



IUL School of Social Sciences
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology

Interdependence, the Negotiation changer:
Impact of the perception of interdependence in Negotiation styles in
Individualistic vs Collectivistic Cultures

Cristina Fabíola Silva Ramos

Dissertation submitted as a partial requirement for the conferral of Master in Psychology of
Intercultural Relations

Supervisor:

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Postdoc Researcher and Invited Professor Miriam Rosa,
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To my friend, Ricardo Ribeiro, who passed away way to soon.

*You were an example of what you can accomplish when you
set your mind and heart to something.*

*Where ever you are, I know you are watching over me and I
hope I have made you proud.*

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A big thanks to all of you.

Resumo

Até então, evidências na literatura apontam que o individualismo está naturalmente associado com a perspectiva de que a negociação é sobre distribuir recursos, enquanto que o coletivismo está associado à perspectiva de que a negociação é em primeira instância sobre as relações e apenas posteriormente sobre a distribuição de recursos. Mesmo assim, pouco se sabe sobre a influência que variáveis do contexto social, como a percepção de interdependência positiva, podem ter na abordagem dos indivíduos à negociação, dependendo da sua aderência à cultura individualista vs. coletivista. Esta dissertação pretende assim, abordar a influência da percepção de interdependência no estilo de resolução de conflitos adotado pelos indivíduos, variando na dimensão individualismo-coletivismo, e se o facto de estarem a negociar com membros do endo- ou do exogrupo os fará diferir nesse sentido. Um cenário experimental (N = 212) mediu o comportamento e estilo de negociação depois de manipular a saliência da cultura, a interdependência e a grupo a que pertencia o parceiro de negociação. Esperávamos que a saliência da cultura individualista do negociador amplificasse o efeito positivo da interdependência no comportamento integrativo em comparação com o comportamento de negociação distributivo. Além disso, a saliência da cultura coletivista do negociador deveria aumentar a atenção à pertença grupal, que por sua vez deveria moderar o efeito da interdependência, levando a um comportamento mais integrativo em comparação ao comportamento distributivo na negociação com o endogrupo do que na negociação com o exogrupo. As nossas análises forneceram resultados mistos para o efeito moderador da saliência da cultura do negociador e o grupo a que pertencia o parceiro de negociação. Concluimos que, embora as nossas hipóteses não tenham sido fortemente apoiadas, há uma tendência apontando nessa direção.

Palavras-chave: negociação, conflito, cultura, interdependência

Abstract

So far, there is evidence in the literature that individualism seems to be naturally associated with the perspective that negotiation is about distributing resources and collectivism is associated with the perspective that negotiation is about relationships first and then about resources distribution. Nonetheless, little is known about the different influences that social context variables such as perceived interdependence may have on individuals' approach to negotiation depending on their adherence to individualist vs. collectivist culture. For that reason, this dissertation intends to address the influence of the perception of positive interdependence on the conflict resolution style adopted by individuals varying on the individualistic-collectivistic dimension, and whether negotiating with ingroup or outgroup members would differ in that regard. A scenario experiment (N = 212) measured negotiation behavior and style after manipulating culture salience, interdependence and group membership of the negotiation partner. We expected that the salience of the negotiator's individualistic culture should amplify the positive effect of interdependence on integrative as compared to distributive negotiation behavior. Moreover, the salience of the negotiator's collectivistic culture should increase attention to group belonging, which in turn should moderate the effect of interdependence, leading to more integrative as compared to distributive behavior in negotiation with ingroup members than in negotiation with outgroup members. Our analyses provided mixed results for the moderating effect of the salience of the negotiator culture and group membership of the negotiation partner. We concluded that, although our hypotheses were not strongly supported, there is a tendency pointing in that direction.

Keywords: negotiation, conflict, culture, interdependence

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Introduction

In the globalized world we live in, it has become necessary to understand how cultures affect the negotiation process and how negotiations unfold depending on that. It is also important to understand how the appropriateness of negotiation behaviors is determined by the cultural background from which the negotiating parties are (Pang & Wang, 2011). Negotiations are not only affected by negotiators' values (Deutsch, 2006), but also by their cultural background in terms of social norms and shared beliefs. There are many different cultural values, norms, and institutions, and although not all of them are related to negotiation, many do because they provide a basis for interpreting situations and a basis for interpreting the behaviors of others (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Cross-cultural negotiations do not only happen amongst world leaders and massive companies' CEOs; they happen in schools, supermarkets and even in households. One important context factor in negotiations that has not yet been studied in terms of its cultural specificities is interdependence. The process of negotiation involves interdependence (Deutsch, 2006) but how does interdependence influence the outcome of negotiation? Cultural differences in the structure of social networks are likely to affect the dynamics of negotiations (Gelfand & Cai, 2004), including the role of interdependence. Accordingly, the present study attempts to examine the relationship between the perception of interdependence and the conflict resolution strategy adopted by individuals applying different cultural frameworks as a key contribution to the field of conflict and negotiation. This thesis intends to deepen our understanding of the negotiation process and of how to solve conflict in a constructive manner, recognizing the negotiators' culture as a key aspect. This article focuses on organisations for a practical reason but, as a matter of fact, organisations are also a rich arena for studying conflict embedded in highly interdependent, authority based and power hierarchical, multi-group structures - the contexts in which conflict typically occurs (Tjosvold, 1998), and negotiation consequently is highly relevant.

The structure of this dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapter I presents the introduction and background to the current research and gives an overview of what is entailed in our study. It presents the specific issues that directed this study on examining how the research on intercultural negotiation has been tackled. It also addresses the theoretical premise on which the study is based, and the hypotheses derived from it. In Chapter II we address the key research methodologies used to conduct the study and give a basic description of the population. A justification of these methods and problems encountered are presented. Chapter

III focuses on the data analysis used and presents the results. At last, Chapter IV consists of a discussion and analysis of the study findings.

Literature review

Conflict - cooperation and competition

Conflicts occur between almost any type of groups such as different ethnic, racial, religious and national groups or even between more trivial groups such as companies, sport fans and clubs and even political parties. Since humans have always waged conflicts, humans have also always engaged in various ways to settle them (Kriesberg, 2009). Nonetheless, as an area of scholarship and professional practice, conflict resolution is relatively young, emerging as a discipline only after World War II (Deutsch, Coleman & Marcus, 2006). It is present in social situations that range from stranger-to-stranger interaction to interpersonal relationships (e.g., disagreements between co-workers, hostage taking events) or even intergroup settings (e.g., international disputes, terrorist incidents) (Hammer, 2005). Defining conflict is not a simple task, and there are many definitions of conflict (Holmes & Fletcher-Berglund, 1995). For example, Boulding (1963) supports the following idea:

Conflict may be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other... (p. 5).

The problem is that this definition denies the reality that people with cooperative, highly overlapping goals can be, and often are, in conflict with each other (Tjosvold, 1998). For that reason, a major focus for social psychologists theorizing about conflict nowadays have been the concepts of cooperation and competition. The theory of cooperation and competition indicates that defining conflict as opposing interests has unrecoverable drawbacks (Tjosvold, 1998). For that reason, in this article we will use Deutsch's (1973) definition of conflict as incompatible activities, that is, one person's actions interfere, obstruct, or in some way get in the way of another's action. Initially developed by Morton Deutsch, the theory's focus is based on two basic ideas (a) goal interdependence and the (b) type of action taken by the people involved (Deutsch, 2006). Cooperation-competition theory argues that negotiators have different social motives (Deutsch, 1973). These can be egoistic when negotiators try to maximize their own outcomes with no regard for the outcomes obtained by their opposing negotiator, or prosocial when negotiators try to maximize both own and other's outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart, Kwon, 2000). The salience of this motives can vary due to individual differences, situational variations or both (De Dreu & Lange, 1995). Situation determined

social motives can be cued by instructions from supervisors, reinforcement schemes or even social relationships (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997).

When confronted with incompatible actions, a common form of conflict resolution is negotiation. Young (1991) defines negotiation as a process of joint decision making that involves communication between individuals who are trying to reach an agreement. For this specific work, we will consider the influence of social motivation on information processing and strategic choice in negotiation - the preference for a certain distribution of outcomes between oneself and the other party (De Dreu, 2004).

Actions taken and conflict resolution style

Although there is a great variety of different strategies and tactics that can be adopted during a negotiation, the most used distinction is between distributive (win-lose situation) and integrative (potential for a win-win situation) behavior. In distributive situations, negotiators perceive that there is a fixed sum of goods or resources to be allocated among the negotiating parties. In contrast, in an integrative situation, negotiators are faced with a non-zero-sum encounter in which there is the possibility for joint gain (Barry & Friedman, 1998). As the search for the maximization of joint gain requires a creative collaborative problem-solving process, the more disputants engage in integrative negotiation procedures, the more positive (in terms of overall efficacy) will be the outcomes of negotiation (Johnson & Johnson, 2003). Currently, one of the most complete models in terms of negotiation styles is the Dual Concern Model originally introduced by Blake and Mouton (1964; see also Kim & Coleman, 2015). This model identifies four conflict-handling styles based on two dimensions: degree of concern for self and concern for others. These dimensions represent, respectively, importance of solving a conflict by advancing one's own priorities and the importance of ensuring the other person gets a desirable solution to the conflict (Kim & Coleman, 2015). Crossing the two dimensions, we end up with five conflict management styles: (a) dominating (high concern for self, low concern for others), (b) integrating (high concern for self and others), (c) compromising (moderate concern about both), (d) obliging (low concern for self and high concern for others), and (e) avoidance (low concern for self and others; Cai & Fink, 2002). These five styles can be organized according to the integrative and distributive dimension. The integrative dimension would comprise variation between the integrating and the avoiding style and the distributive dimension would comprise variation between the dominating and

obliging style. The compromising style is the intersection of the two dimensions (Rahim, 2011). The integrative dimension captures variation between the Integrating style with high concern for both self and others and the Avoiding styles with low concern for self and others. The distributive dimension captures variation between the Dominating style with high concern for self and low concern for others and the Obliging style with low concern for self and high concern for others. These two dimensions represent the problem solving and bargaining styles for handling conflict, respectively. A problem-solving style represents a party's pursuit of own and others' concerns, whereas the bargaining style represents a party's pursuit of own versus others' concerns. For instance, high use of the problem-solving style indicates attempts to increase the satisfaction of concerns of both parties by finding unique solutions to the problems acceptable to them. A low use of this style indicates reduction of those attempts, which can happen because of the involved parties' failure to confront and solve their problems (Rahim, 2002).

Group membership

One important factor that can have an impact on negotiators readiness to engage in collaborative problem solving in negotiation is group membership. Social Identity Theory (SIT), developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979), provides a framework to understand the importance of social identity and group membership. Tajfel and Turner (2004) define intergroup behavior as interactions between two or more individuals (or groups of individuals) that are determined by their respective memberships in various social groups or categories, and not affected by the interindividual personal relationships. The authors then add that pure forms of this extreme are found only infrequently in society. The behavior of soldiers from opposing armies during a battle, or the behavior at a negotiating table of members representing two parties in an intense intergroup conflict are some of the examples that might normally tend to be near the intergroup extreme (the opposite extreme would be interpersonal behavior). Instead, most of the time interactions can be located somewhere between the extremes of the intergroup-interpersonal dimension depending on the salience of social identity in a particular situation. The theory posits that there are three mental processes involved in evaluating others differentially, depending on whether they are ingroup (belonging to the same group as the individual) or outgroup (belonging to a different group). These processes are respectively (1) social categorization, (2) social identification and (3)

Social comparison (Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Social categorization is the cognitive tool by which we categorize people in order to understand the social environment. This tool also provides a system of orientation for self-reference. Following this line of thought, social identification is the process by which the social groups previously created by categorization provide their members with an identification in social terms. These identifications are to a very large extent relational and comparative. Finally, social comparisons are evaluations that group members make of their group in terms of attributes and characteristics with reference to other groups. Positively discrepant comparisons between ingroup and outgroup produce high prestige and a positive social identity; negatively discrepant comparisons between ingroup and outgroup result in low prestige and a negative social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 2004).

It is also interesting to denote that individuals' may differ in their belief systems about the nature and the structure of the relations between social groups in their society in the two extremes, to of "social mobility" and "social change" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The belief system of social mobility is based on the idea that society is flexible & permeable, so, if individuals are not satisfied with the conditions imposed upon their lives either through group membership or social categories, it is possible for them to move individually into another group which suits them better. On the other side, the belief system of social change implies that the nature and structure of the relations between social groups is perceived as characterized by stratification, which makes it impossible or very difficult for individuals, as individuals, to move out of unsatisfactory conditions. The belief system corresponding to the "social change" extreme of this continuum is, therefore, associated with intense intergroup conflicts. (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). There are several strategies that an individual may adopt to deal with a negative or threatened identity. According to Tajfel and Turner (2004) these strategies to improve relative ingroup evaluations are as follows: (a) Individual mobility - In this strategy individuals may try to leave, or dissociate themselves from, their former group. This strategy usually implies attempts, on an individual basis, to achieve upward social mobility, to pass from a lower- to a higher-status group; (b) Social creativity – Assuming that the barriers to leaving one's group are strong, group members may seek positive distinctiveness for the ingroup by redefining the elements used to make the comparison. This does not involve any change in the group's actual social status position or its access to resources. Some ways to achieve this may be comparing the ingroup to the outgroup on some new dimension, changing the value of the attribute used to make the comparison or even changing the outgroup with which the ingroup is compared; (c) Social competition - group

members may seek positive distinctiveness through direct competition with the outgroup. They may try to reverse the relative positions of the ingroup and the outgroup on a salient dimension. To the degree that this may involve comparisons related to the social structure, it implies changes in the groups' objective social locations. In sum, mutual intergroup comparisons are necessary, and often enough, for social competition.

We can hypothesize, therefore that the negotiation process may differ depending on whom the individuals are dealing with, an ingroup or an outgroup member, because in a situation where social identity is salient the concern for members of the ingroup might be directly related to the concern for the self. This distinction between ingroup and outgroup should depend on the salience of social identity, but one can also expect cultural differences, given that group membership plays a different role in collectivistic as compared to individualistic cultures. Moreover, we can also assume that social competition may increase the use of a distributive style. In contrast, engaging in strategies such as social creativity or individual mobility may lead to more integrative problem solving, once they reduce intergroup conflict, although through different paths. The former strategy may restore or create a positive self-image. The latter is destructive of subordinate-group solidarity and provides no solution to negative social identity at group level (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Group membership and culture

While individuals have personalities, groups have cultures (Adair & Brett, 2004). Hofstede (1994) defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from other”. Later, Matsumoto (1996) defined culture as “... the set of attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviours shared by a group of people, but different for each individual, communicated from generation to the other” (p.16). The latter conceptualization sees culture as something much less stable or homogeneous and focuses more on social and cognitive processing than other ideas of culture. By linking culture to individuals and emphasizing the number and diversity of social and experimental settings that individuals encounter, the scope of reference of culture is expanded to not only “kinship” groups (i.e. ethnic group, nation) but also grouping derived from profession, class, religion, etc. (Avruch, 1998). Avruch (1998) denotes that this approach makes the idea of culture much complicated and supports the idea that individuals embody multiple cultures and that “culture” is always psychologically and socially distributed in a group. In a negotiation it

is of utmost importance to distinguish whether the other party is an ingroup or outgroup member. However, from a cross-cultural standpoint, the meaning of ingroup and outgroup is different from culture to culture. For this work, we will focus on Hofstede's dimension of individualism-collectivism (IND-COL). Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov's (2010) definition of Individualism and Collectivism posits as follows:

Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him- or herself and his or her immediate family.

Collectivism, as its opposite, refers to societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive ingroups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (p.92).

In individualistic cultures, such as the United States and Germany, there is high mobility, and people can join and leave groups thus, individuals are adept and open to forming relations with outgroup members, who possibly could become a member of the ingroup. In Collectivist cultures in contrast, individuals are born into cohesive ingroups and mobility tends to be low, resulting in stronger and more durable ties to one's ingroup, resulting in weaker and more distant ties to outgroup members (Gelfand & Cai, 2004). These results suggest that it is easier to enter and exit social networks in individualistic cultures, because relations are more likely to be uniplex¹ and of low density (Gelfand & Cai, 2004). Triandis (1989) observed that collectivists make stronger distinctions between ingroup and outgroup members than individualists, so it is expected that culture interacts with effects of group membership on negotiations. For instance, in addition to subordinating personal to collective goals, people in more collectivist cultures tend to be more concerned about the results of their actions on members of their ingroups, tend to share more resources with ingroup members, feel more interdependent with ingroup members, and feel more involved in the lives of ingroup members (Hui & Triandis, 1986). Another argument that supports this point of view is that Hinkle and Brown (1990) reasoned that the social psychological processes suggested by SIT are more applicable to groups or individuals who have a collectivistic culture more salient or allocentric orientation (as cited in Brown et al., 1992). It is for the individuals whose collectivistic culture is more salient that the group (and its

¹ Specification of the content of the interactions has reference to only one type of interaction (Hinde, 1978). For example, if individual X is Y's boss and they do not have any kind of relationship outside of work, they have a uniplex relation. But, in case X and Y have that work relationship and play football in the same team on weekends they have a multiplex relation, interacting in different contexts.

outcomes) really matter. Triandis and colleagues proposed the dimension of horizontal/vertical which is orthogonal to individualism-collectivism dimension (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). These two dimensions generate four new constructs: (a) Horizontal collectivism (HC); (b) Vertical collectivism (VC); (c) Horizontal individualism (HI); (d) Vertical individualism (VI). HC is a cultural pattern in which the individual sees the self as an aspect of an ingroup. The self is merged with the members of the ingroup, all of whom are identical to each other. In this pattern, the self is interdependent, and equality is the essence of this pattern. VC, similarly to HC is the cultural pattern in which the individual sees the self as an aspect of an ingroup, but the members of the ingroup are different from each other (in terms of status). The self is interdependent but in the different “level” of the self of others. Inequality is accepted in this pattern. Serving and sacrificing for the ingroup is an important aspect of this pattern. HI is a cultural pattern where an autonomous self is postulated, but the individual is more or less equal in status with others. The self is independent, and status is not so relevant. At last, in VI an autonomous self is postulated, but individuals see each other as different, and inequality is expected. The self is independent and different from the self of others in terms of status. Competition is an important aspect of this pattern (Singelis et al., 1995).

To sum up, social psychology has provided, throughout the years, an overall understanding of the processes involved in intergroup conflict but, we want to deepen the focus on cross-cultural conflict (i.e. on comparisons of behavior from a specific culture on negotiations, although these cross-cultural differences may also play a role in intercultural negotiations). I expect that culture, specifically the salience of either individualism or collectivism, will influence negotiations by making the distinction between ingroup members and outgroup members more or less relevant. This is, I expect that individuals who have their collectivistic culture more salient will make more distinctions between ingroup and outgroup and show more integrative behavior in negotiations with ingroup members than with outgroup members, but more distributive behavior in negotiations with outgroup members than with ingroup members. Individuals who have their individualistic culture more salient should make less distinctions depending on group membership so their choices on conflict handling method should not vary much when dealing with an ingroup or an outgroup member.

Interdependence

Another important factor that affects the negotiation process is the perception of interdependence. Social interdependence exists when the accomplishment of each individual goal is affected by the actions of others (Johnson & Johnson, 2003), and conflict implies such interdependence (Deutsch, 2006). Deutsch (1990) advocates that the way in which people believe that their goals are interrelated is an important variable affecting the dynamics and outcomes of their interaction with other individuals. In other words, if you feel like you are interrelated, or you need something from the person you are negotiating with, it is natural that you will address that person differently. Rusbult and Van Lange (2003, p.352) emphasize that “situations involving conflicting interests are interpersonally rich, affording psychological processes such as self-presentation and attributional activity and activating morality- and benevolence-relevant motives and norms”. Someone is interdependent when situations involve high mutual partner control, joint control, or both (partner and joint control) and, increasing dependence normally represents an increase in situation- and person-relevant attention, cognition and affect (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). As stated in social interdependence theory, we can either have (a) positive interdependence or (b) negative interdependence (Johnson & Johnson, 2003). The first one relates to when people can only achieve a goal if others also achieve their goals, in turn, negative interdependence is related to the idea that people can only achieve their own goals if others fail to obtain theirs. In terms of processes, positive interdependence results in promotive interaction while negative interdependence results in contrient interaction (e.g. obstruction of each other’s goal achievement efforts and distrust; Johnson & Johnson, 2003). For example, in a volleyball game, members of the same team are positively dependent on each other and negatively dependent on the members of the other team. In a negotiation, the degree of interdependence between the parties depends on whether there is the possibility to have other negotiation partners (Giebels, De Dreu, & Van Vliert, 2000). Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that few situations are “purely” positive or negative (Deutsch, 2006). As stated by Deutsch (2006):

Positive interdependence can result from people liking one another, being rewarded in terms of their joint achievement, needing to share a resource or overcome an obstacle together, holding common membership or identification with a group whose fate is important to them, being unable to achieve their task goals unless they divide up the

work, being influenced by personality and cultural orientation, being bound together because they are treated this way by a common enemy or an authority, and so on (p.24).

Finally, higher positive interdependence will lead to promotive interaction, which is an integrative negotiation procedure, that will lead to outcomes normally associated to cooperation. In sum, “engaging in an integrative negotiation procedure results in agreements that are cooperative in nature (i.e., they maximize joint gain), thereby linking integrative negotiations and social interdependence theory” (Johnson & Johnson, 2003, pp. 58). We can conclude from this analyses that, according to social interdependence theory, it would be expected that by realizing the possibility of future interaction, positively interdependent negotiators would engage in more integrative negotiations favoring a cooperative process over a competitive process (normally related to distributive negotiations).

Mergers and Culture

Just like social groups, organizations develop certain assumptions, norms and patterns of speech and behavior that make them unique, and, also like for those groups, culture is one of the factors that differentiate one organization from the others (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1993). When organizations and their relations to each other are restructured (e.g., by mergers or acquisitions) there is often a culture-clash. Similar to social sciences, research on culture in mergers² points to the term “culture” as having different connotations over time. Findings reported in the literature show that mergers encompass cultural diversity at the subcultural, functional and organizational level of analysis, in addition to national cultures in the case of cross-border deals (Teerikangas & Very, 2012)

Cultural differences are likely to be especially important in cross-border mergers, where people with possibly conflicting values must coordinate with each other. Although some studies paint the impact of national cultures on mergers in a positive light, more recently this image became more nuanced (Teerikangas & Very, 2012). Weber and Camerer (2003) noted that while cultural conflict often plays a large role in merger failure, it is often neglected when the benefits of a potential merger are examined. In 2012, a study found that, the greater

² A merger or an acquisition can be defined as the combination of two or more companies into one new company or corporation, the main difference between these two lies in the way in which the combination of the companies is brought about. In a Merger if merger negotiations are favorable, the outcome would be a merger of the two companies to form a new larger whole. In an Acquisition company A buys company B and the later becomes wholly owned by company A (Roberts, Wallace, & Moles, 2016). Scholars frequently use these two terms interchangeably or use just mergers, and so will we for the matter of simplicity.

are the cross-country differences in values of trust, hierarchy, and individualism, the smaller is the cross-border merger volume (number of mergers done between companies from those countries) or success (Ahern, Daminelli, & Fracassi, 2012). In contrast, Page (2007) disclosed that greater cultural distance could increase the likelihood of a successful merger if cultural diversity facilitates innovation and promotes new approaches to problem solving (as cited in Ahern et al., 2012). In a study on international mergers, Brock (2005) noted that specific dimensions of cultural differences have different performance implications. Following this chain of thought, the author pointed out that while individualism is likely to affect integration, (e.g., for example, the author found that a mismatch on the individualism variable resulted in more integration problems), power distance affects the degree of resource sharing (e.g., resource sharing became more difficult the higher the power distance of the culture that acquired the other company). Thus, when a buying firm from a collectivistic tradition buys a firm from an individualistic culture, integration-related problems are likely to occur. Later, Reus and Lamont's (2009) study found that cultural distance impedes integration capabilities by having a negative effect on understandability between the parties and communication.

One of the big problems that should be noted is that studies so far rely on existing models of national culture differences and lack the focus on the types of differences in national cultures that really exist in the context. Another problem of this research concerns the kinds of performance measurement that is used; the study of both organizational and national cultures has largely relied on financial metrics, whilst the study of national and organizational cultures has operationalized performance using non-financial measures (Teerikangas & Very, 2012). It also should be noted that, cultural effects in mergers are mostly studied as cross-country effects, but they also exist in mergers within the same nation, due to clashes between organizational cultures that are, sometimes, more antagonistic than those due to cross-national differences (Weber & Camerer, 2003). This study will contribute to the study of organizational culture in negotiations over and above country differences.

Once most of the time interactions can be located somewhere between the extremes of the intergroup-interpersonal dimension depending on the salience of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 2004), we expect that once in individualistic cultures there is higher mobility and people are open to forming relations with outgroup members, contrasting what happens in collectivistic cultures where ties with the outgroup are distant (Gelfand & Cai, 2004). For this reason, individuals higher on collectivism should make a bigger distinction between ingroup and outgroup members. Linking the previous conclusion to the idea that higher levels of

positive interdependence will lead to promotive interaction, which is an integrative negotiation procedure, we can expect that positive interdependence will lead to more integrative choices (Johnson & Johnson, 2003). This idea follows the same direction of Wagner (1995) findings that alluded to the fact that an individualist may engage in cooperative behaviors if his/her personal goals cannot be achieved by working alone. To our knowledge research has failed to address the possible impact of the on this. Once collectivist have more cohesive ingroups and lower mobility, by realizing the possibility of future interaction (and a common future, even if for a short term) positive interdependence can be seen differently by them. For this reason, in this study the issue under scrutiny is whether the impact of perception of interdependence of the negotiators on the conflict resolution style adopted by individuals will vary on the Individualistic-collectivistic dimension, and whether this would depend on whether one is negotiating with ingroup or outgroup members.


H1: A higher the perception of positive interdependence will increase integrative negotiation behavior.

H2: The salience of the negotiator’s individualistic culture will amplify the positive effect of interdependence on integrative as compared to distributive negotiation behavior.

H3: The salience of the negotiator’s collectivistic culture will increase attention to group belonging. Thus, it should moderate the effect of interdependence, leading to more integrative as compared to distributive choices to the ingroup than to the outgroup (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Conceptual Model



Method

In order to test our hypothesis, we conducted an experimental online study using scenarios of an organizational merger and involving participants in negotiations with computer-simulated partners. We manipulated the perception of interdependence of the negotiators and primed the salience of their IND-COL culture. Group membership of the negotiation partner was also manipulated in the instructions the negotiators received. As dependent variable, the negotiations style of the individuals was measured both by a behavioral measure and an attitudinal scale.

Participants

Participation was voluntary, and the participants could withdraw from the experiment freely at any moment. The sampling method of choice was the Snowball method, which consists of yielding a study sample through referrals made among people who know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest (Biernacki & Woldorf, 1981).

A total of 440 participants accessed the study but only 220 participants completed the questionnaire at least until the measures of the dependent variable. Data of participants taking longer than one hour or less than six minutes were excluded from the analysis because in the former case it was likely that they may have been interrupted, which would have undermined the effectiveness of the manipulations and in the latter case one could not assume that they participated seriously. The final number of participants was 199 (N=199). All participants had Portuguese nationality, and 33% of them were men and 67% were women. Participants' age ranged from 18 to 63 years, and most of them were either employed (46%) or students (31%). For means of comparison we also asked them about previous negotiation experience and concluded that the majority (44%) did not have any previous experience (only 37% said they had).

Design and Procedure

The research design of this study was experimental. More precisely, it followed a 2 (IND-COL: individualistic vs collectivistic) x 2 (Interdependence: positive vs. control) x 2 (Target group order: IG/OG VS OG/IG)) mixed design, with culture and interdependence being manipulated between-subjects and the negotiation target manipulated within-subjects with randomly counterbalanced order.

Data were collected via an electronic questionnaire (using Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Before the beginning of the experiment, participants were asked to and express their informed consent. After declaring informed consent with information regarding voluntary participation, anonymity and confidentiality of data, etc, the participant received either an individualistic or collectivistic priming manipulation. Participants were assigned to one of these conditions randomly. Following the priming, they were asked to imagine that they were employees of an organization (ACME or BOLT) that had recently merged with another organization. To make it more credible, they received some information about the merger in form of an official letter from the management. This letter had information about the need of the new organization (after merger) to acquire a new building and the situation with office allocation that that created, as well as about the next steps required for the employees (see Appendix 1). After this, the participants were introduced to the scenario of a first negotiation.

The participants had to go through two different negotiations about two different topics. These negotiations choice of new vs. old offices had implications for access to (a) a new computer and to the existing storage, and on (b) having or not a window in the office and access to a printer (see Appendix 2). These negotiations were presented in random order. Each participant had to negotiate in one scenario with an ingroup member (employee of the same organization) and in the other scenario with an outgroup member (employee of the other organization in the merger), this group membership of the negotiation partner was also in a random order. All participants read about what their preferences where in the negotiation before beginning to negotiate. These preferences were designed in a way that the negotiator could choose strategies that where integrative, such as logrolling (by trading across issues in a negotiation) or strategies that were distributive, such as exerting pressure on the opponent, in order to reach a solution. For the first negotiation, the participants preferences were: that they did not mind having the old office if they got to keep everything in it and they would like the new computer (available in the new offices) and the other person would try to negotiate and have some of the storage space available in the old office. For the second negotiation, the negotiator would want the new office with the window and keep every material. Implications in terms of outcomes would generate a conflict and posterior negotiation about the window, because both negotiators wanted it.

In the negotiations, participants communicated to the negotiation partner via chat by choosing between pre-prepared messages. The computer-simulated negotiation partner responded with pre-prepared messages, after which participants could then chose again

between pre-prepared messages. The negotiations went on for several rounds of message exchange until they were closed with a solution.

When both negotiations were finished, participants filled in a scale for each of the negotiations measuring self-reports on their negotiation behaviour during the two negotiations. The following section of the study was composed of the manipulation checks. The last section included demographic questions and three questions to assess if participants recalled which was their ingroup and with whom they had the first and second negotiation.

After the survey was completed, the participants were debriefed, thanked for their cooperation and asked if they had any questions. None of the commenting participants asked any question or expressed any negative impact of the study. Some participants expressed interest about the final results. They will be informed about the final results after the dissertation is approved.

Materials/Instruments

Manipulations.

This study involved the three following manipulations.:

The manipulation of IND-COL (individualism (IND) vs collectivism (COL)). When addressing the dimension of IND-COL, a large amount of research uses Hofstede's ratings of country-level individualism (IND), rather than assessing IND directly, or simply note that Hofstede found a difference between two countries and then use it as the basis of their assumptions that the two countries differ in that dimension and that their findings relate to this difference (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Another typical approach is to use individualism-collectivism scales that measure IND-COL at the individual level and to correlate this assessment with the individual's outcomes, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. An emerging alternative to the previous approaches, based in social cognition research, involves efforts to prime IND or COL values or independent–interdependent self-definitions before assessing their effect on a dependent measure (See Appendix 3). Following that line of reasoning, the environment in which one is can moderate the weight of the individualistic-collectivistic components. For example, team-work situations are likely to remind individuals of their interdependencies, making the collectivistic components more dominant (He, Sebanz, Sui & Humphreys, 2014). Following the latter approach, I manipulated IND-COL at the

individual level within a single culture to increase power and reduce confounds (He et al., 2014). We used an adapted version of the Similarities and Differences Between Family and Friends (SDFB) task adopted from Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto (1991) (see Appendix 4).

The manipulation the perception of interdependence. Participants were randomly assigned to either a positive interdependence condition or a control condition. In the positive interdependence condition, I introduced the following sentence after defining participants preferences for each of the two negotiations “Os seus superiores exigem que se chegue a uma conclusão no fim da negociação.” which translates to “Your superior demands that you reach a conclusion at the end of the negotiation”. In the control condition no such sentence was presented.

Manipulation of target of negotiation (ingroup vs outgroup) presentation order. This variable was manipulated by randomly assigning a specific organization – ACME or BOLT to the participants (the name was randomized to control for unexpected name effects) and then varying the negotiation partner as either being from the same (ingroup) or from the other (outgroup) merging organization. For instance, participants assigned to belong to ACME would be involved in a negotiation with both a member of ACME (ingroup) and a member of BOLT (outgroup), having the presentation order (ingroup or outgroup first) randomized. At the beginning of each negotiation, participants would receive the briefing “You are in a negotiation with a person from your original organization (e.g. ACME) to tackle the subject of whom should have which office” in case they were to negotiate with the ingroup, or “You are in a negotiation with a person from the organization with whom there was the merger (e.g. BOLT) to tackle the subject of whom should have which office” in case they were to negotiate with a member of the outgroup.

Dependent measures.

Behavioral measure of integrative versus distributive negotiation behavior. A semi-structured negotiation task developed by the researcher was employed (as a proxy for a behavioral measure of the DV) to measure to what extent the participants integrative choices would be chosen as compared to distributive. The measure was composed of ten step negotiations for each scenario. In each step the participant had to select one out of 2 to 4 options of pre-written sentences that they could send in a chat-environment to the negotiation partner. Before the next step they received a computer-simulated response from the alleged negotiation partner, which was independent of the participant’s choice but was designed to

make sense for all options (see Appendix). For each scenario, nine of the choices of each participant created nine data points³. The pre-written sentences from which participants had to choose their communications to the partner were either consistent with an integrative negotiation strategy or with a distributive negotiation strategy. The dependent measure was then calculated as the sum of integrative choices in each negotiation, which could vary between 0 and 9. As the distribution of this measure was skewed, the variable was transformed using the BLOM formula ranking method to approximate it to a normal distribution.

Self-report measure of integrative and distributive negotiation behavior. The adapted Portuguese version of the Dutch Scale for Conflict Handling (DUTCH) designed by Van de Vliert (1997) was used as a second measure of negotiation styles (Almeida, 2015). We adapted this measure, so it would be in the past tense, because the scales were applied after the negotiations (see Table 1). Participants had to fill them in twice, with reference to the negotiations that they just engaged in. For the objective of this thesis we only considered the items measuring tendencies of Integrating and Dominating as the other negotiation styles where not related to our hypothesis (e.g., the avoiding style leads instead to the reduction of satisfaction of the concerns of both parties and result in the failure to solve their problems). The average of the integration style items was used as indicator of integrative behavior and the average of the dominance items were used as indicator of distributive behavior. Internal consistencies were sufficient, as Cronbach's Alpha were .79 and .66 for the first negotiations for the Integrative and Distributive scale, respectively. For the second negotiation Cronbach's Alpha were .84 and .83 for the Integrative and Distributive scale, respectively.

Table 1

Characterization of the DUTCH Scale as used

Dimensions	Number of items	Item Example	Values
Dominating	4	ex: Forcei o meu ponto de vista/ I forced my point of view	5-points Likert scale where 1 is the minimum (Nunca/Never) and 5 is the maximum (Sempre/Always)
Integrating	4	ex: Defendi os meus próprios objetivos e interesses assim como os da outra parte/ I defended my own objectives and interests as well as the other party's	

³ Due to some technical problems with data exporting from Qualtrics to SPSS, one step from each negotiation scenario was excluded from the data analyses. The reason was that one negotiation script included one choice that could not be mapped unequivocally to the theoretical concepts (integrative vs. distributive) and for the other negotiation script the data of one choice was not correctly downloaded from Qualtrics to SPSS.

Manipulation Checks.

Manipulation check of Individualism-Collectivism. we used an adapted version in Portuguese of the scale by Triandis & Gelfand (1998) self-translated. The final version was attained using an interactive back-translation method. The scale was translated, back translated and adjusted a total of four times by people with a C1 or higher level of English. Any inconsistency between versions was corrected by an independent translator, previously to sending the translated scale to the next translator. This scale was used to assess the participants' scores in terms of Vertical (VI) and Horizontal Individualism (HI) and Vertical (VC) and Horizontal Collectivism (HC). As we were not interested on the HC vs. VC distinction, we combined both HC and VC in a single collectivism scale. On the other hand, HI and VI were treated as distinct measures following suggestions from previous research (He, Sebanz, Sui and Humphreys, 2014; Oyserman et al., 2002). The final scales were composed of 4 items for IND and 8 items for COL ($\alpha = .81$). All the items were answered on a 9-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = never to 9 = always. An example of an item from the COL scale is "It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups". For the IND scales, an example of an item from the HI scale is "I often do "my own thing"; for the VI scale an example is "Competition is the law of nature".

Manipulation check of the perception of interdependence. We used a slider measure that assessed the perception of how much participants thought that their success depended on the other person and ranged from "Completely independent of the other person success" to "Completely dependent on the other person success" coded from 0 to 100%.

Manipulation check of order and group membership. We used three multiple choice questions to address this measure. The items read as follows: "To what company did you belong?" "The person with whom you had the first negotiation belonged to which company?" and "The person with whom you had the second negotiation belonged to which company?" The possible answers were "ACME", "BOLT" and "I don't recall".

Other measures

At last, the following demographic information was also gathered in the questionnaire: Age (1 = 18-30; 2 = 30-40; 3 = 40-50; 4 = over 50); (2) Sex (1=feminine; 2 =masculine); (3) Professional Status (1=Active/Employed; 2=Unemployed; 3=Medical leave; 4=Student; 5=Retired; 6=Another situation). This section also included a question about negotiation experience where, in case the participants had experience, we asked them to describe it.

Results

Descriptive Statistics and correlations of noteworthy variables and demographics

Before proceeding to the test of the hypothesis, the means, standard deviations, correlations and confidence intervals of the quantitative variables in the study were calculated, as shown in Table 2.

From the analyses of Table 2 it is possible to conclude, in a systematic way, that:

- (a) The integrative style reported in the DUTCH when negotiating with the ingroup is positively correlated with the perception of positive interdependence when negotiating with the ingroup ($p < .01$), which may indicate that the more individuals have a perception of positive interdependence the more integrative their intentions. This measure is also positively correlated with collectivism ($p < .01$) which may indicate that individuals whose collectivism is more salient are more integrative when negotiating with the Ingroup.
- (b) The integrative style reported in the DUTCH when negotiating with the outgroup is positively correlated to collectivism as well ($p < .01$), which indicated that individuals whose collectivism culture is more salient also report being integrative when negotiating with the outgroup. This measure was, however, not correlated with interdependence.
- (c) The number of integrative choices made by the individuals as measured with the behavioral measure for the ingroup was negatively correlated to Vertical Individualism ($p = .01$) and Horizontal Individualism ($p < .01$), which may indicate that Individuals whose vertical or horizontal individualism was more salient chose less integrative options when negotiating with the ingroup, and to negotiation condition for Individualism-Collectivism ($p = .01$). More specifically, individuals primed with Individualism made less integrative choices. This measure was also positively correlated with perception of positive interdependence for the ingroup ($p = .01$) meaning that the more interdependent they felt the more integrative choices they made.
- (d) The number of integrative choices made by the individuals as measured with the behavioral measure for the outgroup is, negatively correlated with vertical individualism ($p = .01$) indicating that individuals whose Vertical Individualist is more salient made less integrative choices.

Negative correlations were also found between, Horizontal Individualism and perception of interdependence when negotiating with the outgroup ($p = .01$) and ingroup ($p = .03$) Meaning that people whose Horizontal Individualism is more salient perceive less positive interdependence in general. There was also a positive correlation between age and collectivism ($p = .02$) indicating that the older people were, the more salient was their Collectivism. Although these correlations aren't directly associated with our theory they are interesting and in the case of the correlation between age and collectivism they were also somehow expected. A summing up of these results show some unexpected correlations as the negative correlation between vertical and horizontal individualism and the number of integrative choices for the ingroup and vertical individualism and the number of integrative choices for the outgroup. And other such as collectivism only being positively correlated with a more integrative style for the attitudinal measure (DUTCH), both for ingroup and outgroup. Nonetheless, the positive effect of interdependence on integrative style negotiation seems to be supported by the analyses of these correlations.

INTERDEPENDENCE, THE NEGOTIATION CHANGER

Table 2

Means, Standard deviations and correlations with confidence intervals

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. Integrative style when negotiating with ingroup-DUTCH	4.20	0.64														
2. Integrative style when negotiating with outgroup-DUTCH	4.23	0.68	.65**													
3. Number of Integrative choices when negotiating with the ingroup	6.97	1.32	.07	.07												
4. Number of Integrative choices when negotiating with the outgroup	7.34	1.47	.11	.12*	.25**											
5. Age (in years)	30.31	11.47	.17*	.11	-.12	-.12										
6. Sex (1=male & 2=female)	-	-	.09	-.06	-.04	-.01	.08									
7. Previous negotiation experience in a professional/academic context	1.54	0.50	-.15*	-.16*	-.05	-.02	-.12	.02								
8. Measured perception of Positive Interdependence-ingroup	57.11	21.11	.21**	.12	.18*	.16*	.02	.04	-.05							
9. Measured perception of Positive Interdependence-outgroup	59.34	21.61	.15	.13	-.02	.16	-.07	-.05	.00	.49**						
10. Vertical Individualism	4.68	1.86	-.13	-.04	-.19*	-.20**	-.03	-.20**	.02	-.10	-.14					
11. Horizontal Individualism	7.14	1.69	.08	.06	-.23**	-.11	.00	.03	.04	-.20**	-.16*	.38**				
12. Collectivism	8.01	1.41	.24**	.29**	.03	.06	.18*	-.05	-.06	.05	.06	.05	.10			
13. Manipulation of interdependence (0=control & 1=positive interdependence)	-	-	.02	.05	.10	.04	.01	.02	-.01	-.03	-.07	.06	-.07	.14		
14. Target group order (0=IG/OG & 1=OG/IG)	-	-	.05	.10	-.05	.21**	.06	.05	-.04	-.04	-.01	-.12	-.02	.02	-.03	
15. Manipulation of Individualism-Collectivism (1=individualism & 2=collectivism)	-	-	.00	-.04	-.19*	-.13	-.06	.04	.04	.03	.14	.04	.13	.09	.05	.10

Note. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation. * $p < 0.05$ (2-tailed) ** $p < 0.01$ (2-tailed) *** $p < 0.001$ (2-tailed). 10000 bootstrap samples were requested for estimating the indirect effects' bias-corrected 95% bootstrap confidence intervals.

Manipulation Checks

Manipulation check for Interdependence. To test the effectiveness of the manipulation of positive interdependence for the ingroup, we conducted a 2 (IND-COL: individualism vs. collectivism) x 2 (Target group order: IG/OG vs. OG/IG) x 2 (Interdependence: positive vs control) between-subjects General Linear Model (GLM), and the measure of perceived ingroup interdependence as dependent variable. We also had the name of the company to which the participants belonged and the theme of the negotiations as covariates. We obtained a main effect of the theme of the negotiations to which manipulation check was related, $F(1, 182) = 7.10, p = .01, \eta^2_p = .04$. No other significant effect was found ($ps > .34$), including the expected main effect of the positive interdependence manipulation, $F(1, 182) = 0.16, p = .69, \eta^2_p = .00$.

We did the same analyses regarding the manipulation of positive interdependence for the outgroup and obtained just a main effect of IND-COL, $F(1, 181) = 3.98, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .05$. Thus, participants perceived more interdependence in the collectivism condition ($M = 62.35, SD = 21.20$) than in the individualism condition ($M = 56.36, SD = 21.74$). No main effect of interdependence was found ($F(1, 181) = 0.68, p = .41, \eta^2_p = .00$), and no other main effect or interaction was found ($ps > .11$).

To summarize, the expected main effect of interdependence was not found. Although we found a pattern of the IND-COL effect is consistent with theory and previous findings (e.g. Wagner (1995) more interdependence in the collectivism condition), we did not intend this effect as a manipulation of interdependence. Thus, we can conclude that the interdependence manipulation was not successful. These results will be taken into account for the discussion of our main results.

Manipulation check for IND-COL. To test the effectiveness of the manipulation of IND-COL, we conducted three 2 (IND-COL: individualism vs. collectivism) x 2 (target group order: IG/OG vs. OG/IG) x 2 (interdependence: positive vs control) between-subjects GLMs with either Collectivism, Vertical Individualism or Horizontal individualism as dependent variable. Name of the company to which the participants belonged and theme of the negotiations were added as covariates. We did not find any significant effect for either of the

dependent variables ($p > .07$). The closest we got to significant effects was a main effect of the interdependence manipulation on collectivism ($F(1,178) = 3.29, p = .07$) and a main effect of target group order on vertical individualism ($F(1,180) = 3.32, p = .07$). No main effect of the manipulation of individuals IND-COL was found (for COL: $F(1,178) = .80, p = .37, \eta^2_p = .004$; for VI: $F(1,180) = .70, p = .40, \eta^2_p = .00$; for HI: $F(1,180) = 3.00, p = .09, \eta^2_p = .02$), and no other main effect or interaction was found ($ps > .09$).

To sum up, the manipulation check of IND-COL was not successful. These results of the manipulation check will be considered for the discussion of our main results.

Manipulation check for target group order and group membership. To check for the manipulation of target group order and group membership, we converted our raw observations of the responses of the participants to the questions “To what company did you belong?”, “The person with whom you had the first negotiation belonged to which company?” and “The person with whom you had the second negotiation belonged to which company?” into data that would tell us if they correctly recalled. To do so, we created new variables by recoding these questions depending on whether they correctly remembered the names of the respective company. We found that, out of 190 people who answered these questions 72.6% (N=138) recalled to which company they belonged, 58.6% (N=112) recalled to which company the person with whom they had the first negotiation belonged to and 61.6% (N=117) recalled to which company the person with whom they had the second negotiation belonged to. In sum, even though more than 50% recalled both their ingroup name and with whom they had each negotiation, we consider this to be a fragile manipulation once the values are close to 50% (see Table 3).

Table 3.

How many individuals correctly recalled group membership and target group

	Variable	Frequency		Valid Percent	
		Right	Wrong	Right	Wrong
Valid	Who recalled to which company they belonged.	138	52	72.6	27.4
	Who recalled to which company the individual with whom they had the 1 st negotiation belonged.	112	78	58.6	41.1
	Who recalled to which company the individual with whom they had the 2 nd negotiation belonged.	117	73	61.6	31.3
	Total	190			
Missing	System	43			
Total		233			

Hypotheses' test

Tests on the behavioral measure. To test our hypotheses that a higher perception of positive interdependence will increase integrative negotiation behavior (H1), that the salience of the negotiator's individualistic culture will amplify the positive effect of interdependence on integrative as compared to distributive negotiation behavior (H2) and that the salience of the negotiator's collectivistic culture will increase attention to group belonging (H3), we conducted a 2 (IND-COL: individualism vs. collectivism) x 2 (interdependence: positive vs control) x 2 (target group: IG vs. OG) mixed GLM with target group as within subject factor, the other factors as between subject factors and number of integrative choices⁴ as dependent variable. The results showed that there was a marginal main effect of interdependence ($F(1,195) = 3.23, p = .07, \eta^2_p = .02$), and no significant main effects of IND-COL ($F(1,195) = 2.28, p = .13, \eta^2_p = .01$) and target group ($F(1,195) = 0.91, p = .34, \eta^2_p = .001$) on the number of integrative choices made. Also, no significant two-way or three-way interactions were found ($ps > .13$). More precisely, there was no interaction between interdependence and IND-COL

⁴ Noteworthy to point out that for the following analyses, when talking about the number of integrative choices we are referring to the normalized variable.

($F(1, 195) = 0.17, p = .68, \eta^2_p = .001$), target group and IND-COL ($F(1, 195) = 0.30, p = .59, \eta^2_p = .002$), target group and interdependence ($F(1, 195) = 0.02, p = .88, \eta^2_p = .001$), and no three-way interaction between variables ($F(1, 195) = 0.88, p = .35, \eta^2_p = .005$).

Although the interaction effect between Interdependence and IND-COL and target group was not significant, descriptive statistics show that when negotiating with the ingroup in the positive interdependence condition individuals primed with individualism showed a tendency to make more integrative choices ($M = 0.25, SD = 0.88$) compared to the ones primed with collectivism ($M = 0.04, SD = 0.73$). When negotiating with the outgroup, individuals primed with individualism showed a tendency to making more integrative choices than the ones primed with collectivism, independently of the interdependence condition ($M = 0.21, SD = 0.84$ and $M = 0.03, SD = 0.94$, respectively; see Table 4). By analyzing simple mean comparisons, we see a tendency for a difference in interdependence for individuals primed with individualism to make more integrative choices in the positive interdependence condition, ($M_{diff} = 0.30, SE = 0.17$) than in the control condition when negotiating with the ingroup $F(1, 195) = 3.00, p = .09, \eta^2_p = .002$.

We noted that there was a tendency for individuals to make more integrative choices in the condition of positive interdependence than in the control condition, both when negotiating with the ingroup ($M = 0.14, SD = 0.80$ vs $M = -0.04, SD = 0.89$, respectively) and with the outgroup ($M = 0.20, SD = 0.89$ vs $M = 0.04, SD = 0.89$, respectively) (See Table 4). This

Table 4.

pattern is in line with H1, but the differences are not significant.

Descriptive statistics by the conditions

	Negotiation Condition for Interdependence	Negotiation Condition for Individualism- Collectivism	M	SD	N
Number of Integrative choices when negotiating with ingroup member	Control	Individualism	-0.04	0.95	50
		Collectivism	-0.04	0.83	48
		Total	-0.04	0.89	98
	Positive Interdependence	Individualism	0.26	0.88	46
		Collectivism	-0.04	0.73	55
		Total	0.14	0.80	101
	Total	Individualism	0.10	0.92	96
		Collectivism	0.00	0.77	103
		Total	0.05	0.85	199
Number of Integrative choices when negotiating with outgroup member	Control	Individualism	0.15	0.94	50
		Collectivism	-0.07	0.83	48
		Total	0.04	0.89	98
	Positive Interdependence	Individualism	0.29	0.71	46
		Collectivism	0.12	1.01	55
		Total	0.20	0.89	101
	Total	Individualism	0.21	0.84	96
		Collectivism	0.03	0.94	103
		Total	0.12	0.89	199

When focusing on individuals primed with individualism, we can see a tendency of them to make more integrative choices in the positive interdependence condition than in the control condition both for the ingroup ($M = 0.26$, $SD = 0.92$ vs $M = -0.04$, $SD = 0.95$, respectively) and for the outgroup ($M = 0.29$, $SD = 0.71$ vs $M = 0.15$, $SD = 0.94$, respectively). These results, although not significant, are consistent with H2.

On the other hand, we did not find any evidence supporting our Hypothesis 3 in which we expected a tendency from individuals primed with collectivism to make more integrative choices when negotiating with the ingroup ($M = 0.00$, $SD = 0.77$) than with the outgroup ($M = 0.03$, $SD = 0.94$).

Tests on the DUTCH scale. To test our hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (IND-COL: individualism vs. collectivism) x 2 (interdependence: positive interdependence vs control) x 2 (target group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) mixed GLM on the use of integrative style on the DUTCH with target group as within-subject factor and the other factors as between subject factors. The results showed that there was no significant main effect either of the interdependence condition ($F(1,189) = 0.30$, $p = .58$, $\eta^2_p = .00$) or of the IND-COL condition ($F(1,189) = .00$, $p = .99$, $\eta^2_p = .00$). There was also no significant three-way interaction between target group, interdependence condition and IND-COL condition ($F(1, 189) = 0.60$, $p = .44$, $\eta^2_p = .00$). No other significant effects were found ($ps > .15$).

We found no visible tendency for individuals in the condition of positive interdependence to be more integrative than those in the control condition ($M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.64$ vs $M = 4.19$, $SD = 0.65$, respectively) when negotiating with an ingroup member. There was a tendency for individuals in the condition of positive interdependence to be more integrative than those in the control condition when negotiating with an outgroup member ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 0.70$ vs $M = 4.18$, $SD = 0.89$, respectively), independently of being primed with IND or COL. Again, this pattern is in line with H1, but the differences are not significant. To sum up, results with effects on integrative style measured by the DUTCH did not support nor H2 or H3.

Additional analyses

Manipulations Checks.

With name of the company and theme of the negotiations as factors. As our first analyses of the effectiveness of the manipulation where not successful, we conducted some extra analysis regarding the manipulation checks.

For the extra analysis of the effectiveness of the manipulation of positive interdependence for the ingroup, we included contextual variables as factors (for instance, the theme of negotiation or the name given to the ingroup and outgroup), whose order was randomized. Thus, we conducted a 2 (IND-COL: individualism vs. collectivism) x 2 (name of the company: ACME vs. BOLT) x 2 (theme of the negotiations: computer vs. Printer) x 2 (interdependence: Positive Interdependence vs Control) x 2 (target group order: IG/OG vs OG/IG) between-subjects GLM with the measure of perceived ingroup interdependence as dependent variable and age as a covariate. We did not find any other significant effect for ($p > .09$) or the significant effects were associated to merely contextual variables (like theme of the negotiation, $F(1, 170) = 5.45, p = .02, \eta^2_p = .03$), including the expected main effect of the positive interdependence manipulation, $F(1, 154) = 0.31, p > .05, \eta^2_p = .00$.

We did the same analyses regarding the manipulation of positive interdependence for the outgroup. We found an interaction effect of theme of the negotiation and the name of the ingroup, $F(1, 170) = 4.05, p = .05, \eta^2_p = .02$, and an interaction effect of the name of the ingroup and interdependence manipulation, $F(1, 170) = 4.45, p = .04, \eta^2_p = .03$. Even, for part of the participants the manipulation has worked in the opposite direction, namely participants whose ingroup was BOLT perceived more positive interdependence in the control condition ($M = 63.65, SD = 21.25$) than in the positive interdependence on ($M = 55.02, SD = 18.76$). For participants whose ingroup was ACME there was no difference between the positive interdependence condition ($M = 60.12, SD = 24.35$) and the control condition ($M = 58.89, SD = 21.35$).

For the additional analyses of effectiveness of the manipulation of IND-COL we conducted once again three between-subjects GLMs, 2 (IND-COL: individualism vs. collectivism) x 2 (name of the company: ACME vs. BOLT) x 2 (theme of the negotiations: computer vs. Printer) x 2 (interdependence: Positive Interdependence vs Control) x 2 (target group order: IG/OG vs OG/IG), with either Collectivism, vertical individualism or horizontal individualism as dependent variable. The variable age was added as a covariate. The results indicated a main effect of IND-COL on the analyses with horizontal individualism ($F(1, 155)$

= 4.61, $p = .03$, $\eta^2_p = .03$, with individuals ranking higher in horizontal individualism when primed with collectivism ($M = 7.36$, $SD = 1.47$), than when primed with individualism ($M = 6.92$, $SD = 1.86$). We did not find any other significant effect for either of the dependent variables ($p > .07$) with all the significant effects being associated to merely contextual variables. Most importantly, the expected main effect of IND-COL manipulation was not found for the other dependent measures (for collectivism: $F(1,153) = 2.35$, $p = .13$, $\eta^2_p = .02$; for vertical individualism: $F(1,155) = 1.17$, $p = .28$, $\eta^2_p = .01$).

Hypotheses test.

For the alternative analyses done to test our hypothesis, we tried the following several different paths:

Effects on the behavioral measure of integration. We conducted a 2 (IND-COL: individualism vs. collectivism) x 2 (name of the ingroup: ACME vs. BOLT) x 2 (theme of the negotiations: computer vs. printer) x 2 (interdependence: positive Interdependence vs control) x 2 (target group order: IG/OG vs OG/IG) x 2 (target group: ingroup vs. outgroup) mixed GLM with target group as within subject factor, the other factors as between subject factors and number of integrative choices as dependent variable. The variable age was added as a covariate. We found a main effect of the manipulation of IND-COL, $F(1,155) = 2.82$, $p \leq .001$, $\eta^2_p = .02$, meaning that participants made more integrative choices when primed with individualism ($M = 0.26$, $SD = 0.80$) than with collectivism ($M = 0.03$, $SD = 0.92$). We also found an interaction effect of interdependence, name of the ingroup and theme ($F(1,155) = 3.99$, $p \leq .05$, $\eta^2_p = .03$). The analyzes of simple main effects showed that there was an effect of the interdependence manipulation when the ingroup name was BOLT, the theme of the first negotiation was the computer and the negotiation partner was an ingroup member ($F(1,155) = 4.47$, $p = .04$, $\eta^2_p = .03$). The analyzes of the multivariate simple effects of target group within each level combination of the other effects showed that, there were differences between negotiating with the ingroup and the outgroup in the control condition when the ingroup name was BOLT and the theme of the first negotiation was the computer ($F(1,155) = 7.47$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2_p = .05$; see Table 6). The other effects were either irrelevant for our hypotheses or not significant ($ps > .07$).

With DUTCH for the integrative style. We also tested the hypothesis with a 2 (IND-COL: individualism vs. collectivism) x 2 (name of the ingroup: ACME vs. BOLT) x 2 (theme

of the negotiations: computer vs. printer) x 2 (target group order: IG/OG vs OG/IG) x 2 (interdependence: positive interdependence vs control) x 2 (target group: ingroup vs. outgroup) mixed GLM on the use of integrative style on the DUTCH, with target group as within subject factor and the other factors as between subject factors. The variable age was added as a covariate. We found an interaction between target group, name of the ingroup and IND-COL, $F(1,155) = 4.51, p = .04, \eta^2_p = .03$. The analyses of the multivariate simple effects of target group showed differences in negotiating with ingroup or outgroup members when the ingroup name was ACME and participants were primed with individualism, $F(1,155) = 8.24, p = .01, \eta^2_p = .05$. The simple effects of ingroup name being ACME or BOLT was present when individuals primed with collectivism were negotiating with an outgroup member, $F(1,155) = 4.06, p = .05, \eta^2_p = .03$. There was also a five-way interaction between target group, interdependence and IND-COL, name of the ingroup and theme of the negotiation ($F(1,155) = 6.00, p = .02, \eta^2_p = .04$).

With DUTCH for the distributive style. As the hypotheses inherently compare the integrative against the distributive strategy, but both are measured independently in the DUTCH measure (though not in the behavioral measure), we conducted complementary analyses on the distributive style, for which we expected to find opposite results as for the integrative style.

We conducted a 2 (IND-COL: “Individualism” vs. “collectivism”) x 2 (interdependence: positive interdependence vs control) x 2 (target group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) mixed GLM with the use of distributive style on the DUTCH as dependent variable, target group as within subject factor and the other factors as between subject factors. The results showed that there was no significant effect ($ps > .32$).

As done for the integrative style, we also tested the hypothesis with a 2 (IND-COL: individualism vs. collectivism) x 2 (name of the ingroup: ACME vs. BOLT) x 2 (theme of the first negotiation: Computer vs. Printer) x 2 (target group order: IG/OG vs OG/IG) x 2 (interdependence: Positive Interdependence vs Control) x 2 (target group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) mixed GLM with the use of distributive style on the DUTCH as dependent variable, group as within subject factors and the other factors as between subject factors. The variable age was added as a covariate. The results showed that there was an interaction effect

of target group, interdependence, target group order and salient culture ($F(1,155) = 4.81, p = .03, \eta^2_p = .03$). The analyses of the multivariate simple effects of target group within each level combination of the other effects showed that, there were differences between negotiating with the ingroup and the outgroup for the control condition when target group order was IG/OG and individuals were primed with collectivism ($F(1,155) = 7.47, p = .01, \eta^2_p = .05$; see Table 5). The other effects were either irrelevant for our hypotheses, due to being associated

Table 5

Means, Standard deviations for individuals primed with individualism vs. collectivism

		Individualism						
		Interdependence	Target group					
			Ingroup		Outgroup			
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>	
Target group order IG/OG	Control	3.04	0.76	23	3.03	0.97	23	
	Positive Interdependence	3.14	0.84	27	3.23	1.09	27	
Target group order OG/IG	Control	2.89	0.93	24	2.97	0.73	24	
	Positive Interdependence	2.73	1.01	18	2.60	0.94	18	

		Collectivism						
		Interdependence	Target group					
			Ingroup		Outgroup			
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>	
Target group order IG/OG	Control	2.95	0.51	21	3.38	0.75	21	
	Positive Interdependence	2.76	0.89	21	3.01	1.13	21	
Target group order OG/IG	Control	3.12	0.99	23	2.89	0.66	23	
	Positive Interdependence	2.92	1.15	31	2.73	0.94	31	


to merely contextual variables, or not significant ($ps > .08$).

With measured independent variables – Behavioral measure. As our manipulation checks had indicated that our manipulations were probably not successful, we tested our hypotheses also in correlational analyses using the measured independent variables instead of the experimental manipulations. We will describe them in this section of the results.

To test the hypothesis that use of integrative style in a negotiation is a function of how the individuals salient culture (individualism vs collectivism) influences the moderating effect of target group (IG vs. OG) on the relationship between perception of interdependence influences and the use of integrative style in a negotiation a multiple regression was conducted using the process macro for SPSS, model 3 (Hayes, 2013) (-1 for outgroup first, 1 for ingroup first; see Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Moderation analysis variables



Note: results for conflict handling style were analyzed for Ingroup and outgroup as targets, separately. Target group order was used as a proxy for target group.

For the ingroup. The regression model, with the number of integrative choices (as measured with the behavioral measure) when negotiating with the ingroup as the dependent variable, for measured levels of Collectivism. The model did not explain a significant portion of the variance in integrative choices for the ingroup, $R^2 = .28$, $F(9, 177) = 1.64$, $p = .11$. However, we found a significant effect of perception of positive interdependence ($b = 0.008$, 95% CI [0.002, 0.014], $t(183) = 2.75$, $p = .01$) meaning that the more the participants perceived positive interdependence the more integrative choices they made.

The same analysis but with measured levels of vertical individualism, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in use of integrative style, $R^2 = .10$, $F(9, 179) = 2.27$, $p \leq .05$. Although the model was significant, we found no significant interaction effect ($ps > .15$), including the expected two-way interaction, $b = 0.001$, 95% CI [-0.001, 0.004], $t(185) = 1.04$, $p > .05$. Nonetheless, we found a main effect of perception of positive interdependence ($b = 0.007$, 95% CI [0.001, 0.013], $t(185) = 2.39$, $p = .02$) meaning that the more they perception positive interdependence the more integrative choices they made.

The same analysis, this time with measured levels of horizontal individualism, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in making integrative choices, $R^2 = .12$, $F(9, 179) = 2.60$, $p \leq .05$. Although the model was significant, we found no significant interaction effect ($ps > .16$), including the expected two-way interaction, $b = 0.002$, 95% CI [-

0.001, 0.006], $t(185) = 1.41, p > .05$. Nonetheless, we found a main effect of perception of positive interdependence ($b = 0.006, 95\% CI [0.000, 0.012], t(185) = 2.01, p = .05$) meaning that the more they perception positive interdependence the more integrative choices they made. We also found a main effect of horizontal individualism ($b = -0.096, 95\% CI [-0.170, -0.022], t(185) = -2.57, p = .01$), meaning that individuals who ranked higher in horizontal individualism made less integrative choices when negotiating with the ingroup.

For the outgroup. The regression model, with the number of integrative choices (as measured with the behavioral measure) when negotiating with the ingroup as the dependent variable, with measured levels of collectivism. The model did not explain a significant portion of the variance in integrative choices for the outgroup, $R^2 = .05, F(9, 176) = 1.03, p = .42$. Also, none of the effects (main and interaction) were significant ($ps > .07$).

The same analysis but with measured levels of vertical individualism. The model did not explain a significant portion of the variance in integrative choices for the outgroup, $R^2 = .09, F(9, 178) = 1.89, p = .06$. However, we found a significant effect of vertical individualism ($b = -0.091, 95\% CI [-0.161, -0.022], t(184) = -2.60, p = .01$) meaning that individuals who ranked higher in vertical individualism made less integrative choices when negotiating with the outgroup.

The same analysis, this time with measured levels of horizontal individualism, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in making integrative choices, $R^2 = .10, F(9, 178) = 2.25, p \leq .05$. We found the expected two-way interaction between perception of positive interdependence and horizontal individualism ($b = 0.006, 95\% CI [0.002, 0.011], t(183) = 2.76, p = .01$). The effect of perception of positive interdependence on making integrative choices is only significant for values of horizontal individualism 1SD above the mean ($b = 0.014, 95\% CI [0.000, 0.029], t(183) = 1.95, p = .05$).

With measured independent variables – DUTCH for integrative style. We also did a correlational analysis using the measured independent variables instead of the experimental manipulations with the number of integrative choices, as measured with the behavioral measure. We used process macro for spss, model 3 (Hayes, 2013) and the independent variables were mean-centered and target group order was contrast-coded (-1 for outgroup first, 1 for ingroup first).

For the ingroup. The regression model, with the use of the integrative style (as measured with the DUTCH) when negotiating with the ingroup as the dependent variable, for measured levels of Collectivism as proxy for cultural influence, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in use of integrative style, $R^2 = .16$, $F(9, 177) = 3.78$, $p \leq .001$. We found main effects of Collectivism ($b = 0.077$, 95% CI [0.013, 0.140], $t(183) = 2.38$, $p = .02$), meaning that the more salient the individuals collectivism, the more integrative their negotiation style, and of interdependence ($b = 0.007$, 95% CI [0.003, 0.011], $t(183) = 3.30$, $p \leq .01$), meaning that the higher their perception of interdependence, the more integrative their negotiation style. These main effects were qualified by an interaction effect of collectivism and perception of positive interdependence $b = -0.004$, 95% CI [-0.006, -0.001], $t(183) = -2.30$, $p = .02$, indicating that the relationship between perception of positive Interdependence and the use of integrative style is moderated by collectivism. The simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that perception of interdependence only had a significant positive effect for levels of collectivism at 1 standard deviation below the mean ($b = 0.012$, 95% CI [0.004, 0.020], $t(183) = 2.51$, $p = .01$) and mean levels ($b = 0.08$, 95% CI [0.002, 0.014], $t(183) = 2.87$, $p \leq .01$) but not for levels of collectivism at 1 standard deviation above the mean ($b = -0.004$, 95% CI [-0.002, 0.012], $t(183) = -0.07$, $p > .05$)

The same analyses but with measured levels of vertical individualism (instead of collectivism), accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in use of integrative style, $R^2 = .13$, $F(9, 179) = 2.86$, $p \leq .05$. We found a main effect of perception of interdependence ($b = 0.006$, 95% CI [0.002, 0.010], $t(185) = 2.73$, $p = .01$), indicating that the more positive interdependent the individuals felt they were the more they reported to have an integrative style. The other effects were either irrelevant for our hypotheses, due to being associated to merely contextual variables, or not significant ($ps > .19$), including the expected two-way interaction, $b = 0.001$, 95% CI [-0.001, 0.003], $t(185) = 1.31$, $p > .05$.

For the analyses with measured levels of Horizontal Individualism (instead of collectivism), although the model accounted for a significant portion of the variance in use of integrative style $R^2 = .12$, $F(9, 179) = 2.72$, $p \leq .05$, we found no significant interaction effect ($ps > .42$), including the expected two-way interaction, $b = 0.001$, 95% CI [-0.001, 0.003], $t(185) = 0.85$, $p > .05$. We found a main effect of perception of interdependence ($b = 0.007$, 95% CI [0.003, 0.011], $t(185) = 3.10$, $p \leq .01$), indicating that the more positive interdependent the individuals felt they are the more integrative their style. The other effects

where either irrelevant for our hypotheses, due to being associated to merely contextual variables, or not significant ($ps > .09$).

For the outgroup. The regression model, with the use of the integrative style when negotiating with an outgroup member as the dependent variable, for measured levels of Collectivism, accounted for a significant portion of the variance in use of integrative style $R^2 = .12$, $F(9, 176) = 2.68$, $p \leq .05$. We found no significant interaction effect ($ps > .17$), including the expected two-way interaction ($b = -0.002$, 95% $CI [-0.006, 0.001]$, $t(182) = -1.37$, $p > .05$). The only main effect we found was a main effect of Collectivism ($b = 0.127$, 95% $CI [0.058, 0.196]$, $t(182) = 3.65$, $p < .01$) meaning that, the more salient the individuals collectivism the more integrative they rated their behavior.

We conducted the same analyses but with measured levels of Vertical Individualism. The model did not explain a significant portion of the variance of integrative style individuals used when negotiating with an outgroup member, $R^2 = .12$, $F(9, 178) = 1.07$, $p = .39$. Also, none of the effects (main and interaction) were significant ($ps > .15$).

The same analyses but with measured levels of Horizontal Individualism, once again, generated a non-significant model, $R^2 = .24$, $F(9, 178) = 1.19$, $p = .31$, where all the effects (main and interaction) were not significant ($ps > .11$).

With measured independent variables – DUTCH for distributive style.

We also did a correlational analysis using the measured independent variables instead of the experimental manipulations but with the use of distributive style, as measured with the DUTCH, as a dependent variable just identical to what was previously done, we used process macro for spss, model 3 (Hayes, 2013) and the independent variables were mean-centered and target group order was contrast-coded (-1 for outgroup first, 1 for ingroup first).

For the ingroup. The regression model, with the use of the distributive style (as measured with the DUTCH) when negotiating with an ingroup member as the dependent variable, for measured levels of collectivism accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in use of distributive style, $R^2 = .12$, $F(9, 177) = 2.73$, $p \leq .05$. There was a significant main effect of perception of interdependence ($b = -0.007$, 95% $CI [-0.014, -0.001]$, $t(183) = 2.73$, $p = .02$), which means that the more individuals perceived positive independence the less distributive their negotiation style, or the less perception of positive

independence the higher their use of distributive style. There was a moderation shown up by a significant interaction effect of collectivism and perception of positive interdependence $b = -0.004$, 95% $CI [-0.006, -0.001]$, $t(183) = -2.30$, $p = .02$, indicating that the relationship between perception of positive Interdependence and the use of distributive style is moderated by collectivism. The simple slopes analysis revealed that perception of positive interdependence only had a significant effect for levels of collectivism 1 standard deviation above the mean ($b = -0.017$, 95% $CI [-0.026, -0.002]$, $t(183) = -3.18$, $p \leq .01$) and mean levels ($b = -0.009$, 95% $CI [-0.018, -0.001]$, $t(183) = -2.23$, $p = .03$), but not for levels of collectivism at 1 standard deviation below the mean. ($b = 0.003$, 95% $CI [-0.010, 0.017]$, $t(183) = 0.47$, $p > .05$).

The same analysis, but with measured levels of vertical individualism, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in use of distributive style, $R^2 = .16$, $F(9, 179) = 3.77$, $p \leq .001$. We also found a main effect of perception of positive interdependence and vertical individualism. These main effects were qualified by an interaction between perception of positive interdependence and vertical individualism of positive interdependence ($b = -0.003$, 95% $CI [-0.006, -0.001]$, $t(185) = -2.04$, $p = .01$), the use of distributive style was moderated by vertical individualism (i.e., increasing for levels of vertical individualism 1 SD above the mean; see Table 6). We also found a three-way interaction effect where the relationship between perception of positive Interdependence and the use of distributive style was moderated by vertical individualism and target group order (see Table 6). This interaction indicates that we have a negative effect of positive interdependence on the use of distributive style in the ingroup negotiations for mean levels of vertical individualism if they negotiate with outgroup members first ($b = -0.010$, $CI [-0.018, -0.003]$, $t(185) = -2.28$, $p = .02$) and for levels of vertical individualism 1SD above the mean, both if they negotiated with outgroup

members first ($b = -0.010$, $CI [-0.019, 0.000]$, $t(185) = 1.96$, $p = .05$) or ingroup members first ($b = -0.015$, $CI [-0.027, -0.004]$, $t(185) = -2.72$, $p = .01$).

Table 6
Summary of moderated results

Moderator variable model					
$F(9, 179) = 3.77$, $p = .0001$; $R^2 = .16$		<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Effects on the use of distributive style	Constant	3.043	.28	10.73	<.001
	Perception of positive interdependence	0.007	.00	-2.43	.02
	Vertical Individualism	0.109	.03	3.21	<.01
	Target group order	0.019	.06	0.30	>.05
	Perception of positive interdependence * vertical individualism	-0.003	.00	-2.04	.04
	Target group order * Vertical Individualism	-0.095	.03	2.80	.01
	Target group order * Perception of positive interdependence	0.002	.00	0.70	>.05
	Perception of positive interdependence * vertical individualism * target group order	-0.003	.00	-2.00	.05

The same analysis but with measured levels of horizontal individualism, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in use of distributive style, $R^2 = .13$, $F(9, 179) = 2.88$, $p \leq .05$. Although the model was significant, we found no significant interaction effect ($ps > .11$), including the expected two-way interaction, $b = 0.001$, 95% $CI [-0.003, 0.004]$, $t(185) = -0.54$, $p > .05$. Nonetheless, we found a main effect of perception of positive interdependence ($b = -0.007$, 95% $CI [-0.013, 0.001]$, $t(185) = -2.18$, $p = .03$) meaning that the more they perceived positive interdependence the less distributive their style, or the less positive interdependence, the more distributive their style. We also found a main effect of horizontal individualism ($b = 0.120$, 95% $CI [0.042, 0.198]$, $t(185) = 3.05$, $p \leq .01$) which indicates that the higher participants scored in horizontal individualism the higher their ratings in distributive style.

For the outgroup. The regression model, with the use of the distributive style when negotiating with the outgroup as the dependent variable, for measured levels of collectivism, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in use of distributive style $R^2 = .16$, $F(9, 176) = 3.69$, $p \leq .001$. There was no significant two-way interaction $b = -0.003$, 95% $CI [-0.007, 0.002]$, $t(182) = -1.30$, $p > .05$, but there was a moderation shown up by a significant interaction effect of perception of positive interdependence and target group order $b = 0.007$,

95% *CI* [0.001, 0.013], $t(182) = 2.22$, $p = .03$ indicating that the relationship between perception of positive interdependence and the use of distributive style is moderated by group order. More specifically, there was an effect of positive interdependence on the distributive style in the outgroup negotiations if participants negotiated with Outgroup members first ($b = -0.014$, $t(182) = -3.82$, $p \leq .01$). We also found a main effect of perception of positive Interdependence ($b = -0.007$, 95% *CI* [-0.013, -0.001], $t(182) = -2.26$, $p = .02$) meaning the more they perceived positive interdependence the less distributive their ratings.

The same analysis but with measured levels of vertical individualism, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in use of distributive style, $R^2 = .20$, $F(9, 178) = 4.94$, $p \leq .001$. Although the model was significant, we found no significant interaction effect ($ps > .06$), including the expected two-way interaction, $b = -0.004$, 95% *CI* [-0.008, 0.001], $t(183) = -1.74$, $p > .05$. Even so, we found a main effect of vertical individualism ($b = 0.113$, 95% *CI* [0.044, 0.183], $t(184) = 3.21$, $p \leq .01$), meaning that the higher they scored on vertical individualism the more distributive they would rank their choices, when negotiating with the outgroup. We also found a main effect of perception of positive interdependence ($b = -0.008$, 95% *CI* [-0.014, -0.001], $t(184) = -2.37$, $p = .02$), indicating, once again, that the more they perceived positive interdependence the less distributive their ratings.

The analysis with measured levels of horizontal individualism, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in use of distributive style, $R^2 = .20$, $F(9, 178) = 4.94$, $p \leq .001$. We found a significant interaction of perception of positive interdependence and group order showing that there was moderation $b = 0.007$, 95% *CI* [0.001, 0.013], $t(184) = 2.22$, $p = .03$. That is, the relationship between perception of positive interdependence and the use of distributive style was moderated by group order. More specifically, there was an effect of perception of positive interdependence on the use of distributive style in the outgroup negotiations if they negotiated with outgroup members first ($b = -0.017$, $t(184) = -3.16$, $p \leq .01$). We also found a main effect of horizontal individualism ($b = -0.127$, 95% *CI* [0.049, 0.205], $t(184) = -3.20$, $p \leq .01$), meaning that the higher the individuals scored on the horizontal individualism Scale the less they would use the distributive style.

Discussion

Discussing the main results

The present study tested the moderating effects of and Cultural context, more specifically Individualism-Collectivism (IND-COL), on the relation between Interdependence and the conflict resolution style adopted by negotiators in negotiations with ingroup members and outgroup members. We predicted that the higher the perception of positive interdependence the more integrative the negotiation behavior (Hypothesis 1). Introducing the variable culture (IND-COL) to our predictions, we postulated that the salience of the negotiator's individualistic culture would amplify the positive effect of interdependence on integrative as compared to distributive negotiation behavior (Hypothesis 2), and that the salience of the negotiator's collectivistic culture will increase attention to group belonging. Thus, it should moderate the effect of interdependence, leading to more integrative as compared to distributive choices to the ingroup than to the outgroup (Hypothesis 3).

These hypotheses were tested in an experimental scenario study in the context of an imagined organizational merger. Data was collected via an electronic questionnaire (using Qualtrics, Provo, UT). The participants received either an individualistic or collectivistic priming manipulation, randomly. Following the priming, they were asked to imagine that they were employees of an organization (ACME or BOLT), receiving information about the merger in form of an official letter from the management. This letter contained an experimental manipulation of interdependence with the negotiation partners. Half of the participants were allocated randomly to a condition of positive interdependence, the other half to a control condition. All participants had to go through two different negotiations about two different topics, where each participant had to negotiate in one scenario with an ingroup member (employee of the same organization) and in the other scenario with an outgroup member (employee of the other organization in the merger), in a random order. Participants read about what their preferences were in the negotiation before beginning to negotiate. In the negotiations, participants communicated to the negotiation partner via chat by choosing between pre-prepared messages. The computer-simulated negotiation partner responded with pre-prepared messages, and the participants could choose again between pre-prepared messages. The negotiations went on for several rounds and the number of choices that corresponded with an integrative negotiation style served as behavioural measure of integrative behavior. After finishing both negotiations, participants filled in a scale for each of

the negotiations measuring self-reports on their negotiation behaviour during the two negotiations (DUTCH measure). Then they had a section with the manipulation checks and, the last section included demographic questions and three questions to assess if participants recalled which was their ingroup and with whom they had the first and second negotiation.

When analyzing the effects of positive interdependence on conflict handling style of choice with the moderation by IND-COL and target group (ingroup vs. outgroup) our results were mixed. Our analyses, both with the behavioral measure and the DUTCH, provided some partial support to Hypothesis one. Our analysis of experimental results with the behavioral measure and the DUTCH, and with or without the controls and covariates, did not generate significant results to support this hypothesis. The impact of perception of interdependence in the participants may be discussed in the light of the manipulation check results, which indicated that the interdependence manipulation was successful. The quote used to manipulate positive interdependence was used for the first time in this study and therefore there is the possibility that the quote was not priming what we desired, which could explain our unsuccessful manipulation. When testing Hypothesis one with measured independent variables instead of the experimental manipulation we attained support both when the DUTCH (integrative and distributive) or behavioral measures were used. The analyses indicated a positive effect of positive interdependence on integrative style and choices, respectively, when negotiating with the ingroup independently of the salient culture. The same did not happen when the negotiation was with an outgroup member. When the target was an outgroup member the hypothesis was only supported when the dependent measure was the DUTCH for distributive style (i.e., less distributive negotiation style when perceived interdependence was high) and the individuals' salient culture was either collectivism or vertical individualism.

Our main analyses provided mixed results regarding Hypothesis Two. This is, even though the analysis with the behavioral measure showed some (not significant) tendencies that corroborated hypothesis two, the same did not happen for when the analysis was done with the DUTCH for integrative style as a dependent variable. Once again, it is important to note that these analyses were done based on our manipulations which were not successful. Our priming of IND-COL seems to have not worked as well, even though the used method (similarities versus differences prime) has been successfully used to prime culture-related self-construal for the last two decades, with a well-established effect size (Oyserman and Lee,

2008). Nonetheless, the results with the measured independent variables where did not offer much support to this hypothesis either, once we only had a positive effect of perception of positive Interdependence for higher levels of Horizontal Individualism measured with the behavioral measure in negotiations with the outgroup member.

At last, there was no support for Hypothesis three, based on our main analyses. We did not find a three-way interaction between IND-COL, interdependence and target group when analyzing the experimental results. Moreover, the separate analyses for ingroup negotiations and outgroup negotiations with the measured independent variables did also not correspond with the pattern predicted by Hypothesis three. We would have expected that that individuals whose collectivism was salient would make more integrative choices (or less distributive) when negotiating with the ingroup than with the outgroup. Instead, we found that with the behavioral measure this interaction between collectivism, positive interdependence and ingroup or outgroup partner was not there. With the DUTCH for integrative style when negotiating with the ingroup we found the pattern predicted by Hypothesis three with the effect of positive Interdependence being moderated by lower levels of collectivism. When negotiating with the outgroup the interaction was not significant. We also found the desired pattern with the DUTCH for distributive style, again, when negotiating with an ingroup member, but with the exception that the perception of positive Interdependence mattered more for higher levels of collectivism which is the opposite of what we expected according to our predictions.

We can conclude that, although our hypotheses were not strongly supported, there is a tendency pointing in that direction. According to our knowledge, no study has previously addressed how the impact of perception of positive interdependence on the negotiation behavior is influenced by culture and group membership of the target (IG or OG). While we did not find support for our hypotheses, our results do not allow to falsify our proposed hypotheses on the interaction between perception of positive interdependence, cultural context and group membership of the negotiation partner, which were derived from theory and previous results. Therefore, this combination of factors should be further studied.

Study limitations

The present study has some limitations that should be taken into consideration when discussing our findings. Our second limitation, which is related to the questionnaire being extensive, which is probably one of the reasons for the high number of dropouts (more than 50%) before finishing the behavioral measure. Data reliability can be influenced by this factor if the respondents lose their concentration or interest before finishing the questionnaire (Lefever, Dal & Matthíasdóttir, 2007). It was also possible to observe that 112 participants took more than 30 minutes to finish the survey thus, their responses may have not been as spontaneous as desired.

Another important limitation of our study is the fact that our manipulations of interdependence and IND-COL were not successful, nonetheless, this can be a repercussion of having the manipulation checks to far from the manipulations themselves, thus the effect of such manipulation may have run out by then. Another problem may be that when survey experiments have participants respond from far-off, unobservable locations, it is impossible to know for certain if subjects were even exposed to the treatment, let alone whether they were affected in the way the investigator intended. They may not pay as much attention to treatments administered online as they would in a lab, treatments can easily fail. Also, although we considered that our manipulation of group membership and target group order was effective, the values we obtained for participants recall of their own and the negotiation partners' group membership were close to 50%. This may indicate that the participants were guessing instead of really recalling.

Negotiation is a communication-based method to solve conflict, and all behavior – including speech, tone of voice, silence, withdrawal, immobility or denial – is communication (Øien, Steighaug, Iversen & Råheim, 2011). Our behavioral measure did not include this kind of processes involved in communication, leaving some of the options open to the individuals own interpretation. For instance, when the individuals were to choose their reply, they were to base it only on the sentence, absent of tone of voice indications or gesticulation. For example, negotiators may rely more heavily on distributive tactics once lack of social cues in e-mail causes people to be more direct and confrontational in their communications (Kiesler and Sproull, 1992). We also found some unexpected effects of the name of the ingroup and theme of the negotiation. About the effect of ingroup name, this can be associated to the fact that most of the participants in our sample was directly or indirectly associated with sports,

specifically athletics, where the name Bolt is very meaningful. Bolt is the surname of the fastest runner of all time, which can also activate feelings such as competitiveness, or perception of having higher status. We had some participants mentioning they were sad not to be in the company named BOLT. The unexpected effect of some of the options open to the individuals own interpretation.

Most of the limitations we had in this study could have been avoided by having a live, face to face, negotiation. This did not happen because it was not viable within our time frame once we needed a high number of participants. By having a face to face negotiation, the distinction of ingroup and outgroup could have been much more explicit as well as the perception of interdependence and the manipulation of IND-COL and could also have accessed the full range of behavioral choices made by participants. If we were to redo this study with participants negotiating with real people, we would have participants sitting on a arranged scenario where they would have name holders identifying them as representatives of company “X” or “Y”. When negotiating with the ingroup they would both have a name holder saying the same thing, while when negotiating with the out-group if the individual belonged to company “X” the other negotiator would belong to company “Y” and vice-versa. This way, negotiators would have a constant reminder of whom they were negotiating with.

Also, the perception of positive interdependence would be made salient in instructions telling them that they would later have this person as a co-worker and if they reached a satisfactory agreement for both they would both have a salary raise. For the manipulation of IND-COL we would have used two priming methods, we would stick to delivering the Similarities and Differences between Family and Friends (SDFF) task in a brochure, but we would also use a group instantiation procedure adapted from Wenzel (2002) where for collectivism (individualism) individuals would sat around the same (separate) table. Finally, to avoid the unwanted effect of theme of the negotiation we would opt to have only one negotiation and for the effect of name of the ingroup we could choose to use meaningless acronyms.

Implications for research and practice

If our hypotheses were true, this would have implications in terms of how negotiations should be prepared depending not only on who the negotiation partner is which are the settings of such negotiation. The hypothetical truthfulness of our H1 shows how making it

salient that the individuals have a mutual future or the need of one another to succeed they will make more integrative, mutual problem-solving deals. H2 on its turn, would imply that making individuals that have their individualistic culture more salient aware of a mutual future or that they need the other (even if for a short-term) would make them prone to making deals that are more integrative independently of whom their negotiation partner is, an ingroup member or an outgroup one. This way, when trying to reach an agreement that is celebrated between people from different groups having people who are higher in individualism “on the room” would make it easier. Once our prediction for H3 implied a higher level of collectivism leading to paying attention to group membership over perception of positive interdependence, this would lead to individuals making more integrative choices for the ingroup than for the outgroup. This means that negotiations that involve people from different groups, and where collectivism was more salient integrative agreements would be harder to reach. When in this situation a solution would be to start the negotiation by finding a common ground and changing the “comparison lens”. Another solution could be to have a third party doing the actual negotiation.

Once our results do not allow us to be sure if our hypotheses are true or not, it is important to reflect also on which would be conclusions be if they were not true. Following Barbieri’s (2002) conclusions that the more interdependent the dyads, maybe that helps to reach a negotiated resolution but does not prevent the conflict or its escalation (this about international armed conflict). It may be relevant that future research on negotiation and interdependence should focus the nature of final agreement instead of the process of negotiation. It is also relevant to denote that, to our knowledge, the impact of situational social motives such as perception of positive interdependence on individuals with different believe systems and values (such as individuals from whose Collectivistic vs Individualistic cultures are more salient) has not been studied. It can be that in general, cultures with higher individualism, the tendency is to use less "problem solving approach", which are equivalent to integrative behaviors (e.g. Graham et al., 1994), and the opposite to collectivist cultures independently of negotiation partner. This perspective based on culture as shared values, collectivists should be less likely than individualists to perceive negotiation competitively, but this was not the focus of our study. We adopted a view of culture in context viewing culture as a mere component in a multifaceted negotiation system, allowing as to also see how the negotiators react to others.

Summing up, a perspective of culture in context seems a potentially valuable perspective for maximizing our comprehension of the intercultural and cross-cultural negotiations. This view is especially relevant in a world where intercultural contact is no longer limited to the international marketplace and becoming better global individuals depends a lot on a better understanding of our surroundings. At last, despite the limitations previously denoted, our study provides insight into the contextual effects of perception of interdependence, when moderated by culture and group membership on integrative negotiation. Based on these observations, we merit further research on communication behaviors associated with collectivism and individualism and the mechanism by which group membership and perception of positive interdependence leads to more integrative negotiations (or agreements) and how this further affects human behavior.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 – Letter to the employees (ACME & BOLT)



Caros colaboradores,

Com a recente fusão surgiu a necessidade de se criarem mais espaços de trabalho. Por essa razão, a nova empresa adquiriu um novo edifício com capacidade para todos os trabalhadores.

Esse edifício encontra-se no centro da cidade, está em boas condições e possui elevador com acesso a todos os pisos. Já existiam alguns espaços de trabalho no edifício mas, devido ao elevado número de funcionários, foi necessário construir outros novos. Será necessário alocar os espaços entre colaboradores, de modo a que se alcance a distribuição de espaço mais eficiente. Assim sendo, e com o intuito de garantir que há a melhor distribuição de espaço, vimos por este meio convocar a vossa participação nas negociações para os espaços de trabalho. Por fim, estas negociações serão feitas através de uma plataforma online.

As opções disponíveis são:

1) Os escritórios nos pisos 1 e 2 - não têm janela ou impressora e o computador é antigo (aproximadamente 7 anos). As secretárias, no entanto, são maiores e a sala ainda dispõe de espaço de arrumação (uma estante e um armário).

2) Os escritórios nos pisos 4 e 5 - têm uma pequena janela e estão equipados com computadores novos e uma impressora. Por outro lado, a secretária é mais pequena e a sala não possui espaço de arrumação.

Atentamente,

Direção da ACME

+351 271 546 634

acme.com



Caros colaboradores,

Com a recente fusão surgiu a necessidade de se criarem mais espaços de trabalho. Por essa razão, a nova empresa adquiriu um novo edifício com capacidade para todos os trabalhadores.

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2) Os escritórios nos pisos 4 e 5 - têm uma pequena janela e estão equipados com computadores novos e uma impressora. Por outro lado, a secretária é mais pequena e a sala não possui espaço de arrumação.

Atentamente,

Direção da BOLT

+351 271 546 634

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Appendix 2 - Introduction to the negotiations

1.

In the following negotiation, you should note your preferences.

- 1) You do not mind staying with the oldest office as long as you do not have to give away anything you have there;
- 2) You would like the newer computer.

Keep in mind that these negotiations will define the future allocation of jobs. Your answers will have an impact on the answers you get, and for that reason, there will be a short interval after you have chosen your answer and the other person's response.

2.

In the following negotiation, you should note your preferences.

- 1) The most important is to keep the office new because of the window
- 2) You would like to keep all equipment available in the office

Keep in mind that these negotiations will define the future allocation of jobs. Your answers will have an impact on the answers you get, and for that reason, there will be a short interval after you have chosen your answer and the other person's response.

Appendix 3 - Additional information on priming

When addressing the dimension of individualism-collectivism, a large amount of research uses Hofstede's ratings of country-level individualism (IND) rather than assessing IND directly or simply note that Hofstede found a difference between two countries and then use it as the basis of their assumptions that the two countries differ in that dimension and that their findings relate to this difference (Oyserman, Coon, & Kimmelmeier, 2002). Another typical approach is to use individualism-collectivism (IND-COL) scales which measures IND-COL at the individual level and to correlate this assessment with the individual's outcomes, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. An emerging alternative to the previous approaches, based in social cognition research, involves efforts to prime IND or collectivism (COL) values or independent-interdependent self-definitions before assessing their effect on a dependent measure. Following that line of reasoning, the environment in which one is can moderate the weight of the individualistic-collectivistic components. For example, team-work situations are likely to remind individuals of their interdependencies, making the collectivistic components more dominant (He, Sebanz, Sui & Humphreys, 2014). Higgins (1996) observed that, in the social psychology field, the priming process has been defined in terms of the facilitative effects of some events or actions on subsequent associated responses and how such events or actions influence the activation of stored knowledge (Molden, 2014). The influence of this priming is assumed to occur without individuals (a) awareness of this potential influence or (b) intention to utilize the activated representations during judgment or action (Loersch & Payne, 2014). In research, two types of priming manipulations are identified: The first type aims at making a participant's IND and COL values salient, and the second type aims at making a general IND or COL worldview salient (Oyserman et al., 2002). The first one can be, for example, once all individuals have collectivistic and individualistic components of self-construal they can be reinforced by just exposing individuals to the IND-COL scale thus making them aware of their own self prior to responding to the dependent variable, and control participants respond to the dependent variable prior to completing the IND-COL scale. The other one focuses on the fact that individualism or collectivism can be selectively primed by introducing individuals to individualistic or collectivistic scenarios (Oyserman & Lee, 2007).

Oyserman & Lee (2008) proposed that using priming techniques can, then, help to study between-society differences by temporarily focusing participants' attention on culture-relevant content (values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes), culture-relevant goals, and cultural-

relevant cognitive styles. The authors added that this line of reasoning enables the study of cultural influences by examining differences in judgments and behaviour when individualism is made accessible or salient compared to when collectivism is made accessible or salient. Nonetheless, it is important to note that although priming methods generally manipulate collectivism (both vertical (VC) and horizontal collectivism (HC), the VI component, as a measure of competition and desire to win may not be affected by simply activating a collectivistic/individualist mindset (Cozma, 2011). He and colleagues (2014) noted that their priming using the pronoun circling task (participants should circle pronouns in the stories. First-person singular pronouns (e.g., 'I', 'my') are used in the independent (individualism) priming condition and first-person plural pronouns (e.g., 'we', 'our') addressed collectivism (the combination of HC and VC) and HI but may not have succeeded in manipulating VI. Consistent with this, prior studies have shown that HI and VI scores either do not correlate significantly or they may even correlate negatively (Oyserman et al., 2002).

Appendix 4- Similarities and differences task translated with adaptation

For individualism

Pense, durante 2 minutos, no que você tem de diferente da sua família e amigos.

O que espera de si próprio?

Por favor, registre algumas dessas diferenças.

For collectivism

Pense, durante 2 minutos, no que você tem em comum com a sua família e amigos.

O que os outros esperam de si?

Por favor, registre algumas dessas semelhanças numa frase.

Similarities and differences task – Original

“Think for two minutes, of what makes you different from your family and friends.

What do you expect yourself to do?”.

Please register some of those differences.”

“Think for two minutes, of what do you have in common with your family and friends.

What do they expect yourself to do?”

Please register some of those similarities.”

Appendix 5 -Negotiation task - example of the design

Por favor, arraste para a caixa a frase/item que melhor corresponde àquilo que quer dizer.

Itens	Item selecionado:
Olá. É um prazer. Podemos começar?	
Olá. Vamos lá começar.	

Resposta da outra pessoa:



10 secs later the response would appear

Olá, Ok