The European Evaluation Society

Conference:

Three movements in Contemporary Evaluation: Learning, Theory and Evidence

Seville, Spain

2002

Ulrich Schiefer

...firmly looking the other way.
Dissipative economy, evaluation and the end of the development paradigm

Abstract

Based on case studies in former Portuguese colonies it is argued that development co-operation is a dissipative economy aiming primarily at the reproduction of the involved agencies which are dissipative structures, that is, depend on the organisation of a constant flux of energy. The auto-poetic constitution of the interplaying organisations imposes strong filters on the perception of the realities at the receiving end of the development co-operation on all its agents. It is argued that evaluation is – at least in part - a ritualistic exercise intended to keep the aid money flowing in the interest of the agencies. Therefore evaluation efforts are put into an organisational straightjacket that keeps the blind spots firmly hidden. The development perspective as set by the organisations seriously limits evaluators by mechanisms of recruitment, training, field research conditions, reporting requirements and compensation. They learn how to ignore evidence in order not to jeopardize development theory.

Most evaluators would probably agree that the function of evaluation in development co-operation is to provide information and knowledge about the development efforts and their consequences for the developing countries. The evaluation feedback loop can be seen as one part of the circle that spans planning, funding, implementation and evaluation (as for example used in the project cycle).

This paper[1] argues that in some areas of Africa some of the basic underlying assumptions are not longer valid, if they ever were.

Evaluation in development co-operation is part of a complex system that I will call dissipative economy[2].

In order to understand the role and function of evaluation we have to look at the environment and at the conditions that define its inner workings

Or, to put in another way, we have to bring the observer into the picture, as Heinz von Foerster[3] has argued in his second order cybernetics.

Only in this way, with different perspectives of different observers, who all are part of the process, can we get a perspective on the blind spots in our observation.

The following conclusions are drawn from long term research in Portuguese speaking African countries about development co-operation

---

1 The results presented in this study were produced in a long time research context. At the end of the seventies the focus of the interest was the development of post-colonial societies, in the eighties the research moved to the development potential of agrarian societies (Research project "Agrargesellschaften und Ländliche Entwicklungspolitik in Guinea-Bissau" at the Institut für Soziologie der Universität Münster, headed by Christian Sigrist and funded by Stiftung Volkswagenwerk). Then the research was organised by the Centro de Pesqisa, COPIN, Bissau. It was in part funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
The research followed the real developments which invalidated the development paradigm and led to the research project "Disintegration of Agrarian Societies in Africa and Their Potential for Reconstruction" at the CEA, ISCTE, Lisbon, funded by FCT, Lisbon, Portugal (Project Praxis/P/SOC/1110/1998 // Poctii/Soc/11110/98). This project includes fieldwork in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and S. Tomé and Principe. Now the problem of traumatised African societies comes more into focus.

2 See Schiefer (2002).

3 See von Foerster (1994)

with agrarian societies in Africa[4]. While the conclusions might be limited to the case studies, the questions raised might apply to other countries too. Let us first have a look at some basic theoretical and strategic approaches:

1) The development paradigm has already been challenged by reality. Some societies (not only states) do not develop; they are breaking down. So we should also question the development paradigm theoretically and practically[5].

2) The development paradigm obstructs diagnostics and assessments. How can we get a real picture of the societies if we look through a prism of development? Diagnostic has some very real blind spots[6]. Fundamental questions like magic are completely excluded. Another taboo concerns political power. Disintegration and collapse of societies do not enter the development debate yet.

3) The upholding of the development paradigm against all evidence is a self-serving strategy of the agencies that are the dissipative structures of the dissipative economy. They need a constant flux of energy to stabilize their organisations.

4) Where evidence of collapse of states gets too strong, development aid and development theory are temporarily suspended, emergency relief and

---

4 For evidence to support the conclusions presented here see Schiefer (2002), Temudo (1998a,b,c,d), Temudo and Schiefer (2002).

5 Atteslander (1995:12) raised the issue of collapsing societies: "It is not social change in itself which destabilizes collective order but rather its monstrous acceleration which result from more disparate development processes. The inability to keep pace with change leads to crisis-laden collapses of order with entire societies." He takes up Durkheim's concept of: „Anomie as a classical term means normlessness, lawlessness, no sense of social identity, being 'socially lost'" (Atteslander 1995:13).
Wöhlcke (1996) develops an all-encompassing theory of social entropy.
Schiefer (2002:33 pp) describes a concept of social collapse. „Anomie is understood, in a notion derived from Durkheim, as a process that can be self-reinforcing. This 'positive feedback' can lead to a situation where anomic processes further other anomic processes and the societies in question can be drawn into a downward spiral of social disintegration."

6 Fundamental questions like magic are completely excluded. Another taboo concerns political power.

rehabilitation take there place, until development agencies and development theory come back to reclaim their terrain.

5) The collapse of societies does not seem to get as much attention as the collapse of states. International agencies seem to feel stronger about their "development partner institutions" ceasing to function completely then about societies falling apart. They never deal with them without an interface anyway.

6) The refusal to transfer resources to the poor is one of the very few principles of development aid that all members of all agencies who are structurally dependent on the flow of aid agree upon. It simply states, that everybody taking part in the development co-operation may receive a bigger or smaller share of the funds, but that nothing may be handed over to the poor.

This is justified by not wishing to create a "beggar's mentality" and dependency of the so-called target groups. Worries about the dependency of the agencies seem to be much less in evidence. Direct transfer to the poor might reduce the organisations' share in the business of the dissipative economy.

7) This rule to forbid transfers to the poor makes it nearly impossible to reduce poverty in traumatised societies without proper resources.

8) Dissipative economy not only serves to keep the development agencies afloat, it also is the basis for the appropriation model of (mostly urban) power elites that destabilizes many African political systems. The fight for the control over external (development) resources is at the origin of many power struggles in Africa.

9) The dissipative economy also creates a secondary economy that increases transaction costs[7], and that suffocates the local economy.

[7] Wiesner (1998:108pp) in Picciotto; Wiesner (1998).

10) It also contributes to the erosion of the agrarian societies (in many African countries the only societies with an orientation to production and a proper if weakening productive base), and to the destruction of many 'African systems of kinship and marriage'.
It contributes to the general collapse not just of state institutions but also of social institutions. It contributes to the reduction of productive capacity and the loss of potential for self-organisation and of socialisation, that is, the transmission of productive and social potential between generations.

11) For a considerable time the development agencies have tried to dissimulate the poor shape of national "development partner institutions"[8], first by swinging between different partners (from state to the private sector and to the civil society) then by simulating the interface required to guarantee the flux of development aid themselves - that is by acting the part of the receiving end of the development aid too.
12) The shift of the watering can to civil society, which in most theoretical and practical approaches strangely excludes traditional societies, organised along the lines of kinship, clan, ethnicity and similar principles, has created rapid growth of civil society organisations that follow only three organisational principles: self-organisation, communication capacity and capacity to mobilise external resources[9].

Let us now look at some specific points of current development co-operation debate and how basic principles are translated in to operations:

8 It is remarkable how absent thorough organisational analysis of development partner organisations are. Only gradually this taboo seems to be broken and the analytical and methodological instruments are coming forward. See Picciotto (1998) and Feinstein (2001).
9 Schiefer (2002:237pp).

13) Good governance and the other criteria imposed on the countries at the receiving end of development co-operation are beautiful principles, but they exclude precisely the societies from the aid that need it most, namely the societies without public administration, before, during or after wars or societies suffering from bad regimes. Mostly they are not applied anyway, as decision making processes are very slow, inefficient and hampered by interest groups.

14) The separation between emergency relief, rehabilitation and development co-operation by different mechanisms and agencies for funding, for implementation and methodology divides processes that at least in traumatised societies should belong together.

15) Support for self-help as a criterion for funding assumes a potential in the societies that specifically the most affected simply often do not have anymore.

16) Sustainability, which on the implementation level is aimed at through project ownership, leads to the creation of local partner organisations. In societies with a low organisational potential this is another nearly impossible task for the agencies. So in many cases, phoney local organisations are set up and kept at life artificially on the drip. The short term ideology of the exit strategy inspired by the Powell doctrine, which forces organisations to hand over projects after one cycle, hinders the building of a self-supporting and healthy organisational landscape.

17) The imposed strategy to create local partner organisations induces organisations to all kinds of deception and duplicity which handicap not only newly established organisations.

18) Gender equality is also a beautiful principle. In fact in many societies women are seriously disadvantaged. In practice, however, the implementation of development projects along gender lines can introduce

new fault lines into social structures and weaken the communities, which also provide women with shelter, protection and opportunities.

19) Target groups are quite often defined according to abstract criteria, thus isolating groups from the social structures they belong to or are supposed to be re-integrated into.

20) The consultancy principle in bilateral and multilateral development co-operation means in practice that real decision-making power is split between representatives of the state and international agencies. The international project co-ordinator usually controls only formal funding procedures. This usually leads to a situation where the blocking power of national decision makers is used to appropriate funds and other project inputs in one way or the other[10]. This approach presumes the existence of a state and of a public administration. This is rather unrealistic because the state, or more specifically its institutions – mostly falling apart and propped up by external agencies to guarantee a semblance of functioning - quite often are the main obstacle to development. In many cases the state is dysfunctional and in many areas of the countryside, simply non-existent.

21) The collective approach which results in a necessity to create an interface organisation (village co-operative, farmers' association, women's' groups, etc) is universally applicable. It frees the development organisations from the obligation to know about local societies and to treat local institutions as serious partners. This approach also puts the local quasi-modern development agencies into a vantage position, because they supposedly master the modern or quasi-modern forms of communication this kind of organisation requires better than the "target groups".

22) The participative approach has nowadays become nearly mandatory. It does however work only under very specific conditions, which presuppose organisational knowledge, capacity for interaction, capacity for

10 See Schiefer (2002:200pp)

articulation, and experience in handling "development" of the target groups[11]. In societies, where repression is strong, this model does not work. In traumatised societies it works only under very specific circumstances. This approach, fuelled by the enthusiasm of workshops facilitators the world over, ignores that important aspects of reality (such as magic, power relations, etc) in traumatised societies are treated as secrets and will not be brought up in workshops.

23) Market economy is a difficult approach in societies that lack all its economic, institutional, infrastructural, social and normative prerequisites.

24) The sector wide approach (SWAP) (introduced by the EU and other donors) tries to overcome the difficulties of the project approach. It is however oriented less at reality but a functional differentiation of an often either non-existent or not working public administration.

25) The wild organisational landscape often includes organisations with different and disparate target groups, methodological approaches and haphazard distribution in space. If we imagine the allocation of funding of donor organisations as a filter system that works on different levels, we have to look at the confluence of political principles, selection criteria and implementation decision of:

a) The big international donor organisations

b) The national donor organisations

c) The international NGO

d) The local representatives of international NGO

e) The national NGO of the north

f) The local representatives of the national NGO of the north

h) The national governments divided into functional but not functioning ministries

---

11 See Milando (2002).

i) The provincial governments divided into functional but not functioning delegations of the ministries

j) The different local authorities.

This filter-system does not produce rational decisions but rather haphazard and arbitrary allocation of development resources.

28) The usual multiple sources funding is a technique used by donor organisations to spread responsibility and risks. The implementing agencies use it to avoid dependencies on one source of funding and to reduce their risk of survival as organisations. This technique adds an additional touch of complexity, which slows down the decision-making processes and keeps people busy with administration.

29) The project approach. The overwhelming part of development co-operation is planned, implemented and evaluated in the form of projects. The project form is universally used in all spheres of activity. It combines a number of instruments that are very well known and tested and mastered by many people.

In the context we discuss here this form brings, however, a series of problems. For the implementing agency it is imperative to produce a success in project implementation at all costs, even at the cost of dishonesty, which usually fits only too well into the general environment. In many cases further funding and often the survival of the implementing agency depends on the project's success or at least the semblance of it. As success in this area is a fleeting gazelle, this induces organisations to fraud, which is structural for the whole setting.

Projects usually have a cycle that spans two or three years, after a preparation phase of about one year. This limitation of duration often limits the building of trust between target groups and project personnel, as in

African societies, mostly low trust societies[12], especially so if traumatised, trust is mostly trust in people and not in quasi-modern institutions.
The limitation of the duration also increases the chances of political actors to set development agencies against each other for personal gain.
Many agencies, especially the smaller ones, need projects for their own survival. Therefore they often act in an opportunistic fashion when faced with opportunities to get funding for projects. They often give more attention to funding than to realistic implementation. The short-term ideology hampers implementation in dynamic contexts (breakdown processes are dynamic too).
Projects are mostly limited to specific sectors, limited in time and in territorial range, and usually fraught with methodology for implementation. The project form is external to African agrarian societies and poses real difficulties of communication.
30) Personnel. The short term approach and the need to produce successes which is embedded in the project structure, carries over to the project personnel, whose contracts often match the duration of the project, and thus hampers long-term perspectives and long term thinking. The frequent change of personnel also thwarts the production of specific expertise in a given area and the growing of a memory in organisations and in the organisational landscape as a whole.
The frequent rotation of personnel - designed originally in the administrative, military and diplomatic services - in the development setting increases the long-term tolerance of frustration levels. Development personnel always can be sure to change their posts and can always hope that the new posting might be better than the actual one. After a few cycles on the lower levels (NGO etc) many manage to get into better positions with national or international organisations. There their frustrated idealism

12 See Fukuyama (1995), Luhmann (1989).

gives way to a cynicism that rises proportionally with their income. Cheerfulness and vivacity are real social resources in African agrarian societies - in project staff they are mostly absent.

31) Planning methods. Most project planning methods are based on causality. Where causalities are difficult to identify - as in breaking down societies - because too many factors come into the play, the standardised planning techniques don't work very well. The currently applied planning techniques are not well suited to the context discussed here. They don't allow for fast adaptation to rapidly changing circumstances nor do they permit the adaptation of goals, inputs and methods. They usually put all people involved into a behavioural straightjacket that often causes strong frictions with the environment with correspondingly high levels of frustration of the project staff, not to speak of the frustrations of the other people involved.

32) Target, target groups, logical framework, PERT, strategy, intervention, exit strategy, there seems to be a proper lend and lease scheme in place, where development theory borrows from military theory. In part directly, in part through the world of business, development theory has imported concepts and techniques from the military that dominate the development intervention. Often the mostly pacifist protagonists don't seem to be aware of the fact. From the design of the strategy to the organisation of the development intervention the military doctrine of the west is very much in evidence. The changes in military doctrine of the last two centuries reflect clearly on the organisational level of development intervention. Where in former times the general commanded his troops in the field, we have now central organisations with their staffs that do the advance planning and take the decisions and then send their troops into the field from their headquarters. But there are all too many headquarters sending off their

troops who then in the field meet or more often miss each other when allegedly fighting the same enemy.
The local population, divided into target groups, but without really understanding what this implies, is exposed to the unfettered onslaughts of outposts – all armed with different discourses and intervention methodologies – of quite a few different salvation armies.

What are the different forces which influence evaluation of development aid in Africa? What is the topography of the terrain the evaluators work in?

Two basic tenets make up the consensus of the "development community" which defines the framework for evaluation[13]:

- The flux of international aid must not be reduced and if possible increased.
- The aid resources must be controlled by the organisations that handle them.

Inside this framework there is a struggle for power going on – not just between north and south – but between the donor organisations, the international development agencies and the national agencies of the north and the power elites of quite often disintegrating political systems and the local development agencies of the south supposedly trying to produce development for – ever more disintegrating - societies.
Power translates into control over development resources. So evaluation can be used as additional leverage to increase the power of donor agencies as their results may be used to cut off funding or impose conditions on the implementing agencies and of the countries of the south.

[13] We are looking at external conditions for the work of evaluators – not at individual behaviour. It is certainly not intended to doubt the quality and the high professional and ethical standards of most evaluators.

The power elites of the south do not want to have their power challenged, which means, they are not keen to see their appropriation model unravel. They have generally no interest in evaluation at all and see it mostly as an imposition of donors on their freedom to dispose of the resources at their will.

What are the general strategies that answer these requirements?

1) No evaluation at all. Probably still the most frequent form of evaluation in development.

2) Formalistic, administrative evaluation, usually the filling in of some forms and the production of some formalised report.

3) Ritualistic evaluation. An art form, where all the evaluation ingredients are present, but the evaluation results are more or less defined in advance.

4) Killer evaluation, when a funding agency has decided to move out and needs a justification to do that.

5) Evaluation to produce authenticity, usually positioned somewhere on an axis between learning and accountability. Different theoretical approaches and methodologies are available including highly sophisticated models to increase the complexity of the whole process.

They are usually undertaken in an organisational programme or project perspective[14]. As evaluation is conditioned to produce results which do not challenge the basic assumptions mentioned above, evaluation results come more or less in the form of: yes there are serious problems, but there also is hope and some very positive indicators. More funding is needed to overcome the obstacles....

6) Sector wide or national evaluations. These macro-evaluations are usually paid for by the big donor organisations and - at least the published ones -

14 See Feinstein (2001).

present carefully optimistic results which require more inputs in order to reach the development goals.

7) In field evaluations in a long term perspective say in an area based approach are very rare[15]. They might show the chaos produced by the multiple uncoordinated approaches of a great number of development organisations in the same terrain and the absurdity of the system. They might also show that development operations actually weaken the agrarian societies they are supposed to develop.

The diversity of organisational approaches and the resulting complexity of the development co-operation are not problems waiting for a quasi imminent solution, but structural ingredients of the dissipative economy. So the basic approach to evaluation will most likely continue to be in an organisational and project perspective – justified by the wish "to see what results have been produced with the resources" in order to maximise future resource allocation.

For the theoretical and methodological approaches of evaluation the diversity of the organisational landscape of development will be reproduced in the field, adding another layer of complexity to the whole business.

Different schools of evaluation thinking and different groups of evaluators will continue to compete for part of the resources.

If the fight for development resources is anything to go by, the lines of battle might be perceived technical competence and independence of international experts against perceived specific local knowledge of national experts.

[15] Some calls can already be heard. See Feinstein (1998).

Starting from the conditions and constraints they are working under two big groups of evaluators can be distinguished: African experts working locally and nationally and international experts.
Both groups work under ever more difficult conditions. On the operational level it becomes ever more difficult to do research. The collapse of basic infrastructure, the deteriorating of local organisations and the increase of violence increase insecurity and reduce the efficiency of evaluation research.
These difficulties usually keep the - international but also the mostly urban based national - evaluators restricted to centres with a minimum of infrastructures. Their forays into the country-side are usually very short ventures.

African evaluators suffer from a lack of resources. There are very few of them and mostly they have no (non-third-world and development) evaluation culture to draw from. As their number is fairly restricted they are usually overburdened by solicitations. Often they are put under the same time restrictions as international experts. In general, their financial and operational resources are, however, very scarce and it is very difficult for them to get training and access to intellectual resources.
For African evaluators the risks are increasing – the absence of an evaluation culture makes it very difficult to use evaluation as instruments to influence decisions and to conquer the space and the resources necessary for evaluation that goes beyond the ritualistic exercise to fulfil donor requirements. Many of them share the view that the inflow of resources into their country should not be put into jeopardy. On the other hand, it is very difficult for them to ignore the networks they are working and living in and the pressures that are being brought to bear on them by their families, organisations, friends and political masters. They are mostly

aware of the dangers and therefore reluctant (and rightly so) to state uncomfortable truths.
So extra – evaluation considerations might have a high influence on their findings. In an environment of ever growing uncertainty and insecurity, they are always running a risk of catching a bullet or a curse - which might be worse.

International evaluators often find that their sophisticated methodology simply is not realistic under the time constraints and operational conditions they are forced to work in. The operational conditions usually do not allow for the application of their research methodology as required. Quite often their research methodology is not the most appropriate to the cultural, social and operational context[16]. Even the participatory approach is no guarantee for true results, as in many African cultures discourse is an art form of social interaction, where the communication of mere facts may be the least important component.
Quite often they have a restricted perception of reality seen through the perspective of the development paradigm, with underlying theoretical, ideological, political and emotional dimensions and implications.

As the evaluators are under pressure to fulfil their terms of reference they have strong incentives to fudge, using second hand data of uncertain origin – thus turning the grey literature ever more grey in the process. They are also quite often set up by scenarios created by the local agencies[17].

Bound by their agency's organisation perspective, normally evaluating just one programme or project – they do not see or at least not take into their

16 For details of field research under difficult conditions see Schiefer (1995) and (2002:281pp).
17 Temudo (1998), Schiefer (2002).

official account the chaos produced by the multiplicity of development agencies active in the field.

They mostly have some perception of their clients' expectations and of the general consensus they might not wish to challenge, so their findings are often influenced by extraneous considerations.
In general they are adding to the complexity of the process on a perceived high level of technical competence which is however quite often restricted to data treatment, as the data collection under extreme conditions is getting more and more problematic.

As their African colleagues, the international evaluators, even if they manage to avoid all the pitfalls and entrapments, have to face up to a nearly unsolvable dilemma: report true findings and thus put and end to the flow of money which will punish the local agencies and the populations alike (and might make more difficult to get another commission) or to look the other way and hope that time, increased efforts and resources may eventually bring improvements in service delivery, efficiency and impact and might even improve the living condition of the population.

Bibliography

Atteslander, Peter (1995), Introduction. In: Atteslander, P. (ed.), "Anomie. Social destabilization and the development of early warning systems," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 15 (8-10), 9-23.

Feinstein, N.Osvaldo and Picciotto, Robert (ed.) (2001) *Evaluation and Poverty Reduction.* Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J.

Foerster, Heinz von (1994) *Wissenschaft des Unwißbaren*, in: Fedrowitz, J.; Marejovski, D.; Kaiser, G. *Neuroworlds. Gehirn, Geist, Kultur.* Frankfurt a. M., Campus.

Fukuyama, Francis (1996) *Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity.* Free Press Paperbacks. New York.

INEP (ed.) (2000), *Soronda*, Special issue 7 (June). INEP, Bissau.

Long, Norman; Long, Ann (ed.)(1992) *The Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development.* London, Routledge.

Luhmann, Niklas (1989) *Vertrauen: ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität.* Stuttgart, Enke.

Merton, Robert K. (1957), "Social structure and anomie." In: *Social Theory and Social Structure,* rev. and enl. ed., Glencoe, The Free Press, 131-60.

Milando, João (2002) O desenvolvimento participativo em contextos adversos: aspectos africanos. (Ph.D. Diss.).

Picciotto, Robert; Wiesner, Eduardo (1998) *Evaluation & Development. The Institutional Dimension.* New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers.

Richards, Paul (1994), "Local knowledge formation and validation: the case of rice in central Sierra Leone." In: Scoones, Ian and Thompson, John (eds.), *Beyond farmer first.* London, ITP, 39-43.

Rudebeck, Lars (2001), *On democracy's Sustainability*, Stockholm, Sida-Studies.

Schiefer, Ulrich (1986), *Guinea-Bissau zwischen Weltwirtschaft und Subsistenz. Transatlantische Strukturen an der oberen Guinea Küste.* Bonn, ISSA.

Schiefer, Ulrich (1995), Macht, Praxis, Sinn. Anmerkungen zur empirischen Sozialforschung in Afrika. *Peripherie* 57/58, 112-136.

Schiefer, Ulrich (2002), Guinea-Bissau: Entwicklungspolitik und der Zusammenbruch afrikanischer Gesellschaften, IAK, Hamburg. [*Von allen guten Geistern verlassen? Dissipative Ökonomie: Entwicklungs-zusammenarbeit und der Zusammenbruch afrikanischer Gesellschaften. Eine Fall-Studie zu Guinea-Bissau* Habilitationdissertation Universitaet Münster, 1999].

Schiefer, Ulrich and Philip J. Havik (1993), "Introdução. In: Oliveira, O. *et al.* (ed.), *Armazenamento tradicional na Guiné-Bissau*. Lisbon, Münster, Copin.

Sigrist, Christian (1994), *Regulierte Anarchie. Untersuchungen zum Fehlen und zur Entstehung politischer Herrschaft in segmentären Gesellschaften Afrikas.* 3rd ed., Hamburg, EVA.

Sigrist, Christian (1994), *Ethnizität als Selbstorganisation.* In: Kößler, Reinhart and Tilman Schiel *Nationalstaat und Ethnizität*, Frankfurt, IKO, 45-55.

Temudo, Marina P. (1998a+b+c+d), *Inovação e mudança em sociedades rurais africanas. Gestão dos recursos naturais, saber local e instituições de desenvolvimento induzido.* Vol. I, II,III,IV, Lisbon, ISA (Ph.D.Diss.).

Temudo, M. P. and Schiefer, U. (2001) Über die Belastbarkeit afrikanischer Agrargesellschaften in Kriegszeiten. Eine Fallstudie über die Aufnahme von Stadtflüchtlingen im Süden von Guinea-Bissau. In: *Peripherie*, 84, Frankfurt, 70-96.

Wöhlcke, Manfred (1996), *Soziale Entropie.* München, Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag.

Contact of the author:

Prof. Dr. Ulrich Schiefer
ISCTE
Av. Forças Armadas 100
P 1649-026 Lisboa
Portugal
Email: schiefer@iscte.pt
URL: www.iscte.pt
Fax: + 351 21 9055361
Tel: + 351 21 75756599