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Europeanization in Portugal:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

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Para os meus pais

RESUMO

A Europeização é uma área de investigação cada vez mais popular na esfera da integração europeia, particularmente para estudar o impacto dos processos e instituições europeias em Estados Membros e não membros da UE. Na última década, o conceito de Europeização tem sido habitualmente utilizado para o estudo das políticas externas nacionais, apesar do seu distintivo carácter intergovernamental e do facto de se saber ainda pouco sobre as dinâmicas do processo. Neste trabalho, utilizamos o conceito mencionado como abordagem analítica para determinar a natureza do processo de Europeização nos campos da não-proliferação e desarmamento nuclear, utilizando Portugal como estudo de caso. A maioria da literatura sobre a UE e o seu papel como um ator na área da não-proliferação tem um envolvimento teórico mínimo, consistindo sobretudo em pesquisa empírica com orientação política, e o conceito de Europeização ainda não foi aplicado nesse contexto. Além disso, Portugal é ainda um dos países menos investigados na literatura sobre Europeização, um motivo que se deverá prender com o seu pequeno tamanho e localização semiperiférica. Como tal, este trabalho pretende suprir essa lacuna, não apenas em termos de pesquisa sobre processos de Europeização em Portugal, mas também em relação a estudos com uma base teórica nos campos da não-proliferação e desarmamento nuclear. Esta pesquisa sugere que apesar de as matérias na área nuclear não serem uma prioridade para Portugal, a filiação à UE tem ainda um pequeno impacto no discurso, legislação, e ações do país nessas áreas, e levou a uma melhoria dos seus serviços de controlo à exportação.

Palavras-chave: Portugal; União Europeia; Europeização; Não-proliferação nuclear; Desarmamento

ABSTRACT

Europeanization is an increasingly popular research area within the field of European integration, particularly for studying the impact of European processes and institutions on EU Member and non-Member States. In the last decade, the concept of Europeanization has been commonly used in the study of national foreign policies, despite their distinctive intergovernmental nature, but there is still limited knowledge regarding the dynamics of the process. In this work, we use the aforementioned concept as an analytical approach to determine the nature of the Europeanization process in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, using Portugal as a study case. Much of the literature concerning the EU and its role as a non-proliferation actor engages only minimally with theory, consisting mostly of policy-oriented empirical research, and the concept of Europeanization has not yet been applied in that framework. Additionally, Portugal is still one of the least researched countries in Europeanization literature, a reason believed to be anchored on its small size and semi-peripheral location. As such, this work intends to close a gap, not only in terms of research on Europeanization processes in Portugal, but also regarding theoretically-based studies in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. This research suggests that although nuclear matters are not a first-order priority for Portugal, EU membership has had a small impact in the country's discourse, legislation, and actions in those fields, and has led to an improvement of its export control services.

Keywords: Portugal; European Union; Europeanization; Nuclear Non-Proliferation; Disarmament

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

AT	Tax and Customs Authority
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CONOP	Working Party on Non-Proliferation
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CTBT	Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization
CTN	Nuclear Technology Campus
DGAIED	Directorate-General for Armament and Defense Infrastructures
DGRDN	Directorate-General for National Defense Resources
E3	European Three: Germany, France and United Kingdom
EC	European Communities
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IfS	Instrument for Stability
JRC	Joint Research Centre
MDN	Ministry of National Defense
MNE	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
P5	Permanent Five UNSC Members
PrepCom	NPT Preparatory Commission
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PTS	Provisional Technical Secretariat
RevCon	NPT Review Conference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations Organization
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

INTRODUCTION

The overall aim of this work is to study the impact of European Union (EU) membership on its Member States. With that goal in mind, we will use Europeanization as an analytical approach to better understand how they respond to the challenges brought on by European integration. Portugal will be used as a study case as we examine the influence of the EU on the Member State within the framework of the first two pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. By choosing to analyze the country within this framework we hope to fill a gap in knowledge in two different ways. Firstly, by presenting a work with a solid engagement with theory, by applying Europeanization to study the domestic impact of EU institutions. This is particularly relevant, not only because most literature about the EU as a nuclear non-proliferation actor is largely empirical and policy-oriented, but also because Europeanization has yet to be used in this context. Secondly, by carrying out research on a topic that remains largely unexplored in Portugal, which is one the least researched countries in Europeanization studies. Portugal is an interesting case study because it benefits from NATO's nuclear umbrella despite its standing as a non-nuclear country. While the topic at hand would not appear to be a very critical subject for the State, we were intrigued on whether the emergence of nuclear proliferation as a threat to security, along with the growing role of the EU as a security actor, could make an otherwise small concern grow in importance. This study could, therefore, give us some clues on the overall influence of the EU in Portugal, regarding the wider field of security and defense, because if the EU can have an impact on the matters under study, we can expect to find Europeanization processes in other areas considered more relevant to the country's interests. Another reason for the use of the country as a study case is anchored on the fact that our limited availability of resources would have made it extremely difficult to conduct interviews among representatives of other EU Member States.

Portugal is a non-nuclear-weapons state whose Constitution advocates for general, simultaneous, and controlled disarmament. Although the EU is showing signs of growing integration on the subject of nuclear non-proliferation, the issue of disarmament is subject to a variety of clashing interests from the Member States, which often leads to the adoption of lowest common denominator positions. However, as international developments, such as the threat of nuclear terrorism, put the security of the EU Member States at risk, steps need to be taken to protect them, and a united response is increasingly needed. In this context, we wanted to determine the impact of the discussions taking place at the EU level on Portuguese interests, policy, actions, actors, and institutions.

We will start by providing the methodology of our research and explain how it will be conducted. Having explained the motives behind the case study selected, we will justify our choice regarding the theoretical basis and time frame applied as well. The first chapter of this dissertation will start by providing readers with a state of the art on the concept of Europeanization, namely the origins of the term, the most influential works, and the differences between its applications in the study of

domestic and foreign policies. The second chapter will focus on the EU's role on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, starting from its early days, with the founding of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). We will then proceed to describe the path towards the adoption of the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMDs (weapons of mass destruction), followed by the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, and the recent success of the EU regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis. Finally, the third chapter will start by framing the Portuguese position on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in order to assess whether or not change has occurred. We will do so by analyzing a series of documents relating to the Plenary Meetings of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) General Conference, the NPT Review Conferences (RevCons) and Preparatory Committees (PrepComs), and the sessions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and First Committee of the General Assembly that contain Portuguese statements. We will also examine the Portuguese National Defense Strategic Concepts looking for similar information. Subsequently, in the conclusion, we will try to determine if it is possible to attribute any hypothetical changes to Europeanization processes at work, whether present in the country's discourse, or uncovered by the interviews carried out with experts on the subject. A frame relating to the interviews conducted will also be provided.

Methodology

Europeanization will be used as an analytical approach to study the impact of the EU at the domestic level in this work, which will use Portugal as a study case. Given Portugal's small territory and economy, as well as semi-peripheral location, we expect its positioning and actions to fall within the framework of the EU, NATO, and other entities and regimes it is a part of, not playing a leading role or acting independently. Since the EU has shown significant progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, and most dynamics involving Portugal should be of a top-down nature, Europeanization is expected to be an important tool of analysis, because it has proven to be particularly effective in the study of the consequences of EU membership. Since we do not expect Portugal to be a very strong player on nuclear matters, we believe that our definition of Europeanization should be as broad as possible, in order to set a wider net regarding the link between Portugal and the EU in this field. Thus, we define Europeanization as "domestic adaptation to the pressures stemming directly or indirectly from EU membership" (Featherstone, 2003: 7). However, given the fact that the national and European spheres are increasingly interlaced and foreign policy Europeanization can be seen as a "mutually constitutive process of change linking national and European levels" (Major, 2005: 177, 187) we will be on the lookout for any indications of uploading, as well as cross-loading dynamics emanating from the most powerful European players in this area.

Our research timeframe spans from the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on November 1st, 1993, to the present year (as of early September, 2016). This period accompanies the development of a European identity in the field of security and defense, as the aforementioned treaty established the

EU and created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Furthermore, after disagreements over US' 2003 Iraq invasion led to the development of the EU's WMD strategy, the EU has been trying to carve itself a role as a nuclear non-proliferation actor. However, since Europeanization focuses on domestic change, it is important to understand Portuguese positioning and actions in this field of studies before the EU's profile in these matters became more relevant, and therefore more likely to cause impact at the national level. The empirical field will relate to every region of the globe, since the EU has carried out or funded projects in the nuclear field worldwide.

After secondary sources on Europeanization, nuclear non-proliferation, and disarmament were consulted, it was important to analyze a number of primary sources from the most important international fora on non-proliferation, using document analysis as a research tool to gather information. The reasons behind that decision relate to the fact that there are very relevant documents with important, exact, and stable information for our research that can be retrieved in an effective way through information technology. Since national statements are often missing (it is usually the country's responsibility to send them in), we decided to browse through the records of the plenary meetings, as they should be more trustworthy. It should be added, however, that those reports are often missing and containing mistakes. By reviewing Portuguese statements on a national capacity, it is our aim to frame the national position on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in the established timeframe, as well as identify differences in its speeches throughout the years. We will also study reports and working papers submitted by Portugal in this field, as well as Portuguese and European legislation and instruments. Other miscellaneous sources include Portuguese Parliamentary records, news reports, and official websites of the most relevant organizations in this field of study.

However, not only it will be difficult to directly link any possible changes in discourse to the influence of the EU, as it is unlikely that every Europeanization process at play is reflected in Portuguese discourse. Additionally, official documents are just the result of the negotiations between Member States' representatives in the EU sphere, and tell us very little about the discussions that took place. Therefore, it was important to carry out interviews among specialists in the field, in an effort to add a human dimension to our research, which is very important in order to identify socialization and learning mechanisms of Europeanization. Also, interviews have the advantage of allowing us to ask detailed questions that we can then clarify with follow-up questions. We were especially interested in interviewees linked to EU coordination in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including national branches of the Portuguese Public Administration that worked on these matters, as well as others specialists in the field. Interviews are a form of qualitative research and will be used as a way to retrieve rich, descriptive information that we can use to understand the motives behind Portuguese discourse and actions in the topic at hand. It was our intention to carry out semi-structured interviews because they can be prepared beforehand, can prevent straying away from the topic, and provide us with comparable answers. We also expect to conduct unstructured interviews in circumstances where it is unpractical to employ a semi-structured technique, or when very little is known about a particular sub-topic under

research. In any case, as explained by Parker (2005:53), "there is really no such thing as a completely structured interview because people always say things that spill beyond the structure". Another possibility considered was the use of skype or phone calls if a meeting in presence could not be arranged, alternatively resorting to e-mail questionnaires as a last case scenario, or as a later follow-up to an interview. They have the advantage of speed and economy, offer the possibility of bypassing geographic hindrances, and reduce the effect of the interviewer during the process. Face-to-face interviews are preferred, since they allow for more accurate, thoughtful and effective responses, improve the chance of 'self-generated answers' (Shuy, 2002 apud Brinkmann, 2014: 29), and enable complexity, confidence and confidentiality (Brinkmann, 2014:30). However, there is no universally correct answer and ensuing guarantee of success, regardless of the medium used (e.g. some interviewees might thrive on a written form of communication, while others feel more comfortable in a conversation).

As embodied in the NPT, nuclear non-proliferation can be defined as the "prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, while disarmament refers to the "cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery" (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968: 1-2). Although the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are of minor relevance to this work, given the objectives established, we intend to carry out some research in that field to determine if there is a link to the other two pillars of the NPT, in the Portuguese case. According to UN Resolution 1540, a WMD is indirectly defined as a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon. Along with their means of delivery (e.g. missiles and rockets), the document considers WMDs a menace to peace and security worldwide.

Our main research question is: "in what way has EU membership shaped Portuguese interests, policies, actions, actors, and institutions in the fields off nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament?". In order to answer it, we looked into three indicators, using Wong and Hill's (2011: 7), and Gross' (2007: 21) works as frames of reference: 1) salience of the EU in Portuguese foreign policy regarding nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; 2) adherence to EU policy objectives in the same field; and 3) organizational or procedural change in national bureaucracies. The last indicator refers to "the adoption of a new idea or behavior by the organization" (Sengupta apud Goksoy, 2016: 273) or to a "an alteration in the order in which events occur, the pace at which they occur, or in the configuration of events" (Zepeda, 2012: 26), respectively. Due to the salience of socialization and learning as the most important mechanisms of foreign policy Europeanization in the referenced literature, those will be the mechanisms that we will try to identify and correlate to any eventual domestic change. If identified, the domestic changes caused by Europeanization will be assessed through Börzel and Risse (2003)'s three degrees of depth regarding that phenomenon: absorption, accommodation, and transformation. Additionally, we also intend to frame Portuguese positioning regarding nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and determine the usefulness of Europeanization as an analytical approach to the study if, or how, Portugal is influenced by the EU on those matters.

CHAPTER 1 – State of the Art

1.1 - Introduction to Europeanization

According to Mjoset (1997, apud Featherstone, 2003: 5), Europeanization has acquired different significances throughout history. Featherstone (2003: 5) identifies four categories attached to the term: a historical process, a matter of cultural diffusion, a process of institutional adaptation, and the adaptation of policy and policy processes.

The first category directs us to the use of the concept to describe the dissemination of European norms and authority, for instance, regarding the Portuguese imperial endeavors (Featherstone, 2003:6). The usage of the term for transnational cultural diffusion, on the other hand, refers to the dispersal of cultural identities, norms, and ideas, as well as behavior patterns within Europe (Featherstone, 2003: 7). An interesting example of such phenomenon can be found in a study by Soysal (1994: 166) regarding the assimilation of European-based values by Turkish immigrants in Germany. However, the concept of Europeanization is currently most frequently applied to study the "domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership", which can be used in a variety of perspectives, centered at the EU or domestic levels, and relating to its effect on actors, institutions or public policies (Featherstone, 2003: 7). In other words, Europeanization is mostly used in the context of the latter two of the four categories identified by Featherstone, which are the ones that can help us better understand the relationship between Member States and the EU. As that is the goal of our research, it becomes important to trace the origin of this category of the term.

From the late 1950's onwards, literature on the theories of European integration - which started with economic cooperation through the European Coal and Steel Community (formally established in 1951) - was published almost exclusively using liberal intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist approaches, and studied European integration as a 'bottom-up' process (Major, 2005: 176, 179). Therefore, according to the intergovernmentalists, the European Comunities's (EC) politics constituted a prolongation of national level politics, since each national government saw the EC according to domestic interests (Moravcsik, 1991: 25). Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, defended that regional integration would occur when societal actors decided to rely on supranational institutions to realize their demands instead of on their own governments. Subsequently, as these institutions increase their authority and legitimacy, integration would happen 'quasi-automatically' (Haas, 1958: xiv-xv; Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998: 6).

As such, neofunctionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists would 'fight' each other, usually regarding the spill-over effects and their consequences, as well as the power and nature of supranational institutions (Risse, 2005: 294). Essentially, for decades, research in the field of European Studies was mostly concerned with "how to conceptualize and explain the effect of Member States on processes and

outcomes of European integration" (Börzel, 2003: 1-2), with the emphasis being put on European level institution-building (Risse, Cowles & Caporaso, 2001: 3).

Since the mid-1970's, neofunctionalist arguments on European integration became less popular due to the 1966-1967 'empty chair crisis', which led to a 'dark age' for integration theory (Caporaso & Keeler, 1993: 36-37). Haas declared its obsolescence, and theoretical discussions showed a tendency for a validation of intergovernmentalism in detriment of neo-functionalism (Sandholtz & Stone Sweeting, 1998: 3). As such, conventional wisdom regarding European integration studies was that this area was progressing without visible loyalty allocations from the Member States to the EU level, a line of thought that would last until the early 1990's (Risse, 2005: 205).

However, with the intensification of the integration process in the late 1980's (Moumoutzis, 2011: 607), a growing interest in the way Member States reacted to the influence of EU institutions and processes occurred (Börzel, 2003: 1). European integration "was set back on track (…) deepening in rather spectacular ways with the Single European Act" (1986) (Puchala, 1999: 319). Consequently, decades later, European integration scholars started to realize that EU level decisions were impacting on national policies, and that their attention should now be anchored on the study of those impacts (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004: 3). As new questions started to arise, "research on Europeanization was born (…) [and] quickly become an exciting research area without which the study of European integration is incomplete" (Börzel & Risse, 2007: 483-4). Therefore, throughout the 1990's, researchers were becoming progressively more interested in how EU institutions and processes impacted on the domestic level (Börzel & Risse, 2007: 484). Their works typically applied a 'top-down' model to study this effect (Major, 2005: 179), a change that, according to Börzel and Risse (2009: 1), fitted "nicely with recent developments in international studies," a field that had been focusing more and more on how international institutions and norms are impacting domestically.

Finally, it is important to note that up until the mid-2000's, Europeanization literature was mostly limited to the study of the impact of European integration on EU Member States, (Schimmelfennig, 2015: 5), although a few studies had been conducted on 'quasi-Member State countries' (e.g. Switzerland [Sciarini, Fischer & Nicolet, 2004]). However, in very recent years, Europeanization literature has started to include candidate countries for EU accession (Sedelmeier, 2011. 5), focusing increasingly on the Eastern and Mediterranean neighborhood of the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2015: 5).

1.2 - Theorizing Europeanization

Before we analyze some of the most prominent works on Europeanization, it is important to make a clear distinction between European integration and Europeanization, given the evident link between the two concepts. Political integration was famously defined by Haas (1958: 16) as

> The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.

European integration focuses on the delegation of sovereignty of an entity to a supranational organization (like the EU), while Europeanization is just an instrument in the wider context of European integration, without which it would not exist (Major, 2005: 178). Despite the wide use of the term, one of the first precise definitions for Europeanization (and an exceedingly cited one) was given by Ladrech (Featherstone, 2003: 12) as he studied the French domestic policies and institutions. According to Magone (2004: 10), Ladrech's work led to the inflationary use of the concept. Europeanization was conceptualized as a "process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making" (Ladrech, 1994: 69).

Another important contribute regarding the conceptualization of Europeanization was given by Olsen (2002: 923-924), who influentially believed that the key for understanding Europeanization resided in the separation of the concept in five distinct uses, namely changes in external boundaries; developing institutions at the European level; central penetration of national systems of governance; exporting forms of political organization; and lastly as a political unification project. However, due to his remarkably wide spectrum, the usefulness of this definition is debatable since any empirical approach would be discouraging or even impossible (Radaelli, 2006: 59; Moumoutzis, 2011: 610). Risse *et al.*, (2001: 3), on the other hand, defined Europeanization as

> The emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative rules.

In their work, the authors apply a top-down perspective to study the impact of the concept on the domestic structures of the Member States (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 1). They do so by employing a three-step historical institutionalist approach that starts with the assumption that "Europeanization by itself is a necessary but not sufficient condition for domestic change" (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 2). They consider that the starting point of an author's framework should be the identification of the European level processes relevant to a certain area (e.g. citizenship rights) (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 6). The second step concerns the 'goodness of fit', that is, the degree of 'fit' or 'misfit' between EU and domestic policies, which will generate 'adaptational pressures'. The lower the compatibility between policy sectors, the stronger the adaptational pressure, since European institutions will constitute a challenge to the domestic identity, principles, structures and practices (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 7-8). The importance of the goodness of fit

element as a factor for change is also highly emphasized by other scholars (e.g. Major, 2005; Moumoutzis, 2011; Börzel & Risse, 2003; Radaelli, 2003; Lenschow, 2006) and it is central to the understanding of Europeanization through top-down lens (de Fleurs & Müller, 2009: 6).

Thirdly, Risse *et al.*, (2001: 9-12) address the mediating aspects, that is, the institutional and cultural conditions that will dictate the domestic responses to the pressures at the EU level, making a distinction between structural and agency factors. Therefore, multiple veto points; mediating formal institutions; and political and organizational cultures are seen as explanations for the occurrence or absence of structural adaptation, while differential empowerment of actors and learning are seen as facilitating factors for agency adaptation.

The domestic changes caused by Europeanization (or outcomes) have been assessed in a variety of ways, although many of the qualitative variables are common to several authors. For instance, Börzel and Risse (2003: 69-70) distinguish three degrees of depth regarding that phenomenon - absorption, accommodation, and transformation - the latter pointing to a "fundamental shift of national practices" (Lenschow, 2006: 62). Radaelli (2003: 48), on the other hand, proposes a four-fold approach - absorption, transformation, inertia and retrenchment - the latter two typologies referring to cases where domestic governments resist Europeanization, and instances where opposition leads to 'less Europeanization', respectively (Lenschow, 2006: 62; Major, 2005: 180). Finally, Grote and Lang (2003: 226) include all five degrees of domestic change, recovering the typology that Radaelli excluded, namely 'accommodation' (which differs from absorption due to the fact that, while the latter only refers to the incorporation of European requirements and inputs, accommodation implies the adaptation of existing structures [Lenschow, 2006. 62]). Curiously, Radaelli's, Börzel and Risse's, and Grote and Lang's different classifications of the outcomes of Europeanization are offered in the same book (The Politics of Europeanization [Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003]), a leading work on Europeanization.

It is also important to highlight Börzel's (2002: 208) interesting take on Member States' responses to Europeanization. According to the author, at least in the area of regulatory policy, two factors should be considered regarding a country's strategic choice in terms of policy shaping: policy preferences and action capacity. As such, economically advanced countries are more likely to act as 'pace-setters' and policy-makers, while economically less advanced countries ('foot-draggers') "lack both the policies and action capacity necessary for uploading." Alternatively, countries with a medium-level of economic development often act as 'fence-sitters' neither pushing nor opposing policy initiatives (Börzel, 2002: 208-209). Another prominent definition of Europeanization, by Radaelli (2000: 4) describes

> Processes of (a) construction; (b) diffusion; and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules,
> procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms which
> are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated within the
> logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.

This conceptualization is also employed in a more recent contribution of the author where he studies the potential of a bottom-up approach to Europeanization (Radaelli, 2006: 59), a combination that Radaelli considers to be "well beyond a narrow, top-down notion of impact." Therefore, this definition emphasizes the idea of Europeanization as a process instead of as a unidirectional reaction to European influence. Accordingly, in contrast with the bottom-up model used in classic European integration studies, which starts at the domestic level and finishes at the EU level, Radaelli's (2006: 59-61) approach starts and finishes at the level of the domestic system of interaction. By doing so, the scholar attempts to avoid pre-judging that Europeanization "is really affecting the logic of interaction at home" (Radaelli, 2006: 61). This is particularly relevant given that attributing domestic change to the EU can be difficult since globalization must also be considered. It is also important to remember that the EU and its Member States are dynamic entities (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004: 3).

Radaelli (2006: 64) criticizes Börzel and Risse's (2003) belief that adaptational pressure and facilitating factors responding to it (actors or institutions) are a necessary condition for domestic change, as he believes that actors can choose and learn from Europe outside such phenomena. This observation is particularly relevant in the realm of Europeanization of foreign policy, which we will address shortly.

Downloading (e.g. of directives or ideas), and uploading (of national policy preferences) are two terms commonly used in the literature, and refer to 'vertical Europeanization', making a clear delimitation between the EU and the national level.

Although Borzel (2002: 193) influentially described Europeanization as a 'two-way process,' based on the vertical dimensions, Major would later be among the first scholars to see the concept as three-dimensional, including 'cross-loading' as an additional (horizontal) dimension within the CFSP (Tonra, 2015: 187). The term was explained as domestic change through the "transfer of ideas, norms and ways of doing things that are exchanged from and with European neighbors, domestic entities or policy areas". Therefore, it is a change 'due to Europe' and 'within Europe' (Major, 2005: 186) that happens when the EU provides the context for cross-border contacts and exchange of information and expertise (Graziano & Vink, 2013: 47).

1.3 - Europeanization of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy has been described as having unique characteristics because intergovernmental decision-making at the EU level makes Europeanization not only weaker and less likely to occur, but also more difficult to trace (Moumoutzis, 2011: 608; Major, 2005: 182). Despite being developed initially for application in the context of the 'communitarized' first pillar where policy processes are subjected to binding laws, in recent years there has been a growing interest in using the concept to study foreign policy in the Member States (Müller & de Flers, 2012: 19).

According to Magalhães (1988: 7), foreign policy can be defined as "the whole set of decisions and actions of a state in the external domain." Although traditional studies of foreign policy are mainly centered on a country's ambitions to maintain and increase its power and security, since the end of the Cold War the economic dimensions of the relations between countries have gained attention (Breuning, 2007: 5). Although the area of foreign and security policy is intricately linked to national sovereignties, it has become part of the European integration process through the EPC (introduced in 1970) at first, before being superseded by the CFSP in 1993 (Major, 2005: 187; Econimedes, 2005: 471-2). Accordingly, most analyses focus on the impact of the EPC and the CFSP on the development foreign policy practices within States using a top-down model. Nonetheless, the bottom-down aspect is also present in the Europeanization of foreign policies of the Member States, since States also project their interests and policy preferences onto the European agenda, taking advantage of their weight in the international arena (Econimedes, 2005: 472). A number of authors (e.g. Moumoutzis, 2011; Major, 2005; Grabbe, 2001; Mach, Häusermann & Papadopoulos, 2003) believe, however, that Europeanization is not reserved for Member States, but also for countries like Switzerland (Mach *et al.*, 2003); non-European countries (Major, 2005); candidate states; and covering the consequences of meeting EU requirements (Grabbe; 2001). Not unlike the discussions on the concept of Europeanization, scholars cannot find consensus regarding its range (Chrobot, 2007: 31).

1.4 - Theorizing Europeanization of Foreign Policy

The concept of Europeanization has been applied to the study of domestic policies far more often that to foreign policy (Wong & Hill: 1). Due to the distinctive intergovernmental nature of Europeanization of foreign policy, it becomes important to determine why national governments adopt European policy even though they cannot be forced to do so. As already argued, European laws in this area are not legally binding, making adaptational pressure less relevant (de Flers, 2012: 21). However, policy-makers at the national level may still decide to incorporate EU foreign policy norms, practice, and procedures in their policies.

Despite a growing interest in the study of Europeanization of foreign policy, there is still limited knowledge regarding the conditions and the functioning of the process, as existing literature is lacking in terms of systematic theory building (de Flers, 2012: 24). The application of the concept of Europeanization to the study of foreign policy only became popular in the early 2000s (Wong and Hill, 2011: 3) when Ben Tonra published a seminal study on the foreign policies of Denmark and Ireland (2000) and The Netherlands (2001).

Literature on Europeanization of foreign policy tends to single out socialization as the key mechanism of Europeanization of foreign policy (Baun & Marek, 2013: 10), even though it has only been superficially studied on the topic of Europeanization (Müller and de Flers, 2012: 24). Socialization can be defined as a mechanism of Europeanization whereby the acquisition of a supranational logic can

transcend certain national interests (Quaglia, De Francesco & Radaelli, 2008: 4). According to Meyer (2005: 18), socialization dynamics can "overcome gaps in mutual trust and worldviews among national representatives, thereby weakening the ideational influence of their ministries in the capitals." In CFSP institutions, national representatives participate in foreign policy negotiations where political collaboration processes and traditions become entrenched EU norms and values (Major, 2005: 186). Through socialization, domestic actors may change their preferences, even though there are no formal enforcement mechanisms (de Flers, 2011: 31; Major, 2005: 186).

Müller and de Flers (2012: 25) draw from Checkel's (2005) work on norm internalization to address the nature of socialization in CFSP institutions, and identify two degrees of socialization, namely type 1 and type 2 internalization. In type 1 internalization (or strategic socialization), the compliance of EU level diplomats with procedural norms and rules is done so as a strategy to reach domestic goals more effectively. A good example of this would be when an actor accepts a loss in a certain round of negotiations in order to achieve a cooperative reputation that will allow him to leverage a different outcome in a subsequent round (Müller & de Flers, 2012: 32). In this case, the reward for cooperation exceeds the cost of concession (Müller & de Flers, 2012: 25). Type 2 internalization relates to the support of CFSP participants for EU positions and policies because they want to promote common values, norms and objectives (Müller & de Flers, 2012: 25-26). Therefore, unlike strategic socialization, where there is a "strategic adaptation of behavior to social expectations or pressure," type 2 internalization concerns a change of identity or preferences, relating to a shift of allegiance towards solutions for the common good (Beyers, 2005: 900).

The socialization of national representatives also affects their uploading strategies to the EU level (Müller and de Flers, 2012: 27). Furthermore, certain conditions will affect the socialization process, like the autonomy of the national representatives; work experience; domestic socialization; or pre-existing beliefs (at the domestic level); the frequency and intensity of the social interactions of the actors; and the degree of politicization and reputation of an institution (at the EU level) (Müller and de Flers, 2012: 26-27). Due to the high frequency of interaction between national representatives in CFSP committees and working groups, profound socialization effects are expected (Müller and de Flers, 2009: 20). This phenomenon is also referred by some authors as 'elite socialization' (e.g. Fiott, 2006; Wong and Hill, 2011; Smith, 2003). Regardless of whether or not domestic representatives have been 'captured' by EU interests, Wong and Hill (2011: 10) point out that most studies suggest that EU level officials defend both national and European interests. Müller and de Flers (2010: 2-3), however, add another mechanism to the mix, as they discuss how socialization and learning in CFSP institutions have led to domestic policy adaptation and policy preference change.

Learning is prominently defined by Levy (1994: 283) as a "change of beliefs (or the degree in one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observations and interpretation of experience". The author believes that his definition stands out among others in the sense that it does not require learning to "involve policy change, an improved understanding of the world or

an increasingly complex cognitive structure." Actors actively look for information they believe will help them interpret an event, conducting experiments to test their assumptions. It is also important to note that understandings of experience are both part of a teaching and learning process, and actors go through great lengths in order to influence others' perception of events (Levy, 1994: 283-4). Thus, learning implies a 'change in one's belief system' (Müller & de Flers, 2012: 28). Another important point is that learning needs to take place in EU institutions in order for it to be considered a mechanism of Europeanization (de Flers, 2012: 28). According to Tonra (2003: 16), "the formal and informal norms within the CFSP conspire to create a sense of 'we-feeling' and community" where the positions of the committed individual agents and the regime as a whole are mediated though processes of social learning with the aim of protecting the political structure. However, learning is not necessarily social nor does it culminate in socialization" (Braun, 2014: 15)

Disaggregation of types and dynamics of learning is shown to vary among authors. For instance, Radaelli makes a separation between 'thin learning' and 'thick learning'. Thin learning relates to situations where actors readjust their beliefs strategically in order to achieve their goals, while thick learning is associated with fundamental changes on policy preferences and values (Radaelli, 2003: 52). Alternatively, Müller and de Flers (2012: 28) opted for three distinct conceptualizations of learning that are important in the context of foreign policy: organizational learning; lesson drawing/policy transfer; and policy-learning. Organizational learning involves "simple learning about process related behavior and strategy" (Zito and Schout, 2009: 1110), and it "can lead to changes in the understanding of administrative processes and routines both at the EU and at the national level." Within the ESDP, lessons learned on crisis management are institutionalized through the elaboration of reviews and reports (Müller & de Flers, 2012: 28).

Policy learning takes place through networks of policy 'middlemen' (e.g. working groups) (Sabatier, 1988 apud Müller & de Flers, 2012: 29) where information sharing, learning from collective EU experiences, and the evolution of common knowledge may lead to changes of problem definitions, potentially resulting in different policy preferences among domestic actors (Müller & de Flers, 2012: 29). According to Müller and de Flers (2012: 27), literature on European foreign policy often references the importance of foreign policy-learning. Finally, lesson drawing/policy transfer is based on a mutual learning and teaching process between the Member States. As such, the EU serves as an 'arena' for exchange and imitation of ideas (Müller & de Flers, 2012: 29-30).

Since only 10-15% of the foreign policy issues are actually decided by the Council of the EU, most of them are prepared and decided at the level of CFSP committees and working groups (Müller & de Flers, 2012. 24). Quaglia, De Francesco, and Radaelli (2008: 3) add that research has been conducted on whether socialization can be detected in Commission expert committees, comitology committees, and in the College of the Commission as well. Europeanization occurs by means of Member State representatives' influence on preference formation at the domestic level (Müller & de Flers, 2012: 24). Finally, it must be emphasized that mechanisms do not equate with Europeanization, as they are not

"necessary conditions for it to take place and not in every case do they lead or are followed by Europeanization processes" (Pomorska, 2011: 168). For instance, it is possible for considerable socialization to occur without it leading to domestic change (Radaelli, 2006: 68).

Pomorska (2011: 3), despite recognizing the important part played by socialization and learning in the field of Europeanization of foreign policy, adds another mechanism to the mix: conditionality. As such, in her study on Polish foreign policy, she determines that "conditionality works prior to the active observer period and the enlargement", while the other two mechanisms work in a subsequent stage. According to Dimitrova (2002: 175), conditionality is possibly the most important element of 'enlargement governance', with the influence of the EU being strongly felt on candidate states.

1.5 - Europeanization in Portugal

According to Magone (2004: 16), Portugal is one of the least researched countries in Europeanization literature, mainly due to the fact that it is a small and semi peripheral country that does not have enough influence to be a significant player in the European integration process. Wong and Hill (2011: 7) believe that small countries like Portugal have aligned with EU positions so that they can increase their involvement in economic and political issues, a forced adaptation to a changing world environment. However, this does not necessarily implicate a strangling of Portuguese foreign policy as sometimes the EU allocates institutional resources to allow smaller states to "profile themselves in 'new' regions or to project their own interests as European interests." Nevertheless, despite gathering some attention during the period leading to its ascension to the EU, very few studies concerning the effects of the Europeanization processes on the Portuguese political system were published in the following years (Magone, 2004: 17).

Processes of Europeanization in Portugal tend to be top-down, while influence regarding policy-making (bottom-up processes) is very restricted. However, instances of Portuguese Presidency in the Council of the EU contributed to a highlighted profile in those matters, and the country is still influential in aspects that relate to its vital interests (Magone, 2004: 20). While more general studies on Portuguese foreign policy are still far from abundant, they tend to emphasize its Europeanization (Raimundo, 2013a: 243). Vasconcelos (1996: 275) argued that Portuguese foreign policy has tended shown 'Mediterranization' tendencies, due to concerns with developments in the Maghreb region as well as for the opportunity it poses for the country to improve its status among other EU Members (in regard to the ESDP). Although Vasconcelos' study might appear to be dated nowadays, Tsardanidis and Stavridis' (2011: 118) more recent work leads us in the same direction, arguing that Portugal has "tended to concentrate more on [its] immediate neighborhood." Regardless, in the realm of Europeanization of Portuguese foreign policy, studies are almost absent (Raimundo, 2013b: 1).

1.6 - The EU's Role in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

According to Kienzle and Vestergaard (2013: 372), research the area of non-proliferation in EU studies dates back to the 1980's and early 1990's, an interest that can be attributed to the fact that Member States had started to coordinate their national policies in the framework of the EPC. As such, the two decades were well-researched periods in terms of European non-proliferation policy (Kienzle, 2009: 5), during which Harald Müller stood out as a pioneer and a particularly active researcher, authoring or editing several works in the field, albeit with an almost exclusive focus on national policies (Blavoukos, Bourantonis & Portela, 2015: 4; Kienzle, 2009: 5) (e.g. Müller [1987]; Müller [1989]; Müller [1991]). In general, research was more focused "on Member States and the coordination between them than in the common policies within international institutions (…) which reflected the state-centric design of European non-proliferation policies" (Kienzle & Vestergaard, 2013: 372).

According to Kienzle and Vestergaard (2013: 372), accession of France to the NPT, along with the development of the CFSP (established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993), led scholars to focus increasingly on the creation of a common European nuclear non-proliferation policy. Nonetheless, in 1997, Müller and van Dassen (1997: 69) had already concluded that European non-proliferation policies have been converging due to institutional developments. Regarding the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMDs, adopted by the Council in 2003, authors like Portela (2003), Meier and Quille (2005) or Álvarez-Verdugo (2006) gave relevant contributions. During this period, a new trend of research surfaced, recurrently comparing the American and European strategies against proliferation of WMDs (Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013: 372). In any case, ever since the strategy was released, EU and non-proliferation studies have 'mushroomed' (Blavoukos, Bourantonis & Portela, 2015: 5), although most of the literature is mostly policy-oriented empirical research (Kienzle, 2009: 4), engaging only marginally with theory (Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013: 372; Blavoukos, Bourantonis & Portela, 2015: 5), and mostly focusing on the nuclear side of non-proliferation (in detriment of the chemical, biological and radiological) (Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013: 374). Therefore, according to Kienzle and Vestergaard (2013: 374), as the EU achieved a growing recognition among scholars as a non-proliferation actor, researchers became interested in its potential role and effectiveness in international affairs, even if no consensus in those matters was achieved, and despite a general conviction that the EU was not under any immediate WMD threat.

Throughout the 2000's, several works addressed the role of the EU as a non-proliferation actor, focusing mainly on the negotiations that took place regarding Iran (e.g. Bergenäs, 2010; Wanis-St, 2012), or in the sanctions that were imposed against the country (e. g. Sauer, 2007; Borszik, 2016). According to Kienzle and Vestergaard (2013: 374) there has been an increasing interest in the study of the EU's reaction to the Iranian nuclear crisis.

CHAPTER 2 – The EU's Role in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

2.1 - The First Years

Although security and foreign policy were not part of the European integration project from the beginning, nuclear non-proliferation was indirectly included in the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, one of the two treaties of Rome, which founded the EURATOM in 1957. Member States were obligated to allow EURATOM to inspect their civilian nuclear activities (Höhl, Müller, Schaper & Schmitt, 2003: 9). Initially created to organize Member States' nuclear research initiatives with peaceful purposes, this Treaty focused on "pooling knowledge, infrastructure and funding of nuclear energy" (Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, s.a.).

The outline of a European non-proliferation policy started being drawn in the late 1960s through the EPC mechanism (Grand, 2000: 6). Nevertheless, according to Kienzle and Portela (2015: 49), the external role of the EU (then the EC), in the field of non-proliferation, only started in 1981 when, also in the context of the EPC, the Council formed a working group on nuclear questions. Initially a secret body, this working party was only formalized in 1986 with the Single European Act (Van Ham, 2011: 1). Its creation provided the Member States with a framework within which they could coordinate national positions in international fora, and led to the production of a few common statements in the context of the UN and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 49), a "group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" (About the NSG, s.a.). One of the most remarkable actions of the EU in this field happened in 1986, when the European Council instituted an arms embargo on South Africa, prohibiting commerce or trade of major nuclear supplies (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 49).

Between 1985 and 1990, as nuclear proliferation was becoming an increasingly prominent security concern (Cornish, van Ham & Krause, 1996: 31), the EC presented common declarations at the 1987 UN Conference on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as at the 33th General Conference of the IAEA in 1989. At the 1990 European Council meeting in Dublin, a common document on non-proliferation was adopted, and if not for France's opposition (the country was still not a signatory of the NPT), a common declaration could have ensued at the 1990 NPT RevCon (Grand, 2000: 10). It should be mentioned, however, that not only the EU cannot legally act for its Member States, it is also not a signatory of the treaty. Therefore, its participation within Review Conferences "stems from its own Member States and their agreement to coordinate and speak as one block in certain issues" (Dee, 2015: 78).

However, it was with the signing of the EU Treaty in Maastricht, in 1992, and subsequent establishment of the three pillars - one of them relating to the CFSP - as well as with France's signing of the NPT, that the EU was empowered to deal with security matters and felt compelled to upgrade its role as a non-proliferation actor (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 49). At same time, the collapse of the Soviet

Union – which caused the end of the bipolar configuration of the international system – created some room for multilateralism (Kissack, 2013: 408; Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 49). Accordingly, as 'arms control,' 'non-proliferation,' and 'disarmament' were identified as key areas for the CFSP, the Member States started presenting common proposals at international conferences, a trend which would culminate with the EU's campaign for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 49). Therefore, if from 1989-1990 the shaping of a European non-proliferation policy had become evident (Grand, 2000: 6), the adoption of a joint action (European Council, 1994) in 1994 calling for the NPT to be extended indefinitely and without conditions (Müller, Below, Wisotzki, 2013: 311) would lead to its concretization. In the same year, a proliferation crisis in Ukraine would be resolved, as the country signed the Lisbon Protocol to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) that envisaged the removal of former Soviet nuclear weapons from Ukraine's territory, as well as its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapons state. Although the START I was a multilateral agreement between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, after Kiev's Parliament refused its ratification, the EU was essential for its success (Müller and van Dassen, 1997 apud Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 53). This crucial role played by the EU (Müller, Below, Wisotzki, 2013: 311) resulted in a very important diplomatic accomplishment (Grand, 2000: ix), made possible by the EU's united stance (Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013: 374), regardless of whatever divergences may have occurred between Member States (Grand, 2000: ix).

In the mid 1990's the EU also got involved in the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) efforts in Russia, as a result to nuclear traffic events that took place in the first half of the decade (Höhl, Müller, Schaper & Schmitt, 2003: 12). This program sought to prevent the diversion of sensible materials by destroying former Soviet WMD arsenals and establishing verifiable safeguards (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 52). After 1995, the EU continued to gather increasing visibility as an actor in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. In 1997 the EU became a member of the executive board of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, which was entrusted with building two light-water reactors in exchange for North Korea's nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, North Korea's clandestine nuclear program would lead to the EU's suspension of technical assistance five years later. In 1999, the EU adopted a common position which focused on "the promotion of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty" (CTBT) (Council of the EU, 1999) as well as a Council Decision regarding its implementation, two years later (Council of the EU, 2001). The CTBT prohibits all nuclear test-explosions, regardless of the purpose (military or otherwise), and has not currently entered into force, because not all of the 44 countries deemed 'nuclear-capable' (included in the annex 2 of the Treaty) have ratified it (Summoning States to Ratify the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (…), 2011).

In 2000, with Portugal assuming the Presidency the Council, the latter would adopt another Common Position, which listed a set of measures that, in line with the EU's objective of "strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime," would promote the favorable outcome of the 2000 RevCon (Council of the EU, 2000). Its implementation occurred through both national and collective

actions, and during the 2000 NPT Review Conference the EU assisted in the devise of the final document, which included new disarmament commitments to be carried out by the nuclear-weapons-states. Interestingly, the EU Member States were represented in the RevCon in two key groups, namely the nuclear-weapons states and the New Agenda Coalition (Müller, Below, Wisotzki, 2013: 311), a pro-nuclear disarmament group where five non-European Powers were grouped alongside Ireland and Sweden. In the following year, the EU also adopted a common position on the Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (Council of the EU, 2001) regarding the promotion of its finalization and universalization (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 50). Regardless, during the period covered so far, the objectives pursued were lacking in ambition and were overly conservative, despite a great improvement of coordination since the early 1990's (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 51). The EU's underwhelming response to India and Pakistan nuclear tests in 1998, or the lack of a united stance regarding the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, for instance, can be seen as good examples of weak support for regional initiatives. On the other hand, Iran, (through a policy of constructive engagement), Ukraine, and Russia received considerable attention (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 54-55).

2.2 - The Path towards a WMD Strategy

The aftermath of 9/11 forced the EU to become more involved in the fight against proliferation, as allegations that Iran possessed WMDs turned the subject into one of the most salient issues of the international security agenda (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 49-50). The Bush Administration saw the terrorist attacks taking place in American soil as "a confirmation of its long held view that multilateral arms control norms were largely useless" (Müller, 2013: 356), and proceeded with military action (operation 'Iraqi Freedom'). Their actions impacted gravely in terms of European integration, as Member States assumed contending positions regarding the subject (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 49-50). The US, as a country with which the EU maintained an 'irreplaceable' relationship (Council of Europe, 2003) of undeniable centrality, in the field of non-proliferation (Bourantonis, Blavoukos, Portela, 2015: 8), and by virtue of sharing a NATO membership with 11 of the 15 EU Member States (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 50), would be responsible for the occurrence of great disagreements among European States that deeply affected the EU. Those divisions emerged as a 'wake-up call' for Europe's political leaders (Kienzle, 2013: 1143) providing them with the essential impetus to develop a clearer, more solid WMD non-proliferation policy (Ahlstrom, 2005: 32).

In the context of this increased attention that was being paid to non-proliferation, in June 2003, the Council Secretariat presented a draft of the EU's strategic aims in those matters to the PSC, which would result in two documents, namely the 'Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMDs' and the 'Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMDs.' Thus, while the former document "restated the EU's commitment to strengthen existing multilateral arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament processes," the latter

"describe[d] measures to be undertaken by the EU" (Ahlstrom, 2005: 32-34). Those documents were presented at the Thessaloniki European Council days later, and after an intensive negotiation process, the final version of the EU's WMD strategy was published alongside the European Security Strategy (ESS), in December 2003 (Van Ham, 2011: 3).

2.3 - EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD

It was not possible to find a coherent EU policy in the field of nuclear non-proliferation before 2003 (Ahlstrom, 2005: 30). However, while the strategy made the EU a more visible actor, it did not motivate its Member States to surpass their major differences regarding nuclear weapons (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 48), nor did it lead EU non-proliferation policy towards a drastic new direction. On the other hand, it was the first document adopted by the Council outlining common priorities and means of action in this particular area (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 56).

The document starts by identifying the proliferation of WMDs as an increasing menace to security and peace that the EU cannot ignore, using a very similar language to the NPT preamble. Consequently, it was considered essential that the EU's external action would address this issue (EU Strategy against proliferation of WMDs, 2003: 2). The ESS would also consider the proliferation of WMDs to be possibly the most significant security threat to the EU (A Secure Europe in a Better World, 2003: 3) and urged it to seek an multilateralist solution through "the implementation and universalization of the existing disarmament and non-proliferation norms" (EU Strategy against proliferation of WMDs, 2003, 5-6).

The EU also vowed to promote a more stable international and regional environment, in cooperation with its neighbors, through all its available instruments, including coercion (EU Strategy against proliferation of WMDs, 2003: 5; 7-8). The document covered three broad areas: the nature of the threat, the EU's means to address it, and the action plan for its implementation (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 56). According to Müller (2007: 182), the EU's WMD strategy was a sign that Member States' interests on non-proliferation were converging. In the same year, Annalisa Giannella was appointed Personal Representative for non-proliferation to head a new unit in the Council. This constituted an unprecedented effort by the EU in terms of institutional and financial capabilities to implement its WMD Strategy (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 57). Its adoption would follow a year that saw the deepening of several nuclear crises. Besides the US invasion of Iraq, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, and the IAEA confirmed clandestine nuclear activities in Iran (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 61).

According to Kiezle and Portela (2015: 58-59), the WMD strategy's effective multilateralism has led to significant progress in two aspects. Firstly, the 'non-proliferation clause' has to be included in all mixed agreements of the EU with third countries, binding them to a commitment to adhere to all the ratified non-proliferation instruments. It also included a non-binding commitment to join the other non-proliferation agreements. The second aspect refers to other kinds of support for international

agreements, as well as funding of non-proliferation projects through Joint Decisions and Council Decisions. In this context, the IAEA has been the recipient of the largest financial contributions. However, despite the 'notable intensification' of the EU's actions, they have been fairly technical and non-controversial, which hinders its political influence during negotiations.

The years between the 2000 and 2005 RevCon saw controversy, stagnation, and confrontation, as the latter session ended in complete failure (Müller, Below, Wisotzki, 2013: 151). Nonetheless, starting in 2006, the Commission's non-proliferation budget increased, mostly due to the creation of the new Instrument for Stability (IfS) (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 57), one of the "most relevant financial instruments available to support the IAEA," although lacking any real coordination with EURATOM (Lundin, 2015: 153). Besides being the main instrument to fund non-proliferation programs, the IfS also addresses conflict prevention, crisis management, and peace-building (Grip, 2015: 126). Its creation led to a reorientation of the EU's geographical focus from the former Soviet Union towards other regions, in particular Northern Africa and the Middle East, as EU cooperation was redirected from a regional outlook to a more global perspective (Kienzle, 2013: 41; 49). The result of that reorientation culminated with the establishment of a network of Centres of Excellence, an initiative launched in 2010, "in response to the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of countries outside Europe to mitigate CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear] risks", including criminal activities such as CBRN proliferation and terrorism (Mignone, 2013: 1).

On the other hand, its WMD Strategy did not turn the EU into a key player in North Korea or in South Asia, although in the following years the EU did succeed in the implementation of its own projects without the US, namely in terms of transfer of European standards for control of WMD-related exports, as European approaches assumed a decisive perspective of cooperation and long term-goals (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 60-62). In this regard, several Mediterranean countries were the recipients of export control assistance, although, according to Kienzle (2013: 46), only Jordan and Lebanon received substantial support. Between 2005 and 2006, the EU would also commission three pilot projects in South-East Europe in the framework of the EU Outreach Programme in Dual-Use Export control (Grip, 2015: 126). Dual use goods are goods, software, and technology normally used for civilian purposes but that may have military applications and can contribute for the proliferation of WMDs (Dual-use Export Controls, s.a.).

As Iraq's crisis was quickly overcome, several important contributions were made by Europe regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis due to the US' refusal of involvement. Foreign ministers of Germany, France, and the UK (the European 3 or E3) tried to reach an agreement with Teheran, although President Ahmadinejad's election in 2005 would render it void (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 62). Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for the CFSP since 2003, represented the EU in these negotiations, offering Iran several incentives like support for a civilian nuclear program and stronger commercial ties (Portela, 2015: 190). In addition, although the leadership role was assumed by the EU and the High Representative, the voice of the other Member States regarding this matter was still heard (Kienzle &

Portela, 2015: 62). These efforts constituted a 'remarkable feat,' as the EU was able to stop Iran's nuclear activities for about two years (Alcaro & Tabrizi, 2014: 16). However, as Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had joined the group of countries with nuclear technology in 2006 (Tabarani, 2008: 175), the E3 called the country to adopt an IAEA resolution (GOV/2005/77) that, after being rejected, led the UNSC to agree on sanctions to stop Iran's nuclear activities. Thus, by 2006, the E3 were no longer the only ones in conversations with Iran (Portela, 2015: 190).

Regardless, the negotiations that followed would still be led by the EU's High Representative, who acted as a 'bridge-builder' amid the Permanent Five's (P5) distinct interests, in a formula later designated as E3+3 or P5+1 (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 62; Portela, 2015: 190). Therefore, these European efforts provided the US, Russia, and China with a platform to coordinate and agree on policies, and a policy course that "combined potential rewards with an incremental recourse to coercive measures" took place (Alcaro & Tabrizi, 2014: 16). In the years that followed, several UNSC Resolutions would be passed on Iran, adopting further measures against the country's development of sensitive technology, and demanding the suspension of those activities.

In 2008, the EU adopted the New Lines for Action by the EU in Combating the Proliferation of WMDs and their Delivery Systems (Council of the EU, 2008: 2-3), backing the EU WMD Strategy's 'active implementation,' and assessing the threat brought by proliferation as an even bigger risk than in 2003. However, as the 2013 updated version of the document would show, this endeavor resulted in few concrete results and, according to Kienzle and Portela (2015: 57), the institutional changes brought on by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty were more significant. Regardless, the adoption of a WMD Strategy represented an important 'step forward' in the advancement of European non-proliferation policies to the EU, by reinforcing its focus on multilateralism, technical cooperation, and political conditionality, and by establishing "unprecedented institutional and financial capabilities in both the Council and the Commission" (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 63-64).

2.4 - From the 2009 Lisbon Treaty Onwards

According to Quille (2015: 71), the EU's WMD Strategy was "more innovative and more advanced than other areas being developed under the CFSP." Despite its many successes, however, the institutional changes brought on by the Lisbon Treaty were needed for progress to occur. The Treaty, adopted in 2007, set out the "principles, aims and objectives of the external action of the European Union," created the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (who is also Vice-President of the Commission), and established the EEAS. The EU drew on the "full range of its instruments and resources to make its external action more consistent, more effective, and more strategic", as well as "across all areas," to build a comprehensive approach (European Commission, 2013: 2). While institutional challenges remained, the EEAS managed to consolidate the EU's expert capability in the field of nuclear-proliferation (Quille, 2015: 72).

The institutional developments that were brought by the Lisbon Treaty, which "signified a notable shift in the EU's public face in the NPT," were expected to offer new challenges and favorable circumstances to the EU (Dee, 2015: 78; 80). As the 2010 RevCon took place in New York in the following year, the EU's importance grew, as its statements were presented by Catherine Ashton (the EU's first High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) in the opening plenary session. This represented a significant change, since the EU's common positions used to be put forward by the rotating Council Presidency in the review negotiations (Dee, 2015: 85).

After a productive preparatory phase, the expectations were high, despite the tensions created by the Iranian nuclear crisis (Müller, 2010: 5), as secret nuclear facilities were found near Qom, in northern Iran, in 2009 (Onderco, 2015: 62), and the production of enriched uranium started in the following year (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 191). According to Müller (2010: 11-12), the EU's profile throughout the conference was still 'modest,' appearing 'strangely passive' despite the impressive output it produced. This can be seen by the EU Common Position, which was an expression of a very small common denominator, since France and the UK refused any concessions regarding their nuclear stances. Additionally, the Spanish Presidency remained mostly mute, and the vast majority of Member States showed too much discipline while France showed too little. As a result, "the EU's popularity did not rise [and] France's definitely sunk."

The EU's inability to speak with one voice constitutes a major challenge in terms of its performance since, in addition to the voice of the Council Presidency, Member States also act in their own national capacity, conveying in contradictory positions in several occasions. This can be seen as particularly problematic given the fundamental disparities between the Member States' views on crucial issues relating to nuclear disarmament (and nuclear energy, to some degree). In regard to nuclear non-proliferation, on the other hand, there has been an increasing integration among the Member States, as already mentioned (Dee, 2015: 78-79). In any case, no problems were solved by the 2010 RevCon, which deepened the crisis of the NPT (Müller, 2010: 15; 17). A notable example can be found in the Iranian crisis since, while the country "looked rather like a loser" in the RevCon, facing growing isolation throughout the negotiations, it avoided explicit criticism and condemnation (Müller, 2010: 14).

From that year on, the EU would agree on autonomous measures, banning European investments in the country, denying insurance to oil tankers, and embargoing Iran's oil related imports, strengthening the country's sanction regime (Alcaro & Tabrizi, 2014: 17). New EU sanctions in 2012, coupled with US' supplementary sanctions had severe financial consequences for the country, leading to a great depreciation of its currency, and an inability to pay for imported products, intensifying domestic criticism for Ahmadinejad's government. Rouhani's presidential election in 2013 brought more flexibility to his country's position and opened prospects for new negotiations. The following year, the EU suspended some of their sanctions on the trade of precious metals, and regarding some measures affecting Iran's auto and petrochemicals exports. This decision was made after the publication of an IAEA report that stated that the country had stopped uranium enrichment (GOV/INF/2014/1), in line

with the Geneva Interim Agreement (a 'Joint Plan of Action' between Iran and the E3+3 in November, 2013) (Kienzle & Portela, 2015: 193-195), which anticipated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in 2015. This agreement, a result of 20 months of intense negotiation, "put off the threat of a nuclear weapon for 15 years, and remove[d] Iran from economic and political isolation" (Nicoll & Delaney, 2015: vi). In the same year, the 2015 NPT RevCon took place, providing the EU with a stage to show the power of the CFSP and thereby increase its standing as a nuclear non-proliferation actor (Smetana, 2016: 137). However, once again the issue of nuclear disarmament stood in the way of a consensus between the parties of the Treaty, while the Council conclusions on the EU's Common Position merely emphasized the EU's internal differences (Smetana, 2016: 149-150).

Accordingly, it is unlikely that EU's performance in this field will be significantly improved by the input of the EEAS in the upcoming RevCons, as Member States do not seem to be sold on the idea of having the diplomatic service speaking on their behalf on a subject so intricately connected to their energy and security preferences. Nonetheless, despite its limitations, it should be highlighted that the EU did manage to carve itself a role as a "'flag-waver' for multilateralism" during the Review Conferences. Therefore, as the intergovernmental facet of the Member States' foreign policy stands in the way of the EU's goal of becoming an essential non-proliferation actor throughout the globe, it would seem that the full potential of the CFSP and the EEAS remains in danger of never being fully unlocked.

CHAPTER 3 – Europeanization in Portugal: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

3.1 - Portuguese Discourse and International Presence

Despite facing insinuations from Ghana that it could receive "atomic weapons through NATO for use in Africa" in 1965, (United Nations General Assembly 20th Session, 1965: 78), Portugal is a non-nuclear-weapons state that actively cooperates with international organizations working on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and is a signatory "to the most relevant treaties and international and regional mechanisms" in the field (United Nations General Assembly 70th Session, 2015a: 6).[1] Portugal is also a part of several international regimes and initiatives.[2] Moreover, the Portuguese Constitution calls for general, simultaneous and controlled disarmament (Constituição da República Portuguesa: 19). Exploration of uranium ore ended in 2000 (Convention on Nuclear Safety, 2016: 4).

3.1.1 - IAEA General Conference

From 1993 to 2001 Portugal frequently provided statements during the Plenary Meetings of the General Conference of the IAEA. While content relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, like nuclear safety or the IAEA's technical co-operation programs, was always an important part of the message delivered by Portugal, its discourse has shown to differ somewhat in organization and content throughout the years. Regardless, during this period some trends are easily identified, like the importance of the NPT and the IAEA's safeguards agreements, its regret over the unwillingness of Iraq and North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA, and its support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Portugal often started its presentations by highlighting their alignment with the position of the EEC/EU.

Portugal took the floor during the Plenary Meetings of the 45th Regular Session, which occurred shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, sharing its hopes that the event would not "jeopardize the international community's progress towards a safe international security system" (IAEA General Conference (2001), 45th Regular Session: 10), but the discourse did not stand out particularly from past statements. Interestingly, with the exclusion of its statements in 2007, which Portugal presented on

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[1] Namely the Nuclear Energy Control Convention; the Antarctic Treaty; the Safeguards agreement between Portugal and the IAEA; the Outer Space Treaty; the NPT; the Seabed Arms Control Treaty; the Agreement between the EURATOM Community, its Member States and the IAEA concerning the NPT; the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; and the CTBT (not yet in force) (Nuclear Legislation in OECD Countries, 2011: 12).

[2] Such as the Zangger Committee; the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Proliferation Security Initiative; the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; the Missile Technology Control Regime; the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

behalf of the EU (given its presidency of the Council), the 2001 speech preceded a period of 11 years where the country did not take the floor on the Plenary Meetings of the General Conference to voice its national perspective. Since 2012, however, Portugal has presented its position on nuclear matters yearly on this forum. Although mentioning the EU has been a recurring trend since the first document analyzed, it should be noted that it is not very highlighted in Portuguese discourse beyond an introductory note used to show alignment with its position. Nonetheless, its more recent statements have been used to show support for EU instruments in the nuclear field, namely the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence, the EU directives on Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Waste, and the Nuclear Safety Fund. The country has also revealed an interest in the E3+3 negotiations during the last two General Conferences and voiced its support.

Even though the peaceful use of nuclear energy remains the main focus of Portuguese discourse – which is appropriate, given the nature of this forum – a growing interest in matters of security can be detected throughout the years, and particularly during the 57th Conference, in 2013, since Portugal spoke in the first IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security in the same year. While condemnation for North Korea's lack of cooperation with the IAEA remained a trending topic, focus diverted from Iraq to Iran and Syria's refusal to meet their international obligations.

3.1.2 - First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations

Although Portugal was very involved in the discussions taking place during the 62th session of the 1st Committee, in 2007, by means of speaking on behalf of the EU, the country has few statements delivered on a national capacity during the period analyzed. In this context, the limited membership of the Conference on Disarmament is the outstanding subject in Portuguese discourse. This importance is reflected on decisions made by the country to abstain from voting on draft resolutions on disarmament when that matter is not given proper consideration. Portugal promotes its belief in a "non-discriminatory, fully inclusive and multilateral approach" towards disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation (United Nations General Assembly 69th Session, 2014: 22). The country has repeatedly voiced its concerns on the lack of progress in terms of nuclear disarmament and expressed its "frustration and dismay (…) at the slow pace – and that is putting it mildly" at which it has been happening (United Nations General Assembly 70th Session, 2015b: 9).

The catastrophic consequences and humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons' use and the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone constitute other common trends of Portuguese discourse. Additionally, the nation has also voiced its support for the CTBT and the proposal for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, as well as concerns over North Korea and Syria. The EU is not usually mentioned beyond the initial remark of Portuguese alignment with the position thereof.

3.1.3 - NPT Conference Review

Portugal was among the voices calling for the 'indefinite' and 'unconditional' extension of the NPT, by means of considering the proliferation of WMDs "one of the greatest dangers to international peace and stability." (1995 Review and Extension (…), 1995: 12). Although the country did not speak on a national capacity during the 2000 NPT RevCon, the EU's statements and working papers were presented by Portugal on its behalf, since Portugal held the Presidency of the Council of the EU.

Again, in the following RevCon, in 2005, the country opted not to produce a statement. However, in the context of the 2004 PrepCom, it submitted a report on the implementation of article VI of the NPT, and of paragraph 4c of the document "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". Both of those passages focused on the cessation of a nuclear weapons race and on progressive reduction of such weapons globally, with the aim of achieving general and complete disarmament. In that document, Portugal claims not to possess any WMD and to have always called for the adherence to all non-proliferation regimes, especially as a member of NATO and the EU. It also announced the ratification of the CTBT since 2000, for which it would contribute with three monitoring stations in the Azores. Portugal was among a large number of countries that submitted a working paper on the Zangger Committee, an action that would be repeated in 2010 and 2015, two Conferences in which Portugal decided to take the floor during the Plenary Meetings.

Therefore, in 2010, this self-described "non-nuclear peace loving country with a constructive mindset" (2010 Review Conference […]: 3), called for further advancement of the CTBT and the FMCT, strengthening of the IAEA, highlighted the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and urged Iran and North Korea to comply with the IAEA and the UNSC. In 2015, Portugal produced a very comprehensive report on the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 NPT, divided according to the three pillars of the Treaty. This document lists the Portuguese positions and contributions regarding the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and while many of these have already been mentioned, it is important to highlight a few others. For instance, Portugal has executed several demarches with other countries regarding the IAEA safeguard agreements and the Additional Protocol, especially among African Portuguese-speaking nations and East-Timor. The same was done for the universalization of the NPT, in a joint effort with the other members of the EU. Portugal also emphasized the importance of balance between the three pillars of the Treaty, and the development of outreach activities and training courses with other countries in the context of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also announced that it had promoted several outreach activities directed to its industry in the fields of nuclear safety and security. In an effort to raise awareness on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, those topics were included broadly by Portuguese Universities in their curriculum.

Finally, as Portugal took the floor during the 2015 NPT RevCon, it emphasized the importance of implementing the 2010 Plan of Action and to strengthen the NPT in all its three pillars. It also shared its frustration with the slow process of nuclear disarmament and called for a step by step approach with

'practical', 'concrete', and 'realistic' measures to prevent any kind of stagnation in that regard (2015 Review Conference […]). In a very comprehensive and direct statement, Portugal touched a wide variety of topics, including the humanitarian consequences of nuclear-weapons-use, its full commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the right of all parties of the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It also voiced concern over the North Korean and Syrian security crises, hope towards Iran, and expressed the importance of the IAEA and export control mechanisms.

3.1.4 – United Nations Security Council

Portugal was elected a non-permanent member of the UNSC in two separate occasions, from 1997 to 1998, and from 2011 to 2012. It also spoke on behalf of the EU in 2007. During the first period, Portugal was less vocal on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. Having to deal with Iraq's failure to cooperate with the UN Special Commission and the IAEA, an action that the country considered 'regrettable' (S/PV.3831), Portugal sponsored two draft resolutions to impose additional measures to Iraq, which were adopted as resolutions 1134(1997) (S/PV.3826) and 1137(1997) (S/PV.3831). The remaining EU countries (UK, Sweden, and France) voted unanimously on the latter, however France was among the five countries choosing to abstain in the former.

Following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, the Portuguese Representative presided the 3890th meeting of the UNSC, dealing with that issue. However, as it took the floor to make a statement on a national capacity, Portugal merely noted its EU alignment and a favorable vote on the drafting resolution that would declare that the two South Asian countries would not obtain a nuclear-weapon-state status. This resolution (1172 [1998]) was adopted unanimously by all members (S/PV.3890). In 2004 Portugal transmitted its first report in accordance with resolution 1540(2004) (S/AC.44/2004/(02)/44) (discussed below in greater detail).

On the following term as a member of the UNSC, discussions on nuclear matters focused on the Iranian nuclear crisis, although it is pertinent to note that support for the E3+3 framework was, for the most part, absent in Portuguese discourse[3]. In this context, Portugal's contributions, when it took the floor, were remarkably similar in structure and content for the most part. As such, the country usually started by requesting for the final report of the Panel of Experts to be made available to all Member States, in an effort to promote transparency and awareness. Portugal also voiced its concern over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, showed support for the sanction regime in place, and urged the country to collaborate with the IAEA. Portuguese discourse in the context of the 6753rd meeting of the UNSC, followed a slightly different direction, as the country presented a speech more in line with the ones

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[3] A diplomatic source (R1) latter explained that this was due to the fact that it was considered that this topic should be addressed mostly by members of the negotiating team – of which Portugal was not a part of – in an effort to avoid unnecessary noise.

produced for the First Committee. Showing its commitment to global disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, Portugal insisted that nuclear-weapon-states would have to do more (S/PV.6753). Regarding the Portuguese voting record throughout this term on nuclear matters, the country voted in favor of resolutions 1984(2011) (S/PV.6552) and 2049(2012) (S/PV.6781) along with France, Germany, and the UK (regarding Iran). The same applied regarding resolutions 1985(2011) (S/PV.6553) and 2050(2012) (S/PV.6783) concerning North Korea. Portugal also assumed the chairmanship of the UNSC Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (NPT/CONF.2015/3), which related to a secret North Korean enrichment program, and submitted a national report regarding its implementation (S/AC.49/2006/37). Finally, the country submitted several reports on the implementation of resolutions directed towards countries leading proliferation-sensitive activities in the nuclear field (e.g. S/AC.50/2010/43, S/AC.49/2009/43).

3.1.5 - National Defense Strategic Concepts

This document, produced roughly every 10 years, defines Portugal's priorities and global strategy regarding its national defense policy objectives. Although nuclear non-proliferation gained prominence in the last two Strategic Concepts, it was already mentioned in 1994, as Portugal acknowledged the importance of arms control treaties. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as other WMDs, were described in that document as direct threats to security, but nuclear disarmament, on the other hand, was not directly addressed. The Strategic Concept also identifies the development of a defense and security identity within the EU since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, and it states the Portuguese will to make a contribution.

In 2003, a new Strategic Concept was produced, underlining the link between WMDs and terrorism, and the role played by the disintegration of States structures and globalization. Non-proliferation was described, once again, as a serious threat to national and international security, and Portugal mentioned its support and participation in the multilateral efforts dealing with that matter, as well as disarmament and arms control. The country admitted the need to develop new capacities to deal with the growing threat of proliferation, which could possibly be carried out by non-state actors, in order to prevent it and fight it, in cooperation with its allies. Several references are made to the EU regarding its significant steps in the field of security and defense, an endeavor for which Portugal contributes, in hopes that the EU can play a more important role in conflict and crisis resolution.

The most recent version of the document, produced in 2013, followed the same lines of its predecessor, emphasizing greatly the threat posed by the possible possession of WMDs by terrorist groups. Therefore, Portugal made a commitment to contribute to the strengthening of the arms control and non-proliferation policies in international fora, and highlighted the importance of improving its national capabilities to prevent and respond to this threat, in close cooperation with its allies. The UN, NATO and the EU are considered to be the best way for Portugal to guarantee a relevant presence in

international politics, and to maximize the country's security. After the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU assumes new responsibilities as a security actor, creating a new challenge for Portugal, which states its intentions of meeting the new demands that are asked of it in the international scene. If the previous Strategic Concept already made one reference to the CFSP, the new document shows a particular commitment regarding cooperation and promotion of the CSDP, and the importance of pooling and sharing resources, as underlined in the ESS. However, as it was the case with the previous documents, no direct link is established between the EU or its instruments and the fields of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Still, those matters gained prominence in the last two documents.

3.2 - Europeanization Processes

According to a source in the MDN (R3), in Portugal the influence of the EU can be felt in the field of nuclear non-proliferation at the legal and administrative levels. According to the report submitted by Portugal in the context of the 2015 NPT RevCon, the country "has high standards regarding the control of products and technology that can be used in the development of nuclear or radiological weapons" (Implementation of the Action Plan, 2015: 4). However, the 1540 Committee Matrix of Portugal, which organizes national information on the implementation of the 1540 SC resolution, suggests that that was not always the case. An analysis of the document provided us with an overview of the Portuguese legal framework on "legally binding obligations (…) to have and enforce appropriate and effective measures against proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including their delivery systems, by establishing controls" (UN Security Council, s.a.). In that context, Article 275º of the Portuguese Penal Code (Decree-Law no. 48/1995), Law 5/2006 on arms and ammunitions, and Law 52/2003 on fighting terrorism deal with most infractions regarding the prohibition of persons or entities to engage in suspicious activities in the nuclear field. The latter "aimed to implement the European Council's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism within the Portuguese legal order, but the transposition seems to have not been perfect" (Ferro, 2008: 127).

The legislation for the protection of nuclear materials, on the other hand, is broader, although Parliament Resolution 26/2001, relating to the IAEA Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, and Decree-Law 348/89 on protection from ionizing radiation apply to most of the scenarios. The Additional Protocol is a "legal document that supplements states' IAEA safeguards agreements", and they grant the IAEA "complementary legal authority to verify a state's safeguard obligations" regarding their nuclear program (Additional Protocol, s.a.). The remaining legislation was not adopted over a specific period of time, and it extends from the late 80's to 2015. The Additional Protocol is implemented by the CTN, which is the home of the only Portuguese Nuclear Reactor. Presently, it is used mainly for research purposes, although it also serves a role in export control, sharing the information gathered with the MDN, the EU and, if necessary, doing field work when suspicious good arrive in the local customs offices (e.g. the Port of Lisbon) (R12). The SIS and the Strategic Defense

Information Services are also in permanent contact with the EU, sharing with its institutions and the other Member States a variety of information that can relate, directly or indirectly, the nuclear field, WMD traffic, organized crime, money laundering, or transnational terrorism (Quem somos, s.a.).

Regarding the trade of nuclear materials, currently the country applies European Council Regulation 428/2009. Decree-Law 130/2015 adopts the necessary measures for the implementation of that legal act, as well as Council Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP, concerning the control of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses. Even though it took 6 years for Portugal to close that gap in the legal framework, a source from the Customs and Tax Authority (AT) (R6) deemed that it was a priority, since the EU had been exerting pressure from the very beginning by carrying out studies, drafting reports, and asking Portugal for statistical data in order to follow up on any progresses. According to Article 24º of the Regulation, "each Member State shall take appropriate measures to ensure proper enforcement (…) [and] it shall lay down the penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation." The Regulation required a unanimous vote, because it fell under not only the realm of the common trade policy, but also the CFSP. The same source (R6) added that the adoption of this legal act was a matter of interest, although it should be added that Portugal does not carry out relevant business in the nuclear field. They (R6) also mentioned the fact that Portugal was 'light-years' behind in juridical terms on dual-use items export control before the Regulation was adopted.

According to Article 8º of the Portuguese Constitution, the norms issued by UNSC resolutions "come directly into force in Portuguese internal law," while the norms adopted by EU institutions are "applicable in the domestic order as defined by the European Union law". Therefore, sanctions laid out by the UN and the EU are binding for Portugal, although consensus is needed on the European end. On grounds of their nuclear programs, there are EU and UN sanctions currently in place against Iran and North Korea, but no autonomous restrictive measures were implemented by Portugal.

As already mentioned (R3), in Portugal the influence of the EU is also felt at the administrative level, in the participation of Portuguese customs officers in outreach programs, as well as their continuing training through European initiatives directed towards the goal of improving domestic capabilities to answer the challenges brought on by the trade of dual-use items. The activities controlled include export, re-export, trans-shipment, transit, and brokering. This information was also corroborated by a diplomat at the MNE (R2), who highlighted that it was important to develop capabilities to put in place measures against nuclear terrorism. This type of trade falls under the jurisdiction of the AT at the Ministry of Finance. In the EU sphere, the Dual-use Working party, the Dual-use Coordination Group (DUCG), and the DUCG Surveillance Technology Expert group are the most relevant working groups and sub-groups regarding dual-use export control (Final Report, 2015).

According to a source in the DSL (R6), Portugal's AT is a unique case within the EU, because it integrates in its customs services both the external trade licensing and enforcement areas. Licensing officers are responsible for issuing dual-use export licenses, and work in the DSL. The area of enforcement, on the other hand, is a part of the Customs Directorate of Anti-Fraud Services, whose

enforcement officers, 'feed' the informatics systems with data based on a risk analysis that is conducted to the transactions and goods presented to the local customs offices. The data is then shared with EU institutions and the miscellaneous multilateral non-proliferation groups that Portugal is a part of. The AT also includes the local customs officers, who work in the local customs offices, and analyze the trade documents and open the goods if necessary. The AT also works with the SIS, informing the latter of what exports need a license. The same source (R6) would go on to add that the EU did not provide training for any of these officers before 2009, but since then has made efforts in reversing that trend, especially when legislation is revised and approved. Consequently, Portuguese licensing, enforcement, and local customs officers have benefited from training programs sponsored by the European Commission in collaboration with the JRC in Ispra. This change was confirmed by a diplomat (R1) and a MDN source (R3), with the latter adding that the CTN and the AT's cooperation built a grid of qualified inspectors in the export control which reinforced the customs systems.

Portugal has also been involved in other EU initiatives in dual-use export control, as the AT has sent professionals to technical cooperation groups at the EU level – the committees. The DSL source (R6) also emphasized the importance of the 'peer visits,' a series of meetings organized by the Commission with the presence of every Member State, where good practices are shared and a set of more practical exercises are solved, regarding dual-use item trade. These visits constitute a learning opportunity for licensing officers, but in contrast, there were limited learning prospects within the committees for any professional already very familiar with the 428/2009/CFSP Regulation. When asked if these learning opportunities led to a belief change about administrative processes and routines, our AT source (R6) agreed and highlighted the evolution that had taken place in terms of know-how. They (R6) also mentioned an infrastructural change due to the use of a correlation table, an important tool in export control which makes a correspondence between Annex 1 of the Regulation and the classification of a given good, having been brought from the European to the national level.

The EU also organizes outreach seminars directed at the industry and academic sectors, in which Portugal participates, taking place every time there are changes in legislation. Similar initiatives have taken place in Portugal by influence of the Commission, although they (R6) also emphasize German encouragement in those matters. For this reason, and also due to advances in technology, the number of licenses requested has risen every year since, as the industry becomes aware of the requirements dictated by European legislation on the export of dual-use items. The number of seminars organized by the EU to support the implementation of export controls in dual-use items also increased. These initiatives are voluntary and have taken place in several countries in Northern Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, with Portugal participating in a workshop to train customs officers in Malaysia in 2014, in the framework of the EU Outreach Programme in Dual-Use Export Control (R6) (renamed EU P2P [Partner to Partner] Export Control Programme in 2016).

However, the trade of dual-use items does not constitute the entirety of the trade taking place in the nuclear field. While Portugal does not produce nuclear-related technology and equipment to be used

in the military, such items can be traded through Portuguese companies. Portugal follows the Common Military List which "sets the scope of military items controlled for export in the EU pursuant to the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on arms exports" (News by EU p2p (…), s.a.). Since 2008, the document is yearly updated, although João Madeira at the MND (R5) pointed out that changes have been minimal. Its most recent version was adopted in March 2016. Decree-Law 52/2015, updated yearly since 2011, is responsible for transposing EU Directives 2009/43/CE and Commission Directive 2010/80/EU, on the transfer of defense-related products, following the rules and procedures to simplify the trade of said products laid out by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.

In Portugal, according to two sources from the MDN (R4 and R5), the transit of military items in the nuclear field, which would have been dealt with by the DGAIED or the DGRDN (its successor) is negligent. Therefore, although R4 emphasized that workers at the DGAIED had benefited from participating in EU training programs, the accumulation of knowledge that had occurred did not relate to nuclear matters, but to the conventional arms field. Still, they added that such fact did not necessarily mean that the country was unprepared for that possibility. However, Madeira (R5) noted that the replacement of the DGAIED led to a loss of know-how, as most of the staff was no longer working in this field, even though he expressed its intent on pursuing further training for its staff. The former DGAIED also cooperated with the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base regarding the certification of defense-related enterprises to optimize the supply chain and economies of scale, and to promote the certification of Portuguese companies (Relatório Annual (…), 2014: 15). In the context of the implementation of Council Decision 2012/711/CFSP on support of the EU's activities, to "promote, among third countries, the control of arms exports and the principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP," the DGAIED participated in several activities. For instance, Portugal gave legal assistance to Montenegro on the export control of defense related-products in March, 2014 (Relatório Annual (…), 2014: 18). Regarding the dual-use items and the defense-related products regime, Portugal has the chance to add supplementary items to the EU list, although so far it has not done so.

According to a diplomat at the MNE (R1), there are working groups in the Council in the framework of the CFSP, one of which dedicated to non-proliferation issues: the working party on non-proliferation (CONOP). Portugal has a seat in this group, and participates by sending Representatives to these meetings on a monthly basis or more, from the MNE, which follows directly the political aspects of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (within the MNE there is a WMD and light weapons non-proliferation and disarmament division). Despite mentioning that the work done in Brussels, Vienna, Geneva, and New York City is a four-way effort and inputs fly across those cities (which are the headquarters of the EU, the IAEA, the CD, and the UN), R1 declared that, hierarchically, decisions made in Brussels tend to rank higher because there is a more extensive chain of command.

The work of these Representatives is mostly concerned with nuclear non-proliferation discourse, and like in any other EU working group, they attend the meetings bearing instructions from their capitals. Depending on the issue, instructions can be very specific or very general, and include the country's 'red

lines' as well. Based on those guidelines, which the Representatives must follow, the national position is shaped. According a MNE diplomat (R1), although nuclear non-proliferation is a matter that interests Portugal, it is not the most relevant subject. Therefore, the country is mostly concerned with making sure that the Portuguese obligations as a member of NATO are not tainted by the positions taken by the EU, and in keeping that balance. The same source shared a personal experience on an important aspect for Portugal – the civil liability in case of a nuclear disaster. In that context, R1 emphasized that when it comes to a very detailed level of precision concerning a text, Portugal exerts some flexibility. This is due to its perceived smaller dimension, political weight, and interests in the matter, which force the country to 'lose some to gain some.' However, R1 also gave an example of a subject in which Portugal never compromises, which relates to a tendency of the larger states to impose an excessively laudatory language towards themselves, in detriment of the smaller states. In situations like those, Portugal always demands equality of treatment for all nations.

According to a diplomatic source (R1), the instructions that the Portuguese delegates take to the working group on nuclear non-proliferation change across time as a result of their participation in those meetings (as well as events taking place in the international arena). Therefore, there is an evolution of the national positions, since they are complemented by the EU's positions, which also reflect the Portuguese interests – since decisions in the CONOP are made by consensus. In any case, in terms of defending the Portuguese national interests, there is not exactly a difference from the 1990's until today. As a general rule, the discussions in the EU sphere do not lead to impositions, but merely to an adjustment of national discourse, although it was pointed out that every Member State will eventually disagree with a certain decision – even if that rarely happens.

Portuguese participation in the CONOP results in the creation of an internal report – whose information is already adjusted to the European lines – directed to its Administration that then circulates among the Embassies. Therefore, Ambassadors in Brussels, Geneva, Vienna, and New York receive those documents and carry instructions to the international fora on nuclear non-proliferation. However, depending on where the instruction comes from, they are followed more or less precisely. Since those Embassies have great decision-making autonomy, if the decision comes from the PSC, there is a greater tendency to follow the national instructions in terms of developing the necessary paperwork for those sessions. In any case, there are not many changes in discourse in matters of non-proliferation – a statement that applies not only to the Portuguese case. However, we can note a change in note, since as the EU became more vocal on certain matters, the Member States followed the same line (R1). In that context, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, the EU's discourse 'toughened,' and sanctions became a more salient element – a trend that Portugal's discourse followed. R1 did note, however, that despite a bigger concern of the EU in 'being present' in the discussions on nuclear matters, nothing changed regarding its objectives. Interestingly, since the 1990's, and with its progressive integration in the EU, Portugal has shown a tendency to speak more often in international fora due to the fact that other Member States do so (R1). Another diplomatic source (R2), having formerly worked in on

European coordination and NPT negotiations, observed that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was little change in the way Portugal dealt with nuclear matters, but added that the country had become more vocal. For instance, R2 mentioned that Portugal was one of the voices behind the pressure that led the UK to take actions towards nuclear disarmament, acting as a bridge between the more extreme positions.

As a country in a very comfortable 'middle-ground' standing regarding nuclear matters (as a non-nuclear weapon NATO Member State), that can accommodate different positions, Portugal is subject to several kinds of pressure, since various States try to capitalize on its support. In Brussels, other State delegates seek informal conversations with Portugal, looking for support for their positions – although the same applies to Portugal. Delegates from other Member States also travel to the Portuguese MNE to make démarches, as it is usually the case with the 'bigger' states (R1). The same source (R1) also confirmed that the CONOP have undoubtedly played a role in terms of increasing Portuguese participation in seminars, conferences, workshops, and similar events on non-proliferation, by means of encouraging Member State involvement. The same effect, on the other hand, did not occur in the Portuguese participation in EU CBRN Mitigation Centers of Excellence projects, even though there was some enthusiasm in the early stages. Therefore, even though Portugal did not perform poorly, and showed competence, it did not take advantage of this learning opportunity.

According to a MNE diplomat (R2), the EU also organizes an annual conference on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in which Portugal participates, in addition the more important EU coordination in nuclear-non-proliferation, every RevCon and PrepCom, and every conference regarding this subject within the framework of the Middle East. Both diplomatic sources (R1 and R2) also explained that the country could not side with the New Agenda Coalition on certain matters, despite being a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament, because Portugal is under the NATO nuclear umbrella, a *status quo* that it intends to maintain, and that comes with obligations. A MNE diplomat (R2) also referred that another important aspect of Portugal's positioning in nuclear matters was its affirmation that progress in each one of the three pillars of the NPT should happen simultaneously. R2 also mentioned that Portugal's positioning in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament could be summarized with its interest in the strengthening of the regime (e.g. relevant treaties, IAEA's Additional Protocol), and the promotion of concretes measures on nuclear disarmament – a 'roadmap'– to be adopted by other States. Because these issues are not a first-order priority the country (very anti-nuclear), nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are only discussed in the framework of the CFSP, a statement also corroborated by another diplomatic source (R1).

A source from the MDN (R3), on the other hand, argued that the 'national philosophy' in the nuclear field was defined by three main aspects. Firstly, by multilateralism, that is, behaving in conformity with the international non-proliferation treaties. This has been done by transposing EU legislation and treaties signed by Portugal to the national legal framework, and by acting proactively in international fora on the subject. Secondly, by the containment of proliferation, which is mostly done by controlling national exports, by being a part of the multilateral export control regimes, and by sharing

the gathered intelligence. Lastly, by conducting research on nuclear and particle physics, where the country is described as very proactive and high profile (considering population and GDP). A Former Military Advisor at the Portuguese Delegation to NATO (R7) declared they saw the country as a 'conciliator' – a nation that tries to help in the achievement of consensus and is rigorous in the enforcement of the NPT. However, they emphasized repeatedly and confidently that Portugal was a passive player, due to its lack of interest in the topic. General Carlos Branco shared a similar view of Portugal as an unimportant, anonymous 'follower' with posture that is not an obstacle to consensus.

Regarding possible compromises made by Portugal due to its international obligations regarding nuclear security, a diplomatic source (R2) mentioned that the country had its exports of aluminum affected, as the metal is the target of some export control, although they also noted that it was not something very significant. Additionally, when Portugal participates in activities such as outreach initiatives, training programs, international conferences, seminars or workshops, there are costs to consider, and these expenses are often a significant burden. The export control regime imposed by the EU also has an economic downfall on trade, although the country does not carry significant nuclear interests. Portugal has also "offered assistance drafting legislation, registers, and national reports, as well as with implementation of export controls, and with training on proliferation prevention activities, outreach, and awareness-raising" (Portugal 1540 (…), s.a.) in the framework of the 1540(2004) UN Resolution. This Resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,

> Imposes binding obligations on all States to adopt legislation to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, and establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking (…), and encourages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts (United Nations, 2004).

According to a diplomatic source (R1), Portugal has helped a number of countries (e.g. Mozambique) develop their legislation in the nuclear field through EU-funded IAEA projects, activities in which Portugal has participated sporadically (R1 and R3). These actions show alignment with several Council Joint Actions of the EU on the IAEA (2004/495/CFSP; 2005/574/CFSP; 2008/314/CFSP) and, in particular, with Article 1(2) of each one of these documents. The country has also been involved in the EU CTR activities in the former Soviet Union, although that participation has not happened systematically (R1), and the resources it allocated thereto did not constitute individual donations, but instead were part of a combination of Member States contributions.

A MNE source (R2) also brought to our attention the 'awareness campaigns' carried out by the EU with third countries, an account that is aligned with descriptions of the EU as a 'flag-waver for multilateralism.' Therefore, it becomes important to research Portugal's role regarding diligences made for promotion of European values and conventions in the nuclear field. According to R1, R2, R3, and R9, diligences are concerted among EU Member States in a variety of matters, including non-

proliferation, and Portugal is usually designated to carry them out among the countries of the CPLP. A diplomatic source (R1) explained that this is not only due to a common language, but also because of the great similarity that exists between their legal frameworks.

According the same source (R1), Portugal has maintained a regular pressure among those countries by means of specific bilateral diligences; inclusion of the topic in more general bilateral diligences; and by offering technical support to the CTBTO's PTS on training courses and document translation, so that it can be more diligent. In Treaties such as the CTBT, the EU has little legitimacy to appeal to its ratification, as it is not a part of it, so Member States are called upon to do it themselves. R1 mentioned an interesting case in this context, regarding Angola, where the latter asked the CTBTO for a training program and requested Portugal to carry it out. Yet, since Portugal could not afford it, they asked the EU for funding. Since this subject was of the interest of every Member State, the funding was given, and the EU joined this initiative. Therefore, Portugal only had to pay its own professionals for their work, and the endeavor became affordable. However, in these circumstances several diligences are made by States, the EU, and several organizations according to their role.

Regarding the IAEA Additional Protocol, Portugal has urged Angola and Mozambique to ratify the document, and has contributed for the progress that has taken place in those countries. Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau, and East-Timor have been the target of different diligences, in the sense that they relate to the IAEA's Small Quantities Protocol, which is more adequate to their reality (R1). This document intends to minimize the burden of safeguards activities in countries with little to no nuclear activity (Safeguards Agreements, s.a.). The case of Brazil is unique, because, even though Portugal has made diligences for the ratification of the NPT, very little has been done after that occurred (in 1998), as it constitutes a more complex case for which Portugal does not have an active policy (R1). A source from the MDN (R3) argued that Portugal does not discuss nuclear non-proliferation with Brazil. Progress has been very slow, as the subject is not a priority for the CPLP countries. This lack of interest can be attested, for instance, by the underwhelming involvement of the majority of the CPLP countries in an international exercise regarding WMD proliferation that took place in Portuguese territory, within the framework of the PSI, entitled NINFA 2005 (R3). Conversely, in the aftermath of the PSI's Fifth Plenary Meeting in 2004, in Lisbon, Portugal organized a regional outreach meeting with African countries, and Guinea-Bissau was the only Portuguese-speaking nation not present (Nota Verbale, 2004: 5).

Common démarches are a subjected addressed in the meetings of the CONOP, where they are planed and announced, and take place in different formats. They can be carried out by the EU, the Member States, or by both, as a way to strengthen the message. The Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa and East-Timor, like other countries, have been mentioned during CONOP meetings, and, in those instances, diligences are usually open to all States. While Portugal is asked to do diligences among the smaller Portuguese-speaking countries, Angola and Mozambique represent a different case, since it is frequent for the EU to carry diligences itself, accompanied by delegates from several Member-States.

As mentioned by a specialist in international affairs (R9), nuclear non-proliferation is far from the being at the top of the agenda for the Lusophone world, which is reflected in the international conferences involving Portugal (or the EU) and Brazil or Africa. In their opinion (R9), diligences on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are made in a wider security framework, in which Portugal acts as a 'bridge,' without being a very relevant player. It was interesting to observe the different perspectives on this issue between two sources from the diplomatic (R1) and defense (R3) sectors. According to the latter (R3), Portugal is an asset for the EU in making diligences with the Portuguese-speaking countries, and acts as an 'enabler' in the framework of the EU, due to its ease in terms of communication with the aforementioned group, albeit not playing an essential role. Confronted with this assessment, a source from the MNE (R1) firmly disagreed, pointing out that the EU does not always have the necessary resources and knowledge to do démarches by itself, and therefore needs the Member States. In general terms, however, the EU was described by both diplomatic sources (R1 and R2) as carrying little weight on nuclear matters mostly due to the persisting contradictory views between Member States.

Despite the peaceful uses of nuclear energy being of minor importance in this work, we feel it should be mentioned that, according to an Emergency Preparedness source (R11), in Portugal there is no production of electric energy through radioisotopes, since nuclear power plants are non-existent. However, the country uses ionizing radiating in three main areas, namely medicine, industry, and research. Despite not being a 'nuclear country' Portugal is a technologically advanced radiological country. In case of a radiology emergency, Portugal has a multidisciplinary approach involving three main institutions - the Portuguese Environmental Agency, the Directorate-General of Health, and the CTN (which integrates the Portuguese nuclear reactor) – working under the National Authority of Civil Protection, and in collaboration with the military, the police authorities, and other entities. Additionally, in case of such an event, the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform is used to share every relevant information between Member States. Portugal has also been involved in EURATOM-IAEA projects in the development of national regulatory nuclear safety authorities (R1).

According to an Emergency Preparedness source (R11), the Commission is a preponderant influence at every level of radiological protection policy in Portugal, from technical implementation to research, and they also highlighted its impact in the Portuguese legal framework. Although R11 admitted that the Portuguese legal framework on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is fragmented, complex and scattered (which contributes to making it overly extensive), the European Commission clearly harmonizes the basis of radiological protection at the European level. Pedro Rosário (R12) at the Directorate-General of Health, noted that Portuguese legal framework on ionizing radiations has its origins in EURATOM legislation, namely 96/29/EURATOM and 97/43/EURATOM. A newly revised Basic Safety Standards Directive regarding protection against the dangers of ionizing radiation exposure was adopted recently by the Council (2013/59/EURATOM). As such, R12 explained that a revision of the national legal framework in place would soon be necessary – although it would be hard to predict exactly how – as the deadline for its transposition ends in February 2018.

CHAPTER 4 – Conclusion

In this work, we proposed to study how EU membership impacted on Portugal's interests, policy, actions, actors, and institutions regarding nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, tackling a largely unexplored subject with an analytical approach not yet used in this context.

Portugal is in a comfortable position on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Since nuclear matters are not a first-order priority, Portugal's positioning can accommodate to a variety of views, displaying flexibility during discussions in the CONOP. Although the country gives in on important issues, it draws a line with others, refusing a compromise (e.g. when States are not equally treated). For this reason, several countries try to capitalize on Portugal's support. Its priority, however, is that NATO's interests are not affected, since the state wants to remain under the nuclear umbrella. Discussions in the framework of the CONOP are extremely detailed, and Portugal takes a stand on some points, if it disagrees with the language in a particular document. Not surprisingly, our research was able to uncover some signs of a 'sense of community' among diplomats. Thus, a diplomatic source (R1) described EU negotiations as 'homy', and that delegates behaved like a family – to the point of being overly aggressive towards each other during some discussions in the CONOP. While Europeanization mechanisms can be identified in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, their impact on Portuguese actions, institutions, interests, actors, and policies appears to be very subtle outside the framework of the common trade policy (regarding the export control of dual-use items).

The analysis of the primary sources did not allow us to reach any definitive conclusion concerning a significant change in the content of Portuguese statements in international fora on nuclear matters, although it seems apparent that Portugal has recently become more vocal in this field. Although we are aware of some record keeping issues in the documents analyzed, since 2012 the country has produced a consistent and previously unseen stream of statements on the topic at hand. While we could not reach any definite conclusions about a change in tone (regarding sanctions for infractions) in the Portuguese discourse, mostly due to its absence before the 2010's (for the most part), we could observe that the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises are frequently included. However, we should emphasize that variables such as developments in the international system and the competence and interest of the actors involved can carry considerable weight. Finally, EU instruments and actions in nuclear non-proliferation or disarmament do not appear to have gained considerable relevance in the country's statements. Therefore, no significant changes have occurred in practical terms, since defending Portuguese foreign policy interests in this context is no different now than it was when the CFSP was taking its first steps. Additionally, since the EU is not a major player on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Member States may feel discouraged to pursue their domestic goals through the EU. As such, these matters are not discussed in the Portuguese Parliament in the framework of the CFSP.

Due to participating in the discussions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in the EU sphere, the instructions that the Portuguese delegates take to their meetings in Brussels have changed across time. Additionally, from the CONOP or the PSC emanate documents that circulate among embassies, influencing the preparation of the Portuguese Ambassadors in Brussels, Vienna, New York, and Geneva for the meetings they attend. Thus, Portuguese participation in discussions about nuclear matters in the EU sphere have influenced the country's discourse in the international fora, although there is a low salience of the EU in Portuguese foreign policy in this field of study. Preference change is weak and related to Müller and de Flers's (2012: 25) understanding of type 1 socialization, where the reward for cooperation exceeds the cost of concession. Still, it would appear that EU membership has impacted Portugal in other ways, encouraging the country to become more involved in global nuclear non-proliferation ventures, like international conferences, seminars, workshops, and national and international outreach. The State has participated in EU-funded IAEA projects, EU CTR activities, EU outreach programs in dual-use items export control, has given legislative assistance regarding the export of defense-related products, and has carried out démarches agreed at the EU level. A training project taking place in Luanda in the framework of the CTBT was an example of policy projection.

These actions show Portuguese adherence to EU policy objectives in the field, our second indicator of Europeanization. However, it should be emphasized that the involvement of the country in these initiatives appears to be intermittent, even if the limitations associated with its territory, resources, and political weight need to be taken into consideration. It is difficult to establish a causality between socialization or learning mechanisms at the EU level, and the Portuguese actions on the field, especially because there are several international treaties, initiatives and regimes at play, influencing the actors who take part in them – who may also be involved in European coordination. Once again, it is crucial to consider the impact of international developments – in the aftermath of a nuclear test, it is more likely for countries to decide that it is important to take action. Since participation in events such as workshops, seminars or conferences is encouraged in the meetings taking place in the EU sphere, it is possible to argue that the work that has been carried out in Brussels may have contributed for an increase of Portugal's interest in the nuclear field, which is reflected by the sudden surge of statements in recent years – even if it is difficult to establish a relation of causality. We also need to consider the possibility that Europeanization processes occurring in other fields may have 'spilled over' to the nuclear field.

The EU's impact can clearly be seen at the juridical level in Portugal, which has seen a significant progress in recent years in the nuclear field and, significantly, has led to a tightening of the country's control of the trade of dual-use items. Since certain military items are excluded from the trade competence (Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU), legal acts in this framework fall under both the common trade policy and the CFSP. Although decisions need unanimity, Portugal does not constitute a particularly strong obstacle in these matters, which serve the country's interests.

Not only has the 428/2009/CFSP Regulation paved the way for the country to fill in a significant gap in its legal framework, but the EU training courses provided allowed Portuguese bureaucrats many

learning opportunities, leading to a belief change about administrative processes and routines which were subsequently the cause of procedural change at the domestic level – our third indicator. We were also able to identify a form of organizational change, which was caused by the adoption a new tool, namely, the correlation table. This type of learning falls within Müller and de Flers' (2012) understanding of organizational learning, even though the process does not take place in a CFSP institution, but the Commission's science and knowledge service. As good practices and know-how were learned, and then adopted by officers at the AT dealing with dual-use items, administrative changes took place. The Commission, by means of creating a forum for the exchange of good practices between the Member States, shows us that there are definitely cross-loading processes in play in the field of dual-use items export. This horizontal dimension, as well as the uploading of policy preferences identified in the Portugal-led Luanda CTBT project, suggest that the Europeanization dynamics in our case study are more complex than expected, and might justify an approach that goes beyond a narrow top-down view.

Overall, it is our understanding that there are two vertical Europeanization processes in play. The first process is political and occurs through the participation of Portuguese diplomats and bureaucrats in EU working parties and committees. Our conclusions point out to a low degree of change, as no substantial modification of existing policies, interests, actors or institutions appears to have occurred. However, we believe that some ideas were incorporated in the Portuguese domestic structure, as many initiatives on the field of nuclear non-proliferation where the country has participated can be traced back to the EU. Portuguese discourse on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament has been influenced by the work carried out by diplomats in the EU sphere, even if no significant changes occur throughout the years. The degree of domestic change identified in this instance is 'absorption'.

The second Europeanization process refers to the influence of the EU in juridical and administrative terms, a change that relates to the old 'communitarized' first pillar. In this context, it is important to highlight the changes caused by the adoption of the 2009/43/CFSP Regulation in the AT, which led to a significant accumulation of know-how through the newly developed EU's training programs, resulting in a belief change regarding institutional practices. No significant change in the institutional structures of the AT took place, however. Thus, it is our understanding that the degree of domestic change can be qualified as 'accommodation'.

It is also essential to address some of the limitations of the work presented. In first place, it is extremely difficult to establish a causality between a perceived Europeanization process and the observed impact. It is also complicated to prove whether or not the observed domestic changes would have taken place without European integration (Graziano & Vink, 2007: 62). Secondly, while Europeanization has shown to be an effective approach to study the domestic impact of EU membership, by allowing us to ask the right questions, to seek probable mechanisms, and even to assess its degree of occurrence, it is also very difficult to trace, especially within the realm of foreign policy, where it is less likely to happen. This is particularly problematic when studying a country like Portugal, which has less interest in the nuclear field than other countries, particularly the ones with economic interests, nuclear

weapons, or that host nuclear weapons in their territory. Socialization in these circumstances is less likely to induce domestic change since Portugal can easily accommodate with different positions due to the fact that no serious interests are at jeopardy – even if there are financial costs to consider. Thirdly, qualitative research methods are not without limitations. Document analysis can generate an incomplete selection of sources, especially when some of the relevant documents are classified (e.g. CONOP meeting records), or provide insufficient detail. Regarding the interview method, its biggest limitations lie with the possibility that the interviewer may influence the responses that are given, being easy for a researcher to misunderstand or incorrectly annotate the information received. Additionally, the quality of the data is dependent on both good questioning and responses, as well as the memory of the interviewee. While unstructured interviews required a full understanding of the issue in order for the interview to be well-directed, semi-structured interviews lacked some of the flexibility of the latter. The use of the phone for conducting interviews limited the complexity of questions and responses, while the e-mail interviews, despite allowing interviews to take their time, left a lot of room for misinterpretation.

Lastly, it should be added that more research is needed. One of the biggest difficulties faced was finding interviewees that were available or willing to discuss these matters. For this reason, it would have been enriching to collect additional perspectives regarding the effects of socialization on the behavior of the Portuguese actors in the EU sphere (particularly in the CONOP) from other current or past delegates. However, given that the MNE only sends one representative to any given meeting, there is a considerable limitation regarding the array of possible interviewees. This fact showcases another limitation of Europeanization regarding matters that are worked by few national representatives in the EU sphere. In such instances, it becomes more unlikely that they can create change at the national level.

A deeper assessment of the changes that took place in the AT since 2009 can provide researchers in the field of Public Administration with an opportunity to understand the extent of progress that was made, draw lessons, test their applicability in other public sectors, and compare the evolution that occurred in Portugal with the experiences of other Member States. Another interesting project would be the development of a timeline regarding the Portuguese endeavors in this field of study, in order to provide future academics with a starting point to their research – since this topic remains underexplored.

Still, Europeanization is an analytical approach that is likely to prove to be more effective when applied in the context of a different case study. Given the economic interests of countries like Germany in the trade of sensitive nuclear materials, it would be interesting to study the impact of socialization in mid-level diplomats in the EU sphere regarding the adoption of tighter export control measures. One could also study the correlation between the discussions taking place at the CONOP, and some of the steps taken by the UK in the field of nuclear disarmament. In a period where the UK is preparing its exit from the EU, the study of its role as a non-proliferation actor can offer researchers a chance to engage in a rich field of studies. Their work can help determine the extent of the country's contributions to the EU and global security, and assess the potential impact of Brexit for the future of the CFSP, and the EU's positions on nuclear matters, as France will stand alone as EU's remaining nuclear-weapon-state.

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ID	Respondent	Interview Type	Recorded	Additional Information
R1	MNE Diplomat	Semi-structured + Questionnaire (e-mail) + Informal (phone call)	Yes	
R2	MNE Diplomat	Semi-structured	No	Linked to European coordination in the field of non-proliferation and international NPT negotiations
R3	MDN Source	Semi-structured	No	Directorate-General for National Defense Policy
R4	MDN Source	Questionnaire (e-mail)	No	Former worker at the Directorate-General for Armaments and Defense Infrastructures
R5	João Madeira at the MDN	Semi-structured + Questionnaire (e-mail)	Yes	Chief of Division: Logistics Industry and Research and Development of the General-Directorate of National Defense Resources
R6	Ministry of Finances Source	Semi-structured + Questionnaire (e-mail) + Informal (phone call)	No	Directorate of Licensing Services at the Tax and Customs Authority
R7	Former Military Advisor at the Portuguese Delegation to NATO	Semi-structured + Questionnaire (e-mail)	Yes	
R8	Carlos Branco	Unstructured (Skype and phone call)	No	Major-General of the Portuguese Army
R9	Specialist in International Affairs	Unstructured	Yes	
R10	Journalist	Questionnaire (e-mail)	No	Answers obtained through capable sources
R11	Emergency Preparedness Source	Semi-structured	Yes	
R12	Pedro Rosário at the Directorate-General of Health	Semi-structured	Yes	Physics Engineer with the 'Núcleo' (Division) of Protection Against Radiations

Frame 1 – Interviews Conducted