



Political Science and Public Policy Department

The Rise of New Parties and the Eurozone Crisis:
Political Novelties in the eye of Recession

Mariana Calheiros Lima de Sousa

Dissertation submitted as partial requirement for obtaining the
Master of Arts degree in Political Science

Supervisor
Doctor José Ramón Montero Gibert, Cathedritic Professor in Political Science,
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Co-Supervisor
Doctor André Freire, Associate Professor in Political Science,
ISCTE – University Institute of Lisbon

[September, 2017]

Acknowledgements

A person's work is never her's alone. To the writing of this paper many played a part, either through direct contributions embodying technical and scientific input and guidance, or by their emotional support so much needed in this endeavour. I would like to thank fullheartedly Prof. Montero for his patience and constant guidance, who, though at a distance, was always present and Professor Freire for giving me important guidance in Design research and polishing some structural imaturities of my project. I would also like to thank my parents for sharing this rode with me, step by step. To Pedro and Ana who have kept encouraging me to push forth when hope failed me and for believing in me every step of the way. Finally, I would like to thank and to dedicate this effort to my grandmother, who could not wait – she was my driving force and the biggest mentor I could have ever had.

Abstract

The economic crisis of 2008 that hit the Western world sent developed economies into an unexpected and steep descent that translated into a general loss in competitiveness of these economies and placed European and American markets on the verge of collapse.

It did not take long before the political context started mirroring the uncertainty of the markets. With the intervention of EU-granted aid, some EU countries applied austerity packages – much to the discontentment of lenders and debtors alike. The first channel of political expression to reflect such discontentment were elections – not only were incumbents punished at the ballot, but that was also done to the benefit of new social movements and new political parties forming at the time. This phenomenon raised alarms in the media and political cores, as these new parties had either a much more extreme political stance or mobilized entirely new issues. New parties capitalized on new issues and also on the recent low in government popularity rates. The socioeconomic circumstances certainly played a part in this success, thus, it is fundamental to understand which conditions contribute to the success of new parties during economic hardship.

Keywords: New parties, European Union, Financial crisis, electoral success.

Sumário

A crise económica de 2008 que atingiu o mundo ocidental conduziu as economias desenvolvidas numa trajetória descendente que se traduziu na redução da competitividade destas economias e colocou os mercados Europeu e Americano perto do colapso. Não demorou muito até que o contexto político começasse a espelhar esta incerteza dos mercados. Através da intervenção de apoios subsidiados pela UE, alguns países aplicaram pacotes de austeridade – para descontentamento tanto de credores como dos devedores. O primeiro canal de expressão política a refletir este descontentamento foram as eleições – nelas, não só os governos foram punidos com reduzidas margens de voto, mas sobretudo os movimentos sociais e os novos partidos beneficiaram desse descontentamento. Este fenómeno ativou vários alarmes nos media e na esfera política, uma vez que estes novos partidos ou detinham uma ideologia mais extremada ou mobilizavam questões inteiramente novas na agenda política. Os novos partidos beneficiaram assim da colocação destas novas questões e da recente quebra nas taxas de popularidade dos governos. As condições socioeconómicas desempenharam um papel importante no sucesso de novos partidos e, por este motivo, é fundamental entender quais as circunstâncias que contribuem para o sucesso eleitoral de novos partidos durante períodos de recessão económica.

Palavras-chave: Novos partidos, União Europeia, crise financeira, sucesso eleitoral.

Index

| | |
|--|-----|
| Index of Figures and Tables..... | VI |
| Glossary..... | VII |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| CHAPTER I – Theory | 3 |
| 1.1 Establishing the Problem..... | 3 |
| 1.2 Contributions to the field and Relevance of the topic..... | 4 |
| 1.3 Research Question and Objectives..... | 6 |
| 1.4 State of the Art | 7 |
| 1.4.1 The political impact of the economic crisis..... | 7 |
| 1.4.2 New party theory | 8 |
| 1.4.2.1 New Party formation and electoral success – fundamental differences..... | 10 |
| 1.4.2.1.1 Factors explaining new party success - drawing on Harmel’s teachings..... | 12 |
| 1.4.2.2 The Financial crisis and socioeconomic determinants of new party success..... | 12 |
| 1.4.2.3 The Political Opportunity Structure (POS): Traditional parties as political facilitators to the emergence of new political alternatives..... | 13 |
| 1.4.2.4 New social trends foster development of new parties and reduce party loyalties..... | 15 |
| 1.4.3 The Economic and Financial crisis of 2008..... | 16 |
| 1.4.3.1 Mapping social and policy impacts of the crisis..... | 17 |
| 1.5 The Study model – a framework for analysis | 18 |
| 1.5.1 Concepts and Operationalization..... | 18 |
| 1.5.1.1 Defining ‘New party’ | 18 |
| 1.5.1.2 Concept of new party..... | 19 |
| 1.5.1.3 Public Debt..... | 20 |
| 1.5.1.4 GDP annual growth | 20 |
| 1.5.1.5 Inflation rate..... | 21 |
| 1.5.1.6 Unemployment rate..... | 21 |
| 1.5.1.7 Bailout Programs..... | 22 |
| 1.5.2 Hypothesis and Variables..... | 22 |
| 1.5.2.1 Variables..... | 22 |
| 1.5.2.2 The socio-economic Variable – conditions and impact on parties | 23 |
| 1.5.2.3 Hypothesis..... | 24 |
| CHAPTER II – METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY..... | 25 |
| 2.1 Research Structure and Main Sources..... | 26 |

| | |
|--|------|
| 2.2 Case Selection and Time Span..... | 27 |
| CHAPTER III – RESULT DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS | 28 |
| 3.1 Exploring the data | 28 |
| 3.2 Main take-outs of the test..... | 29 |
| CONCLUSION..... | 30 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY..... | 32 |
| SOURCES..... | 37 |
| ANNEX..... | I |
| Anexx A – Binary Logistic Regression assumptions..... | I |
| Linear Regression – Independence of the Variables..... | I |
| Annex B – Binary Logistic Regression..... | II |
| Annex C – Frequencies..... | VI |
| General Statistics and Descriptive..... | VI |
| Annex D - Graphs..... | VIII |
| CURRICULUM VITAE..... | X |

Index of Figures and Tables

Figure 1 | % variation GDP anual growth EU15 2005-2016

Table 1 | Electoral Success: Determinant Factors (logistic regression)

Glossary

AAA-PBP *Anti-austerity Alliance – People Before Profit*

CPI *Consumer Price Index*

EC *European Commission*

ECB *European Central Bank*

EEA *European Economic Area*

ESA95 *European system of national and regional accounts*

EU *European Union*

EUM *European Monetary Union*

FN *Front National*

HICP *Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices*

IMF *International Monetary Fund*

M5S *Movimento 5 Stelle*

TEU *Treaty of the European Union*

USSR *Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics*

INTRODUCTION

Though conveying a very generic image of the current project, the title of this work benchmarks the main focus of its content: to develop an insight into the political consequences of the Great Recession, namely by means of analysing new parties formed in the process - the political novelties - that have seen first light after or during the Great Recession lived in Europe in the past years. "In the political realm, the economic crisis may gain expression through three different channels: election, protest and interests." (Morlino & Raniolo, 2017). This is, thus, a study of the survivors, those new parties that actually made it into national parliament for the first time after they were created. This phenomenon is one that picks up on every channel of expression of an economic crisis: these new parties emerge by inflicting significant losses in incumbent parties' popularity and attaining significant vote shares (elections), they are also a reaction to current politics, as they stand for new solutions, but also against the traditional responses of mainstream parties to the aggravation of the crisis (protest) and finally, they stand for new issues which are affecting and concerning the electorate and are able to accurately respond to the interests of the voters (interests).

The core of this assignment is precisely to understand how financial downturn places emerging new parties as the new bulk of discussion in politics and economics in Europe. Though the rise of new parties - in several accessions, structures and affinities - is not entirely a new phenomenon, it is nevertheless all the more interesting to study it at this point in time, as the rise of new parties helps explain social and political reactions to current instability. "The role of the new parties is relevant not only because they transfused fresh blood into the party system, providing new channels of expression always in the party realm" (Ignazi, 1996:553). Thus, this study encompasses a data set of all parties entering parliament for the first time in the stabilized Western democracies of the EU from 2001 to 2016.

We will attempt to provide an answer to the question on the salience of socioeconomic variables in explaining electoral success of new parties from 2001 to 2016 – encompassing what could be perceived as a pre-crisis period (2001-2008) and a crisis period (2009-2016). This division between a pre-crisis and a crisis period is provided by the analysis of economic indicators that show for a negative financial trend starting from 2009 – Figure 1 shows how GDP annual growth, for instance, has dropped steeply in all the countries under analysis in this study in the year of 2009, which helped us mark this year as the start of a new trend and to benchmark it as the beginning of the economic downfall of the years that follow.

This analysis will include several definitions that are detrimental to outlining the stream of this study: what do we consider here a new party? What makes a party be labeled as new? Do we consider a new party one that has simply formed under this terminology and is registered as such, or one that has benefitted from some degree of success among voters and reached credibility in the public sphere so as to gain seats in the national parliament?

When deciding on how to define ‘new party’, one must outline the very scope of the ‘novelty’ factor – do we refer to the rise of new parties (appearance) or electoral success? Which factors could account for their emergence and success, and why? And how do we perceive the impact of the crisis on changes to the party systems?

We will also turn to the analysis of the literature on both new parties and the economic crisis, in order to inform and add to our inputs and provide a solid background for our conclusions.

Generically, the literature points towards a much more relevant role of institutional and political factors influencing the success of new parties and to a small or even marginal contribution of socioeconomic factors in explaining this phenomenon. We wish to verify whether this conclusion still holds for the time under appreciation in this study and to determine whether socioeconomic factors do not account for a much more significant part of the explanatory model during the crisis period, since this point in time was marked by much more salience of economic and social issues on the agenda and has brought more segments of the electorate into the debate, as the crisis greatly affected voters all across Europe.

In fact, discontentment and disillusionment with current solutions to the crisis adopted by incumbent governments led to a politicization of more segments of society that had withdrawn from the political debate years ago and are now being alerted for the importance of their participation in the public sphere and in elections. In this sense, political consequences of the Great Recession could be considered as more positive, as they brought some numbed segments of the public into the political debate again. New parties emerging at this time could be somehow a consequence of greater awareness and of the need for more engagement from civil society, by bringing new issues into the debate. This is why we witnessed the emergence of many citizen movements that had a very important role in setting new issues up for debate in the policy agenda.

Contributing to this aggravation of public opinion, it was not only the deteriorating conditions of the economy that played a part. In fact, often times it was the response provided by governments that led to discontentment, by introducing a financial straightjacket upon lenders and debtors alike. Thus, it was not so much the problem, but the solution presented that unearthed general dismay with governments and the EU institutions and provided ground for new parties to flourish. In Bermeo and Bartels words: “dramatic political reactions to the Great Recession were associated less with the direct economic repercussions of the crisis than with government initiatives to cope with these repercussions”. (Bermeo and Bartels, 2014: 4)

These comments and many questions strive for an answer and a settlement, which we will attempt to provide in this study. At times, it might have been hard to come up with strict and linear definitions, straightforward answers and to limit the phenomenon in time and space, while other times it was rather enlightening to realize the importance of some socioeconomic indicators in shaping the political landscape of a crisis-ridden Europe.

CHAPTER I – THEORY

1.1 Establishing the problem

This study aims to address what Morlino and Raniolo (2017) call the catalyst effect of the economic crisis – a crisis that emerged after another, only to extend and aggravate it: “the previous crisis of traditional parties was accelerated by the crisis, which deepened the deligitimation of existing actors and paved the way for new political actors.”

The present dissertation aims at establishing a relation between new party entrance in Parliament and how the socioeconomic circumstances - as those shaping the economic crisis in Europe - can alter party systems and contribute to the electoral success of new parties. It is important that the literature fills the gap still existing on new parties’ research and that an holistic and comprehensive approach to new party entrance is developed – one that is not just based in (i) case-studies or (ii) typified categories of parties; but that instead focuses on how a certain phenomenon can affect the steadiness of party systems in Western democracies and develop different new alternatives to mainstream politics.

It is my purpose to provide input for future systematic studies on new, niche, extremist and challenger or protest parties from the perspective of their appearance in the party realm. To this end, I will develop a more comprehensive approach to new party emergence and success, a topic that has been raised in the 1970s by many scholars of comparative politics, but that has not yet been given an all-encompassing response. It is, in fact, “the emprirical evidence as to what conditions mattered that was very much lacking” (Carter, 2012) when it came to new parties. Therefore, I will focus on what conditions are these dictating the success of new parties and whether or when socioeconomic factors such as GDP anual growth, inflation, unemployment or public debt are detrimental to the appearance of new political players. It is thus, with this aim in mind that my study focuses on the understanding of new party entrance in stabilized western democracies of Europe before, during and in the aftermath of the economic recession by focusing on the EU15 Member States for the period comprehended between 2001 and 2016.

As for the type of parties attaining success during the Great Recession, there will be no major considerations made on the subject in the scope of this study, as this provides subject for an entirely new research and could be potential material for further learning, though some recent studies have already advanced greatly on the rise of extremist parties and populism in Europe during the crisis. It is in fact true that I will not be focusing on the ideological blueprint or rootings of these parties, but rather on when in time do they first arise. Nonetheless, general considerations on this topic can provide for a more direct link between the economic recession and the types of parties that have succeded during this period. Generally, it is expected that modes of competition between parties become radicalized. However, this radicalization can take new and original paths. On the one hand, we will have parties setting strong anti-establishment positions, while others despite the fact that they

take up radicalized discourses, often hide more moderate policy positions than anticipated – this would be the case of the Spanish movements *Ciudadanos* and *Podemos*. (Morlino & Raniolo, 2017).

1.2 Contributions to the field and Relevance of the topic

“Mapping party novelty could help define periods of turmoil in the political system” (Litton, 2015:722)

First hand, it is important to understand why a financial crisis can have impact on the political sphere. In fact, it is widely acknowledged that ‘a democratic regime can be deeply affected by economic crisis.’ (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017:1). In the past, it was evident that serious economic and financial downturns could even lead to the breakdown of democracy or ‘*quasi-democratic*’ regimes, as was the case in Germany (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017) back in 1939 that led to the dismay of the Weimar Republic (Bartels, 2014). Even though it is not expected that such dramatic outcomes should result from an economic downturn this time around, as democracies in Western Europe are increasingly consolidated, the rise of populist and extremist parties has, at times, brought uncertainty to the political scenarios of many countries. However, even though the survival of this political regime is not at stake on broad terms, this does not mean that ‘radical, fundamental changes, as well as relatively moderate, partial transformations within democracies’ (Morlino & Raniolo, 2017:2) are discarded from this scenario. Very much to the contrary: democracy and its recent core values are increasingly endangered as economic recession puts pressure and strains on political dialogue across parties and divides civil society on how best to address the issue.

As for the lack of transversal cross-national analysis on new party success during the financial crisis of 2008, it should be noted that it is not to my knowledge that any study has been conducted on recent years on new parties across all the EU15, especially concerning the link between the financial crisis and the electoral success of newly formed parties. There are however, some case studies on the most prominent new parties that were formed or reached electoral success during the financial crisis – it is the case of *Podemos* in Spain and others in Greece, for instance. Thus, it was also my goal to fill in this void and try to address what I consider to be a possible, even though not the only, explanation for new party success over recent years.

It is relevant that this topic is picked up in this very moment in time, as it challenges the frozen party system theory of Lipset & Rokkan (1967) and also because party systems are now facing a metamorphosis that could significantly alter policy outcomes and mirror an underlying change in European political and social views.

As the circumstances of the European political and economic structures have suffered significant shake-ups, it seemed to me to be of the utmost relevance to understand how the new wave of parties formed all across Europe may have owed to the current acute recession any of its success.

However, one should bear in mind and be alerted to the possibility that the crisis may have not been so consequential as one might be tempted to believe. It is not safe to incur in an overstatement

of what the real impact of the economic recession might have been on party systems and the political abstract of Western politics in general, as some studies point to a relatively moderate response to the crisis from public opinion and individual voters. Bermeo and Bartels (2014) had anticipated a much more stringent scenario, but a collection of studies pointed towards a relatively downplayed reaction from civil society. In addition, Singer (2011) also claimed that voters do not care about economic performance as much as it is expected and that the salience of economic performance in voting decisions should be handled carefully.

In fact, many studies and public opinion surveys confirm that economic voting is not based exclusively on one's own individual financial state – that is, if the voters perceive that negative economic performance is generalized and the responsibility for that situation is diluted, then voters are not likely to hold their governments accountable. The economic recession that deflagrated in 2008 affected, to different degrees, all European countries and thus, at first, voters might have not perceived easily who was to blame. However, the adoption of austerity packages that had been endorsed by the governments in power gave them more ground to blame their incumbent governments for the faring off worse of their individual finances and those of their country. Thus, one concludes that when the responsibility for the economic performance is more easily attributed to one actor in the political scene, namely the government, voters tend to vote more based on that economic performance rather than when that responsibility was somewhat diluted. Singer (2011) also claims that at the individual level, the salience of economic performance rises with unemployment and economic vulnerability. The 2008 crisis was highly marked by great increases in unemployment rates in Europe: Greece's unemployment rose from a registered 9.6% in 2009 to a staggering 27.5% in 2013, while Portugal also struggled with higher unemployment rates and the difficulty to create jobs. Thus, we are once again given another reason to believe that socioeconomic factors may have played a role in determining the rise of new parties, as incumbents were being punished at the ballot. Nonetheless, Singer alerts to the need of what we also consider detrimental in this study: to assess the variation in the economy's salience in voting decisions by establishing a link between economic circumstances and political outcomes (Singer, 2011).

It is ultimately in Dahl's words that we find the purpose of this study – 'political parties shape a country's political landscape' (Dahl, 1998:130) and thus, the problem is established - it is precisely this changing landscape that should be explored now, as this work could potentially place the study of new parties as the new centre piece for future research endeavours in political science.

As a first reading for this study I used a very relevant and recent reference on party politics and new party theory – Niklas Bolin, a Swedish political scientist that has devoted its research to the study of party politics and the emergence of new and radical parties in Sweden. His work has provided me with the motto for this dissertation. It was his paper '*New party entrance – analysing the impact of political institutions*' (2007) that opened the gateway for me to understand in his and others's words that the lack of a comprehensive study on new party emergence was one that needed to be tackled. It is

my general goal that of the author's in his paper: 'to explain under what circumstances new parties enter the national parliament for the first time' (Bolin, 2007:1). Nonetheless, it is important to narrow down the scope of this study. As a result, I will differ from Bolin's analysis by focusing specifically on another traditional explanatory variable for the emergence of new parties – the socioeconomic conditions -, which Bolin also considers to be 'important explanations based on the interactions between the new party and the established parties' (Bolin, 2007:3), though not approaching them in his work. I will also differ from Bolin in the approach I will be adopting when looking at new parties – I will not concern myself here with the emergence of new parties itself, but rather focus on the moment they achieve electoral success and make an entrance in the national parliaments.

As a final note, I would like to reiterate that this paper does not in any event wish to represent an all-encompassing or universal paradigm. In fact, since electoral success of new parties is a complex and very changing issue and is to some extent not targeted in research as a main focus area, I will only concentrate on how the socioeconomic circumstances may alter the patterns of electoral success of emerging new parties verified until now.

The chapters that follow will thereof illustrate the reasons for such study, outline its pertinence and provide a clearer glance at new parties in established democracies in Europe, while also shedding some light upon the political and electoral consequences that an economic recession may bring upon the already established and stabilized party systems of Europe.

1.3 Research Question and Objectives

It is my goal to explore the contribution of the crisis to changes in the explanatory models of new party success.

I will analyze the success of new parties at a very specific point in time – the first elections for which they have run – thus, I am only interested in assessing the vote share and office placement data for the first momentum of their life. This first momentum refers to the first two elections in which the party has run. It is important not to look at just the first election, as many new parties have formed right before the first election they have run for and thus, this did not give them enough time nor room to define and disseminate their political agenda and attract voters – it is often the case that in a first election new parties fail to attain seats in parliament, only due to their institutional newness and not because their political agenda was not appealing enough to voters. This is confirmed by the fact that in a second election these parties normally manage to enter parliament, save for some exceptions.

I will be looking at parties from the demand perspective (the voters) and not from a supply side (the parties) of the question. This is to say that I will not be focusing on the dynamics of party competition itself, but rather on how available voters are to seek for new political options in the party realm.

Very much in line with Niklas Bolin (2014), and contrary to what many studies on new parties have to offer, ‘this study does not focus on individual party families. Instead, general applicable explanations are sought’ (Bolin, 2014: 5).

Therefore, our research question focuses specifically on the following: To what extent do socioeconomic factors influence electoral success of new parties in a context of crisis?

As for our objectives, they are equally as linear: (i) to better understand the political consequences of economic hardship; (ii) to assess how western stabilized party systems can change in face of a very exceptional and particular context; (iii) to understand how new parties are symptomatic of those changes and, last but not least, (iv) which specific economic indicators actually do explain the success of new parties.

1.4 State of the Art – a framework for analysis

1.4.1 The political impact of the economic crisis

When looking at new party success, one must start off by understanding how and why an economic context can have an impact in the political sphere, and on party systems in particular. To establish the political consequences of the economic recession is a very important step towards explaining why new parties are expected to fare off better at the polls in times of economic hardship. However, it is not an easy process to understand how both the political and economic spheres interlink and intertwine over this period of time.

In our attempt, it was fundamental to (i) first establish the contours of the economic Recession and parallel and compare them with those that shaped previous crises; (ii) to outline the main features of this crisis; (iii) to understand how economic issues become dominant for voters under economic recession (cf. Singer, 2011 *apud* Morlino & Raniolo, 2017: 2); (iv) how incumbent parties were punished during the economic crisis (cf. Kriesi, 2014, *apud* Morlino & Raniolo, 2017:3); and last, but not the least, (v) the impact of the economic crisis on parties (Bosco and Verney, 2012, *apud* Morlino & Raniolo, 2017: 3).

During previous situations where economic downturn demanded urgent answers, several transformations were noticed in democratic systems – either through their dissolution or the entire reshaping of the system and the very concept of democracy itself. Democracy was not yet a paradigm and the solidity of its structures were questionable. Examples of this are provided by Morlino & Raniolo (2017) in their economic revision of previous similar contexts:

- a) ‘the New Deal in the US and the integration of Northern European Socialist parties in the 30s’;

- b) Germany of the 30s' and 40s' and many other countries across Europe witnessed the rise of authoritarianism or even totalitarianism after the Great Depression of the 30s' hit European economies;
- c) The widespread reforms in social welfare in some European Countries with the introduction of the Welfare State in the period after World War II;
- d) Development of neo-corporatist arrangements, complemented by policies of market deregulation and privatization in the 70s', after the Oil crisis hit democratic nations.'

These aspects show for a political context where democracy was still stabilizing its standing as the political paradigm of the 20th and 21st century. This was the case for the Great Depression of the 30's, as well as that of the Long Recession – 'the prolonged period of economic stagnation that much of the developed world experienced in the 1970s' and early 1980s' (Bermeo & Bartels, 2014:7).

However, it becomes clear that when talking about the economic crisis that started in 2008 in Europe, we are talking of a very different political context where the prevalence of democracy is no longer at stake. So the question that should be asked is: How can we analyse the political impact of the new 2008 economic crisis within a new political cultural context? (Morlino & Raniolo, 2017).

In fact, the crisis deeply affected the Welfare state in a specific group of countries, such as South Europe (Petmesidou and Guillén 2014) and even Bartels begins by acknowledging that incumbent parties have suffered losses – however, it is also Bartels that states that reactions to and the impact of the crisis were relatively reduced. In a socio-economic analysis of the phenomenon, Kahler and Lake (2013) claim that such a negative impact showed few signs. (Morlino & Raniolo, 2017)

Thus, even though historical perspectives suggest that there is reason to believe that economic downturn will substantially reshape and change democracy and politics, the present political context shows that there is little opportunity for change because these changes lack the legitimation of democracy, which is at this stage, the only viable alternative. (Retrieved from Morlino & Raniolo, 2017)

1.4.2 New party theory

Literature on new parties has always been based on three kinds of approaches: either by focusing on (1) case-studies, which cover the majority of studies in this area of comparative politics, (2) new parties by type and ideology as is the case of the studies on post-materialist ecologist parties and the recent trend on populist parties and, last but not least, (3) systemic cross-national electoral analyses of new party success and new party formation. The latter have been much less frequent and made their debut with the works produced by Hauss and Rayside (1978) and Harmel and Robertson (1985).

In addition, many inputs and studies on new parties start from the very first analyses on parties and party systems conducted by Maurice Duverger with his seminal work *Les partis politiques*'(1951)

and the contributions of Joseph LaPalombara and Weiner with their work on *Political parties and political development* (1966). In addition, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) are often cited on party theory, as they have introduced the concept of cleavage politics – a concept that basis any major political change in party systems as a consequence of changes and alterations in social cleavages. As according to the frozen party system theory of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), there would only be enough reason for new parties to form if there would be any new cleavages arising in that specific party system. Since it was generically conceived that western party systems have not, in recent times, witnessed the rise of any particular cleavage adding to those that already existed, the authors classify transformations on western party systems as *frozen* – hence the term ‘frozen party system’ commonly used in many papers on party system theory.

Harmel and Robertson (1985) base their analysis of both new party formation and electoral success on three categories of independent variables: social, political and structural. The authors already drive attention to the need to distinguish between new party formation and electoral success of new parties, as many other authors do, and claim that the lack or inexistence of facilitators to attain electoral success, does not undermine the process of emergence and formation of new parties. The authors start off from the assumption that new parties form in order to ‘*fill representational needs of society*’ – a premissa that we believe to be true for the crisis period, since economic hardship and mainstream party response to the crisis called for more solutions to arise - and that more parties should be formed in countries that are marked by different social and cultural demands and that encompass great social diversity and segmentation.

In fact, many countries where sectionalism and division (be it political, institutional or cultural/ethnic) do show for a plurality of parties in their party systems, as they normally stand for very specific positions and political stances and are aimed at responding to the specific needs of a certain electorate. This is the case of highly fragmented systems with strict regional divides, like Belgium, for instance. Some Eastern and Balkan countries also show for the same plurality of parties due to their ethnic and cultural diversity. In addition to this social and cultural diversity, the authors also point towards big economic gaps and economic inequality as one issue that also contributes to the rise of new parties that will attempt to reduce this gap.

In sum, entrance of new parties is often times a sign of low institutionalization or of very recent democracies that still have very fluid and dynamic party systems – that would be the case of Eastern and Balkan countries. Adding to cultural differences within these countries, they are still very fresh out of a Communist system. Barnea and Rahat (2010) thus conclude that the entrance of new parties onto the scene, especially those that win a significant share of the votes, is considered an indicator of ‘low levels of institutionalization in new democracies and instability in established ones’ (Barnea and Rahat, 2010: 314). It is this instability introduced by economic hardship that concerns us here, thus we have removed from our study sample both (i) recent accessions to the EU and (ii) all countries whose democracy was still relatively new and whose party systems verified large number of

entrances every election. Hence, we have managed to find a criterion that could solidify our study and reduce the margin for error.

As for the political factors, the authors hypothesize that the more parties there are in a party system and the more cleavages are addressed by these parties, the less likely would it be for new parties to form. However, and oddly enough, it is precisely in two-party systems that we find ‘the breeding ground for new parties’ (Harmel and Robertson, 1985).

1.4.2.1 New Party formation and electoral success – fundamental differences

It is fundamental to distinguish between new party formation and new party electoral success as these two phenomena can be often confusing and one might tend to group them under one single reality. However, these refer to separate realities that are sometimes not even originated by the same reasons – one party might be able to form as such, including all formal but also abstract features of a party – from a name to an ideology -, but this does not mean that such party is not just a marginal figure of party competition and whose power to influence policy outcomes and the way political competition is carried out is of any relevance.

It is important to make this distinction between the formation of new parties and electoral success of those parties. Hug (2000) says that ‘while the emergence of a new party and its subsequent electoral success are obviously intimately linked, both processes follow different logics’ (Hug, 2000: 188). Haus and Rayside (1978) and other scholars have started off by explaining the differences between both phenomena, that of emergence and that of electoral success, and by pointing out a set of ‘*facilitators*’ that could explain the emergence and success of new parties. Some of these factors help explain the formation of new parties, while others explain their later success.

This study will thus focus not on formation, but rather on electoral success of new parties – the stories of the *survivors* (Beynes et al., 2016) - those that actually managed to achieve some level of recognition are those concerned here.

Parties that are not able to enter parliament could have much more difficulty influencing the political debate, as they have not attained enough popularity among the electorate to make it to the national parliament.

Electoral success, on the other hand, counts in only recently formed parties that have entered the political game and are present in parliament – it may be a more assertive measure of determining which parties do actually ‘matter’ to mirror the political context and the political expectations of voters. When one new party enters parliament, it shows us that it may have something to offer that somehow has appealed to voters – be it 20% of voters or only 1% of voters. By grasping the general picture of the parties entering parliament for the first time, one gets a first glimpse of which are the new issues that matter to voters and that these parties stand for and how opposed (or aggravated with)

is the electorate to governing parties, by allowing new parties with entirely opposite ideas to enter parliament.

In this study electoral success is measured as the ability of a recently formed party to attain at least one seat in parliament, thus having reached the minimum threshold requirement to enter parliament. Only the measure above should be considered in the definition of electoral success and not those that are concerned with survivability and durability of these new parties (Harmel and Robertson, 1985). This has a lot to do with the fact that many new parties attaining electoral success, as per our definition, may not be able to uphold their success for a series of consecutive elections, nor are we able to predict whether such success will last in time. Often times, it is the case that the institutional newness of these parties does undermine the ability of them to settle in the ideological abstract of voters and thus, these are not able to compete with long-reputed and solid parties that have been around for much longer and whose electorate is either more loyal or more concerned with the stability that these parties can offer.

According to Bolin (2007), there are three ways in which one can measure party entrance, depending on what we conceive to be the necessary requirements of this entrance in national parliaments: party formation on itself, electoral success or even the *momentum* in which the party enters the national arena, i.e. the timing of their entrance. Hino's main argument in his book '*New Challenger parties in Western Europe*' (2012) points towards an important distinction between party formation and subsequent electoral success – these are different concepts and different stages for the parties and, thus, should be studied separately given that the very factors influencing these parties - namely socioeconomic conditions - vary in impact considerably according to the different stages.

I could say that my research will focus on the electoral success of new parties, i.e, the entrance of new parties in parliament, combined with the specific timing upon which the political conjuncture in Europe changed. I am not necessarily making reference to new parties forming government, as they are most often exceptions and not the norm, but instead concentrate on newly formed parties that have attained some level of electoral support and thus have gained seats in parliament.

Why will I be assessing only the parties that made an entrance in the parliament? Some social movements and political movements not really classified as parties often attempt to create a political dimension into the issues they defend, but dissolve soon after– the formation of a party, even though it should align with the quotas – does not necessarily mean that the issue is being taken seriously by the elites or the citizens. By entering parliament, we assume that some level of significance was attributed to the party by the electorate and thus, it is worthy of study.

In sum, I choose to define electoral success of new parties here as the moment they gain enough popular success and votes that allow them to have seats in the parliament.

1.4.2.1.1 Factors explaining new party success - drawing on Harmel's teachings

When attempting to understand new party formation and electoral success, or if we are trying to assert which newly formed parties attained some level of success and others haven't – survivals and failures – we must address a fundamental question: what are the fundamental conditions, be those structural or circumstantial, that allow for new party formation? So is to ask, under which circumstances and scenarios are new parties more likely to emerge and what are the opportunity structures from which they profit?

Some authors name the following reasons as the ones allowing for fertile ground for party formation: 1) cross-cutting cleavages; 2) societal change; 3) proportional electoral system; 4) electoral dealignment; 5) demand for the representation of new issues and new identities - all account for the a first success of new parties. (Beyens et al., 2016). For the maintenance of party success, the context in which one party emerges plays a lesser role.

To the above mentioned aspects accounting for new parties to emerge, I will add another and most relevant one, as initially proposed by Hauss and Rayside (1978) – the political opportunity structure (POS).

Following on Paul Lucardie's (2000) assessment of what conditions influence the foundation and later electoral success of new parties: '1) the political project of the new party which should address problems/issues that appeal to large sects of the electorate; 2) its resources: members, money, management and mass media exposure; 3) the political opportunity structure: position of other relevant parties as well as institutional, socio-economic and cultural conditions' (Lucardie, 2000: 175) – I find that it is this third factor I wish to focus on.

This third factor, the political opportunity structure, will be the factor I wish to explore, but not on all accessions as exposed by Lucardie (2000). I will focus on how socioeconomic conditions built upon significant instability of political structures in the European Union and alterations to party systems and mainstream parties's stances have opened a new path for new parties to explore – it is important to remember that in order for new parties to emerge, it is at times the case that mainstream or '*catch-all*' parties had a role to play, working ever so often as *political facilitators* to the emergence of these new political alternatives. It is the performance of established parties that will also dictate whether new parties gain strength or perish as they draw their first breath.

1.4.3.2 The Financial crisis and socioeconomic determinants of new party success

'The economy is more likely to dominate other issue concerns under conditions of economic recession, volatility, and economic underdevelopment. Moreover, at the individual level the salience of economic performance rises with unemployment and economic vulnerability'(Singer, 2011: 284). According to Singer (2011), the salience of economic issues in the agenda varies according to electoral contexts and among voters: 'Thus, variations in the economy's salience need to be further

incorporated into studies linking economic and political outcomes' (Singer, 2011: 284)

The financial crisis in the Eurozone took a harsh impact upon citizens and parties alike. The political dialogue shifted towards a more revisionist approach to the EMU and the potential of creation of a bankary union. The unveiled sovereign debts of some countries and the domino effect of bank failure all across Europe has sounded the alarm in every European country and has even crisped the relationships between some countries, namely between the interventioned countries of the South of Europe and the lenders in the Northern Countries.

In the meantime, the opportunity emerged for the creation of new studies on the political effect of the financial crisis, which had in turn driven to a fully-fledged political crisis that escalated to severe political instabilities all around Europe.

Challenger parties were rooting out of this turmoil to present different and sometimes more extreme solutions to the financial crisis and the austerity measures applied afterwards. However, it is important to understand why such parties managed to cut through this political momentum – challenger parties are emerging all across Europe, but such a phenomenon is worth looking into. Will such parties succeed and solidify their position in the party systems or will they disappear and dissipate after the momentum has passed?

Also, some new parties emerging out of this crisis are more successful in some countries than others, and that is also worth exploring.

Nonetheless, the purpose of this dissertation is to understand why such parties emerge and if the economic downturn had a part to play in it. Airo Hino (2012) claims that such change (emergence of parties) is real and not just a mere conjunction of circumstances 'Indeed, since the 1970s in particular, established political parties have had to contend with the birth and rise of new competitors that seek to challenge the status quo and that aim to address issues neglected by the mainstream elites' (Hino, 2012)

Even though these challenger parties come to rise in force, it should be stated here that 'the conditions that facilitate (or hinder) a new party's emergence also assist (or hamper) its subsequent electoral success' (Hino, 2012).

1.4.2.3 The Political Opportunity Structure (POS): Traditional parties as political facilitators to the emergence of new political alternatives

'From the literature on social movements, we have learned that political mobilization depends on the combination of three sets of factors: grievances, organization and opportunities' (Kriesi, 2012:2).

In the 80s, new politics parties emerged to respond to a need for more participation and for a different way to make politics (Muller Rommel, 1989; Pogunkte, 1989). It was not something other than democracy that the new social movements were after, they were indeed pushing for 'more

democracy, freedom and means of expression, and to less order, hierarchy and authority' (Ignazi, 1996:554) – the new politics parties demanded, together with libertarian and equalitarian issues, more efficacy and/or more effectiveness of the system, not a radical change of 'the rules of the game'. (Ignazi, 1996:554).

It is this attempt of reform, of progressivism and forward-looking approaches that the traditional parties were not tuned to offer – anti-establishment movements have always worked as a counter-force to traditional parties and have, at times, worked effectively against the order in place. In fact, 'it was their inability to secure such demands that forced these social movements to by-pass traditional parties.' (Ignazi, 1996: 554)

One author in particular claims that the emergence of new parties is not dictated by party decline – it is a result of the decline in the role of party members: 'The perceived lack of internal democracy, the frustration with the rigid bureaucratic structures of the system, the reduction of incentives linked to a decrease in ideological identification lead the members away from the parties and into new alliances with other social movements.' (Ignazi, 1996:554).

This argument can, however, be refuted since traditional catch-all parties have often remained strong in stable western democracies despite the many obstacles that they have encountered. The one aspect that could hold true here would be the effective decrease in ideological identification – a phenomenon that has long impacted big parties, which have witnessed reduction in membership rates and a less loyal electorate. Also, it is true that old parties pave their way into decline by their inability to adapt to new social demands: 'Old parties decline because of their incapacity to adapt to the modified environment and new ones arise, thanks to their different organizational profile (and more successful agenda)' (Rohrschneider, 1993, *apud* Ignazi, 1996, p. 555).

During the financial crisis, new emerging parties have taken advantage of such inadaptability of the traditional parties to propose alternative responses to the economic downturn: '(...) inevitably, new actors respond better than old ones to new challenges' (Ignazi, 1996:560)

Yet we should be cautious about expecting that small parties can dictate a decline in traditional solid and large parties – in fact, very rarely is this the case. However, it becomes clear that more often than ever such phenomena where small parties take up considerable losses on big parties has been noted in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

Inglehart has developed his work around value-change: the post-war socio-economic transformations have allowed different value priorities. Ignazi, on the other hand, questions how can such value change led to the rise of new parties in opposite spectrums. The same structural transformations could produce a different, rather opposite outcome (Ignazi, 1996).

In opposition to this new politics emerging all around Europe, there were the conservative extreme-right parties on the other end of the spectrum, which quickly gained ground. Nevertheless, we should not face extreme right parties as entirely new presences in the party arena – 'the extreme right is an old presence in European political systems.' (Ignazi, 1996: 559), contrary to what happens with

New Politics Parties: ‘while the New Politics really is novel in the partisan constellation, the extreme right dates back to historic fascism’ (Ignazi, 1996: 559). It is also important to note that political extremism may also be associated with times of social or economic grievances: ‘The rise of the extreme right in the 1980s represents another answer to the postindustrial society’ (Ignazi, 1996: 557)

So how come does the typical and consolidated social democracy in Europe finds an enemy in the marginal extreme right parties? Ignazi explains that ‘New extreme right parties have retained attention because they did not wish to revive the old fascist mythology, rather represent issues that were not treated by the traditional parties or they offered a different, more radical answer to old issues’ (Ignazi, 1996: 561). The extreme-left also capitalized on the situation, by denouncing and criticizing the austerity packages imposed on bailed-out countries and exposing the lack of European unity that was called into question by a North-South divide that became increasingly evident. The tension between lenders and debtors did put a strain on the credibility of the European Project and on its ability to halt tensions and bring countries around political and economic consensus.

1.4.2.4 New social trends foster development of new parties and reduce party loyalties

‘General societal trends have shaken the role and the centrality of parties and these changes have fostered the development of new parties.’ (Ignazi, 1996:558)

It is this general societal trends that have also taken a slice off traditional parties. The mutability of such trends and preferences drives less political identification verified today. To the understanding of emergence of new parties it is also important to look at the loss in political identification over recent decades (Harding et al. 1988; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Ignazi, 1996), which has led to less historical affinities or ideological obligations of the individual to remain loyal to their initial political choices. Such volatility does not mean that parties have decreased in importance as the main figures for political expression – they have simply become ever more reduced to an economist and to a *best-pick* contention. It is their performance that determines their popularity rather than their ideological abstract. Ignazi describes such process as follows: ‘the decline of party identification indicates only that people are less attached to a specific party and more independent of emotional or affective bonds in their evaluations of past party performance and in their confidence in future performance. Voters no longer sign a blank cheque. The process of secularization experiences by western societies has weakened ascriptive or hereditary political ties. As the intensity of identification vanishes, parties are evaluated in a cooler way (but not necessarily in a rational way). Affective and emotional bonds, in positive and negative terms, still determine the choice, and this is more true when the ideological temperature rises steeply again. What is new is that citizens are now freer to move from one party to another; switching party allegiances is less and less a traumatic experience’ (Ignazi, 1996: 550). Bartolini and Mair (1990) also explain that new political parties emerge when political dealignment made voters ‘more available’ (Beyenes et al., 2016).

Adding to this idea of political and social diversity are the new growing demands of post-industrialist and post-materialist societies where parties like the greens and other environmentalist factions were known to be formed. The anglo-american world was also witness to such emergence of parties of the likes.

1.4.3 The economic and financial crisis of 2008

The timings that determine the first warning signs, the beginning and the symptomatic period and the watering down of the recession are highly debatable. Researchers normally assume the event of the American Investment Bank Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 15 September 2008 as the breakthrough of what was to be known as the biggest financial and economic recession of the 21st century, with comparable repercussions only seen in the early years of the 20th century during the Great Depression of the 30s’. These two periods are however not so comparable in terms of the factors shaping the economic and financial landscape – the political consequences of these crises were similar, but the large political spectrum was very different (e.g.: EU as a supranational power that coordinates many financial and economic instruments in European countries is a novelty).

It is important to note that both were deflationary crises, marked by high unemployment and low growth (Lindvall, 2014). In addition, both started off as financial crises but ‘later turned into full-blown macroeconomic crises’ (Lindvall, 2014: 750) and ended up benefitting right-wing parties in the first elections after the crises started and later gave way to left forces to gain ground (Lindvall, 2014).




Figure 1 - % Variation of GDP Growth from 2005-2016 in EU15. Source: Eurostat

In fact, even though the outset of the crisis is more or less identified, its most acute phase and eventual cooling down are yet to be defined in time. Moreover, the countries under study have also been affected by the crisis at different points in time and to different degrees, according to their economic resistance to the already felt effects of the economic downturn. Thus, any attempt to

circumscribe this phenomenon in time is a mere approximation of the real timings and is, thus, prone to debate and refutation. However, for the sake of linearity of the study, a standard time approach will be used, considering not only the majority of the studies on the financial crisis, but also major economic and financial facts that give us indication of the time evolution of this crisis (see Table 1).

It is important to highlight that the earlier studies of the 2008 financial crisis that was first felt in Europe around 2010 were conducted considering only an annual perspective, i.e. many of them focus only on data from 2008 or 2009 or on the data that were available at the time of the study. Moreover, these initial analyses were conducted in the eye of the recession, when the crisis was still a very recent event and thus, these could not grasp the entirety of the phenomenon, nor anticipate the totality of political or economic consequences felt thereafter.

Nonetheless, these initial and exploratory analyses were detrimental to understand how the crisis evolved over time and how it was initially perceived. In addition, it allowed for a first grasp of what was actually happening in the markets. According to a study by Frankel and Saravelos (2012) that gathers a review of more than 80 papers on the financial crisis of 2008 and that is aimed at understanding the indicators that were first sign of the incidence of the financial crisis, Obstfeld et al. (2009) are pointed out as the prolocutors of the first studies on the international impact of the financial crisis. ‘They measured crisis incidence as the percentage depreciation of local currencies against the US dollar over 2008 (...)’ (Frankel & Saravelos, 2012).

1.4.3.1 Mapping social and policy impacts of the crisis

With regards to the time limits of the crisis and the time periods that are reported to be of economic hardship, it is important to highlight that the political, electoral and even economic consequences of the crisis vary from the outset and throughout, i.e., it is expected ‘the political situation at the beginning of a global economic crisis to be different from the later phases of such a crisis’ (Lindvall, 2014: 750).

It is also expected that the social and economic groups to be affected directly or indirectly by this crisis vary over time, even though with the prolonging of this crisis increasingly larger portions of the electorate become affected. It is expected that ‘in the beginning of a global economic crisis, voters in the middle of the income distribution are not likely to be personally affected’ (Lindvall, 2014: 750) - a trend that is later reversed when redistributive policies are applied as mitigation measures for low financing of the States and the increased inequality. In addition, since an ‘economic downturn increases the demand for social protection and redistribution for the groups who suffer the most, pivotal voters may well become less ‘altruistic’. (Lindvall, 2014: 749)

Moreover, Lupu and Pontusson (2011) ‘have argued that center-left political alliances become more likely when the shape of the income distribution makes the interests of middle-income voters more aligned with the interests of the poor and less aligned with those of the rich’ (Lindvall, 2014:

750). In fact, it is somehow expected that the left does better at the polls when the ‘political vulnerability begins to be felt across income groups (low and middle), and across social classes (...)’ (Lindvall, 2014: 750).

Lindvall (2014) thus hypothesizes that in a first instance (beginning of crisis), there will be a swing to the right, then, a level-playing field or a swing to the left.

1.5 The Study model – a framework for analysis

1.5.1 Concepts and Operationalization

1.5.1.1 Defining ‘New party’

There has always been difficulty in gathering scholars around the same definition of new party and what makes a new party, which results in different concepts and operationalizations arising at the same time and, consequently, an increased difficulty in attaining comparability among studies on new parties (Barnea and Rahat, 2010:1).

Since the very concept of ‘new party’ is an ambiguous one, I will move on to the explanation of the definition I found most appropriate for the study and why. In order to come up with an assertive definition of what should be conceived as ‘a new party’ I will bear in mind three important aspects:

In the first place, we all must be aware of the fact that the complexity of such phenomenon will naturally bring about different conceptions of what is ‘a party’ and what is then considered as ‘new’ - here are two definitions that need some clearance. Naturally, when attempting to describe party entrance, we will do so with the immediate reference of what we accept to be a new party and that will necessarily narrow down the scope of the research, hence my initial warning against any pretention of universality in my study. Simon Hug (2000) for example, states that in order to understand what a ‘new party’ is and to understand its appearance, it is fundamental that a comparison with mainstream parties is established.

The question I pose is then what is in fact a party? And what sort of new origin, contribution and result will I consider necessary in order to classify a party as new? Harmel had already made secure warning on how making such decision will limit the scope of my research and the natural limitations that this will impose upon my study and conclusions: ‘By making a practical distinction between real (or important or significant) parties and pretenders, authors are intentionally or inadvertently limiting the universe to which they are able to generalize their findings and conclusions’ (Harmel, 1985).

This very author leaves a suggestion to potential students of parties, explaining that ‘students of parties must inevitably grapple with the tradeoffs between generality and certainty when defining their universe for study’ (Harmel, 1985: 407). The implications of my methodological options, choices and trade-offs will further be explained in later chapters specifically targetting my methodological

approach to the issue and the operationalization of concepts at stake.

Secondly, I must bear in mind that the explanatory factors used will also limit the understanding of the emergence of new parties and what can or cannot be classified as a new party. I will in this case focus on one phenomenon as a potential explanatory factor for new party entrance (Bolin, 2007).

As Lucardie puts it, a new party can be also identified by the premises it defends, i.e., ‘a party can be new when it addresses cleavages or issues previously ignored by the established players’ (Lucardie 2000, *apud* in Beyens, et al., 2016, pp.259) This is also somehow what we understand here as new party, since the issues around economic downturn and austerity policies, as well as other issues that somehow relate to the responses to the crisis – namely the discredit of European institutions in addressing the crisis efficiently, which motivated many Eurosceptic stances from new parties (eg. Team Stronach in Austria – FRANK) led to rise in new issues and the placement of these new issues in the agenda. This does not mean that traditional mainstream parties have not tried to address the issue of economic downturn, but certainly they have done so more assertively (namely by paying attention to collateral issues of economic downturn – unemployment, increasing gap between social and economic groups) by pressure being put on them by new political forces and social movements.

1.5.1.2 Concept of new party

The increased number of parties during the economic crisis is defined by the total number of new parties formed from election A (t-1) to election B (t) for those elections taking place between the years of 2001 and 2016.

For the purposes of this study, a new party is a party that has been formed from one of three processes and that has attained electoral success:

- a) an entirely novelty in the party realm, that is not rooted in any existing party and has with them no correlation.
- b) a merger of already-existing parties forming under a new name.
- c) a split from an already-existing party that has now gone to run independently and that does so under a new image and name.

To be considered a new party, the party may not be any older than 6 years and only its first 2 elections will be considered, if these are consecutive.

Eg. a regional party in Spain that has been running for 40 years to local elections and that in 2013 decides to run for the parliamentary elections is not considered a new party as it exceeds the time limitations of our definition – 6 years in existence.

Eg. NEOS party in Austria first appeared in 2008, but only achieved 2.1% of the votes (not enough to gain a seat in the parliament, as the minimum threshold requirement stands at 4%). In 2013 (the national elections taking place immediately after) showed for another run of the party, which attained 5% and entered parliament with 9 seats. This is considered a new party as the first two elections are consecutive and the party is no older than 6 years.

In order to understand the concept of new party, it is fundamental to define what is here understood as electoral success, as a criterion for a party to be defined as new under this study.

Thus, electoral success is defined as follows:

- a) Attaining at least one seat in parliament, as per the national minimum threshold requirement in any of its two first consecutive elections.

1.5.1.3 Public Debt

According to Council Regulation (EC) no. 479/2009 of 25 of May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEU), Public debt is defined as:

‘Government debt’ means the total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year of the sector of ‘general government’, with the exception of those liabilities the corresponding financial assets of which are held by the sector of ‘general government’ (...) is constituted by the liabilities of general government in the following categories: currency and deposits; securities other than shares, excluding financial derivatives and loans, as defined in ESA 95.

1.5.1.4 GDP annual growth

OECD Glossary defines real GDP forecast as the “Real gross domestic product (GDP) is GDP given in constant prices and refers to the volume level of GDP. Constant price estimates of GDP are obtained by expressing values of all goods and services produced in a given year, expressed in terms of a base period. Forecast is based on an assessment of the economic climate in individual countries and the world economy, using a combination of model-based analyses and expert judgement. This indicator is measured in growth rates compared to previous year.” Found in:

Why will we be assessing the GDP annual growth rate and not GDP per capita or absolute measures of GDP: ‘(...) contrary to other measures such as absolute measures of GDP or GDP per capita, GDP annual growth rates have the advantage of not accounting for the population or the size of

the country and therefore we increase the comparability across countries'. (Nunez, Cosano & Pilet, 2014)

1.5.1.5 Inflation rate

According to Eurostat metadata, inflation can be defined as: 'The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) gives comparable measures of inflation for the countries and country groups for which it is produced. It is an economic indicator that measures the change over time of the prices of consumer goods and services acquired by households. In other words, it is a set of consumer price indices (CPI) calculated according to a harmonised approach and a set of definitions as laid down in Regulations and recommendations.

In addition, the HICP provides the official measure of consumer price inflation in the euro area for the purposes of monetary policy and the assessment of inflation convergence as required under the Maastricht criteria for accession to the euro.

The HICP is available for all EU Member States, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. In addition to the individual country series there are three key country-group aggregate indices: the euro area, the European Union (EU), and the European Economic Area (EEA), which, in addition to the EU, also covers Iceland and Norway, but not Liechtenstein.'

1.5.1.6 Unemployment rate

Eurostat metadata uses the definition that was adopted by the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1897/2000 which defines unemployment as follows: 'In accordance with the ILO standards adopted by the 13th and 14th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS), for the purposes of the Community labour force sample survey, unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were:

1. (a) without work during the reference week, i.e. neither had a job nor were at work (for one hour or more) in paid employment or self-employment;
2. (b) currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment before the end of the two weeks following the reference week;
3. (c) actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four week period ending with the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to start later, i.e. within a period of at most three months.'

In order to do a comparative analysis of 15 countries, the definition above was used (total no. of unemployed people) divided by all the active population, which gives us the unemployment rate.

1.5.1.7 Bailout Programs

In addition, Bailout programs will also be entering as a variable of study. It is a dichotomous variable (Yes/No) made to access whether a country has had to undergo any intervention from international financial authorities.

Eurostat defines bailout as ‘a term meaning a rescue from financial distress’, and adds that ‘It is often used when a government unit provides either short-term financial assistance to a corporation to help it survive a period of financial difficulty or a more permanent injection of financial resources to help recapitalize the corporation. A bailout may in effect constitute another means of nationalization if the government acquires control of the corporation it is bailing out. Bailouts of financial institutions are particularly noteworthy. Bailouts are likely to involve highly publicized one-time transactions involving large amounts and are therefore easy to identify’.

In this study, the bailout program will refer not to a state’s action towards a specific corporation and/or sector, but to the programs of international aid that have provided some European states with funding programs to rehabilitate the country’s finances. These programs became known for the tripartite approach, as EU Member States received financing with the inherent supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission (EC) – this threefold alliance for assistance programs was popularized under the name ‘Troika’.

These programs were granted to several countries over different extended packages, that implied a two-way commitment on financing (from international authorities) and application of financial restraining procedures and programs to bring fiscal policies and public and external debts under control (bailed-out countries).

1.5.2 Hypothesis and Variables

1.5.2.1 Variables

The dependent variable analyzed here is the electoral success of new parties, and the variable that will be used as our independent variable is the financial crisis of 2008 and the indicators that are used to assess this reality that is often times not easy to measure or to define and that earlier studies on the economic crisis had trouble in assessing and defining to all extension of the phenomenon. These variables will be analyzed for a determined period of time (2001-2016) and space (EU15).

Our dependent variable here is the electoral success of new parties as according to the definitions we adopted above on new party and electoral success.

Our independent variable, the one we expect to produce effect on the electoral success of new parties, as changes and fluctuations over time in this variable are registered, is the economic

performance, measured by a set of economic variables that measure this phenomenon: GDP annual growth, unemployment rate, inflation, public debt and bailout programs.

1.5.2.2 The socio-economic Variable – conditions and impact on parties

There is a certain disparity between the authors that classify the financial crisis as stemming mainly from external circumstances and pressures (Freire, 2014; Mark Blyth, 2012; Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, 2014; Alexandre Abreu et al, 2013), and others that emphasize endogenous reasons as the main contributors to the crisis we face. Though the discussion around this issue divides academia, the emergence of new politics parties all across Europe immediately after the first effects of the crisis were felt, shows support to the first thesis as new parties emerge all across Europe and thrive through very different domestic realities in many countries.

Duverger's law (1954) establishes a relationship between the electoral system and the party system, and has considerably shaped the discussion around party systems. According to Duverger, we should expect 'more new party entrances in countries with proportional electoral systems' (Bolin, 2007: 5). 'However it is not always obvious which systems are more or less proportional, nor is it clear what we mean by proportionality' (Gallagher 1991, *apud* Bolin, 2007, pp. 5).

Even though the electoral systems are not subject to regular changes and are more or less static, other regulations such as ballot access, access to media and subsidies to political parties are prone to more frequent change (Bolin, 2007). Bowler et al. (2001;2003) show that 'such rules have shifted towards a more liberal environment for all parties, which also would imply an easier path to success for new parties.' (Bolin, 2007). However, it is said that since the 1960s it has been the major political parties that have benefited from this and not the other way around. Party subsidies for example could gravely affect the way a new party enters the political arena and ultimately limit its action. The State is, in the majority of Western European countries, the most prominent institution financing parties. Even though there is no room for a generalistic analysis on party subsidies across Europe as there are heterogeneous manners that States apply in allocating them, it is often common that only parties that had some representation in previous elections might be matching the eligibility criteria for financial support – this would naturally play against the newly formed parties trying to make their first appearance.

We can thus conclude, that party subsidies will in the majority of cases be more advantageous to major parties than to newly formed ones. However, by utilizing campaign resource caps, they might neutralize the advantageous position of bigger and better-financed parties over the small ones. This would even out the results and 'strengthen the power of ideas over the power of money' (Bergamni et al., 2003:143).

Media exposure is also worth mentioning: hampered by the fact that even though some countries allocate free broadcasting time for political parties, this condition can be countered by parties buying off extra time for their media exposure. However, international media have been

balancing out how the parties get exposure, even when national systems are not so prone to establish a balance in media projection of their parties.

Despite all the institutional and political factors clearly playing a determining role in the ability of new parties to attain electoral success, it is not my objective to focus on these traditional explanations, but rather to focus on the yet less prominent aspects of socioeconomic conditions. Thus, my independent variable will rely exclusively on socioeconomic explanations for the recent increase in new parties.

It is important to understand that as far as politicosocial variables are concerned, they derive from the central argument that new parties come to fill representational needs in society (Harmel and Robertson, 1985: 2). One such example of this would be the arising issue-focused parties like anti-immigration parties, or the left-libertarian and ecologist parties that arose in the 80s (Ignazi, 1996:553), a resurgence of extreme-right parties and the leftist responses to the austerity processes in the south of Europe with parties such as Podemos in Spain or entirely new phenomena such as M5S in Italy that stole considerable political ground from traditional parties.

Harmel and Robertson quote clear examples of this ‘Cultural diversity might, at any time, breed new demands that, if unmet by existing parties, may be the basis for new party formation. Likewise, in countries with a high level of economic inequality, unmet demands to narrow the gap may result in new parties (especially on the left) to address those concerns in a manner different from the way they have been addressed by existing parties.’ (Harmel and Robertson, 1985: 503-504). This matter of unmet demands shows us that the traditional parties lose their political space by their inability to respond to current challenges in a manner that would allow such inequalities and divergences to be mitigated and, thus, could be said to work as political facilitators for the creation of breathing space for new parties to be formed.

1.5.2.3 Hypothesis

Taking the main literature as reference, it is known that socioeconomic factors contribute to the explanation of new party success. Starting from this assumption, it is expected that a negative performance from our independent variables would much more likely increase the chances of new parties attaining electoral success. This has led us to formulate the following hypothesis:

H1.1: Larger public debts (% of GDP) are expected to bring about more electoral success of new parties.

H1.2: Increase in unemployment rates has largely marked the economies of the EU during the crisis. New parties will attain more success when higher unemployment rates are registered.

H1.3: Newly formed parties attained much more success in countries that underwent bailout programs.

H1.4: New parties are expected to achieve more electoral success in the crisis period (2009-2016).

H1.5: It is expected that the higher the inflation, the more likely are new parties to attain electoral success.

H1.6: It is expected that when GDP annual growth registers lower values, the more likely are new parties to attain electoral success.

CHAPTER II - METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

There are some methodological problems that may arise from a selection bias in the study sample. The majority of studies focusing on the electoral success of new parties attempt to typify and categorize these parties – some studies became quite famous, but also extensively focused on one singular aspect or type of party: ‘scholars have studied in detail green or left-libertarian parties (e.g. Kitschelt, 1988; Muller-Rommel, 1993), or regional and non-state-wide parties’ (De Winter, 1995; De Winter and Tursan, 1998). However, this is not intended as my fundamental aim in this exercise.

On the other hand, many studies also attempt a comparative approach to the explanation of newly formed parties’ electoral success. One particular aspect was drawn attention to by Simon Hug (2000): even though the emergence of a new party and its subsequent electoral success are intimately linked, both processes follow two different logics that are normally misunderstood in comparative studies. Some hypothesis and variables, for example, may help to explain the emergence of new parties but do not account for their subsequent success and vice-versa.

Following the conclusions presented by Niklas Bolin (2007) on how the literature defines and distinguishes between new party formation and electoral success of new parties, I should follow the same line of thinking of Bolin (2007) – I intend to understand when new parties manage to enter the national parliament for the first time – thus, my dependent variable will also be measured in terms of entrance and not by means of vote share. This is to say too that my dependent variable should only be one – the phenomenon of electoral success of newly formed parties.

I will be considering the variable as dichotomous – entrance vs. Non-entrance by election – this does not mean that I don’t wish to understand the underlying motivations for party entrance, very much to the contrary. Nonetheless, though the election itself and the context it implies is always of extreme importance when trying to access structural factors, it is even more important to determine why such a period of time – 2001 to 2016, as marked by structural economic and social changes,

shows for the importance of social and economic factors when trying to understand new party success and give this variable a new importance when assessing new parties and when they come to be formed.

When I move on to the testing of hypothesis, I will focus on assessing whether the socioeconomic variables and those of an one-off, impactful historical event, like a financial crisis, could have backed and may even have been medular causes of the success of these new parties formed all across Europe from the period of 2001-2016.

The fact that such relation might be asserted was based upon preliminary testing and data verification, which led me to conclude that elaborating on this test the results could be found promising.

Please also note that it is not my intention to establish such relation while obliterating all the other known historical variables in the literature that accurately account too for new party entrance, like the institutional factors, the format of the party system and the systems of voting, as well as media exposure and subsidies to parties. We do acknowledge the importance of these factors, but it is precisely because these can hardly be refuted as important explanatory factors that we do not consider that any further testing is required at this point – these factors are more or less stable and have been proven to directly and consistently affect emergence and success of new parties in all countries.

A good study conducted on the methodology to approach the issue of the electoral success of new parties is that of Hug (2000), who suggests that defining what we consider to be a new party is often times the reason for selection biases to emerge.

In order to examine the viability of our initial assumptions on the relation between the financial crisis that started in 2008-2009 and the electoral success of new parties, an hypothesis test was conducted, which included the crossing of newly formed parties over a specific time period (2001-2016) and economic variables (GDP annual growth, unemployment rate, inflation, public debt and bailout programs) to assess the importance of the latter in explaining the electoral success of new parties in recent years. Even though economic variables are composed of hard data, many other variables had to be codified so as to conduct the test.

2.1 Research Structure: Dataset and Data Analysis

This study encompasses a cross-national analysis of a set of elections taking place between 2001 and 2016 in the western democracies of Europe – EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK). The analysis included the identification of new parties entering the national parliaments for the first time for each individual election, which was done by looking at the *Parties and Elections database*.

Economic data that compose my independent variables (GDP annual growth, inflation, unemployment rate, bailout programs, public debt) were gathered for the same period matching each year of election for all countries. The data were extracted from the *Eurostat database*.

The study sample included 16 years, 15 countries and 63 elections in total for the years 2001-2016. An additional variable separating two time periods (2001-2008) and (2009-2016) was included as well, so we could also infer whether the period – a pre-crisis and a crisis period – could be of any significance in explaining the success of new parties. For the first moment (2001-2008), there were a total of 35 elections, which equals 55.6% of the total election sample. In the second moment (2009-2016) there were 28 elections, corresponding to 44.4% of the election sample.

2.2 Case selection and Time span

This analysis focuses on the EU15, so as to measure the impact of the financial crisis in the electoral success of new parties in the European space. Note that the UK is still contemplated in this analysis, as the national *Brexit* referendum was only held in June 2016 and the negotiations for leaving the EU after the activation of article 50 of the TEU are set to last 2 years (until 2018), thus, the UK will still be considered a Member of the EU for the purposes of this analysis.

In addition, in order to be able to consider a standard sample that limits the chance for error, I will not be contemplating the last three rounds of enlargements: the Eastern enlargement (2004) that included Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; the 2007 enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania; and the Western Balkan enlargement (2013) that saw the accession of Croatia to the EU. The reasons behind this exclusion have a lot to do with the fact that the EU enlargement to the East and Southeast included many former communist countries of the USSR, whose democracies are relatively new and thus, not so stable in time and its party systems not so solid.

So as to avoid mixing up the western stabilized democracies with this opposing scenario, I have decided to exclude these countries from the analysis. In addition, it was verified that the majority of the countries that were excluded registered for great numbers of new parties entering parliament for every single election, which also shows for the immaturity of its party systems, which are clearly still trying to stabilize.

The majority of Central and Northern European Countries held, on average, 4 elections during those 16 years, while the number of elections in Southern European Countries for the same period, rises to an average of 5.

It is important to identify trends in new party success, i.e., to identify economic, cultural, regional or political aspects that explain why party emergence in certain democracies occurs more often in certain cases than others and to locate those formations in time and space. For instance, we are naturally driven to believe that hard-hit countries during the economic recession, namely those that required financial intervention and bailout programs (also a variable that will be analyzed in a dichotomous manner), or countries with less political and economic solidity/stability are more prone

to reflect such instability by means of increased volatility, radicalization of political stances and emergence of political alternatives like new parties.

Likewise, we expect that new parties are more successful in Eastern European Democracies, since the party systems are more dynamic and not as well defined in new democracies as they are in age-old democracies (*Litton, 2015*). Some studies seem to point significantly towards this increased impact of the crisis in these countries ‘Some Eastern European countries show up as suffering the most from the crisis’ (Frankel and Saravelos, 2012: 221). The reasons as to why this happens are yet unclear, but many hint and introduce several indicators that could help explain this. However, the nature of the success of these parties rising in Eastern Europe could generate some confusion as to whether this is owed to the faring off worse of their economies or given to structural immaturities of their party systems, as was explained above. Thus, even though we do acknowledge that Eastern European countries are faced with a much higher frequency of new party emergence and success, they will not be contemplated in this study.

All these hypotheses will be assessed and tested during the project and will contribute not only to mapping new party formation during the great recession, but also to reassess and reevaluate how periods of economic downturn allied with political instability contribute to the changing of party systems by the introduction of “new blood” into these systems.

In addition, the majority of studies on the effects of economic downturns on political attitudes and preferences are only concerned with the short-term effects and thus only analyze data for one or two years (*Lindvall, 2014*). The reason why this study in particular focuses on a larger period is owed to the fact that ‘there is reason to expect the political situation at the beginning of a global economic crisis to be different from the later phases of such a crisis’ (Lindvall, 2014: 750) and it is necessary to test a pre-crisis period and a crisis period to determine whether these economic variables do play a role in determining the success of new political alternatives in the party realm.

CHAPTER III – RESULT DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

3.1 Exploring the data

Considering that the dependent variable (parliamentary entrance of new parties) assumes only very small frequencies (an average of 0-5 new parties per election), the variable was recodified into a binary variable, with a dichotomous result, for which 0 matches a non-occurrence and 1 represents entrance of new parties in parliament. Thus, we have built a dependence model in which we intend to explain a certain variable with resource to a set of predictor variables (independent variables).

Hence, we cannot use for this analysis a linear regression model, because the linearity principle does not apply. The dependent variable is binary and thus, it can never have a normal distribution nor an equal variance.

Due to the reasons mentioned above, I had to use a binary logistic regression which did fully apply to the model we are trying to explain here. Table 1 shows for the results of this regression test.

Table 1 Electoral Success: Determinant factors
(logistic regression)

| Predictor Variables | Electoral Success <i>Odds ratio</i> |
|---------------------|--|
| GDP Variation | 0,979 |
| Inflation | 1,240 |
| Unemployment Rate | 1,094 |
| Public Debt (% GDP) | 1,038* |
| Bailout Program | 123,748* |
| Crisis | 0,962 |
| Constant | 0,000 |
| Nagelkerke R2 | 0,332* |
| χ^2 Model | 17,763 |

* $p < 0.01$

Main take-outs of our test

As seen from Table 1, there are some interesting conclusions that result from the test conducted. The Nagelkerke R2 explains 33.2% of the model, which is a rather interesting result for a binary regression.

From the independent variables that form part of the explanatory model, the Public Debt (% GDP) variable and the Bailout Program variable are statistically different from 0 ($p < 0.05$), thus they have a significant contribution to the explanation of new party success.

Both variables have a positive impact on the explanation of new party success for the periods under analysis, for which the bailout program variable holds the greatest explanatory potential.

However, it should be noted that such explanatory potential should not be overstated, as the countries undergoing bailout programs represent a reduced N (4 cases) and thus they are only part of a vary small sample. Nevertheless, since this study is not a sample study, but a full and all-encompassing study of the full universe of elections for the EU15 between 2001-2016, this variable could still be taken into consideration. The *logged odds* of new party success increase 123.748 times when a country is undergoing a Bailout program.

In sum, one can conclude that the more the predictor variables increase (Public Debt in % of GDP and existence of bailout programs), the more likely is the *odds ratio* of the dependent variable to increase.

This test led us to confirm two out of the six hypothesis that we wanted to test in the model. Hence, the hypothesis 1.1 (H1.1), in which we foresee that larger public debts (% of GDP) are expected to increase the *odds ratio* of electoral success of new parties, is confirmed as valid under this model; hypothesis 1.6 (H1.6) also holds significant explanatory value, as countries hardly hit by the financial crisis that had to undergo bailout programs, are also more likely to see newly formed parties attaining more electoral success.

CONCLUSION

One might not conclude that socioeconomic factors explain a significant part of the model we are trying to understand here. Our analysis concludes that it explains a total of 33.2% of the model with only the Public Debt indicator and the Bailout program indicator showing for any explanatory significance. Contrary to what one would expect, GDP variation, unemployment rate and inflation did not fare off so well in this test and it was not proven that these variables could hold a significant explanatory potential. Thus, we believe that our conclusion comes to be similar to those of previous authors focusing on cross-national analysis for new party success and it seems that other factors, could be those institutional or political, will still account for the greatest role in explaining new party success.

However, even though the economic crisis may not have accounted for a significant part of the explanation of why new parties attain electoral success, the truth of the matter is that if one looks at the parties gaining significant vote shares during the financial crisis, be those parties new or not, it is rather clear that their appearance in the party realm is somehow related to the economic and financial crisis. One example that is most evident of this is the rise of parties in Ireland that are directly and inherently called anti-austerity parties. It is not only part of their ideological abstract, it is even part of its most formal symbols, such as the name of the party itself. This would be the case of the *Anti-Austerity Alliance – People Before Profit (AAA-PBP)* that arose during the crisis.

Also, radicalist parties that have been around for some time have become refreshed and reinvigorated in the most recent elections, by registering high vote shares – *Front National (FN)* for instance – met with success and was in a tight run for government against Macron, this time in the presidential elections of the country.

One cannot ignore that the crisis allowed for the resurfacing of old and forgotten extremist forces and for the rise of new and not-so-well-defined parties. Whether the socioeconomic factors were the only part to play in this, it cannot be confirmed true, but the crisis abstract that settled in party systems and voters alike certainly played a role in recent electoral decisions and have stunned many scholars, politicians and political science students alike.

We can also conclude from this study that analysing new parties is at times like walking on quicksand, as the literature on new parties has not yet settled on a consensual and overarching definition of what makes a new party and what is in fact electoral success. The concept of newness is

not merely a question of semantics (Barnea and Rahat, 2010:317) , thus the margin for error here is entirely out in the open. The lack of consistency in the literature does not allow us to suppress this risk, nor to come up with an unbreachable solution. Thus, any other interpretation of 'newness' or definition of 'new party' could be equally as valid.

As Merton suggests, a choice is one's own and it has to be made nevertheless, always striving for the perfection of the concept.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barnea, Shlomit and Gideon Rahat (2010), *Out with the old, in with the new: What constitutes a new party?*, *Party Politics*, 17(3), pg. 303-320, DOI: 10.1177/1354068810369148
- Bartolini, Stefano, Perter Mair (1990), *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985*, Cambridge University Press.
- Bergman, Torbjörn, Müller, Wolfgang C., Strøm, Kaare and Blomgren, Magnus (2003), 'Democratic Delegation and Accountability: Cross-national Patterns', in Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. and Bergman, T. (eds) *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bermeo, Nancy, Larry Bartels (2014), *Mass Politics in Tough Times*, Oxford University Press, pp.1-5
- Beyens, Stefanie, Paul Lucardie & Kris Deschouwer (2016), *The life and death of New Political Parties in the low countries*, *West European Politics* 39(2), pg. 257-277, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2015.1066589
- Bolin, Niklas (2014), *New Party Parliamentary entry in Western Europe, 1960-2010*. In *European Journal of Government and Economics*, 3(1)
- Bolin, Niklas (2007), *New Party entrance: Analyzing the impact of Political Institutions*. Umeå: Statsvetenskap. (Umeå Working Papers in Political Science 2)
- Bosch, Agustí, Iván M. Durán (2016), *How does economic crisis impel emerging parties on the road to elections? The case of the Spaning Podemos and Ciudadanos*. Paper presented in the 'Tecera jornada de compartament politic I opinió pública' in Barcelona, 21st of June 2016
- Bowler, Shaun, Carter, Elisabeth and Farrell, David M. (2001), 'Studying Electoral Institutions and their Consequences: Electoral Systems and Electoral Laws', Center for the Study of Democracy, Paper 01-05.
- Bowler (2003), 'Changing Party Access to Elections', in Cain, B. E., Dalton, R. J. and Scarrow, S. E. (eds) *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carter, Elisabeth (2002), 'Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties', *West European Politics*, 25(3): 125-46.
- Casal Bertoa, Fernando and Till Weber (2016), *Restrained Change: Party Sytems in Times of Economic Crisis* (August 17,2016). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826629>
- Copelovitch, Mark, Jeffrey Frieden and Stefanie Walter (2016), *The political economy of the Euro Crisis*, *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(7), pg. 811-840
- Crafts, Nicholas (2014), *What does the 1930s' experience tell us about the future of the Eurozone?**, *JCMS* 52(4), pg. 713-727
- Dahl, Robert A. 1998. 'On Democracy'
- De Vries, Catherine and Sarah B. Hobolt (2012), *When dimensions colide: the electoral success of issue entrepreneurs*, *European Union Politics*

- De Vries, Catherine (20..), *The Issue Voting Triangle: The impact of the Systematic Saliency, Party Polarization and Issue Linkage on Issue Voting*
- Duverger, Maurice (1954) *Political Parties - Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. London: Methuen.
- Fernandes, Jorge M. (2016), *The seeds of party system change? The 2015 Portuguese general election*, *West European Politics*, 39(4), pg. 890-900, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2016.1150645
- Freire, André, Lisi, Marco, Andreadis, Ioannis, & Viegas, José Manuel Leite (2014), *Political Representation in Bailed-out Southern Europe: Greece and Portugal Compared*, special issue of *South European Politics and Society*, 19 (4); now Freire, A., Lisi, M., Andreadis, I., & Viegas, J. M. L. (2016), *Political Representation in Times of Bailout: Evidence from Greece and Portugal* (Routledge, London and New York).
- Frankel, Jeffrey, George Saravelos (2012), *Can leading indicators assess country vulnerability? Evidence from the 2008-09 global financial crisis*, *Journal of International Economics*, 87, pp.216-231.
- Funke, Manuel, Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch (2015), *Politics in the Slump: Polarization and Extremism after Financial Crisis, 1870-2014*.
- Geddes, Barbara (1990), *How the cases you choose affect the Answers you get: Selection bias in comparative Politics*. *Political Analysis*, 2, pg.131-150
- Harding, Stephen, David Phillips and Michael Fogarty (1988) *Contrasting Values in Western Europe*. London: Macmillan.
- Harmel, R. (1985), *On the study of new parties*. *International Political Science Review*, 6(4), pg.403-418. Available on: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601052>
- Harmel, R. And John D. Roberts (1985), *Formation and Success of New Parties – A cross-national analysis*. *International Political Science Review*, 6(4), pg.501-523
- Haus, Charles and Rayside, David (1978), 'The Development of New Parties in Western Democracies since 1945', in Maisel, L. and Cooper, J. (eds) *Political Parties: Development and Decay*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Hino, Airo (2012), 'New Challenger Parties in Western Europe – A comparative analysis'. *Routledge research in comparative politics*
- Hug, Simon (2000), *Studying the electoral success of new political parties – a methodological note*, *Party Politics*, 6(2), pg. 187-197
- Ignazi, Piero (1996), *The Crisis of Parties and the rise of New political parties*, *Party Politics*, 2(4):549-566
- Inglehart, Ronald (1985) 'New Perspectives on Value Change', *Comparative Political Studies* 17: 485-532.
- Janda, Kenneth and Desmond S. King (1985), *Formalizing and Testing Duverger's Theories of Political Parties*, *Comparative Political Studies*, 18(2), pg.139-169

- Kahler, M., & Lake, D. A., eds. (2013), *Politics in the New Hard Times: The Great Recession in Comparative Perspective* (Cornell University Press, New York).
- Kriesi, Hanspeter (2012), *Mobilization of protest in the age of austerity* in Marcos Ancelovici, Pascale Dufour, and Héloïse Nez (eds), *Street politics in the age of austerity : from indignados to occupy*, Amsterdam : Amsterdam University Press, 2016.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter (2014), *The Political Consequences of the Economic Crises in Europe: Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest*, pg.297-333 in *Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinion, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession*, edited by Nancy Bermeo and Larry M. Bartels. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Kresi, Hanspeter, Swen Hutter and Jasmine Lorenzini (2015), *Restructuring the West European Party Space in the Great Recession: continuity and change*.
- Lane, P.R., (2012), *The European Sovereign Debt Crisis*, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26(3), pp. 49-68
- Laureano, Raul M. S. and Maria do Carmo Botelho (2010), *SPSS - O meu manual de consulta rápida*. Edições Sílabo, Lisboa.
- Laureano, Raul M.S. and Maria do Carmo Botelho (2011), *Testes de Hipótese com o SPSS – O meu manual de consulta rápida*. Edições Sílabo, Lisboa
- Lindvall, Johannes (2014), *The electoral consequences of two great crises*, *European Journal of Political Research*, 53, pg. 747-765, DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12055
- Lipset, Seymour Martin and Rokkan, Stein. (1967), *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments*
- Litton, Krystyna (2015), *Party novelty: conceptualization and measurement of party change*, *Party Politics*, 21(5), pg.712-725, DOI: 10.1177/1354068813499866
- Lucardie, Paul (2000), *Prophets, purifiers and prolocutors. Towards a theory on the emergence of new parties*, *Party Politics*, 6(2), pg. 175-185
- Lupu, N. & Pontusson, J. (2011). *The structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution*. *American Political Science Review* 105(2): 316–336.
- Lyrantzis, Christos (2011), *Greek Politics in the Era of Economic Crisis: Reassessing Causes and Effects*, GreeSE Paper no.45 Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe
- Magalhães, Pedro (2014), *Introduction – Financial Crisis, Austerity and Electoral Politics*, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, Special Issue
- Mair, Peter (1999), 'New Political Parties in Established Party Systems: How Successful Are They?' in Beukel, E., Klausen, K. K. and Mouritzen, P. E. (eds) *Elites, Parties and Democracy*. Odense: Odense University Press.
- Merton, Robert K. (1987), *Three Fragments from a Sociologist's Notebook: Establishing the Phenomenon, Specified Ignorance, and Strategic Research Materials*. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 13, pg.1-29

- Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (1989 ed.), *New Politics in Western Europe. The Rise and the Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists*. London and Boulder, CO: Westview Press
- Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (1993), *Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa. Entwicklungsphasen und Erfolgsbedingungen*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag
- Morlino, Leonardo and Mario Quaranta (2016), *What is the impact of the economic crisis on democracy? Evidence from Europe*, *International Political Science Review* 37(5), pg.618-633
- Morlino, Leonardo and Francesco Raniolo (2017), *The impact of the economic crisis on South European democracies*. Palgrave Macmillan, DOI: 10.1007/979-3-319-52371-2
- Nunez, Lidia, Pablo Simon Cosano and Jean-Benoit Pilet (2014), *We don't want you to play with them! Economic crisis, electoral volatility and the dynamic of electoral reform*. Paper prepared for the presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions in Salamanca, 2014.
- Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J., Taylor, A., 2009. Financial Instability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008. *American Economic Review* 99 (2), 480–486 (May).
- Pavía, Jose M., Anselm Bodoque and Joaquín Martín (2016), *The birth of a new party: Podemos, a Hurricane in the Spanish crisis of trust*, *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, 4,pg.67-86
- Petmesidou, M., & Guillén, A. M. (2014), 'Can the Welfare State as we know it Survive? A View from the Crisis-ridden South European Periphery', *South European Society and Politics*, 19(3), pp. 295–307.
- Poguntke, Thomas (1989) 'The "New Politics Dimension" in European Green Parties', in Ferdinand Muller-Rommel (ed.) *New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists*, pp. 175-93. Boulder, co: Westview.
- Rohrschneider, Robert (1993) 'Environmental Belief Systems in Western Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, 26: 3-29.
- Scharpf, Fritz W. (2011), *Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Preemption of Democracy*. MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/11. Max-Planck-Institut- für Gesellschaftsforschung, Koln.
- Schmit, Hermann and Soren Holmberg (1995) 'Political Parties in Decline', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuhs (eds) *Citizens and the State*, pp. 95-132. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Selb, Peter and Sandrine Pituctin (2010), *Methodological issues in the study of new parties entry and electoral success*, *Party Politics*, 16(2), pg.147-170, DOI: 10.1177/1354068809341054
- Singer, M.M., (2011), *Who says 'It's the Economy'?* *Cross-National and Cross-Individual Variation in the salience of Economic Performance*, *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(3), pp. 284-312
- Tavits, Margit (2007), *Party Systems in the making: the emergence and success of New Parties in New Democracies*, *British Journal of Political Science*, 38, pg. 113-133, DOI: 10.1017/S0007123408000069

Tsatsanis, Emmanouil, André Freire and Yannis Tsirbas (2014), *The impact of the Economic Crisis on the Ideological Space in Portugal and Greece: A comparison of Elites and Voters*, *South European Society and Politics*, 19(4), pg. 519-540, DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2014.983317

SOURCES

Bailout data and definition available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance_en

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1897/2000

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community

Definition of GDP anual growth – available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/nama10_esms.htm

Eurostat database – available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

GDP anual growth data available at:

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_gdp_c&lang=en

Inflation definition available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/prc_hicp_esms.htm

Inflation data available at:

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=prc_hicp_aing&lang=en

OECD database – available at <https://data.oecd.org/>

Public Debt data available at:

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=gov_10a_main&lang=en

Public Debt definition available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/gov_10dd_esms.htm

Unemployment rate data available at:

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdec450&plugin=1>

Unemployment rate definition available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/une_esms.htm

ANNEXES

Anexx A – Binary Logistic Regression presuppositions Linear Regression – Independence of the Variables

Inserted Variables/Removed^a

| Model | Inserted Variables | Removed Variables | Method |
|-------|--|-------------------|--------|
| 1 | Crisis, GDP Variation, Inflation, Bailout Process, PublicDebt (% of PIB), Unemployment Rate ^b | | Insert |

a. Dependent Variable: Electoral Sucess Dummy

b. All variables included.

Coefficients

| Model | | Colinearity Statistics | |
|-------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------|
| | | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | GDP Variation | ,799 | 1,252 |
| | Inflation | ,829 | 1,206 |
| | Unemployment Rate | ,470 | 2,129 |
| | PublicDebt (% of PIB) | ,535 | 1,870 |
| | Bailout Process | ,591 | 1,692 |
| | Crisis | ,730 | 1,370 |

a. Dependent Variable: Electoral Sucess Dummy

Colinearity Diagnose^a

| Model | Dimension | Autovalor | Condition Index | Variance proportions | | |
|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------|-----------|
| | | | | (Constant) | GDP Variation | Inflation |
| 1 | 1 | 4,301 | 1,000 | ,00 | ,00 | ,01 |
| | 2 | 1,365 | 1,775 | ,00 | ,22 | ,01 |
| | 3 | ,543 | 2,815 | ,00 | ,04 | ,08 |
| | 4 | ,456 | 3,072 | ,01 | ,66 | ,11 |
| | 5 | ,213 | 4,495 | ,01 | ,01 | ,40 |
| | 6 | ,074 | 7,619 | ,00 | ,00 | ,02 |
| | 7 | ,049 | 9,331 | ,98 | ,06 | ,35 |

Colinearity diagnose^a

| Model | Dimension | Variance Proportions | | | |
|-------|-----------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|--------|
| | | Unemployment Rate | PublicDebt (% of PIB) | Bailout Process | Crisis |
| 1 | 1 | ,01 | ,00 | ,01 | ,01 |
| | 2 | ,00 | ,00 | ,15 | ,01 |
| | 3 | ,00 | ,00 | ,37 | ,32 |
| | 4 | ,00 | ,00 | ,23 | ,09 |
| | 5 | ,10 | ,06 | ,03 | ,56 |
| | 6 | ,75 | ,64 | ,02 | ,00 |
| | 7 | ,14 | ,28 | ,20 | ,01 |

a. Dependent Variable: Electoral Success Dummy

Annex B – Binary Logistic Regression

Cases

| Cases that have not been considered | | N | Percentage |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----|------------|
| Select Cases | Included in analysis | 63 | 100,0 |
| | Missing | 0 | ,0 |
| | Total | 63 | 100,0 |
| Non select cases | | 0 | ,0 |
| Total | | 63 | 100,0 |

Coding of the dependent variable

| Original value | Intern value |
|----------------|--------------|
| ,00 | 0 |
| 1,00 | 1 |

Categorical variables coding

| | | Frequency | Coding of the parameter |
|-----------------|---------------|-----------|-------------------------|
| | | | (1) |
| Crisis | Before Crisis | 35 | 1,000 |
| | Crisis | 28 | ,000 |
| Bailout Process | 0 | 59 | 1,000 |
| | 1 | 4 | ,000 |

Bloc 0: Initial Bloc

Classification Table^{a,b}

| Observed | | | Predict | | |
|-------------------|------------------------|------|------------------------|------|--------------------|
| | | | Electoral Sucess Recod | | Correct Percentage |
| | | | ,00 | 1,00 | |
| Step 0 | Electoral Sucess Recod | ,00 | 38 | 0 | 100,0 |
| | | 1,00 | 25 | 0 | ,0 |
| Global Percentage | | | | | 60,3 |

a. Constant included in model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in equation

| | | B | E.P. | Wald | df | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|--------|----------|-------|------|-------|----|------|--------|
| Step 0 | Constant | -,419 | ,258 | 2,644 | 1 | ,104 | ,658 |

Non present variables in equation

| | | | Score | df | Sig. |
|-------------------|-----------|--------------------|--------|----|------|
| Step 0 | Variables | GDP_Variation | ,505 | 1 | ,477 |
| | | Inflation | ,119 | 1 | ,730 |
| | | Unemployment_Rate | 3,063 | 1 | ,080 |
| | | Public_Debt_PIB | 8,773 | 1 | ,003 |
| | | Bailout_process(1) | ,385 | 1 | ,535 |
| | | Crisis(1) | ,958 | 1 | ,328 |
| Global Statistics | | | 16,081 | 6 | ,013 |

Bloc 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Test of the Model Coefficient

| | | Qui-square | df | Sig. |
|-------|-------|------------|----|------|
| Step1 | Step | 17,763 | 6 | ,007 |
| | Bloc | 17,763 | 6 | ,007 |
| | Model | 17,763 | 6 | ,007 |

Sum of the Model

| Step | Log da Verossimilhança | R quadrado Cox & Snell | R quadrado Nagelkerke |
|------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 66,872 ^a | ,246 | ,332 |

a. Estimação finalizada no número de iteração 5 porque as estimativas de parâmetro mudaram foram alteradas para menos de ,001.

| Variables in equation | | B | E.P. | Wald | df | Sig. |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------|-------|-------|----|------|
| Step 1 ^a | GDP_Variation | -,021 | ,099 | ,045 | 1 | ,832 |
| | Inflation | ,215 | ,267 | ,649 | 1 | ,421 |
| | Unemployment_Rate | ,090 | ,093 | ,942 | 1 | ,332 |
| | Public_Debt_PIB | ,038 | ,014 | 7,696 | 1 | ,006 |
| | Bailout_process(1) | 4,818 | 1,995 | 5,834 | 1 | ,016 |
| | Crisis(1) | -,039 | ,679 | ,003 | 1 | ,954 |
| | Constante | -8,796 | 2,845 | 9,561 | 1 | ,002 |

| Variables in equation | | Exp(B) |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---------|
| Step1 ^a | GDP_Variation | ,979 |
| | Inflation | 1,240 |
| | Unemployment_Rate | 1,094 |
| | Public_Debt_PIB | 1,038 |
| | Bailout_process(1) | 123,748 |
| | Crisis(1) | ,962 |
| | Constante | ,000 |

a. Inserted Variables in Step 1: GDP_Variation, Inflation, Unemployment_Rate, Public_Debt_PIB, Bailout_process, Crisis.

**Annex C – Frequencies
General Statistics and Descriptive**

Statistics

| | Electoral Sucess Dummy | GDP Variation | Inflatio n | Unemploym ent Rate | PublicDebt (% of PIB) |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|------------------|---------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| N Valid | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 |
| Missing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mean | ,60 | 1,678 | 1,8095 | 8,6222 | 70,1635 |
| Median | 1,00 | 1,600 | 1,7000 | 7,8000 | 66,5000 |
| Mode | 1 | ,8 | 1,70 | 5,00 | 48,50 |
| Standard Deviation | ,493 | 3,5228 | 1,23167 | 4,79709 | 33,60254 |
| Variance | ,243 | 12,410 | 1,517 | 23,012 | 1129,130 |
| Amplitude | 1 | 24,3 | 5,60 | 20,80 | 152,30 |
| Minimum | 0 | -7,3 | -,90 | 3,70 | 7,30 |
| Maximum | 1 | 17,0 | 4,70 | 24,50 | 159,60 |

Statistics

| | | Bailout Process | Crisis |
|---|---------|-----------------|--------|
| N | Valid | 63 | 63 |
| | Missing | 0 | 0 |

Frequencies Tables

Electoral Sucess Dummy

| | | Frequencies | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------------------------|-------------|---------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Valid | Entry of new parties | 25 | 39,7 | 39,7 | 39,7 |
| | No entry of new parties | 38 | 60,3 | 60,3 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 63 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

Bailout Process

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Válid | 0 | 59 | 93,7 | 93,7 | 93,7 |
| | 1 | 4 | 6,3 | 6,3 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 63 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

Crisis

| | | Frequência | Porcentagem | Porcentagem válida | Porcentagem cumulativa |
|--------|--------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Válido | Befor Crisis | 35 | 55,6 | 55,6 | 55,6 |
| | Crisis | 28 | 44,4 | 44,4 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 63 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

Descriptive

Descriptive Statistics

| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Standard deviation |
|--------------------|----|---------|---------|-------|--------------------|
| GDP Variation | 63 | -7,3 | 17,0 | 1,678 | 3,5228 |
| N valid (listwise) | 63 | | | | |

Descriptive Statistics

| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Standard deviation |
|--------------------|----|---------|---------|--------|--------------------|
| Inflation | 63 | -,90 | 4,70 | 1,8095 | 1,23167 |
| N valid (listwise) | 63 | | | | |



Descriptive Statistics


| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Standard deviation |
|--------------------|----|---------|---------|--------|--------------------|
| Unemployment Rate | 63 | 3,70 | 24,50 | 8,6222 | 4,79709 |
| N valid (listwise) | 63 | | | | |

Descriptive Statistics

| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Standard deviation |
|-----------------------|----|---------|---------|---------|--------------------|
| PublicDebt (% of PIB) | 63 | 7,30 | 159,60 | 70,1635 | 33,60254 |
| N valid (listwise) | 63 | | | | |

Annex D - Graphs





CURRICULUM VITAE

INFORMAÇÃO PESSOAL Mariana Calheiros Lima de Sousa

📍 Rua D. Manuel Vieira de Matos nº47, 4710-386 Braga (Portugal)

☎ (+351 915 093 374)

✉ marianacalheiros.sousa@gmail.com

EXPERIÊNCIA PROFISSIONAL

01/08/2017–Presente

Corporate Communications & Public Affairs Consultant
ATREVIA (Portugal)

- Working mainly in the fields of Pharma, Government, Finance & Banking and Retail
- Desk research, Policy and media monitoring
- Media relations
- Development of Corporate Communication Strategies

01/06/2017–Presente

Translator
AP Portugal (Portugal)

- Scientific and Technical Translation: PT-EN | EN-PT

20/03/2017–01/08/2017

Assistant Consultant - Public Procurement Policy
Oumun Lda. (Portugal)

aid to external consultant for The World Bank and AfDB in Public Procurement Policy

- Desk research
- Creation of Public Procurement strategies for governments
- Preparation of presentations for high-level conferences

01/03/2016–01/06/2016

Trainee Consultant in Public Affairs & Corporate Communications
Acumen Public Affairs, Brussels (Belgium)

Public Relations and Communication in the fields of Health, Pharma, Agriculture and Digital business – American and European Companies

- Stakeholder Mapping
- Media relations
- Policy and media monitoring

01/10/2014–01/07/2015

Trainee at the Representation of the European Commission in Portugal
EU / European Commission - DG Communication (Portugal)

- Political Reporting and Policy Analysis
- Assistance to ESO (European Semester Officer) and to the resident press Officer

- Media Reports
- Media Monitoring/ Information assistance
- Attending and reporting on Conferences and Seminars
- Support to the Organization of REP's events and high-level conferences.

EDUCAÇÃO E FORMAÇÃO

| | | |
|-----------------------|--|-------------|
| 01/09/2010–01/07/2013 | Licenciatura em Línguas e Relações Internacionais Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, Porto (Portugal) English – Contemporary English Literature – German – German Culture - International Organizations - International Law – Administrative Law – International Economics – Languages– Oral and written communication skills | Nível 6 QRQ |
| 01/09/2012–01/03/2013 | Minor em Estudos Europeus Universiteit Maastricht, Maastricht (Países Baixos) Negotiation Skills & Problem-solving – European Institutions | Nível 6 QRQ |

COMPETÊNCIAS PESSOAIS

Língua materna português

Outras línguas

| | COMPREENDER | | FALAR | | ESCREVER |
|---|------------------|---------|----------------|---------------|----------|
| | Compreensão oral | Leitura | Interação oral | Produção oral | |
| inglês | C2 | C2 | C2 | C2 | C2 |
| FCE / CAE / CPE Concorde International - Summer Course | | | | | |
| alemão | B1 | B1 | B1 | B1 | B1 |
| espanhol | B2 | B2 | B2 | B2 | B2 |
| Nível A1 /Nível A2 /Nível B1 /Nível B2 | | | | | |

Níveis: A1 e A2: Utilizador básico - B1 e B2: Utilizador independente - C1 e C2: Utilizador avançado

[Quadro Europeu Comum de Referência para as Línguas](#)

Competências de comunicação

- Technical and formal writing
- Institutional Communication & Protocol
- Speaker's notes and speech writing
- Media relations & Social Media tools

Competências de organização

- Ability to prioritize tasks
- Attention to detail
- Diligent responses to arising problems

Competências relacionadas com o trabalho

Organized
Proactive

Works well in team dynamics

Competência digital

| AUTOAVALIAÇÃO | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| Processamento de informação | Comunicação | Criação de conteúdos | Segurança | Resolução de problemas |
| Utilizador avançado | Utilizador avançado | Utilizador independente | Utilizador básico | Utilizador básico |

Competências digitais - Grelha de auto-avaliação

- Windows and OSX operative systems
- Microsoft Office Proficient user (word, power point, excel)