

REVIEW ARTICLE

Instrumentality Power: or Angola, A Regional Power in Crisis Growth

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Abstract

The small following text was targeted Angola as a regional power that has not yet been *hardpower* can no longer be regarded as *softpower* in the African context in general and regional center-southern Africa in particular. For this reason we tried to develop a new theory that suits Angolan characteristics and its projection in the African context and how important vertex in political-military relations in sub-Saharan Africa.

Keywords: Africa, Angola, Instrumentality power, Regional power.

Introduction

According to political scientists and analysts of international relations, a state characterized as a latent power (local, regional or global) and provided that it has certain specific characteristics. For some it is sufficient that the country demonstrates its power and influence that allows you to enjoy a certain control over your geographic region. For such a regional power can be considered as a shareable medium because, according to them, all hypothetical regional powers will hold another position in the hierarchy of power in the region where they are located.

In my essay "Angola, Regional Emergency Power-Angola, *Potência Regional em Emergência*" [1], I define a typical potential status as a state with the capacity to influence, an organizational form, political, ideological, economic, militarily and technologically, or by a combination of some or all these values, a particular geographic region where it is located or where you can reflect.

Angola projecting some of these capabilities, namely, political, economic and military capability and, in some cases, a mix of ideological organization. And it does so in a way that sometimes goes beyond the "friendliness" (or *soft power*) without trace limits undesirably appear as "leonine" (or *hard power*); will be close-but exceeding -the concept of *middle power*.

A Concept Situated between Middle Power and Hardpower: the Instrumentality Power

Briefly, the modern political science, created by Joseph Nye and defended by Calcagnoto [2] with others, defines that there are two types of reference and powers of the potential predominance: those powers with global or overriding characteristics (*hardpower* – capacity holder of the power to impose their will

through the use of threat or force, even armed) and those that are determined to influence specific and moderately certain geographical areas (*softpower* – i.e. serve its power of conviction and the will of attraction others).

Sign up in the latter case, the power can serve, for example, according to the ideas of sociologist Norman Long [3,4], the "discursive interfaces, organizational, legal and related to material resources."

In any case, the powers that uses the latter strategic power (*softpower*), some further subdivided by intermediate emerging recognized by (*middlepowers*) or regional powers.

If this is true, confirmed by numerous experts in strategy and international relations, the fact remains that, given the recent developments and the emergence of new geographical powers, we can begin to question whether it should not create new parameters for the new regional powers or pre- globals!

Was thinking about it, and basing myself in case increasingly evident in Angola and the natural and foreseeable developments with possible qualitative changes in its potential, recognized procedure more than once, by its neighbours and the global powerhouse that is the USA-even recently one of its assistant secretary of state for Africa this current U.S. position – I adopted a new parameter that define the "*instrumentality power*" (originally, the term that I used as qualification was "*parentalpower*").

In general one can interpret it as an interim emerging regional power, but able to project their importance and potentially the deciding capacity in regions that do not necessarily, are nearby, where similar interests predominate.

But this capacity, as opposed to formatted and transmitted by Nye are not characterized by an ability

to impose its will through the use of threat or force, either convinced or suggestive manner, whether by way of armed threat, but only a so call it patronizing and placating. Hence, initially, the he termed the "parentalpower".

That is, looking at potential "subordinate states" that while not caring about how they behaved within their reference skills, determined by "discreet" Angolan politics would not allow certain qualifying deviations thereof.

Those subordinates States showed being mere instruments of active and clear pre-expansory policy Angola are among those considered in its orbit: hence in the end to adopt the term "instrumentality power".

One should not forget that, contrary to the policy provisions of the African Union, Angola is part simultaneously in two African regional organizations- the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)- as well as two political-military organizations related to the Atlantic Ocean (Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) and the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS/ZPCAS)) and the International Committee of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR); – please note that Angola presides currently the GGC and the ICGLR.

Now, the Angolan politics has shown that capacity projection in two neighbouring states not directly, although one, in a region it considers to be its sphere of influence, and another in a substantially outer zone, but whose importance is evaluated by the linguistic and political correspondence; both states Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking – the CPLP or Community of Portuguese Language Countries). Were – are – cases of Sao Tome and Principe (STP) in the first case, and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. As was also – and still is-in truth Cote d'Ivoire and, although less impact over the two neighbouring Congos (Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo) without forgetting that Namibia feels more need to embrace the hat Angolan *umbrella* of that of the Republic of South Africa.

Moreover, Angola has active participation in military exercises either in Portuguese speaking area or within the African union, and, along with Mozambique and South Africa, one of the leading purveyors of the 5th African Brigade, established in Gaborone, Botswana.

And in the case of Sao Tome and Principe, Angola's political firsts has shown over the other potential state in the region, Nigeria, as in the case of Guinea-Bissau,

as well as had already happened in Cote d'Ivoire, its discrete and incisive impedance was undermined by *Coup d'Etat* occurred there in April 2012.

In both cases the predominant Angolan political and military supremacy – even at the request of local political leaders – was, directly or indirectly, for any reason want Scams or subsequent disputes.

The two recent political excesses in projection, first with the Cote d'Ivoire crisis after the elections, and with the recent MISSANG (*Angolan military mission in Guinea-Bissau*), showed that Angola still has a long way to go to get the state its potential importance outside their logical zone: the Central and Southern Africa [5-14].

Conclusion

A crisis of growth of "instrumentalization power" of Angola? Maybe! Let's see how the strategy of Angolan power will overcome these recent setbacks and get back to impose their will on Guinea-Bissau, even through the UN and the CPLP and somehow, although without the necessary support of Nigeria, through the Economic Development Community of West African States (ECOWAS), through the African Union.

The recent elections in Guinea-Bissau went back to give the majority power to the sister party of institutionalized power in Angola; as well as the presidency. Everything will depend on the military power that caused the Coup and returned to accept the return of civilians to Guinea-Bissau power. Why were these same military who feared the Angolan authorities in Guinea-Bissau and the possibility of ending them with the perks they enjoyed, particularly those who were linked to drug trafficking – and that led to the arrest on the high seas of the former Chief of Staff Navy, Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto, by U.S. Marines¹ -as well as the political and military influence in the region of Casamance, a region that seeks the secession of Senegal.

But do not forget that Brazil first, Portugal and then also want to be in the case of within the CPLP, typical exploitative powers, plus Brazil to Portugal, with characteristics of "instrumentality power" and the continent emerge as complementary of Angola, though – and Brazil is already a BRICS²-seeking greater influence in the continent.

¹ See "DEA: *Ligações fatais* (DEA: Fatal Links) in Ditadura do Consenso blog (2013).

² Emerging middle powers which include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa; according to Richard Haass (it was a top aide to G. W. Bush for International Relations and is president of the Council on Foreign Relations), supported by other authors, considers India and China as well as Russia – that country, since the beginning that is no longer being considered as BRIC (the "R" is for Republic of South Africa, not adding "S") – as belonging to Global Powers that are still part of the USA, the European Union and Japan; cf. CALCAGNOTO (2008).

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