned power related roles (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 40; Del Sarto, 2016: 222; Kutter, 2014: 151; Zielonka, 2013; Mitzen, 2006). This 'civilising' normative

attitude refers to the EU's discursive construction of its identity as an international actor as the 'best' and an 'ideal model' that needs to export its allegedly superior standards and way of life to less 'developed' or less 'civilised' others, regardless of its actual efficiency or performance (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002; Jørgensen, 2015: 499-500; Nițoiu, 2012: 69).

(...) *the constructed NPEU ethos defines a standard of legitimacy* (of preferences and policies) that EU Member States have to take into account if they are to achieve their political goals: their high interaction density with conflict parties provides for informal, social mechanisms to *encourage* conflict parties to comply with EU norms. This high level of activity may, in the minds of EU actors (...) *enable them to justify their actions on the basis of a common ethos, a common reference point emanating from constructions of NPEU* (Pace, 2007: 1053).

The main criticism that we make (alongside other authors, e.g. Bickerton, 2011a, 2011b; Aggestam, 2008; Sjørnsen, 2002, 2006) towards the arguments of some of the NPE proponents concerns the claim that the legitimacy of the NPE approach stems from the principles and norms being promoted

(...) if normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the principles being promoted *must be seen as legitimate*, as well as being promoted in a coherent and consistent way. Legitimacy of principles in world politics may come from previously established international conventions, treaties, or agreements, particularly if these are important within the UN system (Manners, 2009b: 3).

In this context, we follow Diez's (2005) critique of the *assumption* of legitimacy and universality underlying the principles being promoted in the first place, which lead us to identify the EU as having a 'civilising' normative *attitude* rather than *power*.

(...) the projection of European norms and values (in both policy and analysis) needs to be subjected to continuous *deconstruction* through the exposition of contradictions within this discourse, and between this discourse and other practices. This would by no means undermine, but rather rescue, normative power from becoming a self-righteous, messianistic project that *claims to know what Europe is and what others should be like* (Diez, 2005: 636).

The EU attempts, through its various foreign policy tools, to make ‘others’ – especially states, state actors, and state institutions – behave in a way that *the EU sees as normal and adequate*, by organising and modernising them according to the standards deemed by the EU to be ideal or universally valid, stemming from its legal obligations to act normatively, as determined by the treaties. The expression ‘civilising attitude’ is meant to be read as a critical view of the EU’s apparent tacit assumption that everybody else wants to emulate the norms and standards it projects and that the EU itself is an ideal model to be replicated and emulated. Through this attitude, the EU places itself at a superior level in comparison with the ‘other’, in a logic that exposes its ‘postcolonial’ context (Staeger, 2016). The EU’s neighbourhood is often the object of this kind of discourse on behalf of the EU, and there is a growing academic debate surrounding this topic (e.g. Malmvig, 2004; Pace, 2005; Bicchi, 2006; Pace and Schumacher, 2007; Cebeci and Schumacher, 2016; Cebeci, 2017). Our analysis of the EU’s normative justification discourses and narratives as a crisis management actor is oriented towards identifying and deconstructing this ‘attitude’ and the inherent legal obligations to act normatively in the context of this policy.

In this study, it is argued that legitimacy – both at the domestic and international levels – forms an integral part of a unit’s actorness, but it is contended that domestic and external legitimacy of external policies, while based on similar legitimation principles, must be looked at differently because they involve different players and work at different levels. When it comes to external policies, all three legitimation principles in Beetham’s conceptualisation are important and closely linked to the actorness conceptualisations. In order to justify our analytical focus on normative justification, we will consider the multiple conceptualisations and criteria of actorness that have been established and validated in the last decades and link them with Beetham’s principles.

The first legitimation principle – legality, authorisation – is directly linked to the domestic legitimacy of an actor, and to the internal criteria that allow them to act in the international system. If we consider Sjöstedt’s *internal cohesiveness* dimension and *actor capability* concept; Hill’s *capability-expectations gap* problem in EUFP (especially the capabilities part, as they come within the EU, from the Member States, including resources and assets, and the ability to use them); Jupille and Caporaso’s *authority, autonomy, and cohesion* criteria; Bretherton and Vogler’s *capability* criterion; and Conceição-Heldt and Meunier’s *internal cohesiveness* concept, we conclude that all of the latter criteria and concepts are embedded in a legality and authority dimension, and, as such, have primarily a domestic focus. In other words, these criteria essentially fall into the scope of the first principle, or what we

would call the first stage of the process of legitimation of the EU's actorness. These criteria refer primarily to the elements (including legal instruments, domestic legitimacy, capabilities, competences) that the Member States provide the EU so that it may act as an international actor. They do comprise aspects of political legitimation of external policies and instruments, but only domestic democratic ones, omitting the EU's efforts to ensure legitimacy through other means and from other actors, as well as neglecting the role that discourse and identity play in ensuring overall legitimacy for the EU's actorness claims.

The third legitimation principle – performative endorsement – has been attributed a significant importance by authors that have conceptualised actorness with a focus on the EU's recognition by, and positive or non-coercive engagement and interaction with, other actors in the international system. Examples include Sjöstedt's *performance of actor behaviour*; Jupille and Caporaso's *recognition* criterion (particularly the *de facto* dimension); Allen and Smith's *presence* concept; Hill's *capability-expectations gap* problem in EUFP (especially the expectations part); or Bretherton and Vogler's *presence* criterion. We can determine that, in all of these cases, the focus and validation of the fulfilment of these criteria is primarily put on third parties' non-coercive engagement or compliance with the EU, i.e. in ensuring performative endorsement, which we refer to as the 'end-stage' of the process of external legitimation.

However, in order to achieve this third principle, especially when a strong normative component is involved, the persuading / convincing domestic and external actors of the EU's and the E/CSDP's validity – i.e. normative justification – is crucial. The use of the NPE concept as 'normative justification in action' is where its major strength lies:

Normative power should (...) be perceived as *persuasive* in the actions taken to promote such [EU] principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the actions taken must involve *persuasion, argumentation*, and the conferral of prestige or shame. Persuasion in the promotion of principles in world politics involves constructive engagement, the institutionalisation of relations, and the encouragement of multi- and pluri-lateral dialogue between participants (...) (Manners, 2009b: 4).

But who are these 'actors' whose endorsement the EU seeks in order to obtain legitimacy in its foreign policy, and in particular crisis management? It is important to identify the targets of the EU's normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor.



The internal / domestic dimension [of EUFP narrative] is about making sense of what EFP is for to *those inside the EU who implement it, fund it and lend it credibility*. It informs national and EU policy-makers and planners, it appears within military and civilian doctrines, rules of engagement, operating manuals and organizational frames for policy initiatives. It also supplies the fabric for building public knowledge and views about EFP and is the means by which public support for the EU's external activities might be won, lost or recaptured (...). The external factors to which a strategic narrative must respond are its capacity to *express and project the Union's intentions towards third parties – most usually, although not exclusively, states*. A strategic narrative can articulate a rationale for intervention, and for acting in concert with others. It can help make sense of the EU's international presence for outsiders and has the potential to determine the terms of communication with them, and in doing so, define and change relationships (Martin, 2011: 192-3).

The authorities of the third countries that participate in cooperation with the EU, and / or host, E/CSDP missions and operations – insofar as they sign agreements with the EU for the purpose of cooperating, inviting, and requesting (or allowing) the latter to engage in crisis management practices in their territory – are both a source of the EU's legal authority and, to a larger extent, 'validators' or 'endorsers' of E/CSDP instruments. The EU sometimes launches E/CSDP missions and operations in cooperation with third states (as mentioned previously), and while these countries do not have nearly the same weight with regard to any decision-making (European Council, 2000: 24), in the context of their cooperation with the EU under the E/CSDP, they *act on behalf of the EU* alongside the willing and able EU Member States, reflecting the fluidity of the EU's *presence* as a crisis management actor.

In countries in crisis that request the EU's assistance in crisis management and eventually become E/CSDP host countries, the presence of lawlessness and corruption is not uncommon. If these circumstances affect the host countries' populations' trust in, and legitimation of their authorities or governments, then, perhaps indirectly, this resulting lack of trust may also affect the legitimacy of the legal agreements created and signed by the latter and the EU. This problem is likely to be found in cases where the host country's governmental institutions do not work properly (at least according to EU standards). Nonetheless, the EU is not likely to refuse a plea to act in the context of a crisis simply because the requesting country or territory does not have a functioning or legitimate government, since countries in crisis oftentimes do not. In fact, most E/CSDP missions (particularly civilian) are commonly related, in some way, to the establishment, reinforcement, or recreation of structures that reflect EU

values (such as democracy or the rule of law), and that, in principle, contribute to an increase in the legitimacy of local authorities – and paradoxically, thereby, often even contribute to the consolidation of non-democratic structures. We acknowledge this issue, and its potential implications for at least part of the legitimacy of the E/CSDP (namely the legal authority that stems from agreements with host countries). However, we will not emphasise this matter disproportionately, as our focus is on the EU’s – rather than host countries’ – legitimisation efforts.

As such, the absence of coercion (e.g. in the form of executive mandates, conditionality, or sanctions) in the vast majority of cases in the context of the E/CSDP – unlike other externally oriented EU policies whose distinction may become, however, increasingly blurred with the application of the comprehensive or integrated approaches to external conflict and crises – is likely to increase the probability of endorsement and validation, based on the belief in the validity of the E/CSDP and its instruments. However, endorsement can have many nuances and be fuelled by different incentives unrelated to the host country’s authority’s belief in the EU’s actorness and its policy’s validity and desirability, such as the existence of interests or trade-offs related to the EU’s presence in their country for other reasons, or in the context of other policies. Other issues, such as (lack of) interest, (poor) communication, (low level of) ownership, etc., can also affect the host country’s reasons for endorsement (of lack thereof).

So, can endorsement for reasons other than the belief in the policy’s validity and desirability limit the latter’s legitimacy? Perhaps only in a strictly technical and abstract sense. We certainly recognise that the endorsement aspect of legitimacy in this context is a complex matter, especially because the EU makes use of other ‘forcible persuasion’ tools, such as sanctions or conditionality, in other policy contexts in its relationship with countries where it also engages in E/CSDP missions and operations.<sup>15</sup> No matter how desirable it may be to establish a clear distinction between the EU’s actorness in different domains and policies (and local perceptions thereof) in a given country, this is not likely to happen – especially with the practical application of the EU’s ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ approaches to external crises and conflicts. Nonetheless, what becomes more important is how host countries (and other

---

<sup>15</sup> Such as, for example, the cases of Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), Chad (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), Georgia (EUJUST Themis, EUMM Georgia), or to a certain extent Congo (Artemis, EUFOR DR Congo, EUSEC DR Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL DR Congo), among others, where the EU has E/CSDP missions and operations and simultaneously engages in political conditionality (in various policy contexts) and / or democracy promotion-related sanctions with more or less success (Del Biondo, 2015; Arnould and Vlassenroot, 2016; Ketevan, 2016).

actors) *behave publicly* in the context of the EU's legitimation process, as beliefs are extremely difficult to determine (Beetham, 2013: 91; Martin, 2011: 199). Although this is not the focus of our study, both the first and third principles of Beetham's legitimation process are important to identify, as they help to contextualise and set the boundaries for the link between them – normative justification – particularly in what concerns the identification of both the *sources* and *targets* of the latter.

Contrary to what it may appear, the external dimension of legitimacy does not relate solely to third parties / external actors outside the EU sphere. It does include these actors, but domestic EU players are also involved. Overall, actors (both domestic and external) involved in the legitimation of the EU's crisis management actorness include the EU Member States, EU institutions, International Organisations, as well as third countries (including E/CSDP host countries or those the EU calls its 'strategic partners').<sup>16</sup> When it comes to being the target of discourse, in the case of the state, we also consider the citizens of that state. Perhaps not necessarily the general public, but a more 'attentive' public alongside a 'policy and opinion elite' (Almond, 1950: 138), including politicians, diplomats, journalists, and scholars "who understand, to various degrees, the insights and rationales of policies and are thus in a perfect position to interact within the elite, as well as with the attentive public" (Jørgensen, 2015: 493-4). So, the *external* dimension of the EU's legitimation efforts as an international actor has to do with the *actorness* aspect, i.e. the external dimension of the EU's action and identity in the context of policies that take place outside of an actor's strictly domestic sphere.

As mentioned previously, we do not focus on the third principle of legitimation, as proposed by Beetham, and we do not make an effort to establish whether or not it is fulfilled, as it is amply dependent upon the second principle (normative justifiability), not to mention that its effectiveness / impact is extremely difficult to assess, both domestically and externally (Martin, 2011: 199). Our study's focus is precisely on the EU's *process* of legitimation – specifically what we identify as the most important element of this process, i.e. normative justification –, and not on the EU's potential achievement of the *state* of legitimacy. The important (and understudied) aspect of the EU's efforts to ensure endorsement mainly concerns how the EU influences and convinces E/CSDP host countries, as well as its own Member States and other actors in the international system that it is a suitable actor, that it has the appropriate

---

<sup>16</sup> When we speak of states or institutions in this context, we mean the authorities or representatives thereof.

tools and solutions for a given crisis, that the E/CSDP is the appropriate policy to use, and even why or how the EU should even be involved in crisis management.

Neither of Beetham's legitimation principles is entirely without contention or disagreement, and they are intricately linked to the beliefs of those who take part in this relationship, which are primarily the political elites and decision-makers from the EU and its Member States as well as those from the countries that host and participate in E/CSDP missions and operations. This means that *justifying* the appropriateness and validity of these instruments, materialised as missions and operations, and thus convincing others to endorse the EU's actorness and comply with its instruments is the most important step, because it is how the EU achieves legitimacy for its actorness claims.

(...) normative ideas and normative justification have not been considered as important, but *their role and deployment as normative power is critical if the EU's role, perception, strategies and actions are to become more meaningful and more normatively sustainable* in changing world politics (Manners, 2009b: 13).

Performative endorsement complements normative justification as the most visible components of the legitimation process at the international level, as compliance validates as much as non-compliance may delegitimise a given international institution. Without normative justification in the absence of coercion – without convincing others – there is likely to be no compliance nor endorsement, and thus no legitimation. Therein lies an important link between international actorness and legitimacy, as this reflects the intricate link between power and legitimacy at the international level (Beetham, 2013: 274). This is also why normative justification is the most important out of the three legitimating principles, and consequently why our study focuses on analysing this element in particular: legitimacy does not exist without non-coercive endorsement or compliance; and non-coercive endorsement or compliance, in turn, does not exist without proper normative justification. Thus, a non-coercive engagement and interaction – where either public endorsement or compliance occurs – is both a core proof of actorness and of external legitimacy.

Now that we have highlighted and justified the importance of linking external legitimacy and actorness through normative justification (Beetham, 2013; Sjørnsen, 2002; Føllesdal, 2006; Manners, 2006d, 2009b, 2013b; Manners, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 2013), we will explain the conceptual and analytical orientation that will guide us throughout our analysis and we will identify the main goals and claims of our thesis.

## CHAPTER 2 - FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

(...) without theory there is nothing but description, and without methodology there is no transformation of theory into analysis (Hansen, 2006: 1).

### 2.1 - Post-structuralism

In our endeavour to understand the EU's legitimation efforts of its crisis management actorness, we have opted for embedding our CDA within a post-structuralist<sup>17</sup> approach. If we look at the broad spectrum of IR theories and theoretical approaches, we see the post-structuralist 'analytical orientation' (Burke, 2010: 360) as a critical approach to constructivism, as the latter can be seen as a critical approach to more rationalist theories. Post-structuralism "is used critically to investigate how the subject – in the dual senses of subject-matter and the subject-actor – of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts<sup>18</sup> of world politics" (Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989: ix). Even though post-structuralism shares constructivism's emphasis on identities, ideas, language, and overall discourse (including non-linguistic semiotic elements), the former attempts to *interpret and critique the normative link between power and knowledge* in relations between actors in the international system. Adding a post-structuralist dimension to our CDA can help us to critique how the EU's legitimation rhetoric hides power asymmetries.

The ontological starting point for post-structuralist discourse analysis is a conceptualization of policy as always dependent upon the articulation of identity, while identity is simultaneously produced and reproduced through the formulation and legitimation of policy (Hansen, 2006: 187).

---

<sup>17</sup> There is often some level of confusion between post-structuralism and post-modernism, with some authors using both terms interchangeably or simply describing both approaches similarly. In most recent IR conceptualisations, the tendency seems to be an increase in the use of the first to the detriment of the latter: this is perhaps related to an attempt to avoid confusion with the idea of post-modernism as a literary, artistic, or historical moment. Nonetheless, the nomenclature itself matters less than the tools and strategies it entails (Devetak, 2009: 183; Burke, 2010: 359-360). For practical purposes, we will use the term post-structuralism.

<sup>18</sup> As mentioned previously, the use of the word 'text' or 'textual' in a semiotic sense refers to any discursive instance, i.e. a verbal recording (written, oral, or other types of discourses).

Similarly to constructivism, post-structuralism is concerned with the trap of ‘reification’ of discourses and meanings (Hurd, 2010: 300). In other words, post-structuralism argues that reality is not what it appears to be: it is a ‘naturalised’ version of discourses that make up the social world that, in turn, hides asymmetric power relations, while being taken for granted as ‘natural’ and ‘normal’. The goal of post-structuralism is precisely to ‘denaturalise’ the social world and IR, and to critically interpret the latter’s constitutive discourses and texts (Gregory, 1989: xiv). Post-structuralism goes a step beyond constructivism’s assumption of the human construction and management of knowledge and structures in the social world, as it critiques and questions assumptions of meaning, origins, and representations thereof. It argues that all power-knowledge relations are deliberately made, ascribed meaning and significance to, and are perpetuated by humans (Burke, 2010: 359).

Poststructuralism (...) can be drawn upon to show not only that identities matter for foreign policy, but also how they can be studied systematically through the adoption of a theory of discourse. In doing so it pursues a particular set of research questions, centered on *the constitutive significance of representations of identity for formulating and debating foreign policies*, and it argues that *adopting a non-causal epistemology does not imply an abandonment of theoretically rigorous frameworks, empirical analyses of ‘real world relevance,’ or systematic assessments of data and methodology* (Hansen, 2006: 4).

Within post-structuralism, diverse ‘philosophical and intellectual practices’ have been developed in the study of IR and the social relations therein to “challenge the cognitive validity, empirical objectivity and universalist and rationalist claims of idealist, realist, and neorealist schools alike of international relations” (Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989: ix). One example is the Nietzsche-inspired genealogical approach to history, amply explored by Michel Foucault,<sup>19</sup> whereby perpetuated representations and dominations are exposed and relativized in face of the ‘historicisation’ of elements that may have been excluded or hidden from mainstream history (Foucault and Gordon, 1980: 83; Devetak, 2009: 185-190; Powers, 2007).

In our research, we are especially interested in another post-structuralist practice – *deconstruction* – developed as a response to structuralist language theories from the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, initially developed from Ferdinand de Saussure’s work on linguistics.

---

<sup>19</sup> Foucault is often associated with post-structuralism, even though not exclusively, as his work is quite interdisciplinary (Kendall and Wickham, 2004: 129).

Jacques Derrida was behind a strong criticism to Saussure's structuralism, especially concerning "how and where 'meaning' resided in language" (Gregory, 1989: xv). Deconstruction looks at concepts that are known only by what they are not, and identifies the hierarchical struggle within:

(...) conceptual oppositions are never simply neutral but are inevitably hierarchical. One of the two terms in the opposition is privileged over the other. This privileged term supposedly connotes a presence, propriety, fullness, purity, or identity which the other lacks (...) (Devetak, 2009: 191).

In other words, the stronger thing / concept needs the weaker thing / concept – and its contrasting meaning – in order to perpetuate the hierarchy between them. In Derrida's approach to post-structuralism these kinds of oppositions are not seen as strictly linguistic – as Saussure's structuralist 'logocentric' approach would suggest (Saussure, 1966) – but rather contingent upon a cultural and social context, whereby meaning is seen as a dynamic and interactive process (Gregory, 1989: xvi). All discourse is artificial. This does not mean that it is always the case that discourses are deliberately and carefully curated in their entirety (although some are definitely so), but simply that they are a fruit of, and shaped by contingencies such as interests, political / social / cultural contexts, institutions, etc. Derrida's work on the practice of deconstruction was amply influenced by Martin Heidegger, who also wrote about the importance of *difference* in the establishment of identity (Heidegger, 2004). In his essay 'Differance,' Derrida addresses the distinction between written and spoken communication and language, arguing that the latter is overwhelmingly preferred to the detriment of the former, in a paradigm opposition – like many other hierarchical oppositions that disregard the virtues of the disfavoured concept or paradigm. By creating what appears to be a new word or concept (*differance*) – which the author states is neither – Derrida claims that it does not exist, and thus, in order to possibly identify what it means, we must look at what it is not. It is interesting – and likely not accidental – that Derrida chose the base word 'difference' to formulate this proposal and reach these conclusions.

To be sure, a subject becomes a *speaking* subject only by dealing with the system of linguistic differences; or again, he becomes a *signifying* subject (generally by speech or other signs) only by entering into the system of differences. In this sense, certainly, the

speaking or signifying subject would not be self-present, insofar as he speaks or signifies, except for the play of linguistic or semiological difference (Derrida, 2004: 289).

‘Otherness / alterity’ – another dimension of ‘difference’ – is also an important concept in post-structuralist thought. In fact, in IR (as in semiology) the idea of a ‘self’ as opposed to the ‘other’ is quite visible, and it always inherently reflects a latent conflict or struggle for dominance and identity definition. This ontological uncertainty and potential threat leads to the establishment of hierarchies, whereby the ‘self’ sees itself as superior to, and the opposite of the ‘other’, as “the ‘foreign policies’ of nation states are based on what have been shown to be representational practices through which various forms of global otherness have been created” (Shapiro, 1989: 15). In constructivist thought, identity is described as “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt, 1992: 397). This means that, more than being something that is perceived (according to the understandings, beliefs, and context of the observer), identity is something that is primarily constructed and projected from within.

In post-structuralist thought, on the other hand, identity is seen as largely built on the idea of difference *vis-à-vis* the ‘other’, as the ‘self’ is as much what it is, as *what it is not*: “the definition of the internal other and the external other compound one another, and both of these seep into the definition given to the other within the interior of the self” (Connolly, 1989: 326). So, how does the EU’s normative justification discourse relate to its (crisis management) actorness? According to Hansen (2006: 1), “the relationship between identity and foreign policy is at the center of poststructuralism’s research agenda: *foreign policies rely upon representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced and reproduced.*”

In this sense, another post-structuralist concept intricately linked to Derrida’s deconstruction practice – ‘textuality’ – is fundamental to our analysis of the EU’s normative justification discourses (or any discourse analysis, we would argue). Textuality means that all dimensions of discourse are taken into consideration in a thorough analysis and meaning-making that looks well beyond just its linguistic aspects:

As coined by Roland Barthes, the “textuality” of an essay includes historical and rhetorical dimensions as legitimate parts of the essay’s semic and epistemic potential. (...) to see the textuality of discourse is, in part, to recognize that a given text contains, or catalyzes, a surfeit of meanings beyond what the author wanted to say (Gregory, 1989: xviii).



Some dimensions that are intertwined in the EU's discourses, building up the latter's textuality, include the discursive struggles within institutions and Member States underlying the EU's common discourses; the historical, political, social, geographic context surrounding the production and dissemination of those discourses; the channels through which they are disseminated; or the targets thereof. This idea of textuality is embedded in the post-structuralist practice of *semiotics* (the study of meaning-making) that includes discursive and non-discursive mediums, both included in the post-structuralist concept of 'text'.

Barthes thus shows how things come to have meanings by virtue of their being part of a culture and how meanings oftentimes *precede* the thing. He shows how ideologies serve as an interpretive frame through which we tacitly know and thus can "read" the meanings that culture gives to objects, and he shows that *the knowability and apparent incontestability of these meanings can only be accounted for via frames of reference* that are necessarily ideological in the Althusserian sense (ibid.: xix).

The post-structuralist practices of textuality (i.e. the relationship between the text and the context) and intertextuality (i.e. the relationship between concepts and meanings in different texts and within each text) are thus important for IR because they provide "(...) critical inquiry into an area of thought where there is no final arbiter of truth, where meaning is derived from an interrelationship of texts, and power is implicated by the problem of language and other signifying practices" (Der Derian, 1989: 6). According to post-structuralism, the element of *power* in discourses and narratives in the social world is often overlooked because some of these discourses are seen as objective universal *truths* and *absolutes* by some groups of humans, and thus assumed to be not just 'real', but also 'normal' and even 'natural'. Post-structuralism challenges and critiques the factual nature of such 'truths' (Gregory, 1989: xiv). The problem is that only some groups view these 'truths' as such, and when others show a different perspective on reality, they are deemed to be not only different, but also inferior (e.g. potentially 'underdeveloped' or 'uncivilised'). This, in turn, produces an asymmetric power relationship between 'winners' and 'losers'.

Power is most commonly associated with the idea of coercion, especially in IR literature, and defined as one actor having the ability to make another do what they otherwise would not do (Lake, 2013: 55-6). In post-structuralist thought, however, power is seen as more undetectable, yet potentially more influential, as it entails the ability to determine what is 'normal' or 'natural' in social relations, which, in turn, generates asymmetrical relations

between actors *qua* winners or losers (Powers, 2007). Yet the post-structuralist conceptualisation of power is not a one-way street, unlike the idea of top-down coercive power. For this power to be successfully exerted, it requires an actor or group of actors that produce discourse and use it as if it were ‘normal / natural’, and another actor or group of actors that acquiesce, internalise, and thus validate this discourse’s alleged ‘truth’ and ‘normalcy’. Instead of paying attention only to discourses that relate to visible power or coercion, post-structuralism looks especially at, and attempts to deconstruct, those discourses that encompass common assumptions, i.e. discourses that appear ‘innocent’, ‘reasonable’, ‘unproblematic’, or ‘normal’:

Whether a given aspect of social reality is a matter of contention or is regarded as natural and unproblematic, meaning is always imposed, not discovered, for the familiar world cannot be separated from the interpretive practices through which it is made (Shapiro, 1989: 11).

According to Foucault, the inherent power of the ‘normalcy’ attributed to certain discourses stems from modern ‘Western’ societies’ increasing concern with surveillance and enforcement of what is deemed to be ‘normal’, and subsequent rejection or marginalisation of individuals that do not fit this category (Powers, 2007). Using the *Panopticon* analogy, Foucault (1995: 200) made the argument that these surveillance and enforcement practices would eventually result in certain norms, ideas, or discourses being internalised and adopted by the members of that society in such a way that would ultimately render such surveillance and enforcement practices unnecessary in the long run (ibid.: 202, 207). Post-structuralism assumes the existence – and perhaps even the necessity – of these discourses in the functioning of the social world, but it criticises their claims to objectiveness, absoluteness, or universality, as well as the asymmetrical power relations that these claims generate. So, rather than attempting to improve or correct them (like, for example, critical theory might), post-structuralism seeks to question and critique such discourses and narratives in order to deconstruct and ‘denaturalise’ them (Gregory, 1989: xiv).

Now that we have identified the theoretical underpinnings of our analysis, we will explain the type of discourse analysis that we will conduct and the principles that guide this analysis.

## 2.2 - Critical discourse analysis

Language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. Insofar as the legitimizations of power relations (...) are not articulated, (...) language is also ideological (Wodak, 2004: 187).<sup>20</sup>

As mentioned previously, we have opted for conducting a critical discourse analysis of the EU's normative justification as a crisis management actor, informed by post-structuralism. According to Wodak (ibid.: 185-186), CDA is not exactly a specific methodology, but rather a 'school' or 'paradigm' that is based on a series of principles that seek to critique<sup>21</sup> ideologies and power by analysing discourses. Very much like post-structuralism, CDA is "interested in analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language" (ibid.: 187). This similarity reflects CDA's rootedness in, and compatibility with, post-structuralism (Diez, 2014a: 29; Aydın-Düzgit, 2014: 133-135), and why it is particularly advantageous for us to make use of this combination of theoretical and analytical tools in our research. CDA's focus on discourse stems from the ideological weight that discourses can have in establishing or reproducing *unequal* power relations between actors in the social world (Wodak, 2004: 186; Milliken, 1999), in a logic that closely resembles post-structuralist thought. In foreign policy CDA, as in post-structuralism, the idea of 'difference' in power relations stands out as especially relevant (Wodak, 2004: 187). According to Diez, this is because

(...) foreign policy does not start from a given subject of the state, but rather (re)constructs the identity of the state through representing something or someone else as 'foreign' and thereby also setting out what counts as 'not foreign' – or, in other words, setting out the attributes of the 'self' (Diez, 2013: 7).<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> The author was citing Jürgen Habermas (1967), *Erkenntnis und Interesse [Knowledge and Interest]*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, p. 259.

<sup>21</sup> Wodak defines 'critique' as 'making visible the interconnectedness of things' (Wodak, 2004: 187, citing Norman Fairclough (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, Harlow, Longman, p. 747.)

<sup>22</sup> This idea is also present in Saussure's definition of concepts *tout court*, from a linguistic point of view, whereby the latter are "purely differential and defined not by their positive content, but negatively by their relations with other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is in being what they other are not" (Saussure, 1966: 117).

In our study, this is most evident in how the EU's actorness is normatively justified in the EU's portrayal of itself as a model and ideal *vis-à-vis* the 'other' who needs to be democratised and overall 'civilised' to come closer to the EU's 'superior' standards. Conducting CDA on the EU's normative justification of its crisis management actorness allows for a deeper comprehension of not only how the EU identifies itself, but also how this identity and the representation thereof translates into a complex and unequal relationship with the 'other' that stems from a specific (social, cultural, and political) context and the EU's self-placement therein. In fact, "understanding foreign policy as a discursive practice, poststructuralism argues that foreign policy discourses articulate and intertwine material factors and ideas to such an extent that the two cannot be separated from one another" (Hansen, 2006: 1).

Since we are looking to understand how the EU normatively justifies its actorness in a specific area in an attempt to legitimate it, we will analyse its *discourses* – the means through which it convinces other actors within and outside its structure to endorse it. Stuart Hall defines language as "the privileged medium in which we 'make sense' of things, in which meaning is produced and exchanged" (Hall, 1997: 1), whereas Saussure even goes as far as saying that "in the lives of individuals and societies, speech is more important than anything else" (Saussure, 1966: 7). In CDA, as in post-structuralism, the importance of language stems from its relationship to power:

(...) language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power. Power does not derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and the long term. Language provides a finely articulated vehicle for differences in power in hierarchical social structures (Wodak, 2004: 187).

Yet language is just one part of discourse. Following Wodak, we argue that the concept of discourse is more encompassing than just language, as context plays a fundamental role in the latter's analysis and understanding (ibid.: 185), in line with the post-structuralist 'textuality' practice that we have previously described. Discourse is usually defined as how language is used to convey ideas and construct meanings: "discourses are *diverse representations of social life which are inherently positioned* – differently positioned actors 'see' and represent social life in different ways, as different discourses" (Fairclough, 2001: 235). Narratives, in turn, result

from an ‘overlap’ of different ‘fluid’ discourses, that are “institutionalised through social and political practice” (Nițoiu, 2013: 240).

General CDA principles include an interdisciplinary character; a problem-orientation; a theoretical and methodological eclecticism; a fieldwork and ethnographic basis; an abductive character (i.e. the constant interchange between theory and data); genre re-contextualisation efforts; historical contextualisation efforts; eclecticism and pragmatism in the definition of analytical categories and tools; a preference for middle-range theories; and an orientation towards change and practice (Wodak, 2004: 187-188).

### 2.2.1 - Research questions and analytical framework

For practical purposes, our analysis is inspired by Fairclough’s analytical framework for CDA, which we found to be quite clear, well organised, and transparent. We have adapted this framework to our project’s objectives and to post-structuralist premises and analytical practices. In our introductory chapter, we have identified ‘a social problem with a semiotic aspect’, which constitutes the basis for any post-structuralist analysis or CDA in general. This is deemed more relevant to CDA’s ‘critical’ dimension than a research question simply meant to produce knowledge (Fairclough, 2001: 236-237). In the first chapter, we identified a discourse-related social problem, which is the central component of the link between actorness and legitimacy, namely how an actor (in this case the EU) that has legal authority tries to achieve performative endorsement through *normative justification* (Beetham, 2013; Sjørnsen, 2002; Føllesdal, 2006; Manners, 2006d, 2009b, 2013b; Manners, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 2013). The core of an actor’s normative justification is done mainly through discourses aiming at persuading / convincing domestic and external actors to validate the EU’s actorness, thus legitimating it. Our project’s main research questions are our starting point:

- Is the EU a crisis management actor?
- How does the EU’s normative justification discourse relate to its (crisis management) actorness?
- How does the EU frame / construct and justify normatively its perceived crisis management actorness?
- What words, concepts, and assumptions constitute the EU’s discursive framework for speaking about crisis management and its projected role therein?

- How do the EU's discourses as a crisis management actor structure its ambitions and positions in the international system, and shape representations therein?
- What discursive and power asymmetries, if any, are embedded in the EU's crisis management discourses?

Our analysis is based on these broad and encompassing main research questions. We have already responded to the first question in chapter 1.2, where we made an assessment of the EU's crisis management actorness as we went through the various actorness criteria developed throughout the course of the scholarly debate on EU actorness. We briefly went through the second research question as well in general terms as we explained the link between normative justification and actorness in chapter 1.3 and more specifically when we addressed the importance of discourse in the context of foreign policy in chapter 2.2.

As mentioned, we began this thesis with the identification, in chapter 1, of a social problem with a semiotic dimension. Following this, we will proceed to identifying the network of practices where the problem occurs. Here, we seek to answer the following questions:

- What network / structure / context of social practices is this problem rooted in? (Fairclough, 2001: 237).
- What discourses constitute the normative justification of the EU's crisis management actorness?

In chapter 3, we identify the context of the problem, namely what and whose discourses are being studied. We identify the actors and discursive corpus (including documents / texts and speech acts) that make up the EU's normative justification as a crisis management actor that will be subject to CDA. We explore the characteristics of EUFP discourses, namely their multi-layered nature, as well as the discursive struggles, heterogeneity, and fragmentation that take place therein.

In chapter 4, we follow a chronological overview of the historical and semiotic evolution of the EU's crisis management policy and discourses, starting with the inception of the EU's CFSP and ESDP in the 1990s, and finishing with the launch of the 2016 EU Global Strategy. The justification for the beginning and end of this chosen timeframe has already been provided in chapter 1. Throughout chapter 4 we will identify these discourses' messages, the authors' concerns, motivations, definitions, targets, as well as main discursive patterns, hierarchies,

discursive continuities and discontinuities, and discursive omissions, emphases, absences, contradictions, and discrepancies. We bring attention to textual excerpts and expressions that convey particular ideas either because they appear repeatedly in the analysed discourses; because we find them to be unpredicted; because they confirm or challenge claims brought up in the academic debates concerning EU actorness or EU/CSDP legitimacy; if a discourse specifically indicates that a certain idea is important; because we identify aspects that validate or contradict our assumptions, our claims, or our framework of analysis; or because they help us answer or understand our study's objectives.

In this context, we will explore the semiotic development of the EU's normative justification as a crisis management actor, following a chronological organisation in order to provide a better understanding of the evolution of the EU's discourses throughout time, and to better understand how contexts and practice both affect, and are affected by, the EU's discourse. Here, we will substantiate the choice of our discursive corpus by showing its importance in context, and we will provide practical examples of the EU's discursive patterns. In this chapter, context is fundamental. As such, in order to examine the relationship between the semiosis / text and other elements in the identified context where the social practices occur, we will engage in what Fairclough refers to as *interactional analysis*, which is meant to "show how semiotic, including linguistic properties of the text connect with what is going on socially in the interaction" (Fairclough, 2001: 240). This is where the post-structuralist concepts of deconstruction and textuality will be applied. In this context, some of the research questions that we will try to answer include the following:

- How and why did the EU come to develop a crisis management policy? What are the historical / social contexts underlying the EU's discourses?
- How do the EU's discourses as a crisis management actor relate with the practical implementation of the CSDP?

Our CDA entails a linguistic aspect with paradigmatic and syntagmatic components. When we speak of including a paradigmatic component in our analysis, we refer to 'paradigms', or "the range of alternative possibilities available, and the choices that are made amongst them" (ibid.). The syntagmatic component of our analysis refers to the text's phrasing, or the combination of textual and discursive elements and genres that result in what Fairclough labels as specific 'textures', whereby "local social structurings of semiotic difference" are produced (ibid.: 240-241). These textures are analysed by looking at various elements of social practices, such as

representations of the world, social relations, social identities, and cultural values (ibid.: 240, 244-245). Our analysis also features an examination of the discourses' structure, organisation, and specific characteristics. We seek to identify the arguments / reasoning being used to propose or persuade certain ideas (in this case, the main idea that the EU should be perceived as a legitimate crisis management actor). In addition, we will look at how sentences are connected and combined, looking also at grammar and semantics, as well as vocabulary choices, meanings, and metaphors (ibid.: 241-242). Some of the research questions that we will seek to answer in this context include:

- What are the key semiotic and linguistic features of the EU's discourses? What kind of concepts / terminology / vocabulary is used?
- What (if any) are the discursive continuities and discontinuities?

This contextual and semiotic / linguistic aspect of our analysis of the EU's discourses allows us to understand not only how the policy evolved in time, but how the discourses evolved with it and connect with the practice, and ultimately how the EU's portrayal of itself and the rest of the world developed and evolved in the context of this policy. We will engage in Derridean-inspired deconstruction, whereby concepts will be analysed by looking at the contrasting or hierarchical opposition that they encase not only in the strictly linguistic / logocentric sense, but also (and especially) in a contextual sense – political, social, cultural – both aspects being essential to derive meaning from discourse. We will also critique, in a Foucauldian sense, ideas that may appear 'normal', 'natural', 'expected', 'obvious', or 'innocent' in the EU's discourses, in addition to identifying the discursive and power asymmetries between the actor producing the discourse and others that are being represented therein.

Following what Fairclough refers to as a *structural analysis of the order of discourse*, we will investigate "how the 'order of discourse' is structured – how semiosis itself is structured within the network of practices" (ibid.: 237). As mentioned previously, the EU's discourses and narratives in external action are, in a semiotic sense, an 'order of discourse' (i.e. the 'semiotic aspect of a social order', ibid.: 235) where certain international actors – like the EU itself or certain countries or regions – are consistently represented in specific ways that may be favourable or unfavourable; and where some discourses dominate, overshadowing other discourses. This discursive hierarchy has to do with how discourses are made and disseminated by the EU, but also with how they are received by the latter's interlocutors – bringing us back to the importance of these discourses for the EU's legitimation efforts as an actor. In this sense,



Fairclough points out the importance of looking at interaction, as discourses are created for specific targets, and thus intrinsically envisage – and often even deliberately attempt – a reaction (ibid.: 239-240). Thus, we seek to answer the following research questions:

- Is there a discursive hierarchy? If so, what are the dominant discourses and narratives, and what are the marginalised or concealed ones?
- Are there elements that allow us to identify a ‘civilising’ attitude on behalf of the EU?
- How are actors, including the EU, E/CSDP host countries, and other actors, represented in the EU’s discourses?
- How are the EU’s crisis management discourses disseminated, and for whom are they meant? Are there signs that the discourses are directed towards specific actors?

The main discursive patterns, narratives, representations, hierarchizations, and omissions found throughout chapter 4 will be debated and analysed in more detail in chapter 5, in light of the post-structuralist tenets adopted in the thesis, in light of the prevailing literature about discourse analysis in the contexts of (EU) foreign policy, and especially in light of our project’s research questions.

Now that we have explained the conceptual and analytical orientation that will guide us throughout our analysis, we will now proceed to identifying some key claims stemming from the scholarly debate which we will attempt to verify or falsify, at least temporarily, in order to make a valid and useful contribution thereto.

### **2.3 - Main objectives and claims**

The main goal of this study is to highlight the link between the EU’s legitimacy and its actorness in the field of crisis management by analysing the EU’s normative justification as a central element in its legitimation efforts (Beetham, 2013; Sjørnsen, 2002; Føllesdal, 2006; Manners, 2006d, 2009b, 2013b; Manners, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 2013). Applying a post-structuralist-inspired CDA, which entails that discourse, language, meaning, and representation are intricately linked to interpretation, is just one *possible* pathway to analysing the EU’s normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor in the context of the latter’s legitimation, rather than a definite or final analysis. CDA does not suit a positivist methodology (Hall, 1997: 42), as “it is (...) impossible to define identity as a variable that is causally separate

from foreign policy or to measure its explanatory value in competition with non-discursive material factors” (Hansen, 2006: 1). Even though we will conduct a discourse analysis and thus do not intend to identify causalities, we do start our analysis by identifying a set of recurrent claims that appear in the scholarly debate which we will, following our analysis, try to corroborate / verify or refute / falsify:

- Following the post-structuralist tenet that proposes that the *self* constructs its identity and its definition by opposition, and that this opposition, in turn, generates an asymmetry of winners and losers (Devetak, 2009; Heidegger, 2004; Derrida, 2004; Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989; Diez, 2005, 2013), we argue that the EU, in its normative justification as a crisis management actor, places itself in a superior hierarchical positioning *vis-à-vis* those for whom the policy is meant (namely the E/CSDP host countries);
- In line with criticisms made in the EU actorness academic debate, especially since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty (Baird, 2015; Barrinha, 2016; Gehring, Oberthür, and Mühleck, 2013; Groen and Niemann, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013; Bretherton and Vogler, 2013), we argue that the EU gives more importance to curating its own identity and presenting itself as bringing value-added, than on its effectiveness, neglecting the latter in its normative justification as a crisis management actor (Bickerton, 2011b);
- We claim that the EU’s alleged ‘responsibility’ to not only manage others’ crises, but also – and especially – to do it by upholding what it considers to be ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ in the social world (i.e. its own values, ideals, and standards), reflects an underlying ‘civilising’ attitude (Manners, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013; Pace, 2007; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 40; Del Sarto, 2016: 222; Kutter, 2014: 151; Zielonka, 2013; Mitzen, 2006).

As stated previously, we are well aware of the post-positivist nature of CDA and post-structuralism, and thus their incompatibility with the testing of hypotheses. Our efforts in corroborating or refuting certain claims in the scientific literature serve the purpose of making a useful contribution to the scholarly debates on EU actorness, legitimacy, and discourse.

Our analysis’ embeddedness in post-structuralist practices is useful due to their focus on the deconstruction and critique of asymmetric power relations, and their effort to ‘denaturalise’ meta-narratives that shape the social world. Using a Derridaean-inspired deconstructive

approach to our discourse analysis allows us to identify and understand dominant narratives and discourses, as well as underlying meaningful contradictions and differences that shape the EU's discourses. Adding a Foucauldian-inspired approach, on the other hand, helps us to critique the apparent 'normalcy' or 'universality' and acknowledge the artificial nature of the EU's discourses, and the power asymmetries they conceal. Thus, we will examine the EU's normative justification narratives as a crisis management actor, i.e. how the EU portrays and justifies itself as having the responsibility to prevent, manage, and solve crises outside of its territorial sphere, mostly through the advancement of European norms, values, and institutions, whereby the latter's alleged universality and appropriateness is somehow meant to legitimate the EU's actorness.

It is the dominant, surviving textual practices that give rise to the systems of meaning and value from which actions and policies are directed and legitimated. A critical political perspective is, accordingly, one that questions the privileged forms of representation whose domination has led to the unproblematic acceptance of subjects, objects, acts, and themes through which the political world is constructed (Michael J. Shapiro, in Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989: 13).

In this study, we will attempt to identify the ontology and teleology of the narratives underpinning and thus leading to the notion of EU actorness in the field of crisis management, as constructed and projected by the EU through discourses. We will look at the evolution of the EU's discourses since the inception of the CFSP and the ESDP, up until the launch of the EU Global Strategy. In the subsequent chapter, we begin our analysis by discussing aspects pertaining to authorship and discursive struggles that characterise the EU's foreign policy discourses, and by identifying the discursive corpus that will be considered.



### CHAPTER 3 - THE NETWORK OF PRACTICES: THE CONTEXT OF THE EU'S NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION AS A CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTOR

In the absence of a sharp sword, does the EU possess something equally pointed, in which norm diffusion can create more than feelings of attraction towards the EU, but is carried out in ways which are less benign and consensual? At the very least this ambiguity suggests that *narrative is a key component of normative power* whose mechanics deserve closer examination (Martin, 2011: 190).

As we have mentioned, discourse and narratives are fundamental in providing normative justification (Beetham, 2013; Sjørnsen, 2002; Føllesdal, 2006; Manners, 2006d, 2009b, 2013b; Manners, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 2013; Carta and Wodak, 2015) for actorness and for policy implementation at the international level, especially when a strong normative component is involved, and coercion is absent. To understand and deconstruct a discourse's content, looking at context is fundamental. This chapter deals with an important part of the contextualisation and structural aspects of the semiosis underpinning the normative justification sustaining the EU's crisis management actorness, namely the actors and discursive corpus that compose it. We begin by contextualising the network / structure / context of social practices where the identified problem stems from, and is rooted in. Throughout this contextualisation, we attempt to identify and understand the sources that construct the EU's crisis management normative justification discourses by identifying, on one hand, the actors that 'speak' on the EU's behalf and, on the other hand, the actual corpus of documents and speeches that contain normative justification elements in the context of the EU's crisis management actorness.

#### 3.1 - Discursive struggles in EU crisis management policy

*Diversity* – for which we might plausibly read *incoherence* – is part of European DNA, but it poses problems for any attempt to fashion a consistent narrative of normative power, even if there may be consensus for the idea that a narrative is indispensable for such power to function. While there may be agreement on narrative as process, content may prove to be more *divisive* (Martin, 2011: 190).

In recent years, the EU has made visible efforts to present a well-curated, clean, unified image in external action, especially through the various EEAS channels and the High Representative's

public diplomacy endeavours (Jørgensen, 2015: 493). Yet, the EU itself is not a unitary actor with a consistent single voice, but rather a complex and fragmented actor with different and varied discursive sources and channels – in terms of type of discourse, in terms of sources that produce them, and in terms of dissemination (Carta and Morin, 2014: 303-7). EU policy documents and public discourses are inherently ‘fluid’ (Nițoiu, 2013: 240), as they stem from complex bargaining processes at the national and European levels that take into consideration different governmental and non-governmental interests and actors, popular support, and other national and European level dynamics. Wodak, in explaining CDA, brings attention to the recurrence of the idea of ‘discursive struggles’ in such contexts:

An important perspective in CDA related to the notion of ‘power’ is that it is very rare that a text is the work of any one person. In texts discursive differences are negotiated; they are governed by differences in power, which is in part encoded in and determined by discourse and by genre. Therefore, texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance (Wodak, 2004: 187).

Constructivist-oriented research proposes that the construction of an EU identity as a global actor and projection and justification thereof onto the rest of the world is mostly developed through practices of ‘purposeful construction’ (Risse, 2004: 154; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 37). These practices are carried out by both the EU institutions and bodies in charge of EUPP (and E/CSDP) and by the representatives of these bodies and EU Member States, and that ultimately form discourses made in the name of the EU or labelled with the EU’s common authorship, which, as they overlap, are institutionalised into narratives (Nițoiu, 2013: 240). In practice, such discourses and narratives are formed by proposing or endorsing collective statements that conceptualise and reiterate the EU’s identity and the standards and principles upon which this identity is based, or at least establish the latter’s limits (Diez, 2014b). These practices of purposeful construction result from collective action, which stems from socialisation practices, which in turn lead to internalisation – i.e., “the adoption of social beliefs and practices into the actor’s own repertoire of cognitions and behaviours” (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 112), and which ultimately leads to widespread appropriation and outward projection of narratives – albeit heterogeneous – that qualify the EU as having such an identity. Yet, like all discourses, the EU’s discourses are full of discrepancies, contradictions, and conflicting definitions, more so because of the EU’s complex and composite nature as an actor that is made

up of different actors and is constantly evolving, resulting in an increased proclivity towards heterogeneity, fragmentation, and fluidity.

Linked to this is also the connection between different discursive levels and the meanings and purpose of the discourses. Diez argues that there is a difference between an effort of coordination to communicate policies ‘in order to legitimise them’ and the actual meanings behind these practices (Diez, 2014a: 28-29). These struggles operate at three levels, according to Diez: the individual level, the collective level, and the ‘level of the overall discourse’, whereby “the picture is one of competing discursive positions that are not only actively pursued by collective actors, but also shape the latter’s identities” (ibid.: 29). It is mostly with this third level – the level of the overall discourse – that our study is concerned, in the sense that we are looking primarily at the main *narratives* that are made public in the name of the EU about what the world is or should be, according to the EU, its institutions and Member States, and especially what the EU’s role therein is or should be when it comes to crisis management.

Our primary focus on the level of the overall discourse has to do with its purpose of shaping the collective actor’s identity (ibid.), as it makes up the more visible and public aspect of the actor’s discourse, as it evolves into narrative. Yet, due to their interconnectedness, we also consider the collective and individual levels of discourse, or rather different levels of collective and individual discourse – as both these concepts are difficult to discern when it comes to a Member State representative or an EU institutional representative (such as the High Representative), since their speeches and other texts that bear their authorship result from the collective work of entire teams of individuals (themselves not bereft of normative beliefs and individual experiences and cognitions), or they are made individually but in the name of a collective (a state, an institution, the EU structure, etc.) about the EU’s actorness in a given area (Carta and Morin, 2014: 303-5).

Actors that speak publicly in the name of the EU, meaning that they produce and also reinforce the EU’s narratives in matters of foreign policy, including those that sustain the EU’s crisis management actorness, include the European Council, the Council, representatives of the Member States, the HR, the EEAS, the Commission, among others. Despite the EP’s distance from the E/CSDP’s decision-making, this political institution is also responsible for the discursive construction and reproduction of the EU’s identity and actorness in crisis management, and thus of the narratives that constitute the latter. As such, we have decided to include in our study the main EP resolutions that relate to the development of this policy, and to try to grasp the EP’s understanding and reproduction of the language and normative justifications used to sustain the EU’s actorness in crisis management. The mere variety of

actors that speak on the EU's behalf is enough to generate the discursive struggles briefly explained in this section.

The discursive corpus under analysis in this study is made up of the discourses (in the form of official and unofficial documents and statements of different types, as well as speeches) produced by these actors that contain elements that justify the EU's crisis management actorness from a normative standpoint, and whence stem the narratives that underpin the EU's identity in this field. Even though our study does not focus as much on how these discourses are formed, but more so on how they are used publicly in the name of the EU, as this is an aspect of our research that simply cannot be ignored. In fact, discursive struggles are relevant for the analysis and understanding of discourses made by a collective actor, insofar as they result in differences, incoherence, and inconsistencies, as we have pointed out before. In addition, the discursive struggles underlying a collective actor's discourses also serve another purpose, according to Diez (2014a: 29; 2014b): they continuously set, reset, and validate the limits 'to what is considered legitimate and practicable':

(...) meaning does not simply exist as a given, but that it has to be fought over and negotiated – there is a struggle over meaning: a struggle that takes place between discourses that construct and delineate meanings – for instance of what European identity is or where its boundaries lie – in different ways (Diez, 2014a: 28).

In foreign policy discourse analysis – especially one that relies on a Derridean deconstruction approach – it is not just a presence (of an expression, a concept, a commitment, a narrative) that is worth notice; asymmetries, hierarchies, opposites, absences, and vagueness can also be meaningful and serve different purposes (Diez, 2014b, 2016; Schumacher, 2015). Diez (2014b: 325) points out that, according to this logic, meaning 'is produced through *difference*' and that this is a fluid process. The idea of meaning-making through difference – previously explained in the section about post-structuralist practices – postulates that a concept and its opposite co-construct one another, in the sense that a concept or an identity is built upon what the 'self' is and is not (i.e., the 'other'). An often-cited example is the co-construction of the concepts of sovereignty versus anarchy (ibid.). Another example is the use of the expression '*failed states*' in the EU's discourses, which is determined by a verb (fail) whose core definition is embedded with difference not only at a mere linguistic level, but at a political and social level as well, since it means *not* to succeed (at being whatever a state *should* be). So, by defining a 'failed' state – even if the definitions may vary slightly from discourse to discourse –, the EU is also



inherently providing its definition of ‘successful’ state, i.e. the opposite. In other words, the EU is setting, or at least trying to set, the limits to what is acceptable, recognisable, and practicable.

Yet, meanings are contingent upon context, which is continuously changing. This, in turn, results in a sort of permanent state of dispute over the meaning of central concepts, as “social and political core concepts (...) tend to be ‘essentially contested’ exactly because they take on the function of a nodal point, drawing different meanings together and therefore stabilising broader conceptions of society” (ibid.). Because of this, in addition to being characterised by the heterogeneity and fragmentation that stems from inherent discursive struggles, discourses composed by various actors / individuals often result in the lowest common denominator, which results in the frequent use of expressions and concepts – as well as the collective actor’s expressed proposed commitments to this or that policy objective / goal / target – that are more often than not fluid, vague, and ambiguous. In the case of the EU, this leaves room for policy development without compromising the Member States’ individual positions or the latter’s potential option to reduce the EU’s engagement in a given area. This fluidity, vagueness, and ambiguity is what makes the process of meaning-making through difference and delimitation especially relevant. On the other hand, it emphasises the importance of the converging discourses that are reproduced to the point of becoming distinguishable narratives.

Before we look into the EU’s discourses and narratives, we need to identify the sources and data (including official and unofficial documents and statements, as well as speeches) that comprise what we identify as the EU’s normative justification discursive corpus as a crisis management actor, which is the object of the subsequent section.

### **3.2 - Selection of an EU crisis management normative justification discursive corpus**

(...) if the analysis is to be about social signification, a discourse analysis should be based upon a set of texts by different people presumed (according to the research focus) to be authorized speakers / writers of a dominant discourse (...) (Milliken, 1999: 233).

The goal of this thesis is to conduct a CDA of the EU’s normative justification as a central element in its legitimation efforts as a crisis management actor. We share the belief that “across EU documents a discourse can be identified according to which the Union is constructed as a unit which defends its own interests and has an obligation to take on responsibilities in the light

of international challenges” (Larsen, 2004: 69).<sup>23</sup> As such, in order to compile a suitable discursive corpus to conduct our analysis, we established a set of criteria and priorities:

- Texts<sup>24</sup> *must contain elements of normative justification* and substantiation of the EU’s actorness ambitions, actions, and identity *in the policy field of crisis management*;
- *Priority* should be given to texts drafted or uttered at the *highest possible political official EU level*;
- Texts should form, *as much as possible, a basis for policy development*;
- Texts must be drafted or uttered by the EU institutions, organs, representatives, or Member State representatives *involved in the development and implementation of the E/CSDP*.

The core of our discursive corpus, which amounts to more than half of all analysed discursive instances, is comprised of *all* the European Council and Council decisions and other discourses which fit the abovementioned criteria produced in the designated timeframe (between 1992 and 2016), including discourses labelled with the EU’s common authorship (such as treaties and strategic documents). To enrich and complement our core discursive corpus, we included discourses produced by each High Representative to date (namely Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton, and Federica Mogherini), as well as key discourses produced by other EU institutions and institutional actors, including some (like the EP or the Commission) that play a less prominent role in this policy field in terms of actual decision-making, but that nonetheless engage in the discursive construction of the EU’s identity as a crisis management actor. As such, we have added discourses produced by the European Commission that contain elements of normative justification of the EU’s crisis management role, including discourses produced by the institution as a whole and by each one of its Presidents during the designated timeframe (namely Jacques Delors, Jacques Santer, Romano Prodi, José Manuel Barroso, and Jean-Claude Juncker). We have also included *all* resolutions produced by the EP that fit into our criteria in the chosen timeframe for our analysis.

---

<sup>23</sup> Larsen, 2004: 69, citing Henrik Larsen (2000), ‘Europe’s Role in the World: The Discourse’, in Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (eds), *The New World Order: Contrasting Theories*, London: Macmillan.

<sup>24</sup> Text / textual is used here in the semiotic sense of discursive instance, a verbal recording which can take the form of written or oral discourses, or other manners of conveying messages.

In addition, we added discourses produced by some individual Member State representatives outside of their EU institutional roles (i.e. neither in the context of a European Council or Council meeting) that contain elements of normative justification of the EU's crisis management actorness. The analysis of statements made by representatives of the individual Member States in these circumstances is helpful in understanding if there is corroboration and/or reproduction of the key narratives produced by the EU's core official institutional discourse at the national level, even though this is not the primary focus of our research. In this context, we did not include discourses produced by all *current* (at the time of the writing of this thesis) 28 Member States. This is because the purpose of our thesis does not focus on having all Member States represented in our corpus regardless of what their representatives had to say, but rather discourses produced by Member State representatives that contributed to the construction of the EU's identity as a crisis management actor by means of normative justification that were relevant for our study. Our study's historical dimension weighed in our decision to include certain discourses produced by Member State representatives: on one hand, the EU did not always have the same number of Member States; and, on the other hand, not all Member States have always necessarily been equally discursively engaged in this policy field.

As mentioned, we looked *specifically* for discourses that contained normative justification elements, i.e. elements that could help us understand *how the EU justifies and substantiates its actorness ambitions and actions in the area of crisis management*. As such, we did not look for just any random discourse that concerned crisis management in the context of the EU, and we acknowledge that there are other discourses concerning EU-level crisis management in addition to the ones that we have used in this project; instead, we purposefully incorporated discourses that contained normative considerations about the EU's identity and ambitions as a crisis management actor – how it portrays its role, its potential, its responsibilities, the role of other actors, and ultimately form narratives regarding the ontology and teleology of its actorness in this area that justify and drive the development thereof.

All studies have limitations, and most data collection in qualitative analysis, in particular, has limitations. By limitations we mean certain features that may hinder the analysis in some way, in terms of comprehensiveness or depth. Ultimately, it is important to ask ourselves and be aware of the level of impact that the limitations that we here identify have in the achievement of our specific research objectives, however important and deserving of due consideration and examination they may be beyond our thesis' particular goals. There are significant advantages to using the data that we have collected in this study, namely in terms of the latter's validity, reliability, and high quality.

Even though we believe that “there is a dominant EU discourse which articulates the EU as an international actor” (Larsen, 2004: 69), many other actors besides the ones that we have included speak on the EU’s behalf, including representatives of the Member States at various governmental levels, or representatives in EU delegations, for example. In other words, “in the making of EU’s foreign policy, the number of independent national and institutional actors that converge into the EU’s many and frequently contradictory voices accounts for an inherently pluralistic choir” (Carta and Wodak, 2015: 2). So, why certain discourses and not others? Where do we draw the line with regard to EU agency? How do we avoid a selection bias? These are not simple questions, reflecting the complexity and broadness of our object of study. Determining a corpus based on a sample is neither appropriate for the universe in question, nor for the methodology we have opted for. Does this mean that we must use *all* available discursive instances in existence produced by *all* actors that speak on behalf of the EU in a given area, since our study is meant to be representative of the EU’s discourse therein? Not necessarily, as we have established certain *criteria* for limiting the discursive corpus that we mean to analyse, that fit into to our study’s specific objectives and that seek to prevent us from incurring in a selection bias. Thus, our corpus includes *all available discourses that meet the criteria that suit our study’s objectives* (rather than a sample thereof). We acknowledge that both the criteria for determining our corpus and the actual choices of the discourses that comprise the latter are not absolute and may still be subject to criticism. The issue of EU agency and discursive identity is complex and deserves thorough critical thinking (Larsen, 2004; Carta and Morin, 2014; Carta and Wodak, 2015). But an advantage of doing research (and a constant inherent consequence thereof) is that the identification of limitations oftentimes generates opportunities. In this case to widen both the critical thinking about the EU’s agency and the scope of the EU’s discursive corpus in future research.

Similarly to the diversity in our analysed discourses’ *authorship*, there is also variety in the *type* of discourses. This diversity has been included in our study, reflecting the multiplicity of discursive channels and instruments in the construction and justification narratives supporting this policy and of the EU’s constructed actorness and identity in this context. The following table lists the discursive corpus that will be subject to analysis, comprised of 138 discursive units – including speeches, statements, treaties, policy documents, resolutions, and declarations – where we identify the institution or actor that produced the discourse, the type of discourse, and the year in which it was produced, ranging from 1992 to 2016.

<b>AUTHOR</b>	<b>TITLE / CONTEXT</b>	<b>TYPE</b>	<b>YEAR</b>
EU	Treaty on European Union (Maastricht)	Treaty	1992
WEU Council of Ministers	Petersberg Declaration	Declaration	
Jacques Delors (Commission President)	Address to the CSCE Summit - Helsinki	Speech	
Jacques Delors (Commission President)	Address to Special Session of EP Committees on the Former Yugoslavia	Speech	
European Council	Presidency conclusions, Brussels	Policy Document	1993
Jacques Santer (Commission President)	Address to EP, Strasbourg	Speech	1995
WEU Council of Ministers	European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries	Declaration	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Turin	Policy Document	1996
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Dublin	Policy Document	
EU	Treaty on European Union (Amsterdam)	Treaty	1997
Jacques Santer (Commission President)	The EU in the 21st century: political dwarf or world actor?	Speech	1998
Tony Blair (UK Prime Minister)	Informal European summit in Pörtlach, Austria	Press statement	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Vienna	Policy Document	
Jacques Chirac & Gerhard Schröder, HSGs of Germany & France	Franco-German Summit Final Declaration	Declaration	
Tony Blair & Jacques Chirac, HSGs of the UK & France	Joint Declaration, delivered at the British- French Summit, Saint-Malo	Declaration	
European Council	Annex III: Cologne European Council Presidency Report on Strengthening of the ESDP	Policy Document	1999
German Council Presidency	Informal reflection at WEU on Europe's security and defence	Draft Policy Document	
German Foreign Ministry	Informal meeting of EU foreign ministers Eltville, German proposal	Draft Policy Document	

Jacques Chirac & Gerhard Schröder, HSGs of Germany & France	Franco-German Defence and Security Council Declaration	Declaration	
Tony Blair and Massimo D'Alema, HSGs of the UK & Italy	Joint Declaration Launching European Defence Capabilities Initiative, British-Italian summit, London	Declaration	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki	Policy Document	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira	Policy Document	
Romano Prodi (Commission President)	Message on the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration	Statement	
EP	Resolution on the establishment of a common ESDP after Cologne and Helsinki	Resolution	2000
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Nice	Policy Document	
HR & Commission	Report with recommendations for improving coherence & effectiveness of conflict prevention	Draft Policy Document	
Council	Council Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management & resolution in Africa	Policy Document	
Romano Prodi (Commission President)	After Reform: a future strategy for Europe as a whole	Speech	
Council	Draft EU Programme for Prevention of Violent Conflicts	Draft Policy Document	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg	Policy Document	2001
European Council	Conclusions & Plan of Action, Extraordinary European Council meeting, Brussels	Policy Document	
European Council	Follow-up to the September 11 Attacks & the Fight Against Terrorism	Policy Document	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Laeken	Policy Document	
EP	Report on the progress achieved in the implementation of the CFSP	Report	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Seville	Policy Document	
Romano Prodi (Commission President)	A stronger foreign and security policy for Europe	Speech	2002

EP	Resolution on the state of the ESDP and EU-NATO relations	Resolution	
EP	Progress in implementation of CFSP	Resolution	
EU and NATO	EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP	Declaration	
Council	Council Decision on the launching of the EU military operation in the DRC	Policy Document	2003
European Council	European Security Strategy	Policy Document	
European Council	Document on EU-NATO Consultation, Planning and Operations	Policy Document	
European Council	Extraordinary European Council Conclusions, Brussels	Policy Document	
European Council	Athens Declaration, Informal European Council, Athens	Policy Document	
European Council	Presidency's Statement on Iraq, Athens	Policy Document	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Brussels (March)	Policy Document	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki	Policy Document	
EEAS	Fact sheet on EUPM BiH	Factsheet	
EU	Treaty on European Union (Nice)	Treaty	
Javier Solana (HR)	Ceremony marking the end of EUFOR Artemis DRC	Press statement	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Brussels (December)	Policy Document	
Javier Solana (HR) & George Robertson (NATO SG)	Press point	Press statement	
Council	Headline Goal 2010	Policy Document	2004
Council	Council Joint Action on the extension of EUPOL PROXIMA	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action on EUJUST THEMIS	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action EUFOR BiH	Policy Document	
Council	Common Position on conflict prevention, management & resolution in Africa, repealing Common Position 2001/374/CFSP	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action on EUPOL Kinshasa	Policy Document	
Council Secretariat	Fact sheet on EU EUFOR ALTHEA 3	Factsheet	

Javier Solana (HR)	Launch of the mission EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia	Press statement	
Council	Declaration on Combating Terrorism	Policy Document	
Javier Solana (HR)	The European Strategy – The Next Steps?	Speech	
José Manuel Barroso (Commission President)	The European Union and the Emerging World Order: Perceptions and Strategies	Speech	
Javier Solana (HR), Declain Kelleher (PSC Chaiman) & Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO SG)	Joint press point with NATO SG, PSC Chairman, & EU HR	Press statement	
Council	Council Joint Action on EU SSR DRC	Policy Document	
Javier Solana (HR)	Shaping an effective EU Foreign Policy	Speech	
EP	Resolution on the European Security Strategy	Resolution	
Council	Council Joint Action on EUJUST LEX	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action on the EUPOL COPPS	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action on EU BAM Rafah	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action on AMM	Policy Document	
Javier Solana (HR)	Ceremony marking the end of the EUPM FYROM	Press statement	
EEAS	Press Document EUPOL-Kinshasa	Press statement	2006
Council	Presidency Report on ESDP	Policy Document	
Commission	‘Europe in the World’, Practical Proposals for Coherence, Effectiveness & Visibility	Communication	
EP	Resolution on the implementation of the ESS in the context of the ESDP	Resolution	
European Council	Presidency Conclusions, Brussels	Policy Document	2007
Javier Solana (HR)	From Cologne to Berlin & Beyond: Operations, Institutions & Capabilities	Speech	
Angela Merkel (German Chancellor & representing the European Council Presidency), Hans-Gert	Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome	Declaration	



Pottering (EP President), and José Manuel Barroso (Commission President)			
Council	Council Joint Action on EUPOL RD Congo	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action on EUPOL AFGANISTAN	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action on EUFOR CAR Tchad	Policy Document	
PSC	Civilian Headline Goal 2010	Policy Document	
David Miliband (UK Foreign Secretary)	Europe 2030: Model Power Not Superpower	Speech	
José Manuel Barroso (Commission President)	The European Union after the Lisbon Treaty	Speech	
Council	Security and Development	Policy Document	
Council	EU Concept for Force Generation	Policy Document	2008
Council	Council Joint Action EU SSR GUINEA- BISSAU	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action on EUMM Georgia	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action on EULEX Kosovo	Policy Document	
Council	Council Joint Action on EUNAVFOR Somalia	Policy Document	
EU	Report on the Implementation of the ESS	Report	
Council	General Affairs & External Relations Council	Press statement	2009
European Council	Presidency Conclusions (June)	Policy Document	
EP	Resolution on the ESS and the ESDP	Resolution	
Council	Report on the ESDP	Report	
Council	EU Concept for the Use of Force in EU-led Military Operations	Policy Document	
Council Secretariat	Fact sheet on EU EUFOR ALTHEA 16	Factsheet	
Council Secretariat	Fact sheet on EU EUFOR ALTHEA 19	Factsheet	
EEAS	Fact sheet on EUFOR Tchad/RCA	Factsheet	
EU	Treaty on European Union (Lisbon)	Treaty	
Javier Solana (HR)	Mobilise now to stabilise Somalia	Opinion article	
Javier Solana (HR)	Together we are Stronger	Speech	
Council Secretariat	Fact sheet on EU EUFOR ALTHEA 20	Factsheet	2010

European Council	Presidency Conclusions (September)	Policy Document	2011
Catherine Ashton (HR)	Munich security conference	Speech	
Council	Council conclusions on conflict prevention	Policy Document	
EEAS	Annual Activity Report	Report	
EP	Resolution on the development of the CSDP and the Lisbon Treaty	Resolution	2012
Council Secretariat	Fact sheet on EU EUFOR ALTHEA 27	Factsheet	
EEAS	Fact sheet on EUSEC RD CONGO	Factsheet	
Council	Council Conclusions on CSDP	Policy Document	
EP	Resolution on the development of the CSDP	Resolution	
Herman Van Rompuy & José Manuel Barroso (Presidents of the European Council & Commission)	Joint statement on the award of the 2012 Nobel Peace prize to the EU	Statement	
European Council	European Council Conclusions	Policy Document	
Council	Council conclusions on the EEAS Review	Policy Document	
Catherine Ashton (HR)	Comprehensive approach to external conflict & crises	Joint communication	2013
Catherine Ashton (HR)	EEAS Review	Report	
Catherine Ashton (HR)	Final report on the CSDP: Preparing the European Council on Security & Defence	Report	
EP	Resolution on the implementation of the CSDP	Resolution	
European Council	European Council Conclusions 19/20 December	Policy Document	
Council	Council conclusions on comprehensive approach	Policy Document	
EEAS	Fact sheet on EUJUST LEX-Iraq	Factsheet	2014
EEAS	Civilian Operations Commander Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring & Advising in Civilian CSDP missions	Policy Document	
José Manuel Barroso (Commission President)	Strengthening Europe security and defence sector	Speech	

Council	Conclusions on implementation of EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel	Policy Document	2015
Council	Council conclusions on CSDP	Policy Document	
Federica Mogherini (HR)	Joint Consultation Paper 'Towards a new ENP'	Consultation paper	
Commission	Capacity building in support of security & development - Enabling partners to prevent & manage crises	Joint communication	
EP	Resolution on the HR's Annual Report	Resolution	
Commission	The European Agenda on Security	Joint communication	
Council	Conclusions on the Review of the ENP	Policy Document	
Jean-Claude Juncker (Commission President) & Jens Stoltenberg (NATO SG)	Written joint statement	Statement	
European Council	European Council conclusions, Brussels	Policy Document	
EP	Resolution on the implementation of the CSDP	Resolution	
Federica Mogherini (HR)	Report ahead of the June 2015 European Council on security & defence	Report	
Jean-Marc Ayrault & Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Foreign Ministers of France & Germany)	A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties	Statement	2016
EU	Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - a Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy	Policy Document	

**Table 1** - EU crisis management normative justification discursive corpus

As far as language is concerned, even though we are aware that the EU's discourses are constructed and divulged in several languages, we have opted for working mostly with the English language, even though we do engage with writings and speeches in other languages (in

particular French). This is not free of implications for CDA, especially for its more specific linguistic aspects, such as vocabulary or metaphors. We acknowledge that this is a deliberate choice that results in an incomplete analysis of the EU's discourses because it does communicate in other languages. However, we did not select this language randomly, as English is one of the three official working languages of the EU – alongside French and German – which means that while not all documents are translated into every single EU language, they are always made available in one or the three working languages.

In the following chapter we proceed with the CDA by analysing the historical and semiotic evolution of crisis management at the EU level, so that we may, in the subsequent chapter, identify and analyse the characteristics of the EU's main normative justification narratives as a crisis management actor.

## **CHAPTER 4 - THE SEMIOTIC EVOLUTION OF THE EU'S NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION DISCOURSES AS A CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTOR**

Throughout the present chapter we will present a chronological overview of the historical and semiotic evolution of the EU's crisis management policy and discourses, starting with the inception of the EU's CFSP and ESDP in the 1990s, and finishing with the launch of the 2016 EU Global Strategy. The goal of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the evolution of the EU's discourses as a crisis management actor throughout the identified period, in order to identify normative justifications for engaging in this policy area and for developing a sense of actorness therein, and also comprehend the context of discourse and practice and how they are mutually constitutive. In a codification-type logic, we aim to present the constituent elements of our discursive corpus, to identify their connections with one another, their contexts, while simultaneously justifying their choice and providing practical examples. In this chapter, we intend to identify the EU's main recurrent discursive and narrative patterns, the underlying asymmetries and hierarchies, the discursive continuities and discontinuities, as well as omissions and discrepancies, which will be further discussed and analysed in chapter 5. For practical purposes, we have divided this chapter into several subchapters that focus on different periods of the development of the EU's crisis management actorness.

### **4.1 - The genesis and first steps towards the establishment of the ESDP**

The present section analyses and contextualises the discourses produced or divulged in the period comprehended between 1992 and 2003 by European institutions and actors involved in the development of the establishment of the ESDP that contain elements of normative justification. This period represents the early steps in the formation of the ESDP and, as such, is particularly rich in discursive elements that provide normative justifications for the establishment and early development of this policy area and the EU's actorness therein, amply influenced and driven by their specific historical, social, and institutional context. Here, we are already able to identify the genesis of some of the main narratives that mark the EU's discourse and normative justification as a crisis management actor that will be further analysed in chapter 5.

The EU, established in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, included a 'pillar' of security known as the CFSP. The aim of this policy was to coordinate common positions and joint

actions of EU Member States, while the implementation of decisions with defence implications was dealt with by the WEU.<sup>25</sup> A paragraph in the Maastricht Treaty preamble reads:

RESOLVED to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, *which might in time lead to a common defence*, thereby *reinforcing the European identity* and its independence in order to *promote peace, security and progress* in Europe and *in the world* (EU, 1992: 2).

Here, we notice that there is an explicit mention of promotion of *progress* outside Europe in the context of an ‘eventual’ (renamed ‘possible’ since the Amsterdam Treaty) future defence policy. This explicit mentioning of progress promotion in the treaty preamble – which has maintained, by-and-large, its phrasing up until the Lisbon Treaty – suggests a dichotomist distinction between progress and stagnation *vis-à-vis* other countries and regions, in a logic of winners and losers. However, as the same expression is directed at Europe, the potential idea of a contrast / opposition disappears as such. Nonetheless, the normative premise in the EU’s discourse of a link between a future common defence policy and the reinforcement of ‘the’ European identity as a means of promoting peace, security, and progress as a justification for the former is well-defined from the beginning.

The Maastricht Treaty lists five objectives for the newly created Union (Article B), whereby the second one – preceding the protection of Member State nationals’ rights and interests, or the maintenance of the *acquis communautaire* – is to ‘assert its identity on the international scene’ through the implementation of a CFSP and the ‘eventual framing’ of a common defence policy (ibid.: 5). This demonstrates that the goal of establishing an ‘actorness’ identity in the area of security and defence is considered not only intentional but also important and has been explicitly present in the EU’s discourse since its inception, rather than being an unintended consequence. Within the specific provisions on a common foreign and security policy (title V), unlike in the preamble, there is explicit mention of a mission to “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental

---

<sup>25</sup> The WEU, created in 1954, was an intergovernmental organisation, independent from the European integration process, composed of ministers of defence and foreign affairs of several European states. However, due to its co-existence with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the WEU’s role was, in practice, mostly limited to that of “a discussion forum for European NATO members where the presence of US representatives was considered undesirable” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 187).

freedoms” (ibid.: 94) indicating the genesis of a politically oriented normative attitude towards external actors, and a normative justification for the development of the CFSP. Nonetheless, in this treaty this is not, in any way, related to a defence policy (which, at this point, is merely referred to as ‘eventual’), nor is it, for that matter, linked to crisis management.

The political shift that led to the establishment of the EU and its foreign and security policy is linked to a series of events and discourses that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, namely the end of the Cold War and the subsequent emergence of doubts regarding NATO’s purpose and future, as well as the outbreak of armed conflict within continental Europe, specifically in (then) Yugoslavia, which called for European attention and action (European Council, 1993: 29-30; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 187). These events ultimately led to the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration, whereby the WEU confirmed its will to engage in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, as well as “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (WEU Council of Ministers, 1992: 6). None of these concepts is defined in the declaration, which indicates a recurrent and deliberate ambiguity and vagueness in European discourse in what concerns the actual undertakings that these tasks / missions might entail in the future. As the Petersberg Declaration shows, the development of a security and defence area in the context of the EU has been linked, from the beginning, to crisis management outside of the EU’s territory, instead of a more traditional territorial defence type of arrangement (this would remain NATO’s task).

The constant use of nomenclatures such as ‘Ministers’ or ‘WEU Member States’ as the leading actors in the document (to the detriment of using simply WEU or EU) suggests that neither the WEU nor the EU were seen as full actors, reflecting the embryonic stage of the “defence component of the European Union” (ibid.: 6, 9), and highlighting the intergovernmental nature of this area. Nonetheless, there is mention of the “ongoing development of a *European security identity*” in the context of the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies (ibid.: 6), although the document does not elaborate on what that may entail either. Throughout the declaration, the normative justifications provided for the development and launch of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ are constantly linked to ensuring and reinforcing European stability and security. This indicates that the tasks, and thus the origin of EU crisis management actorness, were linked to territorial defence, even if only indirectly.

In this document, there is not much specific mention of the potential recipients of the newly created tasks; nonetheless, it refers to the importance of a sub-group’s work on ‘security in the Mediterranean’ and on the WEU’s “dialogue with the Maghreb countries, taking into

account the political developments both in these countries and in the region” (ibid.: 5) in what may be identified as an early idea of what would later become the ENP.

On July 10, 1992, European Commission President Jacques Delors addressed, in Helsinki, the HSGs present at a Summit of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a precursor to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Delors starts by arguing that “peace, security, cooperation and economic growth - those, along with the social dimension, are the major challenges facing the continent of Europe today, no less than in the past” (Delors, 1992a). In describing the European Community, Delors emphasises ‘post-war backdrop’ that led to its establishment, whereby “a group of states which had only recently been at war with one another came together of their own free will, resolved to share a common destiny (...) sharing common values” (ibid.). The Commission President calls the CSCE a “genuine forum for cooperation between states that now profess to share the same values” as the EU, and brings attention to the EU’s ‘complementary’ to the CSCE (ibid.), emphasising the importance of a transatlantic community of values, which would become a *leitmotif* in EUFP discourse (Larsen, 2004), as would the EU’s role as complementary to other international organisations due to its uniqueness.

One month later, on August 10, 1992, Jacques Delors addressed a special session of EP committees on the former Yugoslavia to discuss the possibility of a role for the EC/EU as a conflict mediator therein. To clarify this position, the Commission President begins by stating that “the Community is not sufficiently integrated or sufficiently powerful to (...) impose itself as a mediator in a conflict whose tragic effects are being felt only two hours away from Brussels” adding that “only Political Union, built on the dual foundation of monetary integration and a common foreign and security policy, will put us in a position to *assume our global responsibilities* boldly and lucidly” (Delors, 1992b). In other words, what Delors is saying is that the EC/EU may not be ready, but there are, nonetheless, ‘global responsibilities’ that must be assumed, even if only at a later stage. A clue to why such responsibilities exist is presented subsequently, when the Commission President states that without the efforts already made in the establishment of the EU, “the tragedy of Yugoslavia could well have spelled serious political tension for Western Europe” (ibid.), meaning that ensuring EU security is a key driver for both integration and a foreign and security policy.

After describing the conflict in the Western Balkans, Delors argues that “it seems clear enough that in the absence of a credible (...) prospect of military intervention, there is nothing to halt the subtle, murderous strategy of the Serbian leaders,” and subsequently poses provocative questions to the members of the EC/EU: “do the Twelve agree to create this



credible prospect on a realistic, demonstrative operational basis? Or can they not agree to go that far?" (ibid.). The speech finishes with a statement recalling the EC/EU's historical domestic peace-oriented nature and resulting external *finalité*, which characterises the 'EU as a model' narrative (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010) that would come to mark EUFP in decades to come: "for fifty years we have been struggling to build a united Europe, to outlaw civil strife between Europeans. We have a degree of success to our credit. But we are in duty bound to militate for recognition of the same values throughout the greater Europe. That is the new challenge of History" (Delors, 1992b).

On January 17, 1995, Jacques Santer, as newly appointed President of the European Commission, addressed the EP in Strasbourg. After praising his predecessor's work, Santer confronts the Commission's (and the EU's) tasks in the years to come, including the situation in former Yugoslavia. In this context, the Commission President frames the EU's legacy and role as coinciding in ontology and teleology as a peace project: "this tragedy teaches us one fundamental lesson: it is more important than ever that the Union *remain an axis of peace and prosperity for the continent of Europe*" (Santer, 1995). Santer highlights the importance of the EU not becoming a "haven of peace in a troubled sea," thus explaining "the importance of developing a *genuine* foreign and security policy (ibid.). The Commission President then lists a set of questions concerning the EU's domestic and external role, including questioning what the EU is doing "to make *Europe's* voice heard in the rest of the world" (ibid.), in the sense of determining the Commission's tasks for the subsequent years. Here, Santer uses Europe as a metonym for the EU, ascribing it an abstract political and cultural value-based identity (which is institutionalised as the EU), but is not limited to a strict geographic concept (Kuus, 2011).

Santer advocates in favour of a strong CFSP, urging the Member States to determine their common interests so that the pursuit of the latter may be more effective. He argues that that which is stopping the EU from having a 'real' CFSP is "the lack of a global and coherent vision" (Santer, 1995), adding that what is missing is concerted effort and planning as well as a strategic dimension. The CFSP, according to Santer, "should apply to the whole world," even though he focuses primarily on the EU's neighbourhood (which, at the time, included the Central and Eastern European countries that came to be a part of the EU following the Nice Treaty). The Commission President states that "*we are already closely involved in developments in the Middle East and naturally have a vital interest in actively promoting the peace process there*" (ibid.). Regarding the transatlantic relationship, Santer claims that the EU and the US "are and will remain very close partners (...) think of our *common interests in security and defence*. My view of our relationship is not pessimistic but lucid and realistic: Europe must be

united *if it is to stand as an equal to the United States*” (ibid.). Here we emphasise the idea of equating the EU with the US as an actor (so long as it is united), reflecting actorness expectations for the newly created EU, and bringing attention to the importance of the transatlantic relationship.

Concerning security and defence, Santer recalls that “the Treaty also commits us to a common security policy and, eventually, to a common defence”, adding that “this will undoubtedly be one of the key issues at the intergovernmental conference” (ibid.). Although Santer does not make many normative considerations about the EU’s envisaged role as a crisis management actor, at this point he asks about the tactic to link the WEU and the EU, as well as the configuration of the EU’s relationship with NATO. The EU’s role is merely referred to, in this context, as regional, as Santer argues that “*we have to build a system which will foster balance and peace across the whole continent*” (ibid.).

On November 14, 1995, an Extraordinary Council of WEU Ministers met in Madrid and agreed upon a document called ‘European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries.’ The document, a precursor to the 2003 European Security Strategy and to the institutional development of a security and defence policy at the EU level, contained “a first limited attempt to draft a distinctive European security strategy” (Biscop, 2004: 11), whereby the WEU sought to

(...) identify the common *interests* of Europeans, the *risks and potential threats*, but also Europe's *new responsibilities* in a strategic environment in which Europe's security is *not confined to security in Europe*, and in which Europe has acquired the capability to make its own contribution to the building of a *just and peaceful world order* (WEU Council of Ministers, 1995: 1).

The WEU ministers acknowledge a new security environment as a result of the end of the Cold War and seek to identify the European states’ place therein. There is an assumption of ‘indivisibility’ of European security and “that a *comprehensive approach* should underlie the concept of security and that cooperative mechanisms should be applied in order to *promote security and stability in the whole of the continent*” (ibid.). One of the means through which the ministers propose to carry out this task is “the establishment of international organizations based on *common* values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (ibid.). The document emphasises Europe’s efforts “towards building an *international order* based on legal instruments”, adding that “no other region of the world has gone so far” in doing so (ibid.).

The document ‘analyses the wide range of security challenges that confront Europe’ in the mid-1990s. Europe’s interests are identified as the upholding of ‘democratic values and human rights, the defence of peace, international order and the rule of law’; Europe’s economic interests; and the security of European citizens. The risks faced by Europe are identified as ‘*potential* armed conflicts’; the proliferation of WMDs; ‘international terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and uncontrolled and illegal immigration’; as well as ‘environmental risks.’ The ‘transatlantic relationship’ is emphasised as particularly relevant in the post-Cold War world, where a community exists that is “guided by their faith in the *values of human dignity, intellectual freedom and civil liberties and in the democratic institutions*” (ibid.: 11). The discourse of an “enduring validity and indispensability of the Alliance” (ibid.: 12) is frequently asserted throughout the document (in line with subsequent discourses, forming a recurrent narrative), and the development of a European security actorness ambition is framed within its context:

Bearing in mind the radically altered security environment, the further development of European cooperation in the field of security and defence and *the broader definition of what constitutes a security challenge*, proposals have been made for a further strengthening of transatlantic ties and a broader framework to express the *solidarity and commonality of values and interests* that constitute the link between the European and North American partners (ibid.).

The emphasis for the development of a security policy in the European context is put not only in the European continent itself, including the Balkans and Eastern Europe, but also on the regions to the East and to the South that would come to be encompassed by the future ENP, referred to as areas ‘of strategic interest for Europe’. The Mediterranean basin in particular is identified by the WEU ministers as being ‘a *high priority* for European security’, with the EU characterised as “play[ing] *a significant role* in the Middle East peace process” (ibid.: 16). Africa is also identified as an ‘area of interest for Europe’ and a potential field for the development of European-led crisis management as “further deterioration of the social, economic and political situation on the African continent would *aggravate the risk of permanent instability and increase migratory pressure from the Africans*”, and that “further instability is generated by a *lack of adherence to democratic principles, widespread, unchecked corruption and violations of human rights*” (ibid.: 17).

The document also identifies the contribution that the WEU countries propose in order to ensure ‘security and *stability* in Europe, in neighbouring areas and in the wider world’, emphasising crisis prevention and management efforts. The ministers highlight the importance of the institutional developments within the EU, in coordination with the WEU, NATO, and the OSCE. The WEU ministers – repeatedly describing the WEU as ‘the defence component of the EU’ and ‘a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance’ – bring attention to the importance of the Petersberg Declaration for the development of EU-level crisis prevention and management. Nonetheless, they admit that while “considerable progress has been made over the past few years in strengthening the ability of WEU nations to respond to crises, (...) it is undeniable that the achievements do not as yet match up to the objectives that have been set” (ibid.: 25), naming the example of ex-Yugoslavia.

The idea of developing an *EU* crisis management *policy* begins to be discussed a few years later, at the European Council meeting in Turin, in 1996. In the meeting proceedings, the EU Member States’ HSG argue in favour of a ‘strengthened capacity for external action of the Union’, whose necessity is justified by stating that “the international situation *increases the responsibilities* of the Union and *the need to strengthen its identity* on the international scene *with the aim of promoting peace and stability*” (European Council, 1996a: 2). In this discourse, there is already an underlying assumption of an existing EU responsibility as well as a need to project and strengthen its identity, both of which are *increased* by the international situation. The ‘international situation’, thus, serves as an *additional* justification for the EU to strengthen its identity and external action, but it is preceded by an assumption that these are needed regardless. Here, the objective that ‘the EU has set itself’ “of implementing a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” (ibid.) is identified, which gained importance in subsequent years with the drafting and signing of the Amsterdam Treaty.

A similar discourse is adopted in the Irish Presidency Conclusions of the December 1996 European Council in Dublin, where European HSGs state that “the Union *must* enhance its capacity to ensure that its external action is coherent and effective in all its aspects, and it must improve its decision-making procedures, *if it is to play a role in the world commensurate with its responsibilities and its potential*” (European Council, 1996b: 4). Underlying this discourse is again an assumption that the EU *does* have the responsibilities and potential to play a role in the international scene and engage in external action, and it is suggested that this also applies to crisis management, as a mention is made to “the strengthening of links with the WEU” (ibid.). Yet, because the WEU was dependent on NATO capabilities for military

operations, the questioning of NATO's *raison d'être* along with the growing desire of the EU to become an international actor in its own right made it turn towards the 'Petersberg tasks', which were signed at the same time as the Maastricht Treaty, but were only launched with the Amsterdam Treaty (signed in 1997).

As mentioned, the Amsterdam Treaty's preamble contains a paragraph relating to the CFSP with similar phrasing as the Maastricht Treaty, whereby a common defence is no longer referred to as 'eventual', but becomes 'progressive', and a specific article offering provisions for this 'progressive framing' is explicitly mentioned. Again, the idea of '*promotion of peace, security and progress*' is used in reference to Europe, as well to the 'world' (EU, 1997: 149). The apparent hierarchy in the listing of the EU's objectives (Article 2) that was seen in the Maastricht Treaty remains, with the goal of 'asserting its identity on the international scene' by means of a CFSP and 'progressive framing' of a common defence policy (ibid.: 152) remaining almost the same, reflecting only the minor changes observed in the preamble. In the Amsterdam Treaty's specific provisions on CFSP (title V) we noticed a difference in the phrasing of the second CFSP objective in comparison to the Maastricht Treaty that reveals a growing confidence in the EU's actorness and cohesiveness in this area, as the sentence "to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways" (ibid.: 155) used to include "and its Member States" (EU, 1992: 58). The goal to "develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" remains unchanged (ibid.: 155), reflecting some of the EU's core normative justifications for the establishment of the CFSP. The future possibility of incorporation of the WEU into the EU is mentioned, and specific tasks regarding the 'defence aspects' of the CFSP are listed (Article 17). This is the genesis of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The tasks listed therein include: 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,' reproducing the exact phrasing of the WEU's Petersberg Declaration, and, similarly to the latter document, without explicating exactly what these tasks entail.

In the context of the Amsterdam Treaty, the post of High Representative for CFSP (HR) was created (Articles 18 and 26), which proved instrumental in driving the idea of EU actorness in the subsequent years. The creation of a post with diplomatic features linked to decision-making in the area of foreign policy (much like a less powerful Foreign Affairs Minister) in a regional integration organisation with supranational traits like the EU was as unparalleled as the Union itself, and, to a certain extent, it confirmed the EU's actorness ambitions: it reflects the "efforts to instantiate a European 'voice' and to personalize EU foreign policy (...), illustrat[ing] further the underpinning logic of the identification of EU foreign policy" (Tonra,

2011: 1195). In fact, Javier Solana revealed himself as a relevant player in the development of the ESDP, as well as in the EU's relationship with NATO. Not only was Solana Secretary General of NATO between 1995 and 1999, but immediately following that he was appointed the EU's first HR for CFSP and Secretary General of the Council (as well as WEU Secretary General) from 1999 until the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The inter-institutional nature of this key figure in EUFP was instrumental in ensuring the basic coherence and consensus that allowed for the development of this area in practice, as well as for the development of the public diplomacy and discourse that accompanied it, which greatly thrust the EU's visibility as an actor in the area of security and defence.

The perceived failure of European / EU action *vis-à-vis* the conflict in the Balkans during the 1990s (EP, 2000: 175, 178), together with a political environment in the United Kingdom (UK), which, with the election of a Labour government, became amenable to developments in the security and defence area at the European level, led to several bilateral and European summits in 1998, the year of the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. These summits included the informal European summit in Pörtlach, the Franco-German summit in Potsdam, the British-French summit in Saint-Malo, as well as several subsequent European Council meetings amply dedicated to the development of the area of security and defence at the EU level. These meetings and resulting discourses manifested the subsistence of political will on behalf of EU Member States for furthering the pursuance of a common security and defence policy and strongly reinforced the idea that the EU ought to play a role as an international actor. It is important to highlight that this has been, since the beginning, an intergovernmental policy, which reflects the importance of the Member States in constructing – both in terms of structures and capabilities, as well as discursively – the EU's identity as a crisis management actor and the EU's normative justification discourse underpinning its actorness in this field.

On April 23, 1998, the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, addressed the Bologna Centre of the Johns Hopkins University with a speech entitled “The EU in the 21st century: political dwarf or world actor?” The speech begins with two assumptions. The first assumption is that “the Union's action on the international scene is *a test of European identity* (...). The peoples of the Union clearly believe that we do not carry the political weight *we could and should carry*” (Santer, 1998). This assumption entails several relevant statements, namely that the EU's actorness and its identity are rooted in one another, and that the EU has a ‘responsibility’ to be an international actor (even though there is no mention here of specific policy areas). The second assumption is that “there is *a crying need for a strong Union on the international scene* (...). In the Middle East, in Asia, in Eastern Europe, in the Balkans, we

need a confident Union working with *other* partners”. Here, as in other instances in the EU’s discourse, there is an abstract call for EU collective action, a ‘crying need’ for the EU to be a strong international actor. Concerning the second sentence, which refers to the regional areas where such actorness would occur, Santer appears to detach those regions from the concept of ‘partners’, in line with the discursive tendency to attribute this epithet to non-EU European or North-American countries and international organisations.

Later in the speech, Santer raises the issue of the EU’s capabilities-expectations gap (Hill, 1993), by stating that “when Europe lacked ambition, it could hardly be taken to task for failing to achieve anything. Now, however, there is a growing danger that Europe will disappoint” (Santer, 1998). Concerning defence, the Commission President argues that “*compared with our greatest ally, we seem to lack one fundamental component of integration: a European military decision-making capability*” (ibid.). Even though he does not (at least at that stage) advocate in favour of an EU army as such, he brings attention to the importance of ‘the deployment of forces abroad’ and ‘the concept of common defence.’ In this sense, he raises some crucial questions:

How, as Europeans, do we take decisions on military intervention outside Europe? Will they be taken by the European Union? By the European allies acting within the structures being established in NATO? Or in WEU? Or in all these places at one and the same time? Will the Union Member States really rule out the idea of ever taking a joint military decision? (ibid.).

These questions reflect the EU’s political environment concerning the development of a security and defence policy with the Amsterdam Treaty. Santer adds that “in some conflicts, diplomacy can succeed *only if there is a united political front backed up by military means*” (ibid.) in line with the prevailing EU defence-related discourses in that same year. He adds that “those conflicts which can be resolved by the threat of military force alone are the ones which are *most visible to European and international public opinion*. And which lead to a disastrous, albeit mistaken, impression of our role in international affairs” (ibid.). Although Santer is not visibly opposed to a development of the EU’s military capabilities, he is implying that the EU’s role may diverge from this and still be relevant, drawing on the idea of the EU’s uniqueness and value-added as a diplomatic actor. Santer finishes his speech by recalling the EU’s history as a peace project and the ‘responsibility’ that ensues from that concerning its role as an international actor.

From the October 1998 informal European summit in Pörtlach resulted a series of press conferences where then British Prime Minister Tony Blair already indicates the UK's shift in favour of greater European integration in the area of security and defence, by stating that "there was a strong willingness, *which the UK obviously shares*, for Europe to take a *stronger foreign policy and security role*" (Blair, 1998: 1). In fact, Blair refers to a CFSP at the EU level as 'necessary', 'overdue', 'needed', and "it is *high time* we got on with trying to engage with formulating it" (ibid.: 2). This reiterates the idea that the EU's engagement in crisis management outside its strict territorial sphere (the case of Kosovo comes up in the discussion) began not just as an ambition or a choice but was discursively marked as an *obligation*. This idea is reinforced when he adds that "Kosovo simply underlines the *need* for Europe to take a very hard-headed review of this and to make sure that it can fulfil *its obligations* and *responsibilities* properly" (ibid.: 3). As we have already noticed (and will continue to point out in other documents throughout this analysis), the idea of a European 'responsibility' to engage in crisis management is one of the most frequent justifications for the development of this policy and for sustaining the EU's perceived actorness therein and it is always phrased as if it were normal or expected, deriving from the EU's own experience as a 'peace project'. When questioned about the EU's lack of military capability *vis-à-vis* NATO in order to 'speak more forcefully on the international stage', Blair replied that "the security and defence identity within NATO for Europe is an *acceptance that there will be circumstances in which it is right to have that identity for Europe*" (ibid.). This response reflects the underlying complementarity between the two organisations and the EU's perceived value-added for justifying its engagement in specific circumstances where NATO's action is less appropriate.

In the same year (1998), the Franco-German summit in Potsdam produced a declaration where, among covering other areas in quite general terms, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder, then HSGs of both countries, pledged the "*définition d'actions concrètes en vue de la mise en œuvre de la politique étrangère et de sécurité communes y compris la politique européenne de défense commune*" (Chirac and Schröder, 1998: 4), with a focus on "*la prévention et la gestion des crises régionales*" (ibid.). Again, the underlying discourse is that the EU is to have a crisis management role outside its territorial sphere (albeit here presented with a primarily regional, rather than global, reach – the examples referred to are 'ex-Yougoslavie et le Proche-Orient'). The identified means for the EU to carry out this role include 'moyens européens propres' particularly through the 'intégration de l'UEO dans l'Union européenne', the creation of 'des forces multinationales européennes tel que le corps européen' as well as the EU's agreements with NATO (ibid.). Again, the mention of NATO emphasises



the idea of complementarity with the EU, thus highlighting both organisations' usefulness and validity in dealing with different kinds or dimensions of crises.

The British-French summit in Saint-Malo resulted in the renowned Saint-Malo Declaration, in which Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, then HSGs of both countries, start out by reinforcing the narrative of urgency / necessity and responsibility for the EU's actorness, by stating that the EU "*needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage,*" emphasising the importance of "the full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP," including the defence aspects thereof (Blair and Chirac, 1998: 1). Again, we notice the recurrent underlying discourse of expectedness or normalcy in assuming that the *EU is supposed to have a role*. Blair and Chirac argue that the EU "(...) must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by *credible military forces*, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to *respond to international crises*" (ibid.). This sentence is quite unprecedented in the context of the discursive development of the CFSP and the E/CSDP. The repeated use of the term 'military' throughout the declaration indicates that this is the preferred (or perhaps the only) means with which the EU can effectively respond to international crises – the latter also reinforcing the narrative of an inherent European responsibility. The declaration repeatedly emphasises the idea of ensuring that "Europe can *make its voice heard* in world affairs" (ibid.). This stresses the prominent role that discourse plays in establishing the EU's identity as a crisis management actor. While in the beginning of the declaration the idea of responding to international crises appears to be a priority, it is followed, a few paragraphs later, by a 'need' for "strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks" (ibid.: 2). Whether these risks are located in the EU's territory or elsewhere is not clear, but the overall discourse points predominantly to EU (military) action outside of its territorial sphere for ensuring its own territorial security (even if indirectly so).

The European Council meeting in Vienna in December 1998 produced a document with the Austrian Presidency Conclusions, where the appointment of 'a personality with a strong political profile' for the post of HR and the setting up of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit within the Council General Secretariat were identified as priorities (European Council, 1998: 13). In this document, the European HSGs praise the Saint-Malo Declaration and highlight and welcome the 'new impetus given to the debate on a common European policy on security and defence', stating that "in order for the EU to be in a position to *play its full role on the international stage*, the CFSP must be backed by *credible operational capabilities*" (ibid.). Again, there is a degree of expectedness underlying the discourse that the EU is 'meant' to play a role on the international stage, used in practice as one of the most important and recurring

normative justifications for the development of the CFSP and of the E/CSDP. The focus on ‘credible’ capabilities for the achievement of the EU’s actorness reflects the scholarly debate’s focus on this actorness criterion (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Hill, 1993; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006).

The German Council Presidency, as were the subsequent Council Presidencies, was very active in debating issues relating to the development of the EU’s crisis management policy. In February 1999, it produced a Presidency paper entitled *Informal Reflection at WEU on Europe’s Security and Defence*. This paper mentions the imminent implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty, which represented significant advances for the area of security and defence at the EU level, stating that “the *prime focus* of our debate should be on how Europe can possess *appropriate structures and capabilities* (which *obviously* need to include military capabilities) to conduct crisis management in the sense of the Petersberg tasks” (German Council Presidency, 1999: 14). This focus on capabilities as key enablers for EU actorness is mirrored in the academic literature (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Hill, 1993; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). The document repeats the prevailing narrative of ‘need’ and ‘urgency’ for EU-led crisis management and lists several options for the use of military means involving different participants and differing degrees of European involvement (German Council Presidency, 1999: 14-15). The options concerning EU or WEU-led operations with or without the use of NATO assets and capabilities deserved the most attention. In this context, the German Council Presidency proposed a series of questions regarding the EU’s envisaged aim and role in this area, as well as the latter’s operationalisation, including questions about the merging of WEU within the EU structure (*ibid.*). The questions remain unanswered in the document, serving as a starting point for furthering the debate, which was meant to conceptualise and operationalise the EU’s crisis management policy and encourage a normative justification debate for supporting its potential actorness in this area.

In March of 1999, the EU foreign ministers met at an informal meeting in Eltville, where German representatives continued the debate through a proposal for the strengthening of the Common Policy on Security and Defence. The German proposal addressed concerns about EU autonomy in security and defence *vis-à-vis* NATO, which “remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members,” (German Foreign Ministry, 1999: 18) while going back to the questions raised in the informal reflection made in the previous month. The proposal focuses very much on institutional structures for decision-making and arrangements concerning capabilities, pointing out that the European Council in Cologne (held three months after), would reflect on *common principles* for the future of European security and defence. The idea of capabilities as central for actorness is reflected in the scholarly literature (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Hill,

1993; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Similarly to the previous reflection, this German proposal comes up with a set of questions to be answered at subsequent European Council meetings, including questions relating to the creation of conditions for the ESDP, the consequences of the WEU's integration into the EU, as well as the development of military capabilities and a European defence industry.

In May 1999, a Franco-German Defence and Security Council took place in Toulouse. This meeting generated a declaration where Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder, then HSGs of both countries, recalled the symbolism of their cooperation for the European project and pledged a joint commitment to ensuring the necessary conditions for the development of “une *Europe de la sécurité et de la défense*” based on “une base industrielle et technologique, forte, dynamique et performante” (Chirac and Schröder, 1999: 40). It is, however, not clear if the intention was to stimulate the creation of an actual *defence* policy for the EU, instead of a security and defence policy based solely on crisis management outside of the EU territorial sphere, but the context of this statement and the continued pledge to maintain NATO in a logic of complementarity indicates the latter.

In June 1999, the European Council in Cologne formally established the ESDP (later renamed CSDP, with the Lisbon Treaty),<sup>26</sup> which would become part of the CFSP and in which the WEU later came to be incorporated. This event also paved the way for a gradual strengthening of the institutional dimension of the ESDP in the years that followed, in order for the EU to fulfil its purported ‘responsibilities’ as an international actor, including the aforementioned appointment of the EU's first HR for CFSP. The German European Council Presidency Report on ‘Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence’ that came out of the Cologne European Council meeting reinforces very closely the discourse articulated in the Saint-Malo declaration of the previous year, especially with regard to the ‘urgency’ of establishing this policy. Yet, unlike the Saint-Malo declaration, the European Council Presidency report does not limit the EU's instruments to military capabilities, instead proposing that the Council be able to take decisions “on the whole range of political, economic and military instruments at its disposal when responding to crisis situations”

---

<sup>26</sup> Even though formally there is a distinction between the ESDP and the CSDP, we noticed that in several discourses from the late 1990s and early 2000s there is mention to a Common European Security and Defence Policy, or to a Common Security and Defence Policy. Throughout this project, however, we will mostly strive to maintain the distinction regarding the two official nomenclatures, relating each one to their respective time period. When speaking in broad terms, for practical purposes, we will use the acronym E/CSDP.

(European Council, 1999a: 1). This focus on the EU's authority and autonomy reflect the scholarly debate's focus on these ideas as key criteria for actorness (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). In fact, the Presidency report appears to diminish the role of military capabilities to the detriment of other types of capabilities, in stating that

The focus of our efforts therefore would be to assure that the EU has at its disposal *the necessary* capabilities (*including* military capabilities) and appropriate structures for effective *EU decision making in crisis management* within the scope of the Petersberg tasks. This is the area where *a European capacity to act is required most urgently* (European Council, 1999a: 1-2).

This downplaying of the military aspect of the future ESDP reflects internal struggles and a discursive and political commitment achieved between the representatives of the (then) twelve EU Member States. The document proceeded with limiting the military aspect by stating that “the development of an EU *military* crisis management capacity is to be seen as *an* activity within the framework of the CFSP” (ibid.: 2), without the same sense of urgency as displayed in previous moments, or on the Saint-Malo declaration. The report frequently uses the expression ‘EU’ as subject (in expressions such as ‘the EU needs’, ‘the EU has’, ‘EU-led operations’, etc.), reflecting a much greater internalisation of its ‘actorness’ identity, especially in comparison with previous discourses.

In July 1999, a British-Italian summit took place in London. This summit produced a Joint Declaration Launching European Defence Capabilities Initiative where Tony Blair and Massimo D’Alema, then HSGs of both countries, emphasised “the *pressing need* for improved European military capabilities” (Blair and D’Alema, 1999: 46), reiterating the prevailing ‘urgency’ and ‘responsibility’ narrative in the EU’s discourse as a means of justifying the establishment of the ESDP (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). Blair and D’Alema mention the preparation for the launch of a joint proposal ‘to set criteria for improved and strengthened European defence capabilities and effective performance’ to be debated at a later stage in the context of the WEU and that ‘this approach’ is meant to be developed ‘with our Partners and Allies’ (Blair and D’Alema, 1999: 46, 47). While the expression *allies* refers to the members of NATO (also referred to in the text as ‘the Alliance’), the targets of the epithet *partners* (with a capital P) are less evident, but the discursive context at the European level about this matter

indicates that it refers to major international organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe.

In December of 1999, a Finnish European Council meeting took place in Helsinki. The Presidency Conclusions that were produced in the aftermath of this meeting have a section dedicated to the ‘Common European Policy on Security and Defence’ where two Presidency progress reports are adopted, mainly concerning capability and institutional developments. While up until this stage all discourses in our corpus focused the responsibility on the EU, here there is a reference to the “primary responsibility of the UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security” (European Council, 1999b). However, in the annex that relates to ESDP, the ‘responsibility’ focus returns to the EU alongside the Member States:

*To assume their responsibilities across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks, the Member States have decided to develop more effective military capabilities and establish new political and military structures for these tasks (ibid.).*

As such, this document appears to deviate slightly from the prevailing narrative of a focus on EU responsibility; yet, if we look at the Member States in this context as essentially *being* the EU, then we can argue that there is discursive continuity, rather than discontinuity. The text itself assumes a discursive continuity, in following the previous sentence with ‘also in order to assume *these* responsibilities, the Union will...’. This use of the Member States almost as a metonym for the EU occurs occasionally, especially in European Council and Council documents, and brings attention to the intergovernmental nature of this policy.

The 2000 European Council meeting in Santa Maria da Feira produced a document with the Portuguese Presidency Conclusions, with an annex concerning the Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. This annex concerns mostly technical aspects of EU capabilities and institutional arrangements for the functioning of the policy, and little normative justification for the development and launch of the policy. However, Appendix 3 of the Presidency Report on a Study on Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management does contain elements that indicate the EU’s normative justification and positioning as a crisis management actor. In this text, the European Council affirms that the goals for which the EU ‘should seek to enhance its capability in civilian aspects of crisis management’ include

(...) improving its potential for saving human lives in crisis situations, for *maintaining basic public order*, preventing further escalation, *facilitating the return to a peaceful, stable and self-sustainable* situation, for *managing adverse effects on EU countries* and for addressing relevant problems of coordination (European Council, 2000a: 18).

Underlying the discourse of ‘maintaining basic public order’ is an assumption that there is an understanding of what constitutes ‘*basic public order*’. This idea is quite evocative of Foucault’s work concerning the practice of enforcement, on behalf of those in power, of what they deem to be normal or expected. Here, the European Council is assuming that the EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities will be able to ‘maintain basic public order’ in ESDP host countries, according to what the EU considers to be adequate. The goal of achieving a ‘peaceful, stable and self-sustainable situation’, in turn, encourages self-regulation in the aftermath of a potential EU intervention, according to EU standards of normalcy and adequacy, characterised by the adjectives ‘peaceful’ and ‘stable’. The superior hierarchic positioning of the EU is also visible in the expression ‘managing adverse effects on EU countries’, as it reminds us of the ultimate justification for the development of this policy and of the EU’s actorness in this area, which is to help others out of crisis situations – whereby it is the EU that dictates what is a ‘crisis’ and what terms and means of action it is willing to engage to tackle that crisis – in order to ultimately ensure the EU’s own security.

Additional normative justification for engaging in civilian crisis management is provided when the European HSGs indicate that the improvement of the EU’s civilian capabilities ‘would provide “*added value*”’ and be able to ‘meet the requests of *the other* lead organisations’ (again, the EU assumes that it is itself one such ‘lead’ organisation), as well as ‘increase the Union’s visibility’ (ibid.). Similarly to other discourses, there is repeated mention of expressions such as the ‘Union *and* the Member States’, accentuating the intergovernmental nature of this policy and the EU’s autonomy complexity, highlighting the dual role of the Member States therein (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). One such example is the section concerning ‘strengthening civilian administration’, whereby “Member States could consider improving the selection, training and deployment of civil administration experts for duties in the *re-establishment of collapsed administrative systems*” (European Council, 2000a: 19). The proposition is that administrative systems that are considered to have ‘collapsed’ (i.e. to have disintegrated or fallen apart, no longer functioning) can be ‘re-established’ following the contribution of EU Member States’ administrations that are, by opposition, portrayed as solid and wholesome, so much so that they are in a position to offer their support in bringing the

collapsed systems back to ‘normal’ based on their own conceptions of what ‘normal’ means. In other words, like the EU itself, EU Member States’ administrations are portrayed as models to be emulated.

Following the Cologne, Helsinki, Lisbon, and Feira European Council meetings, the EP, having gained more powers and responsibilities since the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, produced, in 2000, a resolution on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy. It is interesting that it is this actor, and not so much the actors that have been more closely involved in the development of this policy, that attempts to clarify the EU’s broad definition of security:

(...) with the end of the Cold War, the distinction between security and defence has tended to become blurred, and a security and defence policy implies the use of civilian as well as military means of *diverting and managing crises threatening the interests and values of a State or group of States such as the European Union* (EP, 2000: 175).

Here, an explanation is offered for why the C/ESDP, although having been primarily concerned with crisis management outside the EU’s territorial sphere, is nonetheless considered a ‘security and defence’ policy that seeks to safeguard European interests and safety. As seen in other discourses, the EP resolution mentions separately both the EU and the Member States, and highlights the latter’s importance in the former’s functioning and performance, while simultaneously maintaining the idea of the EU’s individual actorness:

(...) pointing out that the efforts of the Union *and* its Member States to establish a credible common European security and defence policy are intended to strengthen the CFSP, *enabling the Union* to deploy the full gamut of financial, diplomatic, civilian and military instruments at *its* disposal *to achieve its aims* and to exercise a more effective influence on the outcome of international crises (ibid.).

Here we notice the growing tendency to ensure effectiveness in crisis management through the ‘comprehensive’ use of all the EU’s foreign policy tools and policies available. Similarly to other discourses, the EP resolution refers to the EU’s “declared intention of using the CFSP and the CESDP to take *its place* as a *major* player in international politics” (ibid.) as being important for the *revitalisation* and *responsibility* sharing with NATO, as well as for the preservation of international security. As other actors in the EU system, the EP also presents the EU as having

a predetermined, expected, natural ‘major’ role in the international scene, as well as a ‘responsibility’ (shared with NATO) to ensure peace, reinforcing these two (thus far) central narratives in the EU’s normative justification as a crisis management actor. The EP resolution calls for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability of the ESDP (ibid.: 176, 182, 183), which was conceived as a strictly intergovernmental policy.

The link between the goals of exporting the EU’s norms, values, standards, and principles has always been more or less expressly linked with the development of an EU crisis management policy and with security (Larsen, 2004). The EP reiterates and reinforces this idea by emphasising

(...) that this diversification and strengthening of the EU’s intervention capability in crisis areas *must go hand in hand* with action to restore and consolidate the rule of law, democracy, civil society, an independent judicial system, local administration and the economy in those areas, to allow a return to *normal* life at the earliest opportunity and to ensure democratic security in the area concerned (ibid.: 177).

While this is not a new idea in the EU’s discourses, it still carries an asymmetry between those dictating exactly what standards should be applied and especially what constitutes a return to ‘*normal* life’. This asymmetry is present again in the EP’s discourse when it is stated that it “considers that the first stage in establishing a conflict-prevention policy is to develop the EU’s intelligence-gathering and analysis capacities *so as to detect the earliest signs of any crisis*” (ibid.). This indicates not only a potential active search for actorness opportunities, but also, and most importantly, that it is up to the EU to determine what is a ‘crisis’, which can potentially lead to an overstretch of the concept according to its own interests.

On May 9, 2000, European Commission President Romano Prodi produced a brief statement concerning the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration. Prodi begins by evoking Europe’s historical linkage to the making of peace within its borders, as “major wars on our continent have been avoided and the European Union now enjoys an unprecedented standard of economic prosperity” (Prodi, 2000). The Commission President adds that “recent events in the Balkans are a frightful reminder of how fragile peace is, and of *how urgent is the need to extend peace, freedom and prosperity to the whole continent and beyond*” (ibid.), emphasising a growing rhetoric of EU ‘responsibility’ to spread its success as a peace ‘model’ to territories outside its borders. While short and mostly concerned with improving the EU’s democratic practices, this statement is nonetheless relevant for our study in that it reiterates



certain discursive patterns and narratives present in the EU's discourses throughout the analysed timeframe.

In the context of the 2000 European Council in Nice, the institutional framework of the ESDP was set up and reinforced “to enable the EU fully *to assume its responsibilities*” (European Council, 2000b: 24). Annex VI of the French European Council Presidency Conclusions, entitled ‘Report on the European Security and Defence Policy,’ reinforces the prevailing discourse that the creation of this policy is meant to “give the EU the means of playing *its role* fully on the international stage and of *assuming its responsibilities* in the face of crises” (ibid.: 23), adding that the value-added of the development of a policy at the European level comes from the EU's ‘particular characteristic’, namely “its capacity to mobilise a vast range of both civilian and military means and instruments, thus giving it an overall crisis-management and conflict-prevention capability” (ibid.). This highlights the EU's focus on the opportunity and capability dimensions as it developed its actorness in the area of crisis management (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). This description of the EU's specific characteristics and ambitions regarding crisis management, in addition to the praise of NATO's usefulness, reinforces a prevailing narrative of the EU's crisis management actorness as bringing value-added to the international system. In this context, NATO is referred to as remaining a part of the EU's defence structure, as “the development of the ESDP will *contribute to the vitality* of a renewed Transatlantic link” (European Council, 2000b: 24). This justification for NATO's persistence is frequently repeated in the early years of the ESDP, and a distinction is often made between a domestic territorial defence (ensured by NATO) and the ESDP, which remained for almost two decades exclusively charged with crisis management outside of the EU's territorial sphere.

The concept of the ESDP as such is explained in the document and justified as “increas[ing] the range of instruments for responding to crises available to the international community,” while the EU is again placed at the same level as “*leading* organisations such as the UN or the OSCE” (ibid.: 24, 34). The narrative concerning an abstract EU ‘responsibility’ as a justification for the launch of the ESDP is recurrent (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), not only in reference to crisis management in general, but specifically in reference to conflict prevention (European Council, 2000b: 27).

During the Nice European Council, the Secretary General / HR and the Commission presented a report with practical recommendations for improving the coherence and effectiveness of EU action in the field of conflict prevention, where the latter is presented as a

‘fixed priority of EU external action’. The document argues in favour of the EU becoming ‘more pro-active and less reactive’ as well as looking for, and dealing with, potential embryonic crisis before they occur through what came to be known as the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), including the integration of development, trade, economic, humanitarian, military, and civilian tools (HR and Commission, 2000: 2, 4, 10). This document is the first, in the universe of our discursive corpus, that identifies a ‘necessity’ to establish an explicit link between *development* and crisis management as such, although the EU’s normative inclination to export its norms and principles in foreign policy, including in crisis management, already suggests such proclivity. Another aspect proposed in the report concerns the idea of “build[ing] and sustain[ing] effective partnerships *with those who share our values and priorities* at global, regional, national and local level” (ibid.). This type of discourse is at the very base of Manner’s normative power concept, whereby the effectiveness of the normative power is contingent upon the shared belief in the same values and priorities on behalf of the EU’s partners, who are, in some cases, simultaneously targets of some of its policies (Diez and Manners, 2007).

The concept of partnership / partner, as we will observe throughout this study, evolves in the EU’s discourse from a vague concept that is mostly attributed to major international organisations (oftentimes accompanied by the epithet ‘strategic’), to a more encompassing notion that includes (and even becomes focused on) the countries that host the EU’s security and defence missions and operations. In this sense, this discourse of ‘effective partnerships (...) at the national and local level’ appears to be ahead of its time and can be interpreted to represent a slight break from the prevailing narrative that treats the host countries as abstract (because the ESDP had not yet been implemented at this point) and inferior (referred to as ‘collapsed’ or ‘failed’ States, for example), and the partners placed at the same level as the EU and nominally identified (the UN, the OSCE, NATO, the Council of Europe, etc.). We can also interpret the ‘effective partnerships with those who share our values and priorities’ as referring to the latter, rather than the former, which would mark this more as a continuity than a disruption in the EU’s discourse (even though the EU’s discourse eventually evolves in a different direction). What leads us to consider that this might be a discursive disruption or (temporary) discontinuity is that, later on in the text, there is also a distinct and specific mention of the EU’s ‘*international partners*’ (HR and Commission, 2000: 4), an epithet commonly attributed to international organisations.

The EU’s self-focus is present in the document, as in other instances, and the EU’s own ‘*strikingly successful* example’ is used as a justification for the development of a crisis

management policy that includes conflict prevention, which “constitutes one of [the EU’s] most important external policy challenges” (ibid.: 3). Another justification provided, in addition to the ‘human cost in suffering’ is that conflict ‘undermines economic development’ and the EU’s *interests* “by creating instability, by reducing trade and putting investments at risk, by imposing a heavy financial burden in reconstruction *and ultimately by threatening the security of its citizens*” (ibid.). Another instance of the EU’s self-focus in justifying the policy is when the HR and the Commission state that the EU is ‘*well placed* to engage in conflict prevention’ due to its capabilities and expertise in areas in which “the Union has *very considerable influence*” (ibid.: 4), such as trade, cooperation, development, humanitarian assistance, diplomacy, including crisis management missions and operations.

Shortly after the 2000 Nice European Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of ambassadors of the Member States, was formally established to support the Council of the EU in its External Relations formation (Council, 2001a). In addition, an EU Military Committee (EUMC), consisting of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, was created to support the PSC (Council, 2001b). In the same context, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), a permanent military structure that answers to the EUMC, was set up with the purpose of providing military expertise to the ESDP decision-making structure (Council, 2005a). Similarly, a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), composed of EU Member States’ representatives, was created to advice, inform, and elaborate recommendations to the PSC regarding the civilian aspects of crisis management (Council, 2000).

On January 19, 2001, European Commission President Romano Prodi made a speech at the International Bertelsmann Forum ‘Europe without borders’ entitled “After Reform: a future strategy for Europe as a whole.” Among other issues, the speech addresses the topic ‘Europe on the world stage.’ Not just on the designation used in this topic, but throughout the speech, Prodi uses the term ‘Europe’ as a surrogate for the EU, in what is a common discursive practice that is not meant to represent a geographic entity but rather an abstract idea based on common values and history that the EU has come to represent (Kuus, 2011), despite its mutability. Prodi begins by stating that “global challenges *call for global action*, and that has to mean a strong partnership between *strong global players* such as Europe and the US” (Prodi, 2001). Like other Commission Presidents before him (Santer, 1995), Prodi places the EU in an equal position to the EU as an international actor, implying that that is desirable and achievable. While urging for closer relations between the EU and the US in security matters, Prodi claims that “an autonomous European capability *will not weaken NATO* or our security ties to the US. On the

contrary, it should make the EU a more valuable and responsible partner” (Prodi, 2001). This assertion falls in line with a discursive pattern that ascribes a uniqueness to the EU as a crisis management actor which both complements and reinforces NATO and simultaneously justifies a security role for the EU.

The Commission President also advocates in favour of a comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, arguing that “if the EU is to become a *truly effective global player*, we need to go beyond the current fragmentation of our external action,” adding that “we need to integrate all our foreign policy instruments into a single external policy framework, with special rules and procedure tailored to the needs of security and defence” (ibid.). Even though this was conceived as (and remains to this day) a predominantly intergovernmental policy, Prodi argues that the EU’s external representation in matters of security and defence should lie with the European Commission.

In 2001, due to a massive enlargement to the East and the effective introduction of the single currency, a new treaty revision was undertaken. Implemented in 2003, the Nice Treaty maintained the exact phrasing as the Amsterdam Treaty in the previously mentioned preamble paragraph related to the CFSP, and in the EU’s second objective of ‘asserting its identity on the international scene’ (Article 2). The Nice Treaty is the first treaty where the ESDP is actually contemplated as such. Nonetheless, the identification of the tasks to be carried out therein maintain the exact same wording of the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration, namely “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (Article 17.2). These remain vague and ambiguous and, much like before, no definitions or explanations are provided regarding what they involve. So, this treaty revision was not very much focused on improving or changing EU actorness, but rather on other key internal policies and developments, especially targeting the preparation for the common currency and the massive enlargement that followed.

In May 2001, the Council released Common Position 2001/374/CFSP concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. The document begins by stating that “the *primary responsibility* for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent *lies with Africans themselves*” (Council, 2001d: 3), while simultaneously assuming its normative positioning (and value judgement) regarding the issue, by stating that “*there is a link between conflict prevention and democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, where development cooperation has a strategic role to play in strengthening capacities to manage conflicts in peaceful ways*” (ibid.). The Council explains the EU’s proposed role with regard to this issue by stating that the goal of the common position “is to

*contribute* to the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts in Africa by *strengthening African capacity* and means of action in this field” (ibid.). While these objectives and initial statements appear very oriented towards ensuring capacity-building and African ownership of crisis management therein, the document ends up focusing more on the EU itself and on how it can guarantee to have a (pro)active role in this area:

The EU shall develop a proactive, comprehensive and integrated approach (...). As a part of this, and to enhance capacity for early action, a yearly survey shall be drawn up by the Presidency assisted by the High Representative and the Commission and designed to *identify and monitor potential* violent conflicts and presenting the policy options necessary to prevent their outbreak or recurrence (ibid.).

The idea of EU engagement in preventive or early action and a commitment to be active in different stages of crises (i.e. conflict prevention, crisis management, peace-building), as a result of ‘the *need* to respond to existing crises’ appears to dilute the apparent strength of the EU’s initial statement that attributed the primary responsibility for dealing with conflicts in Africa to Africans. The discourse appears to indicate a focus on African ownership explicitly, but implicitly the focus remains very much in tune with the EU responsibility narrative. In this sense, while the EU’s commitment to capacity-building and focus on African ownership appear to be central to its proposed role as a crisis management actor in Africa, there is also a promise of EU operational engagement on the ground as a crisis preventer and manager on its own:

The EU will support, over the long term, the enhancement of African peacekeeping capabilities (...). Notwithstanding such capacity enhancement, the EU and its Member States *will continue*, on a case-by-case basis, to consider deploying their own operational means for conflict prevention and crisis management in Africa (ibid.: 4).

In June 2001, the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, also known as the ‘Göteborg Programme’, was drafted by COREPER (Council, 2001c) and adopted by the Council soon after. In this document, not unlike previous instances, the EU portrays itself as “*a successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development*” (ibid.: 2). In this statement, the COREPER ambassadors reiterate the EU’s strong normative position *vis-à-vis* the conflict prevention dimension of crisis management and emphasises the predominant

narrative that peace (the opposite of conflict) is built through “the externally led construction of liberal democratic institutions” (Légaré, 2010: 35). The accompaniment of – or rather the direct link between – conflict prevention with democratic-oriented normative standards and other European-like administration standards are frequent throughout the document. As in previous discourses, the COREPER establishes in the ‘Göteborg Programme’ a link between conflict prevention and the EU’s normative vision regarding how the world should work, implicitly branding opposite paradigms as lesser paradigms while referring to the EU as a ‘community of peace and *progress*’ thus emphasising the idea of superiority.

As in previous instances, ‘partner’ in conflict prevention is almost anyone – “the UN system, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, other regional and subregional organisations and the international financial institutions” – but the potential host countries (Council, 2001c: 7) where the EU may launch security and defence missions or operations. This reflects the EU’s focus on itself and European values and norms, and potentially in placing higher value in the validation from these specific international partners rather than from the potential host countries. This means that the ‘targets’ of the practical implementation of the policy (i.e. host countries) are not necessarily the ‘targets’ of the EU’s normative justification discourse (i.e. the intended audience that the EU seeks to persuade / convince about the validity of the policy and its actorness in this area).

In the ‘Göteborg Programme’, the COREPER ambassadors identify key priorities for EU actorness:

*In line with the fundamental values of the EU, the highest political priority will be given to improving the effectiveness and coherence of its external action in the field of conflict prevention, thereby also enhancing the preventive capabilities of the international community at large (ibid.).*

The priorities themselves appear to be quite innocuous in terms of establishing or reproducing asymmetries between the EU and its interlocutors (particularly the host countries). However, the fact that coherence (largely an internal actorness criterion, according to Jupille and Caporaso, 1998) is one of the highest political priorities reiterates the inward-looking tendency – derived from the EU’s multi-level nature – for the EU to look more at itself than others when justifying normatively its crisis management policy. The fact that effectiveness is the other highest political priority further highlights this tendency: it suggests that the important thing is doing something (launching missions), not necessarily that the missions that are being launched

are accepted or desired by the host countries' authorities or populations. The EU does point out occasionally that it 'recognises the UNSC's *primary responsibility* for the maintenance of international peace and security' (European Council, 2001a: 11), as is the case of the 2001 Presidency Conclusions of the Göteborg European Council that took place following the launch of the Göteborg Programme.

The 2000 EP Resolution, the Report by the HR and the Commission on conflict prevention, the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention, the Göteborg Programme, and the Göteborg Presidency Conclusions are the first discourses in our corpus to expressly establish a direct link between conflict prevention and development cooperation (ibid.: 12), even though, as pointed out before, the idea of norms export and EU-led State building and democratisation efforts have been linked to the ESDP since the latter's inception. This emerging narrative, which would later be dubbed the 'security-development nexus', represents the EU's efforts to capitalise on what is arguably one of the most recognizable areas in EU foreign policy – development policy – even if it is not the most successful one (Banthia, 2007). While this narrative was not commonly expressly supported up until this point, it became increasingly salient following the 2013 comprehensive approach to external crisis and conflicts, as we will see further ahead in our study.

On September 11, 2001, a series of terrorist attacks on the USA, attributed to Al-Qaeda and in particular to its leader Osama Bin Laden, changed the international scene regarding security (Hughes, 2002; Shearman and Sussex, 2004) and drove the advancement of the EU's efforts in matters of security (EP, 2002: 2). This event triggered an extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels a few days later, meant to "analyse the international situation following the terrorist attacks in the United States and to impart the necessary impetus to the actions of the EU" (European Council, 2001b: 1). While the Conclusions and Plan of Action of the European Council meeting were focused on security, they were particularly concerned with the area of Justice and Home Affairs and with the link between internal and external security, in particular with transnational terrorism. In the Conclusions, the HSGs reinforce a narrative of alterity and consequent asymmetry by classifying the attacks as "an assault on *our open, democratic, tolerant* and multicultural societies" and pledge their solidarity to, and cooperation with, the USA, stating that "the Member States of the Union are prepared to undertake such actions, each according to its means" (ibid.). In the Conclusions, the European Council indicates that the EU "will step up its action against terrorism through a coordinated and interdisciplinary approach embracing all Union policies," in a similar understanding as the future

‘comprehensive approach’ (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013).

The European Council states that the EU calls for ‘the broadest possible global coalition against terrorism, under United Nations aegis’, arguing that it *should* include the EU, the US, candidate countries, Russia, as well as ‘*our Arab and Muslim partners and any other country ready to defend our common values*’ and whose action should be carried out “through a coordinated and inter-disciplinary approach *embracing all Union policies (...)* reconciled with respect for the fundamental freedoms *which form the basis of our civilisation*” (European Council, 2001b: 1). In this document there is a reinforcement of the European responsibility narrative (albeit implicit), and of the narrative that places the focus on the EU dictating the terms and conditions as well as the standards and norms underlying what ‘should’ be done. The European Council proposes an EU policy to combat terrorism, including aspects of police and judicial cooperation and legal instruments, and argues that “the fight against terrorism *requires* of the Union that it play a *greater* part in the efforts of the international community to prevent and stabilise regional conflicts” and that “it is by developing the CFSP and by making the ESDP operational at the earliest opportunity that the Union will be most effective” (ibid.: 3). Again, the rhetoric of EU responsibility marks the discourse of the European Council, and the EU is presented as already playing a part that allegedly needs to become ‘greater’. The European Council states that *the* condition for combatting terrorism is “the integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development” (ibid.), reiterating the growing tendency to join the areas of security and development.

In the extraordinary meeting’s Conclusions, the European HSGs state that they “reject any equation of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world” (ibid.: 4). This assertion was formulated in a context of change in international security that was accompanied by an emergent international (including European) discourse characterised by Islamophobia (Doyle and Ahmad, 2013; Aizurua et al., 2017). This statement is meant to show European ‘objectiveness’ in dealing with terrorism, emphasising that the EU is *not* engaging in practices of ‘equating terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world’. However, the mere sense of a need for affirmation of the EU’s position regarding this matter brings attention to the intrinsic difference and ‘otherness’, emphasised by the expression ‘world’. The EU’s repeated self-identification with the term ‘tolerance’ reinforces an underlying hierarchical positioning (whereby those that ‘tolerate’ put themselves in a superior positioning of ‘allowing’ or ‘indulging’ others). The September attacks fuelled an USA intervention in Afghanistan in early October and contributed towards the subsequent war in Iraq, as both countries were categorised



by then US President George W. Bush as being part of an “axis of evil”.<sup>27</sup> This discourse reinforced an already prevailing narrative of alterity (us vs. them) that opposes European and North American identities to Arab and Middle Eastern identities (Semati, 2010; Wintle, 2016).

In October 2001, the HSGs of the EU Member States together with the President of the Commission produced, in an informal meeting that took place in Ghent, a Declaration in the follow-up to the September 11 attacks and the fight against terrorism. This declaration emphasises a continued support for the USA and for the latter’s actions against terrorism, and it contains several policy recommendations that include the implementation of the action plan proposed in the extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels in September 2001 as well as the indication of the development of a programme tackling risks, alerts, and intervention. The HSGs alongside the Commission President pledge the increase in the EU’s “efforts *in other regions of the world* to promote a fair international system based on security, prosperity, democracy and development. Law *must* be restored to areas of *lawlessness*” (European Council, 2001c: 5). This statement implies not only the prevalence of EU responsibility narrative, but also characterises the EU itself as ‘a fair international system based on security, prosperity, democracy and development’ that needs to be emulated or reproduced ‘in *other* regions of the world’ (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). An indication that the ‘return to stability in the Balkans’ is one of the EU’s ‘clear priorities’ is also mentioned in the document and reflects the first steps in the practical implementation of the ESDP taking place in BiH two years later. The declaration finishes with a paragraph that again underlines an implicit understanding of ‘otherness’ and difference, that, in turn, is emphasised by expressions like ‘to avoid’, ‘any’, ‘equals’, and ‘civilisations’:

*To avoid any equating of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world, the European Council considers it essential to encourage a dialogue of equals between our civilisations, particularly in the framework of the Barcelona process but also by means of an active policy of cultural exchange (European Council, 2001c: 5).*

The very last sentence – “the Union invites those responsible in the Member States to give concrete priority to the dialogue between cultures both at international level and within their societies” (ibid.) – reveals a sense of the complexity of the EU’s *autonomy* as an actor (Jupille

---

<sup>27</sup> <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

and Caporaso, 1998) when the EU Member States' HSGs speak *qua* European Council ('the Union invites') directed at themselves *qua* 'those responsible in the Member States'.

Also in October 2001, the EP voted on a motion for a resolution on the progress achieved in the implementation of the CFSP, where it 'welcomed' the Göteborg Programme and 'endorsed' "the *shift* in the EU's *substantive aspirations* after Nice, whereby future EU foreign policy is to be built on the twin pillars of 'conflict prevention' and (civil and military) 'crisis management'" (EP, 2001: 6). In this document, the EP's discourse begins by being much more restrained and less idealistic than that of intergovernmental institutions (the European Council and the Council) and the Commission in describing the EU's role and providing normative justifications for the latter's engagement in crisis management. In this sense, the EP (at least initially) withholds the EU 'responsibility' narrative in favour of a more realistic or modest explanation (political will):

[The EP] recognises, now that the CFSP bodies and tools have finally been put in place in accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam, that the EU is, for the first time, *trying to give effectively expression to the political will to develop a distinctive foreign policy profile and the ability to act on its own initiative in crisis situations* (ibid.: 7).

Further ahead in the document, however, the EU's '*global responsibility* for peace, security, and sustainable development' appears, consolidating the dominant EU narrative. As in the previously examined EP document, there is a return to the discourse of calling for "a strong parliamentary dimension to the ESDP both by fostering a security and defence policy culture within the EP and by intensifying cooperation between the EP and the national parliaments" (ibid.), whilst making practical institutional recommendations to this end. Even more expressly than the Councils and the Commission, the EP argues in favour of a closer link between internal and external security (the example of combating international terrorism is mentioned). As in previous instances, the need to qualify NATO as still being relevant and even 'indispensable' (after the Cold War) remains a *leitmotif* in EU discourse and continues to be used, to an extent, to establish a distinction between territorial defence and crisis management (ibid.: 8) and to emphasise the EU's own usefulness as a crisis management actor in a logic of complementarity. The EP states its belief in that "the EU should strictly enforce the principle of *conditionality* when mediating in crisis situations" (ibid.), referring to both situations in Europe (the Western Balkans and Macedonia) as well as outside Europe (such as the Middle East). The use of this expression as such is quite unprecedented in EU discourse in the context of crisis management

and has remained somewhat separate from this area throughout the first decade of implementation of the E/CSDP, even if only discursively and not so much in practice due to the interaction of different EU instruments in countries where conditionality is indeed used (Del Biondo, 2015; Arnould and Vlassenroot, 2016; Ketevan, 2016). In the context of crisis management, it is more expectable to find this expression being used with regard to countries that are themselves on a road towards accession than otherwise.

The EP's more moderate discourse (in comparison with other prevailing EU discourses) regarding the EU's role as a crisis management actor and its alleged 'responsibilities' is again visible when it states that "the EU has *demonstrated its determination* to intervene in the foreign policy field as a long-term strategic player on the world stage" (ibid.: 13). In addition, the EP argues that 'the Macedonian case has shown that the EU can succeed as a crisis manager *if* it follows certain criteria, such as ensuring that key EU figures 'act coherently and take a high profile'; or making sure that its message is clear in terms of linking EU support with 'the demand to open a dialogue on political reforms' (reinforcing the proposal of linking conditionality and crisis management); or if the EU implements long-term strategies for the affected region, among others (ibid.: 13). The link between development and crisis management is again present in the EP's discourse when the latter identifies the Commission's main achievement as "the modernisation of the management structures for the administration of all EU cooperation programmes, including development aid, and their combination under one roof (...) in order to dovetail short-and long-term conflict management measures more effectively" (ibid. 16). In this context, the EP classifies the EU's attention to the Balkans and the Middle East 'crisis regions' as being of 'exceptional importance', while simultaneously proposing that the EU "should direct its external policy attention, using the instruments it currently has at its disposal, to (...) countries where a crisis *may well occur*" (ibid.: 17).

In December 2001, a European Council meeting in Laeken made a decision to convene a Convention to debate the future of the EU, as a preparation for a subsequent Intergovernmental Conference, which was meant to produce a new EU treaty. This European Council meeting produced several documents within the Presidency Conclusions – including the Laeken Declaration on the future of the EU and a Declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP – that help us understand the EU's envisaged role as a crisis management actor just before the practical implementation of the ESDP. The Belgian Presidency Conclusions document has a section dedicated to the EU's action following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the USA where the EU's efforts to 'restoring stability in Afghanistan' are briefly explained. These efforts include the 'encouragement' of an international security force that would

contribute ‘to the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces’, to which the EU Member States could contribute in order to “provide a strong signal of their resolve to better assume *their crisis-management responsibilities* and hence help *stabilise* Afghanistan” (European Council, 2001d: 4). Even though we can recognise here the recurrent narrative of an ‘EU responsibility’ to engage in crisis management, this is not specifically directed at the EU, but rather at its Member States. This direction can be explained not only by the intergovernmental nature of the area in question and of the institution producing the discourse, but also by the very particular context of Afghanistan and the fact that no EU crisis management missions or operations had yet been launched.

In annex to the Presidency Conclusions, the Laeken Declaration on the future of the EU includes a section entitled ‘Europe’s *new* role in a globalised world’ where the European Council states that the ‘opposing forces’ – representing the *other* – ‘have not gone away’, and identifies them as “religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism” which are generated by “regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment” (ibid.: 20). It is interesting to notice that the ‘opposing forces’ are referred to thusly, and not as ‘threats’ or ‘risks’, for example. Instead, they are referred to as ‘opposing’, meaning ‘contrasting’, ‘different’, and solutions to mitigate this ‘opposition’ are inherently prescribed by identifying their drivers. In this sense, the European Council asks what Europe’s *new* role ‘in this changed world’ is and asks if Europe has a “*leading role* to play in a new world order, that of a *power* able both to play a *stabilising role* worldwide and to *point the way ahead* for many countries and peoples” (ibid.). Although this is formulated as a question rather than an affirmation, it still carries an asymmetry in the portrayal of the EU’s envisioned global ambitions. Not only is the EU portrayed as a leader but also a power that has a normative capacity – a normative power. In a seeming answer to the question concerning the EU’s ‘leading’ role, the European Council states that Europe is ‘*the* continent of humane values, (...) of liberty, solidarity and (...) diversity’ arguing that its ‘one *boundary* is democracy and human rights’, which means that “the Union is open *only* to countries which uphold *basic* values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law” (ibid.). This explains the logic behind the E/CSDP as a policy that concerns the guarantee of the security of the EU through defence actions (civilian and military) that take place outside of the EU’s territory, pursued through transforming others according to the EU’s values and principles (in a ‘civilising’ logic). The narrative of ‘EU responsibility’ to play an important global role is very much present in this document (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), as is the EU’s (morally) superior hierarchical positioning:

Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalised, yet also highly fragmented world, *Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation*. The role it *has to* play is that of a *power* resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices. In short, a *power wanting to change the course of world affairs* in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A *power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework*, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development (European Council, 2001d: 20).

In a section called 'more democracy, transparency and efficiency in the EU' further ahead in the document, the European Council states that the EU "derives its legitimacy from *the democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses*" (ibid.: 22). Statements like this have both fuelled, and been fuelled by, the normative power Europe narrative in academia, in particular Manners' work (2009b), and by the categorical assumption of universality, ubiquity, and morality (and thus superiority) underlying these principles that the EU argues legitimate its external action, which we argue is at the base of the EU's 'civilising' attitude and is reflective of the EU's 'postcolonial' condition (Staeger, 2016).

In the context of the early development of the ESDP, and to provide support to the emerging policy, an EU Situation Centre was created, in 2002. This structure was renamed EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) in 2012, in the context of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The EU INTCEN's primary task is, in cooperation with the EUMS Intelligence Directorate, to provide intelligence support to the E/CSDP's institutional structure. In late February 2002, the Inaugural Meeting of the Convention on the future of the EU that had been convened by the Laeken European Council at the end of the previous year, a few months earlier, took place in Brussels. At this time, the preparation of the text of the draft Constitutional Treaty that was meant to replace the Nice treaty began. Two months later, in April 2002, the EP launched a resolution on the state of the ESDP and EU-NATO relations, due to the imminence of the launch of the latter policy and of the EU's access to NATO's planning capabilities. The EP starts out by classifying EU values as inherently 'universal', by stating that the CFSP (and the ESDP) "serves the *global interest* and *universal* values, as these have been expressed in the Charter of the United Nations" (EP, 2002a: 1). The resolution emphasises NATO's usefulness, as we have seen in other instances of EU discourse, by

recognising it as ‘*the* military security organisation for collective defence’ (while identifying the ESDP as a crisis management policy).

The EP identifies the emergence of terrorism, after the 2001 USA attacks, and the combat thereof as a ‘major objective in ESDP’ and argues in favour of a comprehensive approach to tackling this phenomenon. Such an approach entails, according to the EP, “a whole range of non-military measures such as intelligence-sharing and police and judicial cooperation (...) or the building of democratic institutions, infrastructure and civil society in *failed* or *failing states*” (ibid.: 2). In addition, the EP reinforces the idea of an underlying ‘civilising attitude’ in EU crisis management by “stressing that the EU’s greatest contribution to preventing international terrorism will be its capacity to be effective in the *building or rebuilding of democratic institutions, social and economic infrastructure, good governance and civil society*” (ibid.). As in other instances, the EP attempts to convince the Member States (as such and in the Council) and other EU institutions (particularly the Commission) – the targets of this resolution – to make the ESDP subject to parliamentary scrutiny and reporting to the EP, in the context of expenditure and budget-related decisions, as well as overall negotiations with NATO, while “recall[ing] that crisis prevention and civil crisis management are a first-pillar issue with clear responsibilities for the Commission and the European Parliament” (ibid.: 5). The impending deployment of the ESDP through missions in BiH and especially FYROM (with access to NATO planning and command capacities) are identified by the EP as being “of great symbolic and practical importance for the EU’s *credibility* in crisis management” (ibid.: 3).

In June 2002, a European Council meeting took place in Seville. The Spanish Presidency Conclusions produced in this meeting mention the effective launch of the ESDP foreseen for January 2003, through the launch of EUPM BiH, and reinforce the EU’s willingness to launch another mission in FYROM. In this context, four priority areas are identified concerning the civilian dimension of crisis management, namely police, the rule of law, civil administration, and civil protection. The Presidency Conclusions include, in annex, a Declaration on the contribution of the CFSP, including the ESDP, to the fight against terrorism. Terrorism is identified as a priority for the EU and ‘a key plank of its external relations policy’, and the CFSP and the ESDP (in particular conflict prevention), are identified as important tools to tackle it.

The EUPM [BiH] is one example of the EU’s commitment to *stabilising* post-conflict regions and helping to establish the rule of law. By *promoting stability*, including the strengthening of local law-enforcement capabilities, norms and standards, the EU helps to

deny terrorist organisations the opportunity to take root. (...) through the military and civilian capabilities developed by the EU for crisis management, the CFSP will become stronger and will contribute *more effectively* to the fight against terrorism *for the benefit of the populations concerned* (European Council, 2002: 33).

Here, the justification for the launch of crisis management missions and operations is altruistic – ‘for the benefit of the populations concerned’ – even though the EU mostly identifies its own security as the end goal of this policy, here reflected by the emphasis on ensuring stabilisation.

In September 2002, the EP divulged a resolution on the progress achieved in the implementation of the CFSP, where it recognises the EU’s ‘clear and unanimous response’ to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the USA in whose context the EU “has demonstrated that it is *also* prepared to assume *global responsibilities* in a multilateral framework” (EP, 2002: 1). Here we notice a reinforcement of the principal EU narrative of a ‘responsibility’ to engage in the area of security at the international level (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), even though the EP’s discourse remains more moderate than that of other institutions by leaving out possessive pronouns and adjectives that denote an assumption of a burden / obligation belonging to the EU (e.g. *its* responsibilities). The EP’s discourse (as in previous instances) reinforces the arguments in favour of a comprehensive framing of the EU’s security-related endeavours, linking the EU’s ‘traditional instruments’ (identified as aid, trade, and diplomacy) with conflict prevention, which is identified as “the guiding principle of [EU] foreign policy actions and is thereby tackling not only the symptoms, but also the root causes of terrorism” (EP, 2002: 2). The EP’s assessment of the September 11, 2001 attacks is that they ‘have altered the basic European foreign and security policy context’, having generated ‘five major strategic tasks’ for the EU since the Cold War ended. These tasks include emphasising the strategic importance of the transatlantic alliance; an increased clarity in the definition of relations between NATO and the ESDP (so as to allow for a better functioning and justification of the latter); ensuring strategic relations with Russia (due to the massive EU enlargement to the East); maintaining multilateral cooperation in the context of the UN; and combatting social, economic, and political root causes of extremism (ibid.).

The EP states that neither the USA alone nor specific international coalitions are able to deal with new threats, identified as “a mixture of terrorism, WMDs, religious fanaticism and states with *crumbling systems of order*” (ibid.) and uses this presumed ineffectiveness as a justification for the increase and improvement in the EU’s international role in “establish[ing]

itself permanently in the strategic quartet comprising the USA, EU, Russia and the UN, open to cooperation with all other partners” (ibid.). This justification for the EU’s actorness is reflected in the identified ‘new threats’ that are meant to be tackled. One of the identified threats – ‘states with crumbling systems of order’ – indicates a normative understanding of what ‘order’ should consist of, implying that that order is based on European models, and the categorisation of the collapse of these systems as a ‘threat’ reveals that it is considered detrimental to the EU’s security, which itself justifies action. These normative understandings and justifications for EU crisis management actorness are reinforced in the EP’s discourse when it states that

(...) *only* a foreign policy based on the consolidation of rights and freedoms and on the affirmation of the principles of democracy and the rule of law *throughout the world*, and in particular in all third countries with which the EU maintains special relations via cooperation and association agreements, *will enable the Union to overcome threats to peace, stability and freedom* (ibid.: 2-3).

The EP does not advocate the EU’s complete independence as an international security actor, particularly in the Middle East context, arguing that “the EU *only* has a chance of influencing the peace process within the quartet with the USA, Russia and the UN, as well as with other countries concerned” (ibid.: 3). There is mention of the EU’s ‘interpretation’ of its crisis management role as being *global* and ‘not limited to the area immediately beyond its borders’, even though the EP claims that it is ‘worried by the *lack of visibility*’ of the EU’s role. Again, as in previous instances, the EP returns to the idea of playing a (bigger) role (recommendations, debate, scrutiny) in the CFSP and the ESDP and to making these policies ‘Community-based’. As such, it criticises the EU’s fragmentation as an international actor (with the Member States acting independently *vis-à-vis* major international events), reflected in the CFSP (and the ESDP) being “determined by the co-existence of two centres of gravity: the HR, as spokesman of the common will of the Member States, and the Commission whose role so far has been narrowly confined to mobilising common resources and instruments” (ibid.: 4).

The EP identifies the USA as being a ‘strategic partner’ of the EU (despite an ‘apparent alienation’ between the two) in “maintaining and fostering common values and interests” (ibid.: 6). Similarly, the success of the EU’s ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia is identified as being contingent upon the inclusion of ‘promotion of democracy and human rights in the former Soviet Union’ (ibid.: 7). These statements provide us with an idea of what the expression



'strategic partners' means for the EU (as this concept becomes increasingly frequent in the EU's discourse), bringing attention to the normative power academic debate (Diez and Manners, 2007). The idea that a 'strategic partner' is interrelated with 'common values' also reinforces certain actorness criteria, such as Bretherton and Vogler's 'opportunity' (2006) that links the EU's normative power to its actorness context and the EU's assumption of the universality of the values it projects to how the latter serve a purpose of legitimating the EU's actorness ambitions.

On October 9, 2002, European Commission President Romano Prodi addressed the EP with a speech entitled "A stronger foreign and security policy for Europe." He begins the speech by asking "whether political union can exist without a common foreign policy. And whether a serious common foreign policy can exist without a common defence policy" (Prodi, 2002). The Commission President argues that "if we are to play *our* part in *ensuring peace, security and prosperity in Europe and beyond*, we need a strong foreign and security policy" (ibid.). Here, as in other discursive instances, there is an abstract assumption that the EU has a part to play (*our* part) in ensuring peace, and that that role is to take place in Europe (i.e. including the Balkans) and outside Europe. The use of the expression "Europe *and beyond*" is more common at this stage of policy development than 'globally' or similar expressions, mirroring a cautious attitude before the launch of the ESDP. Prodi recalls, as other Commission Presidents before him, the genesis the European integration project as a peace project: "the European integration idea rose from the realisation that we needed to find a *new way of solving conflicts*. A method that did not involve recourse to arms [i.e.] by sharing aspects of our sovereignty" (ibid).

The armed conflict in the Western Balkans, according to Prodi, taught Europeans that "diplomacy cannot work without a common foreign policy. And that we had no serious common foreign policy to speak of - much less a common defence and deterrence capability", and because of that, the experience of the EU on the ground was "*humiliating and belittling*" (ibid.). Prodi makes these statements while bringing attention to the EU's 'capacity to rebuild the region economically and politically,' while simultaneously pointing out that "if we had been more effective during the war, it would have cost less - in human lives and in money. And in terms of our own *prestige and self-confidence* - which could help us to defuse future conflicts elsewhere" (ibid.).

In an unprecedented discursive move, Prodi brings attention to the EU's image on the international scene in a negative light, as a means to either encourage his audience (the EP and eventually other EU actors) to support the EU's move towards an ESDP, or simply to illustrate the latter's necessity. Regardless of the goal, the fact remains that he puts emphasis on the EU's

perceived image as a crisis management actor, thus sustaining the importance of improving the latter. Prodi goes on by arguing that “we want to be successful at preventing the conflicts, not just good at picking up the pieces”, adding that “the need for a Common Security and Foreign Policy and a European Security and Defence Identity is more urgent than ever” (ibid.). Even though it is not entirely clear why he distinguishes between a CFSP as a ‘policy’ and an ESDP as an ‘identity’, the idea goes together with the rest of the speech in that it emphasises the need for an EU crisis management actorness identity that is visibly effective and useful and makes the EU proud rather than ashamed.

Also in October 2002, the text of the preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty was proposed by the Conference on the future of the EU, leading to a period of debate, as well as changes and amendment proposals, that were meant to be concluded in 2003. Two months later, in December 2002, an EU-NATO Declaration was drafted, signalling the EU’s access to NATO’s planning capabilities, and thus a significant advancement in its crisis management actorness potential. Drafted in an especially active period for the development of a crisis management policy at the EU level, this short joint declaration – drafted by the representatives of the Member States of both organisations – establishes a strategic partnership between them founded on ‘shared values.’ The aforementioned questioning of NATO’s *raison d’être* during the 1990s and the use of this partnership with the EU as a crisis management actor in order for NATO to remain relevant is visible in the document, as it “reaffirm[s] that a stronger European role will help *contribute to the vitality of the Alliance*, specifically in the field of crisis management” (EU and NATO, 2002). The opposite is also relevant, as the EU uses the gap left by NATO in terms of crisis management to assume a role based on its specificities and value-added. The reference to a ‘stable Euro-Atlantic security environment’ as a goal of the partnership suggests both organisations’ interests and core reasoning for engaging in crisis management.

In this section we have explored the EU’s discourses related to the early development of the EU’s foreign policy that contain normative justification elements for the development of a crisis management dimension within EUFP. We were able to pinpoint some of the major narratives used to justify normatively the EU’s engagement in this area, such as the EU’s alleged ‘responsibility’ as well as the normative assumption of ‘universality’ and ‘desirability’ of EU norms, values, principles, and standards, from whence the EU claims that its actorness legitimacy derives from (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). These narratives that are both

constructed and repeatedly reproduced by the EU will be further analysed and debated in chapter 5.

#### 4.2 - The European Security Strategy and the launch of the ESDP

The present section analyses and contextualises discourses produced or divulged by the EU in the context of the adoption, in 2003, of the European Security Strategy and the practical implementation of the ESDP with the launch of the first crisis management missions and operations until 2004. During this period, albeit relatively short, the international security environment became tenser with the war breaking out in Iraq following a USA-led intervention, and the EU's purported responsibility to play a role as a security actor, including in the field of crisis management, became more acute and visible in its discourses.

The EU's first ESDP mission – EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH) – was effectively launched in January 2003, following Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP, and was closed in June 2012. Despite not being the first EU-led military operation, EUPM BiH was the first EU mission launched under the aegis of the newly created ESDP and one of the longest standing missions to date. It was, however, a takeover from the UN International Police Task Force, and ultimately represented a test for the newly created ESDP (Osland, 2004) achieving moderate success (Celador, 2009). The essential aspects of this police mission's mandate throughout its nearly ten years of duration included the following tasks:

*To strengthen* the operational capacity and joint capability of the law enforcement agencies engaged in the fight against organised crime and corruption; *To assist and support* in the planning and conduct of investigations in the fight against organised crime and corruption in a *systematic* approach; *To assist and promote development* of criminal investigative capacities of BiH; *To enhance* police-prosecution cooperation; *To strengthen* police-penitentiary system cooperation; *To contribute* to ensuring a *suitable* level of accountability (EEAS, 2003).

Each sentence describing a task begins with an expression that suggests the idea of 'improvement' (strengthen, enhance, promote development), and the reference patterns (*systematic* approach, *suitable* level) appear always to be implicitly those of the EU, as if that were the obvious / expectable reference. On the other hand, the normative nature of this mission

stems from the imprecision of the idea of *crisis*, which is a vague and ambiguous concept whose definition the EU (likely purposefully) does not properly address in its E/CSDP related discourses. The EU is referred to in this context as playing a “*key supporting role in the stabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*” (ibid.), an idea emphasised by HR Solana at a press conference (Solana, Kelleher, and De Hoop Scheffer, 2004).

In February 2003, an Extraordinary European Council meeting took place in Brussels to discuss the situation in Iraq, in the context of general protests in Europe opposing a military intervention therein, while the US, the UK, and Spain submitted a draft resolution to the UNSC. This draft resolution was meant to validate a potential intervention by reinforcing the November 2001 UNSC resolution 1441 that stated that there would be ‘serious consequences’ for Iraq if the demands of UN weapons inspectors were not complied with (UNSC, 2002: 5). This environment, which led to serious divisions within Europe (Jones, 2006; Fakiolas and Fakiolas, 2006; Jones, 2004), inspired the (unusually short) Conclusions document to begin with an ominous statement: “the way the unfolding of the situation in Iraq will be handled will have an important impact on the world in the next decades” (European Council, 2003c: 1). Like in previous sporadic instances, the ‘responsibility’ focus is directed at the UNSC instead of the EU itself, in this case due to the imminence of a mandate that would allow for military action to take place (even though this mandate was never issued due to vehement opposition by France and Russia). In the Conclusions document, the European Council does not encourage military action, but there is, nonetheless, a latent threat to use force in case the demands of the UNCS are not met (European Council, 2003c: 1).

The first EU-led military operation, which was also the first mission under the Berlin Plus agreement between NATO and the EU, was EUFOR Concordia (Petrov, 2010), a military operation in FYROM that the EU took over from NATO (originally called ‘Allied Harmony’) with the purpose of ensuring a safe environment for the implementation of the Ohrid peace agreement between FYROM and Albanian representatives. EUFOR Concordia, which lasted from March to December 2003, was not launched under the ESDP, but was replaced by the ESDP mission EUPOL Proxima. EUFOR Concordia was essentially a monitoring mission, despite being clad as a military operation. This mission was crucial in strengthening the EU’s relationship with NATO, and in showing the world that the EU had the capacity to become an effective crisis management actor just before the formal launch of the newly created ESDP (Mace, 2004).

At the ceremony marking the end of EUFOR Concordia, the EU HR stated that ‘the process towards *stabilisation and normalisation*’ had reached a point where foreign troops were

no longer needed. Again, the idea that the EU helps others achieve ‘stability’ and especially ‘normalcy’ is imbued with a marked asymmetry between itself and the others that the EU is trying to help become ‘normal’, according to EU standards. In the ceremony, Solana went on to express his gratitude “to our partners, the United States, NATO, which has provided assets and capabilities to this operation, thereby implementing successfully the Berlin Plus agreements, and the OSCE” (Solana, 2003a: 2). The topic of the EU’s ‘partners’ comes up occasionally in the analysed discourses as unevenly tilted in favour of certain large countries and that mostly align with the EU’s worldview from a normative standpoint, to the detriment of E/CSDP host countries. In fact, in the early years of development and implementation of the ESDP, the latter are very seldom referred to as ‘partners’.

In announcing the end of EUFOR Concordia and the beginning of EUPOL Proxima, Solana emphasised the importance of ‘stabilisation’, and the EU’s fundamental role in ensuring it:

The end of Operation Concordia is in no way the end of the EU engagement in this country. But as the *main threat to stability* is no longer armed conflict but criminality, *the emphasis of our support must be police and not military*. At the same time as we lower the flag here, *the flag will be hoisted* at the Headquarters of the EU Police Mission Proxima (ibid.).

The inclusion, at the end of the speech, of a description of hoisting an EU flag in a non-EU country is quite interesting from a semiotic viewpoint, as it evokes a number of meanings, such as the symbolic affirmation of power over a territory.

With the launch of the EU’s first crisis management missions in the Balkans, a press conference with EU HR Javier Solana and NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson – and deemed a moment of ‘particular significance’ by the former – was held in the context of the completion of the Berlin Plus agreement between both organisations. The agreement’s purpose was described by Lord Robertson as enabling “the handling of future crisis *in Europe*” (in particular in the Balkans region), while the EU’s role in the agreement was described as “providing *another option in the European theatre* for crisis management” (Solana and Robertson, 2003). Additional discussions between the two organisations, as described by Lord Robertson, appear to be framed in an optic of territorial defence: “we are working closely together (...) also on emergency planning, consequence management, if terrorists should attack – on terrorism as a whole” (ibid.). This could mean that either NATO did not envisage a global crisis management role for the EU, or perhaps it might have been early to think about the EU

in such terms, as the area of crisis management at the EU level was still taking its first steps at the time. This apparent divergence in the discursive constructions of the EU's emerging crisis management actorness made by the EU and NATO representatives reveals that, even though most members coincide, the institutional dimension makes a difference, particularly in the EU, in terms of the formation and dissemination of collective discourses, and in the establishing of common narratives and identity. This is noticeable when Javier Solana expands NATO's apparent narrow view of the EU's role in crisis management – or rather the EU-NATO relationship in this area: “security, stability, not only in the region in which we are now, but *beyond* the region in which we are now” (ibid.). On the other hand, Solana appeared to make a distinction between ‘the people of Europe and the people of the Balkans’, which could simply imply a distinction between the EU and Europe, potentially diminishing the previous statement's apparent territorial expansion in relation to the EU's role as a crisis management actor.

While our analytical focus falls on EU discourses, rather than how other actors like NATO took part in the discursive construction of the EU's crisis management actorness, we deemed this press conference to be relevant not only due to the validity in understanding the views of the EU's newly appointed HR concerning the early development of the ESDP, but also in understanding how these views diverge from those of NATO, despite most Member States coinciding. In the open discussion with the journalists during the press conference, Lord Robertson referred to this agreement as “one of the biggest projects that has ever been embarked upon by NATO and the European Union” (ibid.). In the same setting, Solana spoke of the EU's takeover from NATO in FYROM and referred to the EU's ‘responsibilities’ therein as a part of a ‘comprehensive approach’ that the EU had towards the country (including economic and policing activities / missions), which “we [the EU] would like to be part of the European Union” (ibid.). Here we notice strong normative ambitions for the EU's engagement in FYROM in the context of crisis management; however, such ambitions also aim at an ultimate goal that only occasionally does EU crisis management entail, which is that a host country can become a potential accession candidate. In this latter case, the normative aspect is always at the very core, as the processes that seek to increase cohesion between the potential candidate and the rest of the EU are overtly assumed to go beyond mere crisis management, towards a greater approximation to EU standards.

When a journalist asked in what way would the forthcoming meeting between EU Ministers of Defence and the NATO SG improve the CFSP ‘especially on defence,’ Solana replied that they would analyse ‘basically, fundamentally capabilities’ (ibid.). The EU HR

stressed that discussions and meetings would amount to very little without commitments regarding capabilities, in what appeared to be an effort to avoid falling into (or remaining in) a ‘capabilities-expectations gap’, as described by Christopher Hill in the 1990s. The final question of the press conference, addressed at Solana, concerned the EU’s potential role in the event of war in Iraq. Solana cautiously replied that the EU had neither a seat nor formal representation at the UNSC, as only some individual EU Member States did. He also stated that, at the time, the decision to go to war had not been made by any party, stressing the importance of continuing efforts to avoid war and arguing that he would not make statements about an uncertain future scenario.

Nine days after the EU-NATO press conference, on March 20, 2003, a USA-led coalition invaded Iraq. This offensive took place despite the UNSC not having issued a second resolution and UN inspectors not having found, at that point, substantial evidence of the presence of WMDs in Iraq, raising questions about legality and legitimacy (Fisher and Biggar, 2011; Corn and Gyllensporre, 2010). The Iraq conflict led to internal normative divergences within the EU (Puetter and Wiener, 2007), with some Member States backing up the US-led coalition, particularly the UK<sup>28</sup> and Spain, and others being resolutely against intervention, such as Germany and France.

In the subsequent month, on April 16, 2003 the Athens Declaration was produced under the aegis of the Greek European Council Presidency in an informal meeting where the Member State representatives met symbolically under the Acropolis to signal the accession treaty of ten new EU Member States. Even though this is not a document specifically dedicated to crisis management, but rather to considerations about the EU and the meaning of a renewed and larger EU, it does include elements concerning the EU’s envisioned ambitions in matters of external action, portraying ambitions that were heavily influenced by the tense international environment at the time. In this regard, the European Council states that ‘we believe the Union has an *essential* role to play in the world’, pledging to “promote relentlessly the dialogue among *civilizations* and contribute uncompromisingly to *strengthening the institutions of global governance* and expanding the reach of international law” (European Council, 2003d: 2). The ‘alterity’ narrative (us vs. them) that occasionally marks the EU’s discourse appears again in

---

<sup>28</sup> In September 2002 the British government published a document (available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/middle\\_east/02/uk\\_dossier\\_on\\_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf)) describing the potential threat stemming from the alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, which prompted the UK’s direct involvement in the war that began in the subsequent year.

the use of the expression ‘civilizations’. These assertions reaffirm the centrality of the EU in its own discourse, characterised as being in a position that enables and ‘obliges’ it to strengthen global governance institutions. This centrality is reinforced when the European Council maintains the EU ‘responsibility’ narrative as a normative justification to engage in crisis management (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), emphasising the latter with the use of a possessive pronoun (our):

We are committed to *facing up to our global responsibilities*. We will *support conflict prevention, promote justice, help secure peace and defend global stability*. We are determined to work at all levels to tackle global terrorism and stem the weapons of mass destruction. To these ends, the Union will continue to enhance its civilian and military capabilities to enhance stability beyond its borders and further its humanitarian goals (European Council, 2003d: 2).

The Member States’ representatives’ pledge (on behalf of the EU), to support the UN “and its efforts to ensure international legitimacy and global responsibility” (ibid.) reinforce their collective belief in the universality of the UN Charter and in the legitimacy that the UN (and the UNSC in particular) lend to the EU’s own external action (itself deemed ‘necessary’) and that of other actors in the international system. Even if arguably so, this assertion can be interpreted as a criticism to the lack of a UNSC mandate in the context of the US-led coalition’s intervention in Iraq.

The escalation of the situation in Iraq prompted the Greek European Council Presidency to produce a brief Statement on Iraq on the same day as the Athens Declaration. This statement mentions the presence of the UN Secretary-General and the ‘opportunity to discuss the next steps on Iraq’. The responsibility to take action to ‘ensure a secure environment’ is not attributed to the EU as in previous instances, but rather to the ‘coalition’ of which the EU is part, emphasising the EU’s focus on multilateralism. Throughout the document, the emphasis is placed mostly on the UN, which “must play a central role, including in the process leading towards self-government for the Iraqi people, utilizing its unique capacity and experience in the post-conflict nation building” (European Council, 2003e: 1), whereas the EU “reaffirms its commitment to play a *significant role* in the *political* and *economic reconstruction* of the country” (ibid.). The UN is encouraged to ‘further strengthening’ its involvement in post-



conflict Iraq, while the EU “reaffirms its commitment to bring the Israeli / Palestinian Peace Process to a successful conclusion” (ibid.).

On March 20 and 21, 2003, the European Council met in Brussels. The Italian Presidency Conclusions that came out of this meeting focus mostly on the Lisbon Strategy, meant to turn the EU into “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” (European Council, 2003f: 1), but they do include a section on the situation in Iraq following the beginning of the conflict, as well as on the Middle East and other regions, and on the EU’s intended role in those contexts. Concerning Iraq, the document indicates that the EU is “faced with a new situation” (ibid.: 31) and lists the EU’s challenges in this context as the guarantee of Iraq’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, stability, and disarmament; the centrality of the UN’s role therein (including the need for a UNSC post-conflict assistance mandate); the humanitarian situation; as well as the need for EU-led institution building. In addition, the Presidency Conclusions indicate as challenges regional stability, terrorism prevention, the Middle East Peace Process, as well as the “deepen[ing of] *our* dialogue and cooperation in all fields with the Arab and the Islamic worlds” (ibid.: 33). This last point is indicative of a dichotomist world view on behalf of the EU particularly amplified by the use of the expression ‘worlds.’ In the Presidency Conclusions, the ‘primary responsibility’ for ensuring peace and stability at the international level is attributed to the UNSC. Even though this does not dismiss the maintenance of the prevailing ‘EU responsibility’ narrative as a crisis management or security actor, the discursive variance of placing the responsibility focus appears in discourses that concern Iraq, as well as other active conflicts. This can be explained by the EU’s predominant institutional and policy focus on other moments of the crisis cycle, particularly crisis/conflict prevention, and post-conflict crisis management – both of which are carried out predominantly through institution-building based on European standards and models – rather than on active conflict.

In June 2003, the EU launched a military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – Operation Artemis – which lasted until September of the same year (Petrov, 2010). The launch of this military operation, in the same year that the divisions in the context of the Iraq war, was “an attempt by the European powers to prove that they could still cooperate and that the CFSP / ESPD was still alive” and “for the EU to prove that it could act autonomously from NATO” (Olsen, 2009: 1). According to the operation’s mandate in Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP, its purpose was to ‘provide a temporary *stabilisation* force in implementation of the mandate provided in the UNSC Resolution 1484’, in the aftermath of a civil war and subsequent humanitarian crisis (Council, 2003). So, in a way, this short-term

operation was not so different from the idea behind EUFOR Concordia – i.e. a monitoring mission –, even though it was developed without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, and it started out as a French operation (Schmidt, 2011: 568-9; Petrov, 2010).

HR Solana, in a press conference about the end of operation Artemis, stated that “l’Union Européenne entend rester au premier plan des efforts pour la *stabilité*, la paix et la reconstruction en République démocratique du Congo en mettant en œuvre l’ensemble de ses moyens d’action” (Solana, 2003b). The recurrence of the idea of the EU as a ‘force for stability / stabilisation’ indicates precaution on behalf of the EU in its early steps as a crisis management actor, as this idea entails making something unlikely to change (and thus unlikely to disturb). The efforts to make its other regions ‘stable’, i.e. unlikely to change, are related to the EU’s main goal of ensuring its own security, which is prioritised in relation to the promotion of its values, principles, and norms.

The European Council meeting that took place in Thessaloniki on 19 and 20 June 2003 was marked by the presentation of the draft Constitutional Treaty. This treaty was signed in the subsequent year but ended up not being ratified by all Member State governments after failing to obtain support in the French and Dutch referenda that were carried out in 2005 (Hobolt, 2006). Regardless of this treaty’s failure, its drafting reflected an environment amenable to improving the EU’s functioning, particularly in matters of foreign and security policy. The Greek Presidency Conclusions that came out of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting reflect this environment with a section dedicated to External Relations, CFSP, and ESDP, which mentions the forthcoming European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS’s drafting had been entrusted to the EU’s HR Javier Solana in cooperation with Member States’ governments and EU institutions, and with the help of diplomatic, military, as well as academic experts (Biscop, 2004). In this section, the European Council reinforces the dominant EU ‘responsibility’ narrative (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), arguing that “*our* Union is committed to facing up to *our responsibilities*, guaranteeing a secure Europe and a better world” (European Council, 2003g: 17), maintaining a strong focus on multilateralism. The Greek Presidency European Council Conclusions reinforce the EU’s aspirations to “contribute *relentlessly* to strengthening and *reshaping* the institutions of global governance, regional cooperation and expanding the reach of international law” (ibid.) by means of conflict prevention, justice promotion, sustainable development, as well as ensuring peace and stability ‘in our region and globally’. These assertions reflect the EU’s ambitious normative goals, in particular the idea of ‘reshaping’ global governance institutions.

The ESS was drafted as a response to the international environment at the time, marked by a legitimacy crisis of international security and governance organisations (Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés, and Natorski, 2015). The ESS was approved by the European Council in December 2003, signalling the beginning of a new stage for EU security and defence. This strategy was proposed in the same year as the launch of the first ever ESDP missions and had the purpose of providing a conceptual framework for the development and legitimisation of the CFSP and of the ESDP, and to identify Europe's main security challenges and respective political implications in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the USA and the 2003 Iraq war (Biscop, 2004). This was the key strategic document in place at the EU level during most of our period of analysis, up until the launch of the EU Global Strategy, in 2016.

The title of the European Security Strategy, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', indicates a focus on EU territorial security ('a secure Europe'), and on the achievement thereof through an improvement of the outside world ('in a better world'). Another aspect of the title that stands out is the reference to 'Europe' rather than the EU. According to Kuus (2011: 1146), "policy professionals have a substantial and hitherto underappreciated role in the producing (rather than simply describing) a *canonical geographical and geopolitical category like Europe*". What we see here is a representation of the EU as if it embodied (all of) Europe (the latter itself an extensively contested concept). In other words, 'Europe' is used as a concept marked by a deliberate 'constructive ambiguity' which symbolises an abstract political and cultural value-based idea that is materialised by the EU's policies and actions, rather than a merely geographic concept, as "defining the *borders* of Europe distracts from policy because it hinders the creation of an even space where standards could be applied neutrally. It *limits the reach of Europe's soft power*" (ibid.: 1148).

The ESS was the first time that an entity like the EU (an intergovernmental and supranational regional integration organisation, mainly focused on political and economic issues) drafted such a document, representing another instance of the efforts of purposeful construction of an EU identity through discourse that portrays itself as an international actor with a 'responsibility' to act in the field of security and that determines its own broad and encompassing conception of security (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). A sentence in the second paragraph, which encases what would become a key standard in the EU's engagement in crisis management in subsequent years, reads: "(...) the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies" (European Council, 2003a: 1). This sentence denotes the assumption of the premise that peace

building can, or should, be achieved through “the externally led construction of liberal democratic institutions” (Légaré, 2010: 35). This assumption, in turn, creates a distinction between ‘secure’, ‘stable’ and ‘dynamic’ democracies (which represent the European paradigm), and authoritarian regimes, which, by opposition, are implied to be ‘insecure’, ‘unstable’, and ‘stagnant’. Thus, the text suggests that not having liberal democratic state institutions – with free elections, separation of powers, rule of law, and European-like human and civil rights and liberties – is a sign of lack of dynamism and progress. This, in turn, places one paradigm that is marked by positive attributes at a superior level in relation to the other paradigm that is portrayed as an opposite, and thus is implicitly marked with negative attributes.

This idea is reiterated when the document states that “flows of trade and investment, the development of technology *and the spread of democracy have brought* freedom and prosperity to many people.” The use of the noun ‘spread’ and of the verb ‘to bring’ (have brought) suggest that these ‘improvements’ come from an external source, and that it was these actions that generated ‘freedom and prosperity’, thus echoing the idea behind the EU’s aforementioned peace building paradigm and implies that these ‘many people’ were the opposite of ‘free and prosperous’ (i.e. ‘confined’ and ‘deprived’) before these actions. In a paragraph a few pages later, the document goes back to a similar topic – ‘state failure’, marked as a ‘key threat’ – and uses clearer language in establishing a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance:

*State Failure: Bad* governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. (...) Collapse of the State can be associated with *obvious* threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an *alarming* phenomenon that undermines global governance, and *adds to regional instability* (European Council, 2003a: 4).

Peace building through state / institution building has become one of the EU’s main crisis management paradigms (Bouris and Reigeluth, 2012; Bouris, 2012; Turner, 2012). This paragraph encapsulates the EU’s normative justification for engaging in such practices from the onset, i.e. right at the beginning of the launch of the ESDP. This is one of the aspects that reflect this document’s importance in the establishment of the EU’s public discourses as a crisis management actor, and overall as an actor with normative security ambitions. Here, the EU defines what it means by state failure and, later in the document, why this is important for the

EU, implicitly justifying its engagement in state / institution building practices in the context of crisis management.

The first expression in the paragraph – state failure – already contains normative assumptions. It implies that there are criteria that need to be fulfilled in order to ensure that the state does not fail. The use of the noun ‘failure’ entails that the subject to which it refers (in this case a state) is unable to or has stopped performing ‘normally’ or ‘successfully’. But what constitutes ‘normal’ or ‘successful’? The fact that this document stems from the EU’s institutions and is part of the latter’s public discourses indicates that the ‘normal’ or ‘successful’ is the European norm (which, in itself, is quite varied). In this definition, the paragraph presents two criteria for what is considered by the EU to be ‘state failure’: ‘bad governance’ and ‘civil conflict’. Bad is the opposite of good, and the document indicates what constitute ‘bad’ (albeit vague) aspects of governance: corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, and lack of accountability. According to Derridaean logic of deconstruction, these are such also because they are not their opposite – decency/honesty, respect for power, strong institutions, and accountability – these are not just technical considerations whereby a specific case is being compared to a list of universally established criteria. Even if such list existed, there would be nothing ‘natural’ about it: it would still be shaped by historical or institutional contingencies. On the other hand, this definition creates meaning through difference, by determining what a successful state is (for the EU) based on a definition of what it is not. There are elements of value judgement in this document’s definition of state failure, not least because of the use of the qualifier ‘bad’. This is accompanied by a normative assertion, a few pages later, that states that “in failed states, military instruments *may be needed to restore order*” (European Council, 2003a: 7). This brings us back to our earlier statement about this text containing a justification for the EU’s engagement in state building practices in the context of crisis management: the document appears to place similar importance to ‘the weakening of the state system’ as it does to ‘terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, and the privatisation of force’, ultimately classifying all of these as “a very radical *threat*” (ibid.: 5).

The ESS goes on to state that “the European Union is *inevitably* a global player” (ibid.: 1), due to its sheer size, population, and GNP. Yet, when the document describes certain features of this actorness, the focus remains exclusively internal / domestic: “the increasing convergence of European *interests* and the strengthening of *mutual solidarity* of the EU *makes us a more credible and effective actor*” (ibid.), similarly to previous documents. Credibility and effectiveness are, thus, portrayed as having an internal source, and no external elements or

interactions are mentioned in the achievement or confirmation of such attributes. The EU's focus on itself – on its ability, internal functioning, domestic credibility, effectiveness, etc. – to the detriment of external perceptions or endorsement, has accompanied thus far, throughout time, its normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor.

Going back to the idea present in the title, the document states that “Europe *should be ready to share* in the *responsibility* for global security and in building a *better* world” (ibid.). Here, as in other instances, we notice the recurrence of the use of the expression ‘Europe’ as an deliberately ‘ambiguously constructed’ symbolic representation of the EU (Kuus, 2011). The use of the comparative adjective ‘better’ in this passage (and in the title) implies improvement, i.e. something that is more ‘good’ than something else or than it was before. This indicates that whatever is ‘better’ is so in comparison with something that is its relative opposite – ‘worse’, or less ‘good’ – which suggests a superior hierarchical positioning of the object ‘world’ after the EU has engaged in ‘building’ endeavours. This, in turn, suggests that what makes the object ‘world’ to be ‘better’ is, thus, the EU – its action, its paradigms, its values and norms. However, the reference to the verb ‘share’, on the other hand, removes the exclusive focus from the EU, and portrays it as one of many contributors to the ‘betterment’ of the world, recalling the EU’s strong focus on the idea of multilateralism. The idea that ‘Europe *should be ready*’ indicates a strong prescriptive assumption about the EU’s role and obligations to ‘*share* in the *responsibility* for global security’. The deliberate choice (paradigm) of vocabulary – responsibility, mission – suggests an urgency or inevitability regarding its role.

After presenting some statistical data about poverty and disease in the world, and in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the document states that “security is a precondition of development” (European Council, 2003a: 2). This sentence may appear innocent, but it implies certain normative assumptions about the world, as it suggests that development is seen as a universal objective, ultimately shaping the way the EU constructs its role in crisis management – which became more explicit in the 2013 comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013).

The ESS specifically mentions the threat of terrorism for Europe and points out the complexity of the phenomenon. Even though the use of the word ‘terrorism’ may appear initially to refer to a phenomenon that is foreign to the EU, the document admits that “this phenomenon is also a part of our own society” (European Council, 2003a: 3), thus implying that tackling it is also a matter of territorial defence (although not necessarily in a traditional sense). The EU’s justifications for developing a crisis management policy, in discourses that

preceded the ESS, had been more focused on its potential role and value-added than on its territorial security interests. In this document, on the other hand, there are indications of a different rhetoric, linked to the EU's self-interests:

Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula *impact on European interests directly and indirectly*, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, *threaten regional stability* (ibid.: 4).

In this paragraph, a direct reference is made to potential host countries / regions for the EU's crisis management efforts. The fact that the reference is vague, and that the latter are not referred to as potential host countries, but rather as sources of 'problems' that impact the EU's interests, reflects the EU's self-centredness and implicit assumption of superiority. In addition, the use of the expression 'Middle East' is also quite Eurocentric, as it reflects a historical colonial geopolitical positioning of Europe (especially the UK) as the reference point to establish the positioning and designation of this contested region to the detriment of less politically charged and more geographically-oriented designations used therein (such as West Asia, for example) (Bilgin, 2004).

In the section dedicated to the EU's strategic objectives, the document starts by justifying why these are even listed: "to defend its security and to promote its values" (European Council, 2003a: 6). The EU thus appears to justify having a security strategy and a crisis management policy by equating both ideas.

Our traditional concept of self-defence (...) was based on the threat of invasion. *With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad*. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected (...). This implies that *we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs*. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early (ibid.: 7).

In this document, there is an association between a more traditional territorial type of defence and a preventive, normative-oriented type of defence (whereby security is understood as a state, and defence is the action – civilian or military – carried out to achieve that state). With this statement, the EU is implying that the crisis management actions that it intends to carry out are

not only driven by security-related self-interest but are also imbued with a normative view of how the world should be, and how the EU intends to contribute to the realisation of that vision. This positioning risks a relativizing of the ‘emergency’ dimension of certain crises – not to the point of using conditionality, as proposed by the EP, but also not as immediate as, for example, humanitarian assistance – as it might result in a search for ways of imposing a ‘European’ (Kuus, 2011) vision of the world by actively seeking for supposed future or embryonic crises, identified by the EU according to its own convenience.

Even though the following sentence relates largely to what would become the ENP soon after the launch of this document, it also encases key normative ideas that reflect the EU’s justifications for engaging in crisis management and in overall external action: “our task is to promote a ring of *well governed* countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean *with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations*” (European Council, 2003a: 8). By stating that the EU’s task is to ‘promote a ring of well governed countries’ the document is implying that these countries are the opposite – poorly / badly governed countries – prior to the EU’s engagement therein. On the other hand, by adding ‘with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’, the document reiterates the aforementioned idea of the EU’s portrayal as a superior polity, as ‘good’ governance is presented as a precondition for this kind of relations to take place. The statement that this is the EU’s ‘task’ confirms the EU’s normative ambitions and perceived dominance.

Simultaneously to the launch of the ESS, the partnership between the EU and NATO continued towards its consolidation in a document on EU-NATO Consultation, Planning and Operations, drafted by the European Council in December 2003. In the midst of more practical and technical considerations concerning the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement between NATO and the EU, one interesting assertion regarding the EU’s ambitions as a crisis management actor emerges in the succinct document. At one point, the European Council recommends the establishment, within the EUMS, of a civil / military cell in order to enhance the latter’s capacity to conduct early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning, whose purpose (among others) is to “link work across the EU on anticipating crises, including *opportunities* for conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation” (European Council, 2003b: 2). The use of the noun ‘opportunities’ evokes ideas of ‘convenience’, ‘excuses’, or ‘favourable circumstances’ for the EU to be a crisis management actor (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Here, there is again a suggestion of a paradigmatic choice in favour of the EU’s actorness in situations that may not be of emergency. This reflects discourses that constitute the EU’s way of viewing its potential role, where its actorness ambitions are emphasised.



The European Council met in Brussels, in December 2003, and produced a Presidency Conclusions document that focuses largely on the Intergovernmental Conference preparing the draft Constitutional Treaty, as well as the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, but also informing of the European Council's adoption of the ESS, as well as the EU strategy against the proliferation of WMDs. The ESS is described as reaffirming the EU's common determination to face '*our responsibility* for guaranteeing a secure *Europe* in a better world' and the European Council Italian Presidency urges the preparation of proposals for the strategy's practical implementation, starting with a focus on UN-centred multilateralism, combatting terrorism, a strategy for the Middle East, as well a 'comprehensive policy' for BiH (where the European Council confirms the EU's 'readiness' for a Berlin Plus ESDP military operation) (European Council, 2003h).

Also in December 2003, the aforementioned EUPOL Proxima – EU Police Mission in FYROM – was launched, after “the map of the Macedonian police field drawn by the European experts marked out the local police as a force *deviating from European standards of normality*” (Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, 2006: 87). The mission had two one-year mandates, the first from December 2003 until December 2004, and the second from then until December 2005, and was followed by an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) until June 2006. As previously mentioned, EUPOL Proxima followed EUFOR Concordia in the context of the implementation of the Ohrid framework agreement in FYROM. While the previous operation (albeit military) was more of a monitoring mission, Proxima was a police mission (not unlike EUPM BiH) with the purpose of ‘monitoring, mentoring, and advising’ the police in FYROM. At the opening ceremony of EUPOL Proxima, the EU High Representative Javier Solana, as in other instances, begins by elevating the host country to an equality status with the EU, to subsequently ‘remind’ them that the actors’ positioning is asymmetrical, and that the EU is in a superior hierarchical position by stating that “Proxima will be a unique mission carried out in *strong partnership* with the Government. *We want to support you* in the further development of an efficient and professional police service, *living up to European standards*” (Solana, 2003a: 3).

The mandate for the extension of Proxima (Council Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP), whose purpose was “to further support the development of an *efficient* and *professional* police service *based on European standards* of policing,” (Council of the EU, 2004d: 3) even though it is meant to be a mere police mission, reflects the EU's ‘civilising’ ambition towards the country:

(...) the Union's contribution is based upon a broad approach with *activities to address the whole range of rule of law aspects, including institution building programmes* and police activities which should be mutually supportive and reinforcing (ibid.: 2).

Further ahead in the text, the EU goes back to the recurrent idea of stabilisation, and describes itself as a definite contributor to that stability, both in the country as in the region:

It can, however, not be excluded that the security situation may deteriorate with potentially serious repercussions on international security. A continued commitment of EU political effort and resources *will thus help to further embed stability* in the country as well as in the region (ibid.).

As before, when EUPOL Proxima II concluded its mandate, the High Representative made a statement, in which he began by referring to the host country in an apparently balanced and symmetrical way with regard to the EU, but shortly after reminded the listeners of the underlying hierarchy: “in *partnership* and through *competent work of people on both sides*, for two years, PROXIMA has been instrumental in *supporting* the further development of a police service *based on European standards*” (Solana, 2005). While describing Proxima as a ‘necessary task’, Solana went on to state that the EU’s relationship with FYROM would from then on move ‘from post-crisis *stabilisation* to pre-accession integration’, which meant that the ESDP as such was no longer needed.

The EUPAT that followed would only be welcomed by local authorities ‘under certain conditions’ including *not defining it as a stabilization-oriented ‘mission’*, nor as a follow-up to Proxima, but would have to be instead presented as a ‘reform-oriented effort’ (Ioannides, 2006: 14). This shows the local authorities’ concern with discourse (and the image that the latter projects) rather than necessarily the mandate of the mission itself. As such, this mission would be part of the EU’s ‘support to the broader Rule of Law area in this country’: “we began by taking over a military operation, continued with an ESDP police mission, the ending of which we mark today, and will follow up with EUPAT and the European Commission projects” (Solana, 2005). This is an interesting case for observing, in practice, the genesis of what would become the EU’s staple guideline in EU external action after the Lisbon Treaty – the EU’s comprehensive approach concept (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013) – which explains why crisis management is never just that and is always imbued with some sort of normative purpose or ambition. It also highlights the

conceptual imprecision underlying some key concepts – starting with the concept of crisis. On the other hand, the fact that FYROM acquired the status of accession candidate following the end of EUPOL Proxima’s mandate in December 2005 means that the overall ambitions for this country were not the same as for other ESDP host countries, as approximation to EU standards is a precondition for accession.

In January 2004, three years after the launch of the 2001 Council Common Position 2001/374/CFSP concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, this document was repealed and replaced by Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP. Even though in 2004 the EU had only launched one ESDP operation in Africa, at that time the policy was already being implemented and its limits were being tested with each launch. The second version of the EU’s Common Position about conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, more extensive than the previous, is similar in that its initial statement remains the premise that “the *primary responsibility* for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent *lies with Africans themselves*” (Council, 2004g: 25). The document maintains the discourse of a “link between conflict prevention and democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance” (ibid.) and the potential role of development cooperation in crisis management. Yet, the second document differs from the first in that it states earlier the EU’s idea of becoming directly involved in crisis management in Africa ‘with its own capabilities’, “notwithstanding its commitment to African ownership” (ibid.). Its initial view of working in close connection with African actors appears less visible in the second document, where the EU discernibly commits to long-term closer involvement as a crisis management actor on its own, suggesting that the previous version of this document might have been too idealistic to be implemented, or perhaps simply that the EU would have, in Africa, an amenable environment – a context of opportunity – that could enable its crisis management actorness: “the EU shall develop long-term conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives, recognising that progress in these areas is a necessary precondition also for African states to build and sustain capacity to deal effectively with terrorism” (Council, 2004g: 26).

While the first document’s idea of crisis prevention through early action was portrayed as an additional focus of the EU’s proposed role as a crisis management actor (‘the EU shall *also* focus on...’), in the second version of the document this becomes a more central focus: “while recognising the need to respond to existing crises, the EU’s policy *shall focus on preventing* the outbreak and spreading of violent conflicts *through early action*, and on preventing the recurrence of violent conflict” (ibid.). The EU proposes to do this through crisis prevention, crisis management, and peace building, adding, in the second document, the task

of ‘reconstruction’ by means of “supporting the economic, political and social re-building of post-conflict states and societies to prevent the re-escalation of violence and to promote sustainable peace” (ibid.). Here, we see that the 2004 document reflects the evolution of crisis management closer towards the area of development and the application of European state type administration models and standards. This discourse can be seen as early evidence of the EU’s future institutional adoption, nearly 10 years later, of the concept of a ‘comprehensive approach’ to external conflicts and crises (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). The increased discursive focus on EU direct engagement as a crisis management actor (not just as a crisis management ‘mentor’ that provides tools for local ownership) reflects the EU’s attitude of the first years of practical implementation of the ESDP, and the identification and exploitation of an amenable dynamic environment that enabled such actorness – or what Bretherton and Vogler (2006) would identify as ‘opportunity’. It also reflects an adjustment of the EU’s ambitions as the ESDP’s implementation was being tested.

In February 2004, the EU’s HR Javier Solana addressed a Conference on European security in Helsinki regarding the steps to follow after the ESS. While referring to the development of the CFSP, Solana stated that “the Union has emerged as a *distinct* actor also in this area, working *side by side* with its Member States. I am a physicist. I know that a molecule is more than a collection of atoms. The European Union is more than the sum of its parts” (Solana, 2004: 18). His assertion reflects the EU’s intergovernmental character but also its individual actorness, even with additional Member states, and it also reflects the analytical complexities in discerning the EU’s autonomy and authority as an actor in certain matters (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). Solana refers to the EU’s ‘responsibilities’ as one of its main challenges and mentions a change that EUFP underwent from ‘reactive’ to ‘proactive’, acting to ‘prevent new conflicts from erupting’ due to the EU’s ‘new’ crisis management capabilities. According to Solana, the ESS, which “signals a new – strategic – approach to our external action” (Solana, 2004: 19), originated from a European acknowledgement “that we are stronger when we have a common perception of the threats we face and how to deal with them. Threats are never more dangerous than when we are divided” (ibid.). This statement refers to the normative disagreements following the Iraq war that divided EU Member States and to the effort that the ESS represented in ensuring a greater degree of unity in matters of security in face of perceived common threats, reflecting the academic debate’s focus on the importance of cohesion as a key domestic actorness criterion (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998).

Solana refers to the EU's 'responsibilities for building *regional* security' primarily regarding the Balkans, in particular BiH and Kosovo, but also in the Arab world. Solana also identifies as a 'European' (Kuus, 2011) responsibility the achievement of a 'closer economic cooperation with our *neighbours* to the East' accompanied by efforts to develop democracy and good governance and to end frozen conflicts. In addition, the HR speaks of a '*global* responsibility' for the EU to act in matters of terrorism and criminal activities, and of a link between internal and external European security. In this context, we can identify two major normative justifications provided for the development of EU crisis management actorness: the EU's alleged regional and global responsibility, as well as the guarantee of the EU's own security. Solana brings attention to *prevention* – the “need [for the EU] to be able to act at the first signs of trouble” (Solana, 2004: 20) – as a central tool for the EU's security and crisis management actorness, mentioning different examples such as the Balkans or Iran. The HR references the importance of the EU's civilian and military capability development, mentioning the importance of the forthcoming Headline Goal 2010, and the link between the latter and humanitarian, trade, and development tools. Solana also advocates in favour of multilateralism, a key principle in the EU's worldview, bringing attention to the need for security 'partnerships' with the USA (due to the complementarity between both actors' approaches to security), Russia (whose importance increases with each EU enlargement), as well as the UN (placed at the centre of the EU's multilateral worldview). The practical implementation of the ESS is identified as more important than the ESS itself, as “it is not the words but the deeds that count in international politics” (ibid.: 22) – we argue, in this project, that it is both, reflecting the importance of a balance between capabilities and expectations (vehiculated through discourse) as discussed in the corresponding scholarly debate (Hill, 1993).

Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, attributed to Al-Qaida, a European Council meeting that took place in Brussels a few weeks later adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism drafted by the Council. The fight against terrorism falls into a policy 'grey area' somewhere between the area of justice and home affairs and security and defence, yet it is undoubtedly connected to the EU's security and crisis management actorness (Martins and Ferreira-Pereira, 2012; Zwolski and Kaunert, 2013), and thus the EU's discourses concerning this issue are important for our project. The Declaration brings attention to the centrality of the fight against terrorism in the ESS and urges the implementation of the ESS to be carried out, calling for “the development of an EU long-term strategy to address all the factors which contribute to terrorism” (Council, 2004i: 3), mentioning the ESDP's rapid development as a relevant contribution for this matter. Most goals and procedures listed in the

document concern actions related to justice and home affairs and are thus very focused on the EU's borders and internal security. However, one of the proposals made in Annex I concerning the EU's Strategic Objectives to Combat Terrorism (Revised Plan of Action) includes an idea already present in previous EU discourses, which is the promotion of "cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and *the Islamic World*" (ibid.: 17). This assertion represents Europe and 'the Islamic world' as opposing entities (and thus in need of such 'understandings'), enhanced by the use of the expression 'world'.

In May 2004, a document named 'Headline Goal 2010' (HG2010) was drafted and approved by the General Affairs and External Relations Council and endorsed, in the subsequent month, by the European Council. The HG2010 aimed at establishing a new headline goal after the adoption of the ESS in the previous year, as the previous headline goal, which had been established in the 1999 Helsinki European Council summit, was achieved. The 1999 Helsinki headline goal was simply a practical military capability target that entailed the ability to deploy a certain number of multinational rapid reaction forces by 2003, with little to no normative statements about the EU's nature or role. However, the HG2010 is quite a distinct document from its previous 1999 'version'. While the HG2010 also focuses on the development of military capabilities – namely battle groups – as it was drafted in the midst of continued institutional reinforcement of the EU's security and defence area with the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA), whose purpose is to develop EU defence capabilities in aspects of research and technological development and promotion of intra-European arms (Council, 2004a). Our interest in these headline goals, however, is not related to the actual development of military capabilities, but rather on how the EU depicts itself and justifies its potential role as a crisis management actor. This is why we focus on the HG2010 document, a much more extensive document that discusses not only practical aspects related to capability goals, but also justifies these goals in light of the EU's actorship ambitions in the area of crisis management.

The HG2010 begins by reaffirming, as previous documents had, that "the European Union *is a global actor*, ready to share in the *responsibility for global security*" and goes on to admit that, in the ESS, "[the EU] affirmed the role *it wants to play* in the world" (Council, 2004b: 1). Not unlike the ESS, the HG2010 highlights how the EU can "make a *major contribution to security and stability* in a ring of *well governed countries* around Europe and in the world (...)" adding that it "has the civilian and military framework needed to face the multifaceted nature of these new threats" (ibid.). In this assertion, the document reaffirms the idea of a necessity to establish a ring of 'well governed' countries – an expression that entails

value judgement, in that this is the opposite of poorly / badly governed countries, which are likely so because they do not follow European governing norms and standards. This value judgement, as in previous instances, emphasises the suggestion that the EU / Europe is placed in a hierarchically superior and dominating level, as it is suggested that the EU is equipped to face these ‘threats’ by means of its ‘civilian and military framework’. The recurring idea of the EU as a ‘force’ or a ‘guarantor’ of stability and security appears again in this document.

The document mentions the Member States almost as frequently as it does the EU as the main actors. While this does not necessarily mean a decrease in the EU’s projection of unity, it does appear to reiterate the intergovernmental nature of this policy (especially of the latter’s military dimension), where the Council and the European Council are the main institutional actors. It also highlights the source of the military capabilities that the EU has at its disposal (i.e. the Member States).

Even though the HG2010 does not specify how, it points out that the EU “*must* be able to act *before* a crisis occurs” (ibid.). As in previous instances, such as the ESS, this is related to the export of the EU’s norms, values and standards, especially in matters of governance. It also reflects an active search for ‘opportunities’ for actorness in this area, which is made possible by the EU’s omission of a clear definition of key concepts such as ‘crisis’ or ‘threat’. Again, like in previous policy documents, the use of the expression ‘partners’ is used not in reference to potential host countries, but to international organisations such as NATO or the UN (there is also mention of the OSCE and the Council of Europe). Perhaps due to the more technical or practical nature of this document, the prevalence and focus on effectiveness as a means of justifying the validity of the EU’s actorness claims in crisis management is greater than in previous discourses. This ‘utilitarian’ view on normative justification based on a logic of consequences reflects the ‘output’ legitimacy debate concerning EUFP, whereby “policy-makers seek legitimisation by achieving an output that could be seen as an efficient solution to given interests and preferences” (Sjursen and Smith, 2004: 127).

Other aspects of the EU’s actorness in this area identified in the document include the need for further convergence and coherence (ibid.: 8), as well as reiterating the importance of the Member States’ position (either in the Council or the European Council, or as Member States *tout court*) within the development of this policy. This focus reflects the scholarly debate concerning EU actorness conceptualisations, namely the importance of domestic criteria such as cohesion and the analytical difficulties of the EU’s autonomy and authority in this policy field (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998).

In the summer of 2004 the EU launched another ESDP mission – EUJUST Themis –, a Rule of Law mission in Georgia. The mission, which was the first of its kind launched under this policy and lasted one year. The mission’s tasks were to

(...) assist in the development of a horizontal governmental strategy guiding the reform process for all relevant stakeholders within the criminal justice sector, including the establishment of a mechanism for coordination and priority setting for the criminal justice reform (Council, 2004e: 22).

The political changes that occurred in Georgia (an ENP partner country with territorial disputes with Russia) in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution in late 2003, led to a government amenable to a greater integration with Europe and the West, which contributed towards the Russian military intervention therein five years later in an effort to ensure that Georgia would remain under its sphere of influence (Kirova, 2012; Shafee, 2010). EUJUST Themis was a very small-scale mission (with little over 10 EU experts deployed), and, according to its mandate (Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP) it was meant to “(...) *help Georgia in its further progress* and is committed in particular to continue to assist the new government in its efforts to *bring local standards with regard to rule of law closer to international and EU standards*” (Council, 2004e: 21).

Even though a number of EU instruments were already in place or being planned for Georgia in the area of rule of law, the EU deemed this country’s situation appropriate for the launch of a crisis management mission, as both a testing ground and an opportunity for geographical expansion of the ESDP, in addition to elevating the political profile of an EU involvement without directly antagonising Russia. The EU’s HR for CFSP stated that the mission “shows the importance of a *healthy* Rule of Law system. It is key to ensuring *stability* and also *growth*” (Solana, 2004: 1). The EU’s justification for launching a crisis management mission appears to be linked again with its ‘civilising mission’ and with the conceptual imprecision of ‘crisis’, as well as with the idea of searching for potential future crises, in a logic closer to crisis *prevention* by means of export of EU norms and standards:

The security situation in Georgia is stable but may deteriorate with potentially serious repercussions on regional and international security and the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law. *A commitment of EU political effort and resources will help to embed stability in the region* (Council, 2004e: 21).



However, even within the EUFP machinery this mission was considered ‘overstretching’ the idea of civilian ESDP (Kurowska, 2008: 100). The mission provided an opportunity for the EU to be a crisis management actor without an actual crisis even taking place, again following the principle that the EU is a ‘guarantor’ of stability. Yet, the EUJUST Themis mission was not a complete success as an ESDP mission, and the lack of interest on behalf of local authorities reflects this (Bouris and Dobrescu, 2017).

At the end of 2004, the much anticipated EUFOR Althea – an EU military operation in BiH – was launched. ESDP’s longest running military operation (still ongoing at the time of this study) stems from UNSC resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008), and 2183 (2014), and is essentially a takeover from NATO’s SFOR (Stabilisation Force) operation in BiH. Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP states that Althea “(...) should provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in (...) the GFAP [General Framework Agreement for Peace] in BiH and contribute to the *safe and secure environment*,” while emphasising its inclusion in “the EU’s comprehensive approach towards BiH, and support BiH’s progress towards EU integration” (Council, 2004: 10). Here, we see evidence of the ESDP as being a less isolated policy than commonly depicted (due to its strictly intergovernmental character) and evidence of an idea of a comprehensive approach to external crises being implemented nearly a decade before its formal conceptualisation (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013).

Throughout time, a subtle syntagmatic shift is observed in the EU’s depiction of EUFOR Althea’s core mission: while the aforementioned Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP places the EU’s contribution to a *safe and secure environment* in BiH after the fulfilment of tasks related to the implementation of the GFAP, as do the early factsheets about the operation (EU Council Secretariat, 2004), subsequent factsheets released by the Council Secretariat about the mission present these ideas in reverse order. In versions 16, 17, and 20 of ESDP factsheets for EUFOR Althea, the text reads that

The main objectives of Operation [EUFOR] ALTHEA are: *First and foremost, to maintain a safe and secure environment in BiH* and to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton/Paris agreement (...); Also, to support the international community’s High Representative/EU Special Representative for BiH, Valentin Inzko, and the local authorities (EU Council Secretariat, 2009a; 2009b; 2010).

In the subsequent version 27, the text changes in line with the evolution of the operation's mandate: "the main objectives of Operation EUFOR ALTHEA are: *to support BiH efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment in BiH*; and to provide capacity-building and training support to the BiH Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces" (EU Council Secretariat, 2012). The expression 'first and foremost' is dropped, suggesting a greater balance, priority-wise, to both objectives, even though the more ambiguous / vague, yet more politically charged 'maintenance of a safe and secure environment' is still at the top. Another subtle change is in the actor doing the maintenance of the safe and secure environment. While the mandate reads that the goal of the EU is one of 'contributing' towards that, the 2009/10 factsheets state that the EU is the one doing the 'maintaining'. The 2012 factsheet, on the other hand, speaks of the EU's role as a 'supporting' one. The January 2015 version of the factsheet evolves further, placing specific tasks ahead of more general / vague goals, and including the idea of a comprehensive approach therein, suggesting a shift in the EU's priorities towards the country, more directed at the latter's accession to the EU:

The main objectives of Operation ALTHEA are: To provide capacity-building and training to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina; To support BiH efforts to maintain *the* safe and secure environment in BiH; To provide support to the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH (EU Council Secretariat, 2015).

These discursive shifts reflect the operation's mutability and adaptability, which stem from its sheer dimension and the evolution of the surrounding security environment (Knauer, 2011). Overall, it has largely been considered a successful example (ibid.).

On October 29, 2004, the Constitutional Treaty was signed in Rome. This highly politicised and somewhat controversial treaty was meant to represent a new stage in the development of the EU, as it would have imbued it with an augmented political-constitutional dimension, rendering the EU one step closer to a federation. Yet, two referenda in France and the Netherlands during 2005 impeded the treaty's ratification and with them, the project of a Constitutional Treaty as such fell (Dinan, 2008). In matters of EU identity and representation (discursive and otherwise), the treaty would have made a difference, for example with the symbolic and legal 'constitution' dimension and with the replacement of the HR with a Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Lisbon Reform Treaty, signed in 2007 and ratified in 2009, ended up

salvaging much of the Constitutional Treaty's proposed changes and innovations (minus the contentious symbolic elements) (Kreidman, 2009: 70).

On November 30, 2004, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso addressed the 7th European Community Studies Association World Conference with a speech entitled "The European Union and the Emerging World Order: Perceptions and Strategies." Barroso begins by stating that "crises in different parts of the world, including right at our doorstep, remind us of the importance of creating a robust European foreign policy" (Barroso, 2004). While identifying multiple security challenges that the world faces (including failed states, terrorism, or radicalisation) he points out that "the distinction between what is 'internal' and what is 'external' is becoming less relevant by the day," which means that "*Europe* cannot be passive or – even worse – complacent. We must not rest on the laurels of our *great accomplishments* over the last fifty years. Europe cannot be an *island of peace* in a sea of instability. We have to take *our responsibility* in an interdependent world" (ibid.). In addition to using the expression Europe as a symbolic metonym for the EU (Kuus, 2011), Barroso argues that the EU is a project of 'great accomplishments' that has an inherent 'responsibility' to ensure peace at a global scale. In fact, during his brief speech, Barroso claims three times that the EU 'is (undoubtedly) a global player,' and three times that it has a 'responsibility' to do so.

The uniqueness – the 'specific nature' – of the EU's actorness is emphasised, and its value-added is highlighted when Barroso bring attention to the "*wide range* of foreign policy instruments which are *particularly suited* to respond to the challenges" (Barroso, 2004). The Commission President addresses the EU as 'the champion of multilateralism,' claiming, in line with remarks made by two of his predecessors, that "if the EU wants to be an active, *equal partner of the U.S.*, we need to further strengthen our European foreign policy" (ibid.). When specifically addressing crisis management, Barroso is somewhat vague, arguing that "[the EU's emphasis on human security] will also necessitate greater EU activities in the field of *civilian* crisis management, for which we will draw on our various instruments and render them even more operational" (ibid.). He adds that "we are in the process of strengthening our European Security and Defence Policy. Security-related challenges remain relevant in the new world order. Therefore, our foreign policy needs the backing of military instruments. Crisis management tasks stand at the core of this policy," reiterating that "*Europe* is already *well-equipped* to face its new tasks. There are not many international actors who possess this *breadth and depth of instruments*" (ibid.). As in other instances, the Commission President reinforces the EU's uniqueness and value-added as a crisis management actor, which would become a recurrent discursive pattern embedded in a normative justification narrative surrounding the

EU's security role in complementarity to NATO. Unlike his predecessors, however, Barroso puts a lot more emphasis on the civilian dimension of EU actorness tout court and as a crisis management, as he finishes the speech by arguing that "it is my goal to strengthen the *European Union as a civilian power*. We want to project peace, democracy and market economic principles abroad" (ibid.).

In this section we have explored the EU's discourses related to the early development of the ESDP that contain normative justification elements. The launch of the ESS and of the first ESDP missions changed the EU's crisis management actorness not only discursively, but also in practice. The narrative of the EU as a security actor with its own interests and a strategic dimension, albeit rooted in the principle of multilateralism, characterise the EU's discourse during this period and reflect a greater autonomy (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998) and presence (Allen and Smith, 1990; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) in matters of crisis management. The following section illustrates the discursive evolution of the EU's ambitions and normative justifications as a crisis management actor in a period of reflection over the future of the EU, on the road towards the Lisbon Treaty.

### **4.3 - Crisis management goals and actions on the path to the Lisbon Treaty**

The present section analyses and contextualises discourses produced or divulged during the first years of practical implementation of the ESDP and of the ESS, from 2005 until the end of 2008, that contain normative justification elements for the EU's crisis management actorness just before the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in the subsequent year. During this period, a series of missions and operations were launched all over the world, and the EU was able to test and adjust both the discourse and functioning of its crisis management undertakings. This section explores the period following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, which led to a rethinking of the EU's ambitions as an actor (including in the area of security and crisis management) and to their reformulation with a strong focus on external action as is demonstrated by the Lisbon Treaty's corresponding stipulations (Barroso, 2007; Brandão, 2010; Özoğuz-Bolgi, 2013; Ilik and Adamczyk, 2017).

On January 24, 2005, Javier Solana gave a speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation entitled 'Shaping an effective EU Foreign Policy'. The speech begins by stating that there is a "need [for] a stronger and more capable Europe" as "EU foreign policy remains a work in progress" (Solana, 2005: 17). Imbued with high expectations for the Constitutional Treaty, Solana projected that 2005 was likely to be "a crucial year for the political development of the

EU, for our ability to speak with one voice, for the improvement of our crisis management capabilities, and most of all for our effectiveness in promoting security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond” (ibid.). While describing the EU’s global role and ambition, Solana cites and corroborates then German President Horst Köhler in stating that “the EU has a *responsibility* to work for the ‘*global common good*’” (ibid.), reinforcing the prevailing EUFP and security actorhood narrative. Solana identifies a new security environment as a challenge for the EU. This environment is characterised by a change “from a state-based security paradigm to one where, increasingly, non-state actors present the greatest threats to our security and where solutions mostly transcend the power of the state” (ibid.), and where human security becomes paramount.

Solana describes EUFP as being “in essence about managing change, about *safeguarding our people*, about *promoting our values and interests*” and adds that “Europe can and *must* play a *bigger* role” (ibid.: 18). There are several relevant aspects about these statements, from the core normative justifications of foreign policy (and consequently crisis management), namely the EU’s security, its interests, and the promotion of European values, to the assumption that the EU already *plays a big role* and that it *needs* to increase its efforts: “indeed *we are a global actor* (...) with the comprehensive array of instruments – economic, legal, diplomatic, military – at our disposal” (ibid.). The EU’s foreign policy is deemed ‘promising’ “because the EU is an *amazing economic and political success story*” and that “from the outside it looks like a loose ‘European model’ exists, both as a way of organising our societies and in approaching international affairs” (ibid.). Through these affirmations, Solana implies that the EU’s success has turned it into an example that must be reproduced throughout the world in different foreign policy endeavours, even though he acknowledges that “there can be no simple export of a whatever we think the European model is, but the EU is seen as a *source of inspiration*”, as “imitation and adaptation are easier than invention” (ibid.). The HR lists the EU’s efforts made in the context of the implementation of the ESS, namely in the fields of non-proliferation of WMDs and the fight against terrorism, while bringing attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a threat for the EU, the region, and the world. Solana argues that “there was a time when the EU’s foreign policy was criticised for being *all talk and no action*” (ibid.: 20) but states that the practical implementation, as well as the capability and institutional development of the ESDP changed this paradigm.

In April 2005 the EP released a resolution on the European Security Strategy. In the document, the EP proposes a more ‘comprehensive understanding’ of the concept of security to involve political democratic issues as well as social, economic and environmental issues,

since all of these contribute to conflict proliferation as well as “the failure of states and the emergence of criminal and terrorist networks” (EP, 2005: 3). In reference to the ESS, the EP agrees with the necessity of combining “the various assistance programmes and instruments, including those of development policy (...) in conjunction with diplomatic, civilian and military capabilities and expertise” (ibid.), i.e. the adoption of a ‘comprehensive’ approach towards crisis situations (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). The practical implementation of the ESS would, according to the EP, “enable the Union to detect crises sufficiently far in advance to act in a pro-active manner” (EP, 2005: 3). This reflects the prevailing idea that the EU assumes that it is its prerogative to dictate what falls into the category of ‘crisis’, as well as to determine the means it is willing to deploy and the terms under which EU-led crisis management is to take place. When referring to the newly created ENP and the ESS, the EP “stresses that democracy and the rule of law are the most important preconditions for the peaceful coexistence of peoples” (ibid.:4).

Also in April 2005, the EU launched EUPOL Kinshasa, “the first civilian mission of crisis management in Africa” (EEAS, 2006: 1). This mission was followed by EUPOL RD Congo – another police mission in the DRC. The first mission ran from April 2005 to June 2007, and the subsequent one from June 2007 until the end of 2014. We put these missions together in our chronological analysis of the evolution of the EU’s discourses because these missions are not necessarily separate, but rather an adaptation and continuation of the same basic objectives that evolved following the DRC’s requests and the EU’s commitment in this context. At the time, the EU was already involved in crisis management in the DRC and had “already taken concrete steps to contribute to the re-establishment of security within the DRC” (Council, 2004h: 30), namely through the 2003 Operation Artemis. According to Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004 on the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa regarding the Integrated Police Unit (IPU), the initial goal of the mission was, at the behest of DRC authorities, to follow up the Commission’s efforts (through the European Development Fund) in setting up the IPU – according to EU standards – in order to “contribute to ensuring the protection of the state institutions and reinforce the internal security apparatus” in DRC (ibid.). The document identifies the EU’s ambitions for the country, where several civilian missions and military operations were launched under the ESDP:

The current security situation in the DRC may deteriorate with potentially serious repercussions on the process of strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and international

and regional security. *A continued commitment of EU political effort and resources will help to embed stability in the region* (ibid.).

This assertion reaffirms the EU's commitment to stabilisation as well as its self-identification as guarantor for stability – an increasingly common concept used in the context of the E/CSDP, particularly with regard to the Southern Mediterranean region (Roccu and Voltolini, 2018). As mentioned previously, the use of this concept is not innocuous, as stabilising something requires making it unlikely to change and, perhaps more importantly, unlikely to disturb. But more than that, stability is achieved “when the formal roles and structures set by authority match those constructed by informal social interaction” (Margolis, 2010: 332). To do so, action is required on behalf of the stabiliser (i.e. the EU), who provides benchmarks and standards, thus projecting a ‘civilising’ identity (Mitzen, 2006).

On the other hand, the increasing use of this expression, especially after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty is accompanied with a retraction in the EU's normative attitude in crisis management, which carries a change in attitude altogether (this change will be discussed further ahead in this project). Nonetheless, at this point it is important to indicate that the idea of the EU as a ‘stabiliser / force for stabilisation’ has been present in its crisis management discourses since the beginning of the ESDP.

The EUPOL Kinshasa mission statement in the Council document declares that the goal of the mission is to “monitor, mentor, and advise the setting up (...) of the IPU” (ibid.: 31). These vague and ambiguous expressions appear with frequency in EU documents relating to mission goals and mission statements. Oftentimes these expressions’ vagueness and ambiguity serve a practical purpose of leaving room for interpretation and implementation, without compromising the EU. Notwithstanding, all these expressions – ‘monitor’, ‘mentor’, and ‘advise’ – presuppose a superior hierarchical positioning of the EU with regard to its interlocutor, as they entail that not only is the EU going to counsel local actors, but also guide them according to its own standards and subsequently supervise the application of those guidelines. In an October 2006 press document concerning the mission, there is a statement justifying the latter's extension for an additional year where the EU refers to the DRC's situation in a particular way that reflects the EU's take on its liberal democratic reference framework as natural and expected:

On 22 November 2005, taking into account *the continuation of the Transition in the DRC* until 30 June 2006, and following a request by President Kabila dated 6 October 2006, the

Council of the European Union decided to extend the EUPOL-Kinshasa Mission for an additional year, until 31 December 2006 (EEAS, 2006: 1).

In what appears to be a merely informative paragraph, the word ‘transition’ (with a capital ‘T’) is used without references to democracy (or any other kind of transition) and we can only infer what it is being used in reference to either by knowing the country’s specific situation at the time<sup>29</sup> or the fact that the EU (an actor that deliberately projects its own liberal democratic values and assumes the latter’s universality) is the collective author of the document. Otherwise, nothing in this document explains what ‘transition’ is being referred to, with the exception of a sentence that reads that “maintenance of order in Kinshasa has been recognised by the UN as a key element for the success of the *electoral process*” (ibid.: 4). The rest of the document relates to more practical considerations concerning the implementation of the mission.

In July 2005, two months after the launch of EUSEC RD Congo, the EU launched its first integrated rule of law mission – EUJUSTLEX Iraq – an especially contentious mission that was launched only two years following the 2003 Iraq war and lasted until 2013. This mission was idealised by the EU, following the deployment of a ‘Joint Fact-Finding Mission’, and only then was it followed by a formal request on behalf of local authorities (Council of the EU, 2005d: 37). The mission was meant to strengthen the rule of law “with a full array of necessary expertise and assistance ranging from police to justice, penitentiary, human rights and gender” (EEAS, 2014a: 1) by providing “training for high and mid-level officials in senior management and criminal investigation” (Council, 2005d: 38). This was a contentious mission for several reasons, namely the disagreements between EU Member States regarding the EU’s role in Iraq in the aftermath of the war in general, and the fact that training could not take place in the country, not to mention the difficulties derived from local administrative fragmentation and corruption, as well as difficulties in evaluating the mission’s progress (Christova, 2013).

---

<sup>29</sup> ‘Transition’, in the context of the DRC refers to the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DR Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue - Political negotiations on the peace process and on transition in the DRC, signed in 17 December 2002. Title II of the Agreement lists the transition objectives: 1. the reunification and reconstruction of the country, the re-establishment of peace and the restoration of territorial integrity and State authority in the whole of the national territory; 2. national reconciliation; 3. the creation of a restructured, integrated national army; 4. the organisation of free and transparent elections at all levels allowing a constitutional and democratic government to be put in place; 5. the setting up of structures that will lead to a new political order. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/global-and-inclusive-agreement-transition-dr-congo-inter-congolese>



According to Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005, the motivations provided for the launch of the mission were linked to the CFSP's objectives as listed in the Nice Treaty (namely the safeguard of EU values, interests, and security, as well as international security and cooperation, and the development of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights):

EUJUST LEX will implement its mandate in the context of a situation posing a *threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals*, and to the *stability* of Iraq and *which could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy* as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty (Council, 2005d: 37).

Unlike the recurring tendency verified in previous documents, and perhaps due to the high political profile of this mission (given that some EU countries had been directly involved in conflict therein), the Council Joint Action refers to the host country (or rather the latter's authorities) as a 'partner':

The success of the mission will depend on an effective strategic and technical partnership with the Iraqis throughout the operation (...). The EU will use its dialogue with Iraq and its neighbours to encourage continuous regional engagement and support for improved security and for the political and reconstruction process in Iraq (...) (ibid.).

After 9 years, the mission had become 'the largest and most performing international rule of law partner to Iraq' amounting to over 7.000 mid and high-level Iraqi officials trained, leading the path for subsequent development-oriented EU programmes in the areas of democracy, good governance, rule of law and human rights (EEAS, 2014a).

Between 15 September 2005 and 15 December 2006, following Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 September 2005, the EU was swiftly engaged in a Monitoring Mission in Aceh, Indonesia, under the aegis of the ESDP, as part of a successful international effort to implement the Memorandum of Understanding between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Schulze, 2007). A few months after the launch of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, an informal meeting at Hampton Court gave way for the EU HSG to agree to the further strengthening of the EU's crisis management institutional structure. Two years later, in 2007, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was established, following the approval, by the Council, of the Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management.

In November 2005, the EU launched two ESDP missions in the Palestinian territories – EUPOL COPPS (the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories) and EUBAM Rafah (the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Border Crossing Point). According to Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005, EUPOL COPPS was meant to:

(...) contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with *best international standards*, in cooperation with the Community's institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector including Criminal Justice Reform (Council, 2005e: 66).

This Council Joint Action is somewhat different from other similar documents, as it does not refer to EU standards, but to 'international' standards. The reason behind this change has to do with the EU being part of a 'Quartet' that is meant to assist and facilitate the implementation of a Roadmap for the establishment of a Palestinian State. The EUPOL COPPS police and rule of law mission was, similarly to other ESDP missions, idealised by the EU (reaffirmed during several instances in 2004 and 2005), followed by the formal establishment of an EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support by an 'Exchange of Letters' between the Palestinian Prime Minister the EU Special Representative to the Middle-East Peace Process. Unlike previous documents, in addition to not using EU standards as a reference, this Council Joint Action uses inverted commas when referring to 'security', 'institution-building', and 'safety and security', possibly suggesting the volatile nature of this context, or eventually a more careful normative commitment in comparison with other missions:

The follow-on to the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support is an expression of the EU continued readiness to support the Palestinian Authority (...), in particular with regard to 'security' and 'institution-building' (...). Furthermore, the support of the EU to the Palestinian Civil Police aims at increasing the 'safety and security' of the Palestinian population (...) (ibid.: 65).

EUPOL COPPS is considered a success, despite the many operational obstacles it faced in light of a volatile political and security environment (Bouris, 2012: 261). Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005 established the EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), which was meant to

(...) provide a Third-Party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point in order to contribute, in cooperation with the Community's institution-building efforts, to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point and to build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Council, 2005f: 29).

Unlike the EUPOL COPPS, the Council Joint Action establishing EUBAM Rafah does not use inverted commas when referring to the concepts of security, threat, or safety. In this document, we also notice a greater emphasis on the EU's actorness in expressions such as "*the EU has identified as a priority the building up of a Palestinian customs administration in EC-Palestinian cooperation*", or "*the Community has provided assistance to the Palestinian border management*" (ibid.: 28). This actorness focus is likely related to the fact that the EU was invited by the Israeli and Palestinian authorities as a third-party monitor at the Rafah crossing point between Gaza and Egypt, and "was also satisfied as for the first time it was given not the typical role of being a payer but the one on being an on-the-ground player" (Bouris, 2012: 262; Mueller, 2013). However, the mission functioned irregularly and was suspended in June 2007, following Hamas' take over the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Authority's Presidential Guard's subsequent departure from the crossing point, as well as "security concerns and the EU's policy of not engaging with Hamas which it has designated a terrorist organisation" (Bulut, 2009: 303).

Following the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands that rejected a Constitutional Treaty for the EU, a period of reflection about the EU's future ensued (Hooghe and Marks, 2006). In early June 2006, the European Commission proposed a Communication to the European Council entitled 'Europe in the World: Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility' with the purpose of making "pragmatic proposals to enable the Union to define a strong sense of collective purpose in our external action and to ensure that this is backed by the necessary policy instruments" (Commission, 2006: 2). The Commission starts by pointing out that "Europe faces strong economic competition and new threats to its security" and that "Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime remain as pressing as ever" and also that "Europe has the *potential to rise to these challenges* and to share in the new opportunities created by emerging markets and globalisation" (ibid.). In addition to the ample use of the expression 'Europe' as a metonym for 'the EU' (Kuus, 2011), here we notice an apparent retraction from the EU 'responsibility' narrative in favour of a more modest characterisation of

the EU's role in face of the identified challenges. Yet, the Commission brings attention to the ultimate goals of EU external action (including crisis management), i.e. to “protect and promote our interests and our values” (ibid.).

By identifying the purpose of the document as ensuring that the Member States and the EU institutions work together to address certain key issues, the Commission acknowledges the EU's discursive nature, as it is the representatives of these entities that discursively constitute, and act on behalf of, the EU and without whom the EU simply would not exist. As such, the communication document includes a series of proposals for improvement of coordination between both the Member States and the EU institutions, focusing in particular on the Commission's role. In stating that “European citizens expect the Union to use *its substantial international influence* to protect and promote their interests and there is an *expectation* among our international partners for Europe to assume *its global responsibilities*” (ibid.: 3), the Commission returns to the normative ‘attitude’ that places the EU in a superior hierarchical positioning, anchored in the prevailing ‘responsibility’ narrative that has marked EU discourses in matters of foreign and security policy (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). Crisis management related activities are identified as one of the EU's main external action instruments and characterised as ‘very visible elements’ thereof.

On June 12, 2006, the Council produced a Presidency Report on ESDP, calling attention to the continued expansion of the EU's crisis management civilian and military operational activity, reaching three continents. The increase in the EU's CFSP budget is explained by “the *growing need* in the field of civilian crisis management combined with the *increase in the EU's ambition level*” (Council, 2006: 2). Both the abstract ‘need’ for EU engagement in crisis management and the EU's ambitions are presented as normative justifications for the development of its actorness. The report continues, in a very descriptive and technical tone, with an account of the status of the ongoing and planned ESDP missions as well as the development of EU civilian and military capabilities, without delving much into normative considerations. Although this report does not offer much on normative justification for EU engagement in crisis management, it is useful in that it provides an understanding of the environment of determination and ambition through a detailed description of the state of affairs in matters of policy development and implementation, thus helping to contextualise other discourses that are more relevant for our study.

On June 15 and 16, 2006 a European Council meeting took place in Brussels, and the Austrian Presidency Conclusions that came out of this meeting reveal the environment of

reflection about the EU's future. Despite the uncertainty of future treaty changes, "improving the Union's responsiveness to emergencies, crises and disasters inside and outside the Union remains a political imperative" (European Council, 2006: 5), including through the development of EU capabilities. One of the subheadings in the document concerning the promotion of 'the European way of life in a globalised world' reflects the persistence of the EU's normative 'civilising' attitude in the aftermath of the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. The means of promotion include sustainable development "based on democracy, gender equality, solidarity, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights" (ibid.: 7), fighting climate change, re-launching the Lisbon Strategy, developing an EU energy policy, as well as the active promotion of "the dialogue between cultures and civilizations" (ibid.: 11). The subsequent subheading in the document concerns 'improving the efficiency, coherence and visibility of the Union's external policies', reflecting one of the future Lisbon Treaty's staple slogans. This section revisits the Commission's communication and proposes measures for its implementation. Despite the uncertainty concerning the EU's future and treaty change, the EU's normative 'attitude' appears resolute, as the European Council calls for the adoption in the subsequent year a political declaration by EU HSGs "setting out Europe's *values* and *ambitions* and confirming their shared commitment to *deliver* them" (ibid.: 17), in the context of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Rome Treaties. Following this logic, the then recently created ENP is described as "a means to strengthen cooperation with [the EU's] neighbours and *expand prosperity, stability and security* beyond the borders of the European Union" (ibid.: 22).

In July 2006, the EU launched yet another ESDP operation in DRC, following UNSC resolution 1671 and Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27 April 2006 on the EU military operation in support of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) during the election process, in the context of the EU's professed commitment to supporting the 'transition' process in the DRC – described by Moshonas as a "triple transition towards peace, liberalisation and democratisation" (2013: 132). The operation was quite limited in time, in comparison with other ESDP missions and operations, lasting only four months (from 30 July 2006 to 30 November 2006).

In November 2006 the EP put forward a resolution on the implementation of the ESS in the context of the ESDP. In this resolution, the EP assumes that the fight against terrorism requires "a whole range of non-military measures (...) and that the building of democratic institutions, infrastructure and civil society in failed or failing states *is required*" adding that "one of the greatest contributions of the EU to preventing international terrorism is its capacity to be effective in the *building or rebuilding of democratic institutions, social and economic*

*infrastructure, good governance and civil society*” (EP, 2006: 335). In addition to these considerations about the EU’s role in the fight against international terrorism, the EP identifies the normative justifications for the development of the CFSP as the protection of EU citizens from the threats identified in the ESS, the defence of the ‘justified interests of the EU’, as well as the promotion of the UN Charter objectives, by means of the EU “acting as a *global responsible actor* for worldwide peace and democracy” (ibid.). The EP adds that the EU, through the ESDP, ‘must fulfil’ its ‘*legitimate tasks*’ with the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as a ‘primary consideration’. As in all previous EP discourses concerning EUFP and crisis management, the EP urges the increase in parliamentary scrutiny for the CFSP and ESDP and brings attention to the importance of NATO for ensuring European territorial defence. Concerning the development and implementation of the ESDP, the EP “*demands* that the EU – in order to develop its *credibility as a global actor* – concentrate its capabilities on its geographical neighbourhood, particularly the Balkans” even though it also “envisages at the same time the development of further capabilities to enable the EU to make an active contribution to conflict resolution in other parts of the world as well” (ibid.: 336).

On January 29, 2007, EU HR Javier Solana addressed an ESDP Conference at the EU Institute for Security Studies with a speech entitled ‘From Cologne to Berlin and Beyond – Operations, Institutions and Capabilities’. Solana began the speech by pointing out the global reach and scope of the ESDP missions and operations launched by the EU and their ‘significant impact’, and by arguing that through this policy “the EU is providing the ‘key enablers’ for peace and stability” (Solana, 2007: 21). According to the HR, the demand for EU action in matters of crisis management is increasing – which is seen as constituting a *responsibility* – and the sources of such demands are identified as being the EU Member States, the ‘countries in crisis’, and the UN. The reason why the EU is in demand, as Solana explains, has to do with its ‘trademark’ in crisis management missions and operations, characterised by “a joined-up agile, tailor-made and rapid response, each drawing on a mixture of civilian, military, economic, political and institution-building tools” (ibid.: 22). Solana’s optimistic view of the ESDP is visible throughout his speech:

(...) where we have acted we have succeeded. We have helped governments take forward their peace processes and we have helped to make those processes more sustainable by strengthening their institutions. Most of all, although much remains to be done, of course, in all of these places, we have improved the lives of people and given them hope (ibid.).

According to the HR, the ESDP has rendered the EU's external action more credible, while strengthening the EU's dialogue with third countries. In addition, Solana argues that the ESDP "makes multilateralism effective, and it helps *shape the thinking of others*" (ibid.: 23). The development of capabilities, on the other hand, is justified by the need for the EU to "be able to act in response to a range of likely threats to our interests and values" (ibid.: 24), as identified in the ESS.

In March 2007, the European Council Presidency represented by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, together with the Presidents of the EP and of the Commission, Hans-Gert Pottering and José Manuel Barroso respectively, signed the Berlin Declaration commemorating the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Rome Treaties. Albeit short, the declaration comes at a time of uncertainty concerning the future of the EU in both its domestic and external dimensions. In this sense, the authors pointed out that the EU was facing 'major challenges' that go beyond its borders, and that "the European Union is our response to these challenges" through a "European model that combines economic success and social responsibility" (Merkel, Pottering, and Barroso, 2007: 69). As such, the authors argue that they (*qua* the EU) "can thus shape the increasing interdependence of the global economy and ever-growing competition on international markets *according to our values*" adding that the EU "(we) will fight terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration together. We stand up for liberties and civil rights also in the struggle against those who oppose them" (ibid.: 69-70).

In matters of crisis management, the authors stated that

We are committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the world and to ensuring that people do not become victims of war, terrorism and violence. The European Union *wants* to promote freedom and development in the world. We want to drive back poverty, hunger and disease. *We want to continue to take a leading role in that fight* (ibid.: 70).

The declaration finishes on a hopeful note for a new treaty revision and with the authors stating that the EU "will continue to promote democracy, stability and prosperity beyond its borders" (ibid.).

In June 2007 the EU launched EUPOL Afghanistan – the EU Police Mission in war torn Afghanistan – following Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP. The purpose of the mission, which ended on 31 December 2016, after running for 9 years, was described in the following paragraph:

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN *shall significantly* contribute to the establishment *under Afghan ownership* of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, which *will* ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system, *in keeping with the policy advice and institution building work of the Community, Member States and other international actors*. Further the Mission will support the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police service, which works *in accordance with international standards*, within the framework of the rule of law and respects human rights (Council, 2007b: 34).

There are several relevant features about this paragraph concerning the EU's portrayal and justification of its crisis management actorness. The first one is that the verb 'shall' is paired up with the adverb 'significantly', which indicates a reinforced sense of certainty, reflecting the EU's confidence in its abilities to carry out a successful mission, in contrast with the caution verified in documents concerning the previous launch of a police mission within the ESDP (EUPOL COPPS). However, unlike the prevailing tendency in previous documents, one of the mission's objectives is to ensure local ownership. This apparent indication of some kind of local autonomy or control is mitigated soon after with a reminder that the local actors are hierarchically placed under the 'policy advice and institution building work' of the Community, its Member States, as well as 'other international actors'. Yet, the EU maintains the reference to 'international standards' as opposed to the prevailing tendency of referring to 'EU standards.' The Council Joint Action states that the mission "shall carry out its tasks through, amongst other means, monitoring, mentoring, advising and training" (ibid.: 35). These vague and ambiguous concepts – in particular monitoring, mentoring, and advising – are a recurrent feature of the Council Joint Actions and other policy relevant documents setting up ESDP missions, yet they are never clearly defined, possibly to allow room for interpretation. Similarly to other EU missions, EUPOL Afghanistan was idealised by the EU, after sending several exploratory missions to assess what the EU's role could be in rebuilding Afghanistan, and only after an EU proposal was there a formal invitation on behalf of the Afghan government. This logic reflects not only opposing strategic views within the Transatlantic community – namely a EU's long-term civilian-oriented strategy vs. a US / NATO short-term militarized approach (Larivé, 2012), but also the EU's active search for *opportunities* (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) to contribute towards international (and European) security as a crisis management actor.

Also in June 2007, the EU launched EUPOL RD Congo. This mission was, as mentioned previously, an evolution of EUPOL Kinshasa. The mission was launched following Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP on the EU police mission undertaken in the framework of reform



of the security sector (SSR) and its interface with the system of justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo). Even though this remains a police mission, the very title of the Council Joint Action that triggered its launch already points out important aspects concerning the evolution of the EU's ambitions in DRC and "the fragile internal security situation after the national elections" (ibid.): "EUPOL RD Congo shall be a mission without executive powers. It shall accomplish its tasks through, *inter alia*, mentoring, monitoring and advisory duties" (Council, 2007a: 48). Yet, the mission statement remains vague, as in the case of previous cases, with emphasis on the recurrent ambiguous concepts of mentoring, monitoring, and advising.

As it is aware of the benefits to be gained from adopting a comprehensive approach combining the different initiatives underway, the EU indicated in the conclusions adopted by the Council on 15 September 2006 that it was *prepared to assume a coordinating role in international efforts in the security sector*, in close cooperation with the United Nations, to support the Congolese authorities in this field (ibid.: 46).

Despite all ESDP missions launched in the DRC having been launched after formal requests on behalf of local authorities, the fact is that Congolese ownership was low and more often than not implementation of recommendations and of other important aspects of the missions was systematically postponed by local authorities, motivated by the fact that these reforms stem from donors rather than local authorities (Moshonas, 2013). Nonetheless, in this context,<sup>30</sup> one month after the launch of EUPOL Kinshasa, the EU launched another mission in DRC: the EU mission to provide advice and assistance to security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), which lasted until 2016. The EU's motivations to launch the mission have to do with perceived potential risks for internal and external security, but also the EU's (recurrent) identification as a guarantor for stability:

The current security situation in the DRC may deteriorate, with potentially serious repercussions for the process of strengthening democracy, the rule of law and international

---

<sup>30</sup> In addition to operation Artemis, police missions EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RD Congo, and security sector reform mission EUSEC RD Congo, the EU also launched EUFOR RD Congo, a military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) during the election process in 2006, following Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27 April 2006.

and regional security. A continued commitment of EU political effort and resources *will help* to embed *stability* in the region (Council, 2005c: 20).

The mission, in a 2012 EEAS factsheet, is described as having been launched “(...) to support the Congolese authorities in rebuilding an army that will guarantee security throughout the country;” yet, the EU assumes its normative ambitions by stating that – through a small-scale mission as EUSEC DR Congo – it is also meant to “create the conditions for making economic and social development possible again” (EEAS, 2012: 1).<sup>31</sup> In the same documents, there appears to be a hierarchy concerning the portrayal of the EU’s interlocutors: “*working closely with the other contributing members of the international community*, EUSEC RD Congo provides practical support for security sector reform in the DRC by *giving advice and assistance directly to the Congolese authorities*” (ibid.). While the document does not identify which actors are the EU’s ‘partners,’ there is a sense of parity *vis-à-vis* the ‘*other* members of the international community’ (alongside the EU), and an apparent lower positioning of the Congolese authorities, who are portrayed as requiring assistance to be able to carry out their SSR.

In November 2007, a new headline goal document – the ‘Civilian Headline Goal 2010’ (CHG2010) – was drafted, approved by the ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference, and noted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council. This document came to replace the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, which had been launched in the aftermath of the European Security Strategy, the launch of the first ESDP missions, and the launch of the HG2010 document. The CHG2010 is more politically charged than the military headline goal, which makes it more interesting for the purpose of our study.

The CHG2010 document begins by stating that civilian crisis management is an ‘important tool’ for the ESDP which contributes to the EU’s “support for international peace and security” (PSC, 2007: 1). This indicates not only the EU’s commitment to supporting peace efforts outside of its territorial sphere, but also its intention to continue using civilian means to do so (among other instruments). The document goes on to claim that “there has been a growing demand for Security Sector Reform” (ibid.), despite not identifying who should carry out such tasks or who demands that they should be carried out. Similarly to the HG2010, aspects related to the EU’s actorness identified in the document include effectiveness and coherence (ibid.: 2),

---

<sup>31</sup> In a similar factsheet from 2015, the latter statement remains, despite the mission being comprised of only 10 people.

highlighting the importance of the Member States for the development and implementation of this policy. Even though throughout the document the main actor appears to be the EU as such ('the EU is', 'the EU can', 'the EU strengthens', 'the EU should', etc.), there is frequent mention of the EU Ministers or Member States. Although the main decision-making institution in this area is the Council, which is made up of representatives of the Member States' governments, the latter appear to be depicted as separate entities from the EU. This reflects the complexities described by Jupille and Caporaso (1998) in the EU's autonomy and authority as a global actor. The Member States are represented as sources of capabilities and one of the principal 'targets' of the EU's official normative justification discourses in expressions such as: "this will inform the report to Ministers on civilian ESDP preparedness" (PSC, 2007: 7), while their representatives in the Council and in the European Council are simultaneously involved in the composition and dissemination of EU crisis management actorness discourses. The EU's relationship with other actors in this context also appears in the document:

The CHG 2010 should identify and exploit possible synergies with other actors in civilian crisis management, which include International Organisations, Regional Organisations and other major actors, e.g. non-EU States and civil society through Non-governmental Organisations and Civil Society Organisations, in line with agreed principles and in full respect of the EU's autonomous decision-making. (ibid.: 5).

In this paragraph (like in the rest of the document, as in previous documents), the CHG2010 does not mention the potential host countries directly nor does it mention the latter's requests. As is the case with previous documents, the text gives the utmost importance to the EU itself, followed by its 'international partners', namely IOs, regional organisations, 'and other major actors'. Again, like in our analysis of previous documents, what appears to be the second most important target for the EU's normative justification discourses for having a crisis management policy (after the Member States) are its 'international partners'. Although this expression is quite vague and ambiguous, from what we have observed in the EU's discourses is that it is more likely to refer to actors (like NATO, the UN, the USA, etc.) other than the potential host countries.

Also in November 2007, David Miliband, then British Foreign Secretary, addressed students at the College of Europe in Bruges, with a speech entitled 'Europe 2030: Model Power Not Superpower'. The important and interesting characteristic of this speech for our project, despite not focusing extensively on crisis management but rather at EUFP as a whole, concerns

its contribution to the EU actorness debate (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010) from the perspective of a Member State representative, and also the latter's understanding of the future of EUFP. In the speech, Miliband lists his understanding of the EU's threats at the time, identifying one of them as “*rogue states and failing states risk sparking conflicts, the damage of which will spill over into Europe*” (Miliband, 2007). While ‘failing’ states is a familiar designation in EU discourses, ‘rogue’ states not as much. Miliband describes these states as “[states] that defy and endanger the international community by breaking the common rules *we have all agreed to abide by*” (ibid.). As such, this expression is no less hierarchical nor disparaging than the former, as it entails a deviation or disobedience from the norm, as well as inferiority, particularly in the case of a statement about a purported threat to the EU, which, in turn, is characterised by Miliband as a ‘continent of values’ or a ‘triumph of shared values.’ In addition, Miliband argues that this and other threats “provide a new *raison d’être* for the European Union” (ibid.), while proposing that the EU be ‘a pioneer and a leader’ and, if not a superpower, then at least a ‘*model power of regional cooperation*’ that is “able to deploy soft and hard power to promote democracy and tackle conflict beyond its borders” (ibid.). Miliband speaks of a “great shared project for Europe and America, to embed our values and commitments in international rules and institutions” (ibid.), which is relevant to understanding the normative nature of EUFP and especially of the legitimation thereof (Diez and Manners, 2007). In a sentence, Miliband summarises his view of the EU's normative potential and ambitions: “a club that countries want to join, it can *persuade* countries to play by the rules, and *set global standards*. In the way it dispenses *its* responsibilities around the world, it can be a *role model* that others follow” (Miliband, 2007). The EU's challenges for 2030 are described as being predominantly outside of the EU's geographical scope:

A Europe at war not within its borders but *struggling to cope with forces beyond its borders*. Global capital, people and goods with whom it has not made peace. Religious extremism and division on its doorstep. Energy insecurity and climate change which threatens our security as well as our prosperity. *Conflict and instability in regions where we have economic as well as moral interests* (ibid.).

The last sentence is especially revealing of the existence of a European view of an ethical and moral dimension to its crisis management role that accompanies its economic interests (Aggestam, 2008). The idea that “while Europe can be a magnet for the world's best talent, it

cannot be a tent for the world's poorest people" (Miliband, 2007) also fuels its crisis management and accompanying value and norm promotion ambitions.

In matters of conflict prevention, Miliband argues that "a model power should champion international law and human rights not just internally, but externally too" (ibid.), classifying the EU as an 'extraordinary success' in domestically achieving these goals. Comparing the EU to NATO, Miliband argues that "its members have shared values which can generate the political and military commitment for decisive action", and comparing it with the UN, he adds that "its member states have the full spectrum of economic, development, legislative, political and military tools" (ibid.). The 'security-development nexus' comes up in Miliband's speech, when he states that "security without development will soon alienate local populations. Development without security is impossible. They are two sides of the same coin," adding that "we [the EU] must use our *power* and *influence*, not just to resolve conflict, but prevent it. We must show *we are prepared to take a lead* and fulfil *our responsibilities*" (ibid.). Miliband finishes his speech by emphasising the 'EU model' idea: "it is telling that those who are near us, want to join us. And that those who are far away, want to imitate us. The EU can claim *major successes*" (ibid.).<sup>32</sup>

On December 4, 2017, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso addressed the 4th Joint Parliamentary meeting on the Future of Europe with a speech entitled "The European Union after the Lisbon Treaty," where he emphasised the Treaty's importance for the EU's actorness on a global scale 'in diplomatic, security, defence, trade and development issues.' After speaking about the improvement of the EU's democratic credentials, Barroso moves on to a section concerning 'the Interest of an Enlarged European Union in a 'Global World',' where he reminds his audience of the 'great results' achieved by European construction, whereby "Europeans built legitimate ways to resolve their political, cultural and ideological differences in a peaceful way and to *promote* common values and economic and social prosperity," adding that "to preserve and to improve what we achieved during the last fifty years, *we need to influence and to shape the world around us*" (Barroso, 2007). Unlike

---

<sup>32</sup> Looking forward in time to the Brexit process, it is interesting to consider Miliband's words and the discursive changes that occurred domestically in the UK in this context; however, as our thesis does not focus on the Brexit, but rather on the EU's crisis management actorness (regardless of the former's importance for the EU *tout court*), we will refrain from making further considerations on this matter.

previous discourses, there is no mention (in this section of the speech) of an abstract ‘responsibility, but rather of a specific goal to preserve the European way of life.

The means to achieve this goal, according to the Commission President, include “working in close cooperation with our *main partners*, namely *the countries that share the common values of freedom and democracy*, we are in a position to decisively shape globalization” (ibid.). Here, we notice an instance of a prevailing discursive recurrence, whereby the EU’s ‘main partners’ are described as ‘the countries that share the common values of freedom and democracy.’ This reflects the scholarly debate surrounding the NPE concept, which advocates that the ability of the EU to achieve normative power is related to the shared belief in the validity and universality of the values and norms that it propagates (e.g. Pace, 2007; Diez and Manners, 2007; Manners, 2009b).

Barroso enumerates the challenges that the EU and its Member States are meant to tackle, arguing that “the task for the coming decades is how to use the power and the capacities we built during the last half century to promote our values and interests at the global level,” which the Commission President claims “helps the world to be a better place” (Barroso, 2007). In addition to other issues, Barroso claims that the Lisbon Treaty “will allow the *emergence of a true common European defence*,” adding that it “will reinforce the Union’s cohesion, coherence and effectiveness in external affairs. As such, it will improve the Union’s capacity to pursue one of its central tasks: to *shape globalization*” (ibid.).

On December 13, 2007, a Reform EU Treaty was signed in Lisbon, signalling a renewed confidence in the European project and with a strong focus on improving the EU’s external action, including many of the innovations that had been proposed in the failed Constitutional Treaty. In the subsequent subchapter we will explore the discursive contents of the new EU treaty in more detail, in the context of its entering into force in 2009.

During 2008, the EU launched three civilian missions and two military operations, including some of the ESDP’s most durable and renowned ones. In March 2008, the EU launched EUFOR Tchad/RCA – the EU military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic – following Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007. The mission, which lasted only for the period of one year, was meant to be a ‘military bridging operation’ in Chad and the Central African Republic following UNSC resolution 1778 (2007), which also established a UN Mission in the same region (MINURCAT), as a response to the crisis in Darfur “and the urgent need to address the destabilising impact of the crisis on the humanitarian and security situation in neighbouring countries” (Council, 2007c: 21). Both the UN mission and the EU operation were meant to improve the security of refugees and

internally displaced persons, and to allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and creation of ‘favourable conditions for reconstruction and development efforts in these regions’ (ibid.). The French-led EUFOR Tchad/RCA was largely born out of the latter Member State’s “political priority of demonstrating that the EU is an independent international conflict manager, at least in Africa” (Olsen, 2009: 256). A 2009 document explaining the main aspects of the operation explicitly mentions it being part of a ‘comprehensive EU approach’ “designed to enhance the EU's engagement in tackling the crisis in Darfur” where “all the EU's instruments – diplomatic, political and financial – are being mobilised in support of this effort”, including the Commissions financing of MINURCAT through the Instrument for Stability (EEAS, 2009: 2).

Three months after the launch of EUFOR Tchad/ RCA, the EU launched, in June 2008, the EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau – EU SSR Guinea-Bissau – by means of Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP of 12 February 2008.<sup>33</sup> The mission, which was extended several times until it ended in September 2010, was launched in the context of the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy, whose strategic priority is the “promotion of *peace, security and stability* in Africa and Europe” (Council, 2008b: 2). The EU was already present in the country in the context of development programmes. The Council Joint Action points out that “security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau is essential for the *stability* and sustainable *development* of that country” (ibid.), highlighting two key concepts linked with the evolution of the EU’s worldview regarding crisis management. Like other missions before it, EUSSR Guinea-Bissau was idealised by the EU following two missions to gather information during 2007 in cooperation with local authorities, followed, in the subsequent year, by a formal invitation on behalf of the government of Guinea-Bissau. According to the mission statement, EUSSR Guinea-Bissau was meant to “provide local authorities with advice and assistance on SSR (...) to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy (...)” (ibid.: 3). The mission’s objectives are listed as follows:

(...) assisting in the development of detailed implementation plans for downsizing/ restructuring the Armed Forces and security forces (...); assistance to the development and

---

<sup>33</sup> Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP was subsequently amended by Council Joint Actions 2009/405/CFSP of 18 May 2009, 2009/841/CFSP of 17 November 2009, and Council Decision 2010/298/CFSP of 25 May 2010. All the amendments have to do with financial re-arrangements and extensions of the duration of the mission, rather than mission objectives, which means that we will not consider these documents in our discourse analysis.

articulation of capacity-building needs (...); assessment of the potential and risk for continued ESDP engagement in the medium term in support of SSR implementation (ibid.: 3, 4).

Even though the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau might have been initially envisaged by the EU, in a 2012 document concerning the mission, the EU states that “it was conducted in *partnership* with the Republic of Guinea Bissau, which maintains *ownership* of the security sector reform (SSR) process” (EEAS, 2010: 1). Nonetheless, a gaping discrepancy between perceptions and preferences of local actors and external SSR actors such as the EU remains (Kohl, 2015). The underwhelming perceptions of those on the ground, in addition to EUSSR Guinea-Bissau having been primarily conceived by the EU rather than a result of a request on behalf of local authorities reflects an apparent discrepancy between the EU’s portrayal of a successful ownership-oriented mission, and a lack of effectiveness on the ground. The termination of the mission was triggered by an uprising in April 2010, despite the EU’s expressed concerns with the situation on the ground. However, the EU reiterated that “the reform must not be abandoned, as it is a crucial element for ensuring peace, democracy and the socio-economic development of Guinea-Bissau, to which the European Union remains firmly committed” (EEAS, 2010: 3).

In September 2008, following the deployment of an exploratory mission to Georgia to assess the situation of conflict between the latter and Russia, and to prepare a possible ESDP mission – after which the EU received a formal invitation on behalf of the Georgian government – the EU launched the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). According to Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008, the mission, which was still ongoing at the time of this research project, was meant to

(...) provide civilian monitoring of Parties’ actions, including full compliance with the six-point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures (...), working in close coordination with *partners*, particularly the UN and the OSCE, and consistent with other EU activity, in order to contribute to *stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building* whilst also contributing to informing *European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia* (Council, 2008c: 27).

The paragraph reflects a tendency observed in other instances of the EU’s discourses of an attribution of the epithet of ‘partner’ to International Organisations (in this case the UN and the OSCE) instead of the host country. The attribution of the ‘partner’ label in this case, however,



has to do with the fact that both the UN and the OSCE are the two key actors that were tasked to mediate in the context of the Geneva International Discussions framework. The goal of ‘stabilisation’ remains a *leitmotiv* in the EU’s justification for its crisis management actorness – particularly in its neighbourhood (Roccu and Voltolini, 2018); however, this paragraph adds ‘normalisation’ and ‘confidence building’ as additional elements, reflecting an effort of return to pre-war status. Unlike other previous instances, this Council Joint Action actually describes what is entailed in each of these ‘mission tasks’ yet fails to define the concepts with precision. The stabilisation task entails the monitoring, analysis and reporting “on the situation pertaining to the stabilisation process (...)”; the normalisation task entails monitoring, analysing, and reporting “on the situation pertaining to the normalisation process of civil governance, focusing on rule of law, effective law enforcement structures and *adequate* public order”; and the confidence building task entails a contribution “to the reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties and other confidence building measures (...)” (ibid.). What we notice is that there is no clear definition of each of these concepts (likely deliberately), only descriptions of the respective tasks that include the latter, in a redundant and tautological manner, reflecting the EU’s tendency to avoid conceptual clarity. EUMM Georgia can be considered, in addition to other EU efforts, to have helped (re)affirm the EU’s security actorness in the region (Freire and Simão, 2013).

In December 2008, three months after the deployment of EUMM Georgia, the EU launched an EU rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), a high-profile mission in the midst of extensive international presence therein, following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February of the same year. Despite not agreeing on the final status for Kosovo, which is not bereft of problems, EU Member States were in agreement regarding the need to deploy a mission of this nature. The unprecedented and ambitious mission was launched at the behest of the UN (through resolution 1244) for the EU and other international actors to “develop a comprehensive approach to the economic *development* and *stabilisation* of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis,” including “the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation” (Council, 2008d: 92). According to Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, the mission, which was still ongoing at the time of this study, was meant to

(...) assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and

customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and *European best practices* (ibid.: 93).

The means through which the EU proposed to achieve these goals reflect a conceptual vagueness and ambiguity that had not, until that point, been addressed, as the mission was meant to “(...) fulfil its mandate through *monitoring*, *mentoring* and *advising*, while retaining certain executive responsibilities” (ibid.). The executive nature of the mission, even when the EU works in collaboration with local actors, establishes a clear hierarchy between the EU and Kosovo, placing the latter in a subordinate position. A study carried out by Labint Greiçevci in 2011 attempted to analyse the EU’s actorness in the context of EULEX Kosovo, by using Jupille and Caporaso’s 1998 conceptualisation. The author concluded that while the EU has a high level of authority and autonomy to act, there are problems with the recognition criterion (namely on behalf of local authorities). Greiçevci also points out problems with all types of cohesion with the exception of procedural cohesion, particularly due to the existence of horizontal conflicts between the Member States. The author concludes that the identified problems undermine the EU’s effectiveness (Greiçevci, 2011).

Also in December 2008, the EU launched one of its most high-profile CSDP operations: an EU military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, also referred to as EU NAVFOR Somalia, operation Atalanta. The EU’s first ever naval operation under the CSDP, which was still ongoing at the time of the present study, was deployed following UNSC resolutions 1814 and 1816 recommending international action in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and especially resolution 1838 (2008) recommending EU action in particular. Despite European engagement therein prior to the launch of operation Atalanta, the EU’s engagement as a whole was not bereft of economic interests, as, according to Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008, Atalanta was meant to protect World Food Programme vessels delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, and “vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast,” as well as deter, prevent, and repress “acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast,” by means, if necessary, of the use of force (Council, 2008e: 34).

One of the problems of this operation is that it is an example of the long-standing critique in EUFP and ESDP of a ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993), as “military and civilian capacity-building lags behind as operational requirements become more demanding” (Faleg and Blockmans, 2012: 1). Another problem is that it does not solve Somalia’s core problems, as HR Javier Solana put it in an opinion article in the British newspaper The

Guardian: “we are seeking to build on the success of Atalanta and act on land as well as at sea to eradicate piracy and help Somalia develop into a *stable, functioning* state that can offer a future for its people” (Solana, 2009a). Solana’s projected aspirations for Somalia following a possible future EU involvement therein contrast with his description of the country as “fractured, violent, ungovernable and open to external interference, (...) with growing regional instability, continuing piracy and an increasing risk of terrorism” (ibid.). In suggesting the importance of developing a Somali army and police force, Solana points out the EU’s “*added value*, with its *expertise* in security sector reform, training and mentoring” (ibid.), placing the EU at a higher hierarchical level, and implicitly branding the latter as an exemplary crisis management actor.

On December 11, 2008 the EU released a report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, at a time when more than 15 ESDP missions had already been launched. The title of this report – ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’ – shows a change from the title of the ESS’s title – ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ – in the sense that the overall text of the report presents the EU as a much less inward-looking actor as far as security goes and portrays it as more proactive and outward-looking. It also appears to be less judgemental in presenting the world – it is now seen as ‘changing’, rather than in need of ‘betterment’. Nonetheless, the report starts out by arguing that “five years on from the adoption of the European Security Strategy, the European Union carries *greater responsibilities* than at any time in its history,” adding that it “remains an anchor of stability,” and that “enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across our continent” (EU, 2008: 1). This, along with the verb ‘providing’ in the title, reveals a continuity of the ESS’s rhetoric of superiority and dominance of EU liberal democratic standards, and consequent self-perceived duty to spread them: “Europe will rise to these new challenges, as we have done in the past” (ibid.).

The mention of the EU’s value-added as a justification for its engagement in crisis management is frequent: “drawing on a *unique* range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world” (ibid.), as is the portrayal of the kind of actor the EU aims to become: “there is no room for complacency. To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world” (ibid.). The document states a number of leadership and actorness-related objectives, such as that “at a global level, Europe *must lead* a renewal of the multilateral order” (ibid.: 2), that include a need for improvement in some areas: “for our full potential to be realised we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active” (ibid.). Nonetheless, the document still repeatedly portrays the EU as not only making

a positive difference, but as being acknowledged as such: “we are *recognised* as an important contributor to a *better* world” (ibid.).

The EU’s actorness in the area of crisis management has been straightforwardly and admittedly normative from the onset, as the ESS is described in the report as having “established principles and set clear objectives for *advancing the EU’s security interests based on our core values*” (ibid.: 3). The report argues that the ‘vision’ that the EU set out with the ESS was “of how the EU *would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world*” (ibid.: 12), reinforcing the EU’s normative justification actorness discourses’ focus on the EU itself, on its potential role, on its value-added, and ultimately its dominance over other paradigms, which reflects the ‘convincing’ goal of these documents, as the latter state much more frequently what the EU can do in different areas and circumstances than what needs to be, or has been done in particular. This has to do, on one hand, with the unpredictability underlying the emergency and crisis nature of security and crisis management missions (which, nonetheless, sometimes result from the EU’s active seeking for opportunities), but on the other hand, it is very much about convincing domestic and external actors to endorse the EU’s ambitions and actions.

In this section we have explored the EU’s discourses during a period of practical implementation of the ESDP and the challenges and opportunities that rose during the debate that followed the constitutional treaty failure. The prospect of a new treaty that would have a strong focus on effectiveness in matters of external action gave way to a proliferation of discursive acts with the purpose of convincing the Member States and their constituents (in particular in Ireland, due to the latter’s rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in a first referendum in June 2008, which would come to a successful turn on a second referendum in October 2009), as well as other actors, to validate the Reform Treaty. The narrative of the EU as a responsible security actor, derived from its portrayal as a ‘model’ of peace is quite prevalent during this period, as is the call for greater effectiveness and efficiency in the EU’s engagement in crisis management and other foreign policy areas. A strong focus on ESDP missions in Africa reflects a growing link between security and other areas where the EU already had a strong presence (such as development) and an increasing use of a comprehensive approach (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). In the subsequent section we explore the normative justification discourses that followed the signing of the Lisbon Treaty and marked the beginning of a new stage for EUFP, including crisis management.

#### **4.4 - The Lisbon Treaty: an effort toward coherence, effectiveness, and visibility**

The present section analyses and contextualises discourses that include elements of normative justification for the development of the EU's crisis management actorness that were produced or divulged during the first years of practical implementation of the Lisbon Treaty starting in 2009. These include the setting up of the EEAS and the attribution of legal personality to the EU, up until the launch of the 2013 comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crisis. During this period the EU refocused its external action in an effort to achieve greater coherence, effectiveness, and visibility.

On February 19, 2009, the EP produced a resolution on the European Security Strategy and the ESDP. The document begins with the EP describing its expectations for the CFSP, while simultaneously justifying the latter. The EP begins by urging the EU to develop 'its' strategic autonomy by means of a 'strong and effective' CFSP "in order to promote peace and international security, to defend its interests in the world, to protect the security of its own citizens, to contribute to effective multilateralism, to advance respect for human rights and democratic values worldwide, and to safeguard world peace" (EP, 2009: 2). NATO is mentioned, and its importance emphasised, and a clearer distinction between the latter and the ESDP are prescribed by the EP, as "many of the new threats are not simply military and cannot be tackled by military means alone" (ibid.). Concerning the EU's security role, the EP argues that "there is neither an automatic obligation nor the means available for the EU to deploy ESDP missions, be they civilian or military, in all crisis situations" (ibid.). This awareness of the EU's own limits is uncommon in the EU's discourses as a crisis management actor, but it reflects the reality of the EU's deliberate choices of engaging in contexts where the risk is more controlled and conflicts less active (or where NATO or the UN have already a presence), and for avoiding contexts that are likely to be politically controversial (like Iraq, Libya, or Syria, for example). The environment for the preparation of the EP resolution is described rather negatively, particularly concerning a lack of developments in terms of a new or revised ESS "despite extensive preparation but in consequence of a loss of momentum caused by the impasse over the Lisbon Treaty" (ibid.: 5).

The EP argues in favour of an increase in EU-level strategic thinking in matters of security, claiming that Member States have too great a focus on national security interests to the detriment of common interests. According to the EP, this approach is 'counterproductive' in achieving the goal of making the EU "a more important player on the international scene, providing for more effective European security arrangements" (ibid.: 2). As such, the EP argues

that there is a need to identify the EU's common security interests, adding to the work already put in place by the ESS. The EP lists, in addition to the ESS, the protection of EU citizens and EU domestic interests as fundamental, as well as the protection of the EU's external borders and critical infrastructure, the improvement of EU cyber security, energy security, and climate change. Regarding the EU's ambitions as a security actor, the EP posits that the "should not try to become a *superpower* like the United States but that it should guarantee its security, work for stability in its neighbourhood, and contribute to a multilateral global system of security within the framework of the UN", with a particular focus on "crisis and conflict prevention, as well as post-conflict management and resolution" (ibid.: 4). In fact, the EP argues that the EU prioritises crisis *prevention* in the ESDP, pointing out that "security and the rule of law are indispensable preconditions for development and long-term stability" (ibid.).

While acknowledging the validity of the upcoming Atalanta operation, the EP stresses that "the reasons for the problem of piracy in that region are deeper rooted, including as they do poverty in a failed state, and *demand more profound European actions to tackle those problems*" (ibid.: 3), reinforcing the growing tendency of linking security and development. The EP resolution criticises the EU's discourses surrounding the ESS, namely the use of "vague wording (...), which fails to describe a real strategy", as well as the lack of a White Paper, making it "unlikely that a fruitful, wide-ranging public debate will be initiated" (ibid.: 5). As in all other EP discourses concerning the EU's security actorness, this resolution includes several pleas in favour of an increase in parliamentary scrutiny for this policy area, both at the European and national levels.

On April 22, 2009, Javier Solana gave a speech at the University College Dublin entitled 'Together we are Stronger' concerning "why we embarked on the journey of European integration (...) from building peace in Europe to promoting peace around the world" (Solana, 2009b: 73). The speech is both a plea and a justification for the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, particularly directed at an Irish audience. This focus has to do with an earlier rejection of the Treaty in June of the previous year by the Irish constituency, which was scheduled to vote again in another referendum in October 2009. Asking the audience why the EU needs a foreign policy, Solana answers that "Europe is not, and cannot be, an island of peace and prosperity in a turbulent world. We share common values and interests. We want to *promote those values* and *protect those interests*" (ibid.). The threats that Europe faces are identified as "the abuse of human rights, flows of migrants escaping conflict and *failed* states, disputes over natural resources, or international terrorism" (ibid.: 74), which originate outside the EU's territorial sphere. As such, Solana argues that EUFP "is needed *because no country in Europe*

*can cope with them on its own. By acting together we can achieve much better results*” (ibid.). The idea that collective action is necessary is repeated in the text, but the EU is always portrayed as a *primus inter pares* – e.g. “a major actor in the world”, “at the heart of this [global] collective effort” “the EU is *leading* international efforts to fight poverty in Africa and keep the peace in the Balkans” (ibid.).

Asking the audience what the EUFP’s purpose is, Solana answers that “the aim of EU foreign policy is to replace the law of force with the force of law. This comes naturally to us. *The EU, after all, has always been* a peace project founded on democratic values and respect for laws. *The EU wants* a world order based on the rule of law” (ibid.). As in previous instances, we notice that a recurrent normative justification provided by EU actors for engaging in crisis management is the reproduction of the EU’s model (however loose this model is) *because* it worked for the EU. While describing the EU as ‘unique’, Solana compares it to NATO and identifies a *specificity* in the EU’s security and crisis management role, characterised by the EU’s multifaceted capabilities and expertise, that justifies its existence:

[The EU] is not a military alliance, like NATO. NATO is for most EU member states the cornerstone of their territorial defence. This is not the EU’s objective. Rather, EU security and defence policy is a crisis management policy, which forms only one part of a much broader EU foreign and security policy. Plus, the implementation of the EU’s security and defence policy uses the full range of resources available to us: from diplomats and development workers to judges and police, and – but only when necessary – soldiers (ibid.: 75).

NATO is acknowledged as remaining valid and irreplaceable, while the EU assumes security-related aspects that NATO does not, dealing with matters with a markedly different and more comprehensive (or what Solana refers to as ‘holistic’) approach than NATO that comprises the EU’s efforts of linking security and development. The speech is meant to convince the Irish audience of the validity of the Lisbon Treaty for the EU to be able to play a ‘*constructive* global role’, while emphasising the intergovernmental component of EUFP, which is described as ‘marrying’ “the collective resources of EU governments with their common values and interests” (ibid.: 77).

On June 15, 2009, the Czech Council Presidency approved a report on the ESDP. The Council report lists all ongoing ESDP missions and operations at the time, and their main goals or achievements. In a section meant to be merely descriptive, the missions and other EU

activities are fundamentally portrayed in a positive light, and marked with labels like ‘timely’, ‘effective’, ‘successful’, ‘making progress’, ‘innovative’, ‘comprehensive’, ‘breakthrough’, ‘exemplary’, ‘making a tangible contribution’, ‘active’, ‘coordinated’, ‘coherent’, or ‘strategic’ (Council of the EU, 2009c: 2-15). The report consists mostly of a series of technical considerations on institutional and capability development, yet there some normative considerations are made that are of interest to our study, such as the idea that, within the broad area of crisis management, the area of conflict prevention is considered a priority, a ‘key EU objective’. The relationship between the EU and other organisations is featured in the report, with particular attention given to NATO, as in previous discursive instances. EU-NATO relations are identified as a ‘strategic partnership’ that needs to be strengthened “in a spirit of mutual reinforcement and respect for their decision-making autonomy” (ibid.: 34). Unlike most previous instances, though, this report focuses on the areas of convergence of both interests and capabilities of both organisations, instead of what makes them different and complementary.

One of the mandates for the upcoming Council Presidency identified in the report is “to explore synergies between ESDP and Justice and Home Affairs, including by highlighting the mutual operational benefit in the fight against organised crime, developing information sharing between ESDP missions and EUROPOL” (ibid.: 39). The idea of approximating the areas of crisis management and JHA was not particularly common in the EU’s discourse up until this time, but became increasingly so in subsequent years, and materialised with the launch of EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, a military CSDP naval operation in the Mediterranean, in 2015. Another mandate proposed for the subsequent Presidency is the continuation of the promotion of “*an* EU comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and crisis management in ESDP (...) and to ensure the effective implementation of human rights aspects” (ibid.: 41), which reflects the growing practice of framing the ESDP in a wider range of foreign policy instruments even before the institutionalisation of the concept of ‘comprehensive approach’ to external conflicts and crises four years later, in 2013.

Three days later, the European Council Presidency Conclusions of 18 and 19 June 2009 continued with attempting to convince the Irish of the necessity of the Lisbon Treaty, including the security and defence-related aspects thereof. Annex I of the Conclusions document is dedicated to a decision of the HSGs of the EU Member ‘on the concerns of the Irish people on the treaty of Lisbon’ and section C thereof specifically addresses security and defence. This section starts by enumerating the principles that the EU’s action on the global stage, including democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The CSDP’s purpose is vaguely described as “providing the Union with an operational capacity to undertake missions outside the Union for



peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security” (European Council, 2009: 18). In several instances, the policy’s intergovernmental nature is evoked, in an effort to ease Irish concerns over its military neutrality. In this sense, the eventuality of a potential ‘common defence’ is pushed to an uncertain future, and the underlying principle of unanimity that would be necessary to put it in place is repeatedly recalled. In addition, in an effort to mitigate the potential problems arising from the military dimension of the CSDP for the Irish government and constituents, the document states that Lisbon treaty “does not provide for the creation of a European army or for conscription to any military formation” (ibid.: 19), even though the battlegroups had already been operational for two years. The section ends by emphasising that ultimately it is up to the Member States to decide whether or not to participate in military operations. The Irish reply to these concerns is present further ahead in the document, where it “reiterates its commitment to the ideal of peace and friendly cooperation amongst nations and to the principle of the peaceful resolution of international disputes”, in addition to reaffirming “its strong commitment to conflict prevention, resolution and peacekeeping” (ibid.: 22).

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on December 1, 2009 following a positive result in the October Irish referendum, represented an unprecedented effort to improve the EU’s actorness in many different aspects. In this context, the post of High Representative for CFSP was renamed and reorganised as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) (TEU article 18(1)). Catherine Ashton was appointed the first post-Lisbon HR and charged with conducting the CSFP and the CSDP by carrying out proposals for the development of the latter policies, as mandated by the Council (European Council decision 2009/950/EU). In addition, Ashton was also charged with the Vice-Presidency of the Commission, as well as with chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, and the direction of the EDA. In the same year, DGE VIII (political-military affairs) and DGE IX (civilian crisis management) of the Council Secretariat were merged into a new single civilian-military strategic planning structure, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). The CMPD’s role is to provide expertise, support the development of concepts and capabilities, and conduct the political-strategic planning of CSDP civilian missions and military operations.<sup>34</sup> Herman Van Rompuy was nominated the first permanent President of the European Council.

---

<sup>34</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5433/crisis-management-and-planning-directorate-cmpd\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5433/crisis-management-and-planning-directorate-cmpd_en)

Among the most relevant changes introduced with the Lisbon Treaty are some that affect the projected and perceived image of the EU in the international system. One example is the attribution to the EU, as a whole, of *de jure* legal personality (TEU article 47). This means that the EU, in its entirety, rather than just being a specific pillar or institution, acquires the capacity for legal relations (Smith, 1928: 283). However, it also means that the EU as a whole is legally responsible for the activities and policies that it develops and implements. Such activities include what takes place within the framework of the CSDP, namely civilian missions and military operations, as this ceases to be a completely isolated policy, despite the maintenance of a singular character largely dominated by intergovernmental cooperation. This means that *ad hoc* coalitions of willing and able Member States involved in the launch of civilian missions and military operations ultimately do so bearing the EU flag and do so in the name of the EU<sup>35</sup> (Biscop and Coelmont, 2011: 7). It also means that SOMAs / SOFAs, as well as other related agreements, are signed between the countries hosting EU CSDP missions and operations and the EU as a whole, rather than an *ad hoc* group of Member States. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the overall functioning of this policy field resembles a ‘supranational inter-governmentalist’ logic (Howorth, 2012).

As for the actual text of the Lisbon Treaty, with the exception of the number of the article, the treaty’s preamble paragraph that refers to foreign and security policy and to the ‘progressive framing of a common defence policy’ in order to ‘reinforce the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world’ remains the same as in the previous treaty (Nice Treaty). However, unlike the previous treaties, the Lisbon Treaty refrained from presenting an article openly stating the EU’s objectives as it had done so far – the Nice, Amsterdam, and Maastricht Treaties had marked as EU’s second objective the ‘asserting [of] its identity on the international scene’. The Lisbon Treaty not only removed this list as such, but it reformulated, repositioned, and specified the contents of these ‘objectives’ (no longer directly referred to as such). Article 3 (former article 2) is presented in six points. The fifth point reads the following:

In its relations with the wider world, *the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests* and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to *peace, security, the sustainable development* of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among

---

<sup>35</sup> TEU article 44 allows for a group of willing and Member States to launch a mission under the EU flag (the decision-making, however, has to be collective and subject to unanimity).

peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights (...) as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter (TEU article 3.1).

Despite this Treaty's visible effort to improve the EU's actorness, including in security and crisis management, apart from the aforementioned preamble paragraph, the direct mention of the projection of an EU or European 'identity' was removed from the text. This does not mean, however, that the normative character of external action and of the CSDP in particular is no longer present. It simply appears to indicate a more cautious approach to explicit symbolic / ideological language, so as to accommodate Member States' concerns. In fact, the normative character of EU external action is present throughout the text. The first point of the first chapter of Title V, which includes the general provisions on the EU's external action and specific provisions on the CFSP and CSDP, reads:

The Union's action on the international scene shall be *guided by the principles* which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, *and which it seeks to advance in the wider world*: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (TEU article 21.1).

In other words, not only is everything that the EU does externally – including crisis management – meant to be guided by its principles, but also the advancement thereof constitutes itself a key goal for the EU's external action, reiterating the normative nature of the EU's actorness that has been present since the inception of the CFSP. Interestingly, though, the motivations for the development of a CSDP stated in the treaty appear to be increasingly inward-looking. Moreover, the Lisbon treaty looks more at the Member States than previously, somewhat reversing an apparent trend of increased focus on the EU as an actor in its own right in the earlier years of the CSDP:

Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, *based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States*, the identification of *questions of general interest* and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of *convergence of Member States' actions* (TEU article 24.2).

According to article 42.2, first paragraph, the EU under the Lisbon Treaty still does not have a common defence policy as such, much like in previous treaties, as this policy is still referred to as being ‘progressively framed’. Article 41.1 reads that the EU may carry out “missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security”, which include, according to article 43.1, “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict *stabilisation*” (TEU article 43.1). Even though there is more diversity in the listing of the EU’s possibilities for CSDP missions and operations in comparison with previous treaties and documents, these remain undefined and (likely) purposefully vague and ambiguous, so as to allow room for interpretation as to what each one may entail. In fact, according to article 43.2, “the Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation.”

On February 6, 2010, the newly-appointed High Representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy, Catherine Ashton, gave a speech at the Munich security conference with a goal of identifying how the EU sees the main security challenges as well as its approach is in terms of policy response. Ashton refers to the environment as “an important moment in Europe’s history” due to the entering into force of the Lisbon treaty, and to an ensuing “*opportunity to deliver a step change in European foreign policy*” (Ashton, 2010: 25). The High Representative identifies the global threats and challenges as being fragile states, terrorism, organised crime, the proliferation of WMDs, cyber security, energy, climate change, struggles for natural resources, illegal migration, as well as human trafficking. To tackle these threats and challenges, Ashton argues that the EU needs to mobilise all its ‘levers of influence’, including political and economic tools, as well as crisis management, and mentions the relevance of the growing ‘development-security nexus’ and of the link between internal and external security. The establishment of the EEAS is also mentioned as particularly relevant for the implementation of this ‘comprehensive’ approach (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013).

The idea of an EU ‘responsibility’ and ambition to engage in security actorness is present in Ashton’s speech: “we know that we in the EU have *primary responsibility* for our neighbourhood. This is important in itself but *our wider international credibility* also depends on the work we do with our neighbours” (Ashton, 2010: 26). Here we notice a particular geographic focus that is not as present in other crisis management-related discourses that we

have analysed in this study. The link between the EU's action in its neighbourhood and its international credibility reflects a greater focus on image and perceived identity than on effectiveness. On the other hand, the issue of effectiveness is mentioned often in the document, even when the HR admits that this focus was previously lacking: "the days when EU foreign policy could be dismissed as *all talk and no action* are long over" (ibid.). EU crisis management missions and operations are labelled "innovative, tailor-made solutions, mixing civil with military components", bringing attention to the idea of the EU's value-added in the field of security, which corresponds to what is 'required' by the world's 'complex security challenges' (ibid.). As in previous discursive instances, the EU's global role is equated to that of a leader, in statements such as "the European response [to rising powers] should be more generous – in *making space at the top tables of global politics*" (ibid.: 28).

In July 2010, a new diplomatic administrative service – the European External Action Service (EEAS) – was set up in order to assist the HR/VP in coordinating the external action of the EU and to develop and execute the CSDP (Council Decision 2010/427/EU). This administrative structure, comparable to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the EU, was divided into eight thematic and geographic Managing Directorates (MDs). One of these MDs is the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate. This Directorate is in charge of the mobilisation of the Crisis Response System, which includes a Crisis Platform, a Situation Room, and a Crisis Management Board. Also within the EEAS is located a Security Policy and Prevention Directorate, which promotes a comprehensive approach in dealing with security threats and potential conflicts, in coordination with the pertinent services within the EU system (Rehrl, 2014: 40). The work developed by the main CSDP bodies within the EEAS – the EUMS, the CPCC, and the CMPD – is intimately connected with the work developed by the PSC and the Foreign Affairs Council (which, as mentioned, is headed by the HR/VP) and by other bodies that function directly under the PSC, namely the EUMC and CIVCOM.

On September 16, 2010, a European Council meeting took place in Brussels, focusing on the EU's role as a global actor. The Conclusions document begins by pointing out that the meeting's discussion focused on 'how to give new momentum' to EUFP by 'taking advantage' of the 'opportunities' offered by the Lisbon treaty, while agreeing "on the need for Europe to promote its interests and values more assertively and in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit" (European Council, 2010: 1). The first section of the document, concerning the EU's relations with its 'strategic' partners, focuses greatly on the idea of multilateralism, which has been very present in EUFP discourse particularly since the ESS. The first heading of the section is 'a changing world: a challenge for the EU'. In this section, the European Council states that

the EU “*must be an effective global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security and to take the lead in the definition of joint responses to common challenges*” (ibid.). While in previous discursive instances the idea of effectiveness was scarcely present, we begin noticing that, in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, this idea becomes increasingly more important. While mentioning its ‘firmly-rooted’ belief in the idea of multilateralism and in the UN’s role in the world, the European Council also mentions its belief in ‘universal values’, which marks the EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude altogether. An enumeration of the EU’s foreign policy achievements ensues, including the ‘*major stabilizing role in its neighbourhood*’. The idea that the Lisbon treaty will allow the EU ‘and its Member States’ to “act more strategically so as to bring Europe’s *true weight* to bear internationally” (ibid.: 2) is reiterated. The EU’s ‘strategic partnerships with *key players* in the world’ are seen as providing ‘a useful instrument for pursuing European objectives and interests’. These players are identified as the UN, China, Korea, the G8 and the G20, NATO, the EU’s eastern and southern neighbours, Africa, Ukraine, Russia, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. Transatlantic relations, described as being “based on *common values* and constitutes a *core element of the international system*” (ibid.: 4), are identified as being in need of ‘fresh impetus’ that would allow for the creation of “a true partnership based on our respective *strengths* and *specificities*” (ibid.).

While “looking at concrete measures to more generally improve the functioning of the European Union's external policy,” the genesis of the conceptual bases for the institutionalisation of the notion of ‘comprehensive approach’ are present in the European Council Conclusions, as it “calls for a more integrated approach, ensuring that all relevant EU and national instruments and policies are fully and coherently mobilised, consistent with the provisions of the Treaties, in support of the EU’s strategic interests” (ibid.: 8). The idea of EU autonomy as an actor is reinforced in statements such as that “what is done at the level of the European Union complements and reinforces what is done at the level of the Member States and vice versa” (ibid.).

The self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 largely fuelled and contributed to the visibility of the ‘Arab Spring’ pro-democracy uprising movements in the MENA region. These movements led to the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian leaders and affected several other countries in the region, such as Libya and Syria, among others. In the context of these developments in the EU’s neighbourhood and of the early stages of implementation of the Lisbon Treaty changes to EUFP, the EP produced a resolution concerning the development of the CSDP on May 11, 2011. The document begins with the EP stating that

[The EP] recognises that, in a turbulent global context (...) the EU is being *called upon* to *enhance its strategic autonomy to uphold its values, pursue its interests and protect its citizens* by developing a shared vision of the main challenges and threats and by aligning its capabilities and resources to adequately respond to them, thereby contributing to the preservation of international peace and global security, including by pursuing effective multilateralism (EP, 2011: 2).

In this brief description of the EU's crisis management policy goals and dynamics the EP points out what it identifies as the justifications for the EU's engagement in this area, i.e. being 'called upon' to promote values, pursue its interests, and protect its citizens, that will ultimately result in the 'preservation of international peace and global security'. The CSDP revision under the Lisbon Treaty in particular is characterised as

(...) provid[ing] a firm political *statement* of the Union's *intention to act as a force for stability in the world* and provide a clear legal framework for reinforcing its capacities to pursue its foreign and security policy through a *comprehensive approach* drawing upon all the instruments available to the EU and its Member States, *to prevent and manage crises and conflicts, and to build lasting peace* (ibid.).

Similarly to other instances, and unlike the discourses expressed and reproduced by more intergovernmental institutions or representatives, the EP's discourse maintains a certain distance from strong normative assertions concerning the EU's role. This more moderate and careful attitude is noticeable in this paragraph in the expression 'providing a statement of the EU's intention to act as' instead of arguing that the EU simply 'is' a 'force for stability'. In line with a prevailing EU-wide narrative, the EP maintains the discourse of a rootedness of the CSDP within the EU's "legally binding institutional framework of EU principles" (ibid.), including democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, equality and solidarity, bringing attention to the latter's inscription within the objectives of EUFP. Instead of viewing coalitions of the willing and able Member States as a viable alternative to the collective CSDP, the EP 'expresses deep concern about the risk' that these coalitions bring, arguing that "no European State has the capacity to be a significant security and defence actor in the 21st century world" (ibid.: 3), as opposed to the EU, acting collectively. This discourse is contextualised by the EP's 'regret' of "the unwillingness of the EU Member States to define a common position on the Libya crisis" (ibid.) – despite welcoming operation EUFOR Libya –

adding nonetheless that that “the elaboration of a strategy for the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa is *yet another concrete opportunity to demonstrate the ability of the EU to act both on security and development challenges*” (ibid.).

The EP urges the European Council, eight years following the launch of the ESS, to “carry out its task of identifying the strategic interests and political objectives of the EU by drawing up a *European foreign policy strategy* geared to international developments” (ibid.) and urges both the Council and the HR/VP “to build on the concept of *human security* to make it central to the European Foreign Policy Strategy” (ibid.). Following considerations about the CSDP’s capabilities and institutional structure (including pleads in favour of increased parliamentary scrutiny in this field, in line with previous discourses), the EP goes on to express a need to strengthen the link between internal and external security, particularly in matters related to the fight against terrorism, proposing an “expansion of the CSDP to include wider Petersberg-type missions” (ibid.: 12).

Bringing attention to the E/CSDP’s repertoire of 24 civilian missions and military operations in three different continents, the EP argues that CSDP missions are “increasingly being required to assume a ‘multifunctional’ character” (ibid.: 14). This idea reflects the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, which would come to be formalised in 2013 but was already present in practice in EU external action (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). In this sense, the EP predicts a central role for rule of law in upcoming civilian missions and calls for “greater coordination between development cooperation projects and CSDP missions as a part of CFSP” (EP, 2011: 16). While considering E/CSDP missions as “the acid test of the CSDP mandate and an important touchstone of the EU’s *credibility as an international player*” (ibid.: 14), the EP criticises a lack of ‘linkage to a clear political strategy’, which it argues is detrimental to the missions’ effectiveness and efficiency.

The EP supports the international ‘trend towards multipolarity’ and the promotion of multilateralism, emphasising the consistency between the establishment of ‘strategic partnerships’ with “respect for the *universal* rule of law, the specific nature of the EU and the growing interdependence which characterises globalisation” (ibid.: 17). In line with this idea and with occasional previous crisis management-related EU discourses here analysed, the EP places the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in the world’ with the UNSC (where the EP envisions the EU as such having its own permanent seat). NATO is identified, as in previous discourses, as constituting ‘the foundation of collective defence for its Member States’, and attention is brought to “the need for *constructive*



*cooperation* between the EU and NATO, particularly where the two organisations are active in the same theatres of operations” (ibid.: 18), emphasising the specificity and complementarity of each organisation in matters of international security.

Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, the Council of the EU in its Foreign Affairs formation met in Luxembourg in June 2011 and produced a document stating its conclusions on the topic of conflict prevention. In this document, the Council reiterates the idea that “preserving peace, preventing conflicts from erupting into violence and strengthening international security” remains “a primary objective of the EU’s external action,” and goes on to express the EU’s leadership ambitions “in conjunction with its global, regional, national and local partners” (Council, 2011: 1). The reasons why preventing conflicts is so important are enumerated in the document: “violent conflicts cost lives, cause human rights abuses, displace people, disrupt livelihoods, set back economic development, exacerbate state fragility, weaken governance and undermine national and regional security” (ibid.).

Much like in previous documents, there is value judgement regarding different arrangements of governance and state administration, as well as a link between lack of *economic* development and conflict. Even though we may almost objectively argue that violent conflict, forced displacement, and human rights abuses are negative, the portrayal of the remaining situations – lack of economic development, state fragility, and weak governance – as being negative results from an assessment based on specific normative ideas or benchmarks of what constitutes (economic) development, a (strong) state, and (good) governance. As we have seen in previous documents, the EU’s discourses are imbued with normative considerations that result in implicit asymmetric portrayals of its own paradigms *vis-à-vis* other non-European paradigms. The EU’s implicit assumption that European moral dominance is normal or natural means that it is taking a normative position that is shrouded by an apparent (yet false) objectiveness, since its discourses (as are all discourses) are artificial and constructed.

These Council conclusions revisit the 2001 ‘Göteborg Programme’ – i.e. the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts – adopted by the same institution a decade earlier and reinforce its validity as a ‘policy basis’ for EU action in conflict prevention. Even though the Council conclusions mimic the Göteborg Programme (Council, 2001c: 7) and other documents in repeating the attribution of the ‘partner’ epithet to many international institutions and organisations instead of the host countries – the UN, World Bank, OSCE, NATO, the AU, other regional organisations and countries (Council, 2011: 1-2) – the document also indirectly

appears to refer to potential host countries: “the EU will continue to support local, regional, international partners, relevant non-governmental organisations and institutions for conflict prevention and resolution and the strengthening of peace efforts, as appropriate” (ibid.: 2). The importance of the idea of cohesiveness has been strongly reinforced with the development of the concept of ‘comprehensive approach,’ also introduced in the context of the Lisbon Treaty’s changes to the field of EU external action (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), and explicitly mentioned in the Council conclusions on conflict prevention (ibid.).

The first EEAS annual report was produced in reference to the year 2011 and includes practical and structural aspects of the functioning of this administrative body, in addition to containing prescriptions for the role the EEAS can play in the development of the EU’s external action and normative assumptions about the role the EU can, or should, play with the support of this new structure. This document embodies Ashton’s ambitions for the EEAS and, more importantly, for the EU’s actorness in various domains, including crisis management. Its importance lies in having been drafted by the person and the service that have been charged with carrying out the EU’s external action, including the CSDP, in the beginning of a new stage for EU diplomacy. The report is divided into four parts: ‘policy achievements’, ‘management and internal control systems’, ‘building blocks towards the declaration of assurance’, and the ‘declaration of assurance’. As our research concerns the discourses surrounding the external legitimacy of the development and establishment of a specific policy, we will be focusing our analysis on the first part of the document – policy achievements – and in particular on chapters IV (global issues) and V (CSDP). In this document, the normative character of EU external action is quite discernible:

At the start of her mandate, the High Representative set three priorities for EU external relations over 2011-2012. First, the establishment of a functioning EEAS; second, fostering deeper relations with Europe's neighbours, *with the aim of promoting democracy, stability and prosperity*; and third, the building of strong strategic partnerships with existing and emerging global players. The events of 2011 have confirmed that these were *the right* priorities, *defining the EU's role as a global and regional political actor*. The EU’s fundamental values of democracy, the respect for human rights and the consolidation of the Rule of Law, *underpin their implementation* (EEAS, 2011: 6).

At this point, there is no doubt that one of the fundamental goals of the EU's external action is to propagate EU paradigms, standards, norms, and values. However, the EU's discourse maintains the tacit idea that this propagation is natural, expected, or normal, revealing an underlying assumption that these paradigms are absolute and universal, and thus dominating. While praising the EU's many qualities and potential is not new in the documents analysed, an interesting aspect in this particular text is the use of praise even in contexts where the EU did not perform much of a role:

The High Representative, assisted by the EEAS, took a *leading role in international coordination efforts* as well, striving for convergence of views within the international community *even on those issues* (such as the Libyan crisis) which had proven to be more divisive (ibid.).

In line with previous documents, in this document there appears to be a slight difference in reference to 'partners', albeit not substantial. It refers to the EU's 'main strategic partners' as the US, China, India, Brazil, and Russia, but it also refers to being 'committed to strengthening its partnership with Africa' (ibid.: 6-7). Yet, while the first kind (individual countries) are referred to as 'main strategic partners', Africa (a vast and diverse continent with more than 50 countries and a number of regional organisations) is referred to as in only in a collective 'partnership'. This distinction is not explicit, but it is present. Even though these 'partners' are not mentioned at this point in reference to the CSDP, this distinction reflects a common theme of dividing the partners that are portrayed as mattering more (economically strong business partners or – and especially – those that share the EU's worldview, values, and principles, referred to by epithets such as 'strategic' and others) and lesser partners that are portrayed as being in need of change / improvement – which is done through CSDP or other instruments that involve norms export.

In chapter IV – global issues – the document is divided in several subheadings. One of these subheadings concerns the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, followed by another one on conflict prevention. In the former, the document speaks in general terms regarding external action, as these topics are crosscutting for the EU's relations with the rest of the world, including crisis management. The mention of the 2011 document 'Human rights and democracy at the heart of EU external action: towards a more effective approach' a Joint Communication by the HR and the Commission to the EP and the Council, reiterates this, as this document includes sections on both conflict prevention and crisis management.

As in previous documents, the report maintains the focus on the EU, and the EU's concerns and interests, rather than on shared concerns and interests: "the EU held over 40 bilateral human rights dialogues with third countries, providing many opportunities to address effectively *the EU's specific human rights concerns*" (ibid.: 31). This is not inherently wrong or unusual – it is an EU document after all – but it is consistent with the pattern of the EU's self-centeredness and an implicit perceived superiority of European norms and concerns that has been observed so far. In the very brief subheading dedicated to conflict prevention, the document simply reiterates the importance of the aforementioned 2001 'Göteborg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict' as a 'valid policy basis', and mentions the creation of a new Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Division under the aegis of the EEAS.

The subsequent chapter, dedicated to the CSDP, starts with a very practical and not very normatively charged heading (at least directly) regarding capabilities. It mentions mostly aspects related to the improvement of civilian and military capability development and effectiveness, as well as the possibility of pooling and sharing military capabilities among Member States (ibid.: 33). As for the subsequent heading dedicated to cooperation with partners, there are some differences in comparison to previous documents, and that also contrasts with the aforementioned distinction between types of 'partners' identified at the beginning of the document. Instead of referring to them as international or strategic partners, this section refers to international organisations (like NATO, the UN, the AU) simply as such (ibid.). On the other hand, the subsequent section titled 'partner countries' enumerates twelve countries that were participating in on-going CSDP missions and operations at the time, which is not exactly the norm in the identified documents that form the CSDP's policy basis, but there is no direct reference to the CSDP host countries themselves (ibid.: 34). This emphasises the idea identified earlier that countries in need of assistance are seen quite differently as those in a position to partner up with the EU in assisting the former.

On July 23, 2012, the 3183rd Foreign Affairs Council meeting took place in Brussels. In the Council Conclusions on CSDP, the EU Ministers starts by welcoming the imminent launch of CSDP missions EUCAP Nestor in the Horn of Africa, EUCAP SAHEL Niger, and EUAVSEC South Sudan. The Council praises CSDP missions and operations' 'concrete impact on the ground', adding that this policy "is a very tangible expression of the EU's *commitment to contribute to promote and preserve peace and stability*, strengthening the EU's overall ability to respond to security challenges" (Council, 2012: 1). The Council identifies the CSDP's rootedness in the EU's 'comprehensive approach' (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), which "makes full use of the role of

the HR (...) and that mobilises the different tools at the EU's disposal in close interaction with the Member States to achieve the EU's objectives, in close cooperation with other international actors" (Council, 2012: 2). The reference to the EU and the Member States separately emphasises this policy's intergovernmental nature, but the express identification of '*the EU's objectives*' lends the latter a sense of identity and autonomy as an actor, even in the context of an intergovernmental policy.

The Council announces the HR's conceptualisation of the EU's comprehensive approach in the subsequent year, while underlining the CSDP's importance 'as an essential element' in this context. The Council mentions a growing approximation between the CSDP and the area of Freedom, Security and Justice (essentially JHA), in the spirit of the EU's comprehensive approach to external crises and conflicts, leading the CSDP to become increasingly less isolated and thus more integrated in the EU's increasingly holistic approach to external action (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). We notice a broadening and more recurrent use of the concept of 'partners' used in reference to crisis management, as the Council refers to 'partner countries in view of their participation in and support to CSDP missions and operations', particularly in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood, in order to "contribute to enhancing regional security and stability" (Council, 2012: 3).

On October 12, 2012, the Nobel Peace prize was awarded to the EU, prompting Herman Van Rompuy and José Manuel Barroso, the Presidents of the European Council and of the Commission, respectively, to make a brief joint statement. Van Rompuy and Barroso used the opportunity to claim that the prize is an acknowledgement of 'the deep political motives behind our Union', namely "the unique effort by ever more European states to *overcome war and divisions* and to jointly shape *a continent of peace and prosperity*" (Van Rompuy and Barroso, 2012). This prize is taken to be an opportunity to provide public validation of the EU's narrative that it is both a 'model' and a 'provider' of peace for the rest of the world. The EU is described as having achieved peace and unity based on its values of 'human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights', which are the same values that it promotes "in order to make the world a better place for all" (ibid.). The presidents imply that the prize is a validation of the EU's value promotion in the area of peace and security based on the idea that it is a model to be emulated, adding that they are 'proud' of the EU and that the prize is proof that it "remains an *inspiration* for leaders and citizens all over the world" (ibid.).

On November 22, 2012, the EP issued a resolution on the implementation of the CSDP based on the Annual Report from the Council to the EP on the CFSP. The EP's resolution

describes the geopolitical environment at the time where ‘significant changes’ took place with consequences for EU policy making, including for the CFSP and the CSDP. The EP refers specifically to the “upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa (including revolutions, conflicts and/or regime change in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria), the emergence on the international scene of new players with regional or even global ambitions and the reorientation of US defence policy priorities towards the Asia-Pacific area” (EP, 2012: 2). As a response to this tense geopolitical environment, the EP proposes that “the CSDP needs to *consolidate* its contribution to peace and stability in the world through its missions and operations that form part of the EU’s comprehensive approach” (ibid.).

In referring to a ‘strategic framework’ for the CSDP, the EP emphasises that the EU “*should be* a global political player on the international scene in order to promote international peace and security, to protect its interests in the world and to ensure the security of its citizens”, adding that “the EU should be able to assume *its responsibilities* when confronted with international threats, crises and conflicts, especially in its neighbourhood” (ibid.: 3). In this section the EP expresses the motivations that justify the existence and further development of the CSDP, namely the promotion of peace outside of its territorial sphere, and the protection of its interests and of the security of its citizens. On the other hand, the EP reinforces the idea that this is all connected to an existing ‘responsibility’, particularly in the EU’s neighbourhood, thus reinforcing the prevailing narrative that characterises the EU’s perception of its own role as a security actor (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). The EP argues that this can be achieved through a ‘more ambitious vision for the CSDP’ as well as an EU ‘strategic autonomy’ that is, nonetheless, anchored in the idea of its complementarity to NATO and its commitment to multilateralism, adding that, as such, it is time for a revised EU security strategy.

The EP places the CSDP ‘at the heart of a comprehensive approach’ in mentioning the upcoming conceptualisation by the HR, and states that it provides the EU with political credibility and visibility. In this context, the EP provides a normative justification for the CSDP’s development in describing the EU’s strength as a crisis management actor in comparison with other organisations (such as NATO) as lying “in its *unique* potential to mobilise the full range of political, economic, development and humanitarian instruments to support its civilian and military crisis management, missions and operations (...) giv[ing] it a unique and widely appreciated flexibility and efficiency” (EP, 2012: 4-5). The relationship between the EU and NATO, described as one of cooperation and synergy, is argued to be mutually beneficial, even though the EP brings attention to the risk of duplication as the EU

dives deeper into developing military capabilities. On the other hand, the EP “expresses disappointment at the development of civilian crisis management structures within NATO, given that this represents an unnecessary duplication of capabilities already present and well-developed in the EU” (ibid.: 17-18). This disappointment is expressed by the EP because the EU’s value-added and uniqueness as a predominantly civilian comprehensive security actor is one of its most visible and important legitimating narratives in this context.

As the EP describes some of the Lisbon Treaty’s yet unfulfilled innovations, it mentions the idea of the Council being able to “entrust a mission to a group of states in order to preserve the Union’s values and serve its interests” (ibid.: 5). The phrasing of this commitment reverses the traditional order of hierarchy, as the EU was created to serve the Member States’ interests. As such, the EP ascribes to the EU a high degree of actorness and independence, with its own values and interests that can be projected and protected by the individual Member States working collectively under a new provision in the treaty. The EP’s expectations and ambitions for the CSDP are shown to be high, as while acknowledging that this policy has made a contribution to crisis management, peacekeeping, as well as ‘the strengthening of international security’, the EP argues that “the CSDP now needs to be able to intervene in all types of crisis, including in the context of high-intensity conflicts in its own neighbourhood, and to be ambitious enough to have a real impact on the ground” (ibid.: 6). As an example, the EP states that it is ‘regrettable’ that the EU did not make use of CSDP tools in the context of the ‘Arab Spring countries’, particularly in North Africa and the Sahel region. On the other hand, the EP praises the EU’s action in matters of crisis management in contexts such as the Western Balkans or the Horn of Africa.

During the course of 2011 and 2012, the CSDP was not visibly prominent in the European Council’s discursive endeavours, as the focus was mainly put on domestic policies and the financial crisis. In addition, the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings in its southern neighbourhood was mainly constructed in the context of the development of the ENP. Nonetheless, in the context of the European Council Conclusions of 13 and 14 December 2012, the EU’s crisis management policy was emphasised in preparation for ‘further development’ to be made in the subsequent year. Still, the main focus of the document is on the EU’s recovery from the financial crisis, and considerations about the CSDP appear under the heading ‘other items.’ In addressing the EU’s security and defence policy, the European Council’s discourse does not differ from previous instances, as it maintains that “in today’s changing world the European Union is *called upon to assume increased responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security* in order to guarantee the *security of its citizens and the*

*promotion of its interests*” (European Council, 2012: 8). In this assertion, the EU acquires ‘increased’ responsibilities (in addition to the ones it allegedly already has) to maintain world peace, thus reaffirming the EU ‘responsibility’ narrative that has been marking the EU’s discourse since its inception (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). Normative justifications are provided in the European Council’s discourse that seek to explain the EU’s actorness ambitions, namely guaranteeing the security of EU citizens and the promotion of its interests. Interestingly, unlike other instances, there is no mention of promotion of European values or norms, which can be interpreted as the beginning of a retraction in the EU’s normative ambitions.

The CSDP is described as “a tangible EU contribution to international crisis management” and the EU is identified as “play[ing] an important role in its neighbourhood and globally” in this context (European Council, 2012: 9). The European Council inscribes the CSDP within the EU’s comprehensive approach in ‘crisis regions’ – including the Western Balkans, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, Sahel, Afghanistan, as well as the South Caucasus, – and argues that missions and operations ‘should be carried out in close cooperation’ with ‘*other* relevant international actors’, including the UN, NATO, the OSCE, and the AU, as well as ‘partner countries’. The European Council invites the HR to make proposals, in the subsequent year, for improvement of the CSDP, including in aspects that might improve this policy’s effectiveness, visibility, and impact by means of ‘further developing the comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and stabilisation’, as well as aspects that might improve the CSDP’s defence capabilities and industry.

On July 29, 2013, HR Catherine Ashton published a Review of the EEAS’s first years, drafted by herself and her team at the EEAS, providing a basis for the understanding of the newly created EEAS’s purpose and its part in determining the EU’s role in the world, including in the area of crisis management. The Review begins with a foreword by HR Ashton where she recalls the tremendous difficulties present during the setting-up of the EEAS. While doing so, Ashton argues that “the world did not wait for a service to exist”, as “challenges in our own neighbourhood and beyond *demand*ed a European response” (Ashton, 2013b: 1). This assertion reiterates the recurring idea in the EU’s discourses as a crisis management actor of an EU ‘responsibility’ to engage in external ‘challenges’ and crises (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). A few paragraphs later, the HR/VP sums up both the main constraint and the main purpose of the EEAS in its initial years:



We have sought to make the best use of scarce financial resources – and also to *meet expectations that the EU should support progress towards democracy and prosperity* in countries as varied as Libya and Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, Mali and Myanmar/ Burma (Ashton, 2013b: 1).

In this paragraph, Ashton assumes that the EU is *expected* to engage in the promotion of democracy, although she does not mention the source of the expectation. Nonetheless, this says a lot about how EU external action is seen by the person appointed to be in charge of it during a crucial period of reaffirmation of its very purpose and aim. In fact, this paragraph is immediately followed by the affirmation that “We are guided by *our conviction* that Europe has a *special role to play* in today’s world” (ibid.). This sentence is, in many ways, a reproduction of some core ideas that we have identified in previous discourses, not least because of the use of the adjective ‘special’, denoting distinction, uniqueness, exceptionality, in line with one of the main narratives used to legitimate EUFP and crisis management in particular.

After mentioning how ‘people around the world’ are ‘willing to place trust’ in the EU, Ashton assumes that “conflicts thousands of miles from our borders can damage our interests, while the spread of peace, prosperity and democracy around the world is good for Europe” (ibid.). Thus, the HR justifies the development of the EU’s external relations for realist purposes (based on interests and self-preservation) by means of constructivist instruments (spread of peace, prosperity and democracy): “the EEAS has developed into a modern and operational foreign policy service, equipped to promote EU interests and values in our relations with the rest of the world” (ibid.: 2). It is the very frequency of this normative justification for EUFP and crisis management in particular that makes it relevant for our study. While the idea that the EU has a foreign policy to cater to its interests is not very different from what states may do, the idea that it has a foreign policy primarily to *spread its values* – and especially that this has become almost taken for granted – is where it stands out. This idea, in turn, is rooted in the narrative that the EU is a ‘model’ of peace and progress to be reproduced through its foreign policy.

The document then moves on to the EEAS’ structures, in a mostly descriptive manner. At some point, the Review has a section dedicated to Crisis Management Structures, where it begins by stating that “the EU is *highly regarded* for our civilian and military missions” (ibid.: 5). The praise comes from unidentified external sources, which makes the phrasing appear as if the assertion is assumed to be not only true but taken for granted. The section goes on to describe the existing technical and capability features of the missions and the functioning of the

structures. The part concerning EEAS structures is followed by a description of the functioning of the EEAS in the context of the development and implementation of EU external action, and in the context of its relationship with EU institutions. The subsequent part deals with the role of the HR and of the EU delegations worldwide. These sections of the Review are quite descriptive and not very normatively charged (either implicitly or explicitly), relating mostly to practical and administrative aspects. The document finishes with practical recommendations for practical internal improvements, such as further speed, efficiency, and coordination in the decision and implementation of EU external action or avoiding unnecessary structural / institutional duplications.

On October 15, 2013, HR Catherine Ashton produced a final report on the CSDP in preparation for the European Council on Security and Defence to be held later that year. The report begins with a quote by the HR at the EDA annual conference, held in Brussels in March of the same year, where the development of the area of security and defence at the EU level is normatively justified with ‘three cases’: “the first is political, and it concerns fulfilling *Europe’s ambitions* on the world stage. The second is operational: ensuring that Europe has the right military capabilities *to be able to act*. And the third is economic: here it’s about jobs, innovation and growth” (Ashton, 2013c: 1). These internally-oriented normative justifications for the development of the CSDP add to the prevailing discourses concerning the preservation and promotion of EU values and interests, as well as the security of the EU and other citizens.

The first point addressed in the report concerns the ‘strategic context’, characterised by Ashton as being “marked by increased regional and global volatility, emerging security challenges, the US rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific and the impact of the financial crisis” (ibid.). The HR insists on the idea of a growing interconnection between internal and external security and the weakening of the power of individual states (implying that the EU is a viable alternative). In addition, Ashton brings up the ‘Arab uprisings’, which are described as “full of promise [but] have also led to increased instability and conflict” (ibid.) as well as other issues in the EU’s neighbourhood that affect the EU. ‘Long-standing’ security threats are enumerated – including WMDs, terrorism, ‘failed states’, regional conflicts, as well as organised crime – in addition to ‘new’ threats, including cyber-attacks, climate change, and resource-related competition. To tackle these issues, the HR argues that ‘the transatlantic relationship remains essential’, but “Europe must assume greater responsibility for its own security and that of its neighbourhood” (ibid.), meaning that it needs more autonomy and resources in matters of security and defence not only for crisis management outside of its territorial sphere, but also for ensuring EU-level defence.

In order to stimulate a security and defence debate at the highest political level, Ashton enumerates the EU's priorities in this area as: a focus on the CSDP 'as a security provider' primarily in its neighbourhood, 'including through direct intervention'; the protection of the EU's interests and projection of its values by "helping to prevent and resolve crises and *including through projecting power*" (ibid.: 2); building and reinforcing regional and bilateral partnerships to both cooperate and build capacities in matters of crisis management; increase the EU's reaction speed and operational independence in different dimensions (land, air, maritime, space, and cyber); and the practical implementation of the comprehensive approach (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), allowing for the use of a plethora of EUFP tools – described as "the EU's main strength at the international level" (Ashton, 2013c: 4) – 'in a strategically coherent and effective manner'. Following the enumeration of the EU's security priorities, the HR recalls the E/CSDP's achievements throughout the previous 15 years, concluding that "the EU is becoming an effective security provider, and is increasingly being recognized as such" (ibid.: 3), even though many challenges remain. A key challenge that remains is, according to Ashton, that there is no agreement on a 'long-term vision' regarding the CSDP's future, despite this policy becoming increasingly embedded in the idea of the comprehensive approach, as well as focusing increasingly more on capacity-building and on establishing and reinforcing partnerships: "for the EU to *live up to its role as security provider* means that European citizens and the international community need to be able to trust and rely on the EU to deliver *when the situation demands*. We must move from discussion to delivery" (ibid.: 4).

Ashton prescribes greater coherence and alignment between EUFP tools, particularly CSDP's short-term oriented instruments and long-term development instruments (despite both policies having different objectives and decision-making procedures), by means of regional or thematic strategies, in order to "increase their impact, effectiveness and visibility" (ibid.: 5). Another prescription is a closer cooperation with the EU's partners, identified firstly as the UN, NATO, and the AU, where the EU's cooperation with NATO in particular is described as "strong, coherent and *mutually reinforcing*", and as "remain[ing] *as important as ever*" (ibid.). Other partners that are mentioned include 'non-EU NATO allies and candidate countries', including countries such as BiH and Georgia, meant to provide assets, expertise, and knowledge. In addition, a newly created Panel on CSDP of the Eastern Partnership "opens new opportunities for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and EaP countries" in a 'tailor-made approach' that 'adapts this cooperation to the EU's and partners' respective expectations and interests' (ibid.). In addition to closer cooperation with partners, the HR also prescribes an

increased support to capacity-building ‘of local and regional partners’, including Niger, Mali, or Somalia, to encourage partners to “increasingly take the responsibility for preventing crises and managing them on their own” (ibid.).

On 21 November 2013, the EP produced a resolution on CSDP where it enumerates what it identifies as ‘significant and ongoing changes in the geopolitical environment’ that affect not only the EU (and ultimately drive the CSDP) but affect ‘both sides of the Atlantic’. In this context, the EP urges a reassessment and strengthening of the EU’s ‘role in the world’, which is deemed ‘one of the major challenges of the 21st century’. As such, the EP argues that “the time has come for the Member States of the Union to show the political will needed for making the EU a relevant global actor and security provider with *real strategic autonomy*” (EP, 2013: 3). This statement (especially coming from a supranational institution) reinforces the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP (and of the CSDP) and the EU’s relative and conditional autonomy and effectiveness, which are only possible with political will and competence delegation from the Member States. In encouraging the meeting of the European Council at the end of 2013 to debate the future of the CSDP, the EP provides five key justifications for the existence and further development of this policy, namely arguing that

(...) the EU needs to be able to *provide security for its citizens, to promote and defend its fundamental values, to assume its share of responsibility for world peace* and to play an effective role in *preventing and managing regional crises in its wider neighbourhood*, contributing to their resolution and *protecting itself against the negative effects* of these crises (ibid.).

In order for the EU to be able to improve its role and its ability to achieve these goals, the EP proposes that certain mechanisms present in the Lisbon Treaty be put into practice, such as the establishment of permanent structured cooperation between groups of willing and able Member States, among others. The EP emphasises that,

according to the Treaties, the EU’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples (Article 3 TEU) and that its action on the international scene seeks to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and to prevent conflicts and strengthen international security (ibid.: 4).

As such, the EP defends that the CSDP ‘serves these aims’ and needs to be further developed and better integrated in the context of the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). In addition, the EP stresses the need to upgrade also the ESS to take into account growing challenges by focusing more on protecting EU citizens, as well as defending EU infrastructures and the European neighbourhood. Ultimately, the EP stresses “the need to ensure that the EU is in a position to contribute, by means of crisis management operations, to conflict prevention, stabilisation and resolution” (EP, 2013: 5), adding that certain treaty changes (namely the mutual defence and solidarity clauses) have contributed towards the reinforcement of a ‘sense of common destiny’ and a ‘spirit of commitment, mutual understanding and genuine solidarity’ that will allow the EU to “be able to *fulfil its global role*, thus enhancing the security of Europe and that of its citizens” (ibid.). Throughout the document, the EU’s neighbourhood is identified as a key area for EU security, where the EU is thought to need to be able to ‘act autonomously’ (ibid.: 8).

Following two sections dedicated to improvement proposals for capabilities and industry, respectively, the EP finishes the resolution by urging a public debate about EU level security and defence from a normative standpoint, as it “stresses the need to (...) *explain the causal nexus* between security and defence on the one hand, and freedom, democracy, rule of law and prosperity on the other” (ibid.: 11). This sentence entails an assumption (present throughout the EU’s discourses) that this link is driven by an underlying causality, i.e. that core EU values such as democracy and the rule of law produce suitable conditions for peace and security, even though the EP admits that such causal nexus needs to be explained and justified. Moreover, the EP argues that internal and external security are indivisibly linked, and that “a peaceful, secure and stable environment is a precondition for preserving the political, economic and social model in Europe” (ibid.), thus justifying the existence of a policy like the CSDP, which is labelled “a basic pillar of the European integration process” (ibid.).

The ‘comprehensive approach’ concept was formally launched on December 11, 2013, when HR/VP Catherine Ashton presented a Joint Communication to the EP and the Council entitled ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises’. This concept proposes a mobilisation and interconnectedness of all tools and instruments available to the EU, mainly with the purpose of maximising coherence and effectiveness in tackling external conflicts and crises, and of validating the idea of the EU as a relevant international actor (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). The document starts out by explaining that the EU engages in different stages of crisis management

“in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term development” (Ashton, 2013a: 2). This statement reveals the EU’s assumption that ‘development’ is something that is universally desired and that it is a positive thing, as implicitly opposed to ‘stagnation’. Even though the document does not specify what kind of development, or what ‘development’ even means, previous documents have linked the EU’s crisis management policy to an effort to encouraging or improving the *economic* development of the recipient countries or regions. The following paragraph summarises the EU’s ambitions and vision of its own actorness:

The EU has a *vital interest* to prevent, prepare for, respond to, address and help recovery from conflicts, crises and other security threats outside its borders – this is a *permanent task and responsibility*, already recognised in both the European Security Strategy and the EU Internal Security Strategy. This is the case not only *because the EU is widely considered as an example of peace and stability* in its neighbourhood and in other parts of the world, but also because it is in the EU’s global interest (ibid.: 3).

The definition of ‘comprehensiveness’ encompasses itself aspects related to ‘EU instruments and resources’ and ‘the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States’ (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). These aspects indicate the importance of getting domestic EU actors on board with the EU’s crisis management discourses, which denote that the document is mostly targeted at the Member States. Expressions such as ‘unique’ and ‘expertise’ mark the EU’s description of its diplomatic assets, which the document argues can be brought together to allow the EU to “better define and defend its fundamental interests and values, promote its key political objectives and prevent crises or help to restore stability” (ibid.). The positioning of these elements in the sentence is not random, as it appears to reflect the EU’s priorities and deep-rooted normative positioning regarding its ambitions and stance as a crisis management actor. These priorities are also reflected in how the EU describes the purpose of engaging in crisis management, as it is meant to “help to improve the lives of those threatened by conflict and prevent or mitigate the negative effects [for the EU, its citizens and its internal security] of insecurity and conflict elsewhere” (ibid.).

The link between security and development – which is present in previous documents – is considered in this context to be paramount – it ‘is therefore a key underlying principle in the application of an EU comprehensive approach’ (ibid.: 4), again reiterating the EU’s normative

attitude towards crisis management as well as the link established by the EU between lack of development/ progress and conflict. The former concepts are assumed to be universally desired and, as such, become a preferred process for the EU to achieve sustainable peace by means of exporting its normative standards (such as democratic practices, rule of law, and human rights protection). The following paragraph summarises the idea that the EU has of its own role in the area of crisis management, revealing its inward-looking strategy and focus on itself, its understanding of a situation, its potential role, quality, and value-added:

A coherent political strategy for conflict prevention, preparedness and response starts with all relevant players *sharing a common understanding of the situation or the challenge*. A shared analysis should *set out the EU's understanding* about the causes of a potential conflict or crisis, identify the key people and groups involved, review the dynamics of the situation and assess the potential risks of action, or non-action. It must also *identify the EU interests and objectives and our potential role* to contribute to peace, security, development, human rights and the rule of law, taking into account existing EU resources and action in the country or region in question (ibid.: 5).

In this document, the concepts of 'fragile states' and 'poorly governed areas' appear again, as in previous documents. Even though these are not specifically defined, they help sustain the link between an EU normative vision of strong states or well-governed areas and lack of conflicts or crises (ibid.: 9). The inward-looking language remains present in expressions such as 'the EU's understanding', or 'EU interests and objectives' and 'potential role'. As in previous cases, the identification of other actors is directed at the EU's 'international partners' – "the UN in most crisis situations, NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on macro-financial issues, et cetera" (ibid.: 11-12) – rather than the potential host countries / regions, suggesting that the EU seeks the former's recognition and validation above the latter's.

The December 2013 Council Conclusions drafted in response to the EEAS Review are a very brief and technical document. The most normatively charged statement that the document contains is the repetition of the sentence that the EEAS is a "modern and operational foreign policy service, equipped to promote EU values and interests as well as to ensure coordination and consistency in the EU's relations with the rest of the world" (Council, 2013: 1) as stated in the EEAS Review. This reiterates the idea that the promotion of EU values and interests is one of the main tasks of the EEAS, but also one of the main purposes of EU external

action. Concerning crisis management, the document does not go beyond recognising a need for revising and streamlining the policy's planning and decision-making procedures, as well as its effectiveness and efficiency, as it refrains from making any statement related to the policy's normative goals.

On 19 and 20 December 2013, and “for the first time since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council held a thematic debate on defence” (European Council, 2013: 1). The European Council was held in the aftermath of a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who “presented his assessment of current and future security challenges and welcomed the ongoing efforts and commitments *by the EU and its Member States* as being *compatible with, and beneficial to NATO*” (ibid.). Later in the document, the European Council returns to the idea that the CSDP “will continue to develop in full complementarity with NATO in the agreed framework of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of each” (ibid.: 2). The highlighting of NATO's importance and symbiotic relationship with the CSDP is a recurrent narrative in the EU's discourses which serves, among other purposes, to emphasise the EU's complementarity role as a global crisis management actor, and thus the usefulness of both organisations. The mentioning of the EU *and* its Member States here and throughout the Conclusions document highlights the intergovernmental nature not only of the policy in case, but also of the institution producing the discourse.

The European Council begins its Conclusions document by stating that ‘defence matters’, and that “an effective CSDP helps to *enhance the security of European citizens and contributes to peace and stability* in our neighbourhood and in the broader world” (ibid.: 1). The European Council brings attention to the rapid evolution of ‘Europe's strategic and geopolitical environment’ and identifies some capability and industry-related constraints that hinder the EU's action in this field. In this sense, the HSGs argue that “the *EU and its Member States* must exercise *greater responsibilities* in response to those challenges *if* they want to contribute to *maintaining peace and security* through CSDP together with *key partners* such as the UN and NATO” (ibid.: 2). The means through which the European Council proposes that the EU and its Member States exercise ‘greater responsibilities’ is by “deepen[ing] defence cooperation by improving the capacity to conduct missions and operations and (...) improve the development and availability of the required civilian and military capabilities” (ibid.).

The three axes that guide the European Council on defence are identified as increasing the CSDP's effectiveness, visibility, and impact; capability development; as well strengthening the European defence industry. In reference to the first axis, the European Council describes



CSDP missions as a “tangible expression of the Union's commitment to international peace and security” (ibid.: 3), arguing that “the *EU and its Member States* can bring to the international stage *the unique ability* to combine, in a consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and justice” (ibid.). Here, another justification is provided for the EU’s crisis management actorness, as the EU’s uniqueness and preparedness are emphasised as making it a particularly adequate actor in this field, in line with the previously mentioned complementarity to NATO’s more traditional military approach. In addition, a tendency towards a greater focus on ownership is present, as the European Council accentuates the importance of “supporting partner countries and regional organisations, through providing training, advice, equipment and resources where appropriate, so that they can increasingly prevent or manage crises by themselves” (ibid.). Although the focus on ownership and the elevation of CSDP host countries and potential host countries to ‘partners’ became increasingly present in the EU’s discourse, this stance is still largely imbued with an asymmetric positioning of the EU’s ‘partner countries’ *vis-à-vis* the EU itself, whereby the latter positions itself in a higher hierarchical positioning of dictating the standards to be adopted by the former, as well as the terms of the cooperation between the two.

As in previous discourses, there is a reinforcement of the idea of a growing link between external and internal security in the EU’s discourses and policy-making, triggered by a changing security environment with more and diverse challenges that affect the EU, including cyber and maritime security, illegal migration, organised crime, terrorism, as well as energy security.

On March 4, 2014, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso addressed a high-level conference on the European security and defence sector with a speech entitled “Strengthening Europe security and defence sector.” Barroso starts by pointing out that the ‘European security and defence sector’ is “vitaly important to the European Union, to its lasting stability and prosperity as well as to its role and projection on the world stage,” adding that Eurobarometer surveys show that a ‘strong and credible’ “features high among our citizens’ legitimate aspirations” (Barroso, 2014).

After explaining the characteristics of the security and defence industry, Barroso explains why it is strategically important for the EU to develop the latter: “it is a key element of our capacity to ensure that every European has access to security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social well-being. It is therefore at the core of Europe’s ‘raison d’être’,” adding that “it is also at the core of Europe’s role and ambition on the international stage, in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected world” (ibid.). It is interesting and unusual that

the first strategic reason pointed out for the development of a security and defence sector at the EU level is domestically-oriented, and while it appears to reflect an idea of territorial defence, it is most likely to refer to the EU's crisis management endeavours outside of its territorial sphere as indirect guarantors of EU security, in addition to matters of actorness ambition. This interpretation is confirmed when Barroso continues by stating that "recent events from Afghanistan to Africa and even more recently Ukraine have shown that *for the sake of its own stability and security*, Europe has to pay attention to old 'frozen conflicts' and other potential new flashpoints" (ibid.). In addition to explaining the strategic motivation behind the EU's efforts, the Commission President argues that "there is also *beyond Europe a growing demand* for Europeans to dispatch their military forces on mission abroad," and that "*expectations for more action* from Europe *worldwide* have been rising since the 1990s" (ibid.), even though he does not explain whence such demands stem. Barroso adds, in line with statements made by previous Commission Presidents, that "the *need* for further efforts in security and defence is increasingly seen as *a matter of political credibility* of the European Union" (ibid.), reflecting the importance of this area for the EU's actorness identity.

On 17 March 2014, the Council, in its Foreign Affairs formation, discussed the implementation of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. In the Conclusions adopted by the Council, the concept of 'partner' appears frequently in reference to local actors, which the EU seeks to "*support* (...) in addressing the region's key security and development challenges" (Council, 2014b: 1). The Council reiterates its perceived validity of the goals of the strategy in matters of security, peace-building, conflict prevention, countering radicalisation, as well as development, highlighting that "*the link between security and development* will remain *at the heart* of EU policies and operations in the region" (ibid.), in the spirit of the EU's comprehensive approach (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). Even though the so-called 'security-development nexus' was already present in the EU's discourse before, the launch and institutionalisation of the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises in the previous year emphasised this link and made it gradually more discernible in the EU's discourses.

As in previous instances, the Council repeats the idea that "the primary responsibility and ownership for peace, security and development is with the governments of the Sahel region" (Council, 2014b: 3). Yet, it also states that the EU "will continue to *promote* democracy, human rights, decentralisation policies, *good* governance (...) and it will encourage the fight

against corruption as well as counter-radicalisation projects as a means of conflict prevention” (ibid.: 2).

In May 2014, the Council produced a document with conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, proposed in the previous year by the HR/VP. In the Conclusions, the Council argues that the comprehensive approach “contributes greatly to the Union’s ability to play a positive and *transformative role* in its external relations and as a global actor” (Council, 2014a: 1). This assertion stems greatly from a continuance of an inward-looking focus and identity construction as an actor:

The EU’s policies and priorities should *follow from common strategic objectives* and a *clear common vision of what the EU collectively wants to achieve* in its external relations or in a particular conflict or crisis situation. The Council notes that the regional strategies developed for the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and most recently the Gulf of Guinea have been valuable in *framing the EU’s engagements across many policy areas* (ibid.: 2).

The EU’s normative justification discourses shift between frequently acting according to ‘what the EU collectively wants to achieve’ and acting according to an abstract ‘need / responsibility’ for it to act. This shift is reflected in both the EU legitimacy and actorness scholarly debates, albeit separately: the first type of normative justification is identified by authors that defend the EUFP’s intergovernmental nature to justify its legitimacy (e.g. Moravcsic, 2002, 2008), and the second type of justification is reflected in constructivist or post-structuralist authors’ claims of centrality of strategic narratives in justifying actorness claims (e.g. Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017).

Another aspect that was brought up was “the need for the EU to better, earlier and more systematically link up its *political engagement*, its CSDP missions and operations, its *development* cooperation and assistance” (Council, 2014a: 2). This reiterates an aspect that has appeared systematically in the EU’s discourses in the area of crisis management, which is the linkage between the idea of the EU helping countries and regions in crisis and the simultaneous export of its norms and values in this context; as well as a growing tendency to link crisis management and development cooperation. This also recaps the EU’s inherent ambition in the world, which is the prevalence of its ‘superior’ normative standards over other paradigms of ‘weak / bad’ governance and underdevelopment. Following this argument, the document states that “a comprehensive approach should *also* enable rapid EU action as required” (ibid.). The

use of the adverb ‘also’ suggests a bigger concern with the former (political engagement and development) than with the latter (ensuring rapid assistance).

In August 2014, Federica Mogherini assumed the role of HR/VP. Her approach to the area of security and defence has been slightly different from that of Catherine Ashton. This is because Mogherini inherited years of hard work done by Ashton in setting up the EEAS and streamlining a number of procedures related to the area of crisis management (such as the decision-making procedure, for example), and because of the rapidly changing security environment around Europe. Mogherini’s performance as HR in the area of security and defence appears to be more active in matters of public diplomacy (Blockmans and Montesano, 2015), yet she inherited a difficult security environment, as mentioned, which has shaped and conditioned her action.

In the mandates of most civilian CSDP missions, three concepts appear repeatedly: monitoring, mentoring, and advising (MMA). The lack of conceptual clarity had not been properly addressed until – perhaps for practical reasons, such as allowing for room for interpretation – when a document was prepared in November 2014 to establish clear definitions under the guise of ‘operational guidelines’ for these concepts. The extensive EEAS document entitled Civilian Operations Commander Operational Guidelines for monitoring, mentoring and advising in civilian CSDP missions (EEAS, 2014b), is addressed at the PSC and the Council. The document is divided into different sections, including one concerning definitions of each of the three concepts, another section concerning basic principles for monitoring, mentoring, and advising – which include European values; local ownership; capacity building; sustainability; flexibility; patience; awareness of the political, legal, and administrative environment; cultural awareness; respect; interaction; trust and confidence; structured transfer of knowledge; as well as cooperation with other actors –, as well as sections regarding responsibilities within mission leadership, as well as training, and implementation.

In the introduction, the triad of concepts is collectively identified as aiming “at capacity building and transfer of knowledge in order to enable the host country to develop sustainable rule of law organisations and processes” (ibid.: 6), and the purpose of the document is explained. The document then defines and explains the three concepts ‘for the purposes of MMA’:

(...) ‘monitoring’ refers to observing performance, efficiency and work methods and the performance of the local counterparts, with a view to drawing conclusions about how to *improve* their performance through mentoring and advising. It also involves developing a

political and contextual understanding of the institution in which the local counterparts work (ibid.: 8).

The mentor is an experienced person who *fosters and supports* the personal skills and professional performance of another person (mentee). Mentoring takes place in a long-term one-to-one relationship, which must be based on trust and respect (ibid.: 9).

The advisor is an experienced person who *gives advice* to an organisation in order to *develop the performance* of the entire organisation with a view to *enable* the organisation or parts thereof to fulfil its tasks (...) (ibid.: 10).

In addition to these definitions, the document further explains the uses and contexts of the latter as part of civilian CSDP missions. All of these definitions imply an asymmetrical hierarchical positioning, with the actor performing these tasks being placed in a superior dominant position and the actor receiving them being positioned in a subordinate position. Although all MMA principles described in the document are important for civilian crisis management, we will focus particularly on the first two: European values and local ownership. After describing the EU's values as stated in the Lisbon Treaty, the document explains the extent to which they matter in civilian crisis management missions:

The European Union intervenes with a civilian CSDP strengthening mission only when the host country has made its own decision to move towards reform and/ or state and capacity building. *Inviting the EU to assist in these efforts implies acceptance of the abovementioned values and the will of the local authorities to enforce them* (ibid.).

This explanation entails an idea that has been latent in the EU's discourses since the inception of its foreign policy: the EU constructs itself as a crisis management actor built on the protection of liberal norms, institutions, and values, promoting the latter's alleged universality and global desirability *on its own terms*, as the one that determines what should be considered normal, appropriate, and universal. As for local ownership, it is described as 'the ultimate goal of MMA', as "the transition of knowledge, skills and capacity with respect for the full ownership of the host-country's authorities" (ibid.: 11). Yet, the document also points out challenges to ownership that can be solved with capacity building efforts, since

(...) the host country initially might not have the capacity to take ownership because of shortfalls in organisation, experience, legal framework, etc. (...) However, a reform imposed on a country from the outside – even with the agreement of the political elite – is bound to fail in the long run (ibid.).

This might explain why crisis management missions are mostly launched following a formal request on behalf of local authorities, despite oftentimes the EU being the driver behind their launch.

In this section we have explored the EU's discourses in the context of the signing and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. This period reflects a greater focus on EU actorness and visibility, particularly due to the treaty changes, but simultaneously there is a greater discursive emphasis on the intergovernmental specificity of the E/CSDP, following the rejection of the constitutional treaty in 2005. We noticed an increasing approximation between the external and internal dimensions of EU security, and between different areas of Foreign Policy (such as security and development), in line with the implementation of the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). The following section analyses EU discourses that contain normative justification elements for the further development of its crisis management policy that reflect the emergent threats and challenges facing the EU since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

#### **4.5 - Resilience and retraction in the EU's normative ambitions**

In the present section, we analyse and contextualise discourses that include elements of normative justification for the development of the EU's crisis management actorness that were produced or divulged during the period of 2015 and 2016 that led to the adoption of a new EU strategic document, the EU Global Strategy. Around this period, events such as the civil war in Syria and the emergence of new complex and unconventional terrorist networks (such as ISIS) led to political instability in the European southern neighbourhood and within the EU itself, which was simultaneously affected by the refugee crisis that emerged in the Mediterranean region. To the East, the Ukrainian revolution – often dubbed 'Euromaidan' revolution / revolution of dignity – that took place in 2013 and 2014 in favour of increased European approximation or integration, was followed by the Russian annexation of Crimea and the emergence and intensification of territorial disputes between pro-Russian separatist forces and

pro-Ukrainian / pro-European forces (Shveda and Park, 2016). Domestically, the EU was also dealing with the practical implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, as well as with the first steps in an unprecedented Member State's withdrawal from the European project, in the midst of a growing wave of populism and Euroscepticism. These various growing domestic and external challenges and threats that the EU had to deal with during this period strengthened the link between external and internal dimensions of EU security and reinforced the gradual reduction in the EU's normative ambitions in many areas of EUFP, including crisis management. This was accompanied by an increasing portrayal of the EU's interlocutors as 'partners' and a focus on the latter's ownership, autonomy, and capacity-building.

On March 4, 2015, HR Mogherini produced a Joint Consultation Paper entitled 'Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy', meant to "frame the discussion for a thorough re-examination of the ENP" (Mogherini, 2015b: 3). Even though the ENP and the CSDP are distinct policies, they are neither isolated policies nor are they free from mutual influence. Not only is the ENP one of the EU's most important foreign policy frameworks, but the implementation of the comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises has rendered EU external action policies closer and more interconnected so as to tackle goals more effectively and efficiently (Oproiu, 2015). The purpose of analysing this document is to illustrate the similarities between the discursive and policy changes that we observe in the CSDP and those that have occurred in the context of the ENP, emphasising both policies' interconnection in the framework of the construction and normative justification of the EU's overall crisis management actorness.

The Joint Consultation Paper begins by labelling the EU's relationship with its neighbourhood as 'special', citing article 8(1) of the TEU. The lack of stability in the EU's neighbourhood is identified by Mogherini as 'increasing the challenges faced by the EU and its partners', including "aggravating economic and social pressures, irregular migration and refugee flows, security threats *and leading to diverging aspirations*" (Mogherini, 2015b: 2). As the HR briefly describes the evolution of the ENP, including its attempts to adapt to changes such as those generated by the Arab uprisings since 2011, she admits that the policy "has not always been able to offer adequate responses to these recent developments, nor to the changing aspirations of our partners. Therefore, the EU's own interests have not been fully served either" (ibid.). Mogherini argues that "the reform agenda has stalled, in part due to competing interests, in part because not all partners seem equally interested in a special partnership with the EU *under the model of pluralism and integration*" (ibid.). This rhetoric accompanies the

aforementioned tendency towards the increasing use of the epithet ‘partner’ with regard to countries with which the EU has mostly had a marked asymmetric relationship (either by imposing conditionality or by dictating the terms of all manners of assistance, not to mention the EU Member States’ colonial past). In this sense, the ENP reform is, according to the HR, triggered by a “need to review the assumptions on which the policy is based” (ibid.: 3), in addition to its functioning and the appropriateness of EU tools for each context, in order to “ensure the ENP can (...) support more effectively the development of *an area of shared stability, security and prosperity* with our partners” (ibid.).

What was the prevailing paradigm in most areas of EUFP – the EU putting itself and its interests first – is rethought, as Mogherini considers essential to not only consult the EU’s partners ‘on *their* interests and ambitions for this partnership’, but to reconsider the EU’s own interests and ambitions as well, in light of the latter. In addition, “it should also be considered *how the EU should best respond to crises and conflict situations* (...) taking into account the sources of influence and pressure on our partners that determine their political positions, including towards the EU” (ibid.). The CSDP is identified as a key policy for ensuring *stability* in the EU’s neighbourhood – a key idea in the revised ENP – as the lack thereof “not only disrupts progress towards democracy but also threatens the rule of law, violates human rights and has serious impacts on the EU, such as irregular migratory flows and security threats” (ibid.: 6). As such, one of the ideas raised in the HR’s Joint Consultation Paper is a greater integration between the ENP and the CSDP.

This document, meant to “frame a policy debate on the future direction of the ENP” (ibid.: 10), is clear in indicating the overall direction and intentions for the ENP (even if it is not necessarily clear in much else). This direction points, as mentioned, towards stability and a clear retraction in the EU’s normative ambitions, as a result of a dilemma that the EU was facing. For years it pressed for too many or too deep reforms, appearing condescending and patronising, and approximating a colonial attitude. Yet, a relaxation of these normative ambitions in favour of stability and resilience, on the other hand is also not bereft of risks, as the focus on ownership and the treatment of autocrats as ‘partners’ may result in the latter’s validation and in the maintenance of potentially oppressive environments, which, in turn, can generate the problems that the EU is precisely trying to avoid (Schumacher, 2016).

The discourse of other EU institutions at the time also focuses predominantly on the EU’s neighbourhood. This is the case with the EP’s resolution on the HR’s Annual Report on CFSP, published on March 12, 2015, which begins with the identification of a ‘changed political and security environment’ characterised by “the dramatically aggravated security



environment around the EU, especially in its immediate neighbourhood, where the international law-based order and stability and security of Europe are challenged to a degree unprecedented since the beginning of European integration” (EP, 2015a: 1). In addition, the EP points out that the EU’s internal crisis environment hinders the use of “its *full potential to shape* the international political and security environment” (ibid.), and “lack of policy coordination and coherence between EU policies, and financial limitations, pose additional restraints *on Europe’s influence in the world* and its *capacity to be a regional and global security provider* contributing to conflict prevention and crisis management” (ibid.: 2).

The main goals of the CFSP (including many specific CSDP goals) are identified by the EP in the resolution, allowing us to pinpoint the EP’s view regarding the normative justifications for this policy. The first identified goal is the protection of EU values and interests, the strengthening the political and legal order in Europe “thereby restoring and safeguarding peace and stability” (ibid.). The second goal entails the territorial defence of the EU Member States and the protection of EU citizens “by strengthening its ability to defend itself against the threats facing it, including terrorism and arms, drug and human trafficking” (ibid.). The third goal of the CFSP, according to the EP, is “supporting security, democratisation, the rule of law and economic and social development in the EU’s neighbourhood” (ibid.). The fourth goal entails the EU’s assumption of a ‘leadership’ position in conflict resolution by means peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the framework of the CSDP. The listing of the EP’s perception of the CFSP’s goals is presented almost in reverse of the policy’s goals at the time of its inception in the 1990s, where the EU’s leadership and normative ambitions of democratisation and strengthening of the rule of law were at the forefront of the EU’s foreign policy drives, whereas territorial defence was either put last, or indirectly associated with the EU’s proactive action, or primarily left up to NATO.

The idea of multilateralism is also raised by the EP in identifying another CFSP goal, where the EU is meant to, alongside its ‘partners’, strengthen the “the rules-based, pluralistic global political, economic and financial order, including respect for the rule of law and human rights” (ibid.). The last CFSP goal identified by the EP is the EU’s own improvement “in order to strengthen its *resilience* and allow it to *unleash its full potential as a global player*” (ibid.). All of these goals reflect the discursive and practice atmosphere in CFSP and CSDP during the period that preceded the launch of the EU Global Strategy, particularly the last one. The idea of ‘resilience’ – i.e. the EU’s ability to adapt, endure, and especially to recover in face of adversity (Aradau, 2014; Juncos, 2016; Bendiek, 2017: 14; Colombo *et al.*, 2017) – became increasingly important, and was accompanied by a progressive contraction of the EU’s foreign

policy normative ambitions in face of its own vulnerability and of the volatility and unpredictability of its surrounding security environment. Moreover, the goal of strengthening the EU's ability to defend itself and ensure stability reflects a growing acknowledgement of the link between external and internal aspects of EU security, as well as a 'pragmatist' turn in EUFP (Juncos, 2016). The idea of the EU's credibility as an actor is also raised by the EP, in line with the goals established by the Lisbon Treaty in matters of external action. The EP describes the EU's credibility as an actor as stemming from achieving an 'ambitious and effective' EUFP "based on a *shared vision of key European interests, values and objectives* in external relations and on a *common perception of the threats* affecting the EU as a whole" (EP, 2015a: 2) and encourages a 'strategic reflection' to ensue. The need for increased effectiveness and visibility is raised, as the EP proposes a greater emphasis on the comprehensive use of the EU's tools, as well as a move from a reactive to a 'proactive, coherent, and strategic' CFSP, "based on common values and deployed in the shared European interest" (ibid.: 3).

The normative nature of EUFP, including the CFSP and the CSDP, is evoked by the EP, as it mentions that "the EU has the obligation under Article 21 of the Treaty on EU to ensure that its external action is designed and implemented in order to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law" (ibid.). Even though, as in previous instances in EU discourses, the EP praises "the *vital importance* of collective defence guaranteed by NATO for its members" (ibid.: 4), it still "*urges* the Member States, *as a matter of urgency*, to step up their ability to contribute to territorial defence" (ibid.) under the aegis of the CSDP. This greater focus on the EU's ability to defend itself follows the USA's Foreign Policy pivot to Asia and the worsening of crises within and outside of Europe, including terrorist attacks in EU Member States and a growing flow of refugees and irregular migration, making it "increasingly difficult to separate internal from external security" (ibid.: 6).

The EU's relations with its neighbourhood are also the target of comments and recommendations by the EP, as it urges a new, less patronising approach to be undertaken "based on merits, differentiation and the 'more for more' principle", adding that "supporting those countries that want to draw closer to the EU must be a *top priority for EU foreign policy* and that an *important response for containing Russia's ambitions in its neighbourhood* is to invest in the independence, sovereignty, economic development and further democratisation of these countries" (ibid.: 8). These comments are made in the context of Russia's 'aggressive' border policy and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that followed the former's annexation of Crimea. As for the southern neighbourhood, the EP urges the EU to 'substantially

revise' its policy therein with a greater focus on "support for the building of *functioning* and *inclusive* states capable of delivering security for their citizens, promoting democracy, confronting religious extremism, respecting human rights, protecting religious and ethnic minorities and enhancing the rule of law, as a key precondition for investment and economic development" (ibid.: 10).

The importance of the transatlantic alliance is reiterated when the EP brings attention to the idea that "the US is the EU's *key strategic partner*" (ibid.: 12), encouraging "closer coordination (...) on EU foreign policy in support of international law and pursuing common approaches to challenges in the EU neighbourhood and at global level" (ibid.). Moreover, the EP reinforces its perception of the EU as a 'major power', as it "underlines the need for an EU strategy, in coordination with the US, on how to *share* with Russia, China, India and *other major powers* the *responsibility for the peace and stability* of the global political and economic order" (ibid.) and "stresses (...) that the EU should become *a full member of the UN*" (ibid.: 13).

On March 20, 2015, the Council, in its conclusions, commented the Review of the ENP. As in other discourses produced by the EU especially since 2013, there is a reinforcement of the importance of *effectiveness* in the EU's regional and global actorness (Groen and Niemann, 2013; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013; Bretherton and Vogler, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014; Hoffmann and Niemann, 2017). In the press document that summarises the conclusions, the ENP's goals are described as "develop[ing] a democratic, stable and prosperous neighbourhood, based on a commitment to *fundamental values*, including the rule of law, protection of human rights and gender equality" (Council, 2015b: 1). Here, the emphasis is placed on the assumption that certain values are 'fundamental', and thus widely accepted (arguably one of the ENP's problems, and an overall difficulty for the effectiveness of EUPF in general, including crisis management). The Council reiterates the HR's proposal of establishing "closer coordination between ENP and wider CFSP/CSDP activities in a comprehensive manner" (ibid.), in line with the comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises institutionalised a few years earlier (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013).

In the Council conclusions there is an underlying concern with discourse and narratives as a means of normatively justifying the EU's engagement in its neighbouring region:

The Council stresses the importance of *a clear narrative* and the need for *strategic communication efforts* on the EU's engagement in the region, including its *values and objectives*. Further efforts should be taken to *strengthen EU visibility* as a whole and

communicate European foreign policy and the wide range of sector cooperation activities towards the countries of the region (Council, 2015b: 1-2).

This concern enhances the importance attributed by the EU to the discursive dimension of EUFP as a means to ensure the effectiveness thereof.

In line with the changing security environment at the time, and with the EU's ambitions to improve its external policies and domestic policies with external scope, the Commission produced, on April 28, 2015, a Communication, directed at the EP, the Council, the EESC, and the CoR entitled 'the European Agenda on Security'. This document reflects the EU's growing concern with identifying the 'new and complex threats' and challenges in matters of security, and to update its security strategy in light of the growing link between internal and external dimensions of security. The EU's concern with the modernisation of the ENP and the CSDP reflect this environment, as the Commission argues that "many of today's security concerns originate from instability in the EU's immediate neighbourhood and changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism" (Commission, 2015b: 2). The Agenda on Security is meant to, according to the Commission, "set out how the Union can bring *added value* to support the Member States in ensuring security" (ibid.). This idea of justifying the EU's security actorness by focusing on its value-added is a recurring narrative in EU discourses, alongside the 'responsibility' narrative (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), which is shared with the Member States in this document.

Throughout the document, the Commission identifies terrorism, organised crime, and cybersecurity as the EU's main threats, and bolsters the need to strengthen the EU's multilateral, cross-border, and cross-policy approach to security, in line with its comprehensive approach, while focusing increasingly more on the idea of prevention. As such, according to the Commission, the EU must carry out "a global perspective with security as one of our main external priorities" where it "must be able to react to unexpected events, seize new opportunities and anticipate and adapt to future trends and security risks" (Commission, 2015b: 20). Even though the Commission does not state it explicitly, these ideas frame the key concept of 'resilience' that marks EUFP discourse particularly since 2015.

On 18 May 2015, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted a document with conclusions on the CSDP. The document begins with the recurrent affirmation that the 'dramatic changes' that the 'global and European security environment' has gone through "*call for a stronger Europe, with a stronger and more effective Common Security and Defence Policy*" (Council, 2015: 2).

This affirmation is in line with the recurrent idea that the EU has some kind of inherent responsibility to develop this policy area, which consists of the deployment of normatively charged civilian missions and military operations outside of its territorial sphere. Notwithstanding, the document justifies this by arguing that

The conflicts, threats and instability in the EU's (...) neighbourhood (...), together with long standing and newly emerging security challenges, are significantly *impacting European security* as well as *international peace and security* and *challenging our fundamental values and principles* (ibid.).

While a part of the justification is seemingly related to ensuring security and territorial integrity in Europe and beyond, another part has to do with the alleged 'challenging' of EU 'values and principles'. This last relates to a challenging of fundamental EU values and principles domestically (e.g. through terrorist attacks, organised crime, etc.), and abroad. Despite the fact that the E/CSDP has been a predominantly outward-oriented policy that seeks to prevent and manage what the EU identifies as crises outside of its territorial sphere, here we notice a reinforcement of the growing link between external and domestic EU security concerns. The basic idea is that the potential spread of these 'conflicts, threats and instability' can be detrimental to the European way of life at home, meaning that deploying CSDP missions / operations thereto could halt such spread; and that EU fundamental values and principles are universal and thus must be protected, as the idea of an EU 'responsibility' remains central:

By addressing these conflicts, sources of instability and other security challenges, the EU and its Member States are assuming increased *responsibilities* to act as a security provider, at the *international level* and *in particular in the neighbourhood*, thereby also enhancing *their own security* and their *global strategic role* by responding to these challenges together (Council, 2015: 2).

As identified in previous documents, especially since the launch of the 2013 comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (Ashton, 2013a), the encouragement of a stronger link between internal and external security is present in these Council conclusions. In addition to an increasing shift towards more ownership and empowerment *vis-à-vis* CSDP host countries, the growing link between internal and external security could imply more than just a focus on increasing efficiency in the use of the EU's scarce resources or an attempt to improve

effectiveness in dealing with increasingly hybrid threats, but rather a potential decrease in EUFP's normative ambitions. This decrease in the EU's normative ambitions for external action is visible in the 2015 review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Delcour, 2015). The EU's 2016 Global Strategy reinforces this tendency, as we will see further ahead in this analysis.

For the first time, we notice a mention to EU citizens in the context of EU-level policy-making in the area of security and defence, when the Council highlights “the importance of effective communication to raise public awareness and foster a better understanding of security and defence matters” (Council, 2015: 4). Nonetheless, this effort to reach wider audiences, both domestic and external, has been visible especially since Federica Mogherini took office in 2014. This approximation to EU citizens can also be interpreted as a sign of the EU's gradual inward shift and subsequent decrease in normative ambitions in foreign policy, including in security and defence. The following sentence appears to corroborate this interpretation of an inward-shifting tendency, whereby the area of EU-level security and defence appears to be headed towards acquiring more territorial defence features (as opposed to being exclusively dedicated to crisis management outside the EU's territory):

While respecting the primacy of Member States competence in defence, the EU can act as an enabler for security and defence co-operation, in line with the Treaties. Therefore, defence issues should also be considered in coherence with other relevant EU policies and sectors, and vice versa, thereby fully exploiting the EU's added value (ibid.).

Nonetheless, this potential shift is likely to be neither instantaneous, nor diminish the EU's crisis management actorness claims, as the document praises the achievements of the CSDP's ‘significant contribution to international peace and *stability*’ (ibid.: 5). The Council announces the approval of the first CSDP operation – EUNAVFOR MED, Operation Sophia – developed as a result of a collaboration effort between the area of crisis management / CSDP and the area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, reflecting the essence of the EU's comprehensive approach closer to home (ibid.: 6). In this sense, this operation can be considered a first instance of a closer cooperation in EU security and defence (between domestic and external policies), and perhaps also a sign of the apparent tendency towards an inward-shift and possible change in the EU's approach to the CSDP as more than just external crisis management.

The discourse on the concept of ‘partner’ in the area of crisis management is broadened in geographic terms, as the Council refers not only to the UN, NATO, and the OSCE, but also

to the African Union, the League of Arab States, and ASEAN, “as well as *strategic partners* and other *partner countries*, within our neighbourhood and more globally” (ibid.). This reflects the growing tendency towards more ownership and empowerment for host countries, less EU imposition – noticeable in expressions such as ‘*willing neighbourhood countries*’ (ibid.: 7) – and a resulting detachment and apparent decrease in the EU’s normative ambitions in favour of its own territorial integrity, security, and stability. Yet, what we have identified as a *tendency towards a decrease* in the EU’s normative ambitions does not, by any means, mean a complete reversal in the EU’s foreign policy ambitions. The tendency towards more ownership and empowerment for host countries is complimentary to this apparent progressive decrease in the EU’s normative ambitions, but it does not entirely exclude the latter. In fact, the Council conclusions argue in favour of the development of ‘an EU-wide strategic framework for Security Sector Reform’ (ibid.), a policy concept meant to join several EUFP tools including CSDP and Freedom, Security, and Justice, that is quite normatively charged, as it essentially entails EU-led security sector institution-building that reproduces European security standards and norms in third countries.

This normatively-charged yet ownership-oriented approach is also present in other EUFP documents, such as the European Commission’s joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises’ (Commission, 2015a), on which the Council conclusions draw. In practice, this idea has been developed under the aegis of the EU’s claim in favour of a ‘security-development nexus’, already occasionally present in previously analysed documents (e.g. Council, 2001c: 2; European Council, 2003a: 2; Council, 2011), but which gained substantial importance since the 2013 ‘comprehensive approach’ (e.g. Ashton, 2013a: 2, 4; Council, 2014a: 2; Mogherini, 2015a: 4).

After praising the CSDP’s contribution to ‘stability’ a few pages earlier, the Council calls for a “need to enhance the CSDP’s effectiveness and responsiveness in today’s increasingly unpredictable and rapidly changing security environment” (Council, 2015: 9), welcoming a number of technical and procedural improvements, as well as the ‘mainstreaming and strengthening’ of human rights and gender issues within the CSDP. This appears to contradict the possible interpretation that praising stability entails a decrease in the EU’s engagement *tout court*. Yet, following a number of technical considerations concerning the efficiency and procurement of capabilities and equipment, the ministers briefly go back to the idea of an increase in inward-looking territorial defence at the EU-level (as opposed to the almost exclusive focus on external crisis management and prevention that had characterised the

CSDP since its inception), as the Council “encourages Member States, through their national decision-making processes, to further utilise and implement the Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Co-operation (...) in view of reinforcing systematic defence co-operation in Europe” (ibid.: 14).

On 21 May 2015, the EP produced a resolution on the implementation of the CSDP. The EP begins by identifying the reasons for the existence and further development of the policy, which it identifies ‘as direct threats to the Union’s security’, namely the ‘unstable and volatile security environment of the EU and its neighbourhood’ (specifically due to conflicts and crises in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, and Libya), as well as terrorism in Africa. To these threats, the EP adds the US’s disengagement from Europe and the financial crisis, both of which “serve to highlight just how necessary it is for the Union and its Member States to shoulder more responsibility for their own security and defence” (EP, 2015b: 3). This discourse is aligned with the EU’s overall change in discourse in security matters that has been progressively visible since 2013 towards a closer link between internal and external aspects of EU security.

When mentioning the ‘unprecedented instability’ marking the EU’s neighbourhood, the EP shows concern “that the Union *may not jointly be able to be a key player* in addressing each of these threats and that it may all too often be reduced to (...) ad hoc alliances in which it has only a *peripheral or reserve role* to play” (ibid.). In addition, the EP argues that the EU “*hardly possesses* the requisite resources, operationally, industrially or in terms of capabilities, to contribute in a decisive way to the prevention and management of international crises and to assert its own strategic autonomy and strategic interests” (ibid.: 4). These ideas that the EU might *not* be an actor in matters of security and crisis management, or that its role therein might become peripheral is quite distinct from the prevailing discourses and narratives that place the EU at the highest possible level (model, ideal) with responsibility to improve the world and solve others’ crises. It shows a difference between the EP’s discourse and other EU institutions’ and actors’ discourses, but it also represents an instance of a growing tendency that affects the overall EUFP discourse towards a diminishing of its normative ambitions and a questioning of some of the ideas that were, thus far, taken for granted. As such, the EP proposes, with a sense of urgency, that the EU improve the use and coordination of the security and crisis management tools at its disposal under the aegis of the CSDP. According to the EP, the EU should also strengthen the link between CSDP tools and other tools, such as humanitarian and development assistance, highlighting the comprehensive character of EUFP.

The EU’s ‘strength and relevance’ lie, according to the EP, in its specificity and expertise, materialised by “its ability to mobilise resources and bring into play simultaneously



a wide range of diplomatic, security, defence, economic, trade, development and humanitarian instruments, and in full compliance with the provisions of the UN Charter” (ibid.). As such, the EP claims that the ‘isolation’ of CSDP missions in the EU’s overall international security and crisis management efforts is detrimental, as the missions and operations “have been aimed at *enhancing the Union’s crisis response profile* rather than taking strategic measures on the basis of in-depth analysis and planning” (ibid.: 5). EUBAM Libya and EUBAM Rafah are referred to as examples of the CSDP’s ineffectiveness, as they both operate in an “institutional and security context in which it has *never been able to address the basic aims* identified therein” (ibid.). Another example provided is Mali, where “a structural policy for putting such [CSDP] missions on a long-term footing with efficient mandates and objectives that are adequate in terms of dealing with the situations with which they are confronted” is argued to be lacking (ibid.: 6). As such, the EP urges not only the efficient and coordinated use of CSDP and other CFSP tools, but also a strategic reflection on the EU’s main threats and challenges as well as its ambitions in matters of security and crisis management.

HR Mogherini drafted a report ahead of the June 2015 European Council on security and defence. While the HR’s Report focuses predominantly on the CSDP, in practice, the June 2015 European Council on security and defence ended up covering a number of subjects (including migration, security and defence, as well as jobs, growth, and competitiveness), making the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘defence’ quite encompassing in this case. In her report, Mogherini enumerates some of the major changes in the ‘global environment’, such as conflicts in the neighbourhood, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Mediterranean refugee crisis, and the rise of ISIS. Other issues, such as ‘cyber threats, the impact of the financial crisis and the continued fragmentation in the European defence market’ are identified as “trends [that] point to a *growing responsibility for the Union and its Member States*, as well as increased *interdependence* within the Union to effectively *provide security for its citizens*, now and in the long term” (Mogherini, 2015a: 1). In this paragraph, we notice the repetition of the idea of EU ‘responsibility’ to engage in the area of security and defence, a recurrent narrative in the EU’s discourses. Yet, unlike what is commonly defended by the EU – i.e. the idea that it has a ‘responsibility’ to engage in crisis management or conflict prevention *outside* of its territorial sphere – which is one of the main issues that we have been highlighting and critiquing in this research project, this paragraph seems to indicate a different approach to security and defence at the European level. In addition to mentioning the Member States and the idea of ‘interdependence’, by pointing out the ‘responsibility’ to ‘provide security for its citizens’, this paragraph appears to reinforce the tendency of a shift towards a more internal or territorial type

of defence (traditionally linked to states). Both these ideas are reiterated throughout the document:

Indeed it appears logical that the current trends in the security environment will lead to a *more extensive use of security and defence related instruments*. In other words, the *demands* towards the EU to act as a provider of security will continue to increase (ibid.).

The idea of maintaining the way the EU acts in the area of security and defence – through external crisis management and conflict prevention missions under the CSDP – is thus questioned in face of what the HR identifies as the setting of EU’s ambitions, while “taking account of *interests and values*, the overall security environment, the consequent *need to project force* and the available resources” (ibid.). Here, again, the idea of ‘necessity’ reinforces the claim of EU responsibility to engage in security and defence efforts, either through crisis management or a more territorial defence, as the document states that “the Union wants to act as a security provider” (ibid.). One of the main arguments of the document is thus to push forward a European defence industry, so as to allow for the proposed shift towards a more territorial approach to defence.

What does this shift entail? The document attempts to clarify (albeit vaguely) what Mogherini means by an increase in the EU’s engagement in security and defence beyond crisis management:

Of course defence is and will remain Member States’ driven. However (...), the European level does have role to play, in line with the Treaties. For instance, the EU can act as a facilitator and enabler for defence cooperation to support Member States’ capability development (...). This requires *maximizing the added value of the EU* by combining its various instruments, ensuring effectiveness and avoiding duplication (ibid.: 2).

The notion of added value has been, thus far, used as a normative justification narrative to support the EU’s crisis management actorness in comparison and in coordination with NATO. Here, we see this narrative being used in a similar manner in the context of the EU’s relationship with its Member States. The HR goes on to explain how “[CSDP] missions and operations are increasingly becoming more embedded in a wider EU approach” (ibid.: 3), giving the example of the UN-backed EUFOR RCA (which ran from April 2014 to March 2015). This was a predominantly military operation that gained civilian traits, namely through the use of European

Commission programmes directed at the restructuring of the local judicial system and gendarme training, according to European standards. This example is useful to demonstrate how crisis management military operations – and not just the civilian missions – are well embedded in the EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude, whereby local actors are ‘improved’, and ‘helped’ in getting closer to ‘normal’ standards. The idea of linking the two components of crisis management in the EU’s ‘civilising mission’ contributes to the EU’s self-perception (and self-portrayal) as a ‘benign normative actor’ (Del Sarto, 2016: 222). For the EU, this combination of development-related civilian instruments with civilian / military CSDP missions and operations is seen as a priority and a necessary change in light of what Mogherini presents as expected: “demands towards the EU to act as a provider of security will continue to increase in response to the deteriorating situation facing Europe's borders” (Mogherini, 2015a: 4) – despite never clarifying exactly whence these demands come.

The ‘civilising’ ambition of CSDP becomes more visible in a section of the document entitled ‘capacity building to support security and development’. In fact, the very title is already quite revealing, as it reaffirms the EU’s perception of a required link between its idea of development and that of security, as seen in a number of discourses so far (e.g. Council, 2001c: 2; European Council, 2003a: 2; Council, 2011: 1; Ashton, 2013a: 2, 4; Council, 2014a: 2). Ultimately, this assertion reiterates what we have identified as the EU’s main approach to crisis management and conflict prevention in general, i.e. the premise that solving these issues, according to the EU, ought to be achieved through EU-led institution building. This approach, in turn, implies that European paradigms are appropriate to replicate in other circumstances, so much so that they are often labelled ‘ideal models.’ According to the HR, this approach “flows from the growing recognition of the linkages between security and development (the ‘security and development’ nexus)” (Mogherini, 2015a: 4; Keukeleire and Raube, 2013; Anderson and Williams, 2011; Winn and Lewis, 2017)

Unlike the prevailing tendency that has been observed mostly up until 2013 (with occasional exceptions), Mogherini seemingly refers to the countries that host crisis management missions and operations as ‘partners’, by stating that the EU’s empowerment thereof has been ‘gaining ground’, as “the long-term objective is to enable partner countries and regional organizations to take responsibility for their own security, so they can increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves” (Mogherini, 2015a: 4). Both calling CSDP host countries ‘partner’ and the idea of empowerment / ownership are not common in the documents we have analysed up until the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty – in fact, the prevailing paradigm has been EU-led institution-building, based on EU norms and standards, and using

the term ‘partner’ to refer to specific large countries or organisations also engaged in crisis management outside their respective territorial spheres, whose values and normative goals matched those of the EU (such as NATO, the US, the UN, or OSCE). This does not mean that the prevailing paradigm shifted substantially (the shift was progressive), but it does imply a less hierarchical portrayal of the EU’s interlocutors: in such positioning, the EU is admitting that the countries in crisis are capable (albeit with the EU’s help, and following EU standards and norms) to get themselves out of whatever crisis they are in. And the epithet ‘partners’ also helps to slightly mitigate the asymmetries, at least discursively. Nonetheless, there is no mention in the document of whether the EU’s motivations have to do with an effort to manage technical and financial resources more efficiently, or if indeed the EU believes in these countries’ ability to succeed more autonomously than previously suggested.

The HR mentions ‘partners’ in a second instance, this time reverting to previous practices of apparently hierarchization of its interlocutors: “the EU has further developed cooperation with *its international partners*, in particular the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the African Union (AU) and ASEAN, *as well with non-EU NATO Allies and third countries*” (ibid.: 6). According to Mogherini, “EU-UN relations remain the cornerstone of the EU support to effective multilateralism and translate into close operational cooperation *inter alia in Mali, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan*” (ibid.). This paragraph exemplifies the EU’s prevalent logic of the ‘developed’ organisations / countries planning, defining priorities, authorising the launch of negotiations, and ultimately deciding what to do with the ‘less fortunate’ countries and regions (notice how ‘close cooperation’ is ‘in’ rather than ‘with’ said countries).

The report repeatedly establishes a link between internal and external security (ibid.: 5, 6, 10, 11), emphasising a tendency that was already briefly observed in the ESS more than 10 years before, and that has been hinted at in successive discourses with growing emphasis. Still, this does not mean that there is any proposal made for changing the CSDP into a more territorial kind of defence, rather than outward-oriented crisis management. In fact, at some point, the document discusses the Member States’ reluctance in deploying Battlegroups, despite the latter’s alleged “continued interest on the matter” (ibid.: 7). The use of such vague expressions as ‘continued interest’ is quite common in EU documents. Oftentimes vague expressions and concepts are used to allow room for policy development or for mandate interpretation without necessarily compromising the Member States’ individual positions or the latter’s potential option to reduce the EU’s engagement in that area. In this case, we could interpret the use of the expression ‘continued interest’ as a way for the EU (or in this case the HR) to justify this

option's viability, even though there has perhaps never been substantial political will on behalf of the Member States to allow for it to be carried out in practice.

The document considers the 'delaying factors' to 'force generation' to be "the *duration* of the force generation process and the lack of a shared understanding of the *implications of the fast track procedures*" after which it adds that "force generation *also* raises the *broader questions* of political will and credibility" (ibid.: 9). While the concept of 'force generation' refers to the identification and activation of military assets and capabilities, including people and equipment, according to the requirements of a given mission / operation (Council, 2008a: 6), there is nothing innocent about omitting considerations about the implications of the use of force at all. Even though there is no evidence that this sentence reflects in any way some kind of hierarchy of the EU's priorities for this issue, it is still interesting to notice the near absence of moral considerations, especially when most referred to aspects concern practical / technical aspects of force generation (its duration, the implications of the fast track procedures, even political will), followed by a reference to credibility. It is not clear if this 'credibility' refers to the procedure or to the EU itself, but the use of this expression – about which there is nothing technical nor measurable – enters the realm of moral considerations or perceptions, as it refers to some kind of attributed validity or trustworthiness. If credibility is mentioned, why are other kinds of moral considerations not mentioned? This is conceivably a deliberate paradigmatic choice. On the other hand, the reference to credibility hints at the recurring pattern of a concern for the EU's centrality in its own discourse, particularly regarding how it is seen as an actor, despite its performance.

Following a series of chapters on technical considerations about financing, capabilities, and the pooling of resources, the report finishes with a chapter entitled 'way forward'. The chapter begins by stating that "when considered against the ongoing changes in the global and regional environment, *the demand for CSDP is likely to grow and to evolve*" (ibid.: 17). As seen in several discourses so far, the reference to an unidentified abstract 'demand' for the EU to engage in crisis management is quite recurrent. Mogherini then goes on to enumerate the conditions for a mission to be successful:

These missions and operations are successful where *Member States provide the required resources*. Their effect is further enhanced when a *full range of instruments* can be combined towards achieving the *same political objective*. In short, they need to be based on a *strong political will*, to have *clear objectives and mandates*, and to be part of a *comprehensive approach* (ibid.: 18).

The enumerated conditions are essentially internal / domestic, i.e. they stem from the EU's wants and needs, as there is no reference to the needs of local actors. This absence is highlighted by the EU's consistent portrayal of other countries and organisations as the EU's main 'partners', namely the UN, NATO, the AU, and the OSCE (ibid.). This is not surprising, considering that this fits into the recurrent pattern of inward-looking normative justification observed in most discourses so far. This focus presents the CSDP as a very one-sided policy, at least insofar as its normative justification is concerned, as the latter appears to serve to enhance the EU's potential and value-added much more than to solve concrete problems. On the other hand, the identification of what constitutes a problem, or a crisis is also not bereft of normative considerations and is made according to the EU's interests and objectives, as CSDP missions and operations purposefully entail the incorporation and dissemination of EU norms and standards and are oftentimes the result of an active search for opportunities on behalf of the EU, instead of being the direct result of requests on behalf of countries in crisis.

This is in line with the stated belief that there are "clear linkages between security and development" (ibid.), which leads the EU to invest in capacity building, whereby "the long-term objective is to enable partner countries and regional organizations to take responsibility for their own security, so they can increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves" (ibid.). Even though this may arguably be considered less patronising / condescending than executive mandates, the (very normative) EU's primary answer / solution for the 'demand' for its engagement in CSDP missions and operations remains EU-led institution building in third countries where the EU identifies the presence of either a full-fledged crisis (crisis management) or an embryonic one (crisis prevention).

The HR's report finishes by admitting that "defence is Member States driven, but the EU can act as a facilitator and enabler for defence cooperation" (ibid.: 19). This emphasises the idea that the EU's normative justification discourses for developing and engaging in crisis management are likely to be primarily directed at its own Member States, which could help understand why the official discourses that stem from the EU's institutional apparatus that we have been analysing in this research project, are predominantly inward-looking and focused on 'selling' the EU's potential, value-added, and attributes in the area of crisis management, to the detriment of the specific needs of local actors.

On June 16, 2015, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg issued a brief statement concerning the 'strategic partnership' between both institutions. Much like in previous discursive instances here

analysed, there is an underlying notion that the EU and NATO are “*unique and essential partners who share common values and strategic interests*” (Juncker and Stoltenberg, 2015), reinforcing the discourse that the transatlantic relationship goes beyond the military dimension and includes a strong commitment to the dominance of certain values and norms, rooted in the interests of the members of both organisations. They add that “we support continuing close cooperation and complementarity between the two organisations. A stronger European Defence will contribute to a stronger NATO” (ibid). This statement emphasises the narrative of the EU’s value-added as a security actor, in that it does not mean to be a competitor of NATO, but rather a complementary actor to the latter, bringing to the fore distinct tools and unique approaches that surpass the traditional military tools that NATO is known for.

On 25 and 26 June 2015, a European Council summit took place. This summit produced a document stating its conclusions, drawing on the HR’s report and the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions. This European Council, primarily dedicated to security and defence, ended up covering a number of subjects, as mentioned previously, including migration, security and defence, as well as jobs, growth, and competitiveness. This apparent broadening of the area of security and defence seems to conflate simultaneously with the ideals advanced by the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to external crises and conflicts (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), and to the tendency towards establishing a closer link between external and internal security. The European Council conclusions are concentrated in a brief document sectioned in the various mentioned areas.

While this thesis’ focus is on the EU’s normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor, the changes operated in the EU’s depiction of the area of security and defence at the EU level cannot be ignored, which means that the normative considerations reproduced in such more encompassing discourses are also important for our study. In this sense, while discussing issues related to migration, and specifically (although not expressly) related to the EU’s response to the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean region, the document mentions the launch of the CSDP operation EUNAVFOR MED (European Council, 2015: 2). This operation, as mentioned, represents the implementation of a new, more integrated approach to EU crisis management, congregating internal and external security aspects and policy tools. The HSGs go on to briefly discuss migration-related issues, such as relocation within the EU, readmission to countries of origin, or cooperation with the latter. In this last section, the HSGs repeated treatment of African countries as ‘partners’ is substantially different to how these countries have been depicted in CSDP-related discourses up until 2013, reflecting

the EU's increased focus on ownership, empowerment, as well as on stabilisation, and consequent progressive decrease in the EU's overall normative ambitions (ibid.: 5).

On a section dedicated to security and defence, the European Council begins by acknowledging that "Europe's security environment has changed dramatically" (ibid.), calling for several actions. The first is the implementation of the previously analysed European Commission's 'European Agenda on Security' (Commission, 2015b), drafted as a result of the aforementioned changing security environment within Europe and around its borders but primarily internally oriented. Perhaps due to the origin of the document (the Commission) its focus falls more on internal security and justice and home affairs matters, such as terrorism, organised crime, and cybercrime. On the other hand, it is the result of the overall tendency of approximation between domestic and external security concerns and efforts. Even though the references to crisis management or conflict prevention that appear in the Agenda are sparse and usually linked to internal security procedures, the Agenda visibly highlights the aforementioned shift in the EU's actorness in matters related to security towards internal / territorial security.

The second security and defence related action that the European Council conclusions document calls for is the continuation of the HR's 'process of strategic reflection' in preparation of the EU Global Strategy, to be launched in the subsequent year, which will be analysed further ahead in this study.

The third action that the European Council calls for is "a more effective, visible and result oriented CSDP" (European Council, 2015: 6) as well as capability and industry development. Among other considerations, the issue of the mitigation of the hierarchization of the EU's CSDP 'partners', yet without a complete removal thereof, reappears when the HSGs argue in favour of "intensifying partnerships, namely with the UN, NATO, OSCE and AU" followed by "empowering and enabling partners to prevent and manage crises, including through concrete projects of capacity building" (ibid). The EU's treatment of both types of 'partners' appears to be more levelled than before 2015, not least because of the 'empowering and enabling' intentions, even though the latter type is still the target of the EU's 'civilising attitude' through EU-led capacity building based on EU standards and norms. The final sections of the document concern jobs, growth, and competitiveness, as well as a very brief statement about the UK's first steps towards a referendum concerning the country's departure from the EU.

In a complex and challenging context for the EU, a new extensive EU security strategy was launched in June 2016 in an effort to identify key threats and goals, and to formulate possible EU responses for these challenges. The 60-page document is entitled 'Shared Vision,



Common Action: A Stronger Europe – a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’. The rhetoric in this document differs from that which precedes the Lisbon Treaty implementation, especially before 2013: more than identifying what *kind* of actor the EU can be, it inquires as to how the EU can *still* be an actor in the midst of so much doubt, crises, Euroscepticism, and increasing challenges to its security. While the arguments used to answer this discursive shift remain as self-centred as previously, with a focus on the EU’s quality, the EU’s domestic achievements that make it an ideal model, and the EU’s value-added through a unique combination of civilian and military elements in a comprehensive approach to security, the overall discourse does show some degree of change.

The title of the document already reflects some of these changes in the EU’s gradually decreasing normative ambitions with regard to its external action. The first part of the title – ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’ – in addition to referring to two adjectives that refer to the Member States rather than the EU as an actor, the last expression in particular seems to fall in line with the identified growing concern for domestic territorial security, and consequent convergence between internal and external security. The second part of the title, however – a Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy’ – appears less inward-looking, especially considering the expression ‘*global strategy*’. Nonetheless, the explanation provided by Mogherini for the use of the adjective ‘global’ reflects, conversely, a geographic retraction, as the document “deals with peace-building and the resilience of States and societies, *in and around Europe*” (EU, 2016: 4). Moreover, if the syntagmatic positioning of each half of the title reflects any kind of inherent hierarchy, then our interpretation of an inward change in the EU’s overall discourse is corroborated.

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) is divided into four main sections: the first dedicated to the ‘promotion of EU citizens’ interests’, the second concerning the EU external action’s ‘guiding principles’, the third (and most extensive) regarding external action priorities, and the final section entitled ‘from vision to action’ more dedicated to the EU’s available tools and networks to carry out its goals and priorities. The importance of this document is twofold: on one hand, it comes to replace an out-dated decade-old Security Strategy (which was, nonetheless, quite an important and unprecedented document itself when it was first launched), on the other hand, it establishes the EU’s actorness ambitions and prospects in the midst of major geopolitical changes both outside, as well as within the EU. As in previous discourses with a more encompassing scope, we will focus more on the aspects that pertain to security and defence, and in particular to the CSDP.

The actorness literature that we have discussed in chapter 1, in particular the section concerning EU actorness conceptualisations, suggests a shift in the EU's actorness concerns (both in practice and in the academic debate), following the Lisbon Treaty and especially after 2015, towards a greater focus in increased cohesiveness and effectiveness / performance, and later more concentrated around the concept of resilience. Our discourse analysis, covering a span of 24 years of discourses, confirms this pragmatist shift (EU, 2016; Juncos, 2016; Biscop, 2016). In many ways, especially compared to the ESS, "the EUGS is more conscious of the limits imposed by our own capabilities and by others' intractability, and therefore more modest" (Biscop, 2016: 1). In the EUGS there is a greater emphasis on 'sharing responsibilities' than in previous discourses, especially visible since the aforementioned Member State and domestic-oriented 'European Agenda on Security' (Commission, 2015b). Simultaneously, another aspect that appears to be in focus in the Global Strategy is the idea of aiming for more 'achievable' outcomes, rather than 'idealistic' ones – accompanying the changes operated in the EU's approach to its neighbourhood, for example, whereby much of its normative ambition has been reduced in favour of promoting greater stability (Delcour, 2015; Schumacher, 2016). The first paragraph in the Strategy's foreword by Mogherini already encapsulates these ideas:

The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. Yet, *our citizens* and the world *need a strong European Union* like never before. Our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure. The crises within and beyond our borders *are affecting directly our citizens' lives*. In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, *shares* a vision and *acts together* (...) (EU, 2016: 3).

The EUGS's focus is still on the EU and its 'responsibility' to be a global actor, reinforcing a prevailing narrative (Nițoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), but this responsibility is portrayed as much more 'shared' than in previous instances (not only domestically, but also internationally). The EU maintains the abstract idea that the 'wider world' 'expects' a 'stronger Europe', but so do its citizens (EU, 2016: 7). On the other hand, the focus is not so much on how the EU can *project* and reproduce itself and its model (by means of exporting its values, norms, ideals, standards) in other countries and regions (even though this idea is still very much present), but more so on how the EU can better *protect* itself, its interests, and its territory. In fact, in the document, the EU's first priority for external action is presented as its own security. In this sense, the EUGS advocates an increase in European autonomy in the area of security and defence, despite NATO,

while proposing a more territorial defence-type of modality to be developed at the EU level, within the CSDP (ibid.: 20).

Despite sentences like “a fragile world calls for a more *confident* and *responsible* EU, it calls for an *outward- and forward-looking* European foreign and security policy” (ibid.: 5), the overall message conveyed by means of this document is mostly in line with the previously identified retraction from the EU’s normative civilising ambitions, giving primacy to dealing with more direct threats to its existence than to the search for new opportunities of actorness. In this sense, a lot of the focus of the EUGS’s discourse is on ensuring internal coherence and unity between the Member States and the EU institutions in order for the EU to regain credibility as an actor. As this was already the case in other previous discourses, such as the 2015 ENP Review communication, this represents an instance of discursive continuity.

The EUGS advocates a greater focus on the EU’s neighbourhood, as have other EU discourses done, especially since the inception of the ‘Arab Spring’ movements in the MENA region – with a more integrated, comprehensive, and multi-dimensional approach – to the detriment of farther regions / countries, reflecting a greater concentration of focus and energy on the EU’s territorial defence than previously. The EU’s second priority for external action is to “invest in the *resilience* of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa” (ibid.: 23). Albeit narrower than before, this description still appears to be quite a wide geographic range. Nonetheless, the document repeatedly uses expressions such as “the EU will therefore *promote resilience* in its *surrounding regions*” (ibid.). Resilience – a central concept in the EU Global Strategy, is defined in therein as “the *ability* of states and societies to *reform*, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises” (ibid.). This concept is used not only in reference to the EU’s interlocutors, but also to itself, and to its own ability to persevere in light of a complex and volatile security and political environment (Aradau, 2014; Juncos, 2016; Bendiek, 2017; Colombo et al., 2017), and the increased pressure of the Brexit (Biscop, 2016). The use of this concept confirms the identified tendency towards greater empowerment and ownership of countries and regions in crisis in the EU’s neighbourhood, simultaneous to an overall intention to decrease conditionality-oriented approaches.

The EUGS’s third priority for external action – which concerns more particularly the object of this study – regards an ‘integrated approach’ to conflicts and crises (which replaced the 2013 ‘comprehensive approach’ concept), while ‘concentrating’ its ‘efforts in surrounding regions to the east and south’ (EUGS, 2016: 28). The aforementioned geographic retraction is thus visible also in crisis management and peace building. The EU advocates a ‘multi-

dimensional’, ‘multi-level’, and ‘multi-lateral’ approach to the prevention, management, resolution, and stabilisation of regions and countries affected by crises, expanding the idea proposed by the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to external crisis and conflicts three years earlier (ibid.: 28, 29). The EUGS particularly advocates the idea of prevention, namely through “*monitoring* root causes such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change” (ibid.: 29). While the document advocates a ‘more systematic’ EU engagement in security and defence related aspects of these crises, references to ‘stabilisation’ appear to contrast, or at least mitigate the EU’s normative ambition more present in the CSDP’s first two decades. This decrease in the EU’s normative ambition in the area of crisis management is also suggested by the frequent use of more careful, ambiguous, and apparently less normatively charged expressions, such as ‘monitoring’ or ‘fostering inclusive governance through mediation and facilitation’ (ibid.: 31).

In the final section of the EUGS the inward shift marking the area of security and defence appears again, in what seems to be a pledge of increased actorness and broadening of what had been thus far the area of security and defence at the EU level, with a much greater focus on domestic security and capacity-building, arguing that “soft power is not enough: we must *enhance our credibility* in security and defence. To *respond to external crises*, build our *partners’ capacities* and *protect Europe (...)*” (ibid.: 44). In order to do that, the EU states more directly that “Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm” (ibid.: 45).

The idea of a ‘security-development nexus’ in EUFP appears in the EUGS’s overall integrated approach proposal for the improvement of the EU’s actorness and credibility:

We must become more joined-up in our security and development policies. CSDP capacity building missions must be coordinated with security sector and rule of law work by the Commission. Capacity Building for Security and Development can play a key role in empowering and enabling our partners to prevent and respond to crises and will need to be supported financially by the EU. Our peace policy must also ensure a smoother transition from short-term crisis management to long-term peace building to avoid gaps along the conflict cycle. Long-term work on pre-emptive peace, resilience and human rights must be tied to crisis response through humanitarian aid, CSDP, sanctions and diplomacy (ibid.: 50, 51).

This paragraph shows how the EU's normative ambitions are portrayed differently than before 2013 or 2015, even though there is no shortage of normative considerations and goals. There is still an underlying assumption that the EU's goal is to improve / normalise (or 'civilise') others. The main change is rather a greater focus on domestic security, and the stability of the EU's neighbourhood, in order to achieve domestic security. The EU's 'civilising' efforts appear to be less linked to a belief in the idea that European norms, values, and standards are normal, natural, absolute, or universal or to the idea that they must be exported *because of this*, but rather on guaranteeing the EU's own security through increased stabilisation, empowerment, and ownership – which requires a different kind of EU engagement. The CSDP's discursive evolution presents it as a much less normative policy when observed as an isolated policy after 2013, but when considered within the EU's 'comprehensive' and 'integrated' approaches that advocate more openly a 'security-development nexus', the normative attitude remains present.

On the same day as the adoption of the EUGS, June 28, 2016, French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier produced a joint statement entitled "A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties." The statement begins with a mention of the Brexit and the consequences thereof for the EU, and a mention the widespread feeling of Euroscepticism that spread across Europe. The Ministers propose to "strictly focus our joints efforts on those challenges that can only be addressed by common European answers, while leaving others to national or regional decision making and variation. And we must deliver better on those issues we have chosen to focus on" (Ayrault and Steinmeier, 2016). The authors argue that "the European Union provides a unique and indispensable framework for the pursuit of freedom, prosperity and security *in Europe*, for shaping peaceful and mutually beneficial relationships amongst its people and *for contributing to peace and stability in the world*," claiming that both countries see the EU "as *more necessary than ever* and as *the only* framework capable of providing *appropriate* collective answers to the changing international environment," thus proposing "a more *coherent* and a more *assertive* Europe on the world stage" (ibid.).

The Ministers enumerate one of 'today's main challenges' as "ensur[ing] the *security of our citizens* confronted with *growing external and internal threats*" (ibid.), suggesting that they consider a collective type of defence to be developed at the EU level, or that this is a necessity. The logic of resilience and the EU's pragmatist turn is also visible in the French and German Ministers' statement when they claim that "we have to face *increasingly interwoven* internal and external challenges. We see the need to *preserve* (...) our common values both internally

and *vis-à-vis* the outside world” (ibid.). The inward-looking rhetoric is particularly visible in the use of the expression ‘preserve’ to the detriment of the more commonly used ‘promote.’

While referring to the EU’s facing of a ‘deteriorating security environment and an unprecedented level of threat,’ the Ministers focus extensively on the topic of the link between external crises and the EU’s internal security, arguing that they are “more likely to have immediate consequences for European territory and the security of EU citizens,” and that, as a consequence, “Europe’s role as a *credible force for peace* is more important than ever” (ibid.). The solution presented by the Ministers is to “recommit to a shared vision of Europe as a security union, based on solidarity and mutual assistance between member states in support of common security and defence policy,” adding that “providing security *for Europe* as well as contributing to peace and stability globally is at the heart of the European project” (ibid.).

The French and German Ministers stated that they “see the EU as a key power in its neighbourhood but also as an actor for peace and stability with global reach,” citing a number of examples and adding that “beyond the crises, we are convinced that Africa needs also a continuous commitment, being a continent of great challenges and *opportunities*” (ibid.). Despite the EU’s normative retraction at the time, visible in the EUSG and in the Minister’s own statement, there is still an inclination for the pursuit of actorness ‘opportunities’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). The Ministers of France and Germany propose, as a solution to the volatile security environment within and surrounding Europe, the establishment of a “European Security Compact which encompasses all aspects of security and defence dealt with at the European level and thus delivers on the EU’s promise to strengthen security for its citizens” (Ayrault and Steinmeier, 2016).

By fomenting increased dialogue and establishment of common security priorities within the European Council and the Council (with the help of CSDP organs in the Council), the Ministers argue that the EUGS is a step in the right direction, but claim that more must be done, and that their respective Member States will “promote the EU as an *independent and global actor* able to leverage its *unique array of expertise and tools*, civilian and military, in order to *defend and promote the interests of its citizens*” (ibid.). Many aspects of this last utterance are relevant for our analysis. Firstly, the idea of promoting the EU as an ‘independent’ and global actor is evocative of the scholarly debate on actorness, namely of Gunnar Sjöstedt’s 1977a work and, to some degree, of Jupille and Caporaso’s conceptual difficulties in assessing the EU’s autonomy (1998). Secondly, the mention of the EU’s actorness being anchored by a ‘unique array of expertise and tools’ is relevant in that it sustains the narrative of the EU as a security actor that brings value-added based on its ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘uniqueness’ (Biscop,

2004; Tonra, 2011). And third, there is a direct justification for the ultimate purpose of developing the EU's security actorness that does not stem from an abstract 'responsibility', which is not that common in EU discourse, namely the defence and promotion of EU citizens' interests.

The EU's apparent retraction visible in the EUGS is also present in the Ministers' statement when they argue that "the EU will need to take action *more often* in order to *manage crises that directly affect its own security*" (Ayrault and Steinmeier, 2016). Even though they propose an increase in the EU's engagement in crisis management actions, the Ministers argue that the focus thereof must be concerning crises 'that *directly* affect *its own* security' (by means of improved capabilities, budgets, and structures, including the operationalisation of PESCO) reflecting a shift of the EU's crisis management actorness from effectiveness to functionality (Bickerton, 2011b). The Ministers add that the EU "must *invest more in preventing conflict*, in promoting human security and in *stabilising* its neighbourhood and regions affected by crisis all over the world" and ultimately advocate in favour of "a more integrated approach for EU internal security" (ibid.). The statement continues into other areas, such as migration and Justice and Home Affairs, and monetary union and growth. The placement of the EU's actorness as the first and most widely debated issue in the statement indicates the latter's importance.

In this section we have explored the EU's normative justification discourses as an actor in the field of crisis management during 2015 until the launch of the EU Global Strategy in 2016. This period was marked by an increase in the tension surrounding and within Europe in matters of security. Russia's aggressive border policies and conflict in Ukraine, the massive waves of asylum seekers arriving daily in Europe, a worsening of the volatility of terrorist attacks within and around Europe, in addition to the Brexit process have reinforced the EU's normative retraction, as well as its focus on stability and resilience. Discursively, this period is marked by an evolution of the EU's comprehensive approach towards an integrated approach, where development and security appear more interconnected than before, and the CSDP's evolution points to a geographic retraction and a greater focus on EU domestic security. This discursive shift towards increased pragmatism, alongside other findings, such as key concept, narratives, and discursive patterns, hierarchisations, omissions, and (dis)continuities will be further analysed and discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter, in light of the most relevant and recent academic debates.





## CHAPTER 5 - NARRATIVES, HIERARCHIZATIONS, OMISSIONS, AND REPRESENTATIONS

### 5.1 - The EU's discursively constructed identity

This project concerns the EU's normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor, through which it establishes and exports an identity that is expected (by the EU) to be acknowledged and validated – and thus legitimated – by other actors in the international system, as well as domestic EU actors. Following the analysis of the evolution and context of the EU's discourses in the area of crisis management, the goal of this chapter is to discuss the (in)consistencies and recurrences therein. These dynamics help to determine and reinforce certain *narratives* used by the EU to provide normative justifications for its crisis management actorness, which are established as a result of the “overlapping between various discourses which are more fluid and sometimes tend to collide” (Nițoiu, 2013: 240). In addition to identifying the EU's main narratives as a crisis management actor, in this chapter we also analyse discursive hierarchizations and omissions, as well as representations of the EU and other actors involved in its crisis management endeavours. The importance of these narratives is that they represent “an explicit attempt to define and enact two processes central to both internal and external logics of foreign policy: *identification* and *legitimation*” (Martin, 2011: 193; Carta and Wodak, 2015).

One of the roles played by narratives in foreign policy “lies in the effects that its use has on the public acceptance of policies and policy action” (Schumacher, 2015: 384). As such, the narratives produced by the EU (through EU institutions' and Member States' discourses about the EU) in the context of crisis management, include aspects of normative justification in the sense that they are used by the EU to legitimate its ambitions and actorness in this policy area.

Strategic narratives are a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors. Strategic narratives are a tool for political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they operate. They are narratives about both states and the system itself, both about who we are and what kind of order we want. The point of strategic narratives is to influence the behavior of others (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013: 3).

These narratives help construct the EU's fluid and complex identity. Identity is a relevant concept for our project because it is “at the ontological and epistemological centre of

poststructuralist discourse analysis” and is “produced through and constitutive of foreign policy, and it is relationally and discursively constituted” (Hansen, 2006: 33). The EU’s identity conception and projection through self-focus and a curated image (despite the presence of discursive struggles) is one of the more manifest characteristics in the analysed discourses, and it has been expressly and deliberately present since the EU’s inception with the Maastricht Treaty. The five objectives for the EU, as established in the Treaty, already include the goal to ‘assert *its identity* on the international scene’ through the implementation of a CFSP and the ‘eventual framing’ of a common defence policy (EU, 1992: 5). This proves the EU’s purposeful intention to establish and promote an identity as an actor, including in the area of security and defence, rather than this being merely an unintended consequence of its actions. The Amsterdam Treaty reinforces the idea of EU ‘autonomy’ (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998: 217) by removing a Maastricht Treaty reference to the Member States (EU, 1992: 58) in the CFSP’s goal “to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways” (EU, 1997: 155).

It is through the production and reproduction of these processes and practices that the notion of an identity is created, maintained and challenged. Identity becomes a reality as it is instantiated through the discourses of a variety of actors (...). It is disseminated through public and private communication within discursive spaces (Tonra, 2011: 1193).<sup>36</sup>

The use of the pronoun ‘we’ as well as the conjugation of verbs in the third person singular (the EU *is*, the EU *has*, the EU *needs*...) became widespread practices following the Amsterdam Treaty, to the detriment of references to individuals that represent either the EU, or a specific EU institution or body. From a linguistic and semiotic perspective, these deliberate paradigmatic choices are neither arbitrary nor innocuous. These preferences, despite oftentimes being neglected or taken for granted in discourse analysis, illustrate an institutional personification of the EU, and an attribution of characteristics that are not necessarily ‘human’ (as we observe in literary texts), but at least those of an ‘individual’ or an ‘actor’ (Twardzisz, 2013).

As such, the authors of EU discourses often use *prosopopeia*<sup>37</sup> to ascribe a collective identity to a complex institutional structure that not only does not have a (single) voice *per se*,

---

<sup>36</sup> Tonra, 2011: 1993, citing Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso.

<sup>37</sup> *Prosopopeia* is a speech device often used in classical Latin rhetoric to describe a character speaking on behalf of another, while assuming the absent character’s identity.

but is also never actually present and, as such, is always ‘represented’ discursively. In other words, the fact that something, like an actor, an entity, or an idea (e.g. the EU, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the West, etc.), is constantly and continually ‘spoken on behalf of’ means that it is discursively *constructed*, and this construction is changeable, as it is contingent upon historical and social contexts (Cebeci and Schumacher, 2016). So, when we speak of the EU’s self-identification or self-portrayal, we mean the identification or portrayal of the EU on behalf of a group of individuals in the EU’s complex and multilayer system that discursively construct the EU’s fluid identity from within its institutional structure (Carta and Morin, 2014; Carta, 2015). Accordingly, when we personify the EU in our own analysis, we do so consciously and deliberately, following this logic of a discursively constructed identity. The realisation of the EU’s discursively constructed nature allows us to *deconstruct* it by identifying and analysing the ‘building blocks’ (i.e. the narratives) that it uses to shape and project its identity as a crisis management actor, and ultimately make this policy legitimate.

Because the discourses and resulting narratives that we study here are produced by the EU about its own role, they are mainly presented in a positive or optimistic light. They mostly focus on the EU’s ambitions, its potential, and its value-added, to the detriment of representing a more accurate depiction of its policy accomplishments or of its shortcomings in matters of effectiveness. This ‘one-sidedness’ amplifies an existing discrepancy between narratives and practice and a continuous adjustment between the latter, where “a clear pattern of downgrading ambitions when policy outcomes do not match them can be observed in the EU’s external relations” (Nițoiu, 2013: 241), as shown in the EUGS.

We have identified several direct justifications or explanations provided by the EU for the existence and development of its crisis management policy, including providing security for EU citizens, promoting its values, norms, and principles, preventing and managing crises in its neighbourhood, as well as protecting itself against the undesirable or adverse consequences from crises in its immediate and wider neighbourhood. While this project explores these immediate justifications, we seek to go further in understanding the EU’s discursive construction of its self-perceived crisis management actorness role. As such, our goal is to identify and analyse the several interweaving narratives that characterise and frame the EU’s crisis management normative justifications. The narrative / discourse taxonomy that we arrive at in our analysis is neither definite nor absolute, and in many cases involves more than one narrative at a time (in what we call narrative clusters) and it oftentimes involves more than just crisis management, especially as the tendency to adopt an increasingly comprehensive or integrated approach to handling crises becomes institutionalised. One particular feature that we

noticed as we discerned and analysed the results of our codification-oriented semiotic analysis from the previous chapter was that, similarly to the conclusions of authors like Ferreira-Pereira (2010) or Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés, and Natorski (2015), the EU's main narratives have different origins and purposes, as they concern aspects of what the EU *is*, what it *does*, and *why* it acts in general and in specific policy areas, such as crisis management.

In addition, there are other narrative-related elements which resulted from our analysis and that are important for the understanding of the EU's normative justification as a crisis management actor. One such result does not constitute a narrative *per se*, but rather the absence thereof. This is the case with the issue of colonialism, which is a relevant discursive omission when we consider the historical past of many EU Member States and how the EU, despite maintaining a normative 'civilising' attitude in crisis management and other foreign policies, chooses to not address it. In this chapter we also address conceptual imprecisions in the EU's discourses that contain elements of normative justification for its crisis management actorness, as well as the EU's discursive treatment of different actors or groups of actors in this context (including the EU's 'partners' and 'strategic partners', the countries that host E/CSDP missions and operations, in addition to EU Member States).

In sum, in the subsequent sections we seek to delve deeper into our research questions that concern the presence of discursive hierarchies by identifying and analysing the dominant discourses and narratives, as well as the marginalised or concealed ones, and by pinpointing and analysing the elements that allow us to identify a 'civilising' attitude on behalf of the EU.

## **5.2 - The EU as a peace promoting 'model'**

There is a group of narratives present in the analysed discourses – a narrative 'cluster' – that concerns *what the EU is*, where it presents itself as a “*model of prosperity, stability and peace*” (WEU Council of Ministers, 1995: 2) that has 'responsibility' and assumes a 'leadership role' as a crisis manager. A model is a paradigm or example meant for imitation or emulation. And the EU is constantly portrayed not just as a model (among other possible models), but as an archetype, i.e. an *ideal* version of the model, not just by the academic literature but especially by itself (Manners, 2002; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Cebeci, 2012, 2017; Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés, and Natorski, 2015; Chamlian, 2016). The project of European integration, motivated by the consequences of war in Europe, had as its primary goal the establishment of interdependence so as to render the re-emergence of conflict therein difficult, if not impossible. Integration has been considered, throughout the European project's development, a 'cornerstone' of peace in

Europe, i.e. it was meant to create a regional ‘zone of peace’ (McDonagh, 2015). The project consisted, initially, of the integration of two key industries for the reconstruction of the war-torn continent – coal and steel – but soon a more political and social dimension emerged, and European values, principles, and norms began gaining relevance, in particular in the context of the development of EUFP (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010). The peace-motivated European integration project acquired, thus, a philosophical, ethical, and idealistic dimension, amply based on liberalist ideas such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, freedom, interdependence, market economy, and globalisation.

The EU’s regional integration project generated peace for over half a century: a ‘model’ of *democratic peace* put to practice and publicly acknowledged and validated with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. In describing the EU as a ‘striking example’ of peace and progress, the discourses analysed in the previous chapter often recall this origin, assuming the link between democracy and peace / security as an *ethos* that characterises the EU’s very nature (Lucarelli, 2002). In other words, in the EU’s analysed discourses in the area of crisis management, the ‘EU as a model’ narrative coincides with the narrative of the EU as a ‘promoter of peace’ (Nițoiu, 2013: 243-6; Schumacher, 2015: 385-6; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). The EU’s historical experience as a democratic peace project became a narrative *because* it worked out for the EU, and therefore it is validated as a positive and legitimating experiment whose primary goal (peace) was indeed achieved, even if what generated that peace was economic interdependence rather than democracy as such (Mousseau, 2009). The ‘EU as a model’ narrative is “the most sedimented metaphor in EU policy discourse” (Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés, and Naturski, 2015: 19), and it entails the premise of assuming the EU’s ontology and teleology as a democratic peace project as one and the same (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Bicketon, 2011b).

In the analysed discourses in the context of its crisis management normative justification, the EU claims to have *responsibility* not only to engage in crisis management and security actorness, but to assume a *leadership* role. Although the ‘EU as a model’ narrative exists on a more meta/comprehensive level of EUFP that transcends specific policies within EU external action (E/CSDP, ENP, aid, climate, human rights, etc.), it is reclaimed in each of these policies, including crisis management. What we have identified repeatedly in the semiotic analysis in chapter 4 as the EU ‘responsibility’ narrative is, in fact, part of, and rooted in, the ‘EU as a model’ narrative, as it derives from the basic premise of a responsibility or a burden assumed by the EU for managing crises resulting from its appropriation of the idea that *its success as a peace project makes it a model that needs to be reproduced*, so as to spread the success to other parts of the world:

The aim of EU foreign policy is to replace the law of force with the force of law. This *comes naturally to us. The EU, after all, has always been a peace project founded on democratic values and respect for laws. The EU wants a world order based on the rule of law* (Solana, 2009b: 74).

The ESDP was born in part out of European indecisiveness and lack of common tools to act in face of conflict on its doorstep, in former Yugoslavia. With the decision to move forward with the creation of a security and defence policy and the launch of its first crisis management missions, the atmosphere of inaction amplified an existing feeling of responsibility driven by both domestic and external expectations. This feeling is reflected in the EU's discourse, as in most instances the EU maintains (explicitly or implicitly) this idea of 'responsibility', 'duty', 'commitment', or 'task' to engage in crisis management outside its territory: "the EU has a *vital interest* to prevent, prepare for, respond to, address and help recovery from conflicts, crises and other security threats *outside its borders – this is a permanent task and responsibility* (Ashton, 2013a: 3). In fact, in its discourse, the EU does not seem to be as much interested in its own performance as it appears to be in conveying a certain image of ideal / model / example or leader that is *expected* to act (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002). This 'inevitable' 'responsibility' is justified either by its claimed expertise and the appropriateness of its tools, or by its assumed mission of spreading its values, norms, and standards, not just in crisis management, but also in other policies like the ENP (Christou, 2010). The literature concerning types of roles and identities ascribed to the EU reflects this self-portrayal.

Moreover, the EU's engagement in crisis management has involved, up until a discursive shift around 2015, the EU dictating the terms on which crises should be managed according to its own understanding, its own interests, and its own objectives. The 2008 ESS implementation report argues that the 'vision' that the EU set out with the ESS was "of how the EU *would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world*" (EU, 2008: 12). The EU also portrays itself as being "widely considered as an example of peace and stability in its neighbourhood and in other parts of the world" (Ashton, 2013a: 3), and as "*highly regarded for our civilian and military missions*" (Ashton, 2013b: 5). In other words, the EU depicts itself as the image of peace, and progress – a hubris-laden utopia (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002; Hyde-Price, 2008), presented without moral flaw, and thus as having the moral authority to dictate what should be, and to impose (even if only by assuming their 'natural' or 'expected' character) its model onto others. This is especially visible in the incorporation of rule of law and state-

building elements – shaped by European ‘superior’ standards and models – in crisis management missions and operations, particularly in statements such as making “a *major contribution to security and stability in a ring of well governed countries around Europe and in the world*” (Council of the EU, 2004b: 1).

Around 2015, a progressive discursive shift towards resilience and pragmatism becomes more visible (EU, 2016; Biscop, 2016; Juncos, 2016) and an effort to re-shape the EU’s global identity ensues. The EUGS is perhaps the document that most evidently displays this discursive shift, as it “represents an attempt to both reckon with a deteriorated strategic environment *while living up to the Union’s principles*. It reflects an acceptance of both the Union’s declining leverage and influence and the non-linearity of changes occurring at the local, regional and international levels” (Stetter and Tocci, 2017: 7). According to Biscop, this discursive shift represents a return to the original sense of the concept of *Realpolitik*, i.e. “a rejection of liberal utopianism, but *not of liberal ideals themselves*” (Biscop, 2016: 1).

Yet, the idea of ‘principled pragmatism’ underlying the EU’s focus on resilience can be somewhat contradictory and, as such, it can generate problems, since it entails the EU’s maintenance of its focus on the alleged universality of its values, while following a pragmatic flexible approach “which denies the moral imperatives of those universal categories” (Juncos, 2016: 2), making it “bound to generate more criticisms of self-interest, selectivity and double standards and accentuate the weaknesses and limitations of the EU as an international actor, eroding its identity as a normative power” (ibid.). While this may be the case, the EU’s discursive shift does not constitute a complete *discursive discontinuity*, as such (but rather only a partial discontinuity), from the prevailing ‘EU as a model’ narrative *as it is produced by the EU*, but rather affects the EU’s operationalisation thereof through its foreign and domestic policy tools, which, in turn, can affect perceptions of its actorness identity, since the latter is constructed by both discourse and practice.

### **5.3 - The EU as a security actor that brings value-added**

In matters of crisis management, converging discourses that relate to *what the EU is* point not only to a narrative of the EU as a model and provider of peace, but also specifically to a narrative of the EU as a security actor that brings value-added. The EU assumes a role as a crisis management actor for many different reasons, one of them is that it seeks to bring something positive, different, and unique to the table, making use of the existing structures to find its place – its *niche* – and to project itself based on that uniqueness and resulting value-added. In other

words, the EU assumes a fundamental ‘exceptionalism’ (Tonra, 2011) or ‘unconventionality’ (Manners, 2001) in its foreign policy, including crisis management, largely derived from ‘the absence of a major military threat’, which prompted the EU to focus on “*other* factors that can constitute the underlying causes of terrorism or of armed conflict between or within third states, or that can intrinsically affect the values and interests of the EU” (Biscop, 2004: 11). The EU’s difference or specificity in face of other ‘powers’ in the international system in what concerns security can be identified as stemming from it having not only “different power *capabilities*” (Diez, 2005: 614),<sup>38</sup> but also a “distinctive *approach* to security” (Biscop, 2004).

As observed throughout chapter 4, NATO keeps appearing in discourses related to EU crisis management and security, with its importance being constantly reinforced, and its necessity constantly validated. There are at least two main reasons why this is the case. The first reason is that being part of a transatlantic community – largely materialised by NATO – is not restricted to (military) security, but comprises a community of ‘ideals, interests and purposes’ (Diez, 2005: 621-32; Lucarelli, 2002) “committed to *promoting* shared values and *defending* common interests” (WEU Council of Ministers, 1995: 2), that “constitutes a *core element* of the international system” (European Council, 2010: 4). This is considered by the EU to be fundamental for the maintenance of ‘western/liberal’ normative dominance, particularly in face of the emergence of a ‘post-western world’ (Duggan, 2015; Freire, 2017; Stuenkel, 2016).

The second reason is that the subjacent inquiry over NATO’s necessity in the constant affirmation thereof is derived from a questioning of the consequences of the growing complexities of transnational and global security and of the multifaceted solutions needed to tackle them. The EU’s response is the identification of a gap that needs to be filled by an actor that has specific tools that transcend the traditional military tools used by NATO. As such, E/CSDP missions and operations are described as “innovative, tailor-made solutions, mixing civil with military components. This is precisely what the EU’s added value is – and what the complex security challenges of our world require” (Ashton, 2010: 26). The EU describes itself as filling that gap by relying on different instruments, such as expertise, extensive diplomatic experience, or considerable economic influence, thus capitalising on the idea of bringing value-added to the global security environment. With this approach, NATO’s purpose becomes apparent and the EU’s complementary role becomes indispensable, “a true partnership based

---

<sup>38</sup> Diez (2005: 614) citing Kagan, Robert (2003) *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York, Knopf.



on our *respective strengths and specificities*” (European Council, 2010: 4; Mayer, 2017). Even without mention to its complementarity to NATO or the UN, the EU insists on describing itself based on its value-added due to its expertise and specific capabilities, anchored in notions like civilian or normative power.

The functionality underlying the recurrence of discourses and narratives that present the EU as playing ‘positive’ roles on the global scene is particularly evident in moments of crisis (Nițoiu, 2013: 241). The fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War, which led to a change in the global security environment, led the EC/EU to progressively frame a foreign policy and subsequently a security and defence policy based on its value-added. The 2003 European Security Strategy followed a period of normative divergences between the Member States (Puetter and Wiener, 2007) and a reflection upon the EU’s role as a security actor in the context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, and the ensuing Iraq and Afghan conflicts. This context “influenced Member States’ willingness to consider an exercise in strategic thinking that was impossible when ESDP was created just a few years earlier” (Biscop, 2004: 9), and gave way to a reconceptualization of security at the EU level as a multidimensional concept (ibid.: 11). However vague it may be, the ESS itself has worked as a kind of positive ‘narrative’ (Coelmont, 2012; Biscop, 2015) that framed the EU’s ambitions and potential as a security actor based on its value-added for over a decade. The EUGS also represents an instance of this kind of ‘positive’ discursive reframing by outlining the EU’s potential role in a difficult and complex environment, as its “confidence in the value of its unique set of capabilities as a comprehensive security actor has apparently grown” (Mälksoo, 2016: 382). Even if the normative ambitions of the EU appear diminished in the EUGS, the EU is still discursively *portrayed* as defending its core values and providing a valuable, useful, and especially pragmatic contribution to the improvement of the regional or global security environment, particularly in complementarity to its own Member States by combining its particular comprehensive skills and tools.

#### **5.4 - The EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude and ‘normalisation’ narrative**

There is a narrative cluster that concerns *what the EU does*, i.e. how it acts in the area of crisis management, such as through the reproduction of the EU model representing European liberal democratic values, through EU-led institution building. Embedded in the EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude, we identify a narrative of ‘normalisation’, which derives from the recurrent discourses about crisis management practices and instruments making others ‘normal’ or ‘in order’,

according to EU standards (Turner, 2012). One of the main strategies that the EU uses for crisis management, particularly for crisis prevention, is the reproduction of the aforementioned flexible ‘EU model’ representing European liberal democratic values and standards, by means of institution building (EU-led or otherwise, most frequently on multilateral arrangements). In the context of its crisis management actorness discourses, there is a prevalence of the idea that peace can (and should) be made by replacing state institutions that are marked by negative attributes (failed, collapsed, corrupt, rogue) with liberal democratic institutions based on the EU model. The EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude in crisis management is framed by this narrative, stemming from its belief in having a status of model or ideal, i.e. a representation of ‘normalcy’ that others will inevitably want to emulate.

In fact, the ESS – the EU’s first official strategic document, which laid the bases for the development of its crisis management policy – is described by the EU as having “established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests *based on our core values*” (EU, 2008: 3). So, not only are the EU’s values, norms, and standards assumed to be ‘normal’, they are assumed to be an inherent component of crisis management, and this policy is assumed to be a means of external projection of this model, under the aegis of the CFSP. In fact, the CFSP has been overall, since the beginning, meant to “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (e.g. EU, 1992: 94; 1997: 155) indicating the genesis of an underlying normative attitude towards external actors. This link between crisis management and the projection of the European model is especially present in the concept of crisis prevention (e.g. Council, 2001d: 3), and even in the case of small-scale CSDP missions like EUSEC DR Congo, which the EU expected to “*create the conditions* for making economic and social development possible again” (EEAS, 2012: 1).

Crisis prevention largely entails an active search for actorness ‘opportunities’ that are mainly driven by EU interests oftentimes to the detriment of local interests (and local interest). The EU’s discourse – even when referring to specific missions or operations – puts the focus on itself, and in building its image and identity, instead of a focus on the potential host countries or regions, and even oftentimes disregarding the EU’s actual performance (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002), such as the case of EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, which was portrayed by the EU as a successful ownership-oriented mission, while showing a lack of effectiveness on the ground (Ansorg, 2017). Moreover, “the EU’s conflict management policy towards Africa has first and foremost been motivated by European concerns, which consist of both common interests and French national interests in particular” (Olsen, 2009: 257). In other words, the fact that many

crisis management missions and operations (perhaps even the majority) are more an initiative of the EU rather than of the host countries is not bereft of consequences (Ansorg, 2017).

As such, the EU is no stranger to loss of interest and compliance on behalf of local authorities, as seen with the cases of EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RD Congo, EUJUST Themis in Georgia, or EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, for example. These situations of disinterest are frequently motivated by the fact that CSDP missions and operations are often a result of the EU's concerns and interests rather than the local actors', especially in cases when only after an EU proposal there is a formal invitation on behalf of local authorities (e.g. EUPOL Afghanistan, EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, EUMM Georgia). Similarly, local lack of interest and cooperation can also be motivated by an active search, on behalf of the EU, of 'opportunities' to engage in crisis management, including the EU's involvement even before certain situations turn into crises – i.e. the EU "be[ing] able to act before a crisis occurs" (Council of the EU, 2004b: 1). This positioning could potentially result in the relativizing of the 'emergency' dimension of certain crises and a broadening of the concept of crisis itself – potentially to the point of overstretching it, as in the case of EUJUST Themis in Georgia (which suffered, in addition, from the lack of Georgian authorities' willingness to cooperate, see Bouris and Dobrescu, 2017) – as it might result in a search for ways of imposing a European world vision of what constitutes 'normal' by actively seeking for putative future or embryonic alleged 'crises', identified as such by the EU according to its own convenience.

#### 5.4.1 - The EU as a post-colonial actor

The EU's 'civilising' attitude and accompanying 'normalisation' narrative is also related to an important discursive omission. Our analysis revealed that the EU's discursive 'image' – despite being the result of discursive struggles from within – is carefully curated to match an ideal that detaches itself from, and thus does not inherit, the violent and severely asymmetric colonial past of some of its individual Member States. In other words, European 'exceptionalism' is "based on a temporal 'othering' of its history" (Tonra, 2011: 1197; Larsen, 2004). The removal of the EU's colonial past from its crisis management actorness normative justification reveals a paradigmatic choice that is not negligible as "the construction of the political in contemporary Western discourse marginalises the struggle of non-European peoples for economic justice and racial equality and discounts their historical experience of dispossession" (Darby, 2004: 3). Colonialism / imperialism was a normative justification for many EU Member States – before the EU even existed – to export their 'superior' way of life (Kleinfeld and Nicolaïdis, 2009:

140), while simultaneously exploiting and abusing both resources and populations, especially in African countries, for their own gains and interests (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013: 284). The resulting decolonisation processes – that oftentimes included war, but seldom any kind of restitutions, adding to a detachment to pre-colonial forms of traditional political organisation and authority (Darby, 2004: 10) – left entire regions bereft of functioning autonomous administrative structures, and resulted in territorial disputes and civil conflicts, political instability, as well as a history marked by foreign occupation and abuse that lacked any accountability.

The EU's detachment from its Member States' colonial past marks a discursive construction of itself as a new and different post-Westphalian or post-modern actor (Zielonka, 2013: 48-9), as “postcolonial literature is dominated by Europe Past, its imperialisms and colonialisms understood as *events that have come to an end*: there are global after-shocks *but the phenomena that sourced them are ‘post’*” (Hooper and Kramersch, 2007: 526). Whether the EU acknowledges it or otherwise, it remains a (post)colonial actor (Onar, Nicolaïdis, 2013; Turner, 2012); however, this narrative is entirely absent from the EU's discourse as a crisis management actor, even though many of the crises it seeks to prevent or manage are likely to be rooted in problems derived from European colonial occupation, despite the decades that have passed since the end of European colonialism. The EU, in turn, depicts itself as the image of progress and peace and as a unique, sophisticated, and also ‘amnesiac’ (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013: 293; Hooper and Kramersch, 2007: 527) actor that brings ‘good’ governance, ideals, norms, values to the rest of the world (Manners, 2002; Aggestam, 2008), while disregarding the colonial-type logic implied in its attitude (Staeger, 2016; Turner, 2012) and ignoring that “legacies of a more Eurocentric era may inflect, for better or for worse, upon actors’ perceptions and preferences to this day” (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013: 296).

This discursive omission as part of the EU's identity construction is relevant, but largely ignored, because “given continental Europe's past (wars, empires, genocide, and so forth) and the EU's new self-positioning as a morally superior ‘soft’ power, perhaps there is an understandable reticence to stir the imperial/colonial waters” (Hooper and Kramersch, 2007: 532). Yet, by ignoring the past that contributed (to a greater or lesser extent) to many of the present crises (Heldring and Robinson: 2012), the EU as such is shedding itself from any actual responsibility and presents itself as a model or an ideal whose historical identity is shaped by peace and stability. Notwithstanding, the EU is not an entirely autonomous entity in the area of crisis management, and the main decision-makers are Member State representatives, who take advantage of this relatively new forum to begin anew with exporting (once again) ‘superior’

norms, values, and standards with a clean slate (Darby, 2004). Even the concept of ‘ownership’, which the EU publicises abundantly in its discourse, yet struggles to achieve in practice, can be interpreted as a mechanism used to mitigate the normative appearance of its crisis management policy as “a case can be made that the EU became particularly attached to the principle of ownership as a way of avoiding appearing in a neo-imperial light” (Ejdus, 2017: 465).<sup>39</sup>

As explored in previous sections, because the EU’s Member States overcame war and division, the EU’s discourse assumes that other regions / countries that suffer similar circumstances can benefit from the EU’s expertise, and thus exports its ideals, values, and norms in the context of crisis management: “(...) a Union that builds on the success of 70 years of peace; a Union with the strength to contribute to peace and security in our region and in the whole world” (EU, 2016: 5). Yet, and although we are not arguing that the EU is a colonialist actor, its actions and assumptions do resemble colonial logic in many ways (Pace and Schumacher, 2007: 148; Nicolaïdis et al., 2015; Staeger, 2016), not to mention that the omission of its member’s colonial past is not helpful in mitigating the asymmetries generated by the latter.

#### 5.4.2 - The ‘security-development nexus’ narrative

Also within the narrative cluster that relates to *what the EU does* as a crisis management actor, we find a narrative concerning a ‘security-development nexus’ that is intertwined with the EU ‘normalisation’ narrative, as described earlier. The ‘security-development nexus’ narrative is characterised by a “conflation of traditional security concerns with the overall development policy of the EU indicates an expansion of and an effort to legitimize the EU’s foreign and security policy” (Anderson and Williams, 2011: 1).

The EU has discursively presented the fields of security and development as linked since the 2003 ESS and the 2005 European Consensus on Development, which “acknowledge that there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and that without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace” (Council, 2007d: 2). While the underlying link between security and development have always been present in the EU’s crisis management discourse (and that of other international institutions as well) (Bagoyoko and Gibert, 2009; Gänzle, 2009), not least because of the E/CSDP’s strong

---

<sup>39</sup> Ejdus, 2017: 465, citing Rayroux, A. and N. Wilén (2014), “Resisting ownership: the paralysis of EU peacebuilding in the Congo,” *African security*, 7(1), p. 26.

normative features, it has become more visible in recent years, especially with the launch of the EU's comprehensive approach in 2013 (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), which states that the EU engages in different stages of crisis management "in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term development" (Ashton, 2013a: 2). In fact, the link between security and development is considered to be "a key underlying principle in the application of an EU comprehensive approach" (ibid.: 4). The EUGS's 'integrated' approach reiterates and strengthens this idea:

We must become more joined-up in our security and development policies. CSDP capacity building missions must be coordinated with security sector and rule of law work by the Commission. Capacity Building for Security and Development can play a key role in empowering and enabling our partners to prevent and respond to crises (...). Our peace policy must also ensure a smoother transition from short-term crisis management to long-term peace building to avoid gaps along the conflict cycle (EU, 2016: 50, 51).

This means that while the EU's normative ambition, present in its crisis management discourse, appears to subside with an increased focus on stability and local 'ownership', we might argue that it is, in fact, replaced by a stronger link between security and development (the latter being as normative or more than norms exports in crisis management). This process might be interpreted as the 'developmentalisation' of security policy, or the securitisation of development policy (Keukeleire and Raube, 2013; Anderson and Williams, 2011; Winn and Lewis, 2017). Even though the EU's discursive changes towards more ownership and flexibility appear to point away from the predominant tendency of 'depoliticization' (Cebececi and Schumacher, 2016: 6) of EU engagement with third countries, its pragmatist pledge, in line with its neo-functional logic of conflict and crisis management (Visoka and Doyle, 2016), indicates otherwise. The EU's increased focus on local 'ownership' is possibly connected to an uneasiness of being associated with its Member States' colonial past, and to the understanding that the EU itself shares this kind of attitude towards 'developing' countries (this very nomenclature, borrowed from the EU's discourse, is normatively charged and reproduces perceived asymmetries, yet is taken for granted, as are most normatively charged terms present in the EU's discourse).

The emergence of a 'security-development nexus' narrative is arguably justified by the EU's efforts to be recognised as a security and crisis management actor, as much as it has been recognised as a development actor (Anderson and Williams, 2011: 19). The 'security-

development nexus' is, as such, linked to the 'internal-external security nexus', where "the actorness and the security narrative of the nexuses are thus co-constitutive: appropriation of policies and instruments of a multifunctional actor for security purposes; securitization of issues to consolidate policies and actor projection" (Brandão, 2015: 15).

#### 5.4.3 - The EU as an 'anchor of stability'

Somewhere between the narrative clusters concerning *what the EU is* and *what the EU does* is the narrative in which it assumes a *stabilising* role, oftentimes identifying itself as an "anchor of stability" (EU, 2008: 1) in regions and countries where it deploys crisis management missions and operations (especially in its immediate neighbourhood). This narrative, which can also be framed as a 'security-stability nexus' (Roccu and Voltolini, 2018), is anchored in the 'threat/risk' narrative that has marked EUFP particularly since the launch of the ESS (Christou, 2010; Schumacher, 2015). While the ESS marked a stronger shift in the EU's discourse, the idea of promoting 'structural' stability was already present in the Commission's 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention, which defined such stability as encompassing economic development, democracy, respect for human rights, 'viable political structures', and 'healthy' social conditions. In the EU's discourse – in particular in Council Joint Actions setting up missions and operations in contexts as distinct as FYROM, Georgia, or the DRC – we found the recurrent use of a sentence (almost *ipsis verbis*), where the EU claims that "a (continued) commitment of EU political effort and resources will (thus) help to further embed stability in the country (...) [and/or] in the region" (e.g. Council, 2004d: 2; 2004e: 21; 2004h: 30; 2005c: 20).

The use of expressions relating to the EU's efforts to ensure 'stability / stabilisation' - however vague or ambiguous they may be - have been present in the EU's discourse since the early days of the ESDP until the Lisbon Treaty and the launch of the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, acquiring more importance and visibility particularly since 2013/14 with an increased focus on resilience. The changes in the European Commission's Instrument for Stability, which was replaced at that time, by the Instrument *contributing to Stability and Peace*, for example, reflect this increased focus in stability in the context of the 'security-stability nexus' and the 'security-development nexus'.

The basic logic behind this flexible security-stability nexus 'master frame', i.e. a narrative "through which actors interpret uncertain and problematic situations" (Roccu and Voltolini, 2018: 6) and the EU's stabilisation efforts through crisis management (as well as

through other policy frameworks like the ENP) entails an understanding of security as an ontological goal, beyond the mere traditional territorial and structural protection from external threats, and stability as more of a process of mitigating uncertainty and ontological insecurity (ibid.: 9). So, the EU essentially attempts to ensure that a given situation that is deemed problematic remains stable (i.e. that it does not worsen), regardless of the country in case being autocratic or otherwise, with the ultimate objective of limiting potential problems for itself (thus ensuring its own ontological security). Yet, the fact remains that “neither stability nor security nor the nexus between them are self-evident, and indeed they are very much the result of contingent, and hence political, processes of construction, negotiation and also contestation” (ibid.: 2). The problem of the EU’s argument in favour of stability in countries or regions where there are power asymmetries that are detrimental to certain groups, and addressing oppressive authorities as ‘partners’ is that this is likely to ascribe some validation or endorsement to the latter, potentially causing said asymmetries to continue, which, in turn, may cause the opposite of stability and ultimately be detrimental to the EU itself (see Schumacher, 2016, regarding the EU’s stabilisation approach in the context of the ENP, particularly marked since 2015).

After the Lisbon Treaty, with a tendency to look more inwardly and a greater focus on resilience, the references to stability become increasingly linked to dealing with the ‘*threat of instability*’. Throughout this period, this concept has become even more central in the changes operated in the EU’s initial normative ambitions as a crisis management actor, in addition to accompanying an increase in attention to a more territorial kind of defence, as well as an increasing approximation between internal and external security. Ultimately, it is clear in the EU’s discourses that the idea of ensuring ‘stability’ means more than traditional political understandings of this concept such as the mere absence of violence, or structural governance survival, and it does not necessarily preclude all manners of change (Dowding and Kimber, 1983). Stability, in this context, is about suppressing or mitigating changes or problems that affect the ontological survival of the EU’s way of life, deeply rooted in its ‘universal’ values, principles, and norms - which explains also the latter’s centrality in EUFP, including in its crisis management practices.

In addition to the guarantee of ontological security, the use of the concept of stability and the attribution of a stabilising mission to the E/CSDP also entails something else. If we consider that stability is achieved “when the formal roles and structures set by authority match those constructed by informal social interaction” (Margolis, 2010: 332), then we must look to the source of the informally established roles and structures: in the case of E/CSDP missions and operations, the EU places itself in a position of surrogate to the latter, thus providing its



own benchmarks and standards as suitable, and consequently projecting a ‘civilising’ identity (Mitzen, 2006).

### **5.5 - The primacy and universality of EU values, principles, and norms**

Finally, we have identified in our analysis a narrative cluster that concerns *why the EU acts*, and how what it does serves to justify its crisis management actorness, including the motivations for exporting the EU ‘model’ and the normative aspects associated with that: the EU’s assumption of the primacy and universality of its values, principles, and norms, which define its identity and ontology (e.g. Manners, 2000, 2002, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2013a, 2013b; Larsen, 2004; Diez, 2005; Zielonka, 2006; Diez and Manners, 2007; Pace, 2007; Tocci, 2007; Merlingen, 2007; Aggestam, 2008; Gerrits, 2009; Whitman, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 2013; Gordon and Pardo, 2014; Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés, and Natorski, 2015; Del Sarto, 2016; Colombo et al., 2017: 16; etc.).

The reasons behind the EU’s actions and ambitions specifically in the area of crisis management are diverse, and include ensuring its own security above all, maintaining normative influence in world affairs, a sense of responsibility, and ensuring the safety and improve the lives of local populations in crisis affected areas. By assuming that “conflicts thousands of miles from our borders can damage our interests, while the spread of peace, prosperity and democracy around the world is good for Europe” (Ashton, 2013b: 1), the EU thus justifies a crisis management policy with realist purposes – i.e. based on interests and self-preservation (Council of the EU, 2015: 2) – and driven by constructivist instruments (spread of peace, prosperity, and democracy). While this idea has always been important for the EU (from its own formation to the launch of the ESDP, up until the EUGS), it has progressively become more visible in the EU’s discourses as fundamental and essentially linked with the EU’s own (ontological) security.

The EU assumes the primacy and universality of its values, principles, and norms, and assumes that primacy and universality as *legitimizing* their projection (Larsen, 2004; Pace, 2007: 1053; Manners, 2009b: 3; Zielonka, 2013: 46): the EU “derives its legitimacy from *the democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses*” (European Council, 2001d: 22). The EU’s export of its values, principles, and norms (through the E/CSDP and other EUFP frameworks) is motivated by its assumption that, because of its own success, they are appropriate to replicate elsewhere, oftentimes regardless of specific local dynamics. The assumption of universality of EU values, norms, and standards is one of most

visible and relevant normative justifications provided for the EU to engage in crisis management and for its actions in this context. It is a crucial component in the EU's legitimation as a crisis management actor. In crisis management and conflict prevention, the EU's norms, values, and standards are depicted as an essential element in guaranteeing success and in approximating the host country to EU standards, and thus to peace and progress.

The EU's crisis management policy is amply based on the premise that crises can primarily be solved in a stable and long-lasting manner if countries develop liberal democratic institutions based on European standards and models. This policy's rapid progress changed the European security and defence field from a traditional reactive defence type of design, typical of states, to a proactive design that aims at preventive defence, i.e. it evolved from states' more traditional *peace keeping* to EU / international *peace building*. This latter type of involvement between the EU and third countries in the context of conflict prevention and crisis management usually involves a normative component, as the EU often engages in practices that are based on the premise that peace building can be achieved through "the externally led construction of liberal democratic institutions" (Légaré, 2010: 35). The issue here is that – as we have seen throughout this study – the EU considers the latter to be universally accepted and desired. So, by relying on the assumption that these practices and values are universally accepted, the EU assumes that they are legitimate, and thus they justify the EU's projection thereof. As such, the EU attempts, through crisis management and other EUPF tools, to ensure its own ontological security and to maintain a normative dominance in international relations and uses this alleged dominance as a legitimation tool.

In its discourse, the EU simply does not depict crisis management without the promotion of European values and norms, as it reiterates consistently that countries in crisis need the EU's help to achieve peace, progress, and development – the latter being considered by the EU to be universally desired as well. This is one of the main narratives that the EU sustains throughout its normative justification discourse as a crisis management actor, which it uses to legitimate its actions and ambitions in this policy area. The normative aspects of crisis management entail a value judgement over what it means to be in 'crisis', as well as the advancement of certain standards (in this case European standards) to the detriment of existing standards in place in the region affected the alleged crisis, regardless of whether the EU is successful in implementing them or otherwise (Rațiu and Ciulei, 2013).

In addition to portraying its values, norms, and standards as 'natural', 'normal', 'universal', or 'superior', the EU also assumes that they are inherent to crisis management. An example of this logic is a sentence in the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts,

also known as the ‘Göteborg Programme’, where the EU portrays itself as “a successful *example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development*” (Council of the EU, 2001c: 2). Although the EU’s normative ambitions have been present since its inception, the EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude became increasingly more and more visible, with value judgement being more present in EU official documents in the period since the establishment of the EU’s foreign policy, up until the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, this value judgement is not something that is explicit: the EU does not state overtly that its standards and norms are better than others’, but rather its discourse assumes and portrays its action of expansion and propagation of European standards and norms as being normal, natural, universal, and thus unquestionable.

On the other hand, most EU crisis management missions are not accompanied by executive mandates. This means that the norm is the signing of formal invitations and agreements between the EU and the host countries, which then form additional legal bases for the implementation of CSDP missions and operations. When doing so, host countries validate not only the EU’s presence and their help, but also the *kind* of help and especially the normative load that the latter is imbued with. Even in the absence of conditionality, in order to receive the EU’s help in this area, the host countries end up having to accept that it is contingent upon following EU standards, norms, and criteria. Although this does not necessarily render the EU’s normative standards ‘normal’ or ‘universal’ *per se*, it does provide some validation for the latter’s dissemination, which in turn legitimates the EU’s assumption of their ‘normalcy’ and ‘universality’ reflected in its discourses. As such, if the depictions of actors, concepts, or ideas that translate into a power or position asymmetry are thusly publicly validated by the actors within the social order, then the claims of ‘normalcy’ of such asymmetries (systematically produced and reproduced by the dominant discourse) end up receiving some kind of validation.

## **5.6 - Other discursive omissions and conceptual imprecisions**

An omission identified in the EU’s discourse as a crisis management actor concerns ethical considerations regarding the right, the consequences, and the legitimacy of the use of force. Even though the military dimension is small, and the use of force is residual, in the context of the E/CSDP, the EU’s change from having an identity rooted in the narratives of civilian / soft power to having a security and defence policy with a military component has been amply debated and critiqued, especially in academic literature (Duchêne, 1972 and 1973; Padova-Schoppa, 2004; Nielsen, 2013; Bull, 1982; Stavridis, 2001). In the EU’s discourse, actors and

institutions discuss the idea of ‘force generation’, i.e. the identification and activation of military assets and capabilities, including people and equipment, according to the requirements of a given mission / operation (e.g. Council, 2008a: 6), but they make no real considerations about the ethics of the use of force. In 2009, the Council published the EU Concept for the Use of Force in EU-led military operations, which included, as other similar documents, a number of practical and legal considerations regarding the use of force. And while this document also included a section concerning the ‘Legitimacy of use of force’, this section is classified, and, as such, we were unable to analyse it.

There is nothing innocent about omitting considerations about the implications of the use of force, while simultaneously pointing out issues of credibility: “force generation also raises the broader questions of political will and credibility” (Mogherini, 2015a: 9). HR/VP Mogherini’s Report ahead of the June 2015 European Council on security and defence debates many practical / technical aspects of force generation, followed by a mention of credibility. The use of this morally charged expression concerns perceptions about the EU and about validation or trustworthiness; yet the EU’s discourse does not go beyond that, which makes it likely to be a deliberate paradigmatic choice.

Conceptual imprecisions are also quite frequent, as the EU’s discourses are marked by fragmentation and deliberate construction, discursive ‘path dependencies’, and especially discursive struggles stemming from its complex, composite, multi-layered structure. As such, “the EU’s foreign policy vocabulary is blurry with respect to the whole hierarchy of its concepts. Many terms are used, it is not always clear what kind of relationship is constituted by each term” (Blanco, 2016: 45). Throughout our analysis, we have identified several concepts that lack clarity, such as that of ‘strategic partner’ (Ferreira-Pereira and Vieira, 2016; Blanco, 2016), whose semiotic evolution we discuss in the subsequent chapter. Similar lack of clarity affects other concepts in the area of crisis management, some of which have been addressed by the EU to a certain degree, such as the concepts of monitoring, mentoring, and advising (EEAS, 2014b). Another elusive concept, until the launch of the 2013 comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises was that of ‘comprehensive approach’ (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013):

Generic terms like ‘human security’, ‘civil military coordination’ or ‘integrated missions’ are often used interchangeably with the EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’, while comprehensiveness as such is (...) taken as a given standard in any security-related venture

embarked on by the EU and its Member States (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 224-5).

In the EU's crisis management discourse, many concepts lack clear definitions, not least the very concept of crisis management (Olsen, 2009: 246, 7; Kaldor, Martin, and Selchow, 2007).

The term 'crisis management' exemplifies the imprecision of the EU's CFSP and ESDP language and illustrates the 'terminological jungle' that surrounds collective security policy. Terms like 'crisis response', 'civilian crisis response' and 'humanitarian response', and 'conflict' and 'crisis', are often used as if they were interchangeable (Kaldor, Martin, and Selchow, 2007: 274-5).

What is noticeable in the discursive corpus that we have analysed is that the conceptual umbrella under which the CSDP develops – crisis management – entails several different types of actions concerning the managing of crises. If we understand managing as 'handling' or 'dealing with', then other more specific actions fit inside this broad definition, such as the list of tasks in article 43.1 of the Lisbon Treaty, including "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation" (TEU article 43.1). Still, these concepts, which appear repeatedly in EU discourses relating to mission goals and statements and in the overall discursive corpus under analysis, remain vague and unspecified, so much so that "there is no general agreement on how to define conflict management" (Olsen, 2009: 246). These expressions' vagueness and conceptual ambiguity serve a practical purpose of leaving room for interpretation and implementation, without compromising the EU.

While in most instances EU institutions and actors either use the umbrella concept 'crisis management' as a metonym for E/CSDP (as we have done in this project), or side by side conflict prevention and crisis management (e.g. HSG of Germany and France, 1998: 4; European Council, 1999b; EP, 2000; European Council, 2000b), in a discourse produced by the HR and the Commission (2000: 8, 9) crisis management is presented as one of several possible tools for conflict prevention. Apart from the lists of tasks associated with the E/CSDP that are listed in treaties, no clear definitions are offered for either concept. This diversity and ambiguity provides us with clues regarding the scope of the definitions attributed to these key concepts by

different EU institutions and actors, and regarding the uncertainty and resulting flexibility (for mandate definition, for example) that stems from a lack of clarity.

The very designation of the policy under which these tasks and concepts are developed – the common security and defence policy – seems itself distantly related to the latter, as the link between externally-oriented crisis management and defence as territorial protection and the means through which an actor ensures the achievement of the state of security is not entirely clear. On the other hand, the EU does have quite a broad understanding of security and has been progressively linking it with other policy areas, such as development, which likely adds to the confusion regarding conceptual clarity, not to mention the fact that oftentimes security does not merely entail physical integrity, but a more encompassing notion of ontological security that includes the EU's way of life rooted in its core values, norms and principles. The concept of 'crisis' itself is never clearly defined and is ambiguously used as justification for EU action:

(...) the discourse of crisis management assumes that all cases of EU intervention are those occasioned by humanitarian need, and therefore justified normatively (...). Yet the move to term any given situation a 'crisis', and thus trigger intervention is made in the first instance by the EU, rather than those targeted by it (Martin, 2011: 195).

The concepts of 'failed' or 'fragile' state also appear repeatedly in the EU's crisis management normative justification discourse (e.g. EP, 2002a; European Council, 2003a; EP, 2005; Commission, 2006; EP, 2006; Miliband, 2007; EP, 2009; Solana, 2009b; Ashton, 2010, 2013a, 2013c; Council, 2011) with either conflicting or (most often) no clear definitions provided. Also, the EU's discourses do not establish the parameters or red lines that limit and consequently define the criteria that the EU deems essential for a functioning state, even though the concept of 'resilience' amply referred to in the EUGS may provide us with some clues as to what those limits may be (Pospisil and Kuehn, 2016).

In our analysis we found that for the European Parliament, for example, 'failed / failing' States are associated with terrorism and are lacking 'democratic institutions, infrastructure and civil society', which can (and should) be provided by the EU. For the European Council this concept is also associated with terrorism and organised crime, as well as with 'bad governance' (characterised by corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, and lack of accountability) and to civil conflict. Much like the EP, the European Council is quite prescriptive and clear in indicating that it is up to the EU to 'restore order'. The EU's supranational institution (the European Commission) and individual actors (such as HR Solana and the UK Foreign Secretary

David Miliband) are much vaguer and less prescriptive, associating ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ States with ‘challenges’ or one of many ‘threats’ that the EU faces. HR Ashton, like the Council (even though the latter with a slightly stronger emphasis) are also cautious and vague, even though both actors associate ‘fragile’ states with the EU’s conflict prevention endeavours.

These divergent and (especially) scarce definitions are again partly explained by the discursive struggles and resulting fragmentation and conceptual incoherence that characterises the EU’s discourses, but on the other hand, they are also explained by the simple fact that no clearly defined meaning has been established within the EU structure for these complex and contentious concepts (oftentimes deliberately), even though they have been amply acknowledged as security priorities in different policy areas (Grimm, 2014).

## **5.7 - The representation of different actors**

The constant production and reproduction of asymmetries between the EU and other actors – particularly potential host countries – whereby the EU is constantly implicitly represented as being dominant, is the focus of this section. Here, we will discuss the EU’s portrayal different groups of actors other than itself. In this section, we will also address the implications of the EU’s attribution of the epithets of ‘partner’ and ‘strategic partner’ to these interlocutors, a matter which has been amply neglected in the study of EUFP discourse (Blanco, 2016: 36), as well as the increasing use of an ‘ownership’ and ‘autonomy’ rhetoric regarding host countries and potential host countries. Essentially, we seek here to pinpoint the results of our analysis concerning how actors, including the EU, CSDP host countries, and other domestic and external actors, are represented in the EU’s discourses, as well as to identify the targets of those discourses.

### **5.7.1 - The EU’s ‘strategic’ international partners**

In most documents since the beginning of the E/CSDP, and particularly up until the launch of the EU’s 2013 comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, the use of the expression ‘partners’ or ‘strategic partners’ has been used mostly in reference to non-EU European or North-American countries and international organisations, such as NATO, the UN, the US, the OSCE, or the Council of Europe (e.g. Council of the EU, 2001c, 2004b: 7; 2004c: 5; 2008c: 27; Solana, 2003a: 2; EEAS, 2012: 1; Ashton, 2013a: 11-12). This could be interpreted as a suggestion of the EU’s perceived European ‘superiority’ *vis-à-vis* the potential host countries,

or at least in contributing “to the establishment of a hierarchy of partners of the EU” (Blanco, 2016: 47).

Throughout the early years of the E/CSDP’s development and implementation, when the EU does mention the potential host countries or regions, it does so either abstractly, or in normatively charged terms, like when it refers to ‘failed’, ‘fragile’, ‘rogue’, or ‘corrupt’ states. This downplaying or lack of attention to potential host states or regions has to do with the emergency nature of crisis management, but it also has to do with the EU’s focus on itself, derived from its intent on proving its uniqueness, quality, and leadership potential, and the value-added that these alleged qualities can bring to the international system. It also has to do with the inherent belief that European standards are universal and desired, so much so that they need to be exported in all areas of EUFP, as we have already discussed in the chapter about the EU’s perceived primacy of its values, norms, and principles. As such, in broader EUFP contexts, EU discourses often establish a distinction between more important partners, in the sense that they are portrayed as mattering more (economically strong predominantly European or North-American partners, often referred to as ‘strategic partners’) and lesser partners that are portrayed as being in need of change or improvement carried out through EUFP tools, such as the E/CSDP.

In fact, in the EU’s discourses in the context of its crisis management normative justification up until 2013, mostly European or North-American countries and international organisations are referred to as ‘strategic partners’, whereas E/CSDP host countries and potential host countries are, at best, occasionally referred to as ‘partners’. And while this may be the case, the fact remains that “official documents and statements from EU representatives do not provide an explanation of the basic nature of these [strategic partnership] relationships” (Blanco, 2016: 38). A discursive distinction between ‘strategic partners’ and ‘partners’ and other such designations in the context of the EU’s hierarchization of its interlocutors thus lacks conceptual clarity (Ferreira-Pereira and Vieira, 2016; Blanco, 2016: 38). Although the underlying asymmetric positioning of different types of partners according to the latter’s importance for the EU is discernible, the fact remains that the EU’s crisis management discourse does not address this issue from a conceptual point of view. Blanco points out that the normative attitude in EUFP is fundamental in understanding what ‘strategic partnership’ means in the EU context, in the sense that the actors deserving of this epithet on behalf of the EU are the ones that likely share the same goals and values as the EU, and actively support the latter through ‘multilateral cooperation’ (2016: 44-5).



The EU's apparent hierarchization of its interlocutors / partners only appears to subside around the 2013 'comprehensive approach', accompanied by a gradual apparent inward-looking shift and the apparent decrease of the EU's external normative ambitions. After the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, we can already notice some differences in the way the EU portrays its interlocutors, doing so with more inclusiveness, but still maintaining some degree of distinction between the two identified taxonomies (e.g. Council, 2011: 1-2; EEAS, 2011: 6-7, 33-34; Council of the EU, 2015: 6). In this 'intermediate' stage towards a more equal treatment of all its E/CSDP interlocutors, we notice a geographic broadening of the EU's 'partners', which include not only the UN, NATO, and the OSCE, but also the African Union, the League of Arab States, and ASEAN, "as well as *strategic* partners and *other* partner countries, within our neighbourhood and more globally" (Council, 2015: 6). The distinction between 'strategic' and 'other' partners still indicates some distinction, in the midst of greater inclusiveness. Notwithstanding, there are still instances when the previous discursive hierarchy returns and a difference between 'international partners', 'allies', and 'third countries', reflecting the discursive struggles that are inherent to the discourse of a complex and multi-layered actor such as the EU (e.g. Ashton, 2013a: 11-12; Mogherini, 2015a: 6, 18),

In more recent discourses, however, the EU has tended more towards referring to its interlocutors with more ownership and partnership attributes (e.g. Commission, 2015a; European Council, 2015: 5-6; Mogherini, 2015a: 4; EU, 2016: 44, 50, 51), such as the instance where HR Mogherini states that "the long-term objective is to enable partner countries and regional organizations to take responsibility for their own security, so they can increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves" (Mogherini, 2015a: 4). The EU's discursive evolution is visible, but it is not a smooth evolution from one paradigm to the other. Sometimes in the very same discursive unit we can observe the EU's actors / institutions portraying its interlocutors in different ways, signalling the aforementioned discursive struggles (discussed in more detail in chapter 3.1) that characterise the discourse of a complex multi-layered actor like the EU.

#### 5.7.2 - The E/CSDP host countries and potential host countries

Overall, the E/CSDP host countries and potential host countries are constantly placed in an inferior hierarchical position *vis-à-vis* the EU and its 'strategic' and 'international partners' up until the Lisbon Treaty, by being either overlooked or omitted from the EU's crisis management actorness discourse or portrayed negatively (either explicitly or implicitly). One example is the

EU's treatment of countries in crisis as 'failed' and 'corrupt', or as having 'weak institutions', as discussed in chapter 5.6. In these instances, the EU is reaffirming its own identity as being the opposite – by establishing its own limits through difference (i.e. by establishing what it is *not*), while simultaneously repeating its 'responsibility' to help these 'others' to improve, to be remade based on its own image / model, thus pointing out a perceived asymmetry and placing itself at a superior hierarchical level in an effort to legitimate its engagement in crisis management.

The construction of a superior 'Europe' to be emulated was the dominant political discourse of the Central European countries after the breakdown of communism in 1989, but this discourse simultaneously pointed to numerous facts proving the 'Europeanness' of the country in question, thus making these countries identical with yet temporarily separated from Europe (Hansen, 2006: 35).

The example above serves to illustrate how, much like in an enlargement process, requests for assistance in civilian or military matters reflect logics of appropriation or emulation of certain norms, institutions, and standards set by the EU on behalf of other actors in the international system who request such support and assistance. By assuming their intent to emulate the EU (or be a part of the EU through enlargement, as in the above example), these actors acquiesce the 'normalcy' of the EU's political and administrative standards, and they end up somewhat validating the EU's claim as an actor with some degree of normative influence.

(...) the less-than-radical construction of the Other within development discourse is carried out by a privileged Western subject, who is constructing not only the identity of the Other but also the concrete policies it should be undertaking to comply with this proscribed identity (Hansen, 2006: 36).<sup>40</sup>

As such, the EU constructs itself as a crisis management actor built not on traditional territorial defence, but especially on the protection of liberal norms, institutions, and values, and on promoting the latter's alleged universality and desirability for each country and region.

---

<sup>40</sup> Hansen, 2006: 35, citing Todorov, T. (1992) *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, New York, Harper Perennial; and Doty, R.L. (1996) *Imperial Encounters*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

The notion of ‘partner’ in the area of crisis management becomes more encompassing in the EU’s discourses as time progresses, including not only the EU’s traditional ‘international’ or ‘strategic’ partners, but also the E/CSDP’s host countries or potential host countries. The broadening of the scope of this nomenclature is related not only to the beginning of an apparent relative and slow decline in the EU’s normative ambitions in crisis management, where hierarchies between actors become progressively less marked in the EU’s discourses, but also to the increasing wide-ranging use (and subsequent normalisation) of this terminology in other policy contexts (such as the ENP). However, this is not always the case, and we can observe a change in the EU’s discourse throughout time regarding host countries, as discussed previously. This change was accompanied by a gradual change in its attitude towards its own role as a crisis management actor, where E/CSDP host countries and potential host countries begin gradually being treated as ‘partners’ (implicitly or explicitly) and an increased focus on ownership and autonomy is observed, particularly since the launch of the EU ‘comprehensive approach’ in 2013. But before the changes occurred in practice, the EU’s discourse already hinted at this tendency. In 2001, before the launch of the ESDP, the Council released a Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, whose main focus was the statement that “the *primary responsibility* for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent *lies with Africans themselves*,” (Council of the EU, 2001d: 3). Yet, the 2004 revised version of the document diminishes these autonomy ambitions and increases the EU’s commitment to engaging directly and individually in crisis management in Africa on a longer-term basis than what was projected in the first document (Council of the EU, 2004g). Other similar situations of an apparent treatment of the E/CSDP host countries as partners, followed by a demarcation in the asymmetrical relationship between the latter and the EU are recurrent, as EU representatives like HR Solana, appear to place the host country (in this case FYROM) on an equal footing with the EU, to subsequently ‘remind’ them of the EU’s superior hierarchical position and ‘superior’ standards: “Proxima will be a unique mission carried out in strong *partnership* with the Government. We want to support you in the further development of an efficient and professional police service, *living up to European standards*” (Solana, 2003a: 3).

There have been, however, instances when the EU has discursively treated host countries as partners for political reasons, even in the presence of a strong normative attitude as in the case of rule of law missions. An example is the integrated rule of law mission in Iraq, in the context of which the EU directly speaks of the mission’s success being dependent on ‘an effective strategic and technical *partnership* with the Iraqis’ and stating that “the EU will use

its dialogue with Iraq and its neighbours to encourage continuous regional engagement and support for improved security and for the political and reconstruction process in Iraq” (Council, 2005d: 62). Especially since the 2009 entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the 2013 ‘comprehensive approach’, acknowledging E/CSDP host countries, and even referring to the latter as ‘partners’, has become the prevailing discursive norm, as they also began taking part in E/CSDP missions and operations themselves in collaboration with the EU (Ashton, 2013c: 6). As such, this moment marks a change in the EU’s discourse towards greater inclusiveness and less apparent hierarchization:

The EU will continue to support local, regional, international partners, relevant non-governmental organisations and institutions for conflict prevention and resolution and the strengthening of peace efforts, as appropriate (Council of the EU, 2011: 2).

This is noticeable even in cases where missions / operations might have been envisaged by the EU, like EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, which “was conducted in *partnership* with the Republic of Guinea Bissau, which maintains *ownership* of the security sector reform (SSR) process” (EEAS, 2010: 1). Yet, there remain cases where treatment of the host countries is, at best, ambiguous, such as the case of EUSEC RD Congo, where the EU provides ‘practical support for security sector reform in the DRC by giving advice and assistance *directly to the Congolese authorities*’, but at the same time ‘works closely with *the other* contributing members of the international community’ (EEAS, 2012: 1). While the EU’s description of EUSEC RD Congo does not identify which actors are the EU’s partners, there is a sense of parity *vis-à-vis* the ‘other members of the international community’ (alongside the EU), and an apparent lower positioning of Congo, while at the same time referring directly to Congolese authorities. This ambiguity, and especially the oscillation in the treatment of host countries as ‘partners’ and an inferior hierarchical placing of the latter *vis-à-vis* the EU, reveals a lack of uniformity that reflects the discursive struggles underlying the EU’s discourse.

Even in 2015 we notice instances of the prevailing hierarchization discernible in the E/CSDP’s earlier years, even when host countries are clearly identified (as opposed to being omitted), in particular in referring to EU-UN close cooperation ‘in’ rather than ‘with’ these countries:

EU-UN relations remain the cornerstone of the EU support to effective multilateralism and translate into close operational cooperation *inter alia* in Mali, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan (Mogherini, 2015a: 6).

Overall, the EU professes as its ‘long-term objective’ the “*enabling of partner countries and regional organizations to take responsibility for their own security, so they can increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves*” (ibid.: 4; European Council, 2015: 6). There is always the ‘enabling’ part, which remains the same as in 2001 or 2003: the basic idea that EU values, norms, and standards are ‘superior’, ‘normal’, ‘natural’, ‘desired’, and that, through these, the EU can enable its ‘partners’ to get themselves out of a crisis situation. The aforementioned oscillation in the treatment of host countries as ‘partners’ and an inferior hierarchical placing of the latter *vis-à-vis* the EU is visible oftentimes in the same document (e.g. Mogherini, 2015a), as mentioned before, reflecting the inherent struggles that mark the EU’s composite and fragmented discourse.

The overall tendency towards a more inclusive treatment of the EU’s interlocutors is visible not only in the attribution of the ‘partner’ epithet, but also in the acknowledgement of the interlocutors’ ‘willingness’ to collaborate with the EU in its foreign policy ventures (e.g. Council, 2015: 7), as well as the increasingly frequent mention of ‘ownership’. Much like other concepts such as ‘strategic partnerships’ or even ‘crisis’, the EU’s discourse does not offer a clear definition of ‘ownership’ in matters of crisis management, and, in addition, it has not been extensively studied in academic circles. In broad terms, “local ownership is a principle of peace- and state-building based on the premise that international interventions can lead to sustainable results only if there is a sufficient degree of local input, participation, and control” (Ejdus, 2017: 463). As such, ownership in the area of EU crisis management has evolved from mostly a top-down mechanism that essentially merely entailed local buy-in, to an idea of appropriation, by local actors in E/CSDP host countries, of the objectives and principles of the mission / operation, in a more balanced ‘middle ground’ that seeks to incorporate local authorities and assets into the missions (ibid.: 465). This middle ground approach to ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’, in addition to the EU’s increasing focus on ‘stability’ means that local actors that may not partake in the EU’s values, norms, and standards may nonetheless be considered ‘partners’, which is not bereft of consequences, as discussed before.

### 5.7.3 - EU Member States and targets of the EU's discourse

In addition to the EU's 'strategic' and 'international' partners and E/CSDP host countries and potential host countries, the EU's main interlocutors in the context of its crisis management normative justification discourse are the EU Member States themselves. Even though this idea may appear paradoxical, as EU Member States are an integral part of the EU, there are many instances where the complexity of the EU's autonomy as an actor is put in evidence, such as when its discourse is directed at the Member States or Member State representatives, or the latter are referred to with some degree of separateness from the EU, thus highlighting the latter's autonomy (e.g. European Council, 1999b, 2000a, 2001b, 2001c; 2001d, 2010, 2013; Council, 2001d, 2004b, 2007b, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015; EP, 2000, 2002a, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; Commission, 2006, 2015b; Ashton, 2013a; Mogherini, 2015a; Solana, 2004, 2007; EU, 2016; PSC, 2007).

Even though there is not always a clear target for the EU's normative justification discourse as a crisis management actor, and considering the aforementioned hierarchization of the EU's 'partners', we can argue that there are two main groups of actors that are being considered: one group comprising EU institutions, and especially Member State representatives, and the EU's 'international' and 'strategic' partners (including international institutions and organisations, such as the UN or NATO). This distinction between types of partners, paired with the apparent increasing tendency to emphasise the importance of the Member States, indicates that the EU's normative justification discourse may not have been, until recently, so much directed at the potential E/CSDP host countries, but rather at EU actors and the 'international' and 'strategic' partners identified in chapter 5.7.1.

The likelihood that the main target of the EU's normative justification discourse is its Member States somehow reflects the paradox and complexity identified by Jupille and Caporaso (1998) with regard to the analysis of the EU's authority and autonomy as an international actor. This is because the European Council and the Council and the Member States are not entirely distinct entities, since the former institutions are composed of representatives of the latter and have been delegated authority to be the main deciders in the area of crisis management, and simultaneously partake in the construction of the EU's crisis management normative justification discourse amply directed at the Member States. Another aspect of this complexity stems from the close link between domestic and external legitimation that converges in the institutional figure of the Council *because* it is made up of Member State

representatives (who concurrently assume national and EU functions and defend national interests while in EU functions) *and* is the main decision-maker in this area.

The EU appears to primarily direct its discourse at actors within the EU – to ensure both domestic validation/authority as well as instruments and capabilities to carry out its ‘responsibilities’ – and at its ‘international partners,’ in order to ensure recognition of its value-added and worth as an actor. EU discourses until the Maastricht Treaty mention the Member States more than the EC; following the creation of the EU and the launch of the CFSP with the Amsterdam Treaty, EU discourses increasingly refer to the EU *per se* or as a metonym for the EU + Member States, in what we identify as a discursive construction of the EU’s collective identity. Occasionally, in discourses that refer to the military aspects of crisis management, the Member States are referred to independently, but mostly we notice that there has been a growing concern, following the Lisbon Treaty (but already present since the beginning of the ESDP), to distinguish between the EU and the Member States as ‘independent’ entities.

Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, *the Union* shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political *solidarity among Member States*, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of *convergence of Member States’ actions* (TEU article 24.2).

In other words, in the EU’s discourses, the main actor appears to be the EU as such (‘the EU is’, ‘the EU can’, ‘the EU strengthens’, ‘the EU should’, ‘the Union shall’, etc.) but there is also frequent mention of the EU Ministers or Member States, and both the EU and the Member States are treated as the main actors in the discourse, reiterating the intergovernmental nature of this policy.





## CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION

The overall goal of this thesis was to conduct a post-structuralism-inspired CDA of the EU's normative justification narratives as a central element in its legitimation efforts as a crisis management actor since the creation of the CFSP and the ESDP in the 1990s, up until the launch of the 2016 EU Global Strategy.

As we meant to study the EU's legitimation efforts, we began by exploring the scholarly debate concerning EU legitimacy. The purpose of this exploration was the identification of what had been analysed and written about this issue, the definitions and benchmarks proposed for such analyses, and the gaps left unexplored. We found that the debate is vast, but it lacks consensus on how to assess the EU's legitimacy at both the domestic and external levels. There is a tendency to prescribe a certain type of legitimation model, namely of the liberal-democratic type, borrowed from the (EUropean) state level onto the EU level and onto the EU's external level as well, but at the same time no clear definition of legitimacy is presented. With these problems in mind, we then sought to investigate if the EU could be considered a crisis management actor by examining the evolution of the scholarly debate concerning EU actorness and to try to understand how (if at all) legitimacy played a role in this particular debate. We concluded, after going through different conceptualisations and specific criteria, that it is possible to claim that the EU possesses actorness features in the area of crisis management – thus answering our first research question. We have ascertained, however, that the EU's actorness is multidimensional and complex, as the EU acts simultaneously as a security provider and consumer, and its actorness is very much linked to both discourse and practice. Legitimacy seems to play a somewhat peripheral role in the actorness scholarly debate, as it is primarily referred to in terms of democratic legitimacy and the domestic capacity for a unit to become an actor.

We delved deeper into the legitimacy debate by considering the concept in isolation from specific political objects (such as the EU) and chose David Beetham's conceptualisation to apply to our study. By examining the most prevalent actorness conceptualisations together with Beetham's legitimacy principles, we sought to understand how the EU's normative justification discourse relates to its (crisis management) actorness – thus answering our second research question. We concluded that the first principle, legal authority, is mostly connected with the domestic actorness dimensions (which focus on structural capabilities to act), and that the third principle, performative endorsement, is mostly connected with the external dimensions of actorness (which focus primarily on recognition and engagement with other actors). We

concluded that the link between the first and the third principle, normative justification, is particularly important for achieving legitimacy in a context such as the international arena, where coercion is not the norm, thus making it our analytical focus. In addition, a branch of the actorness scholarly debate focused on constructivist-inspired power related role conceptions (both attributed to the EU and assumed by the latter as part of its identity) also gave particular importance to normative justification as a means for the EU to ensure legitimacy as an international actor, thus reinforcing our choice.

Having determined that our analytical focus would fall on the EU's normative justification due to its central role in an actor's legitimation process and having established that normative justification was primarily a discursive effort, we moved on to building our framework of analysis. We set out the main post-structuralist practices that we sought to engage in, namely a Derridean-inspired deconstruction and a Foucauldian-inspired critique of concealed power asymmetries, and we laid out our research questions and the CDA principles and techniques that we would use to answer them.

We began our CDA by identifying the network of social practices where the problem is rooted in and by identifying the discourses that constitute the normative justification of the EU's crisis management actorness – thus answering two more research questions. As such, we explored the characteristics of EUFP discourses, namely their multi-layered nature, as well as the discursive struggles, heterogeneity, and fragmentation that take place therein. We selected a discursive corpus that included all available discourses that met certain criteria which fit into to our specific objectives, namely composed of discourses that contained elements of normative justification and substantiation of the EU's actorness ambitions, actions, and identity in the policy field of crisis management, drafted or uttered at the highest possible political official EU level, which preferably formed a basis for policy development. We gave primacy to (and thus included *all*) European Council and Council discourses (i.e. the highest possible political official EU level) that met these criteria. To these we added discourses produced by other EU institutions and organs that were relevant for our study's goals, and we also added relevant discourses produced by Member State representatives that met the criteria.

We then engaged in a historical and semiotic analysis of the EU's crisis management policy and discourses throughout our chosen timeframe, setting out to answer seven more research questions, namely: how and why the EU came to develop a crisis management policy; identifying the historical and social contexts underlying the EU's discourses; understanding how the EU's discourses as a crisis management actor relate with the practical implementation of the CSDP; exploring how the EU frames / constructs and justifies normatively its perceived

crisis management actorness; identifying the words, concepts, and assumptions that constitute the EU's discursive framework for speaking about crisis management and its projected role therein; identifying the key semiotic and linguistic features of the EU's discourses; as well as pointing out eventual discursive continuities and discontinuities. Ultimately, chapter 4 resulted in the identification of the EU's main discursive patterns, hierarchies, discursive continuities and discontinuities, omissions, emphases, absences, contradictions, and discrepancies, which were further explored in the subsequent chapter.

In chapter 5 we concluded that the EU's identity is substantially rooted in a discursive construction marked by a self-focus and a curated image (thus corroborating a claim in the scholarly debate), where an institutional 'personification' of the EU is the norm. We have concluded that not only is the EU always 'represented' discursively, but it is mainly presented in a positive or optimistic light, which magnifies an incongruity between narratives and practice, leading to a consequent continuous adjustment between the latter. We have also concluded that EU's main narratives have different origins and purposes, concerning aspects of what it is, what it does, and why it acts. Throughout chapter 5 we sought to answer the research question that asked if there is a discursive hierarchy, and to identify both the dominant and the marginalised or concealed discourses and narratives.

We found that there are several interconnected main narratives propagated by the EU. One such narrative links the idea of the 'EU as a model' with the idea of the EU as a 'promoter of peace,' driven by the EU's historical experience as a democratic peace project validated as a positive and legitimating experiment. In other words, the achievement of the EC/EU's primary goal (peace) lead to the inherent assumption of a concurrence between the EU's nature and *finalité* as a democratic peace project, and its success was understood as a model that needs to be reproduced and spread to other parts of the world. Another narrative identified in our analysis corroborates the EU's self-identification as a security actor, which is explained by its individual characteristics and value-added. This narrative is particularly visible when the EU mentions NATO, as it serves the twofold purpose of emphasising the importance of the transatlantic community of values and ideals (which ensures 'Western' dominance) and the identification of a gap that needs to be filled by an actor that has specific instruments and skills beyond NATO's military focus. With this value-added narrative, NATO's purpose is validated, and the EU's complementarity is shown to be necessary.

We also sought to explore the elements that indicated a 'civilising' attitude on behalf of the EU, in line with claims made in the scholarly debates. We found that there is a 'normalisation' narrative that indicates the presence of a 'civilising' attitude, visible in the

attempts of reproduction of the EU model through EU-led institution building. The ‘normalisation’ aspect of this narrative stems from the EU’s efforts to make others ‘normal’ or ‘in order’, according to EU standards. Linked to this narrative is an important discursive omission, namely concerning the European colonial past and the asymmetries generated therein, as well as another narrative that promotes the link between development and security, increasingly visible in the EU’s discourses and practices through the progressive practical implementation of comprehensive and integrated approaches to security.

Another key narrative that marks the EU’s normative justification discourse as a crisis management actor is the EU’s assumption of the primacy and universality of the values, principles, and norms that it exports in this and other policy fields. One of the most relevant features of this narrative is the EU’s assumption of its values, norms, and principles’ legitimacy, which in turn stems from the assumption of their universality, reflecting the criticisms made to the proponents of the NPE concept discussed earlier in this study. We concluded that when E/CSDP host countries validate the EU’s presence and assistance in crisis management, they also end up validating the latter’s normative qualities, thus rendering *some* legitimacy to the EU’s claims. Ultimately, the legitimation that results from the EU’s discourses and action on the ground is partial and one sided in the sense that it diminishes other actors, especially those for whom the policy is meant. The latter legitimate the EU’s help and the terms that are attached to it, but it is not possible to discern if they do so due to a belief in the EU’s appropriateness and validity, or because the crisis that they are allegedly in (as oftentimes it is the EU that decides what a crisis is) is more detrimental than accepting or requesting the EU’s assistance on the EU’s terms. In other words, normative justification works as a legitimation tool in the EU’s eyes, but not necessarily in the E/CSDP host countries’ eyes.

Additional goals, formulated as a research questions, were to understand how actors, including the EU, E/CSDP host countries, and other actors, are represented in the EU’s discourses, as well as understanding how, and for whom the EU’s crisis management discourses are disseminated. These goals were also directed at corroborating or refuting a claim in the scholarly literature that argued that the EU places itself in a superior hierarchical positioning *vis-à-vis* those for whom the policy is meant. We found that, in addition to a constant hierarchization of the EU’s interlocutors, the attribution of the epithet ‘partner’ or ‘strategic partner’ changes throughout time and is marked by inconsistencies. Since the establishment of the EU, the CFPS, and the ESDP, up until around 2013, this classification was primarily attributed to non-EU European or North-American countries and international organisations, including NATO, the UN, the US, the OSCE, or the Council of Europe. Only after the Lisbon

Treaty and the institutionalisation of the concept of comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises did the EU begin to refer to CSDP host countries as such, alongside ideas of local ownership and capacity building, reflecting a seeming decrease in the EU's external normative ambitions. The Member States are central in the EU's discourses as both builders and targets thereof, echoing the intergovernmental nature of this policy field and also bringing attention to the conceptual and analytical difficulties that stem from assessing the EU's autonomy and authority as an actor, as discussed in the literature review.

The profound social transformations that the EU and its surroundings have experienced throughout the years have shaped the EU's discourse, making it progressively less markedly asymmetric. We observe a decrease in what is often deemed a 'condescending' or 'patronising' rhetoric of reproduction of asymmetric relations between the EU and its interlocutors – especially the countries and regions that host crisis management missions, but also the EU's ENP partners (which oftentimes coincide) – as the EU's focus shifts more towards its own ideological and territorial security than previously, as well as towards stabilisation, local ownership, and resilience. Yet, the EU's normative ambitions in the field of crisis management did not necessarily subsume, but were, in fact, replaced by a different paradigm marked by 'principled pragmatism'.

Ultimately, throughout the study, we have associated discourse and policy development, while contextualising both historically and socially, and we have analysed how the EU's main narratives as a crisis management actor structure its ambitions and positions in the international system, and shape representations therein. Without the definiteness and exactitude of a 'truth'-seeking positivist scientific endeavour, our post-structuralism-inspired post-positivist critical discourse analysis led us to the conclusion that all three claims that we set out to confirm, based on the prevailing scholarly literature can be verified in the EU's discourse and supported by our analytical efforts, thus contributing to the advancement of the debate.

We conclude our study by stressing the importance of an actor's normative justification in the context of foreign policy, as a means of justifying the latter, as legitimacy remains the most important mechanism, in the absence of coercion, for international actors and institutions to ensure compliance and overall endorsement. Our analytical focus on the EU's normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor has been motivated by a necessity to understand what constitutes the discursive framework that the EU uses in communicating crisis management and its projected role therein and how this framework evolved, as we assume that discourse and practice are mutually constitutive, and, as such, discourse has a fundamental role in justifying and constructing the meaning of crisis management and in reinforcing the EU's

identity as an actor. It has also been motivated by a necessity to understand how and why the EU deems itself an appropriate actor to engage in this policy area in the name, and in defence of common purposes and values (allegedly shared among its ‘strategic partners’) and following procedures that the EU both understands and projects as being accepted as reasonable, necessary, and appropriate.

Our post-structuralist inspiration served the purpose of highlighting the ‘normalisation’ of discourses and narratives – that is, the *assumption* that they are normal, natural, objective, or expected. This ‘normalisation’ is something that happens permanently in the social world. Our goal was not to make value judgements about any specific narrative (even though this is quite inevitable), nor do we find that there is anything inherently wrong with normatively charged discourses that defend the spread of democracy, human rights, or the rule of law, as the EU’s discourse does. The problem that stems from these – and the problem that our analysis meant to uncover – is simply the assumption that some discourses are normal or natural, as all discourse is, in fact, artificial and constructed. The danger that lies in reifying or normalising certain discourses (e.g. the EU is an ideal model, autocratic governments are not legitimate, security is inherently linked with development...) is that, when acquiesced by its intended audience, discourse becomes a form of power that is potentially more powerful and sustainable than coercion; and the power asymmetries underlying certain narratives become entrenched and eventually established as real, and taken for granted to the detriment of actors or groups in disadvantage. While some discourses are more curated than others, discourse is always contingent upon context and circumstance. As such, assuming that European dominance is normal or natural is taking a normative position masked by false objectiveness.

## **6.1 - Possible avenues for future research**

The most likely continuation of the research developed in this thesis concerns the further exploration of the differences between the various institutional voices that speak on the EU’s behalf in this policy field, from both an institutional and historical point of view, as this is quite underdeveloped in the scholarly literature, as mentioned before.

Another opportunity for future research concerns an extension of the analysis to other official EU means of communication (such as institutional websites or micro-blogging platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.). However, the results of such efforts are likely to reflect the replication of the results of the present study, since we focused primarily on texts

that have been mostly agreed upon by all Member States and representatives within each institution. In this sense, additional communication efforts made by the EU are likely to reflect the convergences and agreements between national and institutional actors that form the core of the policy's development, meaning that they would most likely not represent any sort of significant break or discontinuity from the main narratives found in our analysis, nor the creation of new narratives.

Another research opportunity is an extension of the period of analysis both back to the late 1940s and 1950s, in order to include the establishment of the Western Union and the Western European Union, as well as the failed attempt at creating a European Defence Community. In addition, an extension of the period of analysis further ahead in time, to include the most recent developments in this policy field, such as the development of the PESCO projects, would be very beneficial for understanding the direction that the EU is headed in.

Other dimensions of the analysis that are also important to explore in future research concern the reception of the EU's normative justification strategic narratives as a crisis management actor (in the context of a growing field of research on external perceptions of the EU conducted by authors like Lucarelli and Fioramonti, 2011; Chaban and Holland, 2014; Elgström, 2015; or Bachmann and Müller, 2015), as well as the intentionality dimension, for example by conducting interviews with policy-makers in Brussels, and also continuing an extension of the overall analysis into the Member State level, so as to better understand the articulation between EU-level discourse and policy-making and national Member State interests and preferences.

## REFERENCES

- Aggestam, Lisbeth (2008), "Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?," *International Affairs*, 84(1), pp. 1-11.
- Aizpurua, Eva; Alexa J. Singer; Leah F. Butler; Nicole L. Collier; and Marc G. Gertz (2017), "15 years later: Post 9/11 support for increased security and criminalizing muslims," *Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice*, 15(4), pp. 372-393.
- Allen, David and Michael Smith (1990), "Western Europe's presence in the contemporary international arena," *Review of international affairs*, 16 (1), pp. 19-37.
- Anderson, Stephanie and John Williams (2011), "The Securitization of Development Policy or the Developmentalization of Security Policy?: Legitimacy, Public Opinion, and the EU External Action Service (EAS)," Presented at the 2011 European Union Studies Association Conference Boston, MA. Available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/52090/1/ANDERSON.pdf>
- Ansorg, Nadine (2017) "Security sector reform in Africa: Donor approaches versus local needs," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38(1), pp. 129-144.
- Aradau, Claudia (2014), "The promise of security: resilience, surprise and epistemic politics," *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses*, 2(2), pp. 73-87.
- Arnould, Valerie and Koen Vlassenroot (2016), "EU Policies in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Try and Fail?," SiT/WP/06/16, Paper commissioned by the Human Security Study Group. Available at [http://www.securityintransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/WP06\\_DRC\\_FinalEditedVersion.pdf](http://www.securityintransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/WP06_DRC_FinalEditedVersion.pdf)
- Aust, Helmut Philipp and Mindia Vashakmadze (2008), "Parliamentary Consent to the Use of German Armed Forces Abroad: The 2008 Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the AWACS/Turkey Case," *German Law Journal*, 9(12), pp. 2223 - 2236. Available at [http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol09No12/PDF\\_Vol\\_09\\_No\\_12\\_2223-2236\\_Dev\\_Aust\\_Vashakmadze.pdf](http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol09No12/PDF_Vol_09_No_12_2223-2236_Dev_Aust_Vashakmadze.pdf)
- Aydın-Düzgit, Senem (2014), "Unravelling European Union Foreign Policy through Critical Discourse Analysis: Guidelines for Research," in Carta, Caterina and Jean-Frédéric Morin (eds.) (2014), *EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of Discourse Analysis*, Farnham, Ashgate, pp. 133-149.
- Bachmann, Veit, and Martin Müller (2015) (eds.), *Perceptions of the EU in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa: Looking in from the Outside*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.



- Bagoyoko, Niagalé and Mariev Gibert (2009), “The Linkage between Security, Governance and Development: the European Union in Africa,” *Journal of Development Studies*, 45(5), pp. 789-814.
- Baird, Theodore (2015), “Functional Actorness? Border Security in the EU and Turkey,” *International Journal of Public Administration*, 38(12), pp. 849-859.
- Banthia, Anjali (2007), “Success or Failure? An Evaluation of Fifty Years (1957-2007) of European Union Development Policy in Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific,” *Political Perspectives EPRU*, 2 (1), pp. 1-36. Available at <http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/EPRU-2007-S1-01.pdf>
- Barbara and Olivier Kramsch (2007), “Outlook on Europe – Post-Colonising Europe: The Geopolitics of Globalisation, Empire and Borders: Here and There, Now and Then,” *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 98(4), pp. 526-534.
- Barbé, Esther and Benjamin Kienzle (2007), “Security Provider or Security Consumer? The European Union and Conflict Management,” *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 12(4), pp. 517-536.
- Barbé, Esther and Elizabeth Johansson-Nogués (2008), “The EU as a modest ‘force for good’: the European Neighbourhood Policy,” *International Affairs*, 84(1), pp. 81-96.
- Barbé, Esther; Anna Herranz-Surrallés; and Michał Natorki (2015), “Contending metaphors of the European Union as a global actor: Norms and power in the European discourse on multilateralism,” *Journal of Language and Politics*, 14(1), pp. 18-40.
- Barrinha, André (2016), “Progressive realism and the EU’s international actorness: towards a grand strategy?,” *Journal of European Integration*, 38(4), pp. 441-454.
- Bartolini, Stefano (2005), *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring Between the Nation-State and the European Union*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Bartolini, Stefano (2008), “Taking ‘Constitutionalism’ and ‘Legitimacy’ Seriously,” *European Governance Papers*, Discussion Paper 1. Available at <http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/lib/ep25.pdf>
- Beetham, David (2013), *The Legitimation of Power*, second edition, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bendiek, Annegret (2017), “A Paradigm Shift in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: From Transformation to Resilience”, SWP Research Paper 2017/RP 11, October

2017. Available at [https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research\\_papers/2017RP11\\_bdk.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2017RP11_bdk.pdf)
- Bicchi, Federica (2006), “‘Our size fits all’: normative power Europe and the Mediterranean,” *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), pp. 286-303.
- Bickerton, Christopher J. (2007), “The Perils of Performance: EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization,” *Perspectives*, 28, pp. 24-42.
- Bickerton, Christopher J. (2011a), “Legitimacy Through Norms: The Political Limits to Europe’s Normative Power,” in R. Whitman (ed.) (2011), *Normative Power Europe Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 25-42.
- Bickerton, Christopher J. (2011b), *European Union Foreign Policy: From Effectiveness to Functionality*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bilgin, Pinar (2004), “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” *International Relations*, 18(1), pp. 17-33.
- Birchfield, Vicki; John Krige; and Alasdair R. Young (2017), “European integration as a peace project,” *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 19(1), pp. 3-12
- Biscop, Sven (2004), “The European Security Strategy. Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security,” from *Sécurité & Stratégie*, Paper No. 82, The Royal Defence College (IRSD-KHID). Available at [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2014/1/23/a5d0d939-a188-4e1f-8d2f-8deae988776e/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2014/1/23/a5d0d939-a188-4e1f-8d2f-8deae988776e/publishable_en.pdf)
- Blanco, Luis Fernando (2016), “The functions of ‘strategic partnership’ in European Union foreign policy discourse,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29(1), pp. 36-54.
- Biscop, Sven (2015), *Peace without money, war without Americans: can European strategy cope?*, Ashgate: Farnham.
- Biscop, Sven (2016), “The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics,” *Egmont Security Policy Brief n.75*, June 2016. Available at <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/06/SPB75.pdf?type=pdf>
- Biscop, Sven and Jo Coelmont (2011), “Europe Deploys: Towards a Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP,” *Fiche de l’Irsem n° 8*, July 2011. Available at <http://www.irsem.defense.gouv.fr/spip.php?article74>
- Blockmans, Steven and Francesco Saverio Montesano (2015), “Mogherini’s first 100 days: Not the quiet diplomat,” *CEPS Commentary*, 12 February 2015. Available at [https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Mogherini100\\_commentary\\_final.pdf](https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Mogherini100_commentary_final.pdf)

- Bogdanor, Vernon (2007), "Legitimacy, Accountability and Democracy in the European Union," Federal Trust Report. Available at [http://mayapur.securesites.net/fedtrust/filepool/FedT\\_LAD.pdf](http://mayapur.securesites.net/fedtrust/filepool/FedT_LAD.pdf)
- Bolkvadze, Ketevan (2016), "Cherry Picking EU Conditionality: Selective Compliance in Georgia's Hybrid Regime," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 68(3), pp. 409-440.
- Born, Hans; Alex Dowling, Teodora Fuior, and Suzana Gavrilesco – Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2007), "Parliamentary Oversight of Civilian and Military ESDP Missions: The European and National Levels," Brussels, European Parliament.
- Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse (2009), "The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas," KFG Working Paper Nr. 1.
- Bouris, Dimitris (2012), "The European Union's Role in the Palestinian Territories: State-building through Security Sector Reform?," *European Security*, 21(2), pp. 257-271.
- Bouris, Dimitris and Madalina Dobrescu (2017), "The EU and civilian missions in the neighbourhood," in T. Schumacher, A. Marchetti, and T. Demmelhuber (eds.) (2017), *The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy*, London: Routledge Hooper, pp. 259-269.
- Bouris, Dimitris and Stuart Reigeluth (2012), "Introducing the Rule of Law in Security Sector Reform: European Union Policies in the Palestinian Territories," *The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 4(1), pp. 176-193.
- Brandão, Ana Paula (2010), "A security actor under construction: Inputs from the Lisbon Treaty," Paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm 9-11 September 2010. Available at <http://www.eisa-net.org/eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Brandao%2C%20AP%20-%20Paper%20SGIR%20%202010.pdf>
- Brandão, Ana Paula (2015), "The Internal-External Nexus in The Security Narrative of the European Union," *Janus.Net, e-journal of International Relations*, 6(1), pp. 1-19. Available at <http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/4135/413541154001.pdf>
- Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler (2006), *The European Union as a Global Actor*, second edition, London and New York, Routledge.
- Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler (2013), "A global actor past its peak?," *International Relations*, 27(3), pp. 375-390.
- Brummer, Klaus (2007), "Superficial, Not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy," *European Security*, 16(2), pp. 183-201.

- Buchanan, Allen (2010), *Human Rights, Legitimacy & the Use of Force*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Buchanan, Allen and Robert O. Keohane (2006), "The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions," *Ethics & International Affairs*, 20(4), pp. 405-437.
- Bulut, Esra (2009), "The EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories – EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS)", in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (eds.) (2009), *European Security and Defence Policy - The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, Paris, The European Union Institute for Security Studies, pp. 287-298.
- Burke, Anthony (2010), "Postmodernism," in Christian Reus-Smith and Duncan Snidal (eds.) ([2008] 2010), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 359-377.
- Campbell, David (1992), *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
- Caporaso, James A. (1996), "The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34(1), pp. 29-52.
- Carta, Caterina (2014), "Use of metaphors and international discourse: The EU as an Idiot power, a deceptive Pangloss and a Don Juan in his infancy," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 49(3), pp. 334-353.
- Carta, Caterina (2015), "The swinging "we": Framing the European Union international discourse," *Journal of Language and Politics*, 14(1), pp. 65-86.
- Carta, Caterina and Jean-Frédéric Morin (2014), "Struggling over meanings: Discourses on the EU's international presence," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 49(3), pp. 295-314.
- Carta, Caterina and Ruth Wodak (2015), "Discourse analysis, policy analysis, and the borders of EU identity," *Journal of Language and Politics*, 14(1), pp. 1-17.
- Cebeci, Münevver (2012), "European Foreign Policy Research Reconsidered: Constructing an 'Ideal Power Europe' through Theory?" *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 40(3), pp. 563-583.
- Cebeci, Münevver and Tobias Schumacher (2016), "Deconstructing the EU's Discourse on the Mediterranean," Roma, IAI, MedReset Papers Methodology and Concept Paper 2. Available at [http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/medreset\\_cp\\_2.pdf](http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/medreset_cp_2.pdf)
- Celador, Gemma Collantes (2009), "Becoming 'European' through police reform: a successful strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina?," *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 51(2), pp. 231-242.

- Cerutti, Furio (2003), "A Political Identity of the Europeans?," *Thesis Eleven*, 72(1), pp. 26-45.
- Cerutti, Furio and Sonia Lucarelli (eds.) (2008), *The Search for a European Identity: Values, Policies and Legitimacy of the European Union*, London and New York, Routledge.
- Chaban, Natalia, and Martin Holland (2014) (eds.), *Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis: External Perceptions of the European Union*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chamlian, Lucie (2016), "The Colonisation of the Future: Power, Knowledge and Preparedness in CSDP," *Global Society*, 30(3), pp. 391-411.
- Chebakova, Anastasia (2008), "Theorizing the EU as a global actor: a constructivist approach," ECSA-Canada Biennial Conference "The Maturing European Union," 25-27 September 2008, Edmonton, Alberta. Available at [http://www.ecsa-c.ca/biennial2008/Conference%20Program\\_files/Chebakova.pdf](http://www.ecsa-c.ca/biennial2008/Conference%20Program_files/Chebakova.pdf)
- Christou, George (2010), "European Union security logics to the east: the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership," *European Security*, 19(3), pp. 413-430.
- Christova, Alina (2013), "Seven Years of EUJUST LEX: The Challenge of Rule of Law in Iraq," *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 9(3), pp. 424-439.
- Clark, Ian (2005), *Legitimacy in International Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Čmakalová, Kateřina and Jan M. Rolenc (2012), "Actorness and legitimacy of the European Union," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(2), pp. 260-270.
- Coelmont, Jo (2012), "An EU Security Strategy: An Attractive Narrative," *Egmont Security Policy Brief n.34*, March 2012. Available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/34875/1/SPB34.pdf>
- Coicaud, Jean-Marc (2004 [1997]), *Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility*, translated and edited by David Ames Curtis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Colombo, Silvia; Andrea Dessì; and Vassilis Ntousas (eds.) (2017), *The EU, Resilience and the MENA Region*, Brussels: Foundation for European Progressive Studies and Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali. Available at <http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/9788868129712.pdf>
- Comelli, Michele (2010), "The Democratic Accountability of the CSDP and the Role of the European Parliament", in Greco, Ettore, Nicoletta Pirozzi, and Stefano Silvestri (eds.) (2010), *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and capabilities in the making*, Quaderni IAI, Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali, pp. 79-99. Available at [http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/quaderni\\_e\\_19.pdf](http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/quaderni_e_19.pdf)

- Comelli, Michele (2011), “The Common Security and Defence Policy and the Issue of Democratic Accountability: what Role for the European Parliament?”, in Daniele Archibugi and Guido Montani (eds.) (2011), *European Democracy and Cosmopolitan Democracy*, Ventotene, The Altiero Spinelli Institute for Federalist Studies (The Ventotene Papers), p. 51-67. Available at: [http://www.istitutospinelli.org/documenti/doc\\_details/131-european-democracy-and-cosmopolitan-democracy](http://www.istitutospinelli.org/documenti/doc_details/131-european-democracy-and-cosmopolitan-democracy)
- Comelli, Michele and Flavia Zanon (2009), “Democratic legitimacy and accountability of ESDP operations,” *Documenti IAI*, 39. Available at <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/IAI0934.pdf>
- Connolly, William E. (1989), “Identity and Difference in International Relations,” in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro (eds.) (1989), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, New York, Lexington Books, pp. 323-342.
- Corn, Geoffrey and Dennis Gyllensporre (2010), “International Legality, the Use of Military Force, and Burdens of Persuasion: Self-Defense, the Initiation of Hostilities, and the Impact of the Choice Between Two Evils on the Perception of International Legitimacy,” *Pace Law Review*, 30(2), pp. 484-543.
- Council of the EU (2000), Council Decision 2000/354/CFSP of 22 May 2000 setting up a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000D0354&from=EN>
- Council of the EU (2001a), Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee. Available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/1\\_02720010130en00010003.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/1_02720010130en00010003.pdf)
- Council of the EU (2001b), Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Military Committee of the European Union. Available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/1\\_02720010130en00040006.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/1_02720010130en00040006.pdf)
- Council of the EU (2004a), Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:245:0017:0028:EN:PDF>
- Council of the EU (2005a), Council Decision 2005/395/CFSP of 10 May 2005 amending Decision 2001/80/CFSP on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005D0395&from=EN>
- Council of the EU (2005b [2001]), Council Decision 2005/395/CFSP of 10 May 2005 amending Decision 2001/80/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency.

- Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32005D0395:EN:HTML>
- Council of the EU (2010), Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. Available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas\\_decision\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_decision_en.pdf)
- Cutler, Robert M. and Alexander Von Lingen (2003), “The European Parliament and European Union Security and Defence Policy,” *European Security*, 12(2), pp. 1-20. Available at <http://www.robertcutler.org/download/html/ar03es.html>
- Damro, Chad (2015), “Market power Europe: exploring a dynamic conceptual framework,” *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(9), pp. 1336-1354.
- Darby, Phillip (2004), “Pursuing the Political: A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations International,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 33(1), pp. 1-34.
- Decker, Frank and Jared Sonnicksen (2011), “An Alternative Approach to European Union Democratization: Re-Examining the Direct Election of the Commission President,” *Government and Opposition*, 46(2), pp. 168-191.
- Del Biondo, Karen (2015), “Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa,” *World Development*, Vol. 75, pp. 74–84.
- Delcour, Laure (2015), “The 2015 ENP Review: Beyond Stocktaking, the Need for a Political Strategy,” CEPOB - College of Europe Policy Brief series, 1.15. Available at <https://www.coleurope.eu/research-paper/2015-enp-review-beyond-stocktaking-need-political-strategy>
- Der Derian, James (1989) “The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations,” in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro (eds.) (1989), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, New York, Lexington Books, pp. 3-10.
- Der Derian, James and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.) (1989), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, New York, Lexington Books.
- Derrida, Jacques (2004 [1968]), “Differance,” in Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (eds.) (2004), *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, second edition, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, pp. 278-299.
- Devetak, Richard (2009), “Post-structuralism,” in Burchill et al. (2009), *Theories of International Relations*, fourth edition, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 183-211.

- Diez, Thomas (2005), "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 33(3), pp. 613-36.
- Diez, Thomas (2013), "Setting the limits: Discourse and EU foreign policy," *Cooperation and Conflict* 0(0), pp. 1-15.
- Diez, Thomas (2014a), "Speaking Europe, Drawing Boundaries: Reflections on the Role of Discourse in EU Foreign Policy and Identity," in Carta, Caterina and Jean-Frédéric Morin (eds.) (2014), *EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of Discourse Analysis*, Ashgate: Farnham, pp. 27-41.
- Diez, Thomas (2014b), "Setting the limits: Discourse and EU foreign policy," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 49(3), pp. 319-333.
- Diez, Thomas and Ian Manners (2007), "Reflecting on Normative Power Europe," in Berenskoetter, F. and M. Williams (eds.) (2007), *Power in World Politics*, London, Routledge, pp. 173-188.
- Diez, Thomas and Michelle Pace (2007), "Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation," Paper for Presentation at the 2007 EUSA Conference, Montreal, 17-19 May 2007. Available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/7798/1/diez-t-01a.pdf>
- Dinan, Desmond (2008), "Governance and Institutional Developments: Ending the Constitutional Impasse," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46, Annual Review, pp. 71-90.
- Dowding, Keith M. and Richard Kimber (1983), "The Meaning and Use of 'Political Stability'," *Journal of Political Research* 11, pp. 229-243.
- Doyle, Natalie J. and Irfan Ahmad (2013), "Islamophobia, European Modernity and Contemporary Illiberalism," *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 14(2), pp. 167-172.
- Drent, Margriet (2011), "The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security: A Culture of Coordination?," *Studia Diplomatica*, LXIV-2, pp. 3-18.
- Duchêne, François (1973), "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence," in Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (eds.) (1973), *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community*, London, Macmillan, pp. 1-21.
- Duggan, Niall (2015), "BRICS and the Evolution of a New Agenda Within Global Governance," in Marek Rewizorski (ed.) (2015), *The European Union and the BRICS: Complex Relations in the Era of Global Governance*, Springer International Publishing, pp.11-25.



- Dunne, Tim (2008), "Good Citizen Europe," *International Affairs*, 84(1), pp. 13-28.
- Edwards, Geoffrey (2013), "The EU's foreign policy and the search for effect," *International Relations* September, 27(3), pp. 276-291.
- Ejdus, Filip (2017) "'Here is your mission, now own it!' The rhetoric and practice of local ownership in EU interventions," *European Security*, 26(4), pp. 461-484.
- Elgström, Ole (January 2015), "Legitimacy, Credibility and Coherence: Perceptions of EU Roles in Global Climate Change Negotiations," Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2015/06. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2553882> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2553882>
- Eriksen, Erik Oddvar and John Erik Fossum (2002), "Europe in search of its legitimacy: Assessing strategies of legitimation," ARENA Working Paper 38.
- Fairclough, Norman (2001), "Chapter Six - The Discourse of New Labour: Critical Discourse Analysis," in Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, and Simeon J. Yates (2001), *Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis*, London and Milton Keynes, Sage and The Open University, pp. 229-266.
- Fakiolas, Tassos E. and Efsthios T. Fakiolas (2006), "Europe's 'Division' Over the War in Iraq," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 7(3), pp. 298-311
- Faleg, Giovanni and Steven Blockmans (2012), "The EU's re-engagement as a security actor: Fresh start or still sleepwalking?," *CEPS Commentary*, July 2012. Available at <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu's-re-engagement-security-actor-fresh-start-or-still-sleepwalking>
- Ferhati, Ledina and Fatos Tarifa (2014), "Post-modern Utopia: Europe's global leadership in a post-American age," *International Journal of Civic, Political, and Community Studies*, 11(1), pp. 33-43.
- Ferreira-Pereira, Laura C. and Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira (2016), "Introduction: The European Union's Strategic Partnerships: conceptual approaches, debates and experiences," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29(1), pp. 3-17.
- Ferreira-Pereira, Laura. C. (2010), "The European Union as a 'Model Power': Spreading Peace, Democracy and Human Rights in the Wider World.' In Federica Bindi (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*, Washington D.C., Brookings, pp. 290-302.
- Fisher, David and Nigel Biggar (2011), "Was Iraq an unjust war? A debate on the Iraq war and reflections on Libya," *International Affairs*, 87(3), pp. 687-707.

- Føllesdal, Andreas (2006), "EU legitimacy and normative political theory," in Cini, M. & Bourne, A. K. (eds), *Palgrave advances in European Union studies*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 151-173.
- Føllesdal, Andreas and Simon Hix (2005), "Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(3), pp. 533-562. Available at [http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hix/Working\\_Papers/Follesdal-Hix-JCMS-2006.pdf](http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hix/Working_Papers/Follesdal-Hix-JCMS-2006.pdf)
- Foucault, Michel (1995 [1975]), *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, second edition, New York, Vintage Books.
- Foucault, Michel (author) and Colin Gordon (ed.) (1980), *Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, New York, Pantheon Books.
- Franck, Thomas (1990), *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Franck, Thomas (2002), "Legality and Legitimacy in Humanitarian Intervention," paper presented at Nomos, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, August 31, 2002.
- Freire, Maria Raquel (2017), "EU Relations with the BRICS: Strategic Partnership or Structural Disjunction?," *International Organisations Research Journal*, 12(2), pp. 182-200.
- Freire, Maria Raquel and Lícinia Simão (2013), "The EU's security actorness: the case of EUMM in Georgia," *European Security*, 22(4), pp. 464-477.
- Gänzle, Stefan (2009), "Coping with the 'Security-Development Nexus': The European Community's Instrument for Stability - Rationale and Potential," *Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik Studies* 47. Available at <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-193728>
- Gebhard, Carmen and Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen (2011), "Making sense of EU comprehensive security towards conceptual and analytical clarity," *European Security*, 20(2), pp. 221-241.
- Gerrits, André (ed.) (2009), "Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, *Clingendael European Papers* No. 5.
- Gerth, H. H. and C. Wright Mills (eds.) (1991) [first published in 1948], *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, London, Routledge.
- Gibbs, Graham R. (2007), *Analyzing Qualitative Data*, London, Sage.

- Ginsberg, Roy H. (1999), "Conceptualising the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37 (3), pp. 429-454.
- Gordon, Neve and Sharon Pardo (2014), "Normative Power Europe and the Power of the Local," *Research Note, Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(2), pp. 416-427.
- Gregory, Donna U. (1989), "Foreword," in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro (eds.) (1989), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, New York, Lexington Books, pp. xiii-xxi.
- Greïcevcı, Labinot (2011), "EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 12(3), pp. 283-303. Available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15705854.2011.596307?needAccess=true>
- Gress, David R. (1997), "The weak heart of postmodern Europe," *Orbis*, 41(1), pp. 59-68.
- Grimm, Sonja (2014), "The European Union's ambiguous concept of 'state fragility'," *Third World Quarterly*, 35(2), pp. 252-267
- Groen, Lisanne and Arne Niemann (2013), "The European Union at the Copenhagen climate negotiations: A case of contested EU actorness and effectiveness," *International Relations*, 27(3), pp. 308-324.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1979), *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, translated by Thomas McCarthy, Boston, Beacon.
- Hall, Stuart (ed.) (1997), *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, London, SAGE Publications.
- Hansen, Lene (2006), *Security as Practice: Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war*, London and New York, Routledge.
- Hart, Randle J. and Andrew McKinnon (2010), "Sociological Epistemology: Durkheim's Paradox and Dorothy E. Smith's Actuality," *Sociology*, 44(6), pp. 1038-1054.
- Heidegger, Martin (2004 [1957]), "Identity and Difference," in Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (eds) (2004), *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, second edition, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, pp. 271-272.
- Heldring, Leander and James A. Robinson (2012), "Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa," *NBER Working Paper Series*, Working Paper 18566. Available at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w18566>
- Héritier, Adrienne (1999), "Elements of democratic legitimation in Europe: an alternative perspective," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(2), pp. 269-282.

- Hettne, Björn (2008), "EU as a global actor: An anatomy of actorship," paper presented at the EU in International Affairs 2008 Conference Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 24–26 April 2008. Available at <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.454.9362&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Hettne, Björn and Fredrik Söderbaum (2005), "Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10(4), pp. 535-552.
- Hill, Christopher (1993), "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(3), pp. 305-328.
- Hix, Simon (2005), *The political system of the European Union*, Houndmills, Palgrave.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1998 [1651]), *Leviathan*, edited by J. C. A. Gaskin, Oxford University Press.
- Hobolt, Sara Binzer (2006), "Direct democracy and European integration," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(1), pp. 153-166.
- Hoffmann, Nils and Arne Niemann (2017), "EU actorness and the European Neighbourhood Policy," in T. Schumacher, A. Marchetti, and T. Demmelhuber (eds.) (2017), *The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy*, London: Routledge, pp. 28-38.
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2006), "Europe's Blues: Theoretical Soul-Searching after the Rejection of the European Constitution," *Political Science and Politics*, 39(2), pp. 247-250.
- Hopf, Ted (1998), "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, 23(1), pp. 171-200.
- Houghton, David P. (2007), "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach," *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2007) 3, pp. 24-45.
- Howorth, Jolyon (2012), "Decision-making in security and defense policy: Towards supranational inter-governmentalism?," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(4), pp. 433-453.
- Huff, Ariella (2013), "Problems and Patterns in Parliamentary Scrutiny of the CFSP and CSDP," *OPAL Online Paper Series* 14/2013. Available at <http://www.pademia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/14.pdf>
- Hughes Christopher W. (2002), "Reflections on Globalisation, Security and 9/11," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 15(3), PP. 421-433.
- Hurd, Ian (2002), "Legitimacy, Power and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council," *Global Governance*, 8, pp. 35-51.

- Hurd, Ian (2007), *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press.
- Hurd, Ian (2010), "Constructivism," in Christian Reus-Smith and Duncan Snidal (eds.) ([2008] 2010), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 298-316.
- Hurrelmann, Achim (2007) "Multilevel Legitimacy: Conceptualising Legitimacy Relationships between the EU and National Democracies," in Joan DeBardeleben and Achim Hurrelmann (eds.) (2007), *Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel Governance: Legitimacy, Representation and Accountability in the EU*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 17-37.
- Hyde-Price, Adrian (2008), "A 'tragic actor'? A realist perspective on 'ethical power Europe'," *International Affairs*, 84(1), pp. 29-44.
- Ilik, Goran and Artur Adamczyk (2017) "Finalité politique or just a step forward: the Lisbon Treaty and the identity of the European Union as a global actor," *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, 3(1), pp. 9-25.
- Ioannides, Isabelle (2006), "EU Police Mission PROXIMA: Testing the 'European' Approach to Building Peace," in A. Nowak (ed.), *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, Chaillot Paper No. 90, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, pp. 69-86.
- Ivic, Sanja and Dragan D. Lakicevic (2011), "European identity: Between modernity and postmodernity," *Innovation*, 24(4), pp. 395-407.
- Jones, Erik (2004), "The politics of Europe 2003: differences and disagreements," *Industrial Relations Journal*, 35(6), pp. 483-499.
- Jones, Seth G. (2006), "The Rise of a European Defense," *Political Science Quarterly*, 121(2), pp. 241-267
- Jørgensen, Knud Erik (2015), "Discursively (de-)constructing European foreign policy: Theoretical and methodological challenges," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50(4), pp. 492-509.
- Juncos, Ana E. (2016), "Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a
- Jupille, Joseph and James A. Caporaso (1998), "States, agency and rules: The European Union in global environmental politics," in Rhodes, C. (ed.), *The European Union in the World Community*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, pp. 213-229.
- Kaldor, Mary (2012), "The EU as a New Form of Political Authority: The Example of the Common Security and Defence Policy," *Global Policy*, London School of Economics, 3(1), pp. 79-86.

- Kaldor, Mary; Mary Martin; and Sabine Selchow (2007), "Human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe," *International Affairs*, 83(2), pp. 273-288.
- Kantner, Cathleen (2014), "The European public sphere and the debate about humanitarian military interventions," *European Security*, 23(4), pp. 409-429.
- Kelstrup, Jesper Dahl (2015), "Market Power Europe: A Constructive Critique," *International Journal of Public Administration*, 38(12), pp. 895-901.
- Kendall, Gavin and Gary Wickham (2004), "The Foucaultian framework," in Clive Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium, and David Silverman (2004), *Qualitative Research Practice*, London, Sage, pp. 129-138.
- Keukeleire, Stephan and Kolja Raube (2013), "The security–development nexus and securitization in the EU’s policies towards developing countries," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 26(3), pp. 556-572.
- King, G.; R. O. Keohane; and S. Verba (1994), *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kirova, Iskra (2012), "Public Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Russia, Georgia and the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia," *CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*, paper 7, 2012
- Kleinfeld, Rachel and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2009), "Can a Post-colonial Power Export the Rule of Law? Elements of a General Framework," in Gianluigi Palombella and Neil Walker (eds.) (2009), *Relocating the Rule of Law*, Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, pp. 139-170.
- Knauer, Jannik (2011), "EUFOR Althea: Appraisal and Future Perspectives of the EU’s Former Flagship Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *EU Diplomacy Paper 07/2011*, College of Europe.
- Kohl, Christoph (2015), "Diverging Expectations and Perceptions of Peacebuilding? Local Owners’ and External Actors’ Interactions in Guinea-Bissau's Security Sector Reforms," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 9(3), pp. 334-352.
- Koops, Joachim (2011), *The European Union as an Integrative Power: Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective Multilateralism’ towards NATO And the United Nations*, Brussels, Brussels University Press.
- Kostanyan, Hrant (2016), "Why Moldova’s European integration is failing," *CEPS Commentary*, 3 March 2016.
- Kreidman, Adam (2009), "Correcting Past Mistakes: The Failure of the European Constitution and Its Resurrection as the Lisbon Treaty," in J. Roy and R. Domínguez

- (eds.), *Lisbon Fado: The European Union under Reform*, Miami-Florida European Union Center/Jean Monnet Chair.
- Kurowska, Xymena (2008), "More than a Balkan Crisis Manager: The EUJUST Themis in Georgia," in M. Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaitė (eds.) (2008), *ESDP: An Implementation Perspective*, London, Routledge, pp. 97-110.
- Kutter, Amelie (2014), "(De-)Constructing the EU as a Civilising Power: CFSP/CSDP and the Constitutional Debate in Poland and France," in Carta, Caterina and Jean-Frédéric Morin (eds.) (2014), *EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of Discourse Analysis*, Farnham, Ashgate, pp. 151-169.
- Kuus, Merje (2011), "Policy and Geopolitics: Bounding Europe in Europe," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 101(5), pp. 1140-1155.
- Lake, David A. (2013), "Authority, Coercion, and Power in International Relations," in M. Finnemore and J. Goldstein (eds) (2013), *Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 55-77.
- Larivé, Maxime H. A. (2012), "From speeches to actions: EU involvement in the war in Afghanistan through the EUPOL Afghanistan Mission," *European Security*, 21(2), pp.185-201.
- Larsen, Henrik (2004), "Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy," in B. Tonra and T. Christiansen (eds.), *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, pp. 62-80.
- Légaré, Kathia (2010), "The 'Schizophrenic' Nature of Peacebuilding Operations: Between External Supervision and Self-Rule," in F. Attinà and D. Irrera (eds.) (2010), *Multilateral Security and ESDP Operations*, Ashgate: Farnham, 2010, pp. 35-49.
- Leonard, Mark (2005), "Europe's Transformative Power," bulletin article, Centre for European Reform. Available at <http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2005/europes-transformative-power>
- Leonard, Mark (2011), *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, London and New York, Fourth Estate.
- Lindgren, Karl-Oscar and Thomas Persson (2010), "Input and Output Legitimacy: Synergy or Trade-Off? Empirical Evidence from an EU Survey," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(4), pp. 449-467.
- Locke, John (1980) [first published in 1690], *Second Treatise of Government*, edited by C. B. Macpherson, Indianapolis and Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company.

- Lord, Christopher (2003), "Legitimacy, Democracy and the EU: when abstract questions become practical policy problems," University of Leeds, Department of Politics, Policy Paper 03/00. Available at <http://www.mcrit.com/scenarios/visionsofeurope/documents/one%20Europe%20or%20Several/C%20Lord.pdf>
- Lucarelli, Sonia (2002), "Peace and Democracy: The Rediscovered Link - The EU, NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities" Final Report - Research project funded by the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Individual Research Fellowships – 2000-2002 Programme. Available at <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/00-02/Lucarelli%27s.pdf>
- Lucarelli, Sonia, and Lorenzo Fioramonti (2011), *External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor*, first edition, London and New York, Routledge.
- Mace, Catriona (2004), "Operation Concordia: Developing a 'European' Approach to Crisis Management?," *International Peacekeeping*, 11(3), pp. 474-490.
- Majone, Giandomenico (2006), "The Common Sense of European Integration," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(5), pp. 607 - 626.
- Major, Claudia and Christian Mölling (2013), "Towards an EU Peacebuilding Strategy: The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Comprehensive Approach of the EU in the Area of Civilian Crisis Management," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 18(4), pp. 45-62.
- Mälksoo, Maria (2016), "From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: external policy, internal purpose," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37(3), pp. 374-388.
- Malmvig, Helle (2004), "Cooperation or Democratisation? The EU's Conflicting Mediterranean Security Discourses," Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Working Paper no 2004/8. Available at [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/17634/Cooperation\\_Democratisations.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/17634/Cooperation_Democratisations.pdf)
- Manners, Ian (2000), "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper 38. Available at [http://forskning.ruc.dk/site/files/38395695/Ian\\_Manners\\_Normative\\_Power\\_Europe\\_A\\_Contradiction\\_in\\_Terms\\_COPRI\\_38\\_2000.pdf](http://forskning.ruc.dk/site/files/38395695/Ian_Manners_Normative_Power_Europe_A_Contradiction_in_Terms_COPRI_38_2000.pdf)
- Manners, Ian (2001), "The 'Difference Engine': Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the European Union," Copenhagen, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.
- Manners, Ian (2002), "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), pp. 235-258.



- Manners, Ian (2006a), "Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), pp. 182-199.
- Manners, Ian (2006b), "The symbolic manifestation of the EU's normative role in world politics," in O. Elgström, & M. Smith (eds.), *The European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis*, London: Routledge, pp. 66-84.
- Manners, Ian (2006c), "European Union 'Normative Power' and the Security Challenge," *European Security*, 15(4), pp. 405-421.
- Manners, Ian (2006d), "European Union, normative power and ethical foreign policy," in D. Chandler & V. Heins (eds.), *Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes*, New York: Routledge, pp. 116-136.
- Manners, Ian (2006e), "The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 35(1), pp. 167-180.
- Manners, Ian (2008a), "The normative ethics of the European Union," *International Affairs* 84(1), pp. 45-60.
- Manners, Ian (2008b), "The normative power of the European Union in a globalised world," In Z. Laïdi (ed.), *EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative power and social preferences*, London: Routledge, pp. 22-37.
- Manners, Ian (2008c), "The European Union's normative strategy for sustainable peace," in V. Rittberger, & M. Fischer (eds.), *Strategies for Peace: Contributions of International Organisations, States, and Non-State Actors*, Leverkusen Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, pp. 130-151.
- Manners, Ian (2009a), "Normative Power Europe: A Transdisciplinary Approach to European Studies," in C. Rumford (ed.), *The SAGE handbook of European studies*, London: Sage Publications, Incorporated, pp. 561-586.
- Manners, Ian (2009b), "The EU's Normative Power in Changing World Politics," in A. Gerrits (ed.), *Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion*, The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, pp. 9-24.
- Manners, Ian (2010), "As You Like It: European Union Normative Power in the European Neighbourhood Policy," in R. Whitman & S. Wolff (eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 29-50.
- Manners, Ian (2011), "The European Union's Normative Power: Critical Perspectives and Perspectives on the Critical," in R. Whitman (ed.) (2011), *Normative Power Europe Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 226-247.

- Manners, Ian (2013a), "Assessing the decennial, reassessing the global: Understanding European Union normative power in global politics," *Cooperation and Conflict* 48(2), pp. 304–329.
- Manners, Ian (2013b), "The European Union's Normative Power in a more Global Era," *Journal of European Union Studies in Japan*, 33, pp. 33-55.
- Manners, Ian and Richard Whitman (2013), "Normative Power and the Future of EU Public Diplomacy," in M. Davis Cross and J. Melissen (eds.), *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 183-204.
- Margolis, J. Eli (2010), "Understanding Political Stability and Instability," *Civil Wars*, 12(3), pp. 326-345.
- Martin, Mary (2011), "Human Security and the Search for a Normative Narrative," in R. Whitman (ed.) (2011), *Normative Power Europe Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 187-209.
- Martins, Bruno Oliveira and Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira (2012), "Stepping inside? CSDP missions and EU counter-terrorism," *European Security*, 21(4), pp. 537-556.
- Mayer, Sebastian (2017), "The EU and NATO in Georgia: complementary and overlapping security strategies in a precarious environment," *European Security*, 26(3), pp. 435-453.
- McCall, Cathal (1998), "Postmodern Europe and the resources of communal identities in Northern Ireland," *European Journal of Political Research*, 33 (3), pp. 389-411.
- Mcdonagh, Kenneth (2015), "'Talking the Talk or Walking the Walk': Understanding the EU's Security Identity," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(3), pp. 627-641.
- Menon, Anand (2009), "Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten," *International Affairs*, 85(2), pp. 227-246. Available at [http://www.researchgate.net/publication/227778935\\_Empowering\\_paradise\\_The\\_ESDP\\_at\\_ten](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/227778935_Empowering_paradise_The_ESDP_at_ten)
- Menon, Anand and Stephen Weatherill (2008), "Transnational Legitimacy in a Globalising World: How the European Union Rescues its States," *West European Politics*, 31(3), pp. 397-416.
- Merlingen, Michael (2007), "Everything Is Dangerous: A Critique of 'Normative Power Europe'," *Security Dialogue*, 38(4), pp. 435-453.
- Merlingen, Michael and Rasa Ostrauskaitė (2006), *European Union Peacebuilding and*
- Micossi, Stefano (2008), "Democracy in the European Union," CEPS Working Document No. 286. Available at <http://www.ceps.be/book/democracy-european-union>

- Milliken, Jennifer (1999), "The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods," *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(2), pp. 225-254.
- Mills, J.; A. Bonner; and K. Francis (2006), "The development of constructivist grounded theory," *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 5(1), Article 3, pp. 1-10.
- Miskimmon, Alister; Ben O'Loughlin; and Laura Roselle (2013), *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, London and New York, Routledge.
- Mittag, Jürgen (2006), "Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? Perspectives of Parliamentary Participation in European Security and Defence Policy," Center for European Integration Studies, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Discussion Paper C16.
- Mitzen, Jennifer (2006), "Anchoring Europe's civilizing identity: habits, capabilities and ontological security," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), pp. 270-285.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (2002), "In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(4), pp. 603-624.  
Available at <http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/deficit.pdf>
- Moravcsik, Andrew (2008), "The Myth of Europe's Democratic Deficit," *Intereconomics: Journal of European Public Policy* November-December 2008, pp. 331-340. Available at <http://www.intereconomics.eu/downloads/getfile.php?id=656>
- Moshonas, Stylianos (2013), "Looking beyond reform failure in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Review of African Political Economy*, 40(135), pp. 132-140.
- Mousseau, Michael (2009), "The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace," *International Security*, 33(4), pp. 52-86.
- Mueller, Patrick (2013), "Europe's Foreign Policy and the Middle East Peace Process: The Construction of EU Actorness in Conflict Resolution," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 14(1), pp. 20-35.
- Nicolaïdis, Kalypso and Robert Howse (2002), "This is my Utopia...': Narrative as Power," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Special Anniversary issue, 40(4), pp. 767-792.
- Nicolaïdis, Kalypso; Berny Sebe; and Gabi Maas (eds.) (2015), *Echoes of Empire: Memory, Identity and Colonial Legacies*, London, IB Tauris.
- Nielsen, Kristian L. (2013), "EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap," *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 9(5), pp. 723-739.
- Niemann, Arne and Charlotte Bretherton (2013), "EU external policy at the crossroads: The challenge of actorness and effectiveness," *International Relations* September, 27(3), pp. 261-275.

- Nițoiu, Cristian (2012), "Restructuring the Foreign Policy of the EU: Competing Narratives and Discourses," *Romanian Journal of Political Science*, 12(1), pp. 67-101.
- Nițoiu, Cristian (2013), "The Narrative Construction of the European Union in External Relations," *Perspectives in European Politics and Society*, 14(2), pp. 240-255.
- Olsen, Gorm Rye (2009), "The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?," *International Peacekeeping*, 16(2), pp. 245-260.
- Oppermann, Kai and Alexander Höse (2007), "Public Opinion and the Development of the European Security and Defense Policy," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 12, pp. 149-167.
- Oproiu, Monica (2015), "Crafting a Wider Strategy for Conflict Management in the Neighbourhood? A Comparative Perspective on the European Union's Civilian Missions in Georgia and Kosovo," *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 15(2), pp. 22-41.  
Available at [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2619560](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2619560)
- Orbie, Jan (2006), "Review Essay: Civilian Power Europe, Review of the Original and Current Debates," *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 41(1), pp. 123-128.
- Osland, Kari M. (2004), "The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *International Peacekeeping*, 11(3), pp. 544-560.
- Özoğuz-Bolgi, Selin (2013), "Is the EU Becoming a Global Power After the Treaty of Lisbon?," in A. Boening, J. F. Kremer, and A. van Loon (eds.), *Global Power Europe*, Vol. 1, *Global Power Shift (Comparative Analysis and Perspectives)*, Berlin and Heidelberg Springer, pp. 3-18.
- Pace, Michele and Tobias Schumacher (eds.) (2007), *Conceptualizing Cultural and Social Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: A European Perspective*, Abingdon, Routledge.
- Pace, Michelle (2005), *The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean*, Abingdon, Routledge.
- Pace, Michelle (2007), "The Construction of EU Normative Power," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(5), pp. 1041-1064.
- Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso (2004), *Europe, a Civil Power: Lessons from EU Experience*, London, Federal Trust for Education and Research.
- Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso (2001), *Europa, forza gentile: Cosa ci ha insegnato l'avventura europea*, Bologna, il Mulino.

- Pagani, Fabrizio (1998), "A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union," *European Journal of International Law*, 9, pp. 737-749.
- Papadopoulos, Yannis (2010), "Accountability and Multi-level Governance: More Accountability, Less Democracy?," *West European Politics*, 33(5), pp. 1030-1049.
- Pardo, Ramon Pacheco (2012), "Normal Power Europe: Non-Proliferation and the Normalization of EU's Foreign Policy," *Journal of European Integration*, 34(1), pp. 1-18.
- Peter, Fabienne (2010), "Political Legitimacy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/legitimacy/>
- Peters, Dirk (2014), "European security policy for the people? Public opinion and the EU's Common Foreign, Security and Defence policy," *European Security*, 23(4), pp. 388-408.
- Petrov, Petar (2010), "Early Institutionalisation of the ESDP Governance Arrangements: Insights from the Operations Concordia and Artemis," in S. Vanhoonacker, H. Dijkstra, and H. Maurer (eds), "Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy," *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, Special Issue 1, Vol. 14, article 8. Available at [http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-008a\\_h.htm](http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-008a_h.htm).
- Policing: Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy*, London and New York, Routledge.
- Pospisil, Jan and Florian P. Kühn (2016), "The Resilient State: New Regulatory Modes in International Approaches to Statebuilding?," *Third World Quarterly*, 37(1), pp. 1-16. Available at [https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/21562094/05\\_The\\_Resilient\\_State\\_revised\\_.pdf](https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/21562094/05_The_Resilient_State_revised_.pdf)
- Powers, Penny (2007), "The Philosophical Foundations of Foucaultian Discourse Analysis," *Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines*, 1 (2), pp. 18-34.
- Prager, Jeffrey (1981), "Moral Integration and Political Inclusion: A Comparison of Durkheim's and Weber's Theories of Democracy," *Social Forces*, 59(4), pp. 918-950.
- pragmatist turn?," *European Security*. Available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2016.1247809>
- Puetter, Uwe and Antje Wiener (2007), "Accommodating Normative Divergence in European Foreign Policy Co-ordination: The Example of the Iraq Crisis," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(5), pp. 1065-1088.

- Rațiu, Aurelian and Nicoleta Ciulei (2013), "The European Union Core Values for the Operational Engagements Within Chad," *Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre*, 18(3), pp. 253-261.
- Rawls, John (1996), *Political Liberalism*, New York, Columbia University Press.
- Rehrl, Jochen (ed.) (2014), *Handbook for decision makers: the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union*, Vienna, Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria. Available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/european-security-defence-college/pdf/handbook/handbook-for-decision-makers.pdf>
- Rehrl, Jochen and Weisserth, Hans-Bernhard (eds.) (2012), *Handbook on CSDP - The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union*, second edition, Vienna, Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria.
- Rhodes, Carolyn, (1998) (ed.), *The European Union in the World Community*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
- Risse, Thomas (2004), "Social Constructivism and European Integration," in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds.) (2004), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.159-176.
- Roccu, Roberto and Benedetta Voltolini (2018), "Framing and reframing the EU's engagement with the Mediterranean: Examining the security-stability nexus before and after the Arab uprisings," *Mediterranean Politics*, 23(1), pp. 1-22. Available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13629395.2017.1358895?needAccess=true>
- Saussure, Ferdinand de (1966) [First published in 1916], *Course in general linguistics*; edited by Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye, and Albert Riedlinger; translated, with an introduction and notes by Wade Baskin; New York, Toronto, London; McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Scharpf, Fritz W. (2007), "Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy," Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Working Paper 07/3. Available at <http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp07-3.pdf>
- Scharpf, Fritz W. (2009), "Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity," Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Working Paper 09/1. Available at <http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp09-1.pdf>
- Schimmelfennig, Frank (2000), "International Socialisation in the new Europe: Rational action in an Institutional Environment," *European Journal of International Relations*, 6:1, pp.109-139.

- Schlomach, Gerrit F. (2014), "The European Parliament as the 'driving force' of the Common Security and Defence Policy," KAS International Reports 6/2014, pp. 51-72. Available at [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_38100-1522-2-30.pdf?140618134312](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_38100-1522-2-30.pdf?140618134312)
- Schmidt, Peter (2011), "The EU's Military Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Security Culture, Interests and Games," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 32(3), pp. 567-581.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. (2010), "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Output, Input and Throughput," KFG Working Paper Series, 21. Available at [http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/workingpapers/WorkingPaperKFG\\_21.pdf](http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/workingpapers/WorkingPaperKFG_21.pdf)
- Schmitter, Philippe C. (2001), "What is there to legitimize in the European Union ... and how might this be accomplished?," Istituto Universitario Europeo. Available at <http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profiles/Schmitter/LegitimizeEU.pdf>
- Schulze, Kirsten E. (2007), "Mission Not So Impossible: The Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons learned for the EU," *International Policy Analysis*, July 2007, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04786.pdf>
- Schumacher, Tobias (2015), "Uncertainty at the EU's borders: narratives of EU external relations in the revised European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern borderlands," *European Security*, 24(3), pp. 381-401.
- Schumacher, Tobias (2016), "Back to the Future: The 'New' ENP towards the Southern Neighbourhood and the End of Ambition," *College of Europe Policy Brief*, 1.16. Available at [https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/schumacher\\_cepob\\_1-16.pdf](https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/schumacher_cepob_1-16.pdf)
- Schuman, Robert (1950), *The Schuman Declaration*, Salon de l'Horloge, Quai d'Orsay, 9 May 1950, Paris. Available at [http://www.robert-schuman.eu/declaration\\_9mai.php](http://www.robert-schuman.eu/declaration_9mai.php)
- Semati, Mehdi (2010), "Islamophobia, Culture and Race in the Age of Empire," *Cultural Studies*, 24, pp. 256-275.
- Shafee, Fareed (2010), "New Geopolitics of the South Caucasus," *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 4 (2), pp. 184-186.
- Shapiro, Michael J. (1989), "Textualizing Global Politics," in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro (eds.) (1989), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, New York, Lexington Books, pp. 11-22.
- Shapiro, Scott J. (2001), *Legality*, Cambridge and London, Harvard University Press.
- Shearman, Peter and Matthew Sussex (2017 [2004]), *European Security After 9/11*, London and New York, Routledge.

- Shveda, Yuriy and Joung Ho Park (2016), "Ukraine's revolution of dignity: The dynamics of Euromaidan," *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 7(1), pp. 85-91.
- Sjöstedt, Gunnar (1977a), *The External Role of the European Community*, Farnborough, Saxon House.
- Sjöstedt, Gunnar (1977b), "The Exercise of International Civil Power: A Framework for Analysis," *Cooperation and Conflict*, XII, pp. 21-39.
- Sjursen, Helene (2002), "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(3), pp. 491-513.
- Sjursen, Helene (2006), "The EU as a 'normative power': how can this be?," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), pp. 235-251.
- Sjursen, Helene (2008), "Integration without Democracy? Three Conceptions of European Security Policy in Transformation," ARENA, Working Paper 7. Available at [http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2008/wp08\\_07.pdf](http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2008/wp08_07.pdf)
- Sjursen, Helene (2015), "Integration and democracy in the EU's foreign and security policy," Paper prepared for the EUSA Conference, March 2015, Boston, USA.
- Sjursen, Helene and Karen Smith (2004), "Justifying EU foreign policy: the logics underpinning EU enlargement," in B. Tonra and T. Christiansen (eds.), *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, pp. 126-140.
- Smith, Bryant (1928), "Legal Personality," *The Yale Law Journal*, 37(3), pp. 283-299.
- Smith, Karen E. (2003), "The European Union: a distinctive actor in International Relations," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 9 (2), pp. 103-113.
- Smith, Michael E. (2012), "Developing a 'Comprehensive Approach' to International Security: Institutional Learning and the CSDP," in J. Richardson (ed.), *Constructing a Policy-Making State? Policy Dynamics in the European Union*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 253-268.
- Staeger, Ueli (2016), "Africa-EU Relations and Normative Power Europe: A Decolonial Pan-African Critique," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(4), pp. 981-998.
- Stavridis, Stelios (2001), "'Militarising' the EU: The concept of civilian power Europe revisited," *The International Spectator*, 36(4), pp. 43-50.
- Stie, Anne Elizabeth (2010), "Decision-making Void of Democratic Qualities? An Evaluation of the EU's Second Pillar Decision-making Procedure," in Sophie Vanhoonacker, Hylke Dijkstra and Heidi Maurer (eds.), "Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European



- Security and Defence Policy,” European Integration online Papers (Online) Special Issue 1:14. Available at <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-011a.htm>
- Stuenkel, Oliver (2016), *Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Suchman, Marc C. (1995), “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” *Academy of Management Review*, 20 (3), pp. 571-610.
- Sweeney, Simon (2012), “Common Security and Defence Policy Legitimacy and Process: to What Extent is EUFOR Althea Supported by Due Political Process and is the Mission Fit-for-purpose?,” Paper presented at UACES 42nd Annual Conference Passau, Germany. Available at <http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1201/sweeney.pdf>
- Tardy, Thierry (2014), “CSDP: getting third states on board,” European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Brief, March 1, 2014. Available at [https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief\\_6\\_CSDP\\_and\\_third\\_states.pdf](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_6_CSDP_and_third_states.pdf)
- Thomas Gehring, Sebastian Oberthür, and Marc Mühleck (2013), “European Union Actorness in International Institutions: Why the EU is Recognized as an Actor in Some International Institutions, but Not in Others,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(5), pp. 849-865.
- Thomassen, Jacques and Hermann Schmitt (2004), “Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union,” *Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning*, 45(1), pp. 377-410.
- Tocci, Nathalie (2007), “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners,” CEPS Working Document No. 279.
- Tonra, Ben (2011), “Democratic foundations of EU foreign policy: narratives and the myth of EU exceptionalism,” *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(8), pp. 1190-1207.
- Turner, Mandy (2012), “Completing the Circle: Peacebuilding as Colonial Practice in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” *International Peacekeeping*, 19(4), pp. 492-507.
- Twardzisz, Piotr (2013), *The Language of Interstate Relations: In Search of Personification*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tyler, Tom R. (January 2006), “Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,” *Annual Review of Psychology*, 57, pp. 375-400.
- United Nations Security Council (2002), Resolution 1441 (2002) adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on 8 November 2002. Available at <https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf>
- Van Ham, Peter (2001), “Europe's postmodern identity: A critical appraisal,” *International Politics*, 38 (2), pp. 229-252.

- Visoka, Gözüm and John Doyle (2016), Neo-Functional Peace: The European Union Way of Resolving Conflicts, *JCMS*, 54(4), pp. 862-877. Available at <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.12342>
- Voeten, Erik (2005), "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force," *International Organization*, 59, pp. 527-557.
- Wagner, Wolfgang (2005), "The Democratic Legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy," *ISS Occasional Paper*, N.57, 01 April 2005.
- Wagner, Wolfgang (2006), "The Democratic Control of Military Power Europe," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), pp. 200-216.
- Wagner, Wolfgang (2007), "The Democratic Deficit in the EU's Security and Defense Policy - why bother?," *RECON online working paper no.10*. Available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/8061/1/wagner-w-07b.pdf>
- Wagner, Wolfgang (2015), "Liberal Power Europe," paper prepared for presentation at the 22nd International Conference of Europeanists, Paris, July 8-10, 2015.
- Wallner, Jennifer, (2008), "Legitimacy and Public Policy: Seeing Beyond Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Performance," *The Policy Studies Journal*, 36(3), pp. 421-443.
- Warning, Michael J. (2009), *Transnational Public Governance Networks: Law and Legitimacy*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Weber, Max (1978) [first published in 1922], *Economy and Society*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Wendt, Alexander (1992), "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, 46(2), pp. 391-425. Available at <http://ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/Pol272/Wendt.Anarch.pdf>
- Wendt, Alexander (1994), "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review*, 88(2), pp. 384-396.
- Whitman, Richard G. (ed.) (2011), *Normative Power Europe Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Williams, Michael C. (2003), "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, 47, pp. 511-531.
- Winn, Neil and Alexandra Lewis (2017), "European Union anti-piracy initiatives in the Horn of Africa: linking land-based counter-piracy with maritime security and regional development," *Third World Quarterly*, 38(9), pp. 2113-2128.
- Wintle, Michael (2016), "Islam as Europe's 'Other' in the Long Term: Some Discontinuities," *History*, 101(344), pp. 42-61.

- Wodak, Ruth (2004), "Critical discourse analysis," in Clive Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium, and David Silverman (2004), *Qualitative Research Practice*, London, Sage, pp. 185-201.
- Wodak, Ruth and Paul Chilton (eds.) (2005), *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Interdisciplinarity*, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Zielonka, Jan (2006), "Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union," Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Zielonka, Jan (2013), "Europe's new civilizing missions: the EU's normative power discourse," *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 18(1), pp. 35-55.
- Zwolski, Kamil and Christian Kaunert (2013), *The EU as a global security actor: a comprehensive analysis beyond CFSP and JHA*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.



## SOURCES: DISCURSIVE CORPUS

- Ashton, Catherine (High Representative) (2010), Munich security conference speech by the High Representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy, Catherine Ashton, Munich, 6 February 2010, in Institute for Security Studies (2011), European Union security and defence core documents 2010, Volume XI, compiled by Catherine Glière. Available at <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/european-union-security-and-defence-core-documents-2010---vol-xi>
- Ashton, Catherine (High Representative) (2013a), Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, Brussels, 11 December 2013, Join (2013) 30 Final. Available at [http://www.eas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211\\_03\\_en.pdf](http://www.eas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf)
- Ashton, Catherine (High Representative) (2013b), European External Action Service Review, Brussels, July 2013. Available at [http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/top\\_stories/2013/29072013\\_eeas\\_review\\_en.htm](http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/29072013_eeas_review_en.htm)
- Ashton, Catherine (High Representative) (2013c), Final report on the CSDP: Preparing the European Council on Security and Defence, Brussels, 15 October 2013. Available at <https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/reports/here.pdf>
- Ayrault, Jean-Marc and Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Foreign Ministers of France and Germany) (2016), "A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties," joint contribution by the French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, June 28, 2016. Available at <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/european-union/events/article/a-strong-europe-in-a-world-of-uncertainties-28-06-16>
- Barroso, José Manuel (European Commission President) (2004), "The European Union and the Emerging World Order: Perceptions and Strategies," speech at the 7th ECSA (European Community Studies Association) World Conference, Brussels, 30 November 2004. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-04-499\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-499_en.htm)
- Barroso, José Manuel (European Commission President) (2007), "The European Union after the Lisbon Treaty," speech to the 4th Joint Parliamentary meeting on the Future of Europe, Brussels, speech/07/793, 4th of December 2007. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-07-793\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-793_en.htm)
- Barroso, José Manuel (European Commission President) (2014), "Strengthening Europe security and defence sector," speech at a high-level conference on the European security

and defence sector, Brussels, 4 March 2014. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-14-177\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-177_en.htm)

Blair, Tony (UK Prime Minister) (1998), Press conference following the Informal European summit in Pörschach, Austria, on 24 and 25 October 1998, in Chaillot Paper 47 (May 2001), “From St-Malo to Nice European defence: core documents,” Compiled by Maartje Rutten, pp. 1-3.

Blair, Tony and Jacques Chirac (HSGs of the UK and France) (1998), Joint Declaration, delivered at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France 3 and 4 December 1998. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf>

Blair, Tony and Massimo D’Alema (HSGs of the UK and Italy) (1999), Joint Declaration Launching European Defence Capabilities Initiative, British-Italian summit London, 19-20 July 1999, in Chaillot Paper 47 (May 2001), “From St-Malo to Nice European defence: core documents,” Compiled by Maartje Rutten, pp. 46-47.

Chirac, Jacques and Gerhard Schröder (HSGs of France and Germany) (1998), Franco-German Summit Final Declaration, Potsdam, 1 December 1998, in Chaillot Paper 47 (May 2001), “From St-Malo to Nice European defence: core documents,” Compiled by Maartje Rutten, pp. 4-7.

Chirac, Jacques and Gerhard Schröder (HSGs of France and Germany) (1999), Franco-German Defence and Security Council Declaration, Toulouse, 29 May 1999, in Chaillot Paper 47 (May 2001), “From St-Malo to Nice European defence: core documents,” Compiled by Maartje Rutten, p. 40.

Council of the EU (2001c), Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, 9537/1/01, REV 1, LIMITE, COSDP 146, CONUN 17, DEVGEN 91, RELEX 74, COSCE 2, CODUN 21 Brussels, 7 June 2001. Available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209537%202001%20REV%201>

Council of the EU (2001d), Council Common Position 2001/374/CFSP of 14 May 2001 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. Available at [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:6ab77e80-3c40-4960-95b9-05285f9a2e85.0004.02/DOC\\_1&format=PDF](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:6ab77e80-3c40-4960-95b9-05285f9a2e85.0004.02/DOC_1&format=PDF)

Council of the EU (2003), Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP of 12 June 2003 on the launching of the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003D0432&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2004b), Headline Goal 2010 - approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004, endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/2010%20headline%20goal.pdf>

Council of the EU (2004d), Council Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP of 22 November 2004 on the extension of the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA), Brussels, November 2004. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02004E0789-20050217&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2004e), Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004E0523&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2004f), Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009\\_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede020610ja2004570bih\\_/sede020610ja2004570bih\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede020610ja2004570bih_/sede020610ja2004570bih_en.pdf)

Council of the EU (2004g), Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa and repealing Common Position 2001/374/CFSP. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004E0085&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2004h), Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004 on the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL 'Kinshasa'). Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004E0847&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2004i), Declaration on Combating Terrorism - 7906/04. Available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7906-2004-INIT/en/pdf>

Council of the EU (2005c), Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005 on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005E0355&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2005d), Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005 on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005E0190&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2005e), Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories. Available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004\\_2009/documents/dv/palestinian\\_territories\\_oj\\_/palestinian\\_territories\\_oj\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/palestinian_territories_oj_/palestinian_territories_oj_en.pdf)

Council of the EU (2005f), Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah). Available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004\\_2009/documents/dv/jarafah889\\_05\\_/jarafah889\\_05\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/jarafah889_05_/jarafah889_05_en.pdf)

Council of the EU (2005g), Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 September 2005 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission – AMM). Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005E0643&qid=1510309611904&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2006), Presidency Report on ESDP, Brussels, 12 June 2006 - 10418/06. Available at

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010418%202006%20INIT>

Council of the EU (2007a), Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP of 12 June 2007 on the European Union police mission undertaken in the framework of reform of the security sector (SSR) and its interface with the system of justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo). Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007E0405&qid=1509708469096&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2007b), Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP of 30 May 2007 on establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGANISTAN). Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007E0369&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2007c), Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007 on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007E0677&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2007d), Security and Development – Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, Brussels, 20 November 2007. Available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%201>



5097%202007%20INIT&r=http%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.europa.eu%2Fpd%2Fen%2F07%2Fst15%2Fst15097.en07.pdf

Council of the EU (2008a), EU Concept for Force Generation, 10690/08, COSDP 541, Brussels, 16 June 2008. Available at

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010690%202008%20INIT>

Council of the EU (2008b), Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP of 12 February 2008 on the European Union mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU). Available at

<https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f3229c81-bf05-4ae7-bf67-0510fc94ebe5>

Council of the EU (2008c), Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia. Available at

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0736&from=EN>

Council of the EU (2008d), Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo. Available at

[http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/WEJointActionEULEX\\_EN.pdf](http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/WEJointActionEULEX_EN.pdf)

Council of the EU (2008e), Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:301:0033:0037:EN:PDF>

Council of the EU (2009a), Press Release on the General Affairs and External Relations Council, document 10009/09 (Presse 137), 18-19 May 2009. Available at

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2010009%202009%20INIT>

Council of the EU (2009b), EU Concept for the Use of Force in EU-led Military Operations, Brussels, 4 December 2009. Available at

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2017168%202009%20EXT%201>

Council of the EU (2009c), Presidency Report on ESDP as approved by the Council on 15 June 2009, Brussels. Available at

[https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/Presidency\\_Report\\_on\\_ESDP\\_as\\_approved\\_by\\_the\\_Council\\_on\\_15\\_June\\_2009.pdf](https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/Presidency_Report_on_ESDP_as_approved_by_the_Council_on_15_June_2009.pdf)

Council of the EU (2011), Council conclusions on conflict prevention, 3101<sup>st</sup> Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 20 June 2011. Available at [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122911.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122911.pdf)

Council of the EU (2012), 3183rd Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 23 July 2012 - Council conclusions on common security and defence policy. Available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131971.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131971.pdf)

Council of the EU (2013), Council conclusions on the EEAS Review, General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 17 December 2013. Available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/eN/genaff/140141.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/eN/genaff/140141.pdf)

Council of the EU (2014a), Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014. Available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf)

Council of the EU (2014b), Council conclusions on implementation of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel - Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 17 March 2014. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/28735/141577.pdf>

Council of the EU (2015a), Council conclusions on CSDP, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 18 May 2015. Available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8971-2015-INIT/en/pdf>

Council of the EU (2015b), Council conclusions on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, press release, 188/15 20/04/2015. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/20/council-conclusions-review-european-neighbourhood-policy/>

Delors, Jacques (European Commission President) (1992a), Address to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Summit, Helsinki, 9 and 10 July 1992. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-92-71\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-92-71_en.htm)

Delors, Jacques (European Commission President) (1992b), Speech of President Delors at the Special Session of European Parliament Committees on the Former Yugoslavia, Brussels, 10 August 1992. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-92-77\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-92-77_en.htm)

EU Council Secretariat (2004), EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA) [Fact sheet]. ATH/03 (update 3) 29 November 2004. Available at [http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents\\_travail/2005/03/18defaltheafact/altheafactsheet.pdf](http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/03/18defaltheafact/altheafactsheet.pdf)

EU Council Secretariat (2009a), EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA) [Fact sheet]. September 2009 Althea/16. Available at

[https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/missionPress/files/090915%20Factsheet%20EUFOR%20Althea%20-%20version%2016\\_EN.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/090915%20Factsheet%20EUFOR%20Althea%20-%20version%2016_EN.pdf)

EU Council Secretariat (2009b), EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA) [Fact sheet]. December 2009 Althea/19. Available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/missionPress/files/091204%20Factsheet%20EUFOR%20Althea%20-%20version%2019\\_EN.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/091204%20Factsheet%20EUFOR%20Althea%20-%20version%2019_EN.pdf)

EU Council Secretariat (2010), EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA) [Fact sheet]. January 2010 Althea/20. Available at [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/missionPress/files/100121%20Factsheet%20EUFOR%20Althea%20-%20version%2020\\_EN.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100121%20Factsheet%20EUFOR%20Althea%20-%20version%2020_EN.pdf)

EU Council Secretariat (2012), EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA) [Fact sheet]. April 2012 ALTHEA/27. Available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/missionPress/files/april2012%20Factsheet%20EUFOR%20Althea%20\\_%2027\\_EN\\_new.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/april2012%20Factsheet%20EUFOR%20Althea%20_%2027_EN_new.pdf)

European Commission (2006), Communication from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006: ‘Europe in the World’ – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, Brussels, 8 June 2006, COM(2006) 278 final. Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/councils/bx20060615/euw\\_com06\\_278\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/councils/bx20060615/euw_com06_278_en.pdf)

European Commission (2015a), Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Capacity building in support of security and development - Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises, JOIN(2015) 17 final, Brussels, 30 April 2015. Available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8504-2015-INIT/en/pdf>

European Commission (2015b), Joint communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Agenda on Security, COM(2015) 185 final, Strasbourg, 28 April 2015. Available at [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu\\_agenda\\_on\\_security\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf)

European Council (1993), Presidency conclusions, European Council in Brussels, 10 and 11 December 1993, Annex II, pp. 29-30. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21216/82736.pdf>

European Council (1996a), European Council proceedings, Turin, 29 March 1996. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21169/turin-european-council.pdf>

European Council (1996b), Presidency Conclusions, Dublin, 13 and 14 December 1996. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21147/dublin-european-council.pdf>

European Council (1998), Presidency Conclusions, Vienna, 11-12 December 1998, in in Chaillot Paper 47 (May 2001), “From St-Malo to Nice European defence: core documents,” Compiled by Maartje Rutten, p. 13.

European Council (1999a), Annex III of the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council: Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Cologne, 3 and 4 June 1999. Available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Cologne%20European%20Council%20-%20Annex%20III%20of%20the%20Presidency%20conclusions.pdf>

European Council (1999b), Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999. Available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell1\\_en.htm#b](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell1_en.htm#b)

European Council (2000a), Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21027/santa-maria-da-feira-european-council-presidency-conclusions.pdf>

European Council (2000b), Presidency Conclusions Nice European Council Meeting, Nice, 8 And 9 December 2000. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21005/nice-european-council-presidency-conclusions.pdf>

European Council (2001a), Presidency Conclusions Göteborg European Council Meeting, 15 and 16 June 2001. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20983/00200-r1en1.pdf>

European Council (2001b), Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels, 21 September, 2001. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20972/140en.pdf>

European Council (2001c), Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union and the President of the Commission: Follow-up to the September 11 Attacks and the Fight Against Terrorism - SN 4296/2/01 REV 2, Brussels, 19 October 2001. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20961/acf7be.pdf>

European Council (2001d), Presidency Conclusions – European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20950/68827.pdf>

European Council (2002), Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Seville, 21 and 22 June 2002. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20928/72638.pdf>

European Council (2003a), “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World,” 12 December 2003. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

European Council (2003b), Document on EU-NATO Consultation, Planning and Operations, December 2003. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78414%20-%20EU-NATO%20Consultation,%20Planning%20and%20Operations.pdf>

European Council (2003c), Extraordinary European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 17 February 2003. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20895/extraordinary-european-council-brussels-17-february-2003.pdf>

European Council (2003d), Athens Declaration, Informal European Council, Athens, 16 April 2003. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20884/informal-european-council-athens-declaration-16-april-2003.pdf>

European Council (2003e), Presidency's Statement on Iraq, Athens 16/4/2003. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20874/informal-european-council-athens-declaration-iraq-16-april-2003.pdf>

European Council (2003f), Presidency conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 20 and 21 March 2003. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20858/75136.pdf>

European Council (2003g), European Council Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki, 19 and 20 June 2003. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20847/76279.pdf>

European Council (2003h), European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 12 and 13 December 2003. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20825/78364.pdf>

European Council (2006), Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 15 and 16 June 2006. Available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10633-2006-INIT/en/pdf>

European Council (2009), European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 18 and 19 June 2009. Available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11225-2009-INIT/en/pdf>

European Council (2010), European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 16 September 2010. Available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-21-2010-INIT/en/pdf>

European Council (2012), European Council Conclusions of 13 and 14 December 2012. Available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-205-2012-INIT/en/pdf>

European Council (2013), European Council Conclusions 19/20 December 2013, Brussels. Available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-217-2013-INIT/en/pdf>

European Council (2015), European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) conclusions, EUCO 22/15, Brussels, 26 June 2015. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/26-euco-conclusions/>

European External Action Service (2003), [Factsheet] CSDP European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), updated June 2012. Available at [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupm-bih/pdf/25062012\\_factsheet\\_eupm-bih\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupm-bih/pdf/25062012_factsheet_eupm-bih_en.pdf)

European External Action Service (2006), Press Document EUPOL-Kinshasa - October 2006. Available at [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-kinshasa/pdf/01102006\\_factsheet\\_eupol-kinshasa\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-kinshasa/pdf/01102006_factsheet_eupol-kinshasa_en.pdf)

European External Action Service (2009), 'Factsheet' Tchad-RCA/9 on the EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), March 2009. Available at [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-tchad-rca/pdf/01032009\\_factsheet\\_eufor-tchad-rca\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-tchad-rca/pdf/01032009_factsheet_eufor-tchad-rca_en.pdf)

European External Action Service (2011), Annual Activity Report. Available at [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20121017\\_eeas\\_aar\\_2011\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20121017_eeas_aar_2011_en.pdf)

European External Action Service (2012), Factsheet EUSEC RDC/18 - EU Mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the area of defence (EUSEC RD CONGO). December 2012. Available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eusec-rd-congo/pdf/26122012\\_factsheet\\_eusec-rd-congo\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eusec-rd-congo/pdf/26122012_factsheet_eusec-rd-congo_en.pdf)

European External Action Service (2014a), 'Factsheet' on the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX-Iraq), January 2014. Available at [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eujust-lex-iraq/pdf/facsheet\\_eujust-lex\\_iraq\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eujust-lex-iraq/pdf/facsheet_eujust-lex_iraq_en.pdf)

European External Action Service (2014b), Civilian Operations Commander Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP missions, eeas.cpcc(2014)4077896, Brussels, 7 November 2014. Available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15272-2014-INIT/en/pdf>

European Parliament (2000), Resolution on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy after Cologne and Helsinki (2000/2005(INI)) A5-0339/2000. Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2000-0539+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>

European Parliament (2001), Report on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (C5-0194/2001-2001/2007(INI)), 11 October 2001, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy,

available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P5-TA-2001-0576&format=XML&language=EN>

European Parliament (2002a), Resolution on the present state of the European Security and Defence Policy and EU-NATO relations, P5 TA(2002)0171, 11 April 2002. Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2002-0171+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

European Parliament (2002b), Progress in implementation of CFSP - European Parliament resolution on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (2002/2010(INI)), 11 September 2002, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P5-TA-2002-0451+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>

European Parliament (2005), European Parliament resolution on the European Security Strategy (2004/2167(INI)). Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2005-0133>

European Parliament (2006), Resolution on the implementation of the European Security Strategy in the context of the ESDP, P6\_TA(2006)0495. Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2006-0495+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

European Parliament (2009), Resolution of 19 February 2009 on the European Security Strategy and ESDP (2008/2202(INI)), P6\_TA(2009)0075. Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0075+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>

European Parliament (2011), Resolution of 11 May 2011 on the development of the common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2010/2299(INI)), P7\_TA(2011)0228. Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0228&language=EN>

European Parliament (2012), Resolution of 22 November 2012 on the implementation of the CSDP (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the EP on the CFSP), 12562/2011 – 2012/2138(INI). Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-0455&language=EN>

European Parliament (2013), Implementation of the Common Security and Defence - EP resolution of 21 November 2013 on the implementation of the CSDP (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the CFSP) (14605/1/2012 - 2013/2105(INI)). Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0513&language=EN>

European Parliament (2015a), European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2015 on the Annual Report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament (2014/2219(INI)). Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0075+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>

European Parliament (2015b), Resolution of 21 May 2015 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) (2014/2220(INI)) P8\_TA(2015)0213. Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0213+0+DOC+XML+V0//PT>

European Union (1992), Treaty on European Union (Maastricht), Official Journal of the European Union, C 224, 31 August 1992. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1992:224:FULL&from=EN>

European Union (1997), Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (Amsterdam), Official Journal of the European Union, 97/C 340/02, 10 November 1997. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11997M/TXT&from=EN>

European Union (2003), Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Nice), Official Journal of the European Union, C 325, 24 December 2002. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:C2002/325/01&from=EN>

European Union (2008), Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008, S407/08. Available at [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf)

European Union (2009), Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon), Official Journal of the



European Union, C 202, 7 June 2016. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2016:202:FULL&from=EN>

European Union (2016), Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - a Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016. Available at [https://eeas.europa.eu/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf)

European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2002), EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 16 Dec. 2002, Press Release (2002)142 142. Available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_19544.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm)

German Council Presidency (1999), German Presidency paper: Informal reflection at WEU on Europe's security and defence, Bonn, 24 February 1999, in Chaillot Paper 47 (May 2001), "From St-Malo to Nice European defence: core documents," Compiled by Maartje Rutten, pp. 14-16.

German Foreign Ministry (1999), Informal meeting of EU foreign ministers Eltville, 13-14 March 1999, German proposal, in Chaillot Paper 47 (May 2001), "From St-Malo to Nice European defence: core documents," Compiled by Maartje Rutten, pp. 17-19.

High Representative and European Commission (2000), Report containing practical recommendations for improving the coherence and effectiveness of EU action in the field of conflict prevention -14088/00. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/98328.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/98328.pdf)

Juncker, Jean-Claude and Jens Stoltenberg (European Commission President and NATO Secretary General) (2015), Written joint statement of European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Brussels, 16 June 2015. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_STATEMENT-15-5206\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5206_en.htm)

Merkel, Angela; Hans-Gert Pottering; and José Manuel Barroso (German Chancellor and representative of the European Council Presidency, European Parliament President, and European Commission President) (2007), Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome, Berlin, March 25, 2007, in EUISS (2008) Chaillot Paper n° 112, EU security and defence Core documents 2007, Volume VIII, compiled by Catherine Glière, pp. 69-70. Available at <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-security-and-defence-core-documents-2007-vol-viii>

Miliband, David (UK Foreign Secretary) (2007), "Europe 2030: Model Power Not Superpower," speech to the College of Europe, Bruges 15 November 2007. Available at [https://www.brugesgroup.com/images/media\\_centre/rebuttals/MilibandBrugesSpeech.pdf](https://www.brugesgroup.com/images/media_centre/rebuttals/MilibandBrugesSpeech.pdf)

Mogherini, Federica (High Representative) (2015a), Report ahead of the June 2015 European Council on security and defence. Available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/documents/pdf/report-ahead\\_european-defence-agency.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/documents/pdf/report-ahead_european-defence-agency.pdf)

Mogherini, Federica (High Representative) (2015b), Joint Consultation Paper: Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 4 March 2015, JOIN(2015) 6 final. Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/neighbourhood/consultation/consultation.pdf>

Political and Security Committee (2007), Civilian Headline Goal 2010 - approved by the ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference and noted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 19 November 2007 - doc. 14823/07. Available at [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian\\_Headline\\_Goal\\_2010.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf)

Prodi, Romano (European Commission President) (2000), Message from Romano PRODI on the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, IP/00/459, Brussels, 9 May 2000. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-00-459\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-00-459_en.htm)

Prodi, Romano (European Commission President) (2001), “After Reform: a future strategy for Europe as a whole,” speech at the International Bertelsmann Forum ‘Europe without borders,’ speech/01/14, Berlin, 19 January 2001. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-01-14\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-01-14_en.htm)

Prodi, Romano (European Commission President) (2002), “A stronger foreign and security policy for Europe,” speech/02/465, European Parliament, Brussels, 9 October 2002. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-02-465\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-465_en.htm)

Santer, Jacques (European Commission President) (1995), Speech by President Santer to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 17 January 1995. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-95-1\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-95-1_en.htm)

Santer, Jacques (European Commission President) (1998), “The EU in the 21st century: political dwarf or world actor?,” speech at the Bologna Centre of the Johns Hopkins University, speech/98/80, Bologna, 23 April 1998. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-98-80\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-98-80_en.htm)

Solana, Javier (High Representative) (2003), Remarques de Javier Solana, Haut représentant de l'UE pour la PESC, à l'occasion de la fin de l'opération “Artémis” à Bunia (République démocratique du Congo), S0168/03, Brussels, 1 September 2003. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Remarques%20SOLANA%20fin.pdf>

- Solana, Javier (High Representative) (2004), “The European Strategy – The Next Steps?,” address at the Conference on European security at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 25 February 2004, in Institute for Security Studies (2005), Chaillot Paper n° 75, EU security and defence Core documents 2004, Volume V, pp. 18-22. Available at <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-security-and-defence---core-documents-2004>
- Solana, Javier (High Representative) (2004), Message from Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the occasion of the launch of the mission EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia, S0199/04, Brussels, 23 July 2004. Available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/040722%20message%20Tbilisi%20EUJUST.pdf>
- Solana, Javier (High Representative) (2005), “Shaping an effective EU Foreign Policy,” Foundation Konrad Adenauer, Brussels, 24 January 2005, in Institute for Security Studies (2006), Chaillot Paper n° 87, EU security and defence Core documents 2005, Volume VI, March 2006, pp. 17-22. Available at <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-security-and-defence---core-documents-2005-volume-vi>
- Solana, Javier (High Representative) (2005), Statement by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, on the occasion of the ceremony marking the end of the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 9 December 2005, S406/05. Brussels, 9 December 2005. Available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/87469.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/87469.pdf)
- Solana, Javier (High Representative) (2007), “From Cologne to Berlin and Beyond – Operations, Institutions and Capabilities,” address at the European Security and Defence Policy Conference, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Berlin, 29 January 2007, in EUISS (2008) Chaillot Paper n° 112, EU security and defence Core documents 2007, Volume VIII, compiled by Catherine Glière, pp. 21-25. Available at <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-security-and-defence-core-documents-2007-vol-viii>
- Solana, Javier (High Representative) (2009a), “Mobilise now to stabilise Somalia,” *The Guardian*, 12 August 2009. Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/aug/12/stabilise-somalia-poverty-piracy>
- Solana, Javier (High Representative) (2009b), “Together we are Stronger,” address at the University College Dublin, 22 April, 2009, in EU Institute for Security Studies (2009), EU security and defence Core documents 2009, Volume X, July 2010, compiled by Catherine

Glière, pp. 73-77. Available at <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/european-union-security-and-defence-core-documents-2009—-volume-x>

Solana, Javier and George Robertson (EU High Representative and NATO Secretary General) (2003), Press point, 11 March 2003. Audio file available at

<http://www.nato.int/multi/audio/2003/030311a.mp3>

Solana, Javier; Declain Kelleher; and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (EU High Representative, PSC Chairman, and NATO Secretary General) (2004), Joint press point with NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the PSC Chairman, Ambassador Declain Kelleher and the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana, 21 January 2004. Available at <http://www.nato.int/multi/audio/2004/040121a.mp3>

Van Rompuy, Herman and José Manuel Barroso (European Council President and Commission President) (2012), Joint statement by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, and José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, on the award of the 2012 Nobel Peace prize to the European Union. Available at

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/132807.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/132807.pdf)

WEU Council of Ministers (1992), “Petersberg Declaration,” Bonn, 19 June 1992. Available at <https://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf>

WEU Council of Ministers (1995), Extraordinary Council of WEU Ministers: ‘European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries’. Available at

<http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/WEU141195.PDF>